International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

  1. 1 Wednesday, May 6th, 1998

    2 (In open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.


    5 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, we have problems

    6 with the translation. The channel that I have is 4,

    7 and I am not getting English.


    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: We will have a break for

    10 five minutes to settle the matter.

    11 --- Recess at 9.12 a.m.

    12 --- Resumed at 9.20 a.m.

    13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: We can proceed now. I

    14 believe that everything has been straightened out. It

    15 has. Thank you.

    16 Mr. Niemann, can you hear the English

    17 translation?

    18 MR. NIEMANN: Yes.

    19 JUDGE RODRIGUES: So we can continue. We

    20 shall continue with the testimony of Professor

    21 Bianchini, Mr. Niemann.

    22 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, can Professor Bianchini be

    23 brought in? Thank you.

    24 Stefano Bianchini (continued)

    25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Professor Bianchini, how

  2. 1 are you feeling? Are you feeling okay in this new

    2 courtroom? You can be seated. You have already taken

    3 the oath, and you will continue to answer the questions

    4 posed to you by Prosecutor Niemann.

    5 Examined by Mr. Niemann.

    6 Q. Professor, yesterday, just before the break,

    7 we had reached the stage where you had embarked upon a

    8 discussion of the conflict that was to emerge between

    9 the Bosnian Croats and the government of

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you had proceeded to show us

    11 some maps which reflected the respective claims of the

    12 Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats.

    13 Moving on in that vein, can you tell us who

    14 it was or what organisations represented the political

    15 and military interests of the Bosnian Croats?

    16 A. In an interview by Stjepan Klujic --

    17 Stjepan Klujic was the President of HDZ in

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1990 up to February 1992

    19 -- he proudly described himself as a man of Tudjman.

    20 Generally the relations between the HDZ in Bosnia and

    21 the HDZ in Croatia were known to be very closed. Very often

    22 the members of the presidency of the HDZ in Bosnia went

    23 to Zagreb to discuss common matters of interest.

    24 So this declaration, which is interesting,

    25 was given to a journalist of Bosnia, Goran Tordovic


  3. 1 (phonetic) and published in a book, in a collection of

    2 articles. It is just to give you an idea of what

    3 the connection was between the leadership of

    4 Herceg-Bosna and Zagreb and how they proudly confirmed

    5 this, taking into account that even -- sometimes there not

    6 complete agreement between this leadership

    7 and Zagreb, particularly in the case of Stjepan Klujic

    8 who consistently defended the idea of saving the

    9 independence and integrity of Bosnia. For this

    10 reason, he was removed in February 1992.

    11 But there are other elements that can confirm

    12 this particular relation between Zagreb, and between the

    13 HDZ in Zagreb and the HDZ in Herceg-Bosna.

    14 The role of the Minister of Defence, Gojko Susak

    15 is crucial in this sense. Gojko Susak was a

    16 Herzegovinian. He was born in Herzegovina, and he was

    17 known, even in Croatia, as the most representative of

    18 the Herzegovina lobby in the government of Croatia.

    19 We have documents that show the kind of relations

    20 between Gojko Susak and HDZ. Very often

    21 the HDZ in Herceg-Bosna sent letters or asked Gojko

    22 Susak for help, for instance, even to receive a

    23 supply of weapons.

    24 A document, an interesting document, has been

    25 published. It was confidential, in fact. It was a

  4. 1 document prepared last year by the OSCE. This

    2 document, albeit confidential, was published in

    3 Sarajevo by a monthly Dani. In this document, the

    4 OSCE officials give information, very wide information,

    5 about the role of Herceg-Bosna and Zagreb in their --

    6 and their mutual relations.

    7 According to this document, for instance,

    8 Gojko Susak and Miroslav Tudjman, the son of the

    9 President of the Republic, crucially contributed in

    10 supplying, supporting, and sending weapons to HVO

    11 during the war through a private enterprise named Alan,

    12 A-L-A-N, which later became, according to this

    13 document, a state enterprise, R.H. Alan, and so in this

    14 document, this was particularly focused.

    15 It's also true that the opposition in the

    16 parliament -- in the Sabor, in the parliament in

    17 Zagreb, tried several times to know the percentage of

    18 the Croat budget sent to Herceg-Bosna for military

    19 and civilian help. But even in this case, HDZ in

    20 Zagreb regularly opposed giving this kind of

    21 information to the opposition.

    22 I have also a document which is interesting,

    23 and if the Court allows, I can give you some details

    24 and I can refresh my memory looking at the documents I

    25 have with me.

  5. 1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you.

    2 A. This is a document of June 1992. It has

    3 been -- the letterhead is "Republic of Croatia,

    4 Ministry of Defence, Zagreb," it is signed by Defence

    5 Minister Gojko Susak and is an order -- it's an order

    6 to send 13 persons to the southern front. The southern

    7 front was the front directed by Janko Bobetko, and these

    8 persons were on the southern front which was formally,

    9 which had to be considered formally, southern

    10 Dalmatia from Split to Dubrovnik, but as many documents

    11 confirm, this southern front included a large part of

    12 Herzegovina, even Mostar and sometimes Nevesinje.

    13 So this document is interesting. Why?

    14 Because it is followed by another document of March

    15 1993. This means June, March, eight, nine months

    16 later. This document comes from the HVO and is

    17 signed by the deputy head of the army command of the

    18 Croat community of Herceg-Bosna, Miro Andric. In

    19 this document you can find a person, Mr. Zlatic, who is

    20 included in the letter of Gojko Susak eight months

    21 earlier, in which it is written that Mr. Zlatic

    22 fulfilled his tasks on the southern battlefield. This

    23 is a document of HVO sent from Mostar to the person --

    24 to the Croatian army, the 101 air brigade, and it's

    25 written that he fulfilled his tasks and must reserve

  6. 1 all pertaining rights, obligations. In this sense,

    2 they make free Zlatic to come back to the Croatian army

    3 from the HVO brigades.

    4 So this shows a kind of linkage from the

    5 Croatian army, sending in person to the southern front

    6 which is, in fact, something not related only on the

    7 territory of Croatia, and these persons were later made

    8 free by HVO in order to allow them to come back to

    9 Croatia.

    10 So this seems to me an interesting document

    11 that can confirm these kind of relations between the

    12 two parts and ...

    13 MR. NIEMANN:

    14 Q. Now, in your researches -- I think before we

    15 go on to that. Can you just basically give us a very

    16 brief description of what was the HDZ and what was the

    17 HVO and the HV, because these are terms which are

    18 used -- I think it should be clear what we are

    19 referring to.

    20 A. Okay. HDZ is a political party and worked

    21 as a political party. It was created before the

    22 election of 1990. We had opportunity to speak about

    23 it -- about it, in the last session. HDZ is quite

    24 clear institution.

    25 About HVO. HVO was formally established

  7. 1 on April 8, 1992, that is two days after the official

    2 eruption of the war. In fact, HVO already existed

    3 earlier. A group of -- as an instrument of defending

    4 Croat people. It was connected particularly -- it

    5 was organised particularly after the events in Ravno

    6 which took place in October 1991 when Ravno was burned

    7 by Serb irregulars backed by JNA.

    8 HVO was -- when the HVO was created in --

    9 formally in October -- in, sorry, in April 1992, it was

    10 created as the armed organisation, the defence

    11 organisation, of the Croat people in Herceg-Bosna. This

    12 HVO, this organisation, was restructured in July,

    13 between July and August, in the following months, and

    14 in July it was transformed into a temporarily military

    15 government in a way, structured in different sections

    16 with local administrative organisation distributed in

    17 Herceg-Bosna. And until August 3rd, the President of

    18 HVO was Mate Boban who was also the President of

    19 Herceg-Bosna. And then after August 14, he made a

    20 decision to resign and other persons were appointed by

    21 him directly as the President and later Vice-Presidents

    22 of HVO.

    23 So this is an organisation with these kind of

    24 characteristics later, and what is important to stress

    25 is that anyway, the Presidents and the Vice-Presidents

  8. 1 and the other members of the HVO were liable for their

    2 actions to the President of Herceg-Bosna. So in this

    3 case, Mate Boban maintained control, strict

    4 control, over HVO.

    5 HVO and HDZ. I don't remember if -- you

    6 asked me another organisation.

    7 Q. And the HV.

    8 A. HV is the Croat army, Hrvatska was the

    9 Croat army. HV is the Croat army.

    10 Q. Now, what was the role played by Herceg-Bosna

    11 as an autonomous region?

    12 A. Herceg-Bosna played a very interesting role

    13 in the sense that the authorities of Herceg-Bosna tried

    14 to establish full control over the area of

    15 Herceg-Bosna.

    16 I had the opportunity to read 300 pages of

    17 the official gazette of Herceg-Bosna published between

    18 the autumn of 1992 and February-March 1994. It is very

    19 interesting, the reading of these documents, because

    20 you can see a lot of decisions, rules, regulations,

    21 approved/published in order to establish the complete

    22 control over the area by HVO and Herceg-Bosna. I mean,

    23 in these 300 pages, you can find a new regulation,

    24 fiscal regulation, the appointment of commissions and

    25 governments; you can find the decision to dismantle the

  9. 1 university, the Muslim university, Dzemal Bijedic --

    2 the university, sorry, devoted to a Muslim personality,

    3 Dzemal Bijedic. It was the University of Mostar, and

    4 another university was created, the Croat University

    5 of Mostar, which is -- sorry, this is of interest

    6 peculiar because I am professor -- the Rector was

    7 appointed by the HVO and was responsible to the HVO for his

    8 actions, so no autonomy at all.

    9 Then you can find several other decisions.

    10 For instance, about the complete educational

    11 system, even the certificates, the insignia, the ranks

    12 of the army. So it's a very interesting list of

    13 decisions that -- you can find also, this is very

    14 interesting, in addition the decision that made the

    15 Croat currency the currency of Herceg-Bosna, and the

    16 decision of 1993 where it was established that the air

    17 space of Herzegovina was under the control of the

    18 Croat Republic.

    19 Q. And is there any other evidence of the role

    20 that Croatia played in the military and political life

    21 of Herceg-Bosna which you can refer us to?

    22 A. Yes, there are other elements. An important

    23 role was played since the beginning of the war in

    24 Bosnia, I mean, since the beginning of April 1992, by

    25 General Janko Bobetko. General Janko Bobetko is a very

  10. 1 famous person, very well known in Croatia, because he

    2 was Tito's General, as Tudjman was. During the

    3 second half of the '60s, the beginning of the '70s, he

    4 supported the nationalistic claims in Croatian Zagreb,

    5 and for this reason he was charged with nationalism by

    6 Tito and for this reason he was expelled from political

    7 life after 1971.

    8 He, after 1990, when Communism collapsed, he

    9 came back on the political/military scene and he

    10 became, in 1991, a military advisor of the Presidency

    11 and the Government of Croatia. Then on April 10, he

    12 was sent as Chief-of-Staff to the southern front to

    13 manage the southern front of Croatia because he had

    14 excellent results, military results, in outcomes during

    15 1992.

    16 At the end of the year, in fall 1992, he came

    17 back to Zagreb and became Chief-of-Staff of

    18 the Croat army. He prepared, under his command

    19 there were prepared the most successful operations of

    20 the Croat army when they -- to recover control of

    21 Peruca, of Maslenica Bridge, and even the Oluja

    22 offensive was prepared under his command, albeit he

    23 retired in 1995 becoming member of the Sabor, of

    24 the Croat parliament.

    25 He wrote very interesting memoirs published


  11. 1 in Zagreb in 1996 in which he reconstructs the battles

    2 during the wars. The book is entitled

    3 "Svemojebitke," "All My Battles," and he published a

    4 lot of documents in this book.

    5 You know why southern front was so important

    6 for Croatia and why Croatia was so interested, at least,

    7 in controlling one part of Bosnia? There are many

    8 reasons. I mentioned yesterday historical reasons, but

    9 more practical reasons were of greater interest to the

    10 Croatian government between January and April 1992.

    11 That is, in -- may I just show you the map of Bosnia in

    12 order to help? You can come back again to one of the

    13 maps. Maybe one of the -- this can be interesting.

    14 Map 114 is of the 1918, but it allows one

    15 to see better the borders between -- so the map 114.

    16 Q. I think you need to press the button. You

    17 may have it on your screen now.

    18 A. Yeah, yeah. It's good because you can see

    19 the borders, and the borders of Bosnia and Croatia

    20 haven’t change since 1918. I don't have in --

    21 Q. If you press "Video" --

    22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    23 MR. NIEMANN:

    24 Q. The video is the second button down.

    25 A. Okay. Now is. And as you can see,

  12. 1 particularly Dubrovnik because it was bombed in the

    2 fall 1991. It was under the risk of bombardment by the

    3 Serbs from the area of Tribja, this area behind

    4 Dubrovnik. So it was very important for Croatia to

    5 have -- at least a guarantee that this area will not be

    6 under the bombardment of the Serbs. So for this

    7 reason, they were interested in having control of the

    8 southern part of Herceg-Bosna in order to

    9 defend, to defend the southern part of Dalmatia and the

    10 Dubrovnik area.

    11 This was one reason. The other reason was,

    12 of course, that there were many -- there was the

    13 agreement. I spoke yesterday of this agreement with

    14 Milosevic in Karajordjevo in 1991 and then the

    15 following actions taken by the government -- by Tudjman

    16 or by the Herceg-Bosna government in order to

    17 ease the relationships between these two parts of

    18 Croatia.

    19 One can take into consideration, I mentioned

    20 the decision of Herceg-Bosna to accept and to introduce

    21 the currency, the Croat currency in Herceg-Bosna,

    22 the control of the air space given to Croatia. Or even

    23 we can mention the maps; very often by the newspaper,

    24 the journalists considered prepared by Tudjman

    25 himself. One of the incidents particularly happened in

  13. 1 London in 1995 when, if you remember it was in all the

    2 newspapers, when a map of Bosnia was drawn and the

    3 journalists claimed it was made personally Tudjman who

    4 prepared this map in this restaurant and where the

    5 partition of Bosnia was very clear, and Banja Luka was

    6 assigned to Croatia. Banja Luka is a predominantly Serb

    7 city. While Tuzla, which is predominantly a Muslim city,

    8 was assigned to Serbia. So the division was in this

    9 sense.

