Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10577

1 Wednesday, 9 June 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Mr. Court Deputy.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

7 IT-02-60-T, the Prosecutor versus Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic.

8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

9 Good morning, everybody.

10 Before we hear the witness, are there any matters that the parties

11 would like to raise?

12 Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour. I just have a short

14 matter, but I think it's rather important.

15 Yesterday we were served with a courtesy party of an ex parte and

16 confidential --

17 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, shall we go to private session?

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Oh, yes. I'm sorry. I thought we were. I

19 apologise.

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll go to private session, please.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you for reminding me.

22 [Private session]

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22 [Open session]

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

Page 10582

1 JUDGE LIU: Did you have a good rest yesterday?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

3 JUDGE LIU: Are you ready to continue?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE LIU: We won't be long. Thank you.

6 Now, Mr. McCloskey.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued]

10 Q. Good morning, Mr. Salapura.

11 A. Good morning, sir.

12 Q. Now, is it your testimony that members of the 10th Diversionary

13 Unit that participated in Branjevo Farm killings were on leave at the time

14 of those killings?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can you tell us how you know that?

17 A. Well, because I had received information once I arrived at the

18 command post in Han Pijesak that the elements which had taken part in

19 fighting back in Srebrenica had been released and allowed to go on leave.

20 The commander had been injured and was on sick leave, and the other troops

21 were allowed to go on leave. Only the guards remained.

22 Q. And when did you find that information out?

23 A. On the 13th, on the evening of the 13th.

24 Q. And who did you find it from -- find it out from?

25 A. It was at the command post that I managed to get through to one

Page 10583

1 of my assistants or administrators. I can't remember quite exactly who it

2 was that told me about that, but they said that only the three of them

3 were still there, and that Lieutenant Colonel Karanovic had been allowed

4 to go on leave prior to the commencement of the operation seven days

5 early, and that Lieutenant Colonel Jankovic -- or rather, Colonel

6 Jankovic, I think that was the rank he held at the time, that he had been

7 sent over to the Drina Corps to act there as liaison officer, and that the

8 detachment, the element had been involved in combat operations. The

9 commander had been injured because a vehicle had tumbled over, and all the

10 men had been allowed to go on leave for about ten days. I can't quite

11 remember, but I think ten days.

12 Q. Where were you when you found out about this information on

13 the 13th?

14 A. Han Pijesak.

15 Q. At about what time of day was this, just again roughly?

16 A. Well, it was sometime in the afternoon. I really can't say.

17 It's sort of difficult to say now what time it was in the afternoon.

18 Q. Mr. Erdemovic said that Pelemis was trying to drive an UN APC and

19 he rolled it and someone was killed. Is that what happened?

20 A. Yes. Yes. The APC. One soldier was killed and several were

21 injured. Pelemis himself was injured.

22 Q. So why do you think the soldiers on leave were the ones that were

23 at Branjevo Farm? Surely not the whole 10th Diversionary Unit was on

24 leave.

25 A. No, not the whole unit. Half of the unit was still in Modrica.

Page 10584

1 Q. So why do you think it's the people on leave that took part in

2 this?

3 A. Everyone else was on leave except for the guards, the guards.

4 Q. So why do you think these particular people were the ones that

5 were at Branjevo Farm?

6 A. Well, there's no inherent logic in a guard leaving his guard

7 post. Two or three men -- the two or three men there, well, those were

8 the people.

9 Q. So how do you know that they were even there?

10 A. Where? Well, I don't know about that. I never said who had been

11 at the farm, at Branjevo, wherever, or at the command post.

12 Q. So how do you know the 10th --

13 A. This is something that I never referred to, and I really know

14 nothing about that.

15 Q. So you don't know really who was at the Branjevo Military Farm.

16 A. No.

17 Q. So you don't have any other information besides Drazen Erdemovic

18 about who was at Branjevo Farm.

19 A. No, I never looked into that.

20 Q. Did you know that a unit, as is customary, went to the funeral of

21 the soldier that were killed in the 10th Diversionary after that -- after

22 he was killed on the 13th?

23 A. Well, probably someone did go, yes.

24 Q. Does the name Mr. --

25 A. Whether anyone --

Page 10585

1 Q. -- Koljerat [phoen] ring a bell?

2 A. No.

3 Q. -- outside Trebinje?

4 A. No.

5 Q. You know, Trebinje is all the way -- as you know, all the way

6 across Bosnia over -- all the way to --

7 A. Trebinje, yes, sure. I know Trebinje. I know its location.

8 Q. I think we're probably going too fast for -- for the

9 interpreters.

10 Now, according to Mr. Erdemovic, he and part of his unit went all

11 the way across Bosnia to Trebinje and were at the funeral of Mr. Koljerat

12 on those days after the 13th but prior to going to Branjevo Farm. So they

13 wouldn't have gone there on holiday, would they, or on leave?

14 A. Yes. I don't know when they left for Branjevo. I don't know, or

15 that they did go. I don't even know where Branjevo is.

16 Q. Okay. I want to show you a document. It's been marked as P113.

17 If you could take a look at P113B. It's the -- I hope you can read it.

18 This is a 17 July document under the name of Ratko Mladic.

19 A. I can't read this. This is illegible.

20 Q. Why don't you give it a try. It doesn't look that illegible.

21 Are you able to make any of it out?

22 We might have a better one now. I apologise. Yes, we do.

23 Sir --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Wait for the better one. It's -- and it's got another

Page 10586

1 number, 539.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't know if it's possible to get the English

3 on the -- on the ELMO.

4 Is that on the ELMO? I'm sorry, I can't -- I'm not getting

5 anything.

6 THE USHER: It is on the ELMO. There was a technical problem.

7 We're just sorting it out.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. I'd just like the Court to be able to see

9 it.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that. I've managed

11 to read this.


13 Q. Have you had a chance to see that before today? Has anyone

14 showed it to you or ...

15 A. No, never. These documents never reached me.

16 Q. Okay. Sorry, we have a little technical problem with the booth.

17 JUDGE LIU: Mr. McCloskey, shall we proceed and -- to see how far

18 we could go.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. And I would --

20 JUDGE LIU: Maybe you or you ask the witness to read the relevant

21 paragraph.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: I will -- I will do that. And if we could ask the

23 audio guys to just test the -- the machines each morning.

24 Q. Okay. I'll go -- I'll go slowly. Well, first of all, do you

25 remember any of the subject matter that -- talking about in this document?

Page 10587

1 Does any of this ring any bells?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. Well, the first part of it talks about - and this is to

4 the Drina Corps Command for information -

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you very much, audiovisual --

6 Q. - and to the 1st Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac Brigade, Miletici

7 Brigade. And Mladic apparently in paragraph 1 is sending three officers,

8 Colonels Nedjo Trkulja, Milovan Stankovic, and Bogdan Sladojevic, from the

9 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. Do you know those three

10 colonels?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And where was -- what unit was Trkulja part of?

13 A. The Main Staff.

14 Q. Right. But what part of the Main Staff? What was his job?

15 A. Chief of armoured units.

16 Q. And how about Mr. -- or Colonel Stankovic?

17 A. Colonel Stankovic was with the Ozren Operations Group. And just

18 before that, he had come to the Main Staff, and I pointed him to -- to a

19 post in the administration. He was sort of beginning to work.

20 Q. Administration of intelligence?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And how about Bogdan Sladojevic.

23 A. Bogdan Sladojevic worked for the operational sector.

24 Q. All right. And are you aware that Bogdan Sladojevic had just

25 come over from the -- the VJ to join the VRS Main Staff?

Page 10588

1 A. I think he had just come from the Army of the Republika Srpska

2 Krajina back then.

3 Q. Well, he told us in an interview --

4 A. That's as far as I know, as to where he came from.

5 Q. He told us in an interview that he was on the 13th of July, 1995

6 a -- a member of the VJ and that on 13 July he and, I think, about 20

7 other officers of the VJ that were originally from Bosnia were ordered by

8 General Perisic of the VJ to go to the VRS and become part of the VRS.

9 You must have known about that.

10 A. I know that when Sladojevic arrived, when the group arrived, he

11 told me that he had been to Vukovar.

12 Q. Were you aware --

13 A. And in the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Now, where

14 exactly, I didn't know. I didn't go into that.

15 Q. Were you aware that he was a VJ officer --

16 A. I know about this group of officers arriving.

17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: I know we're in Courtroom I, where President -- or

19 former President Milosevic is generally tried, but we're not into that

20 case. I don't know what the VJ has to do with this case, with this

21 individual at this point in time, so I think it's irrelevant.

22 Yesterday there was a whole series of questions as to the VJ. I

23 didn't object. But today I think -- you know, I'm always being reminded

24 how we need to be efficient. How does the VJ -- who belonged to the VJ --

25 at what point in time, what does it have to do with this case? Perhaps in

Page 10589

1 the Milosevic case it does. And I know we're in Courtroom I, but

2 Mr. Milosevic isn't here and this is not his case.

3 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, this is a cross-examination. I

4 believe the Prosecution could ask any questions which might be related to

5 the credibility of this witness.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I fail to see, Your Honour, with all due

7 respect, how that relates to the credibility of the witness. If somebody

8 was a member of the VJ, I just don't see the connection. But okay, if

9 that's what he's trying to do - I don't know - I hope, maybe, perhaps, but

10 I doubt it. I have my doubts.

11 JUDGE LIU: Well, your doubts is registered here, and -- and we'll

12 see how far, you know, we --

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

14 JUDGE LIU: -- could go in this direction. But thank you very much

15 for raising this issue.

16 You may proceed.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

18 Q. Sir, were you aware that some 20 or more officers had just been

19 ordered over from the VJ?

20 A. No. I was not aware of there being 20 officers who were. I know

21 that some officers came over. Whether that was pursuant to an order or

22 whatever, this is something I didn't know.

23 Q. Okay. Well, let's not --

24 A. Probably there had been an order, yes.

25 Q. Let's not worry about the numbers, then. So -- but you were

Page 10590

1 aware that several VJ officers came over to be part of the VRS at this

2 time period, around 13 July?

3 A. Well, I don't know when exactly this was, whether in June or in

4 May. That's when they came. I'm not sure when precisely Sladojevic came.

5 I can't give you the exact date. It's been nine years. It would not be

6 fair to start guessing now, whether it was back in 1994 or 1995, what the

7 time frame was, and when the whole thing happened.

8 Q. Don't worry about the dates. As I've said, you know roughly the

9 time period we're talking about that VJ officers came over to be part of

10 the VRS.

11 A. I'm not sure if it was in that period or in what period it was.

12 Those men, Sladojevic and I'm not sure who else had arrived, but there

13 were other persons who had arrived, or how many. I don't know. This is

14 something I can't say, and I can't specify the time period, whether it was

15 this day or that day. I can't give you the exact date or time of their

16 arrival, even if we're talking about years.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go for one more question on this into

18 private session.

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We'll go to the private session, please.

20 [Private session]

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10591

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3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 [Open session]


9 Q. And in paragraph 3, it talks about Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic

10 getting appointed to the various units that were combing the territory for

11 the remaining Muslim forces. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic at the

12 time and what was his position?

13 A. Well, Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic at the time, he was with the

14 military police.

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't get the last word.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I believe later he came to the

17 Main Staff as an administrator. Whether it was before or after -- but if

18 you look at this order, then probably it was prior to this.

19 Before all this happened, but I can't say exactly when.


21 Q. You were in Han Pijesak at the time of this order, weren't you?

22 A. Yes. On the 17th I was in Han Pijesak.

23 Q. And you've seen this intercept, which I won't go over in detail,

24 that was P265, where your name is mentioned, Keserovic is mentioned. Do

25 you know -- but you don't know anything about that intercept or this

Page 10592

1 order?

2 A. No. You can't see anything from that, and I'm not sure what the

3 context is. I've said before and I'll say it again. I spent most of my

4 time in bed recovering at the time. I would go up to the room

5 occasionally, but I didn't go out very often on the 18th and the 17th.

6 That's one thing I know for sure. In the morning, I went to see a doctor.

7 I was feeling slightly better and I had been receiving therapy. And on

8 the 18th, on the afternoon of the 18th, I drove back to Banja Luka,

9 because on the 17th we had received word that the road was again open for

10 traffic.

11 As for Karanovic, the analyst, that was on the 17th, I think, but

12 I can't say. I think it was on that day that he was back from leave.

13 Q. Before you left --

14 A. Therefore, well, as for the telex, I really can't make any sense

15 of that. So I can't see the name of the document and I have no idea what

16 it's about.

17 Q. Before you left for Banja Luka, had you heard about the over five

18 or 6.000 Muslim prisoners that had been murdered in the Bratunac and

19 Zvornik area?

20 A. No, absolutely nothing.

21 Q. And where were you on the morning of the 14th of July?

22 A. In Han Pijesak.

23 Q. Okay. And you -- you testified earlier that you did contact the

24 Zvornik Brigade; is that correct?

25 A. Yes. I mean, I told you. I just didn't tell you whether it's

Page 10593

1 the 15th. I cannot say exactly which date it is. Or is it the 16th?

