1 Friday, May 8, 1998
2 (In open session)
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
4 (The witness entered court)
5 (The accused entered court)
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Good morning, ladies and
7 gentlemen. Good morning, Mr. Prosecutor, counsel, the
8 interpreters, the technical booth. Are we all set and
9 ready? Yes, we are. We shall continue with the
10 hearing with Professor Bianchini.
11 Good morning, Professor Bianchini.
12 Mr. Mikulicic, you have the floor.
13 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honour, good morning.
14 Dear colleague, good morning. Mr. Prosecutor,
15 Professor Bianchini.
16 So this morning we shall resume and pick up
17 where we ended yesterday, and that is questions through
18 the counsel, defence.
19 I would kindly ask the usher to pass to
20 Professor Bianchini the exhibit, exhibit numbers 116,
21 119, 126 in order to be able to compare them. 116,
22 119, and 126.
23 Stefano Bianchini (continued)
24 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic
25 Q. Yesterday, we discussed the issue that at the
1 meeting in Villa Konak on the 7th and 8th of March,
2 1992, between Messrs. Boban, Izetbegovic, and Karadzic,
3 the principles of the new order of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina were discussed, and here as exhibit 116 we
5 have the map based on that. Do we have it?
6 Yesterday, we also stated that the division
7 on this map coincides practically to the Vance-Owen
8 Plan which followed about a year later. If we take
9 into consideration these two maps with set-up of the
10 ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, bearing this
11 in mind, I will kindly ask you, Professor, for your
12 comments concerning the decision, the exhibit 126, on
13 the establishment founding of the Croatian community of
14 Herceg-Bosna. Here you can see that this was published
15 in the national gazette in September 1992 and it is
16 based on the session on the 3rd of July, 1992, when the
17 decision was adopted in this form. Do you agree, sir?
18 A. Not exactly because the problem is that the
19 document, as you can see, is of November 18, 1991. So
20 it was published in the official gazette in
21 September 1992; that is more or less one year later. I
22 think for the simple reason that in November 1991, they
23 didn't have any official gazette. The official gazette
24 started to be published after July 1992. So this is, I
25 think, the reason that they wanted to give a more
1 official meaning to a decision, in fact, made one year
3 Q. I agree, Professor, but, please, I would like
4 to draw your attention to the fact that the initial
5 decision from November 1991 was amended and
6 supplemented at the session of the third of July,
7 1993. Therefore, the final form of the decision which
8 was published in the official gazette and was published
9 on the 7th of July, 1993.
10 A. Yes, you have --
11 Q. Please, take into consideration the
12 introduction of the decision.
13 A. No, I'm just thinking if the elements that
14 were included instead of that -- it was only the
15 so-called, in English it is "The reasons." So this
16 part: While all the decision about the so-called
17 basic, basic decisions, that is from the article 1 to
18 the end are the same. So they added this part in this
19 sense --
20 Q. My question, Professor, sir, was: Do you
21 agree that at the meeting on the 3rd of July, 1992,
22 this decision, which was published in the national
23 gazette, was given its final form and shape?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As it has been stated in the introduction.
1 Professor, could you comment on the point of
2 this decision under 'I' on the reasons, heading
3 "Reasons," which refers to the reasons for setting up
4 the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna. What is the
6 A. You mention the first paragraph which means
7 "Faced with ruthless aggression."
8 Q. That's right.
9 A. Army and Chetniks on the Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia with the
11 tremendous number of human victims with suffering and
12 ordeals with the fact that the age old Croatian
13 territories and goods are being taken away with the
14 destruction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 and its legally elected bodies, the Croatian people of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the difficult moments of its
17 history, when the last Communist army of Europe united
18 with the Chetniks is endangering the existence of the
19 Croatian people and the Republic of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina is deeply aware that its future lies with
21 the future of the entire Croatian people. Yes.
22 Q. I wish to hear your comment on the reasons of
23 why the community of Herceg-Bosna was set up on the
24 basis of just what you have just read, sir.
25 A. From this document, it's clear that exist a
1 common concern for the future of the Croatian people,
2 both in Croatia and in the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 where Croatian people still live. So the attention is
4 particularly centred on the future of the Croat
5 people and the ties between the two groups of Croats
6 in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is
7 the focus of their concern.
8 Q. I understand. When you say that the focus is
9 the survival of the Croatian people, can you comment in
10 what framework? I would like to indicate to you parts
11 of this decision where it speaks of the destruction of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina and also the endeavours for a
13 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, and where does the
14 Croatian people see its place in Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 in a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina?
16 A. Yes, it's written about the sovereignty of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it's written also with the
18 destruction of the Republic which is considered as a
19 matter of fact already in existence, and this is a document
20 of July. Please, we have to take into account the two
21 questions. When in April 1992 HVO was created, under
22 article 2 of the document which was prepared and signed
23 by Mate Boban, it is clearly stated that HVO has the
24 duty to protect the territorial sovereignty of Herceg-Bosna
25 and protect Croatian people. This is a very important
1 point. And the second point is a document signed by --
2 I have this document -- signed by Mate Boban on the 10th
3 of April, two days later, where it is written that the
4 HVO represent the army of the Croatian people, because
5 they don't accept the Territorial Defence, that is the
6 Bosnian army, as their own military army because they
7 don't have any confidence in it.
8 So in this sense, I think that considering
9 these two documents before, the attention is that they
10 are already declaring that Bosnia-Herzegovina doesn't
11 exist anymore, and they are particularly interested,
12 albeit they repeat the sovereignty of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The focus of the interest of this
14 document is that they are particularly concerned with the
15 Croats fate in Croatia and in Herzegovina, but not in
16 the general -- in the general context of
18 Q. Professor, I would like to focus on the
19 commenting of this document which has been submitted as
20 an exhibit here. Later on, we will pass on to other
22 Could you agree with the conclusion, sir,
23 that in the text of this document, as the reason for
24 setting up the community of Herceg-Bosna, that it will
25 be set up due to the ruthless aggression of JNA and
1 Chetniks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the destruction of the
2 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, third that the
3 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina will support a
4 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina, and article 5 of this
5 document on the second page, that the community,
6 community of Herceg-Bosna, will respect and recognise
7 the legally elected bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 Are these the basis for setting up the community of
10 A. I just add, to agree with you -- to this
11 question, that one is written on the sovereignty of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is added that but always
13 emphasising that they are protecting their own
14 historical area and the interests of the entire
15 Croat people. There own historical area means that
16 they were particularly interested in protecting
17 Herzegovina, not the whole Bosnia, not Bosnia as a
19 So it's -- it's possible to understand from
20 this document that there are some kind of cautious or
21 preventions in participating or in saving the whole
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that it's a document from
23 which we can understand that very early has been taken
24 into account that Bosnia-Herzegovina has disappeared
25 very rapidly.
1 Q. I would ask you again, Professor, to answer
2 the question which has been put. Do we, from this
3 document, on the basis of the text which was also
4 published in the official gazette, does it indicate
5 that Herceg-Bosna was founded in view -- due to the
6 reason of the JNA and Chetniks' aggression, its
7 destruction for the creation of independent Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina and for the independent Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, these are the postulates of this decision,
10 and do you agree that the reasons for setting up a
11 Bosnian community was in the document?
12 A. ... contained the following sentence: On the
13 emphasis, I don't agree.
14 Q. I did not understand.
15 A. -- your question that in all the topics, in
16 all the topics you mentioned, you include that this
17 sovereignty has been, in a way, considered that the
18 Croatian Democratic Union emphasised that they are
19 protecting their own historical area and the interests
20 of the entire Croatian people. If you include this, I
21 agree. If you don't include, I can't be --
22 Q. Of course, Professor, sir, of course I
23 include that particular thesis --
24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me for interrupting,
25 but your dialogue is quite interesting, but one should
1 bear in mind the fact that you have interpreters
2 mediating in your dialogue, and since you tend to reply
3 immediately, the interpreters are unable to finish the
4 translation and to translate your statements in full
5 whereas everything which you say is extremely
6 important, so please bear that in mind.
7 MR. MIKULICIC: Your Honours, the Defence
8 apologises for asking the questions too quickly. We
9 should certainly bear that in mind henceforth.
10 Q. Of course, Professor Bianchini, bearing in
11 mind this particular provision that the primary task is
12 to defend those parts of the sovereign Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina in which the ethnicity which we're talking
14 about lives, of course bearing that in mind but with a
15 view to the defence of part of the territory just as a
16 part of the entirety of Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you then
17 agree that the reason for the establishment of Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina is, as indicated, with the respect for
19 the democratically legally elected authorities as
20 proclaimed in article 5 of this decision?
21 A. I can agree if it's clear that there existed
22 this kind of peculiar accent on the aspect of the
23 protection of Croatian areas instead of whole
25 Q. The protection of the Croatian parts but
1 within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
2 A. Yes, Croats. It's not for the Muslims and
3 the others leaving Bosnia. This is the crucial
5 Q. I agree. But going back again to an attempt
6 to calm the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the part
7 of the international community from the attempt in
8 Villa Konak to the Vance-Owen Plan, and taking into
9 consideration all these endeavours on the part of the
10 international community to resolve the question in
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina, I should like to ask you for
12 your comment whether this decision, on the
13 establishment of Herceg-Bosna, especially with
14 reference to article II which states what
15 municipalities shall form part of the Croatian
16 community of Herceg-Bosna, does this fit in or, rather,
17 is this a logical sequence of the agreement, exhibit
18 116, from the Villa Konak and later of Vance Owen's
19 plan. I should like to kindly ask you to take stock of
20 the names of these municipalities and to compare the
21 municipalities which comprise -- are comprised in the
22 map which is exhibit 116 and map which is part of
23 exhibit 126.
24 So, please, does the indication, the
25 designation of municipalities from the decision on the
1 establishment of a Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna,
2 does it coincide with the division shown in this map
3 which was made under the auspices of the international
5 Professor, sir, perhaps it would be of help
6 to you in answering this question to have the map from
7 the Vance-Owen Plan which I have copied from the book
8 of Karlo Rotim which is the defence of Herceg-Bosna
9 where the municipalities are described by name, and
10 this map which is in the file, the court file, you
11 cannot see the names of municipalities, so I should
12 like to ask the usher to come and pass this map to
13 Professor Bianchini. Of course, I have copies also for
14 my colleagues from the OTP and for Your Honours as
16 THE REGISTRAR: This is exhibit number D6.
17 A. Well, the decision of creating a Croatian
18 community of Herceg-Bosna with adding this part, the
19 Reasons of July, but the community of Herceg-Bosna was
20 created in November 1991. That is -- sorry. The list
21 of the -- in the article II, the list of the
22 municipalities which are included here is the same. So
23 in this case, it's correct to say that they were
24 preparing -- they were -- this area, which is included
25 in the Vance-Owen Plan, which is included in the Konak
1 more or less, because the difference is little -- the
2 differences are little, have not only the document in
3 between of this document we are speaking about that is
4 of July 1992 but we have also the previous decision of
5 November 1991, in which the list of the municipalities
6 is the same.
7 So if you can consider that the international
8 community in a way considered to establish an area with
9 a majority of Croatian population which corresponded
10 with the list of the municipalities claimed by the
11 Croatian community since November 1991, this is
12 correct. Since November 1991.
13 Q. Thank you. I should like to ask you for a
14 small comment also, going back to our conversation of
15 yesterday, regarding the document that you mentioned
16 from November 1991. Will we agree that -- it was a
17 party document, and that it was a document about the
18 Croatian Democratic Union as a political party of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereas what was published in the
20 official gazette is a different form of document than a
21 party document; do you agree with that?
