Case No IT-95-14
1 Friday, 22nd August 1997
2 (10.00 am)
3 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Mr. Registrar, please have
4 the accused brought in.
5 (Accused brought in)
6 JUDGE JORDA: The booths for interpretation are ready. Can
7 everyone hear me? Mr.. Blaskic, can you hear me?
8 MR. BLASKIC: Good morning, your Honours. I hear you well.
9 JUDGE JORDA: We can continue then. Mr. Prosecutor, please
10 have the witness brought in who has started to testify.
11 I suppose Mr. Cayley will continue?
12 MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, your Honours,
13 learned counsel. A point of clarification on the
14 provision of a document to the Defence. Major
15 Baggesen's war diary from Bosnia. My learned friend
16 Mr. Hayman kindly provided me with a letter this morning
17 which he sent to the Registry in November 1996 where he
18 requested a translation of the document from Danish into
19 English. Enquiry has been made with the registry and
20 I understand the position is that the document was
21 provided to them in an original English translation at
22 the end of May 1996. The revised version that was
23 provided yesterday, that is in fact a new document,
24 although that was without any knowledge on our part, so
25 that is just to clarify matters for the purposes of the
1 record. It is the first that we have seen of this
2 document as well.
3 In any event it is our view it does not prejudice
4 the position of the Defence. It is in the form of a
5 record of events as a police officer's notebook would be
6 used. We do not intend to tender it as an exhibit into
7 court. Thank you.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?
9 MR. HAYMAN: I suggest we see how long the direct examination
10 goes today, your Honour, and that will determine whether
11 any issues are raised. It is true I requested a
12 translation in November 1996, but our records reflect we
13 did not receive anything until yesterday afternoon,
14 whereas it was provided in translated form to the
15 Prosecution in May 1997 and the second or cleaned-up
16 English version apparently perhaps a week ago or more,
17 but let us see how long the direct takes. If there is
18 an issue, we will raise it, your Honour.
19 JUDGE JORDA: The court does not intend to decide whether it
20 will be tendered as evidence or not, but I should like
21 to hear the view of the Registrar.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Actually, it is a document which should be
23 the object of communication between the parties. The
24 Registrar was required to make a translation; it did do
25 this translation and submitted the translations to the
1 parties that requested it.
2 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore the party that asked for the
3 translation, was that the Defence?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, in this present case, the person that
5 we made the enquiries with told us that the translation
6 was requested by the Defence.
7 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore we consider it to be a new exhibit
8 for the Prosecution?
9 THE REGISTRAR: The new one is the one that was submitted
10 yesterday that was corrected because there were some
11 errors in the translation.
12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, have you had time to examine
13 this new version of the translation?
14 MR. CAYLEY: We have, your Honour, yes.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore that means that we have an exhibit
16 translated by the Registry, translation being required
17 by the Defence. This document was given to the
18 Prosecution, and, before any decision is taken as to
19 whether we should admit it into evidence, I propose we
20 continue with the examination-in-chief and the
21 cross-examination, and if it is necessary to use this
22 diary in the course of the testimony of the officer,
23 then the Trial Chamber will make a decision as to
24 whether it will be admitted or not.
25 Having regulated that matter, Mr. Cayley, please
1 have the witness brought in.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 (Witness entered court)
4 JUDGE JORDA: Good day, Major. Can you hear me in English,
5 in the language that is easiest for you to follow; can
6 you hear me?
7 A. Good morning, Mr. President. Yes, I can hear you.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. You will continue to be
9 examined by the Prosecution, whose witness you are and
10 I wish to remind you that you are still under oath.
11 Mr. Cayley, you may proceed.
12 MAJOR LARS BORHOJ BAGGESEN (continued)
13 Examined by MR. CAYLEY (continued)
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Major Baggesen, one point: I have been advised by
16 the President to slow down in my asking of questions.
17 If you pause and count 1, 2 in your head before you
18 answer my question, that gives the translation units an
19 opportunity to actually translate what we are saying; so
20 it is my responsibility, I have the problem of
21 regulating the speed but if you could remember that in
22 the course of your testimony. Thank you.
23 Yesterday, we stopped at a point where we were
24 speaking about military communications and specifically
25 the military communications system of the HVO. I would
1 just like you to conclude on that point and answer the
2 question whether or not there was an effective system of
3 military communication between HVO headquarters in
4 Central Bosnia, if you could give your opinion as a
5 professional soldier on that matter?
6 A. In my opinion and after my experience as an officer in
7 Denmark for 20 years, what I saw in Bosnia from the HVO
8 side, we saw I think antennas, as I told you yesterday,
9 we saw radio equipment in several places so I think and
10 I can conclude that they were able to communicate
11 effectively with their units from a corps level to
12 brigade level and maybe on to lower levels as well.
13 Q. You said specifically from a corps level to a brigade
14 level. Could you explain to the court when you use the
15 term "corps" what you mean by that?
16 A. By "corps level", I mean from Colonel Blaskic's
17 headquarters.
18 Q. Which was in fact called an operational group?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Are you equating that to a NATO Danish Army term?
21 A. Yes, to a corps.
22 Q. If we could now move on, during the first two weeks in
23 April in Central Bosnia, how would you describe the
24 situation on the ground, the atmosphere in the area?
25 A. In the first period, it seemed calm but there was some
1 tension. There was a lot of shooting. Most of the
2 shooting was due to a lot of drunk soldiers, but later
3 on the tension raised and the incidents were more and
4 more.
5 Q. By "drunken soldiers", drunken soldiers of which party?
6 A. Both sides.
7 Q. When you say that there were a lot of incidences, what
8 incidences are you referring to?
9 A. Incidences due to snipers killing civilians, burnt
10 houses and looting in the houses.
11 Q. I believe that during the first few weeks in April, you
12 were briefed by Jean Pierre Thebault, the ECMM
13 ambassador on the Vance-Owen Plan; is that correct?
14 A. Yes, that is correct.
15 Q. I think you took a photocopy of a document from a local
16 newspaper?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Do you have that document with you? Major Baggesen, if
19 you just wait one moment while I hand copies of this
20 document out.
21 Mr. President, if this document could be marked
22 Prosecutor exhibit 88. Major Baggesen has his original
23 copy of the document. It is actually something he would
24 like to keep, so the document which I propose to exhibit
25 with the Registry is a photocopy of that document,
1 although it is a clear and accurate copy of the
2 document.
3 JUDGE JORDA: Any objections? No objections.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If the ELMO could be switched on, please? This
5 is a map which I think you photocopied from a local
6 newspaper, is it not?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. I think this was a local representation of the proposed
9 Vance-Owen Plan; is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Using this map which you produced at the time in Bosnia,
12 can you explain to the court your understanding of the
13 Vance-Owen Plan as it was explained to you by Ambassador
14 Thebault?
15 A. We were told that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was a plan
16 to secure the peace and co-operation in Bosnia, and
17 briefly, this plan was made by Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen, and
18 it was saying in that plan that Bosnia-Herzegovina had
19 to be shared in ten provinces and each province has to
20 be governed by one of the ethnic groups in Bosnia, so
21 some of the provinces had to be governed by the Bosnian
22 Serbs, some of them have to be governed by the Bosnian
23 Croats and some of them by the Bosnian Muslims.
24 Q. Major Baggesen, could you specifically put the pointer
25 towards province 10? This province, what was this
1 province to be called within the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
2 A. Province number 10, Travnicka.
3 Q. Who was it that was proposed to be the authority in this
4 particular area?
5 A. The Bosnian Croats.
6 Q. You have made a note, have you not, at number 10, and
7 I think you have written something next to Travnicka.
8 What have you written there?
9 A. "Croats, mixed".
10 Q. What does that mean?
11 A. That means it was not an ethnic clean province; there
12 were other ethnic groups in that area and most of them
13 were Bosnian Muslims.
14 Q. So you are saying that it was not an exclusive ethnic
15 group at the time in that province; there were other
16 ethnic groups in the province?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Can you identify for the record the provinces which were
19 to be part of this Travnik province, the municipalities?
20 A. Yes, I can do that. Can you hear me now? We have the
21 municipality of Busovaca, Vitez, Travnik, Novi Travnik,
22 Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Bugojna, Donji Vakuf, Jajce,
23 Kupres, Duvno and Livno.
24 Q. Am I right in saying that that province, province 10,
25 actually borders on to the republic of Croatia?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. At the time that this plan was explained to you, what
3 were your personal views about it?
4 A. My personal views were not the same as Mr. Vance and
5 Mr. Owen's. I did not like this plan because I did not
6 like to see one ethnic group taking over all the other
7 ethnic groups in the area. I would prefer maybe
8 provinces like this, but governed by a government with
9 all the ethnic groups in it.
10 Q. Am I right in saying that you had real fears about this
11 agreement at the time?
12 A. Yes, we were not only a few who had this opinion,
13 because we were afraid that this -- if those provinces
14 were going to be governed by one of the ethnic groups,
15 it could harm the other ethnic groups in that area.
16 Q. Why could it harm those other ethnic groups in the area?
17 A. Because it would be a lot easier for one ethnic group if
18 you could have an ethnically clean province, because if
19 you have other ethnic groups in that area, that could
20 create problems because they want to have a piece of the
21 cake.
22 Q. I understand.
23 A. So actually, and we were afraid that this could -- that
24 there would be maybe more land-grabbing, so at first --
25 when one of the ethnic groups had a specific area, they
1 want more.
2 Q. I understand. Am I right in saying that the ECMM
3 actively promoted this particular plan?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If I could now show you another document which you
6 recently provided to me, this will be tendered as
7 Prosecutor's exhibit 89, please, Mr. President. This
8 will be 89A and 89B; it is in French and English.
9 THE REGISTRAR: 89A will be the English version and 89B the
10 French version.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
12 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Cayley, please.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Major Baggesen, can you identify this document?
15 A. Yes, I can; that is routine team task, our orders down
16 there telling us what to do.
17 Q. These were your standard operating procedures?
18 A. Yes, that is correct.
19 Q. Could you read serial 8 on this document please?
20 A. Serial 8 says that we had to promote the Vance-Owen
21 Peace Plan which encouraged all parties to co-operate by
22 attending provincial and municipal meetings and by
23 offering guidance and interpretation of the plan.
24 Q. Did you?
25 A. We did. When we had meetings with the local
1 municipalities and the local commanders, we told them
2 about the Peace Plan.
3 Q. Thank you. If we can move on.
4 I would now like you to remember, if you can, the
5 events from 12th April onwards. Just to refresh your
6 memory on what I think is a fairly non-contentious
7 matter, I think you attended, did you not, an Easter
8 celebration at the hotel Vitez.
9 A. Yes, that is correct. All the ECMM monitors, we were
10 invited to an Easter celebration party at the HVO
11 headquarters at the hotel Vitez.
12 Q. Who was present at this party?
13 A. Colonel Blaskic, together with Mr. Kordic and most of the
14 HVO commanders.
15 Q. Did Mr. Kordic introduce himself to you?
16 A. Yes, he did.
17 Q. What did he say that his position was in the HVO
18 hierarchy?
19 A. He presented himself as the Vice-President of the
20 self-proclaimed republic of Herceg-Bosna.
21 Q. Did anybody make any speeches at this party?
22 A. As I can remember, both Colonel Blaskic and Mr. Kordic
23 gave a speech.
24 Q. But you could not understand the content because they
25 were spoken in the Croatian language; is that correct?
1 A. Yes and there was no interpreter close to me so I was
2 not able to hear.
3 Q. I think that M Thebault, the French ambassador, arrived
4 late at the party; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that is correct. He was arriving later because M
6 Thebault was going to Travnik. There had been some
7 tension in Travnik for a few days because the population
8 in Travnik was mixed of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
9 Muslims and the Bosnian Croats had started to flag with
10 the Croatian flag in Travnik, and the Muslims in that
11 area did not want the Croatian flag in Travnik.
12 Therefore the Ambassador went to Travnik to solve the
13 problem.
14 Q. Just to clarify this point for the transcript, you say
15 that the Bosnian Croats had raised the Croatian flag in
16 Travnik and this had upset the Muslims in the area; is
17 that correct?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Did Ambassador Thebault actually get into Travnik?
20 A. No, he did not, because on the way to Travnik, he was
21 stopped at the Puticevo checkpoint where the HVO
22 soldiers at the checkpoint aimed their weapons against
23 him and they did not allow him to pass the checkpoint
24 and go to Travnik.
25 Q. Major Baggesen, there is a map next to you on the
1 easel. Could you take a look at it and see if you
2 recognise it?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. What I would like you to do is to take one of the pens
5 that is next to you on the TV screen and mark on that
6 map -- use one of the markers, please. If you would
7 mark on the map the location of the Puticevo checkpoint
8 near Travnik. If you could mark it with a cross --
9 A. Too late.
10 Q. With a circle, that is fine. If you could mark it "HVO"
11 to indicate that it was an HVO checkpoint. If you could
12 stay up there, while we are on checkpoints, from
13 recollection could you mark in a red pen the location on
14 that exhibit of every permanent HVO checkpoint that you
15 can remember?
16 MR. HAYMAN: Could we have a time reference, your Honour?
17 MR. CAYLEY: For the period of time that you were serving in
18 the former Yugoslavia, which I think is the only period
19 you can give any evidence for, so from April to June
20 1993 the permanent checkpoints that you remember?
21 A. The ones I was going to mark on here was permanent
22 checkpoints in that area that were there for the whole
23 period of my time there. Those checkpoints I am going
24 to mark on the map are those checkpoints who were manned
25 during my period and it was all checkpoints that were
1 there every day during my period. There were a lot of
2 other checkpoints, but they were only manned during
3 special occasions. The Puticevo checkpoint manned by
4 HVO --
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, can I approach the witness,
6 please?
7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course, Mr. Cayley.
8 MR. CAYLEY: I do not know if my learned colleague wishes to
9 come in any closer?
10 Major Baggesen, can you identify the geographical
11 location on the map of the checkpoint, of each one, so
12 the one at the top?
13 A. The one at the top is the Puticevo checkpoint.
14 Q. The one that you just marked?
15 A. Are on the entrance to one of the roads to Vitez, and
16 the next one is the Dubravica checkpoint.
17 Q. That is the Dubravica checkpoint.
18 A. Then there was another checkpoint in this area, but
19 I cannot remember exactly the position, but somewhere
20 here (indicates).
21 Q. Can you put a larger circle and for the purposes of the
22 transcript, this is an approximation of the location of
23 the checkpoint.
24 Major Baggesen, will you take this blue pen and,
25 for the purposes of accuracy and truth, can you place on
1 there the locations of the Bosnian army checkpoints that
2 you were aware of in the three-month period of April to
3 June 1993 in Central Bosnia?
4 A. Yes, I will do that. There was one, I cannot
5 remember -- BiH checkpoint here.
6 Q. You are marking that "BiH" to identify that.
7 A. Yes. Those were BiH checkpoints. I cannot remember if
8 this was there the whole time, but I know we passed a
9 checkpoint there several times.
10 Q. Thank you very much, Major Baggesen.
11 A. Then there were checkpoints at the Busovaca road;
12 I cannot remember the exact places. There were
13 checkpoints in the Kiseljak area, down in this area, but
14 I cannot remember exactly the places.
15 Q. We will not put them in if you cannot remember the more
16 or less exact locations. Thank you.
17 Major Baggesen, what was the importance of those
18 checkpoints?
19 A. The importance of checkpoints was for the ones who had
20 the checkpoint to control all traffic in that area,
21 ingoing and outgoing traffic.
22 Q. From your experience on the ground, were they actually
23 effective at doing that?
24 A. Yes, they were.
25 Q. I think, going back to the Easter celebrations, that you
1 yourself attempted to actually go to Travnik; is that
2 right?
3 A. Yes, that is correct.
4 Q. Who was that with?
5 A. Together with a German monitor, Mr. Dieter Schellschmidt,
6 we wanted to go up there. At first the ambassador did
7 not want us to go up there. He thought it was too
8 dangerous for us to go up there because of the tensions
9 in that area, but because we were military persons we
10 thought it was necessary to monitor the situation, so we
11 went to that checkpoint to monitor what was happening up
12 there.
13 Q. With the pointer, can you indicate to the court broadly
14 where you were travelling from and to and the location
15 of Zenica, just so we can all orientate ourselves to the
16 map.
17 A. Zenica is situated here.
18 Q. Which was the headquarters of the ECMM?
19 A. Yes. This particular day we were in the Vitez at the
20 HVO headquarters at hotel Vitez. We travelled this road
21 to the checkpoint up here.
22 Q. Thank you. Take a seat. So you travelled this road
23 from Vitez. Can you tell the court what happened?
24 A. On our way to the checkpoint, there was nothing outside
25 Vitez, there was no problem, but approximately 1
1 kilometre before we reached the checkpoint, we saw a
2 military unit, maybe a headquarters, on the right side
3 of the road.
4 Q. I am sorry to interrupt you. Which checkpoint?
5 A. The checkpoint near Travnik we were going to have a look
6 at.
7 Q. Continue, please.
8 A. At this military unit, maybe a headquarters, we saw the
9 Croatian flag raised in front of the building and a
10 black flag with a skull and two crossbones were there as
11 well. This last-mentioned flag, the pirate flag, was
12 normally used by soldiers from the HOS.
13 Q. What was the ECMM view on these HOS soldiers?
14 A. Our view or our military view on the HOS units was that
15 they were better equipped and they were better trained.
16 Normally they were the units who were doing special
17 operations, if I can use that.
18 Q. Did you form an opinion about whose command these troops
19 fell under?