2 Perhaps if you have some documents that could jog my memory. So that's

3 what happened. The information came before the counter-attack that the

4 Muslim forces were supposed to carry out from Tuzla vis-a-vis some

5 particular facility, but I can't remember the exact date.

6 Q. Well, if we use the very early morning hours of the 16th of July

7 as the -- the morning the Muslim forces surged across Serb lines and

8 killed more than 50 Serb soldiers, would it have occurred -- would you

9 have been contacting Zvornik prior to that time?

10 MR. KARNAVAS: It's asking the gentleman to speculate, Your

11 Honour. I don't object to the question, but it is rather speculative.

12 JUDGE LIU: Well, I -- I don't think so, because there's some

13 basis there.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour. I'm just -- I'm just

15 suggesting that it might be speculative. I don't object to the question,

16 you know, to the form -- to the nature of the question, but the form,

17 yes.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yes. You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey.


20 Q. Mr. Salapura, I'm just trying to -- you've indicated it might

21 have been the 14th, 15th, or even the 16th, so I'm just trying to help you

22 narrow the date a bit. So we know, and I'm sure you remember, that --

23 that morning of 16 July during that battle, but -- so can you tell us

24 at -- roughly how long before that horrible morning that you were in

25 contact with the Zvornik Brigade ?

Page 10594

1 A. I cannot remember. I really can't say. It's been quite a while,

2 hasn't it? I can just guess. I mean, it must have been before that. I

3 know that I consider that to be an important piece of information and an

4 urgent piece of information that should be forwarded to the command. As

5 for the exact date, I really don't know.

6 Q. Okay.

7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the answer.


9 Q. Sorry, could you repeat what you just said. The interpreters

10 missed that.

11 A. There would be an attack, a counter-attack from the direction of

12 Tuzla. It would be carried out by the forces of the Tuzla Corps and the

13 attack would be against a particular facility. I don't know exactly which

14 one. But this is what I remember.

15 Q. All right. And where did you go to actually communicate with the

16 Zvornik Brigade? Where -- what part of the facility at Han Pijesak did

17 you go to communicate?

18 A. I did not go anywhere. I just walked out of the room where my

19 analysts were working, out of the office.

20 Q. To where? To the radio room?

21 A. Oh, no. I had a room of my own where I was lying down, and that's

22 where I had a telephone. But I had a big room where the analysts were

23 working, with several desks, and that's where the telephone links were,

24 and that is where one could establish communication with different units,

25 different elements, the Drina Corps. I don't know exactly the ways in

Page 10595

1 which these communications would be established. I mean, I cannot define

2 that right now.

3 Q. Were you able to pick up your phone and contact the Drina Corps,

4 who patched you through to Zvornik, as is, we've learned to be, the normal

5 way ?

6 A. No. I'd have to call the switchboard, our switchboard at the Main

7 Staff, and then I'd have to ask them to put me through to the Drina Corps,

8 and then to ask from the Drina Corps to put me through to the brigade.

9 Q. And you remember that happened on one of these days, 14, 15 July?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Let's go to this document. It's the duty officer notebook, P507.

12 As was mentioned yesterday, sir, this is the rough notes of the duty

13 officer of the Zvornik Brigade that he scratched down as he got

14 information and various calls. And I want to ask you: Did you know --

15 and I think you've spoken about this before, but did you know a Major

16 Pavle Golic?

17 A. Yes. Yes, I did. Of course I did.

18 Q. And what was his -- what unit was he in and what was his

19 position?

20 A. He was an officer in the intelligence department of the Drina

21 Corps.

22 Q. Okay. So he was someone you were very acquainted with.

23 A. Yes. Yes, very well.

24 Q. Did you say "operations" yesterday, or am I misrecollecting

25 that? I thought you said he was in operations, or maybe it was a

Page 10596

1 translation error .

2 A. No. Sorry, I never said that. I couldn't have possibly said

3 something like that.

4 Q. He told us that he was in the -- in the intel branch, like you

5 say, so I just wanted to clear that up.

6 Now, are you aware of a Lieutenant Drago Nikolic from the Zvornik

7 Brigade, the chief of security?

8 A. Yes, I know Drago. I think I met him in 1992. I saw him two or

9 three times, I think.

10 Q. Okay. And now, if you will look at this conversation, and

11 figuring that the Colonel Salapura is you, Drago is Lieutenant Drago

12 Nikolic, Beara is Colonel Ljubisa Beara --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and Golic is Pavle Golic. Now, Golic was at the Drina Corps

15 Command on the -- on the 14th of July, as far as we know. Do you have

16 any reason to believe he was somewhere else?

17 A. You know what? I really cannot say anything to you on the basis

18 of this: I really do not remember. I can just engage in guesswork now.

19 But if you want me to engage in guesswork and assumptions, then I can give

20 you 100 options, and then we can see what would come out of that. The

21 only thing I can tell you now is what I told you already; namely, that I

22 cannot give orders either to Beara or Nikolic. That is quite clear. Pajo

23 Golic particularly cannot. I know that for sure. So this was just a

24 transfer of information from one person to another, from superiors.

25 That's the only thing that could have happened, taking a message,

Page 10597

1 something like that. On the basis of this, it is impossible to say

2 anything. I can just guess.

3 Q. Sir, I just asked you if you knew where Golic was. I didn't ask

4 you to guess. I don't want you to guess. And so if you don't know,

5 that's fine.

6 So you say this --

7 A. I don't know at that particular moment. I cannot tell you where

8 the man was at that particular moment. Perhaps he was in the office;

9 perhaps he was in town; perhaps he was, I don't know, in Zvornik, in

10 Vlasenica. I don't know. I have no idea.

11 Q. Now, let me give you some facts, and maybe it will refresh your

12 recollection, but you said you think this was just merely information, you

13 know, passed from one to another, and I -- I think that's right. That's

14 what it looks like. So do you have any reason to doubt this, that you --

15 that you called and -- and gave the message that Drago and Beara were

16 supposed to report to Golic?

17 A. As I said, I'd have to guess. Well, we can guess. I've already

18 said so. There's a hundred options that are possible. But after all this

19 time to remember such details --

20 Q. I don't want you to guess. You're the one that said this is just

21 information being passed from one to another. Now, I'm asking you: Is

22 there any reason to believe this didn't happen, that you called these guys

23 and just passed on this information?

24 A. I did not say that it was only passing on information. I'm

25 telling you I cannot remember. I cannot remember what exactly happened.

Page 10598

1 I just gave you one of the possible options.

2 Q. Okay. Well, let me give you what the facts have shown here.

3 Maybe it will help your -- refresh your recollection. Okay, Colonel

4 Salapura, you are at Han Pijesak, the Main Staff headquarters. You are

5 the head intel man under Tolimir. You have been to the area, talked to

6 officers, including Mladic and others. You should be briefed on what's

7 going on.

8 Now, you call. From the headquarters you get patched through from

9 Vlasenica to Zvornik, you speak to the duty officer, and you tell that

10 duty officer basically that Drago Nikolic and Colonel Beara should

11 report --

12 A. Sorry. I'm sorry, do you mean by telephone?

13 Q. Well, that's -- by telephone or by radio, however you would

14 normally communicate.

15 A. Yes. Yes.

16 Q. And that you told the duty officer to -- to have Drago Nikolic

17 and Ljubisa Beara report to Major Pavle Golic of the intel branch, who

18 would be in Vlasenica that morning of the 14th.

19 Now, the morning of the 14th, Drago Nikolic was arranging for

20 prisoners, some five, 6.000 prisoners that were located in some four

21 schools all over the Zvornik area and preparing for their execution.

22 Beara was doing the same thing, first in Bratunac, then in Zvornik on the

23 14th. And we know that Pavle Golic was involved in that process because

24 we know from an intercept that he is assisting in providing 500 litres of

25 fuel to buses on the 16th of July from Mr. Popovic to transport prisoners

Page 10599

1 around Pilica.

2 So given that background, does that help refresh your recollection

3 about why you would have been calling and asking the duty officer to have

4 Drago Nikolic and Ljubisa Beara report to your subordinate, Major Pavle

5 Golic?

6 A. No. No. I did not have anything that would be pointing to such

7 activities, not a hint. As for what this is about specifically, I could

8 not say. I did not have a single hint, as I've already said, that would

9 point to such activity.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you.

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: I have no further questions.

12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

13 Any redirect, Mr. Karnavas?

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I do, just brief.

15 Re-examined by Mr. Karnavas:

16 Q. Good morning, sir.

17 A. Good morning.

18 Q. I just have a few questions.

19 The information that you received --

20 MR. KARNAVAS: If we could get the assistants to lower the --

21 thank you. Thank you.

22 Q. The information that you received from Belgrade, did you consider

23 that serious information?

24 A. Yes, absolutely. Very serious.

25 Q. And during that period of time, what were your main focuses? What

Page 10600

1 were you focussing on, being the intel person? What areas?

2 A. That's the western part. As an intelligence person as at the Main

3 Staff, only the western part. As for this zone, in the eastern part, that

4 was the task of the corps and of their intelligence organs .

5 Q. All right. Now, which part are we -- which part is that?

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, Your Honour.


8 MR. McCLOSKEY: This has been gone through, and it's really not

9 contested --

10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, excuse me. Excuse me, Your Honour.

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is not just a green light to go into the

12 material all over again.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: The suggestion was why didn't this gentleman go to

14 track down prisoners in Nova Kasaba to talk to them. This is the highest

15 ranking officer in the intel. And I'm trying to show that there is a

16 reason why in the areas in which he was focussing, because there was a

17 huge suggestion being made that somehow this individual should have been

18 tracking down where the 28th Column was, and that's why I'm trying to

19 refocus the gentleman. It will be five minutes and we can all get on to

20 the next witness.

21 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, I understand that the parties

22 have different views on that, and I believe that we have -- already know,

23 you know, your point.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.

25 Q. Sir, yesterday you were questioned about your connections with the

Page 10601

1 VJ as if you were a member of the Yugoslav army or had connections with

2 the Milosevic government at that point in time. Could you please tell us

3 whether you had travelled to other places, such as the Federation or

4 Croatia or other countries, to meet with sources to get intelligence

5 information on other occasions?

6 A. Well, I did travel to the area of the Federation for negotiations,

7 talks, et cetera, but this is an area, Your Honours, that I think is not

8 really relevant to this particular trial. I did travel, and also the

9 operations people involved in this particular line of work. We travelled

10 abroad too, to Hungary and to other countries.

11 Q. All right. That was --

12 A. If that means anything.

13 Q. That does mean quite a bit. Thank you.

14 Now, had General Mladic taken the information that you had been

15 trying to convey to him seriously, would that have changed the course of

16 events, perhaps later on, in what -- what happened in the Krajina area?

17 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, Your Honour. These are just

19 open-ended -- this is a great concern to the Prosecution because we don't

20 have the Rules -- under the Rules re-cross, and this is not rebuttal, as

21 far as I can see.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, Your Honour, yesterday --

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I know if there's going to be a long

24 explanation and -- and all that in front of the witness, I would prefer

25 that the witness be -- be left out. But it's very simple to --

Page 10602

1 MR. KARNAVAS: If I can, Your Honour --

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: --rephrase the question .

3 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, I think this is a hypothetical

4 question, you know.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour.

6 JUDGE LIU: You may put your question in another way.


8 Q. Yesterday the Prosecution was trying to suggest that you didn't

9 care about the Serb soldiers that were ultimately killed in -- by the

10 28th Division in Zvornik?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, Your Honour.


13 Q. And now I would like to ask you --

14 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: You know, in -- in telling this witness what the

16 Prosecution thinks about him, this is just absurd and inappropriate.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: This is what he was trying to suggest, Your

18 Honour, that the --

19 JUDGE LIU: Well, we have come over -- we have come over this

20 issue many, many, many times in the past.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: That was the suggestion, Your Honour, that I -- I

22 gleaned from the line of the questioning. And now I'm trying to suggest

23 that he was also concerned about other lies, a potential onslaught that

24 was about to happen and did in fact happen, and had Mladic listened to

25 him, perhaps, you know, things could have been avoided. That's what I'm

Page 10603

1 trying to suggest.

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, you may ask the questions in -- based on that

3 "yesterday you were asked a question," so on and so forth, "what's your

4 view about it?"

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I think I'm going to need to

6 explain now what I was -- I was trying to suggest that this man would

7 have been concerned about those Serb lives and as a result would have

8 known about information in the column, not that he wouldn't have been

9 concerned about Serb lives. That's absurd.


11 Q. At the point in time when you met General Mladic and you were

12 trying to convey the information that you had learned from Belgrade, what

13 were you concerned about? Which area and for what events?

14 A. For quite a while I only dealt with the western area, the HVO and

15 the preparation of the Croatian forces for an attack and, of course, the

16 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their preparations in Trebinje, so that

17 area in Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is to say, I focussed on the western

18 part.

