International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Case No IT-95-14

  1. 1 Tuesday, 22nd July 1997

    2 (10.00 am)

    3 Mr. Robert Donia (continued)

    4 Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Can we have the accused

    6 brought in which the usher, please?

    7 (Accused enters court)

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Before we start our hearing today -- let us

    9 wait until Mr. Blaskic sits down -- I would like to ask

    10 Mr. Harmon to come here along with one of the Defence

    11 lawyers, perhaps two of them, but either one, Mr. Hayman

    12 or Mr. Nobilo. It is for an organisational issue that

    13 I would like to have in camera here. So I'm asking you

    14 to approach the bench. (Pause.)

    15 All right. We can now resume our hearing, the

    16 public hearing, that is. Usher, would you please have

    17 the witness brought in, Mr. Donia?

    18 (Witness enters court)

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, good morning. Do you hear me?

    20 A. Yes, sir. Good morning.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Have you rested?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: That's good. Mr. Hayman, you have the

    24 floor.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Donia?

  2. 1 A. Good morning, Mr. Hayman.

    2 Q. Let me return to the subject that we ended with

    3 yesterday, Exhibit D/6, the document titled "joint

    4 statement". Do you know of any agreements between

    5 these parties prior to this date of April 1993 wherein

    6 in substance the parties agreed to any of these points?

    7 A. On 24th March 1993 in New York President Izetbegovic and

    8 Mr. Boban, according to Lord Owen, held a five hour

    9 session at which they reached agreement on the interim

    10 arrangements, in Lord Owen's words, after President

    11 Izetbegovic had been threatened by Mr. Boban with the

    12 dissolution of their then military alliance.

    13 Q. Do you know any more about what interim arrangements

    14 were agreed upon on March 24th?

    15 A. No.

    16 Q. Do you know of any other agreements prior to 2nd April

    17 1993 within any of the six points in the joint

    18 statement, which is Exhibit D/6, were agreed upon

    19 between the parties.

    20 A. There was reported an agreement between President

    21 Izetbegovic, on the one hand, and President Tudjman and

    22 Mr. Boban, on the other hand in Zagreb on I believe it

    23 was 28th of March. That pertained, as far as the

    24 announcement was concerned, only to the establishment of

    25 a joint command.

  3. 1 Q. That would relate -- would that relate to point three or

    2 four in Exhibit D/6?

    3 A. Well, it would -- it's similar to point four.

    4 Q. After this date, April 2, 1993, when was the first

    5 agreement between the parties ratifying or documenting

    6 agreement on any of these six points in Exhibit D/6?

    7 A. I do not know of any in the immediate time-frame of this

    8 document.

    9 Q. Do you know of any in April of 1993?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. If the usher could assist, your Honour, I have a

    12 document I would like placed before the witness.

    13 (Handed.) This has been provided to the translators and

    14 I understand they have had a chance to review it, but

    15 they have not produced a written translation, your

    16 Honour. If you would take a moment to review that,

    17 Mr. Donia, please ...

    18 A. Okay. (Pause.)

    19 Q. Perhaps while we are doing that, your Honour, a site

    20 translation could be provided?

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Oui. What passage, Mr. Hayman, are you

    22 talking about? What passage do you want to have

    23 translated? I would like it not to be too quick so that

    24 our interpreters can do it properly.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: I would recommend the introduction, then under

  4. 1 "joint statement", paragraph 2, 3, paragraph 5 and the

    2 paragraphs titled "enclosure" on the second page, which

    3 are five short paragraphs. (Pause.)

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, thank you.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, would you agree, walking through this

    6 document with me, that under paragraph two on the first

    7 page, under the heading "joint statement", the last

    8 sentence regarding a cease-fire of hostilities, that that

    9 is substantially equivalent to point 5 in Exhibit D/6,

    10 the joint statement?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Moving on to the next page, to the top of the page,

    13 which is the continued part of paragraph 3 of the joint

    14 statement, I draw your attention again to the last

    15 sentence regarding two things: first, the directive:

    16 " ... to immediately start implementing the

    17 agreement on the legality of both the army of Bosnia and

    18 Herzegovina and the HVO".

    19 Do you know to what that is a reference?

    20 A. No.

    21 Q. The next clause provides further a directive or an

    22 agreement on:

    23 "... the establishment of a joint command of both

    24 forces made up of representatives of both headquarters".

    25 Do you agree that that constitutes all of the

  5. 1 essential elements or components in point four of the

    2 joint statement, which is Exhibit D/6?

    3 A. It specified no deadline for that creation, but other

    4 than that is in agreement with point four.

    5 Q. And it directs the establishment of a command?

    6 A. It does, yes.

    7 Q. Then directing your attention to the portion marked

    8 enclosure, paragraph three directs or indicates that the

    9 permanent joint headquarters or command will be located

    10 at Travnik. Do you see that?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Do you know whether or not that joint command was

    13 established in Travnik?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. You do not know?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. In paragraphs 4 and 5 would you agree -- this is also of

    18 the enclosure, in the enclosure -- would you agree that

    19 the contents of those paragraphs constitute the same

    20 agreement, the same elements present in point three of

    21 Exhibit D/6, the joint statement?

    22 A. Point three -- excuse me just a second.

    23 Q. Strike that. Let me restate the question. Would you

    24 agree that without specifying which force will have

    25 command in what particular territorial area, that

  6. 1 paragraphs 4 and 5 of exhibit D/8 creates the same

    2 structure or a similar structure as is contemplated in

    3 paragraph 3 of Exhibit D/6, that is unified command over

    4 HVO and ABIH forces?

    5 A. There is a contradiction between that portion of point 4

    6 -- point 4 in the enclosure, which states these would

    7 be related to the operational command for joint

    8 operations and not to provincial boundaries and the

    9 specifications, I believe, of point two on the joint

    10 statement. The establishment of a joint command under

    11 joint headquarters seems to me to correspond to the

    12 provisions in that first paragraph of point three.

    13 Q. You are referring now to Exhibit D/6?

    14 A. To the joint statement, yes.

    15 Q. Wouldn't you agree that in paragraph 4 of exhibit D/8,

    16 which is the agreement of 25th April, that an agreement

    17 was made that military districts would be identified?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. And would you further agree that each district was to

    20 have a commander and a deputy, one from the HVO and the

    21 other from the ABiH?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. And would you further agree that line of command was to

    24 have unified command overall BiH and HVO forces within

    25 that military district?

  7. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Do you know whether in April, as of April 25th of 1993,

    3 whether point two, that is the issue raised in point two

    4 of Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was that a live

    5 issue in Central Bosnia, if you know? Was that an issue

    6 of any contention between the parties, the presence of

    7 so-called outside forces in the region?

    8 A. Yes, it was.

    9 Q. How do you know that?

    10 A. It was -- I certainly have considered it as a source of

    11 tension between the government and Bosnian Croat parties

    12 for some months after the signing of the Vance-Owen by

    13 the Bosnian government on 25th March.

    14 Q. What issue do you perceive or believe to have existed

    15 between the parties on that subject as of that date?

    16 A. Well, the question of whether the armed forces would be

    17 and police would be separated by the Vance-Owen

    18 boundaries.

    19 Q. By that you mean local -- whether local forces within

    20 each canton or province would, in effect, be in charge?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. So you maintain that that was still an issue in dispute

    23 as of April 25th, 1993?

    24 A. That would be my understanding, yes, it was.

    25 Q. If I may have a moment, your Honour ... (Pause.) We'll

  8. 1 come back to that issue after perhaps the break, if we

    2 reach one, Mr. Donia. Perhaps if you have an

    3 opportunity during the break, you, too, can review the

    4 provisions of the Vance-Owen plan agreed upon on 25th

    5 March 1993.

    6 Q. Let me ask you: during the evening recess did you have

    7 a chance to confer with anyone concerning whether

    8 Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, was ever, in fact,

    9 reached, that is whether any agreement was ever reached

    10 between the parties indicated on that statement as to

    11 those points?

    12 A. Well, the first part of your question is yes, I have had

    13 an opportunity to confer with members of the Prosecution

    14 on that issue of the joint -- so-called joint statement

    15 of 2nd April. I can't tell you that I reached a

    16 conclusion on the second part of your question, which

    17 was exactly the nature of the agreement reached.

    18 Q. Did they give you their position?

    19 A. No.

    20 Q. Did they tell you what they believed with respect to

    21 that issue?

    22 A. I do not know that they have a position and they haven't

    23 shared a particular belief with me on it.

    24 Q. Did they make any additional materials available to you?

    25 A. They made available to me two documents which I first

  9. 1 saw on 26th May 1997, which were the Statement of Facts

    2 relevant not to this document but to the other one that

    3 you showed me, from which you indicated that material

    4 had been excised. I would tell you that, in fact,

    5 I have seen that document before on 26th May. It is,

    6 in fact, 41 pages long, has 169 paragraphs in it. So

    7 when you stated that there was material excised, I think

    8 you were referring to about 20 pages, and 168

    9 paragraphs.

    10 Q. That's right. In order to relieve the burden on the

    11 interpreters and so forth, you can imagine it's

    12 necessary --

    13 MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, would you go ahead?

    15 MR. KEHOE: I object to Mr. Hayman's speech, after yesterday

    16 he gives this witness one paragraph from a 41 page

    17 document with 169 paragraphs in it and uses as an excuse

    18 the fact that he is trying to alleviate the burden on

    19 the interpreters. I object to his speech. He did

    20 what he did.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: The facts speak for themselves, your Honour.

    22 I can proceed.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Then proceed.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Are you telling us, Mr. Donia, that you were in

    25 error when you testified yesterday that you'd never seen

  10. 1 the materials which were Exhibit D/7?

    2 A. I assume your designation of the exhibit is correct. I

    3 had indeed seen those on 26th March as a very small part

    4 of a much larger document of the length that

    5 I indicated, yes.

    6 Q. And did you discuss with the Prosecutor whether this

    7 redaction of this document was some attempt by me to

    8 deceive you as to the content of what I showed you and

    9 what was Exhibit D/7?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. Do you believe it was an attempt by me to deceive you?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. You testified yesterday that you first focused on the

    14 so-called ultimatum, which you have -- a label you have

    15 assigned to Exhibit D/6, some time in May of this year;

    16 is that right?

    17 A. That's -- no, I think I believe I said in June, either

    18 late May or early June.

    19 Q. And that's well after your book had been published?

    20 A. Well after it, yes.

    21 Q. And the material you came into possession of at or after

    22 that point in time caused you to change your opinion as

    23 to the causes of the conflict between Croats and Muslims

    24 that erupted in Central Bosnia in April of 1993;

    25 correct?

  11. 1 A. Perhaps not my broad general opinion, but the specific

    2 causation certainly is much more closely pinpointed for

    3 me at this point, yes.

    4 Q. Now would your opinion change if you learned that at

    5 least one influential actor on the ground in the region

    6 did not view Exhibit D/6 as an ultimatum? Might that

    7 cause you to change your opinion? I'm referring to an

    8 actor on the side of the Bosnian government.

    9 A. It might. I am of the belief that any student of

    10 history has to at any time be willing to revise

    11 conclusions based on new evidence --

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Hayman. Could you make your

    13 question more specific because you are making your

    14 question to people who know one another. I ask you to

    15 rephrase your question making it very clear what you are

    16 referring to. It's difficult for the judges to listen

    17 to this dialogue between two people who know what

    18 they're talking about. So make your questions more

    19 specific, please.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. I will try. Your

    21 Honour, I have a document I would like placed before the

    22 witness. It's a portion of a statement of a

    23 prosecution witness whose identity and the contents of

    24 the statement I am not free to publicly disclose,

    25 including here in this public session. But I would

  12. 1 nonetheless like it placed before the witness and

    2 I would ask him to read the last paragraph. I would

    3 ask that a site translation of the last paragraph be

    4 provided. The translators already have a copy of

    5 this. All we need, your Honour, is some way to inform

    6 the witness of the position of this individual and then

    7 I simply intend to ask the general question: does

    8 having this information in any way cause him to change

    9 or even question the opinion he has proffered to the

    10 court?

    11 JUDGE JORDA: This document that you're going to show, is

    12 this covered by any kind of confidentiality

    13 requirement?

    14 MR. HAYMAN: It is. It is covered by the requirement

    15 imposed on the Defence not to disclose the identity of

    16 certain prosecution witnesses, nor the contents of their

    17 statements, unless necessary, for example, even in

    18 investigation. I submit this is necessary and the

    19 court can make whatever instructions to the witness that

    20 it needs to in terms of future confidentiality of the

    21 material.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: I think we have to first hear what the

    23 Prosecutor wishes to say.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Quite candidly without going into closed session

    25 with this statement and discussing it, it is quite

  13. 1 difficult to talk about the statement in the abstract

    2 because I am not sure exactly which witness we are

    3 discussing here. I am not sure if it's the 53

    4 witnesses that Mr. Hayman was sought to exclude. I do

    5 not have any more information in that regard than your

    6 Honours. So if we ought to proceed in this fashion,

    7 and there are other objections with cross-examining

    8 someone from somebody else's statement, but before we

    9 get to that point, I think it is crucial for the

    10 Prosecution and for the court to determine who this

    11 witness is, in closed session naturally. (Pause).

    12 JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal says we are now in private

    13 session. We are not in camera but we will cut the

    14 sound in the public gallery. How is this done

    15 technically? Do you give the instructions? Do I? What

    16 do we do? Is there an override I have to touch? It's

    17 done? Are you sure?

    18 (In closed session).

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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    19 (In open session).

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, we are no longer in closed

    21 session. It's not a private session now. If I can

    22 judge by the fact that everyone has deserted us now.

    23 If you would like to proceed without any further delays,

    24 and we will try to finish by 12.45. This afternoon we

    25 will start again at 3 o'clock with Mr. Donia to answer

  2. 1 the questions that my colleagues want to ask or that

    2 I might want to ask. Mr. Hayman, we'll try to conclude

    3 your cross-examination at 12.45.

    4 MR. KEHOE: If I may be heard, your Honour, I will have a

    5 few questions.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Bien sur.

    7 MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, I will have a few

    8 questions of Mr. Donia as well. I do not know if you

    9 want to do that before your questioning or after it.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: I will have to deliberate this with my

    11 colleagues. Yesterday you were so eager that this

    12 principle be agreed to, that there be one counsel, one

    13 witness. At least I think this merits deliberations

    14 with my colleagues. Otherwise we can see that the

    15 Defence will also ask for time to reply. So we have to

    16 be reasonable here. We will discuss this.

