1 Monday, 7 July 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Case Number IT-02-60-T, the
7 Prosecutor versus Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.
8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
9 Welcome back to this courtroom. Today, we'll restart to hear the case.
10 And before that, I would like to remind all the parties that this Trial
11 Chamber rendered a decision on the 3rd of July on the independent
12 counsel's motion for Mr. Vidoje Blagojevic to instruct the Registrar to
13 appoint new lead and co-counsel. It seems the translation of the whole
14 decision will take some time, I will summarise relevant parts of the
15 decision, especially for the benefit of the accused, Mr. Blagojevic.
16 After careful assessment of the facts presented, and a review of
17 the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the international human rights
18 standards, the Trial Chamber arrives at the following conclusions:
19 First, in assessing whether assigned counsel for accused should be
20 withdrawn, it is for the person seeking the withdrawal to satisfy the
21 Registrar that he should exercise his discretion in the interests of
22 justice. The burden of proof is squarely on the person requesting the
23 withdrawal of assigned counsel to demonstrate good cause. Accused
24 should, therefore, take great care in working with the Registrar to
25 select their counsel.
1 Two, there's no absolute right for an indigent accused to choose
2 his or her assigned counsel. It is a limited right. It is within the
3 Registrar's discretion to override the wishes of the accused if relevant
4 and a sufficient ground exists for holding that it is necessary in the
5 interests of justice.
6 Thirdly, there's no right to co-counsel. Co-counsel may be
7 appointed in the interests of justice, and upon the request of lead
8 counsel. While serving under the direction of lead counsel, co-counsel
9 is bound to carry out his or her professional responsibilities in the
10 best interests of the accused and in accordance with all obligations
11 under the rules, directives, and the codes of the Tribunal.
12 Fourth, one aspect of the right to a fair trial is the right to
13 expeditious trial. Immediately before or at any time after the
14 commencement of trial proceedings, only in the most exceptional motions
15 for withdrawal of counsel will be entertained as such replacement of
16 counsel will have an effect on the accused's right to be tried
18 Fifth, in this case, the Trial Chamber recognises the friction
19 exists between the accused and his counsel. Friction is not, however,
20 equal to fundamental lack of trust due to misconduct or manifest inignitus
21 [phoen]. Choosing to cease communications with counsel is not equivalent
22 to counsel breaching his obligation to communicate and consult their
24 Finally, Defence counsel have an ethical obligation to promote and
25 build trust. Counsel should always act in the manner to earn the trust of
1 their clients. The Trial Chamber called counsel to work with the legal
2 representative assigned in accordance with this decision to rebuild the
3 accused's trust in their professional abilities and their commitment to
4 provide him with competent, diligent, and zealous representation in the
5 proceedings before this Trial Chamber. Pursuant to Rule 54 and Rule 73
6 of the rules of procedure, the Trial Chamber dismisses the motion and
7 orders that, first, the Registrar will appoint in consultation with the
8 accused a legal representative to assist the accused and his Defence team
9 in preparation of his Defence in accordance with terms specified below no
10 later than ten days after the rendering of this decision. The legal
11 representative must share counsel's objectives in assuring that the
12 accused receives a fair and expeditious trial and a competent, effective,
13 and a zealous Defence. Towards that end, the legal representative shall
14 work with the accused and counsel, not simply as a bridge or
15 interlocutor, but as a temporary addition to the accused's Defence team.
16 And thirdly, the terms of the assignment of the legal
17 representative are: The legal representative shall be a person who meets
18 the qualification of counsel pursuant to Rule 44 and Rule 45 of the rules,
19 and is currently on the list of counsel maintained by the Registrar
20 pursuant to Rule 45 of the rules. The legal representative shall be
21 assigned for a period of up to three months. The legal representative is
22 a complement to the Defence team and is not a replacement. The accused
23 must work with his counsel through whatever means they find the most
24 appropriate while recognising that the legal representative's appointment
25 is a temporary and extraordinary measure to normalise the situation. The
1 legal representative has the right to appear in Court. The legal
2 representative is bound by lawyer/client privilege. In the event that a
3 accused has a specific issue he would like to raise before the Trial
4 Chamber, he may do so through counsel or upon being granted leave through
5 the legal representative.
6 The legal representative will not have the right to examine and
7 cross-examine witnesses. The decision is being translated in an
8 expeditious manner, and we are told that the accused will get copy in
9 B/C/S by this Wednesday. The Trial Chamber would like to inform the
10 accused that you could seek certification for leave to appeal this
11 decision if you are not satisfied with it. We have been informed that
12 the independent counsel will be meeting you on the 14th of July to
13 discuss the decision and any follow-up steps you may choose to make. The
14 Trial Chamber will extend the period of time for you to seek
15 certification until after you have a chance to read the decision and
16 discuss it with the independent counsel. At the same time, the Trial
17 Chamber will encourage you to work with the Registrar to select the legal
18 representative and encourage you to rebuild your relationship with
19 Mr. Karnavas and Mrs. Tomanovic as they are your counsel.
20 In light of recent disclosure of new exhibits and the witness
21 statement of Mr. Nikolic and Mr. Obrenovic, as well as the issue related
22 to Mr. Blagojevic's counsel, the Trial Chamber will recommend to the
23 Prosecution that it not call Mr. Nikolic and Mr. Obrenovic until after
24 the summer recess. Thank you.
25 Any observations? Yes, Mr. Blagojevic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have understood
2 what you have said now, and I think that I have followed as much as I
3 could because, of course, for me, this is more or less new material.
4 Your Honours, you must understand the situation. When a person is
5 falsely accusing you of criminal and corruption, and you do not have a
6 right or a possibility to resist that, furthermore, that person is then
7 imposing themselves on you to defend you in such an important case.
8 That's all I have to say. Thank you.
9 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Blagojevic, I could not agree with you in
10 this aspect. Anyway, the reasons is very clear in that decision. We
11 only hope that you could have the opportunity to discuss this matter with
12 the independent counsel assigned by this Trial Chamber. As I said, if
13 you are not satisfied with the decision, still you have remedies to make
14 it up. You could file application for certification of appeal of this
15 decision, and we will extend the time limits for you.
16 Well, having said that, could we hear the witness. Yes,
17 Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, we do have a witness, though
19 we also have a new lawyer from the Prosecution which, if I could
20 introduce, Antoinette Issa is a brand new lawyer with the Office of the
21 Prosecutor, and also Ann Davis is with us.
22 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Welcome to this case.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: And we will take your recommendation and call
24 Mr. Obrenovic and Mr. Nikolic after the break. And just so the record is
25 clear, the charges mentioned by Mr. Blagojevic are nothing to do with
1 charges brought by the Prosecution. We have our own different charges. It
2 may be unclear from the way he stated that on the record. But we have
3 Mr. Nesib Mandzic available, and we would call him at this time.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Ms. Sinatra.
5 MS. SINATRA: I'm sorry, I couldn't remember how to push the
6 button on here. Your Honours, I do have one matter I would like to file
7 with the Court a document. If you recall, in May we had a problem with
8 an executive decision ordered by George W. Bush that created a felony for
9 anybody to offer assistance or services to anybody on annex B, and
10 Mr. Jokic's name still exists on annex B. I wrote to the Department of
11 the Treasury, and my response from the Department of the Treasury is
12 unacceptable and still does not relieve me from the threat of Prosecution
13 by my government. I will make sure that the President of the Tribunal
14 receives a copy of this today. But just for the record, I would like the
15 Court to know that I have not been exonerated at this point under this
16 executive order issued by George W. Bush. I would like -- I gave a copy
17 to the Prosecutor but I'd like the Court to have a copy of this document
18 and it to be filed as record in our trial also.
19 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. We will be very glad to
20 receive that document.