19 My approach to all these problems was selective, because I had

20 very few people available. You could have seen that in the Srebrenica

21 operation. The key people were absent; they were not present at all in

22 that part.

23 Q. Incidentally, did your source, the one that you met in Belgrade,

24 tell you what we learned in this courtroom, that the HVO at the time had

25 been receiving arms from the United States and other countries in

Page 10604

1 preparation for this particular activity?

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I cannot --


4 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is really going beyond anything, and it's

5 obviously deliberate. That -- and it cuts to the foundation of this

6 adversarial system, which I'm ready to give up on, frankly, but it --

7 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas --

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Because I'm going to need to have re-cross.

9 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: He's more than welcome to have re-cross, Your

11 Honour.

12 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, I think this question is out of scope.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE LIU: Please drop it .


16 Q. Let me go back to a document that was shown to you by the

17 Prosecutor. It's P865.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: If we could have the assistance of -- I only have

19 my English version, so I suspect that perhaps -- oh, here's the B/C/S. I

20 apologise. Here we go.

21 And we could put my copy on the ELMO here so we can all see it.

22 Thank you, sir.

23 Q. Now, could you please look at -- you told us that General Tolimir

24 was both the head of intelligence and security at that point in time; is

25 that correct?

Page 10605

1 A. Yes. Chief of Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs, and

2 at the same time he was deputy -- or rather, assistant commander for

3 these particular affairs.

4 Q. Is there a time -- do we see a time on this particular document?

5 We see a date, 13 July.

6 A. No.

7 Q. If we could look at -- look at the document closely. I don't

8 have my copy.

9 "2230 hours," at the top -- at the very top on the right-hand,

10 do you see where it says " 2230 hours"?

11 A. Yes, I can see that.

12 Q. And --

13 A. I'm just not sure who wrote it.

14 Q. If I'm correct, would that be 10.30 at night, July 13th, 1995?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And from looking at this particular document that was shown to you

17 by the Prosecution yesterday, would it not appear that General Tolimir is

18 suggesting that prisoners be sent and be put up in places where usually

19 Serb officers -- or Serb soldiers stay and to work -- to do this

20 agricultural work? Is that what he is suggesting?

21 A. If you look at this document, that's what it says; clearly, in

22 fact.

23 Q. And can you conclude from this document whether at that point in

24 time General Tolimir, who was both the head of the security and

25 intelligence sector, would have known about any killing operations on --

Page 10606

1 on the 13th of July at 10.30 p.m. that night?


3 MR. McCLOSKEY: This witness says he doesn't know anything about

4 this document, and this is -- nor does he know much about anything, so

5 this has to be speculative.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour --

7 JUDGE LIU: Well -- well, it is a speculative question because,

8 you know, this document was issued by another person and we ask this

9 witness to tell us what's in the mind of that person. But -- but in this

10 circumstances, I would like to hear the answer from this witness.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can read this document. I

12 can have a look, just like you can. What it says is perfectly clear. I'm

13 not sure what the problem is. It talks about the existing capacities for

14 putting people up and then about these 800 or perhaps 80 prisoners of war,

15 because I can't read clearly.


17 Q. Well, let me just rephrase my question. There's been testimony

18 here by Momir Nikolic that on the morning of the 12th he was informed by

19 Popovic and Kosoric that all of the men were to be separated and killed.

20 Looking at this document --

21 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: We're now going, you know, way out again, into

23 other witnesses, other testimony. You know, if he'd chosen this tact

24 on -- on direct, but how that has to do with -- with this getting --

25 speculation on this document is pretty far-fetched.

Page 10607

1 MR. KARNAVAS: This document was introduced by the Prosecution.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I don't have any problems with him

3 questioning about the document.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm questioning the document.

5 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, I think the issue about this document

6 has already been solved. This witness answered the question, and we are

7 satisfied with this answer.

8 Shall we move on?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Your Honour, we can move on.

10 I have no further questions.

11 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

12 Mr. Stojanovic, do you have any redirect?

13 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just two questions, Your Honour.

14 Good morning, first of all, Mr. Salapura.

15 Further cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] During the cross-examination yesterday at one

17 point you stated that the job of a unit intelligence officer was to

18 interview prisoners in order to gather intelligence. You remember that;

19 right?

20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. In the context of the question, you were asked why were you not

22 the one who was interviewing those prisoners.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. As an officer attached to the Main Staff, it wasn't your job to

25 do that sort of thing on the ground.

Page 10608

1 A. No. As chief, I certainly wasn't expected to interview prisoners

2 of war. It wouldn't even have been an operational kind of job; although,

3 I did that sort of job, because I was short of staff. But that's a

4 different question altogether. It's more a complex one. Whereas, this is

5 something that anyone can do.

6 Q. It's precisely in that context that I want to ask you the

7 following: Hypothetically speaking, an intelligence officer attached to

8 the command of the Zvornik Brigade, Dusko Vukotic, receives information

9 that he is to interview a prisoner of war. He is duty-bound to do it.

10 And would I be right in stating the following: Once he has gathered the

11 necessary intelligence, the prisoner of war belongs to the security organ

12 who should then process the prisoner, as far as the operational aspect is

13 concerned? It would not be the duty of the intelligence officer, would

14 it?

15 A. By no means would that be the job of an intelligence officer.

16 Each unit's commander determines the gathering place, a spot where the

17 prisoners of war are gathered and secured. The next step is camps are

18 determined and all the other logistics organs and security organs get

19 involved. The whole security system, how security is provided, taking the

20 prisoners there, the involvement of the police units, and so on and so

21 forth. But this is something that the commander determines in his order.

22 As for the unit intelligence officer, the intelligence officer

23 that's attached to the unit --

24 Q. Can you just please slow down for the benefit of the transcript.

25 A. The intelligence officer attached to a certain unit only comes up

Page 10609

1 with a request to interview a particular prisoner, if the prisoner is

2 suspected to contain essential information, to be in possession of

3 essential information, if there is the possibility that the prisoner may

4 be in possession of relevant information. Only in that case, because

5 that's relevant to security and to escorting the prisoners. Now,

6 whichever unit is in charge, intelligence or security, they must turn to

7 the superior commander for approval.

8 Q. Thank you very much. And the next question I have, something you

9 said today on cross-examination, that you personally in the morning on

10 the 14th had no information whatsoever concerning the activities of

11 Ljubisa Beara and Dragan Nikolic over those days in the area covered by

12 the Zvornik Brigade. You remember that, don't you?

13 A. Yes, by all means.

14 Q. So even if you had wanted to, you would have been in no position

15 to inform the person that you may have contacted at the command of the

16 Zvornik Brigade as to why, on which mission precisely those two persons

17 were in the Zvornik area to begin with.

18 A. Yes, that's certain. I didn't even know they were there. There

19 could have been possibly a message that had been conveyed, or something

20 like that.

21 Q. And the job of the duty operations officer would be to pass the

22 message on.

23 A. Precisely, just as much to pass it on. The message could have

24 been received, for example, by the duty operations officer at the Main

25 Staff receiving the message and saying, "Pass it on to Salapura and he

Page 10610

1 should call such and such person for this or for that," or it could have

2 been any other officer there. Based on that, you can't tell who the

3 message came from or who it was passed on by. It's very difficult for me

4 to say so many years later what exactly had taken place, because there are

5 a number of different possibilities, hundreds of them, actually.

6 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Salapura.

7 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for

8 you.

9 Your Honours, this completes my redirect.

10 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

11 Judge Vassylenko.

12 Questioned by the Court:

13 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Good morning, Mr. Salapura. I have some

14 questions for you.

15 Can you explain us the functional differences between intelligence

16 bodies, security bodies, and military police in the VRS?

17 A. Intelligence bodies, as any other intelligence bodies, what they

18 do is only collecting, gathering intelligence on the enemy forces, the

19 sort of terrain they are dealing with; and with regard to the other side

20 of the front and enemy-controlled territory, of course, that sort of

21 intelligence.

22 As for security organs, they deal with security-related and

23 counter-intelligence-related issues. In our territory, in

24 enemy-controlled territory, and they apply the overall security system.

25 They propose measures to the commander, and they monitor the

Page 10611

1 implementation of those measures.

2 The military police are a unit with their own special tasks. I'm

3 not sure if I am able to list those in details. They deal with security.

4 They take part in combat, monitoring, escort, traffic, providing security

5 for facilities and persons, for camps, for prisons, and so on and so

6 forth, everything that happens at army level, or the tribunal, as the

7 police do here. Well, they have the same sort of authority as the police.

8 Only in zones covered by military units and in relation to military

9 personnel.

10 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: My next question: What units or elements of

11 the VRS were charged to deal with and care of prisoners of war and

12 enemies, refugees?

13 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. Taking prisoners to the

14 camps and providing security there, above all, the military police units

15 and the police units would be in charge of that. If that proves

16 insufficient - I'm talking about rules about the general principles, what

17 is envisaged as a rule - the commander may choose to appoint any other

18 unit, even a unit not taking part in combat activities at the time.

19 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: And what was the role of intelligence bodies

20 and security bodies in providing, let us say, care of prisoners of war?

21 Or in dealing with prisoners of war.

22 A. Intelligence bodies have no jurisdiction over that, except if the

23 need arises for them to make a request. If they are in a camp, from the

24 camp command to perhaps interview one of the prisoners in order to gather

25 specific intelligence, or while a prisoner is being captured, if there is

Page 10612

1 an officer, a battalion officer who realises that this person may be in

2 possession of certain relevant information, they can call the battalion's

3 intelligence administrator, who will then gather the information on the

4 spot, which unit the person belongs to, where the unit was located. But

5 that's the only authority that the intelligence bodies have over prisoners

6 of war.

7 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: What about security bodies?

8 A. Security bodies regulate a whole number of different things:

9 Taking the prisoners there, providing security, and so on and so forth.

10 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: And military police? What is the role of

11 military police?

12 A. Well, security bodies make proposals, which forces should be

13 involved. That's up to the commanders, whether it should be the military

14 police, police units, some other units perhaps.

15 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Okay. My next question: What was the --

16 A. Well, as I said -- my apologies. My apologies. That wasn't part

17 of my job, the security detail. I'm no expert in that field. I'm not

18 familiar with details. But generally speaking, that's how it worked.

19 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Okay. And what was the chain of command in

20 relation to security bodies and intelligence bodies in the VRS?

21 A. Well, I can only talk about intelligence-related matters.

22 Intelligence bodies did not really have a centralised structure. At Main

23 Staff level, there was an administration, an administration which had its

24 own departments, and it was poorly staffed. This is something that I

25 could never successfully deal with. I couldn't find a solution. It had

Page 10613

1 operational officers, who gathered operational intelligence. So much for

2 the administration.

3 We had a unit attached section [as interpreted] and intelligence

4 officers who were attached to units, and they were only responsible to

5 their own commanders and Chiefs of Staff. The administration had no

6 authority to exercise command over them or to give them orders. They were

7 duty-bound to submit intelligence to the administration and the

8 administration would then pass intelligence on to corps-level bodies such

9 information as they had. Once it has been processed, it would be passed

10 on so it could be used. And all this would be envisaged in an order on

11 intelligence and security.

12 The administration dealt with training those people, getting them

13 to have proper qualifications for their work, and it also issued

14 directives on how their work should be improved. If there was something

15 that had to be done pursuant to a request made by the administration, then

16 the administration had to make this request and to send it to the Chief of

17 Staff at corps level, so that the Chief of Staff could then approve a

18 possible involvement.

19 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Mr. Salapura, as far as I know, in some units

20 of the VRS - for example, in the Bratunac Brigade - the security and

21 intelligence functions were performed by one person. Whom this person was

22 subordinated to?

23 A. This person was subordinated to the brigade commander -- or

24 rather, to the Chief of Staff of the brigade.

25 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: And what about his superiors in the, let us

Page 10614

1 say, chain -- security and intelligence chain?

2 A. Well, you have the corps, the intelligence organ -- or rather,

3 the security organ of the corps, but the corps intelligence organ can only

4 submit their own information, and it is duty-bound to pass their

5 intelligence on to the corps intelligence organ. It can't give it orders.

6 That is under sole jurisdiction of the brigade staff, Chief of Staff, as

7 far as intelligence work is concerned.

8 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: My last question: Whose orders could have

9 precedence for the brigade security and intelligence officer? Those

10 issued by, for example, Colonel Beara and orders of brigade commander,

11 provided they had the same subject matter.

12 A. Well, this is a question for security organs, not for me, I

13 believe. They have their own methods, methods that my units didn't use.

14 They have their own communication structure, methods of reporting and

15 briefing.

16 What my service did was totally transparent. Everyone received

17 our information, the Chiefs of Staffs, commands, and their information was

18 submitted in a different way, through different channels. This is

19 something that I don't feel competent to talk about. I think you should

20 ask someone who does this sort of job, because I could only be speculating

21 at best. It's difficult to say.