    17 MR. KEHOE: May I comment on that proposition,

    18 Mr. President?

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Oui.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Of course the Prosecution at this juncture has

    21 the burden of proof and there are some items being

    22 brought out by the Defence in cross-examination that

    23 clearly need to be clarified for Mr. President and your

    24 Honours' review.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: If they can be, your Honour.

  3. 1 MR. KEHOE: Please. (Pause.)

    2 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Comparing the different legal

    3 systems is an enriching experience but it can also slow

    4 things down. Together with my colleagues and pursuant

    5 to a reading both of the spirit and the law of Rules 85

    6 of the Rules, we have decided that the party which

    7 called the witness to testify, that is will have the

    8 right, in fact, to reply on new points. That means

    9 that the Prosecutor in this case for Mr. Donia, because

    10 this is a prosecution witness, may reply in order to

    11 provide -- to find answers to new points that were

    12 raised during these discussions. In principle this

    13 same rule will apply to a Defence witness, which means

    14 that in this case the Defence cannot reply. However,

    15 if there were any new points which the Prosecutor, who

    16 ordinarily should not intervene, brings in new

    17 accusations, at that point the Tribunal will decide

    18 whether or not it is right to give the floor to the

    19 Defence. But the principle has now been established

    20 that the witness was examined and cross-examined by the

    21 Defence and the Prosecutor may reply only in order to

    22 answer new points. Having settled this issue,

    23 Mr. Hayman, I give you back the floor.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour.

    25 Mr. Donia, is your position with Merrill Lynch a

  4. 1 full-time job?

    2 A. Yes, it is.

    3 Q. Approximately how many -- strike that.

    4 THE INTERPRETER: Can we have the microphone for the

    5 witness, please? Thank you.

    6 A. Can you hear me? Okay.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Do you have a title with Merrill Lynch?

    8 A. Yes. I'm a Senior Resident Vice President.

    9 Q. Do you have managerial responsibilities over a

    10 particular group of people?

    11 A. Yes, I do.

    12 Q. What group is that?

    13 A. It is a group of financial consultants in San Diego

    14 County.

    15 Q. How many persons do you supervise?

    16 A. About 85.

    17 Q. So it's a full-time job in every sense of the word?

    18 A. In every sense of the word.

    19 Q. The subject of your doctoral dissertation was "Bosnian

    20 Muslims in transition 1878-1906"; is that correct?

    21 A. That is correct.

    22 Q. The subject was bounded by those temporal limits; is

    23 that correct?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Is it also correct that that study, your dissertation

  5. 1 "dealt almost exclusively with elite Muslims"?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. You completed that dissertation in 1976?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. From 1974-1975 were you a Fullbright scholar?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Did you spend those years principally in Sarajevo?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. In fact, did you reside in Sarajevo during that period?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Did you reside anywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina other

    12 than Sarajevo during the period of that Fullbright

    13 scholarship?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Have you ever resided anywhere out of Sarajevo in

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    17 A. No.

    18 Q. Now you also published a book in 1981; is that correct?

    19 A. The book in 1981 was a revised version of the

    20 dissertation of 1976, yes.

    21 Q. You published it under the title "Islam under the double

    22 eagles, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1914";

    23 is that correct?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. So the time period covered by the book was extended by

  6. 1 six years, from 1908 in your dissertation, to 1914 in

    2 the book; correct?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. This book, like your dissertation, also focused on

    5 Muslims in the so-called elite during that period?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. What was your occupation prior to joining Merrill Lynch?

    8 A. I was an assistant professor of history at the Ohio

    9 State University Lima campus.

    10 Q. For how many years had you held that position?

    11 A. Three.

    12 Q. When did you join Merrill Lynch?

    13 A. 1981.

    14 Q. Have you ever been a full professor?

    15 A. No.

    16 Q. The work you have done in the field of history since

    17 1981, has it been funded or unfunded?

    18 A. Unfunded.

    19 Q. You testified that between 1994 and the present day you

    20 made seven trips to Bosnia-Herzegovina and one trip to

    21 Croatia?

    22 A. One trip solely to Croatia. In most of the trips to

    23 Bosnia I was also in Zagreb for anywhere from one to

    24 four days.

    25 Q. Did you personally fund those trips as well?

  7. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to your 1994

    3 book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed".

    4 I take it you only wrote the portions in the book after

    5 1878?

    6 A. That is correct. Chapters 5 forward and the

    7 introduction.

    8 Q. And your co-author, Dr. Fine, wrote the other portions of

    9 the book?

    10 A. That is correct.

    11 Q. The year 1878 corresponds to the beginning of the

    12 Hapsburg period, also the period you studied in your

    13 dissertation; correct?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. But in the book you also wrote about periods of time

    16 after the Hapsburg period ended; correct?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Did you undertake some kind of study or review of that

    19 period prior to writing those sections of the book?

    20 A. Well, yes. I think the book kind of began as a

    21 conception of trying to provide a general survey,

    22 history in one volume, of Bosnian history from the sixth

    23 century forward, and my role in this was to cover that

    24 period that is roughly defined as the modern period.

    25 So that involved consulting a great deal of new

  8. 1 literature, trying to identify, you know, more recent

    2 studies in some of these areas and trying to tell a

    3 story that was concise by definition of a somewhat

    4 summary character, but which hopefully provided an

    5 integrated account of the history of Bosnia.

    6 Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to

    7 work on this study?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. Did you take a leave of absence from Merrill Lynch to

    10 work on the book in any regard?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. Does the book rely principally on secondary sources or

    13 primary sources?

    14 A. I would say it relies principally on secondary sources

    15 with the exception perhaps of some insights derived from

    16 my own work in the period from 1878-1918.

    17 Q. By secondary sources you mean other publications,

    18 newspaper accounts, that kind of thing?

    19 A. Yes. Other scholarly studies, some press accounts and a

    20 variety of things, some of which arrived by the

    21 Internet, and many of which are simply publications that

    22 have come out.

    23 Q. Would you agree that the book is written more for a

    24 popular audience as opposed to a scholarly audience?

    25 A. Yes.

  9. 1 Q. You would not claim it is a scholarly work?

    2 A. I would not deny it as a scholarly work but would leave

    3 others to judge that. I should perhaps put it in a bit

    4 of a context, in that up until this volume and one

    5 other, which was written at just about the same time, by

    6 Noel Malcolm called "Bosnia: A short history" there

    7 really did not exist in any language a single

    8 comprehensive history of Bosnia from the arrival of the

    9 Slavs in the Balkan peninsula into the 1990s. So there

    10 was a gap there in terms of the literature in general, a

    11 gap which has proven surprisingly difficult even for

    12 scholars in the region to fill.

    13 Q. Would you agree, though, your book is not annotated to

    14 any significant degree?

    15 A. Oh, yes, I would agree.

    16 Q. There are about 20 footnotes in 300 pages?

    17 A. I didn't count but I would concur.

    18 Q. Is it fair to say your book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a

    19 tradition betrayed" focuses on urban Bosnia?

    20 A. I wouldn't say it focuses on it. It ends up saying a

    21 great deal about urban life in Bosnia over various

    22 times. It is in many respects a political study, but

    23 I wouldn't necessarily say it focuses on urban issues or

    24 urban groups.

    25 Q. Would you say your own experience in living in

  10. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina was an urban experience?

    2 A. Very much so, yes.

    3 Q. And that is your own personal point of reference with

    4 regard to this subject matter?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. You wrote an article in 1978; correct? You wrote a

    7 chapter in a book perhaps in 1978; correct?

    8 A. Well, I wrote -- I delivered a paper in 1978 which was

    9 subsequently published by the -- I believe by the

    10 Academy of Sciences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if that's

    11 what you are thinking of. I did co-author a piece with

    12 an anthropologist, William Lockwood. I do not know

    13 what exactly you have.

    14 Q. That's what I am referring to, the piece with

    15 Mr. Lockwood, titled "The Bosnian Muslims: Class,

    16 Ethnicity and Political Behaviour in a European State"?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Do you recall generally that article?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Did you state in that article with reference to modern

    21 day Bosnia and Herzegovina that:

    22 "Villages are most commonly ethnically homogenous,

    23 although some villages are mixed. In the latter case

    24 ethnic groups are usually segregated into distinct

    25 neighbourhoods or hamlets"?

  11. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Did you also state with respect to the subject of ethnic

    3 groups:

    4 "They tend to constitute three distinct social

    5 systems superimposed on the same geographic region.

    6 Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector,

    7 especially among peasants, and this is reflected in

    8 marriage patterns, visiting ..." --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

    10 MR. KEHOE: If I may, I would like a reference for what

    11 counsel is reading from. I realise he is reading from

    12 the Donia/Lockwood article but where in the article,

    13 counsel?

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Page 186 in the version I have, your Honour.

    15 If I can finish the quote:

    16 "Contact is limited primarily to the economic

    17 sector, especially among peasants, and this is reflected

    18 in marriage patterns, visiting patterns, communication

    19 networks and world view".

    20 Do you agree with that statement?

    21 A. Yes. Those are the words of my co-author there,

    22 Professor Lockwood, and I would certainly concur.

    23 Q. Would you agree that your book "Bosnia and Herzegovina:

    24 A Tradition Betrayed" has been criticised by some

    25 reviewers as overly emphasising a, if you will, rosy

  12. 1 picture of urban life in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the

    2 war?

    3 A. Not only urban life, I would say, but for

    4 over-emphasising perhaps the degree of harmony between

    5 the nationalities generally.

    6 Q. So that criticism has emanated from a number of sources,

    7 has it?

    8 A. It has certainly been cited in three or four reviews

    9 I've seen, yes.

    10 Q. Your Honour, I would like to have one of those book

    11 reviews placed before the witness and marked as an

    12 exhibit, if the usher could assist.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: This will be D/10, Mr. Kehoe? D/10; right?

    14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, this is the first two pages of a

    16 review. I think it does continue into additional

    17 pages, but what I wish to ask you about is on the second

    18 page. The fourth full paragraph and I would like to

    19 read it to you and then ask a question:

    20 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on

    21 the whole compelling, but its presentation is troubling.

    22 Having defined Bosnian tradition as free from

    23 inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in contortions to

    24 explain ..."

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, give a little bit of time, please,

  13. 1 for the interpreters here. They have to be given the

    2 text.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: They have it, your Honour.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Would you recall the reference, please, for

    5 the interpreters.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: I will, your Honour. They do have this

    7 story. It was provided to them yesterday highlighted

    8 with the relevant paragraph highlighted. I will

    9 reading from Exhibit D/10, which is from the Information

    10 Access Company. It is a headline "Bosnia and

    11 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed", book reviews

    12 published on September 12, 1994.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Returning to the second page marked in the

    15 upper right-hand corner as page 33, the fourth full

    16 paragraph reads as follows:

    17 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is on

    18 the whole compelling, but its presentation is

    19 troubling. Having defined Bosnian tradition as free

    20 from inter-ethnic strife, they must engage in

    21 contortions to explain the region's long record of

    22 bloodshed, including peasant revolts under the Ottomans

    23 and local nationalist (especially Serbian) resistance to

    24 Hapsburg, Royal Yugoslav and Titoist rule. All of

    25 these had ethnic and religious aspects. When such

  14. 1 purported aberrations are attributed solely to class

    2 differences or "outside forces", the argument begins to

    3 sound circular. Bosnia is tolerant, and if it sometimes

    4 hasn't been, it wasn't acting like Bosnia. By focusing

    5 on urban culture as the true picture of Bosnia, the

    6 authors neglect the more refractory countryside where,

    7 in fact, much of the current conflict is rooted.

    8 Finally, the atrocities of World War II constitute an

    9 exception so drastic it virtually disproves the rule".

    10 Do you see that passage, Mr. Donia?

    11 A. Yes. In fact, I read it before.

    12 Q. Are there other critiques and criticisms out there in

    13 the press touching upon some or all of these strains?

    14 A. Certainly.

    15 Q. Now your book was written you state in the early pages:

    16 "To shed light on the sources of the Bosnian

    17 conflict that began in early 1992"; correct?

    18 A. That is correct.

    19 Q. Is there any mention in your book of Tihomir Blaskic?

    20 A. No.

    21 Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to Exhibit 4A,

    22 which is a chronology attached to an outline that you

    23 prepared. Do you have Exhibit 4A, which I believe is

    24 an English translation of Exhibit 4? While the witness

    25 is finding that, your Honour, perhaps the usher could

  15. 1 hand out an additional exhibit. Do you find that

    2 exhibit?

    3 A. Is this lands of the western Balkan chronology. There

    4 is an outline, ICTY presentation outline and attached is

    5 a chronology.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Chronology of six pages. The total document

    7 appears to be six pages in length?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. I would like to direct your attention to the last page,

    10 marked as page 6, of Exhibit 4A, the English

    11 translation, to an event that you cite as having

    12 occurred on 9th July 1993. It reads as follows:

    13 "Meeting Owen and Stoltenberg in Zagreb, Croatian

    14 President Tudjman accepts the idea that if Croats want Novi

    15 Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, they will have to give up

    16 Stolac to Muslims".

    17 Do you see that entry?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Did you get the fact of that event from your own

    20 personal knowledge or some other source?

    21 A. I believe I got that from Lord Owen's book.

    22 Q. Did you make a decision to include that in the

    23 chronology or did someone else suggest you do so?

    24 A. No, I made the decision to include it.

    25 Q. Now would you agree that in the -- that this event, as

  16. 1 depicted by Lord Owen in his book "Balkan Odyssey" that

    2 he depicts this event as President Tudjman making a

    3 concession in order to bring about the success, if you

    4 will, of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. In fact, if you turn to the next exhibit which has been

    7 placed in front of you, excerpts of the Lord Owen book,

    8 "Balkan Odyssey" -- do you have that? Have you been

    9 provided with that? No. I think it's coming your

    10 way. It has been marked as exhibit D/11. Have you

    11 read "Balkan Odyssey", Mr. Donia?

    12 A. Yes, I have.

    13 Q. If you would turn to page 209, there is a portion that

    14 has been highlighted. I would like to read it to

    15 you. This is page 209 of exhibit D/11, excerpts from

    16 Lord Owen's book "Balkan Odyssey":

    17 "The most important result from our two meetings

    18 on 9th July, respectively in Belgrade and Zagreb, was

    19 that Milosevic and Tudjman were now committed to

    20 reaching 30 per cent of territory for a Muslim majority

    21 republic. Over lunch with me, Tudjman seemed

    22 grudgingly to accept that if the Croats wanted Novi

    23 Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone

    24 dictated that they would have to give Stolac to the

    25 Muslims. A map for a predominantly Muslim republic

  17. 1 from the Sava to the sea was now becoming closer to

    2 reality ..."