    10 Otherwise, otherwise, you know in addition

    11 that since 1995, the Croat government has granted 10

    12 percent of the seats in the Sabor, in the Croatian

    13 parliament, to the -- formally the Croat Diaspora.

    14 This 10 percent of seats were occupied by

    15 representatives from Herceg-Bosna, so they took part in

    16 the elections in Croatia in 1995 and can do so in the years to

    17 come.

    18 So this is a very peculiar situation even in

    19 the international context.

    20 Q. Just touching on that point there --

    21 A. Pardon?

    22 Q. Just touching on that point you just

    23 mentioned about the seats in the Croatian Sabor. Are

    24 you saying that when there are elections in Croatia

    25 that those elections spill over into Bosnia-Herzegovina


  14. 1 and that 10 percent of the parliament is devoted to

    2 Herceg-Bosna?

    3 A. Yeah, yes, 10 percent of the seats. And then

    4 I can mention even the recent -- just to give you a

    5 trend. The recent, in 1997, proposal again coming from

    6 Tudjman to create a confederation between Croatia and

    7 the Federation of Bosnia. This means the Federation

    8 established by the United States in 1994 with the

    9 Washington agreement between the Muslims and the

    10 Croats.

    11 So in this -- this -- you know, when -- every

    12 time when -- the proposal arrives from Croatia to

    13 create a confederation with the Bosnian Federation,

    14 it creates a lot of concern and sensitivity in

    15 Bosnia, particularly within the Muslim population but

    16 also within those who claim, democrats who claim the

    17 sovereignty and integrity of the whole of Bosnia. So

    18 you have -- even you had in Sarajevo press in second

    19 half of 1997 strong reactions against this proposal of

    20 Tudjman.

    21 So this is the context of the disputed

    22 relations between the government in Zagreb and the

    23 government in Sarajevo.

    24 But coming back again to Bobetko. Bobetko

    25 described in his memoirs his meeting with Gojko Susak

  15. 1 on April 10th. He went to Susak and he explained to

    2 him how important it was to create a southern command

    3 in order to protect Dubrovnik and Dalmatia. Gojko

    4 Susak agreed with him, and both of them went to Tudjman.

    5 Tudjman immediately appointed Janko Bobetko as

    6 head or chief of the southern command, and thanks to

    7 this, he started his action in southern Dalmatia.

    8 So this was also a way just to confirm that

    9 decisions were made on the top of the government

    10 between particularly -- direct contacts with the

    11 President of the Republic and the Minister of Defence

    12 when it involved this part of the former Yugoslavia.

    13 And this can explain probably why the HVO in

    14 the end was considered dependent upon the

    15 headquarters in Split where Janko Bobetko was the chief

    16 commander.

    17 The OSCE published a table, a map you have in

    18 exhibit number 117. This document is in two pages, and

    19 I will explain why.

    20 Q. Perhaps you might tell us first where it

    21 comes from, if you would? It doesn't seem to be

    22 working properly. Put it on video --

    23 A. Yes. The document is in two pages only

    24 because I wanted to make clear the other one just to

    25 offer you to see in the page where the table was. It

  16. 1 was on the first half of the page. And then in the

    2 other you have just a larger picture in order to see

    3 better the table.

    4 Q. Can you tell us where you got the document

    5 from?

    6 A. Yes. The document is -- the map was included

    7 in the confidential document of OSCE prepared last

    8 year, and as I mentioned before when I spoke about the

    9 relations between Gojko Susak, Miroslav Tudjman, and

    10 the private enterprise Alan, it was included in this

    11 document, and this document has been published by the

    12 magazine Dani in Sarajevo. So this map has been

    13 included in this document, and you can see in this

    14 annex first the organisation of the Croat army, and

    15 this is the first -- the first picture.

    16 The second one, you have the picture of the

    17 HVO, the HVO army, Croat Defence Council command,

    18 how they were organised, and then you have the

    19 relation, the general staff in the third of the

    20 Croat army with the different district, Osijek,

    21 Bjelovar, Zagreb, and Karlovac, and then you have the

    22 Corps District 6 in Split, and from this you have the

    23 HVO general staff under this command.

    24 So in the Corps District 6 was acting

    25 Bobetko, and then you have this connection, direct

  17. 1 connection, between HVO general staff and the Corps

    2 District 6 of Split linked to the general staff of

    3 Croatia who was under the control of Bobetko from fall

    4 in 1992.

    5 Q. And it says down at the very bottom "HV-HVO

    6 Integrated Command Structure For Wartime Combat

    7 Operations." What particular period of time does this

    8 relate to?

    9 A. As for Bobetko is the period between April

    10 1992 and fall 1992, but then, then this relations --

    11 and we have documents on this continued in the months

    12 to come, in 1993, so -- and in 1994, so as we can see

    13 from the evidence of international documents, not only

    14 from documents coming from the battlefields.

    15 Q. So what you're saying is that the time frame

    16 really for this is from '92 through to '94?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Now, what about the other document on the

    19 second page? What's the significance of that?

    20 A. Pardon?

    21 Q. The second page of that document, what is the

    22 significance of it?

    23 A. The second page of this document is just to

    24 make clear for the Court because it is the same

    25 document but -- in the first you see where in the page

  18. 1 of the magazine was the table and then just to clarify,

    2 to better clarify, to allow you to read better, yes,

    3 because otherwise, it was very complicated.

    4 Q. What were the political measures taken by

    5 Croatia in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    6 A. What do you mean in this sense?

    7 Q. Well, during the period of the conflict,

    8 starting right at the beginning and going through to

    9 1995, what political steps were taken by Croatia in

    10 relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    11 A. But, you know, I mentioned the economic

    12 support to the -- the support came particularly from

    13 the Ministry of Defence. I have documents on this

    14 economic support, and if the Court allows, I can

    15 refresh my memory and I can give details on documents

    16 on this.

    17 Q. Yes. Just tell us in general terms what it

    18 is that --

    19 A. Oh, in general terms it was, for instance,

    20 documents referring that 540,000 Deutschmark were

    21 offered to Bugojno in order to defend themselves or

    22 they send, even from the Minister of Defence, support

    23 10,000 Deutschmark to the HDZ of one area in Bosnia.

    24 So it was economic support that arrived or before --

    25 even on the eve of the war, March '92, or even when the

  19. 1 war erupted after, so there were documents in this

    2 sense that confirmed this kind of economic support

    3 coming directly from the Ministry of Defence,

    4 particularly. Sometimes Ministry of Finance.

    5 Q. Moving on to exhibit 118, which is the next

    6 document that you have there before you, what's the

    7 significance of that?

    8 A. 1918, you mention?

    9 Q. No, document 118.

    10 A. I have another one, sorry.

    11 Q. It's the next document --

    12 A. No, no. I have organised differently and

    13 so ...

    14 Q. It's not 19.

    15 A. Sorry. Ah, yes. Yes.

    16 Q. No, no, no. The document I'm referring to,

    17 Professor, is --

    18 A. This is 1990.

    19 Q. -- the "Conclusions of The Joint Meeting of

    20 the Herzegovina Regional Meeting and the Travnik

    21 Regional Community."

    22 A. What is the number?

    23 Q. 118.

    24 A. Eighteen?

    25 Q. Eighteen.

  20. 1 A. Eighteen. 118.

    2 Q. Yes.

    3 A. Yes. Well ... Yes, yes. This is the Serbo

    4 Croat version, and this -- the regional, and this is

    5 the translation of the document.

    6 Let me say that this is a very interesting

    7 document, but this document is connected with a

    8 peculiar phase, a phase before the beginning of the

    9 war. We are in November 1991. And in order to

    10 understand this document, it should be interesting to

    11 refer to another document, another document that has

    12 been -- this is the minutes of a meeting that took

    13 place in Travnik and where Dario Kordic participated,

    14 where the representative in Herceg-Bosna in this area

    15 made pressure and outlined the possibility to

    16 reschedule differently the policy of HDZ. We have to

    17 take into account that at that time Stjepan Klujic was

    18 still the President of HDZ.

    19 And in this document, people, the Croat

    20 representative in Herceg-Bosna, spoke about the risk of

    21 a silent occupation that was going on. In fact, a

    22 silent occupation that was going on in Bosnia, this was

    23 in July of 1991, and for this reason they supported a

    24 more aggressive political attitude of HDZ. They

    25 charged the representative of HDZ in the Bosnian

  21. 1 parliament to be puppets of the SDA, the party of

    2 Izetbegovic, and for this reason they claimed the

    3 creation of a kind of regional Croat organisation of

    4 Herceg-Bosna. This was in July 1991, and only in

    5 November was Herceg-Bosna established.

    6 So this showed the current stream within the

    7 HDZ was preparing a different political orientation

    8 than that of Stjepan Klujic at the moment, and this

    9 explained why, in February 1992, Klujic was overthrown.

    10 After this meeting in July 1991, we had a

    11 second meeting, this document, in November, the 12th of

    12 November, 1991. This document --

    13 Q. "This document" is exhibit --

    14 A. The exhibit now, under the number 118 and

    15 118a, little (a), the letterhead is of the Croat

    16 Democratic Union, is a document with the Conclusions of

    17 a Joint Meeting of the Herzegovina Regional Community

    18 and the Travnik Regional Community, and it is

    19 followed -- it was signed by Boban and Kordic and is

    20 followed by a list of about 22 names, people who

    21 write -- who wrote their signatures.

    22 What is interesting about this document, if you

    23 consider particularly the conclusion, the conclusion

    24 informed us that meetings took place in Zagreb with

    25 President Franjo Tudjman on 13 and 20 June, 1991, that

  22. 1 is before the war erupted in Yugoslavia, before the

    2 proclamation of independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

    3 And if you read after "Proceeding from these

    4 conclusions adopted at the aforementioned meetings" in

    5 Grude in October 1991, in Busovaca in October 1991,

    6 that is in two towns of Bosnia, "these two regional

    7 communities jointly and unanimously," that is, the

    8 Herzegovina Regional Community and the Travnik Regional

    9 Community, "these two regional communities jointly and

    10 unanimously decided that the Croat people in Bosnia

    11 and Herzegovina must finally start conducting a

    12 decisive and active policy which should bring about the

    13 realisation of our eternal dream - a joint Croat

    14 State."

    15 I think that we don't need to comment on this

    16 sentence if you think also about the maps we spoke of

    17 yesterday, the historical dream, the eternal dream, you

    18 can understand very well this claim, which is supported

    19 in this sentence immediately after when it is speaking,

    20 about three lines after: "... (the proclamation of

    21 Croat banovina ..." "Banovina" means

    22 "immediately," and if you have memory of yesterday,

    23 you can remember very well why the use of this term.

    24 "... the Croatian banovina in Bosnia-Herzegovina." So

    25 a kind of autonomous area in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And

  23. 1 then to "conduct a referendum for joining the Republic

    2 of Croatia."

    3 So the first step was the creation

    4 of an autonomous area under the control, it's clear, of

    5 the Croat leadership, and then to conduct a

    6 referendum. If you think what happened later, when I

    7 mentioned all the laws, regulations, orders, published

    8 in the official gazette between 1992 and 1994, as I

    9 referred earlier, you can see how this decision was

    10 implemented in the years to come.

    11 Then, if you go to the point 2 of the same

    12 document, you can find: "Among some of the leaders of

    13 the HDZ for Bosnia and Herzegovina there are still

    14 forces which oppose these historical interests of the

    15 Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

    16 I think that we can read immediately the name

    17 Stjepan Klujic because of what I said. So "oppose

    18 these historical interests," and again you can see is

    19 mentioned the word "history." So this sentence is :

    20 "These forces are in favour of non-existent sovereign

    21 Bosnia." You see? Just to make clear the reference to

    22 Klujic because he defended southern Bosnia.

    23 And then in the end of the same sentence, you

    24 can find the sentences -- "We must show" -- the three

    25 lines at the end: "We must show Europe and the world

  24. 1 which areas are the Croat areas in Bosnia and

    2 Herzegovina and where our future lies. These people

    3 will on no account accept any other solution except

    4 within the borders of a free Croatia."

    5 So I think that this is also sentence, this

    6 is very clear, so the perspective is to create a common

    7 state with Croatia, with Zagreb.

    8 Q. Now, Professor, conversely, was there any

    9 provision in the constitution of Croatia of 1990 which

    10 would have facilitated the incorporation of Croat

    11 people living in other states?

    12 A. Yes, yes. If you read the Constitution,

    13 basic sources, point 1 at the beginning of the

    14 Constitution, you can find a very interesting sentence,

    15 when the Croat Republic was defined. And so it's

    16 written that the Croat Republic was established as

    17 the national state of the Croat people. So the

    18 national state of the Croat people.

    19 It is a clear aspect of the ethnic

    20 orientation of the State of Croatia, which is

    21 supported, in fact, by the Article 10, second

    22 paragraph, of the same constitution, where it is

    23 written that part of the Croat people living abroad,

    24 part of the Croat people living abroad -- it is very

    25 interesting because again you have a collective

  25. 1 dimension of the rights of an ethnic group. This part

    2 of the Croat people will receive support, special

    3 support from the Croat State. So this is a duty

    4 that the constitution gives to the Croat state in

    5 order to protect the part of the people outside --

    6 living abroad, which means particularly the area of

    7 Herceg-Bosna so ...

    8 Q. And in your researches, did you discover any

    9 evidence of duality of citizenship, any documents or

    10 material that supported dual citizenship between

    11 Croatia and Herceg-Bosna?

    12 A. Yes. If I can refer to the document --

    13 exhibit document 121 in "A," 121 A -- sorry, sorry.