22 JUDGE VASSYLENKO: Thank you. I have no more questions.

23 JUDGE LIU: Any questions out of Judge's question?

24 Mr. Karnavas.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: No, Mr. President.

Page 10615

1 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Very briefly.

3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.

4 Further cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

5 Q. So you are not -- well, Mr. Kosoric being the Drina Corps chief

6 intel officer; right? Svetozar Kosoric?

7 A. Yes. Yes.

8 Q. You were not his commander. You wouldn't issue him orders.

9 A. No. That's the commander, Chief of Staff, his commander, corps

10 commander. He was a unit intelligence officer with the corps. All I

11 could do -- or rather, what I was duty-bound to do is to pass information

12 on to him and then his duty was to pass information on to the

13 administration. I may have told him, for example, that he wasn't doing

14 his job well enough, and my analysts, who'd come up with proposals as to

15 what should be improved, we could organise training session, a seminar

16 perhaps, get people in to talk about these things, to explain things.

17 That would have been the jurisdiction of the administration over that.

18 The commander was authorised, for example, to -- to get an

19 intelligence officer and appoint him to act as battalion commander for a

20 month, or for 20 days. There were cases like that, many. We had an

21 intelligence officer with the corps who spent six months working as the

22 chief of the operations group. That's up to the commander. This is

23 something that I -- that I had no authority over. I wasn't there to issue

24 tasks for him.

25 Q. The commander, be it the corps, brigade, or Main Staff, is

Page 10616

1 central to all this in the exercise of command; is that right?

2 MR. KARNAVAS: All what, Your Honour? All this regarding

3 intelligence, I take it? I would like to --

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: He knows what I'm talking about, and he answered

5 the question.



8 MR. KARNAVAS: I would expect Mr. McCloskey to show a little more

9 respect. I understand he's a little afraid lately, but, you know, he

10 could be respectful.

11 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think the context is very clear here in the

12 answers and the questions.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I just hope that tu quoque applies in

14 this area, if he's going to be behaving this way.

15 JUDGE LIU: I do not see anything abnormal, you know, happened

16 here.

17 Yes.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Salapura and I are having a good discussion.

19 Unfortunately, the answer was interrupted by counsel and it didn't get on

20 the record.

21 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Maybe you could re-ask your question.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: So --

23 Q. So, Mr. Salapura, in this -- what you've been discussing, the --

24 the relationship between the intel branches and command, command is

25 central to this entire process and this entire decision-making process,

Page 10617

1 isn't it, the commander's role?

2 A. Yes. The commander takes the decisions and he's the one who

3 gives orders, and he's the one who bears all the responsibility for -- for

4 the overall implementation.

5 Q. That's the responsibility of command.

6 A. [No audible response]

7 Q. And what you said, your relationship with Kosoric is just as true

8 with Kosoric's relationship with Momir Nikolic; is that correct? The Main

9 Staff to corps and the corps to brigade.

10 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, we lose something there. Your

11 question is: "So that's the responsibility of commander." I think the

12 witness answered that question, but we did not pick it up in the

13 transcript.

14 JUDGE ARGIBAY: It doesn't appear.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Perhaps I interrupted that time.

16 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Go slowly. We still have time.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sir --

18 Q. Sir, so my question was: The commander is central to this role

19 in making the decisions.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And what you described -- your relationship with Kosoric is it

22 works the same way between Mr. Kosoric and the corps and Mr. Momir Nikolic

23 in the brigade; isn't that correct?

24 A. Yes. I'm talking about the intelligence line. Absolutely.

25 Intelligence.

Page 10618

1 Q. You have described the security line to us briefly, and you have

2 stated that the security officers also report to their commanders.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to -- I'm going to object at

4 this point. He's indicated --

5 JUDGE LIU: Wait.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me.

7 First of all, it's a mischaracterisation, a gross one at that.

8 Secondly, the gentleman indicated that he's not competent.

9 Thirdly, we have a security, you know, general coming in next and

10 he can ask those questions of -- of that. But the gentleman indicated

11 that he wasn't competent in that field. He's also indicated that they're

12 separate branches.

13 JUDGE LIU: I -- I believe that the witness will say something to

14 us. Let the witness tell us.

15 Witness, are you going to say something? Are you going to answer

16 that question?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I said I was talking about

18 everything that was intelligence related. As for security, I'm no expert

19 in that field. I'm not qualified to talk about that. So that's all I'm

20 talking about, but that's how it worked.


22 Q. You're familiar with the rules, and you testified in direct that

23 security officers also report to their commanders. You know that much.

24 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.

25 Q. Certainly the commander is responsible for the military police

Page 10619

1 platoons and units under his command.

2 A. He's responsible for everything that is under his command, all

3 units.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Nothing further.

5 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

6 Well, at this stage, are there any documents to tender?

7 Mr. Karnavas.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. Yes, Your Honour. D194/1, which is the

9 intelligence information; D195/1, another intelligence information;

10 D196/1, intelligence information; D197, an intercept. And in the

11 eventuality the Prosecution does not introduce P865, we would like to

12 tender it as D199. We believe it demonstrates Mr. Tolimir's state of mind

13 at the time and what his knowledge was with respect to whether any

14 execution plans were underway.

15 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

16 Any objections?

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Mr. President. But I should -- I should note,

18 also if we could get those intercepts -- you've heard a lot about Bosnian

19 Muslim intercepts.

20 These -- just as for background on authentication, the intercept

21 referred to by Mr. Karnavas was obtained in a search of a -- I believe it

22 was a Bosnian Croat military facility, and we have -- do not have -- have

23 not been able to conduct the thorough investigation of those materials

24 that we have on the others. There are -- yeah, it was in Mostar.

25 There are, in fact, three sort of synopses of conversations on

Page 10620

1 this intercept. Mr. Salapura has actually spoken of the content of the

2 last one, and I think that is self-authenticating to that degree, because

3 he recalled that information. And so the other two I just wanted to let

4 the Court know that yes, you may -- I have no objection to this coming

5 in, but we do not -- do not know the processes and the people and how they

6 were all conducted, but I think given his testimony, that certainly the

7 third intercept should -- should be admitted, and I have no objection to

8 the other two coming in as well.

9 JUDGE LIU: And would you please indicate to us the -- the number

10 of that intercept. Here we have several. That is D197?

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Yes.

12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: And we --

14 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think since there's no objections from the

15 Prosecution, those documents are admitted into the evidence; although, we

16 don't believe that the D194 is relevant. Maybe in the future we could see

17 the relevance by reading other documents, but at this stage those

18 documents are admitted into the evidence.

19 On the part of the Prosecution, do you have any documents to

20 tender?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I -- just the one document

22 counsel referred to, P865, the Tolimir document. And he made a brief

23 argument on that document. And if I could be allowed 20 seconds to

24 respond to that.

25 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, I don't think it's proper, you

Page 10621

1 know. Are you -- are you going to tell us about the background of this

2 document or the source of this document or something else?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I was going to respond to Mr. Karnavas's argument,

4 but I wanted to get your leave to do it, because I agree with you, it's

5 not proper at this stage to be making an argument. But I think given that

6 counsel has made an argument, I could take 20 seconds just to alert you to

7 something in the document.

8 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Karnavas, do you have any objections?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, he just indicated that it's improper for him

10 to make an argument, so I hope -- you know, I don't understand what his

11 problem is. He can offer the document or not. If he's not going to offer

12 it, I would like to offer it. If he wants to make an argument, there'll

13 be plenty of time in closing argument for him to make an argument.

14 JUDGE LIU: So you oppose it?

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I don't think it's necessary, but I'm not --

16 you know, I leave it to the Court's discretion.

17 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. McCloskey, since there is opposition from

18 Defence, I think we have to stick to the Rules.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE LIU: The document P865 is admitted into evidence, maybe

21 with the two numbers, one is for Prosecution and the other is for the

22 Defence. It is so decided.

23 Well, Witness, thank you very much for coming to The Hague to give

24 your evidence. We wish you have a pleasant journey back home. When we

25 are adjourned, the usher will show you --

Page 10622

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 [The witness withdrew]

3 JUDGE LIU: And we are adjourned now, and we'll resume at 11.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

5 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

6 [The witness entered court]

7 JUDGE LIU: Good morning, Witness.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

9 JUDGE LIU: Would you please make the solemn declaration.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

11 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. You may sit down, please.


14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Mr. Karnavas, the witness is yours.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

17 Examined by Mr. Karnavas:

18 Q. Good morning, sir.

19 A. Good morning.

20 Q. Would you please tell us your name.

21 A. My name is Dragomir Keserovic.

22 Q. And could you please tell us your last name letter by letter.

23 A. K-e-s-e-r-o-v-i-c, with a diacritic.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Keserovic. Could you please tell us, what is your

25 current occupation?

Page 10623

1 A. Currently I am a general in the Army of Republika Srpska, and I

2 hold the position of Assistant Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska.

3 Q. Could you please tell us what is the area of your expertise

4 within the VRS.

5 A. I am head of the Department of Security -- or rather, head of the

6 Security Service of Defence in the Ministry of Defence.

7 Q. All right. And how long have you held that position, sir?

8 A. Since the 10th of September, 2002.

9 Q. Now, if we could just briefly discuss your educational

10 background. Could you tell us after completing secondary education what

11 sort of education -- further education, higher education you received.

12 A. I completed the military Academy for Ground Forces Armoured Units

13 in 1981. I completed the General Staff Academy in Belgrade and the Army

14 of Yugoslavia in 1997. From the 1st of February, 1996 until the 1st of

15 February, 1997, that is.

16 I completed the School of National Defence, also in Belgrade, in

17 the school year of 1998-1999.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. As far as the military is concerned, I completed many educational

20 courses that have to do with the Security Service and the military police.

21 I also completed a post-graduate course at the Faculty of National

22 Defence, again within the Department of Security.

23 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, could you please tell us back in July 1995

24 what rank you had within the VRS.

25 A. Lieutenant colonel.

Page 10624

1 Q. Could you please tell us in which organ or in which capacity you

2 were serving.

3 A. I was in the military police department of the security

4 administration of the sector for security and intelligence affairs of the

5 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.

6 Q. And where were you located at that point in time?

7 A. The headquarters of my department was in Banja Luka in the

8 building of the headquarters of the 1st Krajina Corps.

9 Q. Now, did you have any -- anything to do with the 65 Protection

10 Regiment?

11 A. Not with the regiment. But like with the other units of the Army

12 of Republika Srpska, I had professional links with the battalion of the

13 military police from the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment.

14 Q. And could you please describe to us in general those professional

15 links.

16 A. Yes. The security department worked on training and equipping

17 military police units. It worked on the seven services of the military

18 police too, and it also worked on giving guidance to the duty services of

19 the military police. Those are the three directions of activity within

20 the military police.

21 From a professional point of view, that was channelled by the

22 military police department from the security administration, from the

23 Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs of the Main Staff.

24 Q. You said that you worked on the seven services of the military

25 police. Could you please describe to us in general what those seven

Page 10625

1 services are.

2 A. I think I can do that. That is the service for providing

3 security, then the investigation service, the patrol service, the escort

4 service, the duty service, the service for crime prevention and control,

5 and the service for the control of military traffic.

6 Q. All right. Now, could you please tell us, in light of your

7 position during that period of time - and I'm speaking of July 1995 in

8 general - what was your professional affiliation or link with Colonel

9 Beara?

10 A. Colonel Beara was the chief of the security administration. In

11 that administration, there were four organisational entities. One of them

12 was the department for Military Police, and I was in it.

13 Q. And just so we -- we have a clear understanding, you said that

14 there were four organisational entities. Could you list the other two.

15 A. The other three: The counter-intelligence department, the

16 analysis department, and the counter-intelligence group.

17 Q. Okay. And then the military police being the fourth?

18 A. The fourth.

19 Q. Now, was -- who was your immediate superior officer?

20 A. Colonel Beara.

21 Q. So I take it he would be the one giving you orders?

22 A. It can be put that way, yes.

23 Q. Now -- well, did you report to anyone directly, other than Beara?

24 A. No.

25 Q. All right. Now, did you have a staff of your own?

Page 10626

1 A. Not in the department. Until I came to the military police

2 department, it only existed on paper, and there was not a single person

3 who was involved in military police affairs. At the time when I was in

4 that department, I was there by myself. So after I left, no one stayed

5 behind. It was only later that it was manned. So in the department

6 itself, I did not have anyone who would work with me on these particular

7 affairs.

8 Q. And what was -- specifically or concretely, what was the military

9 police department -- or what were you in charge of in your capacity as the

10 head of the military police department?

11 A. At that time, we were primarily involved in manning military

12 police units and providing appropriate personnel, since there weren't

13 enough personnel. Also, we tried to equip the units with appropriate

14 materiel and technical equipment, and we were making efforts to bring

15 military police units into a position so that they would not be classical

16 military units, as they were primarily until then, but we wanted them to

17 carry out specific military police duties.

18 Q. Now, to what extent did your position reach down all the way,

19 say, to the brigade level?

