International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Case No IT-95-14

  1. 1 Monday, 25th August 1997

    2 (10.00 am)

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed.

    4 Madam Registrar, please have the accused brought in.

    5 (Accused brought in)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Are the booths ready? Yes. All the booths?

    7 Can everyone hear me, the Defence, the Prosecution?

    8 Mr. Blaskic, can you hear me?

    9 MR. BLASKIC: Good morning, your Honours, I hear you well.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you? We have the assistance with us of

    11 the new Registrar. Could she please introduce herself

    12 so that everybody knows her?

    13 THE REGISTRAR: My name is Natacha Fauveau.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: So, Mme Fauveau, you are going to serve Trial

    15 Chamber number 1. Without delaying any further, we are

    16 going to ask Mme Fauveau to have the witness brought in,

    17 Major Baggesen.

    18 (Witness entered court)

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Major Baggesen, good morning, can you hear

    20 me?

    21 A. Good morning, Mr. President, your Honours. I can hear

    22 loud and clear.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. We are going to continue

    24 with the cross-examination and I think it is Mr. Hayman

    25 who is doing the cross-examination. You may continue,

  2. 1 Mr. Hayman.

    2 MAJOR LARS BAGGESEN (continued)

    3 Cross-examination by MR. HAYMAN (continued)

    4 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President, your Honours. Good

    5 morning, Major Baggesen.

    6 A. Good morning, Mr. Hayman.

    7 Q. Do you have your diary and any other materials you would

    8 like before we continue your testimony?

    9 A. I have my diary, but if you are going to question me

    10 about some of my reports, I would like to have a copy of

    11 those as well.

    12 Q. Very well, I will try and prompt the Registrar to give

    13 those to you before any such questions, but if at any

    14 time we are discussing an area where you do not have a

    15 document that you would like to have, for the purposes

    16 of referring to the document, please stop me and do not

    17 hesitate to ask for the document, okay?

    18 A. Thank you.

    19 Q. Let me ask you, since your tour in Bosnia ended, have

    20 you undertaken any study of the war or of ECMM materials

    21 or anything of that sort?

    22 A. Yes, because after I came back after the mission in

    23 Bosnia, I was asked to train the new Danish monitors who

    24 were going to the former Yugoslavia, to the European

    25 Community monitor mission, and at that time, I had

  3. 1 access to see different kinds of reports from that area,

    2 so the new monitors should be -- I was able to tell the

    3 new monitors how the situation was at the present time.

    4 Q. So those were current reports rather than reports from

    5 the time-period of your service in Bosnia?

    6 A. Yes, it was new reports.

    7 Q. What was the time-period or timeframe of those reports?

    8 A. I think I trained some of the monitors one year after

    9 I came back, because after a year, one of the other

    10 monitors had to take over this task, because it was

    11 different from when I have been down there. I think it

    12 was too long ago for me, so I want some fresh people in

    13 to train the monitors.

    14 Q. So you believe it was June 1994 approximately when you

    15 would have undertaken a review of current ECMM reports

    16 about Bosnia?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. After you left the theatre, did you undertake any study

    19 or review of materials directed at the 1993 timeframe,

    20 events in 1993 in Bosnia?

    21 A. No, only the reports we made at the time.

    22 Q. Would you say that Tihomir Blaskic supported efforts to

    23 expand the work of the ECMM in Central Bosnia during

    24 your tour?

    25 A. I think that both Colonel Blaskic and Hadzihasanovic did

  4. 1 their best.

    2 Q. In that regard to facilitate the work of ECMM; is that

    3 what you mean?

    4 A. Yes, but it was not always enough.

    5 Q. You still faced many difficulties, is that what you

    6 mean?

    7 A. Yes, we did.

    8 Q. Do you recall anything in particular concerning

    9 Colonel Blaskic's efforts to promote ECMM involvement in

    10 the areas of Vares and Zepce?

    11 A. I cannot remember from the Vares area, but for the Zepce

    12 area where I had an area of responsibility during my

    13 period of time down there, we normally had no contact

    14 with Colonel Blaskic because when we were working in

    15 that area, there was no tension between BiH and HVO at

    16 that time.

    17 Q. If the usher could assist, your Honour, I have a

    18 document I would like placed before the witness. It is

    19 short, it is in English; I regret I have no translation

    20 at this time. The document for the record was provided

    21 by the Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor and was

    22 identified as a daily summary report dated 19th March

    23 1993. I note that does not appear on the document; that

    24 appeared on an index we received, so may I repeat it:

    25 daily summary report, 19th March 1993.

  5. 1 Major, did ECMM call one of its routine types of

    2 reports a daily summary report?

    3 A. Normally the daily summary report was a report made by

    4 the Regional Centre and sent to the headquarters in

    5 Zagreb.

    6 Q. I am sorry to disturb the usher again, but if we could

    7 place this one paragraph of this document on the ELMO,

    8 I would like to call your attention to the first couple

    9 of sentences of the report and ask you if you have any

    10 other information about this issue mentioned in the

    11 report. Thank you.

    12 Let me read the first couple of sentences, Major,

    13 and then I will ask you about them. The document is

    14 entitled "Tuzla, Busovaca Commission/Zenica:

    15 "The Commission met along with the HRC and the

    16 COO ECMM with Colonel Blaskic, HVO. A wide variety of

    17 topics were discussed, but the main purpose of the

    18 meeting was to familiarise the COO with the issues in

    19 the area of RC Zenica. Colonel Blaskic stressed the

    20 need for ECMM involvement in the areas of Vares and

    21 Zepce in order to continue/stabilise the situations

    22 there and to maintain calm in these areas."

    23 First, Major, if you could help us, COO ECMM, what

    24 would that be a reference to?

    25 A. I think the COO ECMM was -- I think it was a staff

  6. 1 officer from our headquarters in Zagreb, and if it was

    2 not senior operations officer in Zagreb, it could be our

    3 own operations officer in Zenica, but because this

    4 meeting was before I arrived, I do not know, but I think

    5 it could be the senior operations officer from Zagreb.

    6 Q. After you arrived, that is a few weeks after this report

    7 was generated and you arrived in the country, did you go

    8 during your tour to either Vares or Zepce on behalf of

    9 ECMM?

    10 A. Yes, I did.

    11 Q. Did the HVO local commander in Zepce support the efforts

    12 of the ECMM?

    13 A. Yes, actually at that time when I visited that area it

    14 seems that it was very calm in that area and I can

    15 remember when going to that area we saw there were some

    16 checkpoints manned with HVO and BiH in co-operation.

    17 Q. Did you find it odd that within the same operative zone,

    18 there were points where co-operation seemed to be so

    19 positive between the HVO and the army and yet there were

    20 other points where the situation was so poor?

    21 A. In the Zepce area and the Zavidovici area and Maglaj

    22 area and the northern part of that area we were

    23 operating in, it was necessary for the HVO and BiH to

    24 work together because this area was surrounded on three

    25 sides by the Bosnian Serb Army, so therefore they had to

  7. 1 work together, and if not the Bosnian Serb Army would

    2 have taken over that area.

    3 Q. They would have all perished; is that your point?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Have you reviewed the documents which gave rise to the

    6 Busovaca Joint Commission? That is the founding

    7 documents.

    8 A. I have seen that document, but I cannot recall all the

    9 details in it.

    10 Q. Among that -- within that document or among those

    11 documents, was there a joint order from Hadzihasanovic

    12 and Blaskic giving certain powers to their deputies and

    13 their representatives on the Commission?

    14 A. I cannot recall that.

    15 Q. Were there times, when you were travelling with the

    16 Commission and Mr. Nakic, the Deputy Commander of the HVO

    17 in the operative zone was with you, when the group was

    18 not allowed to pass through a checkpoint?

    19 A. Yes, there were.

    20 Q. Did you find that odd, that the Deputy Commander of the

    21 HVO in the zone could not get through an HVO checkpoint

    22 within his zone of command?

    23 A. Yes. Normally, we did not have problems at those

    24 checkpoints I marked at the board last week. Sometimes

    25 when we were going to do some fact-finding in one of

  8. 1 those areas where there have been complaints, there was

    2 maybe a small, newly established checkpoint and

    3 sometimes we were not allowed to pass that checkpoint.

    4 Then we had to ask Colonel Blaskic's office to have a

    5 written order to pass that.

    6 Q. Have you finished your answer?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Was that on more than one occasion then that the

    9 Busovaca Joint Commission group, including Deputy

    10 Commander Nakic, was not allowed to pass through an HVO

    11 checkpoint?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Was it on several occasions that that occurred?

    14 A. It happened a few times.

    15 Q. Can you tell us briefly what specific training or study

    16 you have received or undertaken concerning the

    17 organisation and functioning of armies within the Warsaw

    18 Pact or the armies organised according to the Soviet

    19 model?

    20 A. I have studied all the Warsaw Pacts, how they were

    21 organised, and I have studied how the former Yugoslavia

    22 National Army, how they were organised, and actually, we

    23 could see that the same type of organisation used in the

    24 Yugoslavian National Army, the JNA, was copied to HVO

    25 and BiH.

  9. 1 Q. Your study of the Soviet model and the JNA, was that

    2 formal coursework or independent reading and study?

    3 What type of study was it?

    4 A. It was a study during my training as an intelligence

    5 officer.

    6 Q. As part of a survey course of different military

    7 systems?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Any other study or particularised research you did on

    10 either the Soviet military model or the former Yugoslav

    11 National Army model?

    12 A. I do not think I would be able to tell all this in

    13 court, because that is something to do with the Danish

    14 Army.

    15 Q. I do not want you to reveal any confidential

    16 information. Speaking at a very general level, is it

    17 other coursework you have received or are you referring

    18 to some type of tour or duty that you have had that

    19 involved the Soviet or Warsaw Pact model?

    20 A. I think I already had answered that I know how the units

    21 were organised.

    22 Q. I do not want you to reveal any confidential

    23 information, but I am trying to determine the depth and

    24 nature of any studies or training you have received in

    25 that area. If you feel you have given a complete answer

  10. 1 and you are not able to provide any more information, so

    2 be it.

    3 How many men under the JNA system of organisation

    4 would a captain command?

    5 A. You know, the JNA, until 1991, there was national

    6 service in Yugoslavia, so when we came in 1993, all men

    7 that were -- they started in the JNA at 18 so I think in

    8 1993 all men about 20 have done national service in the

    9 JNA and so therefore a lot of the soldiers in HVO and

    10 BiH have done military service. That included a lot of

    11 the officers.

    12 Q. You may not have heard my question. My question was:

    13 under the JNA model or system of organisation, how many

    14 men would a captain command, that is a captain in the

    15 JNA would be in command of how many men?

    16 A. You had a structure where normally a company were around

    17 100 men, battalion level had three, four or five

    18 companies and the brigade units had a lot of battalions;

    19 it would all depend on what type of brigade it was.

    20 Q. What type of unit would a captain typically command?

    21 A. Can you use another word --

    22 Q. For captain? Apparently in the JNA, that position would

    23 be known as "capitan", something to that effect. In

    24 English it is captain, as in the captain of an ocean

    25 vessel.

  11. 1 A. In Denmark a captain is normally a company commander.

    2 Q. About 100 men then?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. That is in the Danish system?

    5 A. And normally in all NATO and former Warsaw Pact units.

    6 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether, in terms of training

    7 and organising military units within the JNA, was a

    8 distinction drawn between the basic training of soldiers

    9 and the training of men within units; that is training

    10 them to perform as part of a unit?

    11 A. They were trained to perform as a part of the unit and

    12 actually JNA was one of the biggest armies in Europe,

    13 and it was a very -- I think they were very clever, the

    14 soldiers in the JNA and well trained.

    15 Q. They emphasised both types of training, is that right,

    16 personal basic training and training to operate as part

    17 of a unit?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Do you know, within the JNA model, what period of

    20 training was deemed necessary to train the smallest

    21 group of soldiers; that is approximately 10 soldiers, to

    22 train them to work as a unit. How long was that deemed

    23 to take under the JNA system?

    24 A. It all depends on what type of units. Normally I think

    25 they had to do their national service for a minimum of

  12. 1 12 months and, of course, you have to start with the

    2 basic training and all depending on what kind of unit,

    3 this basic training was I think two or three months,

    4 just where they would teach how to be an individual

    5 soldier and after that we were training how to

    6 co-operate in an unit.

    7 Q. So you agree that at least in the JNA system, there is a

    8 sequential order of training, starting with basic

    9 training of the individual, followed by training

    10 individual soldiers to function as part of a basic unit

    11 of perhaps, say, 10 soldiers?

    12 A. Yes, that is normally in all armies the world over.

    13 Q. After that, is there also a period of training deemed

    14 necessary to train members of a platoon to work

    15 together; that is a larger unit of soldier?

    16 A. That is normally what you are doing; when you are able

    17 to co-operate in a small unit then you are trained to

    18 co-operate in a bigger unit and after that in a bigger

    19 unit again.

    20 Q. So the progression would be roughly the ten-men unit,

    21 then a platoon type of unit --

    22 A. Then a company.

    23 Q. And then a battalion; is that right?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. And then finally to operate as part of a brigade?

  13. 1 A. Sometimes that was at the same time.

    2 Q. That is they would be teaching those different levels of

    3 organisation at the same time?

    4 A. Yes, sometimes.

    5 Q. Do you know how long within the JNA model it would take

    6 to complete all of that training for a given soldier?

    7 A. I think they would use most of their national service to

    8 train that.

    9 Q. Which would be about 12 months?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Have you reviewed any JNA manuals or other materials in

    12 that record?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. You are giving your best answer as you sit here today?

    15 A. Yes, because that is the normal way for all armies in

    16 the world to train like that.

    17 Q. So your answer is not specific to the JNA; it is a

    18 generic answer based on your experience of all

    19 militaries?

    20 A. Yes, that is right.

    21 Q. First within NATO, the NATO context or NATO language, is

    22 an operative zone the same thing as a zone of

    23 responsibility, or is there a distinction between those

    24 two terms?

    25 A. I think that the operative zone is the same as the area

  14. 1 of responsibility.

    2 Q. It is the same as AOR, area of responsibility?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. How about in the JNA model? Do you know whether it is

    5 the same or whether there was a distinction?

    6 A. There was a distinction.

    7 Q. What was the distinction?

    8 A. As I can recall, I do not think the JNA was operating in

    9 operative zones, but they had their brigades and their

    10 corps level and those units had their own area of

    11 responsibility when they are going to a war.

    12 Q. So the JNA did not have operative zones; that is your

    13 recollection?

    14 A. Yes. Not during peacetime. Maybe during wartime they

    15 would do something similar to that to give a special

    16 unit an area of responsibility, and then you call this

    17 type of unit an operational zone.

    18 Q. Would you agree that within the JNA model, there is a

    19 distinction between a corps as a method of organising

    20 soldiers or units of soldiers and an operative zone?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. What is the distinction that you would see in those two

    23 concepts?

    24 A. Because the corps is a unit who have a lot of men and OZ

    25 is the area of responsibility.

  15. 1 Q. Would you agree that a corps is a tactical group of

    2 units?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Whereas an operative zone is more of an administrative

    5 concept?

    6 A. I think that is the area this unit had --

    7 Q. It is a geographic concept then?

    8 A. They have their area of responsibility in that specific

    9 area. That is normally when you -- in a war, every unit

    10 has their own area of responsibilities and the commander

    11 there is commander of all the operations inside this

    12 AOR.

    13 Q. Within the Danish or NATO model, approximately how many

    14 soldiers would exist within a corps? I understand an

    15 estimate is probably required. There may be no specific

    16 number.

    17 A. Maybe 10,000 soldiers.

    18 Q. To effectively command a corps within the NATO concept,

    19 what size of headquarters staff would be required?

    20 A. You have the commander and the deputy commander and then

    21 you will have staff officers who are responsible for the

    22 operations, staff officers who are responsible for the

    23 intelligence services, staff officers who are

    24 responsible for the logistics, transport of men,

    25 ammunition and fuel and things like that, and you will

  16. 1 have staff officers who are responsible for the

    2 administrative work.

    3 Q. Would you say though -- is this work that can

    4 effectively be performed by a headquarters staff of ten,

    5 or does it typically require a headquarters staff of a

    6 couple of hundred officers to get the work done so there

    7 is effective command over that corps?

    8 A. It all depends what kind of corps, but I think you can

    9 have ten high rank officers and then you will have a lot

    10 of non-commissioned officers and civilians who are doing

    11 a lot of the paperwork.

    12 Q. What is the minimum number -- if this is not a question

    13 you feel you can answer, please say so. Is there a

    14 minimum number of professional officers, that is

    15 professional, trained officers, to function effectively

    16 as a corps headquarters staff?

    17 A. I think as a minimum the commander, his deputy and staff

    18 officers who are responsible for the beforementioned

    19 operations and the intelligence and the logistics and

    20 the administering of things, they had to be professional

    21 soldiers that have been trained at the Military Academy.

    22 Q. You think it would only take about seven professional

    23 officers therefore to command a corps of about 10,000

    24 men?

    25 A. Yes, because all the commanders had to be professional

  17. 1 soldiers as well, all the brigade commanders.

    2 Q. Is that also true in wartime, that in your opinion,

    3 seven professional officers together with brigade

    4 commanders, could effectively command 10,000 soldiers

    5 within a corps?

    6 A. No. Normally in wartime you will have a lot of officers

    7 who have been doing the -- they have been given some

    8 officers' training, and they will have been officers

    9 prepared and they are in the reserve, so you can bring

    10 in those officers who had a former officers' training to

    11 be a member of the staff.

    12 Q. So you think in wartime it would take a greater number

    13 of officers to effectively run the corps?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Within the NATO model, how many professional officers

    16 are typically assigned or attached to the command

    17 headquarters staff at the corps level?

    18 A. 20 or 25.

    19 Q. Then how many non-commissioned officers and other

    20 administrative type of personnel?

    21 A. A lot more; I cannot say how many.

    22 Q. Hundreds of NCOs and administrative assistants?

    23 A. I think 50.

    24 Q. Putting aside the issue of communications which we will

    25 discuss later, what else is necessary in terms of a

  18. 1 headquarters staff and the functioning of a headquarters

    2 staff for a commander to exercise effective command?

    3 A. It is necessary for the commander, when he has given his

    4 orders, that he controlled -- that these orders were

    5 carried out in the way he wants them to be. He can do

    6 that himself or he could let one of his staff officers

    7 to inspect the soldiers, the units, to see if their

    8 orders the commander gave were carried out in the way

    9 the commander wanted them to do.

    10 Q. What about logistical requirements? Does whether or not

    11 you have supplies to provide to troops under your

    12 command affect the ability of a commander to actually

    13 control those troops, money to pay them, guns, those

    14 types of things?

    15 A. We have seen in a lot of armies that getting the money

    16 to the troops has been a problem. I think in the former

    17 Yugoslavia that was a problem, but I do not think that,

    18 especially not for HVO, they had a lot of weapons and

    19 equipment from the former JNA, but, of course, when the

    20 commander is going to order his units to do something,

    21 it is vital that those units had the proper equipment,

    22 the proper weapons to carry out those orders.

    23 Q. Yes, but if troops are not paid, does that affect the

    24 ability of a commander to exercise command over those

    25 troops?

  19. 1 A. Not in wartime, because when the soldiers are in the

    2 front, he does not have anything to use his money for.

    3 Q. What about if soldiers are not regularly fed, if they

    4 are getting one meal a day, does that affect the ability

    5 of the commander to exercise command over those troops?

    6 A. It all depends on how disciplined the unit are.

    7 Q. If they are not operating at a high level of discipline,

    8 would a lack of, for example food, could that affect a

    9 commander's ability to exercise command?

    10 A. Yes, it could.

    11 Q. Have you ever worked in the area of institution building

    12 within the military sphere? I can define that term if

    13 you would like me to.

    14 A. Yes, please.

    15 Q. Have you ever for example gone to Lithuania to consult

    16 with the army there on how to build a professional

    17 effective army?

    18 A. I do not think I quite understand your question.

    19 Q. My question was whether you personally had ever been

    20 involved in any work in the area of institution

    21 building, by which I mean the process of building a

    22 professional institution or entity such as a well

    23 trained, disciplined effective army where none had

    24 existed before?

    25 A. Yes.

  20. 1 Q. Tell me, when have you been involved in

    2 institution-building within the military sphere?

    3 A. In Denmark, together with other NATO countries, we are

    4 going to build up Home Guard units in the Baltic area.

    5 We are sending instructors to Estonia and Latvia and

    6 trying to building up a new military unit in that area.

    7 Q. Have you personally been involved in those efforts?

    8 A. Yes, just only to do some planning, paperwork, on what

    9 those instructors who were going over there -- how they

    10 should behave and what sort of training they should give

    11 over there. Then we are bringing officers from the

    12 countries in the Baltic to Denmark and we train them in

    13 Denmark so they are able to go back to their own units

    14 and train them.

    15 Q. When did the programme start?

    16 A. I think just after the Soviet Union was divided.

    17 Q. So several years ago?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Is the programme still going on?

    20 A. Yes, it is. Actually next month I will receive some

    21 officers from over there and I have to train them and

    22 tell them how to command a Home Guard district.

    23 Q. Is it a long-term project?

    24 A. I would not say.

    25 Q. It has been going on for three to five years; is that

  21. 1 right?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Is it scheduled to end soon?

    4 A. I hope.

    5 Q. But I take it you do not know.

    6 A. I do not know.

    7 Q. After the intense period of conflict from roughly

    8 16th April to 20th April 1993, did the army hold any

    9 civilian prisoners, and if you wish to refer to your

    10 diary at page 7, you are free to do so.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, I would like to know whether you

    12 intend to offer this exhibit on the Busovaca group as

    13 evidence. I think it has been identified. There may be

    14 some doubt as to the date. What is your opinion,

    15 Mr. Hayman? Do you want to tender it?

    16 MR. HAYMAN: I will offer it, your Honour, and the date is

    17 the date that I read which was provided to us by the

    18 Prosecution. Because it is redacted, we do not have a

    19 date on the document itself.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I assume that the Prosecution agrees? Does

    21 the Prosecution agree on the date, 19th March 1993?

    22 Mr. Cayley?

    23 MR. CAYLEY: I would imagine that the witness, your Honour,

    24 is probably the best person to answer that question.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: I do not agree with that, your Honour. If

  22. 1 counsel does not have a copy of the index they provided

    2 to us, I am happy to share it with him. Perhaps if we

    3 could hold these exhibits for a moment, I could provide

    4 the index to the Prosecutor during the next break and

    5 that will eliminate the issue. I am hesitant to burden

    6 the witness with these dates.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Continue then, please, Mr. Hayman.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Major, the question involved civilian prisoners

    9 on the army side after the intense conflict in

    10 mid-April. Did they have such prisoners?

    11 A. Yes, there were prisoners in Zenica and at the

    12 20th April, we visited the prison in Zenica and we saw

    13 there was prisoners of war there and we saw a lot of

    14 civilians there as well. I cannot recall how many, but

    15 as I have mentioned in my diary, they were leaving 25

    16 prisoners in each room.

    17 Q. In 60 square feet?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Would you agree with the comment that "it was worse than

    20 a hen house"?

    21 A. In the Danish edition I did not use the word "hen

    22 house", but some of the hens are living in very small

    23 rooms, and I compare that with this. This was because

    24 this was the first prison I visited, and after I visit a

    25 lot of the prisons in the area, this was one of the

  23. 1 better ones.

    2 Q. Turning your attention to the villages in the area of

    3 Zenica, and perhaps while I am raising this subject we

    4 could put exhibit 29A on the easel and see if it could

    5 be of use.