    3 Would you agree that this agreement recounted by

    4 Lord Owen for a 30 per cent territorial share for a

    5 Muslim republic was a breakthrough in the Vance-Owen

    6 peace process?

    7 A. Just to clarify, I believe this was at the time when

    8 Mr. Vance was gone and we had Owen and Stoltenberg

    9 working on the various plans that made this up.

    10 Q. The continued effort?

    11 A. Yes. I would agree. I think it was one of a number of

    12 discussions that reached the percentage numbers that the

    13 negotiators were seeking to arrive at, and I would

    14 therefore agree with you that it's a breakthrough of

    15 sorts.

    16 Q. Would you agree that as used in this passage the phrase:

    17 "If the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and

    18 Busovaca ... they would have to give Stolac",

    19 that that's a reference to the boundaries of

    20 provinces or cantons under the Vance-Owen or

    21 Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement; correct?

    22 A. Yes. Again Vance-Owen was dead by now as a plan, so

    23 I think the notion that he was grudgingly accepting this

    24 trade-off speaks for itself. He was willing to make

    25 that trade-off and clearly on a arithmetic basis Stolac,

  18. 1 which was then under Croat control, would have to go to

    2 the Muslims.

    3 Q. But this was not part of a discussion. This statement

    4 you put in your chronology does not reflect any

    5 annexationist intentions or discussions engaged in on 9

    6 July 1993; correct?

    7 A. Correct.

    8 Q. In terms of annexationist as territory being annexed in

    9 some way to the Republic of Croatia. Do you agree with

    10 that?

    11 A. I would agree.

    12 Q. Now four entries down from the one we've been discussing

    13 on your chronology, again Exhibit 4A, the English

    14 translation of Exhibit 4, I would like to direct your

    15 attention to an entry from December of 1993, which

    16 reads:

    17 "President Tudjman informs Ambassadors of EU

    18 countries, then Owen and Stoltenberg, that Vitez and

    19 Busovaca can under no circumstances be given: must be

    20 included in predominantly Croatian unit of Bosnia".

    21 Again did you obtain that information from the

    22 book "Balkan Odyssey"?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Would you agree, based on your review of "Balkan

    25 Odyssey", that President Tudjman made this statement,

  19. 1 assuming it was made, in the context of negotiations

    2 concerning the terms of the so-called EU action plan?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. This was a proposed union of three republics within

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. And that this was a proposed solution to the conflict

    8 proposed by the EU? Would you agree with that?

    9 A. That's correct, yes.

    10 Q. And that every party to these discussions at this point

    11 in time was engaging in negotiations concerning what

    12 territory might be included in each of these three

    13 constituent republics within this EU solution, proposed

    14 solution to the conflict?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. I would like to direct your attention in Exhibit D/11 to

    17 page 77, the bottom of page 77. Lord Owen writes --

    18 and if you look over on page 76 you will see this is a

    19 reference to November, the November of 1992 time

    20 period. That's the point at which we are in in the

    21 book. Lord Owen writes at the bottom of page 77,

    22 Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan Odyssey":

    23 "I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had

    24 accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its

    25 internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price

  20. 1 for recognition of Croatia, but had never hidden his

    2 belief that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not sustainable, and

    3 the Cvetkovic-Macek map was more than a glint in his

    4 eye".

    5 Do you see that passage?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Would you based on your knowledge and study agree as of

    8 this date President Tudjman had accepted the

    9 internationally agreed upon boundaries of BiH?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Turning to page 127 of these excerpts from Lord Owen's

    12 book, in the right-hand side of the page there is a

    13 reference to:

    14 "... the Croatian role in controlling all arms

    15 supplies to the Bosnian Government".

    16 Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia

    17 controlled the flow of virtually all arms to the

    18 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Would you agree that an extensive amount of arms were,

    21 in fact, provided by the Republic of Croatia to the

    22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the course of the

    23 war?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Do you see the passage below the one I noted in which

  21. 1 President Izetbegovic is addressing at a certain point

    2 in time exactly what quantity of arms he did possess and

    3 his government did possess? Do you see that passage?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. You have characterised the Croat militia in Bosnia as

    6 existing principally in Western Herzegovina or based on

    7 troops drawn from, personnel drawn from Western

    8 Herzegovina. Could you clarify that?

    9 A. I do not --

    10 Q. I'll restate the question.

    11 A. Okay.

    12 Q. Do you agree that the Croat militia in Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina was drawn principally from personnel in

    14 Western Herzegovina?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. And would you agree that those individuals had a

    17 principal loyalty to political leaders within

    18 Herceg-Bosna?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Namely Mate Boban?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Would you also agree that an organisation known as HOS

    23 came to be merged within this Croat militia derived from

    24 western Herzegovina personnel?

    25 A. Yes. That's my understanding, that in the course of the

  22. 1 Summer or Fall of 1992 that that took place.

    2 Q. Who was HOS? What is HOS?

    3 A. HOS was a kind of an alternative paramilitary

    4 organisation. Its political leaders -- and I know very

    5 little about its military composition and so on -- its

    6 political leaders were probably more sympathetic to a

    7 Muslim participation in their ranks or at least more

    8 appealing to Muslims and so attracted a fair number of

    9 them. It also, of course, came into conflict with the

    10 HVO in the summer of 1992.

    11 Q. The HOS forces did?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Would you agree that HOS was an ultra nationalist

    14 organisation?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. And that members of HOS tended to have extreme

    17 nationalist views?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Would you also agree that to the extent one can

    20 generalise, Bosnian Croats residing in Western

    21 Herzegovina tend to have extreme or highly nationalist


    23 A. As a rule, yes.

    24 Q. Would you agree that that stands in some contrast to the

    25 views held, again to the extent one can generalise, to

  23. 1 views held by Bosnian Croats native to the Central

    2 Bosnia area, where there is a greater mix of ethnic

    3 groups? Would you agree with that proposition?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Do you know what part of Bosnia the defendant in this

    6 case came from, where he grew up?

    7 A. I don't, no.

    8 Q. Were most of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina forces

    9 involved in the conflict with Bosnian Croats in Central

    10 Bosnia, were they members of "all Muslim brigades"?

    11 A. I just don't know.

    12 Q. Would you turn to page 234 of "Bosnia and Herzegovina:

    13 A Tradition Betrayed" and see if that refreshes your

    14 recollection in that regard, at the top line?

    15 A. I say:

    16 "Most of the fighting was done by all Muslim

    17 brigades".

    18 Q. Would you agree that in the Spring of 1992 or beginning

    19 in the Spring of 1992 Muslim irregulars and gangs

    20 terrorised civilians in government-controlled areas? If

    21 you would like to refer to the passage, it is at page

    22 267.

    23 A. Yes, I would agree.

    24 Q. Would you further agree that for the most part the

    25 activities of these Muslim units were restrained by the

  24. 1 government, even though Muslim gangs were tolerated

    2 because of their contributions to the war effort?

    3 A. There's -- I'm sorry. The first part of that question

    4 is -- I mean, I would agree they were tolerated by the

    5 government because of their contribution to the war

    6 effort, but there was also some effort to restrain

    7 them. In October of 1993 the gang control of Sarajevo

    8 basically came to an end at the insistence of Prime

    9 Minister Selezic.

    10 Q. Do you know how many of the dead in Yugoslavia during

    11 the World War II time period were victims of Yugoslav

    12 violence, that is died at the hands of other Yugoslavs?

    13 A. As I've said, I have again reconsidered that issue in

    14 the light of recent scholarship and I can't give you a

    15 direct answer to your question if terms of numbers but

    16 feel there has been a substantial tendency to exaggerate

    17 those numbers over time, and the total number of dead

    18 I think is -- the number right around 1 million is

    19 something that I think has been convincingly established

    20 by demographic work.

    21 Q. So you would disagree with Lord Owen's words at page 9

    22 of Balkan Odyssey in Exhibit D/11 that:

    23 "In total of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed

    24 during the second World War, about 1 million were slain

    25 by fellow Yugoslavs".

  25. 1 Would you disagree with that statement?

    2 A. The statement is a reflection of a very commonly used

    3 figure. As I say, I think the newer work on it would

    4 suggest that it probably is lower than 1.7 million. So

    5 yes, I find the newer work convincing and would think

    6 that the number is somewhat lower than that.

    7 Q. You stated in your direct testimony that at some point

    8 in 1993 Bosnian Croats:

    9 " ... had a window of opportunity to implement

    10 some of these territorial ambitions that were expressed"

    11 in the formation of Herceg-Bosna. Transcript page 216,

    12 lines 16-22. Would you like to refer to that passage?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Do you find that passage?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. When in your view was this "window"?

    17 A. It really began with the adherence by President

    18 Izetbegovic on behalf of the Bosnian government to the

    19 Vance-Owen plan, and at that time, and by "window of

    20 opportunity" what I mean is that the entire energy and

    21 attention of the international community was directed

    22 towards the Serbian, Bosnian Serb position at that time

    23 vis-à-vis the Vance-Owen plan. They were renewing some

    24 military activity in Eastern Bosnia. They were

    25 engaging in some very complex negotiations, trying to

  26. 1 establish greater ethnic purity in a couple of cities of

    2 Eastern Bosnia and the international community was

    3 increasingly talking about sanctions, about possible

    4 greater military involvement in the event that either

    5 the agreement was signed or that the Serbs declined to

    6 do this. The attention of the international community

    7 was just solely riveted on events there.

    8 Q. When was the window? That was my question. Can you

    9 answer the question? When was the window?

    10 A. Well, I told you the beginning date of it. It's the

    11 time that the Bosnians signed on, and that would be 25th

    12 March. Probably went through the 5th May, the time

    13 that the third Bosnian assembly rejected the provisions

    14 of Vance-Owen.

    15 Q. Now to posit that there was a window for territorial

    16 conquest requires military superiority; would you agree?

    17 A. To posit that there was a window for military conquest

    18 would require military superiority, unless one's

    19 energies on the other side were directed to some other

    20 objective, so at least, let us say, in the immediate

    21 region or area it would require military superiority,

    22 yes.

    23 Q. What happened to the territories controlled by the

    24 Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia after conflict erupted

    25 on April 16th, 1993 until the end of the conflict,

  27. 1 February 1994? Did they gain territory or did they lose

    2 territory?

    3 A. They lost territory.

    4 Q. In fact, they lost a lot of territory, did they not?

    5 A. Yes, they did.

    6 Q. If you turn to Exhibit D/11, excerpts from "Balkan

    7 Odyssey", the last page, page 363, there is a map. Do

    8 you see the map?

    9 A. Are you talking about "Balkan Odyssey"?

    10 Q. "Balkan Odyssey", the last page of these experts, on

    11 page 363. Do you see the map?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. You drew upon a number of maps from this book in your

    14 direct testimony and they were admitted as exhibits,

    15 didn't you?

    16 A. Yes, I did.

    17 Q. Was this map one of them?

    18 A. No, it was not.

    19 Q. This map, would you agree, purports to indicate the

    20 situation regarding territory held either by the Bosnian

    21 Croats or by the Bosnian government on 12th October

    22 1995. Do you agree with that?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Would you also agree that these territories reflected in

    25 this map were essentially locked in at the end of the

  28. 1 conflict in February of 1994 and they are, in fact, the

    2 same as those that would have existed in October of

    3 1995?

    4 A. Yes. They are essentially the same.

    5 Q. Now focusing your attention to Central Bosnia, do you

    6 see a little bow tie with Vitez in the middle of the bow

    7 tie?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. And that is a Croat enclave within Central Bosnia;

    10 correct?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Do you see that enclave has been cut off from another

    13 enclave around the area of Kiseljak?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Do you have the other maps before you that were admitted

    16 during your testimony?

    17 A. I don't believe I do, sir.

    18 Q. Would one of those maps depict the territories

    19 controlled by Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993?

    20 Did you include such a map?

    21 A. No, I have no -- all the maps I gave to you I believe

    22 were peace proposals and not territorial control by --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Not to make a comparison with other maps.

    24 It has to be clear to the judges. You can't just speak

    25 about maps. You are comparing a map which was not used

  29. 1 by the witness. I mean, you compare it with the maps

    2 that he himself made, that he drew from the same work.

    3 Could you be clearer, please?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, you are stating you did not reference

    5 in your testimony any maps reflecting terrain held by

    6 Bosnian Croats prior to April 16th, 1993; is that right?

    7 A. I believe that's correct, yes. There may have been

    8 some congruence between the peace plans and the

    9 territorial holdings, but the maps that I presented were

    10 specifically to show peace plan proposals.

    11 Q. But you would agree that the map on page 363 of the

    12 "Balkan Odyssey" excerpts, Exhibit D/11, shows the

    13 dramatic loss of territory that resulted, that is loss

    14 of territory by Bosnian Croat forces, that resulted from

    15 the conflict with Bosnian Muslim forces that began in

    16 April 1993, would you not?

    17 A. That I would agree. Just to make a point, there are

    18 some gains there which reflect Croat military offensives

    19 prior to 12 October 1995 in the kind of north-western

    20 area, but your point is fundamentally correct. There

    21 were gains by the Bosnian government vis-à-vis the

    22 Bosnian Croats prior to the time that this map came into

    23 effect.

    24 Q. Are there any gains reflected in the central Bosnia

    25 region reflected in this map vis-à-vis land held prior

  30. 1 to April 15th, 1993 that you are aware of?

    2 A. Again I don't have the prior map, but the situation from

    3 April 15th, 1993 until the time of this map would

    4 clearly not reflect any gains in that area. It would

    5 reflect losses and gains by the Bosnian government

    6 forces.

    7 Q. Your Honour, if I may have a moment to review my notes,

    8 and while I'm doing that, perhaps I would like to move

    9 for admission of all other remaining exhibits that have

    10 been tendered during the cross-examination of this

    11 witness.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to suspend -- do you want to say

    13 something, Mr. Kehoe?