    14 Q. 126.

    15 A. 126. Yes. 126, yes. 126. Here. I found

    16 it.

    17 First I would like to draw your attention to

    18 the document, the decision recognising the Socialist

    19 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign

    20 independent state signed by the President of the

    21 Croat Republic, Franjo Tudjman, in Zagreb the 7th of

    22 April, 1992.

    23 Q. What document number is that?

    24 A. It's document 126 B.

    25 Q. Why did you want to draw attention to that?

  26. 1 A. I think it is very interesting if you take

    2 into consideration particularly the second paragraph of

    3 point 1: "International recognition of Bosnia and

    4 Herzegovina shall imply that the Croat people, as

    5 one of the three constituent nations in Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina, shall be guaranteed their sovereign

    7 rights."

    8 So in a sense it makes clear that the

    9 recognition is directly linked to the fact that the

    10 sovereign rights of the Croat people in Bosnia will

    11 be granted in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    12 And the second is the point 2 where it is

    13 written that: "This act of recognition grants the

    14 right to dual citizenship to the members of the

    15 Croat nation who wish citizenship. Furthermore, we

    16 wish to propose that this issue be regulated by a

    17 bilateral agreement."

    18 This agreement in this case -- in the case

    19 the Croatia started to send application forms for --

    20 for --

    21 Q. Citizenship.

    22 A. -- citizenship immediately, and I have

    23 evidence of 2,000 forms -- more than 2,000 forms sent

    24 to Mostar to be distributed to the

    25 population. So it was not that one single citizen went

  27. 1 to the Embassy or the Representative of the Croatian State

    2 abroad and asked for dual citizenship providing

    3 documents, but application forms were sent immediately

    4 by -- through the Mostar representative of Herceg-Bosna

    5 to the population in order to encourage the population

    6 to ask for dual citizenship.

    7 Anyway, if you consider also document 126 A,

    8 exhibit 126 A, you can see this is the document of --

    9 this document is of September 1992, is a document of

    10 Herceg-Bosna, of the Croat community of

    11 Herceg-Bosna. It was published in the official

    12 gazette and is a decision about the creation -- a later

    13 publication of the document approved in November. As

    14 you see, at the end of the document you see the date,

    15 Mostar, 18 November, 1991, at the end of the document

    16 there the signature of President of Herceg-Bosna,

    17 Mate Boban. But it was published in the gazette, in the

    18 official gazette in September 1992 because they didn't

    19 have an official gazette before.

    20 So in this document you can see also an

    21 element of not complete adherence to the idea of the

    22 sovereignty and independence of Bosnia. If you look at

    23 point 2, paragraph 2 of the reasons: "Through

    24 their party, the Croatian Democratic Union and the

    25 legally elected government in this Republic, Croats in

  28. 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina have supported a sovereign

    2 Bosnia and Herzegovina but always emphasised that they

    3 are protecting their own historical area and the

    4 interests of the entire Croat people."

    5 Which means that they had a very close image

    6 of their own territory which they were protecting, this

    7 historical area and the interests of the entire

    8 Croat people. This is the entire Croat people,

    9 which is something ambiguous considering that "entire"

    10 can take into consideration also the Croat people

    11 outside Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    12 And then is very interesting also the

    13 sentence, you can see in the third paragraph.

    14 You know, when we speak about

    15 self-determination generally, we speak about

    16 self-determination, and you can find the document on

    17 self-determination, until, including, the right of

    18 secession. If you look here at the first -- the fifth,

    19 sixth line, it's very interesting, you can find --

    20 Q. Professor, it might be better if you can

    21 point to the projector.

    22 A. Sorry, sorry. It is here:

    23 "... inalienable and indivisible right the

    24 non-transferable and the non-expandable --"

    25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear

  29. 1 the witness.

    2 MR. NIEMANN:

    3 Q. It has to be translated. You have to speak

    4 much slower; otherwise, the translators can't pick it

    5 up.

    6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    7 THE WITNESS: You see here is the document on

    8 self-determination, the sovereignty of the people,

    9 including the right to associate, which is very

    10 interesting and strange because you have the right of

    11 secession. Here you have the right to associate. And

    12 it's clear that it means taking into consideration the

    13 documents we spoke before, "associate" means associate

    14 this area to Croatia.

    15 So if you think that the strategy was more or

    16 less a first step in having an area under the complete

    17 control of Croat authorities in Bosnia and then to

    18 link this area to Croatia, you can see in this document

    19 even elements of this policy supported and repeated.

    20 So this shows what went on before the war

    21 in Bosnia and in the phases immediately after the war

    22 erupted in April 1992.

    23 JUDGE RODRIGUES: It would be good to have a

    24 break now, Mr. Niemann. So we shall adjourn for a

    25 20-minute break?

  30. 1 THE REGISTRAR: All rise, please.

    2 --- Recess at 10.22 a.m.

    3 --- Resume at 10.47 a.m.

    4 JUDGE RODRIGUES: You may start. I should,

    5 however, like to say a few words regarding the

    6 organisation of our work; namely, we shall be taking a

    7 break of 15 minutes around noon, at noon, and that's

    8 it.

    9 You may now proceed.

    10 Excuse me, I see that Mr. Aleksovski is not

    11 in court.

    12 Okay. Now you may start, Mr. Niemann.

    13 MR. NIEMANN:

    14 Q. Professor, during the course of your evidence

    15 this morning, you made reference to General Janko

    16 Bobetko, and I think you've included amongst your

    17 documents, in particular Exhibit 121A through to 121O

    18 documents that relate to General Bobetko.

    19 I'm wondering if, looking at those documents

    20 and preferably proceeding through them in order, you

    21 can take us through them and indicate to us what you

    22 see as the significance of them in relation to the

    23 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in '92-'93?

    24 A. First, I prepared just a map. This is

    25 Exhibit No. 120, it's a map that was prepared here by

  31. 1 the officials of the Tribunal under my direction. It

    2 shows the main cities, areas which were included

    3 or quoted in the documents or in the documents

    4 published by Janko Bobetko in his memoirs. I just

    5 added some of the main cities of Croatia and Bosnia,

    6 just to help you to locate all the areas of, for

    7 instance, Split, Srebrenica, Bihac, Banja Luka, Tuzla,

    8 of course just to give you the context, while the

    9 main area, the main area quoted is that which you see

    10 from Metkovic, Ploce to Miljacena, Prozor, Bugojno or

    11 Livno.

    12 This is the area which is of interest

    13 because of the military actions directed by General Janko

    14 Bobetko.

    15 So this is just the general picture, and

    16 we can come back to the map when something is not clear,

    17 just to locate the places.

    18 And then we can start looking at the

    19 documents. The first one is document 121.

    20 Q. That's 121A I think?

    21 A. 121A is in English, yes.

    22 All these documents here relate to the

    23 actions of Bobetko -- the military actions of Bobetko on

    24 the southern front which were published in the book of

    25 Bobetko himself in Zagreb.

  32. 1 This is a document with the letterhead of

    2 the Croat Republic, the President of the

    3 Republic. It is an order on the basis of which

    4 General Bobetko was appointed commander of all the

    5 units of the Croatian army on the southern front, from

    6 Split to Dubrovnik. That is in the area that I quoted

    7 before.

    8 This is just to show you the order that

    9 the Croatian navy was under his command and he was

    10 also authorised to recruit staff for his activities

    11 because it was non-existent at the time.

    12 This is the first document.

    13 Then we have a series of documents related to

    14 the decisions made by Janko Bobetko during military

    15 operations in 1992.

    16 The first one is the No. 121B. This document

    17 is a document with the letterhead of the Commander of

    18 Split operative zone, as you can see, the Ploce forward

    19 command post. Ploce is on the coast -- on the Adriatic

    20 Sea. It is an order sent by the

    21 commander of the Split operative zone on the basis of the

    22 ordinance of General Janko Bobetko.

    23 And what is particularly interesting is

    24 point 2 in Citluk, make contact with Mr. Perak, the

    25 Defence commander of that part of Herzegovina, and

  33. 1 coordinate the defence of that area with him. Citluk

    2 is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this is just the first

    3 order to establish coordination of the defence

    4 between Herceg-Bosna and Croatia.

    5 And what is interesting is particularly point

    6 6, 6-6, you see it is -- the original was like this,

    7 "All HV...", this is Croatian army, hard to be removed

    8 from the fighters and present yourselves as volunteer

    9 defenders of your homeland."

    10 Let me say that this is significant enough, I

    11 think. I found, and I had an opportunity to see

    12 several documents, not only one, with this sentence

    13 included for whole period 1992-1993. Documents from

    14 Tomislovgrad, from Livno, or documents from Vitez, in

    15 which you can find this statement based on the HVO order and

    16 on that from the commander of

    17 Split. As you can see in this document, soldiers,

    18 officers of the Croatian army had to remove their

    19 insignia, and the order in these documents clarifies that

    20 this was because this could create trouble for Croatia on

    21 the international scene.

    22 So this was -- it was very clear. It

    23 is written in these documents, please inform the

    24 soldiers, explain the reasons, but it's better if they

    25 don't have enough identity cards or insignia of HVO to

  34. 1 be put instead of the HV, of the Croatian army, it is

    2 better not to have any insignia.

    3 So this was the suggestion, it was better not

    4 to have insignias at all.

    5 In fact, there are many documents that can

    6 confirm this relationship even on other aspects as, for

    7 instance, connections with the problem of the military

    8 service recruits who had the opportunity to do their

    9 military service in Bosnia. This was as in Croatia;

    10 that is, there was an exchange, a kind of an agreement

    11 that people doing their military service in Bosnia were

    12 exempt in Croatia and vice versa.

    13 Or there were even changes in the military.

    14 You remember the document of Gojko Susak I mentioned

    15 before. There are other people who, for instance, received

    16 the rank of colonel in Herceg-Bosna. They

    17 were given a certificate so that they could

    18 continue their activities in declaration army, moving from

    19 HVO, from the Herceg-Bosna army to the Croatian army.

    20 So anyway, this point 6 is very interesting

    21 for this reason, because it made clear that in April,

    22 1992 -- but this sentence was repeated very often in

    23 other documents, as I told you, this -- it was very

    24 clear that there were concerns in the international

    25 community about the involvement of Croatia in Bosnia. And

  35. 1 this is the reason why it was suggested to the

    2 officials and soldiers of the Croatian army to leave off

    3 the insignia of the Croatian army.

    4 Then we can see the following document,

    5 document No. 121C. This is a very interesting

    6 document.

    7 If you look at the letterhead, the letterhead

    8 is Southern Front Command. Then immediately Southern

    9 Front Command, the line immediately after is "Followed

    10 command post Grude," but Grude is not in Croatia, it is

    11 in Bosnia.

    12 And then what is interesting, if you look at

    13 the signature, the signature and the stamp is -- on the

    14 other page -- General Janko Bobetko, signed and stamped

    15 Herceg-Bosna, main staff.

    16 But Janko Bobetko was appointed by Tudjman as

    17 the chief commander for the southern front in Croatia,

    18 so you see that he used the stamp of Herceg-Bosna, main

    19 staff.

    20 So we can conclude that Janko Bobetko was the

    21 chief of both the Croatian army and the HVO at that

    22 time. The southern front included not only part of Croatia,

    23 but even Herzegovina, that is part of another

    24 state, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    25 And what is also interesting in this document

  36. 1 is point 2 -- not only point 1 is the southern front to

    2 be established as the forward command post established

    3 in Grude.

    4 The second point is the responsible officer

    5 of the forward command post in my absence shall be

    6 Colonel Milivoj Petkovic who holds all authority as

    7 Colonel relating to the command and coordination of

    8 combat activities.

    9 Petkovic is very interesting figure in the

    10 sense that he was born in Dalmatia, in a village close

    11 to Sibenik. If you look at the map, Sibenik is here,

    12 and you can see where is Grude, because we were speaking,

    13 and Citluk, because we quoted also Citluk.

    14 He was born in a village close to Djibnic, he

    15 was a Croat, he became general after this. He was

    16 now -- you see in this document, he was appointed by

    17 Bobetko to be responsible on his behalf for the forward

    18 command post Grude, but then he became a general, the

    19 head, the chief of the staff of HVO.

    20 He was later the head of the command of

    21 the HVO and then he came back to Croatia, as a

    22 general in the Croatian army. So he is an interesting

    23 person for this reason alone.

    24 We can go further and see the document, the

    25 following document, 121D.

  37. 1 We are now again in the -- with this document

    2 in the Republic of Croatia southern front command, as

    3 you can see from the letterhead. What is interesting

    4 in this letter is, first -- the first point: Major

    5 General Roso, is to immediately strengthen the command

    6 staff of Tomislovgrad - Tomislovgrad is in Bosnia. You

    7 can see Tomislovgrad is here - and use his influence

    8 and most energetic action towards all groups and

    9 individuals who wish to promote their sense to

    10 commanders of various layouts.

    11 So it is said to make order in this area.

    12 And then in point No. 4, the commander of

    13 the forward military post, Milivoj Petkovic shall be at

    14 the disposal of Tomislovgrad command until further

    15 notice and he was replaced.

