Case No IT-95-14
1 Monday, 21st July 1997
2 (10.00 am)
3 (In open session)
4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Registrar, would you have
5 the accused brought in, please?
6 (Accused enters court)
7 JUDGE JORDA: Does everybody hear me? Does the Office of
8 the Prosecutor hear? Do the defence hear? Mr. Blaskic,
9 do you hear?
10 GENERAL BLASKIC: Yes, your Honour, I hear you well.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, thank you. Perhaps the Office of the
12 Prosecutor is now -- today is it made up of the same
13 people? Has anybody changed? Are you the same? Yes,
14 all right. The Defence, there is the same composition
15 of attorneys. So I think everything is now ready for
16 us to begin.
17 Mr. Prosecutor, our schedule was a bit upset, as
18 you remember, because the first witness could not stay
19 here and we decided that we would postpone the
20 cross-examination. Mr. Simon Leach also was
21 interrupted. Where are we now? What is today's
22 schedule for today? I want to say this both for the
23 Prosecutor and the Defence. There will be a certain
24 number of interruptions that are out of our control,
25 unfortunately, so long as we have only one court room.
1 That is on Thursday almost the entire day and Friday
2 afternoon apparently we are not going to be able to
3 meet. So turning to the Prosecutor, how are we going
4 to organise our work?
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, your Honours, learned counsel,
6 good morning. We are going to commence this morning
7 with the cross-examination of Mr. Donia, and when that is
8 complete we will then continue with Mr. Leach. We do
9 have other witnesses for the rest of the week and we
10 will fit in with the schedule as best we can but we do
11 have witnesses to fill this week.
12 As a preliminary matter, Mr. President, the
13 abridged translations that you received in French have
14 now been completed, so I would like to submit those in
15 evidence. They are part of Exhibit 38B. I think
16 there were five in all. I have those in complete
18 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Does the Defence have any
20 MR. CAYLEY: This, you will remember, Mr. President, is
21 relevant to the testimony of Dr. Zoran Pajic.
22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Thank you. Registrar,
23 have you put in the documents? I think that one of them
24 was actually published. (Handed) Thank you. All
25 right. Then I will put it in my binder. All right.
1 Perhaps we can begin, start by having the witness
2 brought in. We are now talking about Mr. Robert Donia,
3 is it?
4 MR. CAYLEY: That is right, Mr. President. I will now hand
5 over to my co-counsel, Mr. Kehoe.
6 (Witness enters court).
7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, first of all, do you hear me?
8 A. Yes, sir, I do.
9 Q. Okay. Let me remind you that you are still under
10 oath. Mr. Kehoe, do you want to begin the questioning?
11 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, our last session with Mr. Donia,
12 I believe it was on 25th June, we completed our
13 examination of Mr. Donia and he was being tendered for
15 JUDGE JORDA: That's what I had thought, but since we had
16 not met, I wasn't sure whether you wanted to add
17 something. I thought you had completed that. All
18 right. Now the floor is now Mr. Nobilo's or Mr. Hayman,
19 but I see Mr. Nobilo getting up, so I can give you the
20 floor to have the witness answer your questions.
21 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, your Honour.
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Nobilo
23 MR. NOBILO: Your Honours, Mr. Donia, we shall go back to the
24 beginning of your testimony, so as to facilitate the
25 task of my colleagues and their Honours. On page 65 of
1 the transcript -- I shall not quote it, but I should
2 like to refer to it in brief -- you said that from 1972
3 until 1976 and later from 1974 to 1975 you had done some
4 research in the archives of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So
5 I would like to know regarding this period from
6 1974-1975 which archives exactly you went to and
7 precisely which segment of history you studied and what
8 exactly you were doing in the archives?
9 A. I was awarded a Fullbright Research Scholarship in 1974
10 for the academic year of 1974-1975. My principal topic
11 during that time was the Muslim Movement for Cultural
12 and Religous Autonomy, which took place from
13 1899-1910. My research was principally in the Arki
14 Bosni Herzegovina, in the collections of documents that
15 were generated by the Austro-Hungarian authorities at
16 that time in early 20th century. I also at that time
17 worked in the National Library, National and University
18 Library in Sarajevo. I also worked with considerable
19 less time in archives in Belgrade, Zagreb, Budapest,
20 Vienna, London and Paris.
21 Q. Thank you. I wonder which languages can you use in
22 addition to English?
23 A. Most of that research was in the German language.
24 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, your Honour. That question was not
1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Kehoe? You wanted to say something.
2 MR. KEHOE: That question was not translated. I didn't
3 hear the translation. That's all.
4 JUDGE JORDA: There was an interpretation problem for a
5 moment. Let me turn to the booth. Mr. Nobilo, will
6 you ask your question again please.
7 MR. NOBILO: I will repeat the question. The question was:
8 which language in addition to his native English can he
10 A. German and the language formerly known as
11 Serbo-Croatian, now known either as Bosnian, Serbian or
13 Q. Further on, on page 67 of the transcript, you spoke
14 about your research from November 1994, when you made
15 several trips to Bosnia and one to Croatia and when you
16 had a series of contacts with your colleagues, making
17 interviews and continuing your research. I am
18 interested again in learning which institutions and
19 which individuals you contacted and whom you
20 interviewed, if you could be more specific?
21 A. That's a rather long list, but in terms of the
22 institutions that I contacted and worked with, they were
23 principally the Institute for History in Sarajevo, the
24 Filosofski Fakultat or Philosophy Faculty at the
25 University of Sarajevo and Academy of Sciences of
2 Q. As for the interviews, did you interview persons who
3 were participants in the events from 1990 to 1994/1995,
4 or when you mention interviews, are you referring to
5 interviews with your colleagues, scholars?
6 A. Both. I have interviewed some participants in
7 political events from 1990 on. I have interviewed
8 Mayor Beslagic of Tuzla. I interviewed Mr. Stjepan
9 Kljuic and several political leaders in both the Tuzla
10 and Mostar areas for articles that I subsequently
11 published in Transition Magazine. I have also begun
12 and not completed a project to interview former mayors
13 of the city of Sarajevo.
14 Q. When you mention Mostar, can you recall whom you talked
15 to in Mostar?
16 A. I spoke with the rector and pro-rector of the university
17 of Mostar in west Mostar. The rector's name was
18 Professor Kordic. I can't recall the pro-rector's name
19 at this time, although it is in my article. I spoke
20 briefly with the Director of the newly opened national
21 library in west Mostar and the rector of the University
22 of Mostar in the east, Mr. Slipcavic.
23 Q. Thank you. The company that you are working in, does it
24 have any business relationships with the Government of
1 A. None. None.
2 Q. In the examination-in-chief you claimed that the South
3 Slavs tribes came to the Balkans and that today's
4 territory of Croatia and Bosnia were inhabited by south
5 Slavs. I would like to know whether those tribes bore
6 any names? Do we know the names of those tribes so that
7 we might identify them, the tribes, the South Slavs
8 tribes that settled there and began to live in the
9 territory of today's Bosnia and today's Croatia?
10 A. I think many of us would like to know all those names
11 and I would just preface my answer by saying that
12 sources are very scarce and to some degree unreliable.
13 Probably the most important document which identifies
14 names of tribes is the manuscript of Constantine VII
15 Porphyrogenitus, who died in 959. In his document he
16 reports at least two names, those of the Croats and
17 Serbs as tribes that migrated from the areas that
18 I indicated.
19 Q. Thank you. Furthermore, you mentioned Cyrillus and
20 Methodias, who were Orthodox missionaries. Can you
21 remind us of the dates of their lives and work?
22 A. The mission was normally dated as 863. I do not know
23 the dates of the lives, birth and death of either one of
24 them. I'm not certain that they are known with great
25 certainty by any scholars, but I do not have them at
2 Q. I'm asking you this because how can you defend your
3 claim that they are Orthodox missionaries when the split
4 into Catholicism and Orthodoxy occurred in 1054?
5 A. I think you raise a good point and at that time the
6 church was certainly divided into two parts, but not
7 formally completely split. They were missionaries who
8 were sent out from Constantinople and therefore
9 associated with that Eastern Orthodox cultural and
10 religious orientation but your point that the church was
11 not yet at that point divided is correct.
12 Q. Thank you. You spoke about Hungarian authority gaining
13 control of Bosnia, so I would like to hear your
14 assessment of the Pacta Conventa of 1104, whether you
15 are familiar with that document and how you view it?
16 A. 1102 is the normal date that's attributed to the Pacta
17 Conventa, and it is a document that brings the Croatian
18 nobility into an agreement with the Crown of Hungary.
19 Its character has been critiqued by Nada Klaic,
20 Professor Nada Klaic, a Croatian historian, who died in
21 the late 1980s, who points out that the date of that
22 document, our actual document that we have, is from a
23 considerably later time, and therefore may have some
24 characteristics in it that are more properly
25 characteristic of the, say, late 13th century than the
1 12th. However, the document in so far as it speaks to
2 developments in the 12th century or 1102 states that the
3 nobility or noble families of Croatia agreed to accept
4 the authority of the Hungarian Crown and thereafter the
5 Crown of Hungary became known as -- the King of Hungary
6 became known as the King of Hungary and Croatia.
7 Q. Thank you. Can you define the Hungarian Crown of Saint
8 Stephen as a personal union or something else; in other
9 words, was the Hungarian king, king of Hungary and
10 Croatia or of a subordinate Croatia?
11 A. I do not know.
12 Q. Thank you. The title of Ban, you said that it was used
13 as an indication of something like a governor among the
14 South Slavs. Could you please try and be more precise
15 and say among which tribes and in which regions was this
16 title of "Ban" used?
17 A. No.
18 Q. A second question: did the Serbs and Bulgarians have
19 the same title of Ban? Are you familiar with that?
20 A. I do not believe that they did.
21 Q. Do you perhaps know who was the first well-known Ban of
22 Bosnia, who has gone down in history?
23 A. As I indicated in my testimony, Kulin Ban is normally
24 the person indicated as the most important of those
1 Q. But not the first? Are you familiar with Ban Boric from
2 1154 as the first Ban in Bosnia?
3 A. I am familiar with that name. I do not know that this
4 is something that is known with certainty, that he was
5 the first.
6 Q. Are you familiar with the founder of the Kotromanic
7 dynasty, Ban Prijezda?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Thank you. Could we pass on to the Bogomils, please?
10 Can you explain where this expression comes from, the
11 expression of Bogomils, and why do you describe the
12 Bosnian church with the term Bogomils?
13 A. I have specifically not described the Bosnian church
14 with the term Bogomil. In fact, I said that scholars
15 disagree on this point and my own inclination is to
16 discount reports and sources which suggest that the
17 Bosnian church is Bogomil.
18 Q. Thank you. How would you define it, for you said that
19 the Bosnian church was between the Catholic church and
20 the Orthodox church that was established in between? In
21 what sense do you mean that?
22 A. It's a church that was created to be independent of
23 role, and yet it never really became a court church in
24 the Bosnian State. It is variously described by
25 scholars as a church which had very simple practices,
1 some of which corresponded to conventional Catholicism,
2 and some of which may not have, but others talk about it
3 as a largely monastic type of church organisation. It
4 probably never had a great reach or powerful impact on
5 the population, according to the rather fragmentary
6 sources that we have.
7 Q. But could you please explain, because you said that it
8 was between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, in what sense?
9 What did it have from Orthodoxy and what was its
10 relationship towards Orthodoxy?
11 MR. KEHOE: If I may, your Honour, if counsel is referring
12 to a portion in the transcript, I think it is probably
13 more accurate to give the page and the line so the
14 witness, if need be, and certainly the Prosecutor can
15 reference that particular section.
16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but for the time being the witness has
17 not complained about anything. I think that he was
18 able to answer. He was able to see what was what and
19 he'll know when he has to say that he wants this or
21 MR. KEHOE: I understand, your Honour. It was more for my
22 reference point in the transcript to follow exactly
23 where defence counsel is questioning in the
25 JUDGE JORDA: So really it is an objection for yourself
1 then. Mr. Nobilo perhaps could provide us with some
2 more details, if he thinks it would be appropriate, in
3 order to facilitate the hearing.
4 MR. NOBILO: It is page 85 of the transcript lines 1-7 -- or
5 5-7, which refers exactly to the Bosnian church, and its
6 relationships with Catholicism and Orthodoxy. That is
7 why I am trying to obtain some clarifications.
8 JUDGE JORDA: To interrupt you just for a moment, I have to
9 confer with my colleagues. (Pause.) All right. Go
10 on, Mr. Nobilo.
11 MR. NOBILO: Thank you. Therefore, my question had to do
12 with the relationship with Orthodoxy. Is there
13 anything specific in that relationship? What did it
15 A. I believe -- I'm sorry I do not have a copy of the
16 transcript in front of me. Perhaps it would be
17 helpful. I believe you're referring to a statement
18 that I made that the Bosnian church was on the fault
19 line between the Catholic and Orthodox worlds, between
20 the western and eastern worlds; is that correct?
21 Q. Yes, exactly. What is the context of the position of
22 the Bosnian church on that fault line?
23 A. I made that statement to indicate that the church was in
24 neither sphere in the firm sense of the word. It had
25 practices which appeared to be very undeveloped. It
1 had -- first of all, the sources that we have on this
2 are exclusively, almost exclusively foreign sources,
3 which had a vested interest in portraying that Bosnian
4 church as heretical, that is as believing in a dualist
5 heresy that was then widespread in Bulgaria. This has
6 been seized upon, if you will; it has been adopted by
7 many in the present century as evidence of a separate
8 ecclesiastical organisation that preceded conversions to
9 Islam. The evidence regarding the Bosnian church, as
10 I indicated, is heavily contested. I certainly did not
11 mean to imply that it somehow mixed and matched Orthodox
12 and Catholic practices in some way, because we do not
13 know much about the practices of the Bosnian church, and
14 I referred to that only in the sense that in the general
15 sense that to the east Orthodoxy tended to flourish and
16 to the west of the Bosnian church, and I would say to
17 the south to some degree Catholicism.
18 Q. I have understood that. Thank you. You mentioned
19 heresy. Do you accept that the Bosnian church had the
20 characteristic of dual heresy, or is it something else?
21 A. I do not accept the notion that it was dualist.
22 Q. Based on your knowledge can you ascertain what per cent
23 of the population belonged to the Bosnian church at the
24 time when the Turks arrived in the Balkans? Let's just
25 put it: was it a minority or a majority?
1 A. I do not -- that's a difficult question to address in
2 percentage terms, but at the time that the Ottomans can
3 be said to conquer Bosnia, the Bosnian church was a
4 dying institution. It had allegiance in only a few
5 areas of the country.
6 Q. Thank you. In several places, like on page 110 of the
7 transcript, you mentioned the Bosnia theory of the
8 origins of the Bosnia in the Bogomil movement. Can you
9 comment on this theory? Do you consider it
11 A. Well, there are many different versions of that
12 theory. I would limit, I guess, my comment to say that
13 the existence of a widespread dualist heresy in Bosnia
14 prior to the Ottoman invasion does not have the
15 unanimous support of scholars, and therefore it's not a
16 universally accepted viewpoint.
17 Q. On page 113 of the transcript you mention the Orthodox
18 Serbs who migrated to Bosnia and then later to Croatia
19 in the part known later as Krajina, and since you do not
20 give the names of these tribes, why do you refer to
21 these Orthodox migrants as Serbs? Are there any other
22 names for these new immigrants there?
23 A. I note one assumption in your question that I could not
24 give the names of the tribes. I believe I just did
25 give you some names. The people who migrated, let us
1 say, the ethnicity or nature and identity of them is
2 again debated. The scholarship divides between those
3 who would characterise them as Serbs and those who would
4 characterise them as Vlaks.
5 Q. On page 124 of the transcript you started talking about
6 the modern concept of the nation, that is the
7 establishment of the nation. You said the first phase
8 was a cultural community based for the most part on
9 common language. With respect to that my question is:
10 do you know what language was spoken in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, in these territories of ours? The
12 population there, do you know what language they spoke,
13 and then do you know anything about the speeches and the
14 dialects, and here I am referring to the Jaikaviza (sic)
15 and Aikaviza (sic) and also the Cakisto (sic) based
16 dialect and is there anything to be gleaned with respect
17 to the population breakdown based on these language
19 A. I hear these questions there. The first one was: what
20 is the name of the language that was spoken in Bosnia?
21 I would have to say that without a time-frame it's very
22 difficult to even give a speculative answer to that
23 question. The second question pertained to dialects,
24 and the particular Stokavski and Kajkavski dialects. I
25 will tell you I am not a linguist and would only give
1 you a speculative answer in that area.
2 Your third question was: is anything to be
3 gleaned from that information? I would say that some
4 scholars have gleaned a great deal from it. I'm not
5 one of them.
6 Q. Maybe I can assist you with respect to the language
7 spoken there during the Ottoman Empire?
8 MR. KEHOE: Please, your Honour --
9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?
10 MR. KEHOE: I object to the form of the question and I ask
11 counsel just to ask questions as opposed to commentary
12 or speeches preliminary to that question.
13 MR. NOBILO: With your permission, the expert witness Donia
14 said he could not speak to the language issue unless we
15 specified the period. Therefore, I asked the question
16 specifying the time period of the Ottoman Empire?