    14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. If there's some type of

    15 admission of this Statement of Facts excerpt by counsel,

    16 I am not only going to object, but contest this

    17 document, and ask the court for some sanctions with

    18 regard to this document due to the total impropriety of

    19 trying to admit a Statement of Facts or any portion

    20 thereof into evidence. That's not to argue with D/6,

    21 which is the joint statement, which is a separate

    22 document. I'm simply talking about the Statement of

    23 Facts and the excerpt from the Statement of Facts and

    24 the impropriety of offering such a document to the Trial

    25 Chamber.

  31. 1 MR. HAYMAN: I have no idea what that's a reference to. If

    2 there is a portion of it that needs to be sealed because

    3 there is something sensitive, I have no objection to

    4 that. I didn't reference the identity of any witness

    5 or any other content. It was offered because it was

    6 relevant what this witness had and had not been told,

    7 I believe, by the Prosecution.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

    9 MR. KEHOE: Quite simply, your Honour, what was shown to

    10 this witness was, as this witness pointed out, one

    11 paragraph of a 41 page document, in which there were 169

    12 paragraphs, in addition to the supplementary Statement

    13 of Facts, which I believe is about 18 pages. I think

    14 it is somewhat clear. I believe that Mr. Hayman argued

    15 this during the motion on the vagueness issue, that the

    16 presentation of facts, the facts in the statement that

    17 were given to the Confirming Judge, could not be

    18 presented to this Chamber. I believe, Mr. President,

    19 that to some degree your Honour echoed that during oral

    20 arguments on that subject, but quite clearly Mr. Hayman

    21 stridently put forward that position in writing and

    22 orally. Nevertheless he presents a portion of a

    23 Statement of Facts that is only supposed to go to a

    24 confirming judge and not to a Trial Chamber to this

    25 court, knowing full well, based on his prior comments,

  32. 1 that it was improper. Now quite clearly the way to

    2 rebut that statement --

    3 JUDGE JORDA: What are you specifically -- what exhibit are

    4 you particularly speaking about? What document are you

    5 talking about?

    6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm referring to D/7, which is the

    7 exhibit that Mr. Hayman presented yesterday.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: In general the problem of exhibits was dealt

    9 with during the first week. The Tribunal showed that

    10 it desired to take all exhibits that would be filed so

    11 long as it did not have to settle identification problem

    12 relating to protected witnesses, because each of the

    13 parties would try to argue with the judges that the

    14 document in question serves only a part of the interests

    15 of the adversary. I believe that this issue was more

    16 or less settled. I would like to consult my

    17 colleagues. (Pause.)

    18 The exhibit will be accepted, as in general others

    19 are put into the file. Each of the parties has to

    20 evaluate the partial nature of this or that exhibit and

    21 during their final deliberations the judges will decide

    22 to what extent they will take into account the

    23 probability or credibility of this or that document.

    24 However, there is an exception for those documents which

    25 are attached to the file and which would raise problems

  33. 1 as far as the identity of witnesses are concerned. As

    2 it is now 12.45, we are suspending our hearing and we

    3 will resume at 3 o'clock.

    4 (12.45 pm)

    5 (Luncheon adjournment)





















  34. 1 (3.00 pm)

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We can resume our hearing. Usher, have the

    3 accused brought in, please.

    4 (Accused re-enters court).

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, when we broke a while ago, the

    6 Registrar was taking in all the documents and numbering

    7 them. Mr. Hayman, I now give you the floor to continue

    8 the cross-examination, which would last for about one

    9 hour; is that right? A maximum of one hour?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: No more than ten questions, your Honour.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but if each of the questions lasts an

    12 hour, that will take up a lot of time. All right.

    13 Proceed. Proceed please.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Mr. Donia, we have spoken of your

    15 current conclusions and opinions regarding the causes of

    16 the conflict in April of 1993 in Central Bosnia.

    17 I would like to ask you another question about the

    18 causes of that conflict as you set them forth in your

    19 book, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed".

    20 Would you agree in your book you identify two events as

    21 specific cautions of the conflict in the spring of 1993?

    22 A. I identified two general factors, I believe. I said

    23 sovereignty and symbols were the primary cause of the

    24 outbreak. Perhaps you would like to ...

    25 Q. If you would like to refresh your memory on page 252,

  35. 1 you are most welcome to. Let me ask specifically do

    2 you state in the book at the top of page 252 that first:

    3 "Croatian commanders demanded that Bosnian army

    4 units in Western Herzegovina, an area assigned to

    5 Croatian control under the peace plan, be merged into

    6 the Croatian army"?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Do you also state:

    9 "In the Travnik area, another region designated as

    10 Croatian in the plan, despite its large Muslim

    11 population, Croatian officers insisted that the Croatian

    12 flag fly beside the Bosnian flag"?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Are those the two specific incidents, if you will, or

    15 events that you cite as causes of the spring conflict?

    16 A. These are the factors that I cited in the book, yes.

    17 Q. Later on in the Fall of 1993 where you agree with Lord

    18 Owen, and I would like to direct you to page 237 of

    19 Exhibit D/11, which are the excerpts from Lord Owen's

    20 book, "Balkan Odyssey", would you agree with his

    21 statement at page 237 that in the time-frame, September

    22 1993:

    23 "The Muslims had clearly chosen to continue with

    24 the war, believing that sanctions would soften up the

    25 Serbs and on the advice of their military commanders,

  36. 1 that they could defeat the Croats in Central Bosnia"?

    2 A. I'm sorry. I don't have that exhibit at hand.

    3 Q. I think you should be allowed to read this sentence in

    4 print?

    5 A. Thank you. 239?

    6 Q. 237, the top of the first full paragraph, the sentence

    7 beginning with the phrase:

    8 "The Muslims had clearly chosen ..."

    9 A. I probably would not agree with the word "clearly"

    10 because I am not too sure it was all that clear, but

    11 I agree with the general thrust of that assessment by

    12 Lord Owen.

    13 Q. Now we have spoken a great deal during your testimony

    14 concerning the ancient tribal hatreds, this is,

    15 starting, I believe, in the sixth century and going, of

    16 course, right up into the 20th century. I would like

    17 to direct your attention now to the spring of 1993.

    18 The war in Bosnia had been raging for roughly how long

    19 at that point, in months?

    20 A. Let us say about 13 months, 14 months.

    21 Q. So over a year?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. And perhaps as many as 1 million refugees had been made

    24 homeless and remained within Bosnia?

    25 A. Yes.

  37. 1 Q. Would you agree that by the spring of 1993 inter-ethnic

    2 tensions were at an extraordinarily high level?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. And would you agree that those tensions at times and in

    5 certain places were characterised by feelings such as

    6 terror?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Fear?

    9 A. Certainly.

    10 Q. Paranoia?

    11 A. Unquestionably.

    12 Q. You write in your book that certainly by the middle of

    13 1993, if not the spring, atrocities had been committed

    14 by members of each of the three major ethnic groups in

    15 Bosnia. Would you agree that in the course of the war

    16 atrocities were committed by members of the three ethnic

    17 groups, major ethnic groups?

    18 A. I think if you look at the specific comments that

    19 I made, they pertain to the armed forces of these three

    20 groups. I don't believe I made the statement that the

    21 ethnic groups per se committed those atrocities.

    22 Q. So you state that members of the armed forces of all

    23 three combatants committed atrocities?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. And would you agree that the fact that there were

  38. 1 victims of such atrocities of all sides further

    2 increased tensions and the volatility of the situation

    3 in Bosnia in 1993?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. I want to ask you about two examples. One, you cite

    6 the deaths of approximately 35 civilians in a town

    7 called Kriz, K-R-I-Z, at the hands of the soldiers of

    8 the Bosnian army in September 1993?

    9 A. Yes, I do.

    10 Q. The victims, were they mixed Serb/Croat?

    11 A. I do not know. I have not revisited that question

    12 since the writing of the book.

    13 Q. Then also I want to ask you and finally, on page 255 you

    14 discuss the tragic killing of two clerics in a monastery

    15 in Fojnica. Do you describe in that passage how in the

    16 course of a battle between the armed forces of the

    17 Bosnian Croats and the government forces that a rumour

    18 spread among the government forces defending Fojnica

    19 that the Franciscan monastery in Fojnica harboured a

    20 radio transmitter and was being used as a storehouse for

    21 weapons?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. And apparently based on this rumour soldiers from the

    24 government army entered the monastery on November 13th,

    25 1993 and murdered the two clerics in the monastery?

  39. 1 A. I state that those soldiers did enter the monastery on

    2 that date. I don't tie it to the rumour of the radio

    3 transmitter per se.

    4 Q. Can you think of anything else that would cause members

    5 of any military to murder religious figures other than

    6 feelings such as the paranoia, fears and prejudices that

    7 could be inflamed as a result of rumours of the type you

    8 identify in that passage?

    9 A. I think paranoia, fears and prejudices are exactly what

    10 is at stake here rather than transmitters.

    11 Q. No further questions, your Honour. Thank you,

    12 Mr. Donia, for sharing your views with us.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: The cross-examination is now concluded.

    14 Mr. Kehoe, in agreement with the Trial Chamber, which has

    15 set up its case law in this matter, will now take the

    16 floor again. The Trial Chamber wishes to ask the

    17 Prosecutor to comply with what was decided, that is the

    18 questions that you ask will not be repetitions of

    19 questions that have already been asked during the

    20 initial questions, but new ones. Mr. Kehoe, you are

    21 under -- you are free but you are being watched.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    23 Re-examination by Mr. Kehoe.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Turning to the last line of questioning by the

    25 Defence, I think you described the situation in Central

  40. 1 Bosnia as one of fear and anxiety and essentially, for

    2 lack of a better term, very heightened tensions; is that

    3 correct, sir?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Given those circumstances do you, as a historian, find

    6 it somewhat bizarre that a President such as Mate Boban,

    7 who wanted allegedly peace, would issue -- the HVO would

    8 issue an ultimatum as you found in Slobodna Dalmatia and

    9 also found in Vjesnik in April 1993?

    10 A. I would characterise it as inflammatory.

    11 Q. Just to cover a few things handled by the cross, your

    12 Honour. This is a Defence exhibit. I believe it's

    13 Defence Exhibit 10. Mr. Dubuisson, if Exhibit D/10 can

    14 be presented to Mr. Donia, D/10. That description is a

    15 two-page article by Jerry Kisslinger -- Kisslinger from

    16 the New Leader dated 12th September 1994. Do you have

    17 that, sir?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Now on the second page of that there is an area

    21 that is highlighted; is that right? That was read by

    22 the Defence?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Go to the bottom of that page. There is a somewhat

    25 complementary statement concerning you and Professor

  41. 1 Fine at the bottom of that page that is cut off; is that

    2 right?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. It says that:

    5 "Still, like Vulliamy", I believe relating to

    6 another author, Ed Vulliamy, "Donia and Fine deepen our

    7 understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and

    8 underscore the distance between knowledge and political

    9 wisdom".

    10 Your Honour, for the sake of accuracy --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, this is D/10 "Bosnia and

    12 Herzegovina, a tradition betrayed". Are these the

    13 comments on the book, the criticisms of the book? Could

    14 you be more specific with your question, because you

    15 didn't follow it? This is after the underscored

    16 paragraph, the one that was underscored by the

    17 Defence. What was the question? Could you read the

    18 paragraph please, as we did this morning, this paragraph

    19 that is going to support the question that you are going

    20 to ask.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. The beginning last paragraph

    22 on that page states:

    23 "Still, like Vulliamy, Donia and Fine deepen our

    24 understanding of what has been lost in Bosnia and

    25 underscore the distance between knowledge and political

  42. 1 wisdom".

    2 Do you see that?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Do you take that as a compliment, sir?

    5 A. I will take it as a compliment with pleasure.

    6 Q. For the sake of accuracy and completeness, your Honours,

    7 if this document is going to be admitted into evidence,

    8 which I believe it is, the Prosecution would like to

    9 offer to the court the complete critique of the article,

    10 and we would offer it to the court as Prosecutor's

    11 Exhibit 39, with the help of the usher?

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Do you have that?

    13 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I do, your Honour.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore if improperly summarising for the

    15 same article there are two numbers. One is D/10 for

    16 the Defence and D/39 for the Prosecutor. Is that

    17 right? D/10 and D/39. There's no translation into

    18 French, I guess. We will allow the French Judge to

    19 come to the explanations that he needs.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, that was the point I was to get to

    21 next. With some of these exhibits being taken off the

    22 computer relatively recently, this being one of them, I

    23 will provide a French translation quickly.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. I'm moving ahead, Mr. Donia,

    25 because we don't need to get involved in a literary

  43. 1 debate. You were shown another document by the

    2 Defence, which I believe was marked as D/8. Again with

    3 the assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, that is the cease-fire

    4 agreement signed on 25th April 1993?

    5 A. Yes, sir.

    6 Q. Now you were questioned concerning that document by the

    7 Defence this morning, were you not?

    8 A. Yes, I was.

    9 Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Donia, but a few events took

    10 place between early April and a cease-fire agreement that

    11 was signed on 25th April 1993, didn't it?

    12 A. Yes, they certainly did.

    13 Q. What happened?

    14 A. Renewed hostilities broke out on the morning of April

    15 16th in selected portions of Central Bosnia, in

    16 particular the Lasva Valley, and those hostilities

    17 continued for some time.

    18 Q. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that people were

    19 killing each other in Central Bosnia or in Bosnia before

    20 this agreement was signed?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. And turning to paragraph 2, isn't there an

    23 acknowledgement that not only was there killing, but

    24 there were serious violations of international

    25 humanitarian law?

  44. 1 A. Those are the words, yes.

    2 Q. Carrying on in that paragraph, the signatories ask for

    3 an immediate cease-fire?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Carrying on, sir, to the following page, and I direct

    6 your attention -- one moment -- on paragraph 5 there's

    7 an agreement, is there not, that these violations of

    8 international humanitarian law, of rights -- excuse me.

    9 I will read it:

    10 "Each instance of violation of such rights, there

    11 will be an immediate examination of the personal

    12 responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetuated

    13 against the civilian population"?

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 Q. That is, is it not, according to this defence document,

    16 an acknowledgement taken on by the HVO, by the signatory,

    17 Mate Boban; is that right?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. To your knowledge, sir, do you know if the HVO ever

    20 brought anybody to justice based on crimes that took

    21 place in Central Bosnia or any place in Bosnia during

    22 this time-frame?

    23 A. Not to my knowledge.

    24 Q. Now, turning on, we move to the enclosure, which sets up

    25 the joint headquarters between Sefer Haliolovic and

  45. 1 Milvoj Petkovic. Do you see that, sir?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Now in the prior agreements on Vance-Owen, the division

    4 of land was being talked about in terms of cantons, was

    5 it not?