22 A. Not so much. Not so much. Take into
23 consideration the peculiar situation and the political
24 culture of people of that time, so if you consider from
25 the international point of view, from the legal
1 international point of view --
2 Q. Exactly.
3 A. -- ex post, you can consider one is the
4 party, one is a institutional organisation, which was
5 not anyway agreed with the government of Bosnia. This
6 is an autonomous decision. So this is -- this
7 institutional framework is not coming from an agreement
8 within the government and established in this sense,
9 it's an autonomous decision. It is a claim, in a
11 Anyway, taking into consideration that the
12 political culture and the mentality of the time was so
13 that institutional building and the role of the party
14 had not so clear and evident borders in between the two
15 things, I think that we have to take into account this
16 peculiar political aspect. We cannot remain close to a
17 mere legal interpretation which I can understand from
18 different point of view, but if you ask from my point
19 of view, the answer can't be the same.
20 Q. You're probably right, Professor Bianchini.
21 That is a form of legal question rather than a question
22 for an expert of your vocation.
23 Let us --
24 A. No, sorry. No, sorry.
25 Q. Yes, please.
1 A. It's not a question of my -- only of my
2 peculiar -- particular orientation. I would contest an
3 only legal interpretation of these two documents
4 because you can't have a legal interpretation only if
5 you don't take into account also the peculiar political
6 culture and mentality of the policymakers at that time
7 when the documents were prepared. So it's not only a
8 question of my peculiar -- this is one -- because I'm
9 very sensitive in this sense because sometimes I have a
10 lot of discussions with other experts in the
11 international context when they move only from "legal
12 external point of view." This doesn't work in the
13 context of the former Yugoslavia. We have to take into
14 consideration that these elements must be compared with
15 the peculiar mentalities, situation and political
16 culture within. Otherwise, the result is that of
17 Vance-Owen. They thought -- they thought to have a
18 mediation in order to create two, three, ten cantons,
19 two, three areas with an ethnic majority in order to
20 save the sovereignty of Bosnia. But the interpretation
21 inside was they are legitimising us, so we have to
22 continue this in order later to erase the sovereignty
23 of Bosnia because this was the interpretation, this was
24 the reason why Messrs. Vance Owen and Owen Stoltenberg
25 shared the responsibility in this sense, because they
1 didn't take into account the peculiar mentality of the
2 people who were negotiating with them, and I think that
3 this has to be taken into account. Sorry.
4 Q. Of course, I can absolutely agree with you
5 that it is very easy to interpret events exposed and it
6 is quite another matter when we do it in this way. Let
7 us leave, however, these documents aside for the time
9 I will now pass onto a subject which has to
10 do with the establishment of the sovereign Republic of
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the developments which
12 ensued as well as touch upon the links between the
13 sovereign republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
14 Republic of Croatia as former republics of the
15 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. So let us
16 proceed from the beginning. Will you please be so kind
17 as to repeat for the benefit of the trial chamber when
18 was the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed?
19 A. From the governmental point of view, it was
20 immediately after the referendum, the outcomes of the
21 referendum were known, so in March -- March 1992,
22 albeit from the international point of view, the
23 recognition was on April 6th.
24 Q. So April 6th. April 6th, 1992, the
25 international community recognised the sovereignty of
1 the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and
2 independent state.
3 Q. Do you recall which state, from among the
4 international community thereafter was the first or
5 among the first to recognise the sovereignty of
6 Bosnia -- of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
7 more specifically on the 7th of April, the second day
8 after, in 1992, of course?
9 A. The international reaction, it was the United
10 States, Croatia, and other countries.
11 Q. So a day after, the international community
12 had recognised the sovereignty of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina; Croatia has self-recognised the
14 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can you
15 comment on this? How do you comment on this speedy
16 recognition on the part of Croatia, because we know
17 that many other countries did so much later.
18 A. We have in the exhibit the decision signed by
19 the President Tudjman on this, and we have had the
20 opportunity to comment already on this subject,
21 so I don't have any other evidence to stress in the
22 context of the former Yugoslavia. It was in a sense
23 understandable the recognition from Croatia because it
24 was expected that from the international community that
25 the country recognised just a few months earlier did
1 this step, particularly because otherwise the suspicion
2 that Croatia might have territorial claims immediately
3 on Bosnia would have endangered the recognition -- you
4 see that in the recognition, it was stated that they
5 recognised the state -- this was before the Badinter
6 commission made known his -- its opinion, that is,
7 between December 1991 and January 1992, it was stated
8 that recognition was followed only grant that a state
9 has no claims, territorial claims, towards neighbours.
10 So it was in this sense expected.
11 But the same document of the President
12 Tudjman included the famous recognition, dual
13 recognition of citizenship, which was not agreed with
14 the government of Bosnia. This was unilaterally a
15 decision included in the recognition, and this created
16 immediately concern and difficulties between Zagreb and
17 Sarajevo. Immediately.
18 Q. We shall come to that, Professor, sir. So on
19 the 7th of April, Croatia recognised the sovereignty of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 After that, there were contacts established
22 at the level of the governments of the two states, and
23 here I particularly have in mind the contact
24 established between the presidents Alija Izetbegovic
25 and Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb on the 21st of July in
1 1992. I have here the text of the agreement.
2 Unfortunately, for technical reasons, we have not
3 managed to have it translated and will do so
4 subsequently, but I do have a copy for you, for the
5 registry, for the colleagues from the OTP, but I should
6 like you to see this document so that we can hear your
7 comments on it. I should like to ask the usher to pass
8 the document to the professor.
9 Q. Professor, are you familiar with the text of
10 this agreement. So it emanated from the meetings
11 between Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Tudjman on July 21,
12 1992, in Zagreb.
13 Can you comment on this agreement for our
14 benefit in brief?
15 A. You know, because it's -- some of the copies
16 are not -- yeah.
17 Q. Quite generally.
18 A. This is a document that was attempting to
19 establish a kind of military alliance between Croatia
20 and Bosnia which was not in effect -- this was the aim
21 particularly of Mr. Tudjman. But a complete military
22 alliance had been rejected by Izetbegovic at that
23 time. So the compromise was this document. So this is
24 in general. Then we can speak about some specific
25 point, if you want.
1 What is very important is that point 6 is
2 that HVO is a part of the army of the Bosnian army; so
3 is considered in this document as a part of the Bosnian
4 army, which was not so clear before. The second
5 question is that the two countries agreed to cooperate
6 militarily alongside the borders, alongside the borders
7 of the two countries, and they made a decision, and
8 this is the point, point 8, that a military
9 alliance will be taken into account effectively only if
10 the international community will be unable to stop the
12 So in this sense, in this sense, the document
13 is, albeit some of my colleagues consider it a document
14 as a military alliance, I think it is -- we need to
15 have a more cautious evaluation of this document as a
16 document of creating -- aimed at creating better
17 relations between the two countries, taking into
18 account that concerns and tensions were already growing
19 between Croat authorities and Bosnian authorities.
20 Q. So this is your general interpretation. I
21 should like to ask you for a couple of specific
22 interpretations. I shall read the text to you so that
23 the text can be translated and then I will ask for your
24 comment. We are now on item 1. The president of the
25 presidency of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 and the president of the Republic of Croatia have
2 agreed that the future state set-up of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina shall proceed from the principle of full
4 equality of the three titular peoples, the Muslims, the
5 Croats, and the Serbs. The constitutional and the
6 political order of the country shall be based on the
7 constituent units in the establishment of which care
8 shall be taken of the national, historical, cultural,
9 economic, traffic, and other elements.
10 I am kindly asking you for a comment of this
12 A. Okay. The comment is that Izetbegovic, with
13 this point, accepted the idea that Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 will be transformed into a state which is based on areas
15 where the three titular nations have a dominant role in
16 considering this area with an integration of cultural,
17 political, economical -- which is included in the claim
18 of -- when Herceg-Bosna was created in November 1991.
19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that you considered
20 this document a military alliance, on the one hand, but
21 is it just a military alliance? I am pointing to the
22 text of the document which refers to the following
23 issues: Item II namely.
24 A. I don't consider this a military alliance, so
25 I would -- my colleagues sometimes interpret this in
1 this sense. I am more cautious, and I consider this a
2 document attempting to make, create better
3 conditions for improved relations between Croatia and
4 Bosnia. So it is a little bit different.
5 Q. Okay. Item 2 refers to the fact that the
6 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
7 Croatia will cooperate.
8 Now, line 3. As regards the questions of the
9 economy, financial, and energy -- industrial and energy
10 field cooperation, cooperation in restoring life in the
11 demolished areas, the addressing of property questions,
12 of physical and legal persons, the coordination of
13 social services in the respective states, and in
14 particular, in the field of work, of labour, social and
15 welfare policy, health, education, science, culture,
16 physical culture, scientific and technical cooperation,
17 cultural and educational cooperation, information, and
18 religious matters.
19 So we see that we're talking here about a
20 very comprehensive form of cooperation, complex
21 cooperation, covering all fields of life of a
22 community. Can I have your comment, please?
23 A. This is a -- as you know is a general --
24 general agreement, a general framework, where then you
25 have to go into details, but it's a general agreement
1 on the basis of which the two leaders decided to
2 cooperate in all these fields described.
3 Q. Professor, item 3 of this document. The
4 State delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina expresses its gratitude to the Republic of
6 Croatia for having accepted or taken in and caring for
7 refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
8 exceeding its possibilities. I shall just like to
9 remind you of a fact which was aired on the 9th of May
10 at the press conference in 1992, 9th of May, and that
11 was that on the 9th of May, 1992, practically at the
12 time of this period, Croatia had already taken care for
13 228,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina which was
14 around 5 percent of the total population of the
15 Republic of Croatia at the time. Can you comment on
17 A. A lot of -- a larger part of the population
18 from Bosnia, when the war started, fled the country,
19 and, of course, because of the borders, they went
20 immediately to Croatia when they did not -- didn't go
21 outside the former Yugoslavia at all.
22 In this sense, Croatia received a wave of
23 refugees, and this is an article where it is
24 appreciated the contribution of the Croatian government
25 in order to give hospitality to the refugees from
2 Q. Professor, are you perhaps aware what the
3 national composition of this number of refugees was,
4 these refugees who found shelter in the Republic of
5 Croatia and came from the Republic of Bosnia and
7 A. The large majority of them, I don't know the
8 exact percentage, but the large majority were Muslims.
9 Q. Item 4 of this agreement: "The Republic of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will
11 cooperate also in the field -- internal affairs and the
13 Item 5: "The President of the Republic of
14 Bosnia and the President of the Republic of Croatia
15 have agreed that in further pursuing their cooperation,
16 they shall meet regularly, at least twice a year."
17 Can you agree with the conclusion, Professor,
18 that here we are talking about an endeavour of
19 long-term cooperation through direct bilateral contact?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Yes, we have to take into account the
22 interpreters who do not have the document.
23 As for item 6, you have already made comment
24 in your introductory statement, which is that the
25 Republic of Croatia, the HVO was a constituent part of
1 the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Please
2 comment on paragraph 2 of item 6, and I'll read it now
3 for the sake of translation.
4 "The temporary civilian authorities, the
5 provisional civilian authorities, which were created in
6 the war conditions within the framework of the Croatian
7 Defence council, shall be coordinated and
8 established -- shall be brought into compliance as soon
9 as possible with the constitutional order of the
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on which talks shall
11 be immediately initiated in the spirit of the principle
12 referred to in item 1 of this agreement."
13 Let us remind ourselves, item 1 is the
14 agreement of the -- about the future constitutional
15 order of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the principles of
16 the full equality of the constituent peoples, the
17 Serbs, the Muslims, and the Croats. Can you comment
18 upon this part of the text?
19 A. Yes. On the one hand, this was a clear and
20 evident rejection of some of the sentences included in
21 the documents which created the HVO on the 8th of April, 1992,
22 and which followed the 10th of April. So in this
23 sense, it was clear that HVO was not another army
24 because the Croatian people did not recognise as its
25 own army, the Bosnian army, but here you see that the --
1 under the pressure, evidently under the pressure of the
2 Croatian government, it recognised that HVO is a part
3 of the army, so the Croatian people recognised as its
4 own the army of Bosnia as its own army, taking part in
5 the command. This was the decision. And secondly,
6 second sentence is that an agreement has to be started,
7 a negotiation has to be started in order to adopt the
8 evolution of the situation as far as concerned the
9 autonomy of Herceg-Bosna in the framework of a new
10 Bosnian -- a Bosnian state. So this is the comment for
11 the two paragraphs.