17 A. Well, I think the best answer to that question is that
18 the most common language in Bosnia during the Ottoman
19 period was Slavic, and various people will attempt to
20 assign a more specific word to that Slavic language.
21 I would also note that other languages were spoken.
22 Turkish was certainly spoken by the administrative
23 elite, particularly as the Ottoman Empire administration
24 took hold, and there was some Spanish in the Sephardic
25 Jewish communities, but the primary language spoken by
1 most people I would characterise as Slavic.
2 Q. I'm interested when the Bosniaks or Muslims, depending
3 on how you use the term, did articulate their idea of a
4 statehood, in other words when did this nation start to
5 be established?
6 A. Those are two different questions. The first is when
7 did they articulate their notion of a statehood and
8 I would say that there are signs of a Bosnian Muslim
9 separatist state in the early 19th century. The actual
10 Bosnian Muslim nationalist movement, as I think of it,
11 really comes about in the 1960s, very, very late
12 relative to the other national movements. The question
13 of when the Bosnian Muslims began to develop as a
14 separate entity I think is an entirely different one and
15 probably goes back to some time prior to the 19th
16 century during Ottoman Rule.
17 Q. You stated that the idea of statehood first appeared in
18 the 19th century. Can you specify a name or a group
19 that advanced such a demand or claim, something more
21 A. No.
22 Q. On page 127 of the transcript you spoke of the delegates
23 in the Yugoslav assembly of 1920, and you said that the
24 majority of the Bosniaks did identify themselves as
25 Croats. Do you know exactly how many delegates were
2 A. I can't give you an exact number. The number of
3 delegates was around 40 and the number of Muslim
4 delegates who declared themselves as Croats was,
5 I think, in the low 20s, just barely a majority.
6 I emphasised in making that point that the notion of
7 identifying with a nationality on the part of the
8 Bosnian Muslim political elite was a very limited
9 phenomenon, and confined to intellectuals and
10 participants in political processes and was not
11 reflective of the broader population. I also
12 emphasised that those identities were frequently subject
13 to change, because there were rather superficial and
14 fleeting. The actual numbers are provided in Atif
15 Pulvatra's book, which is called "The Yugoslav Muslim
16 Organisation" and he does give those exact numbers.
17 I just do not have them at hand.
18 Q. Thank you. You said 40 delegates. Were there 40
19 delegates in the Parliament or just the 40 Muslims?
20 I did not understand you well?
21 A. I said about 40, and this would be the number of Bosnian
22 Muslim delegates in the constituent assembly.
23 Q. Thank you: we come to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. You
24 did not specify very much the inter-ethnic relationships
25 in Yugoslavia of that period. Can you describe them in
1 some detail?
2 A. Well, that's again a very challenging question. The
3 kingdom was established with the Karadordevic dynasty at
4 its head and much of the military and administrative
5 apparatus was under the control of Serbs. There was
6 certainly throughout the kingdom's history a Serbian
7 domination of the administrative and military corps that
8 set the tone for much of what took place. The Croatian
9 portion of the empire, while I think the Croats can be
10 said to have entered the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
11 and Slovenes with some enthusiasm, many of them came to
12 feel that this was not the best deal in terms of what
13 their expectations had been for a South Slavs kingdom.
14 The Slovenes to some degree felt the same. I would
15 emphasise in all of this there are variations over time
16 in how these peoples felt and it's very difficult to
17 characterise ethnic relations at any given time with
18 this kind of generalisation. The Bosnian Muslim
19 political leadership generally found itself in support
20 of the kingdom and the coalition that was in power. It
21 was frequently a member of the ruling coalition, and the
22 leader of the Bosnian Muslims, Mehmed Spaho, until his
23 death in 1939, was represented in a number of the
24 cabinets of the Yugoslav kingdom.
25 Q. It is obvious that we are talking about an extended
1 period of time, but was at any point in the history of
2 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia national equality really
4 A. No, I do not believe it was.
5 Q. Do you know was there violence which was related to the
6 inter-ethnic relations in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia?
7 A. I believe I mentioned in my direct testimony the killing
8 of Stjepan Radic in Parliament in -- the assassination
9 of him in Parliament. He died, of course, some time
10 later, but that was certainly a factor. You know,
11 there were numerous demonstrations at various times in
12 the history of the kingdom in all of the capital cities,
13 in the capital cities of the primary areas, including
14 Zagreb and Belgrade.
15 Q. And other forms of oppression that ended in death, the
16 conflict with the armed forces of the kingdom and the
17 non-Serb parts of the population, do you know anything
18 about that?
19 A. No.
20 Q. I would like to move to the dictatorship of 6th January
21 1929. Why did the kingdom --
22 JUDGE JORDA: The name -- what number -- the answer is a
23 bit ambiguous here. You asked whether there was
24 oppression committed by the royal army. Do you hear
25 what I'm saying, Mr. Nobilo? You asked the witness
1 whether there had been any oppression carried out by the
2 royal army but then you added "can you answer?". Then
3 he said "no". I myself do not know whether the answer
4 "no" given by the witness was no, there was no
5 repression or no, I do not know. I do not know how to
6 answer that question. Mr. Donia, what did that "no"
7 refer to? It was "no, I do not know" or "no, there was
8 no repression"?
9 A. My answer is no, I do not know what the question is
10 referring to. I'm sorry.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.
12 MR. NOBILO: So we are moving on to page 134 of the
13 transcript, the introduction of the royal dictatorship
14 on 6th January 1929. Can you give us some reasons for
15 this dictatorship being introduced at the time?
16 A. The Royal House concluded that the open system of
17 Parliamentary confrontation between representatives of
18 the various parties was basically a downhill spiral, and
19 was leading nowhere. Thus the dictatorship was an
20 effort to defuse national conflicts and remove national
21 aspirations from the political agenda. The
22 dictatorship was accompanied by a ban on the Communist
23 Party and a ban on parties with an ethnic or national or
24 religious identity. Consequently most existing
25 political formations in the kingdom of the Croats -- of
1 the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were at that point
2 outlawed. So clearly the hope of the monarchy was to
3 remove nationality as a source of agitation and
4 instability in the realm.
5 Q. If I understood you correctly, this dictatorship was
6 aiming to rescue Yugoslavia; is that a correct inference
7 that I am making, that is to prevent its break-up?
8 A. Yes. I think also and preserve the position of the
9 Royal Family.
10 Q. Referring to the assassination of Radic in the assembly,
11 the Croat political leader, do you know the
12 circumstances? Who assassinated him?
13 A. He was assassinated by a Montenegrin, who is usually
14 described in these books as a crazed person, a
15 Montenegrin clearly motivated in some fashion by a
16 feeling of allegiance to Serbia.
17 Q. Do you know his subsequent fate? Was he tried?
18 A. No, I do not know.
19 Q. Further on page 134 of the transcript you said that
20 Radic was a controversial figure. Can you explain what
21 you meant by that?
22 A. He was a very charismatic figure. He was a very
23 emotional speaker, aroused great passion both in his
24 supporters and those who were critical of him. He
25 became very controversial by his travels abroad and his
1 flirtations with the Russians or the Soviets and his
2 general tendency to spend a certain amount of time out
3 of the country or in contact with foreigners.
4 Q. Do you know what were the electoral results that he
5 had? Do you know the last elections in which -- what
6 were the results that he got?
7 A. I can't give you specifics. I would note that the
8 Croatian Peasant Party, of which he was the head until
9 his death, experienced great success in the areas with
10 Croatian population.
11 Q. We're moving to the Banovina, the often mentioned
12 Banovina Croatia. Can you tell me what reasons do you
13 see for the creation of the Banovina in the context of
14 the sequence of events in the Yugoslav kingdom? What
15 was what was the reason for the establishment of the
17 A. I think there are several reasons that the negotiations
18 were initiated and the Banovina plan subsequently
19 adopted. One was certainly the international situation
20 in which the pressure on Yugoslavia from Germany was
21 being intense and the desire of the monarchy and circles
22 in support of the monarchy was strong to reach an
23 understanding with the Croatian leadership which would
24 allow Yugoslavia to survive and remain independent and
25 avoid any kind of further German meddling or possibly
1 even a German invasion. That probably was the most
2 pressing issue to be addressed at that time, and again
3 there were numerous other reasons. The need of the
4 monarchy to find a viable, on-going political compromise
5 internally was important and to generally defuse the
6 growing political controversies domestically.
7 Q. You gave us two reasons that the King, that is the Royal
8 House, may have had for accepting the Banovina. Why
9 did the Croats demand the Banovina? What were their
11 A. Well, again I think there were several. They hoped to
12 achieve a status equal to the Serbs in the Royal Kingdom
13 and achieve a greater territorial autonomy, if you will,
14 over areas that they perceived to be inhabited by
15 Croats. The actual negotiations reveal a very,
16 I think, determined and consistent strategy, if you
17 will, by Vladko Majic, the Croatian Peasant Party leader
18 who had succeeded Radic, to achieve as much territorial
19 gain for the Croatian Banovina as possible. There were
20 some discussions of plebiscites to determine exactly
21 what areas would go into which entity. Those were
22 never held, as the pressure of reaching an agreement
24 Q. Thank you. We're moving on to page 140 of the
25 transcript. You stated there that many Croats,
1 including Franjo Tudjman, the President, never in their
2 heart accepted the borders of 1945. Can you tell me
3 when did Croatia recognise Bosnia and did it recognise
4 Bosnia within its borders?
5 A. I'd just like to note that your question presumes that
6 I -- that was my statement. I believe that my
7 statement was a quote from Lord David Owen, who observed
8 that Tudjman in his heart had never accepted that as
9 expressed in his recent book, "Balkan odyssey". There
10 was a second question there, which was when Croatia
11 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina and the answer is
12 April 7th, 1992.
13 Q. My apologies. Indeed this is a quote from Lord Owen.
14 I did not mean to put it in your mouth. Can you tell
15 me when was Bosnia founded as a State; in other words,
16 when did it proclaim its independence?
17 A. April 6th, 1992.
18 Q. Can you tell me whether the Federal Republic of
19 Yugoslavia, that is Montenegro and Serbia, have they
20 recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina within its borders?
21 A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure of the date. They have,
22 but I can't give you the date.
23 Q. Year?
24 A. I do not know.
25 Q. Thank you. In your view was the Croatian national
1 question better resolved in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
2 with the Banovina or in the Socialist Federal Republic
3 of Yugoslavia after 1945?
4 A. I do not know that I can make that assessment. In the
5 long run I do not think it was satisfactorily solved in
6 either political configuration, certainly not to
7 everyone's satisfaction. Again one would have to look
8 at in discussing the socialist period exactly the
9 time-frame, because there certainly were times when
10 nationality relations were better than others in the
11 course of the socialist era.
12 Q. But generally speaking could you make an assessment, up
13 to the elections of 1990, if you can?
14 A. I really can't make that assessment. It's difficult to
15 make that judgement, I think.
16 Q. Thank you. You spoke of imagine I have, who succeeded
17 Radic and his contacts with Mussolini's Italy. Do you
18 know what happened to Majic, what was his personal fate
19 after the Italians and Germans conquered the Kingdom of
21 A. He actually played a role in the coup of March 27th,
22 1941, briefly supported the new regime, which was
23 Ante-German and committed to resisting Nazi attack. At
24 that time when the Germans invaded he was absolutely
25 sent to his village for a period of time. He then
1 ended up in the camp at Jasenovac for a period of time
2 but did not perish there. He subsequently left and
3 I believe went to Canada, where he died in 1964.
4 Q. Thank you. You went on to say that Hitler and Germany
5 were not satisfied with Yugoslavia on April 6th and
6 attacked Yugoslavia. Could you explain what happened,
7 which were the events which preceded the attack, the
8 German attack against Yugoslavia?
9 A. On March 27th a coup took place directed or under the
10 leadership of two Yugoslav air force generals, one of
11 whom was general Dusan Simovic. That coup to some
12 degree took place under popular pressure and resulted in
13 Prince Paul, the regent, fleeing the country and the 17
14 year old King Peter coming to power for a very few
15 days. This was in part due to the unhappiness of the
16 public broadly in the Yugoslav kingdom with Yugoslavia's
17 adherence to the tripartite packet. The coup took
18 place and large demonstrations in Belgrade indicated
19 very popular support for resistance to Germany. This
20 was a flash point for Hitler, who subsequently organised
21 and directed the invasion of Yugoslavia.
22 Q. Are you aware who was behind the organisation of the
23 demonstrations in Belgrade?
24 A. Well, the Communist Party played a major role.
25 Q. And the British intelligence service, have you any
1 information that they participated in any way in
2 organising those demonstrations?
3 A. They certainly did, and had various people who were
4 being paid in various ways. I think it's probably an
5 exaggeration to call this a British engineered coup,
6 because there was great popular support for it, but at
7 the same time there was an instrumental important role
8 played by England in this process.
9 Q. Thank you. In this connection the Communist Party,
10 when and prompted by which event did it proclaim the
11 resistance against the Germans after this invasion?
12 A. There's again some debate about that, but the actual
13 declaration of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia awaited
14 the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which took
15 place, I think, on June 21st, if I'm not mistaken, 1941.
16 Q. That's right, yes, yes. My next question: when the
17 Germans attacked Yugoslavia, was there any serious armed
18 resistance against the Germans and the Italians?
19 A. There was and, of course, as we know, it lasted
20 throughout the war. That resistance was in the first
21 instance organised by Colonel Mohilovic and the movement
22 known as the Chetniks, which was loyal to the Royal
23 Family, and which had the endorsement of the government
24 in exile in London. At the same time the partisan
25 movement under Tito gained momentum and subsequently
1 came to pose a much more serious challenge to the allied
3 Q. I apologise. Maybe my question wasn't clear enough.
4 I was trying to get an answer to the question of did the
5 Royal Yugoslav Army put up any serious resistance when
6 the actual attack occurred?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Can you analyse why the State surrendered without any
10 A. Well, I think there were many reasons, and I cannot
11 subscribe to a stab in the back theory by any
12 nationality or group for that. The fact is that the
13 Royal Army did not put up much resistance, but that
14 resistance, which was a very popular one, of course,
15 picked up shortly thereafter, and subsequently had a
16 very major impact on events.
17 Q. Would you agree with the view that the army simply broke
18 up or did it withdraw in an organised fashion and then
19 later organise resistance? I'm talking about the Royal
20 Army as a whole?
21 A. I think it's somewhere in between. Your point that
22 there was no organised resistance initially by the Royal
23 Army I think is a valid one, and it rather quickly
24 dispersed. It was not, you know, a glorious moment in
25 the history of the Yugoslav Royal Army.
1 Q. Do you know what was the main reason why this army
2 dispersed, why it didn't put up any resistance?
3 A. Well, as I've said, I think there are a number of
4 reasons. It was certainly not prepared to confront the
5 dimensions of this challenge, as was the case in other
6 places in Eastern Europe as well, and was not organised
7 in any way for a kind of a resistance movement.
8 Q. You mentioned on page 43 that the Ustashas in the
9 Kingdom of Yugoslavia were becoming an increasingly
10 important factor or something to that effect. Could
11 you perhaps be more specific in assessing the strength
12 of the Ustashas within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that
13 is until the invasion of the Germans, how numerous they
14 were, how strong their organisation was?
15 A. Without the transcript in front of me I do not know my
16 specific words, but I think I indicated that they were a
17 destabilising force. The fact is that they were --
18 Q. Exactly. That's right. It was a destabilising force
19 in Yugoslavia and the sentence before that says:
20 "The growing presence of the Ustashas became a
22 A. Most of the Ustasha, after the assassination of 1934, at
23 which time the Ustasha had real strong Italian
24 sponsorship, after that assassination of Alexander, the
25 Ustashas were principally confined to an island off
1 Italy and as, let us say, a terrorist or potential
2 military force really played no significant role. They
3 were certainly there as a potential threat to the
4 monarchy and the stability of the regime, but I think in
5 saying that they were a growing presence I probably
6 misstated their numerical strength within Yugoslavia as
8 Q. Do you know how many Ustashas there were in 1941, for
9 instance, in Italy, when they came to Croatia? How many
10 of them came from Italy?
11 A. No, I do not know that number. It's in the hundreds.
12 Q. Thank you. After the Ustashas came into power, on page
13 145, you speak of the support and popularity of the
14 Ustashas. What does that mean for you? What did you
15 mean by that?
16 A. Initially in the very early days of the creation of the
17 independent state of Croatia I think there was a general
18 feeling amongst the Croatian population that this was
19 for the first time an independent Croatian state. Now
20 there were no public opinion polls taken that I know of
21 in these early days, and none, in fact, during the whole
22 period that would tell us how widespread this belief was
23 but a number of observers, based on commentary in the
24 press and elsewhere, have noted that this was a brief
25 moment where there was some enthusiasm or support for
1 the notion of an independent Croatian state. It didn't
2 last very long. In the first place the role agreement,
3 which was in May of 1941, seriously discredited the
4 Ustasha regime, because in that agreement a large
5 portion of the Dalmatian coast was given over to Italy
6 and, of course, Dalmatia was the historic home of the
7 Croatian kingdom and therefore this appeared to the
8 wider population to be an indication of the dependence
9 of the Ustasha on the axis powers. Furthermore, their
10 methods soon led them to a position of unpopularity with
11 a great deal of the population.