    6 A. Provinces.

    7 Q. Provinces.

    8 A. Ten provinces, yes.

    9 Q. I believe -- correct me if I am wrong -- the three

    10 provinces that were to be controlled by the Bosnian

    11 Croats were 3, 8 and 10?

    12 A. Provinces 3, 8 and 10, yes, were to be the majority

    13 Croat provinces.

    14 Q. There was language in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan

    15 concerning the military aspects of 3, 8 and 10 as well,

    16 weren't there?

    17 A. Yes, there was.

    18 Q. Does this document say anything about provinces 3, 8 and

    19 10 and reordering their military according to provincial

    20 boundaries -- excuse me -- according to province

    21 boundaries?

    22 A. Well, it specifically rejects the notion of organising

    23 the military command under the joint commanders along

    24 provincial boundaries. Point 4 specifically states

    25 that:

  46. 1 "The two commanders in chief will form military

    2 districts under the joint headquarters, whose areas will

    3 be related to the operational requirement for joint

    4 operations and not to provisional provincial

    5 boundaries".

    6 Q. So would it be fair to say, Mr. Donia, that after the

    7 fighting broke out in April of 1993, we're talking about

    8 an entirely different scenario, when this document is

    9 signed?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. And the armies are driven by operational concerns as

    12 opposed to by provincial concerns; isn't that so?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Do you find that significant?

    15 A. Well, I think it amounts to a rejection of the notion of

    16 provincial boundaries as a basis for military

    17 organisation, and therefore is very significant in that

    18 it rejects specifically the terms that were earlier

    19 proposed by the HVO in its ultimatum of 3rd April.

    20 Q. Let's turn our attention to a few other questions that

    21 were asked by the Defence on cross-examination.

    22 I focus your attention, and again I request the

    23 assistance of Mr. Dubuisson, and ask that he give D/11 to

    24 the witness. D/11, your Honours, is the excerpt from

    25 "Balkan Odyssey" by David Owen offered by the Defence.

  47. 1 A. I have it.

    2 Q. Do you have it, Mr. Donia?

    3 A. Yes, I do.

    4 Q. Let me turn your attention to what has been underlined

    5 by the Defence on page 77.

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. In the area that has been underlined by the Defence it

    8 reads as follows:

    9 "I knew at this early stage that Tudjman had

    10 accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its

    11 internationally agreed boundaries as a necessary price

    12 for recognition of Croatia".

    13 Do you see that, sir?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Do you recall the question by the Defence where you were

    16 asked whether, in fact, Tudjman had recognised the

    17 territorial boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you

    18 recall that question?

    19 A. Yes, I do.

    20 Q. Was there another reason, a more expanded reason, than

    21 explained here for Croatia acknowledging

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina or recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    23 A. Lord Owen suggests it here. It was a necessary price

    24 for the recognition of Croatia in this broad package

    25 arrangement that was led by the European community and

  48. 1 the United States, and specifically the provisions of

    2 the Badenter Commission in December and January of --

    3 December of 1991 and January of 1992, which required

    4 Croatia as a price of recognition to participate in the

    5 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 Q. So it was a package deal, wasn't it?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Tudjman recognises Bosnia and then Croatia is recognised

    9 by EU countries and the United States?

    10 A. That's correct.

    11 Q. Nonetheless, Lord Owen continues on and says:

    12 "But Tudjman had never hidden his belief that

    13 Bosnia and Herzegovina was not sustainable and the

    14 Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement", the Banovina plan of 1939,

    15 "was more than a glint in his eye".

    16 Do you see that, sir?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Following that Lord Owen continued on and he mentioned

    19 that:

    20 "On July 9th, 1993 Tudjman seemed grudgingly to

    21 accept that if the Croats wanted Novi Travnik, Vitez and

    22 Busovaca, then the arithmetic alone dictated that they

    23 would have to give Stolac to the Muslims".

    24 You quoted that during your direct and in cross,

    25 and that is in Lord Owen's book, is it not?

  49. 1 A. Yes, it is also in the chronology. I believe. It is

    2 referred to in our chronology.

    3 Q. Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaca are where?

    4 A. In the Lasva Valley, near the extreme north Eastern

    5 extension of the Croatian Banovina as defined in the

    6 Cvetkovic-Macek agreement.

    7 Q. Where did hostilities break out on the morning of 16th

    8 April 1993?

    9 A. In the Lasva Valley.

    10 Q. As we move on, there is another quote that you presented

    11 from 20th December 1993 by Owen, where Lord Owen says:

    12 "As the search for more territory for the Muslims

    13 gathered momentum, the Croatian Government once again

    14 and without any attempt to pretend that they did not set

    15 policy for the Bosnian Croats, stated to all EU

    16 Ambassadors in Zagreb that there had to be 17.5 per cent

    17 for any predominantly Croat republic, and in no

    18 circumstances could Vitez and Busovaca be given up".

    19 Did he write that in his book?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. This is the same Vitez and Busovaca that he mentioned on

    22 July 9th that's in Central Bosnia?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. The same Vitez and Busovaca in Central Bosnia that was

    25 attacked --

  50. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Could you ask your question, please? Try to

    2 be succinct, because there is a discussion starting

    3 now. We often reproach the Defence for this. Let's

    4 try to be more synthetic, that is, to synthesise better

    5 and make your questions clearer. Thank you.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you, sir. The same

    7 Vitez and Busovaca that was in or around the attack on

    8 the morning of 16th April 1993?

    9 A. Yes, and that emphasis on the Lasva Valley communities

    10 is consistent with his approach to the Cvetkovic-Macek

    11 plan.

    12 Q. Turning once again to the Defence exhibits and showing

    13 you what has been marked as D/6 and D/7, again with the

    14 assistance of the usher and Mr. Dubuisson, D/6 and D/7,

    15 if you could hand those to Mr. Donia. (Handed.)

    16 Now, Mr. Donia, let's turn our attention to D/7.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Go ahead.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn our attention to D/7, which is the

    19 one paragraph of 161 paragraphs and 61 pages that has

    20 been excerpted by the Defence. Do you see that?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Now the second sentence -- actually the first sentence,

    23 can you read that, sir?

    24 A. Point 19?

    25 Q. Yes.

  51. 1 A. "The Vance-Owen Peace Plan placed a number of provinces

    2 under joint HVO and ABH command, of which province

    3 number 10 included the municipalities of Vitez and

    4 Busovaca. Subsequently on 2nd April 1993 Alija

    5 Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of the Republic

    6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mate Boban, President of

    7 the HZ H-B, agreed to place province number 10 under the

    8 command of the general headquarters of the HVO".

    9 Q. Was this particular paragraph part of a longer document

    10 or documents that you reviewed on 26th May 1997?

    11 A. Yes, it was. The cover page and the point 19 were part

    12 of that much larger, more extensive document.

    13 Q. Now talking about the events on 2nd April 1993, does

    14 this paragraph of the document offer a full explanation

    15 of the important events that happened at that time?

    16 A. No. It's very partial. It's incomplete.

    17 Q. Now turning your attention back to D/6, do you see a

    18 written date up in the upper right-hand corner, sir?

    19 A. I see 4th November 1995.

    20 Q. Your Honours, I think that the court can take judicial

    21 notice that that is the date that this was logged into

    22 the Registry of the International Law Crimes Tribunal,

    23 4th November 1995, a date that is almost two years ago?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Take us through, sir, exactly the chronology and the

  52. 1 significant events that are missing from this document,

    2 starting from the 2nd?

    3 A. Well --

    4 Q. Excuse me. You can actually start from the

    5 negotiations on Vance-Owen in late March 1993?

    6 A. On March 24th, as reported by Lord Owen, Mr. Boban and

    7 President Izetbegovic arrived, after a five hour

    8 meeting, arrived at an agreement on the transitional

    9 arrangements for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, according to

    10 Lord Owen, after Boban had threatened to withdraw from

    11 their then military alliance. This was at the end of

    12 three protracted periods of negotiation in New York, in

    13 which United Nations' officials Owen and Vance attempted

    14 to achieve agreement from all three parties. On 25th

    15 March 1993 President Izetbegovic signed all portions of

    16 the Vance-Owen plan, joining Mr. Boban in that complete

    17 adherence, however, noting in a separate annex that he

    18 was expecting either Serbian compliance to follow

    19 shortly or the international community to compel Serbian

    20 compliance, and that the plan would be signed within a

    21 period of ten to fifteen days, perhaps somewhat longer,

    22 where he would reconsider his signature.

    23 Following that, he left New York, went to Zagreb

    24 and Mr. Boban went to Zagreb as well, and the two of them

    25 and President Tudjman met, discussed extensively

  53. 1 provisions for a joint command, and President

    2 Izetbegovic emerged from that meeting at the new Embassy

    3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb and noted that they had

    4 reached agreement in principle, but that the specifics

    5 would be, in his words, "a difficult piece of business

    6 on the ground" in terms of a joint command. At that

    7 point the Serb, Bosnian Serb leadership had still not

    8 acquiesced to the Vance-Owen plan and the events of the

    9 day of 2nd April and early morning of 3rd April in

    10 Bjelica that at that point the Bosnian Serbs rejected

    11 the Vance-Owen plan.

    12 Q. Did that change the dynamics of the Vance-Owen plan?

    13 A. Well, it changed the overall situation rather

    14 dramatically, because it had to be a deep disappointment

    15 to Owen, to Vance, really to all the other parties, and

    16 it meant that there was at that point no treaty, no

    17 agreement on peace.

    18 Q. Just as a sideline, while this particular negotiation is

    19 going on and the Bosnian Serbs are refusing in the early

    20 morning hours of the 3rd -- by the way, what time in the

    21 morning was this; do you know?

    22 A. I think about 6.00, just before 6.00 in the morning.

    23 Q. This is a meeting that starts on 2nd April and finishes

    24 at 6.00 in the morning on 3rd April?

    25 A. Yes.

  54. 1 Q. Is there anything significant going on in other parts of

    2 Bosnia concerning the Bosnian Muslims and the Serbs?

    3 A. The city of Srebrenica was under siege. The Serbs were

    4 conducting a kind of on-going offensive against the

    5 Bosnian government in Eastern Bosnia and experiencing

    6 military successes in that endeavour. At the same time

    7 the international community was threatening sanctions

    8 against Serbia itself for support of the Bosnian Serbs

    9 and was prepared to impose them if the Bosnian Serbs did

    10 not agree to the Vance-Owen plan.

    11 Q. Now, sir, turning your attention again to D/6, with an

    12 unsigned document that is dated 2nd April 1993 in

    13 Mostar; is that right?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. You said -- have you seen any documents, sir, that have

    16 led you to believe that this particular document was not

    17 signed and that the factual statement made almost two

    18 years ago in the Prosecutor's Statement of Facts is

    19 incorrect?

    20 A. Well, first of all, this document which was presented

    21 yesterday to me by the Defence as an original of the

    22 plan -- of the joint statement is not signed. There

    23 are no signatures on the original local language version

    24 of this document, although there appear to be spaces for

    25 signature underneath the typed names of the two persons,

  55. 1 Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban.

    2 In addition I have reviewed the newspaper

    3 Oslobodjene, on 3rd April, which reported that on 2nd

    4 April Alija Izetbegovic presided in Sarajevo over a

    5 joint meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    6 and the government of the Republic of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on that same day met with the

    8 French Ambassador to discuss possible humanitarian aid

    9 as a recognition of his signature to the Vance-Owen

    10 peace plan.

    11 Q. Your Honour, at this time I would like to hand out as

    12 Prosecutor's Exhibit 40 the article from Oslobodjene,

    13 dated 3rd April 1993, that reflects the two meetings

    14 that Mr. Donia just discussed, i.e. the cabinet meeting and

    15 also the meeting with the French Foreign Minister, and

    16 I request the assistance of the usher. I will say,

    17 your Honour, that not only do we not have a French

    18 translation of this; we do not have an English

    19 translation either. I will subsequently provide

    20 both.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: What shall we do? Shall we have a site

    22 translation here? Is this a new exhibit?

    23 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour. I have, Mr. President,

    24 provided this to the translation booth, and if your

    25 Honour wants a site translation --

  56. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps it could be put on the ELMO so that

    2 the public gallery could see it as well. This is D/40.

    3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, this is 40, not D/40 but 40.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Do you see it, Mr. Donia.

    5 MR. KEHOE: The article, Mr. Donia, you are pointing to at

    6 this point is which article, sir?

    7 A. This is the article pertaining to the common joint

    8 meeting session of the Presidency and the Government of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 Q. Does that article reflect any discussion about a joint

    11 command with the HVO?

    12 A. Yes, it does.

    13 Q. What does it say?

    14 A. Just paraphrasing, the last sentence of the Article

    15 indicates that the combined meeting was determined as a

    16 first priority to enter into and promote discussions

    17 about the establishment of a joint command with the HVO.

    18 Q. Mr. President, I do not know if you want a site

    19 translation or ...

    20 JUDGE JORDA: It's not too long. Perhaps there could be a

    21 site translation. Perhaps the witness could read it in

    22 Serbo-Croat?

    23 A. You stretch my capabilities here, Mr. President, but I

    24 will do my best.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: I will allow the interpreter to do it?

  57. 1 A. Okay.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead. Would you read it, please?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 THE INTERPRETER: "A joint session of the Presidency and

    5 Government of The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was

    6 held today chaired by Alija Izetbegovic. The State

    7 delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at today's meeting

    8 submitted a report on the course and results of the

    9 peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina held in New

    10 York. The Presidency and the government accepted this

    11 report and made a positive assessment of the work of our

    12 delegation. It was pointed out that at the talks in

    13 New York the strategic policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    14 for peace was confirmed, which does not mean the

    15 weakening of our defensive capability, the more so as

    16 our country is under the strong pressure of the

    17 aggressor's military forces. It was decided that talks

    18 should be continued as soon as possible on the formation

    19 of joint commands of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    20 the HVO".

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Now, Mr. President, at the right side of the page

    23 is the article I do believe with the meeting with the

    24 French Ambassador. If we could also have a site

    25 translation of that particular article in the right-hand

  58. 1 column.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Allez-y.