21 MS. SINATRA: I might have the usher.
22 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you could do that during the break.
23 MS. SINATRA: Okay. Thank you. Also, Your Honours, I forgot to
24 introduce, we have Chris Murphy with us today. She is our case manager,
25 and I want to welcome her to the courtroom.
1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Welcome to this courtroom.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
5 JUDGE LIU: Would you please make the solemn declaration in
6 accordance with the paper the usher is showing to you, please.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
8 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 WITNESS: NESIB MANDZIC
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may sit down, please.
12 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
13 Examined by Mr. McCloskey:
14 Q. Yes, sir, could you state your full name and spell your last name
15 for us, please.
16 A. Nesib Mandzic, born in 1962 in Skelani Municipality of Srebrenica.
17 Q. What is your current occupation?
18 A. I am an electrical engineer. I have been working at the
19 electrical company of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its seat in Sarajevo.
20 Q. Are you currently undergoing studies?
21 A. Yes, I went to do postgraduate studies in electrical engineering.
22 I finished all my exams, and I'm currently doing a dissertation. I'm
23 writing up an MSC and I hope that in a few months I will complete it.
24 Apart from these activities I am a member of the municipal assembly of
25 Srebrenica, that is, of the municipal council and so on.
1 Q. Where were you living in July 1995?
2 A. In the Srebrenica enclave.
3 Q. How long had you been living there?
4 A. I was born in Skelani in Srebrenica Municipality, but in the
5 urban area of Srebrenica. And the enclave was part of that. I worked
6 there from 1990 until July 1995. Also including the part of the war from
7 1991 to 1995.
8 Q. What was your occupation in July 1995? What kind of work were
9 you doing?
10 A. I was a director of the secondary school, and I was lecturing at
11 the same school.
12 Q. During that period, that summer of 1995, did you come in contact
13 with any Dutch officers that would come by the school?
14 A. Yes, in the course of 1994 and the first half of 1995, I had
15 contacts with officers of the Dutch battalion and soldiers to our school,
16 a Dutch officer came. I believe his name was Boering. He came and
17 assisted us with acquiring some school material in difficult
19 Q. Where were you on 11 July, 1995?
20 A. In the night between the 10th and the 11th of July, 1995,
21 together with my colleagues, it was such a dramatic situation that
22 occurred. We happened to be at the school. We spent the night there.
23 We didn't sleep there, but just spent the night in such fear thinking and
24 discussing where to go, whether to go through the forest, through the
25 wood, or whether to go to the UNPROFOR base in Potocari. So on the 11th
1 of July, we found ourselves in the secondary school, and it was about
2 1300 hours. Because of the attack of the Bosnian Serb army, we had to
3 withdraw. Some of us went through the wood towards Tuzla and the others
4 went to Potocari and so on.
5 Q. During the day on 11 July, can you describe the situation that
6 was happening around you and what you decided to do?
7 A. The situation was a dramatic one. Every person and every face
8 you can see that there was a fear of death because of the approaching of
9 the Serb army because of their operations that were mostly going toward
10 civilian targets. There were shells that were landing around the town,
11 on the streets. There were people shouting, screaming for help, women
12 with children. I saw helpless old people in the streets. Nobody could
13 help them. Nobody could evacuate them. In such a situation, there
14 wasn't a person either from the military or the political leadership,
15 from the Bosnian authorities, to say you can go to the Potocari, to the
16 DutchBat base or show us any other way out.
17 Q. So what did you decide to do on the afternoon of the 11th of
19 A. Considering that I was wounded in 1993, and I was recovering from
20 that, and it was at the end of May, beginning of June the field hospital
21 of the DutchBat, there was surgery that was performed on me. I was not
22 able to go through the wood. So I decided to go to the Potocari UN camp
23 of the DutchBat, hoping that in that camp, like thousands of others, I
24 would get protection considering that it was a demilitarised zone which
25 would also include protection of civilian population. And it was on this
1 basis that in the afternoon of the 11th of July, I arrived in Potocari in
3 Q. You mentioned a demilitarised zone. In reality, was the enclave
4 fully demilitarised?
5 A. Mostly it was, if we look at the handover of the heavy weaponry
6 of AA weaponry, of anti-tank weapons and so on.
7 Q. Was there a Bosnian Muslim organisation though to a -- an army
8 inside the enclave at that time in July? You said mostly.
9 A. As far as I know about the organisation of real military
10 formations, we can say that these were present in the Srebrenica enclave.
11 There were certain symbolic units that were mostly -- they kept certain
12 trophy weapons. They were close by to the area. What I mean to say is
13 that these were people who had kept these trophy weapons. They lived in
14 the areas where it was really necessary to keep some kind of security.
15 Q. You've told us you decided to go to Potocari. Can you describe
16 your -- how you went to Potocari and what occurred along the way?
17 A. On the way to Potocari, the army of Republika Srpska was shelling
18 the convoy, both on left and right side of the road creating a
19 psychological pressure on the convoy to go and move towards Potocari
20 without thinking about any other options.
21 Q. Can you describe how many people were with you and describe this
22 what you call a convoy of people as they move along the road towards
24 A. It was a convoy which was about 5 kilometres long. There were
25 tens of thousands of people who were moving in the direction of Potocari.
1 Mostly women, elderly people, people who were helpless. There was a lot
2 of fear, panic, screaming in the course of that journey. Every single
3 time a shell landed, there would be a mother throwing herself on the
4 asphalt, with children crying.
5 Q. Was this large group of people mostly on foot or in vehicles?
6 A. Mostly, over 95 per cent, went on foot. There was a small group
7 as much as I was able to see, people who could really hardly move, sick or
8 elderly they were on lorries. And I noticed, I think, that there were
9 people sick that were loaded from the hospital.
10 Q. Did you see any shells land in the crowd that was moving towards
12 A. Yes, I saw shells landing before all those people set out for
13 Potocari. Near the konfekcija building in Srebrenica, a shell fell on a
14 group of people, several thousands of people. Later I heard that the
15 shell had killed and wounded some of those people. On the way to
16 Potocari, however, shells were falling left and right. I couldn't see
17 clearly at that time, that any of the people travelling with me were
18 injured. But people were saying that the convoys behind us suffered
19 casualties, there were people who had been killed and wounded.
20 Q. About what time did you get to Potocari?
21 A. Between 4.00 and 5.00 in the afternoon.
22 Q. Where did you go?
23 A. As most other people, I tried to approach the DutchBat camp in
24 Potocari. We were not, however, allowed to do so. And then we returned
25 to the same place as before, across the road. And we looked for a small
1 shelter, sort of a refuge, to rest in the deadly heat and take shelter
2 from Serb soldiers' gunfire nearby.
3 Q. That afternoon and early evening, can you briefly describe the
4 situation in Potocari, how many people, what was going on?
5 A. On the afternoon of the 11th of July in Potocari, there were
6 about 30.000 refugees from the areas of a number of different
7 municipalities. Most people were from Srebrenica, Bratunac, Vlasenica
8 municipalities, Visegrad, Zvornik, and so on and so forth. At any rate,
9 every single person was obviously in fear, afraid, even the smallest
10 child. There was fear on the way from Srebrenica to Potocari. As on the
11 previous days, the army of Republika Srpska was carrying out offensive
12 operations aiming at cleaning the enclave of its Muslim population. The
13 same afternoon, the shooting and shelling continued overhead, the aim of
14 the shelling was intimidation of civilians to prevent them from even
15 pondering their return, to make them accept the fact of deportation.
16 Q. Were there Dutch soldiers among the Muslim refugees in Potocari
17 at that time?
18 A. Yes. Most of the Dutch soldiers were in the camp in July 1995.
19 They took refuge there alongside with about 5.000 refugees, but more than
20 20.000 refugees remained outside the camp.