20 A. There was no doubt to us that they were under command of
21 Colonel Blaskic, because normally -- that is normal in
22 the military way, when you are having a command over a
23 certain area of responsibility, then you will have
24 automatically a command over all the military units in
25 that area, and therefore this HOS units operated in the
1 area which were under the command of Colonel Blaskic.
2 Q. Tell me, did you get past these soldiers in this
3 checkpoint near Travnik?
4 A. When we arrived to a checkpoint, I can remember that it
5 was manned by HVO soldiers and we could see it was HVO
6 soldiers because of the badge on the soldiers. There
7 were soldiers there in black uniforms. The soldiers in
8 black uniforms we discussed, because normally the HOS
9 soldiers were in black uniforms but I cannot remember if
10 we saw the HOS sign on them.
11 Q. Did you pass the checkpoint?
12 A. Actually, I cannot remember if we passed the checkpoint,
13 but I can remember that when we went back, we took
14 another way back to Zenica and it seemed calm. There
15 were a lot of smaller checkpoints, but there was no
16 problem passing those checkpoints.
17 Q. If I could now go forward in time to 14th April, and
18 again you can use your diary to refresh your memory,
19 I think a complaint was made at the Busovaca Joint
20 Commission by the HVO at that time about the kidnapping
21 of four staff officers; is that right?
22 A. Yes, that is correct. We learnt that four staff
23 officers --
24 Q. If you could pause a moment, Major Baggesen.
25 JUDGE RIAD: May I just have some clarification? You said
1 the HOS were for special missions. What were these
2 special missions?
3 A. Those special missions, and I use the expression
4 "special operations", we were told that those were the
5 units who did some of the crime against the law of armed
6 conflicts.
7 JUDGE RIAD: Some of the crimes?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE RIAD: What do you call "crimes against --
10 A. Killing of civilians, looting houses, burning houses,
11 things like that.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
13 MR. CAYLEY: If I can just refresh your memory, 14th April,
14 the kidnapping of four staff officers in Travnik and
15 Novi Travnik. Complaint was made by Colonel Blaskic's
16 representatives at the joint commission, is that right?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Can you explain the complaint that was made?
19 A. We were told that four HVO staff officers were kidnapped
20 close to a front in the Travnik area and we were told
21 that by HVO, that they thought it was 7, a Muslim
22 brigade, who was behind this kidnapping.
23 Q. What did you do as a result of this complaint?
24 A. We made a special investigation team with the Spanish
25 deputy we had at the RC Zenica, Juan Valentin and me
1 and, together with Franjo Nakic from HVO and Mr. Merdan
2 from BiH, we went out to investigate this kidnapping.
3 Q. Did you go to visit 7 Muslim Brigade?
4 A. Yes, we went to the headquarters of the 7th Muslim
5 Brigade, who were situated in the mountains near
6 Bugojna.
7 Q. Could you just, again for the purpose of orientation,
8 indicate on the map (i) where the staff officers were
9 kidnapped and (ii) the journey you took to Bugojna?
10 A. Vitez is situated here, Travnik in this area, and we
11 were told that the HVO officers were kidnapped in this
12 area. Therefore we took our way to Bugojna who is
13 situated down in this area, and the headquarters of the
14 7th Muslim Brigade are somewhere out here.
15 Q. Thank you, Major Baggesen. When you got to the
16 headquarters of the 7th Muslim Brigade, what did they
17 tell you about these events?
18 A. We had a meeting with representatives from the brigade
19 and they told us they were not behind this kidnapping,
20 and we discussed the matter, but they refused to have
21 anything to do with that.
22 Q. How did they behave towards you?
23 A. Actually we have heard a lot of rumours about this
24 7th Muslim Brigade. We heard they were very Islamic,
25 but we were surprised; they were very polite to us.
1 I do not think we actually trusted them 100 per cent,
2 but they were acting very polite and very disciplined.
3 Q. Thank you. After you received this answer from the
4 7th Muslim Brigade, where did you go next?
5 A. We went back and on our way back we visited the local
6 HVO brigade commander in Novi Travnik, Mr. Sabljic to
7 tell him about our findings.
8 Q. I think there were some other people there as well, were
9 there not, from the HVO?
10 A. After we have told Mr. Sabljic about our findings, the
11 commander of the military HVO police came into the
12 brigade commander's office and we told him about our
13 findings as well, and then this military police
14 commander went very angry because we have not found out
15 anything. Then he said that the only way to solve the
16 problem was to arrest Mr. Merdan, who was a senior
17 representative from BiH and a member of the
18 investigation team.
19 Q. So the commander of the HVO military police suggested
20 that the only solution was to arrest Dzemal Merdan; is
21 that correct?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. What happened?
24 A. Actually, Mr. Nakic who was a member of the investigation
25 team who we were told was Mr. Blaskic's deputy, and
1 Mr. Sabljic, the local brigade commander, they were not
2 able to do anything because we complained to them that
3 they have to do something and tell something to this
4 military police commander.
5 Q. Did the military police commander arrest Mr. Merdan?
6 A. Yes, and then we told him that Mr. Merdan was under our
7 protection and he will leave the office and Novi Travnik
8 together with us.
9 Q. Major Baggesen, if you could slow down a little bit for
10 the purposes of interpretation. What did the HVO
11 military police commander say when you said that
12 Mr. Merdan was going to leave the office with you?
13 A. Then he told us that then he would have to arrest us as
14 well.
15 Q. Did he?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Was he serious about this?
18 A. He seems very serious and he put a guard with us and
19 this guard, he cocked his rifle so he was guarding us.
20 Q. By "cocking his rifle", you mean that the guard put a
21 round of ammunition in the chamber of the weapon?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So did you take the threat seriously?
24 A. Yes, we did.
25 Q. What did you do at this point?
1 A. We were allowed to make a phone call from the office and
2 while I, Mr. Nakic or Mr. Sabljic were able to command
3 this military police officer, we tried to get in contact
4 with Mr. Blaskic --
5 Q. Can I interrupt you there? You said:
6 "While I, Mr. Nakic or Mr. Sabljic were able to
7 command this military police ..."
8 Did you mean you were not able?
9 A. Yes, we were not able, because we were told the only one
10 who had command over the military police was Mr. Blaskic
11 himself.
12 Q. What did you do?
13 A. Through our interpreter we tried to get in contact with
14 Colonel Blaskic. We did not succeed on our first call,
15 but we heard that he was present but actually he was
16 having a shower. After that, we tried to get in contact
17 with our own headquarters in Zenica and we told the duty
18 officer at our own headquarters about the situation and
19 we asked him to get in contact with the British UNPROFOR
20 battalion and ask for their help so they could come and
21 get us out.
22 Q. Which was the Cheshire regiment located in Vitez?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Part of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia.
25 How did the head of the military police react when you
1 said that the UN Protection Force were coming to assist?
2 A. He told us that if the UNPROFOR unit would come to get
3 us out, his unit will open fire against the UNPROFOR
4 units.
5 Q. Did you call Colonel Blaskic back on the telephone?
6 A. Yes, we did, and actually we succeeded to have a contact
7 with Colonel Blaskic and our interpreter told him about
8 the situation, and then Colonel Blaskic asked to have a
9 conversation with the military police commander, and
10 after a while, the military police commander did not
11 want to continue the conversation in the office where we
12 were able to listen, so he went to another office to
13 continue the conversation with Colonel Blaskic, and
14 after a while, he came back and released us. He was
15 very red in his head.
16 Q. Very red in the face?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. As a military man, what did it look like to you had
19 happened?
20 A. We normally call it a military conversation.
21 Q. I understand. After this, were you released?
22 A. Yes, we were released and we could go back to Zenica.
23 Q. With Mr. Merdan?
24 A. With Mr. Merdan and the rest of the team.
25 Q. Am I right in saying that after this event, part of the
1 road in the area was closed?
2 A. Yes, that is correct, after that it was ordered by the
3 Commander of HVO, Colonel Blaskic, that the route from
4 Travnik to Gornji Vakuf had to be closed.
5 Q. Was that as a result of the kidnapping of the four staff
6 officers?
7 A. We were told that was the result and I can remember that
8 there was made another roadblock by civilians, all
9 relatives to the four kidnapped officers because they
10 were, as well as we, all were disappointed that we have
11 not found out anything yet.
12 Q. Although this moves ahead quite some period in time, can
13 you explain to the court ultimately what happened in
14 respect of those four HVO staff officers?
15 A. Later on, I cannot recall the exact date --
16 Q. Can you recall the month?
17 A. In April, later in April, at our headquarters in Zenica,
18 the ECMM headquarters in Zenica, we had a representative
19 from Mujahedins, Muslim extremists, who came to us and
20 gave us a letter. In this letter, the Mujahedins told
21 us that they had the four, or later on five, kidnapped
22 officers. Before this took place, another HVO brigade
23 commander were kidnapped in Zenica. He was commanding
24 one of the HVO brigades in Zenica and he was stopped.
25 The four bodyguards who were travelling with him in his
1 car were killed by a shot in the head. An eyewitness
2 only 100 metres from that spot was killed as well, so at
3 this time, the Mujahedins had now five kidnapped
4 officers. When we had this letter, the Mujahedins told
5 us that now we were responsible for releasing I think it
6 was 15 of their Muslim brothers who were kept by HVO.
7 Q. So why had all these staff officers been kidnapped?
8 A. Actually because HVO had arrested a lot of Mujahedins
9 and now the Mujahedins want to have something to deal
10 with.
11 Q. Was there an exchange arranged by ECMM?
12 A. Yes, we started to negotiate with the Mujahedins and
13 with HVO, and at last all the kidnapped officers were
14 released.
15 Q. Were they all safe and healthy?
16 A. After conditions, yes.
17 Q. The Mujahedin, were they in good condition when they
18 were released?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So that concludes that event. If we could now return to
21 15th April, these staff officers are still in custody,
22 they have not yet been released, so you are continuing
23 your investigations to find out where they are. I think
24 on 15th April you travelled to Vitez from Zenica; is
25 that correct?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. I think at this time you had a British battalion escort
3 you because the circumstances were dangerous. There was
4 a lot of shooting and you were unarmed; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, normally as I told the court yesterday, we were
6 unarmed and we were poorly protected and at that time,
7 we were shot at very often by both parts, I do not think
8 it was to kill us, just to scare us, and we needed
9 armoured protection to do our job, so therefore the rest
10 of the time when I was down there, we had to go in
11 armoured vehicles from the British battalion, the
12 Canadian battalion or the Danish battalion in Kiseljak.
13 Q. Am I right in saying that that evening you decided to
14 stay in Vitez, on the evening of 15th April?
15 A. Yes, we did, because we felt not secure going from Vitez
16 to Zenica, because the tension in the area at that time
17 was very high, there was a lot of shooting in that area.
18 Q. You stayed at the ECMM house next to the British
19 battalion headquarters; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, we did.
21 Q. I think there was also a problem with your vehicle, was
22 there not?
23 A. Yes, actually our vehicle broke down, the clutch was
24 destroyed, so we were not able to -- we were only able
25 to drive 20 miles a hour or something.
1 Q. Can you tell the court in your own words of the events
2 of the morning of 16th April, at what time you woke and
3 what you heard?
4 A. We woke up early in the morning because there was heavy
5 shelling in that area. We could hear a lot of shooting
6 with machine-guns, heavy machine-guns; we could hear
7 outgoing rounds from artillery and outgoing rounds from
8 mortars.
9 Q. You are a professional soldier. These weapons have a
10 very distinctive sound; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, they have.
12 Q. You said that you heard heavy machine-gun fire. You
13 also said you heard mortar fire. Is it possible from
14 the sound of a mortar to actually estimate the calibre
15 or size of that mortar?
16 A. Yes, because of this special noise; you can hear if it
17 is a light mortar, a medium mortar or a heavy mortar.
18 Q. Am I right in saying that the sound is created by the
19 shell being dropped into the mortar barrel?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. It hits the base of the mortar barrel and then ignites,
22 there is an explosion and the shell comes from the
23 barrel; is that correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Were you able to estimate the size of mortar that was
1 being used, approximately?
2 A. We agreed that it was not a light mortar; it was more a
3 medium or maybe a heavy mortar.
4 Q. And the artillery fire, again the shell from a piece of
5 artillery, does it make a distinctive sound, depending
6 on the size?
7 A. The bigger noise --
8 Q. The bigger the bang, the bigger the weapon?
9 A. At this time we thought it was a medium artillery.
10 Q. What time was this in the morning, approximately?
11 A. It was very early, I think about 5.30 or something.
12 Q. Had you received information from the British battalion
13 about military positions in the area and weapons?
14 A. Normally because we were living so close to the British
15 battalion, we were just living outside the entrance to
16 their barracks, normally we went to their informations
17 office and asked them what kind of military units were
18 in those areas where we were going to, and we learnt
19 during one of these meetings with the British battalion
20 that HVO had some positions where they had mortars and
21 artillery in that area surrounding the BritBat camp and
22 the ECMM house.
23 Q. Major Baggesen, can you slow down in your speech?
24 I will do my best as well. Go much, much slower so the
25 interpreters can give an accurate translation.
1 You said that the British battalion informed you
2 that the HVO had positions where they had mortars and
3 artillery in this area. What did they tell you about
4 the Bosnian army in this area?
5 A. We did not and UNPROFOR at that time did not know
6 anything about BiH positions in that area. We have not
7 seen anyone.
8 Q. When you say "did not know anything about", do you mean
9 that they did not know anything or that there were no
10 positions in the area?
11 A. I think there were no -- because we have been in the
12 area, UNPROFOR have been in the area, and we have seen
13 no signs of BiH positions in the area.
14 Q. What about weaponry of any BiH that might have been in
15 the area? What did they tell you about the weaponry of
16 those soldiers?
17 A. Only small arms and light machine-guns, so no big arms.
18 Q. By "big arms", what do you mean?
19 A. Heavy machine-gun and artillery and mortars.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if the Prosecutor could now tender
21 exhibit 56A? This is an exhibit that has already been
22 admitted into evidence. It is an aerial photograph, but
23 this is a paper copy of that photograph, because the
24 witness may make some marks. We do not want to mark the
25 original version, and we can arrange for a copy of that
1 paper copy to be given to the Defence.
2 Mr. Usher, if you could? (Handed).
3 Major Baggesen, remembering that speed is
4 everything, could you take a look at that aerial
5 photograph and see if you recognise it?
6 A. Yes, that is a photograph of Vitez and the roads in the
7 Vitez area.
8 Q. I know that the ECMM house is not actually marked on
9 that photograph, in fact it is not depicted on the
10 photograph, but if you could stand up and indicate sort
11 of approximately where it would have been located?
12 A. I will do. We have Vitez situated here (indicating) and
13 the normal road we used -- Vitez is situated here and we
14 have the road from Zenica and to Travnik, this one. The
15 ECMM house and the British battalion were down in this
16 area here, outside this picture.
17 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, can I approach the witness,
18 please?
19 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. If the Defence wants to they can do so
20 as well.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Am I right in saying that you tried to leave
22 Vitez that morning and return to Zenica?
23 A. Yes, that is correct. Because of all the shooting and
24 all the fire with mortars, artillery and heavy
25 machine-guns, we did not feel safe in Vitez, therefore
1 we wanted to travel back to Zenica.
2 Q. This was in a vehicle with a non-serviceable clutch?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So you were travelling pretty slowly?
5 A. Yes, but it was an armoured vehicle so we were -- we
6 felt safe in the vehicle.
7 Q. Can you indicate on the map the route that you took past
8 Vitez on the way back to Zenica?
9 A. On the way back to Zenica, we took this road as normal,
10 up in this direction.
11 Q. So you are pointing to the road to the left of the
12 central road running through Vitez?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. It is, as it were, a bypass road. Did you actually --
15 wait one moment. Did you actually see anything on that
16 road as you were travelling?
17 A. Yes, when we were travelling in this direction, we were
18 able to see smoke from this area, the distance from here
19 to here is approximately 1 kilometre.
20 Q. So the distance between the road that you were
21 travelling on and the area from which you could see
22 smoke was approximately 1 kilometre; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Can you indicate with this red pen approximately, and
25 I say that for the purposes of the transcript, the area
1 where you could see smoke rising?
2 A. I cannot pinpoint one house, but I can say it was in
3 this area of Vitez.
4 Q. Can you mark that with this red pen. Can you mark that
5 1, can you put a 1 by it? It might be an idea if you
6 put the date in as well, which is 16th April, and the
7 approximate time of day, as best you can remember. Did
8 you discuss with your colleague the smoke that you could
9 see?
10 A. I cannot remember if we discussed it because it happened
11 so often that we were passing a village where there was
12 smoke because the house was burning.
13 Q. What did the smoke actually indicate to you?
14 A. That there were some houses on fire.
15 Q. I think you travelled on up that road, did you not?
16 A. Yes, we travelled up this road and I cannot remember
17 exactly the place, but we found a place where there were
18 some persons lying down at the road.
19 Q. What sort of persons lying on the road?
20 A. Persons in civilian clothes, maybe civilians.
21 Q. Were they alive or dead?
22 A. When we tried to get out of our vehicle to investigate
23 that, we were shot at by soldiers in HVO uniforms.
24 Q. So you got back into the vehicle and continued on up the
25 road?
1 A. Yes, we continued up the road in this direction.
2 Q. Did you get to Zenica?
3 A. No, we did not because we were stopped in the Dubravica
4 checkpoint.
5 Q. Can you indicate where the Dubravica checkpoint is?
6 A. The Dubravica checkpoint is situated in this junction
7 here.
8 Q. Can you take this blue marker and just mark on there
9 where that is? You are marking it "HVO Checkpoint", and
10 it is a blue circle. Did you get through the Dubravica
11 checkpoint?