    6 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could just make a

    7 clarification, my learned friend just made a quote from

    8 the diary in which he said 60 square feet. If he looks

    9 again he will find the measurement is slightly different

    10 from that. Perhaps he could correct the position, or

    11 the witness.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: I am sorry, were you asking me? Let us do it

    13 through the witness, counsel. Major, were the groups of

    14 25 prisoners imprisoned in 60 square metres of space

    15 each?

    16 A. Yes -- no, not each.

    17 Q. Each group of 25?

    18 A. Yes, were living in rooms like that.

    19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, a very French question. Is it 60

    21 square feet or 60 square metres? The translation gives

    22 me sometimes feet and I must check. This is a third of

    23 the metres, so is it 60 square feet or 60 square metres

    24 please, Major?

    25 A. Square metres, Mr. President.

  24. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to ask you about your visit on

    3 April 21st 1993 to the village of Zalje in the region of

    4 Zenica. Do you recall that visit?

    5 A. Yes, I do.

    6 Q. Do you think you would be able to indicate where

    7 approximately that village was located?

    8 A. I cannot recall the exact position, but it was in one of

    9 the villages in the surrounding area of Zenica.

    10 Q. Did you visit this visit with Father Stjepan who you

    11 have previously described?

    12 A. Yes, we did and he told us about those incidents, so

    13 I have not been an eyewitness to those killed persons,

    14 but Father Stjepan, he told us about those persons who

    15 had been killed in that area.

    16 Q. What did he tell you?

    17 A. He told us that ten civilians had been killed, including

    18 a young girl who was lying in her bed shot in the head.

    19 It also included the murder of an old man of 90 years

    20 old.

    21 Q. Do you recall: was there a village of mixed ethnicity?

    22 What type of village was it? Do you have any

    23 recollection in that regard?

    24 A. I think most of the villages down there were with mixed

    25 population. We were told by Father Stjepan that the

  25. 1 unit who did this awful thing were a MOS unit, you would

    2 call them Mujahedins.

    3 Q. I am not sure the term Mujahedin has been defined. What

    4 did people mean in this theatre when they used the term

    5 Mujahedin?

    6 A. These Mujahedins is not a national unit from Bosnia, but

    7 a group of individuals coming from Arabic countries.

    8 Q. So foreign nationals fighting in Bosnia on the side of

    9 the army; is that a fair statement?

    10 A. I am not saying on the side, because actually I think

    11 they were fighting their own war. I discussed the

    12 matter with General Hadzihasanovic, because we

    13 complained to the Third Corps about things like this.

    14 He told us he was not able to control the Mujahedins but

    15 he was going to do his best because all those things

    16 that these Mujahedins did down there were harming the

    17 Muslim reputation, so therefore he would try to stop

    18 them if he was able to do that.

    19 Q. Did those types of atrocities on both sides greatly

    20 inflame the situation?

    21 A. I do not think that this incident inflamed the tension

    22 in the area because there was a lot of incidents like

    23 this from both sides.

    24 Q. You spoke earlier about the fears of the Croat civilians

    25 in the Zenica area. Were there some real fears based on

  26. 1 incidents like this?

    2 A. I cannot recall if this incident in Zalje -- I do not

    3 think that was the reason that the rumours started later

    4 on, but, of course, it happened and people knew about

    5 it.

    6 Q. It would affect psychology and the mental thoughts of

    7 those people living in the area; correct?

    8 A. Yes, that is correct.

    9 Q. You were asked in your direct examination whether there

    10 were troops of the army in the Lasva Valley on April

    11 16th 1993. Do you recall that question?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Your answer as I recall was no. Have I recalled it

    14 properly?

    15 A. Yes, that is correct.

    16 Q. As of April 16th, you had been in the theatre about two

    17 weeks; is that right?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. You had been briefed on arrival by ECMM; correct?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. And you had had one or more briefings from UNPROFOR; is

    22 that also correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Had some or all of those briefings included the issue of

    25 the army and where they were or were not located?

  27. 1 A. Yes, because normally in that area, the British

    2 battalion was sending out patrols and they were covering

    3 more or less the whole area so they were able to see

    4 where there were HVO positions and where there were BiH

    5 positions. We have no information about BiH positions

    6 in that area near Ahmici for example.

    7 Q. Let me ask you: did you have occasion to visit the Third

    8 Corps headquarters in Zenica?

    9 A. Yes, I was there several times.

    10 Q. Did you learn in the course of those visits how many

    11 brigades there were in the Third Corps?

    12 A. Actually I cannot recall the exact numbers of brigades.

    13 I never -- I did not have the opportunity to receive

    14 this list when we asked for it, so we had the list from

    15 HVO but at that time we did not have the list from BiH.

    16 Q. Did you ever get a list from the BiH of the brigades in

    17 the Third Corps?

    18 A. I did not, but we knew about their brigades. I cannot

    19 recall how many and where they were situated. I can

    20 remember some of them were situated in Zenica and south

    21 of Zenica.

    22 Q. Do you recall whether there were any Territorial Defence

    23 Forces in the Lasva Valley as of 16th April 1993?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. That is you do not recall or you think there were none?

  28. 1 A. I think there were none.

    2 Q. You also said you visited the village of Ahmici a few

    3 days before the massacre on 16th April. How many days

    4 before? Can you give us your best recollection in that

    5 regard?

    6 A. Two or three days before.

    7 Q. The purpose of your visit was to visit the mosque?

    8 A. Yes, to see the mosque.

    9 Q. That is the mosque in lower Ahmici or upper Ahmici?

    10 A. Lower Ahmici.

    11 Q. Did you go further into the village up the hill than the

    12 mosque?

    13 A. No, we did not.

    14 Q. Did you visit the school that is slightly up the road

    15 and to the left, that is across the street from the

    16 mosque?

    17 A. No, we just went to the mosque and we stopped in front

    18 of the mosque just to see the mosque.

    19 Q. How far up from the road is the mosque? Just an

    20 estimate, if you can.

    21 A. 1,000 metres or less.

    22 Q. On your visit, did you ask anyone any questions about

    23 the presence or absence of Territorial Defence or army

    24 troops in Ahmici?

    25 A. No, we did not but I was able to use my eyes and I could

  29. 1 see there was no sign of military activity in that part

    2 of Ahmici.

    3 Q. I take it you were not there to look for signs of the

    4 military, correct?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. You did not ask anyone, for example, "where is the army

    7 headquarters?"

    8 A. No, we did not.

    9 Q. I would like to read you a list of locations and ask you

    10 if you have ever visited the Territorial Defence units

    11 in any of these locations. Kruscica?

    12 A. I cannot remember. I think if you are able to show me

    13 on the map, maybe I can recall some of the areas.

    14 Q. Very well. Kruscica is immediately to the south,

    15 immediately, I do not know what the distance, but it is

    16 located in a southerly direction from Vitez, do you see

    17 it?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Did you ever visit a TO or Territorial Defence unit in

    20 Kruscica?

    21 A. Actually I cannot recall all the areas, but I can

    22 remember that we visited some units of the BH in --

    23 I cannot remember, there was one headquarters or

    24 something similar in the Vitez area. There was

    25 something in the mountains up here, and we visited some

  30. 1 in the Busovaca area.

    2 Q. Did you visit a BiH headquarters in Poculica?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. You do not recall where this headquarters was?

    5 A. I remember we visited a headquarters in this area here

    6 somewhere.

    7 Q. You are indicating to the south of Vitez?

    8 A. Yes, south of Vitez.

    9 Q. Roughly in the area of Kruscica? I am not trying to tie

    10 you to the name of that village, but when you indicated

    11 with your finger were you indicating generally in the

    12 area of Kruscica and to the south downward on the map of

    13 Kruscica?

    14 A. I recall that we visited a unit in the mountains or the

    15 hilly area.

    16 Q. To the south of Vitez?

    17 A. Yes, but it was not that south, it was up here.

    18 Q. Not that south, indicating the area of mountains where

    19 there are no towns considerably to the south?

    20 A. It was more, not in this direction but in the area here.

    21 Q. Between Kruscica and Rovina?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. When was that visit?

    24 A. I cannot remember, it was together with the Busovaca

    25 Joint Commission and we had to go out there to see if

  31. 1 one of the local agreements was carried out by the local

    2 commander in that area.

    3 Q. Was that unit established as of 16th April or do you

    4 know?

    5 A. I cannot recall the exact period. Maybe it was before

    6 16th April or maybe after, I cannot remember.

    7 Q. Did you visit a Territorial Defence unit in the town of

    8 Gacice, indicating to the west of Vitez?

    9 A. No.

    10 Q. Did you visit a TO unit in the area of Donja Veceriska,

    11 which is to the north-west of Gacice and to the

    12 west-north-west of Vitez?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. How about a TO unit in the village of Vranjska, and in a

    15 moment we will try and identify that for you on the map,

    16 if we can. I do not know if we are going to be able to

    17 identify that one on the map for you, but I take it the

    18 name does not mean anything to you in terms of a TO

    19 unit?

    20 A. The only thing I can remember is that we visited one

    21 small headquarters up here.

    22 Q. Indicating to the south of Vitez.

    23 A. I do not think -- it was not a brigade headquarters; it

    24 was a battalion or company headquarters.

    25 Q. Was that a TO unit or an army unit, if you recall?

  32. 1 A. I cannot recall. I can recall that we visited a

    2 headquarters and it was a battalion headquarters or a

    3 company headquarters.

    4 Q. The unit you visited to the north of Vitez, do you

    5 remember anything else about that unit? Was it

    6 Territorial Defence, was it army, the type of command or

    7 headquarters it was, any details?

    8 A. The only thing I can remember, in the beginning BiH had

    9 a small military headquarters in Vitez. I think it was

    10 situated in this part of Vitez here.

    11 Q. In Stari Vitez? Old Vitez?

    12 A. Yes, in old Vitez.

    13 Q. So there was an army unit in Stari Vitez as far as you

    14 knew?

    15 A. We saw a headquarters and had a meeting at a

    16 headquarters.

    17 Q. That is within the Lasva Valley, correct?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Let me just read a list of other towns and ask you if

    20 they refresh your recollection as to any visits to

    21 Territorial Defence units that you may have made:

    22 Pezici, Poculica, Bukva, Muratovici, Preocica, Tolovici,

    23 Lupac, Vrhovine, Sivrino Selo. Do those refresh your

    24 recollection at all?

    25 A. No.

  33. 1 Q. Please be seated. Did you visit, on your tour, any of

    2 the three battalions of the 325th Brigade of the Third

    3 Corps?

    4 A. I cannot remember the names of the different brigades.

    5 Maybe, maybe not.

    6 Q. Other than the two army or TO locations you have

    7 described, one south of Vitez, one north, do you have

    8 any recollection of visiting any other army units within

    9 the area of the Lasva Valley?

    10 A. No, not together with the Busovaca Joint Commission or

    11 later on together with my own team.

    12 Q. So at no time, you do not recall any such visits?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. Is that correct that at no time do you recall any such

    15 visits?

    16 A. I cannot recall that any of the other monitor teams have

    17 visited headquarters in other areas than those which

    18 were mentioned.

    19 Q. Let me just quickly list other units and their locations

    20 and ask you if it refreshes your recollection in any

    21 way.

    22 306th brigade in Han Bila; 17th Krainja Brigade in

    23 Kruscica; 333rd Brigade in the Busovaca municipality,

    24 headquartered in Kacuni. Do any of those refresh your

    25 recollection at all?

  34. 1 A. Yes, the last one. I cannot recall if that was the name

    2 of the brigade, but I remember visiting a unit in the

    3 Busovaca area.

    4 Q. An army unit?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. After the conflict began on 16th April, was a

    7 confrontation line or a frontline formed between HVO and

    8 army forces?

    9 A. I can remember that we were discussing who was having

    10 the control over certain areas in that area. I cannot

    11 recall that we were able to draw a strict line on the

    12 map, but we learned that HVO were commanding most of the

    13 valley including Vitez.

    14 Q. Most of the what?

    15 A. Most of the Lasva valley, because we were able to see by

    16 the checkpoints manned at the road, so those checkpoints

    17 that are marked on the road show that HVO were

    18 controlling this area.

    19 Q. Did those checkpoints exist before the 16th?

    20 A. Yes, they did and after the 16th.

    21 Q. They did not change as a result of the conflict on the

    22 16th?

    23 A. That showed that HVO was still having a control in that

    24 area.

    25 Q. I take it that other than that you did not gather any

  35. 1 information or receive any information where the

    2 confrontation lines or front lines were between the HVO

    3 and the army?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. If the usher could assist, your Honour, Major, you

    6 described receiving a letter from the Mujahedin

    7 concerning the abduction of Commander Totic and the four

    8 HVO officers from the Travnik, Novi Travnik area.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. I would like to show you a letter and ask you if you

    11 recognise it.

    12 I would ask the usher to put it on the ELMO,

    13 I think we will need to have a brief sight translation

    14 of it.

    15 While that is being done, perhaps the Registrar

    16 could provide numbers for the last exhibit and for this

    17 one, if it is convenient.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: This one is D37 and the previous one is D36.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Any objections?

    21 MR. CAYLEY: No objections, your Honour.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, please.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: The letter has illegible writing at the very

    24 top, at least illegible to me. Then there appears to be

    25 some Arabic writing and then, cut off the ELMO at the

  36. 1 very top, is the word "Zenica", and then there are

    2 certain numbers which speak for themselves:

    3 "To whom it may concern. We inform you that all

    4 hostages of HVO officers are alive and we want immediate

    5 release of all foreign prisoners from HVO prisons in

    6 Bosnia. It is to be noted that we have tried many times

    7 through your agencies and other responsible

    8 organisations to release them, but without any

    9 response. So there was no other way left after that,

    10 only to take those leaders as hostages and to exchange.

    11 We waited long to give chance to such organisations to

    12 release our brothers without any bloodshed. So we warn

    13 you that if our brothers are not released, we are going

    14 to kill all the hostages and for these brothers from

    15 foreign countries we inform you that they know their way

    16 and good [or God] very clearly, for they came to die as

    17 martyrs in the way of Allah alone and nothing else, and

    18 that such operations will never be the last. On the

    19 contrary it will be the beginning of a series of Jehadic

    20 operations and martorious actions which we shall be able

    21 to perform with the help of Allah to whom we return and

    22 to whom all the order is. Last but not least, you and

    23 all other organisations will be responsible for the

    24 killing of the hostages and the prisoners."

    25 Then there is some further Arabic writing. Do you

  37. 1 recognise this letter?

    2 A. Yes, I do. I can recall that we received this letter in

    3 this version and then a German version as well with the

    4 same text and it was handed over to us by a

    5 representative from the Mujahedin.

    6 Q. The kidnapping of Commander Todic took place on

    7 15th April, do you recall that, 1993?

    8 A. Yes I think he was captured after the four staff

    9 officers at the Travnik front.

    10 Q. And ECMM did conduct an investigation at the scene of

    11 the abduction?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. I take it you were not one of the members of that

    14 investigative team?

    15 A. Another Danish monitor went to the scene and he saw the

    16 scene.

    17 Q. Did he describe it to you in some detail?

    18 A. Yes, he did.

    19 Q. Did you ever view a videotape of the scene?

    20 A. No.

    21 Q. Do you know whether the scene of the abduction that is

    22 videotaped footage from the scene of the abduction was

    23 played on the local news in the Lasva Valley on the

    24 evening of 15th April 1993?

    25 A. I do not know, but a lot of the incidents down there

  38. 1 were filmed to the local television stations.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, we have a short tape we would like

    3 to play. Perhaps this would be a convenient break, or

    4 if you wish to proceed, we will.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: I think we can have the break now and we will

    6 continue at 11.35.

    7 (11.15 am)

    8 (A short break)

    9 (11.35 am)

    10 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Madam Registrar,

    11 please have the accused brought in.

    12 (Accused brought in)

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, I think we interrupted you just

    14 when you wished to show the witness a videotape.

    15 I assume the technical department is ready so please

    16 continue.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, your Honour, almost. Let me ask the

    18 witness another question or two to set the stage. Were

    19 you informed through the ECMM investigation that the

    20 abduction involved the killing of four bodyguards and

    21 one innocent bystander?

    22 A. Yes, that is correct.

    23 Q. Were you informed that those individuals, at least the

    24 bodyguards, appeared to have first been wounded and then

    25 were executed by shots to the head?

  39. 1 A. Yes.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, this tape has three segments.

    3 I will seek to pause between the segments to ask

    4 additional questions of the witness. Regretfully, the

    5 first segment is most unpleasant and I wish to apologise

    6 to the court for feeling the need to show it, but also

    7 to advise the gallery that if there is anyone not

    8 wishing to view these scenes, that they should avert

    9 their eyes or temporarily leave the gallery.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. You said what is necessary so

    11 there is no need for me to repeat it. Please continue.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Then I would ask the technical

    13 assistants to play the tape and I will ask for a pause

    14 when we conclude the first segment. We are not asking

    15 the translators to try and translate the TV reporter

    16 comments at this time, your Honour.

    17 (Videotape played)

    18 MR. HAYMAN: Do those appear to be shells, Major, on the

    19 ground?

    20 A. No, I think it was holsters from the small arms.

    21 Q. Spent shells, shell casings?

    22 (Videotape stopped)

    23 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Did you count four bodyguards and

    24 one apparent bystander from that tape, Major?

    25 A. Yes, I think the first person we were looking at was the

  40. 1 eyewitness.

    2 Q. The individual not in uniform?

    3 A. Yes, and the four persons close to the vehicle were the

    4 bodyguards.

    5 Q. Was it your understanding from the ECMM report that the

    6 abduction occurred from a vehicle, that is while the

    7 vehicle was actually moving?

    8 A. Actually I think that this vehicle was stopped and then

    9 fired on, and I can remember, we discussed the matter we

    10 were told about -- I was told about this. I had not

    11 seen it at the spot, but we were surprised that the

    12 brigade commander was not hurt after seeing the car.

    13 Q. Is the screen that was depicted in the tape consistent

    14 with the reports that ECMM gathered concerning the

    15 incident?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. How long was Commander Totic an HVO commander in

    18 Zenica? How long was he held hostage, if you know? If

    19 you wish to refer to your diary on 17th May, you

    20 certainly may?

    21 A. He was released together with four other HVO officers,

    22 so he has been in Mujahedin custody a day or two less

    23 than the other ones.

    24 Q. Was he released on approximately 17th May?

    25 A. He was released the same day together with other four

  41. 1 HVO officers.

    2 Q. Was that on 17th May, as far as you recall?

    3 A. Yes, that is correct.

    4 Q. During his captivity, were his whereabouts known to the

    5 ECMM, or was he held in a secret location, to your

    6 knowledge?

    7 A. All five of them were held in a secret place to us. We

    8 did not know where they were.

    9 Q. Was it known whether he was alive or dead?

    10 A. We were told -- as far as I can remember, a videotape

    11 was handed over to us or to his relatives showing that

    12 he was still alive.

    13 Q. I would like to play the second segment of this tape and

    14 ask you if you have seen it and if you can identify it.

    15 The audio track, your Honour, I do not think it

    16 intelligible at this time, so I would ask that the first

    17 five or ten seconds be played and then we can

    18 fast-forward to the conclusion of that segment.

    19 (Videotape played)

    20 MR. HAYMAN: There is a point in the tape where the

    21 individual takes off his hat; perhaps the technical

    22 assistants could take us to that point.

    23 (Videotape stopped)

    24 MR. HAYMAN: While they are doing that, may I ask you, Major,

    25 did you receive any information whether Commander Totic

  42. 1 sustained any wounds or injuries in connection with the

    2 abduction, or do you not recall?

    3 A. I do not recall, but I do not think that he had any.

    4 Q. Let me ask the technical personnel whether they have

    5 located that portion of the segment.

    6 If it could be played, your Honour?

    7 (Videotape played)

    8 Q. Do you see the wound on the top of his head?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Is that consistent with a bullet grazing the top of his

    11 skull or are you not able to comment?

    12 A. I would have to take a closer look. It could be or it

    13 could be something else. If it was a bullet maybe it

    14 would be a bigger wound, but it could be.

    15 Q. Thank you. We can fast-forward to the end of that

    16 segment.

    17 (Videotape stopped)

    18 Q. You said you had an occasion to discuss the Mujahedin

    19 with General Hadzihasanovic; is that right?

    20 A. Yes, that is correct.

    21 Q. Did he say to you on some occasion that the army had

    22 done their best to get rid of the Mujahedin but they had

    23 not been effective enough in doing so?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Does that sound consistent with what you recall?

  43. 1 A. Yes. He told us that he wanted to stop this because the

    2 activities carried out by the Mujahedin would harm the

    3 Muslim reputation.

    4 Q. Did you attend the event at which certain Mujahedin

    5 prisoners were freed and exchanged for Commander Totic?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Where did that occur?

    8 A. I can remember that I was releasing the four HVO

    9 officers; they were handed over to me in a secure place

    10 in Travnik, and -- after that I had the four HVO

    11 officers and we went to Vitez, hotel Vitez,

    12 Colonel Blaskic's headquarters, where I handed over the

    13 four officers to Colonel Blaskic.

    14 Q. Was he grateful for their release?

    15 A. I hope.

    16 Q. Did you see any signs?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Did he thank you?

    19 A. Yes, he did and I think that the local TV station was

    20 there as well.

    21 Q. Did you then proceed to Zenica for the other exchange?

    22 A. Yes, because it was agreed that the Mujahedins should be

    23 released in front of our headquarters in Zenica.

    24 I cannot recall where Mr. Totic -- if he was released in

    25 Zenica or in Vitez.

  44. 1 Q. Did any of the Mujahedin fighters attend the prisoner

    2 exchange event in Zenica?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Approximately how many?

    5 A. 100, I think, members of the Mujahedins and maybe

    6 members of the 7th Muslim Brigade, who had a

    7 headquarters in Zenica, at the music school.

    8 Q. Was there any connection insofar as you knew between the

    9 7th Muslim Brigade and the Mujahedin fighters?

    10 A. We did our best to find out if there were any

    11 connections, but as I have told the court before, the

    12 7th Muslim Brigade were acting very Islamic, so

    13 therefore they have some connection in their beliefs.

    14 Q. With the Mujahedin fighters?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. But that was the extent of the connection you were able

    17 to determine?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. I would ask the technical personnel to play the third

    20 segment of the tape, your Honour.

    21 (Videotape played)

    22 Q. Do you recall, Major, how many Mujahedin fighters were

    23 exchanged for the five HVO officers?

    24 A. 15, I think. No, 13.

    25 Q. Do you recognise the vehicle with the blue patch?

  45. 1 A. Yes, that was one of our vehicles.

    2 Q. By "our" you mean ECMM?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Do you recognise this scene?

    5 A. Yes, I think that was in the front of the International

    6 Hotel where we had our headquarters.

    7 Q. Does that appear to be the same individual who was on

    8 the second segment?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: That concludes the tape.

    11 (Videotape stopped)

    12 Q. Did the Mujahedin have a permanent headquarters anywhere

    13 or were their whereabouts generally secret?

    14 A. We did not know anything about the headquarters. We

    15 think that they maybe had something --

    16 MR. CAYLEY: It is just a small point, Mr. President. The

    17 first video clip was identified by my learned friend as

    18 coming from TV Vitez. I wondered if he could just

    19 identify to the court the source of the other two

    20 clips.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: I cannot, your Honour. I do not know as I stand

    22 here the source -- that is who filmed the second and

    23 third segments.

    24 Commenting on whether the Mujahedin had a

    25 headquarters that was known to ECMM?

  46. 1 A. Yes, we think that in Zenica, they had maybe a

    2 headquarters or something at the music school in Zenica.

    3 Q. Did you visit that location on any occasions?

    4 A. Yes, later on when I was chairing this Joint

    5 Humanitarian Commission when we were looking for

    6 detained persons.