21 Q. That evening, were you contacted by anyone from the Dutch
23 A. Yes, they used a megaphone, and they called out my name. I
24 didn't know what was happening, but when they called out my name, I
25 responded, I was approached by an interpreter and an officer of DutchBat.
1 They asked me to enter the camp because the commander of the Dutch
2 battalion wanted to speak to me. They said the situation was very
3 difficult and uncertain, both for the refugees and for the Dutch
4 soldiers. I heard then that certain Dutch soldiers had been imprisoned,
5 taken prisoner by the army of Republika Srpska, that Serbs were asking
6 for negotiations to release them.
7 Q. So did you go to the Dutch camp and meet with the Dutch commander?
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. And what did he tell you?
10 A. As I said, they told me that the situation was difficult, that
11 some Dutch soldiers had been captured, that under such difficult
12 circumstances, there was nearly nothing they could do, that it was the
13 Serbs setting the terms for these negotiations, and that the Serbs asked
14 for a Bosnian delegation to also attend these negotiations.
15 Q. So you mentioned negotiations. Do you recall the name of the
16 commander of the Dutch battalion that was speaking to you?
17 A. Yes, it was Colonel Karremans.
18 Q. What did he say to you regarding your involvement in these
20 A. Colonel Karremans tried to convince me to go to these
21 negotiations with the Serb side. He said he would support me in my
22 intention, to ask for safe evacuation of refugees during those
23 negotiations, for the refugees to be protected during the evacuation
25 Q. And what did you say to him?
1 A. I told him that I was not representative of the civilian
2 authorities and that it was difficult to understand under such unfair
3 circumstances for me to appear on behalf of the civilian authorities. As
4 far as I knew, the civilian authorities had fled through the woods. I
5 had no authority, nor did I feel that I had any ability or capacity, to
6 represent these civilian bodies of authority.
7 Q. So today, you hold an office, but back then you were -- you
8 didn't hold any kind of political office or in any sort of representation
9 capacity. Is that correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. So what did you decide to do?
12 A. Colonel Karremans and his deputy major, Franken, convinced me
13 and told me, yes, we know all that, but you're an intellectual, you're a
14 man of the people. You're someone people trust and you can help in this
15 difficult time. On the other hand, you have the Serb side insisting on
16 these negotiations, there must be negotiations because the Serb side are
17 requesting negotiations. And negotiations can be of assistance both to
18 you, the refugees, and to the Dutch soldiers facing a very difficult
19 situation. I was sweating from pressure. I was buckling under pressure.
20 I was afraid of going to Bratunac. We had heard what had happened there
21 in July 1992 when Bosniaks had been killed at the stadium. I was afraid
22 of the situation as it was in Potocari. I was afraid to travel. I was
23 afraid of the pressure I would be facing once I got there.
24 Q. So what did you decide to do?
25 A. They took some time convincing me, the colonel of the DutchBat
1 and his deputy, and I agreed to get in the car with them and drive to
2 Bratunac to these so-called negotiations, although it was quite clear to
3 me at the time that those were not too equally strong sides negotiating.
4 I knew that these negotiations were a basic precondition for the survival
5 of the population there.
6 Q. Where in Bratunac did you go with DutchBat?
7 A. The Fontana Hotel, and the same night, the 11th of July, we
8 arrived about 11.00.
9 Q. All right. Now, yesterday did you have a chance in my office to
10 view some video of the meetings that occurred, that you were involved in
11 both on the night of the 11th and the morning of the 12th?
12 A. Yes, yes.
13 Q. I'm going to show you just a brief segment of that video that he
14 is involved in in order to save some times, Your Honours. We don't, I
15 don't think, need to see the entire segment. But before we get to that,
16 I'd like to show you a few still photographs of some of the people that
17 were at that meeting. And this should be Exhibit P27.
18 Do you recognise that individual on the screen?
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Apparently, we aren't -- his screen is the one
20 that's not working --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see a clearer image now,
22 but it's not all that clear.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY:
24 Q. Well, we'll try it the old-fashioned way.
25 A. This is the communications officer of the DutchBat in Srebrenica.
1 This was the person I was talking about. He would see me at the secondary
2 school, Major Boering.
3 Q. Thank you. Let's go to the next photograph. This is Exhibit 28.
4 Do you recognise that person?
5 A. Yes, this is the commander of the Dutch battalion, Mr. Karremans.
6 Q. And were both Boering and Karremans at the meeting on the 11th of
8 A. Yes, they were.
9 Q. All right. If you could look at Exhibit P29, the next one, was
10 this person at the meeting?
11 A. Yes, this was Petar, the interpreter. He works for the UN now in
12 the Zvornik area.
13 Q. Was he a Muslim interpreter or a Serb interpreter that night? Do
14 you know who he was working for?
15 A. He is a Serb himself. During the war, he worked as a UN
16 interpreter. His job was with the UN, but he was interpreting for the
17 Serb side. He's currently working as an interpreter for the UN.
18 Q. All right. Let's look at the next one, Exhibit P30. Was this
19 person at the meeting that night of the 11th?
20 A. Yes, this is an officer of the army of Republika Srpska. I saw
21 him at the meetings at the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac. But I also saw him
22 in Potocari. He used to come there to see how the deportations were
23 going and whether everything was unfolding according to the plan of the
24 army of Republika Srpska.
25 Q. Did you know his name at the time?
1 A. No, I didn't, although General Mladic did introduce them to us,
2 all of them, the military and civilian representatives. But I did not
3 remember his name.
4 Q. All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 31.
5 A. This is General Krstic.
6 Q. Was he at the meeting that night?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you remember where he was seated?
9 A. Next to General Mladic.
10 Q. All right. Let's go to P32.
11 A. General Mladic.
12 Q. All right. Now I will show you a brief segment from that evening
13 and just ask you to watch it along with us and I'll ask you a question or
14 two about it.
15 [Videotape played]
16 Mr. McCLOSKEY:
17 Q. Mr. Mandzic, how were you feeling at this point with General
18 Mladic in front of you and you're speaking?
19 A. I was completely scared. I knew what had been happening between
20 1992 and 1995 in the Srebrenica enclave and outside the Srebrenica enclave
21 in the neighbouring municipalities and across Bosnia-Herzegovina were
22 persecutions of the Bosniak population, they were being driven out from
23 Serb-held territory, the territory held by the army of Republika Srpska.
24 Q. Mr. Mandzic, let me just interrupt. Try to answer my question.
25 I will ask you questions about those things, but we need to go question
1 by question. You do mention that there are people in the enclave from
2 many outlying municipalities. Can you just briefly explain how people
3 from outlying municipalities ended up in the Srebrenica enclave?
4 A. In early April, or rather May 1992, they had been driven from
5 their homes and land by units of the Republika Srpska. And they found
6 refuge in the villages around Srebrenica and in the town itself, in early
7 May 1992. Those were refugees from other municipalities such as Zvornik,
8 Bratunac, Vlasenica. Hundreds of people, of those refugees were killed
9 and massacred by the army of Republika Srpska and paramilitary units
10 coming from Serbian Sinagora [phoen] as they were trying to reach safety
11 back in 1992.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could continue the tape.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. McCLOSKEY:
15 Q. Mr. Mandzic, how did you feel when General Mladic told you that
16 people would survive, stay, or vanish, and talked about discussing the
17 salvation of the Muslim people and stated that the future of your people
18 was in your hands? How did those statements make you feel?
19 A. I was intimidated. General Mladic was talking about the
20 disappearance of the Muslim people from the enclave, or outside the
21 enclave for that matter. He said the destiny of your people in this
22 enclave and even outside the enclave is in your hands. That's what he was
23 saying. We knew that Gorazde, Brcko and the other enclaves were next. I
24 felt great fear above all. I was thinking feverishly how I could help
25 those people. I knew that death was awaiting them. This soldier, this
1 general, this man, had his mind set on making a whole people disappear.