12 Q. Of course there were no popular opinion polls, but is it
13 possible to make any conclusions regarding the
14 popularity and strength of the Ustasha movement as
15 compared to the partisan movement, based on the strength
16 and the units of the partisan movement in Croatia if we
17 look at 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945? Can you make any
18 conclusions on that basis on the popularity of the
19 Ustasha as opposed to the partisans among the Croatian
21 A. Well, the partisans won, and they did so by, as I have
22 indicated, several policies which insisted on the
23 equality of nations and the policy of utmost resistance
24 to the occupying powers. There is clearly a trend from
25 1941 until 1945, perhaps not in a single straight line,
1 but nevertheless a decline in Ustasha strength and a
2 rise in the popularity and effectiveness of the
3 partisans in Croatia and in Bosnia in this period.
4 Q. Thank you. If we analyse the partisan movement in
5 Croatia and Bosnia in relation to the strength of the
6 partisan movement in other parts of Yugoslavia, is it
7 possible to make any conclusions and any comparisons
9 A. Well, certainly the partisan movement was strong in both
10 Bosnia and Croatia. Much of the combat that took place
11 between the partisans and the German occupiers in
12 particular took place in Bosnia and the participation of
13 all nationalities in Bosnia and of Croats in the
14 partisan movement was very strong, possibly in numerical
15 terms stronger in some other parts of Yugoslavia, but it
16 should be emphasised that this was a movement that had
17 widespread participation and strong support from all
19 Q. Thank you. Maybe due to my lack of knowledge of the
20 English language I didn't clearly understand what you
21 said in connection with Ustasha brutalities and a
22 reference to the current President of Croatia, President
23 Tudjman. What movement did he belong to?
24 A. He was a partisan in World War II.
25 Q. Thank you. Further on, speaking about Dr. Franjo
1 Tudjman, you said that he gave a lower number of victims
2 of the independent Croatia which was lower than was
3 currently believed and currently used. Which is more
4 realistic? Could you comment on that, his assessment or
5 the current one?
6 A. There have been numerous attempts to arrive at a fairly
7 precise number of war dead and those who were victims
8 both of the camp at Jasenovac and at all Ustasha death
9 camps combined and the total number of war dead in
10 Yugoslavia. There are a number that have used not the
11 roles of victims or the hypothesis of the numbers of
12 people which were just -- might have been based on eye
13 witnesses but were instead based on census records.
14 One is by Professor Shajavic. I do not have that
15 citation at hand but it is certainly a number that is
16 much closer to Dr. Tudjman's than those that are
17 frequently used on the Serbian side to characterise
18 those losses. My own conclusions have moved towards
19 the conclusions of Zerjavic and a historian named
20 Kocevic. Those are very close to Dr. Tudjman's
21 conclusions. I would tell you that my views on that
22 have changed probably over the last few years in favour
23 of the most scientific and precise studies that have
24 been done. I believe those numbers put the number of
25 people killed in death camps at somewhere around 125,000
1 and at Jasenovac somewhat below 100,000, with the total
2 number of war victims just over 1 million. I would
3 emphasise, as he does, that this is -- one war death is
4 a crime and it is not acceptable, but I think it is
5 important also from a historical standpoint to have
6 those accurate numbers and I feel we probably have due
7 to that research in the last four or five years, a much
8 more precise understanding of what those numbers are.
9 Q. Thank you. I should like to go back to what you
10 repeated today, that the Chetniks and the partisans were
11 two resistance movements against the occupiers against
12 the Nazis. So I'm asking you to mention a battle that
13 the Chetniks waged against the Italians or the Germans.
14 A. I'm sorry. I can't do that.
15 Q. I did not understand.
16 A. I can't give you a battle name.
17 Q. Do you know whether they fought against the Germans and
18 the Italians as all?
19 A. By November of 1991 (sic) the Cetnik movement was
20 basically out of the resistance business and it came to
21 numerous agreements both with the occupying powers and
22 even with NDH and attempted to prepare agreements with
23 the partisans on this topic. Your point is, of course,
24 that the Cetnik movement never really mounted an
25 effective resistance. I would say that it had that
1 intention at the beginning of the war but by the end of
2 1941 had really lost the will to do that and resistance
3 to the occupying forces was left almost exclusively in
4 the hands of the partisans.
5 Q. I agree with you, but why did you then say that there
6 were two resistance movements if the Cetnik movement was
7 not, in effect, a resistance movement?
8 A. It began that way.
9 Q. Let us go on to page 148 and 149, where you spoke about
10 the Germans who organised a Muslim unit. So my
11 question is: the Muslims of the time in Bosnia, did
12 they participate in regular Ustasha units as well
13 outside this one unit organised by the Germans?
14 A. I do not know. My assumption would be that there was
15 at least some of that, yes.
16 Q. Do you know whether the Muslims held senior posts in the
17 independent state of Croatia? I'm thinking of Pavolic's
19 A. Yes. A Muslim was designated as, I think, first deputy
20 Prime Minister or second Prime Minister. There was a
21 Muslim who was appointed to a high position in the
22 independent state of Croatia and there were Muslims
23 appointed to some other positions as well.
24 Q. Do you perhaps know from history the name of Osman
25 Kulenovic, Dzaferbeg Kulenovic, Ademaga Masic?
1 A. The first two you have mentioned I know held positions
2 in the NDH government.
3 Q. When the Ustashas came into power do you know who at
4 that moment was President of the Yugoslav Muslim
6 A. No.
7 Q. You spoke about inter-ethnic violence from 1941 until
8 the end of the war. When President Tito came into
9 power in Yugoslavia did you encounter any large scale
10 inner ethnic violence after that date?
11 A. There was violence. I do not characterise it as
12 inter-ethnic in the sense that one ethnic group was
13 trying to retaliate or exterminate another, but one
14 should certainly note the events of May 1945, when
15 various forces, including Slovene, Croat and even
16 partisan forces and some Serbs were attempting to escape
17 the partisan advance and to flee into Austria the
18 so-called Bleiburg massacres. In that situation the
19 British basically turned these people back into the arms
20 of the partisans and many of them were summarily
21 executed. The number of people killed there is,
22 I think, typically looked at in terms of about 20,000, a
23 substantial number of people. It was a very
24 politically motivated set of killings. It probably
25 doesn't -- you know, although again certainly not to
1 minimise this, but it was not a specifically ethnically
2 or nationally motivated set of killings.
3 Q. You said that 20,000 dead in Bleiburg. Among them how
4 many were Croat victims roughly, among the 20,000
5 Bleiburg victims?
6 A. I'm not certain. A substantial number of them were
7 Croats and some were Slovenes as well. I think
8 probably the majority from Croats and Slovenes.
9 Q. Which unit did this in Bleiburg? Where did it come
10 from? Do you know?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Thank you. So we come to Tito's Yugoslavia. You said
13 that Tito's Yugoslavia --
14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, perhaps we could take our break
15 now and you can resume at 11.45.
16 (11.30 am)
17 (Short break)
18 (11.45 am)
19 JUDGE JORDA: We are resuming our hearing. Have the
20 accused brought in, please.
21 (Accused re-enters court)
22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo?
23 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, your Honour. Mr. Donia, we said
24 that we would move on to the period of Tito's
25 Yugoslavia. In your examination-in-chief you mentioned
1 that Yugoslavia was a centralised state for the most
2 part during the rule of Joseph Broz Tito; is that
4 A. It began as a --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the witness.
6 A. It began as a centralised state modelled after the
7 Soviet constitution of 1936 and very much committed to
8 administrative centralisation. It remained that way
9 through the early 1950s, but some first indications of
10 decentralisation or less stringent central control
11 started emerging already in the years immediately after
12 the break with Stalin.
13 Q. But when would we would be able to mark the time until
14 which Yugoslavia was a centralised state?
15 A. I do not think there's a particular point in time but
16 rather a progressive decentralisation which achieved
17 institutional status in the constitution of 1974.
18 There were numerous efforts at decentralisation, at
19 reform, at decentralisation, some of which were
20 successful and others not, but I think as a general
21 statement one could look at a process of
22 decentralisation from the early 1950s into the
24 Q. You said that in the constitution of 1974 the
25 decentralisation was institutionalised. I would like
1 to bring you back and ask you to comment how the
2 Communist Party influenced the decentralisation, and
3 I mean by this through its organisation and its -- the
4 influence that it had in the government bodies. Were
5 they contributing to the --
6 JUDGE JORDA: In order to make things a bit easier, I would
7 ask you to ask clear, specific questions, not too many
8 questions at the same time, one on top of the other, as
9 we say.
10 MR. NOBILO: It is a bit complicated. That is, regardless
11 of the constitution, centralised or decentralised, what
12 model of government was introduced by the Communist
13 Party and how did it influence the country? Were the
14 decisions made at the top or were they more grass root?
15 A. I would distinguish between centralisation,
16 decentralisation, on the one hand, and a single-party
17 state versus pluralism on the other hand. Yugoslavia
18 began as a centralised, single-party state. By the
19 early 1950s it was beginning a gradual uneven process of
20 decentralisation. There remained one political party
21 in Yugoslavia from that time until I would say perhaps
22 right to the end. However, one must recognise that
23 that party became very fragmented along republican lines
24 in the course of even the 1960s, so that the party was a
25 single entity but had republican components, which had
1 very distinct interests and pursued those interests,
2 even as the process of decentralisation was going on,
3 but I would not want to suggest that political pluralism
4 in the sense of a multi-party system entered Yugoslavia
5 prior to the late 1980s or even 1990.
6 Q. Let's try it this way. The JNA, the Yugoslav National
7 Army, were they -- was it a centralised or decentralised
8 institution up until 1990?
9 A. The Yugoslav National Army was a centralised
10 institution, one whose leadership up until that time was
11 very committed to the preservation of the Yugoslav
13 Q. During the State socialism period, especially during the
14 period of Tito's rule, who controlled the State
15 financial funds? Was it the federation authorities or
16 the republican ones?
17 A. By and large the federal funds were controlled by the
18 federal authorities and those decisions were made by
19 people in power who tended to be high party members.
20 Q. During the period of the state socialism, before the
21 self-government, self-management part, who controlled
22 the highest -- who controlled companies who had the
23 highest profit, that was were they controlled by the
24 federal bodies or by the republican ones?
25 A. Could you clarify for me what time period you mean by
1 "state socialism"?
2 Q. This is before self-management was introduced, before
3 the self-management socialists period. I think we can
4 break up the period of Tito's rule into state socialism
5 and self-management. There is a difference there. So
6 there were state export companies during the State
7 period. Do you know who managed them?
8 A. Again I would ask you for some year. I think that
9 self-management was introduced in 1949. I can
10 certainly answer for the period of 1945-1949.
11 Q. We would -- I would disagree that the self-management
12 was introduced then. I am thinking more of the 1960s?
13 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, your Honour.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Kehoe?
15 MR. KEHOE: I object to whether Mr. Nobilo agrees or
16 disagrees with the witness' answer.
17 JUDGE JORDA: I sustain this objection.
18 MR. NOBILO: Very well. Thank you. Let's say the 1960s,
19 up until 1956. Let us say from 1945-1965. My
20 question is: who managed the State export companies in
21 that period of time?
22 A. The Federal Government.
23 Q. During this same period who controlled the Federal
24 National Bank?
25 A. The Federal Government controlled the bank.
1 Q. Can you define -- was there the economic equality in
2 Yugoslavia, let's say, up until 1974 and following 1974,
3 the economic equality between the different republics,
4 of course?
5 A. Up until 1974?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. I think even economists might get in a bar fight over
8 the answer to that question. It's generally viewed by
9 a the supporters of Croatia and Slovenia that those
10 funds were disproportionately awarded to the
11 under-developed republics and I think that probably that
12 is unquestionably the case in accord with the Federal
13 Republic's developmental objectives.
14 Q. Can you give us a general assessment of the socialist
15 Yugoslavia? Was there an ethnic equality or did one
16 ethnic group dominate over the others?
17 A. That's an "either/or" question and I do not want to
18 really answer "either/or". I think the Federal
19 Republic set out with a strong commitment to national
20 equality between the various nationalities, implemented
21 radical measures to implement that equality, some of
22 which were very successful, others of which were not,
23 and so by the 1970s we see substantial dissatisfaction
24 in certain republics with the allocation of federal
25 resources in particular. However, this was articulated
1 principally in terms of republics rather than between
2 nationalities or ethnic groups.
3 Q. Can you tell me which nationality dominated in the
4 Federal bodies, including the military and all the other
5 Federal bodies?
6 A. As I've indicated, I can't answer that question with a
7 straightforward naming you one nationality. I do not
8 accept the premise of your question that one nationality
9 dominated federal institutions throughout the socialist
11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, excuse me. Were you talking
12 about republics or nationalities in that last question?
13 The interpretation says: "What was the dominant
14 nationality?". Do you mean what was the dominant
15 republic or was there a dominant republic?
16 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Mr. President. At this time I am asking
17 about nationality. That means a nation, an ethnic
18 group. Was it dominating in the federal bodies at this
20 A. Again, sir, I reject your premise that there was a
21 dominant nationality in federal bodies throughout the
22 period of Socialist Yugoslavia.
23 Q. Very well. Thank you. So could you give us like a
24 general assessment about the Socialist Yugoslavia? Was
25 it a democratic country?
1 A. That's a very value-laden term, and it's difficult to
2 assess it throughout the period. I believe that the
3 Federal Republic became more democratic as time went
4 along in that the party became more wider -- there was
5 greatest participation in party organs. Internal
6 disputes within the party became over time more open.
7 So I would be -- to my understanding of democracy,
8 I would say there was a gradual movement towards a more
9 democratic society. However, this remained a one party
10 state throughout the period of Socialist Yugoslavia, one
11 in which there were central institutions that would not
12 tolerate secession or pluralist movements. That is an
13 intrinsic part of my understanding of democracy. Thus
14 I would have to give you a qualified answer. I think
15 there was a gradual tend towards more democratisation in
16 the period of socialist Yugoslavia, but it never fully
17 became a democratic state.
18 Q. What was the status or the protection of human rights in
19 the socialist Yugoslavia? Do you know about that?
20 A. Well, I think it at times was better than others. By
21 "human rights" again there are various
22 understandings. There was no question that the rights
23 of individuals were violated from time to time and at
24 times frequently by the Yugoslav Secret Police in
25 various episodes and incidents. It was certainly a
1 much better human rights environment than in any
2 socialist country that I could think of in the Eastern
3 Bloc. So again, relatively speaking, there were
4 several human rights violations and, not to be
5 overlooked, but as a generalisation, this became a much
6 more tolerant environment than was typical of west
7 European countries.
8 Q. Maybe if I asked you specifically. Would a person who
9 tended to express their opinions that were not in
10 accordance with the generally accepted rules with the
11 constitution be prosecuted?
12 A. Sir, I was there on numerous occasions in the 1960s and
13 1970s and people expressed to me very openly their
14 political views. To my knowledge they were not
15 prosecuted for those views. There were certainly
16 instances in which people were prosecuted for political
17 activities in support of or in promotion of those views.
18 Q. Very well. I would like to move to page 154 of the
19 transcript, where you talked about motivation for
20 decentralisation by Joseph Broz Tito, who was preparing
21 a successor. You said that he did not want to be
22 succeeded by another strong personality. What would be
23 the motives of Joseph Broz Tito that led him to
24 promulgate the constitutional views of 1974?
25 A. Well, I think you have just identified the primary
1 motivation, which was perhaps a certain paranoia on
2 Tito's part that he would be succeeded by some strong
3 man with policies that were contrary to what his
4 personal policies and views were. He clearly hoped
5 that the constitution as a decentralising element would
6 allow all the political contenders within Yugoslavia to
7 maximise their freedom of political activity and
8 economic development under the general umbrella of the
9 federal structure. He believed that this decentralised
10 system would in some manner work. Indeed, it did for
11 some period of time after his death, but the
12 destabilising component within it was, I think, obvious
13 to many observers already in 1974.
14 Q. In other words, was the principal motivation a personal
15 jealousy or was it an attempt to rescue Yugoslavia?
16 A. I do not think you can remove his personal experiences
17 from that policy. He had turned to various people in
18 hopes that they would succeed him and been disappointed
19 in their eagerness to seize power or to assume power,
20 and so I do not think that one should remove his
21 personal experience from that determination. He
22 certainly hoped that Yugoslavia would out last him,
23 would survive him, and his -- I view the 1974
24 constitution as his final legacy. It in many respects
25 did optimise the freedom of movement of the republics
1 and at the same time it failed to provide a succession
2 structure which would be durable.
3 Q. Thank you. I'm moving to when the tensions started
4 rising in Bosnia. The Agrocomerc affair, the victims
5 in Neum. I would like to know who were the victims of
6 these affairs. The political representatives of which
8 A. Well, I think in general the victims were members of the
9 older political establishment and certainly there was
10 victims of the movements from a wide array of political
11 leadership. My impression is that the Muslim leaders
12 probably suffered principally in Dizdarevic's removal
13 from succession to the Presidency and in general the
14 Muslim political leadership probably got the worst of
15 this. It was, however, a generation movement in that
16 the socialist alliance was what was driving it, or at
17 least the latter parts of it, rather than a nationalist
18 coup of some sort in the Bosnian party.