12 Q. Professor, please pay attention to the first
13 word in the second paragraph. It says temporarily,
14 provisional civilian authorities.
15 Do you agree that this agreement at the level
16 of the presidents of the two states has laid down that
17 the forms of organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 were of a temporary, provisional nature, as far as the
19 civilian authorities were concerned?
20 A. Yes. As far as I knew, this was temporary,
21 because it was not included this term "temporary" in
22 the previous Herzegovinan document.
23 Q. So it was temporary. We agree on that. Do
24 you agree that as regards further developments, it said
25 that there were would be further negotiations, and it
1 also referred to the fact that the two presidents would
2 be meeting twice a year. The issue was not defined,
3 namely, fully through the existing document but would
4 have been negotiated and further shaped in future
5 negotiations; do we agree that that was the gist of it?
6 A. Yes, this was the aim.
7 Q. Professor, a while ago you referred to the
8 context of the acquisition of citizenship, so would you
9 please pay attention to item 7 which I shall now read
10 for translation purposes.
11 I am quoting item 7: "The Republic of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia shall
13 mutually make it possible for each other's citizens to
14 acquire dual citizenship."
15 A. Yes, this is the recognition that a mutual --
16 mutual, double citizenship might be accepted according
17 to this. This is mutual. This is very important, this
18 term "Uzajamno." "Mutual." This means concerns not
19 only Bosnia but also Croatia. As you know, as you
20 know, the Croatian constitution was amended last
21 December and Muslims were erased as a nationality or
22 minority in Croatia.
23 Q. The same happened with the Slovenes?
24 A. I know. Yes, I know.
25 Q. You have already commented partially on item
1 8 in your introduction to the -- so I would like to
2 focus on paragraph 2 of item 8, which has to do with
3 the joint position of the two presidents to the effect
4 that there was continued aggression of Serb and
5 Montenegrin forces on the Republic of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, in this context paragraph 2
7 says, and I quote: "To that end, both States shall
8 continue their hitherto successful cooperation and
9 permanent coordination of their defensive operations in
10 the border zones between the two States."
11 Mr. Professor, can you agree when I say that
12 even before this agreement, there was successful
13 cooperation and that it was said that it would continue
14 in the border zones?
15 A. No. No. I don't agree. This is a sentence
16 to show a situation of cooperation which, in fact,
17 didn't exist. What happened -- there existed, some kind
18 of cooperation, at the beginning when it was not clear
19 for the population the first weeks of war. It was not
20 clear what was going on.
21 You know, the Serbs and Montenegrin -- the
22 JNA attacked, and attacked particularly in eastern
23 Bosnia, eastern Bosnia, and western Bosnia, in order to
24 create a corridor between these two areas. So a lot of
25 people, particularly Muslim and generally people who
1 did not heavy weapons, they started to fight or
2 because they wanted to defend the family, the house,
3 just these things. And then they -- when they found
4 the others -- other people fighting with them, they
6 So in the first weeks, you had Muslim people
7 joining the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and you had
8 Croatian people joining the army of Bosnia in Central
9 Bosnia. This was at the beginning. And later, this
10 polarised. When it happened, this.
11 One thing that was not known at the time, but
12 you have in evidence in the exhibit -- sorry, in the
13 evidence of the document of Bobetko, the 12th of April,
14 Bobetko gave the first order to leave off the insignia of
15 the Croatian army in Bosnia, and then before this
16 agreement, when Mostar was freed by the army -- by the
17 Croatian army and the HVO, the government in Bosnia
18 expected to have help in order to stop the siege of
19 Sarajevo, but the HVO didn't pay any effort to do this,
20 and this created great concerns. For this reason, they
21 went to Zagreb and they signed this kind of sentence in
22 order to hope to stop these kind of tensions growing
23 and to create the best condition for future
24 cooperations. But speaking about past good
25 cooperation, it seems to me that it was -- they were
1 policymakers so they interpreted, but the situation on
2 the ground was a little bit different, and the sentence
3 was -- in the terms they hoped in the future to have
4 this while claiming that it was already in the past,
5 but it was not exactly the situation.
6 Q. Yes. Be that as it may, we do have before us
7 an official document signed by the highest
8 representatives of two sovereign states. I suppose
9 that we cannot say that this particular sentence, which
10 I ask you to comment on, is false, or can we say that?
11 A. It's diplomatic sentence.
12 Q. In paragraph 3 of the same item, paragraph 3
13 of the same item says that unless there is an immediate
14 end put to the aggression on the states that -- and
15 that is the last sentence, and I'm quoting -- "all the
16 necessary forms shall be considered -- all the
17 necessary forms of broader cooperation shall be
18 considered and implemented in the military field as
19 well as a coordination of military operations for the
20 purpose of the definitive repelling of the danger which
21 was threatening the two states."
22 Can we agree that this refers to aggression
23 on the part of the Serb and Montenegrin armies on
24 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I should like to ask the registry to -- I
2 should like to tender this as a defence exhibit and I
3 should like the registry to take it into consideration
4 as such and mark it with the next number?
5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Do you have a comment, Mr.
7 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. We object to
8 the tender of it only on this basis: Until we've been
9 able to read it fully, when the translation is
10 available. So I don't expect, at the end of the day,
11 to be objecting to it, but I do object now because I
12 can't read it and I don't know what it says other than
13 what has been interpreted through Mr. Mikulicic.
14 So once the translation is available and
15 we've read it, I don't think there should be any
16 difficulties, but at this stage we do object.
17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Mikulicic, Mr. Niemann
18 is right, I believe. I feel that we cannot admit the
19 document without a translation, so we can speak about
20 the document as we have spoken about the constitution
21 which also has not been tendered into the file, but I
22 do not think that it is possible for it to be tendered
23 as an exhibit without a translation. So once we do
24 have the translation, you will be able to ask for it to
25 be tendered.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: The defence has apologised
2 because of the technical impossibility to also append a
3 translation to this document, but it will certainly do
4 so in the further course of the proceedings, and then
5 we shall ask Your Honours for it to be tendered.
6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you.
7 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked just
8 for the purposes of identification as defence exhibit
9 number 7.
10 MR. MIKULICIC:
11 Q. This agreement that we have been talking
12 about, both the presidents -- the agreement states the
13 wish of both presidents to continue meeting with a view
14 to implementing the agreement which they reached. Can
15 the usher please pass exhibit 126 F to the professor?
16 So that is a document of the United Nations
17 dated April 26, 1993. It is a letter whereby Mr. Mario
18 Nobilo, the ambassador attached to the United Nations,
19 the Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia, submits to
20 the president of the Security Council and attached to
21 this letter is a joint statement of Messrs. Izetbegovic
22 and Mate Boban in connection with a meeting that was
23 held in Zagreb on the 24th of April, and, please, I
24 draw your attention to the date, that is two days after
25 the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement -- no, I'm sorry.
1 No, I apologise.
2 You have commented on this joint statement.
3 However, I am sorry, I apologise. I have the wrong
4 sequence in my documents, so I withdraw this question
5 and I shall start again.
6 Will the court usher please pass this
7 document to the professor? Of course, I have a copy
8 for the Chamber and for the Prosecution.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Defence exhibit D8.
10 MR. MIKULICIC:
11 Q. So this is a document dated April 22, 1993.
12 It is an appeal of the president of the Republic of
13 Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman. Are you familiar with
14 this document, Professor?
15 A. ... be able to read it.
16 Q. Can you just look at it briefly and give us a
17 brief comment on what the purpose and the contents of
18 the document are?
19 A. Yes. I know generally because I know
20 Mr. Tudjman made this kind of appeal in order to stop
21 the tension -- the clash, the military clashes, that
22 already were spreading in Bosnia between Muslims and
23 Croats. This is this declaration which was based on
24 the one side on international pressures on Mr. Tudjman
25 on the other side because an alliance with the Muslims,
1 it's understandable, it might be in the interests of
2 the Croatian government, considering official position
3 made in other situations.
4 Q. Professor, you say that this is a document
5 where President Tudjman is appealing for a cessation of
6 the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Croats
7 and the Muslims, so that is April 22nd, 1992 -- 1993.
8 And the last paragraph of this document, if
9 you will be so kind, we shall read it: "For the sake
10 of peace and preservation of strategically important
11 Croat-Muslim alliance, as well as for the sake of
12 implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan, I welcome
13 readiness expressed by the Croat and Muslim leaders in
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mate Boban and Alija
15 Izetbegovic, to meet with the co-chairman of the
16 international conference on the former Yugoslavia, Lord
17 David Owen, in Zagreb, 24 April 1993."
18 I give you the exhibit we looked at before,
19 and that is exhibit 126 F. So on the basis of an
20 invitation in Zagreb on the 24th of April, under the
21 auspices of Lord David Owen, there was a meeting
22 attended by Mr. Mate Boban and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.
23 The outcome of this meeting was a joint declaration, a
24 joint statement, as stated in document 126 F.
25 Can you give us a general comment on this
1 meeting and the results of the meeting as embodied in
2 the joint statement?
3 A. About the statement, it's very important, I
4 think, particularly point 2, with it's written that the
5 signature is -- of this joint statement, "... hereby
6 order all military units of the Army of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence council to
8 immediately cease fire and all hostilities in all areas
9 where such military units are in contact."
10 This is a clear evident effort to stop
11 military clashes with the hope that they can remain
12 incidents and not a war. So this was the reason.
13 About the result, as you know, the document didn't have
14 any serious consequence because the war continued and
15 even the tensions worsened rapidly in May and June. So
16 in this sense. But this was an attempt to stop.
17 Q. Item 4 of this joint statement --
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Excuse me, Mr. Mikulicic,
19 for interrupting, but we have some technical problems
20 with the video monitor. I think anyway it is a
21 convenient point to take a break, a 20-minute break.
22 Thank you.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.
24 --- Reconvened at 10.45 a.m.
25 (The accused entered court)
1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Mikulicic, you may
3 MR. MIKULICIC:
4 Q. Professor, we ended with this last document
5 of the 25th of April, 1993, which represents and has
6 been sent through the permanent representative of
7 Croatia, and it is a document of the joint statement on
8 the meeting held in Zagreb in April 1993. You, in your
9 introduction, gave an explanation and a global
10 commentary of this document. I would like to ask now
11 for some additional comments, if I may?
12 So we do agree, I assume, and if not -- so
13 this is really a document which is a consequence of the
14 attempts to stop the conflict between the units of the
15 Croatian and Bosnian people in Bosnia?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So let us focus on item 4, and I would kindly
18 ask you to give us a more detailed commentary of it,
19 and what does this item really represent?
20 A. The statement is very clear in this sense, it
21 confirms that the military clashes between the
22 army of Bosnia and --
23 Q. Units of --
24 A. Units of, military clashes between units
25 anyway -- units of HVO and the army of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, are
2 contrary to the policy of the representatives of the
3 two peoples and the continuation of such conflict would
4 seriously jeopardise the achievement of their political
5 goals, that is, the independence and territorial
6 integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within
7 the framework of the Vance-Owen Plan accepted and
8 signed by the signatories of this statement and success
9 in the fight against the aggressors who wants to break
10 the state apart, occupy the territories and annex the
11 occupied territories to greater Serbia. The sentence I
12 think is very clear and evident in its meaning and ...
13 Q. So we may agree that the meaning of this item
14 is, that is, that the conflict between the units of the
15 Bosnia army and the HVO go against the common policy,
16 namely, the achievement of independence and territorial
17 integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 within the framework of the Vance-Owen Plan which was
19 signed previously. That is the meaning; do you agree,
21 A. This is the exact meaning of the said
22 diplomatic document.