12 A. No, we did not because the soldiers there told us that
13 it was too dangerous for us to travel further in that
14 direction because of the heavy fightings in that area.
15 Q. Were there -- how many soldiers were there at the
16 checkpoint?
17 A. That day there were more soldiers at the checkpoint than
18 normal. The normal picture was that there were two,
19 maybe three, soldiers at the checkpoint, but this
20 morning there were maybe ten soldiers at the checkpoint.
21 Q. What did that indicate to you?
22 A. It indicated that something was going on, maybe a
23 military operation in that area.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Major Baggesen.
25 Thank you, Mr. President.
1 They refused to allow you to pass; is that
2 correct?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. What did you do?
5 A. There was no other way to go to Zenica, so we went back
6 to Vitez and we continued an investigation in the case
7 with the four kidnapped officers.
8 Q. Did you receive any calls from Zenica?
9 A. Yes, when we came back to our house in Vitez, we
10 received a call from the duty officer at our
11 headquarters in Zenica, and he told us that our
12 headquarters had been contacted by the commander of the
13 Serbs, Bosnian Corps, asking us to contact
14 Colonel Blaskic and ask for a cease-fire.
15 Q. Did you try and contact Colonel Blaskic?
16 A. We tried several times but we were told that
17 Colonel Blaskic was not in at his headquarters.
18 Q. You were with a fellow army officer at the time, I think
19 a lieutenant-colonel, am I right, from the Canadian
20 army?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did you discuss this lack of presence of
23 Colonel Blaskic?
24 A. Yes, we did and we found out that maybe we were not that
25 surprised that we were not able to get in contact with
1 Colonel Blaskic, because it is normal during a military
2 operation that the commander is at the forward
3 headquarters so he can be closer to the front and
4 command his soldiers.
5 Q. It is normal for a commander to be at his forward
6 headquarters to command his operation on the ground and
7 you were calling the hotel Vitez which was a rear or
8 central headquarters; is that correct?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Am I right in saying that that day, the British
11 battalion based in Vitez, outside Vitez, had patrols out
12 on the ground in Vitez?
13 A. Normally BritBat had patrols out in that area.
14 Q. I think they were receiving or giving you information
15 about what was going on out on the ground; is that
16 correct?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. Did you try and get back to Zenica again that day?
19 A. Yes, later on when it was dark, we tried to go back to
20 Zenica, using the same road as we tried to use this
21 morning.
22 Q. Can you please stand up again, Major Baggesen, and just
23 for the sake of clarity indicate on the map the road
24 that you were taking?
25 A. Can I do it from here?
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. We had our headquarters in Vitez down here and we took
3 this way (indicates).
4 Q. What time was that, this second attempt to leave Vitez?
5 A. I cannot remember the exact time. Yes, I have it here,
6 9.30, and I can remember it was dark at that time.
7 Q. Can you tell the court what you could see as you were
8 travelling down this road?
9 A. We were able to see that there was still some fire in
10 this part of Vitez. We were able to see that in the
11 dark because all the fires in that area illuminated the
12 sky. We were able to see that there was a lot of firing
13 with machine-guns because -- that is easy to see when it
14 is dark because of all the traces in the air.
15 Q. Can you explain to the court so that we are all clear
16 what tracer fire is?
17 A. Tracer fire is, normally, when you are firing a machine
18 gun or a heavy machine-gun, every five or ten rounds
19 have a piece of phosphorous in the back of the
20 projectile so you are able when you are shooting in the
21 dark to see the curve of the projectiles. It is easier
22 for the men who are using the weapon to see the targets.
23 Q. So in effect you can see lightning rods across the sky
24 as every fifth or tenth round has this phosphorus in the
25 round?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. Since you could clearly see the direction of fire, can
3 you explain to the court what you could actually see,
4 where the firing was coming from and where it was going?
5 A. We were able to see that the firing came from different
6 positions but all in the same direction, and we were
7 only able to see fire going in one direction, we were
8 not able to see that someone was firing back.
9 Q. So what did that indicate to you?
10 A. That this was -- there was only one part who was
11 shooting.
12 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I do not know if you wish to break
13 now.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, it is time for a break. We will resume
15 work at 11.40.
16 (11.20 am)
17 (A short break)
18 (11.40 am)
19 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please have the
20 accused brought in.
21 (Accused brought in)
22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley?
23 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 One point, Mr. President, has arisen in the break.
25 I have been informed by the translation unit that there
1 was a small error in a translation from the English into
2 the Bosnian Serbo-Croat, and that was in respect of the
3 description that Major Baggesen gave to a conversation
4 that took place in Travnik on the telephone between
5 Colonel Blaskic and the HVO military police commander.
6 He stated that he believed, or his opinion was, that a
7 military conversation had taken place and I understand
8 that the translation that Mr. Nobilo and Colonel Blaskic
9 received is that there was not a military conversation,
10 so it is in the positive rather than the negative.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. If both parties agree, I am going
12 to ask the Registrar to confirm in the transcript this
13 correction of the error. I must also say I did not wish
14 to interrupt, but you are having a military conversation
15 and there seems to be a kind of complicity between you,
16 as if this was a conversation among military people.
17 I did not wish to interrupt because I know that it may
18 mean many things. I do not suppose it is so very
19 important, but it seems to be conducted between you.
20 I am not mistaken, am I, Mr. Cayley?
21 MR. CAYLEY: I suppose that military people do speak in a
22 certain manner, your Honour. I am a humble military
23 Prosecutor, but I do have some military knowledge. What
24 I will try and do, and I hope I have done that already,
25 is to explain when military terminology is used. It is
1 important, it is relevant; this is a trial of an army
2 officer after all, and I am doing my best to try and
3 explain military terms to lay people. I am not an
4 expert myself; Major Baggesen is more of an expert or is
5 an expert in matters of weaponry and communications, but
6 I will remember, Mr. President, from now on what you have
7 said and try and simplify language.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Prosecutor. We are only humble
9 judges and not military experts. We can continue now.
10 MR. CAYLEY: Major Baggesen, for the purposes of the record,
11 you marked on the map 0600 hours. What was that time
12 that you have indicated on the aerial photograph?
13 A. That was, as I can remember, the time when we were
14 driving at the road, passing Vitez.
15 Q. Just to recall, 15th and 16th April when you were
16 present in this area, did you see any Bosnian government
17 forces at the time, any Bosnian army units on the
18 ground?
19 A. No, we did not in that area.
20 Q. Remembering again that speed is everything, and also
21 explaining military terminology to the court, we will
22 continue. I will stop you if I am nudged by my
23 colleagues here that a term has been used that may not
24 be clear to the court.
25 I think the time is now approximately 2130 hours.
1 It is 10.30 in the evening, and you are travelling on
2 this road, this bypass road through Vitez; is that
3 correct?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. Did you get past the checkpoint at this time?
6 A. Yes, we passed the checkpoint and there was no problem
7 at that checkpoint.
8 Q. Were there any other checkpoints in the region of that
9 checkpoint you have marked on that aerial photograph?
10 A. Yes, there was another checkpoint in the neighbourhood
11 that controlled the road from one road down to Vitez.
12 Q. Can you again mark that on that aerial photograph with
13 the same marker that you did before? You might wish to
14 mark that "HVO 2". If you could put "HVO CP2", just to
15 distinguish it from the other mark.
16 A. This checkpoint normally controlled the traffic on the
17 road from the main road and into Vitez, so we do not
18 have to pass this checkpoint when we were using the
19 before-mentioned road, only if we have to go from the
20 junction to Vitez.
21 Q. From the direction of Zenica, taking into account these
22 two checkpoints you have marked, who controlled access
23 in and out of the town?
24 A. Of Vitez?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. HVO.
2 Q. You successfully negotiated the checkpoint on this
3 occasion. Where did you go to after this?
4 A. We tried to go back to Zenica because we felt more
5 secure in Zenica. When we were coming closer to Zenica
6 and outside this photo, we were able to see that the
7 whole sky was illuminated by a big fire.
8 MR. CAYLEY: If you could wait, Major Baggesen, at this
9 point?
10 Mr. President, I would like to tender exhibit 50A
11 which again is a photographic copy of an exhibit that we
12 have previously tendered before the court, the purpose
13 again being because the witness is going to mark this
14 photographic copy.
15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Dubuisson?
16 THE REGISTRAR: Could you give me the number, the exact
17 number of the original exhibit?
18 MR. CAYLEY: It is 50.
19 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore the original exhibit is 50, and for
20 the needs of this testimony, we are going to work on a
21 photocopy which will also be admitted under which
22 number?
23 THE REGISTRAR: To facilitate our work, we are going to call
24 it 50A.
25 JUDGE JORDA: Everybody is agreed? Very well. Continue,
1 please, Mr. Cayley.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Major Baggesen, can
3 you take a look at this aerial photograph next to you?
4 Do you recognise it?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, again if I can ask the indulgence
7 of the court, if I could approach the witness?
8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course. Also the Defence may do that
9 if they wish.
10 MR. CAYLEY: Can you indicate to the court the road on which
11 you travelled on the way back to Zenica? What villages
12 does that road pass?
13 A. The area of Ahmici.
14 Q. Can you explain to the court what you saw as you drove
15 down that road?
16 A. We were driving along this road from Vitez to the Zenica
17 area and when we came down here, we were able to see
18 that this area here was illuminated and we could see
19 there was a big fire going on. Actually, when we came
20 closer, we could see that the whole area was on fire.
21 Q. Did you find the source of the fire, where the fire was
22 coming from?
23 A. Yes, because when we came up here, we could see that the
24 area here was on fire.
25 Q. Can you take the red marker and indicate the area? Is
1 this approximately, this is not exact, the area that you
2 can identify here?
3 A. It was very difficult; we could just see that the whole
4 area was burning.
5 Q. Can you mark with that red pen the area that you saw was
6 burning? You have marked a red circle on the aerial
7 photograph. That is the area that you believe was
8 burning?
9 A. Yes, maybe more, because there was a lot of --
10 Q. Mr. Hayman cannot see, so could you make it a bit
11 clearer? You were about to say something. Maybe?
12 A. Maybe it was a bigger area. It was very difficult to
13 see because of all the fires in there, but I can
14 remember it was an awful sight because at that time we
15 had seen a lot of single houses on fire but this time it
16 was a whole area that was burning. At that time, there
17 was a beautiful mosque and we were able to see at that
18 time that the minaret was still up and we were able to
19 see this minaret illuminated from all the fires around.
20 Q. The minaret of the mosque was still standing and it was
21 illuminated by this fire?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Describe the size of this fire to make it clear to the
24 court, the extent, the area it was covering?
25 A. From my point of view, it was to see a whole village on
1 fire.
2 Q. Did you try and enter the village?
3 A. Yes, we did. We tried to go in here (indicating) to
4 monitor the situation, but we were stopped at a
5 checkpoint here (indicating), as I can remember. There
6 was only one, maybe two, soldiers who denied us access
7 to that area.
8 Q. Who was the checkpoint manned by? What soldiers?
9 A. HVO, and we could see that because they were wearing HVO
10 badges.
11 Q. Can you mark on the map the location of that checkpoint
12 in blue; that is fine. You might want to mark it
13 "HVO". So you have marked, for the purposes of the
14 transcript, a blue circle indicating that there was an
15 HVO checkpoint on the main road next to the side road
16 going into the village of Ahmici; is that correct?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Thank you. Did the soldiers at this checkpoint give you
19 a reason why you could not go into the village of
20 Ahmici?
21 A. Yes, we were told that it was an unsafe area for us to
22 go into because there were heavy fightings in that area.
23 Q. They said there was heavy fighting in the area. Did you
24 see any sign of fighting?
25 A. No, we saw from the road -- we were able to look up at
1 the road and we saw some persons at the ground, close to
2 the road, maybe bodies, maybe persons who were just
3 lying down; we were not able to see if it was bodies.
4 One of the houses were illuminated. They all were, but
5 in one of them we were able to see a person laying in
6 the window, maybe a body, maybe a person who was on his
7 way in or out of the house.
8 Q. But you were looking up the road and it was difficult to
9 see; is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. The damage that you saw in the village, this fire, again
12 you are a professional army officer, and, remembering to
13 keep the language simple, did you discuss with your
14 fellow officer how that fire had been started in that
15 village?
16 A. Yes, because a fire like this could not have been
17 started because there have been used artillery or
18 mortars, so we discussed and concluded that this was a
19 fire that was put on by humans.
20 Q. So you are saying that somebody had physically started
21 the fire?
22 A. Yes, it was not a result of use of weapons.
23 Q. I think that you had visited Ahmici before this time; is
24 that correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Do you remember approximately when?
2 A. I cannot remember the exact day; it was a few days
3 before this happened. Normally we passed Ahmici when we
4 were going from Zenica to Vitez, and one of my
5 interpreters told me one day that we have to visit
6 Ahmici, so I could see the mosque, because the people in
7 Ahmici were very proud of their new mosque. It was
8 mostly a new-built mosque. The people in Ahmici had
9 raised the money themselves for this mosque. My
10 interpreter asked me to go up there to have a look,
11 because normally I am interested in architecture. We
12 went up and I saw the mosque and it was a beautiful
13 mosque.
14 Q. How did the village appear to you on that day?
15 A. Very calm. The children were playing in the street, we
16 were able to hear the birds singing and it was very calm
17 in that area.
18 Q. Did you see any signs of military fortifications?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Any trenches?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Any wire?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Any artillery positions?
25 A. We saw nothing. It seems that Ahmici was -- you are not
1 able to see that there was a war going on when you visit
2 Ahmici.
3 JUDGE JORDA: A bit more slowly, please, for the benefit of
4 the interpreters.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President.
6 So you saw no sign of any military activity when
7 you visited Ahmici a few days before?
8 A. No, there was no sign of military activity.
9 Q. As far as you could see?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Just to conclude on these days, the attack that you had
12 seen on Vitez and the aftermath, the results of the
13 attack on Ahmici, what were the conclusions that you
14 reached about this matter as a professional soldier in
15 discussion with your colleagues in ECMM?
16 A. We concluded that this was a military operation, but not
17 against a military target, but against a civilian
18 target.
19 Q. Am I correct in saying that a report was actually made
20 in writing about this matter?
21 A. We made a lot of reports, so yes.
22 MR. CAYLEY: I would like to tender an exhibit.
23 Mr. Dubuisson, what number will this be?
24 THE REGISTRAR: Number 90.
25 MR. CAYLEY: If I could tender exhibit 90? (Handed).
1 I apologise, Mr. President, there is not a translation
2 into the French language, but I will get the witness to
3 read out the relevant paragraph. Much of this is
4 actually irrelevant, but in the interests of totality
5 I admit the whole document.
6 Do you recognise this document, Major Baggesen?
7 A. Yes, this document is an ECMM weekly summary and this is
8 a document which was weekly made at our headquarters in
9 Zagreb. It was a summary of all the reports from the
10 Regional Centres in the area.
11 Q. Could you turn to paragraphs 14 and 15? If you could
12 pause one moment.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Cayley.
14 MR. CAYLEY: I understand that this document actually
15 provides summaries of events, in fact all across Bosnia
16 and in Croatia I think, and also in Hungary and Albania
17 where there were officers of the ECMM; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. There was a summary of the region reports from the ECMM
20 in Zenica; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you read paragraph 15 of the summary?
23 A. Yes, it says:
24 "The declared position of the Bosnian Croat
25 authorities to implement the Vance-Owen Plan, forcing
1 the Muslim population to leave the so-called Croat
2 provinces, provoked a reaction which resulted in strong
3 and brutal fighting with action against the civilian
4 population, especially in the Zenica and Vitez regions."
5 Q. Why was that conclusion reached?
6 A. Because what we were able to see there was military
7 actions, military activities against the civilian Muslim
8 population in that area.
9 Q. Do you believe that what you saw on 15th and 16th April
10 was the result of some uprising by two or three soldiers
11 who just decided to take matters into their own hands,
12 attack the Vitez and Ahmici area?
13 A. No, there is no doubt that this was a military
14 operation.
15 Q. Was the area into Vitez sealed at the time that you were
16 there?
17 A. It was sealed by the HVO.
18 Q. The checkpoints?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So the traffic was being controlled going in and out of
21 the town?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You say it was a military operation. What was the
24 purpose of this military operation in your view? I know
25 you have read the report?
1 A. We think that this operation, military operation,
2 against the civilian population was to scare them and to
3 show what would happen if other villages and the Muslim
4 inhabitants in other villages if they do not move out.
5 So I think this was an example to show.
6 Q. Can you give an estimate of the number of men that you
7 believe would have been required to carry out this size
8 of operation?
9 A. I would think maybe 500 to 600 soldiers to do this
10 operation in Vitez and Ahmici area. This would include
11 the checkpoints.
12 Q. Would it have to have co-ordinated?
13 A. Yes, when you have a big operation like this, it had to
14 be co-ordinated because you have to use different units
15 and you have to command those units, because there is a
16 lot of -- you have to transport the soldiers to the
17 area, you have to do all the logistic stuff when you are
18 carrying out operations like this.
19 Q. By "logistics", you mean military supplies, ammunition,
20 fuel?
21 A. Yes, things like that.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Excuse me, one moment, Mr. President. (Pause).
23 I think you left Ahmici that evening not having
24 been able to get into the village.
25 A. Yes, we did.
1 Q. And you returned to the city of Zenica; is that correct?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. I want to move forward in time, and again you may
4 refresh your memory from your diary, to 19th April.
5 What happened in Zenica on 19th April?
6 A. The day started as usual but in the morning the city was
7 attacked without any warning by artillery.