19 Q. You talked about the socialist youth and you mentioned
20 socialist alliance. Who spearheaded this movement?
21 A. I'm sorry. It was the Socialist Youth Alliance.
22 Q. Very well. Last time you said -- you mentioned the
23 Socialist Youth and the investigative journalist. My
24 question to you: do you really believe that there were
25 investigative journalists in the Socialist Yugoslavia
1 and that the Socialist Youth was an independent group?
2 A. Well, there are two questions there. Were there
3 independent investigative journalists in Yugoslavia?
4 Yes, absolutely. One can identify the papers that they
5 worked for. Borba became one; Nasidani in Bosnia.
6 Investigative journalism actually can be dated to the
7 1970s, when there was some aggressive reporting on
8 bankruptcies and other economic issues. So
9 investigative journalism has, in fact, an important role
10 in the development of a more open approach to political
11 questions dating back some years.
12 As to your question of whether the Socialist Youth
13 Alliance was independent, I would say again I would
14 hesitate to characterise it as either a slave of the
15 broader party or fully independent. I think it emerged
16 as a force with some autonomy in the course of the late
17 1980s at the same time that other youth movements of
18 younger party members, such as Mladost in Slovenia, this
19 was taking place in other republics.
20 Q. The persons that were victims of these affairs, you said
21 that they were mostly Muslims. How do you perceive
22 them, as Muslims who wanted more decentralisation, or do
23 you perceive them as Muslim politicians who wanted more
25 A. It is again a complicated answer. I would prefer to
1 say I just do not know. I think that the issues for
2 Bosnia were somewhat different than the issues for
3 Yugoslavia. Within the Bosnia party there were some
4 questions of party coherence, pluralism versus unitary
5 party organisation and within Yugoslavia there was
6 clearly a question of the role of the Bosnian Muslims in
7 the federal institutions, particularly the presidency.
8 Q. Within the framework of such political relationships
9 persons who were victims in these affairs, what did they
10 advocate? Which concept?
11 A. As I say, I can't give you a simple answer to that
13 Q. Thank you. What is your general assessment why did the
14 Socialist Yugoslavia break up? What are the causes of
15 its break-up?
16 A. That's a very important and very complicated question.
17 I think there are numerous answers to it. The one was
18 first clearly the erosion of central institutions.
19 That erosion had obviously actors pressing forward in
20 it. The seizure of power in the Communist Party of
21 Serbia by Milosevic I feel was a prime cause of the
22 break-up, not immediately, but had far-reaching
23 ramifications. Certainly the changing role of the
24 Yugoslav National Army played an important role as well.
25 Q. Can you give us a chronology of events that signified
1 the break-up of Yugoslavia with the perspective of
2 several years now, in other words particular specific
3 events that marked the gradual break-up of Yugoslavia?
4 A. I have already tried to do that with some events, and
5 I'm sure that I have omitted many, but would not know
6 exactly where to go to fill in that process further than
7 I've done it for you.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Could you be more -- remember, Mr. Nobilo,
9 that the witness gave us a sketch of an entire
10 chronology. I am not sure that this cannot be
11 clarified -- will clarify anything if you ask him by
12 memory. If you ask him to repeat the chronology of
13 events, starting with the document you have, which is
14 one of the exhibits, you might be able to say whether --
15 I do not want to tell you what questions to ask but
16 maybe you could supplement or ask him a comment on
17 certain dates that needed to be added but to ask once
18 again for a chronology which the witness already
19 presented in the documents seems a bit difficult to me
20 and also might be a reason -- might be a waste of time,
21 in fact. Would you re-ask the question, please?
22 MR. NOBILO: Thank you. I shall try to put the question in
23 a different way. How do you assess the gathering at
24 Gazimaston? When was it held and what is the import of
25 that gathering?
1 A. I do not know.
2 Q. My next question: do you know anything about the
3 miners' strike in Kosovo, when they were on strike in
4 the pits underground?
5 A. There certainly were strikes in Kosovo. I think there
6 were strikes in 1980 and again in 1989. I'm sorry.
7 I just do not know where you're going with this
9 Q. Namely I'm interested in the nature of that strike.
10 Were the demands of those miners underground of a
11 political nature or purely of a social nature as a
12 labour strike?
13 A. Well, I would characterise that movement as both
14 economic and political.
15 Q. Can you tell us anything about the events of the people
16 in Kosovo under the leadership of Miroslav Solevic?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you know anything about the popular events in
19 Montenegro, when there was a change of power under the
20 influence of the demonstrations?
21 A. Well, I think you just summarised it. There was indeed
22 a change of power under the influence of demonstrations
23 organised under Milosevic's leadership. I can't give
24 you the precise date, but I believe it was in late 1988
25 or early 1989.
1 Q. But what were the main demands of the demonstrators,
2 their political demands?
3 A. Well, they were demanding the resignation of the
4 political leadership of the League of Communists of
6 Q. But why did they demand their resignation?
7 A. Well, this was part of demonstrations that took place in
8 Montenegro, in Vojvodina and attempted demonstrations in
9 Slovenia and in Kosovo to install party leaders who were
10 loyal to Milosevic. The existing party leadership was
11 -- again it is kind of the same issues that arose in
12 Bosnia -- viewed as old, as ineffective and as not
13 sufficiently vital and self-interested in the general
14 nature of the economic situation. So I would put those
15 events in the context of an effort by Milosevic-inspired
16 crowds to force the resignation of the Communist Party
17 -- league of communist leadership.
18 Q. Could you say what you feel regarding the demonstrators
19 that wanted Milosevic supporters to come into power?
20 Were they extreme nationalists or were they not so
21 extremist, or, rather, could you put within that context
22 the change of power in Montenegro?
23 A. Well, they were principally people who were given a day
24 off, a bus ride and a lunch to participate in the
25 demonstrations, and it's difficult to characterise their
1 politics much beyond that.
2 Q. Can you perhaps be more specific regarding the slogans
3 that were most frequently used in view of the
4 nationalism in Yugoslavia at the time.
5 Q. From Milosevic, the pro-Milosevic people were motivated
6 by the notion of an anti-bureaucratic revolution.
7 Q. What does that mean?
8 A. You'd have to ask them. I would say it is a slogan
9 that has utterly no meaning to most of us.
10 Q. Could you assess that movement demanding an
11 anti-bureaucratic revolution as a movement of Serb
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You mentioned in passing something, but was a similar
15 movement in Vojvodina the one that toppled the existing
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. What happened in Ljubljana with this anti-bureaucratic
20 A. A demonstration was scheduled for Ljubljana and the
21 demonstrators were to arrive from the east by trains and
22 to avoid this demonstration from taking place, with the
23 obvious undesirable consequences from the point of view
24 of the Slovene political leadership, they simply shut
25 down the railroads and the roads. Subsequently those
1 demonstrators were unable to gather in Ljubljana and the
2 demonstration never took place.
3 Q. Can you tell me in general terms regarding this
4 anti-bureaucratic revolution in what year was it
5 operative? When was this?
6 A. Well, I mentioned 1988 and 1989. It has remained a
7 slogan of Milosevic for some time after that, but he
8 came to power in the Serbian party in 1987. That is
9 certainly a date that I identify as the first time in
10 which the use of crowds, mobs, tried to force a change
11 in the constitutional structure in Yugoslavia, and
12 therefore represented a departure from accepted norms of
13 contention within the League of Communists.
14 Q. Do you know something about the economic embargo
15 enforced by Serbia against Slovenia?
16 A. The economic embargo followed upon this demonstrate or
17 scheduled demonstration that we have talked about and
18 was an effort to force the Slovene leadership to its
19 knees in economic terms. Slovenia was sufficiently
20 economically independent so that this did not have its
21 desired consequences.
22 Q. Can you tell me what is the importance of the 14th
23 extraordinary congress of the League of Communists of
24 Yugoslavia held in January 1990?
25 A. As I indicated, I believe, in my direct testimony, this
1 was the congress labelled "extraordinary", because it
2 was hoped that this congress would resolve the
3 outstanding constitutional issues in Yugoslavia and
4 provide some constitutional mechanism or compromise
5 mechanism to allow the party to stay together. At that
6 meeting the proceedings failed to yield that result and
7 the Slovenian delegation walked out of the meeting
8 followed closely by the Croatian delegation.
9 Subsequently the session was adjourned indefinitely.
10 Within a period of two or three weeks this effectively
11 spelled the end of the League of Communists of
12 Yugoslavia as a functioning, centralised institution.
13 It clearly was severely weakened going into this
14 meeting, and this is normally the date that is credited
15 with its -- the date on which its demise was final.
16 Q. As far as I have been able to understand, after that
17 event the congress was never continued?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us anything about the
20 memorandum, which you did not mention, of the Serbian
21 Academy of Arts and Sciences, what it was and what its
22 importance was?
23 A. Like many documents, it has probably assumed more
24 importance to those who reacted to it since then than
25 those who originally wrote it, but it was a document, a
1 draft document prepared by certain members of the
2 Academy of Sciences, the Serbian Academy of Sciences,
3 which listed a series of complaints about Serbian
4 disadvantages in the Federal Republic and complained
5 that the Serbs were discriminated against in various
6 ways in Federal Yugoslavia. It subsequently gained
7 great notoriety as a document espousing greater Serbian
8 nationalism. There certainly was that element in it,
9 but I think the language is much more moderate and its
10 topic is much more moderate than some people made it out
11 to be.
12 Q. Can you indicate when the memorandum was published?
13 A. It was published in 19 -- it was drafted in 1986. It
14 was published a couple of months, I believe, after it
15 was drafted, and I can't give you the month. I'm
17 Q. Can you tell us anything about the western Serbian
18 borders as interpreted by Vuk Draskovic, Miroslav
19 Solevic and Seselj?
20 A. There are three different questions there, I believe.
21 I can tell you that in the opinion of all of those
22 people the claims of Serbia in their minds were such
23 that Serbian territory should reach far to the west of
24 where The Republic of Serbia's borders were, not a
25 complete disagreement on either, but they all clearly
1 claimed Bosnia portions of Croatia and generally
2 favoured a far westward extension of the boundaries that
3 you are speaking of.
4 Q. Can we say regarding the most significant politician
5 among them, Vuk Draskovic, how he designated the western
6 borders of Serbia? Which towns did he indicate as
7 marking those borders?
8 A. I do not know.
9 Q. Stipe Mesic and the problems surrounding his election as
10 President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, can you
11 comment on that?
12 A. The situation which Tito had left in the constitution of
13 1974 was such that upon his death there would be a
14 rotation in the members of the Presidency and, in fact,
15 as time went along, the succession was determined years
16 in advance. There was a nominal vote of confirmation
17 as each one of these one-year successions took place
18 after Tito's death in May of 1980, and on May 15th of
19 1991 Stipe Mesic was next in line to succeed to the
20 President of the Presidency. By that time the coup --
21 coups in Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo had taken
22 place, so that four of the eight votes on the Presidency
23 were essentially under the control of Milosevic: going
24 into that meeting there was a strenuous effort to get an
25 agreement to confirm Mesic, who was really believed by
1 many people to be a devoted Croatian nationalist, and
2 the vote ultimately came to 4 to 4. At that point the
3 Federal Presidency as such ceased to exist in the minds
4 of most legal experts.
5 At that time -- this was May of 1991 -- just as
6 the events in Croatia and Slovenia were starting to
7 unfold and consequently the international community
8 became involved, and a part of the compromise that came
9 out of the discussions about Slovenia resulted in an
10 agreement that Mesic would be confirmed as the President
11 of the Presidency, and that took place, I believe, in
12 July of 1991. He held that position for about five or
13 six months, I believe, resigned in December, if I'm not
14 mistaken, but was -- had very little effect in that role
15 as President of the Presidency.
16 Q. If we put aside all you have said about Mesic, all the
17 other events through memorandum, the popular meetings in
18 Kosovo, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Ljubljana, was this
19 before or after Tudjman came into power in Croatia?
20 A. Tudjman came into power in the course of 1990, so the
21 developments that you are speaking of were principally
22 prior to his assuming office.
23 Q. How could we describe the year 1990, the moment when
24 Tudjman came into office, in relation to the functioning
25 of the federal bodies and inter-ethnic relations?
1 A. I'm sorry. I do not understand that question.
2 Q. Tudjman came into power in 1990 so my question is:
3 could you briefly describe or define the conditions
4 under which he came into power in relation to, first,
5 the functioning of federal bodies and, secondly, in
6 relation to ethnic relationships in Yugoslavia?
7 A. Well, let me try the first question first. He came
8 into power in accord with the elections that were held
9 in each republic in the course of 1990. It was widely
10 planned that there would be a federal election in that
11 year and that election was never held. Consequently
12 there were elections in each republic and by 1990 these
13 republics were functioning very substantially
14 autonomously. What federal institutions there were
15 were very weakened with the exception of the Yugoslav
16 National Army. So I think one could say that Tudjman's
17 coming to power in 1990 took place at a time when the
18 republics were almost on their own in terms of the
19 practical day-to-day running of affairs but still had
20 serious business to transact with the Federal Republic
21 and the Croatian and Slovenian sides were clearly
22 seeking to avoid the -- they were fearful, if you will,
23 of the exercise of federal authority as it was being
24 practised by Milosevic.
25 Your second question was in terms of ethnic
1 relations, and I would only say that although some of
2 the parties that won in various republics were, in fact,
3 communists, that all candidates who won, including
4 Tudjman, did so on a nationalist platform, and so the
5 ethnic dimension of things was clearly moving in a very
6 nationalist direction at that time.
7 Q. Thank you. So we come to page 167 of the transcript
8 and certain citations that you made from Tudjman's book,
9 and reading that book as a whole, did you anywhere come
10 across Tudjman advocating a violent change of borders by
12 A. No.
13 Q. Tudjman in that work, does he anywhere underline or
14 disseminate nationalist hatred towards any nation and
15 specifically towards the Bosniaks?
16 A. In that work, no.
17 Q. In that work does he advocate forcible movements of
18 populations, resettlement of populations?
19 A. No, he does not in that work. He has taken positions
20 in other works which indicate that he is -- as a kind of
21 a moral or philosophical issue views certain types of
22 violence as a deeply ingrained part of, let's say,
23 historical movements. However, in this particular work
24 I do not see that.
25 Q. When we are talking about violence, does he instigate
1 violence at the present time or does he explain it in
3 A. Well, let me read a statement from his new book, which
4 is: "The horrors of war" in which he states as follows:
5 "Common military violence is transformed into
6 genocidal extermination and deportation of populations
7 when the conqueror has permanent designs upon the
8 territory and ethnic assimilation of the opposing
10 I must say that that comes very close to an
11 advocacy position. It certainly states that it is
12 deeply ingrained in the character of military violence
13 when annexationist aims are at stake.
14 Q. He explains the concept, but does he favour such action
16 A. He does not specifically advocate a course of action in
17 a particular situation, no. He is speaking from the
18 kind of philosophical, historical standpoint here.
19 Q. Can you tell us what the attitude of the Republic of
20 Croatia was towards The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 regarding its borders? Has Croatia recognised those
23 A. As I have indicated, I think The Republic of Croatia has
24 followed two different tracks in its approach to
25 Bosnia. The first, which is premised on some sort of a
1 military alliance with Bosnia, was followed on April
2 7th, 1992 with a recognition and with the various
3 international communities' involvement in Croatian
4 matters. At the same time it's clear that in action in
5 terms of establishing the Herceg-Bosna area that those
6 borders have not been respected in terms of the actual
7 policies of the Croatian Republic towards Bosnia.
8 Q. We have now reached pages 167, 168 and 169, where you
9 quoted elements from the mentioned book of Franjo
10 Tudjman. So I should like to throw some light on those
11 allegations of his and to hear your views on them. Do
12 you agree with Franjo Tudjman's statement that Serbia
13 and Vojvodina had strong historical, national, economic
14 and cultural links, Serbia and Vojvodina?
15 A. Yes, I think that's true. Again I would want to
16 clarify the period of history at which that has been
17 true. It has been true at some times more than others
18 but certainly say for the period 1690 strengthened those
19 ties for a couple of decades after 1690 and at various
20 times they have been strong, yes.
21 Q. Let us go on to some other statements you made
22 yesterday, quoting from his book. The next one, do you
23 think that is correct, that large parts of Croatia were
24 attached to Bosnia only after Turkey's occupation? Is
25 that correct historically speaking?
1 A. I'm sorry. I perhaps should go to the transcript,
2 because --
3 Q. It is page 169, line 17:
4 "Large parts of Croatia had been incorporated into
5 Bosnia by the Turks"?
6 A. Excuse me, sir, just a second.
7 Q. Page 169, line 17. (Pause.)
8 A. Again I think it's a statement that has to be carefully
9 interpreted. It is in part fully true, but one could
10 easily extend the definition of Croatia to points that
11 I think would be questionable. So clearly large parts
12 of what had been Croatia were incorporated into the
13 military frontier, and I would say perhaps some parts of
14 Croatia, but I would maybe not want to agree that large
15 parts had been incorporated.
16 Q. Are you familiar with the notion of Turkish Croatia, the
17 western part of Bosnia?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. When did that part of Bosnia become a component part of
21 A. Well, I think you've said it yourself. It has been so
22 for a long time. If you are speaking of Jajce and
23 Bihac, you know Jajce was the ancient capital for some
24 time and I think it has certainly been part of Bosnia
25 for many centuries.