23 Q. I remember that when you, in your
24 introductory commentary, you indicated the peculiarity,
25 namely, this witness for this document, as a witness we
1 have the signature of Dr. Tudjman. In view of the
2 preceding document, the appeal of President Tudjman
3 which we have just seen, which was issued two days
4 earlier in which he calls in line with the Vance-Owen
5 Plan, the leaders, Bosnian Croatian leaders in a
6 meeting in Zagreb under the auspices of Lord Owen,
7 isn't it then in this context, isn't it also quite
8 normal that, as a host, it is Dr. Tudjman who will be
9 signing -- who appealed for this meeting and who also
10 launched the initiative for this meeting? Could we --
11 could you agree with this explanation of the signature
12 of President Tudjman on this document?
13 A. Only to a certain extent in the sense that if
14 you consider that the initiative started from Tudjman,
15 in that context, yes, no problem. But, this event was
16 in a particular context, that is the context of the
17 dismemberment of Yugoslavia, in which the difficulties
18 in relations within Croatia and Bosnia, the need -- the
19 need that Tudjman had in a way to have formal good
20 relations with Izetbegovic, I would like to emphasise
21 that when in July 1992, Izetbegovic and Tudjman met and
22 signed the agreement you attended before, the first aim
23 of Tudjman was to have a military alliance in order to
24 legitimise the Croatian army presence in Herzegovina
25 which was not, in the end, the result of the meeting.
1 So in this sense, he was urged because he
2 needed this to do. We know from the legal point of
3 view it is one thing, but we have to take into account
4 again the ground -- we are speaking about policymakers,
5 and they use different tools in order to achieve their
6 own goals.
7 So in this sense, I understand from the
8 formal point of view he invited <name unclear>, but
9 behind this we have to take into account he wanted this
10 because he was the protector of Mate Boban. This is
11 the crucial question. So he was the person in this
12 sense involved in the question, and he knew very well
13 that he had the army, the question of saving the
14 alliance with in a sense the Muslims was because even
15 Croats will be threatened by the offensive of the JNA
16 in a sense, so he had different arguments to do this,
17 but we have to take it into account in this context.
18 Q. Of course. But we must also take into
19 account that the meeting was held under the auspices of
20 the international community, namely, personified in
21 Lord Owen; do you agree?
22 Could you comment on page 4 of this document
23 which represents an agreement of the representatives of
24 the Bosnian and Croatian peoples in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina and military representatives, General
1 Halivovic and General Petkovic respectively. I would
2 like to ask you for a short commentary on this annex.
3 Item 1: "BiH army and the HVO will retain their
4 separate identities and command structures. Their
5 functions will include all aspects of personnel,
6 logistic, administration, training, morale, and
7 identity. They will form a joint command which will be
8 responsible for the operational control of military
9 districts. The joint command will consist of two
10 commanders in chief, General Halilovic and General
11 Petkovic will meet on a regular basis, at least
13 Could you comment this obviously military
14 agreement is a consequence and follows the political
15 agreement signed on the same day.
16 A. I don't know if the term "military agreement"
17 is exact because I don't know what we can mean by this
18 term exactly. If you think that military
19 agreement is military agreement between two army -- as,
20 for instance, the Croatian army and the Bosnian army,
21 this is not the case. This is a case of an agreement
22 of two -- between two units of the army of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the state, so we have to take
24 into consideration that we are speaking about the
25 framework of one state. And this is a very interesting
1 document because this is the attempt, maybe the last --
2 and, in fact, I think this was the last attempt -- to
3 find a compromise. I think this is the better word, a
4 "compromise," in order to establish a mutual
5 recognition of two military units. In a sense, this is
6 from Izetbegovics point of view a step back on the
7 position he wanted to support during the meeting in
8 July 1991 when it was stated the HVO is a part of the
9 Bosnian army. Here is already -- is already envisaging
10 some kind of confederation. Two different armies with
11 a joint command which can meet every week -- weekly.
12 So in this sense, it's a compromise. It was a
13 compromise that didn't work at all, as we know, but
14 this was the attempt at stopping the clashes in order
15 to create some kind of military confederation of two
16 units within the same state.
17 Q. We'll leave this document and I'd kindly ask
18 the usher to present to the witness another document
19 which the defence will introduce and tender as an
20 exhibit and we would like to hear his comment.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Defence document D9.
22 MR. MIKULICIC:
23 Q. Professor, sir, are you acquainted with this
24 statement which followed the meeting of Alija
25 Izetbegovic and Mate Boban in Mostar on the 2nd of
1 April, 1993, and which also speaks of the document
2 which was just analysed?
3 A. It is also before the military clash occurred
4 in Travnik, five days before.
5 Q. Could you give us a general comment on this
6 meeting on the basis of this joint statement of the two
7 representatives of the peoples of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina? I would only ask you to take into account
9 the date, this is the 2nd of April, and also to take
10 into account the date when the Muslims signed the
11 Vance-Owen Plan, that was the end of March 1993. So it
12 was signed eight days after the signature of the
13 Vance-Owen Plan by the Bosnian side and Mate Boban
14 signed it in January of that year. Would you comment
15 on that?
16 A. This is another statement in this context you
17 mentioned. Another statement in order to stop clashes
18 which occurred between the units of HVO and Bosnian
19 Herzegovinan army as stressed in point 5 as well as in
20 point 1. The document is taking into consideration
21 particularly what happened in -- because this was in
22 April, so before the clashes in Travnik but after what
23 happened between January and February in Busovaca.
24 So in this context, when the -- Izetbegovic,
25 as their side accepted to sign the Vance-Owen Plan,
1 which is important to take into consideration, the
2 Vance-Owen Plan was based on different documents, and
3 these different documents were submitted and prepared
4 not only in January but even in February and March. So
5 this was, because the government of Izetbegovic wanted
6 to have some more guarantees and discussion continued.
7 And then we have -- so in this context, this statement
8 is again an attempt of stopping clashes, military
9 clashes, which already occurred since -- as we have
10 information since the middle of June, 1992.
11 Q. So generally we may agree that this was
12 another one of the attempts of the two sides, a mutual
13 attempt of the two sides involved in the conflict to
14 resolve those tensions?
15 A. They didn't solve the conflict. They
17 Q. An attempt.
18 A. This was a formal attempt to give information
19 to the army not to clash each other.
20 Q. Professor, now, remembering the
21 Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement from July 1992 which was
22 jointly agreed that the two Presidents would be meeting
23 and contacting on the basis of that agreement, did such
24 meetings follow?
25 A. Generally, yes. I'm not so sure that it was
1 exactly two times per year all the time, but they had
2 often meetings together. As well as, you know, Tudjman
3 and Milosevic had, Tudjman and Milosevic met 48 times
4 during the war period, so this was in this context.
5 Q. Do you know, Professor, anything about the
6 meeting between the two Presidents in September of that
7 year in Geneva? I would kindly ask the usher to give
8 the Professor -- to pass the Professor that
10 THE REGISTRAR: Defence exhibit D10.
11 MR. MIKULICIC:
12 Q. Do you know that the two Presidents met in
13 September of that year in Geneva on the basis of the
14 earlier agreements that they would be contacting and
15 meeting in order to find solutions to the problems? Is
16 this joint declaration another attempt to resolve the
17 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina; would you say that,
19 A. To a certain extent. I read the document,
20 and I was immediately interested by a specific point
21 which I found new -- the origin of new concerns and
22 contrasts between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which
23 is very interesting. Let me find the point. It's the
24 point on -- because the pages were ... When they speak
25 about a union -- where is?
1 Q. Professor, first I should like to try to
2 confirm certain points. Could we consider this
3 document as an attempt of the two Presidents to resolve
4 the conflict which happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
5 namely, they agreed on the setting up of working
6 groups, and these groups would have to consider and
7 deliberate the problems connected with the situation in
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here I am primarily thinking
9 of paragraph 1, items 4, 5, and 6 of it. Then item 3
10 where we see the names of these -- the people heading
11 working groups which were to resolve these questions.
12 In this sense, it is a new attempt to resolve the
13 situation which has been created in the territory of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Could you comment on that,
16 A. You know, only to a certain extent. It's
17 true that I can also -- here they made the decision to
18 provide, as you can see at point 2, here on the
19 second page, "Provide for bilateral and unconditional
20 disbanding of all detainee camps," for instance, which
21 didn't occur. But this was -- they had a lot of
22 meetings, they agreed -- papers, papers, nothing on the
23 ground. You can see particularly point 5: "Form a
24 working group for matters related to the territorial
25 delimitation between the two represent Republics of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina including access to the sea."
2 How long they discussed this question of access to the
3 sea. It was immediately a question of concern and
4 fighting until today, until today, because the
5 question of Ploca, the question is under discussion
6 till today between Tudjman and Izetbegovic. So I
7 wanted to say that this is a document -- just one of
8 the other papers signed without any effect, without any
10 Q. Could we agree that this is one of the
11 attempts, and you have said yourself there was a series
12 of such attempts, to resolve this question?
13 A. If we want to use a diplomatic terminology,
14 yes, diplomatically, we can say this.
15 Q. Professor, sir, for the period we're talking
16 about, from the date of recognition of the sovereignty
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then 1992, 1993, you have
18 mentioned the term "diplomatic." What were the
19 diplomatic relations between the two countries? Were
20 they on the level of embassies with an exchange of
21 ambassadors? Did they have diplomatic contacts? Can
22 you tell us anything about that?
23 A. As far as I know, they had diplomatic
24 representatives. There was a diplomatic representative
25 in Zagreb of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they tried to
1 establish some contacts between them. I don't know
2 when the representatives were established in the two
3 capitals. And the ambassador came later because of the
4 peculiar situation. It was, for many reasons,
5 impossible for long time to enter Sarajevo, so this was
6 one of the situations.
7 Q. The Croatian ambassador came to Sarajevo in
8 June 1994, but can you remember when did the Bosnian
9 ambassador come to Zagreb?
10 A. I can presume immediately after the
11 recognition. In Zagreb, there were -- Zagreb was not
12 threatened by the war, so it was easier to establish --
13 Q. Yes, less than in Sarajevo, at least.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Professor, are you aware that in any time
16 throughout 1992, 1993, and 1994, that the bilateral
17 contacts between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 were severed?
19 A. As far as I know, no. They were maintained
20 for what was possible, contacts between the two
21 states. And it was understandable why.
22 Q. I have here another document which has the
23 same fate as the document for which colleague Niemann
24 lodged a complaint. It's a document in Croatian. I
25 would just now submit it for filing. I will also later
1 on submit the translation. The Professor understands
2 the language. And if your Honour allows it, I would
3 like to ask the Professor for a short comment of it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: This document is identified
5 as D11, only marked as such for the sake of
7 MR. MIKULICIC:
8 Q. Professor, what generally can you explain to
9 the Trial Chamber what this document is about?
10 A. This is an information sent by the Republic
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina about the embassy of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
13 of the Croatian Republic in which it informs them about
14 the fact that they appointed a certain number of
15 persons, six on one side and 21 on another side, as --
16 as a representative, economic and military
17 representatives in Zagreb, and as a representative of
18 the command of the Republic of Bosnia in Zagreb. So
19 far as I understand, this is the information of people
20 working in the embassy, in Bosnian embassy on these two
22 Q. Can you agree, Professor, that along the
23 lines of this document, the conclusion derives, and
24 this is a document from July 1993, and we can see that
25 on the receipt seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
1 so can you agree that this document actually indicates
2 that period, which is to say, July 1993 where, in the
3 territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we
4 had conflicts going on between the Croatian and Muslim
5 units, so at that particular period the embassy of the
6 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had, in its military
7 and economic representation branch, recruited quite
8 numerous staff as well as in the logistical department
9 of the main staff of the armed forces of the Republic
10 of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Split, but it
11 can also be concluded on the basis of this document,
12 this meant putting into practice ties between the two
13 states also in the military field on the level of
14 embassies. Do you agree to this conclusion?