8 Q. Where were you at the time this happened?
9 A. At our headquarters in Zenica.
10 Q. Did you actually respond to this shelling of the city?
11 A. Yes, we did. After the shelling, I went down to the
12 area that had been hit, together with another Danish
13 monitor, Allan Laustsen, who is a former artillery
14 officer.
15 Q. So an officer familiar with heavy weapons, with heavy
16 guns, and the ammunition used by those guns; is that
17 correct?
18 A. Yes, normally all officers in the Danish Army are
19 familiar with the use of artillery. It is a part of our
20 officers' training.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could tender exhibit 91?
22 Mr. Usher? (Handed). Could you explain to the court
23 what this photograph depicts?
24 A. This photograph is a photograph I took the same day at
25 the marketplace in Zenica. It shows one of the impacts
1 in that area.
2 Q. So this is a point where one of these shells fell in the
3 city.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you remember approximately what time these shells
6 fell?
7 A. 9.30 in the morning.
8 Q. So this is what the ground looked like where one of
9 these shells fell?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What could you tell by looking at this crater with your
12 expert eye?
13 A. Normally when we are seeing an impact like this, we are
14 able to see what direction it came from and we can -- it
15 all depends on how the ground are. We are able to see
16 what kind of artillery that were used there, how big a
17 cannon was used.
18 Q. Were you able to do that with this crater?
19 A. Yes, specifically on this crater because it is very easy
20 on this one to see the direction from the firing.
21 Q. Can you explain to the court, using a pointer, how you
22 came to that conclusion, remembering again that many
23 people in here are not from a military background. Can
24 you explain how you worked out the direction of fire?
25 A. We can see that the grenade or the shell hits just here,
1 and then there is a lot of splashmarks out in this area.
2 Q. The splashmarks, you call them "splashmarks"; I know
3 that again is a term that is used. What are they caused
4 by?
5 A. They are caused by the shrapnel.
6 Q. They are caused by the shrapnel that flies out from the
7 shell. Is that a normal pattern made by a shell when it
8 hits the ground?
9 A. Yes, when it hits on the road like here.
10 Q. Can you indicate with the pointer from what direction
11 the shell was coming?
12 A. It was coming from this direction, and it hits here, it
13 explodes and all the splash goes in this direction, to
14 those two sides here.
15 Q. There are no splashmarks behind?
16 A. No, so therefore this -- it is very easy, we were
17 logging it and it was very easy for us to see the
18 direction.
19 Q. Were you able to use the information that you saw on the
20 ground to work out on the map from which direction the
21 shell had been fired?
22 A. Yes, because we were using our compass, and using that
23 we were able to put it on the map.
24 Q. Do you have a compass with you at the moment?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you just demonstrate to the court the exercise that
2 you went through?
3 A. As I showed with the pointer, it was easy to see the
4 direction. Then we took our compass and put it in there
5 and then we were able to see the direction and from this
6 it was easy to see that the direction was 270 degrees.
7 Q. Which is broadly, on the four compass points, from a
8 westerly direction?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. I am not going to ask you to stand up and look at the
11 map again, but from your recollection what was in a
12 westerly direction from Zenica?
13 A. An area under HVO control.
14 Q. The range of the shell, the distance that it can be
15 fired, obviously has an effect as well on the possible
16 location of where the firing is coming from; is that
17 correct?
18 A. Yes, and this type of artillery was being used here. We
19 discussed and we concluded that it had to be medium
20 artillery, that is a 122 millimetre artillery. Normally
21 you use them on a distance of 14 or 15 kilometres.
22 Q. How could you tell what size of artillery it was, that
23 it was a 122 millimetre?
24 A. Just like you can hear on the noise, the bigger the
25 bang, the bigger --
1 Q. Basically a bigger hole in the ground?
2 A. The same here, from the size of the hole.
3 Q. Just to correct matters, can you state again the size
4 that you estimated the artillery shell was that hit the
5 ground in Zenica?
6 A. 122 millimetres.
7 Q. You say that you estimated that the range was 14 to 15
8 kilometres and that it had been fired from a westerly
9 direction; is that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You could obviously look at a map and pinpoint an area
12 15 kilometres from Zenica in a westerly direction.
13 Where did that take you on the map?
14 A. To an area controlled by HVO.
15 Q. Do you remember the name of that area, broadly speaking
16 between two towns?
17 A. I cannot remember the name.
18 Q. If you stand up and look at the map and if the usher
19 could assist you by flipping over the aerial photograph
20 that is covering the map, you may be able to refresh
21 your memory from the map.
22 Mr. President, may I approach the witness?
23 Can you indicate where Zenica is on the map?
24 A. Zenica is here and a western direction from Zenica is to
25 this area over here.
1 Q. That is a westerly direction. This is an approximation,
2 is it not; it is not an exact science.
3 A. No.
4 Q. Where do you estimate that the shells came from? Where
5 did you and Allan Laustsen estimate that the shells had
6 been fired from?
7 A. From the area over here (indicates).
8 Q. Can you specify what that area is on the map?
9 A. That is the Bila area.
10 Q. The Bila area on the map. That is in the top mid-point
11 on the map.
12 A. Normally we call this area the Bila area and that was at
13 that time controlled by the HVO.
14 Q. Fine, thank you very much.
15 A. We concluded it was HVO, we were not able to have a look
16 at -- there was no name on the shells, but we did not
17 think that BiH were going to shell their own town.
18 Later on Zenica was shelled by the Bosnian Serb Army,
19 but that was from another direction from an area north
20 of Travnik and there was no doubt that this was from
21 this area.
22 Q. These shots that were fired into Zenica?
23 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, can you repeat this?
24 MR. CAYLEY: You have just said, have you not, Major Baggesen
25 that you concluded it was the HVO, but you did not think
1 that the Bosnian army were going to shell their own
2 town; is that correct? Then you said that later on the
3 Bosnian Serb Army shelled Zenica, but that was from
4 another direction that was north of Travnik and that
5 there was no doubt in your mind that these shells --
6 A. Were from the HVO area.
7 Q. This shelling, was it aimed at a military target?
8 A. We were not able to see any military targets in that
9 area where the shells were, where all the impacts were.
10 Q. There were military targets in Zenica, were there not?
11 A. Yes, there were, but not at the marketplace.
12 Q. So these shells fell in the marketplace?
13 A. (Witness nodded).
14 Q. Do you believe they were aimed shots, that they were
15 actually targetting a specific area?
16 A. After what we have seen down there, the men, the
17 soldiers, who were manning the artillery pieces were
18 badly trained and I do not think they were able to hit a
19 target with that precision as we normally see good
20 trained soldiers could do, so we think this was just a
21 terror-bombing against the area.
22 Q. Terror-bombing?
23 A. Yes, that is a military word again, I am sorry, but an
24 artillery attack against a civilian target would be
25 proposed to scare people.
1 Q. Why do you think they wanted to scare people?
2 A. At that time, there was a minority of Bosnian Croats who
3 were living in Zenica and this could be the reason for
4 HVO to do this attack, maybe to scare the Croat
5 inhabitants in Zenica out of Zenica.
6 Q. Why would they want to frighten the Croat inhabitants of
7 Zenica into leaving the city?
8 A. Because they want them to go to the 10th province; I am
9 referring to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. We saw later on
10 examples that HVO were doing a lot of things to get
11 Croats out of Zenica.
12 Q. They were moving the population?
13 A. Yes, they were.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Excuse me one moment, Mr. President. (Pause).
15 JUDGE RIAD: I am sorry to try to ask for a clarification.
16 You said they were trying to move out the Croat
17 population. I did not understand why they should move
18 them out? Was it as a preparation for an attack of the
19 area?
20 A. No, your Honour, I think that this was done because they
21 want as many Croats in the 10th province as possible,
22 therefore they want to move all the Croats out of Zenica
23 so the majority in the 10th province could be Croats.
24 You can see this together with they were doing all those
25 ethnic cleansing from the 10th province, so they were
1 scaring the Muslim population out of the 10th province
2 and they were taking Croat people from the Zenica area
3 who were belonging to the 9th province to the
4 10th province.
5 JUDGE RIAD: By scaring both sides?
6 A. Yes, actually.
7 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse us, Mr. Cayley. You can continue.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Just to clarify that point that Judge Riad has
9 asked, Zenica itself was in the 9th province of the
10 Vance-Owen Peace Plan; is that correct?
11 A. Yes, and the border between the 9th and the
12 10th province was the border between the Vitez, Travnik
13 and Busovaca -- the borders between those municipalities
14 and Zenica municipality.
15 Q. And the Zenica municipality, or the Zenica province
16 within the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, who was to control
17 that under the Plan?
18 A. The Bosnian Muslims.
19 MR. CAYLEY: If I can now tender Prosecutor's exhibit 91?
20 JUDGE JORDA: No objections?
21 MR. CAYLEY: My apologies, 92. If I could tender
22 Prosecutor's exhibit 92? The photograph is 91.
23 (Handed).
24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Dubuisson, which is 92? Thank you.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Major Baggesen, can you turn to the second
1 page of this document? Is that your signature?
2 A. Yes, that is correct.
3 Q. I do not want you to read this report, but it concerns
4 the events of 25th April 1993. If you could summarise
5 to the court what happened, indicating on the map the
6 locations of where these events happened? This,
7 I think, involved a visit by you with another monitor to
8 villages just south of Zenica; is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. I think you were accompanied by Father Stjepan, who was
11 a Roman Catholic priest from Zenica; is that correct?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. Can you explain to the court how this visit to these
14 villages south of Zenica came about?
15 A. Yes. The day before this happened, around 24th April,
16 there was a lot of rumours in Zenica, rumours from the
17 Croats telling that Muslims were going to attack and
18 kill all the Croats in Zenica and in the small villages
19 around Zenica. Therefore a lot of the Croat population
20 in Zenica and the small villages around Zenica escaped.
21 They all escaped to a village called Grahovcici and our
22 main task was to get many of those refugees back to
23 their own houses. Therefore a Dutch monitor, Henk
24 Morsink, and I together with Father Stjepan went out to
25 visit those villages where the refugees came from to see
1 if there were any problems in those areas.
2 Q. Can you indicate on the map just broadly -- the judges
3 will not be able to see it -- where Zenica is?
4 A. Zenica is situated here (indicating) and all the
5 villagers were from small villages out in this area here
6 (indicating) and he went to a place called Grahovcici in
7 this area.
8 Q. These small villages south of Zenica, who was that area
9 controlled by?
10 A. This area, controlled by BiH.
11 Q. By the Bosnian army. Were they villages with a mixed
12 ethnic population?
13 A. Yes, all of the villages were mixed population with
14 Muslims and Croats.
15 Q. You say that as a result of rumours, these people fled
16 to Grahovcici?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Who was that controlled by?
19 A. HVO.
20 Q. Did you visit these small villages just south of Zenica?
21 A. Yes, we did and we found that there was no problems
22 except for in one of the villages where some of the
23 houses had been robbed.
24 Q. So in one of the villages, some of the houses belonging
25 to whom?
1 A. To the Croats.
2 Q. To the Bosnian Croats had been robbed, but what about in
3 the other villages?
4 A. There was no problem and we interviewed the Muslim
5 neighbours to the Croats in the area and we told them
6 that there was no problem and they wanted their
7 neighbours back because they had friendly relations with
8 them.
9 Q. I think you were told in two of the villages, Stranjani
10 and Janjac, that several houses had been burnt down and
11 an old lady had been killed by sniper fire?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. Did you see that?
14 A. I cannot remember if we saw the burnt houses, but it was
15 normal down there to see burnt houses. In every village
16 there were burnt houses.
17 Q. But your feeling generally about these villages is that
18 things were fairly peaceful?
19 A. It was not only our opinion, it was Father Stjepan's
20 opinion as well.
21 Q. The Roman Catholic priest?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What did the Bosnian Muslims living in these villages
24 say about their Bosnian Croat neighbours? Did they want
25 them back?
1 A. Yes, they wanted them back because they had good
2 relations with them.
3 Q. What did you do?
4 A. Together with Father Stjepan we went to Grahovcici where
5 we had a meeting with representatives from the small
6 villages and we told them, or Father Stjepan told them,
7 about our findings and we told them that it was safe for
8 them to go home.
9 Q. How many refugees were there in Grahovcici?
10 A. 2,000.
11 Q. 2,000 refugees?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Why did they say they had fled from their homes?
14 A. Because they have heard the rumour that the Muslims were
15 going to kill them all.
16 Q. Did they say who told them these rumours?
17 A. It came from other Croats.
18 Q. Did you make arrangements to return these Bosnian Croats
19 to their homes in these villages?
20 A. Yes, actually this arrangement was thought of by us but
21 fulfilled by Father Stjepan who found some civilian
22 buses from Zenica to go to Grahovcici the next day to
23 bring them home.
24 Q. Did everything go to plan?
25 A. Not in the beginning, because the next day we went to
1 Grahovcici but at an HVO checkpoint, temporary
2 checkpoint, in Novi Selo, we were stopped, and the
3 commander there, he took the buses from us and we were
4 not allowed to go to Grahovcici.
5 Q. So at the HVO checkpoint in Grahovcici, the HVO
6 commander took the buses from you and would not allow
7 you to go down into the village. What did he say?
8 A. He said actually that all the refugees in Grahovcici
9 were going to the Bila area, controlled by HVO, because
10 they were more safe there, and he told us that they were
11 going to use the buses for this, so they would take the
12 buses and take the refugees from Grahovcici to Bila
13 area.
14 Q. Did you speak with the refugees through the
15 interpreters?
16 A. Yes, we did and they told us that some of them who
17 wanted to go after our first visit, they wanted to go
18 back to the villages, but they were stopped at the
19 checkpoint and forced back by the HVO soldiers up
20 there. The HVO soldiers up there fired warning shots
21 against the Croats who wanted to go back to their
22 houses.
23 Q. So against their own people?
24 A. Yes, but only firing in the air; they did not shoot
25 directly on them.
1 Q. What happened in the end in this situation?
2 A. In the end, we had our buses back and we were able to
3 transport a lot of the refugees back to their own
4 houses. I can remember that 1,400 came back to their
5 own houses, some of them by foot and some of them by the
6 buses. 300 of them decided to stay in Grahovcici and
7 300 had already been moved or wanted to go to the Bila
8 area, so I think we succeeded in this operation.
9 Q. Could you take a seat, please, Major Baggesen.
10 Did you and Henk Morsink reach any conclusions
11 about this event?
12 A. Yes, we did, and that conclusion was that people were
13 forced out of the Zenica by HVO spreading those rumours
14 and it was very obvious because we saw, when people
15 wanted to go back, they were forced back by HVO, forced
16 back to that direction where HVO wanted them to go.
17 Q. Why did the HVO want to move them to that area, to the
18 area of Bila?
19 A. Because it was controlled by HVO and it was in the
20 10th province.
21 Q. They wanted to increase the population of ethnic Croats
22 in that area; is that correct?
23 A. That is correct, because all those villages they came
24 from was in the Bosnian Muslim province number 9.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
1 If I could just have a moment, Mr. President?
2 (Pause).
3 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley, continue please.
4 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 If we could now again move ahead in time to
6 27th April, when I think you and Henk Morsink drove to a
7 small Muslim village south of Kiseljak; is that correct?
8 A. Yes, that is correct.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could tender another exhibit,
10 again this is an aerial photograph that has previously
11 been exhibited as exhibit 74. The witness may make some
12 markings of it, so this is a photographic copy. If
13 I could tender that as exhibit 74A and if that could be
14 placed on the easel; thank you.
15 Could you just describe the location of the
16 village of Rotilje?
17 A. The village is situated in this area here and Kiseljak
18 is situated here, and Zenica would be down here
19 somewhere.
20 Q. Because it is in a northerly direction?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Just to clarify a point my colleagues have asked me, who
23 was Henk Morsink?
24 A. Henk Morsink was a Dutch monitor.
25 Q. A Dutch army officer serving as a monitor with you?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You visited the village of Rotilje. Why did you visit
3 the village of Rotilje?
4 A. Because we wanted to monitor the situation in the
5 village. There had been an ECMM team in the village
6 before, because there have been some incidents in that
7 village.
8 Q. What incidents were there in the village?
9 A. It was a Muslim village and there have been some
10 civilians killed in that village by HVO.
11 Q. When you got to this village, what did you find?
12 A. We found that those who were still living in the village
13 were not able to leave the village because the HVO had
14 positions on the slopes of the mountains around the
15 village, so if they tried to go out of the village,
16 there would be some snipers in the area that were firing
17 at them, so they were not able to leave the area; they
18 were not able to get anything in the village.
19 Q. Were these people in the village soldiers?
20 A. No, they were all civilians.
21 Q. Women?
22 A. Both.
23 Q. Women and men?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What did they tell you about events in the village?
1 A. Nothing new, nothing we did not know, because we had a
2 team in the area before, but we were told that there had
3 been some killings, very awful things in that village.
4 A young woman was raped and later on slaughtered. It is
5 very difficult to describe how she was slaughtered.
6 Q. Can you describe to the court how she was killed?
7 A. Actually what we heard was that after this young woman
8 had been raped an automatic weapon had been put up
9 between her legs and the bullets were fired.
10 Q. To which ethnic group did this woman belong?
11 A. Muslim.
12 Q. By whom had this action been committed?
13 A. It was done by HVO.
14 Q. Were you told anything else about events in the village?
15 A. Yes, we were told that an elderly couple were burnt
16 alive in the house and two other persons, I think I can
17 remember it was a father and son, they were killed by
18 smashing their head with a skull or an axe or something;
19 it was very awful. We did not see the victims. The
20 former team who visited this area, they saw all the
21 bloodstains.