    16 So Bobetko, decided who has to go and

    17 make order in one area of Bosnia, who had to move from

    18 one part to another part. And this is also

    19 interesting, the last point, where it is written

    20 there: RH, that is the Republic of Croatia, Minister

    21 of Defence, that means Gojko Susak, shall be notified

    22 immediately about the situation in Tomislovgrad, as

    23 about the situation in Bosnia, and be asked to visit

    24 that town as soon as possible, please, and be asked to

    25 visit that town as soon as possible and to use his

  38. 1 authority to eliminate all groups and individuals who

    2 claim to answer directly to the Minister.

    3 So it was clearly an attempt probably to work

    4 outside the order of Bobetko and he wanted, because he

    5 had the agreement with Susak, as you remember, in

    6 April, 1992 before going to Tudjman about his

    7 activities, and he wanted to have the influence of

    8 Minister Susak in Tomislovgrad in order to make clear

    9 that who is the chief and the commander in the whole

    10 area.

    11 And so it's interesting because Gojko Susak

    12 is asking to come to Bosnia as soon as possible and to

    13 use his influence to control this part of the

    14 Herceg-Bosna authorities -- local authorities. This

    15 confirms more about the strong links between Gojko

    16 Susak and the Herzegovina authorities with a different

    17 point of view.

    18 I think that we can go forward to the

    19 document 121E.

    20 This document again of the Republic of

    21 Croatia is a document of 19 May, 1992, from -- the

    22 letterhead is again the Republic of Croatia, Bobetko

    23 signed as Republic of Croatia, Croatian army command,

    24 and what is interesting is the first point, for

    25 instance: "Establish a forward command post in Central

  39. 1 Bosnia in Gornji Vakuf. You can see where is Gornji

    2 Vakuf on the map; you can see it is in the heart of

    3 Bosnia here, close to the heart of Bosnia.

    4 So it is not only as the first time,

    5 Capljina, Grude, Citluk, Grude, now in Gornji Vakuf.

    6 So Bobetko made the decision from a

    7 letterhead of the Croatian Republic who he has had to

    8 be the forward command post in Central Bosnia, and not

    9 only he created this -- the forward command post, but

    10 he appointed, as you see in the point 2, Brigadier

    11 Jakupovic as the commander of the forward command post.

    12 Then we can go further, document 121F. You

    13 see this is also a military order. This is a military

    14 order sent by Bobetko as a commander of the southern

    15 front with the letterhead of Croatia, from Ploce. This

    16 is a document of 15 June, 1992.

    17 And it's very interesting to turn our

    18 attention to the end of the point 1 when explaining

    19 about the enemy - in at the end you can see the

    20 sentence, reinforcement of two tanks has been sent

    21 toward Cobanovo Polje from the direction of Nevesimje

    22 for psychological effect."

    23 If you look at the map again, you can see

    24 where Nevesimje is. So you can see the area of action

    25 is this wide area of Herzegovina and Central Bosnia.

  40. 1 In the same document you can find, again at

    2 the point 2.1, quoted what HVO has to do in Capljina,

    3 the Capljina compromising the tanks, shall organise

    4 active defence in its zone of responsibility, and so on

    5 and so on at this point. You can see.

    6 And if you turn the page, page 2, you can see

    7 again quoted, tanks from Capljina HVO should go as support

    8 to the area of Pileta.

    9 This was again the area of Capljina which is close

    10 to the border here, it's part of Bosnia. Close to

    11 Medjugorje and Pocitelj, this area.

    12 We can go further? Yeah.

    13 So the number now 121G.

    14 Q. And if the document just reconfirms the

    15 previous points--

    16 A. Yeah.

    17 Q. --just say so, and we can move more quickly

    18 through them.

    19 A. This is another interesting document. The

    20 document is, as you can see from the letterhead,

    21 Republic of Croatia, southern front command, dated

    22 April 19 and is done in Grude, that is in

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    24 Q. And it's just Exhibit 121G.

    25 A. Yes. And if you look at the signature at the

  41. 1 end, the document is signed and stamped again by

    2 General Bobetko as a commander of the southern front

    3 with the stamp of the Herceg-Bosna main staff. So with

    4 the stamp of a region in another state. And in this

    5 document, you can turn your attention in particular to

    6 the order, to point one, where it's written immediately

    7 begin to prepare for and recognise the crucial defence

    8 in Livno and Tomislovgrad.

    9 If you look again at the map, you can see

    10 Livno and Tomislovgrad are in Bosnia. So all the

    11 area -- you see, again, the area under the control

    12 of Vakuf, Nevesimje, Livno, Capljina, Citluk, this was

    13 the area, again confirmed by the document.

    14 The next exhibit is No. 121H.

    15 Q. 121H.

    16 A. This is of April. This is a document of

    17 April, 1992, letterhead Croatian community of

    18 Herceg-Bosna, again southern front command, Grude,

    19 Grude foreign post again.

    20 So you can see this southern front was not

    21 only a front in Croatia but consisted of a wider front

    22 including parts of another state. This is clear. You

    23 can see here just a list of people appointed by General

    24 Bobetko as a commanders of the different HVO units, of

    25 the Croat community of Herceg-Bosna.

  42. 1 These are officers, I found their names very

    2 often, especially of Zegko Sigec, who was particularly

    3 involved in a question connected to the

    4 citizenship and documents related to 1993, information

    5 about the need of leaving off the insignia of the Croatian army

    6 from soldiers -- officers and soldiers of the

    7 Croatian army acting in Bosnia.

    8 This is just to give you an idea of the

    9 list of persons. You see commanders, deputy commanders,

    10 chiefs, captains, administrative offices, chiefs of

    11 artillery. So it's large -- chiefs of communication,

    12 chiefs of engineering, lieutenants, chiefs of

    13 intelligence. It's a large group of persons with

    14 different responsibilities who were appointed by

    15 Bobetko himself.

    16 Okay. We can go further.

    17 This now, turn to document 121I. This is

    18 interesting. If you look, even the original document,

    19 you can see the letterhead of the -- and you have the

    20 translation of the Croat community of Herceg-Bosna

    21 of HVO and you can see that, in spite of this kind of

    22 letterhead, you have the signature of the commander of

    23 the southern front again, Janko Bobetko, with the stamp

    24 of Herceg-Bosna.

    25 And again this is the appointment of

  43. 1 major general Ante Roso responsible for the Livno

    2 region. Livno is another town in Bosnia, here.

    3 Q. And I think there is also a reference there

    4 to the Prozor Konjic region as well in the second

    5 paragraph?

    6 A. Konic, yes. Konic is a town, a town to the

    7 north of Mostar, along the River Neretva. The River

    8 Neretva, Mostar is going to Jablanica and Konic which

    9 is more or less here, and then you leave the Neretva,

    10 the course of Neretva and you go straight to -- the

    11 road goes straight to Sarajevo.

    12 You can consider Konic is more or less

    13 here after Jablanica and Mount Prajnia, in this

    14 area. So this is.

    15 We can go further. Document 121J again, I

    16 mean, this is new confirmation -- this is another

    17 document of April, as you see the date is April 21st,

    18 which is three, four weeks after the beginning of the war

    19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The official one. You can

    20 see that the document is again with the letterhead

    21 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna, HVO, southern front

    22 command, and the signature is General Janko Bobetko and

    23 signed with the staff -- Herceg-Bosna staff.

    24 So this is another document which confirms that

    25 Janko Bobetko was managing military actions of HVO in the

  44. 1 period.

    2 Can we go further. Yes. The following document

    3 is number 121K.

    4 This is an interesting document, again for the

    5 following reasons: This is a document done in Ploce,

    6 that is in Croatia. You can see 4th May, 1992,

    7 the Republic of Croatia southern front command, and is

    8 signed by Janko Bobetko. The signature is as a

    9 commander of the southern front in the framework of the

    10 Croatian State.

    11 And what is interesting in the order is that

    12 preparation and submission of a list of future operation

    13 of -- this is, you see, the anti-tank system, against

    14 the JNA. 60 people were to be designed -- were to come

    15 from HVO headquarters of Herceg-Bosna, and the

    16 preoccupation of the General is that all the units of

    17 HVO should be equally represented.

    18 So he gave a very clear order to

    19 train or to prepare future operations involving all the

    20 units of HVO.

    21 We can go further. The following exhibit is

    22 121 -- yes, the following is 121L.

    23 Again, we have a document -- this is a document

    24 of June 14, and the letterhead is once again Croatian

    25 community of Herceg-Bosna. You see it concerns on the

  45. 1 period April-May. You can find letters with the

    2 letterhead of the Croatian Republic or of the Croatian

    3 community of Herceg-Bosna indifferently, and Bobetko

    4 signed here with the stamp of Herceg-Bosna again.

    5 And in this letter, he is giving an order to

    6 prepare military identity cards for the members of HVO

    7 units.

    8 This explains why these military cards were a

    9 problem. Sometimes they didn't have enough military

    10 identity cards for the soldiers in 1993. That's why,

    11 in the document I mentioned, and which we had an opportunity

    12 to see, it was written sometimes at the end of 1992,

    13 beginning of 1993, the first month of 1993 that in

    14 the event that soldiers or officials of the Croatian

    15 army had no military identity card of HVO, it was

    16 better to participate in the fighting without any

    17 insignia but not with the insignia of the Croatian

    18 army.

    19 This is just the beginning of a story, this

    20 lecture, yes.

    21 So we can go further. This is 121. The

    22 following is 121M. This is a document of the Croatian

    23 Republic sent from Ploce on July 13, 1992, and is an

    24 order to the operative groups in south-eastern

    25 Herzegovina, operating in south-eastern Herzegovina,

  46. 1 It is a document that included order for defence around

    2 Mostar.

    3 I can confirm that in his memoirs, when he

    4 wrote them, Janko Bobetko explained clearly that

    5 the so-called Cagal operation - that is Jackal in

    6 English - ended with, and he explained that

    7 Mostar was freed by the Croat army and HVO jointly.

    8 So the operation was -- this was because

    9 there were many, many disputes later between HVO and

    10 the Bosnian army. The Bosnian army charged HVO

    11 with having participated in the liberation of Mostar with

    12 another army of another State, not under an

    13 international or bilateral agreement between Bosnia and

    14 Croatia, and even an army that acted later in

    15 cooperation with HVO against the sovereign

    16 independence of Bosnia in an operation against the

    17 Muslims.

    18 So this was one of the elements of the

    19 disputes during 1993 and the beginning of 1994 before

    20 signing the Washington Agreement which stopped the war

    21 between the Muslims and the Croats in Bosnia.

    22 The agreement was signed in 1994, March.

    23 It was imposed by the United States.

    24 This is the interest of this document. We

    25 can continue.

  47. 1 121N. This is another document of orders of

    2 General Bobetko from June, 1992 related to -- and

    3 the letter is -- the document is with a letterhead of

    4 the Republic of Croatia, signed by Bobetko in -- as a

    5 commander of the Croatian army, and what is of interest

    6 is particularly the end of the document here -- no.

    7 Where it is written point 3 -- point 1: "Forces of

    8 the Mostar HVO shall move toward another area."

    9 So that is, you see, another document

    10 which confirms that the orders for operational activities

    11 to be carried out by HVO were coming directly from General Bobetko

    12 And on the other pages, point 3, point 2,

    13 you can see that the Stolac battalion in Celpatur

    14 captured the Stolac region.

    15 If you look again at the map of Bosnia, you

    16 can see where Stolac is. It is in this part of

    17 Herzegovina, the south-eastern part of Herzegovina.

    18 We can move on.

    19 Q. And the next document?

    20 A. And the next -- the next document is the last

    21 one, 121O. It's a document of June 18. Again, a

    22 document -- a document of the Republic of Croatia, this

    23 is the letterhead, and signed directly by Bobetko, the

    24 pages, and there you can find several quotations of the

    25 activities that had to be done in the area.

  48. 1 For instance, south-western Herzegovina

    2 immediately -- to move immediately from Medjugorje to

    3 Mostar. This is what he contributed to in the liberation

    4 of Mostar in 1992. You can see that he assigned a zone

    5 of responsibility and made each unit responsible for

    6 its assigned zone.

    7 You can see also -- all the document is

    8 connected, as you can see, at the beginning,

    9 immediately after detention of and of. Following the

    10 liberation of the east bank of the Neretva river and the

    11 city of Mostar in order to establish the

    12 order of battle along the achieved lines fully

    13 controlling -- and so on and so on.

    14 So it was liberating Mostar, giving orders

    15 to continue and to operate in other areas which you see

    16 in other points, point 4, for instance, Stolac, HVO.

    17 Other orders including and involving HVO and coming

    18 again from General Bobetko.

    19 Q. Professor, did this close working

    20 relationship between the HVO and the HV continue on

    21 through 1993- 94?

    22 A. Yeah.

    23 Q. And did there occur in the latter part of

    24 1992 an increase in tension between the forces of the

    25 HVO-HV and the forces of the Republic of

  49. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    2 A. Yes, yes. Tensions -- tensions which were even

    3 reported by journalists. It is an interesting exercise

    4 to follow the newspapers, international or local

    5 ones, about the evolution of the war in

    6 Bosnia. And there is evidence of clashes, particularly

    7 in the area around, as you can see, I can use

    8 this map which can help, in the area Travnik and

    9 Novi Travnik already in October and September --

    10 October and November 1992 in Prozor, then in Vitez.

    11 So these three areas, that is areas in the

    12 so-called Central Bosnia, there were troubles and

    13 clashes between the Muslims and Croats in that period.

    14 It's interesting that on October 9th I

    15 found in newspapers information that the Minister of

    16 Defence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    17 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced a

    18 cease-fire, a joint cease-fire between the Serb armies

    19 and the Bosnian army. And what is interesting is the

    20 comment of the newspapers in the sense that the

    21 newspapers referred to that for the first time, and they

    22 stressed this, this was the first time that Croatian

    23 army was doing something without the Muslims. This

    24 cease-fire was a cease-fire, according to the newspapers,

    25 only between the Croats and the Serbs,

  50. 1 excluding, in this sense, the Muslims.