1 Q. I was thinking of Bihac and western Bosnia which is
2 known as Turkish Croatia. So when did that part become
3 part of Bosnia?
4 A. Well, it became part of Bosnia in the course of the
5 Ottoman administration.
6 Q. Thank you. Another statement is contained in the
7 following sentence, and that is that:
8 "Bosnia and Herzegovina were historically linked
9 to Croatia and also geographically and economically
11 Is that allegation of Franjo Tudjman as a
12 historian correct in your view?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Just a moment, please. In your view, the shape of
15 Croatia, the one it has now, is that a customary shape
16 for a state, or is it some kind of an exception?
17 A. I know of no customary shape for a state.
18 Q. Do you know any other state that looks like that or is
19 anything like that in shape?
20 A. Well, I'm not visualising all hundreds of states in the
21 world in my mind right now, but I would say that it is
22 -- there is no customary shape for a state. They
23 assume very different dimensions, depending on natural
24 features, depending on historical boundaries.
25 Q. The question in the referendum in the Republic of
1 Croatia on 19th May, do you know what it was, what was
2 the question put to the referendum in May?
3 A. I'm sorry. What year?
4 Q. On 19th May 1991 a referendum was held in Croatia and
5 there was a question put to the electorate, to which
6 they had to answer "yes" or "no", so I'm asking you
7 whether you know what the question was?
8 A. Well, I believe that was the date of the Croatian
9 referendum on independence.
10 Q. But what was the contents of the question? What do the
11 people have to declare themselves in favour of? Was it
12 an independent Croatia or a Croatia that would link with
13 the federal state in the form of a confederation; do you
15 A. I do not know.
16 Q. Do you know whether the question put to the referendum
17 contained any reference to the attitude towards the
18 Serbian minority in Croatia?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, it's now 1 o'clock. Perhaps we
22 could stop, but I would also like to ask you if you
23 could tell us about how long you still have, either you
24 or Mr. Hayman, for the cross-examination. I'm asking
25 only the question so that we can organise our work.
1 MR. NOBILO: I think it will not take more than an hour as
2 far as I'm concerned, but Mr. Hayman will continue after
4 MR. HAYMAN: I have probably two hours of questions. That's
5 my best guess, your Honour.
6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?
7 MR. KEHOE: At this point, your Honour, this is going to be
8 a double cross-examination, and the Prosecutor would
9 strenuously object to this practice of double
10 cross-examination. Now I need not remind the court
11 that Mr. Nobilo and Mr. Hayman have had two weeks,
12 actually more than two weeks, your Honour now -- almost
13 three weeks since June 25th 1997 until today to prepare
14 for this cross-examination. Now taken to its logical
15 conclusion, the cross-examination of every defence
16 witness could, of course, be done by the three of us in
17 turn. The Prosecutor has made a commitment that we
18 will do single cross-examinations. Now the last
19 cross-examination --
20 JUDGE JORDA: What are you suggesting?
21 MR. KEHOE: I suggest at this point that Mr. Hayman be
22 precluded and be prevented from cross-examining
23 Mr. Donia, and Mr. Nobilo finish the cross-examination
24 from beginning to end.
25 JUDGE JORDA: The judges will decide that and we will
1 resume our hearing at 2.30.
2 (1.00 pm)
3 (Luncheon adjournment)
1 (2.30 pm)
2 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume the hearing. Registrar,
3 please have the accused brought in.
4 (Accused re-enters court)
5 JUDGE JORDA: We stopped this morning on an issue raised by
6 the Prosecutor. The Trial Chamber has decided as
7 follows. From now on -- yes, please come in. The
8 witness may come in.
9 (Witness re-enters court)
10 JUDGE JORDA: On behalf of my colleagues I wanted to
11 respond to the question which was raised by the
12 Prosecutor at the point that we suspended our hearing.
13 The Trial Chamber has decided that whenever a witness is
14 called to testify, he may be cross-examined or examined
15 by one counsel. Number two, it happens that this
16 principle perhaps was not expressed clearly, because
17 about two weeks ago we proceeded differently at the time
18 that there was another witness testifying. At that
19 time or under those conditions it is, of course,
20 legitimate that Mr. Hayman worked together with Mr. Nobilo
21 and prepared to make an intervention. Therefore, the
22 Trial Chamber has now decided that for the last time
23 today two lawyers will be able to speak during the
24 cross-examination, but this -- let me finish, Mr. Hayman,
25 please -- but this will be the second time and the last
1 time. From this time forward there will only be one
2 witness, one interrogation, one cross-examination each
3 by one lawyer, and the Trial Chamber would like that the
4 questioning of the witness be concluded this afternoon,
5 because the judges themselves have certain questions
6 they would like to ask. I see that Mr. Hayman wants to
7 make a comment and I now give you the floor.
8 MR. HAYMAN: Briefly, your Honour, we would have liked to
9 have been heard on this matter, simply because although
10 we do not expect it necessary in the case of many
11 witnesses to seek both the opportunity for both
12 Mr. Nobilo and myself to cross-examine the witness, there
13 are -- will be some witnesses, like this witness, whose
14 expertise in testimony falls between two languages,
15 between two worlds, if you will. Mr. Nobilo has a
16 special knowledge of the history of the Balkans,
17 knowledge from growing up in Yugoslavia. His father
18 fought with the partisans, knowledge I cannot gain
19 through weeks of study. At the same time Mr. Nobilo's
20 English, although workable, he cannot read English with
21 any speed. I think I am safe in saying that without
22 insulting my colleague. This witness, while he speaks
23 Serbo-Croatian, Bosnian, and he has worked in that
24 culture and on that subject matter he has written and
25 published voluminously in English. To ask Mr. Nobilo to
1 digest those materials and conduct the cross-examination
2 I submit would not be appropriate. I do not want to
3 slow down the proceedings, but I would ask that the
4 court leave open the possibility that there may be
5 future witnesses, perhaps the exception, not the rule,
6 where to require either Mr. Nobilo or myself to conduct
7 the entire examination would work an extreme hardship on
8 the Defence.
9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?
10 MR. KEHOE: The answer to that quite clearly is that counsel
11 has made a choice. Now I personally read English
12 probably as well or maybe not as well as Mr. Hayman, but
13 he could have gone out in the last three weeks and
14 purchased Mr. Donia's book and participated and done the
15 examination himself and consulted with any number of
16 people. The issue quite clearly here is that the
17 Defence seeks to have two shots at prosecution witnesses
18 and they have had three weeks to prepare this
19 cross-examination of this particular gentleman. Now in
20 the spirit of moving this matter along I think that the
21 trial court should continue with your Honours' --
22 Mr. President's and your Honours' ruling that Mr. Hayman
23 and Mr. Nobilo take one shot on cross-examination and
24 that's it. Now if taken to its logical conclusion, if
25 we talk about expertise, I am sure Mr. Hayman and
1 Mr. Cayley have expertise in areas I do not have
2 expertise in and various subject matters. I do not
3 know what's going to come up in this case. However,
4 there has to be a line drawn at a point where the
5 protracted cross-examination has to end and this is the
7 I ask the court most respectfully to continue to
8 the court's ruling, to just permit one cross-examination
9 and not permit this double team by the Defence.
10 JUDGE JORDA: The Trial Chamber has heard you, but will not
11 change its decision, Mr. Hayman. It refers to two
12 points. There must have been a misunderstanding at the
13 beginning. I am certainly responsible for it and I ask
14 your pardon for that, but the Presiding Judge with his
15 two colleagues has tried to work in such a way that
16 there be a certain kind of order and equity that would
17 be as perfect as possible during the hearing. That is
18 why today only, because you were not advised, you,
19 Mr. Hayman, can speak. As for the rest, it is a
20 question of good organisation and I believe that the
21 Trial Chamber even if it seems to be pushing you a bit,
22 it does generally leave you the time to organise
23 yourself and I think you simply have to organise
24 yourselves amongst yourselves. This is also applicable
25 to the Prosecution. Aside from this afternoon, since
1 you didn't know what the rules were, you may speak but
2 into the future I want the rules to be very clear.
3 When a witness comes to testify, he will be questioned
4 only by one person from the Office of the Prosecutor and
5 cross-examined by one member of the Defence team. This
6 is being done in the interests of justice so the trial
7 moves forward as quickly as possible, as harmoniously
8 and equitably as possible.
9 The question has now been resolved and I can give
10 the floor back to Mr. Nobilo to continue his
12 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, your Honour.
13 Professor Donia, could you please go to page 171
14 of the transcript, because I have a very specific
15 question and I would like you to be able to refer to
16 it? Page 171.
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Line 7, starting -- this is from Mr. Tudjman's book,
19 where he says that:
20 "In the Croatian Banovina the Croats had a clear
22 Is that correct? Do you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Further, you gave the data on how many Croat -- what was
25 the size of Croatian population in each of the kotars
1 that went into the Banovina. Then on the following
2 page, lines 3-7, you draw a conclusion that the Croats
3 had the majority only if they had also included the
4 Muslims; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. My question to you now is the following: is it correct
7 to say, when talking about the historian Tudjman, that
8 the Croats had a majority in Banovina when citing the
9 census report from 1991, when you referred to the census
10 of 1939 in reference to the Croatian Banovina?
11 A. The reference that I made here is to the census figures
12 from 1991. I do not believe there was a census in
13 1939. There was one earlier in the 1930s, I believe
14 1931, and I do not have those figures available.
15 Q. Do you believe that it is correct to use those -- that
16 information, those data? The Croats may have gained a
17 majority in the meantime. What do you think on that
19 A. I have looked at the 1910 census, which shows a
20 remarkable consistency in percentage of the Catholic
21 population in those districts with the numbers that
22 I have given here. So while I concur that this is a
23 long stretch of time, 81 years, with 1939 something in
24 the middle, your point is well taken that my numbers
25 here are not taken from the nearest census to the
1 creation of the Banovina.
2 Q. Do you then withdraw your conclusion that Tudjman was
3 thinking that the Muslims should be incorporated so that
4 the Croats would gain a clear majority?
5 A. No, I do not. He clearly goes on in his explanation to
6 argue that the Muslims are Croats, and it is only using
7 that kind of logic that this argument can be advanced.
8 Q. And can you tell us when he said that the Croats were in
9 the majority, did he also have Muslims in mind or were
10 the Croats actually in the majority in 1939?
11 A. Well, the quote that you have here on lines 7 through 12
12 is in the English language version in the present
13 tense. This is a book published in 1981. So his
14 statement that:
15 "The Croats have a clear majority",
16 clearly pertains to a time period later than the
17 1939 agreement.
18 Q. Correct. However, your comment was that the Croats
19 were not in the majority. They were in the majority in
20 1939 only including the Muslims, but now my question to
21 you is whether you would allow that the Croats
22 themselves, without the Muslims, were the majority in
23 these kotars, in these counties, in 1939?
24 A. I am open to that evidence, but have not seen any
25 evidence that would lead me to conclude that they were
1 in 1939. I would note again that there were some plans
2 for plebiscites that were discussed in the negotiations
3 prior to the 1939 agreement. Those plebiscites were
4 never held, because the agreement was sealed rather
5 quickly in the course of these negotiations. So my
6 conclusion is that I simply have no basis for believing
7 that the Croats were in a majority in these particular
8 districts in 1939.
9 Q. I am pointing to your inference, 181 page:
10 "No counties have a Croatian majority. The only
11 way to get these numbers is to include in these six
12 counties the Muslim population in addition to the
14 However, you do not have the data, so you cannot
15 draw any inferences if you do not have the population
16 data, the census data for these six counties?
17 A. Well, as I've said, I have looked at 1991. I have also
18 looked at 1910. The percentages are remarkably
19 similar. Looking at the religious data, I feel that's
20 a conclusion I can reach. I am open to other data that
21 may contradict it, but I see no reason to abandon the
22 conclusion that one can only get to a majority, that is
23 an absolute majority, in these counties by grouping
24 together the Croats and the Muslims. This is not the
25 case in Herzegovina where there are several kotars or
1 counties in which there was an absolute Muslim majority,
2 but in reference to these Bosnian districts, it seems to
3 me that it's highly unlikely that in 1939 one can come
4 to the conclusion that there was a majority of Croats in
5 each of these districts.
6 Q. Well, thank you. In any event we can conclude that you
7 do not have data for 1939; is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. We'll move on. You talked about the positions of
10 Mr. Tudjman in his history books. Can you tell us
11 something about his personal views as a politician on
12 the issue of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
13 A. Well, I fail to distinguish in many respects between his
14 role as a historian and as a politician. I think that
15 he has been remarkably consistent in implementing
16 certain of his views reached as a historian in his role
17 as a politician as well. I guess I don't have any
18 insight into what his personal views might be apart from
19 those expressed by him as a historian and writer.
20 Q. Do you know anything about Alija Izetbegovic's
21 preparedness to accept the division of Bosnia and
23 A. Yes. Can you give me a time period in which you would
24 like to ...
25 Q. 16th September 1993 the agreement between Izetbegovic
1 and Krajisnik mediated by Messrs. Stoltenberg and Owen,
2 where there was a provision that The Republic could be
3 divided after two years. Do you know anything about
4 this agreement?
5 A. Not that specific agreement, no.
6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Do you have any information on
7 whether any international factors, as they were called
8 in the former Yugoslavia, were advocating the division
9 -- the United States, Germany, Great Britain, United
10 Nations, one of the five big agreements that you
12 A. I think one should look at this as a series of proposals
13 which involve to a greater or lesser extent the
14 separation of parts of Bosnia. In the discussions that
15 took place under the European community in February and
16 March of 1992, there was, of course, much discussion of
17 cantonisation, and I think that all of the parties
18 viewed that as an almost idyllic resolution on the Swiss
19 model rather than a plan for outright partition, but as
20 time went along and these discussions came under the
21 leadership of the London conference in the summer of
22 1992 and led to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, these became
23 much more closer to what one would characterise as
24 partition. President Izetbegovic was involved in these
25 discussions from the very beginning. At various times
1 he agreed to different proposals for the separation of
2 Bosnia into component parts, including the cantonisation
3 proposal that was first proposed in Lisbon and
4 subsequently to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. So I think
5 he was involved in these discussions from the very
6 beginning, and right up through the Dayton peace
7 agreements there were on-going discussions about the
8 resolutions that would allow a peaceful end of the
9 conflict and virtually every one of those proposals
10 involved some form of division.
11 At the same time President Izetbegovic frequently
12 asserted in the language of the United Nations'
13 resolutions his belief in a politically independent
14 sovereign and united Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two
15 in a sense were in some conflict. They were in
16 conflict not only in terms of the policy that
17 Mr. Izetbegovic pursued, but also that the policy that
18 was being pursued by the international community. The
19 United Nations' resolutions were asserting one thing and
20 at the same time the Vance-Owen talks were clearly
21 leading to some form of division.
22 Q. Can we conclude that during the negotiations which was
23 meant to resolve the war situation in Bosnia, all the
24 participants had in mind or operated with certain modes
25 of division within Bosnia and Herzegovina?
1 A. At one time or another I believe that is the case, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. Can we now please move on? You mentioned
3 five major peace agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 I would like to take you from one to the -- through all
5 of them so that we can see what the form of the central
6 and regional government was. That means the division of
7 power between the ethnic constituent parts and the
8 central government, for instance, of 23rd February 1993,
9 the Gutiero plan of the EU. Can you define these
10 provisions just briefly?
11 A. I am not going to be able to address issues of
12 constitutional law in this regard, but I can generally
13 characterise the agreement of the Gutiero plan or
14 agreement from Lisbon as one which supported
15 cantonisation and, as I've said, I think that the
16 cantonisation that people had in mind was the
17 establishment of political units which were largely
18 self-contained but which had nevertheless a strong
19 participation in the central government. If you wish
20 to move on to the provisions --
21 Q. Just a moment. I apologise. The EU plan of Lisbon,
22 can you tell us who signed it and who did not sign it?
23 A. It was signed in Sarajevo on March 18th. I believe it
24 was signed by all parties, the Bosnian Croat party,
25 President Izetbegovic for the Bosnian government and the
1 Bosnian Serbs.
2 Q. The logical question that arises from it: why wasn't it
3 implemented? Would you know an answer to that?
4 A. Yes. The agreement was renounced by President
5 Izetbegovic shortly after he signed it, towards the end
6 of the month of March, and it was also, I would note, a
7 rather desperate last minute effort to reach a
8 negotiated settlement when other developments on the
9 ground were rapidly leading to a military confrontation
10 and, in fact, skirmishes had already broken out in parts
11 of Bosnia at that time.
12 Q. Between which sides?
13 A. Between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government.
14 Q. Next as you mentioned in examination-in-chief the
15 Vance-Owen plans from January 1993. Can you give us
16 the main characteristics of this plan and who signed it,
18 A. The Vance-Owen plan was an outcome from the London
19 conference of August 1992, which asserted certain
20 constitutional -- certain principles for a peace plan,
21 including the return of the right of all refugees to
22 return to their homes, and then went on to specify some
23 provisional agreements, ultimately a demilitarisation
24 and some constitutional provisions. These protracted
25 negotiations in the Fall of 1992 really did not lead to
1 a consensus or an agreement by the three parties on a
2 map in particular. As I indicated in my direct
3 testimony on January 3rd, 1993, Mate Boban signed the
4 Vance-Owen plan in its entirety on behalf of the
6 Then on March 25th, after three long sessions in
7 New York Alija Izetbegovic signed on behalf of the
8 Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, although at
9 one point the agreement was initialled by Radovan
10 Karadzic on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, it was never,
11 in fact, endorsed by the assembly of the Bosnian Serbs
12 and therefore never effectively ratified by them.