20 A. There were criteria according to which this manning took place

21 and according to which both personnel and equipment were sent to

22 particular units and also members of military police units were sent for

23 training according to certain criteria. Recruitment was centralised, and

24 we took part in the decision-making process as to how many soldiers should

25 be sent to which units.

Page 10627

1 Procurement was centralised too. Military police equipment was

2 procured, and then we suggested how it should further be allocated to

3 different units. Then we also linked up the duty services from the

4 brigade through the corps, all the way to the battalion of the military

5 police in the Motorised Protection Regiment. These were links that were

6 based on the legislation and rules that were in force at the time.

7 Q. Now, at your level, would you be able to influence, say, a

8 brigade as to who would be placed in the military police, who would

9 command it, who would be the deputy commander, the numbers, and so on and

10 so forth?

11 A. I could not decide, I did not have the right to decide, but there

12 was a rule that the commander of a unit when deciding to appoint officers

13 to the military police should consult first and foremost his own security

14 organ and then, if necessary, the superior officer in the military police

15 chain. It could happen that the opinion of the corps would be sought for

16 appointing a military police officer in the battalion, but this hardly

17 ever happened in the case of companies and squads, but then it depends on

18 where they were too.

19 Q. Now, in light of your -- in light of your position, I take it you

20 had to work with the rules and regulations dealing with the security organ

21 in general. Is that correct?

22 A. Well, yes. But there are two sets of rules involved, and as you

23 said, generally speaking all members of the security organs were supposed

24 to adhere to them at all levels, regardless of their position and their

25 actual line of work. One set of these rules is the rules of service in

Page 10628

1 the security organs, and the second set are the rules of service of the

2 military police, the instructions for applying the rules of the military

3 police, and the laws that accompany these rules.

4 Q. All right. I want to speak at the -- at the brigade level, the

5 relationship, you know, between the security organ and the commander, or

6 how the security organ fits within the command. Could you please describe

7 to us in general what were the general -- what were the functions of the

8 security organ.

9 A. A security organ is a member of the brigade command and is one of

10 the assistant commanders too. As for his work, in terms of the security

11 of the unit, he is responsible to the brigade commander. At the same

12 time, he takes part in the work of the brigade command in the process of

13 planning and adopting decisions. In that context, he proposes measures

14 related to security and using the military police unit that may be within

15 the composition of that unit. That is his relationship vis-a-vis the

16 brigade commander.

17 The security organ of a brigade has another link, which is

18 professional -- or rather, functional. It is called professional command

19 and control, and that is vis-a-vis the superior security organ -- or

20 rather, the head of the superior security organ.

21 As regards these matters that have to do with professional command

22 and control, most often this is counter-intelligence, the security organ

23 is responsible to the superior security organ and only to a certain extent

24 that he or the responsible security organ believe it is necessary, so it

25 is only to that extent that he familiarises the brigade commander with

Page 10629

1 that particular matter.

2 Q. Thank you, General. Now, I want to go into a little more detail

3 on this aspect which you just covered. When you say, "Professional

4 command and control," could you please describe to us, to the best that

5 you can, concretely, that is, what are we talking about?

6 A. When we say "professional command and control" in the Security

7 Service, this entails many activities, mostly from the so-called

8 counter-intelligence area of activity. There are two elements that are

9 important in terms of understanding this: The first is that the security

10 organ in a certain period of time deals with information, data,

11 assessments, and evaluations of security challenges, risks, and threats

12 within the unit and addressed against the unit that were not expressed

13 very evidently, so they do not have enough valid evidence yet. They

14 cannot inform the commander and the others as yet about this, and also

15 ultimately this may lead to criminal prosecution before courts of law.

16 That is one side of it -- or rather, one element.

17 The second one is the following: When following these activities

18 and documenting them, the law prescribes the methods and means according

19 to which the principle of the inviolability of public information and

20 communication is deviated from. On the basis of special authority and

21 powers that security organs have, this falls under this professional

22 command and control and the professional line of work they are engaged in

23 in a particular unit.

24 Q. Thank you. Now, these two elements, did you just give us a

25 definition of what is considered counter-intelligence? Was that what that

Page 10630

1 was -- the two elements that you were describing?

2 A. For the most part, yes.

3 Q. Now, is there anything else about counter-intelligence that we

4 should know about in trying to understand this concept, what is

5 counter-intelligence?

6 A. There is a broad spectrum of security threats. There are many

7 ways in which the enemy tries to endanger a unit. Sometimes this happens

8 within the unit itself; sometimes it happens in such a way that it

9 involves foreign elements. This also has to do with the protection of

10 confidential or secret military information at all levels, secrecy of

11 decisions. And also according to the rules that regulate this particular

12 matter, then there is activity related to opposing foreign intelligence

13 services, also activity involving internal undermining. Then -- then

14 there is the possibility of paramilitary organisations within the area or

15 the unit itself. All of that are concrete counter-intelligence affairs

16 that have to be followed, monitored, documented, and this should lead to

17 an epilogue that is prescribed by law in one way or the other.

18 Q. All right. Now, at which level -- or at what level, I should

19 say, is counter-intelligence determined within the security organ?

20 A. I'm afraid I did not understand your question.

21 Q. Let me be a little more concrete. Would the -- would a security

22 officer at the battalion level, would he make a decision as to what is or

23 is not counter-intelligence?

24 A. He does not make decisions as to what counter-intelligence

25 activity is, because counter-intelligence activity is precisely spelled

Page 10631

1 out in the instructions and the rules. However, he does register

2 activities and collect information which he deems to be of security

3 interest and which he feels may jeopardise his unit, the unit he is in at

4 a given point in time.

5 When information is collected in this way, he sends it further on

6 to the superior security organ, who re-evaluates this information, and

7 then professionally he gives guidance to the lower-level security organ,

8 in terms of what he should do with regard to a particular matter. He

9 himself does not always decide what he is going to do next. In most

10 cases, he is given professional guidance by the superior security organ.

11 Q. All right. Now, would -- before seeking this -- this guidance by

12 the superior security organ, this professional guidance, could the

13 security officer of a battalion go directly to his battalion commander to

14 seek some guidance or at least pass on that information?

15 A. At any rate, the answer is yes. There are a few serious security

16 issues that can occur at battalion level that would require the superior

17 security organ to be consulted before you go and talk to your own

18 commander, but it's very difficult to remember any practical example, but

19 certainly there are a few such problems, because all problems that are

20 likely to happen, to occur at battalion level, for the most part are

21 problems of a more public nature, and one could say that it is possible to

22 go and confer with the battalion commander. Of course, if one is looking

23 at the kind of information or data that could spread and become a more

24 general security problem and the battalion-level security organ is then

25 able to consider all of the potential consequences and predict how the

Page 10632

1 situation might evolve surrounding that problem, the rule is first one

2 goes to the superior security organ, confers with him and receives

3 instructions as to what to do next.

4 However, when serious problems are encountered, first you go to

5 the superior security organ. If it's a problem of a more public nature

6 and easier to spot and identify and document, then one can go directly to

7 one's own unit commander, and the unit commander, under all aspects of

8 combat readiness, is the responsible one, and this organ is there to help

9 with security-related issues.

10 Q. Now, let's move up to the brigade, the brigade level. And now

11 we're talking about the brigade security organ. With respect to

12 activities or information collected within the sphere of

13 counter-intelligence, to whom would the security organ first and foremost

14 inform or report to?

15 A. In the sense of security regarding the staff -- or rather, one

16 part of the activity, roughly speaking, one-third of the overall activity

17 undertaken by security organs in a given command, this would be up to the

18 unit commander, to the brigade commander only.

19 Q. What about the other two-thirds?

20 A. As for the remaining two-thirds, that merits a brief explanation,

21 but the remaining two-thirds constitute the so-called counter-intelligence

22 activities and tasks, and that is the focus of the work of security

23 organs. As I said before, in that respect, the security organ is,

24 professionally speaking, under the command and control of a superior

25 officer, in the security organ itself.

Page 10633

1 The security organ goes about these tasks and activities without

2 necessarily informing the brigade commander every single time. They do

3 provide some sort of general information as to their potential whereabouts

4 or the general nature of certain tasks and duties in the sphere of

5 counter-intelligence-related activity, or perhaps not even that much; they

6 can only say, "I have some jobs and duties that I have to carry out

7 personally or pursuant to an order from the security organ," and now a

8 professionally trained commander will not ask any further questions of the

9 security organ at this point.

10 Once the results of that work become apparent and once it is

11 possible to prove these results, then the security organ has the duty to

12 inform the unit commander accordingly. In some way, as far as the

13 relations between the commander and the security organ, it has always been

14 the stumbling-block of the exact ratio and the amount of reporting and

15 information that was supposed to go on. This is a matter of one's

16 assessment. This is a matter of the training level of the security organ

17 itself, as well as the trust that has been established between the organ

18 and the commander. However, the correct way to do it would be to inform

19 the commander so that the commander or the unit would not be liable to any

20 surprises.

21 Q. All right. Now, at the brigade level, the superior security

22 organ for a brigade security officer would be where?

23 A. That is the chief of the security and intelligence or

24 intelligence and security-related tasks with the corps command.

25 Q. Now, you indicated that at some point there would be a duty if

Page 10634

1 and when the time came for the security officer or the head of the

2 security for the brigade to inform his commander about those

3 counter-intelligence activities. My question is: Would he take that

4 decision on his own, or would he need some sort of approval or guidance

5 from the superior security organ prior to disclosing the information that

6 he had -- or the work that he had been conducting?


8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, it's leading. The question should be

9 what advice, if any, does a person need to take, not offering a potential

10 answer.

11 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

12 You may rephrase your question, Mr. Karnavas.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. But the way that Mr. McCloskey stated

14 it doesn't make any sense, so I'm afraid I can't ask it in that fashion.

15 Because that wasn't the purpose of my question.

16 JUDGE LIU: I'm not asking you to ask your question according to

17 the Prosecution's fashion.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm trying to see --

19 Q. After conducting this counter-intelligence activity -- or

20 actually, before the security organ at the brigade level can inform the

21 commander of his activities or information gathered from

22 counter-intelligence activities, does he need to get permission, and if

23 so, from whom?

24 A. A combined method of work or an operational combined method of

25 work is a very complex activity indeed. It is very difficult to provide a

Page 10635

1 brief answer to that question. However, in most cases, the superior

2 officer of the security organ can provide recommendations and advice to

3 his subordinates as to what extent exactly the brigade commander should be

4 informed.

5 Q. All right. What would be the relationship, if there exists one,

6 between the security organ of the brigade, at the brigade level, with the

7 security organ at the Main Staff level?

8 A. There is no direct relationship. Only through the officers of

9 the corps security organ.

10 Q. Well, let me ask you concretely, just to make sure that I

11 understand it. Is there a direct relationship between Beara, who was at

12 the Main Staff, and Momir Nikolic at the Bratunac Brigade? In other

13 words, can Beara or should Beara, under the rules, assuming that they are

14 followed, go directly to Nikolic and give him orders, advice, directions?

15 A. No.

16 Q. How should it work?

17 A. As long as the tasks arise from assessments and evaluations at

18 the level of the security administration attached to the Main Staff, these

19 should then be sent to the chief of the corps department, and the chief of

20 the corps department should pass them on to the section chief in the

21 brigade.

22 Q. All right. What about the reverse scenario? Can Nikolic, or

23 should Nikolic, assuming that the rules are followed, go directly to

24 Beara, bypassing, in other words, Popovic, who's at the Drina Corps?

25 A. No.

Page 10636

1 Q. Now, what about -- what about the general himself, Mladic? Can

2 he, assuming the rules as they were designed to be applied, can he, given

3 his position, being the commander of the VRS, go and directly give an

4 order to Momir Nikolic?

5 A. To all practical intents and purposes, this could be the case but

6 this is not the correct way to do it. The correct way to do it would be

7 for General Mladic to go to his assistant - specifically, General

8 Tolimir - give him a task, and then the task is passed on down the line of

9 communication that we have already described.

10 Q. Well, what if the general was in the vicinity, General Mladic?

11 Again, now the reverse. Would Momir Nikolic be entitled to go, under the

12 rules, directly to General Mladic to give him some sort of a security or

13 intelligence report, in light of his position?

14 A. At this point, this is a matter of direct communication and

15 perhaps a reflection of the situation, whatever the situation may be at a

16 given point in time. But in no way can this be applied as a rule, a

17 general rule, and in no way can one always act in this fashion.

18 Q. All right. Now, before we get to the relationship between the

19 security organ at the brigade level and the military police, I want to

20 show you what has come into evidence as P398. We could look at this. We

21 have a copy for the ELMO.

22 First of all, General, do you recall seeing this document at or

23 around the time when it --

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think it's 389, by our view.

Page 10637

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. What did I say? Oh, okay, it's 389.