22 Q. Did you have any reason to disbelieve what you had been
23 told?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Just to recall what you have said, the civilians that
1 were left in the village could not leave because snipers
2 were positioned around the village; is that correct?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. To which force did these snipers belong?
5 A. HVO.
6 Q. I would like to now again move forward in time and if
7 I could tender another exhibit, please; this is exhibit
8 93. This is another ECMM report, I believe written by
9 you. Is that your signature on this document?
10 A. Yes, that is correct.
11 Q. So this report was created by you?
12 A. Yes, together with the aforementioned Henk Morsink.
13 Q. Am I correct in saying that you had actually been told
14 by the ECMM liaison officer which you identified in your
15 testimony yesterday who was stationed at the Kiseljak
16 headquarters of UNPROFOR, of the UN Protection Force,
17 had informed you of certain events in the Kiseljak area;
18 is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What had he told you?
21 A. We were told that something had happened in a small
22 village north of Kiseljak in the Gomionica area. They
23 were able from the UNPROFOR headquarters to see that
24 there were some fires, some houses that were burning up
25 there, and they wanted ECMM to investigate in the
1 matter.
2 Q. Is the village of Gomionica on the aerial photograph
3 next to you?
4 A. Yes, this is this area (indicating) and Kiseljak is up
5 here.
6 Q. If you could remain standing, Major Baggesen.
7 Mr. President, may I approach the witness?
8 Can you take a pen? Am I correct in saying that
9 you went with an escort from the Canadian battalion of
10 the UN Protection Force?
11 A. Yes, that is correct.
12 Q. You were in armoured personnel carriers; is that
13 correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What is an armoured personnel carrier?
16 A. It is an armoured vehicle where normally you are using
17 it to transport people where we need to be protected.
18 Q. It has an armament on it, a weapon?
19 A. Yes, normally a heavy machine-gun.
20 Q. Why did you need to travel in this vehicle?
21 A. Because we were not safe in our own vehicles because at
22 certain occasions there were shots after us.
23 Q. Did you try and enter the village of Gomionica?
24 A. Yes, we did. We were coming on this direction and we
25 tried the first time to go into Gomionica by using this
1 road, but down here there were a checkpoint manned by a
2 very old man with a very old rifle, but that was not to
3 stop us; we were not allowed to force past.
4 Q. Can you mark that checkpoint on the aerial photograph?
5 You have marked it in black marker and you have marked
6 it "HVO CP".
7 A. I will call it CP1.
8 Q. That is fine. So you could not pass by this old man.
9 Who did he belong to?
10 A. He was HVO. Therefore we tried another way to the
11 village because we could see another way into the
12 village here. Then we tried to go in here, but we went
13 into another checkpoint.
14 Q. Who was controlling that checkpoint?
15 A. HVO as well.
16 Q. Could you mark that on the map?
17 For the purposes of the transcript, Major Baggesen
18 is marking another checkpoint and he is marking it
19 "HVO CP2". Could you pass this checkpoint?
20 A. No, we were not allowed to pass this checkpoint. The
21 soldiers there, they aimed their weapons against us and
22 they aimed their antitank weapons against us.
23 Q. What is an antitank weapon?
24 A. It is a weapon you are normally using when you have to
25 kill an armoured vehicle.
1 Q. It is a shoulder launch weapon, it is a rocket-propelled
2 grenade?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So these people were serious?
5 A. Yes, they were. We were told that the local HVO
6 commander in Kiseljak had ordered them to close all the
7 roads to Kiseljak.
8 Q. Did he identify who that commander was?
9 A. Yes, he did, but I cannot remember the name. It is in
10 the report, I think.
11 Q. Thank you, Major Baggesen.
12 A. After that, he gave us ten seconds to leave that area.
13 Q. If you could pause for a moment, Major Baggesen.
14 (Pause).
15 Am I correct in saying that next you tried to
16 visit the village of Polje Visnjica?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you identify that on the map?
19 A. That was an area over here.
20 Q. Was there a checkpoint?
21 A. There was another checkpoint and, again, we were stopped
22 at that checkpoint.
23 Q. Could you mark that on the aerial photograph, again with
24 the same marker?
25 A. I cannot mark the specific position because I cannot
1 remember the specific position, but I can mark the area.
2 Q. Yes, I would mark the area. If you could mark that
3 "HVO CP3"? For the purposes of the transcript, that is
4 the HVO checkpoint going into the village of Polje
5 Visnjica. Were you able to pass this checkpoint?
6 A. No, we were not allowed to pass this checkpoint. This
7 time they pulled out mines in front of our armoured
8 vehicles and again they aimed their weapons, including
9 the antitank weapons, against us.
10 Q. When you say they "pulled mines out in front of your
11 vehicle", what do you mean by that?
12 A. Land mines, so we were not able to pass it with our APC
13 without being killed.
14 Q. Because the weight of the vehicle would have detonated
15 the mines on the road?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So what did you do?
18 A. We went back, because we were not able to fulfil our
19 task.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I think now would be actually a
21 good time, if you wish, to finish for this morning.
22 JUDGE JORDA: I agree. We will resume at 2.30 pm.
23 (1.00 pm)
24 (Adjourned until 2.30 pm)
25
1 (2.30 pm)
2 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please have the
3 accused brought in.
4 (Accused brought in)
5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, for reasons which have been
6 conveyed to me by the Registrar regarding the
7 convenience of the witness, the Chamber will work until
8 4.30 and after that we will not resume work. So the
9 cross-examination of Mr. Hayman will begin on Monday at
10 10.00. Mr. Prosecutor, try and finish by 4.30. And
11 anyway that coincides with the time you envisaged for
12 your examination-in-chief, I think.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon,
14 your Honours, learned counsel.
15 Two administrative matters arise, Mr. President.
16 First of all, I have received clarification from the
17 Registrar's officer in respect of the diary and the
18 service upon the Defence and I wonder if, Mr. Dubuisson,
19 you could give an account of the movement of that diary
20 in the last year, please.
21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Registrar.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Regarding this document, we received a
23 request coming from Mr. Hayman in November. We contacted
24 the translation and it was completed during December.
25 After that, we sent it to Mr. Nobilo in February,
1 together with a number of other documents; that is as
2 far as the first document is concerned, so I recall that
3 what was given yesterday is actually a slightly modified
4 document due to certain translation errors.
5 MR. CAYLEY: I think that clarifies the position,
6 Mr. President, in respect of that document, unless my
7 learned friend has any comments to make.
8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?
9 MR. HAYMAN: If I may be permitted to commence my
10 cross-examination on Monday, I do not think there is an
11 issue here to discuss. We are happy to proceed.
12 JUDGE JORDA: Perfect. The incident is closed. Please
13 continue, Mr. Prosecutor.
14 MR. CAYLEY: The second administrative matter, your Honour,
15 is if I could apply for admission of Prosecutor's
16 exhibits 88, 89A, 89B, 29E, 56A, 50A, 90, 91, 92 and 93
17 into evidence, please, if there are no objections.
18 MR. HAYMAN: No objections, your Honour, to any of the
19 exhibits marked during this examination. There are some
20 others that counsel mentioned which I cannot call up
21 from memory. We would like to look at those before we
22 waive any objection, just to have in mind what they
23 are. I can list the ones that I think were marked in
24 this examination: 56A, 29E, 50A, 90, 91, 92, 74A, 88 and
25 89A and 89B, so there is no objection as to those
1 exhibits. The others there may well not be but I would
2 like to make sure I have them all in mind.
3 JUDGE JORDA: Which are the others? Excuse me, I did not
4 quite register the exhibits mentioned by Mr. Cayley for
5 which Mr. Hayman is asking for some delay. Maybe I was
6 not paying attention.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, there is first 88 as admitted by
8 Mr. Cayley; it is a map. That is the first map shown
9 this morning. Then we have 89A, which is the English
10 version of the procedural functioning of the ECMM and
11 then the French version of the same, that is B, and that
12 has been mentioned by Mr. Cayley.
13 Then we have the map, 29E, which is actually a
14 copy of map 29 which is to be found on your right, and
15 which was marked by the witness. That is 29E, which was
16 not mentioned by Mr. Cayley. Then exhibit 56A, which is
17 a copy marked by the witness of the map 56. Then the
18 map 50A, again a copy marked by the witness of the map
19 number 50.
20 Then we have exhibit 90, a weekly summary report
21 of Regional Centres; then 91, the mortar photographs;
22 then 92, a two-page document; and 74A, a copy marked by
23 the witness of map 74, that is the last one that is
24 still on the easel, and finally 93, which is a report of
25 the ECMM of the witness.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Which, Mr. Hayman, are the numbers, following
2 what you have heard from the Registrar, of exhibits you
3 wish to think about? Though I have, each time an
4 exhibit was tendered, asked if there was any objection
5 or not.
6 MR. HAYMAN: No objection to those, your Honour. In the
7 order Mr. Cayley read them out, jumping around a little
8 bit, I thought there were some extras in the list. If
9 not, they are all fine with us, your Honour.
10 JUDGE JORDA: Perfect. As everything is fine,
11 Mr. Prosecutor, you can continue with the examination of
12 your witness.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Major Baggesen, we finished your testimony at a
15 point in time where you had tried to visit the village
16 of Polje Visnjica and I think you stated to the court
17 that you were unable to enter that village; is that
18 right?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. I think I am correct in saying that you then returned to
21 the city of Zenica; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I would now like to show you another ECMM document.
24 I would like to tender this as Prosecutor's exhibit 94;
25 is that correct?
1 Major Baggesen, do you recognise this report?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Is that your signature at the bottom of the report?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Could you explain to the court what the content of this
6 report concerns?
7 A. Actually at that day we visited the local Red Cross in
8 Visoko, situated north of Kiseljak and they had a lot of
9 refugees in that area, approximately 20,000 refugees,
10 and 1,038 refugees were coming from the Kiseljak area
11 during the last few days.
12 Q. Was it stated to you where those Bosnian refugees were
13 from, which villages they were from?
14 A. Yes, they were from Svinjarevo and Jehovac and Gromiljak
15 and Behrici, and from Gomionica and Bilalovac.
16 Q. Were any of these villages villages that you had
17 attempted to visit the day before the events that you
18 told us about before lunch?
19 A. Yes, we tried to go into Gomionica.
20 Q. These refugees, were they Muslims?
21 A. Yes, they were.
22 Q. Am I right in saying that after you had visited these
23 refugees in Visoko, you returned to the Kiseljak area?
24 A. Yes, we did.
25 Q. What did you do when you got to Kiseljak?
1 A. Actually we tried to visit the village of Gomionica
2 again and this time, we succeeded to go into the village
3 and a lot of other organisations were waiting to come to
4 the village to see what had happened, so after we came
5 to the village -- no, that was the other day. This day
6 we succeeded to go into the village and when the
7 commander of the two APCs, that was a lieutenant from
8 the Canadian battalion, we dismounted from the APCs, we
9 were fired at from a light machine-gun.
10 Q. I think you made a report, did you not, about these
11 events? I think if I give you that that will assist you
12 in refreshing your memory. If I could tender into
13 evidence Prosecutor's exhibit 94, which is a daily
14 report of 29th April? (Handed). It is 95, my
15 apologies.
16 Do you recognise this report, Major Baggesen?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Is that your signature?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. This report concerns your subsequent visit to the
21 Kiseljak area after you had visited the refugees in
22 Visoko. I think you visited a number of villages in the
23 area, is that correct?
24 A. Yes, we did.
25 Q. Could you stand up next to the aerial photograph which
1 I think represents the area, and indicate the location
2 of the village and your findings in that village?
3 A. We visited the Gomionica and the Visnjica area. This is
4 the area here.
5 Q. You are indicating on the area marked Visnjica on that
6 exhibit?
7 A. Yes. We visited again this day Gomionica; this was our
8 third attempt to go into the village. The day before,
9 as I mentioned before, we were shot at from some
10 positions in there, but this day there was -- we could
11 go into that area and it was totally -- there were no
12 people in there, no dead bodies, nothing.
13 Q. What was the state of the village of Gomionica?
14 A. A lot of burnt houses, but we did not walk because we
15 were afraid that maybe there were some booby-traps, that
16 the area had been mined, so we did not want to go into
17 the buildings.
18 Q. What did you find in the village of Visnjica?
19 A. In Visnjica we found that 40 out of 100 Muslim houses
20 were burnt.
21 Q. Can you point to it on the map?
22 A. This here (indicates).
23 Q. I do not think Doci is marked on that aerial photograph,
24 I do not know if you can remember where it was?
25 A. Actually I cannot remember where it was. In the area.
1 Q. It is mentioned in your report. The village of Hercezi?
2 A. This is this area here (indicates).
3 Q. You are pointing to an area of the photograph which is
4 labelled Hercezi. What did you find there?
5 A. We found that the few Muslim families that returned,
6 they had good relations to the Croat neigbourhoods.
7 There were no burnt houses there, but we were told that
8 there was 14 people killed in the Hercezi area and in
9 the Visnjica area, so in this area between those two we
10 learned that 14 people had been killed.
11 Q. Did you proceed safely through this area on this
12 particular day? Were there any incidences directed
13 against you?
14 A. Yes, because there was still the checkpoint and we were
15 stopped in the checkpoint and I can remember that the
16 HVO soldiers there searched our APC and they verbally
17 insulted our Muslim interpreter.
18 Q. In which village was that?
19 A. It was at the checkpoint here marked with "HVO CP3".
20 Q. Were there any other incidences directed against you
21 that day?
22 A. Actually when we visited Gomionica area, as I was saying
23 before, a lot of other organisations were waiting to
24 come in, and after we came to the area and secured the
25 area with the two Canadian APCs, they had heavy
1 machine-guns and they secured the area because the last
2 time we went there we were shot at, so this time we
3 secured the area. Then we were going in with
4 representatives from UNHCR and from ICRC. During this
5 period, one of the Canadian soldiers observed that some
6 soldiers -- a patrol were in the area.
7 Q. What soldiers, from the Bosnian army or from the HVO?
8 A. From the HVO. This Canadian soldier told us that they
9 were having Droganov, sniper rifle and antitank weapons.
10 Q. This soldier could observe this HVO patrol with a sniper
11 rifle, I think you said, and an antitank weapon?
12 A. RPG-7.
13 Q. Rocket-propelled grenade?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Did anything actually happen to you in the village of
16 Gomionica?
17 A. No, because after that we went out again because we did
18 not want to get into a conflict with this HVO patrol.
19 Q. I think you made a conclusion in your reports, did you
20 not, in respect of all of these villages. Can you read
21 that conclusion to the court?
22 A. Yes:
23 "Our conclusion was it was obvious that ethnic
24 cleansing had taken place in the area."
25 Q. So it was obvious that ethnic cleansing had taken place
1 in the area. Do you stand by that conclusion?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Thank you. Can you take a seat, please, Major Baggesen.
4 I would like you to now look at your diary and to
5 refer to the entry on, I think it is Friday 30th April.
6 JUDGE JORDA: To avoid coming back to that, 94, 95, they
7 have already been admitted; there is no objection on the
8 part of the Defence. Very well. Thank you. Continue,
9 please.
10 MR. CAYLEY: This entry I think concerns your visit to the
11 HVO prison in Kiseljak; is that right?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. Can you tell the court about this incident, please?
14 A. That day we went to the HVO headquarters in Kiseljak and
15 we wanted to visit the prison there because there have
16 been a lot of cease-fires down there and there have been
17 a lot of agreements. This time we were going to see if
18 HVO in Kiseljak had fulfilled the latest agreement
19 saying that all prisoners had to be released.
20 In this agreement, it was agreed that all
21 prisoners had to be released at 12.00, and we visited
22 the prison at that time. We were there at 3.00 in the
23 afternoon and we found out that there were still
24 prisoners there.
25 Q. If I could now show you the last aerial photograph. The
1 Prosecutor will tender this as exhibit 76A. Again, your
2 Honour, it is a photograph that has already been
3 exhibited and this is a paper copy of the same
4 photograph.
5 Major Baggesen, do you recognise that photograph?
6 A. Yes, that is a photograph from Kiseljak.
7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, would you mind if I approached the
8 witness, please?
9 If you could stand up, please, Major Baggesen? If
10 you could wait.
11 JUDGE JORDA: I apologise. Please continue, Mr. Cayley.
12 MR. CAYLEY: Can you remember from this photograph where the
13 HVO prison was located in Kiseljak?
14 A. Yes, it was located at the Kiseljak barracks, which is
15 situated here.
16 Q. So it was actually located in the HVO military
17 headquarters in Kiseljak, the prison?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. How many prisoners were you going there to release?
20 A. I cannot remember how many there were, but -- is it
21 mentioned in the diary?
22 Q. You say in your diary in fact that there were 48 men
23 held in a 93-metre-squared building. Can you identify
24 in that photograph where those prisoners were held in
25 the Kiseljak area?
1 A. Yes, there were some buildings here (indicating), and
2 there were prisoners in that building there and in the
3 building there.
4 Q. With one of these pens, can you ring the building where
5 these prisoners were kept, so you are marking on the
6 photograph in a blue pen the location of the prisoners.
7 Can you write "HVO prison"? Thank you. These
8 prisoners, were they prisoners of war? Were they
9 soldiers or civilians?
10 A. They were all civilians.
11 Q. How old were they?
12 A. I cannot remember how old they were, but there were old
13 people and young people amongst them.
14 Q. Do you remember any of the ages of the young or the
15 elderly?
16 A. The youngest was a boy of 14 years of age.
17 Q. There was a boy of 14 years of age in this prison?
18 A. Yes. We had been told there were some women in there
19 but they had been released earlier.