13 Q. What happened to Alija Izetbegovic's position, that is
14 his signature? Did he abide by his commitment to the
15 agreement or did something else happen?
16 A. The agreement was never concluded because the Bosnian
17 Serbs never completed their ratification of it.
18 President Izetbegovic indicated at the time of signing
19 and in the several days after signing the document that
20 he would withdraw his signature within a period of ten
21 to fifteen days if the international community did not
22 succeed in persuading the Bosnian Serbs to ratify the
23 agreement or did not employ force to assure its
25 Q. And did he -- did his signature stay on this agreement
1 or did he withdraw it -- I mean Alija Izetbegovic?
2 A. To my knowledge, he never withdrew it.
3 Q. Can you address the relationship between the central
4 government and the provincial governments? According to
5 the Vance-Owen plan, what would be the relationship
6 between the central and local government, the provincial
8 A. Well, there were ten provincial governments stated or
9 outlined and the relationship between the central
10 government and each of these provincial entities was to
11 be quite weak. The central government would have
12 responsibility for foreign policy and some
13 administrative matters, but most other items would be
14 left to the individual provinces.
15 Q. Thank you. The next plan you mention was the agreement
16 between the Croats and Muslims from March 1994. This
17 was the fourth major plan, if I recall correctly?
18 A. Yes. I think we skipped number 3. Just very briefly
20 Q. Correct. The Owen-Stoltenberg from June of 1993?
21 A. Yes. In fact, there were a number of successive plans
22 which fall under the category of the Owen-Stoltenberg
23 agreement -- mediation and none of them were quite the
24 same. There was the union of republics; there was the
25 so-called proposal that was reached in the British
1 cruiser in the Adriatic Sea, which was from September of
2 1993; these and a couple of other plans which are
3 essentially territorial modifications of the Vance-Owen
4 plan were considered and for one reason or another not
5 ratified by all three parties in the course of the
6 latter half of 1993. Actually I would say the months
7 from June until early January 1994 -- June of 1993 until
8 early January of 1994.
9 Q. The common denominator of all these plans is the
10 existence of republics within Bosnia-Herzegovina and a
11 view of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of republics, all
12 this in reference to the Owen-Stoltenberg plans?
13 A. Yes, I would agree that that is one common
14 characteristic and the other common characteristic was
15 the very difficult negotiations intended to give the
16 Bosnian government either initially 30 per cent of the
17 territorial area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a number
18 that later changed to 33 per cent. This was a
19 percentages gain in territorial terms.
20 Q. Do you know who signed these Owen-Stoltenberg plans?
21 Who signed all of them? Can you specify which side
22 signed what?
23 A. No, I really can't specify what each one did. There
24 was opposition from Izetbegovic to signing at least a
25 couple of those, including the intrepid -- not intrepid
1 -- the plan from the Adriatic cruiser and there was
2 also resistance, of course, to the union of Serb
3 republics, as it was proposed in June.
4 Q. Can you say whether the Croatian side signed these
5 plans, and I mean the Owen-Stoltenberg plans?
6 A. They certainly signed -- I know that they signed the
7 first two, the first one that came in July of 1993 and
8 then the September plan.
9 Q. Thank you. Now plan number 4 was the plan from March
10 of 1994. Can you tell us what this plan involved?
11 A. This was -- this marked the first direct involvement by
12 United States diplomats to try to create an agreement
13 and resulted in the creation of the Federation of Bosnia
14 and Herzegovina by virtue of an agreement between the
15 Croat and Muslim parties. It began with the so-called
16 Washington accords and subsequently led to -- it began
17 with a cease-fire really between the Croat and Muslim
18 sides and led eventually to a constitutional arrangement
19 which was contained in the Washington agreements.
20 Q. Just in brief, did both sides sign this agreement and
21 kept their signatures on it?
22 A. Indeed they did. Dr Tudjman at the time that he signed
23 gave an unmistakable signal that he was being forced to
24 sign it by the western powers. He stated in the press
25 conference after his signature that: "The west has
1 concluded and is convincing us that we must work
2 together with the Muslims in Bosnia".
3 Q. But, if I understood you correctly, all sides signed it?
4 A. The Muslim and Croats signed it.
5 Q. Of course, yes. Now we move to the Dayton Agreement.
6 Can you tell us in brief what was the division of power
7 between the central government and the government -- the
8 power of the entities and then who all signed this
10 A. That's probably a question that no-one has quite
11 answered yet, but I'll give you at least an overview
12 answer of how the sovereignty was divided. The Dayton
13 agreements did involve a map that divided Bosnia into
14 two entities, one entity that of the Serb republic and
15 the second entity that of the Federation of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. A central government linking these
17 two entries was to be -- was established with very weak
18 powers and again more of a co-ordinating role than any
19 extensive functions.
20 Q. So according to the Dayton accords which are still in
21 effect, how do you assess Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a
22 federation, confederation or union of states?
23 A. It is some combination of all those. It is a weak
24 central polity made up of two largely separate entities,
25 each of which has committed itself to certain principles
1 that are contained in the Dayton agreement, including
2 the rights of refugees to return to their homes, the
3 maintenance of a military balance of power amongst the
4 two entities and a federation which was essentially a
5 non-starter from the beginning and in which the two
6 component parts have very little functioning common
7 life. It's hard to describe that in any short,
8 encapsulated form. The constitutional provisions of
9 the Dayton Agreement are sufficiently complex so that
10 I do not know that I can characterise it in a single
11 phrase or word.
12 Q. If we review all five of these agreements and a great
13 deal of time spent in negotiating them, am I correct in
14 saying that the basis of all those negotiations was a
15 bargaining over territory? I put it rather bluntly, but
16 maybe an exchange of territories between the entities?
17 A. They involve several issues. They involved from the
18 very beginning constitutional issues, the relationship
19 between the various component parts. All were
20 established on the basis of United Nations' resolutions
21 and proclamations, which emphasised the political
22 integrity, independence and territorial unit of Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina. They all involved discussions of the
24 provisional arrangements, namely the transitional
25 arrangements which would lead to peace, and a map as
1 well. So I think these negotiations all involved all
2 of those issues, and the one that ultimately prevailed,
3 of course, was the Dayton peace agreement.
4 Q. Do you believe that the acceptance of maps was the main
5 stumbling block, or was it some other constitutional
6 provisions, if we view all these five agreements
8 A. Well, I think there were several important issues, and
9 much of the individual discussions centred on maps, but
10 at a number of points in time constitutional
11 arrangements proved to be a more difficult issue to
12 resolve than one might assume. So I would believe that
13 the several issues were involved in these talks and to
14 view them as a map issue alone is an oversimplification
15 of the way these talks proceeded.
16 Q. Thank you. If we look at the Vance-Owen plan and all
17 the other plans that followed, leading up finally to the
18 Washington agreements and the Dayton accords, did the
19 acceptance of that plan mean agreeing to the abolition
20 of Herceg-Bosna? Therefore, the adoption of that plan
21 does it implicitly apply to the abolition of
23 A. I couldn't conclude -- I'm not a constitutional lawyer
24 and I do not know that I would agree that it does or
25 doesn't lead to the dissolution of Herceg-Bosna.
1 I know that at a number of points in the progression of
2 discussions the Croatian Republic committed itself to
3 the abolition of Herceg-Bosna and I honestly can't give
4 you the dates, but there were several occasions on which
5 that commitment was made, and, of course, not carried
7 Q. Thank you. May I ask you to go back a little to page
8 177, lines 4-7, of the transcript, when you quoted Lord
9 Owen's book, "the Balkan Odyssey", where he says that:
10 "Tudjman carried his nationalism openly on his
11 sleeve and that he had one goal in life, to control the
12 territory which he believed historically belonged to
14 A couple of lines above that the period of 1992
15 and 1993 is mentioned as the year when Mr. Owen described
16 Tudjman in this way. So could you briefly describe the
17 military situation that President Tudjman or Croatia
18 found itself in in 1992 and 1993, the military
20 A. Well, The Republic of Croatia, of course, was, as
21 I indicated in my direct testimony, involved in a bloody
22 war in the course of 1991, which resulted in a cease-fire
23 and establishment of a United Nations' mandate in the
24 Republic of Croatia. I'm not a military specialist and
25 I would only say that from the point of view of the
1 political developments that I watched, this was a time
2 in Croatia in which perhaps the primary domestic
3 political agenda was building up Croatia's armed forces.
4 Q. Can you tell us where the UNPA zones were formed when
5 the UN arrived? What percentage of the territory was
6 under the control of the rebel Croatian Serbs?
7 A. I do not know.
8 Q. Do you know that in 1992, when the United Nations'
9 forces came to the UNPA zone, as we called it, what
10 percentage of the territory at the beginning of 1992 was
11 under the control of the JNA and the Serbian side in
13 A. I'm unable to give you a percentage.
14 Q. Thank you. Your main position, and please correct me
15 if I'm wrong, Mr. Donia, is that Bosnia for centuries was
16 a multi-cultural society and that there were no
17 conflicts among its ethnic groups. So my question is:
18 the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina before 1991, did they
19 ever independently control their territory without the
20 supervision of some external force?
21 A. Let me say I think you have not accurately represented
22 my general view on the history of Bosnia. I do not
23 portray it as an idyllic world where no contention
24 occurred. I have made the point that violence, ethnic
25 violence, was largely absent in Bosnia except for two
1 major periods in its history, one in the period
2 1941-1945, and the second one the period that began in
3 1992. There was contention, disagreement and plenty of
4 other types of conflict, social, economic and at times
5 one sees the political organisations of the various
6 nationalities working in coalition with one another,
7 breaking up and working with other coalitions. So I do
8 not believe that I have asserted a conflict-free
9 society. I have suggested that the nature of violence
10 in Bosnia's history was largely not of an ethnic
11 character but these other characters. With that
12 clarification, may I ask you if you could re-ask the
13 question so that I can answer you?
14 Q. In the history of Bosnia before 1991 was there a period
15 when the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided their
16 destiny themselves; in other words, when Bosnia was not
17 a component part of a larger entity, a kingdom or a
19 A. I would just say that the term "deciding their destiny
20 by themselves" is a different question from whether
21 they were part of a larger entity. The answer to the
22 first part of that question is yes, I think they had
23 substantial control over their own destinies at various
24 times, but they were, as to the second part of your
25 question, consistently part of some other entity, with
1 the exception of the period of the Medieval Bosnian
2 State, which owed only nominal suzerainty to the
3 Hungarian Crown. After that, of course, Bosnia was
4 part of the Ottoman occupation until 1878;
5 Austro-Hungary, 1878 to 1918. I would say at times at
6 least in that period Bosnians had considerable control
7 over their own destiny, not as much as they wanted to,
8 but then part of the Yugoslav State, part of the
9 independent State of Croatia and then part of Socialist
10 Yugoslavia thereafter.
11 Q. Let us go according to chronology. In what way or
12 partially at least could it decide its destiny during
13 the Ottoman Empire?
14 A. I think you asked me if the peoples of Bosnia could
15 decide their own destiny and I think that, first of all,
16 there was a Muslim political elite which gained
17 considerable ability to control its own destiny in the
18 course of early 19th century -- late 18th, early 19th
19 century in Bosnia until some of those movements were
20 crushed by the Ottomans. Certainly at times the
21 Serbian Orthodox institutions in Bosnia had a limited
22 timing and ability to exercise control at least at the
23 local level. So of a lesser degree there probably
24 could be said of the Catholic church but certainly not
25 until very late in the period.
1 Q. Yes, but during the Austro-Hungarian empire in the
2 institutional sense could Bosnia in any way decide its
4 A. I'm not comfortable with the notion of Bosnia as an
5 animated entity. You began this question by asking
6 about the peoples of Bosnia and I think I can answer
7 that question. There was autonomy granted under
8 Austro-Hungarian rule to the Serbian church and school
9 communes in, I think, 1909 and to the Muslim religious
10 and cultural institutions also in 1909. In addition,
11 the Catholic church had considerable ability to
12 influence events in Bosnia under Austro-Hungarian rule,
13 so at least to some of the population that viewed itself
14 as Croatian had that right. I'm not arguing that
15 Bosnia as a political entity had independence or
16 sovereignty, but various peoples were able to achieve
17 some limited control over their own destinies over that
18 period, to be sure.
19 Q. What you have been talking about is cultural autonomy.
20 I am only interested in the political autonomy of the
21 peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. How could they decide
22 their destiny during the period of the Austro-Hungarian
23 empire? Through which institutions?
24 A. You lead me to the Parliament created in 1910, which
25 had, to be sure, limited authority. It was elected, as
1 I've indicated, on a limited franchise, and the power of
2 the Parliament to make laws was circumscribed to some
3 degree by the authorities, but that was the nature of
4 political authority which the Bosnians were able to
5 exercise during that period.
6 Q. During the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, if we leave aside the
7 Banovinas, the peoples who were living in the territory
8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina today, could they in any way
9 autonomously decide on their political destiny and
10 regulate their mutual relationships?
11 A. That again is two questions. Bosnia did not have
12 autonomy during royal Yugoslavia, but its people
13 participated in the Parliamentary institutions of the
14 kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1918
15 until the dictatorship was proclaimed in 1929 on a
16 largely unrestricted basis, much as citizens of a State
17 in the United States participate in federal political
18 institutions. After 1929 the rules were tightened and
19 the degree of that participation declined, but it
20 nevertheless continued in Parliamentary representation
21 and elections.
22 Q. Anyway if we ignore for a moment the Middle Ages, is it
23 correct to say that Bosnia-Herzegovina became a
24 sovereign state for the first time in 1991?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. A few words about the war in Slovenia. On
2 page 181 you mention that the Slovenians put up
3 surprisingly successful resistance to the JNA and as a
4 result the JNA with drew. So my question is: Did the
5 JNA withdraw from Slovenia because of the surprising
6 resistance of the Slovenes or for some other reason?
7 A. I think there were a combination of reasons. The
8 degree of resistance was indeed a surprise I think to
9 the JNA command and certainly facilitated its decision
10 they did not have much at stake in Slovenia. I will
11 stay away and avoid a single causal answer to your
12 answer. Certainly the surprising resistance by the
13 Slovenes was important. At the same time the JNA
14 command clearly arrived rather quickly at the conclusion
15 that Slovenia was not central to its plans and
16 furthermore that the detaching of Slovenia from the
17 Yugoslav Federal Republic might have some advantages for
18 the JNA.
19 Q. But why, why was the war in Slovenia so small in scale
20 and in Croatia much greater? Why was the fighting
21 fiercer? Can you tell us something about the reasons?
22 A. Well, the circumstances in Slovenia were such that the
23 JNA quickly arrived at a conclusion that its strategic
24 interests were not at stake, I think a decision
25 facilitated by the surprising resistance. This
1 decision was not one that the JNA reached in Croatia or
2 Bosnia. The reasons that it reached those conclusions
3 in Croatia and Bosnia are again several. Certainly of
4 vital importance was the concern for the Serbian
5 population that existed both in Croatia and Bosnia and
6 the then developing relationship between certain
7 officers in the JNA command and the Serbian political
8 movements in the Krajina and the paramilitary
9 organisations that had been trained in Serbia.
10 Q. You mentioned the strategic interest of the JNA. You
11 mentioned paramilitary Serbian organisations in
12 Krajina. Could you explain why it was in the strategic
13 interests of the JNA to go to war in Croatia and prevent
14 secession and it was not in its strategic interest to
15 prevent the secession of Slovenia, because according to
16 its constitution the JNA should have preserved the unit
17 of Yugoslavia. So that is the difference in the
18 strategic interests of the JNA in Slovenia and in
20 A. I am not sure what the constitution has to do with the
21 interests of the JNA. The JNA was in the position of
22 evaluating various positions. I really can't present
23 to you -- present myself as an expert as to what
24 happened within the JNA at that time and would be
25 reluctant to make an assessment about its strategic
2 Q. Yes, but you did mention the strategic interests. Let
3 me re-word that question. The Serbs' plan to determine
4 the western borders of Serbia, did they in any event
5 involve Slovenia in any sense?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Could we find the reasons for the lack of interest of
8 the JNA in the secession of Slovenia therein?
9 A. One might.
10 Q. Thank you. When, according to you, did the Yugoslav
11 people's army begin its interview in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. I can't fix a date for it. The Yugoslav National Army
13 was obviously posted in Bosnia from the time of World
14 War II, and so had, you know, serious facilities,
15 production facilities, troop facilities, large numbers
16 of troops in Bosnia that had been there all along. It
17 intensified their presence in Bosnia in the course of
18 the war in Croatia, but I can't really give you
19 specifics of that effort on the part of the JNA.
20 I think it's difficult to state a date that a group that
21 was there from the beginning or from some time can be
22 said to be directly intervening. That was more of a
23 progressive process that occurred over some time rather
24 than a single date in which it was initiated.