2 Q. Now, General, do you recall seeing this document when it was

3 generated? And from the date, you see 11 November 1994. 11 November

4 1994. I'm sorry --

5 A. Yes. But the 24th of October, 1994.

6 Q. I'm sorry. I apologise.

7 A. No. I've never seen this document before.

8 Q. All right.

9 A. Not at all, not back then.

10 Q. Okay. All right. Now, before coming to court today, have you

11 had a chance to look at it, at this document?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And have you had a chance to examine it somewhat?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And to the best of your ability, could -- in light of your

16 position, background, experience, knowledge in the field, could you tell

17 us whether this instruction in general or in principle follows the

18 regulations and the laws with respect to the security or security and

19 intelligence organ.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Would you please tell us -- you told us earlier about the

22 one-third, two-thirds distinction, administrative versus

23 counter-intelligence. Here we have this percentage of what would appear

24 to be 80 and 20 per cent. Do you know where these numbers were plucked

25 out of?

Page 10638

1 A. I can't be sure. I can't answer this.

2 Q. But the one-third that you were referring to, would that be, with

3 respect to what is being identified here as the tasks under 20 per cent?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So I take it the 80 per cent would be the 66 per cent -- or the

6 two-thirds that you've indicated earlier?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, I want to focus your attention, if I could, on paragraph 3,

9 under "Instructions," and in particular, I would like you to look at

10 the -- and this would be on page 2 in the English version, Mr. Usher. And

11 it's on the second page at the top of the page for both.

12 I'm looking at the second paragraph of paragraph number 3, and it

13 states here: "At the same time, to the extent and in the measure

14 necessary, members of the security and intelligence organs must provide

15 their immediate superiors with information, assessments and observations

16 regarding the security of units or institutions."

17 And what I want to focus your attention on is that particular

18 language, where it says: " the extent and in the measure necessary,"

19 that portion. Do you see that, General?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, could you please give us an explanation what exactly does

22 that mean? And I believe you already told us a little bit, but I just

23 want to hear your concrete observations.

24 A. Yes. As I've already said - I do not wish to repeat myself - the

25 extent and measure necessary, this is not easily quantifiable and not easy

Page 10639

1 to determine; however, the lower-level security organ is usually given a

2 definition of this by the superior security organ commander. Rather, it

3 is up to the security organ to assess what the extent and the measure

4 should be.

5 Q. At the brigade level, would that be the -- the head of the

6 security organ? In other words, to the extent and the measure he thought

7 necessary, he would inform his commander?

8 A. Sometimes, yes. But most often if he was told to do so by the

9 corps security organ.

10 Q. All right. Now, in looking at this -- that portion that we

11 focussed on, it would appear that it's subject to some interpretation as

12 to the latitude, the breadth.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you see any problems that that -- or any potential problems

15 giving someone at the brigade level, for instance, a security officer,

16 with this sort of latitude or discretionary power, if we want to put it

17 that way, with respect to what and at which time and how much he would

18 inform his commander on matters that would fit in with this -- in this 80

19 per cent or 66 percentile of counter-intelligence activity?

20 A. Yes. This can produce an effect with security organs, especially

21 in situations where the security organ is not sufficiently trained and is

22 not sufficiently familiar with the laws and provisions, the laws and the

23 rules. This can produce or lead to certain deviations or aberrations on

24 this issue, and this cuts both ways. It can be that he totally keeps all

25 information back from the commander or that he entirely neglects the basic

Page 10640

1 fundamental principles of counter-intelligence work and shares all

2 information at the very outset with the commander -- rather, informs the

3 commander about everything. This can be a source of certain forms of

4 negative behaviours, first and foremost by insufficiently trained security

5 organs.

6 Q. All right. Thank you. I believe that's all I have for this

7 document.

8 Now, if we could focus our attention a little bit on the aspects

9 of the military police.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: And if I could have the kindness of Mr. Usher to

11 bring it down a little bit.

12 And before I go into this area too much, Mr. President, will we be

13 breaking at our normal time?

14 JUDGE LIU: I'm not sure when will be the normal time. But if you

15 feel, you know, time for a break, we will break at 12.00, or you just

16 finished a section.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: I would -- I would appreciate around 12.00, in

18 light of my -- the situation on the ground here, my own physical strength

19 today.

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes.


22 Q. Now, I want to just briefly discuss with you this relationship

23 between the security organ and the military police. Could you please tell

24 us, at the brigade level now, first of all, who commands or who is in

25 charge of the military police?

Page 10641

1 A. The brigade commander exercises command and control over the

2 military police, as over all other subordinate units.

3 Q. That's his asset?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, we know that a -- the military police have a commander -- a

6 "komandir" of their own, but who is the commander of the military police,

7 who is their immediate commanding officer?

8 A. The brigade commander.

9 Q. To what extent does the security organ get involved with the

10 military police?

11 A. As I've pointed out, the security organ attached to the brigade,

12 as for the work of the command in terms of planning and decision-making is

13 concerned, it makes proposals for the deployment of military police units

14 and presents this proposal to the brigade commander. At the same time,

15 the security organ also has a role to play, in terms of professional

16 guidance, in relation to military police services; namely, the services

17 that we enumerated back at the outset.

18 In practical terms, this means that any deployment or use of

19 military police units is ordered and commanded by the commander of that

20 unit. As for specific tasks, throughout the military police services the

21 security organ has the authority to issue a task, an assignment to a

22 section, department, or whatever the military police has, so that these

23 tasks are then carried out by these individual services regardless of the

24 commander, but they could and should inform the commander about the

25 results of those activities, depending on the case or mission at hand.

Page 10642

1 Q. All right. Can the chief of intelligence and security issue

2 orders to the military police as he sees fit? In other words, however he

3 feels at the time.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Why not?

6 A. Command is single. That applies to military police units. As to

7 all other units, there is only one commander who exercises command over

8 these units. In the case of brigade, this is the brigade commander.

9 Q. All right. What about the superior security organs? Say, the --

10 the corps security organ, Popovic in this particular case? Can he under

11 the rules, assuming we follow them, can he reach down and give direct

12 orders to members of the military police of a brigade, such as the

13 Bratunac Brigade?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Well, what about Beara? He's at the Main Staff. He's --

16 A. No.

17 Q. All right. Okay.

18 JUDGE LIU: It's 12.00.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: I believe -- I believe I just finished that

20 section, Your Honour. Thank you.

21 JUDGE LIU: So we'll have a break and we'll resume at 12.30.

22 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.

24 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Mr. Karnavas, please continue.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

Page 10643

1 Q. General, I want to switch to some -- switch topics and get more

2 focussed into the period that we are concerned with. And to start with, I

3 would like to show you a document that has been introduced as P543. And

4 if you could just look at it quickly, and then I'll -- I'll direct your

5 attention to the appropriate segment.

6 Now, sir, do you know what this document is?

7 A. The heading shows that this is an order of the commander of the

8 Drina Corps for active activities -- or rather, for the operation named

9 Krivaja 95.

10 Q. And I believe if we go all the way to the last page we see the

11 author of this document, or the person who is -- takes responsibility for

12 the contents of it. We see Major General Zivanovic. Do you see that,

13 sir?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. And I take it you knew Mr. Zivanovic at that point in

16 time?

17 A. I knew him, but most probably he didn't know me.

18 Q. Okay. All right. And it shows that he was the commander of the

19 Drina Corps at that particular time.

20 Now, if I could focus your attention, sir, I'd like to focus your

21 attention to paragraph number 10. It would be on page -- page 6 in the

22 English, page 4 in your version, with the title "Combat security." Look

23 at that.

24 Have you located it, sir?

25 A. Yes. It is security for combat activity. That's what it is.

Page 10644

1 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, prior to coming here today, you -- I've

2 shown you this document, have I not?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And, in fact, I've asked you to look at this particular

5 paragraph, paragraph number 10, and specifically to go to the latter part

6 of the paragraph that deals with the security organ in dealing with

7 prisoners of war; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, in looking at this paragraph or this section of the -- the

10 order by General Zivanovic, could you please give us your interpretation

11 or your expert analysis on this particular segment; that is, the dealing

12 of -- with prisoners of war by the security organ.

13 A. The second part reads as follows: "In dealing with prisoners of

14 war and the civilian population behave in every way in accordance with the

15 Geneva Conventions." That's fine. However: "Security organs and

16 military police will indicate the areas for gathering and securing

17 prisoners of war and war booty," which precedes the other paragraph I

18 read, this is incorrect and the corps commander did not specify this task

19 properly. This is improper. The rules regulate this in a different way.

20 Q. Could you please explain to us how the rules regulate this

21 aspect.

22 A. In the process of decision-making, when war prisoners and war

23 booty are anticipated, the assistant commander for logistics makes a

24 proposal and the corps commander adopts this proposal related to the

25 localities where prisoners of war will be gathered and separately the

Page 10645

1 localities where war booty will be collected. The operations organ in the

2 staff proposes the way in which these localities will be secured. If the

3 unit concerned has a military police unit, then the security organ

4 proposes that the military police unit should secure the locations where

5 war prisoners and war booty will be collected. Then all of that is

6 translated into an order of this kind, and then the military police unit

7 is given a task, or if there is no military police unit, then another unit

8 is given the task specifically by the commander to provide security for

9 prisoners of war -- or rather, the locality where prisoners of war will be

10 gathered.

11 In the order addressed to logistics and the rear services - and

12 that is an integral part of the commander's order - that is where the

13 place or locality where the war prisoners will be gathered and where war

14 booty will be collected respectively. That is the way it should be in

15 accordance with the rules.

16 Q. Now, let me -- let me touch on a couple of aspects of this

17 answer. First of all, why is it necessary to have the rear services or

18 the logistics sector or organ involved in this process?

19 A. First of all, logistics or the rear services have many

20 obligations regarding prisoners of war and war booty too.

21 As regards prisoners of war, the location where they will be

22 gathered, according to rules of combat, is usually in a different part of

23 the area of that unit, where their in-depth positions are, because

24 prisoners of war have to be fed; they have to receive proper medical care.

25 Then perhaps their transport has to be organised from the actual

Page 10646

1 collection point, and everything else. That means that they should have

2 all the prescribed logistics support, and they should be accorded the

3 treatment guaranteed by conventions dealing with the treatment of

4 prisoners of war. That is why this locality has to be established in such

5 a way that it is easily or readily accessible, so that the logistics or

6 rear services can carry out their tasks properly. That is one of the

7 reasons.

8 Another one of the reasons is that such a place should not be

9 close to the front end or the first line because of the possible dangers

10 that could follow. That is the way it is regulated by the rules, and that

11 is the way it should be regulated as such.

12 Q. All right. Now, aside from what you just told us, in looking at

13 the way this is written, do you see any potential problems with giving the

14 security organ these tasks in the manner in which -- that are outlined in

15 this particular order?

16 A. I think -- well, actually, in this way, security organs are

17 charged with particular duties and tasks. They could take part in the

18 security activities of the military police and also in the treatment of

19 prisoners of war afterwards; that is to say, when they are interviewed and

20 so on. This goes beyond the possibilities and level of training of these

21 organs, in terms of producing results that would show that the task is not

22 carried out completely or was carried out in part only. Then there can be

23 other problems in this regard. Quite simply, security organs are not

24 trained for dealing with all the measures that have to be taken in terms

25 of this activity.

Page 10647

1 Q. All right. Thank you. I believe that's all we have at this

2 point in time with this document.

3 Now, I want to share with you another document that has come in as

4 P406, Exhibit P406. And to save a little time, I believe that you've --

5 I've shown you this document as well. It's dated July 5, 1995. And it's

6 Colonel Blagojevic's order for active combat operations. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And as I understand it, I asked you to look at the particular

9 segment in Colonel Blagojevic's order with respect to prisoners of war,

10 which would be -- I believe it's on page 5 of your -- of your document.

11 It's also page 5 in the English document. It's under paragraph 10.

12 Do you see that, sir, where it --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. Now, it says here that: "Prisoners of war and war booty

15 will be collected in Pribicevac -- in the sector," and it's

16 underlined: "Comply the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of prisoners

17 of war and the population."

18 My first question is: Sir, are you familiar with or acquainted

19 with the -- with the Pribicevac sector?

20 A. No.

21 Q. All right. Secondly, in reading this and in comparing it to what

22 was ordered or in the order in which -- the manner which it was drafted in

23 the order by General Zivanovic, can you please give us your expert opinion

24 as to the manner in which Colonel Blagojevic has drafted his order.

25 A. The order of Colonel Blagojevic -- or rather, the commander of

Page 10648

1 the Bratunac Brigade -- or rather, this particular position that we are

2 commenting upon is correct in both cases; namely, the commander adopted

3 somebody's proposal or decided independently when establishing an area, an

4 area where prisoners of war and war booty are to be collected has to be

5 established in the order. So from that point of view, this order is

6 correct, and it reflects the way the rules regulate this subject matter.

7 Q. All right. Now, if you went to paragraph 12, which would be the

8 last page - it would be page 7 - it says here that: "The IKM," the

9 forward command post of the brigade, "would be in the Pribicevac sector."