20 Q. Why were they there?
21 A. Because they were Muslims.
22 Q. That was why they were there, because they were Muslims?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you, Major Baggesen.
25 Mr. President, I would now like to tender
1 Prosecutor's exhibit 96, which is another ECMM report of
2 1st May. Mr. President, if there is no objection from my
3 learned friend I would like to move to admit the aerial
4 photograph exhibit 76A into evidence.
5 Major Baggesen, I wonder if you can summarise the
6 contents of this report, again written by you. If I can
7 start you off, I think it concerns a communication, does
8 it not, from the telephone company in Zenica, that the
9 telephone line between Zenica and Sarajevo had been cut
10 and that it had been cut in the Kiseljak area; is that
11 correct?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. They wanted you to reconnect the telephone lines so that
14 Zenica could speak with Sarajevo; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What did you do?
17 A. We started in the morning where we had a meeting at the
18 telephone company's building in Zenica. We had a
19 meeting with the head engineer and he told us that the
20 telephone line was cut in the Kiseljak area and he asked
21 us to do something to get it repaired, because Zenica
22 was not able to make telephone calls to Sarajevo.
23 Q. Why did he not go and repair the telephone line himself
24 in Kiseljak?
25 A. Because the people who were having control over this
1 communication company, PTT, they were Muslims so they
2 were not allowed to go to Kiseljak. They had to pass
3 HVO checkpoints.
4 Q. So the PTT engineer in Zenica was a Muslim and he could
5 not travel to the PTT offices in Kiseljak because he
6 could not pass through the checkpoints.
7 A. No.
8 Q. Whose checkpoints were those that he could not pass
9 through?
10 A. HVO checkpoints.
11 Q. What did you do?
12 A. We drove to Kiseljak and we went to the PTT building,
13 the communications building in Kiseljak, to try to
14 investigate in the matter. The building was closed and
15 we were told that the engineer that worked there, he
16 lived in Kresevo and therefore we went to Kresevo to
17 have a meeting with him.
18 Q. You were told in Kiseljak that the telephone engineer
19 who worked there, he lived in Kresevo and that you would
20 need to go there to speak with him.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did you do that?
23 A. Yes, we did that, and he told us that it was correct
24 that the telephone lines were cut in Kiseljak, and he
25 told us it was due to shelling. There had been some
1 impact, the telephone building had been hit by some
2 grenades, and that is why the PTT line had been broken.
3 Q. The telephone line between Zenica and Sarajevo?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Did he agree to repair the telephone line at Kiseljak?
6 A. He told us that it would be easy enough to repair the
7 telephone line, it just needed a written order from
8 Colonel Blaskic or a written order from the commander of
9 the HVO military police.
10 Q. So he would only repair the telephone line in Kiseljak
11 if he received an order from Colonel Blaskic or the head
12 of the HVO military police?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you have an order from Colonel Blaskic to fix the
15 telephone line?
16 A. No, we have not. I can remember we went back to
17 Kiseljak and we went to the Kiseljak barracks and at the
18 HVO headquarters there --
19 Q. The HVO headquarters is the building that you identified
20 on this aerial photograph?
21 A. Yes, situated there. We there had a meeting with the
22 head of the PTT in Kiseljak.
23 Q. The head of the telephone company in Kiseljak?
24 A. He was at the headquarters in Kiseljak. He told us the
25 same, that the telephone line was cut due to the
1 shelling at the building. He furthermore told us that
2 he could not see any reason to repair it because it was
3 not necessary for Zenica to have any contact with
4 Sarajevo. He did not want to repair that before after
5 the conflict.
6 Q. He said that he saw no need for Zenica to be able to
7 communicate with Sarajevo and that in any event he would
8 not see it should be repaired until after the end of the
9 war?
10 A. That was his own personal opinion but I think if we had
11 the written order from Colonel Blaskic or from the
12 commander of the military police, he had to repair it.
13 When we saw this PTT building in Kiseljak, we only saw a
14 small impact, a small damage at the building, and I do
15 not think that was enough to damage all the technics in
16 the building.
17 Q. You were suspicious about whether or not it had been
18 damaged by shellfire or whether or not it had been
19 deliberately cut?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What was your opinion?
22 A. That it had been cut.
23 Q. Deliberately?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. If you could turn to your diary entry of
1 7th May, which concerns the establishment of a joint
2 headquarters in the Kiseljak area, a joint headquarters
3 of the HVO and the BiH. What do you recall about that
4 meeting?
5 A. I can recall at this time yesterday I was speaking about
6 the Busovaca Joint Commission and at this time, this was
7 replaced by a joint headquarters in the Travnik area and
8 now we want to make a similar joint headquarters in the
9 Kiseljak area.
10 Q. Am I right in saying that the Busovaca Joint Commission
11 which was a sort of commission where the two parties
12 talked to each other was replaced in the Vitez and
13 Travnik area by a joint military headquarters, by a
14 military headquarters between the two armies?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. That was organised by negotiation through your body, the
17 ECMM, is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You wanted to do the same thing in Kiseljak; is that
20 correct? You wanted to set up a joint military
21 headquarters between the Bosnian army and the HVO in
22 Kiseljak; is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Can you explain to the court about the meeting
25 concerning that joint headquarters, and whether or not
1 it was ever set up?
2 A. We had the meeting at UNPROFOR headquarters in Kiseljak
3 with participations from HVO and BiH, and from UNPROFOR,
4 and we were trying to establish this joint
5 headquarters. It was a long meeting and I mentioned in
6 my diary that it lasted six hours, and we were not able
7 to go anywhere during this meeting. The BiH, they
8 wanted to co-operate and they wanted that we should make
9 this mixed headquarters, but the HVO did not want to
10 make this joint headquarters.
11 Q. In your opinion, why did the HVO not want a joint
12 headquarters in the Kiseljak area?
13 A. Because at that time HVO were controlling that area.
14 They do not want to share this command with BiH.
15 I think the reason for BiH at that time wanted to
16 co-operate was because they were the weak part and they
17 actually were fighting with their back against the wall,
18 so this was their only way to survive in that area.
19 Q. If you could look at your diary entry for 8th May you
20 visited an area I think called Fojnica. Where is
21 Fojnica?
22 A. It is not on the map.
23 Q. We do not have a map of it, but just describe to the
24 court in relation to Kiseljak?
25 A. It is close to Kiseljak, South West of Kiseljak area.
1 Q. When you got to Fojnica, what did you discover there?
2 A. Everything was quiet, people were living together,
3 Croats and Muslims working together without any
4 problems.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if the Prosecutor could tender
6 exhibit 97 to the witness.
7 Do you recognise this report, Major Baggesen?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. Is that your signature?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Can I direct you to 3D on that report. This was an
12 incident which I think happened on 11th May, was it not?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Could you explain this incident to the court?
15 A. Yes, and I will start a little earlier, because at this
16 time, as I mentioned before, this joint headquarters was
17 established in the Travnik area, and that morning,
18 I went to visit this joint headquarters together with a
19 Greek monitor, Stavros Kinigopoulos, and we went to the
20 joint headquarters and at the headquarters we were told
21 about some incidents, and one of the incidents they told
22 us about was an HVO soldier had been killed by a sniper,
23 and old Croat civilian men had been killed and there
24 have been fightings between two units of BiH and HVO.
25 While we were there we were told that some Muslim
1 families were forced out of their houses in the Novoj
2 Biloj area.
3 Q. Where is Nova Bila?
4 A. That is close to Vitez. We went to that area and we
5 witnessed that two Muslim families were forced out of
6 their houses and their houses were given over to Croat
7 families.
8 Q. Who forced them out of their houses?
9 A. It was an HVO unit, we were able to see that, and we
10 were told the commander of this HVO unit had the
11 nickname Zuti. We heard this name in other occasions as
12 well.
13 Q. Did you witness this event actually happen?
14 A. Yes, we did.
15 Q. Could you not try to stop the eviction of this people
16 from their house?
17 A. It was very difficult for us to stop things happening
18 down there because we were unarmed, we could only do it
19 verbally. It is very difficult to negotiate with a man
20 carrying a rifle, so we complained about this and this
21 was everything we were able to do.
22 Q. Who did you complain to about this incident?
23 A. On our way back we passed Colonel Blaskic and we
24 complained about this to Colonel Blaskic.
25 Q. You said you passed Colonel Blaskic. You passed the
1 hotel Vitez in Vitez and you went into his headquarters
2 and you told him about this incident. What did he say?
3 A. He said he was sorry and he would try to do something
4 about it.
5 Q. Did he do anything about it?
6 A. I do not think because at this time it only seems as a
7 minor problem that two families were forced out. I am
8 sorry to say, but that was the reality down there. It
9 was not the last time we saw people forced out of their
10 own houses.
11 Q. I think if we move forward again in time to 14th May,
12 you had a meeting again at this new joint headquarters
13 between the Bosnian army and the HVO in Travnik, and
14 I think at that time you asked representatives of the
15 Bosnian army and representatives of the HVO for a list
16 of all of the units in their area and the person under
17 whose command those units fell. Did you ever receive
18 that list?
19 A. I received a list from HVO that was handed over to me at
20 the spot and later translated by my interpreter to an
21 English list. I did not receive a list from BiH at the
22 spot, so I have not seen the list from BiH.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could tender Prosecutor's
24 exhibit 98. (Handed).
25 Do you recognise this list, Major Baggesen?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. What is this list?
3 A. This list shows the name of the commanders for the units
4 that were under Colonel Blaskic's command.
5 Q. This was provided to you by the HVO?
6 A. Yes, this is a translation my interpreter did at the
7 spot.
8 Q. From the original document?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So this lists all the brigades under his command.
11 A. It is telling the name of the brigade, the commander's
12 name actually, their telephone numbers for the
13 headquarters and where they were located.
14 Q. Do you have any particular comments to make about this
15 document?
16 A. Yes, it shows that as I told you earlier these units
17 Colonel Blaskic was commanding were organised.
18 Q. Thank you. If I could take you forward to 10th June and
19 the entry in your diary for that day, I think at this
20 time there had been a major cease-fire agreement in
21 Bosnia; am I correct?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. It had been signed by the UNPROFOR commander on the
24 ground and also by Brigadier General Petkovic, the Chief
25 of Staff of the HVO; is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Am I right in saying that part of that agreement was an
3 agreement by both sides for the release of prisoners of
4 war; is that correct?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Am I right in saying that you were appointed as the
7 chairman of the commission that would oversee the
8 release of those prisoners?
9 A. Yes. I would like to add that this agreement was signed
10 by BiH as well.
11 Q. Who signed it on behalf of the Bosnian army, can you
12 remember?
13 A. I cannot remember, but it was not Hadzihasanovic but --
14 Q. His superior, so the Commander in Chief of the Bosnian
15 government forces.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Am I right in saying that on 15th June, you had the
18 opportunity to visit the HVO police chief in Vitez?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. Where was his headquarters in Vitez?
21 A. At the old cinema Vitez, very close to the HVO
22 headquarters.
23 Q. To the hotel Vitez?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. How far was the cinema from the hotel Vitez?
1 A. A few hundred metres.
2 Q. Why did you go to visit the Vitez cinema?
3 A. Because this joint humanitarian commission which I was
4 the chairman for, we were going to visit all places
5 where we had heard rumours that there should be some
6 detained persons or where there should be prisoners, so
7 therefore we started off to visit all those places, and
8 there were some rumours that there were some prisoners
9 at the police station, therefore we went to the police
10 station.
11 Q. Did you speak to the HVO personnel about these rumours
12 in the police station in the Vitez cinema?
13 A. Yes, we had a meeting with the commander there for the
14 police, and he told us that there were no prisoners in
15 the police station. Then I told him that this joint
16 humanitarian commission was allowed to seek all areas.
17 As far as I can remember, we even had a piece of paper
18 that we showed him, then we were allowed to see.
19 Q. Who was the piece of paper signed by; do you remember?
20 A. I think it was signed by the before-mentioned Generals.
21 Q. From the original cease-fire agreement?
22 A. Yes. After the police commander had seen this paper and
23 before we even had to search the area he told us, okay,
24 he had five persons in the basement, down in the cellar.
25 Q. Did you go down to the basement?
1 A. Yes, we did.
2 Q. What did you find in the basement?
3 A. We found that there were five Muslims sitting down there
4 in a small room.
5 Q. What was their condition?
6 A. Poor.
7 Q. Were they prisoners of war, soldiers?
8 A. No, they were civilians.
9 Q. Males, females?
10 A. Males. They told us they came from Banja Luka; they
11 were on their way to Zenica but they were taken into
12 custody at an HVO checkpoint.
13 Q. They were refugees from Banja Luka?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What did you do?
16 A. I asked the HVO representative in the commission to
17 release them at the spot.
18 JUDGE JORDA: A bit more slowly please, Mr. Cayley.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. I am watching the clock.
20 I will slow down.
21 You say you released them on the spot. Where did
22 you take them?
23 A. After that, we took them back to Zenica and we gave them
24 to the International Red Cross who had headquarters in
25 Zenica and they have a desk where refugees could sign
1 in.
2 Q. You are quite sure that these people were civilians that
3 were imprisoned?
4 A. Yes, no doubt. I think one of them was too young to be
5 a soldier and the rest of them were too old.
6 Q. If I could now take you to your diary entry of
7 21st June, I think at this time you returned to Kiseljak
8 again; is that correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. This was in respect of your duties as the chairman of
11 this prisoner release, this humanitarian commission to
12 release prisoners; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. Where did you go to in Kiseljak?
15 A. We went to the prison in Kiseljak at the HVO barracks.
16 Q. Could you point to that on the photograph that is up
17 there?
18 A. To this area, where we have been before (indicating).
19 Q. Was this a military headquarters as well as a prison?
20 A. Yes, it was.
21 Q. Under whose command did this fall?
22 A. HVO.
23 Q. When you arrived at the prison, were you expecting to
24 receive some Muslim prisoners?
25 A. Yes, it had been very difficult to work in that area
1 because we had tried several days to come into Kiseljak
2 prison to release those prisoners. In the beginning, we
3 were allowed to go in there from the commission, but
4 before we were able to release the prisoners, the
5 International Red Cross had to interview all prisoners
6 before we were able to release them, but the
7 International Red Cross were not allowed to come into
8 the prison, so therefore -- we could not release them
9 before the ICRC, International Red Cross, had
10 interviewed the prisoners.
11 Q. On this occasion, you were able to release the
12 prisoners.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Why were you able to do it on this occasion?
15 A. On this occasion, because of all the problems we had
16 down there, we were always -- because at this time,
17 there have been some conflict between Muslims and Croats
18 and there have been some fightings in the Kresevo area,
19 and therefore, we were told that the local commander
20 down there, he was at the front in Kresevo and therefore
21 there were no men down there who were able to authorise
22 the release, but one of the days the HVO member of the
23 commission went to Colonel Blaskic and had a written
24 order from Colonel Blaskic that ICRC should be allowed
25 to visit the prison, so after some bureaucracy, we were
1 able to go in there and we were able to release the
2 66 prisoners on this Monday.
3 Q. When you arrived, what did the HVO commander at the
4 Kiseljak barracks say to you about the prisoners?
5 A. When we arrived that morning, actually he told us that
6 the prisoners had already been released. Then I asked
7 him for a piece of paper that could certify that they
8 have been released, and then he said, "Okay, they are
9 not released; they are working in the field."
10 Q. What did you say to that?
11 A. I was not able to see any fields in the area and there
12 was no -- I could not see any farms. Then he told me
13 that they were -- he only used the word "fieldworking"
14 because they were out digging trenches and clearing
15 minefields.
16 Q. So these prisoners were out digging trenches and
17 clearing minefields; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The HVO commander at Kiseljak informed you of this?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. What did you say to him when he told you this?
22 A. I tried to give him a lecture on the Geneva Convention,
23 but he told me that you cannot use it down there.
24 Q. He told you that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
25 the Kiseljak area?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did these prisoners ever arrive in Kiseljak?
3 A. Yes, I think we had to wait for ten hours and then they
4 came back and in the beginning there were only 65 and
5 then we ask for the last one and again we were told that
6 he was released this morning, but when we asked for a
7 piece of paper that could clarify this, he said, "Okay,
8 he is working in the field too", but he was in another
9 place. After a while, we received the last man and we
10 were able to go back with all 66 prisoners.
11 Q. Were these individuals prisoners of war, combatants, or
12 were they civilians?
13 A. All civilians.
14 Q. They were all civilians these people that were released
15 to you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can I take you to your diary entry of 23rd June? If you
18 could explain your entry concerning the village of
19 Skradno where you state in your diary the HVO held 88
20 Muslims, where is the village of Skradno?
21 A. The village of Skradno is situated east of Vitez, in
22 that area.
23 Q. You visited it on 23rd June?
24 A. Yes, we did and we have heard that there was some
25 Muslims living in that area, but all those Muslims in
1 that area came from another area, and I think it was
2 named not Busovaca but --
3 Q. Bukovici. So all the Muslims in Skradno were from a
4 village called Bukovici. Why were they being held in
5 Skradno?
6 A. Actually I do not know, but the HVO had moved them to
7 Skradno.
8 Q. Were they concerned, these Muslims, in the village of
9 Skradno?
10 A. Yes, because you are not able to leave Skradno because
11 there were some HVO guards in the area, not in Skradno
12 but in the surrounding area, so you are not able to
13 leave the area, and they were afraid and there were
14 those rumours that Skradno would be a new Ahmici if BiH
15 attacked Vitez.
16 MR. CAYLEY: If there are no objections from my learned
17 friend, I would like to admit exhibits 96, 97 and 98
18 into evidence.