15 A. As far as I understand -- I know for the
16 organisation of diplomatic activities, it seems to me
17 that the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina in this
18 sense was in a peculiar period at least -- action in
19 Zagreb, in Croatia.
20 Q. Thank you. Professor, we referred to, during
21 today's conversation, that during the unfortunate
22 events in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
23 Republic of Croatia, despite the situation that it
24 itself was, received a large number of refugees, that
25 even Mr. Izetbegovic, along the lines of meetings
1 between Tudjman and Izetbegovic, expressed their
2 gratitude to the Republic of Croatia. I would ask the
3 usher to pass to the professor, just for the sake of
4 illustration of the subject that we are going to be
5 discussing, exhibit number 120. That is the atlas map
6 which you have constructed so that the trial chamber
7 could follow more easily the situation being described
8 on the terrain. So this is a map of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
10 you said was made according to your instructions. And
11 I can make use of it at this particular moment only to
12 ask you to explain to the Chamber what states does
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina have borders on this specific
14 map on the south-east and on the north-west?
15 A. Bosnia-Herzegovina has borders with Croatia,
16 from this line on this -- with this area (indicating)
17 with Serbia and Montenegro formally. At the time of
18 the war, Bosnia had as its borders the province -- so
19 proclaimed independent Serb area of Krajina which
20 was in this area (indicating) more or less.
21 Q. Can you confirm then the conclusion that
22 actually Bosnia and Herzegovina had a border on the one
23 side with the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro whom it
24 had proclaimed aggressors on the territory of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, on the other side, with its
1 allies, their allies, in the self-styled Republic of
2 Serbia Krajina, and on the third side a part of its
3 border with the Republic of Croatia, the only part of
4 the border which was passable at the time. Can you
5 agree with that conclusion?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Professor, in this time of war in Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, we, all of us, witnessed, as well as you
9 yourself, the substantial humanitarian relief and aid
10 which was granted by the international community to
11 help the suffering people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 Can you tell the Trial Chamber what routes
13 were taken by the humanitarian aid. How did it reach
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina? I'm not speaking about the
15 exact geographical location of the routes, but
16 generally speaking ...
17 A. As you can see from the map, it's evident
18 that they had no other possibility to join Bosnia than
19 across Croatia, Croatian territory. This is obvious,
20 and particularly they had -- I can -- because I knew
21 many of them who, particularly from Italy, gave great
22 support to the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
23 that -- was in Split, generally, and from Split they
24 joined the other parts of Bosnia. Generally.
25 Q. Can you agree, Professor, that despite the
1 fact that in 1991 the United Nations imposed an arms
2 embargo, that anyway a certain quantity of arms, let us
3 say, found some concealed ways to reach the territory
4 of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. When it comes to the question of the
7 transportation of arms, does the same apply as what we
8 said for humanitarian aid, namely that arms reached
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatian territory?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can you agree, Professor, with the thesis
12 that the Republic of Croatia could absolutely have cut
13 off every delivery of both humanitarian aid and of
14 weapons to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
15 it wanted to do so?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Does this mean that thus the humanitarian
18 assistance and the arms that came to Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina came there with the knowledge and
20 assistance of the Republic of Croatia?
21 A. To a large extent, yes. To a large extent
22 because I'm not so sure, for instance, for the army --
23 for the weapons coming from the Arabs or Islamic
24 countries, but in other situations, yes.
25 Q. Professor, you just mentioned the question of
1 Arabic, i.e., Islamic interests. Can you tell this
2 Chamber what their role was, the role of that part of
3 the world, apart from the European Community, the
4 United States, and Russia, what was the role of the
5 Arabic and Islamic countries in the conflict which was
6 going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
7 A. I already spoke about this topic before in
8 past sessions. The Islamic community was deeply
9 divided. They spoke a lot. They did less. They spoke
10 a lot, particularly at international meetings, because they
11 wanted to support the persistence of Islamic
12 communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the aim.
13 The other -- the problem is -- was that -- because the
14 Islamic community was divided within, particularly
15 Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran had different ideas of
16 the evolution of (unintelligible). So the possible
17 support coming from one -- part of the other countries
18 might have different impact in this context. This is
19 one thing. The second thing that they were aware that
20 any move of the Islamic community in supporting
21 strongly and effectively the Muslims in Bosnia would
22 be -- would create concern in the international
23 community and strengthen the -- one of the typical
24 arguments of the Serb side that it was in Bosnia a
25 war against -- of Christianity against Islamic world.
1 This was also the same argument that was used by HVO
2 when the clashes with the Muslims started. This is
3 exactly the same. In the document, for instance, of
4 April 1993, when the group of the HVO in Travnik sent
5 the document to Messrs. Tudjman and Boban explaining
6 what was -- in Travnik, they accused -- they charged
7 Mujehadin to do this -- they used this term. It's true
8 that Iran sent some groups of Mujehadin and we know that
9 immediately after the date the agreement was signed.
10 The United States made very strong control and forced
11 these kind of people to leave the country, but they
12 were a group of persons, and the impact -- the impact
13 of this on the Islamic world -- on the Islamic world in
14 Bosnia, which was, generally speaking, atheistic, in
15 fact, to be Islamic was more because they wanted to
16 distinguish themselves as ethnic community from the
17 Croats and the Serbs than related to religious ideas,
18 so the impact was only partial and had the opportunity
19 to act, particularly with one stream of SDA, I
20 mentioned several times yesterday this stream, which was
21 in favour of the idea to accept even a partition of
22 Bosnia and create a Muslimania. This was the goal of
23 the fundamentalists, a Muslim state in order to create
24 a core of Muslim spreading -- the Muslim religion into
25 Europe as the first Muslim state of Europe. This was
1 the famous -- but in January, if we speak about the
2 Islamic community, even Turkey -- Turkey spoke a lot,
3 but really, they did very -- so that -- it was so true
4 that Izetbegovic was several times disappointed in the
5 support, restricted support coming from the Islamic
6 countries in comparison with its -- his expectations.
7 Q. You said, Professor, that the Islamic world,
8 they did not have a unified stand. You also said
9 that -- say that also within the framework of the
10 Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were
11 different positions. What was the racial forces within
12 the body of the Muslim population in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina in view of these different
14 attitudes, which forces were prevalent and which ones
15 were in the minority?
16 A. Very difficult to say considering the
17 condition of war. Very difficult to say, to have a
18 clear picture. Take into consideration the evolution
19 of events, I can conclude that this stream was a
20 minority stream. How minor it was, this is difficult
21 to say.
22 Q. Which stream?
23 A. Fundamentalists. It was made pressure,
24 sometimes influenced Izetbegovic, but the other stream
25 was a majority, take into account that they had the
1 support of other -- other parts of the population which
2 was not Muslim in the sense that supported SDA but they
3 were, for instance, supporting other political parties'
4 organisations, I mean the organisation of
5 Zulfikarpasic, the SDP -- the Social Democrats Party --
6 former Communist left wing, or democrats who wanted to
7 preserve the integrity of Bosnia and the integrity of
8 Bosnia as a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic community.
9 This part of the population was against the Vance-Owen
10 Plan, the Owen Stoltenberg plan, and the Konak
11 agreement. And they influenced the other stream of the
12 SDA. So I think that in conclusion, the fundamentalist
13 were a minority even in the SDA.
14 Q. So generally observing -- observed and
15 locally observed, can you agree with the thesis that in
16 certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these
17 fundamental streams prevailed over these others, shall
18 we call them, moderate streams among the Muslim
19 population in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Professor, are you aware of the fact that
22 foreign nationals, I mostly have in mind nationals of
23 Islamic countries, joined during the events that we are
24 discussing, those which took place in 1992, 1993, and
25 1994, joined the ranks of the army of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina and even, in fact, formed some of their own
2 units, military units. Let me just remind you of a
3 unit called Al Mujaheed which was in the third corps of
4 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; can you comment on
6 A. I know this kind of brigade existed, and
7 particularly the United States, no-- that this was one
8 of the reasons of particular concern of the United
9 States, and I don't disagree with you that this was one
10 of the reasons why United States took the initiative in
11 the beginning of 1994 to intervene in Bosnia and impose
12 the federation -- the federation between the Muslim and
13 the Croats.
14 Q. You mentioned the United Nations. Will you
15 tell us -- can you familiarise us with how, if -- what
16 kind of a reaction, if any, did the European
17 Community, i.e. the United Nations have to this
18 phenomenon, particularly the reaction of the United
20 A. Sometimes they expressed concern.
21 Q. Does this mean that this concern of theirs
22 was expressed through official documents; are you aware
23 of that?
24 A. I don't know this. Anyway, I know that
25 concerns existed.
1 Q. When we mentioned this Al Mujaheed which was
2 part of the third corps, can you tell us in what area
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina were they located, if you know;
4 do you know?
5 A. No, I don't know. It seems just one, just
6 one, was around Zenica, but I'm not so sure.
7 Q. So we have agreed, Professor, on the fact
8 that the Republic of Croatia had taken in a great
9 number of Muslim refugees who had fled the war in
10 Bosnia and came to the territory of the Republic of
11 Croatia, and also that the Republic of Croatia made it
12 possible for humanitarian relief and arms transported
13 to pass through its territory to Bosnia-Herzegovina and
14 also according to the agreement between Tudjman and
15 Izetbegovic in the border areas between Bosnia and
16 Croatia, there were units of the Croatian army. Please
17 comment on this fact, in the light of the fact that we
18 have such phenomena in today's world, and I am
19 particularly referring to the role of Turkey in respect
20 of the Kurdish population in its border areas and the
21 role of Israel with respect to the Palestinians living
22 in the border areas with Lebanon. Can you comment on
23 this? Can you correlate these examples in a way?
24 A. As far as the Croatian position is concerned,
25 you know, Croatia didn't have any other alternative
1 than allow these volunteer humanitarian aid and even to
2 allow the cross border transportation of illegal
3 weapons. They could not stop because if they did
4 this, the reactions of the -- the reaction of the
5 international community would have been great, so strong
6 that -- take into consideration that Croatia didn't
7 control one-third of its territory -- with sanctions
8 against Croatia in that situation, would push Croatia
9 into a corner and Serbia would even have much more
10 possibility to threaten Croatia and Bosnia than it
11 might have had at the time. So this was a peculiar situation
12 that must be taken into account. Croatia tried to
13 obtain at that time, if possible, the support of the
14 European Union or the United States while, I would like
15 to stress, that in 1993, the international community
16 was particularly surprised, particularly after June
17 1993, about the aggressive diplomatic position of
18 Croatia towards Bosnia. This was evident -- so this
19 was just to explain the different situation.
20 As far as concern, the comparison with the
21 Kurds or with the Palestinians, you know, national
22 question is an open issue not only for the Balkans or
23 for Yugoslavia and Bosnia, but is a question for
24 international relations too. There are many countries
25 that don't want to recognise ethnic groups -- this is
1 the case of the Kurds, for instance -- because this
2 means that they can claim to be a nation, and if they
3 claim to be a nation, they can claim the state. This
4 means a threat to the integrity of the state. So this
5 is the reason why. This is one of the reasons why the
6 international community was so weak in reaction -- in
7 the reaction to the Yugoslav dismantlement, because
8 they didn't have the instrument, the knowledge, and the
9 ability to interfere. Even if they in different
10 way understood, national principle is the principle
11 which legitimise the state. So when you use the term
12 "nation" in the United States it has a certain meaning,
13 in Croatia another one. But when you speak about
14 national rights, national rights of self-determination,
15 immediately you create a situation which the European
16 Community -- the international community and,
17 generally, and generally the -- yes, the international
18 community and the policymakers particularly, they have
19 no other particular tools, instruments to interfere
20 clearly making distinctions. So if you compare the
21 Kurds, I can say that from this point of view, Turkey
22 is working with the Kurds as well as the Serbs are
23 working more or less with the Albanians in Kosovo. If
24 you want to speak, you can make a similar -- similar
25 position in the confrontation of Israel towards the
1 Palestinians because of the concerns of the stability
2 of the countries and so on. All these questions are
3 unsolved because -- this is my peculiar position, of
4 course, and this is one of the reasons of my disputes
5 with some of my colleagues because the Yugoslav example
6 made clear that we are at the end of the story for the
7 national state and for the sovereignty of national
9 Q. Professor, perhaps I didn't phrase my
10 question rightly, so you did not answer my question the
11 way I wanted. That is the question of the military
12 intervention along the border areas of another state in
13 the kind of case that we can see today in the relation
14 between Turkey and Iraq and Israel and Lebanon. That
15 was the question?