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And do you still maintain your position, the one that

13 you've just stated, that Colonel Blagojevic's designation, specific

14 designation of where the prisoners would be located, if and when any would

15 be caught?

16 A. Since this has to do with the forward command post and that it is

17 the area of Pribicevac, I'm not familiar with the area, but what has to be

18 taken into account is the proximity of the first line -- or rather, the

19 area where combat activities take place. I stand by what I said, that

20 this is closer to the other end, that it is further away from the first

21 line. It is closer to the rear command post.

22 Q. And if I were to tell you that at that location that would be

23 where the commander would also be located during the critical period, the

24 commander of the Bratunac Brigade, that is, would that in any way affect

25 your -- the opinion that you've already stated in either a positive or a

Page 10649

1 negative fashion?

2 A. I could not give any comments as to the reasons why the location

3 was established in such a way.

4 Q. Now, I want to focus your attention on -- on paragraph 5.6, and

5 this would be on page 4, at the top of page 4, and it would be page 3,

6 sir, General, it would be page 3 for you. 5.6, it says here: "The

7 reserve: If necessary, have the Military Police Platoon ready for

8 deployment in the sector of the Command Post of the 1st Bratunac Light

9 Infantry Brigade."

10 Now, I have a pretty general question for you: Is this proper to

11 have the Military Police Platoon as the reserve, or is this an abuse of

12 that particular asset, a violation of the rules and regulations?

13 A. No. This is an order for active combat activities and the unit

14 was used in the right way -- or rather, it was given the right kind of

15 task. In combat activities, only in exceptional cases, and in a situation

16 of initial grouping, an effort is made always for this kind of reserve,

17 and this was done quite correctly from the point of view of the rules that

18 regulate the use of military police units.

19 Q. Thank you, General.

20 Now, before I go on to the next segment - and that would be the

21 activities that took place after the fall of Srebrenica - could you please

22 tell us where you were during that period of time.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Sir, I believe that's -- you can -- that would be

24 enough. And I'm through with this document as well.

25 A. Until the 15th of July, the evening of the 15th of July, I was in

Page 10650

1 the area of responsibility of the 1st Infantry Brigade Novi Grad of the

2 1st Krajina Corps -- or the 2nd Krajina Corps, since in a certain period

3 of time the brigade went from one corps to the other. But at any rate, it

4 was the 1st Infantry Brigade Novi Grad. And on the 16th of July, I came

5 to Han Pijesak -- or rather, to Crna Rijeka, the command post of the Main

6 Staff, that is.

7 Q. Could you please tell us how long you had been gone from the

8 area. You told us you arrived back on the evening of the 15th of July.

9 What was the period of your absence from this area?

10 A. Without any interruption from the 5th of July -- or rather, the

11 4th of July, when I was given the task in relation to the 1st Brigade

12 Novi Grad. Before that, I came every now and then from the 19th of March

13 that year, and for the most part I was in the area of responsibility of

14 the 1st or 2nd Krajina Corps.

15 Q. All right. Now, could you please tell us what exactly you were

16 doing from the 4th to the evening of the 15th of July. What were you

17 engaged in?

18 A. I was on the team of the Main Staff that was viewing the causes

19 and consequences of the loss of positions by this brigade where major

20 losses were sustained, in terms of manpower and materiel at part of the

21 positions of this brigade. That was the task, and that is what was being

22 done. The deadline for carrying out this task was the 15th of July. That

23 was the set deadline.

24 Q. Did you during that critical period, the ones that you've

25 outlined, from the 4th until the -- the 15th, the evening of the 15th, did

Page 10651

1 you in any way participate in any activities dealing with Srebrenica?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Prior, prior to leaving for this particular task, that is, prior

4 to July 4th, were you in any way consulted or did you in any way get

5 involved in the activities regarding the -- the events surrounding

6 Srebrenica, that were to follow, that is?

7 A. No.

8 Q. During that period, were you ever contacted by Colonel Beara?

9 A. No.

10 Q. All right. Now, in your -- during that -- that period while you

11 were absent, were you getting any reports or any information with respect

12 to what had happened in Srebrenica?

13 A. No.

14 Q. During that period of time, were you engaged with in any way,

15 with the military police, with respect to any activities that would be

16 connected or linked to Srebrenica and the events that followed afterwards?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Now, during that period of time - and let me just focus your

19 attention on two critical days, the 12th and the 13th of July, 1995 - did

20 you ever visit Potocari?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Or were you in the Bratunac area?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Could you please tell us the area that you were in, what would be

25 the distance? How far away would you be?

Page 10652

1 A. The road one usually takes, it would be between 450 and 500

2 kilometres.

3 Q. Now, since you weren't there on those days, the 12th, the 13th

4 and onwards, perhaps I can give you some -- some information with respect

5 to Potocari and maybe you can help us.

6 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Mr. McCloskey.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, providing a witness information is -- it

8 would be leading.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: That's why I phrased it that way, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE LIU: Well, it depends on what kind of information. This

11 witness testified that he was not even there during that period. I don't

12 know the purpose for you to provide those information to this witness.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, I -- I phrased it in such a way

14 that at least I would be alarming everybody of what I was about to do.

15 JUDGE LIU: We are alarmed.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: I was -- well, let me put it this way, Your Honour:

17 In light of the gentleman's position, even though he was absent, I was

18 going to pose a series of questions with respect to who would be

19 responsible for the individuals in Potocari and then the prisoners that

20 were separated, keeping in mind that he wasn't there. Now, in order for

21 me to do that, I would have to give him some -- some of the facts that

22 have already come in.

23 Now, if I'm not permitted because the Court may decide that the

24 gentleman, since he wasn't there and has no firsthand knowledge would not

25 be competent at least to discuss that, I -- I will accept that, but I

Page 10653

1 certainly don't want those questions being asked on cross-examination.

2 JUDGE LIU: Well, it's -- it depends, you know. Sometimes the

3 hearsay evidence is also admissible, so you may try. But -- but I'm not

4 sure about, you know, the results.

5 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, it sounds like Mr. Karnavas is using

7 this person as perhaps an expert witness on the very fundamental issues of

8 the case. First of all, we haven't had any notice of anything like that,

9 and it's perfectly appropriate for him to talk about the rules, as he has

10 done, and how they are applied, and we can all take our knowledge of this

11 case and apply them, but to take him to some place where he says he knows

12 nothing about and was not there at this stage really is not appropriate.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may briefly respond.

14 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: The gentleman, years ago - I'm using the plural -

16 was questioned by the OTP, so they certainly knew this gentleman.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, if we're going to get into that, I

18 think we need to -- we need to start having discussions outside the

19 presence of the -- the witness. I just don't know what comes next when we

20 start getting into the history.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I was merely responding because they said

22 they had no notice. The gentleman lives in Banja Luka. They questioned

23 him. They talked to him about those events. So certainly -- it's not as

24 if, you know, I've just introduced somebody that they had absolutely no

25 knowledge of. And they've questioned the gentleman.

Page 10654

1 Now, if I'm forbidden into that area, I can accept that decision,

2 so long as the Prosecution is forbidden from venturing into those areas.

3 That's all. I just want to know what the rules of engagement are. So ...

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President --

5 JUDGE LIU: Mr. McCloskey.

6 MR. McCLOSKEY: You are being, as I'm sure you understand, being

7 put in a position where Mr. Karnavas is trying to make deals with the

8 Court, which -- that he wants to get a pre-emptive ruling against what I

9 can go into on cross-examination. That's absurd and improper and is --

10 should be out of the question.

11 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Karnavas, we allowed you to go into this

12 area, but bear in mind that this witness was absent during that time and

13 all we heard will be the hearsay evidence. We will see how far you could

14 go.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I'll just ask some foundational questions

16 and take it from there, Your Honour.

17 Q. General, I know you weren't there, but since that period, did

18 you -- have you had a chance to learn about meetings that were held

19 between General Mladic and the DutchBat and representatives of the Muslim

20 community there?

21 A. No.

22 Q. My next question: Do you feel sufficiently knowledgeable or

23 confident in being able to discuss as to who would be responsible for the

24 individuals that had left Srebrenica and had gathered to Potocari, some of

25 whom were evacuated, some of whom were separated and eventually killed?

Page 10655

1 A. Based on what I know, I can't say who was responsible.

2 Q. All right. Just one question. I think you -- since you -- and

3 you might be able to assist us here. Would Nikolic in that critical --

4 those critical days, would he have been in a position to directly order

5 the military police to go and perform various tasks in Potocari without

6 first seeking the approval of the commander, that is, Commander

7 Blagojevic?

8 A. Would he have been in a position? I don't know. But if he had

9 done that, that would not have been a correct thing to do, not a proper

10 thing to do.

11 Q. All right. And I believe you told us earlier, but just in case I

12 wasn't -- I'm not clear on this. Would he have been able to conduct

13 activities with Popovic and Beara on his own without consulting or getting

14 the approval of his commander?

15 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's rather vague "would he have been able."

17 MR. KARNAVAS: The rules.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Would he have been able. But if your question is

19 according to the rules, that's perfectly non-objectionable.

20 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: I did qualify it, but I'll rephrase, Your Honour.

22 Q. During these critical days when all sorts of activity went on,

23 was Momir Nikolic free to go about and carry on or carry out tasks and

24 orders issued to him by Popovic and Beara without first notifying his

25 commander and perhaps even getting the approval of his commander?

Page 10656

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm going to object to that.


3 MR. McCLOSKEY: To bring in the concept of free and freedom, that

4 really throws a monkey-wrench into the question.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Perhaps the gentleman could -- if he understood my

6 question, perhaps he can answer it. If freedom is such a very difficult

7 concept, something that we hear every day from -- you know, on TV,

8 especially these days, coming out of Iraq, I think the gentleman can --

9 can certainly answer that question.

10 JUDGE LIU: I think without that word "free," the sentence still

11 stands.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.

13 Q. Could you answer the question, General.

14 A. No. Based on the existing laws and regulations governing service

15 in the military, he would not have been allowed to do that.

16 Q. All right. Thank you.

17 Now, I just want to show you one document. It has been introduced

18 already. It's P687. It's a document that was generated by President

19 Karadzic addressed to Miroslav Deronjic, president of the SDS, who was

20 appointed the commissioner. And I want you to look at it, and

21 particularly if you could pay close attention to paragraphs number 4

22 and 5.

23 Okay. Now -- and again, if you feel sufficiently confident and

24 competent to answer this question, in light of your position and

25 background, even though this is a document to a civilian organ, in reading

Page 10657

1 paragraphs 4 and 5, do you have an opinion as to what Deronjic's

2 responsibility would have been or should have been or were in fact, based

3 on what President Karadzic's decision [sic]?


5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. This document speaks for itself. I

6 don't see how this witness is in any position to be commenting on it.

7 JUDGE LIU: And as you pointed out, Mr. Karnavas, this is for the

8 civilian branches, not for the military ones.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: I qualified it, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE LIU: I understand. So we don't know the purpose, you know,

11 for you to ask this question to this particular witness.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: May I just -- very well, Your Honour. But I take

13 it since Mr. McCloskey said the document speaks for itself, it's speaking

14 to me that Deronjic was in charge. Would that -- is that what

15 Mr. McCloskey meant by that?

16 JUDGE LIU: Well, we could read the document by ourselves. As for

17 what kind of conclusion we draw, it's another matter.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: So I -- I take it I should move on?

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. All right. I think this document --

21 Q. All right. I think this document -- we shouldn't have any

22 problem, General. It's Exhibit P500, a document given to us by the Office

23 of the Prosecution.

24 Have you seen this document before, sir?

25 A. Yes.

Page 10658

1 Q. And what does this document refer to, at least with respect to

2 you specifically?

3 A. This document refers to the fact that at one point in time,

4 specifically on the 17th of July, the commander of the Main Staff ordered

5 that part of the Krivaja 95 operation, or rather, the completion of the

6 search of the terrain along the line of movement of the 28th Division from

7 Srebrenica, I should be the one to take over command over all units within

8 the area -- or rather, the units enumerated in this document.

9 Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about those events. First of all, were

10 you ever given an order? And if so, by whom?

11 A. I never received personally this written document, but I did

12 receive the order in this form at the command post in the Main Staff from

13 the commander of the Main Staff. As for who wrote the document, that was

14 done by the chief of the operations organ in the Main Staff.

15 Q. All right. Now, specifically, what were the orders given to you

16 as you understood them?

17 A. The task given to me by General Mladic was roughly as described

18 in this document. I'm not sure if this is a totally accurate

19 interpretation, but essentially it is accurate, yes. Myself, I don't know

20 about this other thing concerning involvement at stage 2 between Drinjaca

21 and Cerska. This is something I don't remember.

22 Q. Please continue, General.

23 Okay. Let me go on to my next question. Now, in this particular

24 task, were you going as part of the security organ or in some other

25 capacity?