19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.
20 Mr. Registrar, they have been admitted into
21 evidence.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Major Baggesen, what date did you leave Bosnia;
23 do you remember?
24 A. We left Zenica at 28th June.
25 Q. Some concluding remarks, based on your experiences in
1 Bosnia and your expertise as a career army officer in
2 the Danish Army. Of the two sides, the HVO and the BiH,
3 who was better armed, in your opinion, from what you saw
4 on the ground during your time in Bosnia?
5 A. It was very obvious that HVO were better equipped and
6 they have more weapons than their counterparts.
7 Q. That is from your observations on the ground?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Which of the two armies resembled more of a standard
10 military unit? In that sense, I mean an organised
11 military unit?
12 A. There is no doubt that HVO were a well organised unit,
13 so I think that Colonel Blaskic had a well organised
14 unit, and we could see that when we saw the list with
15 all the brigades and all the commanders, that this was a
16 well organised unit.
17 Q. So your impression over those months, you felt that the
18 HVO was a well organised army?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In the area where you were?
21 A. In the area where I was, yes.
22 Q. Discipline. Which of the two armies, the Bosnian army
23 or the HVO were a better disciplined unit?
24 A. It is difficult to answer on this one, but actually
25 I think BiH were the best disciplined army of those two.
1 Q. Why do you say that?
2 A. Because I think the soldiers were more -- I cannot use
3 the word "polite", but they were more like soldiers,
4 they were acting more like soldiers, they have --
5 I think their morale was a little better.
6 Q. Why was their morale better?
7 A. Because I think that the officers in the BiH, they were
8 able to encourage their soldiers. They had to, because
9 at that time, BiH, they were a beaten army, and the only
10 way a beaten army can survive is by their officers to
11 encourage the soldiers trying to ...
12 Q. So to encourage your soldiers in what is a fairly
13 desperate situation; is that what you are saying?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In terms of training, did you see any training of HVO
16 soldiers going on whilst you were down in Bosnia?
17 A. No, I did not.
18 Q. Not at all?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Why do you think this was?
21 A. Actually, I do not know, because normally you had to
22 train your soldiers, even if there is a war going on,
23 but any time when we visited some of the headquarters at
24 the barracks, we did not see any training or anything
25 similar.
1 Q. Just to recap, to go back: the attacks which you
2 witnessed, the attack of which you witnessed the
3 aftermath in Ahmici and the attack which you witnessed
4 ongoing in Vitez, and in fact you also witnessed the
5 aftermath of attacks in the Kiseljak area -- what type
6 of organisation do you need to mount military operations
7 of that size and that scale over that period of time?
8 A. At the attack against Ahmici?
9 Q. And Vitez.
10 A. During that attack, as I said earlier, I think 500 to
11 600 men; that is a battalion, I think.
12 Q. Does an attack like that involve planning from a high
13 level within a military unit, normally speaking?
14 A. Yes, it does.
15 Q. Why?
16 A. Because every military operation had to be planned if
17 you want a result, and a good result where you have to
18 take care of -- you have to take care of all the
19 things. You have to bring in ammunition, you have to
20 bring in the soldiers and you have to plan for all those
21 things, planning for the communications and different
22 things.
23 Q. Am I right in saying that in most armed forces, there
24 are agreed orders, whether they be oral or written,
25 which actually cover every aspect that is necessary for
1 a military operation to reduce casualties, to bring in
2 ammunition, to bring in fuel; is that correct?
3 A. That is normal for an army unit to have that order.
4 Q. You think that the attacks that you saw would have had
5 to have been organised and well organised at a high
6 level?
7 A. Yes, no doubt about that.
8 Q. In the three months that you were in Central Bosnia and
9 in the Vitez area, Vitez and Kiseljak, can you recall,
10 and only if you recall, whether you saw in those areas
11 during those three months generally more HVO soldiers,
12 generally more Bosnian army soldiers or about the same
13 number of both?
14 A. In those mentioned areas, there were generally more HVO
15 soldiers than BiH.
16 Q. And in the Zenica municipality or the city of Zenica,
17 were there more HVO or more Bosnian army or about the
18 same?
19 A. At that time, there were only BiH soldiers in Zenica.
20 In the beginning, there were two HVO brigades in the
21 Zenica area, but they lay down their weapons, so there
22 were only BiH soldiers in Zenica.
23 Q. Just on your own personal expertise, I think you have a
24 number of badges on your right chest which indicate that
25 you are a specialist in certain fields in the army.
1 I wonder if you could just, concentrating on those
2 concerning weapons and communications, if you could
3 indicate by pointing to your chest what those badges
4 mean?
5 A. The different ones here?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Specialist badges on different kinds of weapons, small
8 arms, and specialist badge in communications.
9 Q. So you are a recognised expert to a degree in the Danish
10 Army in those particular areas?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I think you have a number of decorations for
13 distinguished service in the Danish Army, do you not, on
14 your right chest?
15 A. Actually it is only one of them from Denmark; the rest
16 of them are --
17 Q. For UN service?
18 A. Yes, and ECMM.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Major Baggesen. Mr. President, I do
20 not have any further questions of the witness, so
21 I offer him to the Defence.
22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, though we said that the
23 cross-examination would begin Monday, if you are ready,
24 the Trial Chamber would be grateful to you if you could
25 help us to make some progress and work until 4.30. Of
1 course, that would be convenient for the witness who
2 would be able to go home after that.
3 MR. HAYMAN: I leave it to the court, your Honour. I can
4 start but what I would have to warn the court is that
5 I have not yet had an opportunity to compare the
6 33-page diary with this witness's other statements, so,
7 if I start today, then Monday when I have compared them
8 I may have to go back and ask the witness about the same
9 events, having had a chance to review this diary and
10 compare it to the other statements, but I can begin.
11 I am happy to, but I, of course --
12 JUDGE JORDA: I am going to consult my colleagues.
13 (Pause). The Trial Chamber has decided to continue, so
14 it is your turn, Mr. Hayman. Of course, it is understood
15 that if it is necessary for some further clarifications
16 after having studied the documents, you will be able to
17 do so. Therefore please begin, Mr. Hayman.
18 Cross-examined by MR. HAYMAN
19 Q. Thank you, your Honour.
20 Good afternoon, major. Do you recall receiving a
21 letter from me some months ago?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I do not have it in front of me, so bear with me. In
24 that letter, did I request the opportunity to meet with
25 you and interview you before the trial?
1 A. Yes, you did.
2 Q. As a result of receiving that letter, did you consult
3 with authorities in your government concerning that
4 possibility?
5 A. Not in the government, because I have not received
6 anything from my government about your letter, but I was
7 discussing it with the Danish military advocate judge,
8 and we were told -- I can tell you why; in Denmark we
9 have other rules than here. In Denmark, it is the
10 police who are the prosecutors, and they are -- if
11 I were and I was told I have to be the Prosecutor's
12 witness, then the defence were not allowed to speak with
13 me, and that is why we did not have the opportunity to
14 speak.
15 Q. So you were told by the judge advocate or the judge
16 within the military court or law department that you
17 conferred with that under Danish national law or the law
18 of the Danish military, you were forbidden from talking
19 to the Defence; is that right?
20 A. We were not forbidden, but it was advised by him that
21 this was the Danish rules and we did not know the rules
22 of this Tribunal.
23 Q. Then you knew that someone else was going to respond to
24 me and tell me that in essence it was forbidden for you
25 to speak with me under the Danish rules or the Danish
1 practice.
2 A. I told you, I do not know. I was called several times
3 from your office in Los Angeles and I told this to this
4 lady who called me.
5 Q. You relayed this to Miss van Essen yourself?
6 A. If that was her name.
7 Q. Are you aware that this same policy has been applied to
8 other former ECMM monitors from Denmark, that they are
9 not allowed to speak with the Defence; are you aware of
10 that?
11 A. Yes. We were told that you already had our statements
12 so you had the information.
13 Q. Some of them, yes. Tell me, the Home Guard in Denmark:
14 how frequently do the Home Guard soldiers train?
15 A. It all depends on what kind of unit. Normally, they
16 have exercises once a month for a weekend.
17 Q. Similar to what we would call the Army Reserve in the
18 United States?
19 A. Maybe similar to your National Guard.
20 Q. Yes. These soldiers in the Home Guard, they are not
21 full-time professional soldiers?
22 A. No, they are not.
23 Q. Is it particularly important where soldiers do not have
24 professional training, that is they have not served on a
25 full-time basis in the military, that they have regular
1 training opportunities?
2 A. Yes, it is.
3 Q. If you do not have that, you do not really have
4 soldiers, do you?
5 A. In the Danish Home Guard, we have a lot of tasks -- we
6 do not only use the soldiers for fighting, we have Home
7 Guard soldiers who are doing other things like that, who
8 are specialists in sitting in an office and doing all
9 those things.
10 Q. I am talking about fighting now. If you take a civilian
11 and call him a soldier and do not give him any training
12 and no regular training opportunities, you do not really
13 have a soldier, do you?
14 A. No. Normally, when we are going to have the new Home
15 Guard soldiers, a lot of them have been soldiers -- we
16 have national service in Denmark and a lot of the Home
17 Guard soldiers have already been given that military
18 training in the army. After that, a lot of them
19 volunteer to the Home Guard. Those who have not been in
20 the army, we normally -- we always give them a basic
21 training in the beginning just after they have signed
22 their contract with us.
23 Q. How long does that basic training last?
24 A. We gave them one week in use of weaponry. This first
25 week includes classes in the law, fighting in --
1 I cannot remember the name now.
2 Q. Did you say fighting?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Fighting in built-up areas?
5 A. No, not built-up areas. When you have in a conflict --
6 the rules --
7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, is that very important for the
8 Defence of General Blaskic, to know the system of
9 military training in Denmark? If it is important,
10 continue.
11 MR. HAYMAN: I will move as rapidly as I can, your Honour.
12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, thank you.
13 MR. HAYMAN: To have an effective military, you need absolute
14 adherence to the chain of command, do you not?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Because if you do not have that, you have people doing
17 what they want to do, not what they have been ordered to
18 do; correct?
19 A. I think that it all depends on your military
20 commanders. If you had a good military commander, you
21 will have good superior -- you have some good officers
22 and you will have some good soldiers, if you have a good
23 commander, because the commander, his responsibility to
24 his commander is the discipline and the morale, if these
25 two is perfect. His battalion or brigade commanders are
1 responsible to him for the training and all that, so
2 every commander on the different levels are responsible
3 for the training and the morale, the discipline.
4 Q. So the soldiers in the field, they are responsible to
5 their first or immediate commander; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then that commander is in turn responsible to
8 superior commanders?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So for a person in the position of then Colonel Blaskic,
11 the individuals that he was directly responsible for
12 directing their behaviour were his brigade commanders?
13 A. Yes, they were responsible to Colonel Blaskic that his
14 men behave.
15 Q. He was responsible for telling them what he expected of
16 them and how he expected their men to behave and conduct
17 themselves; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. How does a soldier acquire this ethos, if you will, of
20 adherence to the chain of command? How do you instil
21 that in a new soldier or recruit?
22 A. It is normally not a problem, because when you teach
23 soldiers then you -- it is very easy to teach them on
24 the chain of command. They know that they have to do
25 what they are told to.
1 Q. That is when you are bringing soldiers into an existing
2 army?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. They can see how other soldiers behave. Imagine a
5 situation, if you would, where there is no existing army
6 but a large group of people are gathered together and
7 said, "We are under attack; you have to become an army",
8 but there are no or few role models in terms of adhering
9 to this chain of command. Can you imagine in that
10 situation it might be more difficult instilling in these
11 soldiers an ethos in which they are committed to
12 adhering to a chain of command.
13 A. It all depends on the people's discipline and their
14 morale. It is no excuse. If you are going to have an
15 armed force and it is only people who have never been
16 given a weapon before, you are still responsible for
17 giving that training. The commander is always the man
18 who is responsible for what his men are doing. So it is
19 not an excuse if you go to war with a lot of people who
20 are not having their basic training, because those
21 soldiers who you are giving those weapons to can do a
22 lot of awful things with those weapons.
23 Q. You are using the term "not an excuse". Not an excuse
24 in terms of what normative or legal structure?
25 MR. CAYLEY: Can I object, your Honour? Counsel is now
1 talking about "normative" and "legal" structures.
2 JUDGE JORDA: I apologise, I did not hear that. My
3 microphone was not switched on properly. Could you
4 please repeat your objection, Mr. Prosecutor?
5 MR. CAYLEY: I have two points to make. The first point is
6 counsel is using the words "within what normative or
7 legal structure". First of all, this witness is a
8 military man; he is giving his opinion on the
9 organisation of armies, and, secondly, Defence counsel
10 is well aware that English is not this witness's first
11 language. He does speak like many Scandinavians good
12 English, but using phrases like that is going to confuse
13 the witness.
14 JUDGE JORDA: I do not really understand very well your
15 second remark which I do not think is quite permanent.
16 As for the first, my impression was that the witness has
17 already answered that question, so perhaps we can hurry
18 it on a little.
19 MR. HAYMAN: I think so, your Honour.
20 Can I say, major, if at any time I use expressions
21 or words that are unclear to you please stop me, because
22 the last thing I want to do is elicit any information
23 from you that is not totally accurate and does not
24 completely represent your testimony before this
25 Tribunal. Will you do that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you. You were asked about the concept of fighting
3 in built-up areas. Is fighting in built-up areas
4 sometimes necessary, for example if the military
5 objective of the operation is to gain control of a town
6 with a high density or a high number of buildings?
7 A. Sometimes, yes, it can be necessary to fight in built-up
8 areas, but normally all units are doing their best to
9 avoid this, because when you have to fight in built-up
10 areas, it is a big risk because there is a lot of
11 civilians in those areas.
12 Q. Is one option where fighting in built-up areas is
13 necessary to try and remove the civilian population,
14 either by invitation or by force so that they are
15 removed from the area?
16 A. That is a way you can do it, if necessary.
17 Q. If that does not occur and yet the fighting occurs, is
18 it inevitable, however tragic, that there will be
19 civilian casualties in the course of that fighting in
20 built-up areas?
21 A. Actually I think you are going to have a very very, very
22 good excuse to do that.
23 Q. It has to be absolutely necessary in the sense of
24 military necessity; is that what you are saying?
25 A. Yes. I cannot imagine what the reasons would be that
1 are good enough to kill civilian people, just to do
2 something like that.
3 Q. If it were necessary -- and if you are not comfortable
4 answering the question, that is fine, you can say so --
5 if it were necessary and fighting in built-up areas
6 occurs, would you agree that civilian casualties,
7 however tragic, are inevitable?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. In fact it is likely that more civilians than soldiers
10 will be killed as a result of such fighting?
11 A. That could be the result.
12 Q. How many days were you on the ground in Bosnia in the
13 course of your service as an EC monitor?
14 A. How many days?
15 Q. How long? What exactly was the time-period?
16 A. As you can see in the diary, I arrived in the Zenica
17 area on 2nd April, and we went home early morning on
18 Monday, 28th June.
19 Q. Did you have any leave or recreation period while you
20 were in country?
21 A. Yes, I went home for a week to Denmark.
22 Q. So altogether that means you spent about ten weeks in
23 country on duty as an EC monitor?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you normally reside in Zenica during your period of
1 service? Is that where you were bunked or quartered?
2 A. Yes, we were.
3 Q. How many nights during your ten weeks in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina did you spend in Vitez; that is, how
5 many times did you overnight in Vitez?
6 A. I cannot recall, because normally at our house in Vitez,
7 during the night there were one monitor and one
8 interpreter, but I cannot recall how many nights I spent
9 in Vitez.
10 Q. Can you estimate: was it a few days, or a week or two,
11 or half of your time?
12 A. Maybe five or six nights.
13 Q. Did you have office duty on any days as, say, the
14 operations manager or operations officer?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was that a regular rotation?
17 A. No, it was not because normally I was in the field as a
18 team leader. A few days we were sitting at the
19 headquarters in Zenica making reports. Sometimes we
20 were sitting in the house in Vitez and made those
21 reports.
22 Q. You spoke of your briefing on arrival first in Zagreb
23 and then in Zenica. When you arrived and you received
24 this briefing, were you briefed on the threat that the
25 Serbs were posing to Central Bosnia?
1 A. We were told about that conflict as well. Actually, we
2 were told that close to a front against the Bosnian
3 Serb Army, normally BiH and HVO were working together in
4 those areas without problems.
5 Q. Were you told that the HVO and the BiH together were
6 virtually encircled by the Bosnian Serbs?
7 A. Not totally, because HVO had borders to Croatia.
8 Q. They could take the road down through Gornji Vakuf and
9 out to Split?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. But other than that roadway, were the Croats and
12 Muslims, if you will, in Central Bosnia encircled by the
13 Serbs?
14 A. Yes, you can say that.
15 Q. Were you briefed or did you learn in the course of your
16 service what the rough population mix in this pocket, if
17 you will, in Central Bosnia was; was it 5:1 Muslims to
18 Serbs, 10:1, 2:1, or do you not know?
19 A. I can remember that we saw something on that, and
20 somewhere, and I still have that, I have a piece of
21 paper telling how the ethnic groups -- how many there
22 were in the different municipalities.
23 Q. But you have no recollection of an aggregate number on
24 that score?
25 A. No.
1 Q. At your briefing in Zenica, you said you were told who
2 the military commanders were of the army and the HVO.
3 What were you told in that briefing about Dario Kordic?
4 A. We were told that he was Vice-President of Herceg-Bosna,
5 and he was the local political leader.