    3 THE INTERPRETER: "The French government expresses its

    4 satisfaction that the President of the Republic of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, has signed the

    6 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, because it considers that in this

    7 way the implementation of those documents will restore

    8 peace to these regions and enable the return of numerous

    9 refugees to their homes. This was stated yesterday in

    10 talks with Alija Izetbegovic by the French Ambassador in

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Henri Jacolan, after the President

    12 of Bosnia-Herzegovina had informed him of the positions

    13 of the Presidency in relation to the Peace Plan.

    14 According to a statement issued at the end of a cordial

    15 reception in the Presidency by the Cabinet of the

    16 President, Ambassador Jacolan informed the hosts that

    17 France will continue to send humanitarian aid to

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the tempo will not slow

    19 down. Reference was also made to humanitarian

    20 activities for Srebrenica, when the French Ambassador

    21 underlined that General Phillipe Morrion enjoys the

    22 support of the French government and particularly of

    23 public opinion. The French Ambassador had a meeting

    24 yesterday also with Dr. Zlatko Lukumjia, Vice-President

    25 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina".

  59. 1 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecutor would

    2 like to have marked as Prosecutor's Exhibit 41 a

    3 composite exhibit of three pages, a letter addressed to

    4 you, your Honour, by the president of the Republic of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. It is in

    6 Bosnian, with a cover letter from the Minister's

    7 counsel, Mme Vidovic. It reads as follows:

    8 "Referring to the letter of Prosecutor,

    9 Mr. Mark Harmon, I hereby state the following: I have

    10 never signed a statement concerning Izetbegovic Boban

    11 nor had I been in Mostar on that day, 2nd April 1993.

    12 I do not recall that such a statement has ever been

    13 offered by any party or that it had been contained into

    14 the documentation at my disposal".

    15 Again, your Honour, this is addressed to you

    16 directly, and we offer it as an exhibit, Prosecutor's

    17 Exhibit 41. We have copies to be handed out.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: What is the date of this document?

    19 MR. KEHOE: The date of the letter, your Honour, I believe

    20 is today.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I'm glad to know that I'm receiving mail

    22 today.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: If it is to be received, your Honour, I would

    24 like to note our objection at an appropriate time.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Before we take this document, I would like to

  60. 1 hear your objection.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I'm certainly --

    3 JUDGE JORDA: (Pause). Mr. Hayman, first, you wanted to

    4 make an intervention and then the Tribunal has to take a

    5 decision. First we want to hear what Mr. Hayman has to

    6 say.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I must raise this as a matter of

    8 principle. In the instance of this particular letter

    9 it is really of no consequence to the Defence whether

    10 it's admitted or not. As the court can see, if you

    11 have it, in the second paragraph President Izetbegovic

    12 refutes the notion of an ultimatum and says he doesn't

    13 recall the matter at all. It obviously made no

    14 significant impact on him. Our point is this. This

    15 is a court of witnesses and proper evidence. This is

    16 not a court where witnesses can mail in their statements

    17 and not be subjected to normal court processes, the

    18 defendant's, the accused's right of confrontation and

    19 cross-examination. So although this particular letter

    20 is quite innocuous I can imagine if this practice were

    21 condoned, where does it lead? As to all witnesses,

    22 prosecution, defence, and indeed the court's witnesses,

    23 there must be a right of confrontation. There must be

    24 a right of cross-examination. So that is the concern

    25 I wish to raise. Thank you.

  61. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you for your objection. First of all,

    2 the Tribunal states that -- actually personally I say

    3 that I'm surprised that there is correspondence

    4 addressed to me which goes through the Office of the

    5 Prosecutor and then arrives in the middle of the hearing

    6 in a very unusual way of working, especially in judicial

    7 matters.

    8 Then the second point: first we have to know, in

    9 fact, whether this does, in fact, come from the

    10 President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    11 Mr. Izetbegovic. That's the minimum of precautions that

    12 we can take. The third comment goes back to one that

    13 the Defence already made, and that the Tribunal agrees

    14 with, that this is an adversarial procedure and either

    15 Mr. Izetbegovic is going to appear, as called by the

    16 Prosecutor, or a representative of his to come to

    17 testify in regarding to this letter in order that the

    18 Defence may be able to ask questions as well.

    19 First, if you could answer my first two comments

    20 and then for the time being we will not take this as

    21 evidence -- rather as an exhibit. We will keep it

    22 outside of the record until the Prosecutor says what it

    23 wants to do with it, specifically as regards any

    24 possible testimony by Mr. Izetbegovic, I suppose he had

    25 been told by the Prosecutor to intervene in this debate

  62. 1 or a representative of his, but I don't think as it

    2 stands it can come in as this, because especially this

    3 is a letter which affects me personally. Would you

    4 give us some explanations about this, Mr. Kehoe.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, gladly. For the record, this

    6 letter references a letter by my colleague, Mr. Harmon.

    7 Mr. Harmon sent a letter yesterday after this subject had

    8 been raised by the Defence, to Mme Vidovic. Based on

    9 that letter the response coming from the Bosnian

    10 government is the response that Mr. President and your

    11 Honours have before you. That letter came to Mr. Harmon

    12 directly at approximately 3.00 pm. So we have had it

    13 literally or I have had it since the time I have been

    14 standing in this courtroom and not before that time.

    15 With regard to the authentication of the document,

    16 your Honour, of course, the Prosecution has no

    17 objections to holding the document in abeyance and we

    18 will provide further authentication of this document at

    19 the appropriate time.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: (Pause.) The Tribunal asks the Registrar to

    21 identify the document and asks that it not be tendered

    22 as an exhibit for the time being. It will be taken as an

    23 exhibit once there is an adversarial hearing, if later

    24 the Prosecutor wants to bring in a witness or put it in

    25 as part of a hearing which will be inter partes. For

  63. 1 the time being I'm asking the Registrar to write a short

    2 note telling what happened here. Mr. Kehoe, if you want

    3 to bring this into a later hearing, you can, of course,

    4 but for the time being I want you to move on to the next

    5 question and not refer to this document for the time

    6 being, which is not known either by the judges or the

    7 witness or the Defence, or even yourself. So now we

    8 move on to the next question that you want to ask the

    9 witness.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Mr. Donia, a document that

    11 you referred to during your direct examination and that

    12 was referred to on cross concerning the two newspaper

    13 articles that are part of Exhibits 24 and 25, wherein

    14 you stated on direct and on cross the threat exists.

    15 Can you turn your attention to Exhibit 25, which is the

    16 article of Slobodna Dalmatia of 4th April 1993?

    17 A. Yes, sir.

    18 Q. Do you know who the author of that article is?

    19 A. The author --

    20 Q. Microphone, please?

    21 A. Can you hear me? Okay. The author of the newspaper

    22 article in Slobodna Dalmatia is Mr. Vagar, Vaso Vagar.

    23 Q. Do you know who Mr. Vagar is?

    24 A. He is obviously a correspondent for Slobodna Dalmatia.

    25 He is also the spokesman for the HVO.

  64. 1 Q. So the person who is the spokesman for the HVO is also

    2 the author of this article?

    3 A. That's correct.

    4 Q. Now in this particular article, the article that wasn't

    5 addressed by the Defence, can you point to what you

    6 argue is the threat, the ultimatum?

    7 A. In this particular article I would point to the section

    8 that is just below the six points. In the English

    9 language version this is the -- just beginning one

    10 paragraph below point 6.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Can you put it on to the ELMO, please?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I think it will be clearer for everybody that

    14 way.

    15 A. If I may read these two paragraphs which are most of the

    16 ultimatum or threat:

    17 "In the event that the statement is not signed by

    18 the heads of the Muslim delegation in provinces 3, 8 and

    19 10, the HVO of the HZ H-B", that is the Croatian

    20 Community of Herceg-Bosna, "has decided to apply the

    21 provisions of the peace plan whereby each national armed

    22 force will have to withdraw to its domicile province.

    23 Since the Basic Agreement and the agreement on

    24 Transitional Organisation clearly differentiate between

    25 the future central authority and authority in the

  65. 1 provinces, the HVO of the HZ H-B shall prevent any

    2 attempt by the present one-sided Presidency and the

    3 Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to appoint various

    4 bodies, (counties for instance) while all decisions of

    5 the future transitional Presidency of the Republic of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the transitional central

    7 government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina shall

    8 be respected and applied in conformity with the

    9 obligations undertaken by signing the Peace Plan".

    10 Q. Would you term this a unilateral demand?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Is there a request in this document for the signature of

    13 President Alija Izetbegovic?

    14 A. Yes, there is. It is in the paragraph immediately

    15 above what I just read, where the pointer is:

    16 "The HVO of the HZ H-B hopes that Izetbegovic,

    17 having understood the exceptional importance of the

    18 statement, will sign that document as well, because the

    19 document also confirms the desire for peace which is so

    20 necessary for everyone".

    21 Q. Taking this particular newspaper article in conjunction

    22 with the newspaper article of the previous day from

    23 Oslobodjene, that put President Izetbegovic in two

    24 separate meetings in Sarajevo, have you as a historian

    25 reached any conclusions from President Izetbegovic

  66. 1 agreed to this unilateral demand by the HVO?

    2 A. Given that there is no signature on the documents -- the

    3 document from 2nd April, given that he is reliably

    4 reported to be tied up in Sarajevo, and given that the

    5 next day the HVO requests his signature on this

    6 document, I think it highly unlikely that he agreed to

    7 or signed the document that was submitted for the 2nd

    8 April. I would add that the HVO actually began its

    9 deliberations in Mostar on 1st April, and we can see a

    10 report on that first meeting by the same correspondent

    11 in Slobodna Dalmatia. My best guess would be this

    12 might have been a draft prepared for the signature of

    13 these two parties, but never signed by Mr. Izetbegovic.

    14 Q. This particular article and demand came out after the

    15 Bosnian Serbs had voted down the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,

    16 didn't it?

    17 A. Yes. I think we can establish, based on the document

    18 that we have been looking at from the 2nd April, that

    19 the six point agreement probably preceded that

    20 rejection, but the broader document here, which I've

    21 characterised as the ultimatum, does indeed date from

    22 3rd April, after the rejection by the Bosnian Serb

    23 assembly at Bjelica.

    24 Q. Did that change the various aspects of this tripartite

    25 agreement between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and

  67. 1 the Bosnian Muslims?

    2 A. It rendered it at least for the time null and void and

    3 sent the international mediators back to a process to

    4 seek Serbian compliance with it and in a sense got the

    5 process going again.

    6 Q. Mr. Donia, you were challenged on cross-examination

    7 concerning the deadline of this ultimatum, were you not,

    8 sir?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. And you stated in cross-examination that you, as a

    11 historian, were not the only individual who concluded

    12 that in reading this documentation it was, in fact, an

    13 ultimatum; is that correct?

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 Q. Let me show you, first, your Honour, with the assistance

    16 of the usher -- again I only have an English copy and I

    17 will have the others translated -- what has been marked

    18 for identification as -- what has been marked as

    19 Prosecutor Exhibit 42. Mr. President, before we put

    20 this on the ELMO for a site translation, if we can just

    21 have a couple of questions as to what exactly this is.

    22 May I proceed, Mr. President?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course. Go ahead.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Before we put this on the ELMO, Mr. Donia, can

    25 you explain exactly what this is and what type of

  68. 1 resource this comes from?

    2 A. This is a page from the Foreign Broadcast Information

    3 Service, which is a US government supported research

    4 service providing coverage of daily press reports in

    5 Eastern Europe. It was sent to me at my request by a

    6 research assistant at the University of Michigan, Centre

    7 for Russian and East European Studies, Helene

    8 d'Erlinson, and the date of that was June 7th, 1997.

    9 Q. That was subsequent to the conversations that you and I

    10 had had here in The Hague?

    11 A. That's correct, after our first conversation.

    12 Q. Mr. President and your Honours, with the permission of

    13 the court, if we can put this on the ELMO for a site

    14 translation. I have given a copy to the interpretation

    15 booth to assist them in that regard as well.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: But you could be more specific. Which

    17 American media are you using? This is from a daily

    18 presence which was set up by some kind of American

    19 media. Mr. Donia, do you have the name of this American

    20 media? Is this a press agency, a specialised organ?

    21 What it is?

    22 A. Yes, Mr. President. The foreign broadcast information

    23 service is a monitoring service that monitors radio and

    24 periodical press in Eastern Europe and then publishes

    25 texts of relevant documents. This particular article

  69. 1 is from the Belgrade Tanjug service in English on 10th

    2 April 1993. So this was a broadcast made out of

    3 Belgrade and monitored by the Foreign Broadcast

    4 Information Service Assets and then reported in this

    5 publication. It is a relatively -- it is very widely

    6 used, heavily used research resource for specific

    7 developments throughout the Eastern European area.

    8 MR. KEHOE: It we could put that on the ELMO?

    9 A. May I suggest perhaps for brevity's sake, I think there

    10 are just a couple of key paragraphs here if you wish to

    11 only translate part.

    12 MR. KEHOE: With the court's permission, if we could point

    13 to those key portions of the article, that would be

    14 helpful.

    15 A. It begins here.

    16 MR. KEHOE: Can you move it on the ELMO?

    17 JUDGE JORDA: All right. You may read those passages

    18 which you consider to be relevant.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Perhaps beginning with this paragraph.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

    21 A. "The Muslim Croat conflict broke out a few months ago in

    22 central Bosnia-Herzegovina in the towns of Busovaca and

    23 Travnik and it spread to the region of Konjic and

    24 Jablanica last month, where they split up over military

    25 and political power in ethnically mixed parts of

  70. 1 provinces designated by international mediators, Cyrus

    2 Vance and Lord Owen.

    3 Both Croats and Muslims, however, expect that the

    4 real conflict is yet to come after April 15th, the

    5 deadline set by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban for the

    6 withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat

    7 provinces of the Vance-Owen plan. There is a Muslim

    8 Croat conflict in Zenica also. Here it was provoked by

    9 the fact that humanitarian and other convoys are finding

    10 it increasingly difficult to reach Muslim territories

    11 through Croat controlled territories. This

    12 particularly pertains to the road through Metkovic,

    13 Mostar, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Travnik and

    14 further towards Zenica, Zepac or Gradacac, the Bosnian

    15 Serb army report said".

    16 Q. This particular article comes out of Belgrade, a Serb

    17 source, as you say?

    18 A. It comes out of Belgrade and is further based on a

    19 Bosnian Serb army report, yes.

    20 Q. You also mentioned in your cross-examination an article

    21 from Borba, dated 5th April 1993, did you not, which

    22 references a Reuters article?