2 The next day, at the next meeting, when --
3 Q. Hold on before we get there. We will get there. Let me ask you
4 some questions. At the meeting on the 11th, was there material -- did
5 things happen that were not on the video that you have been able to see,
6 the complete video?
7 A. Yes. There were a lot of symbols there, a swine being
8 slaughtered in the neighbourhood near Fontana Hotel. It was supposed to
9 be some kind of metaphor, you see this swine being slaughtered, it's
10 exactly what we will do with you. There were other menacing messages by
11 General Mladic. You see what your own political representatives did to
12 you, Izetbegovic can't help you now, Ganic can't help you now. The only
13 person who can help you now is Mladic himself, that's me. He was
14 threatening us. And then at last he would say: "I'll show mercy. I'll
15 let everyone go."
16 Q. I'll show you another Exhibit P33. It should be right there since
17 the machine's not working.
18 A. This is the board of the Municipal Assembly of Srebrenica. When
19 we first met in Bratunac, General Mladic put this board before me. He
20 said put this in front of Nesib so he can have a look to see what it
21 looks like. Or rather plaque. I saw immediately that the right-hand
22 portion of this plaque, there was a piece missing where it said
23 "Bosnia-Herzegovina" and there was a message across the board "This is
24 the end of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the end of the old forms of living
25 together in Bosnia and Herzegovina" or in Srebrenica municipality for
1 that matter as it had been for centuries up until July 1992. When I say
2 the different forms of living, I mean religious and ethnic tolerance and
3 so forth.
4 Q. Okay. When the meeting -- thank you. When the meeting ended,
5 where did you go?
6 A. When the meeting ended, I got on to the DutchBat vehicle and we
7 headed back towards Potocari. That same night, I tried to reason, I
8 tried to think how can we survive? And I had to think on behalf of all
9 those refugees, how to draw up a list, how to answer Mladic's requests.
10 I was at the camp, DutchBat camp, that night. I was trying to sleep, but
11 I couldn't sleep. I had dark premonitions and a very dim view of what
12 would happen to the civilian population.
13 Q. Did you go to a meeting the next morning at the Hotel Fontana as
14 planned at 10.00?
15 A. Yes. And we also expanded this Bosniak delegation. There was a
16 Mrs. Camila Osmanovic and Mr. Ibro Nuhanovic.
17 Q. What was Ibro's last name?
18 A. Nuhanovic.
19 Q. Nuhanovic with an N or with an M? Just for the record.
20 A. With an N.
21 Q. Thank you. About what time did you arrive at that meeting?
22 A. About 10.00 a.m. in the morning on the 12th of July.
23 Q. Now was General Krstic and General Mladic at that meeting?
24 A. Certainly.
25 Q. And --
1 A. And a number of other officers and members of the political
2 leadership of the Bratunac Municipality.
3 Q. Can you name any of those political leaders from Bratunac?
4 A. I recall Miroslav Deronjic. I went to school with him. I also
5 remember General Mladic also introduced members of the legislative
6 authority of the Bratunac municipality, Mr. Simic. And I can't recall
7 another man -- there was another man, but I can't recall him. He was from
8 the political leadership of the Bratunac municipality.
9 Q. Was Colonel Karremans and Major Boering also at that meeting?
10 A. Yes, we came with them in the same vehicle.
11 Q. All right. We'll play another short segment of that meeting, if
12 we could.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. McCLOSKEY:
15 Q. Mr. Mandzic, was the -- that's obviously just a short clip of
16 that meeting. But was the substance of that meeting on the 12th any
17 different, did it have any significant differences than the meeting that
18 happened the night before?
19 A. More or less General Mladic repeated the words, that he would
20 ensure all the Bosniak population to leave and even to return to their
21 homes but there were moments of psychological pressure like at this other
22 meeting, one of his soldiers or officers would barge in during the
23 meeting and they would say: "General, the Muslims have come to Bratunac
24 unauthorised." And then at that moment, colleague Camila Osmanovic stood
25 up and was that an association to 1992 of the killing of Bosniaks in
1 Bratunac? I'm saying this was one of our impressions, impressions that
2 we had. Also what was not defined and where General Mladic didn't give a
3 straight answer to, like I asked him the first night at the meeting, is
4 it going to be a safe evacuation of the population from the enclave, and
5 it was mostly discussed at the level of the Red Cross and the
6 coordination of UNPROFOR with an evacuation, safe evacuation, with
7 dignity of the civilian population. Certainly there was pressure and the
8 attack of the Serb soldiers, and such aspects -- this was disallowed to
9 be discussed further by General Mladic. He stopped all that discussion.
10 He didn't want that to be discussed.
11 Q. Do you recall any mention of the Serbs wanting to see the
12 military-aged men that were in Potocari?
13 A. Yes, that was one aspect in which pressure was applied. In
14 Potocari, there was mostly elderly, women, children. That was true,
15 people who had nothing to do with the war, war operations. They just
16 happened to find themselves in such difficult circumstances in the
17 war-torn zone. They just wanted to go home.
18 Q. What do you recall about the military-aged men being mentioned at
19 that meeting, if anything?
20 A. There was -- it was mentioned that certain Bosniaks who were
21 younger, that there were some indications that some of them may have
22 committed some offences and that they should be interviewed by the
23 Officers of the Bosnian Serb army, and the DutchBat officers could be
24 present at these interviews. And we reacted immediately. We said in
25 Potocari, there are very few people who are in any connection with
1 offences and crimes and murders. These are people mostly in Potocari who
2 have spent the war in the enclave. They were there, they just happened to
3 be there. They were not prepared for the war. They couldn't wait for the
4 war to be over and they were mostly civilians.
5 Q. Where did you go after the meeting?
6 A. Well, with the vehicle of the DutchBat, we returned to Potocari,
7 to the UN base. And together with the colleague Ibro Nuhanovic, we
8 resumed our conversation how in which way we can make a list primarily of
9 the male population because we could see that everything was revolving
10 around the male population, that male population would be under threat,
11 would be in danger, from 15 onwards, 15 years of age onwards. At that
12 moment, myself and colleague Nuhanovic, who is no longer alive as of the
13 13th of July, 1995, we were speaking. We tried to make a table, an
14 overview, which would be a good thing to have the data on the male
15 population. And we heard from some distance, 150, 200 metres, we heard
16 some noise, clamour, and we then suddenly realised the Serbian army had
17 arrived, they had mixed in themselves with the civilians. So the very
18 moment that that idea that we had listing and making a table of all the
19 male population of 15 years of age onwards it was impossible to enforce,
20 because already, 12th of July, after 1200 hours, Serb soldiers, Serbian
21 army barged into the mass of people and it was impossible for us to do
22 anything whatsoever, to see how many men were present in the place, in the
24 Q. Were you able to make a list of men inside the actual DutchBat
1 A. Yes, we tried to make a list, and we made a list, although I have
2 to mention the great number of people, of adults, inside the base, inside
3 the Dutch UN base, did not adhere to our idea of being on the list. They
4 specifically asked me what if the Serb army get hold of that list? Are
5 we going to be the first ones to be killed off? And I really couldn't
6 explain to them how difficult this was. So finally people who had a lot
7 of confidence in me and colleague Nuhanovic and others who were working
8 on this list, we tried within a very short time, we wrote down the names
9 of 239 people, mostly out of these people listed, 239 people, more than
10 90 per cent went missing. That is, the Serb army executed them. Time
11 has passed since then, and knowing some of them, I have to say these
12 people were civilians. They worked in factories before the war. They
13 worked in the fields before the war. They tried to feed their families
14 before the war, to make up for the lack of water and food in the enclave.