6 Q. Anything else?
7 A. That he liked to dress in military uniforms.
8 Q. What were you told, if anything, in that briefing
9 concerning HOS?
10 A. We were told about HOS that it was a military unit with
11 connection to the Croatian army. We were told that they
12 were better trained and they were better equipped, i.e.
13 they had better and more modern weapons.
14 Q. Was it explained to you that they were separate from the
15 HVO when you arrived and got this briefing; that they
16 were a separate entity from the HVO?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Did you learn after arriving in Zenica that there was an
19 HOS unit in Zenica?
20 A. I cannot remember where we saw those HOS units, but we
21 saw them different places.
22 Q. Was there a HOS unit in Zenica that was part of the army
23 of BiH when you arrived?
24 A. No.
25 Q. It was not?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Did you ever hear that, that there had been such a unit?
3 A. No.
4 Q. You spoke of -- and I am jumping ahead a little bit in
5 your testimony; let me warn you of that -- that on one
6 occasion at a checkpoint you saw the HOS flag and it was
7 a black skull and crossbones flag; do you recall that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You said that HOS were known to commit certain types of
10 acts. Can you tell us more about that? What kinds of
11 acts were you either told or did you come to know HOS
12 members were prone to or likely to commit, if I am
13 stating it accurately?
14 A. We were told that the HOS units normally were those
15 units that were used when you have to -- when HVO were
16 going to do some of the dirty work. By that, I mean
17 when they are going to burn houses and kill civilians
18 and things like that.
19 Q. Were you told that they were prone to commit criminal
20 acts?
21 A. Can you use another word for that, please?
22 Q. I will; thank you for asking. Were you told that they
23 were likely to commit criminal acts because of the
24 characteristics or the traits that they held?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Were you told anything in your briefings or did you
2 learn anything during your service about an individual
3 named Darko Kraljevic?
4 A. I cannot recall that name.
5 Q. Were you told anything in your briefings or did you
6 learn anything during your service in the country
7 concerning a unit named Vitezovi, or the Vitez Knights?
8 A. No.
9 Q. May I ask you the same question concerning a unit known
10 as the Jokers?
11 A. I have heard about that unit, but I was not able to
12 recognise them. I know they have a special badge, but
13 I have not seen people wearing this badge.
14 Q. Did you learn anything else about them during your
15 service?
16 A. Not during my service.
17 Q. After your service concluded, did you learn anything
18 about them?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What?
21 A. That it was a special unit, that they had contact to the
22 HVO military police, and that they were doing crimes
23 against human rights.
24 Q. Anything else?
25 A. No.
1 Q. You said you met with then Colonel Blaskic ten or
2 fifteen times during your tour; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. On one occasion you said you met him at the Easter
5 celebration in Vitez on April 12th 1993; is that right?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. On another occasion you said you met him and you
8 obtained an order from him for the release of a certain
9 number of prisoners in Kiseljak; is that right?
10 A. I did not have the meeting concerning that. The HVO
11 representative in the Joint Humanitarian Commission went
12 to Colonel Blaskic to get this permission, or one of the
13 HVO members of the commission had this written order.
14 Q. Which member was that that went and got that order from
15 Colonel Blaskic, if you remember?
16 A. Concerning the release --
17 Q. The release of the prisoners?
18 A. Which of the releases?
19 Q. The one concerning the prisoners in Kiseljak?
20 A. The big release.
21 Q. The big release at the end when you finally got the
22 prisoners out of prison utilising an order you got from
23 Colonel Blaskic, you finally got an order to get them
24 out. Do you remember which representative got that
25 order for the joint commission. Was it Zoran Mr.avak?
1 A. Yes, or Pero Skopljak because the other two persons in
2 the humanitarian commission went into an ambush on their
3 way to Vitez to get a written order. I cannot remember
4 if it was those two who were going to have this written
5 order, but we had the written order.
6 Q. Two other members of the HVO joint commission were
7 ambushed on the way to Vitez that day?
8 A. Not on that day, but I have mentioned that in the diary.
9 Q. On the way to Skradno? Are you thinking of June 23rd?
10 A. Yes, that day we had a meeting in Busovaca first, and
11 then we were going to have some papers, so this was --
12 I do not think this was that they were going to -- they
13 were not going for the Kiseljak papers. I think they
14 were going to get another piece of paper, but they went
15 into an ambush.
16 Q. You are recalling, I take it, that on 23rd June 1993,
17 two HVO members of this joint commission -- and by the
18 way, had these two been working with you for some time
19 to try and resolve problems and reduce tensions?
20 A. I have met them before because there have been members
21 in the Busovaca Joint Commission.
22 Q. They were not full-time members?
23 A. One of them, I cannot recall his name, I cannot remember
24 if it was Zoran Mr.avak or it was Zarko.
25 Q. You left them in Busovaca; you stayed to do something
1 and they went ahead to Vitez, is that right?
2 A. Yes. Normally, at that time, we were provided with an
3 armed escort from the British battalion. When we were
4 driving in a Croat-occupied area, the two Muslim or
5 three Muslim representatives in the Commission was
6 sitting inside this APC, so they were secure and when we
7 were travelling to a Muslim-controlled area, the HVO
8 members were sitting in the APC. That is why the two
9 HVO members were driving in their own vehicle because
10 they were driving in an HVO-controlled area.
11 Q. Even though they were in HVO-controlled territory on
12 23rd June 1993, nonetheless, they were ambushed by
13 Mujahedin fighters?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. One of them was killed on the spot?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. The other was seriously injured in his legs?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. It was in fact very dangerous in the area you were
20 moving around in during May and June 1993?
21 A. It was.
22 Q. Extremely dangerous?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And you moved only in an armoured vehicle of some sort
25 during that period of time, correct?
1 A. We did not have armoured vehicles, sometimes we had to
2 do it in a soft skin vehicle. We preferred to have an
3 armoured vehicle.
4 Q. So on the occasion, coming back to this order for the
5 release of the prisoners in Kiseljak, you did not
6 actually have a meeting with Colonel Blaskic on that
7 occasion?
8 A. Not on that occasion.
9 Q. You said you met with him ten or fifteen times. Can you
10 identify the first time you met him?
11 A. I cannot remember the first time. I think I met
12 Colonel Blaskic before the Easter celebration, but
13 I cannot remember the exact time, because when I say
14 I met Colonel Blaskic ten or fifteen times, I did not
15 speak to him all those times. Maybe we were together in
16 another team, i.e. the Busovaca Joint Commission and
17 other monitors from the Busovaca Joint Commission was
18 speaking to Colonel Blaskic.
19 Q. Did he attend any meetings of the Busovaca Joint
20 Commission at which you attended?
21 A. I can remember actually him attending some of the
22 meetings.
23 Q. Did you say you can or you cannot remember?
24 A. I can.
25 Q. That he did?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. First of all, was that one or more than one meeting that
3 he attended?
4 A. I cannot recall but at that stage one or two meetings.
5 Q. Do you remember anything discussed, what the subject
6 matter of that meeting or two meetings was?
7 A. No, I cannot, but normally if Colonel Blaskic were at
8 our meetings, normally Hadzihasanovic would be at the
9 same meeting and we were normally at this level
10 discussing a local cease-fire agreement, and, as I told
11 you before, or I told the Prosecutor, there was made a
12 lot of agreements and cease-fires down there so I cannot
13 recall them all.
14 Q. Did you have any other substantive meetings with
15 Colonel Blaskic; that is not meetings where perhaps a
16 cup of coffee was had and pleasantries exchanged but any
17 actual discussions, either that you participated in or
18 that you were present, when other people had substantive
19 discussions with him?
20 A. I cannot recall them all. I can recall having met
21 Colonel Blaskic ten or fifteen times. That is as I told
22 you -- it is not necessarily that I had a meeting, but
23 I was there.
24 Q. If I read your diary, I could perhaps direct you to
25 anything that may be in here; I will read it before we
1 continue on Monday, and I will end this area soon, but
2 do you remember any substantive meetings or substantive
3 discussions that you attended or participated in with
4 then Colonel Blaskic?
5 A. No, normally if we had something where we want to speak,
6 we have to make a complaint, a big complaint to
7 Colonel Blaskic or to the Commander of the 3rd Muslim
8 Corps, Hadzihasanovic, normally it was not done by a
9 monitor but by an ambassador.
10 Q. Mr. Thebault?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did Mr. Thebault have free and complete access to make
13 complaints or register information with then
14 Colonel Blaskic?
15 A. Actually I do not think that it was easier for the
16 ambassador that it was for us.
17 Q. What kind of access did you or your colleagues on the
18 monitoring mission have then?
19 A. Normally if we were going to have a meeting with
20 Colonel Blaskic -- actually we were not able to call him
21 from Zenica, so we had to go to his headquarters and he
22 was not always in, so therefore ...
23 Q. When there was something that needed to be brought to
24 his attention, was ECMM able to do that?
25 A. Yes, normally when we were sitting in the Busovaca Joint
1 Commission there was a lot of complaints and normally
2 they were giving to Franjo Nakic, who was
3 Colonel Blaskic's deputy; then Mr. Nakic was supposed to
4 give them to Colonel Blaskic.
5 Q. Did you get to know Franjo Nakic well in the course of
6 working with him?
7 A. I would not be able to know a man well during this short
8 period, but I think that Mr. Nakic was a man who we could
9 trust.
10 Q. Did you feel that he was doing his best to try and make
11 the Joint Commission work?
12 A. Yes, no doubt about that.
13 Q. Are you aware he was hand-picked for the job by
14 Tihomir Blaskic?
15 A. I was not aware.
16 Q. You were aware that he was Colonel Blaskic's deputy?
17 A. Yes, and I suppose that is the reason for him sitting in
18 the Busovaca Joint Commission.
19 Q. Was misconduct by drunken soldiers a continuing problem
20 during your tour?
21 A. It was not a problem to me; it was a problem to the
22 people down there.
23 Q. It was a problem to all the residents of the area, was
24 it not?
25 A. Yes, but it was not every day, especially in the
1 beginning, in the Easter, the soldiers on both sides
2 actually had something to drink and then they fight with
3 weapons normally in the air.
4 Q. But not always?
5 A. Normally.
6 Q. You spoke to us concerning the Vance-Owen Plan, and you
7 told us that you personally were afraid of what fruit
8 the Vance-Owen Plan might produce. Do you believe that
9 the Vance-Owen Plan caused the civil authorities in
10 Central Bosnia to have less incentive to try and work
11 together and form a joint authority?
12 A. I do not know.
13 Q. Did the Vance-Owen Plan have an effect on the Croat
14 citizenry of Central Bosnia, if you know? I am talking
15 of the average man.
16 A. Actually I think that all the people down there were --
17 they heard a lot of new agreements and a new cease-fire
18 and all that. Honestly I think that the Vance-Owen Plan
19 for the people down there was just another plan that
20 would be replaced by another plan that would be replaced
21 by another plan, so ...
22 Q. You do not think that there was an understanding among
23 many citizens that the international community had given
24 Croats in the 10th province the right to govern that
25 province?
1 A. Maybe for the Croats in that area, if they came from
2 that area.
3 Q. Did it definitely increase tensions between Croats and
4 Muslims in that area?
5 A. Yes, it did.
6 Q. You spoke to us of a flag-raising incident on or about
7 April 12th. Do you know any more about what actually
8 happened in Travnik, I believe it was, in connection
9 with that incident?
10 A. I can remember that there was a lot of tension in that
11 area, but it was not my area of responsibility. I can
12 remember that there were a lot of problems in the
13 Travnik area because of the flag-raising.
14 Q. Let me just ask you if any of this stimulates your
15 memory. Were one or more Croatian flags raised as part
16 of an Easter celebration? Does that refresh any
17 recollection in your mind?
18 A. As we were told, it was not raised only because of the
19 Easter celebration, it was raised because the Croat
20 inhabitants wanted to use the Croat flag when they
21 wanted to do.
22 Q. Who told you that?
23 A. We were told it by the Croats in that area.
24 Q. The Croats in Travnik told you that?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did they tell you what happened to the flags that were
2 raised? Were they taken down and burnt?
3 A. I should not be surprised.
4 Q. Then there was some shooting?
5 A. Maybe.
6 Q. But that does not stimulate your memory?
7 A. No, because it was not my area of responsibility.
8 Q. Okay. You told us of the kidnapping of four HVO
9 officers that you learned of on April 14th 1993.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And that they were kidnapped near the front, close to
12 Travnik. That front was a front with the Serbs?
13 A. Actually I cannot remember the exact place where they
14 were kidnapped, I can just remember it was in the
15 Travnik area.
16 Q. You have already said that the situation was extremely
17 tense in Travnik. Did the kidnapping of these four
18 officers worsen those tensions?
19 A. Yes, it did.
20 Q. You went, together with Nakic and Merdan and others to
21 visit the 7th Muslim Brigade; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What can you tell us about that brigade? Were there any
24 special characteristics of that brigade?
25 A. I would say. The 7th Muslim Brigade was a brigade --
1 one of the brigades under Hadzihasanovic's command. It
2 was different to the others because this brigade were
3 manned by Muslims who were more Islamic than the rest of
4 the army.
5 Q. Was religious fervour a common bond among the men in
6 that unit?
7 A. Yes, and they were all looking very Islamic, they were
8 all having a beard and normally they were using great
9 banners with Islamic words on it.
10 Q. Arabic words?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. They were soldiers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as far as
13 you knew?
14 A. Yes, they were.
15 Q. You said that you and the other members of the
16 investigative team went to the 7th Muslim Brigade. Did
17 Merdan, General Merdan or whatever his proper title was
18 at the time, concur that the 7th Muslim Brigade should
19 be visited to enquire about the kidnapping of these four
20 officers?
21 A. Yes, he was the one that suggested that you have to go
22 there, so we went there, of course.
23 Q. You said that after they denied any knowledge or
24 involvement in the kidnappings, you left, but the phrase
25 you used was, "We did not trust them 100 per cent." Can
1 you elaborate on that?
2 A. That is what I said: we did not trust them
3 100 per cent. By that, I meant we maybe believed them
4 99 per cent. We were a little -- because they were very
5 different to all the other kinds of units we had
6 meetings with and they acted in another way, so we
7 were -- we did not know where we had them.
8 Q. Did you ever talk to Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia
9 and determine whether the 7th Muslim Brigade inspired
10 great fear among the Croats in Central Bosnia?
11 A. They did, because there was a lot of rumours, especially
12 spread by HVO, that the 7th Muslim Brigade were doing a
13 lot of naughty things down there. So again we saw HVO
14 and were telling lots of stories about what the
15 7th Muslim Brigade did, so it is natural people were
16 scared of them.
17 Q. And people were scared?
18 A. People were scared. Everyone was scared down there,
19 even me sometimes.
20 Q. You told us after your visit to the 7th Muslim Brigade
21 you went back to the HVO brigade command in
22 Novi Travnik; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. There a military policeman took certain acts. Was that
25 the local military commander?
1 A. I cannot remember if he was the local military police
2 commander or he was -- at which level he was a
3 commander, but he was a high rank officer, I think.
4 I was surprised that Nakic -- either Nakic or
5 Mr. Sabljic, the local brigade commander, were able to
6 order him to release us again. Therefore we concluded
7 that he was a high rank officer.
8 Q. In connection with that incident, did the HVO military
9 police officer -- did he also place Nakic under arrest,
10 Franjo Nakic?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Was Nakic free to leave?
13 A. I think.
14 Q. Did he leave?
15 A. No, because he was together with us in our vehicle.
16 Q. You all stayed in the car?
17 A. No, at Mr. Sabljic's office; we were sitting all in his
18 office.
19 Q. Was there another HVO representative or was Nakic the
20 only one with you?
21 A. Nakic was the only one.
22 Q. He stayed with you and Merdan while the situation got
23 worked out?
24 A. And Mr. Sabljic, the HVO brigade commander, was there as
25 well.
1 Q. Mr. Nakic and Mr. Sabljic, were they very unhappy with the
2 actions of this military policeman?
3 A. Yes, they were. As I said before, they told us they
4 were unable to do anything because the military police
5 were not under their command.
6 Q. When they said that, "not under their command", you knew
7 Nakic was the deputy for the Operative Zone Central
8 Bosnia, correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Does that mean that the military police did not report
11 to the Operative Zone Central Bosnia?
12 A. No, because we were told by Nakic -- I cannot remember
13 if it was Nakic or Sabljic -- that the only one who was
14 able to command the military police was
15 Colonel Blaskic. That was the reason for us to call
16 Colonel Blaskic. If we knew that this unit was not
17 under his command, we would have tried to call another
18 one.
19 Q. Did they say that Colonel Blaskic was the only one who
20 might be able to get Merdan out in substance; is that
21 what they said?
22 A. They said that Colonel Blaskic commanded the military
23 police.
24 Q. You were speaking through an interpreter, were you?
25 A. Yes, Nakic and Sabljic, yes.
1 Q. You had an interpreter with you at the time?
2 A. That day we have our senior interpreter.
3 Q. How long was the phone conversation or conversations
4 between then Colonel Blaskic and this military
5 policeman?
6 A. At the Commander's Office, I think a few minutes, then
7 he went to another office to continue the conversation
8 in there.
9 Q. How long was he absent in this other office?
10 A. I cannot remember, five or ten minutes.
11 Q. So, all told, it was somewhere in excess of ten minutes
12 on the phone?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Before he came back and the release was effected?
15 A. Yes.
16 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps we should adjourn now, because I think
17 the witness has some personal business, and we will meet
18 again on Monday at 10.00. Thank you.
19 (4.35 pm)
20 (Court adjourned until 10.00 am on
21 Monday, 25th August 1997)
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