    23 A. Yes. The Belgrade newspaper, Borba.

    24 Q. Mr. President, with the court's permission again we will

    25 refer to Prosecutor Exhibit 43, the Borba article, and

  71. 1 the English copy coming from the computer, which is

    2 44. Again we will provide a French translation as soon

    3 as possible.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: About how many questions do you have left,

    5 Mr. Kehoe?

    6 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I have another document to go

    7 through after these documents and then come

    8 conclusionary questions. I will probably be finished,

    9 if we go straight through, at 5 o'clock.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Okay. We will take a look at this

    11 document. Then there is another one, you said?

    12 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, there are these two documents

    13 and there is a third.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Go through this document.

    15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Donia, let us turn our attention to these two

    16 documents. We are referring to the Borba article of

    17 5th April 1993, which has contained in it, does it not,

    18 a wire service article from Reuters; is that correct?

    19 A. Yes, it does. That's correct.

    20 Q. Again what is Borba?

    21 A. Borba is a Belgrade newspaper.

    22 Q. The other article, which is the English article, what is

    23 that, sir?

    24 A. This is taken off the archives of the Reuters service

    25 and was the Reuters story as originally disseminated on

  72. 1 April 4th.

    2 Q. Again with the -- Mr. President and your Honours'

    3 permission, if we can put this on the ELMO and have

    4 Mr. Donia do a similar translation on this document using

    5 the English version?

    6 A. Again with your permission, Mr. President, I'll only read

    7 selected portions for the sake of brevity.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead.

    9 A. Thank you. This is by Mark Heinrich, Dateline Zagreb,

    10 April 4th, 1993:

    11 "Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal

    12 of Muslim troops from provinces designated or Croat

    13 self-rule under a UN peace plan, reviving tensions

    14 between nominal civil war allies, who battled earlier

    15 this year.

    16 Bosnia's Croat militia command, HVO, threw an

    17 extra spanner into the peace works when in an ultimatum

    18 like statement carried by Croatian state media called on

    19 Muslim army and police units to vacate regions earmarked

    20 for Croat government.

    21 The HVO set an April 15th deadline for Bosnian

    22 President Alija Izetbegovic to sign a joint communiqué

    23 ratifying the withdrawals, creating a common high

    24 command and certifying there were no Muslim Croat

    25 territorial disputes. "If Izetbegovic fails to sign

  73. 1 this agreement by April 15, the HVO will unilaterally

    2 enforce its jurisdiction in cantons 3, 8 and 10", the

    3 statement from HVO headquarters in the south-west Croat

    4 stronghold of Mostar warned.

    5 Muslims constitute large minorities or even

    6 localised majorities in number 8 and 10 provinces.

    7 Pitched battles erupted there in January after the

    8 dominant HVO tried to force Muslim units to submit to

    9 its command".

    10 Q. Lastly, Mr. Donia, the --

    11 A. Let me finish with the --

    12 Q. Go ahead.

    13 A. "Sponsored and armed by neighbouring Croatia, the HVO has

    14 transformed territory approximating the two provinces

    15 into a protectorate of its patron, named Herceg-Bosna,

    16 complete with Croatian currency and car numbers.

    17 Muslim anger over this quiet take-over of terrain

    18 uncontested by Serbs had simmered for months, with world

    19 attention diverted by Serb sieges of the Bosnian

    20 capital, Sarajevo, and the Muslim populated east".

    21 Finally in reference to the central government it

    22 said:

    23 "Any attempt by what it calls Bosnia's

    24 illegitimate one-party government to set up parallel

    25 authorities in the region will be thwarted".

  74. 1 Q. Mr. Donia, I apologise for getting ahead of myself.

    2 I would ask you to take a look at one last article

    3 again. This is in Bosnian Serbo-Croatian from Borba,

    4 dated 6th April 1993. With the assistance of the usher

    5 ... I believe for the sake of the record the document

    6 -- the Borba and Reuters article are 43 and 43A and

    7 this new article is moving to 44.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: For the numbering, could you tell us what the

    9 number of this is, Registrar? The Borba article is 43.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: Oui. Yes, it is.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: And the Reuters is 44? I'm just asking the

    13 question. 43A. This is now 44. Mr. Kehoe, proceed,

    14 please.

    15 MR. KEHOE: The document that's before you, Mr. President, is

    16 44. Again, Mr. Donia, that's a Borba article dated 6th

    17 April 1993, is it not?

    18 A. The article is in the newspaper dated 6th April, yes,

    19 that's correct.

    20 Q. Again what is the periodical Borba?

    21 A. A Belgrade newspaper.

    22 Q. For the sake of a site translation, your Honour, we have

    23 it on the ELMO, and I have given a copy to the

    24 translators for translation.

    25 THE INTERPRETER: "The leader of the Bosnian Croats, Mate

  75. 1 Boban, has demanded that the Bosnian army, which is

    2 under the control of the Muslims withdraw from three

    3 provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are considered

    4 Croatian. Threatening that unless that is done he will

    5 resort to force, in an appeal to President Alija

    6 Izetbegovic, published in Zagreb yesterday, Boban

    7 demanded that the Vance-Owen plan be implemented

    8 immediately, which envisages the division of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces. The leader of

    10 the Bosnian Croats refers to the "declaration on the

    11 Croat Muslim co-operation and military organisation of

    12 Bosnia until its complete demilitarisation", which

    13 envisages that units of the Bosnian army and police

    14 until the complete demilitarisation of Bosnia withdraw

    15 to their domicile provinces within three days".

    16 MR. KEHOE: May I proceed, Mr. President? Now, Mr. Donia,

    17 when you were talking about other commentators calling

    18 this statement by the HVO an ultimatum on 3rd April

    19 1993, were you considering these other sources?

    20 A. No. I actually considered at that point only the --

    21 earlier I considered only the FBIS source and more

    22 recently have looked at these. So clearly in looking

    23 at these several stories, this one from the French press

    24 agency, the one from Reuters, and the one reported by

    25 Tanjug, all of them I think are consistent with the

  76. 1 notion that this was a threat or an ultimatum.

    2 Q. Did the review by these other commentators support your

    3 conclusion that this statement by the HVO was an

    4 ultimatum to expire on 15th April 1993?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. As a historian looking back on the events, were there

    7 any other events, any other significant events, other

    8 than these particular articles, that as you look back,

    9 led you to the conclusion that the comments of the HVO

    10 made on 3rd April 1993, was meant to be an ultimatum

    11 that was to be complied with by the Bosnian Muslims by

    12 15th April 1993?

    13 A. Well, the outbreak of hostilities on 16th April is

    14 clearly consistent with that position.

    15 Q. Can I have one moment, your Honour? Your Honour, I have

    16 no further questions.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We are going to take a break.

    18 Mr. Hayman, I think that will relax everybody. We are

    19 now going to take a 20 minute break and we can begin

    20 around 4.55. We can now suspend the hearing.

    21 (4.30 pm)

    22 (Short break)

    23 (4.55 pm)

    24 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume our hearing of the please

    25 have the accused brought in.

  77. 1 (Accused re-enters court)

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, if we've understood correctly, you

    3 have completed what you had to do.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, your Honour, except --

    5 JUDGE JORDA: We could bring the witness in though. This

    6 is a witness I could ask even if the witness is not

    7 here. You have concluded. At least that's what

    8 I have understood you to have said.

    9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, except for introducing the

    10 exhibits that I tendered to the Registrar, absent the

    11 letter from President Izetbegovic.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: So you presented. Letters. I am not too

    13 sure I understand what distinction you are making

    14 please. When you say presented them, what do you

    15 mean?

    16 MR. KEHOE: I just want to introduce into evidence

    17 Exhibit 39, 40, 42 --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: I understand.

    19 MR. KEHOE: We are not offering the letter from President

    20 Izetbegovic, what I believe has been marked as

    21 Exhibit 41.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Which, in fact, I had just received a

    23 fax from. I am on an equal footing. I have the

    24 letter as well. But that does not change the decision

    25 which the Trial Chamber has taken. Thank you,

  78. 1 Mr. Kehoe. I think we have concluded. Mr. Hayman

    2 wanted to take the floor again. If not, I believe we

    3 have finished with Mr. Donia and want to thank him. In

    4 principle you don't come in now but do you want to speak

    5 about something else, Mr. Hayman.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: All I would ask is in respect with these three

    7 new articles, or I guess there are four, I have a couple

    8 of questions on each, simply with respect to this new

    9 material. That would be my request.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Go ahead. Be brief,

    11 please.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: I understand, your Honour. Thank you.

    13 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Hayman

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Donia, directing your attention to

    15 Exhibit 42, the Tanjug article?

    16 A. Tanjug.

    17 Q. The source is the government agency in Belgrade; is that

    18 right? That's the by-line of the material?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. That government press agency in turn cites its source as

    21 the Bosnian Serb army?

    22 A. That's correct. The first Krajina Corps of the Bosnian

    23 Serb army.

    24 Q. Would you agree at this time the Bosnian Serb army was

    25 engaged in warfare with the two other parties whose

  79. 1 conduct are discussed in the article?

    2 A. Yes, absolutely I would agree with that and would note

    3 the bias that would obviously accompany that source.

    4 Q. They have an interest in destabilising any alliance

    5 between those two parties, would you agree?

    6 A. Yes. I think they do. I guess my observation, having

    7 looked at a fair number of these reports, is that their

    8 information is sometimes surprisingly accurate and good

    9 and at other times is clearly influenced by the

    10 political agenda of the Bosnian Serbs.

    11 Q. Let us look at this article as an example of that

    12 proposition that sometimes they are accurate and

    13 sometimes they are grossly inaccurate. In the first

    14 paragraph after the introductory paragraph the article

    15 references a heavy artillery duel in Travnik over the

    16 issue of which flag would be flown. Do you see that

    17 reference?

    18 A. Yes. Uh-huh.

    19 Q. In your book you describe an incident regarding flag

    20 raising in Travnik, do you not?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. There is no mention in your book of any artillery duel;

    23 correct?

    24 A. That's correct.

    25 Q. Have you ever heard that there was a heavy artillery

  80. 1 duel in connection with this flag raising incident in

    2 Travnik?

    3 A. I am not even really convinced there was a flag raising

    4 incident in Travnik any more. There were some

    5 corrections after that story came out in the US press.

    6 So it may be that even that part of it is erroneous.

    7 Q. Based on everything you know isn't the second paragraph

    8 of this article false with respect to the allegation

    9 that a heavy artillery duel occurred in Travnik in

    10 connection with this flag raising event in Travnik?

    11 A. I am an agnostic on that. I do not know.

    12 Q. It is not how you characterise it in your book?

    13 A. It is not how I characterise it in my book and I would

    14 share some doubts about the accuracy.

    15 Q. In the fifth paragraph of the article it references a

    16 supposed call by Boban:

    17 "... for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from

    18 so-called Croat provinces in the Vance-Owen plan".

    19 Do you see that?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Anywhere in Exhibit D/6, the joint statement, is there

    22 any call for the withdrawal of all Muslim units from any

    23 province in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    24 A. Well, let's see. I'm --

    25 Q. Exhibit D/6, the joint statement. This is the

  81. 1 April 2nd, 1993 short half page joint statement. I'm

    2 showing it to you now to help you find it?

    3 A. That, as I've indicated many times, is not the

    4 ultimatum. It's not the obvious reference here to a

    5 deadline for the withdrawal of Muslim units, no.

    6 Certainly this joint statement which we now question was

    7 ever signed, or I would question was ever signed, this

    8 is not what we're talking about here. It's not the

    9 reference in this article either.

    10 Q. So you would agree that Exhibit D/6 does not contain any

    11 request or demand for the withdrawal of all Muslim units

    12 from anywhere; correct?

    13 A. I don't know what the relevance of that is to this

    14 particular document, because this report clearly does

    15 not refer to Exhibit D/6.

    16 Q. To what does it refer?

    17 A. It obviously refers to what I have referred to as the

    18 ultimatum, which is the HVO proclamation of 3rd April.

    19 Q. Would you like to look at the Vjesnik version or the

    20 Slobodna Dalmatia version?

    21 A. Your choice.

    22 Q. Why don't we start with the Vjesnik version,

    23 Exhibit 24C? Is there a request in this document for

    24 the withdrawal of all Muslim units from so-called Croat

    25 provinces so designated under the Vance-Owen plan?

  82. 1 A. Not in that language, no.

    2 Q. If I could direct your attention to Exhibit 43A, the

    3 Borba -- the translation of one of the Borba articles,

    4 this story also states, for example, in the lead line:

    5 "Bosnian Croats on Sunday demanded the withdrawal

    6 of Muslim troops from provinces designated for Croat

    7 self-rule".

    8 Do either the so-called joint statement or the two

    9 news articles which you have characterised as in the

    10 nature of an ultimatum demand the withdrawal of Muslim

    11 troops from provinces designated for Croat self-rule?

    12 A. Well, I think that as a news article it draws by

    13 inference the conclusion that the Bosnian Croats in

    14 demanding the withdrawal of units from which they came

    15 refers to Muslims. So there is an implication drawn

    16 here in the article as a news article, and does not use

    17 the precise language of the statement issued by the HVO,

    18 HB H Z.

    19 Q. It is a news reporter adding their gloss; correct?

    20 A. It's a news reporter drawing an inference from original

    21 statement.

    22 Q. Do you have any basis to tell this court that in April

    23 of 1993 the implementation of point two of the joint

    24 statement, which is Exhibit D/6, would have required the

    25 removal of a single government soldier from Central

  83. 1 Bosnia, that is would have required their removal to

    2 another province or canton; in other words, were any of

    3 those soldiers of an origin from outside that area? Do

    4 you have any basis to tell us that that was the case?

    5 A. I'm not too sure exactly what you're asking. If you're

    6 asking me to identify specific individuals or comment on

    7 the general observation, it is clear that the

    8 organisation of the HVO and the army of Bosnia and

    9 Herzegovina as they existed at that time would have

    10 entailed substantial movement of troops in order to come

    11 into accord with the provisions of this statement.

    12 Q. Weren't the troops from the Government of Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina that were in the Lasva Valley in April of

    14 1993, weren't they from the Third Corpus, which was

    15 based in Zenica, or do you not know?