16 A. This creates concerns and these actions are
17 condemned by international relations. Then you can
18 argue why the international community condemned
19 differently or used different tools in condemning these
20 countries. This is another question.
21 Q. Can you agree with the fact that today in the
22 modern world we are also faced with such situations
23 whereby, in order to protect its own territory, a state
24 intervenes in the border areas of the other state so as
25 to prevent a threat to its own territory. For example,
1 Israel treating the terrorist acts on behalf of PLO or
2 the specific case of Turkey to protect itself against
3 the terrorist acts of the Kurds. I do not mean to
4 underestimate at all the sense of these actions, but
5 just saying that these are acts which are in
6 contravention of international law.
7 A. Even the reaction of the state is not allowed
8 by international rules, you know, so both of the things
9 are, in this sense, very disputed, and in the case of
10 Bosnia, we have to take into account that there were
11 not terrorist acts of the Muslims in Croatia that can
12 justify this intervention.
13 Take into consideration -- you are
14 speaking -- more time you mentioned the Croatian army
15 along the borders. They were not only on the borders,
16 they were even in the centre. I don't think that
17 Mostar can be considered on the borders. So I think
18 that borders -- we can -- and probably from the legal
19 point of view you can discuss for a long time what is
20 the border and where is the border. But any way,
21 taking into consideration the particular situation, I
22 don't think that Mostar can be considered a border.
23 Q. What I had in mind in making this comparison
24 were attacks by Serbs and Montenegrin -- and Serb
25 and the Montenegrin army on the territory of Croatia
1 from these southern parts, parts of the Krajina?
2 A. I understand. But in this case, Croatian
3 government had to receive a kind of invitation of a
4 request from the Bosnian government to intervene in
5 each state to support Tudjman and Izetbegovic--
6 Q. That is the agreement Tudjman and
8 A. As you can see in Herzegovina since the
9 12th of April. The agreement was in July. And in
10 July, this agreement didn't allow to go through the
11 borders. Just -- it was the cooperation on the
12 borders, but not to have the army within the Bosnian
13 state. So I think that in this -- this was the wish of
14 Tudjman for this document, but this document didn't
15 allow this.
16 Q. But it is explicitly stated in the agreement
17 that in the case of a continued Serb and Montenegrin
18 aggression, they would agree on further and wider
19 military cooperation?
20 A. If -- as I stated -- if the international
21 community failed in these actions. In other words, you
22 need again a claim, a request by Izetbegovic to enter
23 the state, because otherwise, they can -- you can think
24 that the Vance-Owen Plan, the Vance-Owen Stoltenberg
25 plan, were other attempts of international community to
1 stop the war. So this was not -- who judges in this
2 case when is the moment to interfere? I think that in
3 this case, the request to come into the territory -- in
4 the territory of one state must be coming from the
5 legal government.
6 Q. It was along those lines that many
7 negotiations were conducted that we have already made
8 reference to before. Some were more successful, some
9 were less successful, but generally, irrespective of
10 the participation of the international community, there
11 was generally little success; can you agree with that?
12 A. Generally speaking I can say that all these
13 agreements didn't have any outcome, positive outcome,
14 until the intervention of the United States. On the
15 other side, I would like to repeat that, albeit, we saw
16 a lot of agreements, no one was clearly defining a
17 military alliance between Bosnia and Croatia, and no
18 one allowed the participation of Croatian army on the
19 territory except for cooperation along the borders.
20 Q. That's exactly what I was talking about. I
21 should now like to ask the usher to bring to the
22 professor document 126 E.
23 So this is a document of the Council of
24 Europe declaration on the former Yugoslavia. Please
25 pay attention -- I draw your attention to -- I believe
1 it is not the whole document, however.
2 I draw your attention to the time of the
3 production of this document. Will you tell us at this
4 time, the 11th and 12th of December, 1992, who was
5 attacking the Muslim population in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina? That was actually the basis for the
7 creation of this document, the adoption of this
8 document. Who was attacking them in the areas of
9 Sarajevo and other areas which are referred to in the
10 document? Who is considered the attacking party in
11 this document?
12 A. From the general point of view or in relation
13 particularly to the Muslim-Croat relations? Because --
14 Q. No, from --
15 A. General Bosnian? From the general Bosnian
16 point of view, as you can see in point 2 is
17 written: "The primary responsibility for the conflict
18 and its brutality lies with the present leadership of
19 Serbia and of the Bosnian Serbs." It is presently
20 correct -- very correct.
21 Q. Thank you. Will the usher please give the
22 professor document 126 I?
23 This is a document which is a statement
24 signed by the President of the Republic of Serbia,
25 Slobodan Milosevic, and the president of the Republic
1 of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, signed in Geneva on the
2 17th of July, 1993, and this prompts me to ask the
3 question, and that is the question which you have
4 touched upon a number of times in your previous
5 statement, and that is the question of the meeting in
6 Karajorjevo and the outcomes of those meetings. First
7 of all let me ask you: Have you had occasion in your
8 research work so far to come across a document which
9 had been published in connection with such -- with that
10 meeting, with possible conclusions from that meeting?
11 A. I already said during the previous sessions
12 that we don't have any minutes of the meeting in
13 Karajorjovo. We have only the public declaration of
14 one of the members of the commission that was appointed
15 by Tudjman and took part in the discussion with the
16 Serb commission in order to prepare the maps
17 immediately after Karajorjovo, and these meetings
18 occurred during June, July, August 1991.
19 Q. So tell us, Professor, do you know, roughly
20 speaking, in the period from 1991 to the beginning of
21 1992 how many different meetings, plans, attempts at
22 addressing the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
23 there been within Bosnia-Herzegovina and outside
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the
25 international community?
1 A. Many. I don't know the number, but many. As
2 we can see.
3 Q. Can you at least approximately say what that
4 number is?
5 A. No, but I can -- we can speak about the -- it
6 depends when you want to start because we can include
7 even the project of confederation, of Yugoslav
8 confederation submitted by the European Union at the
9 end of 1991, we can include the Cutiliero attempt at a
10 negotiation, the Konak, which is connected, the plan of
11 Lord Carrington, the Vance-Owen Plan, the plan of
12 Owen-Stoltenberg, the Washington agreement, the Dayton
13 agreement, and then you have maps and discussion with
14 other persons because this is Karajorjovo, but also the
15 meeting in Graz May 6 between Karadzic and Boban
16 then they meet June 20 in Njivice, between
17 representatives also of SDS and HDZ in order to find
18 solution, and then, if I can remember, in a book
19 published by Zdranko Tomac, in Croatia the title is
20 "Qui a Tue la Bosnie?" -- "Who killed Bosnia?" is
21 reported one part of one of these meetings -- if I can
22 maybe check on my notes, I can be more sure, in this
23 sense because it was written, it was written -- I don't
24 remember if it was a meeting in between -- between
25 Milosevic-Tudjman or between Mate Boban and Karadzic,
1 so the level, I don't know, but it was established --
2 it was general agreement between the Serb side and
3 the Croat side about the borders. It was in the
4 book of Zdranko Tomac -- sorry, Zdranko Tomac was the
5 Vice-President of Croatia in the government, coalition
6 government in August 1991, and he was the leader of the
7 SDP party, it was the party coming from the former
8 League of Communists. And in this book of memoirs, he
9 stated that the agreement -- quoted, he quoted one part
10 of this public agreement, and the borders, the only two
11 questions were the Serb side and the Croatian side
12 were unable to find an agreement was, according to this
13 document, the borders along the river Neretva. The
14 Croatian side claimed all the city of Mostar, which is
15 on one side -- on the other side of Neretva river, and
16 the borders of the famous Banovina of 1939 which
17 included one part of the left bank of the Neretva
18 river, while the Serb side wanted only to have the
19 borders alongside the river. So this was written in
20 the -- but this was -- this is what has been published
21 and what we know.
22 Q. So we may agree that there were many, many
23 attempts at resolving the issue of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina through various meetings -- multilateral,
25 bilateral -- plans, agreements, joint declarations,
1 joint statements and so on and so forth. What does
2 that actually mean? Can we in principle agree that
3 this means that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 was not at all easy to resolve in the very least?
5 A. This means that -- this is my firm belief --
6 that it's impossible to find a negotiation amongst
7 nationalisms, different nationalisms. The difficulty
8 to find a solution in Bosnia was because the
9 negotiations was made all by those who shared
10 a nationalist approach, or by the European Unions, or the
11 international community who tried to negotiate with
12 them the other side -- the other part of the Bosnian
13 question, that is the role of the civilian populations,
14 the role of the oppositions, of anti-democratic --
15 sorry, anti-nationalist parties. I can just mention,
16 for instance, for the Croatian side, the role that
17 might be played by Komsic, the leader of the Croatian
18 Peasant Party in Bosnia, and other
19 people, such as these people, for instance, was very
20 crucial, because something new happened after the
21 agreement, the Washington agreement, and during the
22 Dayton agreement, these people was, in a way, included
23 in the three -- in the three delegations, the Serb
24 the Croat, the Bosnian. So they were taking part in
25 something new, but of course before the Dayton
1 agreement, this was very interesting, a meeting was
2 organised -- this was September 1995. I was there
3 invited in Perugia, in Italy, and the representation of
4 anti-nationalist organisations in Bosnia were all
5 participating. There were Mr. Komsic from Croatian
6 side, there was Mr. Dodik, the current Premier of the
7 Republic of Srpska, Serb side, and there was Tocic
8 from Tuzla -- I can't say Muslim side because he
9 doesn't agree surely about this definition. So it was
10 coming from the democratic areas of Tuzla, as you know,
11 Tuzla, they saved all along the world the
12 multi-cultural, multi-ethnic characteristic of the
13 city. So this part was neglected and this was the
14 reason why it was so difficult to find a solution,
15 because the attention was all the time concentrated on
16 nationalism. One has to take into consideration that the
17 war in Bosnia was not, as we could see, claimed in all
18 the documents, only a war between two or three sides:
19 The Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims, but it was also
20 a war against civilian populations. I think that it
21 was primarily this, because in order to achieve the
22 goals to have at least three areas with a predominant
23 ethnic group or even the partition of Bosnia, it was
24 very important to compel the population to accept this
25 or moving the population or displacing -- sending them
1 abroad, or killing the population, ethnic cleansing.
2 This was a strategy that was included in the war. So
3 those who supported this, even the fundamentalist,
4 Muslim fundamentalist, we can mention again the
5 <unintelligible>, were all responsible for this case,
6 but the ideological responsibility is -- from my point
7 of view has to be charged to nationalism.
8 Q. Did the international community have a common
9 approach to the resolution of the question of Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina throughout this period? We've seen
11 documents --
12 A. No.
13 Q. I wanted to remind the Villa Konak document
14 and others, but the answer is "No." Your Honour?
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes, we will take a break.
16 The break will last 15 minutes.
17 --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.
18 --- Resumed at 12.27 p.m.
19 (The witness entered court)
20 (The accused entered court)
21 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Mikulicic, Professor,
22 we may resume.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: I would ask the usher to
24 remove the document from the ELMO and to pass the
25 document, the following document, 126 J.
1 Once again, distinguished colleague,
2 Mr. Niemann, I thank you for submitting this document
3 to the file and we, as Defence, will be availing
4 ourselves of it now.
5 Q. I would ask you to turn to the second page,
6 Professor Bianchini, of the document. So it is a UN
7 document we're referring to with which the
8 Charge d'affaires of Croatia, Vladimir Drobnjak, the
9 9th November, 1993. From the document you can see that
10 it follows the document of the 3rd of November, 1993,
11 in which a request was made for an urgent meeting of
12 the Security Council in connection with the events
13 described in paragraph 2 of this document. So we are
14 discussing here the Vitez area for which it said that
15 it is the largest Bosnian Croat enclave in Central
16 Bosnia. And to give the Trial Chamber a view of where
17 this is, I will kindly ask the usher to give us exhibit
18 39 in order to be able to have a view of the area under
20 Professor, please place the map on the ELMO,
21 and show us the area discussed in the UN document.