    2 Q. Yes. I think that in the transcript it says

    3 that the agreement was between the Serb armies and

    4 the Bosnian army. I don't think you meant Bosnian

    5 army?

    6 A. The Serb army of Bosnia, yes, yes, the

    7 Serb Republic of -- the Serb Republic of Bosnia,

    8 Herceg-Bosna. So it was between two armies, the

    9 Serb army in Bosnia and Herceg-Bosna, Bosnian army,

    10 HVO.

    11 Q. To be distinguished from the army of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    13 A. Yes, yes, distinguished army of Herceg-Bosna

    14 so yes, because sometimes the Muslim army, sometimes

    15 the army of Herceg-Bosna.

    16 Q. Can you describe to us the development of

    17 these tensions that existed between the Muslims and the

    18 Croats in Bosnia in 1993 -- 1992, leading through to

    19 1993?

    20 A. '93, yes. You know, in the -- at the end of

    21 1992, Vance and Owen were received -- well, requested

    22 to prepare a plan, a possible plan to be submitted to

    23 the parties in conflict, and this plan was

    24 submitted in Geneva at the beginning of January, 1993.

    25 May I refer to the map in Exhibit No. 119?

  51. 1 This is the map of the Vance-Owen Plan. The

    2 Vance-Owen Plan was Exhibit 119. The plan was

    3 organised in such -- articulated in such a way that

    4 Bosnia was confirmed as an independent and sovereign

    5 state based on 10 cantons, and Bosnia was divided, the

    6 map was suggesting into different cantons. These 10

    7 cantons were divided in such a way that three were

    8 under the predominance of Croats, three under the

    9 predominance of Serbs, three under the predominant

    10 of the Muslims, and one, Sarajevo district, for

    11 all of them together.

    12 So you can see from this map the areas 3, 8,

    13 10 were assigned to the Croatian area, you see this is

    14 the area of Herceg-Bosna, more or less, and this is the

    15 area of Posnija.

    16 Q. And, Professor, did the presentation of this

    17 plan to some extent tend to support the aspirations of

    18 the Croats and the Serbs in relation to

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    20 A. As you can see also the -- in a way, yes.

    21 Because, as I mentioned, the first war goal of both

    22 Croats and Serbs was the establishment of an area

    23 completely under their own control and then to prepare

    24 the association with the borders.

    25 We have also a document from the Serb side

  52. 1 which is more or less similar to that of -- we had seen

    2 from the meeting in Grude on November 12, 1991.

    3 The Serb document is a document published

    4 of a meeting with a brigade, of a brigade following

    5 another meeting which took place in Banja Luka in 1992

    6 when the war had already erupted in April -- erupted in

    7 Bosnia -- May, sorry, May 1992, May.

    8 It's important, May, because the document was

    9 written that some difficulties had arisen on the

    10 Serb side because Milosevic was compelled by the

    11 international community to withdraw one part of the

    12 military in order -- you remember the 20 percent, the

    13 cosmetic change of the activity of JNA in Bosnia, it

    14 was in that period.

    15 And so they met in Banja Luka, and

    16 in the brigades in order to clearly establish the war

    17 goals of the SDS and the Serb army. The war goals

    18 were in particular to set up an area completely under

    19 the control of the Serbs, to have the control of the

    20 borders between the river Una and Neretva, which means

    21 this border, but not to establish any border, any

    22 controlled border where Bosnia neighboured on the

    23 self-proclaimed Republic of Serb Krajina, this

    24 area.

    25 It was just to establish the border

  53. 1 between Dalmatia, under the control of Croatia and

    2 Bosnia, but not in the area controlled by the Serbs in

    3 Croatia, because the idea was, in the end, to connect

    4 the two areas.

    5 As you can see, this was the proposal, the

    6 proposal of Vance- again stressing the idea

    7 that these cantons were predominantly ethnic cantons.

    8 This was the interpretation, effectively, of the

    9 Croat and Serb side, from the Croat and

    10 Serb side.

    11 For instance, this map was presented at

    12 the beginning of January, but we have a document of

    13 January -- if I well remember, 15 January. I had

    14 document with me, signed by the President of the HVO

    15 in which it was clearly stated that in cantons 3, 8, 9

    16 assigned by the Vance-Owen Plan to the control of the

    17 Croat authorities, the authorities of Bosnian army,

    18 both -- Herzegovina army, had to submit to the

    19 command of HVO or leave the areas.

    20 And this order was followed by similar orders

    21 and requests by other heads of HVO units, for

    22 instance, immediately in Mostar, immediately in Konjic,

    23 that is in this area, in January 1993, and then in

    24 Travnik in April, 1993 when the troop of Dario Kordic

    25 -- in this period. You know, the state symbols had

  54. 1 very great importance, flags, insignia.

    2 So formally the war erupted between -- in the

    3 night between the 7th and 8th of April, 1993. In order

    4 to follow this -- to accomplish the order of Prlic, the

    5 flags of the Croat community of Herceg-Bosna were

    6 put up the local municipalities, local official

    7 municipalities of Travnik.

    8 The army, the Bosnian army opposed this, and

    9 clashes started, the military clashes started, and

    10 then the situation precipitated and precipitated

    11 particularly in Central Bosnia, that is in this area --

    12 may I refer again to this map? Maybe in this case even

    13 more clear.

    14 This area around Travnik, Novi Travnik,

    15 Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor, Busovaca, this area

    16 in particularly. In this situation, this area in June and

    17 then in August-September the army -- the Bosnian army

    18 had very great military success, and this created a lot

    19 of problems for HVO.

    20 We have from that period documents and evidence

    21 of attempts by HVO in this area to establish contact

    22 with the Serb army. Even an order -- we have a

    23 document of the Serb army explaining that they

    24 received a request for weapons and -- from the

    25 Herceg-Bosnian army in order to fight against the

  55. 1 Muslims.

    2 And then together the Serbs -- Serb army

    3 and the HVO tried -- besieged Zepce, for instance. So

    4 there were in that period, particularly in the summer

    5 of 1993, relations between the Serb army and HVO. It

    6 was the period when Mate Boban and Karadzic again met

    7 in Montenegro to discuss the idea of the partition of

    8 Bosnia. The war was particularly important, this

    9 area, because, of course, the army, the Bosnian army

    10 tried to create -- to divide the area under the control

    11 of Herceg-Bosna.

    12 As you can see, this was the area claimed,

    13 and so they wanted to block the homogenisation of this

    14 area.

    15 So the war particularly escalated in

    16 this area or along the Neretva, especially in

    17 Mostar. As you know, Mostar was divided into parts.

    18 In November, the bridge was destroyed. All these

    19 events are well known. This was in November, 1993, and

    20 in this period, particularly in the period when -- from

    21 the -- when the HVO was defeated at the beginning of

    22 the summer and then -- by the army in Central

    23 Bosnia.

    24 And at the end of the year rumours,

    25 discussions, impressions increased in the international

  56. 1 community because a lot of information was

    2 arriving that, particularly after the defeat of the HVO

    3 in Central Bosnia, Croatia sent soldiers and officials

    4 of the Croat army into Bosnia in order to help HVO

    5 in that period. And this was a very dramatic period

    6 for the Croat army, Croat army in Bosnia, for

    7 Herceg-Bosna too.

    8 Q. Now, I think, Professor, that leads us to the

    9 next point, and that is the involvement of the

    10 international community, particularly in relation to

    11 the reaction by the international community to the

    12 involvement of Croatia, the Republic of Croatia, in

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 And I think that you have a number of

    15 documents which illustrate the increasing concern of

    16 the international community in relation to Croatia's

    17 involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina there.

    18 Perhaps you might take us through those

    19 documents, illustrating by reference to the documents

    20 the points that you wish to make in connection with

    21 this increasing international concern of Croatia's

    22 involvement.

    23 A. Okay. So let us start with a document,

    24 Exhibit No. 122. This document is a document from the

    25 United Nations Security Council. It's a document dated

  57. 1 the 30 May, 1992, and is connected with -- is a report

    2 of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of

    3 the Security Council Resolution 752.

    4 One had to report about several questions,

    5 several things connected to Bosnia. What is

    6 interesting for our discussion here now is particularly

    7 point No. 10 on the third page where it is stated,

    8 point 10 at the bottom of the page: "As regards."

    9 This is a point connected to the withdrawal of elements

    10 of the Croat army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    11 Bear in mind the document is of May, 1992.

    12 This is connected with the Bobetko operations as I

    13 illustrated before.

    14 As regards withdrawal of elements of the

    15 Croat army. So it is clear the international

    16 community was aware of this. Now, in

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina information currently available in

    18 New York suggests that no such withdrawal has

    19 occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of

    20 the Croatian army personnel in uniform operating within

    21 and as part of military formations in

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities have

    23 consistently taken the position that the Croatian

    24 soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina have left the

    25 Croatian army and are not subject to its authority.

  58. 1 International observations do not however doubt that

    2 portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are under the

    3 control of Croatian military units, whether belonging

    4 to the local Territorial Defence, paramilitary groups,

    5 or to the Croatian army. It is unclear in the

    6 circumstances how their withdrawal or dismantlement as

    7 required by the council can be achieved."

    8 So if you take into consideration the

    9 documents we had the opportunity to see before and to

    10 make a connection, at the time they didn't have -- the

    11 international community didn't have the documents, we

    12 had the opportunity to read before. But as you can see

    13 through the representative of UNPROFOR, they received

    14 enough information to know that the soldiers or

    15 officers of the Croat army were there, all were

    16 there without their insignia, as you can see,

    17 particularly thinking on the last sentences of this

    18 point.

    19 You can make comparison, immediate comparison

    20 with another document. I am following differently the

    21 order, sorry.

    22 Q. Yes. Give us the number, please.

    23 A. The number is 126C -- this is 122. 126C.

    24 This is resolution 752. Because this was quoted

    25 here in the beginning of this document. This is why I

  59. 1 think that it's important. Resolution 752.

    2 Q. If you just place it on the screen, we can

    3 follow it.

    4 A. Yes, resolution 752 (1992). This is the

    5 resolution of -- approved by the Security Council in

    6 May 1993 -- 15 May, 1993 -- in 1992, sorry, 1992. This

    7 resolution is interesting, particularly

    8 point 3 on the following page where it's written, as

    9 you can see: "Demands that all forms of interference

    10 from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina including by units of

    11 the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, as well as elements of

    12 the Croatian army cease immediately and the

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina neighbours take swift actions to end

    14 such interference and respect the territorial integrity

    15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

    16 This was the document written 15 days before the

    17 document I read previously; this was from document

    18 122 and was a report on the basis of this request of --

    19 coming from the Security Council and the

    20 Secretary-General reported the sentence -- point 10

    21 I read a few minutes ago.

    22 It's also interesting, if we can go to

    23 another document, 126D now, D. Yes. This is another

    24 resolution of the Security Council. The resolution is

    25 number 787 of 1992, 16 November. Bobetko was at

  60. 1 that time already Chief-of-Staff of the whole

    2 Croatian army, the southern front, in Zagreb, and the

    3 point -- the interesting point is the second -- after

    4 point 5 on the third page.

    5 This part where you can see about -- it's

    6 again a point on the form of interference and you can

    7 see after the resolution where it is quoted,

    8 resolution 752 (1992) and other relevant resolution,

    9 including the requirement that all forces, in

    10 particular elements of the Croat army -- you see, in

    11 particular elements.

    12 This now is particular. Before you had both,

    13 now you have particularly elements of Croatian

    14 army should be withdrawn or be subject to the authority of the

    15 government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or be

    16 disbanded or disarmed.

    17 So the request was to take different -- or in

    18 any case to put this army under the control of the

    19 Republic of Bosnia, or to disarm or disband it, in any

    20 case to withdraw the Croatian army particularly from

    21 this -- from the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    22 We can go further and see another document,

    23 especially document 126E. 126E.

    24 This is interesting because I spoke and I

    25 showed two documents and two resolutions of the Security

  61. 1 Council. This is different. So United Nations, this

    2 is a document, a different document, it's a document of

    3 the European Council on Croatia. When the European

    4 Union had a meeting in Edinburgh at the end of December

    5 of 1992. We are following in this case the two

    6 resolutions of the United Nations, and you can

    7 turn your attention particularly to the last sentences

    8 of point 2 on this page, last sentences here, where

    9 you can read the last four sentences: "The European

    10 Council calls on the Croatian authorities for their

    11 part to comply with all UN Security Council

    12 resolutions and to cooperate in good faith with the

    13 peace process, since they too carry a share of the

    14 responsibility for attacks on the Muslim population."

    15 Please consider that this is -- attacks on

    16 the Muslim population. This is December 1992.

    17 As I mentioned, the official war between

    18 Croats and Muslims started in April, 1993. As a

    19 consequence -- as a consequence of the Vance-Owen Plan

    20 but, as I mentioned before, clashes already started in

    21 September, October, and November. They stopped in

    22 the middle of November in the area of Central Bosnia,

    23 Travnik, Novi Travnik and Vitez.

    24 So this is a concern in this case of the

    25 European council about clashes already started in

  62. 1 Central Bosnia and without any relation -- at the

    2 beginning there were events, the war started later, so

    3 there were concerns already about a situation that was

    4 growing on dramatically towards dramatic outcomes that

    5 happened later in 1993.

    6 So...

    7 Q. You can do another document, I think.

    8 A. Another document? Okay. We can see the

    9 following document is document 126F. We are coming

    10 again to the United Nations with this document. Was

    11 interesting, this document.