    16 A. That I don't know. This refers to a variety of -- could

    17 refer to a variety of troops of the Bosnia-Herzegovina

    18 army, which had certainly Muslim brigades. It had

    19 brigades with a lot of Serbs and Croats in them. For

    20 that matter, I think it's quite safe to assume that the

    21 HVO at this point has some Muslims in it.

    22 Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit 44, does the second

    23 paragraph represent that Mr. Boban threatened the use of

    24 force? This is the second paragraph of the Borba

    25 article -- Borba publication of an AFP article?

  84. 1 A. Yes. Yes, it does.

    2 Q. Do you find that anywhere a stated threat of force in

    3 any of the joint statements or in Exhibit 24 or 25?

    4 A. An explicit threat of force is not there.

    5 Q. Do you know if any of these newspapers or press reports

    6 we have been reviewing made their way to the Lasva

    7 Valley in April of 1993?

    8 A. Well, it would probably be highly unusual if the

    9 Slobodna Dalmatia did not make it to the Lasva Valley,

    10 and I would say the same is probably true of Vjesnik.

    11 Q. At this point in the war you think they were getting

    12 regular newspaper deliveries?

    13 A. I didn't say that. I said it would be highly unlikely

    14 that it did not make its way there.

    15 Q. In April or six months later?

    16 A. No, in April.

    17 Q. No further questions.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We have now finished the

    19 examination and cross-examination, the comments of the

    20 Prosecutor, the last observations of the Defence.

    21 I would now like to turn to my colleagues and ask

    22 whether they want to ask any questions. Judge Riad?

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Professor Donia, I would like to have some

    24 clarifications. First, how was the HVO created and for

    25 what purpose was it created?

  85. 1 A. It was created, I believe, on 8th April 1992 immediately

    2 -- 7th or 8th April, immediately after the declarations

    3 of independence and the first hostilities were

    4 evolving. It was created clearly to create a fighting

    5 force which would incorporate Croatian, Bosnian Croat

    6 soldiers and also whatever Muslims or others might wish

    7 to join it.

    8 Q. Who created it?

    9 A. I really don't know exactly who created it in terms of

    10 the personalities.

    11 Q. Who are the leaders of this HVO? Where did they come

    12 from?

    13 A. I really don't know. I would have to say I would be

    14 misleading you if I tried to answer that question.

    15 Q. Do you know any of them? Do you know any of the leaders

    16 of the HVO?

    17 A. No.

    18 Q. And the recruits?

    19 A. The recruits were principally Bosnian Croats and some

    20 Muslims.

    21 Q. But in the light of the dual nationality, they could

    22 have been Croats too?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Let us say the weapons, where did the weapons come from?

    25 A. Certainly some of the weapons came from Croatia.

  86. 1 Q. To your knowledge at the very outset, the creation of

    2 the HVO, did any official officers of the Croatian army

    3 participate in founding this HVO?

    4 A. Yes, there was at least some participation from Croatian

    5 army officers from the Republic of Croatia in the

    6 formation of it.

    7 Q. After its Croatian was it sponsored in any way or

    8 controlled by the Croatian Government?

    9 A. I'm really not qualified to answer questions of the

    10 degree of control. I would say that the understanding

    11 in the scholarly literature is that it has been

    12 basically an extension of an instrument of the armoury

    13 of the Republic of Croatia.

    14 Q. When the confrontation started with the Government of

    15 Bosnia -- of the army of the Government of Bosnia, where

    16 did the Croatian army itself reside? Where was it

    17 stationed?

    18 A. Well, it was stated really at various points throughout

    19 -- I mean, it was obviously at that point very

    20 concerned about the Serb areas that were under Serbian

    21 control, and therefore had troops, you know, surrounding

    22 those areas. It had troops just really all over in

    23 terms of the areas near Croatia or in Croatia and near

    24 Bosnia.

    25 Q. But it did not go inside Bosnia?

  87. 1 A. Well, it clearly went inside Bosnia at numerous times

    2 during this period of time. That actually led to some

    3 reprimand from the United Nations and threats by the

    4 Security Council to sanction Croatia for its use --

    5 sending Croatian regular Republic of Croatia troops into

    6 Bosnia.

    7 Q. It penetrated the frontiers to give support of the HVO

    8 to the HVO in its confrontation?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Or was it in its own right?

    11 A. Probably both. Clearly it was in strong support of the

    12 HVO during this period in Central Bosnia, yes.

    13 Q. You mentioned that the Croatian Democratic Union

    14 advocated and I quote "a territorial unit as an

    15 extension of the republic of Croatia". This union was

    16 representing -- what did it represent, this union?

    17 A. Well, the Croatian Democratic Union was founded to

    18 represent the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It

    19 originally -- its first representatives represented

    20 Croats from all over Bosnia, those living in cities, in

    21 villages, territorially completely dispersed through the

    22 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    23 Q. What links did this Croatian Democratic Union -- what

    24 was the link between it and the Croatian Government?

    25 A. I think it really operated with the support and the

  88. 1 encouragement of the Croatian government up until the

    2 events of February 1992, when it was essentially taken

    3 over by people who were acting directly at the orders of

    4 people in the Croatian government. From that point on

    5 it functioned rather slavishly as an instrument of The

    6 Republic of Croatia foreign policy.

    7 Q. Was there any kind of dominance of the Croatian

    8 government on other political institutions in

    9 Herceg-Bosna?

    10 A. Yes. That domination was very complete in terms of the

    11 army, in terms of the educational institutions. The

    12 telephone network was linked with Croatia. The entire

    13 really governmental, administrative structure was

    14 closely linked with Croatia.

    15 Q. When you said in terms of the army, was it -- was the

    16 army financed by Croatia or were the weapons or --

    17 A. I would say -- yes, financed and armed.

    18 Q. Financed and armed?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. You also quoted Lord Owen's book, "Balkan Odyssey" and

    21 mentioned that Dr. Tudjman had one goal:

    22 "To control the territory which he believed

    23 historically belonged to Croatia".

    24 Now what was precisely the territory mentioned

    25 here and were there any plans foreseen to gain these

  89. 1 territories?

    2 A. That's just, I think, a very important question. There

    3 really are, I guess, two ways of answering it. The one

    4 really is the answer that was favoured by the far right

    5 in Croatia, some of the rightist parties, which defined

    6 the Bosnian Muslims -- thought of the Bosnian Muslims as

    7 all Croats, and therefore any policy should encompass

    8 incorporating all of Bosnia-Herzegovina into land

    9 defined as Croatian. This was the, let us say,

    10 theoretical position of President Tudjman, but when it

    11 came to the practical policies of supporting

    12 Herceg-Bosna as a territorial entity, then he appears to

    13 be very much driven by the notion of the Cvetkovic-Macek

    14 map, which of course amounted to a partial annexation of

    15 Bosnia, including those areas in Western Herzegovina

    16 which were fundamentally purely Croat and those areas in

    17 Central Bosnia which had a substantial Croat population

    18 but not a majority Croat population, but were

    19 incorporated in the map from 1939.

    20 Q. Were there any steps foreseen to implement this wish?

    21 A. I would characterise that as a, let us say, gradual

    22 process of annexation that has gone on to this day. It

    23 involved the merging of administrative entities, support

    24 for the military and police. As I have mentioned, phone

    25 system, postal system, all these kind of administrative

  90. 1 services, were integrated over time. The specific, you

    2 know, plans kind of advanced step by step as

    3 opportunities arose in the course of the war in Bosnia

    4 and the contention even that has been there since the

    5 Peace Plan that has been implemented.

    6 Q. But as far as the population were concerned, were there

    7 any plans?

    8 A. You mean were there specific plans?

    9 Q. As far as the people living in these areas are

    10 concerned?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Were there any plans?

    13 A. You mean plans that might have been launched by the

    14 people in the areas?

    15 Q. Plans as far as the people dwelling in these areas?

    16 What were they supposed to be dealt with?

    17 A. Oh, you mean people who were not Croats?

    18 Q. Yes.

    19 A. No. I know of no specific plans that were created to

    20 deal with the non-Croat population, no. I don't think

    21 that that was -- that wasn't something that was, let us

    22 say, premeditated, a pre-planned part of these

    23 annexationist ambitions.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

    25 A. Thank you, sir.

  91. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor, I have two series of

    2 questions for you. The first has to do with the

    3 ultimatum or alleged ultimatum. You have given

    4 evidence of a proclamation I think of 3rd April 1993 and

    5 evidence has been introduced to the effect that certain

    6 parts of the media characterised that proclamation as

    7 amounting to an ultimatum, which I think is consistent

    8 with your own analysis of the position. Defence

    9 counsel asked you whether the newspapers in question

    10 might have found their way into the Lasva Valley and you

    11 gave the answer which you gave. Are you in a position

    12 to assist the court by saying whether those newspaper

    13 articles which describe the proclamation as amounting to

    14 an ultimatum might have permeated into parts of

    15 HVO-controlled areas outside of the Lasva Valley?

    16 A. My impression of the original announcement on April 3rd

    17 was that this was a very major announcement designed for

    18 consumption by the public in Croatia and Croatian

    19 inhabited areas of Bosnia. The citation from the FBIS,

    20 the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Tanjug, in

    21 English, is a radio broadcast. So I don't think one

    22 should limit the notions of these newspapers -- of

    23 dissemination of this ultimatum, as I have characterised

    24 it, to the printed media. This was certainly a time

    25 when many people were closely attuned, tuned to their

  92. 1 radios for information on the war and what was going

    2 on. So I would -- given the emphasis, the publicity

    3 that was attended to this statement on April 3rd and the

    4 fact that it was picked up by several different media in

    5 the subsequent three to five days, to me the value or

    6 perhaps the importance of the Tanjug article is that it

    7 says that this is a broad public understanding, that

    8 there is a deadline of April 15th. That would suggest

    9 to me that throughout these areas this was well-known.

    10 Q. So you are saying to the court that the characterisation

    11 of the proclamation of 3rd April as an ultimatum would

    12 have been generally disseminated throughout

    13 Croatian-controlled areas?

    14 A. That would be my assessment, yes, sir.

    15 Q. Are you in a position to assist the court by saying

    16 whether there ever emanated from any official quarter in

    17 Croatian-controlled areas of a denial of the

    18 characterisation of the proclamation as an ultimatum?

    19 A. I have looked to see if there was such a denial issued

    20 in the press that I have looked at. I have found no

    21 denial, and would believe that any such denial would be

    22 -- would have been very widely disseminated in that

    23 period.

    24 Q. I turn to the second point which I have in mind. It

    25 has to do with your residence in Sarajevo while you were

  93. 1 composing your dissertation. I think you said you

    2 resided in the city?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. And an issue was raised as to a comparison between the

    5 attitudes of rural people and the attitudes of people in

    6 the urban areas. You remember that area?

    7 A. Yes, sir.

    8 Q. Now, did you ever travel outside of Sarajevo?

    9 A. Yes, I did.

    10 Q. How frequently, would you say?

    11 A. Oh, once or twice a month.

    12 Q. And during what overall period?

    13 A. During the entire period from the summer of 1974 through

    14 the early fall of 1975.

    15 Q. In the course of those travels outside of Sarajevo,

    16 would you have had occasion to speak to any persons?

    17 A. Yes, certainly.

    18 Q. What kinds of persons?

    19 A. Well, first of all, there are numerous towns of a

    20 smaller dimension than Sarajevo that I spoke with:

    21 Mostar, Jablanica, Metkovic, Tuzla, Banja Luka. So

    22 I certainly visited some of the lesser towns and spoke

    23 to people there. I had several occasions to visit

    24 villages typically with friends that either came from

    25 those villages or who had friends in, and so I did,

  94. 1 I think, experience some small taste of village life.

    2 I regret that I did not have the experience of some

    3 anthropologists who have spent a full year in one

    4 village or so, but I did have some exposure to village

    5 life.

    6 Q. In your judgement as a historian, would those visits have

    7 presented you with an adequate opportunity to collect an

    8 impression of the attitudes of rural people?

    9 A. Certainly on the basis of personal experience again

    10 there were, I'm sure, many issues that I never touched

    11 on with them but certainly had that opportunity.

    12 Q. Thank you.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Donia, the Tribunal wishes to thank you

    14 for your long testimony, which demonstrated your

    15 availability to the International Criminal Tribunal.

    16 At this time the usher will accompany you out of the

    17 courtroom and we will proceed according to the schedule

    18 set up by the Prosecutor until 6 o'clock. That is

    19 either the hearing of another witness or the

    20 cross-examination -- another cross-examination which you

    21 wish to have, unless you were not prepared at this

    22 point. Thank you, Mr. Donia.

    23 A. Thank you.

    24 (Witness withdraws from court).

    25 MR. KEHOE: With all due respect, your Honour, the witness

  95. 1 that I thought we would get on earlier this afternoon we

    2 excused because I thought we were only going to 5.30.

    3 I was unaware that we were going to 6 o'clock.

    4 I apologise to your Honour.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Because we did begin a little bit later.

    6 I say that for you and for the interpreters as well.

    7 Then we will stop at 5.30. You may be seated.

    8 Tomorrow we will resume at 10 o'clock, because on

    9 Thursday we will not have a hearing. I would simply

    10 like to call your attention to the fact both of the

    11 Prosecutor and the Defence -- I have made a very simple

    12 calculation. We have spent four days on Mr. Donia's

    13 testimony. If we multiply the number of days of that

    14 very important witness by the number of witnesses

    15 mentioned by the Prosecutor and the Defence, you can

    16 imagine how we would need a second courtroom. That's

    17 being done but actually and more seriously this is not

    18 in any way an ultimatum from me. I would request that

    19 within these proceedings, which is very, very carefully

    20 carried out and very respectful of the rights of the

    21 Defence, and which allows the Prosecutor to move forward

    22 through his proof properly. I would like to request,

    23 as I have already done, to consider that in this

    24 Tribunal history is looking at us, and that justice is

    25 one of our concerns, as well as care, but also a certain

  96. 1 type of speed. I am not saying -- don't make me say

    2 what I am not saying. I am not saying that four days

    3 of hearing for this testimony, 21st June and today as

    4 well. You are very familiar with these proceedings.

    5 You know that these are not those that are practised in

    6 other systems, but this is the one that we are

    7 practising. Therefore I am asking you to be conscious

    8 of the responsibility which is yours. My colleagues

    9 and myself will not hesitate when there are questions

    10 which are being repeated to tell you so in order for us

    11 to move things forward quickly. On the good intentions

    12 we will end this hearing and begin tomorrow again at 10

    13 o'clock.

    14 (5.30 pm)

    15 (Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am tomorrow)

    16 --ooOoo--