15 Q. Did you work with DutchBat in preparing this list for the men
16 that were actually inside the UN Compound as opposed to the people
17 outside the compound?
18 A. Yes. Yes, we did. Yes. And in those preparations, because some
19 of the persons did not want to be on the list, I went back to the base,
20 that is, to the deputy commander of the DutchBat, Major Franken, and I
21 said to him certain people do not want to be on the list. They are
22 worried about the list falling into Serb hands? What do you think? Who
23 should we give these details to? And he said, well, you can give me the
24 list, and if the Trial Chamber will excuse me, he said he would put the
25 list in his undergarments.
1 Q. And so did you give him the list of 239?
2 A. Yes, I did. I did give a list of 239 people.
3 Q. Yesterday, did you see a photocopy of that list in my office?
4 A. Yes, but the copy -- I saw the copy in October, sometime in
5 October when journalists arrived in Tuzla. So it was not the first time
6 for me to see this list.
7 Q. October 1995 was the first time you saw it after the events?
8 A. Yes, that's right.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honours, Major Franken will be testifying,
10 and that list will be an exhibit in his testimony.
11 Q. Can you briefly tell us what happened to Ibro Nuhanovic, the
12 other person who was at the meeting with you representing the meetings?
13 A. Yes. This person's name is Ibro Nuhanovic. He was a member of
14 the so-called Bosniak negotiation team, negotiating group. And together
15 with me, he worked on this list. And on the 13th of July, members of his
16 family, that is his wife and his younger son, had to leave the DutchBat
17 camp at the demand of the Serb army like the other refugees, and he knew
18 that his wife and his son would be divided. And he couldn't, as a
19 parent, as a spouse, he couldn't stand that. And Hasan, who was an
20 interpreter at the DutchBat, he wanted Major Franken, he asked him to let
21 his parents stay so they wouldn't have to leave with this group because
22 he could see that there was a -- people being divided, males being
23 separated from women and children. And Major Franken just shrugged and
24 said, Hasan, I can't help you. Your brother and your mother have to
25 leave, and your father can stay. But Mr. Nuhanovic couldn't stand that,
1 separating from his family, from his spouse and his son. He left with
2 them, and he left then and he was never seen again. He was killed and
3 his wife as well, and his younger son, and the only person left from that
4 family is his other son who is now in a very difficult psychological
5 condition because of the loss of his family.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honours, do you think it might be a good
7 time to take a break.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll resume at quarter to 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
11 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, shall we continue.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Mandzic, we now have you back at the DutchBat base after the
14 meeting at the Hotel Fontana. About what time did you get back to the
15 DutchBat base in Potocari on the 12th of July?
16 A. Approximately before 1200 hours, so just before noon.
17 Q. Now you've described that the Serb army came in to the area
18 outside of the DutchBat base. Were you able to actually see the people
19 being loaded on buses and transported out of the area from where you were
20 at the DutchBat base?
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry, Your Honours, I didn't notice we didn't
22 have Ms. Sinatra.
23 MS. SINATRA: Please accept our apologies. Excuse us.
24 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was able to see the arrival
1 of the Serb soldiers in front of the UN base in Potocari. I was able to
2 see they were distributing, in inverted commas, sweets and chocolate to
3 the children. After about an hour, I was able to see from the window of
4 the place where we were standing at the base, I was able to see the
5 separation process, that is, the loading of women only on to buses which
6 made me conclude that it was in that area that men were separated from
8 MR. McCLOSKEY:
9 Q. So did you actually see men being separated or did you just see
10 women only being put on buses?
11 A. We saw a group, they were in front of the bus at a distance about
12 30 to 50 metres. So there were groups, mixed groups of refugees, men,
13 women, elderly, men, women, children, adults, et cetera. Some 50 metres
14 away from that group, there were parked buses and lorries. On the first
15 day of the deportation, on the 12th of July, those buses in the hours of
16 the afternoon, women were forcibly loaded on to buses while men were not
17 loaded on to buses on that side where we were standing. The men were not
18 deported. So this made us conclude that men were being separated.
19 Q. So how long did you watch this process going on, on the 12th?
20 A. I was able to see that throughout the afternoon, for hours, from
21 about 1300 hours until well over 2000 hours. It was a horrific situation,
22 very painful to watch. My colleagues were able to see it as well. All
23 the people that were at the UN base, officers, soldiers of the DutchBat,
24 including the refugees who were inside the base. Everybody was able to
25 see this separation which then brought fear of death into the hearts of
1 everyone who was inside and outside of the camp, over 20.000 people, and
2 about 5.000 who were inside the camp, inside the base. I asked Major
3 Franken to stop the evacuation because this evacuation, or rather
4 deportation would bring to the execution of thousands of men. And we were
5 also worried about the fate of young women, young girls, that they would
6 be raped. Later on, after the arrival in Tuzla, we recognised the tragic
7 situation, that some of my friends, fellow citizens from the same town,
8 were raped. Because of religion and because of shame that they shouldn't
9 be speaking about this, these raped young women, these young girls, did
10 not turn to organs of authority or to the medical teams in order to say --
11 tell their story and say what happened, and they didn't ask for
12 protection. This was something that was done within their families.
13 These stories did not go outside their families.
14 Q. Were you asked to do anything that afternoon by any of the
16 A. I don't know which authority do you mean there? There was only
17 the authority of the army of Republika Srpska and the power of the army
18 of Republika Srpska. On the other side, there was just the presence of
19 the Dutch soldiers and officers, and we were completely helpless. We
20 were at the mercy of the officers and soldiers of the army of Republika
21 Srpska and their superiors.
22 Q. Did you speak to people outside the base that day?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Can you describe how that occurred.
25 A. Well, in the afternoon, about 1600 hours on the 12th of July, the
1 interpreter and one of the surgeons of the DutchBat in Srebrenica
2 approached me and my colleague, Nuhanovic, that I spoke about and about
3 his tragic situation, that General Mladic wanted to see us, that we should
4 leave the base and speak to the people. On the way from the building
5 where we were with the Dutch soldiers and officers up to the gathered
6 mass of population, it was about 250, 300 metres, and as we were leaving
7 the base, there was some Serb soldiers who met us. Some of those Serb
8 soldiers rushed over to the Dutch soldiers and disarmed them. And one of
9 the Serb soldiers rushed to Mr. Nuhanovic and said: "Is that you?" And
10 Ibro Nuhanovic stopped silent, I was also completely scared. I didn't --
11 we didn't answer. That Serb soldier then hit Mr. Nuhanovic. Mr.
12 Nuhanovic went down on his knees, and then this Dutch sergeant who was
13 escorting us tried to prevent that. And he said: No, no, that's not
14 right. Let him go. After that, some 50 metres from there, we then set
15 off towards General Mladic because we could see him about 50 metres from
16 there. So then he said: Speak to the people. There were about 20.000 --
17 more than 20.000 people in front of us. They were waiting for this
18 forcible deportation. We could foresee that the worst thing would happen,
19 but we really couldn't speak about that to them, and we wouldn't be
20 allowed to tell them what our foreboding was. General Mladic then asked
21 the people gathered: Do you know these two men, pointing to me and Mr.
22 Nuhanovic. People said yes, we do know them. They work at the school.
23 One is a headmaster, one is a principal and the other one is a lecturer at
24 the same school. What kind of people are they, he asked. And they said,
25 normal people, ordinary people, honest people.
1 And then General Mladic said don't create panic, you will all
2 leave. First of all women with small children, elderly people, sick
3 people, and the rest. But the departure and the way that we were forced
4 to speak to this group of gathered people it was a specific type of
5 psychological pressure which made us realise, as members of this so-called
6 negotiating team, that we could do nothing. And the message to the
7 population that was being deported is that they couldn't expect any help
8 from the outside, not from international institutions, not from
9 institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they should just accept that
10 silently -- they should accept the situation, the situation whereby the
11 male population was being separated from the rest.
12 Q. Where did you spend the night of 12 July?
13 A. Inside the base with the interpreters and some officers of the
14 DutchBat, except that we were not staying in the same room as the Dutch
15 soldiers obviously.
16 Q. That night of the 12th, did you receive any information about
17 what was going on outside the camp?
18 A. That same night, I left the building where the command of the
19 Dutch battalion was seated. I had walked between 10 and 15 metres
20 outside the building. You could hear screams, indiscernible voices,
21 sounds of shooting. We couldn't tell how far this shooting was taking
22 place. There was a lot of commotion, it was difficult to tell where the
23 shots were coming from. But this made us realise, because we had seen
24 Serb soldiers, that something horrible was going on there.
25 The next morning, the next day, on the 13th of July, Camila
1 Osmanovic entered into the base, and she had been with us the day before
2 as part of the negotiating team. When she came, she confirmed what we
3 had heard from other citizens, that outside the base in the night,
4 between the 12th and the 13th of July, Serb soldiers had been killing
5 people, massacring people. Some people had been massacred and their
6 throats had been slit as they were on their way to fetch water for the
7 people who were assembled there. She said that there had been separations
8 near the elektroprivreda building.
9 Q. Now, on 13 July, were you able to observe the continuing efforts
10 to move the population out of Potocari?
11 A. Yes, also on the 13th of July, forcible deportation -- urgent
12 deportation continued. I was shocked, as were the others, at the sheer
13 speed of it, how quickly the deportation of Bosniaks from Potocari was
14 unfolding. I could see the lorries and buses that were being used for
15 the purpose, lorries with trailers from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina,
16 or rather from all the various Serb-held areas. Our conclusion was that
17 this was a planned operation, that it must have been planned well in
18 advance because it was impossible to assemble 50 buses and 50 lorries in
19 such short notice, within 24 hours only. It would have been impossible
20 to have tens of thousands of people deported within just 24 hours.
21 Q. So did much the same occur on the 13th as had occurred on the
23 A. Yes. And in the early afternoon hours on the 13th of July, the
24 deportation of refugees outside the camp was completed, and the
25 deportation of Bosniaks who were inside the base began. The same
1 procedure of separating people was applied as with those who were outside
2 the base. I remember inside the base, the areas where refugees could
3 move were restricted. There were lines on the ground showing them the
4 way on to the buses. And this lasted until about 2000 hours on the same
5 day, this same procedure was applied. First women and children, and
6 after them, the men. Who the men were, it was difficult to keep track at
7 the time, but today we have thousands and thousands of exhumed bodies of
8 Bosniak men from Srebrenica who had been killed.
9 Q. So do you know if the men that were staying in the DutchBat
10 compound, the military-aged men, were allowed to be bussed out with the
11 women and children?
12 A. Well, they were on their way at one point, but the Serb army were
13 inside the camp on the 13th of July and outside the base, too. And they
14 were the ones deciding who would be boarding the buses and who would be
15 separated. But the great majority of men above 15 years of age were
16 separated, put on to the buses, and deported. I must point out that even
17 children below 15 years of age were sometimes executed. You can double
18 check this using the International Red Cross list. I knew parents whose
19 children were primary-school age, and their children were in the base on
20 the 11th, 12th, and 13th of July. On the 13th of July, their mothers
21 took them away, children aged between 12 and 14 years of age.
22 Q. Were there some Muslims that were inside the base that were
23 allowed to stay with you and not be transported on the 12th and 13th, but
24 were transported later?
25 A. Yes. A group of 26 Bosniaks remained, including six or seven
1 interpreters, interpreters for the Dutch Battalion, two or three for the
2 Medicines San Frontiers, members of their families, 26 Bosniaks remained
3 there until the 21st of July. However, as of the 13th of July, we were
4 subjected to pressure by the Serb soldiers. They were searching the base
5 to see if there were any Bosniaks still left. They were asking us
6 questions as to what we had been doing during the war, if we had taken
7 part in any of the military operations. That's what they asked me.
8 There were several dozens of wounded persons, civilians, who were still
9 in the camp after the 13th of July.
10 Later on, they were transferred, or rather deported, to Tuzla.
11 As far as I know, that's what the Medicines San Frontiers tried to
12 achieve. However, some of those were killed, and some were exchanged
13 months later. They were kept at a Serb camp in Batkovic after the
15 Q. Why was it that a certain number of Muslim interpreters and
16 others were allowed to stay behind and be evacuated with DutchBat?
17 A. I don't know the exact reason. I suppose the command of the
18 Dutch battalion spoke on their behalf and put in a word for them. They
19 said they needed these people until the very end of their mandate in
20 Srebrenica. But I must repeat, I can't be sure.
21 Q. So between the 13th, when the transportation was finished, and
22 the 21st when you and DutchBat actually left, where did you stay?
23 A. Inside the base, the same building where the officers and the
24 soldiers were, the Dutch soldiers, the Dutch army. But we were not
25 sharing the same rooms. We were not sleeping in the same rooms.
1 Q. I want to take you now to the 17th of July while you were still
2 at the Dutch base. Can you tell us what happened on the 17th regarding
3 some documents.
4 A. Yes. On the 17th of July, as on the previous days, a group of
5 wounded Bosniaks was there. They were all severely wounded. The Dutch
6 battalion had a medical team but they were not capable of seeing to their
7 wounds because they didn't have sufficient equipment to operate, to carry
8 out surgery. On the 17th of July, I also noticed Serb soldiers and
9 officers entering the building at which the command of the Dutch
10 battalion was stationed. I noticed the same Serb officers staying for
11 hours after that, and then I was called to come and see the deputy
12 commander of the Dutch battalion. I went there to see the deputy
13 commander. I met him there, and also met my former friend and colleague
14 Miroslav Deronjic there.
15 Q. Just to clarify who the deputy commander of the battalion is
17 A. Major Franken. I'm not sure my pronunciation is correct.
18 Q. How did you know Mr. Deronjic who you just described?
19 A. We worked together between 1990 and 1992, the Srebrenica
20 secondary school. I saw Mr. Deronjic also at the meeting on the 12th of
21 July at the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac. And I knew that since 1990, in
22 addition to working as a teacher, he also held political office. He was
23 the president of the Serbian democratic party during the war and you
24 can say the war plunged him into politics and into politics of separation
25 I was afraid of this -- of meeting again with Deronjic. I was afraid of
1 facing him. So as I said, on the 17th of July, I was called by the
2 command to meet Major Franken and my former colleague, Mr. Deronjic.
3 Without long introductions, a proposal for an agreement was
4 tabled for me to look at.
5 Q. What was this about? What did you learn about it?
6 A. Learned about what, what exactly are you referring to?
7 Q. Prior to them showing you an agreement, did anyone talk about it
8 to you, Mr. Deronjic, or the Dutch?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Okay so --
11 A. This draft document was already prepared.
12 Q. Okay. So were you able to read it?
13 A. Yes, I was able to read through it. It wouldn't have taken more
14 than two or three minutes to read through. But I must say that I was
15 surprised that this document was only presented after the Serb officers
16 had arrived at the command and after they met with the Dutch officers.
17 Two hours later, I was called to come over. I came. Deronjic brought
18 this document. He put it on the table in front of me and told me to read
19 through it and sign it.