25 Q. Perhaps we could mention some of the more remarkable
1 events. Do you know when the JNA destroyed the
2 Croatian village of Ravno, at least the year? It is a
3 village in Bosnia-Herzegovenia?
4 A. October of 1991.
5 Q. Do you know when 10,000 reservists from Serbia and
6 Montenegro were deployed on the ground in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not into the barracks but on the
9 A. No. It was some time in the Fall of 1991.
10 Q. Do you know when the JNA arrested Alija Izetbegovic?
11 A. Yes. I'm not too sure where you're going with these
12 questions. I can answer "yes" and "no" to your
13 interrogation of my knowledge of these events but if
14 you're trying to ask for a series of developments,
15 I think it would be better to speak about this
16 progression of events as a holistic process. As I've
17 indicated, the mobilisation of the JNA intensified in
18 Bosnia in the Fall of 1991. That took -- there were
19 several dimensions to that. One was the creation of
20 the so-called Serbian military areas, which took place
21 in September of 1991, and secured greater military
22 control of some civilian areas and positioned the JNA to
23 better prosecute the war in Croatia. Then this role of
24 the JNA along the border areas of Croatia in particular
25 became very important in the way that the war was waged
1 in Croatia.
2 Q. I'm trying to see when the JNA started its preparations
3 for the conflict, and I think you've answered that
4 question. Do you know when a state of war was
5 proclaimed by the government in Sarajevo and against
6 whom? Who was designated the aggressor?
7 A. When a state of war was proclaimed in Sarajevo,
8 I believe it was 7th April 1991. I'm not certain. I
9 can't give you that date with certainty -- or 1992.
10 Q. Do you know when the first attack of the JNA was
11 launched on Sarajevo?
12 A. Again there are multiple dates that one can use. There
13 were clashes beginning on March 1st and actual attacks
14 that began by Serbian paramilitary units on April 6th,
15 and the first attacks on Sarajevo occurred immediately
17 Q. Do you know which is the official date for the
18 establishment of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
19 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina? When was it formally
21 A. No.
22 Q. Can you estimate whether this was before or after the
23 attack on Sarajevo?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. On page 184 of the transcript you claim
1 that Milosevic had a dispute with a part of the Bosnian
2 Serbs in March 1993. Am I correct in saying this?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Have I remembered what you said well? What does that
5 mean? Did he completely break off all relationships?
6 Did military co-operation between Serbia and the Bosnian
7 Serbs continue? Was there any kind of intervention by
8 the JNA? Could you explain that a little?
9 A. Sir, that's four questions I hear, and so could you ask
10 me one perhaps and I'll ...
11 Q. Yes. You claim that Milosevic fell out with a section
12 of the Bosnian Serbs in March 1993. What does that
13 exactly imply for you?
14 A. It was in March of 1993 that Milosevic asked the Bosnian
15 Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. There was
16 considerable pressure upon the Bosnian Serbs to do
17 that. At their so-called assembly they rejected that,
18 and I think at that point one can say that there was a
19 split or difference of view points between Milosevic and
20 the Bosnian Serb leadership.
21 Q. After that date did Serbia give the Bosnian Serbs
22 military assistance?
23 A. I believe they did, yes.
24 Q. After that date did paramilitary units from Serbia enter
25 Bosnia and wage war on the side of the Bosnian Serbs?
1 A. I would say that the preponderance of evidence would say
2 that they did, yes.
3 Q. After that date did the JNA in any way directly
4 participate in any one of the battles in the territory
5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. Just if I can clarify the question a minute, from May of
7 1992 going forward the JNA in its manifestations in
8 Bosnia became the army of the Bosnian Serbs.
9 Therefore, although I view this as yet an extension of
10 the JNA's military force under a different name, it did
11 become, in fact, a force under a separate command, that
12 of General Mladic, and the question as to whether the
13 JNA, as it was based in Serbia and Montenegro,
14 intervened, I think there are very strong probability
15 that additional units entered at the time of the fight
16 for Srebrenica in March and April 1993 but I do not have
17 the evidence to support that sufficiently.
18 Q. Thank you. We come to Karadordevo. You mentioned
19 Karadordevo --
20 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, perhaps we will take a break now,
21 20 minutes, which is what we are going to do from now on
22 so we do not overtax the interpreters. This morning
23 you said, Mr. Nobilo, that you thought you would
24 cross-examine the witness for about an hour. I think
25 it has been more than an hour now. I am not trying to
1 time you every time you ask questions, but I do think by
2 what your colleague said we should be finished by 5.30
3 and allow time for my colleagues and myself to ask
4 questions. So how do you see the rest of the
5 afternoon? How do you see the schedule for the rest of
6 the afternoon, because you are the one who knows the
7 questions you still have left to ask. We don't.
8 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I have another three pages of
9 this block of mine, and it's rather difficult for me to
10 say. I may have four or five questions and some
11 sub-questions, but I think I will be finished in less
12 than half an hour. At least I'll do my best to speed
13 up things as much as possible.
14 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Then we will resume at 4.30,
15 perhaps a slightly longer break, so that you can discuss
16 things with Mr. Hayman, and then if you take half an
17 hour, it will take us to 5 o'clock. Mr. Hayman, you
18 yourself, about how much time do you think you are going
19 to need?
20 MR. HAYMAN: I have eliminated about a third of my material
21 in the sake of brevity and speed, but I still think,
22 because I have a number of documents from the witness'
23 prior publications and writings to show him, that that
24 is going to take a period of time, just the simple
25 process of distributing and having some site
1 translations of very limited portions I have
2 highlighted. I do think it's going to take a couple of
3 hours but I think I can do it in a couple of hours.
4 JUDGE JORDA: About two hours then. Do you have any
5 comments you would like to make about this schedule,
6 Prosecution, because that means, of course, that
7 Mr. Donia would have to come back tomorrow morning.
8 Mr. Kehoe?
9 MR. KEHOE: I have to be here one way or the other, Judge.
10 I think it's a matter of Mr. Donia.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia is available to the International
12 Criminal Tribunal. I suppose that's what he is going
13 to answer, although I am sure you are tired?
14 A. I'm at your disposal, your Honour.
15 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Then we will break now. We'll
16 start again at 4.30 for an hour and then tomorrow
17 morning again.
18 (4.05 pm)
19 (Short break)
20 (4.30 pm)
21 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume. Please have the accused
22 brought in.
23 (Accused re-enters court)
24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo?
25 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, your Honour. Mr. Donia, we had
1 stopped at Karadordevo. You mentioned Karadordevo and
2 the speculations of the press on an agreement between
3 Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic on a division of
4 Bosnia; is that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Witness, microphone please.
7 MR. NOBILO: Do you know, are you aware of any statement
8 made by the participants in that meeting on the
9 substance of that meeting?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Do you have any direct information regarding the
12 contents of that meeting?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Speculation in the media, as you said, about the
15 agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic on the division
16 of Bosnia, do you accept it as a historian as being
17 correct or do you have a neutral or indifferent attitude
18 towards that?
19 A. On this issue of exactly what was agreed upon at
20 Milosevo, I have become an agnostic. I do not believe
21 that the participants have either made a statement of
22 sufficient clarity nor a denial that is sufficiently
23 convincing to lead me to any firm conclusion. I would
24 note that amongst my scholarly colleagues I'm in the
25 minority in that regard and those who have looked at the
1 interviews with people who were close to the
2 participants have come to the conclusion that there was
3 some sort of definite agreement. I'm thinking
4 principally about the article by Atilla Hore in the East
5 European Quarterly of April 1997 called "The Croatian
6 Project to Partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-1994"
7 based on interviews done by various publications in
8 Croatia with those who were either present or were close
9 to the participants. This is one example of an
10 independent person who has concluded that such an
11 agreement was reached, but I myself really can't
12 conclude anything other than that there was extensive
13 speculation and has been ever since in the media.
14 Q. Then perhaps as a neutral observer how would you explain
15 that after that agreement in the summer of 1991 Vukavar
16 took place and Dubrovnik took place, the events in
17 Vukavar and Dubrovnik. How does this match with the
18 agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic?
19 A. Well, I really do not believe it necessarily conflicts
20 with it, because the two parties, while potentially
21 eager to carve-up Bosnia, nevertheless were pursuing a
22 separate agenda. Each of them was pursuing a separate
23 agenda on the issue of Croatia. It will be remembered
24 that the Karadordevo meeting did take place early in
25 1991 prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia
1 and in Croatia, so this could be seen as one of several
2 efforts to reach an agreement prior to the outbreak of
3 hostilities and indeed one which might have potentially
4 prevented them. Again I emphasise I can draw no
5 conclusion as to exactly what agreement was reached at
7 Q. Thank you. On page 208 of the transcript you said that
8 the Republika Srpska and the Croatian Community of
9 Herceg-Bosna were very similar. It is lines 1-5.
10 Briefly could you tell us what is the main reason of the
11 formation of the Serb Republic? What is its aim?
12 A. Just to be clear, in the statement that I made I said
13 that the Croatian Community was engaging in an act at
14 this time that was remarkably similar to what the Serbs
15 were doing at the very same time, establishing a
16 separate community on a purely territorial basis. Your
17 basis was what was the purpose of the creation of the
18 Srkpsa Republika and its purpose was to establish a
19 separate territorial entity within Bosnia, which
20 certainly in the Bosnian Serb conception was one to be
21 dominated by the Bosnian Serbs or inhabited exclusively
22 by them.
23 Q. The founders of Republika Srpska, did they have a
24 further aim of unification with The Republic of Serbia,
25 or were they satisfied with establishing their own
1 entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. I think they probably had an ultimate aim of unification
3 with Serbia, but were not in a position to pursue that
4 agenda at that time.
5 Q. But did they officially declare that as being their
7 A. I do not know.
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what was the main aim of
9 the formation of the Croatian Community of
10 Herceg-Bosna? Why it was founded?
11 A. Well, I think it was founded for a couple of reasons,
12 but I would observe that it had the express purpose of
13 establishing a territorial entity of Bosnian Croats very
14 similar to the Serbian objectives at the time, a
15 separate territorial entity dominated by, if not
16 exclusively inhabited by, Bosnia's Croats.
17 Q. When establishing these facts did you have any contact
18 with the legal documents of the Croatian Community of
19 Herceg-Bosna or the founding documents?
20 A. Yes. I also took note of Lord Owen's observation that
21 in his view the objectives being pursued by the Croatian
22 Community were not only similar to but, in fact,
23 modelled on those of the Srkpsa Republika.
24 Q. Can you tell us in the founding act of the Croatian
25 Community of Herceg-Bosna what is stated to be the
1 reason for the formation of that community?
2 A. I do not have that document at hand.
3 Q. Can you tell me regarding the legal documents of
4 Herceg-Bosna did that community recognise being a part
5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina or not?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. When were the three autonomous Serbian
8 regions established? Could you tell us the dates?
9 A. September of 1991.
10 Q. And when was the Republika Srpska founded?
11 A. I do not have the exact date. I believe it was early
12 1992, perhaps January. In that range.
13 Q. Would you accept January 9th, 1992 as the date?
14 A. I will accept it, yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us in your assessment whether
16 the government in Sarajevo started in time to prepare
17 for defence against the aggression of the JNA, the
18 Yugoslav army?
19 A. Yes, it did.
20 Q. You spoke about dual citizenship and you claimed on page
21 211 of the transcript, like 17-21, that dual citizenship
22 -- I'm citing from memory -- that it was envisaged only
23 for those living in the Croatian Community of
24 Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?
25 A. That was the report that was carried in the press at the
1 time of the two resolutions that were passed at this
2 meeting on 9th February, the one regarding dual
3 citizenship on the territory of Herceg-Bosna and the
4 second regarding the upcoming referendum for
5 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is
7 Q. Have you seen those documents in their original form,
8 the documents you are referring to?
9 A. I've seen the press report. I forget the paper that
10 carried it. I believe it was Vjesnik. It may have
11 been Slobodna Dalmatia. One of those two newspapers
12 carried a report on the resolution of that meeting.
13 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the constitution of the
14 Republic of Croatia and the law on citizenship that all
15 Croats, regardless of where they live in the world, are
16 entitled to Croatian citizenship in addition to the
17 citizenship of the country of their residence?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you. Pursuant to the law and the constitution,
20 can a Croat from Sarajevo have a Croatian citizenship
21 just like a Croat from Medjugorje?
22 A. You're asking me a constitutional question. My
23 impression is that under the Croatian constitution and
24 this extraordinary provision that one could. One could
25 have that citizenship in Australia or Micronesia.
1 Q. On page 215 you talk about the territorial objectives of
2 the HDZ instead of the cultural objectives and the
3 cultural community of Bosnian Croats. Do you think
4 that it was appropriate in 1991 and 1992 to focus on the
5 formation of a cultural community or rather a community
6 that would defend the territory on which one lives?
7 A. Well, not only do I think that it was appropriate to
8 focus on a cultural community, but I would cite
9 interviews by the chief Franciscan in Bosnia, Petar
10 Anjelovic, and Bishop Pujic of Sarajevo, who in March
11 and July of 1993 both condemned in exclusionary policy
12 of a territorial emphasis abandoning these hundreds of
13 thousands of Croats outside the territorial unit of
14 Herceg-Bosna. I share their view that this is
15 inappropriate, was in 1992 and still would be.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you know that in the course of 1992 and
17 1993 how many Bosniaks and Croats fled from
19 A. Your question was how many Croats or Bosnian?
20 Q. Bosniaks and Croats, both ethnic groups as inhabitants
21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
22 A. That's a number that's a little bit contested. The
23 number frequently used for refugees created was 2
24 million. Many of those were refugees who were driven
25 from their homes but remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
1 a good probably half or more of those were indeed driven
2 from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and accepted in
3 refugees in neighbouring countries.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Donia. Your Honour, that would be all
5 I have for this witness.
6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Hayman.
8 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour. Good afternoon,
9 Mr. Donia?
10 A. Good afternoon, sir.
11 Q. Would you agree when war broke out in Bosnia in March of
12 1992 the JNA and/or Bosnian Serbs enjoyed an
13 overwhelming advantage in weaponry and personnel over
14 the combined forces of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The JNA or Bosnian Serbs had about 90,000 troops in
17 Bosnia at that time; is that correct?
18 A. Yes. That's a good number to -- it's a good estimate.
19 Q. And the JNA also controlled most armies and munition
20 stock piles and could rely on over 40 planes and
21 hundreds of tanks. Would you agree with that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. By contrast the Bosnian Croat militia had about how many
24 men under arms in that time period, if any, March/April
1 A. The Bosnian Croat militia, I'm not certain -- I wouldn't
2 be certain of that number without consulting.
3 Q. Do you have a copy of your book with you?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. "Bosnia and Herzegovina,: a tradition betrayed"?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Let me ask you to see if the passage at page 239
8 refreshes your recollection with respect to the number
9 of men under arms in the Bosnian Croat militia?
10 A. Yes. I cite the figure 12,000 in western Herzegovina.
11 Q. Now west Herzegovina, that's a good distance from
12 Central Bosnia; would you agree?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. It's more than 10 or 20 or even 50 kms from Central
15 Bosnia to western Herzegovina?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you know how many men under arms the Bosnian Croat
18 militia had in Central Bosnia in the time period April
20 A. No.
21 Q. Now, the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had superior
22 manpower to the Bosnian Croat militia. Would you agree
23 with that proposition as of April 1992, superior in
25 A. The territorial forces certainly had more nominal
1 participants than in the Croatian militia.
2 Q. And there were about 50,000 of those. Would you agree
3 with that?
4 A. Yes, of varying degrees of preparation, participation
5 and weaponry.
6 Q. Now when you say territorial forces, are you referring
7 to the indigenous reserve, if you will, forces that
8 existed throughout Yugoslavia prior to the war in 1992,
9 the wars in 1991 and 1992?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you know was the -- if you know, was the Bosnian
12 Croat militia in Central Bosnia also born from the
13 territorial forces, just like the army of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina was born from the territorial forces in that
16 A. No, I do not know.
17 Q. You do not know the answer to that question?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Do you have any reason to believe otherwise that the
20 Bosnian Croat militia in Central Bosnia was not born
21 from the territorial forces that existed in that region?
22 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I object to the form of the
23 question. I mean, the witness just said he didn't
25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, would you reformulate your
1 question or do you want to ask the question as you asked
3 MR. HAYMAN: Well, I asked did he have any reason to doubt
4 that the Bosnian Croat militia was from the territorial
5 forces. I will rephrase it, your Honour. Do you have
6 any information to the contrary, Mr. Donia?
7 A. I just know very little about the actual formation of
8 the HVO in Bosnia. I just can't answer the question.
9 I have no reason to believe otherwise but have no reason
10 to believe that was the case either.
11 Q. Were the members of the territorial force or forces,
12 were they professional soldiers?
13 A. No. They were in a sense trained reservists.
14 Q. Were they reservists, if you know, that had a regular
15 period of duty, such as one month a year or 20 weekends
16 a year, or was that not part of the territorial force
18 A. I know that they were not full-time forces. I do not
19 know what their annual obligations were.