22 A. You can take into consideration the largest
23 one, this area (indicating).
24 Q. This is the area, the area on the map,
25 coloured with the prevalent Croatian population below
1 50 percent, which is mainly surrounded with a Muslim
2 population, somewhere below 50 percent, or Gornji Vakuf
3 and Zenica, the predominant population is over 50
4 percent. Do you agree with the content of the map?
5 Now let us turn back to the UN document.
6 In paragraph 2, it discusses the area of
7 Vitez, the largest Bosnian Croat enclave in Central
8 Bosnia, is seriously threatened by the Bosnian Muslim
9 armed forces. Many reports have been received of
10 military activity, that there are many, also, refugees.
11 So we are dealing here with a conflict.
12 Could you tell us what it is about?
13 A. Here is described a military defeat of the
14 Croatian army in Central Bosnia, and as a consequence
15 of this, the battles, the fights in this area, started
16 in September 1992, but they had a particular wave of
17 clashes in the period between -- during all
18 the summer. So at the end of the summer, the
19 Croatian army was -- the HVO was defeated and the
20 Muslim army was running into the villages. There were
21 displaced people, as is described in this.
22 Exactly -- this is a curious date when -- the
23 9th of November, 1993, the letter was sent. The same
24 day the bridge in Mostar was destroyed by the HVO in
1 It was in one contest -- one situation; in
2 another one, another one. In the context of the
3 Central Bosnia, we are facing a situation in which the
4 Muslim army was on the offensive and was moving on.
5 Q. And faced with the situation of numerous
6 refugees and a population that has been encircled, I
7 would like to introduce also an exhibit which should be
8 passed on to Professor Bianchini.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Defence exhibit D12.
10 MR. MIKULICIC:
11 Q. Mr. Bianchini, we have a motion for a
12 resolution for the European parliament in Brussels of
13 the 7th of November, 1993, a day later than the
14 document we have just been discussing, the UN
15 Security Council document. This is a document
16 submitted by the Liberal Democratic Party and which has
17 requested the European parliament and submitted a
18 motion for a resolution.
19 I would kindly ask you for comments for items
20 A and C.
21 A. Sorry, the date is 10th of November. You
22 told 7th. This is 10th November.
23 Q. That is the date.
24 A. Sorry -- it was -- this is a motion
25 presented -- submitted by which party?
1 Q. Liberal Democratic Reformists within the
2 European parliament --
3 A. Parliament. Here you see there is emphasis on the
4 situation where Bosnian Croats were found during that
5 period trapped in Central Bosnia with -- in very great
6 difficulties, and here is "fearing for the lives of the
7 thousands of men, women, and children who have fled
8 into the forest from their homes in Vares following the
9 conquest of the town by Bosnian Muslim forces and who
10 are the latest victims of ethnic cleansing."
11 These are the points you mentioned. May I
12 just -- interesting question. This is true, it was a
13 great defeat and it was a great move of Croatian
14 population at that time considering that the large
15 percentage of Croats living in Bosnia were from
16 Central Bosnia, not from Herzegovina.
17 This question of Vitez -- of Vares is
18 particularly interesting, is pointed in the document
19 you see, the forests from their homes in Vares. What
20 happened before Vares -- this was the end of go in, go
21 out from the Muslim side and the Croatian side. In
22 Vares, the mayor was a Croat mayor. And in Vares, this
23 mayor sought to save multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
24 relations with the Muslims in the months before
25 this happened. He had the support of the Muslims,
1 even when a great number of displaced people, Croatian
2 displaced people, coming from other areas of Bosnia,
3 went to Vares. And he opposed any pressures from the
4 HVO to break relations with the Muslims.
5 So HVO entered in Vares and compelled --
6 overthrew the mayor, threatened the mayor, and compelled
7 the Muslim population to flee the village.
8 Then, in reaction, the army, the Bosnian
9 army intervened. There was another battle,
10 battlefield, and then the HVO was defeated. This is
11 the result of that, when, in this case, the Croats
12 had to flee Vares and the Muslims came back again,
13 again into the village.
14 So we can consider, of course, the dramatic
15 situation in which the population was in this context. But
16 I repeat, a person able to save Croat, a Croat
17 person, able to work and to hinder tension there was
18 removed by the fundamentalist stream of the HVO and
19 this was the result, unfortunately.
20 Q. Thank you. So here we're dealing with a
21 region, Vitez, Busovaca in the central part of the
22 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this region
23 was, in fact, the object of such an operation.
24 Therefore, we can agree that there were conflicts
25 here. And I will submit a UN document; therefore, I
1 kindly ask the usher ...
2 THE REGISTRAR: Defence exhibit number D13.
3 MR. MIKULICIC: We have a rather poor copy of
4 the document, but in view of its importance and in view
5 of the need of Professor Bianchini to comment on it, I
6 shall read the text. We are dealing with a UN
7 document, a letter, signed by Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, the
8 permanent representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
9 the United Nations, it's dated the 21st of April, 1993,
10 addressed to the UN Security Council, and allow me to
11 read the text.
12 "Recent reports of conflicts between the
13 Bosnian and Herzegovinan army and the Croatian Defence
14 Council have been greatly exaggerated as an ethnic
15 conflict between Muslims and Croats. This fighting is
16 not a conflict based along ethnic lines; rather, it is
17 a conflict which is a consequence of the international
18 community's armed embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina,
19 and the international community's failure to provide
20 adequate humanitarian assistance to the besieged
21 population in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina. The arms
22 embargo denies both Muslims and Croats adequate defence
23 capabilities in the face of barbarous aggression from
24 Serbia and Montenegro. The armed embargo and the lack
25 of adequate assistance pits neighbour against neighbour
1 for control of scarce resources. If the two" -- I
2 believe it's "parties" -- if the two.
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: "Armies."
4 MR. MIKULICIC: "Armies," sorry. "If the two
5 armies had adequate defence capabilities and if the
6 population in Central Bosnia were adequately assisted
7 with humanitarian needs, conflict between local leaders
8 would have never occurred. Furthermore, I am pleased
9 to report that the conflict between the two armies has
10 subsided today as leaders from both sides have taken
11 concrete and intensive measures to <check document>
12 resources. Despite the conflicts over the past two
13 days, the alliance between army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 and Croatian Defence Council will be firmly sustained.
15 May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing this
16 letter as a document of the Secretary-General?"
17 Signed, Muhamed Sacirbey,
18 Ambassador/Permanent Representative.
19 Q. Professor, this document has a date of the
20 21st of April, 1993, when, in the area of Vitez and
21 Busovaca, the conflicts erupted. Do you agree
22 with this conclusion?
23 A. I think particularly in Travnik.
24 Q. In Travnik.
25 A. If I can remember, it's the same period when
1 Tudjman called Izetbegovic to Zagreb and --
2 Q. Ahmici was on the 16th of April. Would you
3 comment on this letter, please?
4 A. My comment is, considering the knowledge of
5 the whole situation, is that diplomacy had used all the
6 arguments, all the possible arguments. This is a
7 letter, a very amazing -- you know, this is not
8 absolutely true, that it was the lack of the weapons
9 that provoked the war -- the conflict between the two
10 groups. I can understand, particularly Muslim Bosnia
11 wanted to obtain the end of the embargo and they used
12 all possible arguments. This is really a
13 completely unfounded argument, because the document
14 is -- from the document you can get the impression
15 that the conflict started only recently while we have
16 said that clashes, armed clashes, started for the first
17 time, as far as I know, in mid June 1992. That is,
18 more or less, eight months before.
19 So I think that, you know, we have to
20 consider that in particular the government of Bosnia
21 had, on the one side, the need not to have a second
22 enemy in order to resist against the Serbs and
24 Secondly, they needed in a way to stop any
25 attempts, military attempts, or political attempts from
1 Croatia to control one part of the territory in a way
2 that can completely create the condition for the
3 partition of Bosnia. So they had to move in this
4 difficult situation in trying an alliance with Tudjman
5 in order to resist the Serb army; at the same
6 time, to stop Tudjman having too much influence in
7 the area. But all the time, the aim of HVO in Croatia
8 was linked to the idea of connecting Herceg-Bosna to
9 Croatia, taking into consideration I have a document --
10 Q. Professor, excuse me for interrupting. I
11 wish your comment of this document --
12 A. I think it's based on arguments that are not
13 founded in truth.
14 Q. Can this be considered an official document
15 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? In view of
16 the fact that it has been submitted by the permanent
17 representative, Ambassador Sacirbey, in the United
18 Nations to the Security Council, do you agree that in
19 the diplomatic sense it is an official document that
20 expresses the stance and views at that given moment?
21 A. This is a diplomatic document, official
22 diplomatic document, yes.
23 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Professor
24 Bianchini. The defence rests.
25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you, Mr. Mikulicic.
1 Mr. Niemann, do you have any questions to ask
2 the witness in rebuttal?
3 Re-examined by Mr. Niemann.
4 Q. Professor, in the course of your evidence,
5 you spoke of the conflict between the HV and HVO on one
6 side and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other
7 side starting in April of 1993, but I take it from what
8 you said, you're not suggesting that this was the first
9 time that any conflict occurred between these military
10 forces; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, it is correct. I emphasised that the
12 first clash, according to HVO sources, according to HVO
13 sources, was in the middle of June 1992. That is more
14 or less when the operation to free Mostar was
16 I have a document, on the basis of which I am
17 telling this, I have a document here. If you want,
18 I can refer the exact dates, if I can look to the
19 Court and I can refer the date?
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. This document, I have the original version,
22 Croatian version, and the translation. It's a document
23 of the military police of Herceg-Bosna. It has been
24 published by the administration of the military police
25 in Lubusi in April 1995 and it is a
1 series of reports, of articles, written by officials of
2 the military police in order to celebrate and explain
3 the aims of the military police in the last three
5 In this document, there are very interesting
6 things. First, it's written that the first conflicts
7 took place with the Muslims in the middle of June
8 1992. Secondly, it's clarified that weapons,
9 equipment, and help arrived to the HVO and the military
10 police from the Croatian government since the 15th of
11 April, 1992. It's also added that, anyway, sabotage
12 platoons and other units, military units, existed
13 already as Croatian sabotage platoons were in
14 Lubusi, Mostar, and Grude, three cities of
15 Herzegovina, since the fall of 1991.
16 It's also explained that the training of the
17 military police and HVO took place all in Croatia or in
18 Herzegovina and with the help of the Croatian
20 I have another document of 1993 where it's
21 written the name of five persons sent for training to
22 the military academy, to Zagreb, from Herceg-Bosna. I
23 have also a very interesting document signed by Milivj
24 Petkovic, the head, the chief of HVO,
25 on the programme -- it's a programme of military
1 actions -- the programme for training of the HVO, the
2 document is of September 1992. In the document is a
3 very interesting writing, something about instructions
4 in patriotism, with a short programme. From this
5 short programme it appears clear that these
6 instructions in patriotism were focused only on the
7 Croatian Republic and Herceg-Bosna.
8 Q. Thank you, Professor. And another issue that
9 arose in your discussions in cross-examination with
10 Mr. Mikulicic related to the agreements that were
11 entered into between the respective Presidents, Tudjman
12 and Izetbegovic. Did any of those agreements that you
13 know of relate to any supposed threat by Bosnian Serbs
14 on the territory of Croatia? Did you see any
15 agreements of that nature at all?
16 A. No. Mainly, no. They include some time in
17 some documents the problem of Croatia threatened by the
18 Serbs but in a framework where the main focus was the
19 situation in Bosnia.
20 Q. So if there was any threat -- is it true to
21 say that if there was any threat to Croatian territory,
22 it was as a result of Serbs living in Croatia rather
23 than Bosnian Serbs?
24 A. It was a threat coming from the Serbs in
25 Croatia who had, as an aim, to establish close ties
1 with the Serbs in Bosnia and through them with Serbia.