    12 This is a letter sent to the United Nations,

    13 the original is in English, it was sent on the 26th

    14 April, 1993. April 1993, it means that 20 days

    15 after the Travnik events that provoked the war between

    16 the Croats and Muslims. And this letter was sent by

    17 the -- by the permanent representative of Croatia to

    18 the United Nations to inform the United

    19 Nations that a common agreement had been found between

    20 Muslims and Croats.

    21 And what is interesting is the end of this

    22 document, on the third page, where you can see that the

    23 joint statement about coordination of the army,

    24 cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims, was

    25 signed by Izetbegovic and Mate Boban, the two of the

  63. 1 Bosnian state with witnessed by Tudjman, the president

    2 of Croatia. So the president of Croatia in a way

    3 supported this moment and was the witness of this

    4 agreement between two parties of the same state.

    5 It's again confirmation that Mate Boban worked with

    6 the support of Franjo Tudjman.

    7 But if you see, the other page after, which

    8 is also interesting, the second document where it was

    9 established that the HVO has a representative in the

    10 command of the army, of the Bosnian army, of the

    11 Bosnian army, as a part of the Bosnian army, this

    12 document was signed by Izetbegovic and Boban as

    13 political representatives of the two parties signing

    14 the agreement, Muslims and the Croats, by General

    15 Milivoj Petkovic who was the general of the high

    16 command of the Bosnian armies. You see Petkovic, do

    17 you remember this name, at the time, at the Bobetko

    18 time, one year earlier he was a colonel, now he is

    19 General Milivoj Petkovic who was at that time the head

    20 of the chief of the HVO.

    21 So this is just to show the evolution of the

    22 military situation. This agreement, in fact, didn't

    23 work. The war between the two parties, the Croats and

    24 the Muslims continued, and even the situation worsened

    25 in the months to come, May and particularly June, July,

  64. 1 August, the war was particularly -- particularly

    2 heavy in Central Bosnia.

    3 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, now is a

    4 convenient time.

    5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I propose a break. We will

    6 have a quarter of an hour's break, please.

    7 --- Recess at 12.03 p.m.

    8 --- Resumed at 12.20 p.m.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Niemann, you are given

    10 the floor, and we will be deliberating until 1.30 p.m.

    11 MR. NIEMANN:

    12 Q. Professor, just prior to the break, you were

    13 going through a series of documents from the

    14 international perspective dealing with the question of

    15 Croatia's involvement and participation in

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina in '92-'93 and beyond. Can you

    17 continue now, please, by referring to those documents?

    18 A. The next document is document 126 G.

    19 This is a document of the United Nations

    20 again, it's a document prepared on April 30, 1993, as you

    21 can see the date, and with -- this is a report, a

    22 report of a delegation which went to visit Bosnia

    23 previously. You have here a list of the persons who

    24 signed the report.

    25 The report is very wide ranging, is taking into

  65. 1 consideration different situations, particularly

    2 Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa where you know the Serb

    3 army was particularly involved surrounding the Muslims.

    4 It was the period when Morillon went to Srebrenica

    5 to save injured people.

    6 What is interesting from our point of view is

    7 the part on Vitez, because Vitez -- this is page --

    8 sorry --

    9 Q. Nine, I think.

    10 A. Page 9, yes. Where the mission -- you have

    11 the description, the visit of the missions, they went

    12 to Ahmici, they had an opportunity to see what was

    13 occurring in those areas, but particularly in the -- of

    14 course, we have to take into account this was a mission

    15 which arrived immediately after the events. The picture was

    16 unclear at that moment. However, it's very

    17 interesting that at point 35 on this page 9, as you can

    18 see, they asked for a full explanation from the Croat

    19 Defence Council on what was going on in Vitez and

    20 Central Bosnia, and they spoke to Mr. Boban about this

    21 topic.

    22 What is interesting is the discussion they

    23 had with Boban, points 36 and 37. In a way, even

    24 point 40, 41 is interesting as a consequence of this

    25 too.

  66. 1 You can see here Mr. Boban, with whom the

    2 mission met at the airport in Split, denied

    3 participation of his forces in these acts; in the acts

    4 at Ahmici in Central Bosnia, which he said were the

    5 acts of radical groups.

    6 And it's very interesting, you see here

    7 quoted in brackets "(General Wahlgren had informed us

    8 that this group even had swastikas on their clothing)."

    9 But you know that there are also documents that the

    10 uniformed people -- that if they don't have identity

    11 cards of HVO, it was better to have no other insignia,

    12 but surely not the Croat army, so every other

    13 insignia were possible to be -- were likely to be used.

    14 I can tell you, it was very interesting also

    15 an episode that occurred in order to understand this

    16 event. The episode occurred at the beginning of the

    17 war in Bosnia, in August 1992, because at that time the

    18 Croatian HVO, the HVO was not the only military group

    19 of the Croats in Bosnia. At the time, there were also

    20 the so-called -- the HOS. The HOS was the

    21 organisation, the military organisation, related to the

    22 Paraga party, the Hrvatska Stranka Prava, which was the

    23 Croat party of the right led by Dobrosav Paraga in

    24 Croatia in Zagreb. They had this army, and one of the

    25 members of this HOS was general -- general of the HOS,

  67. 1 a self-appointed general in this case, and Prkacin who

    2 was an elected member of the Croatian Sabor in 1995

    3 under the -- not in the 10 percent of the seats of

    4 Herceg-Bosna, his was for Herceg-Bosna, but in the list

    5 of the party, of the questioned party of the right.

    6 This is just again one element, because it

    7 confirmed this particular relation that people had with

    8 Zagreb, independently from -- on different levels, yes,

    9 on different levels.

    10 And this HOS were forced on the -- the idea

    11 of the HOS and the idea of the Paraga party was that

    12 the whole Bosnia was part of Croatia. The historical

    13 dream and the historical borders of Croatia were the

    14 Drina river. The Drina is the river which defines the

    15 borders between Bosnia and Serbia.

    16 So this was different from the agreement or

    17 the attempted agreements between the Serb and the

    18 Croat side to divide Bosnia, and for this

    19 reason, for instance, one of the head of the

    20 HOS created a -- at the beginning of the war many

    21 troubles. Mr. Kraljevic was killed in August 1993, and

    22 after all this, his death, HOS were submitted under the

    23 pressure of Boban, so under the command of HVO. So in

    24 a sense after August-September 1993, there were no

    25 regular units officially out of the control of the HVO.

  68. 1 The other point is point 37 where

    2 Mr. Boban, while expressing his condemnation of these

    3 acts, nevertheless stated that one must not look only

    4 at the effects but at the causes, and that Croats had

    5 been massacred by Muslims. "The Mission," which was

    6 very interested in the reaction, "The Mission expressed

    7 its deep concern and told him that these developments

    8 could seriously tarnish his image and that of the

    9 Croats in general, not to mention the repercussions

    10 that it could have on the Republic of Croatia."

    11 The attempts justify that in a way Boban

    12 made in this situation immediately created a reaction,

    13 a negative reaction of the Commission, who had more or

    14 less the same -- different but the logic was the same,

    15 the reaction by President Tudjman. If you read

    16 point 41 where it is stated, for instance, the Mission

    17 "conveyed ... shock and horror at the killings by

    18 Croats of Muslims in central Bosnia and called upon him

    19 to help actively in preventing any recurrence of these

    20 outrageous incidents and bringing those responsible to

    21 immediate justice. President Tudjman agreed that the

    22 acts of inhumanity were unpardonable but said that as

    23 long as causes existed for provocation, there may be a

    24 temptation to resort to such acts of horror which were

    25 typical not only of the Bosnian Croats. He promised to

  69. 1 use his influence to see that the guilty were

    2 punished."

    3 You can see there, in a way, the mechanism

    4 was, yes, it is to be condemned, these acts, but you

    5 have to understand the situation, the reaction, the

    6 tensions. It's, in a way, a kind of justification that

    7 created concern in the Mission and in a sense can be

    8 interesting in order to understand the reaction of the

    9 international representatives in this case.

    10 Now we can go further, and document 126 H.

    11 This is a document of the Security Council, a

    12 document dated May 10th, 1993. It's a note by the

    13 President of the Security Council, and what is

    14 interesting are particularly paragraphs 3 and 4

    15 where you can see that: "The Security Council strongly

    16 condemns this major military offensive launched by

    17 Bosnian Croat paramilitary units which is totally

    18 inconsistent with the signature of the Peace Plan for

    19 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnian

    20 Croat party."

    21 We are in May 1993 and they are considering,

    22 of course, the Peace Plan, this is Vance-Owen Plan.

    23 "The Council demands that the attacks

    24 against the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica,

    25 cease forthwith; that Bosnian Croat paramilitary units

  70. 1 withdraw immediately from the area and that all the

    2 parties strictly comply with their previous commitments

    3 as well as the cease-fire agreed to today between the

    4 Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    5 and the Bosnian Croat party."

    6 And then you can see in point -- in the

    7 last paragraph: "The Security Council once again

    8 reiterates its demand that UNPROFOR personnel be

    9 allowed unimpeded access throughout the Republic of

    10 Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in this particular case,

    11 demands that the Bosnian Croat paramilitary units

    12 ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR as well as

    13 all United Nations personnel in the areas of Mostar,

    14 Jablanica and Dreznica. In this connection, the

    15 Council expresses its deep concern at the increasing

    16 hostile attitude of Bosnian Croat paramilitary units

    17 towards UNPROFOR personnel."

    18 The area mentioned is mostly Jablanica, that

    19 he is considering, the map, this area in Bosnia. And

    20 this means that we can, in this case, understand

    21 probably the attempt not to have personnel,

    22 UNPROFOR personnel in the area was because they

    23 referred to the United Nations Secretary-General for --

    24 and so this was just to give you the atmosphere --

    25 Q. And I think on the second page --

  71. 1 A. Yes, yes. On the second page, you have

    2 point, the first point: "The Security Council calls

    3 upon the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with the

    4 commitments under the Zagreb agreement of 25 April

    5 1993 ..." This was the agreement signed by Izetbegovic

    6 and Boban, witnessed by Tudjman. We saw it before.

    7 "... to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat

    8 leadership and paramilitary units with a view to

    9 ceasing immediately their attacks particularly in the

    10 areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. It further

    11 calls on the Republic of Croatia to adhere strictly to

    12 its obligations under Security Council resolution 752,

    13 including putting an end to all forms of interference

    14 and respecting the territorial integrity of the

    15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

    16 What is interesting is that the international

    17 community was calling upon the Republic of Croatia to

    18 influence the position because they were the -- Tudjman

    19 was the witness to this agreement between Izetbegovic

    20 and Boban, so the international community urged him to

    21 make pressure in order to stop the attacks in that

    22 area, and the document is interesting because it's from

    23 May, so this shows when I ended my -- when I referred

    24 in the last session, I'm reminded that the document

    25 signed at the end of April of 1993, in fact, was not

  72. 1 implemented at all. So this is clear evidence what I

    2 said before in this document.

    3 Q. And resolution 752 related withdrawing of

    4 troops, did it not?

    5 A. Yes, yes.

    6 Q. And the next paragraph that immediately

    7 follows after that deals with the question of

    8 sovereignty, does it not?

    9 A. Yeah. "The Security Council once again

    10 reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

    11 independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    12 and the inacceptability of the acquisition of territory

    13 by force and the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'."

    14 So I think that this is a very clear

    15 statement and a result of the pressure of the

    16 European -- of the international community in this case

    17 towards Croatia.

    18 We can go further with the document 126 I.

    19 Q. I think we've looked at this one previously,

    20 so perhaps we can move on to -- unless you have a

    21 particular point that you wish to make about.

    22 I'm sorry, I think I'm -- I'm sorry, we

    23 haven't looked at it. I'm sorry. I was confusing it

    24 with another document.

    25 A. This document has been signed in Geneva in

  73. 1 July 17, and as you can see, it has been signed by

    2 Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman. It's a

    3 statement of the two Presidents of the two republics

    4 which deny speculations about the partition of Bosnia.

    5 Point 2 is the crucial point because after denying

    6 the partition: "The only way to achieve permanent

    7 peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the recognition

    8 of the interests of all the three constituent peoples

    9 and in the achievement of the agreement on the

    10 establishment of three republics within the scope of a

    11 confederation."

    12 So in the other situation, we spoke about the

    13 federation, a union, now a confederation of three

    14 republics, so you see again the attempt to -- as a

    15 first step to have three republics in a union and then

    16 eventually denying -- the speculation for a partition

    17 when you have three republics within the scope of a

    18 confederation, which is not clear what this mean -- we

    19 don't have, in fact, up to now "confederation," the

    20 word, we have a federation, United States and

    21 Switzerland are federations. So in this case -- in this

    22 case it just means that the three republics can manage

    23 together the common interest and then it's -- as a

    24 matter of fact in future the integration of Bosnia will

    25 be threatened by the -- a new partition, we don't know,

  74. 1 of course, peaceful or not. In.

    2 Any case, because we see the document -- I

    3 remind the document of November 12, 1991 of Grude, when

    4 Mate Boban and Dario Kordic signed and established the

    5 goals, the main goals of the Croats in Bosnia, this

    6 was one part of their goals, the request of one part of

    7 their goals to be achieved.

    8 At the same time, it is a confirmation that

    9 some kind of agreement, or attempt at agreement was

    10 going on between Croat and Serb sides about

    11 Bosnia, albeit this is just an agreement for creation

    12 in Bosnia of three unions.

    13 The document offer the possibility for the

    14 preparing of another peace plan. It was the

    15 Owen-Stoltenberg plan which was submitted a few days

    16 after this request. And the proposal was to create,

    17 instead of ten cantons, three areas with a predominant

    18 ethnic group which was, in fact, more or less the

    19 proposal of Tudjman and Milosevic, and this proposal

    20 was rejected by the Bosnian parliament in October

    21 1993. As a consequence of this rejection, the

    22 relations between Croats and Muslims worsened again and

    23 a new phase of war started in that period.