    7 Q. Did it appear to be a headquarters of at least some

    8 Mujahedin fighters?

    9 A. It could be, because we saw some banners with Arabic

    10 words on it.

    11 Q. Were there any personnel there who you believed to be

    12 Mujahedin fighters, at the music school when you visited

    13 it?

    14 A. Yes. Actually, I was the only one who was allowed to go

    15 in and visit the rooms in the music school. The BiH

    16 members of the commission were not allowed to go in

    17 there, the HVO members were not allowed to go in there,

    18 so I was the only one who was allowed to go inside and

    19 see the area.

    20 Q. This music school was located in the city of Zenica?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Do you know whether the specific perpetrators of the

    23 Totic abduction were ever identified or any actions

    24 taken to try and identify those individuals?

    25 A. I do not know.

  47. 1 Q. Now I would like to turn to the subject matter of

    2 communications. You said in your testimony that the

    3 telephone line at one point in time in Kiseljak was cut

    4 so that Zenica could not communicate with Sarajevo. Do

    5 you recall that?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Is it a normal tactic in warfare to cut your enemy's

    8 communication lines?

    9 A. Yes, it is.

    10 Q. A basic tactic, would you agree?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. You travelled to Kiseljak on a number of occasions

    13 during your tour; you have described them. Did you ever

    14 see Colonel Blaskic in Kiseljak on one of your visits to

    15 Kiseljak?

    16 A. I cannot recall to have seen Colonel Blaskic in

    17 Kiseljak.

    18 Q. Were you ever told that he had a headquarters staff in

    19 Kiseljak?

    20 A. We knew that there was a headquarters in Kiseljak, but

    21 we did not know if it was a headquarters connected to

    22 Colonel Blaskic himself. We knew there was a local HVO

    23 brigade headquarters in Kiseljak.

    24 Q. Did that brigade headquarters occupy the Kiseljak

    25 barracks?

  48. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Were you ever told specifically that Colonel Blaskic

    3 maintained a headquarters staff at Kiseljak barracks?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Did you ever see any evidence that he did, whatever

    6 those indicia might be?

    7 A. No, but we knew from some of the persons, the Croats in

    8 Kiseljak, that it was possible to go from Vitez to

    9 Kiseljak, passing the mountain and using the small roads

    10 and paths.

    11 Q. Tell me, when you went to Kiseljak during your tour, how

    12 would you get there?

    13 A. Normally we used two different roads. We could use the

    14 Busovaca road from Vitez through Busovaca and down to

    15 Kiseljak and we could use another road where we were

    16 actually following the river through Visoko and that way

    17 down to Kiseljak.

    18 Q. Was there a route that you normally used?

    19 A. Normally we used both of them, but sometimes it was

    20 difficult for us to pass the Busovaca road because of

    21 the checkpoints in that area.

    22 Q. What army or armies had checkpoints on the road from

    23 Busovaca to Kiseljak along the direct route, if you

    24 recall?

    25 A. Both parties had, but I cannot recall as I told you last

  49. 1 Friday -- I cannot recall the exact positions, but HVO

    2 had checkpoints there and BiH had -- I think BiH had the

    3 centre part.

    4 Q. I am going to approach and perhaps looking at the map

    5 could help refresh your memory.

    6 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, may I approach the witness? Thank

    7 you.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Would you agree that on this map, exhibit 29E,

    9 it reflects the town of Busovaca, indicating where I am

    10 currently pointing, the town of Kiseljak where I am

    11 currently pointing and a road that traverses in a fairly

    12 direct manner between the two?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Do you also see on this road the location marked Kacuni?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Which is about?

    17 A. Five kilometres from Busovaca.

    18 Q. Perhaps a fourth of the way from Busovaca towards

    19 Kiseljak?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Then if you were to traverse another fourth of the way,

    22 you come to a location denominated Bilalovac?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Do you have any recollection whether the stretch of this

    25 road from Kacuni to Bilalovac was held by the army?

  50. 1 A. This area was held by -- controlled by the army.

    2 Q. Indicating this area from Bilalovac to Kacuni?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Was that true during your tour?

    5 A. As I can recall, we had to use -- because we had a lot

    6 of problems in the roads, sometimes there were landmines

    7 on the roads, so therefore we felt more secure taking

    8 this long way here down to Kiseljak.

    9 Q. By "the long way", you are indicating following the

    10 Lasva river near Kakanj and then down in a

    11 south-easterly direction to Visoko?

    12 A. Then from Visoko to Kiseljak.

    13 Q. Then from Visoko in a south-westerly direction to

    14 Kiseljak?

    15 A. The only problems we had here was this was very close to

    16 the Bosnian Serb Army positions and normally they would

    17 fire at us when we passed this area.

    18 Q. The portion south of Visoko?

    19 A. Normally we had to pass this at high speed because the

    20 Bosnian Serbs were firing at us.

    21 Q. Thank you. In the Visoko area, do you recall who

    22 controlled that road, as you would travel south from

    23 Visoko?

    24 A. As I can recall, BiH controlled that road, and we

    25 normally had no problems using that road.

  51. 1 Q. Except for the Serb artillery?

    2 A. Just for the Serb artillery or their snipers.

    3 Q. Did you come to learn that, in addition to the road from

    4 Kacuni to Bilalovac being held by the army, that the

    5 telephone lines from Busovaca to Kiseljak were cut?

    6 A. I cannot recall.

    7 Q. Did you ever use a landline, and by "land line" I am

    8 referring to a telephone that uses physical wire on the

    9 ground; did you ever use a landline while you were in

    10 Kiseljak to call Busovaca or Vitez?

    11 A. I cannot recall.

    12 Q. Do you recall ever speaking with Colonel Blaskic on a

    13 landline phone while you were in Kiseljak?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. You said something about a mountain path. Can you

    16 elaborate? What were you saying?

    17 A. We were told by the Croats in Kiseljak that it was

    18 possible to go from Kiseljak to Vitez using the small

    19 roads in the mountain, but we did not do that because we

    20 did not want to risk ourselves or vehicles going on the

    21 small roads.

    22 Q. You felt it was too dangerous a possible route; is that

    23 right?

    24 A. Yes, and that was normally for all, including UNPROFOR

    25 down there, because a lot of the small routes could be

  52. 1 mined, by both sides.

    2 Q. On a small remote road, you might be very vulnerable to

    3 an ambush; is that true?

    4 A. Yes, true. If you are not having the control of that

    5 area, but as we were told, the HVO were controlling that

    6 area, so you were able to go from Kiseljak to Vitez in

    7 an area controlled by HVO.

    8 Q. Who told you this?

    9 A. We were told that in Kiseljak by HVO.

    10 Q. Do you remember whom?

    11 A. I cannot remember the individual.

    12 Q. Were you talking to a soldier in casual talk or were you

    13 in a meeting with a commander or someone in a position

    14 of responsibility?

    15 A. It was more in casual talk with -- I cannot recall if it

    16 was a commander, but it was an officer who told me that.

    17 Q. Were you told this once or on more than one occasion?

    18 A. Only once.

    19 Q. Was any specific route identified for you, or just a

    20 general reference to a mountain path?

    21 A. Yes, he told us that it was possible to pass the

    22 mountains to go to Vitez. I can remember that because

    23 we were discussing that it would have been a lot easier

    24 for them using the Busovaca road. Then he told us yes,

    25 because it was difficult for them to use the mountain

  53. 1 road to Vitez and then I asked, "The mountain road to

    2 Vitez, what is that road?" Then he said, "When we go to

    3 Vitez, we have to use the small roads in the mountains."

    4 Q. Now I would like to ask you some questions about

    5 radios. Do different radios have different

    6 capabilities?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. For example a walkie-talkie. What is the normal range

    9 of a walkie-talkie?

    10 A. It all depends, from a few hundred metres to maybe 1 or

    11 2 kilometres.

    12 Q. What kind of variables would affect the range of a

    13 walkie-talkie?

    14 A. Terrain. If you are in a flat country, the range will

    15 be longer than in hilly terrain.

    16 Q. Does a walkie-talkie require a line of sight to enable

    17 two persons to communicate via walkie-talkie ?

    18 A. Not necessarily, but normally.

    19 Q. Under normal conditions a line of sight connection is

    20 required?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. As one moves towards more sophisticated types of radio,

    23 what are other categories, if there are such categories,

    24 of radios above the walkie-talkie level?

    25 A. You have different kind of radios; it all depends what

  54. 1 unit, of course. A company unit will normally have

    2 radio equipment so they are able to communicate with

    3 their platoons, and normally the distance between the

    4 company headquarters and the platoons are only a few

    5 kilometres, so therefore they do not need big radios for

    6 that, but when the company commander has to get in

    7 contact with the battalion or the brigade headquarters,

    8 he needs a bigger radio that is able to send and receive

    9 messages on a longer distance.

    10 Q. Are there categories though, such as tactical radios or

    11 other types of radios, which are used to describe radios

    12 to meet these different needs?

    13 A. No, normally it is how many watts, and normally a small

    14 radio is sending with two or three watts and a bigger

    15 radio is normally with 30 or 50 watts. Normally at

    16 company level you will have a radio that is able to send

    17 on 2 watts and on the higher level you have to use

    18 radios with 30 or 50 watts.

    19 Q. On what level would you need a 30 or 50 watt radio?

    20 A. Brigade level. Because of the units down there --

    21 before the break we discussed the organisation with the

    22 corps and the brigade and all that, and I told you that

    23 the normal strength of a corps was maybe 10,000 men. It

    24 could be more, but in Bosnia, this was not that, because

    25 normally a brigade down there were maybe only 100 men.

  55. 1 Q. As opposed to 2,000 or 4,000?

    2 A. Yes, what would normally be in a brigade, so they do not

    3 have to use that many radios as if it was in a normal

    4 corps or brigade unit.

    5 Q. What kind of radio would have been necessary, in your

    6 judgment, to communicate between Vitez and Zepce?

    7 A. I think that communications between Vitez and Zepce, you

    8 need another type of radio, because the radio we have

    9 discussed until now are on VHF and I think you need a

    10 bigger radio to have contact between Vitez and Zepce,

    11 maybe you have to use an HF radio, or you can do it with

    12 a VHF radio if it is strong enough.

    13 Q. Do both VHF and HF radios use antennas?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Do they use the same kind of antennas?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. What is the difference in antennas between HF and VHF?

    18 A. Normally when you are using an HF radio you can use a

    19 ground plane antenna. You can use that as well for VHF,

    20 so sometimes you can use the same type of antenna.

    21 Q. What is a ground plane antenna?

    22 A. A ground plane antenna is an antenna where you have one

    23 antenna up and then you have three antennas going down.

    24 Q. Like the outline of a three-sided pyramid?

    25 A. Yes.

  56. 1 Q. Is there another kind of antenna you can use for a VHF

    2 radio?

    3 A. Normally you are using just one antenna.

    4 Q. Just a wire strung up on a building or in a tree or what

    5 have you?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. But I take it that type of antenna does not support HF?

    8 A. Could be.

    9 Q. So a single-wire antenna could support HF or VHF?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. And a ground plane antenna could support either one?

    12 A. Yes, and you are able, if you are making -- when you are

    13 using both of the radios, you can make another antenna

    14 to improve the sending, so you are able to send longer.

    15 That is another type of ground plane antenna that you

    16 connect it to a radio and then you can pull up a wire of

    17 25 or 30 metres just laying at the road, on the road or

    18 into a tree and then you are able to improve the radio.

    19 Q. How tall are these ground plane antennas generally?

    20 A. They can be for a few metres. If it is one of the big

    21 radio stations, if you are just using one of the small

    22 radio stations -- normally on 2 watts or 30 watts

    23 normally you can fix the antenna on the radio but you

    24 are able to connect a larger antenna to the radio and by

    25 that you can improve the radio.

  57. 1 Q. To get a greater range you need to increase the size of

    2 the antenna?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Could exhibit 98 be placed before the witness?

    5 (Handed).

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Hayman.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour.

    8 Major, exhibit 98 is a list of HVO brigades?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. I would like you to go through this list quickly with

    11 you and ask you to identify first at which of these

    12 brigade headquarters did you observe radio equipment.

    13 You can skip the zone for the moment, the hotel Vitez,

    14 and focus on the brigades.

    15 A. I can remember that I saw, of course, antennas in Vitez,

    16 then I saw antennas at some of the headquarters in

    17 Travnik. Specifically I can remember at one place, that

    18 was in a forward headquarters close to the Bosnian Serb

    19 front. This forward headquarters is not mentioned

    20 here. But I cannot specifically point out which of

    21 those brigades I was able to see antennas at, but I can

    22 remember seeing them in Travnik in a normal brigade

    23 headquarters, in Travnik close to the Bosnian Serb front

    24 and in Vitez.

    25 This is normal, because all armies including

  58. 1 myself, we are doing our best to hide all the radio

    2 equipment, because if the enemy is going to see our

    3 radio equipment, they would do anything to destroy it.

    4 Q. I understand the army did not give you a list of their

    5 brigades even when you asked them; correct?

    6 A. No, because the man at the joint headquarters at that

    7 time, he was not able to provide us with a more detailed

    8 list like this, so therefore I think we had it later on.

    9 Q. I am not asking you right now whether secrecy would or

    10 would not be normal in terms of military

    11 communications. I am asking you, other than the front

    12 near Travnik, the Travnik brigade and the hotel Vitez,

    13 can you recall seeing any radio equipment or antenna at

    14 any other HVO commands?

    15 A. No, I cannot recall that, but, as I told you, it is

    16 normal to hide your radio equipment.

    17 Q. And antenna?

    18 A. Of course, you do the best to hide the antennas as well.

    19 Q. Can you put antenna inside a building or do you get much

    20 better range if you put them outside a building?

    21 A. Normally outside, but you can have a remote control so

    22 you do not have to have the antenna at the

    23 headquarters. You can have it 1 kilometre from the

    24 headquarters, then you can have remote control from the

    25 antenna to the headquarters using a field line between

  59. 1 the two. It is not necessary to have the antenna at the

    2 headquarters.

    3 Q. Did you ever see that type of technology utilised by the

    4 HVO?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. At the Travnik brigade, do you remember what type of

    7 equipment or antenna you saw?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. Do you recall whether you saw radio equipment or merely

    10 an antenna?

    11 A. At one of the headquarters we saw an antenna and close

    12 to the -- or in this forward headquarters close to the

    13 Serb front, I saw radio equipment which was operated.

    14 Q. At the Travnik brigade, you do not recall whether you

    15 saw a radio or an antenna; is that correct?

    16 A. I saw an antenna but not the radio.

    17 Q. Do you recall the type or size of the antenna?

    18 A. No.

    19 Q. At the front near Travnik, what type of radio did you

    20 see?

    21 A. I saw a radio station, I was not able to tell what kind

    22 because it was not a radio similar to those radios

    23 I have been trained on, but I think it was a VHF radio.

    24 Q. A VHF not a HF radio?

    25 A. Yes.

  60. 1 Q. Were you able to determine what the wattage of the radio

    2 was?

    3 A. I was not able to see that, but on the size of the

    4 radio, I think it was between 30 and 50 watts.

    5 Q. How large was it?

    6 A. (indicates).

    7 Q. Indicating perhaps 18 inches by 12 inches?

    8 A. Normally I do not use inches.

    9 Q. I am sorry. How about half a metre by a third of a

    10 metre?

    11 A. I think 30 centimetres like this and maybe 15

    12 centimetres in the height.

    13 Q. Did it look like a new radio or an old radio?

    14 A. It did not look like a brand new radio.

    15 Q. At the hotel Vitez, did you see a radio or an antenna or

    16 both?

    17 A. I did not see a radio, I saw one antenna; I cannot

    18 remember if there were more than one. Normally there

    19 are on a headquarters like that, but as I told you, you

    20 can have antennas in other places at the headquarters,

    21 but I saw when I was passing a room, the door was open

    22 and I saw a man in there who was speaking in a

    23 microphone. That indicated that there were radio

    24 equipment.

    25 Q. I take it from the microphone you are not able to

  61. 1 determine what type of equipment it was?

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. Or the wattage or power or range, nothing like that?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Is it necessary to put up an antenna to test a radio to

    6 see if it works, to see if it works over a particular

    7 range?

    8 A. Yes, if you have to get in contact with other radio

    9 stations ...

    10 Q. You have to test it?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The hotel Vitez was in a valley; is that correct?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Of course valleys are surrounded by mountains. Was the

    15 valley in which the hotel Vitez was located ringed by

    16 mountains on all sides?

    17 A. Yes, but you can still use your radio equipment.

    18 Q. What effect do mountains have on the use of a radio

    19 located in the valley?

    20 A. Normally it is difficult to pass the mountains using a

    21 VHF radio, but you are able to put up radio stations in

    22 the mountains and use them as remote controls.

    23 Q. You are speaking of relay stations?

    24 A. Yes, relay stations.

    25 Q. Without a relay station, is it impossible to use a VHF

  62. 1 radio to transmit over a mountain to somebody on the

    2 other side?

    3 A. Yes, you normally need a HF radio.

    4 Q. You have to have a HF radio to do that; is that correct?

    5 A. Under normal conditions, yes.

    6 Q. Do you know whether there was a relay station on a

    7 mountain known as the Vlassic feature to the west of

    8 Travnik?

    9 A. I do not know.

    10 Q. Do you know whether there was a relay station on a

    11 mountain known as Lisac?

    12 A. No, we never saw any relay stations. Of course, they

    13 would do their best to hide them as well.

    14 Q. Do you have any information that would suggest that the

    15 HVO had radio relay stations around the Lasva valley?

    16 A. We have not seen them, but it was necessary to have

    17 them.

    18 Q. It would have been necessary to have effective

    19 communications; correct?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Is that what you are saying?

    22 A. Yes, by radio.

    23 Q. Correct. Who held the mountaintops around the

    24 Lasva Valley? Which army controlled those mountaintops,

    25 if you know?

  63. 1 A. I think that both parties had positions on the

    2 mountains.

    3 Q. If those mountaintops were held by the ABiH, they would

    4 first of all be in a position to deny the HVO use of any

    5 of those mountaintops for relay stations; correct?

    6 A. Yes, they would.

    7 Q. Would they also be in a position to intercept HVO radio

    8 transmissions from down in the valley?

    9 A. Yes, and that is normal in every army, that you are

    10 doing your best to find which frequencies the enemy are

    11 using and then you will do a lot of things to scramble

    12 those communications.

    13 Q. Yes, you mentioned scrambling. If the army, the ABiH,

    14 also held the mountaintops around the Lasva Valley,

    15 would they also have been in a position to jam or

    16 scramble HVO communications?

    17 A. Just as HVO were able to do the same against BiH.

    18 Q. What is jamming or scrambling of radio transmissions?

    19 A. You are trying to destroy the communications between the

    20 radio stations by sending a signal on the same frequency

    21 and you have different types of jamming you can use, so

    22 normally if you are using a big radio transmitter, it is

    23 able to transmit some kind of noise.

    24 Q. Such as white noise, static noise?

    25 A. Yes.

  64. 1 Q. If you have two parties, one on the mountaintop and one

    2 in the valley, is the one on the mountaintop in a very

    3 good position to jam the radio transmissions of the

    4 party in the valley trying to transmit out?

    5 A. They can do it from another position as well. It is not

    6 necessary to be at a high position to do that.

    7 Q. Is it advantageous to be at a high position?

    8 A. Yes, but you can do it as well if you are in the valley;

    9 you can do the same, you can jam the radio signals who

    10 are transmitted from a radio station in the mountains.

    11 Q. Someone trying to transmit into the valley, you can jam

    12 their receipt of those transmissions in the valley?

    13 A. Outside as well.

    14 Q. Can a jamming device transmit over the mountains without

    15 a relay station?

    16 A. You have different kinds of jamming devices and

    17 especially you can use airplanes to do this jamming, but

    18 I do not think HVO or BiH were using aircraft to do the

    19 jamming.

    20 Q. Other than the radio you described that you saw on the

    21 front near Travnik -- by the way, that was the front

    22 against the Serbs; correct?

    23 A. Yes, that is correct.

    24 Q. Other than that radio, did you see any other evidence of

    25 mobile radio communications? I am not talking about

  65. 1 walkie-talkies here but radio units that could be moved

    2 to the battle location, and that is on the part of the

    3 HVO?

    4 A. Yes. I cannot recall seeing small radios like that, but

    5 they were using walkie-talkies.

    6 Q. Which have a range of up to 1 or perhaps 2 kilometres?

    7 A. It all depends on the area.

    8 Q. Do you know whether the BiH army had a mobile

    9 communications truck which they utilised? Did you ever

    10 see that truck?

    11 A. No, I did not.

    12 Q. Did you ever hear about it?

    13 A. Later on I heard that they had a communications system

    14 like that, but that was not in that area.

    15 Q. It was in Zenica?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. It was moving around because it was a truck?

    18 A. Yes, but I do not think it was able to go into that area

    19 because of the checkpoints, but we have heard that there

    20 have been a mobile communications setup from the BiH in

    21 the Zepce area, up there.

    22 Q. It would have been able to go as far as any checkpoints

    23 blocking it; correct?

    24 A. Yes, but we knew that BiH were having communication as

    25 well.

  66. 1 Q. Of course.

    2 A. All armies had radio equipment.

    3 Q. During the period of your tour, did you know where the

    4 commander above Colonel Blaskic physically was located?

    5 Where was his commander?

    6 A. I think that was General Petkovic.

    7 Q. Was he in Mostar?

    8 A. I think he was in Mostar.

    9 Q. Did you ever see any evidence that Colonel Blaskic

    10 during your tour had an effective way electronically to

    11 communicate with his commander in Mostar or was he as

    12 far as you know cut off from his commander?

    13 A. I cannot recall that.

    14 Q. You have no evidence one way or the other for the

    15 Tribunal on that issue?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. If it is possible to have radio communications between

    18 Vitez and Mostar, what kind of radio would it take?

    19 A. HF radio.

    20 Q. A sophisticated HF radio?

    21 A. Yes, but I knew that General Petkovic, he went to Vitez

    22 several times.

    23 Q. He travelled there on one or more occasions?

    24 A. We had meetings with the General as well in the Busovaca

    25 Joint Commission, and meetings between Petkovic, ECMM

  67. 1 and General Dedic from the BiH.

    2 Q. I was speaking of electronic communications such as

    3 telephone or radio, regular communications

    4 capabilities.

    5 A. Another means of communication is to send an ordnance,

    6 so you can send a written order by an ordnance.

    7 Q. Send a courier, a driver or someone to hike or something

    8 like that?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Are landlines, telephone landlines vulnerable to

    11 interception?

    12 A. Yes, they are.

    13 Q. Are unsecure radio transmissions even easier to

    14 intercept?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Did you ever see any evidence that the HVO had secure

    17 radio communications; that is the capability to encrypt

    18 or encode radio communications?

    19 A. I have not seen radio equipment like that.

    20 Q. You yourself in the ECMM, you used satellite phones?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. You carried a briefcase-like device with you?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. You would set those up and anywhere you were, you could

    25 bounce an electronic signal up to a satellite which

  68. 1 would then bounce it down to the headquarters in Zagreb?

    2 A. Yes, or if we were going to call from Vitez to Zenica we

    3 would use that as well.

    4 Q. You would use your satellite phone?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. You had a fax machine built into your satellite phone

    7 device?

    8 A. Not at that, but we have some other communication

    9 equipment where we were able to use a fax.

    10 Q. At RC Zenica?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. That is equipment the ECMM themselves installed?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. They were self-reliant; is that right?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Did any of the combatants in Central Bosnia have this

    17 kind of technology to your knowledge?

    18 A. Not to my knowledge but that would be normal.

    19 Q. Did you ever see anyone else have any such satellite

    20 phone or satellite fax technology?

    21 A. Not the BiH or HVO.

    22 Q. And the ECMM brought its own because the local phone

    23 lines et cetera were not a reliable means of

    24 communication; correct?

    25 A. Yes.

  69. 1 Q. They were unreliable, correct?

    2 A. Yes, normally if you can use the PTT lines we prefer to

    3 do that because it was very expensive for us to use the

    4 satellite phone.

    5 Q. But the regular telephone was unreliable?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. And it was, of course, unsecure; correct?

    8 A. All telephone lines are.

    9 Q. Correct. Let me ask you to turn your attention to the

    10 Kiseljak municipality. You have described for us some

    11 terrible incidents and atrocities. I want to understand

    12 clearly: did you witness the actual commission of any of

    13 these acts or did you arrive after the scene and take

    14 down -- learn what you could from the scene itself after

    15 the fact?

    16 A. Arrived after the thing took place.

    17 Q. Would you agree that to the north-west of Kiseljak, a

    18 number of the villages you described are located on the

    19 hillsides adjacent to the Kiseljak/Busovaca road?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Putting the issue of civilians and civilian structures

    22 aside, totally aside, please, would you agree that

    23 control of that road by military force requires control

    24 of the adjacent hillsides?

    25 A. Yes.

  70. 1 Q. Was the Kiseljak municipality in province 10 under the

    2 Vance-Owen Peace Plan? If you would like to refer to

    3 the newspaper article, it is exhibit 88. Would you like

    4 to --

    5 A. Yes, I would like to see that.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: If exhibit 88 could be placed before the

    7 witness, your Honour? (Handed).

    8 My question was whether the Kiseljak municipality

    9 falls within province 10.

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. Could you put it on the ELMO so we can all follow

    12 along?

    13 If the technical personnel could assist? Yes.

    14 Can you perhaps with the chopstick indicate

    15 Kiseljak municipality? Is it there to the left of the S

    16 in Sarajevo?

    17 A. Yes, it is just at that point, so it is a part of the

    18 7th province.

    19 Q. The Sarajevo province?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Not province 10.

    22 A. No.

    23 Q. You stated on one occasion that you were stopped and not

    24 allowed free access to one of these villages by a local

    25 commander who said that his commander, Ivica Rajic had

  71. 1 given orders to stop all UNHCR and ECMM vehicles; do you

    2 recall that?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Did you understand Ivica Rajic to be the local HVO

    5 commander in Kiseljak?

    6 A. Not compared to this list where we have the name of the

    7 commanders, but some time maybe a commander was replaced

    8 and another one took over, but there was actually a lot

    9 of local commanders down there and everyone who was an

    10 officer, who was named as commander, so I think that is

    11 why he used the title commander.

    12 Q. Do you know whether this Ivica Rajic referred to on this

    13 occasion is the same Ivica Rajic indicted by the

    14 Tribunal for the Stupni Do massacre, or do you not know?

    15 A. I do not know that case.

    16 Q. Other than what testimony you have already given us, did

    17 you gather any additional evidence concerning the

    18 specific identity of the perpetrators of the atrocities

    19 and other wrongful acts committed in the Kiseljak

    20 municipality that you observed evidence of?

    21 A. Can I have that question once more?

    22 Q. Yes. Other than the testimony you have given here in

    23 your days of testimony, did you obtain any other

    24 evidence concerning the specific perpetrators of the

    25 atrocities and other wrongful acts you have described,

  72. 1 that you saw evidence of in the Kiseljak municipality?

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. Other than the testimony you have already given, to the

    4 extent it does or does not, did you gather any

    5 additional evidence concerning on whose orders or at

    6 whose encouragement the perpetrators of those acts may

    7 have acted?

    8 A. This was as we were told that units in the Kiseljak area

    9 were under Colonel Blaskic's command, the person who was

    10 in control of those units.

    11 Q. What evidence do you have that Colonel Blaskic either

    12 directed or encouraged the unspeakable acts you have

    13 described in the Kiseljak municipality?

    14 A. We were told in Kiseljak that Colonel Blaskic was

    15 commanding units down there, and part of the evidence is

    16 when we were going to release prisoners down there from

    17 the HVO headquarters in Kiseljak where they were in

    18 prison, the only one who was able to allow us in there

    19 was a letter from Colonel Blaskic.

    20 Q. From that, you inferred that he directed or encouraged

    21 the atrocities that you have described in the Kiseljak

    22 municipality?

    23 A. Not directly but his men did. I have no evidence of

    24 that, because I have not seen a written order from

    25 Colonel Blaskic saying, "You have to do this massacre."

  73. 1 Q. You say you were told in Kiseljak that Colonel Blaskic

    2 was the HVO zone commander; is that right?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Were you told any details about whether he directed or

    5 did not direct the activities of the HVO in Kiseljak?

    6 A. No.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: One moment, your Honour. (Pause).

    8 If the usher could assist?

    9 This visit to Kiseljak, to the prison in Kiseljak

    10 where you were compelled to get a written order from

    11 Colonel Blaskic directing the release of prisoners, that

    12 was in May or June, was it?

    13 A. Yes, it was during the big release where we were going

    14 to release all prisoners in Bosnia. We were as ECMM and

    15 the Joint Humanitarian Commission. We were allowed to

    16 go in there, but representatives from International Red

    17 Cross were not allowed to go in there because the local

    18 commander down there, as we were told, was fighting at

    19 the Kresevo front so there was no one there who was able

    20 to open the gates for ICRC.

    21 Q. I would like to show you a document and then ask you

    22 whether you were aware of it at the time you visited the

    23 prison in Kiseljak.

    24 Your Honour, this exhibit on the back is the BSC

    25 original; on the front is an English translation. Again

  74. 1 I regret there is no French translation at this time,

    2 but there will be soon and I would ask you, Major, to

    3 place the English translation on the ELMO so we can

    4 sight translate a couple of provisions and then I would

    5 like to ask you a question. This is an order dated

    6 24th April 1993, to all commanders of units in Central

    7 Bosnia Operative Zone. It is an order of the HVO. It

    8 states, based on certain requests by the chief -- it

    9 says:

    10 "Based on the request by the Chief of the HVO main

    11 headquarters of 22nd April 1993 and regarding the

    12 application of basic principles of the international

    13 humanitarian law, I hereby demand from all units and

    14 members of the HVO to:

    15 "(1) respect and protect the civilian population

    16 in wartime. Civilians, by definition, do not take part

    17 in conflicts and therefore cannot be a target of attack;

    18 "(2) treat captured soldiers and civilians

    19 humanely and ensure they are appropriately protected;

    20 "(3) report the identity of all the captured and

    21 detained to the ICRC and enable ICRC representatives to

    22 visit them according to ICRC standard conditions."

    23 Let us pause for a moment, Major. That is exactly

    24 what was not allowed, was not being allowed by the local

    25 HVO soldiers in Kiseljak during your visit in May or

  75. 1 June; correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Would you agree that it appears there was a standing

    4 order from Colonel Blaskic; you will notice his name and

    5 signature in the lower right-hand copy of this order.

    6 When you went to the Kiseljak prison, there was a

    7 standing order that the Red Cross be granted access and

    8 when you were not granted access, you went back to

    9 Vitez, you got a specific additional order from

    10 Colonel Blaskic, went back to Kiseljak and with that

    11 order in your hand, you were able to get the prisoners

    12 released; is that right?

    13 A. Yes, but normally, it is not enough just to make an

    14 order. It is very easy just to make an order. As a

    15 commander, when you have made an order like this, you

    16 have to control that this order is obeyed. Everyone

    17 could just sit making an order and give orders to the

    18 left and to the right. As a commander, you have to

    19 control that your orders are carried out in the way you

    20 want them to be.

    21 Q. Do you have any evidence that Colonel Blaskic was able

    22 to travel, other than in an UNPROFOR vehicle, between

    23 Vitez and Busovaca from late January 1993 until the end

    24 of the war? Is the answer to that no?

    25 A. Then he could use other means to control that. When we

  76. 1 were telling through the Busovaca Joint Commission or

    2 making other complaints, then he has to go in and

    3 interfere to tell his commanders that they have to obey

    4 his orders.

    5 Q. Did he do that on the occasion that you went to the

    6 Kiseljak prison and his prior order had not been

    7 obeyed. You went back to Vitez, you got another order

    8 from him and you took it down to Kiseljak and with that

    9 you got the prisoners released; correct?

    10 A. Yes. This should have happened -- normally if you are

    11 responsible for that, this order had to be carried out.

    12 Q. It should have been carried out the first time; correct?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. That is how a proper army would function; correct?

    15 A. Normally a commander gives an order and he will control

    16 that his order is fulfilled or he will let another body

    17 do that, one of his -- as we were discussing earlier

    18 this morning, he could use one of his staff officers to

    19 do that. Earlier you told the court that

    20 Colonel Blaskic has his own headquarters in Kiseljak and

    21 then -- you asked me if I was aware that Colonel Blaskic

    22 had a headquarters in Kiseljak.

    23 Q. I asked you whether you had any evidence that he did,

    24 but I was not suggesting the truth of the fact about

    25 which I asked. I am sorry if I inadvertently misled you

  77. 1 in that regard.

    2 If the usher could assist again? We will be

    3 turning our attention now --

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Before we go on to the next exhibit, I should

    5 like to go back a little bit. There was a video clip,

    6 remember? We identified the first clip at the request

    7 of the Prosecutor. We could not identify the next

    8 clips, but I am turning to the Registrar. What number

    9 will the video be?

    10 THE REGISTRAR: It will be D38 the video.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Defence exhibit D38. Very well. Have you

    12 completed with the order of commander Blaskic which the

    13 witness is commenting on now? Will that be D39?

    14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, D39.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: No objection? Mr. Prosecutor?

    16 MR. CAYLEY: Only on D39 that my learned friend identifies

    17 the source of this document before admission.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: The Prosecutor's Office, your Honour.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, you know the source?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: The Office of the Prosecutor gave this to us,

    21 your Honour.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: So you are familiar with it, Mr. Cayley, very

    23 well. D39 then.

    24 Continue.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, your Honour. I would like the Major to

  78. 1 turn --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: If it is too long in that case we will break

    3 now.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: If I could just have three minutes, your Honour,

    5 I need to ask a question before the break. May I?

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Yes.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to turn, Major, to the issue of the

    8 artillery attack on the city of Zenica, 19th April

    9 1993. I would like to provide you with a map of the

    10 city. The map is in two parts. It is not connected by

    11 any tape or paper clips; we are going to have to work

    12 together to do that. There is a legend in BSC only for

    13 the map.

    14 There are three pages, your Honour. Together they

    15 constitute potentially an exhibit and I defer to the

    16 Registrar as to how they wish to mark and identify

    17 these. Two pages is a map, one map, but it is broken

    18 into two pages because of its size, and a legend.

    19 A. I think I got the same two sheets.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I am going to approach the Major.

    21 MR. CAYLEY: I think we have the same two as well, so we may

    22 actually have the other copy.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps we can remedy the situation by taking

    24 a break until 2.30. Maybe we are all a bit tired now,

    25 so we can resume work at 2.30. Would that be a

  79. 1 solution, or do you insist on having your two or three

    2 questions before the break? It is up to you.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: Just one question before the break, if the court

    4 would indulge me. I am trying to save time so we do not

    5 need additional time later.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Fine.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Major, if you could look at this map for a

    8 moment and I invite my colleagues -- now we have put the

    9 two pieces of the map together, do you recognise this

    10 map as representing portions of the city of Zenica?

    11 A. Yes, I do.

    12 Q. Can you indicate where the marketplace is located that

    13 was hit by artillery fire on 19th April 1993, if it is

    14 on this map?

    15 A. As I can recall, it was in this area here.

    16 Q. Could you circle that with a blue pen, please? Perhaps

    17 inside the circle put the letter M for market. Thank

    18 you very much.

    19 Your Honour, thank you for indulging the Defence.

    20 It is convenient to take a break if the court is so

    21 inclined.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps I could put a question regarding the

    23 use of time. How much more time do you think you will

    24 need for your cross-examination so that the witness may

    25 know also for how long he is needed.

  80. 1 MR. HAYMAN: I expect to finish this afternoon, your Honour.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you. We will resume work at

    3 2.30.

    4 (1.00 pm)

    5 (Adjourned until 2.30 pm)





















  81. 1 (2.30 pm)

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Madam Registrar, let us

    3 have the accused brought in.

    4 (Accused brought in)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, have you assembled your exhibit?

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, your Honour, thank you.

    7 Major, during the lunch break, it proved somewhat

    8 difficult to connect the two parts of the map tendered

    9 before the break, and as you can see, only the

    10 right-hand portion of the map has a compass direction on

    11 it, so the connection is important; so what I am going

    12 to ask is that the usher place another version of the

    13 same map on the easel, which came to the Defence in one

    14 piece, and it is the same map, with the exception of a

    15 few signatures on it. If they need to be redacted or

    16 taken off this copy, we can do that.

    17 If it is okay, I will put it up here and then

    18 I would like to start the process again. (Handed).

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor?

    20 MR. CAYLEY: May I approach the witness, Mr. President?

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: So I invite you to join me at the easel and,

    23 take your time, you can see the prior marking that you

    24 made and I would ask that you make another marking on

    25 this map, this integrated map of where approximately the

  82. 1 marketplace was that is the issue at the heart of the

    2 April 19th 1993 shelling incident.

    3 A. Shall I mark it with a M?

    4 Q. That would be helpful, thank you. I believe you

    5 testified that your analysis caused you to conclude that

    6 the artillery shell or shells which hit the marketplace

    7 on 19th April came from a direct westerly direction?

    8 A. Yes, that is right.

    9 Q. Would it be possible on this map to indicate a westerly

    10 direction from, perhaps, the centre of the circle you

    11 have indicated, using the compass guide in the upper

    12 right-hand portion of the map.

    13 A. North is that direction; west is this direction like

    14 this (indicates).

    15 Q. So would another piece of paper or another ruler be

    16 helpful? I have a large envelope; perhaps if I actually

    17 put it on the compass bearing for east/west, is that

    18 helpful?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Perhaps you can place the ruler --

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, could you please give Mr. Hayman

    22 a ruler, if you have one. Perhaps you do not have one.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: We have a ruler, your Honour, only it is not

    24 quite long enough to take us the whole distance. My

    25 thought was, if we mark the east/west trajectory in this

  83. 1 manner, the witness can use it as an aid in marking the

    2 same trajectory on from the marketplace, and then

    3 I would ask that we make a mark with the green pen of

    4 that trajectory on this map.

    5 A. Normally when we were doing things like that, we were

    6 not using this map because a map like this is not

    7 precise enough when you have to do that. Normally we

    8 are using maps like that (indicates). From the centre

    9 of the impact, we used maps like this.

    10 Q. We have a more precise map that I would like to use to

    11 illustrate the possible direction from which the shell

    12 came, but for right now, what I am interested in

    13 illustrating is what is the possible incoming -- local

    14 incoming direction of the shell within this urban area,

    15 but certainly your comment is noted that this is not a

    16 military map; it is more in the nature of a tourist

    17 map.

    18 A. If you are satisfied, I can do it like this.

    19 Q. Given the limitations of this map, are you satisfied

    20 with that?

    21 A. This is westerly.

    22 Q. You have marked a green line heading down towards the

    23 lower left-hand corner of this map; is that right?

    24 A. Yes, if this one is correct.

    25 Q. Relying upon the compass indicator on the map. Do you

  84. 1 know, there are some locations marked nearby this line,

    2 this west/east line on this map. There is a legend in

    3 BSC which we can read a few of them into the record. Do

    4 you recall whether there were any military locations

    5 such as brigade headquarters in the vicinity of this

    6 trajectory?

    7 A. There was a lot of minor military headquarters in this

    8 area. Those were not big military headquarters, but

    9 normally civilian buildings where there was an office or

    10 two, so it was not a big military barracks or something

    11 like that. Normally one building where maybe one room

    12 or two rooms were used for that purpose. The only

    13 military targets in this area were up here at the steel

    14 factory where Hadzihasanovic had his headquarters.

    15 Q. The Third Corps headquarters?

    16 A. Yes, that is correct.

    17 Q. Is it off that map or do you think it is on this map?

    18 A. You can see part of it here marked with 1. The circle

    19 with a 1 in is the headquarters there of the Third

    20 Corps.

    21 Q. Let me ask my colleague, your Honour, to read for the

    22 purposes of the record a few of the other locations so

    23 that we can have a translation of those terms. So

    24 number 1 on the legend is as follows.

    25 MR. NOBILO: The Third Corps command.

  85. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Can you find number 1 on the map, Major?

    2 A. Yes, here.

    3 Q. Do you have the same green pen? If you could mark the 1

    4 in green perhaps, that would be helpful. Thank you.

    5 Mr. Nobilo?

    6 MR. NOBILO: Municipal staff of Territorial Defence is number

    7 4. Zenica municipal TO staff, number 4.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Were you familiar with that office, the staff

    9 headquarters of the Territorial Defence in Zenica?

    10 A. Yes, but I cannot recall where it was.

    11 Q. Do you see the number 4 on this map?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Could you just fill in in green the circle that contains

    14 4?

    15 Mr. Nobilo, if you could continue with number 2.

    16 MR. NOBILO: Number 2 indicates the headquarters of the

    17 314th Motorised Brigade of the military police, and a

    18 part of the units known as Green Legions.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Do you find the number 2 encircled on the map?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. If you could mark that with green, that is helpful.

    22 Mr. Nobilo?

    23 MR. NOBILO: Next is number 5, that is 301st Mechanised

    24 Brigade.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Do you find number 5 on the map, Major?

  86. 1 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I just make a comment?

    2 Could Mr. Hayman actually ask the witness whether he

    3 knows that that is the unit --

    4 JUDGE JORDA: I think that the Prosecutor has made an

    5 objection which I did not hear. Please repeat it.

    6 MR. CAYLEY: The point I am making at the moment, your

    7 Honour, is this is rather like a game where Mr. Hayman

    8 identifies the number and then the witness colours in

    9 the number on the map. He should actually be asked

    10 whether or not he was aware that the unit was in the

    11 location which is indicated by the number and then he

    12 can mark it. I have no objection to him actually

    13 marking on units where he is aware that that unit was

    14 located there, but not just to colour in the numbers on

    15 the map.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, sustained.

    17 Please be more precise, Mr. Hayman, when asking

    18 questions to the witness.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Item number 5, the headquarters of the

    20 301st Mechanised Brigade; is that a location you were

    21 familiar with? Did you know it existed in Zenica during

    22 your tour?

    23 A. Actually I can remember that there were some -- I am not

    24 saying big headquarters, but some offices around in that

    25 area who was manned by military persons. I could not

  87. 1 recall them as headquarters like that. The only two

    2 I can recall is the Third Corps headquarters up here and

    3 I recall the music school I visited.

    4 Q. Do you recall generally there being other army of BiH

    5 offices in this part of town?

    6 A. Yes, offices, not headquarters like that, so it was not

    7 barracks with a lot of soldiers.

    8 Q. They were not army bases.

    9 A. They were not bases, only officers.

    10 Q. They were officers serving one function or another?

    11 A. Yes, but I would not say that those small offices should

    12 be a military target.

    13 Q. I understand that, that you hold the position that none

    14 of these army offices or other locations identified on

    15 this legend would constitute a suitable military target

    16 for artillery purposes.

    17 A. No.

    18 Q. I am not asking you that question; I am simply trying to

    19 establish what there was in this part of town. Do you

    20 find the music centre on this map, or would you like us

    21 to read that for you?

    22 A. The music school?

    23 Q. The music school, yes. On the legend, I would ask

    24 Mr. Nobilo to read number 9.

    25 MR. NOBILO: Music school, number 9. It had the company of

  88. 1 the 7th Muslim Brigade.

    2 A. That music school was the same headquarters I visited

    3 during the prisoner release when we had to visit

    4 different places.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Now I would ask, your Honour, the usher's

    6 assistance in placing a much larger topographical map on

    7 the easel so we can attempt to repeat the exercise and

    8 gain a better understanding of the possible trajectory

    9 of these artillery shells.

    10 A. May I say again? All of those places here as you

    11 mentioned, the only place where I saw soldiers, BiH

    12 soldiers, except for the headquarters, was at the music

    13 school.

    14 Q. Did you visit those other locations or do you not recall

    15 visiting them?

    16 A. Normally we were passing around in this area and there

    17 was no signs of big barracks, but we knew that they had

    18 offices around in the area.

    19 Q. Is it fair to say you did not undertake any study or

    20 enquiry into exactly what functions were performed at

    21 those facilities or exactly what staff or personnel were

    22 based at those facilities?

    23 A. We were told that some of the officers were recruiting

    24 officers, where young men can go to when they want to

    25 join the army, and we were told that there were some

  89. 1 officers from the Civil Defence of Zenica in that area

    2 as well, but we did not, because we were often

    3 patrolling in that area, we did not see any military

    4 bases in that area.

    5 Q. There were no military bases in that particular region?

    6 A. No, so the only place where I was able to see soldiers

    7 regularly was close to the music school.

    8 Q. Thank you. If the usher could assist? Again, what

    9 I would hope we can do with this map is first, keeping

    10 in mind in what part of town you have identified the

    11 marketplace as being located, can you identify roughly

    12 that spot and then will we be able to identify western

    13 direction emanating from that point?

    14 A. Yes, you can see here there is a stream from the Bosna

    15 River into the town and we have the same stream going in

    16 there, so this area was situated in this area

    17 (indicates).

    18 Q. Can you enlarge a black dot there perhaps for reference

    19 purposes? Thank you. Does this map have a direction, a

    20 north/south indicator?

    21 A. Yes, these lines are going north/south and these lines

    22 are going east/west (indicates).

    23 Q. So to indicate a direct westerly trajectory from the

    24 point of impact, would one place a ruler as best as one

    25 can parallel to the lines running across the map? If

  90. 1 you will place it where you would like to have it, I can

    2 hold it in place and then if you would draw a line that

    3 would be helpful. Perhaps if you can draw over it one

    4 more time to make it dark.

    5 A. This is the area we normally called the Bila area.

    6 Q. Thank you.

    7 A. We knew this area was under HVO control.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: I believe this map will be D41.

    9 THE REGISTRAR: D41, yes.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: And the smaller tourist map of Zenica in legend

    11 will be some series within D40, I believe.

    12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, D40B.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: 40D is the tourist map, right, in two pieces?

    14 THE REGISTRAR: D40 is the map submitted in two pieces; the

    15 left part is D40A, the right D40B. It is the left part

    16 of the map.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: And D40B the right half?

    18 THE REGISTRAR: If you are looking at it, it is the left.

    19 D40C is the legend and D40D is the one-piece map.

    20 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Major, you mentioned that the Bila

    21 area was under whose control?

    22 A. HVO.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Hayman.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. Major, how would you describe the

    25 principles that guided your analysis? Were they

  91. 1 mathematical or were they experiential, based on your

    2 experience? How would you describe them?

    3 A. Actually, when we did an investigation of the impact,

    4 I took a photograph of one of those impacts and this was

    5 showed on the ELMO last Friday.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: It seems to me that this question has already

    7 been put to the witness. Are you talking about the

    8 basic principle or the method? I think the witness has

    9 already explained the method.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: He has explained it to a point, your Honour, but

    11 I would like to try and take it to one further point in

    12 terms of precision.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, then you will have to ask the witness a

    14 direct question, but do not ask him to re-explain the

    15 trajectory and everything else on the basis of the

    16 principles that he has given. You can ask him

    17 specifically the question that you wish, if you do not

    18 like something that he said last week.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: My question was: would you describe the

    20 process -- I am not asking you to redescribe it; I am

    21 asking you: would you characterise it as mathematical,

    22 experiential or a combination of the two?

    23 A. It is more mathematical, because, when you are using

    24 your compass, you are able to get the direction and you

    25 are able to put it on the map.

  92. 1 Q. So it is basically a mathematical principle that you

    2 used?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. You said that this was one of a number of impact points

    5 on the asphalt in this area; is that correct?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Did you analyse more than one or just one?

    8 A. More than one. I can remember there were six impacts

    9 during that attack, and I can remember that we were

    10 looking at three of them. The one that I showed, this

    11 was, as I can remember it, from the marketplace; then we

    12 looked at another one that I cannot recall for the

    13 moment and then we looked at an impact close to a bus

    14 stop in that area as well.

    15 Q. So you looked at some of the six but not all of the six;

    16 is that right?

    17 A. We only analysed three of those areas because at the

    18 marketplace, there were two impacts, near the bus

    19 station there were two impacts, one actually at the bus

    20 station and one on the opposite side of the road; then

    21 there were two impacts which were in other places.

    22 Q. How far away from the market were the other two that you

    23 mentioned?

    24 A. Can I go to the map?

    25 Q. Of course.

  93. 1 A. I can recall that we saw impacts here, impacts here

    2 (indicating), then there were some in between and one in

    3 this area here.

    4 Q. Indicating to the bottom central portion of the green

    5 circle, to the top centre portion of the green circle,

    6 the centre of the circle and to the western edge of the

    7 circle; is that right Major?

    8 A. There were impacts here, impacts here, impacts here and

    9 here.

    10 Q. Indicating the central bottom half portion of the

    11 circle; correct?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. The central top half portion; correct?

    14 A. Yes, and this part.

    15 Q. The middle of the western half, correct, and then right

    16 in the middle of the circle; correct?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Did you select the three points of impact that you

    19 examined at random or were they selected in not a random

    20 way?

    21 A. I can remember that we visited the marketplace at first

    22 and investigated those two and after that we went to the

    23 bus stop and investigated those, and I cannot remember

    24 which of those two we took and in what order. We

    25 visited the marketplace first, then the bus stop and

  94. 1 then the other two places.

    2 Q. But you said you performed your analysis on

    3 approximately three of the six impact sites.

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Was the process by which you picked three out of the six

    6 based on a random technique or was it not based on a

    7 random technique?

    8 A. It was not based on techniques. We just took them as we

    9 came to that area.

    10 Q. Did you analyse the first three that you came to?

    11 A. Yes, the first three areas because at the first -- at

    12 the marketplace there were two impacts, and we took the

    13 best of them and used that for our investigations. We

    14 went to the bus stop and there were two impacts in that

    15 area and we took the best of those to analyse.

    16 Q. When you say you used the best, what do you mean?

    17 A. If the court can remember last Friday when we were shown

    18 this picture at the ELMO, where I was able to show the

    19 splashmark on it -- we took this one because this was an

    20 easy one actually to analyse.

    21 Q. So the marks were clearer on that splashmark/point of

    22 impact than on some of the other examples?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Perhaps exhibit 91 should be placed before you.

    25 Perhaps it will be helpful. You stated it is a

  95. 1 mathematical process. Is there a margin of error in

    2 this process, or is it not a mathematical process with

    3 that level of specificity?

    4 A. I would not call it a mathematical process because it is

    5 so easy to analyse the direction.

    6 Q. Do you understand the concept of a normal curve and

    7 margin for error and so forth? With this type of

    8 process, would one normally expect this type of process

    9 to have a margin for error of a certain percentage or

    10 number of degrees?

    11 A. I will not say on this one, because this was so easy to

    12 analyse, so there is no doubt about the direction.

    13 Maybe a few degrees, that is it.

    14 Q. If you take a few degrees' difference and you run it out

    15 15 kilometres, how great a distance is that; do you

    16 know? Do you know what one degree difference in a

    17 trajectory at 15 kilometres is?

    18 A. 150 metres or something?

    19 Q. I do not know.

    20 A. It is only minor.

    21 Q. So your view is if there is a margin for error as to

    22 your process, it is, at most, 1 or 2 degrees?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Do you know: is there any academic or scientific work

    25 that would support that, or is that simply your own

  96. 1 evaluation, with respect to the size of the potential

    2 margin for error?

    3 A. Actually I do not know any other way to analyse.

    4 Q. You do not know of any scholarly work or mathematical

    5 work that discusses this issue?

    6 A. No, because this is the normal way I am trained to

    7 analyse the impact.

    8 Q. Did you also find pieces of artillery shells at the

    9 scene?

    10 A. Yes, we did.

    11 Q. Could you look at those shells, and did that help you

    12 confirm the size of the shell?

    13 A. Sometimes, and other times not. It all depended on what

    14 type of ammunition was used.

    15 Q. You concluded that the shell was from a 122 millimetre

    16 cannon. What is the maximum range of such a cannon?

    17 A. It all depends on the charge, because when you are

    18 firing a cannon, you can give it different kind of

    19 charges, because you have all the power in different

    20 small bags. Normally when you are firing a cannon you

    21 are first putting in the projectile and after that, all

    22 depending on how long you are going to shoot, you would

    23 throw in some of those bags with powder.

    24 Q. When we are talking about the charge, I want to be

    25 clear, you are talking about putting an explosive such

  97. 1 as powder before the actual shell is loaded in the

    2 cannon?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. It is loaded behind the shell; correct?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. It is the charge that causes the shell to come shooting

    7 out of the cannon's mouth?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. You are saying the range can vary depending on the size

    10 of the charge?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Do you know the customary maximum range, that is within

    13 the specifications of this type of equipment, for a 122

    14 millimetre cannon?

    15 A. Normally we are saying that the effective range is 14 to

    16 15 kilometres. It can maybe shoot a little longer with

    17 some more sophisticated equipment on it, but normally 14

    18 to 15 kilometres.

    19 Q. Do you know if the range of this type would be affected

    20 if the shell casings were being repacked?

    21 A. You have to give me that question once more.

    22 Q. Is there a piece of the shell that you retrieve from the

    23 cannon after the shell has been fired, or is the whole

    24 shell casing spent, gone?

    25 A. No, you still have the holster.

  98. 1 Q. Like the empty shell -- after firing a hand gun, you

    2 have a shell. If those holsters, as you put them, were

    3 being repacked and reused because of a shortage, would

    4 that affect the range?

    5 A. No, it would not, because the range of the gun is

    6 depending on the amount of powder you are putting in it.

    7 Q. Solely on the charge?

    8 A. Yes. Normally you use them again, those holsters.

    9 Q. I would call it a shell, but you are calling it a

    10 holster?

    11 A. The shell is the one that is going out.

    12 Q. The shell has gone?

    13 A. And the holster, as I call it, is the thing that is

    14 taken out of the cannon afterwards.

    15 Q. To the west of the areas of impact, do you recall, were

    16 there any tall buildings, tall structures?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Were there any tall structures directly to the west of

    19 any points of impact?

    20 A. No, and I can remember because during this attack we

    21 were at our headquarters that was situated here and

    22 I took a photograph. From this window I was able to see

    23 tall buildings and I could see the smoke from the impact

    24 behind the tall buildings.

    25 Q. You have described a range of shell impacts covering a

  99. 1 certain area. Do you recall whether there were any tall

    2 buildings directly to the west of any of the points of

    3 impact?

    4 A. There was a lot of tall buildings in the area here.

    5 Q. Indicating to the west/north-west of the circle you have

    6 marked in green?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. You have before you exhibit 91. Did you mark the photo

    9 in some way, when you took it, that is? Did you put

    10 something on the photo to denote a northerly direction?

    11 A. No, I did not.

    12 Q. I take it it is critical that you know which way is

    13 north vis-a-vis this footprint on this photo, exhibit

    14 91, for you to be able to perform your analysis; is that

    15 correct?

    16 A. Yes, of course we know but when we are using the

    17 analysis we were there at the spot having our compass,

    18 so we knew the direction. We knew that north was in

    19 that direction, south in that direction, east in that

    20 direction, west in that direction.

    21 Q. Are you able to recreate the exercise by identifying a

    22 northerly direction on exhibit 91, or do you have to

    23 work backwards; that is remember the direction of the

    24 shell and then deduce the direction north, working

    25 backwards?

  100. 1 A. I would not be able to see in this picture where

    2 north -- okay I can remember the direction, I would be

    3 able to put my compass, you have to turn the picture

    4 like this and that is north.

    5 Q. When you put your compass on the picture, you were

    6 illustrating the technique you used at the time, not

    7 suggesting that in fact you recall that north is in a

    8 particular location on this photo; is that right, Major?

    9 A. Yes. Our analysis was down there at the spot of this

    10 impact.

    11 Q. Did you make a written report or analysis of the

    12 shelling?

    13 A. When we came back after this fact-finding mission, we

    14 discussed it at our headquarters and we made a normal

    15 report about that. I cannot remember if we made any

    16 complaints to Colonel Blaskic about this, but reports

    17 were made.

    18 Q. This investigation though, were you charged with someone

    19 to go out and investigate or did you respond of your own

    20 initiative and investigate based on your own initiative?

    21 A. I cannot recall because we were just ordered to go out

    22 and investigate.

    23 Q. By Ambassador Thebault?

    24 A. Yes, or maybe the duty officer.

    25 Q. Did they say, "Go out and do an analysis", or "Go take a

  101. 1 look." What was the nature of your charge; do you

    2 recall?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. At the time of your investigation, did you know where

    5 any HVO artillery pieces were specifically located?

    6 A. We had heard from the British battalion that there were

    7 HVO positions in that area and that fits with the

    8 direction.

    9 Q. So that was your belief at the time you were conducting

    10 your investigation?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. What about any army of BiH artillery locations.

    13 A. We were not informed.

    14 Q. How about Serb artillery positions to the west or north

    15 of Travnik?

    16 A. Later on Zenica as well as Vitez was shelled by the

    17 Bosnian Serb Army from positions north of Travnik, and

    18 at that time, because I can remember later on

    19 investigating that, because HVO were claiming that BiH

    20 were shelling Vitez and BiH were claiming that HVO were

    21 shelling Zenica, then we went out to do this

    22 investigation and I can remember that our findings were

    23 that these attacks were the Bosnian Serb Army shelling

    24 Zenica and Vitez from the same position north of

    25 Travnik.

  102. 1 Q. Do you know, after the 19th April attack, where the army

    2 of BiH alleged or claims the shells had come from?

    3 A. At that time, both side claimed that it was the opposite

    4 part who were shelling them. Therefore we wanted to

    5 investigate in this and our findings were that, if I can

    6 remember, one of the attacks against Zenica and Vitez

    7 was from the Bosnian Serb Army.

    8 Q. Can you estimate how many ethnic Croats were living in

    9 the town of Zenica at the time of the shelling?

    10 A. I cannot remember the exact numbers. As far as I can

    11 remember, maybe 20,000 Croats were living in Zenica

    12 area.

    13 Q. In the municipality or in town?

    14 A. In the municipality.

    15 Q. How about in town. Would that be a much smaller

    16 number?

    17 A. I do not know, because --

    18 Q. Okay, that is fine.

    19 A. They were living together because in Zenica, the Croats

    20 and the Muslims were living together in the same areas.

    21 Q. Was Zenica shelled roughly half a dozen times after the

    22 19th during the course of your tour?

    23 A. Yes, and this attack on the 19th was the only attack

    24 where we concluded that this was done by the HVO. The

    25 other attacks, our conclusions were that this was made

  103. 1 by Bosnian Serb Army.

    2 Q. So you concluded that during this period of time at

    3 least from April 20th into May and June, the Bosnian

    4 Serbs were regularly shelling Zenica; is that right?

    5 A. Yes, that is correct.

    6 Q. You said that the attack in the Vitez and Ahmici areas

    7 on 16th April were well planned and were planned at a

    8 high level. Do you recall that?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. You also said that the operation on that day, you

    11 estimated, involved 500 to 600 men. Do you recall that?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. How many men are there in a battalion?

    14 A. In a normal battalion or in a battalion down there?

    15 Q. First in a normal battalion how many?

    16 A. That is normally 500 to 600 men.

    17 Q. In a HVO battalion, if you know?

    18 A. More or less because it was difficult -- some of the

    19 brigades down there had only 100 men, and some of them

    20 have 300.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I think you have already asked this question,

    22 Mr. Hayman. There have been very many questions about

    23 the military organisation of the HVO et cetera.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: When you say you believe the operation on

    25 16th April was planned at a high level, what level do

  104. 1 you mean?

    2 A. Higher than brigade level, because, as I told you just

    3 before, some of the brigades were only having maybe 100

    4 or 300 people, so therefore it should be more than a

    5 brigade commander to do that.

    6 Q. So it is your judgment that it involved however many

    7 brigades were necessary to add up to at least 500 men;

    8 is that your opinion?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. So your opinion is, put another way, that any

    11 combination of men that would reach 500 could have been

    12 the level at which it was planned, as long as it was

    13 co-ordination between those units; is that right?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. To plan the type of operation that you observed on

    16 16th April, I would like to try and form a mental list

    17 with you; I want you to articulate it for us, of what

    18 would have to be done. Let me ask you some questions in

    19 that regard. In your opinion, would stockpiles of

    20 ammunitions have to be predeployed?

    21 A. Predeployed or taken with you.

    22 Q. So you do not believe munitions would have to be

    23 prestaged or prelocated somewhere?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. If they were not, would they have to be gathered at a

  105. 1 munitions depot or warehouse and issued to the soldiers?

    2 A. Yes, because if they were going to deploy all the

    3 ammunition before the attack, then the other part would

    4 know that something was going on.

    5 Q. So either munitions had to be predeployed or the

    6 soldiers had to be rounded up somewhere approximate to a

    7 munitions facility or warehouse and issued extra

    8 munitions; is that right?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Would any battlefield communications equipment have to

    11 be predeployed?

    12 A. Normally you are bringing your radios with you.

    13 Q. Just take them with you?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. How many trucks would it take to transport 500 to 600

    16 men?

    17 A. It all depends on the need, the transport, because

    18 normally the infantry are using their feet, and the

    19 distance from Vitez to Ahmici is not longer than

    20 soldiers are able to walk by foot.

    21 Q. You are saying either the 600 soldiers marched to the

    22 operation; if not, how many trucks would be required to

    23 move a specific number of men? Can you fit 20 men in a

    24 truck, 40 men, 50 men?

    25 A. It would all depend on the kind of truck. I think you

  106. 1 would have to use 30 or 40 trucks.

    2 Q. Would you need any extra fuel? Would that have to be

    3 predeployed or not?

    4 A. You would bring it with you.

    5 Q. Put it in the back of the truck?

    6 A. Or if you go back to get some more soldiers you would

    7 have the opportunity to refuel your vehicles.

    8 Q. Would there be an operation or an exercise with respect

    9 to fighting in built-up areas before this type of

    10 well-planned operation in a built-up area?

    11 A. That should be the normal way to do it, because before

    12 an operation like this, you have to prepare soldiers for

    13 it. You have to tell them -- that is the normal way to

    14 do it.

    15 Q. The normal way to do it is tell every soldier exactly

    16 what their task is; is that right?

    17 A. Yes, and train them for it.

    18 Q. And then train them to carry out that task; correct?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. To do that, would you have to gather these 500 or 600

    21 men together for briefings?

    22 A. Not necessarily. It is efficient if you just bring in

    23 the commanders and give the orders to the commanders and

    24 then the lower commanders can exercise their own units.

    25 Q. If the 500 or 600 men were not gathered together in one

  107. 1 place, is it your opinion that the specific instructions

    2 to the men in the field were issued at the brigade

    3 commander or lower levels?

    4 A. I think the brigade commanders gave the orders as they

    5 have got their orders from the HVO headquarters, so the

    6 brigade commanders were the men who were responsible to

    7 train the soldiers for the operation.

    8 Q. Major, how do you know whether the brigade commanders

    9 repeated orders or changed orders? Were you there?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. How do you know whether the brigade commanders repeated

    12 orders or changed orders?

    13 A. It is normal in a brigade commanders are doing what they

    14 are told.

    15 Q. In a normal army they would repeat the orders they

    16 received and the soldiers below them would obey those

    17 orders; correct?

    18 A. Mm.

    19 Q. We have already seen from the order we looked at about

    20 Red Cross access that there were orders given to this

    21 army that were not obeyed; correct?

    22 A. Yes. But the operation was carried out, was it not?

    23 Q. A tragedy occurred, Major. Would special battle orders

    24 have to be prepared, in your view?

    25 A. Yes.

  108. 1 Q. What would those look like?

    2 A. Normally in the western armies, when you are giving a

    3 battle order, you have to tell them about the task; you

    4 have to tell about your own situation, about the enemy's

    5 situation; you have to tell them how you will

    6 co-ordinate the operation; you will tell them about

    7 communications; you will tell them about logistics.

    8 That is the normal contents of a combat order.

    9 Q. If such special combat orders are not issued, what is

    10 likely to result, if you send men out on a mission

    11 without having given those types of orders?

    12 A. They will not be able to fulfil their operation.

    13 Q. Or an uncontrolled operation will go forward; is that

    14 correct? If they are not given specific combat orders

    15 in the different areas you have identified?

    16 A. I do not think the soldiers, if they did not receive an

    17 order, that they would do a thing like this. Even

    18 soldiers are human beings. We saw examples down there

    19 that some individuals did things like that, but not

    20 units like this.

    21 Q. This was on a larger scale, was it not?

    22 A. Yes. This was happening in Ahmici was not made by

    23 individuals or one group of men who did not receive an

    24 order and wanted to have something.

    25 Q. There was some number of men acting in concert in Ahmici

  109. 1 with absolutely no regard for human life; correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. How many men was that? How many men would have been

    4 required to destroy that village?

    5 A. I do not know.

    6 Q. You have no opinion? You have given us an opinion --

    7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, can I make an objection, please?

    8 Mr. Hayman has asked --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, make your objection, please.

    10 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Hayman has asked over and over and over again

    11 the number of men involved in this operation. I think

    12 the witness has answered the question more than once and

    13 I think that this line of questioning should move on.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: The objection is sustained, Mr. Hayman, you

    15 have put this question on a number of occasions. At

    16 times, you are asking the witness his opinion as a

    17 military expert whether this or that is necessary for an

    18 attack, for reserve forces et cetera, and then you tell

    19 him you do not have proof of what you are saying, so

    20 please choose your angle of approach to the matter.

    21 Continue, please.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: You have said that 500 to 600 men participated

    23 in the operation. How many of them were required in

    24 Ahmici? How many of them were required to be present in

    25 Ahmici for this operation, in your expert opinion?

  110. 1 A. I am not an expert, I have never commanded a unit who --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, go on to another question. Whether

    3 the expert can tell you that Ahmici was totally

    4 destroyed by so many men, that is not a pertinent

    5 question. Please do not repeat the question. Continue,

    6 I should like to remind you that you said you would

    7 finish your cross-examination this afternoon. I wish to

    8 remind you that the judges may also have certain

    9 questions to put, so please continue.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: I understand your Honour and I am moving forward

    11 with the greatest speed that I can, but I would like to

    12 note for the record that when an expert gives a number

    13 of men in an opinion that they believe were involved,

    14 the Defence should be entitled to break that number down

    15 in terms of its component parts. That was what I was

    16 trying to do. If the court insists, I will abandon that

    17 area and move on.

    18 On 14th or 15th April, what preparations for this

    19 operation did you observe?

    20 A. We did not observe the preparations because at those two

    21 days, I was travelling in Travnik, in the Novi Travnik

    22 area.

    23 Q. On the 14th you visited the 7th Muslim Brigade; correct?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Which is some distance from Vitez; is that right?

  111. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. And you got into Zenica at 3.00 am on the 15th, roughly?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. And on the 15th, you were back in Novi Travnik

    5 investigating the four officers who had been abducted;

    6 correct?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. So you were not in a position to observe any

    9 preparations for this operation, correct?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. I would like to ask you, of the 500 to 600 men you have

    12 described, what component parts would be required for

    13 that number; that is how many would participate in an

    14 infantry attack and where; how many would participate in

    15 artillery attacks, how many would man checkpoints? Can

    16 you break that number down for us?

    17 A. It all depends on how many artillery units you are going

    18 to man, because you have to use people to man the

    19 artillery pieces; you have to, as I said, have people to

    20 seal the whole area using the checkpoints, then you have

    21 a unit to carry out the attack.

    22 Q. Major --

    23 A. I think that you have to use half of them to carry out

    24 the attack and to help those with the logistics and the

    25 other half to man the artillery positions and the

  112. 1 checkpoints.

    2 Q. So in your opinion, 250 to 300 men would be required to

    3 man the artillery and the checkpoints?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. And 250 to 300 to actually carry out infantry attacks in

    6 the Vitez and Ahmici areas?

    7 A. Yes, and secure the movements.

    8 Q. Secure whose movements?

    9 A. Those units' own movements, because normally when you

    10 are in war and you are moving a unit, one unit would

    11 secure the move of the other unit, and when this first

    12 unit are in a prime target or area positions, then they

    13 will be guarding the area and then take the other unit

    14 in front, so I do not say that 300 men were used for the

    15 attack.

    16 Q. Thank you, I think I understand the concept you are

    17 illustrating. Generally, does an artillery attack

    18 precede an infantry attack?

    19 A. Yes. Normally during this artillery attack the infantry

    20 will move on and when the artillery attack stops, the

    21 infantry will attack the rest of the target.

    22 Q. Will move into the target?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Will you estimate from the tracer fire that you saw on

    25 the evening of the 16th how many men would be required

  113. 1 to generate the amount of tracer fire you saw?

    2 A. I am not able to say that.

    3 Q. For how long did you observe the tracer fire? A minute,

    4 ten minutes, an hour?

    5 A. I think we were at the road for half an hour and we saw

    6 tracer fire in that time.

    7 Q. You also said in your testimony that the HVO was well

    8 organised, and you drew our attention to the list of

    9 brigades which you obtained from the HVO. Do you recall

    10 that testimony?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. When you say "well organised", do you mean they were

    13 well organised on paper or do you mean that they

    14 functioned as an organised effective disciplined army?

    15 What did you mean when you used the term "well

    16 organised"?

    17 A. They were well organised on paper and we saw that many

    18 of the units were organised as well, but normally, as

    19 I told you, in a brigade, in a normal brigade in a

    20 western country, there is more men than in those

    21 brigades, because some of the brigades were only manned

    22 by 100 men, some of them 300 men, so it was more like

    23 companies in a western army, but the chain of command

    24 was there, from Colonel Blaskic's headquarters to the

    25 brigade headquarters, and from the brigade headquarters

  114. 1 to the lower levels. That was, as I say -- it was well

    2 organised.

    3 Q. I understand; when you say "well organised on paper" you

    4 mean they had titles for their brigades, they had

    5 soldiers broken down into brigades, they even had a

    6 telephone list which they shared with each other as well

    7 as with international organisations like ECMM; correct?

    8 A. Yes. We were able to see that they had a headquarters

    9 at the top and this headquarters commanded a lot of

    10 subunits and those subunits commanded other subunits.

    11 This is the normal chain of command and organisation you

    12 see in all armies.

    13 Q. That is being well organised on paper, would you agree;

    14 that is what that means? People are put in the right

    15 cubbyholes, if you will?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. In terms of whether the HVO functioned like a well

    18 organised effective army, that is whether there was

    19 respect for the chain of command et cetera, what is your

    20 opinion?

    21 A. I think there was respect for the chain of command.

    22 Q. What do you base that on?

    23 A. Because the HVO headquarters gave the brigade commanders

    24 orders as you showed us before, and normally those

    25 orders were carried out and the brigade commanders gave

  115. 1 orders from this order to their units.

    2 Q. Normally they were carried out?

    3 A. Normally.

    4 Q. Your experience with respect to orders being carried

    5 out, is that limited to authorisation to clear

    6 checkpoints or does it extend to other matters?

    7 A. Other matters as well.

    8 Q. Such as?

    9 A. Local cease-fires in areas. I can remember we had

    10 problems in the Kakanj area where there were fightings

    11 between HVO and BiH and they were giving orders as

    12 well. They fulfilled the orders.

    13 Q. Major, were there extraordinary problems in Central

    14 Bosnia getting cease-fire orders to stick?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. There were, were there not?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. On the part of HVO soldiers violating cease-fires and

    19 army soldiers violating cease-fires?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. If a large number of orders from the zone level to the

    22 brigade level were not followed, then the commander at

    23 the zone level would not have effective commanding

    24 control of the soldiers in that theatre, correct, under

    25 his command?

  116. 1 A. That is correct, therefore a commander -- if one of his

    2 lower commanders is not doing what he is told, he should

    3 be replaced with another one.

    4 Q. If the commander has the power to do that. Normally the

    5 commander would have that power; correct?

    6 A. He would and I think he had.

    7 Q. Do you know any examples of changing commanders that

    8 were fired or recalled and so forth in the --

    9 A. I can remember that one HVO commander in the southern

    10 part of Colonel Blaskic's area of responsibility was

    11 replaced because he refused to attack a civilian target.

    12 Q. When was that?

    13 A. It was during the period where there were fightings at

    14 Kresevo.

    15 Q. Did you see this order to attack a civilian target?

    16 A. No, probably we were told that.

    17 Q. Who told you that?

    18 A. The locals down there; the HVO told us that this

    19 commander was replaced by another because the

    20 aforementioned commander did not want to fulfil this

    21 order.

    22 Q. Replaced by Colonel Blaskic because he refused to attack

    23 a civilian target?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Have you told that to anyone before in connection with

  117. 1 this case?

    2 A. I cannot recall.

    3 Q. Is it in your statement to the Tribunal investigators?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. Is it in your diary?

    6 A. No, it is not in my diary.

    7 Q. Do you have any documents or notes to support it?

    8 A. I think and I can remember it was a matter discussed at

    9 the UNPROFOR headquarters in Kiseljak as well, that one

    10 of the commanders in that area was replaced, and we

    11 wondered where he was.

    12 Q. Do you have any notes, any documentation, any minutes,

    13 any ECMM reports to support that?

    14 A. No. I can only tell the court what I heard. Maybe

    15 there will be some witness from UNPROFOR, from the

    16 headquarters in Kiseljak, who is able to tell the court

    17 about it.

    18 Q. If the usher could assist?

    19 A. When I say he was replaced because he refused to attack

    20 a civilian target, I meant he refused, as we were told,

    21 to attack a village.

    22 Q. If you could place this, perhaps with the assistance of

    23 the usher, on the ELMO?

    24 By way of background, your Honour, this is an

    25 order from General Blaskic. The first page, front and

  118. 1 back, is an English translation; the second page is a

    2 poor copy of a BSC original. These were provided by the

    3 Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor to us.

    4 MR. CAYLEY: We do not have a back on ours.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: We do not have all the documents.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Would you agree, Major, before we look at the

    7 document, that if discipline becomes a critical problem

    8 in a fighting force, then those soldiers who are

    9 undisciplined must be removed from their units?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Their uniforms must be taken away and their weapons must

    12 be taken away; do you agree? That is the proper course

    13 of action if discipline reaches a critical problem?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Let us look at this order together. Perhaps we could

    16 enlarge the image and we could do it half a page at

    17 a time, please. The top, 17th March 1993, 1200 hours:

    18 "Treatment of persons inclined towards criminal

    19 and disruptive conduct. Order for the attention of...",

    20 and there is a list. For brevity I will skip over the

    21 list for now of various entities, units and so forth.

    22 If you could move the paper up slightly?

    23 "In order to prevent the recurring, openly

    24 disruptive conduct of individuals in HVO uniforms and

    25 the HVO armed formations insignia and raise combat

  119. 1 readiness, I hereby issue the following order:

    2 "(1) immediately order platoon, company and

    3 battalion commanders at all levels to assess the conduct

    4 of conscripts and name the persons inclined toward

    5 disruptive and criminal conduct, in particular ...

    6 Responsibility: brigade commander", and there is a date

    7 given for completion and fulfilment of the order:

    8 "(2) to identify the cause, consequences of the

    9 conduct disruptive to order and discipline in an unit or

    10 command for each conscript prone to discipline conduct

    11 in the unit or command.

    12 "(3) persons prone to disruptive conduct shall

    13 return their weapons, uniform and other [rest illegible]

    14 and appropriate wartime assignment according to the

    15 decree.

    16 "(4) Should a member of an armed HVO formation

    17 decline to surrender to competent military bodies [part

    18 illegible] he shall be arrested and disarmed and

    19 disciplinary and other measures shall be obtained

    20 against him. The assistant for EMKP (abbreviation

    21 unknown) shall remove their names from the register

    22 (rest illegible). Commanders at all levels shall be

    23 responsible for covering conscripts prone to disruptive

    24 and criminal conduct, in particular who have been

    25 recorded as such in the records of platoon, company

  120. 1 et cetera."

    2 Two more short paragraphs in terms of carrying out

    3 the order and then it indicates:

    4 "Commander: Tihomir Blaskic", signed and stamped.

    5 Would you agree that this appears to be an order

    6 designed to remove undisciplined elements from the HVO?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Is it unusual for an order like this to have to be

    9 issued, in terms of a professional western army?

    10 A. I have not seen that it has been necessary in other

    11 armies.

    12 Q. You have not seen --

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. You have not seen situations so extreme that this type

    15 of an order was necessary, is that what you are saying?

    16 A. What I want, because --

    17 Q. Major, is that what you are saying? Do you agree with

    18 that? I did not get an answer to the question, I am

    19 afraid. Are you saying you have not seen a situation so

    20 extreme in other armies that an order of this type was

    21 necessary; is that right?

    22 A. No, because normally other armies -- I do not know if

    23 HVO had it, we have standard operational planning,

    24 called SOP, where things like this are in, people know

    25 how to react if things like this should happen.

  121. 1 Therefore it is not necessary to give orders like this,

    2 because this is a standing order in all other armies,

    3 that if someone are doing things like what happened

    4 there, they have to be removed.

    5 Q. And in wartime, this is a difficult issue to deal with,

    6 would you agree, if discipline is breaking down at such

    7 a level that this kind of order is required? That is a

    8 difficult issue for a commander to deal with?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Perhaps if the usher could assist? I would like to ask

    11 you: you have described many burned civilian and other

    12 structures which you saw in Muslim villages or parts of

    13 villages. Would you agree that the bulk of this type of

    14 conduct, the evidence of most of this type of conduct

    15 which you observed, was on or after 16th April 1993?

    16 A. Before and after. It was not an impact.

    17 Q. I was wondering if your presence here was exposing us

    18 all to external forces of a different type.

    19 Before the 16th, would you agree that the burning

    20 of structures was only --

    21 JUDGE JORDA: It is just a question of the break. Do you

    22 wish to finish with this document before the break? It

    23 is up to you.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Please, your Honour. If the court wishes to

    25 break, that is fine.

  122. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The hearing is adjourned until

    2 4.15 pm.

    3 (3.55 pm)

    4 (A short break)

    5 (4.15 pm)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please have the

    7 accused brought in.

    8 (Accused brought in)

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, your Honour.

    11 Major, if you could place this most recent order

    12 of 22nd April on the ELMO, I would like to have just the

    13 most basic portions of the order translated by sight.

    14 If we could have the ELMO on, please? If we could zoom

    15 slightly? Thank you. It is dated 22nd April 1993 to

    16 Vares commanders. The preamble reads:

    17 "In order to prevent incidents in which houses and

    18 other commercial facilities are set on fire and looted,

    19 I hereby issue the following order:

    20 "(1) I strictly prohibit the torching of houses

    21 and other commercial facilities and looting in the zone

    22 of responsibility of the command of the Central Bosnia

    23 operations zone controlled by HVO units.

    24 "(2) Brigade and independent unit commanders must

    25 issue an order to their subordinates to make them

  123. 1 responsible for preventing such crimes.

    2 "(3) The most stringent measures shall be taken

    3 against violators of this order pursuant to the

    4 regulation book on military discipline in HVO units."

    5 I will omit the last two paragraphs for speed:

    6 "Commander Tihomir Blaskic, signed and stamped."

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Let us have the numbers for the

    8 exhibits, please?

    9 THE REGISTRAR: This is D43.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: And the previous one?

    11 THE REGISTRAR: D42. The previous one is D42. The English

    12 version is D42A and the Croatian version D42B.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I should like to remind you that we do not

    14 have a French version for the moment. Yes, it is the

    15 Croatian version.

    16 THE REGISTRAR: A is the English version.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Fine.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: Major, do you find this order extraordinary?

    19 A. Yes, but it was obviously necessary.

    20 Q. If the usher could assist? I have one more order

    21 I would like to show you.

    22 A. Normally -- if I am allowed to speak -- when we had --

    23 ECMM had some copies of Colonel Blaskic's orders, but we

    24 only received orders showing agreements concerning

    25 cease-fires. We never had copies of those.

  124. 1 Q. You did not get a full set of either of the parties'

    2 orders; correct?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. So it is difficult for you to comment, is it not, on the

    5 internal workings and perhaps problems of the HVO? Do

    6 you think that is fair?

    7 A. Yes, because we had not seen those orders before.

    8 Q. I understand. Believe me, I am not faulting you for

    9 material you have not seen, far from it. If you could

    10 help us, though, by placing this next exhibit on the

    11 ELMO? If the ELMO could be enlarged, the image? Thank

    12 you. The top date-line of this order is 24th April

    13 1993, 0920 hours, titled "Prevention of Uncontrolled

    14 Conduct of Commanders and Individuals". It is addressed

    15 to commanders of all units in Central Bosnia Operative

    16 Zone and I would like to read the preamble first:

    17 "Order. After an inspection of the field, it has

    18 been observed that lower ranking commanders and their

    19 units are acting in an uncontrolled way, failing to

    20 carry out orders of their superiors, making arbitrary

    21 decisions contrary to issued orders, planning and

    22 carrying out personal combat actions, exerting pressure

    23 on civilians and interfering with the activities of

    24 UNPROFOR, ICRC and the European Monitoring Mission which

    25 has negative consequences for the HVO and the soldiers

  125. 1 who carry out their assignments in a consistent manner.

    2 "In order to prevent such negative consequences

    3 and to fully carry out the order issued by the chief of

    4 the HVO main headquarters", then a number is given, of

    5 that order, "of 22nd April 1993, I hereby order ...",

    6 and then I will call your attention to paragraph 3:

    7 "Arrest immediately individuals or groups that get

    8 out of line and submit a warrant of arrest to the

    9 military police unit commander.

    10 "(4) you are responsible ..." -- Who would "you"

    11 be, Major? Would that be a reference to commanders of

    12 units within the zone?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. "You are responsible for stopping the most extreme

    15 individuals and groups who have got out of line, do not

    16 protect civilians, burn and destroy civilian

    17 facilities", that is a reference to the groups who are

    18 doing those things, of course:

    19 "This conduct is sheer terrorism. Use all means

    20 available, including force, to prevent it."

    21 By reference to force, would that include force of

    22 arms, Major?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Then, I am skipping the last two paragraphs for speed:

    25 "Commander Tihomir Blaskic, signed and stamped."

  126. 1 If the recitation and the preamble are correct,

    2 Major, would you agree that that is indicative of an

    3 army that is not functioning properly, in which command

    4 and control has broken down?

    5 A. I will not say broken down, but in an order like this,

    6 you are telling what to do if it should do, but some

    7 part of it, it seems, had to be necessary to give an

    8 order like this.

    9 Q. There has to be some remaining element of control or at

    10 least there is an attempt to preserve it, would you

    11 agree?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. I believe that will be Defence exhibit 44?

    14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is exhibit D44.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: No objection, Mr. Prosecutor?

    17 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to make absolutely sure, Major --

    18 and I have a few more questions, but I do intend to

    19 finish today, I assure you -- I would like to make it

    20 absolutely clear what portions of the conflict on April

    21 16th you personally observed. You said early in the

    22 morning you heard artillery?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. And then you were stopped at a checkpoint near Vitez and

    25 in the course of driving to that checkpoint, you could

  127. 1 see smoke rising from portions of Vitez; correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Did you go into Vitez on the morning of the 16th?

    4 A. No, we did not.

    5 Q. Did you see anything else of the conflict on the morning

    6 of the 16th, any other aspects of it than what I have

    7 described?

    8 A. I can recall that was the morning where we saw those

    9 bodies at the road.

    10 Q. You saw five or more individuals laying on the road.

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. And some soldiers off to the side of the road in,

    13 I believe, black uniforms; is that right?

    14 A. Fired at us when we tried to go to those bodies to

    15 investigate them.

    16 Q. Other than that, on the morning of the 16th did you see

    17 any other portions of the conflict?

    18 A. No, we did not.

    19 Q. The day of the 16th you spent in Travnik; correct?

    20 A. Travnik and Vitez.

    21 Q. When you say you spent it in Vitez, I am talking about

    22 the daylight hours now?

    23 A. The daylight hours we went to Travnik.

    24 Q. During the entire daylight hours of the 16th you were

    25 neither in the Vitez area or the Ahmici area; correct?

  128. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. You returned to Vitez in the evening perhaps around 9.30

    3 pm; correct?

    4 A. I cannot recall the exact time.

    5 Q. Was it considerably after the dinner hour? I suppose

    6 that depends on when your dinner hour is.

    7 A. I cannot recall the exact time.

    8 Q. Was it dark?

    9 A. I think we came back before dark.

    10 Q. Where did you go when you first came back to Vitez?

    11 A. To our house in Vitez and after that we went to the

    12 British battalion and asked them what had happened in

    13 that area, because we were a little afraid if our house

    14 in Vitez was still there when we came back because of

    15 all the shellings in that area before we left it.

    16 Q. Before you left to drive to try and return to the Zenica

    17 on the evening of the 16th, did you make any other

    18 observations about the conflict, the fighting that was

    19 going on, or were you not in a position to do that?

    20 A. As you know, we had problems with our vehicle, and we

    21 wanted to go back to Zenica as quick as possible, so we

    22 did not allow ourselves to do anything else but just

    23 trying to go home.

    24 Q. You were tending to other business, so it is accurate,

    25 is it not, that until you started to drive home to

  129. 1 Zenica from the point you arrived back in Vitez, you did

    2 not make any additional observations concerning the

    3 conflict that was going on; correct?

    4 A. Correct, but we heard at UNPROFOR, at the British

    5 battalion -- because normally when we had been out on a

    6 mission in Vitez, normally we went back and we had a

    7 visit with the British battalion, telling them about our

    8 findings as well, and then the British battalion told us

    9 about their findings. This was necessary because

    10 sometimes we were travelling in areas where the British

    11 battalion had not been and maybe we saw some HVO or BiH

    12 positions in those areas, so we just handed over our

    13 information to the British battalion and opposite. This

    14 was necessary for both of us because we were shot at

    15 several times from HVO positions and BiH positions, so

    16 therefore we have to help each other, so we were --

    17 Q. You briefed them and they briefed you?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Right now I am focusing on your personal observations,

    20 first hand observations.

    21 A. Okay.

    22 Q. On the evening then of the 16th, you left the BritBat

    23 base in your vehicle?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. When driving east on the main Vitez/Busovaca road, you

  130. 1 observed some tracer fire?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. For about half an hour, you said?

    4 A. Yes, I think it was for half an hour.

    5 Q. Then you came to a checkpoint at the Ahmici main road

    6 junction?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. You were not allowed to pass?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. But from that vantage point you could see many houses

    11 burning in Ahmici; is that right?

    12 A. Yes, we were able to see that.

    13 Q. But you were not able to go up into Ahmici on that day?

    14 A. No.

    15 Q. Then you went on to Zenica, correct?

    16 A. Even if we could go in there, I do not think we had been

    17 able to do that because of what was happening there; we

    18 were not secure enough ourselves.

    19 Q. From where you were though you could not observe any

    20 fighting; correct?

    21 A. Only all the burning houses and then we saw a few

    22 persons in the road and in the window.

    23 Q. Other than what I have just described, did you see any

    24 other portions of the conflict itself on the 16th?

    25 A. No.

  131. 1 Q. Are you able to tell us then from your own observations

    2 how many of the 250 to 300 men that you believe would be

    3 necessary for the infantry portion of the operation on

    4 16th April, how many would have been required in Ahmici,

    5 or are you not able to say?

    6 A. I am not able to say that. As I told you before, I have

    7 no experience in how to burn down villages.

    8 Q. With your own eyes, you do not know very much, if

    9 anything, about the actual conflict in Ahmici, other

    10 than it ended with many, many homes being burned and

    11 obviously people being killed; is that fair?

    12 A. And we know that all those burned houses were not the

    13 result of an artillery attack or a mortar attack,

    14 because if there have been used artillery or mortars

    15 against those buildings, it will normally not put on a

    16 fire of this size, so we discussed and we concluded that

    17 this fire was put on by -- some men have put on the

    18 fire.

    19 Q. How many people would it take to burn down a village of

    20 that size? That would be the only empirical basis you

    21 would have to estimate manpower need; correct?

    22 A. I do not know how many men were used in that and I have

    23 told you that before.

    24 Q. I appreciate your patience. I am trying to make sure

    25 the record is clear.

  132. 1 You said that in your experience, there would be

    2 an HVO forward command post for an operation of the type

    3 undertaken on 16th April 1993; is that right?

    4 A. That is a normal procedure when an army is going to an

    5 operation, then the commander will command his unit from

    6 a forward headquarters.

    7 Q. If the commander was not at the forward base, would that

    8 degrade in any way the ability of the commander to

    9 monitor and direct the operation?

    10 A. If the commander is not present at the forward

    11 headquarters, a representative of the commander should

    12 be there.

    13 Q. Or else it degrades the commander's ability to monitor

    14 and direct the operation; would you agree?

    15 A. It all depends which order the commander gave to the

    16 units.

    17 Q. Some time on April 16th, a phone call was placed to HVO

    18 headquarters at the hotel Vitez to try and reach

    19 Colonel Blaskic; do you recall that testimony?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Who placed that call?

    22 A. I can recall that in the morning, we had a call from our

    23 headquarters in Zenica, they have been contacted by

    24 Hadzihasanovic asking ECMM to get in contact with

    25 Colonel Blaskic and ask for a cease-fire.

  133. 1 Q. Who placed the call to HVO headquarters? Do you

    2 remember?

    3 A. This was done by a Canadian lieutenant-colonel, Remi

    4 Landry, through our interpreter.

    5 Q. You told us that you learned that Blaskic was away from

    6 the headquarters; is that right?

    7 A. Yes, that is correct.

    8 Q. Do you infer from that that perhaps he was at a forward

    9 command post?

    10 A. Yes, because when all these were happening and we were

    11 not able to get in contact with Colonel Blaskic at his

    12 headquarters, then he was supposed to be at the forward

    13 headquarters. That is the normal way for a commander to

    14 react.

    15 Q. I am going to ask you to search your memory. Did Remi

    16 Landry tell you that he was told that Blaskic was not at

    17 the headquarters or simply that he was not available?

    18 Do you remember, Major?

    19 A. I cannot recall that, but we were not able to contact

    20 him at his headquarters.

    21 Q. If I could have a page of Mr. Remi Landry's statement

    22 placed in front of the witness, your Honour. I would

    23 like to see if it refreshes the witness's recollection.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Hayman.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. If we could place this one

  134. 1 page before the witness? I would ask his assistance in

    2 placing it on the ELMO and that of the usher. Let me

    3 call your attention to the top line of the first full

    4 paragraph. It reads:

    5 "On the early morning of 16th April 1993", so that

    6 should help date the reference. Then the paragraph I am

    7 going to call your attention to is the third full

    8 paragraph beginning "This day ..." Why do we not put it

    9 on the ELMO, if you do not mind, and we can read it so

    10 everyone can understand the contents? If you could move

    11 the document up slightly, Major? Perfect, thank you.

    12 The paragraph I would like to call your attention to

    13 reads as follows:

    14 "This day, I also tried to get in touch with

    15 Colonel Blaskic, but I was informed by the HVO

    16 headquarters in Vitez that Colonel Blaskic was not

    17 available. I cannot recollect to whom I spoke. I was

    18 not told where Colonel Blaskic was, nor where I could

    19 get in touch with him. I cannot recollect what time

    20 I tried to get in touch with Colonel Blaskic this day."

    21 Does that refresh your memory, Major, with respect

    22 to what you were told on that day by Remi Landry?

    23 A. As I told you, we tried to contact him but we were not

    24 able to get in contact with him, but if it was because

    25 he was not available or he was not at his headquarters,

  135. 1 I cannot ...

    2 Q. You do not remember?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. That is fine, thank you. You said in your direct

    5 testimony that you believed in the time-period of your

    6 tour that the army of BiH was a beaten army; do you

    7 recall that?

    8 A. In that area, yes.

    9 Q. In the Lasva valley.

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Again if I could ask the usher's assistance?

    12 While that is occurring, your Honour, I believe

    13 the last page, just for the record, it will be Defence

    14 exhibit D45. The prior order of 24th April 1993 at 0920

    15 hours would be D44. This excerpt of a document will be

    16 D46. Also for the record --

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, you have comments regarding

    18 D44, 45 and 46?

    19 MR. CAYLEY: Only, Mr. President, in respect of Defence

    20 exhibit 45. Last week, I think you made it clear to

    21 both parties that if statements were going to be

    22 exhibited in evidence that the entire statement, in its

    23 totality, should be exhibited and not just extracts that

    24 are particularly relevant or material to one party, so

    25 we would ask that the entire statement be exhibited in

  136. 1 evidence and not just one page.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: We do not need any of that exhibit admitted if

    3 the Prosecution objects. Our position is that anything

    4 can be used to attempt to refresh a witness whose memory

    5 needs refreshing. If one paragraph out of such a

    6 document is used, the Prosecution is free to use any

    7 other part of that document to seek to refresh

    8 recollection, but it does not make a 100-page book

    9 necessarily something that must be admitted into

    10 evidence.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: There are two questions. There is the

    12 question of principle and the number of pages. We have

    13 dealt with the question of principle upon your request,

    14 Mr. Hayman and Mr. Nobilo. Can you tell me how long is

    15 this report, this document? How long is it? Yes, you

    16 gave me the answer. In that case, the whole document

    17 will be admitted, regardless of the number of pages.

    18 D45 and then exhibit D46, please do not forget to give

    19 us the source of that document to identify it.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I was doing that, your Honour. This document

    21 was provided by the Prosecution and it has simply been

    22 identified -- let me consult with my counsel across the

    23 bar for a moment, your Honour, to check whether I may

    24 use a certain phrase. If I may?

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you may. (Pause).

  137. 1 MR. HAYMAN: It has been identified to us, your Honour, as a

    2 Mil Info Summ, which I believe stands for military

    3 information summary generated by the Prince of Wales's

    4 own unit or company, dated 8th June 1993. Are you

    5 familiar, Major, with the Mil Info Summs generated by

    6 the UNPROFOR BritBat forces?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. If you could place this redacted portion of this Mil

    9 Info Summ on the ELMO? If you could move it over just a

    10 little? I apologise for having to ask you to assist us

    11 in this way.

    12 This portion, the pertinent portion of this Mil

    13 Info Summ I would like to call to your attention is as

    14 follows:

    15 "Bila valley. 2 Gen. The expected BiH offensive

    16 in the area has begun. A major Muslim push has been

    17 made down the Bila valley towards Vitez and Travnik.

    18 The villages of Guca Gora", and I will omit the grid or

    19 map indicators, "Brahovici, Grahovcici, Bukovica,

    20 Radonice and Maline have been captured by the BiH.

    21 C/S" -- do you know what that is a reference to?

    22 A. That is call signs. That is the normal phrase they use

    23 for their units, patrols. Each patrol has their own

    24 call sign to use on the radio equipment. Normally the

    25 British Battalion were using C/S.

  138. 1 Q. It refers to one of the units out in the field?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. "C/S have witnessed atrocities being committed by the

    4 BiH in Guca Gora and C/SS are remaining there in order

    5 to provide local protection for the approximate 200 X

    6 Croat civilians who are surrounded by the attacking BiH

    7 troops. There is a mass move of Croats down through the

    8 Bila valley into the Vitez, Novi Bila and Busovaca

    9 areas."

    10 Major, this was on 8th June 1993. In fact, was

    11 the HVO driven out of Travnik within a short period of

    12 after this date?

    13 A. I cannot recall if it was out of Travnik, but I can

    14 recall that BiH did this, that was normally when even as

    15 I concluded it was a beaten army, a beaten army is not

    16 the same as an army who is not able to fight. Sometimes

    17 it was the only way they were able to survive was to

    18 make a counter-attack.

    19 Q. If the usher could assist?

    20 A. I can recall that during this attack, that HVO were

    21 shaken.

    22 Q. They were shaken?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Were they starting to become the beaten army by this

    25 time?

  139. 1 A. Not the beaten army but I think that BiH succeeded in

    2 some of their attacks.

    3 Q. Now I would like to turn your attention forward about a

    4 month in your tour to this document, which is also a Mil

    5 Info Summ from the Prince of Wales's own unit, dated

    6 10th July 1993, that is Mil Info Summ, Prince of Wales'

    7 own or PWO, 10th July 1993, and I would like to read you

    8 the highlighted sections on your copy, if you would be

    9 so kind to put it on the ELMO again so that others can

    10 follow.

    11 Again this document, your Honour, provided to the

    12 Defence, I believe pursuant to our discovery motion.

    13 Paragraph 10, under the heading "Vitez":

    14 "A meeting with the CO" -- is that commonly a term

    15 representing commanding officer, Major?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. "A meeting with the commanding officer and Mimad Alagic,

    18 Commander Bosanska Krajina, revealed that Alagic is in

    19 command of approximately 12,000 BiH troops and that his

    20 current mission is to capture the remaining Croat

    21 enclaves of Vitez and Busovaca."

    22 Skipping down to heading A:

    23 "The aim of the current fighting is to capture the

    24 ammo factory", and there is a parenthetical reference to

    25 grid coordinates. After the end of the comment, the

  140. 1 bottom of that paragraph, it continues:

    2 "The secondary objective in this specific area is

    3 to cut the HVO MSR."

    4 Do you know what MSR is a reference to?

    5 A. Not for a moment, but maybe a little later I will recall

    6 it.

    7 Q. Would you agree it appears to refer to a territory or

    8 geographic area under the control of the HVO, something

    9 of that sort?

    10 A. Maybe.

    11 Q. Very well:

    12 "The secondary objective in this specific area is

    13 to cut the HVO MSR which connects Novi Bila with Vitez",

    14 again grid references.

    15 "B. More co-ordinated attacks will be made to

    16 cut the HVO MSR in the following areas: (i) Novi Bila;

    17 (ii) at the Dubravica T-junction; (iii) Nadioci; (iv)

    18 the Busovaca T-junction."

    19 Then skipping down to the comment that appears

    20 approximately eight lines from the bottom:

    21 "Comment. If successful, this operation will

    22 effectively isolate the Vitez area into five small

    23 pockets."

    24 Would you agree that the HVO in Vitez and Busovaca

    25 had far fewer than the 12,000 men referenced in this

  141. 1 document?

    2 A. Actually I do not think that this commander of this

    3 Bosanska Krajina had all those men. Sometimes

    4 commanders were telling you they had a lot of men, we do

    5 not always believe them. Here he states that he has all

    6 those men. If that is true, then there were more BiH

    7 soldiers in this operation than HVO soldiers, I think.

    8 Q. I am not sure, did you answer my earlier question

    9 whether Travnik fell? Did the HVO lose Travnik in the

    10 June/July time-period of 1993?

    11 A. I answered you that I cannot recall if Travnik fell.

    12 Q. The HVO brigades had been expelled from Zenica back in

    13 April; correct?

    14 A. Yes. I think actually MSR means "main supply routes".

    15 Q. Which would connote some territorial connection?

    16 A. Yes, all the roads where they normally were using to

    17 bring in and out troops and ammunition and fuel and all

    18 that.

    19 Q. By the time you departed the theatre, had the HVO also

    20 lost about half of its territory that it had held in the

    21 Novi Travnik municipality, or do you know?

    22 A. I do not know.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I would like to request that these

    24 latest exhibits be admitted. I believe this most recent

    25 one will be D47.

  142. 1 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is D47.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: I think that will mean that the only exhibit

    3 that I have tendered during this examination not

    4 admitted or not fully admitted will be the tape, D38.

    5 If I can confirm that? If there is no objection to the

    6 others?

    7 MR. CAYLEY: The two videotapes for which the source has not

    8 been identified by my learned friend and secondly, the

    9 statement D45, which the court has requested be admitted

    10 in totality and not just one page as it is now, so those

    11 are the only two exhibits that we would object to being

    12 admitted at this stage.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Regarding 45, that is not an objection, as we

    14 have ruled that the report be admitted in totality. As

    15 for the three tapes, for the first, we were told the

    16 source, local TV, as far as I recall. As for the two

    17 other clips, they have not been identified. Mr. Hayman

    18 could not give us the source. So should they be

    19 rejected or not? I am going to consult my colleagues

    20 (Pause).

    21 The Trial Chamber is of the opinion that these two

    22 clips should be admitted as evidence for two reasons:

    23 first that the witness recognised through the pictures

    24 the people. He did not, of course, identify the source,

    25 but he recognised the clips; and secondly, the judges

  143. 1 are quite free, it is up to their discretion, to

    2 appreciate these two clips, knowing that the source was

    3 not formally identified. Therefore, Mme Fauveau, will

    4 you give us the numbers for these two tapes?

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Actually it is one tape with three clips.

    6 The first segment is D38A, the second D38B and D38C.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    8 Mr. Hayman?

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, that concludes my testimony.

    10 Thank you Major for sharing your testimony with

    11 us.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. I turn to the Prosecution. Do you

    13 have any additional questions as this is your witness,

    14 Mr. Prosecutor, before my colleagues or I myself have

    15 some questions? It is 5.00 pm. Do you have any

    16 additional questions?

    17 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, a number of material issues have

    18 been raised by the Defence. I do have quite an

    19 extensive re-examination of this witness. I will make

    20 it as brief as I can. The witness is prepared to stay

    21 another day so that you and your brother judges may ask

    22 him further questions, but there are a number of matters

    23 which I feel I need to cover for the sake of

    24 completeness of this testimony.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. In that case you are going to

  144. 1 begin straight away, of course on condition you are not

    2 going to do the examination-in-chief all over, only as

    3 regards what was new in the cross-examination. Remember

    4 that the judges are very attentive and I am sure you

    5 will bear that in mind. Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.

    6 Re-examined by MR. CAYLEY

    7 Q. I will, Mr. President, thank you.

    8 Major Baggesen, in order to be as brief as I can

    9 I will try and address your cross-examination in blocks

    10 rather than go through each and every individual part of

    11 your testimony again.

    12 You remember that you testified both in your

    13 examination-in-chief and your cross-examination that

    14 certain civilian prisoners were released in Kiseljak on

    15 21st June 1993; that is correct, is it not?

    16 A. Yes, that is correct.

    17 Q. Were those individuals that were released civilians or

    18 soldiers?

    19 A. They were all dressed in civilian clothes and when we

    20 asked them whether they were civilians or soldiers they

    21 told us that they were civilians.

    22 Q. Who was the HVO representative that was with you at the

    23 time?

    24 A. That was Mr. Pero Skopljak from Vitez.

    25 Q. You also stated that these particular prisoners had

  145. 1 actually come from digging trenches and clearing

    2 minefields. Did you complain to Mr. Skopljak about this

    3 matter?

    4 A. Yes, of course.

    5 Q. Who did Mr. Skopljak report to?

    6 A. He was supposed to respond to Colonel Blaskic.

    7 Q. In your entire service in Central Bosnia, did you ever

    8 come across any soldiers who were prisoners of war in

    9 HVO prisons?

    10 A. Not in HVO prisons.

    11 Q. In what capacity were those individuals in HVO prisons?

    12 A. They were all civilians, and we knew that because

    13 normally when we visit those, we have the opportunity to

    14 speak with them and they are all able to tell the same

    15 story, that they were civilians.

    16 Q. Referring to your cross-examination about the HVO, my

    17 learned friend asked you certain questions about the

    18 level of health of HVO soldiers. Did you ever

    19 personally witness any ill-fed HVO soldiers in the

    20 Central Bosnian region that you saw?

    21 A. No, I did not, as I did not see any BiH soldiers who

    22 were starving.

    23 Q. Indeed I think at the Easter celebration that you

    24 attended in Vitez, how would you describe the quantity

    25 of food that was available there for the HVO?

  146. 1 A. I think that was good enough; it was a nice party with a

    2 lot of local dishes.

    3 Q. But you never witnessed any starving or hungry HVO

    4 soldiers in your three months in the region?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. Can we now very briefly return to 16th April? You were

    7 in Vitez and later in Ahmici. On that day, did you see

    8 any Bosnian government soldiers in the area of Vitez or

    9 Ahmici, any at all? Did you see any individual soldiers

    10 or organised units?

    11 A. No, I did not.

    12 Q. What were the only soldiers that you saw on that day in

    13 the area?

    14 A. Only HVO soldiers.

    15 Q. If you can address your mind to the kidnapping of the

    16 five HVO officers, one of whom was kidnapped on

    17 15th April, the other four considerably earlier, and we

    18 will not repeat that testimony, but the video clips that

    19 were shown by the Defence and which you identified are a

    20 ghastly sight. Was that a regular image that was seen

    21 on the television in Zenica and Vitez? Was it unusual

    22 that such an image should be seen on television?

    23 A. No, because there was a local TV station in Zenica and

    24 there was TV Vitez, and those were the two medias who

    25 were doing their best to inform the public of what had

  147. 1 happened and incidents, so it was just to see the news

    2 that every day or every second day we were able to see

    3 things -- not like the kidnapping, but we were able to

    4 see pictures of killed people.

    5 Q. So it was a regular occurrence to see such gory images

    6 on television?

    7 A. Yes, because it was a part -- normally the media was

    8 used for propaganda means. Of course, something like

    9 this fits in that, but normally we saw a lot of things

    10 like that.

    11 Q. Indeed the incident of the kidnapping of Commander Totic

    12 actually happened in a Bosnian government-controlled

    13 area; is that right?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. And the Bosnian government authorities in Zenica did not

    16 prevent the filming of these dead bodyguards and the

    17 bystander?

    18 A. And even the brigade commander attended a party hosted

    19 by the Bosnian Corps the night before.

    20 Q. By the brigade commander, you are referring to Commander

    21 Totic?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Major Baggesen, do you think that the kidnapping of the

    24 four staff officers in the Novi Travnik and Travnik area

    25 and the kidnapping of Zivko Totic had anything at all to

  148. 1 do with what happened on 16th April in Vitez and Ahmici?

    2 A. I think that this incident with the kidnapped persons

    3 was an isolated incident, and the only reason for this

    4 incident was that the Mujahedins wanted to have

    5 something they were able to bargain with the HVO about,

    6 because at that time, HVO had already taken a lot of the

    7 Mujahedins in their custody and now the Mujahedins

    8 wanted to take some HVO in their custody so they were

    9 able to bargain. That is the normal way the Mujahedins

    10 are operating. You can see kidnappings like this in the

    11 Middle East and Lebanon and in Afghanistan. I think

    12 this incident had nothing to do with the rest of the

    13 conflict down there.

    14 Q. Specifically the conflict that erupted on 16th April?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. You do not believe the kidnapping was related to the

    17 eruption of the conflict?

    18 A. No.

    19 Q. In your cross-examination, you were asked many questions

    20 on military structures and asked to compare Western

    21 European army headquarters structures to the HVO

    22 headquarters structure. You equated Colonel Blaskic's

    23 command in Vitez to a corps headquarters.

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. In the Danish Army, how large is an army corps?

  149. 1 A. 40 or 50,000 people.

    2 Q. Was the HVO headquarters or the number of troops that

    3 Colonel Blaskic commanded considerably less than this?

    4 A. Yes, more or less. I only called Colonel Blaskic's

    5 headquarters a corps level because the unit he commanded

    6 had the same size as Hadzihasanovic and he was a corps

    7 level.

    8 Q. But there were many less troops than in a Western

    9 European corps?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. If there were many less troops, you would expect there

    12 would be less staff officers in headquarters to command

    13 that much smaller corps; is that correct?

    14 A. Yes, of course.

    15 Q. The Zenica shelling: from your memory, what was the

    16 distance of the nearest military target to where those

    17 six shells fell? Which shell fell closest to a military

    18 target and how far was it away from that target?

    19 A. I can remember one of the impact was not -- the impact

    20 that was not at the marketplace or the bus stop --

    21 I think there was two in the centre where one of the

    22 impacts were more in a western direction and I think

    23 from that impact to the nearest military -- not a

    24 headquarters but an office was 500 metres.

    25 Q. You were not sure whether any of those offices were

  150. 1 actually military targets?

    2 A. From my point of view, they were not military targets,

    3 because it was only a minor unit there. The only

    4 military target in that area was the corps headquarters

    5 at the steel factory.

    6 Q. In respect of these offices that were 500 metres away

    7 when you are firing a weapon like this, what is the

    8 margin of error when you are firing from approximately

    9 15 kilometres with a 122 millimetre howitzer in, let us

    10 say, a sideways direction to make it simple. What is

    11 the margin of error on a well-trained gun crew?

    12 A. On a well trained gun crew I would think 50 metres, but

    13 with a bad trained crew I think maybe 100 metres.

    14 Q. So this was 5 times as bad as a badly trained gun crew?

    15 A. Not five times, from 50 to --

    16 Q. You said 100 metres would be a badly trained gun crew

    17 and this was 500 metres away.

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. So in your professional opinion, what was the target?

    20 A. In that area where the impact was, and if you are

    21 looking those 100 metres to each side, I was not able to

    22 tell you that there were any military targets, so

    23 I think that this attack was carried out against a

    24 civilian target, and I think the aim of this attack was

    25 just to show that HVO were able to attack Zenica with

  151. 1 artillery. I cannot see any approach but that.

    2 Q. Are you aware of the casualties that were caused by that

    3 shelling?

    4 A. I cannot remember how many but I think it was about 60.

    5 Q. Do you know how many people were killed?

    6 A. No, but we heard that a lot of people have been killed

    7 at the marketplace, because there was normally a lot of

    8 people, civilians, sitting at the marketplace with a

    9 small desk selling cigarettes, changing money, because

    10 the local money down there because not -- you could not

    11 use the local money and you could -- I can remember one

    12 time I went to one of them with my zippo lighter and

    13 needed gas for my zippo lighter, small desks like that,

    14 so there were lots of people like that were killed.

    15 Q. It was well known there would have been lots of

    16 civilians in that particular area?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. If we could now move ahead, Major Baggesen, to your time

    19 on the Busovaca Joint Commission? Again I am going to

    20 move as quickly as I can. How long did you sit on this

    21 body approximately?

    22 A. Four or five weeks.

    23 Q. During that time, did you make regular complaint to the

    24 HVO representative about the conduct of HVO soldiers?

    25 A. Yes, we did.

  152. 1 Q. What was the subject matter of those complaints?

    2 A. Normally we did the complaints after we came back to the

    3 ECMM house in the afternoon, where we discussed the

    4 fact-finding missions we had been on on these mixed

    5 teams, and then we made the complaints to HVO and to BiH

    6 about our findings and those complaints were normally on

    7 killing of civilian persons, burnt down houses, robbed

    8 houses and things like that.

    9 Q. When was the Busovaca Joint Commission established?

    10 A. January 1993.

    11 Q. How long did it function for?

    12 A. I think five months.

    13 Q. From your knowledge and from speaking to your

    14 colleagues, were complaints of the nature that you have

    15 just described made throughout that period to the HVO

    16 representative?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Who was that HVO representative reporting to?

    19 A. Franjo Nakic was normally reporting to Colonel Blaskic.

    20 Q. In fact I think the Defence said Mr. Nakic had been

    21 hand-picked for the job by Colonel Blaskic?

    22 A. Yes, he was a man we trusted.

    23 Q. Communications and orders, very briefly. In military

    24 operations, is it normal for a geographical area of

    25 command to be cut off from a commander? He may command

  153. 1 in a particular area, but he may command another area

    2 that is cut off. Is that normal in wartime?

    3 A. Yes, it is.

    4 Q. In the Danish Army, is that any excuse for not properly

    5 organising your command, issuing orders, ensuring

    6 control?

    7 A. No.

    8 Q. You would not be able to ring up your General and say,

    9 "I am terribly sorry, General, I cannot make it to this

    10 particular area; we are cut off", no?

    11 I would just like to show you these orders again.

    12 If the witness could be shown Defence exhibit 39. In

    13 fact, while you are up, 39, 42A, 43A, 44A.

    14 A. I have some of those up here.

    15 Q. If you could place D39 on the ELMO? Major Baggesen,

    16 what is the date of this order?

    17 A. 24th April 1993.

    18 Q. Who is the order addressed to? If you could read it out

    19 to the court?

    20 A. It is addressed to all commanders of units in Central

    21 Bosnia Operative Zone, and to brigades and independent

    22 units.

    23 Q. If you could read the next line?

    24 A. "Based on the request by the Chief of the HVO main

    25 headquarters", then a number --

  154. 1 Q. You can stop there. If you then go to the bottom of the

    2 document, and if you could read out to the court to whom

    3 copies of this order --

    4 A. "A copy to files and a copy to ONO (operations and

    5 training body)."

    6 Q. What does the phrase "operations and training body" mean

    7 to you?

    8 A. That is normally the staff officer and his men who are

    9 responsible for doing the operation and the training of

    10 the soldiers.

    11 Q. So the fact that Colonel Blaskic was actually addressing

    12 a copy of this order to that body, what would that

    13 indicate to you?

    14 A. That he had this body.

    15 Q. That he had an operations and training body?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. That he had an establishment for the operations and for

    18 the training of soldiers?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. If you could now move to the next document, D42A, which

    21 is the order of 17th March 1993.

    22 A. The one dated 17th March?

    23 Q. Correct. I would just like to refer you to where it

    24 says "for the attention of" and if you could read to

    25 whom this order was addressed by Colonel Blaskic.

  155. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I do not object to questions about

    2 the document, but the document speaks for itself, so to

    3 have him read portions I think unnecessarily takes up

    4 time and is beneath the expertise of this witness.

    5 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could comment? It is

    6 actually material to the Prosecutor's case to whom

    7 Colonel Blaskic was addressing his orders. Mr. Hayman

    8 omitted to read part of the document; it is only fair to

    9 both parties that a complete picture is presented to the

    10 court, and not only part of it which is actually

    11 beneficial to one particular party.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: They should be admitted in their entirety,

    13 translated in their entirety, as part of the record, but

    14 what I am saying is to have a witness simply read a

    15 portion -- I am going to want to read other portions.

    16 It does not end anywhere. These documents will speak

    17 for themselves. If he has a question about meaning or

    18 something like that, I have no objection.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, I should like to remind you that

    20 this document was submitted to the Trial Chamber by you

    21 as evidence. We are now in the re-examination stage and

    22 it seems to me quite normal that the Prosecutor wishes

    23 to study the document in accordance with the strategy of

    24 the Prosecution, therefore I think there is no problem.

    25 Do you intend to have the whole document read,

  156. 1 Mr. Prosecutor?

    2 MR. CAYLEY: No, your Honour. In respect of all the

    3 documents it will be portions omitted by my learned

    4 friend. I think, for the sake of completeness and

    5 fairness, other parts of the document should be admitted

    6 which are material to the Prosecutor's case.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I would like them read in their entirety, your

    8 Honour, because otherwise there is no end to it.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, the question has been decided.

    10 I am going to repeat, but not again: this document was

    11 tendered by you and it is quite normal that the

    12 Prosecution should use that document when his turn

    13 comes.

    14 You have the floor.

    15 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you Mr. President. If you could just read

    16 from where it states "for the attention of" to where it

    17 says "to be notified" in brackets. I do not want you to

    18 read the entire document.

    19 A. "For attention of commanders to HVO Brigades; Independent

    20 Units", and those included:

    21 "Motorised Division, 4th Light Artillery Rocket

    22 Division, Vitezovi Special Taskforce, Vitez Military

    23 Police 4th Battalion, Chief of Travnik Police

    24 Department, Chief of Travnik Defence Department, and HVO

    25 Presidents to be notified."

  157. 1 Q. Are these the persons to whom Colonel Blaskic was

    2 addressing this order?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. If I could now ask you to refer to the order dated

    5 22nd April 1993?

    6 A. Will you please tell me the date again?

    7 Q. 22nd April 1993. That is D43A.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: D43, is that right?

    9 MR. CAYLEY: That is correct, Mr. President.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead, please.

    11 MR. CAYLEY: If you could again read, this is the order

    12 dealing with citizens' property, to whom this order was

    13 addressed?

    14 A. It is addressed to the brigade commanders of Brigade

    15 Number 1 to Brigade Number 12, and commanders of

    16 individual units, and this includes the 4th Light

    17 Artillery Rocket Division, Motorised Division, 4th

    18 Battalion Military Police, Vitezovi Special Taskforce

    19 and the Communication Company.

    20 Q. If you could go to the end of that document and again

    21 where the copies are notified, could you just read that

    22 to the court?

    23 A. "One copy to the addressee, one copy to ONO (operation

    24 and training body) and one copy to the files."

    25 Q. Again that order is signed and stamped Tihomir Blaskic;

  158. 1 is that correct?

    2 A. That is correct.

    3 Q. If you could go now to the final document, which is

    4 Defence exhibit 44A, to whom is this order addressed?

    5 A. To commanders of all units in Central Bosnia Operative

    6 Zone.

    7 Q. If you go to the end of this document, again there are

    8 copies to whom?

    9 A. "One copy to the addressee, one copy to ONO (operations

    10 and training body) and one copy to records."

    11 Q. Major Baggesen, all these orders together, does this

    12 strike you as a commander who is not able to communicate

    13 with his subordinate units?

    14 A. No. Actually all these orders show that Colonel Blaskic

    15 was commanding all the units because all those units are

    16 mentioned as the address at the top of the orders and it

    17 shows that he had an operation and training body, and

    18 all those orders to all those units show that he was

    19 able to communicate, because if he was not able to

    20 communicate, he was not able to give out orders like

    21 this.

    22 Q. You have the orders in front of you. The order dealing

    23 with citizens' property is of 22nd April; the order

    24 dealing with the treatment of civilians and prisoners is

    25 of 24th April and the order dealing with prevention of

  159. 1 uncontrolled conduct of commanders and individuals is of

    2 24th April. Are they all subsequent to the events that

    3 happened in Ahmici and Vitez that you witnessed?

    4 A. Yes, all these orders are after that time.

    5 Q. So they are orders after the event?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 MR. CAYLEY: If I may just have a moment, Mr. President?

    8 (Pause).

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley, are you ready?

    10 MR. CAYLEY: I am, Mr. President and I only have a few more

    11 questions so I think we will be able to complete with

    12 this witness today.

    13 Major Baggesen, while you were serving in Central

    14 Bosnia, did you ever compare your command at home with

    15 the command of Colonel Blaskic?

    16 A. Yes, I did at several times; I compared my unit with

    17 both Colonel Blaskic's unit and General Hadzihasanovic's

    18 unit.

    19 Q. Why did you do that?

    20 A. Looking at my own units, a lot of my soldiers they are

    21 all, except my staff, part-time soldiers. A lot of them

    22 have been doing national service in the Danish Army and

    23 some of them are coming to the Home Guard without any

    24 military background, and then we trained them. What we

    25 saw down there was that HVO and BiH had a lot of

  160. 1 soldiers who had been in national service because in

    2 Bosnia -- in the whole Yugoslavia, all men had to do 12

    3 months' national service in the JNA until 1991, so

    4 therefore I think the biggest part of the soldiers in

    5 BiH and HVO had the military training from JNA, and then

    6 they have the young ones who enlisted after 1991, after

    7 the JNA did not exist, then to train those and give them

    8 basic military training.

    9 Q. So a large number of the soldiers in HVO and BiH had

    10 done basic military training in the JNA; is that what

    11 you are saying?

    12 A. That is correct.

    13 Q. I believe the soldiers you command in Denmark are also

    14 part-time soldiers, are they not?

    15 A. Yes, they are.

    16 Q. How much basic training do you give them?

    17 A. The ones who have no military background, we train them

    18 in the beginning for one week and during this week, we

    19 give them the necessary training how to use their

    20 personal weapon, we train them in first aid, we train

    21 them in their own protection against nuclear,

    22 biochemical and chemical weapons and we give them

    23 lessons in the law on armed conflicts.

    24 Q. You do this all in a week?

    25 A. Yes.

  161. 1 Q. After this time you issue a weapon to them?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. They keep that weapon at home, do they not, in the

    4 Danish Home Guard?

    5 A. Yes, together with the ammunition and the rest of the

    6 equipment.

    7 Q. Do you have any problems with the soldiers by keeping

    8 their weapons at home? Do any soldiers misuse those

    9 weapons?

    10 A. No, I can only recall one incident in one part of the

    11 country years ago, but no incidents.

    12 Q. Why do you think that is?

    13 A. Because we teach them that they have to take care of

    14 those weapons and those ammunitions, so.

    15 Q. You have answered my question. In your view, is it

    16 simply enough for a commander to issue a written order

    17 and do nothing else, or is an officer normally expected

    18 to actually follow up on the orders that he issues to

    19 ensure they are being obeyed?

    20 A. That is the normal and correct way to do it. Normally

    21 when I as a commander am giving an order, I will control

    22 that this order is carried out in the way I wanted it to

    23 be carried out, and I will normally do that to inspect

    24 my troops or I will let one of my staff officers do

    25 that.

  162. 1 Q. You have, I think, 16 companies under your command.

    2 A. 17.

    3 Q. 17 companies, I apologise. Do you sometimes actually

    4 attend a company exercise by surprise, just to see that

    5 your orders are being carried out?

    6 A. Yes, that is the normal way to do it.

    7 Q. But you regularly monitor what is going on.

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. In terms of Central Bosnia, training, there was a war

    10 going on, was there not, so it may well have been that

    11 there was insufficient time to train soldiers. Do you

    12 agree with that?

    13 A. Not all the time, because there was a lot of calm

    14 periods down there where the soldiers were not at the

    15 front, so during those calm periods, they were able to

    16 train the soldiers, because they did not have to use all

    17 the men at the front. You could have maybe some of the

    18 soldiers at the front and the rest could be back in

    19 their barracks being given the proper training there.

    20 Q. Other than Ahmici and Vitez, did you witness any other

    21 military operations involving the HVO and the BiH?

    22 A. Me myself, I monitored the situation in the Kakanj area

    23 where BiH and HVO were engaged.

    24 Q. Other than that, have you ever witnessed what you would

    25 term a military engagement between two forces in Central

  163. 1 Bosnia?

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. What were HVO troops doing the rest of the time you were

    4 in Central Bosnia?

    5 A. I do not know.

    6 Q. Major Baggesen, from your experience as a professional

    7 officer, 20 years, and your knowledge of the Danish Army

    8 and of other armies in Europe, have you ever known of a

    9 colonel who is promoted to a general who is not able to

    10 perform his duties properly?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. Have you ever known of a colonel who was unable to have

    13 his orders carried out by junior officers under his

    14 command who was subsequently promoted to a general?

    15 A. No.

    16 Q. Have you ever known of a colonel who was unable to

    17 discipline the troops under his command who was

    18 subsequently promoted to a general?

    19 A. No.

    20 Q. Have you ever known of a colonel who failed to carry out

    21 the instructions of his political masters who was

    22 promoted to a general?

    23 A. No, I have not.

    24 MR. CAYLEY: I have no further questions for the witness,

    25 Mr. President, but I would ask that the court address one

  164. 1 matter and that is in respect of exhibits D42A, D43, D39

    2 and D44, which were orders which were submitted into

    3 evidence by my learned friend and, if they are being

    4 admitted by the Defence, the Prosecution would request

    5 that an admission be made now by the Defence that these

    6 are in fact documents that were signed by their client,

    7 that the author of these documents is Colonel Blaskic,

    8 and the Prosecution would like that admission on the

    9 transcript of the proceedings.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: I think there should be no difficulty, because

    11 the Defence itself underlined that these documents were

    12 signed by Colonel Blaskic.

    13 Mr. Hayman?

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, there is no dispute here, but, as

    15 a matter of principle, we are not here to answer the

    16 Prosecutor's questions in their case. We offer

    17 documents: they can object or they can not object, and

    18 this no man's land in between is quite bizarre. I have

    19 never seen it before.

    20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, a final comment. We are not

    21 objecting to these documents. We are merely saying that

    22 the Defence tendered them; they tendered them to show

    23 that their client was issuing certain orders to prevent

    24 certain types of conduct. If they admit them for that

    25 purpose, they must by inference be saying that their

  165. 1 client is the author of these documents. All the

    2 Prosecutor would respectfully request from the court is

    3 they be asked to make a formal admission on the

    4 transcript that these documents were signed by their

    5 client.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, Mr. Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber

    7 has noted that these exhibits were tendered by the

    8 Defence, were signed by Colonel Blaskic which is not at

    9 all disputed by the Defence, I assume, Mr. Hayman? It is

    10 not disputed?

    11 MR. HAYMAN: They speak for themselves. My point was: we are

    12 not here to answer the questions of the Prosecution nor to

    13 testify on behalf of our client in the Prosecution's

    14 case. His opportunity to testify will come in the

    15 Defence case.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Listen, I think that the evidence was tendered

    17 by the Defence, it was signed by General Blaskic, the

    18 exhibits speak for themselves, they were signed by

    19 General Blaskic. I think the incident is closed.

    20 Have you any further questions, Mr. Prosecutor?

    21 MR. CAYLEY: No, thank you very much, Mr. President.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I turn now to my colleagues.

    23 Judge Riad, do you have any questions to put to the

    24 witness please?

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Major Baggesen, I am sorry to impose on you

  166. 1 some questions; you must be tired by now, because I am.

    2 Just some questions concerning the exhibit D43 which

    3 relates really to a more general idea which you exposed

    4 when you said that the commander has to check whether

    5 his orders are carried out, this is part of his

    6 responsibility. I want to ask you: if he discovers they

    7 are not carried out, what should his attitude be?

    8 A. Then, your Honour, he had to speak with the commander

    9 who is not willing to fulfil this order and if that is

    10 not enough, to replace the commander.

    11 Q. To continue this question with the exhibit D43, which is

    12 the order rendered on 22nd April 1993, paragraph 3 which

    13 in particular was read:

    14 "The most stringent measures shall be taken

    15 against violators of this order, pursuant to the

    16 regulation book on military discipline."

    17 First, this order was rendered after the incident

    18 of Ahmici, was it not?

    19 A. Yes, it was.

    20 Q. So all what could be considered as violations were

    21 already committed. To your knowledge, has any adequate

    22 measure been taken towards those who committed it and

    23 who violated this order?

    24 A. I do not know, your Honour.

    25 Q. You do not know. You also mentioned cases, I think last

  167. 1 week and perhaps today too, in which you were sometimes

    2 confronted with obstacles from HVO personnel, whether at

    3 checkpoint or whether that incident happened when you

    4 spoke of this military conversation, if you remember.

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Thanks to the intervention of General Blaskic when you

    7 addressed yourself to him, that was solved.

    8 A. Yes, it was.

    9 Q. Do you know of any other cases where, having addressed

    10 yourself to him, the situation was not solved? Was his

    11 order always obeyed?

    12 A. Your Honour, I can recall if we had had problems, and we

    13 told this to Colonel Blaskic, he was able to solve the

    14 problems for us. I cannot recall that we have not been

    15 able to do anything having this written order from

    16 Colonel Blaskic.

    17 Q. Thank you. I would like just to ask another more

    18 general question that is just a clarification,

    19 concerning the ECMM weekly summary which you presented

    20 to us, I think. This is just for my own knowledge. In

    21 paragraph 15, it reads as follows:

    22 "The declared position of the Bosnian Croat

    23 authorities to implement the Vance-Owen Plan forcing the

    24 Muslim population to leave the so-called Croat provinces

    25 provoked a reaction which resulted in strong and brutal

  168. 1 fighting with actions against the civilian population,

    2 especially in the Zenica and Vitez regions."

    3 Could you perhaps clarify this a little bit? Who

    4 reacted and what was this provoked action and how do you

    5 relate it with the brutal fighting? What was the other

    6 alternative?

    7 A. Can I see the document, your Honour, just to recall --

    8 Q. I do not know what number it is. Perhaps I can send it

    9 to you, because I do not have a number on it.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: It is maybe exhibit 90. I think it is 90.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is exhibit 90.

    12 A. What was happening during this period was that we

    13 mentioned this, that HVO wanted to, actually to get rid

    14 of all the Muslims in province number 10 and therefore

    15 they started all the ethnic cleansing to get the

    16 Muslims -- to scare them out of the 10th province.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: You seem to relate that to the Vance-Owen

    18 Plan.

    19 A. Yes, because the Vance-Owen Plan told that province

    20 number 10 should be governed by the Croats, and

    21 therefore the Croats wanted to have an ethnically clean

    22 province, therefore they scared the Muslims out of

    23 province number 10. That was our conclusion, your

    24 Honour.

    25 Q. Because in another moment, you said you opposed the

  169. 1 Vance-Owen Plan.

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. So I think it was the Vance-Owen Plan which provoked the

    4 whole thing?

    5 A. Yes. That is my personal conclusion.

    6 Q. But did the Vance-Owen Plan proclaim it as an ethnically

    7 pure department?

    8 A. No, it did not, but that was how the Croats who were

    9 going to govern this province -- this was their reaction

    10 because they wanted it like that. That is my own

    11 personal view on that.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Major.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabudden?

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEN: Thank you.

    15 Major Baggesen, I invite your attention to an

    16 interesting piece of cross-examination which was

    17 directed to establishing a certain distinction; on the

    18 one hand it was put to you that you could have a

    19 military force whose functions were purely tactical; on

    20 the other hand you could have a military force which was

    21 also exercising administrative functions within a

    22 defined geographical area. Do you recall that piece of

    23 the evidence?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. I imagine there can be some plasticity in modelling

  170. 1 these arrangements. Can you have a situation like this

    2 in which you have a military force which is exercising

    3 tactical functions but within a defined geographical

    4 area?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Let us turn a little to the relationship of

    7 General Blaskic to those who were superior to him. You

    8 said, I thought, that on occasion, he would communicate

    9 with General Petkovic in Mostar; is that right?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Would he communicate with General Petkovic directly, or

    12 would he have to go through some intermediary in Vitez?

    13 A. I think that Colonel Blaskic has access directly to

    14 General Petkovic.

    15 Q. He had direct access?

    16 A. Yes, and that is the normal on this command level; the

    17 commanders can speak with each other.

    18 Q. So within his operational area, in Central Bosnia,

    19 General Blaskic had no superior; he would relate to

    20 General Petkovic away in Mostar?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Let us look at the relations of General Blaskic below

    23 him. You showed the court a document which I have

    24 marked 98; I hope I am not in error. That is why I have

    25 shown it up, that document.

  171. 1 A. I can recognise the document.

    2 Q. It is a list of brigade commanders serving, I believe,

    3 under General Blaskic?

    4 A. Yes, that is correct.

    5 Q. Two of them interest me. You have a column entitled

    6 "Vitez Brigade". Do you see that column?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. In the next box there is the name Mr. Mario Cerkez.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. I take it that Mr. Cerkez was therefore the brigade

    11 commander in the Vitez area serving under

    12 General Blaskic; is that right?

    13 A. That is correct.

    14 Q. I see that in the fourth box his place, I take it that

    15 means his place of work, was at the Vitez cinema; is

    16 that right?

    17 A. Yes, that is correct.

    18 Q. So we are getting the structure. Then three columns

    19 below, horizontally, we have a reference to the Ban

    20 Jelacic brigade. In the last box we have Kiseljak

    21 barracks. That again was intended on this scheme to

    22 demonstrate that Kiseljak barracks was commanded by

    23 someone who related directly to General Blaskic. Was

    24 that the scheme?

    25 A. Yes, it was.

  172. 1 Q. I come to something else. You made the interesting

    2 remark earlier today to the effect, I hope I do not

    3 misquote you, that in those areas in which the BiH and

    4 the HVO were in confrontation with the Serbs, the

    5 tendency was for the BiH and HVO to co-operate; is that

    6 right?

    7 A. That is correct.

    8 Q. That applied for example to a case in which the BiH and

    9 the HVO were, as you said, surrounded by the Serbs. Did

    10 Serbs surround the Vitez/Ahmici area?

    11 A. No, they did not. They were in position further north

    12 of that area.

    13 Q. Let me ask you about your testimony about the

    14 replacement of an HVO commander. I wonder if you

    15 remember it.

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. You were cross-examined on the point of some interest as

    18 to whether you had mentioned that in your diary or in

    19 your written reports.

    20 A. I have not, because this was an incident some of the

    21 other monitors, one of the other teams, told me that

    22 they have been -- they were going to that area near

    23 Kiseljak and Kresevo and they were going to have a

    24 meeting with this HVO commander whose name I cannot

    25 recall and they were told that he was replaced because

  173. 1 he did not want to carry out this order to attack a

    2 village.

    3 Q. So matters of that kind you did not note in your diary

    4 or in your written reports?

    5 A. No, because it was not my area of responsibility.

    6 Q. I turn to exhibit 89A. It is entitled "Routine Team

    7 Tasks". It says that the tasks allocated to each team

    8 within its own area of responsibility will usually be,

    9 (iii):

    10 "Routinely liaise with military authorities of the

    11 HVO, BiH Armija, BSA and UN as appropriate."

    12 You recall that?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. I want you to focus on the HVO and the BiH Armija.

    15 There was a conflict, as we know, between the Bosnian

    16 Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. Your task, I imagine,

    17 was to assist in reducing the level of tension between

    18 those two groups if you could; am I right, general?

    19 A. That is correct and we tried to make local cease-fires.

    20 Q. In the course of discharging those responsibilities, you

    21 would occupy yourself, for example, with making

    22 cease-fire agreements, is that right, or promoting them?

    23 A. Yes, that is correct.

    24 Q. If you had to promote the making of a cease-fire

    25 agreement between those two groups, would you think it

  174. 1 sufficient to have as the two parties someone on the

    2 side of the HVO and someone on the side of the BiH, or

    3 would you also want to bring in other informal armed

    4 groups and have them sign the document?

    5 A. Normally when we did things like that it was not on a

    6 local level; normally it involved Colonel Blaskic and

    7 General Hadzihasanovic.

    8 Q. I see, the two principal parties, as it were.

    9 A. Yes, both of the two commanders signed this agreement.

    10 Q. I turn to exhibit D45, the document signed by your

    11 colleague Mr. Landry, I think. It was the penultimate

    12 paragraph which I think was read out by counsel to you.

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. The one in which Mr. Landry said that he was informed by

    15 the HVO headquarters in Vitez that Colonel Blaskic was

    16 not available, and then there was some discussion as to

    17 whether that meant he was not in the premises or he

    18 might be elsewhere, but not within access. It goes on:

    19 "I cannot recollect to whom I spoke. I was not

    20 told where Colonel Blaskic was, nor where I could get in

    21 touch with him."

    22 What would that sentence bring to your mind:

    23 "I was not told where Colonel Blaskic was, nor

    24 where I could get in touch with him."

    25 A. Because if they told us where we were able to contact

  175. 1 Colonel Blaskic, they had to tell us where they had

    2 their forward headquarters, I think.

    3 Q. In other words, would that sentence signify to your mind

    4 that Colonel Blaskic was in the hotel Vitez or was out

    5 of the hotel Vitez?

    6 A. Out of the hotel Vitez.

    7 Q. I come to exhibit D42A, dated 17th March. The rubric

    8 was read out by you a little earlier. I want you to

    9 focus on two things and to explain them to me. The

    10 document is issued "for the attention of commanders to

    11 HVO brigades, independent units". What might be the

    12 meaning of that term, "independent units"?

    13 A. As I see it, the independent units are commanded

    14 directly by Colonel Blaskic. They are not belonging to

    15 one of the brigades but they are having their orders

    16 directly from Colonel Blaskic.

    17 Q. Directly from him. Now, two lines down we have a

    18 reference to the Vitezovi special taskforce. Did you

    19 see that Vitezovi special taskforce?

    20 A. Mr. Hayman asked me in the beginning of his

    21 cross-examination if I have ever seen this unit called

    22 Vitezovi or another unit called the Jokers. I have

    23 maybe seen them, but I have not been aware if they were

    24 belonging to --

    25 Q. This suggests too that whatever it was it was within the

  176. 1 command of Colonel Blaskic, does it not?

    2 A. No doubt about that.

    3 Q. All right, good. Would that also apply to the next

    4 document, D43A, which was also addressed inter alia to

    5 the Vitezovi special taskforce. That document would

    6 likewise suggest to you that the Vitezovi special

    7 taskforce came within the command of Colonel Blaskic,

    8 would it?

    9 A. Yes, and it says as well that he commanded the

    10 communications.

    11 Q. I want you to pause there as I ask you this: these

    12 documents were all issued after 16th April. On the

    13 16th, you were in communication with General Blaskic's

    14 headquarters?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. About this matter. Was there any publicity given on

    17 that day or the next day to the events which took place

    18 in Vitez and in Ahmici? Was there any TV coverage or

    19 so?

    20 A. I cannot recall if there were any television --

    21 Q. Pardon? I did not get that.

    22 A. I cannot recall if there have been any TV stations

    23 covering this. I can remember that the day after, after

    24 I think M Thebault, together with the head of the ECMM

    25 in Zenica -- Ambassador Thebault, together with the --

  177. 1 with the commander of the British Battalion, they went

    2 to Ahmici and this was covered by Sky News, one of the

    3 international TV stations.

    4 Q. So there was some international coverage then?

    5 A. Yes, and actually I think that these orders are a result

    6 of all this because Colonel Blaskic was aware of all --

    7 that the whole world was looking at this incident.

    8 Q. I did not ask you that, Major. That is an inference

    9 that the court may wish to consider, one way or another,

    10 later on.

    11 A. Sorry.

    12 Q. Thank you. In one of the documents, Colonel Blaskic

    13 enjoined his subordinate officers to arrest any

    14 malfeasors, any violators of the laws of international

    15 humanitarian justice. You answered my colleague,

    16 Judge Riad, by saying that you did not know whether any

    17 steps had been taken. Is that a correct rendering of

    18 what you said?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. I put it differently then to you. As you were in touch,

    21 you or your organisation was in touch with the HVO at

    22 high level over these developments, if any steps had

    23 been taken by the HVO to discipline any violators, would

    24 that have come to your knowledge?

    25 A. I think maybe we would be able to see the result of

  178. 1 that, but we were not informed about what they did, so

    2 I do not know if they carried out this particular piece.

    3 Q. But you say you were not informed?

    4 A. No.

    5 Q. If any steps had been taken; that is the position?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. I see. The last document before me is, I think, exhibit

    8 39A. That opens with the words in the operative

    9 paragraph -- I wonder if I am misleading you so I had

    10 better hold up my paper to you so you can see visually

    11 what I have in mind. It is a document issued by

    12 General Blaskic dated 24th April. I have annotated it

    13 39A.

    14 A. I have it here, your Honour.

    15 Q. It opens with the words "Based on the request by the

    16 Chief of the HVO Main Headquarters, reference number of

    17 22nd April 1993."

    18 Who was that Chief of the HVO Main Headquarters as

    19 mentioned by General Blaskic here?

    20 A. I think Colonel Blaskic is referring to

    21 General Petkovic.

    22 Q. Pardon?

    23 A. I think, your Honour, that Colonel Blaskic is referring

    24 to General Petkovic.

    25 Q. In Mostar?

  179. 1 A. Yes.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEN: I see. Thank you very much, Major.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: I have one or two questions because everyone

    4 is tired, you first of all and then the interpreters as

    5 well. Regarding the questions put to you by the

    6 Prosecution making a comparison between the Danish Army,

    7 your own Home Guard that you were in charge of, the army

    8 of the BH and the HVO, you were saying that it was a

    9 professional army that had undergone professional

    10 training; therefore you said that it was an organised

    11 army regarding the HVO; are we agreed? Is that correct?

    12 A. I did not say --

    13 Q. I just want to know whether I am not mistaken regarding

    14 your interpretation when you made a comparison between

    15 Western armies and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    16 the structure of the HVO. I think that you said that

    17 they could be compared in terms of military organisation

    18 and training; am I right?

    19 A. Yes, but I did not say that it was a professional army.

    20 I was comparing an HVO unit and BiH unit with my unit

    21 who are consisting of part-time soldiers and the biggest

    22 part of those soldiers had had national service in the

    23 army, so a lot of the soldiers --

    24 Q. I have understood, yes, you already said that, so I do

    25 not want you to repeat it. I am focusing on a rather

  180. 1 important problem. You spoke about training in Denmark,

    2 regarding the law on armed conflicts.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. I want to know whether during your mission in Central

    5 Bosnia you had the impression that the soldiers which

    6 comprised the HVO and the BH-Army, but I am focusing on

    7 the HVO; did they have occasion to have any training on

    8 international humanitarian law and specifically the law

    9 on armed conflicts?

    10 A. I do not think they had that training.

    11 Q. Thank you. My second and last question: before

    12 17th March, the series of orders that have been conveyed

    13 to us, did you have the impression or the knowledge that

    14 Colonel Blaskic gave any orders similar to these before

    15 the attack took place? Colonel Blaskic, later

    16 General Blaskic, did he pass any orders to prevent such

    17 incidents or do you have the impression that these were

    18 isolated and that they were issued in the period that

    19 followed these incidents?

    20 A. I think that these orders were only given after

    21 16th April. We have not seen or we have not been told

    22 about similar orders given before that.

    23 Q. Do you have the impression that in an organised army,

    24 this type of order would be given at the beginning of a

    25 conflict or in the preparations for a conflict? Does it

  181. 1 seem to you to be normal that a colonel with important

    2 responsibilities should give orders of this kind?

    3 A. No, this order, Mr. President, should have been given on

    4 a more earlier stage at the conflict.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: That is it.

    6 Very well, thank you, commander, for your

    7 contribution to the International Criminal Tribunal.

    8 The court wishes to thank you once again.

    9 We are going to adjourn for today and meet again

    10 tomorrow at 10.00 am. I should like to remind you,

    11 I think, that the Registrar has already told the Defence

    12 that we will finish work on Wednesday evening. I hope

    13 that has already been communicated to the parties. The

    14 meeting is adjourned until tomorrow at 10.00 am.

    15 (The witness withdrew)

    16 (6.15 pm)

    17 (Court adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)