2 Q. Finally, is it true then that the agreements
3 that were entered into between the two Presidents were
4 mostly related to resolution of the conflict between
5 Bosnian Croats and -- well, I should say the HV-HVO and
6 the army in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. The main attention was this because it was
8 evident that none of the two, but particularly the
9 Muslims, were unable to fight anyway against Serb
10 and Montenegrin aggression if they had to fight against
11 the Croats too. So they needed to solve these questions
12 first, and this was their peculiar interest, and for
13 this reason they tried to find a solution and a solution
14 of all the documents we discuss today were particularly
15 centred on the idea to find an agreement between the
16 Muslim side and the Croatian side.
17 MR. NIEMANN: No further questions.
18 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I should like to ask the
19 registrar to give us document 42 and put it on the
21 Questions from Judge Rodrigues:
22 Q. Professor Bianchini, on the basis of the
23 results of these elections, HDZ actually lost the
24 elections. Actually, a certain agreement was reached
25 between the Muslims and the Croats, if I understood you
2 A. Not exactly, because if you speak about a
3 lost -- loss in the elections, we have to compare with
4 the previous election. This was the first democratic
5 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 So I wanted to, when I spoke, that they
7 received just a little less of percentage in comparison
8 with the influence of the Muslim community or Croatian
9 community in the census. May I give you the
10 comparison -- this was in comparison with the census --
11 Q. Excuse me, Professor. Perhaps I didn't quite
12 understand this well. The actual question is
13 irrelevant, whether there was an agreement between the
14 SDS and others. But you did say that other parties,
15 when it comes to other parties, the Muslim party was
16 led by a certain group of people, we had Zulfikarpasic
17 and several other people. Initially they were together
18 with Izetbegovic, if I understood you correctly, that
19 was prior to the elections, and then later they went
20 their separate ways. There were also some other minor
21 parties involved.
22 So I believe that it will be very important
23 for you tell us something about this later parting of
24 ways and the consequences thereof, and was the war also
25 one of these consequences?
1 A. Yes, exactly. MBO was the party of
2 Zulfikarpasic. Zulfikarpasic founded SDA with
3 Izetbegovic together. Zulfikarpasic is a rich man
4 living in Switzerland, and he lived more or less all
5 his life abroad, outside Yugoslavia. And they were
6 together and they had a lot of misunderstanding before
7 the elections. So this created the condition for the
8 split. Izetbegovic pushed particularly at that time --
9 insisted particularly on the aspect, Islamic aspects,
10 while Zulfikarpasic had a more secular approach, just
11 to give you the difference.
12 Then after this split, Zulfikarpasic,
13 however, had maintained good relations with
14 Izetbegovic, and sometimes he tried to maintain even a
15 link with Belgrade. He even suggested to establish a
16 kind of agreement with Belgrade, and there exists a
17 book with the minutes published by Zulfikarpasic, the
18 title is "Okovona Bosna," It was
19 published by him. He has an institute of research
20 and studies in Switzerland, and they published this
21 book after a discussion with Croatian leaders, Gotovac
22 And others, and it explained all the
23 attempts at creating this mediation between Karadzic,
24 Milosevic on one side and Izetbegovic on the other side
25 and how this attempt failed, because it failed.
1 And then from this -- when the war erupted,
2 Zulfikarpasic went back to Switzerland and he spent a
3 large part of his time there but never completely
4 outside the political situation. He put pressure on
5 the international communities through his institute or
6 he went, when it was possible, to Bosnia by private
7 aeroplane. He's very rich; he has his own plane. So he
8 had this possibility to move from one area to the
9 another and tried to mediate and influence.
10 This all was a stream, a circuitous stream,
11 that any way was particularly linked to the idea to
12 safe the integrity of Bosnia and the secular position
13 of Bosnia while Izetbegovic was uncertain on this
15 Q. Another question, Professor. Could we please
16 have document number 107?
17 This document, Professor, has to do with the
18 creation of the SAOs, the Serb autonomous
19 provinces. This came under Serb control, and the
20 Muslims and the Croats thought that the Serbs wished to
21 take parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Muslim and
22 the Croatian sides voted a resolution on the
23 sovereignty of Bosnia whereas the Serb side rejected
24 to take part in that, and this led to tensions between
25 the two groups. These tensions escalated into
1 aggression, and if they did, was that because -- did
2 that lead to war?
3 A. The question was in these terms: This map
4 offers you a picture of the autonomous region created
5 by the Serbs, SDS, particularly the Serb party,
6 between September and January -- September 1991 and
7 January 1992, this period. The declaration of the
8 sovereignty of Bosnia, in which the SDS did not take part,
9 was of October. October 15, if I well remember. So
10 this process was started but ended later.
11 In this context, it was clear that the
12 Serb side wanted to maintain Bosnia, whole Bosnia,
13 or at least a large part of this Bosnia, into the
14 Yugoslav framework federation. Yugoslavia still
15 existed at that time. While the Croats and Muslim party,
16 SDA, HDZ, agreed at that time to find a perspective of
17 independence for Bosnia while they had a little bit
18 different interpretation later. But this is another
20 In this sense, the SDS didn't want to take
21 part in the vote because it didn't want to legitimise
22 its defeat because otherwise, you know, the numbers of
23 the possibility to defeat the SDS, if you put together
24 the representative of HDZ and the representative of SDA
25 in the parliament. It refused -- this was the
1 beginning of a process of worsening relations, because
2 immediately after, the Serb SDS proclaimed a
3 plebiscite in order to confirm the wish of the Serb
4 people to remain in Yugoslavia, and they voted in
5 November. Then you had the European Union submitting
6 in December the proposal -- requesting to submit
7 proposal for recognition.
8 So in this context again, the Croats, HDZ and
9 SDA, the Muslim party, agreed to submit, the Serbs
10 didn't take part in the vote, and then proclaimed the
11 republic of Serb people -- it was not Serb
12 Republic -- republic of Serb people in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was in January. Then they
14 ended this process.
15 At the same time, Croatian side from
16 November -- November 1991 and January 1992 created its
17 own autonomous regions, the three areas.
18 Then they made a decision, because the
19 Badinter Commission asked for a referendum, because it
20 was not clear the wish of the whole population because
21 the Serbs didn't vote, asked for a referendum. The
22 Croatian and the Serbias and the Muslims on side made
23 a decision to organise the referendum. The Serb
24 side opposed and it didn't vote. And it made the
25 decision -- it made a decision to consider that the
1 referendum will obligate only Croatians and Muslims but
2 not the Serbs.
3 You see -- you can see that everything is
4 going on in such a way that a military clash first --
5 or after can happen because when you have to implement
6 the decision of remaining in Yugoslavia or declaring
7 independence, one of the two sides in this case will
8 move against the other. For this reason, when the
9 sovereignty was proclaimed, the war exploded.
10 On the other side, you know, it's very
11 interesting to consider the speculation, in a sense,
12 the intellectual speculation of Bosnian General and
13 known intellectual Sefer Halilovic, after the war, in
14 this period, he published articles. And he suggested
15 about the idea: Okay, we could establish an agreement
16 with the Serbs. What might happen in this case? If
17 you think you have the same situation, the
18 Muslims, with an agreement with the Serbs, will create
19 a new majority, a majority who wish to stay in
20 Yugoslavia; and you have another party, a minority, the
21 Croatian side, who wish not. So probably in this
22 sense, because they already created the autonomous
23 provinces also, you can imagine the possibility to
24 organise some plebiscite to declare they did not
25 agree, and so the war, in any case, was doomed to
1 explode, from one side or the other side.
2 This put Izetbegovic in a very difficult position
3 in order to manage the situation between the two
4 communities. And in this sense, his uncertainty to
5 find his allies is another question. But this is a
6 question connected to the whole Yugoslavia. Not one of
7 the leaderships, policymakers of all the republics, had
8 attempted to create a policy of alliances within
9 Yugoslavia, including the Slovenes, but each of them
10 sought to guarantee their own areas, and this created a
11 situation where it was impossible to find an agreement
12 in this sense.
13 And that's why it was clear since the
14 beginning of the war, in June 1991, when the war
15 started in Slovenia, that the war will arrive -- will
16 join Bosnia. Because -- because of this -- because the
17 mechanism was so clear, so evident, that it was very
18 easy to predict such an outcome, such a tragic outcome.
19 Q. Another question, Professor Bianchini. We
20 made several references here to the HVO, the HV. I
21 wish to know if you have specific information or
22 opinion, do you, namely, have any information as to the
23 relation between the HVO and the civilian authorities;
24 for instance, by way of a small example, for someone to
25 come to a camp, one had to have authority, permission
1 from both the local authorities and the civilian
2 authorities. Did you comprehend the actual
3 relationship? Was it possible to distinguish between
4 the civilian police, the military police, the guard,
5 and the civilian authorities; do you have any specific
6 opinion as to that, if you understand my question?
7 A. Yes, I understand the question. I have a
8 document signed by -- I'm not so sure about Mate Boban,
9 but it's a document coming from Herceg-Bosna or the
10 command of HVO in which it is clearly stated,
11 particularly in the case of Konjic ,
12 that all local units and police depended on the HVO.
13 HVO was the -- temporarily military government of
14 Herceg-Bosna. Its duty was to protect the territorial
15 sovereignty of Herceg-Bosna, Croatian people.
16 So in this case, HVO managed generally all
17 the other bodies, and they were liable to it, in this
18 sense. Even people appointed, was appointed by HVO,
19 and HVO, the President of HVO, who was Javo Kaperlic
20 Since 1992, was liable to the
21 President of Herceg-Bosna, that is, directly to Mate
23 So in this sense, it seems to me, if I can
24 answer your question, that, yes, you have different
25 bodies, but all these bodies, in one way or another
1 had to answer to the HVO. And HVO had a local
2 organisation, a structure with a local organisation and
3 different departments. It was organised with a
4 department, for instance, for justice, the department
5 for -- the military department, the department for
6 economics. Like a little government, you know?
7 And I have also another document where it's
8 clearly stated -- this is a document coming from the
9 Vice-President of the Department for Justice of the HVO
10 of September 1992, where it's clearly stated that in
11 the area of Herceg-Bosna, the only legal system is the
12 legal system of Herceg-Bosna. So this was a clear act
13 in diminishing the sovereignty of the Bosnian
14 government in Sarajevo.
15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Thank you very much,
16 Professor Bianchini. I believe that the Chamber has no
17 further questions, so you have just completed your
18 testimony, and the International Criminal Tribunal
19 thanks you for having come here and for having provided
20 us with all this information.
21 Before we conclude, perhaps it will be
22 appropriate to take a look at our schedule. I believe
23 that we continue on the 21st or the 22nd of May. We
24 also have some other dates in our calendar which we
25 have set. I do not seem to be able to locate it.
1 The witness is dismissed.
2 (Witness stands down)
3 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I believe that you are
4 aware of the dates which we have set in our schedule.
5 What we need to fix is whether we shall start in the
6 third or fourth week of August. If I have understood
7 you properly, Mr. Niemann will not be here in the third
8 week of August. Is that so, Mr. Niemann?
9 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, I won't be here
10 for the first week of August, but after that, I'm here
11 continuously. So it's just the first week of August
12 that is a difficulty for me.
13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: Okay, the first week.
14 Thank you. So we will work things out. It is a bit
15 difficult for the second week of August. Probably,
16 most probably, the third and the fourth weeks will be
17 convenient for both parties and we will continue our
18 work in one of those weeks.
19 That will be all for today. I wish you a
20 pleasant weekend. To you, the interpreters in the
21 technical booth, I thank you all.
22 MR. NIEMANN: Just so it makes things easier
23 for everyone to know where they are, that is the
24 evidence of the Prosecution, and I close the
25 Prosecution case on the completion of Professor
1 Bianchini's evidence.
2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I believe that we had all
3 gathered that.
4 And it is up to you, Mr. Mikulicic, the next
5 time we convene, to present us with your opening
6 statement and to introduce your witnesses.
7 Thank you very much, Mr. Niemann.
8 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned
9 at 1.20 p.m.