Page 10659

1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

2 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. And as --

3 MR. KARNAVAS: What's the objection about?

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: How -- in what capacity are you going? I mean --

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, it could have been going in a variety of

6 capacities.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: That is the proper way to ask the question, and

8 I just -- to try to help prevent me having to jump up.

9 JUDGE LIU: Yes. I think this is the direct examination,

10 Mr. Karnavas. You should not put a leading question to this witness.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: I agree, Your Honour, if I was suggesting

12 information. Now, as I indicated, OTP questioned the man, and we had lots

13 of testimony that he's from the security organ, so that wasn't leading. I

14 wasn't suggesting. And I said if he was going in another -- in another

15 capacity. I didn't give a suggestion as to what other capacities he might

16 have been going, so I don't see the problem, but I'll ask -- I'll

17 rephrase, Your Honour. I'm rephrase.

18 JUDGE LIU: Yeah. Rephrase your question, please.


20 Q. In what capacity were you going?

21 A. I'm not sure -- or rather, I can't say in what capacity I was

22 going. What I can say is that, as I said at the outset, I was working

23 with the security administration of the military police of the Main Staff,

24 if what's what you mean by "capacity."

25 This specific task that is set out in this document is redefined

Page 10660

1 and modified. If I had pursued this task, I would have gone there as the

2 commander of units, as stated in the document, but it was not in the --

3 the capacity of commander that I went, because in the evening hours the

4 task had been modified.

5 Q. Could you please explain how it had been modified.

6 A. This task is unrealistic, and that was my assessment at the time,

7 and I let the commander of the Main Staff know how I felt about it and

8 that I was not able to carry it out, like this. I did this in the

9 presence of two of his assistants. He did not accept this. He walked out

10 of the room in which we were talking.

11 The role of mediator to have this decision modified was taken up

12 by General Tolimir. He followed the commander out, and in his own room,

13 in front of the building itself, he stayed with him for several hours. It

14 was late in the evening that he told me that I would still go and tour

15 this area, that I would not take over command over those units. He said

16 that I would talk to the superior officers of the units under the blockade

17 and that we would search the terrain and that then I would be able to

18 assess how the operation was going and I would report back to him on that.

19 So that was the redefined task.

20 Now, in which capacity I was there exactly, I really can't say.

21 Q. Okay. Thank you -- thank you, General. Now, did you go to

22 the -- did you go to Bratunac?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you recall what day it was that you went to Bratunac?

25 A. I have not memorised the date. I know that it was one day, based

Page 10661

1 on some documents, this particular document also, and other similar

2 documents from other units. I narrowed the time span down to two possible

3 days, the 17th or the 18th, but I can't say which of the two it was.

4 Q. When you went to Bratunac, did you meet with anyone?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. With whom did you meet?

7 A. At the command of the Bratunac Brigade, I looked for the brigade

8 commander in the morning hours, give or take an hour or two, I'm not sure,

9 but I located him. I found him at the command post, and that was also

10 where we met, because we had not known each other previously.

11 Q. And what happened when you met the commander of the Bratunac

12 Brigade at the command post of the Bratunac Brigade?

13 A. He told me that activities on that day were unfolding the same

14 way as the previous day, in relation to searching the terrain. He said

15 that some units had been blocked and that some of the military units, the

16 army's units and the MUP units, a small fraction of those, were searching

17 the ground along the Bratunac-Milici-Konjevic Polje road.

18 Q. All right. And based on that information, what did you do?

19 A. Following my return to the Main Staff, I passed on the

20 information and said that those activities were well underway and that

21 probably they would be completed by the end of that day or perhaps the

22 following day.

23 Q. All right. Now, did Colonel Blagojevic at any point in time

24 describe to you the relationship between MUP and the VRS troops?

25 A. I don't remember that.

Page 10662

1 Q. Did you on that particular day go to the field to give any orders

2 or to make an inspection as to how the activities were being carried out?

3 A. In part I did carry out an inspection. But as for going to the

4 field and visiting the units who were searching the ground, no, I did not

5 go there.

6 Q. Can you please tell us how and to what extent you carried out

7 this inspection.

8 A. By talking to the units, starting with the first unit, which was

9 a military police company belonging to the military police battalion of

10 the Protection Motorised Regiment, between Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje,

11 I spoke to the battalion commander, Major Malinic. Further down to

12 Konjevic Polje, I met one of the officers from the communications

13 regiment, whose identity, or rather, name I can't remember.

14 Finally, in Konjevic Polje itself, I learned -- I didn't talk to

15 anyone in particular. I learned that the Engineers Unit of the Drina

16 Corps, and then further down from Konjevic Polje, outside Bratunac or I

17 can't say where precisely there were some forces of the Bratunac Brigade

18 at -- along that road. That was as much as I was able to see, especially

19 the blockade along the route where it was supposed to occur.

20 Q. Did you carry out any inspection with MUP units, assuming that

21 that was part of your portfolio?

22 A. No. I found out then that some of their units were on the

23 ground. I didn't see them, but in Bratunac I met who I believed was the

24 Chief of Staff of the Special MUP Brigade, Mr. Borovcanin, and another

25 officer from the same units, whose name I really can't remember. This MUP

Page 10663

1 officer, I saw him somewhere along the road between Bratunac and

2 Konjevic Polje. I never had any other contact with MUP units.

3 Q. Now, on that day, did you learn whether any prisoners had been

4 taken or captured?

5 A. The only thing I did learn about prisoners on that day was in

6 relation to Major Malinic, who in our conversation told me that on the

7 football pitch in Nova Kasaba between two and 3.000 people had been

8 assembled, between two and 3.000 prisoners, and that they had been taken

9 to Bratunac.

10 Q. Had Major Malinic told you who had issued those orders?

11 A. Yes. The order for the prisoners to be taken from the football

12 pitch in Kasaba to Bratunac had been issued to him personally by the

13 commander of the Main Staff when he was passing by the football pitch, and

14 he personally addressed those prisoners.

15 Q. All right. Did you ever learn what happened to those prisoners?

16 A. Not at that time.

17 Q. Would you please tell us what you learned.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection as to foundation.

19 JUDGE LIU: Yes.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could have an idea when he learned this, it

21 would make more sense.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I think I can do my direct in the fashion in

23 which I wish to, because the following question is when -- I don't need to

24 ask it in the order in which the Prosecutor is directing me to.

25 JUDGE LIU: Well, just so far as -- to have a better understanding

Page 10664

1 of the issue.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand --

3 JUDGE LIU: Maybe -- maybe if the time frame, you know, comes

4 first would be much better.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, it might -- okay, very well, Your Honour. If

6 I'm being given instruction by the Court, not a problem. But, you know,

7 usually what, when, how, we get to those eventually.

8 Q. For the Prosecutor's sake, could you please tell us when you

9 learned what happened to the men.

10 A. As for the fact that something had happened or that a crime had

11 occurred, there were rumours just after the war. The first direct

12 personal knowledge that I had about this was from the trial of the

13 Sabotage Detachment, when Erdemovic and Kremenovic were tried before this

14 Court. As for more comprehensive information on all these events, that

15 was over the last year, following a decision of the human rights council

16 in relation to the events surrounding Srebrenica and an investigation

17 undertaken by Republika Srpska in relation to those events, and this is

18 the first time that these matters have been discussed openly.

19 Q. All right. Did you at any point in time conduct your own

20 investigation, a separate one? And I'm not asking you about what the RS

21 is doing but one within the security organ.

22 A. Well, I'm afraid I do not understand your question. But

23 specifically I do not know of any investigation being conducted by the

24 security organs in relation to the events that took place in and around

25 Srebrenica or that they did that independently.

Page 10665

1 Q. Did Colonel Beara ever tell you what he had been involved with

2 during those days?

3 A. No.

4 Q. What about Popovic? I believe he was a lieutenant colonel with

5 the Drina Corps.

6 A. Yes. He was a lieutenant colonel in the Drina Corps, and he

7 never talked to me specifically about what happened or the circumstances

8 concerning his engagement at the time.

9 Q. All right. Now, staying with the -- with the day that you went

10 to Bratunac to carry out these activities, whether it was the 17th or

11 the 18th, to your recollection, could you please tell us what else you did

12 on that day, if anything.

13 A. Well, on that day, in addition to this, I had a few other

14 engagements. One of them was to find Colonel Jankovic from the

15 intelligence administration of the Main Staff, which was done, since when

16 asked to do so, he did come to the command post of the Bratunac Brigade

17 shortly after my arrival. I was supposed to tell him of a few engagements

18 that he was supposed to carry out. One was to return arms and equipment

19 that the units of the Army of Republika Srpska took from the UNPROFOR

20 troops - that is to say, the Dutch Battalion - at checkpoints. The other

21 task he had was to go to the command of the Dutch Battalion in order to

22 convey information -- or rather, reach agreement on the evacuation,

23 because in the meantime it was decided that the evacuation of the Dutch

24 Battalion would take place across the Drina River -- that is to say, via

25 Serbia -- or rather, via the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not via

Page 10666

1 Sarajevo or Sarajevo airport.

2 Jankovic and I were also supposed to find someone from the

3 Ministry of the Interior in order to convey to them that the evacuation of

4 the Dutch Battalion would be the responsibility of the Ministry of the

5 Interior and of Mr. Tomo Kovac personally. Those were my activities in

6 that day -- on that day.

7 Q. Now, where did you go after that? Where did you spend the night?

8 A. I don't remember, but I think it was at the command post at

9 Crna Rijeka.

10 Q. All right. Now, did you at any point in time go to Zvornik, to

11 the Zvornik area?

12 A. No. No, no, no.

13 Q. And Han Pijesak is in the opposite direction, once you get to the

14 intersection of Konjevic Polje; is that correct?

15 A. Yes. Yes.

16 Q. All right. Now, you said that you were somewhat unclear about --

17 as to the date. I want to show you Exhibit P265. Could you please look

18 at this. Perhaps this may assist in some way. It's a document given to

19 us by the Prosecutor, an intercept. The date we have been told is

20 the 17th, and it has "1115 hours," so that would be 11.15 in the morning.

21 Could you please look at that. First of all, do you see your name

22 on this document?

23 A. Yes. I can see that I'm mentioned.

24 Q. Would you just please look at it and tell us whether this

25 intercept would have any relation to your visit to the Bratunac Brigade

Page 10667

1 pursuant to the order that you had been issued by General Mladic.

2 A. The message shows that I was being sought. I cannot see from the

3 message where I was at that moment, but I do not preclude the possibility

4 of being on that day, the 17th, on that road, precisely due to the fact

5 that I'm not sure which date this was.

6 Q. But assuming that this was the 17th, as we've been told, it says

7 here -- there's a question: "Has Kremenovic set off?"

8 And then it says: "Well, we met him when we were on our way

9 here." "Well, he hasn't come to me yet." "Well, in that case, what will

10 happen is that he first went ahead over there to Momir Nikolic."

11 Now, from this, can you help us out here. First of all, we have

12 here a time, 11.15. Your arrival at the Bratunac Brigade, would that have

13 been at this -- at around this time, before, or after, to your

14 recollection?

15 A. At that time, in the morning -- it must have been in the morning,

16 because in the early afternoon hours, again at the command post I was

17 looking for Colonel Blagojevic. I don't know why, but I no longer managed

18 to find him there.

19 Q. All right. And what about Momir Nikolic? It says here

20 something -- something about: "Well, in that case, what will happen is

21 that he first went ahead over there to Momir Nikolic." Why would you go

22 to visit a captain, who was not even a first class captain, a reservist,

23 even though he's in the security organ, to a colonel at the time from the

24 Main Staff?

25 A. There could have been reason for me to see Nikolic, but I did

Page 10668

1 not -- or rather, I don't know. I did not know Momir Nikolic at all. Had

2 it not been for this trial, I probably never would have got to know him.

3 So why he was not at the command at that point in time and why he was not

4 in Bratunac is something that I don't know. I cannot say at all, in

5 relation to him, where he was and what he was doing, but I don't know -- I

6 don't remember ever having been in contact with him in any way, not

7 personally. So before Blagojevic or afterwards, I did not see Nikolic.

8 Q. One last question: Based on the order that you had received from

9 General Mladic, with whom were you supposed to make contact with or to

10 whom were you supposed to report once you arrived at the Bratunac Brigade?

11 A. I was supposed to report to the commander of the brigade, Colonel

12 Blagojevic.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm afraid we won't be able to finish

15 today. I have just a little bit left for tomorrow, and so I -- I think

16 this is a good time.

17 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness, I'm afraid that you have to stay in The

18 Hague for another day, and during your stay please remember that you are

19 still under the oath, so do not talk to anybody and do not let anybody

20 talk to you about your testimony. Do you understand that?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.

23 There's an announcement for the schedule for tomorrow, and

24 tomorrow we'll sit in the Courtroom II for the whole day, and the morning

25 session will start from 10.00 until 11.30, and we'll have a long break,

Page 10669

1 about two hours and a half, and we'll resume at 2.00 until 5.30 in the

2 afternoon, which means that each sitting will last 90 minutes.

3 Well, the hearing for today is adjourned.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day of

6 June, 2004, at 10.00 a.m.