    24 This was in the fall 1993 when another event,

    25 even worsened the complex picture of the war. This was

  75. 1 the, may I say, the serial war within the Muslims, with

    2 the secession of the group led by Fikret Abdic in the

    3 area of Bihac. Just to show you the map again. This

    4 here is Bihac. This was the area. And Fikret Abdic

    5 was a member of the presidency of Bosnia after the

    6 election in 1990. He was very well known person in the

    7 Communist establishment. He led a company, agra

    8 commerce, in the '80s, into bankruptcy. I think he was

    9 for this reason in prison. So a very disputed

    10 personality.

    11 What is crucial that in this case a conflict

    12 arose within the Muslim groups. Fikret Abdic sought

    13 to have, first, a good relationship with Tudjman and

    14 then the support of the Serbs, and you see this was an

    15 area, a Muslim area, led by Fikret Abdic, but where

    16 fighting took place between the Bosnian army and the

    17 groups of Abdic and areas surrounded by Serbs because

    18 the Serbs controlled this area of Banja Luka and they

    19 controlled this area of Croatia which was Krajina.

    20 It's just to give you the picture of the situation.

    21 So we can continue with other documents.

    22 The next one is 126 K. Sorry. I made a

    23 mistake, sorry. 126 J. 126 J, yes, this one.

    24 This is a letter -- this document of the

    25 United Nations, it's a letter of 27 July, 1993, and is

  76. 1 a letter from the permanent representative of Bosnia in

    2 the United Nations, Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey.

    3 The letter is sent, it's included -- a letter

    4 received from -- received from the Republic of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, Croatia, that the

    6 official television channel of Croatian government and

    7 other media calling for demonstration of mass -- for

    8 demonstration in Zagreb, and he added the document, the

    9 following document, on Croatia -- on the Croatian

    10 Charge d'affaires, this is the following page, where

    11 you can see, in particular, the description of the

    12 situation. "In the area of Vitez," which is a town in

    13 Central Bosnia, "the largest Bosnian Croat enclave in

    14 central Bosnia," and the letter claims that the

    15 population is "threatened by the Bosnian Muslim armed

    16 force. We have received the report of high military

    17 activity by the Bosnian Muslim army in that area where

    18 two Bosnian Croat villages, Zabrdje and Jeliko, on the

    19 outskirts of Vitez have already been overrun, and the

    20 residents have been expelled. Presently, more than

    21 40,000 refugees, mostly Bosnian Croats, are living in

    22 deplorable conditions inside Vitez."

    23 This was in a letter in -- that was sent by

    24 Sacirbey, and this is a letter that followed the

    25 situation in -- let me say, all the attacks of the

  77. 1 army -- of the Bosnian army in Central Bosnia when the

    2 Croats were defeated and they had to come back again

    3 from the centre of Bosnia.

    4 So this is -- again, the Bosnian authorities

    5 have noted existence of ammunition in Vitez. They are

    6 showing how concerned they were in this context for the

    7 situation of the Croatian population in a period of

    8 offensive made by the army of Bosnia. On the other

    9 side we have the concern of Mr. Sacirbey about

    10 organisation and demonstration in Croatia of what was

    11 going on in Zagreb.

    12 So this can offer to -- a different picture

    13 of two -- of situation of tensions that was not only in

    14 Bosnia but created tensions between Bosnia and Zagreb

    15 too.

    16 We can go further, on document 126 K.

    17 Q. I think that was a letter attached to that,

    18 it's the second paragraph of the letter that you ...

    19 A. Yes, the second paragraph of the -- is an

    20 information that claimed in November, more or less when

    21 the offensive of the army was going on -- Bosnian army

    22 was going on in Central Bosnia, the old bridge in

    23 Mostar was destroyed by the Croatian army. "On this

    24 day ... the Croatian army and the Croatian Defence

    25 Council has destroyed the most significant monument of

  78. 1 Bosnian-Herzogovinian culture." This is a document --

    2 official protest from the Presidency of

    3 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government

    4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina informing the Security Council

    5 what was happening and they charged the Croatian army

    6 was taking part in the military operation in Mostar.

    7 Q. And is this more or less a continuation of

    8 the issues -- of the cooperation between the Croatian

    9 army and the Defence Council that you referred to when

    10 you looked at the Bogatca documents of 1992?

    11 A. Yes, exactly.

    12 Q. The next document?

    13 A. The next one is 126 -- sorry, 126 L.

    14 Q. Again, it's another letter, and if you would

    15 look at the third paragraph of the letter?

    16 A. Yes. The third paragraph of the letter is --

    17 this letter is a letter of -- signed by Izetbegovic, it

    18 was signed in November of 1993, to the

    19 Secretary-General, and he's stressing that -- this is

    20 very important. This was the position of the Bosnian

    21 government, the official position of the Bosnian

    22 government, when you can see it's written that "the

    23 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a conflict

    24 of" -- this is the protest -- "of three sides, as

    25 stated in your letter. It is an open and brutal

  79. 1 aggression against an independent State, which is a

    2 Member State of the United Nations. A direct

    3 consequence of the aggression has been the

    4 establishment of phantom para-states in the territory

    5 of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..." Phantom para-states are

    6 to be considered Herceg-Bosna from one side and the

    7 Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other

    8 side. "... which was followed by a legitimacy given by

    9 the international community, taking them as the sides

    10 to the conflict. It is not possible to conduct a peace

    11 process successfully having such hypotheses on its

    12 grounds."

    13 Q. What is meant by that?

    14 A. Pardon?

    15 Q. What do you understand him to be saying

    16 there? What's the purpose that he's trying to convey?

    17 A. So the question is that, in fact, the two

    18 para-states are acting for other two neighbour states

    19 and they are connected with them, so in this case the

    20 claim is that they were involved in order to divide

    21 Bosnia and not as a conflict within Bosnia and a

    22 conflict -- civil conflict, a civil conflict in a state

    23 but an aggression coming from Serbia and Croatia and,

    24 in this case, an international conflict.

    25 Q. And the next document, 126 --

  80. 1 A. The next document is 126 M.

    2 Q. And I think -- the annex again is the

    3 interesting part of that, is it not, in the first

    4 paragraph -- first and second paragraphs of the

    5 annex.

    6 A. Yes. This a document -- this is a letter

    7 sent on 28 January, 1994, so we are in a new year, 1994.

    8 It was sent by the Prime Minister of Bosnia, Haris

    9 Silajdzic, and was sent to the President of

    10 Security Council, and the letter is -- includes in the

    11 centre -- here in the -- after the second paragraph, it

    12 includes a list from the -- information of the

    13 government, a list of the military actions carried in the

    14 territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by

    15 brigades of the Croat army.

    16 So you can see the description of the brigade

    17 of Split, the brigade from Zagreb, the brigade from

    18 Srebrenica, Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Varazdin, and

    19 you have a list of different units of the army, and

    20 this was the list submitted by the Bosnian government

    21 to the United Nations to show who was participating

    22 in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 Q. And this letter is dated the 28th of January,

    24 1994.

    25 A. Yeah.

  81. 1 Q. And over the page, I think there's a

    2 reference, is there not, in the centre of the page, the

    3 paragraph: "Thus we conclude." Do you see that

    4 paragraph?

    5 A. The final paragraph of the -- you mean the

    6 final paragraph of the letter?

    7 Q. No, I don't mean that. I meant the paragraph

    8 which is the fourth paragraph on the second -- on page

    9 3, which is the last page of the letter.

    10 A. Ah, yes, on the Posavina front in the Sector

    11 of Orasje, four brigades of the Croatian army. I can't

    12 see in the ...

    13 Q. You've got the wrong page. It's the next

    14 page I want you to refer to.

    15 A. This is.

    16 Q. Would you refer to the next page?

    17 A. The second page?

    18 Q. Yes. It becomes the third page. You see the

    19 paragraph "Thus we conclude."

    20 A. "We express our deep concern."

    21 Q. No, the top.

    22 A. On the top?

    23 Q. "Thus we conclude." The paragraph starting

    24 "Thus we conclude." It's the fourth paragraph down.

    25 A. Ah, "Thus we conclude," yes, yes, "we


  82. 1 conclude that in the sector of Mostar, Prozor and

    2 Gornji Vakuf, twelve brigades of the regular Croatian

    3 army with manpower estimated at 15,000 to 18,000

    4 soldiers is directly involved in military operations."

    5 You see, this 15,000 is the number which was

    6 estimated by the International Institute for Strategic

    7 Studies when we saw yesterday the figures about the

    8 forces arrayed in Bosnia, and this was more or less the

    9 evolution in 1993, beginning 1994. "... involved in

    10 military operations. In the Posavina sector," which is

    11 the north of Bosnia, "the estimate goes as far as

    12 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers of the Croatian army.

    13 Accordingly, the estimate ranges from 25,000 to 30,000

    14 soldiers of the Croatian army actively participating in

    15 military operations against the Republic of Bosnia and

    16 Herzegovina."

    17 This was the conclusion from the Bosnian

    18 point of view, from the Bosnian official, from the

    19 Bosnian government point of view.

    20 Q. And the next paragraph I think --

    21 A. "This high number of Croatian regular army

    22 troops are supplemented by heavy artillery, armoured

    23 vehicles and numerous other war materials" coming from

    24 Croatia.

    25 Q. And again is this a development and

  83. 1 progression of what was happening in 1992 when

    2 General --

    3 A. Yes, it's a progression we can see in the

    4 other documents prepared directly by -- in the

    5 following documents prepared by the United Nations,

    6 their estimation, thanks to the possibility of

    7 UNPROFOR personnel to check the information. So this

    8 was the position of the government. But the following

    9 document, for instance, the 126 N, is a document of the

    10 Security Council.

    11 Q. Again, this one's dated 2nd February, 1994, I

    12 think?

    13 A. It is the 2nd February, yes. The previous

    14 document was the 28th of January. So four days after.

    15 And this is a document -- this is signed by the --

    16 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros

    17 Boutros-Ghali, and was -- is a letter addressed by him,

    18 the 2nd February -- the 1st February, from the

    19 Secretary-General to the President of the Security

    20 Council. And what is interesting is particularly the

    21 third paragraph: "The Croatian Army has directly

    22 supported the HVO in terms of manpower, equipment and

    23 weapons for some time. Initially the level of support

    24 was limited to individual and small sub-units, many of

    25 them volunteers. As the offensives of the Bosnia and

  84. 1 Herzegovina Government forces against the HVO have

    2 become successful, the numbers of Croatian soldiers

    3 appear to have increased. It is assessed that in total

    4 there is the equivalent of three Croatian Brigades of

    5 regular Army personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    6 approximately 3,000 to 5,000 (this is an

    7 estimation ...)" This is important. "(... as it is

    8 impossible with UNPROFOR's assets to obtain required

    9 information for a more accurate account). There have

    10 been confirmed reports by UNPROFOR personnel that

    11 elements (troops and equipment) from the following

    12 Croatian Army (HV) units are indeed present in central

    13 and southern Bosnia and Herzegovina."

    14 And then you see the list of the personnel,

    15 the elements, on the basis of the UNPROFOR personnel,

    16 which kind of brigade were operating in the central and

    17 southern Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Croatian

    18 army. Then you have the list of the army.

    19 Then you have the following paragraph in the

    20 following page explaining that: "Equipment includes

    21 heavy artillery and multi-barrelled rocket launchers,"

    22 so "Most recently" and "is unable to confirm positively

    23 any Croatian Army tank activity in Bosnia and

    24 Herzegovina." So there was no clear evidence of this;

    25 they didn't have. "Also in January ... confirmed that

  85. 1 four helicopter flights from Croatia crossed into

    2 Bosnia and Herzegovina." They have different

    3 information but information that, however, a certain

    4 number of brigades and soldiers of the Croatian army

    5 were acting in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period between

    6 1993 and 1994.

    7 Q. Now, just going back, I think, to document

    8 123 that we haven't looked at, exhibit 123, it's a --

    9 it was one of the documents that I think was ...

    10 A. Yeah.

    11 Q. You may not be able to get it -- see if you

    12 can find it there. It's 123, exhibit 123. It's a

    13 Security Council document of the 3rd of February, 1994.

    14 A. Yeah. This is the 3rd of February, the day

    15 after.

    16 Q. Yes.

    17 A. Yes. On the basis of this letter sent by

    18 Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This is the number 123.

    19 Q. I think it's the first paragraph that's

    20 particularly interesting, is it not?

    21 A. The first paragraph: "The Security Council

    22 is deeply concerned that the Republic of Croatia has

    23 deployed elements of the Croatian Army along with heavy

    24 military equipment in the central and southern parts of

    25 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as described in

  86. 1 the Secretary-General's letter of 1 February 1994," the

    2 letter we read before.

    3 And then you can see the fourth paragraph

    4 is: "The Security Council demands that the Republic of

    5 Croatia withdraw forthwith all elements of the Croatian

    6 Army (HV)" -- you see there the symbol -- "along with

    7 military equipment and fully respect the territorial

    8 integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

    9 What is interesting even more is the first

    10 paragraph of the next page of this document: "The

    11 Security Council will consider other serious measures

    12 if the Republic of Croatia fails to put an immediate

    13 end to all forms of interference in the Republic of

    14 Bosnia and Herzegovina."

    15 This is a very important topic because this

    16 is a first official threat to Zagreb with sanctions.

    17 As far as I know, the first policy maker who spoke

    18 about sanctions and threatened Croatia with sanctions

    19 was the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus

    20 Kinkel, in May 1993 when he was in Zagreb, and he spoke

    21 to Tudjman and he was very concerned about the policy

    22 of Croatian government.

    23 The international community also in November

    24 put pressures on Tudjman because they considered that

    25 a particular responsibility of the Croatian army was --

  87. 1 in November where it destroyed the villages of Pocitelj

    2 and Divoselo, and Tudjman promised to hold an inquiry

    3 in this sense.

    4 Then we had other threats of sanctions

    5 particularly in February, this is February 1994, when

    6 Kohl made a dramatic speech on the television in

    7 February 1994 and even the Italian Minister of Foreign

    8 Affairs, Andreatta, threatened Zagreb with sanctions in

    9 that month.

    10 So this was the month for putting the firm

    11 international pressure on the Croatian government in

    12 order to obtain the withdrawal of the Croatian army

    13 units in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 Q. Now can we go on to the next document, 126 N,

    15 which is again a document of the 2nd of February, 1994.

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. And it's a letter, is it not, from --

    18 A. This is a letter.

    19 Q. -- from Croatia, the permanent representative

    20 for Croatia, United Nations.

    21 A. Yes. This is a letter -- yes. A letter of

    22 February 2nd, 1994. It was written by the permanent

    23 representative of Croatia in -- at the United Nations,

    24 and --

    25 Q. The second paragraph --

  88. 1 A. The second paragraph is very crucial: "My

    2 government," it is written, "does not deny that there

    3 are regular Croatian Army troops in the border areas

    4 between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of

    5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are stationed there in

    6 accordance with the Joint Agreement of 12 July 1992" --

    7 probably this was a mistake, typewritten mistake, the

    8 agreement was of the 21st of July -- anyway -- "between

    9 my Government and the Government of the Republic of

    10 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Repositioning of these troops

    11 would seriously undermine the territorial integrity and

    12 security of the Republic of Croatia."

    13 This -- the agreement between -- which is

    14 mentioned here in this letter was signed on July 21st,

    15 1992 by Izetbegovic and Tudjman, and it considered that

    16 HVO was a part of the army, of the Bosnian army, and,

    17 secondly, it was written that cooperation between the

    18 Croatian army and the Bosnian army was possible along

    19 the borders, but any future military alliance between

    20 the two countries will be taken into consideration

    21 only, only in the event that the international

    22 community has failed in attempts at stopping the war in

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

    24 So it was under the condition.

    25 And immediately after the signing of this

  89. 1 document, Tudjman put pressure again on Izetbegovic

    2 in order to have a more complete alliance and

    3 federation or confederation but Izetbegovic rejected

    4 the proposal all the time.

    5 So this was the agreement and this

    6 important -- interesting -- it is interesting --

    7 Q. Just before you move on, I think the fact of

    8 the matter is, is it not, the HVO did not at any stage

    9 come under the control of the army of

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    11 A. In fact, no. In fact, HVO acted as an

    12 independent army in the sense that you see there were

    13 attempts in July, attempts -- the agreement was that it

    14 was -- it had to be part of the army. Later, in April,

    15 in April 1993, it was signed again, the document we

    16 see, between Mate Boban and Izetbegovic, is annexed to

    17 the other one with the witness of Tudjman. It was

    18 stated that HVO will have a representative in the army,

    19 but these agreements didn't work. The attempt was

    20 not -- on the contrary, in the beginning -- at the

    21 beginning of 1993, we have the order of Prlic, the head

    22 of HVO, the President, which established that in the

    23 cantons of the provisional plan assigned to Croatia,

    24 the commander of the army had to be submitted to the

    25 HVO command. So you have, in this case, the country.

  90. 1 Q. But you cite this nevertheless in support for

    2 your proposition that the HVO and the army of Croatia,

    3 the HV, had a sort of continuity in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    4 right from '92 through to '95.

    5 A. If I can say, my personal opinion was that

    6 this was the same army, same army.

    7 Q. Thank you.

    8 A. The connection were so strong that we can --

    9 from the political point of view, the approach from the

    10 political -- as a political scientist, I can say that

    11 the main impression was that this was the same army.

    12 I would like just to turn your attention even

    13 to the sentence on the second page of the letter of

    14 Nobilo, Mario Nobilo. This is: "Under such

    15 circumstances, where the Council doesn't have the

    16 resources to protect the Croat citizens of Bosnia and

    17 Herzegovina, my Government has no moral right to

    18 prevent the Croatian volunteers from helping the

    19 imperilled Bosnian Croat community, which makes up 18

    20 percent of the country's population, but has been

    21 expelled onto 10 percent of the country's territory."

    22 So this sentence is important in order to

    23 consider the following letter. This was the official

    24 statement generally defended by the Croatian

    25 government, that people fighting in Bosnia was citizens

  91. 1 of Bosnia, were born in Bosnia, were volunteers without

    2 any control, official control from the Croatian army.

    3 This was the official position of the Croatian

    4 government at that point.

    5 But if you look at the following document,

    6 number 126 P, this document is a document -- is a

    7 letter again sent on 16 February, 1994, through the

    8 permanent representative Mario Nobilo, the Croatian

    9 permanent representative in the United Nations sent by

    10 Mate Granic, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for

    11 Foreign Affairs of Croatia to the Secretary-General.

    12 This letter, I would like to turn your

    13 attention in particular to page 3, the fourth and the

    14 fifth paragraphs, where we are informed that: "As a

    15 peace-promoting step in cooperation with the Security

    16 Council and as a goodwill gesture towards the Sarajevo

    17 Government, in the meantime my Government expresses its

    18 readiness to withdraw certain units from the border

    19 areas with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with

    20 the recent Security Council request."

    21 This again is consistent with the letter, the

    22 previous letter, sent by Mr. Nobilo. "But my

    23 government," Croatian government, of course, "calls

    24 upon the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and

    25 Herzegovina immediately to order its army to cease all

  92. 1 hostilities and offensive actions against Croatian

    2 population centres, especially in the region of central

    3 Bosnia. Following the cessation of hostilities, we

    4 shall issue an appeal to all Croat volunteers in

    5 central Bosnia to lay down their arms and return to

    6 their normal civilian lives."

    7 So this is another element.

    8 And then it is interesting, the following

    9 sentence: "The Republic of Croatia is ready to call

    10 off the units of the Croatian Army on the left bank of

    11 the Neretva River and elements of the Croatian Army on

    12 the right bank on the Neretva."

    13 I would like to show you just a moment a map

    14 of Bosnia, if I can say again, just to give you a

    15 picture. This is again map 114, because it's

    16 clear. And you can see Bosnia and where the Neretva

    17 River is. So the left bank is this --

    18 JUDGE NIETO NAVIO: I'm sorry, Mr. President,

    19 I cannot change my screen.

    20 MR. NIEMANN: Nor can I.

    21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me. Do we have a

    22 technical problem since my colleague judges cannot

    23 follow on the screen, on the monitor, the document. I

    24 personally can. I have the images.

    25 I would kindly ask the technical service to

  93. 1 inform me -- yes, on one of the screens, we do have the

    2 image of the map. On the other one, we do not.

    3 Obviously, we do have a problem. Now everything is all

    4 right.

    5 I think everything is under control now. Do

    6 we all have the images on the screen?

    7 I think there are some disturbances in the

    8 transmission because when I have an image on, picture

    9 on the screen -- excuse me -- we could continue if we

    10 get the picture back. But in the meantime, it has

    11 changed again.

    12 We're speaking of document 124.

    13 Continue.

    14 A. Okay. Now I lost my picture on the monitor,

    15 but doesn't matter. You can see here on the map the

    16 Neretva River, which the document speaks about, Mate Granic

    17 is speaking about the units of the Croatian army on the

    18 left bank, which is this one, and volunteers,

    19 volunteers -- and the elements. One is the -- one of

    20 the elements of the Croatian army.

    21 The units of the Croatian army are on the

    22 left bank, this here, and the elements of the Croatian

    23 army on the right bank. So you can see that it's

    24 difficult to say that they were exactly along the

    25 border, albeit that they were not only in a point near

  94. 1 to the border, you know?

    2 So this is, in a way, a kind of admission

    3 from the Deputy Prime Minister that the army was -- the

    4 Croatian army was in the territory of Herzegovina along

    5 the river Neretva instead of the borders.

    6 A kind of confirmation is in the following

    7 documents. Yes.

    8 MR. NIEMANN:

    9 Q. Because I think if you go to exhibit 126

    10 Q, and in particular the fourth paragraph starting on

    11 the 10th February, "UNPROFOR observed." Fourth

    12 paragraph, first page.

    13 A. Fourth paragraph, yes.

    14 Fourth paragraph. Yes. "On 10 February,

    15 UNPROFOR observed a convoy ..."

    16 This letter is the letter of 17 February, and

    17 it comes from Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali

    18 to the President of the Security Council, so it's

    19 information coming from the personnel of the

    20 UNPROFOR to the Secretary-General, and then the

    21 Secretary-General is referring to the President of the

    22 Security Council in February.

    23 And in this letter it is written that

    24 UNPROFOR -- in the fourth paragraph it is written that

    25 "UNPROFOR observed a convoy of the Croatian Defence

  95. 1 Council (HVO), consisting of 21 trucks and other

    2 equipment, leaving the territory of Bosnia and

    3 Herzegovina via the Lipa checkpoint," which is a little

    4 bit strange that a convoy of HVO, that is, of the

    5 Croatian army -- the Bosnian Croatia army was going to

    6 Croatia in this period.

    7 "One of these trucks had markings of the

    8 Fifth HV Brigade." That is the Fifth Croatian Army

    9 Brigade. "The convoy also included a bus carrying 36

    10 soldiers with insignia of an independent Croatian Army

    11 unit from Zagreb. The event was videotaped by a

    12 uniformed cameraman of the (Croatian army) or (the

    13 Croatian Army of Bosnia.)"

    14 So in this case, it is informing that

    15 something is going on, some withdrawal is going on, and

    16 UNPROFOR officials were noticing that troops with

    17 different insignia were crossing the borders toward

    18 Croatia.

    19 The same document, in the following page,

    20 page 2, you can see in the third paragraph: "In the

    21 absence of any observations of (a Croatian Army)

    22 withdrawal movements beyond that on 10 February,

    23 UNPROFOR continues to assess that there still may be

    24 5,000 (Croatian Army) troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    25 although no (Croatian Army) command posts nor any full

  96. 1 (Croatian Army) brigades operating as formed units have

    2 been identified."

    3 So they estimate because the problem was that

    4 they didn't have insignia. And in this sense -- it

    5 appears -- the following sentence is also interesting:

    6 "It appears that (Croatian Army) troops are now being

    7 more circumspect ..." This is interesting. "... and

    8 may be removing their (Croatian Army) insignia while in

    9 Bosnia and Herzegovina and replacing them with those of

    10 the HVO. UNPROFOR believes that (Croatian Army)

    11 insignia on a number of vehicles has been erased or

    12 repainted." Which is consistent with orders received

    13 since 1992 from Bobetko.

    14 We can go further. Another document is 126

    15 R.

    16 This is a letter of 17 February, 1994, the

    17 same date -- the same day of the previous document.

    18 The letter was sent by the Ambassador Nobilo as the

    19 Croatian representative to the United Nations, to the

    20 Secretary-General, and these two paragraphs, the second

    21 and the third, are interesting enough.

    22 The first one informs us that "Croatian

    23 volunteers that had been situated" -- we are speaking

    24 about volunteers -- "that had been situated in the

    25 Uskoplje-Rama area in Central Bosnia" -- so this is

  97. 1 Central Bosnia -- "have returned to the Republic of

    2 Croatia on 10 February 1994. The convoy consisted of

    3 24 [sic] vehicles with 12 heavy artillery weapons, 3

    4 buses, and 650 volunteers --"

    5 Q. I think that's 44 vehicles.

    6 A. Yes. It says here 44 vehicles, yeah.

    7 The second paragraph informs us that on

    8 16 February, six days after, at 10.00 hours "elements of

    9 the Croatian Army" -- not anymore volunteers, "elements

    10 of the Croatian Army left the wider Neretva river

    11 region." You say "wider" means something very generic

    12 but wide, more than wide. So if you look again at the

    13 map 114 and you see the river Neretva area and you can

    14 see in this case the term "wider Neretva river

    15 region," this means it is not just some point but wider

    16 means an area large enough to include all the regions

    17 existing around the Neretva river. So this means --

    18 this is another admission that elements -- at least

    19 elements of the Croatian Army were in wider Neretva

    20 region until 16 February, 1994.

    21 And the document goes on: "... and I

    22 have been repositioned in the Metkovic area," Metkovic

    23 is in Croatia, "on the territory of the Republic of

    24 Croatia. I have received information from my

    25 authorities that amongst the aforesaid elements of the

  98. 1 Croatian Army were 600 soldiers, 4 battle tanks and 6

    2 heavy artillery pieces."

    3 So they had to admit that anyway. They have

    4 tanks, artillery pieces, and soldiers in the wider

    5 Neretva River region.

    6 MR. NIEMANN: I think, Professor, it is now

    7 half past one, and Your Honours may wish to adjourn at

    8 this stage.

    9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: We will adjourn our

    10 hearing. I believe that only two documents still

    11 remain to be discussed; is it not so? Four.

    12 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, there's some

    13 other documents, but I'll be very short in the

    14 morning. I wouldn't expect to be longer than an hour

    15 at most, but I'm just about ready to wrap up.

    16 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Okay. We will therefore

    17 adjourn the hearing for today, and tomorrow we will

    18 reconvene at 9.00 a.m. Thank you, Professor.

    19 --- Whereupon proceedings concluded at 1.30

    20 p.m. until May 7, 1998, at 9.00 a.m.