20 Q. What happened after you read it?
21 A. I read the document. I noticed a number of shortcomings, the
22 document began with a statement stating that it was the Bosniak civilian
23 authorities, the Bosniak side, requesting the meeting, as I said at the
24 beginning of my testimony today, myself, my colleague Camila, and Ibro
25 were no formal or official representatives or even authorised
1 representatives of the civilian bodies. There was the other remark
2 at the beginning of that document, we were not the ones who actually
3 requested the meeting. We were forced to attend. On the footage, you
4 can see some details of the meeting. We were not even allowed to say what
5 exactly we thought was necessary to ensure our survival.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to the document, then. And
7 you will hopefully see a side-by-side on the screen of the B/C/S version
8 which is on the right and the English version which is on the left. And
9 this is Exhibit 36.1.
10 Q. And if you could look at the English version first, Mr. Mandzic,
11 to tell me whether or not that is a photocopy of your signature on the
12 left side of the screen.
13 A. My signature, if you look at the English version. Yes.
14 Q. All right. And if you could look at the second page of the B/C/S
15 version, is that also your signature?
16 A. Yes, yes.
17 Q. Okay. Well then let's go down this document briefly and get your
18 comments on it.
19 A. I assume this statement was put together by Mr. Deronjic even
20 before he arrived in the base. Furthermore, declaration of
21 representatives of the civilian authorities of the enclave of Srebrenica,
22 I must point out that we were no formal representatives of the civilian
23 authorities, nor did anyone authorise us to act on anyone else's behalf.
24 Q. All right.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honours, I would also mark as Exhibit P36.2
1 another English translation of this. This is a more complete and
2 accurate translation of the B/C/S document. The field translation
3 document had some names and some issues left out of it which I will ask
4 Mr. Mandzic about briefly.
5 Q. Mr. Mandzic, in the -- in paragraph 2 of Exhibit 36.2A, which is
6 the English translation that we had done in The Hague, it says that "At
7 our request, negotiations were conducted between representatives of our
8 civilian authorities." Would you comment on whether or not you believe
9 on the 11th and 12th, those were negotiations?
10 A. In the second paragraph of this statement, it reads: "Our
11 request." We never requested these negotiations. As I said at the
12 beginning of my testimony, this was imposed on us by the Serb side. They
13 asked the command of the Dutch battalion that Bosniaks attend these
14 negotiations. So the second passage of this statement is simply false.
15 Further, in the third passage, there is another mistake and another proof
16 that Mr. Deronjic put this statement together by himself, without
17 consulting anyone. Here we find Mrs. Camila's last name stated, her last
18 name is Osmanovic, not Purkovic. Purkovic was actually her maiden name.
19 And this is yet more proof that Mr. Deronjic took part in putting together
20 this statement because Mr. Deronjic and Camila when she was still called
21 Purkovic were schoolmates in secondary school, and he remembered her name
22 as being Purkovic but now her last name was Osmanovic ever since she got
23 married. Further --
24 Q. Was she there on the 17th to take part in this?
25 A. She was inside the base on the 17th of July. But on account of
1 the dramatic events unfolding between the 12th and the 13th of July, in
2 her statement, she said she had heard screams, sounds of shooting, men
3 being taken away, and she suffered a breakdown. She tried to commit
4 suicide by hanging herself. Her brother got her off the rope. And from
5 that point on, until the 21st, our evacuation, she was under constant
6 surveillance by the medical team and her brother, who was also inside the
7 base. But certainly, she should have been included in this list as a
8 member of the negotiating team as well as Ibro Nuhanovic.
9 Q. Did negotiations actually occur on the 12th and the 11th? Were
10 you able to negotiate anything with Mladic?
11 A. I don't think it would be proper to call those negotiations.
12 Those were no negotiations of two equal sides, negotiating on equal terms
13 in order to reach some kind of compromise. These were imposed
14 negotiations, negotiations with an ultimatum. Our presence there was
15 only required to put up a front for the international public, to have an
16 appearance of trying to work together with representatives of the
17 civilian authorities. But those who really decided the fate of the
18 civilian population, or rather as Mr. Mladic, General Mladic said
19 himself, whether the civilian population would vanish or not, it was
20 really him. So please, you must understand that the term "negotiation"
21 simply does not apply in this case. If you say negotiations, it makes
22 the criminals appear in a much more favourable light. It's an insult to
23 the victims and those who managed to survive.
24 Q. All right. Midway down the page, it talks about what the two
25 sides agreed to. It says: "At the end of the negotiations between the
1 two sides, the following was agreed..." If you could take a look at that
2 and then comment on each of the sentences below that, and I'll read them
3 to you. "That our civilian population could stay in the enclave or move
4 out, depending on the wish of each individual." Was that a true
5 statement? Does that reflect the wishes of the Muslim population at that
6 time in your view?
7 A. This is not true. None of the Bosniak representatives were there
8 when this statement was being put together. The wording is by
9 Mr. Deronjic, but the actual words were probably spoken by General Mladic.
10 Q. Let's look at the next sentence. "Should we wish to move out
11 from the enclave, it was agreed that we could choose where we wanted to
12 go. We decided the entire civilian population move out of the enclave
13 and be evacuated to the territory of Kladanj Municipality." Did the
14 civilian population voluntarily decide to leave the enclave in your
16 A. In the period between the 6th of July, 1992, and the 13th of
17 July, 1995, was subjected to a military coup by the Serb forces. So
18 being forced to flee as refugees, their houses being torched, the killing
19 and wounding of elderly people, even children. The situation after the
20 13th of July when forced deportations began, had there been international
21 forces present and willing at that time to stop the Serb forces and force
22 them to return to their initial positions, I can guarantee that all those
23 people, the refugees, would return to their homes, even those that had
24 been torched. Those people knew full well what deportations meant, that
25 they would be uprooted.
1 Q. The next paragraph says, "It was arranged that the evacuation
2 would be carried out by the army and police of Republika Srpska and that
3 UNPROFOR would supervise and provide an escort for the evacuation." Do
4 you know if UNPROFOR was able to escort the evacuation or transportation
5 of these people?
6 A. This does not correspond what I can read here with the original
7 agreement. On the first evening, the meetings between the 11th and 12th
8 of July, Colonel Karremans was referring to the possibility of safe
9 transport being organised for the refugees by UNPROFOR. But he said he
10 wasn't sure if he could get the vehicles necessary for an evacuation on
11 that scale. On the other hand, Mladic never asked any questions. He
12 began deportations. And I remember one busload of Bosniaks arrived, the
13 zone of delineation near Kladanj on the first day of deportations, about
14 40 persons who survived a massacre. Yet thousands and thousands of men
15 were executed. And they were in Potocari in July of 1995, which does not
16 correspond with this statement that I see here.
17 Q. So the -- and the next statement says that the evacuations was
18 carried out by the Serb side correctly and that this agreement had
19 been -- the clauses of the agreement had been adhered to. So I take it
20 you would agree with that also?
21 A. Yes, I disagree absolutely. It was a complete impossibility as
22 far as we were concerned to influence the course of the deportation,
23 rather to prevent it, myself and Mr. Nuhanovic. On the second and third
24 day of the deportation, we asked Major Franken, deputy commander of the
25 DutchBat, say we really have to stop this. And then they said that the
1 Serbs were dictating the conditions and that there was nothing they could
2 do about it to prevent this. This was a plan. We were able to see this
3 in the field. The plan was to completely cleanse the enclave, to commit
4 murder, mostly of adult male population with the intention to completely
5 extinguish any trace of the fact that Bosniaks, Muslims lived in that area
6 for centuries beforehand. And there was never a dilemma as to whether
7 they would ever come back to their homes, to where they had lived before.
8 Q. This last paragraph says that "During the evacuation, there were
9 no incidents on either side, and the Serb side has adhered to all the
10 regulations of the Geneva Conventions and the international war law,"
11 which I grant by your previous answers you would disagree with. But what
12 I want to ask you about now is in Exhibit 36.1, we see, as well as in the
13 B/C/S version, handwritten in there "as far as convoys actually escorted
14 by the UN forces are concerned."
15 Can you tell us how that handwritten section got in there, who
16 did it, and what the circumstances around it are?
17 A. I read these documents then, on the 17th of July. For a few
18 moments, for a few minutes, I was speechless. I was by myself.
19 Mr. Nuhanovic was separated. There was nothing known about him. Camila
20 was completely psychologically drained, exhausted, and then the escort of
21 Dutch soldiers and officers, they were looking at the deportation. I
22 turned towards Major Franken. I looked him in the eye. I cannot
23 describe to you, I cannot describe to you the look. I asked in his gaze
24 for assistance, help. I asked for this statement to be denied, this Serb
25 statement that had been put together. Major Franken understood this cry
1 for help. He understood it speechlessly. We were communicating through
2 looks because in front of Serb officers and Deronjic, he said "What do
3 you think if we should add this addition?" Yes, but as far as convoys
4 actually escorted by UN forces, because they only escorted the deported
5 buses for a few hours up to Kladanj. And after that, Serbs had taken
6 away all the vehicles, so the Dutch, as Major Franken said, were no longer
7 able to continue with the escorts. So what he wanted is to make this
8 statement relevant only for the buses that they had actually escorted.
9 And that's how it was.
10 So I said, okay, let's put this. Let's add this. As far as the
11 addition is concerned, I didn't add it. This is not my handwriting. I
12 think it was an interpreter who did it who was present there.
13 Q. Why did you sign these documents if the guts of them were not
15 A. You must understand regarding the fate of thousands of people,
16 men who were separated in the period between the 11th and the 13th of
17 July, we had no idea what happened, whether they were executed or whether
18 they had crossed on to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As far as
19 the destiny of dozens, of hundreds of wounded civilians and others, we had
20 no clue. We did not know whether they were executed, whether they had
21 come to the territory under the control of BH. We believed they were
22 under the control of the Serb army, and that was so. Further on, we had
23 no assistance, we had no help by -- given by international institutions
24 as a kind of protection. I mean the medical institutions, the Red Cross
25 institutions. We had no contact with the authorities of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, we had Dutch soldiers, we had
2 DutchBat, and I frequently tend to believe that they were more than
3 scared. They couldn't wait to get rid of Srebrenica and the enclave and
4 the life in the enclave, which was similar to life under medieval
5 circumstances. And in addition to that at the base, there were 26
6 Bosniaks, 10 to 15 young men, interpreters with the UNPROFOR, with the
7 MSF, young children, elderly people. All that was a condition for them to
8 leave. We presumed that that was a condition for them to leave, so that
9 some wounded would stay alive.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Mandzic. I don't have any further questions,
11 Mr. President. I apologise. Our original estimate was a little long. I
12 have certain advantage over my colleagues from the Krstic trial, and so I
13 was able to get perhaps more to the point.
14 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Well, since we just had a break for 40
15 days, and today is Monday, and the witness and some of the members of the
16 Prosecution and the Defence team just arrived yesterday, I think we'll
17 have an early break today and leave the cross-examination until tomorrow
19 Witness, I have to warn you, as I did with other witnesses,
20 during your stay in The Hague, you are still under the oath. So do not
21 talk to anybody about your testimony and do not let anybody talk to you
22 about it. Do you understand that?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do understand, Your Honours.
24 I know the rules, and I accept the rules and respect them. Thank you.
25 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. And I'm looking forward to
1 seeing you tomorrow afternoon.
2 Madam usher, would you please show the witness out of the room.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 At this stage, are there any matters to bring to the attention of
5 the Trial Chamber? Yes, Ms. Sinatra.
6 MS. SINATRA: Yes, thank you, Your Honours. I just wanted to ask
7 the Court's indulgence on a couple of matters. I have not filed a formal
8 request for an extension of time to respond to a couple of the
9 Prosecution's motions. But at this time, I'd like to ask the Court's
10 indulgence and approval. We have -- I'd like to write a formal response
11 to the request for judicial notice of adjudicated facts. I think the
12 motion might have been filed June 23rd. So we're at the time limitation,
13 if I could just ask the Court to extend the time until Monday, I would
14 have that filed immediately. That's one, if there are no objections from
15 the Prosecution. I haven't discussed it with Mr. McCloskey.
16 The second one would be the Prosecution has filed a motion for
17 clarification about the decision of the Trial Chamber from May 22nd. And
18 I would ask the Court not to rule on the admissibility of the statements
19 of the accused until the end of the Defence case because there's a lot of
20 witnesses to be placed on the witness stand, cross-examinations of
21 Prosecution witnesses and Defence witnesses that will be dealing with this
22 issue. And I believe that under Rule 95 and 89, we have a lot of issues
23 to deal with. But if the Court would allow me, I will respond to the
24 Prosecution's motions just illuminating the legal issues that we will be
25 dealing with and presenting during our consideration of the statements of
1 the accused.
2 So I'm asking the Court to not rule on the admissibility of the
3 statements of the accused until all the evidence is heard, asking for an
4 extension of time to respond to two Prosecution motions, the motion for
5 judicial notice of adjudicated facts and the motion for clarification by
6 the Prosecution.
7 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Any response?
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I have no problem with the
9 brief extensions Ms. Sinatra has asked for to respond to our filings. I
10 would object, however, to the putting off of the decision regarding
11 the -- Mr. Jokic's statement until what must amount to months down the
12 road. This is a significant issue. It's an issue that is traditionally
13 in common law brought up prior to trial on a motion by the Defence to
14 have the statement excluded, which was never done in this case. As
15 Ms. De la Torre pointed out, I don't see why Defence witnesses would have
16 any relevant significance to this issue nor has Ms. Sinatra stated any.
17 So I don't see why an important issue such as this should be put off.
18 Aside from giving each side a chance to make arguments on the various
19 legal issues, this is an issue that's ripe and is ready for your decision
20 once the arguments are done as far as I can see.
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. As far as for the first matter concerning
22 the judicial notice, I think, you know, Ms. Sinatra's request is granted.
23 We'll extend the time for you to reply on this issue.
24 MS. SINATRA: Thank you.
25 JUDGE LIU: As for that clarification of the admission of the
1 statements of Mr. Jokic, we believe that Ms. Sinatra has a right to file
2 a response on that matter.
3 As for whether we have to postpone it until end of this case or
4 not, I hope Ms. Sinatra could file written submissions listing your
5 reasons for that so that we can consider the overall picture. Is that
6 agreeable to you?
7 MS. SINATRA: Yes, Your Honour, I will be filing the reasons for
8 our request. And I appreciate this extension of time.
9 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
10 MS. SINATRA: Thank you.
11 JUDGE LIU: So we'll resume tomorrow afternoon at 2.15 in the
12 Courtroom III, I think.
13 MS. SINATRA: Your Honour, just one more thing, I would like to
14 provide the Trial Chamber with this document from the US Treasury
15 Department. I don't know if it's necessary for me to ask for political
16 asylum at this point. But according to the rules of this executive
17 order, I am committing a felony by appearing in Court. I intend to
18 continue to appear in Court, but I do hope that the Trial Chamber and our
19 judicial body of the Tribunal will consider this issue.
20 JUDGE LIU: Well, we'll see the contents of your filings, to see
21 whether there is a risk as you described.
22 MS. SINATRA: Thank you.
23 JUDGE LIU: Do you have anything?
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: I just already stood up, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE LIU: The proceeding is adjourned.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
2 at 11.44 a.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
3 the 8th day of July, 2003, at 2.15 p.m.