20 Q. Do you know whether all men between certain ages were
21 actually members of the territorial force in the former
23 A. Well, I think that was the original intent in theory but
24 to the extent to which it became reality I really do not
1 Q. Do you know whether the members of the territorial
2 forces had firearms issued to them? In other words did
3 they have their own firearm in the former Yugoslavia?
4 A. I do not know.
5 Q. Do you know whether they possessed any modern
6 communications equipment?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you know whether the concept of the territorial
9 forces was that they would defend their own local area
10 in case of an attack by an aggressor?
11 A. That was certainly the theory, yes.
12 Q. Do you agree that's inconsistent with the concept of a
13 mobile fighting force that will move outside of its
14 local area in order to fight an aggressor on another
16 A. Well, yes. I think it is inconsistent. It's certainly
17 not part of a unified theory. The territorial forces
18 were in the event of an invasion were clearly not
19 expected to remain within 1 km or 2 of their homes, but
20 neither were they a highly mobile force designed to move
21 all the way across the country.
22 Q. You referred in your direct testimony to the process by
23 which greater combat capability was achieved by the
24 territorial forces as a process that occurred over
25 approximately three years. If you would like to look
1 at that testimony, that's on page 187, line 18: do you
2 see that testimony?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. If you know, was that greater strength or combat
5 capability gained over a three year period because
6 soldiers acquired more training over those three years?
7 A. I think it was a number of factors.
8 Q. Would that have been one of the factors?
9 A. Yes. They acquired certainly more training; they
10 acquired more weapons; they acquired certain mobile
11 capabilities that they didn't have before. So that
12 process did, in fact, move forward within Bosnia for
13 those forces, yes.
14 Q. Would their potency, if you will, also have changed and
15 improved as they learned matters such as discipline,
16 military discipline, what that means?
17 A. Yes, I think so.
18 Q. At the end of this three year time period that you have
19 outlined, which would have been roughly in 1995, would
20 the army or armies that grew out of the territorial
21 forces, would they have been comparable, in your
22 opinion, to mature armies in western Europe, the British
23 army or other armies, the America army, something like
24 that, or would there still have been a gap in terms of
25 the maturity and level of professionalism between those
1 two groups of fighting forces?
2 A. I've addressed in my direct testimony two issues, the
3 Croatian army and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
4 I would just like to note that there was some difference
5 between the two in that Croatian forces had much greater
6 access to modern weaponry and the Croatian army under
7 the very strong campaign to regain its strength probably
8 developed greater capabilities than the army of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina in this period that we're talking
11 Q. I'm asking you, though, about the elements that grew out
12 of the territorial forces. You've said that the army
13 of Bosnia and Herzegovina grew out of the territorial
14 forces of the former Yugoslavia; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you've said you do not know whether the HVO in
17 Central Bosnia also grew out of the territorial forces;
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. So focusing for the moment on that force or forces that
21 grew out of the territorial forces that existed in the
22 former Yugoslavia, would you say that as of the end of
23 this three year period you have outlined in roughly
24 1995, would the force or forces that resulted from this
25 process of elevation have been comparable to a modern
1 army in western Europe, or would there still have been a
2 gap between those two?
3 A. It was in no way comparable to a west European army.
4 Q. Is that because there would still have been a gap in
5 terms of the level of training of those two groups of
6 soldiers? Would you agree with that?
7 A. Among other factors, yes. Training, weaponry,
8 ammunition. So a variety of factors inhibited the
9 growth of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that period.
10 Q. And the overall level of professionalism and discipline
11 would also have been different from that in a modern
12 western European army?
13 A. Yes. It was a very different kind of force.
14 Q. Would you agree with the proposition that roads in
15 Central Bosnia have historically been of critical
16 military significance?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. In fact, they were very important to the German
19 occupiers, were they not?
20 A. Yes, they were. They were important to the Austrian
21 forces who invaded and occupied back in 1878, yes.
22 Q. And similarly, were they very important -- that is they
23 were of strategic military significance -- in the
24 conflict that erupted in Central Bosnia between Croats
25 and Muslims? Would you agree with that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Would you agree that that conclusion would apply, for
3 example, to the road from Busovaca to Travnik in Central
4 Bosnia? Would you consider that to be an important
5 artery between two cities of some size?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You said a moment ago that there were roughly 1 million
8 refugees within Bosnia that remained within Bosnia at
9 some point in time. I didn't catch the time. Roughly
10 when would that have been? By what point would there
11 have been 1 million refugees? If you wish to discuss
12 your recollection, you do discuss this issue at the top
13 of page 245 in your book. I recognise it's late in the
14 day, Mr. Donia, and I'm not going to make your
15 examination a memory quiz?
16 A. I just appreciate your reading the book. The flow of
17 refugees rapidly increased after April of 1992 and
18 I have indicated that by the Fall of 1992 that about 2
19 million refugees had been created.
20 Q. Do you agree with the proposition that about 1 million
21 of those remained in Bosnia?
22 A. At one time or another, yes. Again that was a
23 progressive process that many of them fled or left and
24 so taking a snapshot in time is probably difficult. It
25 was a process, but I think my point in making the
1 statement in the book was that Bosnia itself carried a
2 very heavy refugee burden, along with the countries to
3 which many of these refugees fled.
4 Q. And it was an extraordinarily heavy burden, was it not,
5 the burden from these refugees, the burden, for example,
6 on municipal services?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Providing the minimum wherewithal to these individuals
9 placed a huge burden on the authorities in the areas in
10 which these refugees came; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now do you know with any specificity whether, in fact,
13 central Bosnia was the recipient, if you will, of a
14 substantial inflow of refugees during the latter part of
16 A. No.
17 Q. Well, let us think about that for a movement. Eastern
18 Bosnia was in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs by the Fall
19 of 1992; correct?
20 A. Yes. Northern Bosnia -- let me take exception to all of
21 Eastern Bosnia. There were still numerous enclaves
22 which had large populations of Muslims who were
23 subsequently to become refugees. Some of them were
24 already refugees from villages then controlled by the
25 Bosnian Serb forces.
1 Q. Let's step back one step. When war broke out, would
2 you agree that within a matter of weeks the Bosnian
3 Serbs occupied, took over approximately 65 per cent of
4 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And did they necessarily create a vast movement of
7 refugees by virtue of that action which they took?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did their actions during that early period in the war
10 include actions in Eastern Bosnia?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And in northern Bosnia?
13 A. Yes, and in the western --
14 Q. And in north-west Bosnia?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And would you agree that simple geometry would suggest
17 that refugees fleeing these movements would in part at
18 least tend to flow in towards Central Bosnia?
19 A. That's speculation. I do not really know enough about
20 the flow of refugees in that part of the country to
21 answer your question. My experience in looking at some
22 other areas was that refugees tended to flow along the
23 areas of easiest egress and into towns with which they
24 were familiar, for example from Eastern Bosnia there was
25 a great flow into Tuzla, which was the city most
1 familiar to refugees in that part of the country.
2 Q. Let me change the subject. We have a little bit of
3 time remaining and I'll try and use it efficiently, if
4 I may.
5 You testified during your direct examination
6 concerning a so-called ultimatum, which you
7 characterised as an ultimatum which gave a deadline of
8 April 15th, 1993. Do you recall that testimony
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you read in your testimony portions of a news
12 article, one or more news articles, which I believe were
13 Exhibits 25 and 26. I do not know that you'll need to
14 refer to them, but perhaps they could be placed in front
15 of the witness for ease of reference, if necessary. Do
16 you have a summary of the agreement, so we can continue
17 while those are being put in front of you?
18 A. I have the documents.
19 Q. You have them?
20 A. Uh-huh.
21 Q. Very good. There are how many points according to this
22 news story in this "ultimatum"?
23 A. The draft agreement contains six points. I would point
24 out that the two documents, one an article from Slobodna
25 Dalmatia and the other an article from Vjesnik
1 apparently share more in common than those six points.
2 That is there is a declaration of sorts that was issued
3 by the Croatian Defence Council and which is reflected
4 in both documents.
5 Q. So there are six points; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. According to the news stories?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Point one in essence, would you agree it is that all
10 misunderstandings between the Croat and Muslim nation
11 that is in Bosnia concerning borders, etc., have been
12 resolved? Is that the first point in essence?
13 A. The language is that all misunderstandings have been
15 Q. So there are no further misunderstandings. That's the
16 essence of point one; would you agree?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now point two, would you agree that the essence is that
19 external forces, that is forces that did not originate
20 from within a particular area, must leave that area
21 within three days?
22 A. Yes. Now I want to clarify the nature of this document
23 that we're looking at. It is a quoted six point draft
24 agreement, which has been signed by one party and not
25 the other. Your statement of the nature of the first
1 and second points I accept.
2 Q. Fine. Would you agree that that second point would
3 mean that if, for example, there was a garrison of
4 troops that was permanently posted, for example, in the
5 town of Zenica and had been raised from persons in that
6 area, that garrison of troops would not have to leave
7 that area under point two of this agreement?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now point three, would you agree, provides that in each
10 of the provinces under the Vance-Owen plan, of the six
11 provinces that were designated as so-called Croat or
12 Muslim provinces, that in each one command would be
13 exercised by either the HVO or the army of Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina over all HVO and army of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina forces within that province or canton?
16 Would you agree with that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Would you agree that a unitary command structure of this
19 type would be more effective, would have been more
20 effective in co-ordinating the common defence against the
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now point four, would you agree that in essence that
24 point obliges the headquarters of the HVO and that of
25 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina to form a joint
1 headquarters by April 15th, 1993?
2 A. No, it does not oblige the staff of the army of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina to do so because it was not signed by
5 Q. It would under the terms of the agreement; accepting it
6 for the moment as under the four corners of the
7 agreement, that's what's proposed or contemplated by
8 point four; would you agree?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Then point 5 is in essence a point that states: "There
11 shall be no further conflict"?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Point 6 provides for free passage of people and goods;
14 is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. After this proposal was out in the media after about
17 April 3rd, 1993, did President Izetbegovic speak out and
18 reject this proposal?
19 A. I would like to point out that these six points do not
20 stand in isolation in this document. This document was
21 not circulated in the media by itself. It was
22 circulated as part of a broader declaration by the
23 Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of
24 Herceg-Bosna, which involved specific steps regarding
25 its implementation. Thus, as far as what President
1 Izetbegovic knew about it or was given the opportunity
2 to sign, that is not clear from this document at all.
3 Q. So you do not believe that this agreement in terms, the
4 six points we have just described, that that ever
5 existed as a separate document?
6 A. I do not know.
7 Q. You do not know?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Would you like to see it?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Have you ever seen it before, the agreement with the six
12 points we have discussed?
13 A. No. I've only seen the press reports.
14 Q. Could the usher assist in placing an exhibit before the
15 witness, your Honour? There's also a French
16 translation, so perhaps these two exhibits could be
17 marked in a co-ordinated manner.
18 JUDGE JORDA: Usher, would you make sure that the exhibits
19 are numbered correctly, please.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. This is D/6 and D/6A is the French
22 MR. HAYMAN: Did you have occasion, Mr. Donia, before
23 testifying to meet and confer with the representatives
24 of the office of the Tribunal Prosecutor?
25 A. I did, yes.
1 Q. In the course of those conferences did you discuss the
2 issue of this so-called ultimatum that you have
3 subscribed to in these two news reports, Exhibits 25 and
4 26? Was that subject discussed?
5 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
6 Q. At any time did representatives of the Office of the
7 Prosecutor tell you that they had in their possession
8 this joint statement, which is exhibit D6?
9 A. This statement in this form?
10 Q. In this form?
11 A. No.
12 Q. They didn't show it to you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. And they didn't tell you that they had it?
15 A. No.
16 Q. When did you first conclude that this so-called
17 ultimatum and the "deadline" of April 15th, 1993 was of
18 great significance?
19 A. I first concluded that there was a deadline of great
20 significance when I went to the Foreign Broadcast
21 Information Service Reports for the period from late
22 March to mid-April 1993 and at that time I noted a
23 report which indicated that there was an ultimatum in
24 effect, and that further led me to want to confirm its
25 existence in the periodic press of the time and then, in
1 fact, to request the Prosecution research team anything
2 that would confirm the existence of that ultimatum and
3 this agreement.
4 Q. So I take it the Prosecution gave you Exhibits 25 and
5 26; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You did not turn those up as a result of your own
8 research and study?
9 A. I did turn up the ultimatum itself as a result of my own
10 research and study. I specifically -- I asked the
11 Prosecution team, in particular Milan Andrejevic, who is
12 very familiar with those press -- the periodical press
13 in that time to confirm the existence of that ultimatum.
14 Q. Did you find Exhibits 25 and 26 or did the Prosecution
15 provide them to you?
16 A. The Prosecution provided them to me.
17 Q. When you say you found an "ultimatum", are you stating
18 that you found reported in press reports of an
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Is there any mention in your book of this so-called
23 A. No.
24 Q. Your book is over 300 pages in length. Would you agree
25 with that?
1 A. I think that's right, yes.
2 Q. And that's true despite the fact you state in the
3 preface or introduction that:
4 "Our account is intended to shed light on the
5 sources of the Bosnian conflict that began in early
8 A. That was indeed the intent of the book. It is
9 unfortunately not a comprehensive account and there are
10 many, many omissions in that volume. I could tell you
12 Q. In fact, in your book do you attribute the conflict that
13 broke out in April of 1993 between Bosnian Croats and
14 Bosnian Muslims to other factors than this so-called
16 A. Yes. I think I mention a number of factors in there.
17 Q. And this so-called ultimatum is not one of them; is that
19 A. That is correct. I was unaware of that ultimatum at
20 the time I penned those lines in the summer of 1993.
21 Q. Has your opinion and views changed and now you do
22 believe this so-called ultimatum was a critical factor
23 in sparking conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
24 Muslims in April 1993?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Other than the Prosecution investigators and other
2 representatives of the office of the Tribunal
3 Prosecutor, have you interviewed a single participant in
4 either the political arena or the military arena in
5 Central Bosnia on this issue of whether this agreement
6 was viewed as an ultimatum or not, and whether it had
7 any role in sparking conflict between Bosnian Muslims
8 and Bosnian Croats? Have you interviewed a single
9 participant in those events on that issue?
10 A. No.
11 Q. In your meetings with the Office of the Prosecutor did
12 they tell you that they had represented to the
13 confirming Judge in this case that, in fact, this
14 agreement, which is exhibit D/6, was reached?
15 A. I'm sorry. Would you ask that question again?
16 Q. Did they tell you that they represented to the
17 confirming Judge, that is the Judge who confirms the
18 indictment in this matter, that this agreement was
19 reached and entered into by President Izetbegovic and
20 Mr. Boban?
21 A. They did not so represent to me, no.
22 Q. Could the usher assist in distributing additional
23 exhibits, your Honour? Again there's an English and a
24 French version. (Handed). Could the Registrar
25 provide the exhibit numbers, your Honour?
1 THE REGISTRAR: This is document D/7 and D/7A.
2 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Mr. Donia, these are materials from
3 which non-pertinent portions have been redacted. What
4 remains, have you had a chance to read it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Have you ever seen this document before, exhibit D/7?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Have you ever discussed it with anyone from the office
9 of the Tribunal Prosecutor, the contents of this
11 A. No.
12 Q. You stated in your direct testimony that you believed
13 this six point agreement would be wholly unacceptable,
14 or words to that effect, on the part of the Government
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?
16 A. I want to see my words.
17 Q. How would you put it? You voiced some sentiment in that
18 direction. You can pick your own words. How would
19 you put it?
20 A. I have never been certain about the original drafting of
21 this document and the specific time of authorship and
22 persons of authorship are not and haven't been at any
23 point known to me. So I have looked at it and believed
24 it was very much in the kind of spirit of what was going
25 on as the HVO pushed forward for a resolution of the
1 jurisdictional issues at that time. It certainly was
2 not something that Alija Izetbegovic and the Government
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina would eagerly put forward. At
4 the same time it was in the -- particularly point four,
5 which pertains to a joint headquarters, it was very much
6 in accord with the announcement of President Izetbegovic
7 in Zagreb a few days before this.
8 Q. Speaking out in favour of a joint headquarters, so that
9 a more co-ordinated and effective resistance to the
10 Serbian aggression could be mounted by the Bosnian
11 Croats and Bosnian Muslims; correct?
12 A. Well, you put words in his mouth. I think he emerged
13 from the meeting with President Tudjman and Mr. Boban
14 having the announcement that this had been agreed upon,
15 and certainly the pressures on him at that point were a
16 factor in his reaching that agreement.
17 Q. So is it your testimony that you are unsure whether the
18 six points in this agreement would or would not have
19 been unacceptable to the Government of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina at the time?
21 A. I would say that with regards to point four, I have no
22 doubt that it was acceptable and desirable. With
23 regards to the other points, I think that the enthusiasm
24 -- there would be certainly rapid agreement on point
25 one, much less agreement on point two, much less
1 eagerness on the part of the government to endorse point
2 two, and the same point with point three and certainly
3 strong agreement on point four -- excuse me -- five and
5 Q. Your Honour, we have reached 5.30. If this is a
6 convenient breaking point ...
7 JUDGE JORDA: Oui. I thought we would be able to break at
8 this point. We will resume tomorrow at 10 o'clock with
9 the continued cross-examination of Mr. Donia. The court
10 stands adjourned until tomorrow.
11 (5.30 pm)
12 (Court adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning)