1 Tuesday, 11th November 1997

2 (10.00 am)

3 (In open session)

4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Registrar, please have the

5 accused brought in.

6 (Accused brought in)

7 JUDGE JORDA: Are the interpreters ready? Does everybody

8 hear? Mr. Blaskic -- first the Prosecutor, do you hear,

9 the Defence? Good morning, everybody. Mr. Blaskic, do

10 you hear me?

11 MR. BLASKIC: Your Honours, good morning, I hear you well.

12 JUDGE JORDA: I think that we can now resume the

13 cross-examination of Colonel Bryan Watters. Registrar,

14 would you please have the witness brought in so that the

15 cross-examination can continue. Mr. Kehoe?

16 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, can we just go into private session

17 concerning the issue that we ended with yesterday and

18 the representations that were made by the Office of the

19 Prosecutor yesterday afternoon.

20 JUDGE JORDA: You do not want us first to finish with the

21 cross-examination? We do not really want to keep

22 disturbing the arrangements we have made. I thought we

23 had gotten to a certain point in the cross-examination,

24 I am not sure we should stop it there. What is your

25 opinion about that, Mr. Hayman?

1 MR. HAYMAN: I am not sure what this is about. Is this about

2 interpreters, your Honour? I do not know clearly what

3 it is that needs to be addressed.

4 JUDGE JORDA: So we can know what subject will be raised,

5 I would ask the Registrar to have a private session set

6 up.

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21 (In open session)

22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Perhaps we could have the witness

23 brought in now then.

24 (Witness entered court)

25 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel Watters, do you hear me?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Did you have a good evening, are

3 you well rested?

4 A. Yes, I am, sir.

5 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume the cross-examination by

6 General Blaskic's Defence attorney. Mr. Hayman, you have

7 the floor.

8 LIEUTENANT COLONEL WATTERS (continued)

9 Cross-examined by MR. HAYMAN (continued)

10 Q. Good morning, Colonel Watters.

11 A. Good morning.

12 Q. Just as a preliminary question, in preparing for your

13 testimony, did you have occasion to review any diaries,

14 notes, radio logs, reports, documents of that sort?

15 A. Yes, I did, sir.

16 Q. Can you tell us first of all, what types of documents

17 did you review?

18 A. I reviewed the military information summaries, which

19 were produced by our intelligence cell in 1 Cheshire

20 battle group. I reviewed the daily situation reports,

21 which were produced by the operations room of 1 Cheshire

22 battle group and I reviewed some of the radio logs of

23 the battle group VHF Net.

24 Q. And the copies of those documents you reviewed, had they

25 been redacted or cut up, if you will, or were they

1 complete copies?

2 A. They were complete copies.

3 Q. Did your review of those materials help refresh your

4 recollection of the events in question?

5 A. They enabled me to put my recollections in a sequential

6 order, which was the difficulty I was having, four years

7 later, trying to remember the order in which things

8 happened.

9 Q. So you have relied on them in your testimony here?

10 A. Yes, I have.

11 Q. Do you remember what period of radio logs you reviewed?

12 A. The major area of radio logs I reviewed was from

13 16th April through until about 21st April.

14 Q. And Mil Info Summs and daily Sit Rep reports, did you

15 review all of the reports prepared during your tour,

16 that is your personal period of time spent in the

17 theatre?

18 A. Yes, I also did review those areas before I arrived from

19 the point at which our tour started there, which I had

20 known at the time, but after four years had forgotten a

21 great deal of information.

22 Q. Did you also have a chance to review any of these

23 materials prior to giving the statements that you gave

24 to the Office of the Prosecutor?

25 A. Yes, I did. We as a battalion hold copies or the

1 originals of those documents.

2 Q. Did you review your statements, one or more of your

3 statements before giving testimony here?

4 A. Today, no, yesterday, yes.

5 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you a few questions

6 concerning the issue of control of roads in Central

7 Bosnia. Are you familiar with the hill at Grbavica that

8 overlooks the Vitez/Travnik road?

9 A. Yes, I am, we call it the mountain road, the road that

10 leads from Dubravica up to Zenica.

11 Q. Actually I am referring to the road from Vitez to

12 Travnik.

13 A. Yes, I know that road very well.

14 Q. Is Grbavica located to the north of that road and to the

15 west north west of the UNPROFOR camp at Bila?

16 A. I would have to check on the map to be honest, sir.

17 Q. Could you take a look? I am sorry to have to ask you to

18 rise so soon in your testimony. (Pause). The location

19 is not marked on the Prosecutor's map, your Honour.

20 Did you find it, Colonel?

21 A. If it is the hill that was behind our base in Stari

22 Bila, then I know that hill.

23 Q. And adjacent to -- could you tell us in terms of

24 direction where the hill is located from your camp?

25 A. It was just to the east of our camp.

1 Q. Very well. Would you agree that that hill dominated the

2 road, the road from Vitez to Travnik at that point?

3 A. At that point, yes it did.

4 Q. Would you agree that that road from Vitez to Travnik was

5 a road of strategic military significance to both the

6 HVO and the Army of BiH?

7 A. Yes, I would.

8 Q. When you arrived in the theatre, were you briefed

9 concerning any efforts of the Army of BiH to control

10 that position on the hill at Grbavica?

11 A. I saw no evidence routinely that anyone was controlling

12 that hill. We actually used to control that hill

13 ourselves when we were, for example, bringing in

14 helicopters to evacuate our wounded, because the hill

15 had a strategic domination over the local countryside.

16 I do not remember seeing BiH positions on that hill, no.

17 MR. HAYMAN: If I could ask the usher to assist in placing a

18 document before the witness, I believe the usher may

19 have stepped out, I can do it, your Honour, with your

20 leave. (Handed). Your Honour, this is a four

21 page document, parts of it were redacted prior to being

22 provided to the Defence and the page I am interested in

23 for today's purposes is the last. I will read it all if

24 the Prosecutor so wishes, otherwise I suggest we hold

25 the first three pages in abeyance, if you will, and

1 concentrate on the fourth page.

2 If the ELMO could be activated and the top of the

3 first page could be placed on the ELMO?

4 I would direct your attention, Colonel, to the top

5 of the first page of the document, the handwritten

6 portion which reads:

7 "Cheshire Mil Info 090 29 January 93."

8 Then if the document could be turned to the last

9 and fourth page, thank you Colonel, I will read it:

10 "BiH troops continue to build a number of Defence

11 positions on the Grbavica Brdo feature GR 2099954, which

12 overlooks Bila school. Comment. This feature dominates

13 the main Travnik to Vitez road."

14 First of all, would you agree that this document,

15 although redacted, appears in the format of Mil Info

16 Summs prepared by your regiment?

17 A. Yes, I would.

18 Q. Would you agree that this reference on the

19 fourth page refers to the hill at Grbavica adjacent to

20 the Bila school?

21 A. Yes, I would.

22 Q. Did you ever have occasion to see these defensive

23 positions referred to in the Mil Info Summ?

24 A. The Mil Info Summ was dated before I arrived and was

25 the -- reflected the period of the fighting that largely

1 took place in the Kiseljak valley around Busovaca, if my

2 memory serves me. There was no fighting, to the best of

3 my knowledge, of any consequence, around Bila school at

4 that time.

5 Also I think, sir, I ought to put Mil Info Summs

6 into context so that the comment, for example, is

7 relevant. The Mil Info Summs were a daily correlation

8 of all the information that we gained through our

9 patrolling and contact with the local population. They

10 were put together by a captain, a sergeant and a

11 corporal in our intelligence cell and the comment refers

12 to a comment by either the captain or the sergeant as to

13 the relevance of the particular information. The

14 reliability of the information was normally catalogued

15 with an introduction of either a source, meaning a

16 source of information that cannot be substantiated; a

17 normally reliable source, which would mean in the past,

18 when cross-referenced, this information was relevant and

19 accurate, or a reliable source, which meant that

20 repeatedly when cross-referenced the information from

21 this source, which might be one of our own officers, for

22 example, was found to be accurate. They were not

23 designed to be read in single sound bites. You really

24 need to read each daily summary, because each area may

25 reflect and contradict each other, so they do not

1 actually represent necessarily a factual account, they

2 represent the account as we saw it on that day, and very

3 often --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down?

5 A. Sorry. The comment and the actual contents of Mil Info

6 Summs were often found to be erroneous when

7 cross-referenced later in further Mil Info Summs with

8 additional information. I am not saying that this

9 particular extract is not accurate, I just wanted to set

10 Mil Info Summs in context; they are not an authority.

11 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. I take it you would agree with the

12 comment on this page that this hill or feature dominates

13 the road?

14 A. It dominates the road at that point. It does not

15 dominate the whole road.

16 Q. I take it from your comment of a moment ago that

17 because, for example, this Mil Info Summ has been so

18 heavily redacted, it is difficult to determine the

19 actual meaning and significance of the document itself,

20 correct?

21 A. I would need to read the whole Mil Info Summ to get a

22 feel for what the situation was on that day.

23 Q. As would anyone, correct, anyone reviewing the Mil Info

24 Summ and trying to draw useful information from it?

25 A. The Mil Info Summs were produced for the command team of

1 1 Cheshire by the intelligence cell in debriefing

2 patrols and other people we spoke with. The only other

3 people in receipt of them were headquarters UN in

4 Kiseljak and they received them for information as

5 well. They were a tool for the command group of

6 1 Cheshire to review from an information perspective the

7 events of the day and cross-reference it with events on

8 other days.

9 JUDGE JORDA: I have been told that the speed,

10 question/answer, is going too fast and that it is

11 difficult for the transcript -- the court stenographers

12 are having trouble as well, not only interpreters.

13 MR. HAYMAN: We will work harder at it your Honour, thank

14 you. I will review the rest of the Mil Info Summ with

15 the witness if necessary, but first I would like to

16 offer it, having reviewed it to the extent I have.

17 A. May I just, in answering your question, which I never

18 properly did, I am sorry? When I arrived in Vitez

19 school, there was evidence of old defence positions on

20 that hill. They were not occupied at the time that

21 I was in Vitez school and the only time the position was

22 used was during the period about 16 to 25 April, when

23 mortars were placed on and around that feature and fired

24 out and incoming mortar rounds which hit our school as

25 well as that feature came in. We were never quite sure

1 who fired the mortars.

2 Q. But there were incoming mortars to the Grbavica hill

3 during the period that included April 16th, is that

4 right?

5 A. Yes, it is, but there was nobody on the hill, it was

6 rather a waste of mortars.

7 MR. HAYMAN: I offer the document, your Honour, in evidence.

8 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, is counsel offering the entire

9 document including that which he has not discussed?

10 MR. HAYMAN: I will offer it all and if there is an objection

11 perhaps I will offer part.

12 MR. KEHOE: That is fine.

13 MR. HAYMAN: I offer all of it at this point, yes.

14 MR. KEHOE: I was merely asking by way of clarification.

15 That is fine.

16 JUDGE JORDA: You are asking for the entire document to be

17 put in to the record, is that right?

18 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, your Honour.

19 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to remind you -- I am not really

20 sure where we are here, I have kind of lost the thread

21 here, but the question of knowing whether we are putting

22 the entire document when only one part of it has been

23 discussed is a question we have to resolve, but I see

24 since there is no disagreement, we will take the whole

25 document. All right, we will accept the entire

1 document. Registrar?

2 THE REGISTRAR: This would be D62, which is the transparency

3 which is on the easel.

4 MR. HAYMAN: You spoke yesterday at times of refugees.

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Are you familiar with refugees from the region of the

7 Krajina coming to the Lasva Valley?

8 A. Not particularly, no.

9 Q. During your tour, did you hear of the 1st Krajina

10 Brigade of the Army of BiH?

11 A. At this time I do not have a recollection of that,

12 sorry.

13 Q. Did you hear of the 7th or 27th Krajina Brigade during

14 your tour?

15 A. I was familiar with the fall of the Krajina, but I was

16 not familiar and have no direct recollection of

17 individual brigades.

18 Q. Would that include the 305th Jajce Brigade, also part of

19 the Krajina brigades?

20 A. I do remember a Jajce brigade, that was an external

21 brigade located in Gornji Vakuf and its presence was

22 very disruptive. I remember we assisted the removal of

23 that brigade.

24 Q. It was disruptive in the sense that they were outside

25 forces?

1 A. Within the efforts of BritBat to establish a cease-fire

2 in Gornji Vakuf, one of the HVO objections was to the

3 presence of the Jajce Brigade, which they believed had

4 changed the balance of power within Gornji Vakuf and

5 wanted that, as they described it, "external brigade"

6 moved out of the environment of Gornji Vakuf, where its

7 presence in HVO terms was preventative of them agreeing

8 to a cease-fire.

9 Q. During your tour, did you learn whether the reserve

10 headquarters of the third corpus was in Preocica?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Yesterday at times you spoke of a Muslim minority in the

13 Lasva Valley. Was the population mix in the

14 Lasva Valley prior to the conflict in 1993 approximately

15 50/50, to your knowledge?

16 A. I am sorry, I would not know that. I suspect it might

17 have been. I do not know and you would have to define

18 the Lasva Valley as well.

19 Q. Yesterday you spoke of mortars.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Would you agree that certain mortars are under the

22 control of an artillery unit or group, while other

23 mortars are infantry mortars?

24 A. Yes, I would.

25 Q. What size mortars would be controlled by infantry?

1 A. That is quite difficult. I would suspect that anything

2 below 60 millimetres might be controlled by infantry,

3 and that is certainly the case in the British army.

4 Anything above 60 to 80 millimetres would be classified

5 as an artillery piece and would be controlled by

6 artillery units.

7 Q. So 60 to 80 millimetres you believe is a range which

8 could fall either way, either to infantry forces or to

9 an artillery unit?

10 A. Yes, certainly in the British army.

11 Q. Do you know about the former JNA, where those mortars

12 would fall in terms of command and authority?

13 A. I would suspect in the JNA it was probably quite similar

14 to the British army.

15 Q. What about RPGs, rocket propelled grenades? Would they

16 typically be held and controlled by infantry units?

17 A. Yes, I saw those being carried by infantry units of BiH

18 and HVO in Bosnia.

19 Q. You spoke yesterday of Mr. Kordic.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you give us an example of an occasion when

22 Colonel Blaskic was not able to deal with a problem and

23 as a result you went to Mr. Kordic for action?

24 A. Yes, I can. There was a convoy coming from the

25 direction of a central aid depot in Zenica, bound for

1 Travnik. The convoy was stopped by a checkpoint close

2 to the Busovaca/Vitez road junction. The young officer

3 commanding the convoy failed to execute his halt convoy

4 drills properly, in that he did not slew his Warrior to

5 block the forward movement of the convoy. He had

6 anti-tank mines placed by HVO soldiers at the front and

7 rear of the tracks of his Warrior, so blocking his

8 Warrior in position, and the troops climbed on -- the

9 HVO troops climbed on to the running board of the lead

10 vehicle, put a rifle through the side window, injuring

11 the driver, and ordered him at gunpoint to drive round

12 the Warrior, and this happened simultaneously down the

13 convoy. Those vehicles were taken, turning left, down

14 to Busovaca and left into a factory complex on the north

15 side of Busovaca.

16 Q. So the convoy was hijacked?

17 A. That is the description of the hijack. The officer

18 commanding the convoy said to the commander of the HVO

19 soldiers doing this, "this convoy has got the authority

20 of the regional commander HVO, Colonel Tihomir Blaskic,

21 to move safely through this area", and the commander

22 said, "we do not take our orders from Blaskic, we take

23 our orders from Kordic".

24 Q. The individual who said this, were they in an uniform?

25 A. Yes, they were.

1 Q. What kind of uniform?

2 A. Again, I was not there, the description was they were in

3 black uniforms.

4 Q. Were they described to you as HVO soldiers?

5 A. We described everybody as HVO soldiers who were Croat.

6 We were aware there were other HVO units, HOS types, who

7 dressed slightly different from normal HVO soldiers, but

8 to keep things simple for our junior commanders we

9 referred to Muslims as BiH and Croats as HVO.

10 Q. The information you received on this particular occasion

11 was that the HVO troops were dressed in black?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Let me direct your attention now to 16th April. On that

14 occasion, that morning, you drove into Vitez, correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You saw certain dead bodies?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You saw some of those bodies in a portion of Vitez that

19 you would characterise as the Muslim portion?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And did you also see five bodies in what you believe to

22 be the Croat portion of Vitez?

23 A. I was not quite sure what the -- those five bodies were

24 beyond Vitez, although within the environs of Vitez.

25 They were over the bridge on the far side of the town,

1 turn right and they were on the left. I would not know

2 what the specific ethnic mix of that was. They were

3 certainly outside of the two defined areas we knew as

4 Muslim and Croat, so I would not be able to comment.

5 I certainly could not tell from the state of the bodies

6 whether they were Croats or Muslims.

7 Q. On that morning, you went into Stari Vitez and met with

8 Sefkija Djidic, is that right?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. What did he say to you?

11 A. He was confused as to what the situation was, he was

12 fighting a defensive battle and was keen to see a

13 cease-fire and was willing to personally come to Vitez

14 school to discuss a cease-fire.

15 Q. Were there soldiers at his headquarters?

16 A. Actually now I reflect on it, it is slightly strange.

17 There were very few soldiers actually in his

18 headquarters. I suspected they were manning positions

19 on the Muslim edge of the town.

20 Q. How many did you see at his headquarters in Stari Vitez?

21 A. Not very many. I really cannot remember. Two or three,

22 something like that, four.

23 Q. Were they armed?

24 A. Yes, they were.

25 Q. What kind of arms?

1 A. Rifles.

2 Q. AK 47s?

3 A. AK 47 generic weapons, yes.

4 Q. And Djidic made clear to you that he was defending the

5 town, Stari Vitez, correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did he tell you that so far he had successfully defended

8 the town against the HVO attack?

9 A. Yes, he did.

10 Q. You know from your own knowledge that that defence was

11 successful throughout the day of 16th April, correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The 17th April, correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And on to the end of your tour in May 1993, correct?

16 A. Correct, sir.

17 Q. You also visited the Hotel Vitez on the morning of

18 16th April 1993, correct?

19 A. I cannot remember, I do not think I did. I may have

20 done and then, not being able to find who I needed to

21 talk to, I went to a cinema building around the back of

22 Vitez, which was the headquarters of HVO Vitez, as

23 opposed to the Hotel Vitez, which was the headquarters

24 of regional command Central Bosnia.

25 Q. Did you at least drive by the Hotel Vitez on the morning

1 of 16th April?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. Outside of the Hotel Vitez, did you see HVO soldiers

4 taking up armed positions with their firearms?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. Were they aiming in the direction of Stari Vitez?

7 A. Yes, they were.

8 Q. Would you agree that as of 16th April 1993 Stari Vitez

9 posed a military threat to the Hotel Vitez, the

10 headquarters of the HVO?

11 A. What do you mean by "military threat"?

12 Q. Could snipers in Stari Vitez attack, hit, fire upon the

13 Hotel Vitez?

14 A. Yes, they could.

15 Q. And in fact later in the day on the 16th, you met with

16 two HVO soldiers, Mr. Prskalo and Mr. Pilisic, correct, in

17 this meeting at 12.30?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. After the meeting they returned, you were informed, to

20 the Hotel Vitez?

21 A. They were taken back by the liaison officer responsible

22 for Vitez/Busovaca.

23 Q. You were later informed they were both hit by sniper on

24 the afternoon of the 16th after exiting an UN Warrior on

25 their way walking towards the Hotel Vitez, correct?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that that fire came from

3 Stari Vitez, which hit those two men?

4 A. I do not know the exact positions of the sniper fire,

5 but they were certainly Muslim snipers. The direction

6 of fire the liaison officer believed was from his rear

7 as he was walking towards the hotel, which would be in

8 the direction of Stari Vitez. I cannot be specific as

9 to where the sniper positions were. We did not know.

10 Q. As you drove by the Hotel Vitez that morning, could you

11 see whether the windows had been shot out or broken out

12 by grenades?

13 A. I do not have a memory of that.

14 Q. Do you recall, did you go in the building, the Hotel

15 Vitez, or not?

16 A. I think I did. It is really difficult to remember

17 exactly what I did on that morning in detail. I have a

18 vivid memory of going to the cinema and I have a vague

19 memory of going into the Hotel Vitez. Whether it was on

20 the morning of the 16th, the afternoon of the 16th,

21 whether it was on the 17th or 18th I cannot remember,

22 I am afraid.

23 Q. I understand. On your way in and out of Stari Vitez on

24 the morning of 16th April 1993, did you see any trenches

25 or earthen fortifications around the perimeter of

1 Stari Vitez, the Muslim portion of Vitez?

2 A. I do not have a recollection of that, no. I suspected

3 people were defending the positions from the houses.

4 Q. Would that be normal in the absence of earthen

5 fortifications, that any available structure would be

6 used to mount a defence?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Thank you. Later on in your tour, sniping from

9 Stari Vitez continued to be a problem and an issue,

10 correct?

11 A. Sniping from both directions in Vitez, from Vitez centre

12 into Stari Vitez and from Stari Vitez into central Vitez

13 was a problem.

14 Q. Do you know during the period of your service in Bosnia

15 how many dead and wounded in Vitez were sustained as

16 a result of sniper fire from Stari Vitez directed

17 against Vitez?

18 A. No, I do not.

19 Q. Do you know who may have gathered those statistics or

20 kept records of those dead and wounded?

21 A. The Mil Info Summs will have reflected what we were told

22 by various sources and that would probably have been

23 from the commander of Vitez HVO forces to our liaison

24 officer in contact. I suspect that information would be

25 in Mil Info Summs. The accuracy of that information --

1 I would have to read the Mil Info Summs to gain an

2 impression of how accurate that impression might be.

3 Q. Would you also agree that mortars and RPGs fired from

4 within Stari Vitez could threaten the entire geographic

5 area of Vitez?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now let me turn your attention to your visit to Kruscica

8 later in the day on 16th April 1993. Kruscica lies

9 directly to the south, or below, on the map which is

10 Exhibit 29J, below Vitez, correct?

11 A. Correct, south of Vitez.

12 Q. You went there around 5.30 in the afternoon?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Did you determine as a result of your visit that the

15 Army of BiH may have been firing mortars from Kruscica

16 into Vitez on 16th April?

17 A. No, there was nothing to indicate that.

18 Q. Have you said that in any prior interview with the

19 Office of the Prosecutor, that the Armija could have

20 been firing mortars from Kruscica on 16th April 1993?

21 A. That was not the question you asked me. Did I see

22 evidence? The answer was I did not see evidence, but

23 certainly there were BiH positions there and certainly

24 Vitez would be in range of mortars in Kruscica.

25 Q. Was part of the discussion between the United Nations

1 forces and the Army of BiH prior to your going to

2 Kruscica a request by the United Nations that the Army

3 of BiH stop its attack on Poculica?

4 A. Are you talking about the conference at 12.30?

5 Q. I am referring to the discussions and the conditions

6 that were set forth by the Army of BiH in which one of

7 their demands was that UNPROFOR come to Kruscica and

8 evacuate what the Army of BiH described as "wounded

9 female civilians".

10 A. That was one of the conditions, yes.

11 Q. What is that UNPROFOR wanted the Armija to do, that this

12 was a condition precedent for stated by the Armija?

13 A. We just wanted them to stop all indirect fire and

14 fighting within the environs of Vitez.

15 Q. Did that include fighting in the area of Poculica?

16 A. It included fighting everywhere.

17 Q. Including Poculica?

18 A. It would include Poculica. Fighting everywhere, no

19 specifics.

20 Q. After you got to Kruscica, did you find that virtually

21 all of the injured were men, not women?

22 A. I think that is the case. They were certainly men and

23 women, they were not just women, which was what we

24 understood they were. There were women among them.

25 Q. But it was predominantly male casualties correct?

1 A. That is correct. I think there were only about five or

2 six, and I think three out of the five or six were male.

3 Q. How many Army of BiH soldiers did you see at the BiH

4 headquarters in Kruscica on the afternoon of 16th April

5 1993?

6 A. Half a dozen, a dozen.

7 Q. Did you see other soldiers of the Army of BiH in

8 trenches or other earthen fortifications in Kruscica?

9 A. No, I did not. It was dark when we were driving

10 through.

11 Q. Again, as in the case with Stari Vitez, would you

12 believe that in fact the soldiers of BiH at the time

13 were predominantly dispersed in defensive positions, not

14 congregated at the headquarters in Kruscica at the time

15 you visited?

16 A. Yes, I would.

17 Q. Lacking trenches, would you also believe it to be true

18 that they were using any and all available structures in

19 Kruscica to mount their defence?

20 A. Yes, I would.

21 Q. Did Kruscica fall to the HVO on 16th April 1993?

22 A. No, it did not.

23 Q. Did it fall on the 17th?

24 A. No, it did not.

25 Q. Did it fall at any time prior to your leaving the

1 theatre on May 8th 1993?

2 A. No, sir.

3 Q. So we can say, can we not, that the Army of BiH

4 successfully defended Kruscica from the HVO attack that

5 began on 167th April 1993?

6 A. Yes, but on that night my view of the position was that

7 they actually were going to lose. I was quite surprised

8 they managed to defend it. We went back the next

9 morning to try and see, and our route back was blocked

10 by anti-tank mines and a bowser across the road which we

11 managed to negotiate. We got back to the BiH

12 headquarters and they were still defending the town.

13 Q. So it was a pitched battle which you witnessed on the

14 late afternoon/evening of 16th April in Kruscica, is

15 that right?

16 A. I saw very -- I have no recollection of seeing anything

17 leaving Kruscica in terms of artillery or mortars and a

18 vivid recollection of an enormous amount of RPG, mortar

19 and artillery coming into Kruscica. I described it as

20 being in a bowl, it just looked like a cauldron of fire.

21 Q. Kruscica, I believe you said yesterday, lies on a road

22 that could potentially have been used to link Vitez to

23 points south in Herzegovina, correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In that sense, do you agree Kruscica was a location of

1 strategic military significance to both the HVO and the

2 Army of BiH?

3 A. I would say it is operationally important. I would not

4 say it is strategically important.

5 Q. Would you agree Kruscica could be used to mortar or

6 shell the town of Vitez?

7 A. It was in range of Vitez, yes.

8 Q. Did it mortar or shell Vitez during the course of your

9 tour?

10 A. It may well have done. Again, I would have to go and

11 check our Mil Info Summs and read them. There is no

12 reason why it did not, but I do not have a vivid

13 recollection of reading about it.

14 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could place a very short document

15 before the witness, your Honour? (Handed). If this

16 could be placed on the ELMO, Mr. President, Colonel

17 Watters, this again is a redacted portion of a

18 document. Let me read it to you:

19 "1. PWO Mil Info Summ number 098 dated 4 July

20 1993. Vitez.

21 "2. The customary friction between Stari Vitez,

22 Kruscica and the Croat-controlled parts of the town

23 continued with the BiH in Kruscica admitting

24 responsibility for the mortar atk" -- is that "attack"?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Yesterday, "yest", is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "For the mortar attack yesterday which injured 5 times

4 Croats."

5 Would that mean five Croats?

6 A. Yes, it would.

7 Q. Can you tell us what PWO refers to in this Mil Info

8 Summ?

9 A. Yes, it refers to the 1st Battalion of the Prince of

10 Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, who had replaced

11 BritBat 1 Cheshire in mid May, and this Mil Info Summ is

12 dated 4th July and so would refer to a mortar attack

13 which took place on 3rd July.

14 Q. After you departed the theatre?

15 A. Two months after we departed the theatre.

16 Q. Does this document appear to be in the format, to the

17 extent it has not been redacted, of a Mil Info Summ

18 prepared by the military of the United Kingdom?

19 A. It was prepared by the intelligence cell of 1 PWO,

20 I would suspect.

21 MR. HAYMAN: I offer the document.

22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Prosecutor?

23 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I would object to this document.

24 This is not a document the facts of which this

25 particular witness knows anything about. This witness

1 left the theatre, I believe it was in and around

2 11th May 1993, and it may well be some Prince of Wales'

3 own regiment of Yorkshire witnesses that will testify.

4 With all due respect, this particular document should be

5 enquired at at that time. This witness has no knowledge

6 as to the facts concerning this particular document.

7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, the witness -- this dispute

8 over the identification of documents I find to be rather

9 sterile. We have asked Colonel Watters whether it has

10 elements allowing him to identify this type of

11 document. It need not necessarily be a document he

12 himself saw, he was not there on 4th July, but could he

13 still identify this document, or is it a document that

14 reminds him of nothing? The Colonel has seen documents

15 of this kind throughout his career and particularly

16 during the 90 days he was there, so I am addressing

17 myself to the Colonel and ask him whether he can

18 identify this document or not at all.

19 A. Sir, it is in the format of the Mil Info Summs that we

20 produced during our time and that the 1 PWO cell

21 produced on our behalf during the changeover period. As

22 to the facts of the case, I obviously cannot comment, or

23 the facts of the statement.

24 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. I propose that we admit it into

25 evidence, registering the reservations made by the

1 witness and the Prosecutor. This document has not been

2 formally identified by the witness, it is a document

3 published in July 1993, and the judges will assess the

4 weight of this document. We are admitting it with the

5 reservations made by the Prosecutor and the witness, so

6 what is the number of this document?

7 THE REGISTRAR: It is exhibit D63.

8 JUDGE JORDA: So admit D63 with the reservations on the part

9 of the Office of the Prosecutor.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Very well.

11 JUDGE JORDA: And the Trial Chamber will evaluate it.

12 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel Watters, let me turn your attention to

13 17th April 1993. You told us yesterday that you went to

14 a war clinic in Vitez and you saw two bodies inside the

15 clinic.

16 A. That is correct. On the visit to Kruscica, the

17 commander in Kruscica had no medical resources or

18 personnel and the two doctors who administered Kruscica

19 from the clinic in Vitez had not returned back to the

20 village of Kruscica where they lived, and he asked if we

21 would enquire through the officers of the HVO whether

22 they could locate these two doctors, and whether we

23 could get reassurance to the BiH commander in Kruscica

24 as to their safety, and he wished them to be returned

25 back to that village.

1 Q. So did you go to the clinic and enquire as to the

2 whereabouts and safety of these two doctors?

3 A. We went first of all to the headquarters of Vitez town,

4 to Mario Cerkez's headquarters. They did not know about

5 the whereabouts of any doctors, but were able to show us

6 on our maps where the clinic was within the town. We

7 informed them that we would go to the clinic and see if

8 we could find the doctors.

9 Q. Did they tell you who controlled the clinic?

10 A. No, they did not.

11 Q. They did not mention the name Kraljevic?

12 A. I have no recollection of that.

13 Q. So you went to the clinic. Did you enquire as to the

14 safety and whereabouts of these two doctors at the

15 clinic?

16 A. There was nobody at the clinic. The area was under

17 sniper fire and there was nobody around.

18 Q. Sniper fire from where?

19 A. It is very difficult to tell where you are being fired

20 at from snipers. All you actually hear, in an urban

21 environment, is the crack of the round passing by you.

22 It is very difficult to hear the thump which is the

23 actual sound of the rifle firing. We were quite

24 disorientated as to where the sniper fire was coming

25 from.

1 Q. Was the clinic in a location such that it was exposed to

2 potential sniper fire from Stari Vitez?

3 A. I think it probably was. I would have to look at an air

4 photograph and try and reorientate myself, I am afraid.

5 It is not something I have thought about.

6 Q. Were you given the names of the doctors you were

7 enquiring about?

8 A. Yes, we were.

9 Q. What were the names?

10 A. I cannot remember.

11 Q. After you went to the clinic and found it under

12 assault --

13 A. It was under sniper fire, not assault.

14 Q. Under sniper fire, did you undertake any other enquiry

15 to try and determine the safety and whereabouts of these

16 two doctors?

17 A. We looked through the windows, went right round the

18 clinic. In the clinic there were two men dressed in

19 white coats lying dead. There was nobody else in the

20 clinic, there was nobody we could enquire from. We went

21 back and told the HVO headquarters that we could not

22 locate the doctors, we had found two men in the clinic

23 in white coats, they may well have been the doctors, and

24 that was as far as I proceeded with that enquiry,

25 although I was aware that the BiH pursued the enquiry

1 further. I am not totally clear as to where it went.

2 Q. Did you --

3 A. My assumption was that the two men in the clinic were

4 the two dead doctors.

5 Q. Other than your visual observations, did you ever

6 confirm or disprove that these doctors had been harmed?

7 A. I do not remember the doctors ever reappearing, but as

8 I say, the issue was subsumed by far more important

9 issues.

10 Q. You did not go to Zenica to look for them, I take it?

11 A. No, I did not.

12 Q. Would the names of these doctors be located in any

13 records, reports, radio logs or other papers in the

14 possession of UNPROFOR or 1 Cheshire?

15 A. They might be, they may well be in a Mil Info Summ.

16 I do not have a recollection of their names, I just

17 remember referring to them as "the two doctors".

18 Q. Let me turn your attention to 19th April. You discussed

19 yesterday coming upon a group of, I believe, women and

20 children blocking the road --

21 A. And some old men.

22 Q. Thank you, blocking the road between Vitez and Busovaca

23 around the Nadioci area, correct?

24 A. Not between Vitez and Busovaca, it was beyond that

25 junction towards the Zenica flyover.

1 Q. So above the Kaonik junction towards Zenica?

2 A. I think so. Again, I would have to check the map.

3 I think that is roughly where they were.

4 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 53B could be retrieved, your Honour,

5 it was shown to the witness yesterday.

6 A. When you say the Vitez road, I think of the road from

7 Kaonik down to Busovaca, it was not on that road. It

8 was on the road from Vitez to the Zenica flyover.

9 Q. Was it near the so-called Swiss chalet building?

10 A. Yes, it was.

11 Q. That is in the area of Nadioci, is it?

12 A. Yes, it is.

13 JUDGE JORDA: Would you go more slowly, please?

14 MR. HAYMAN: My apologies. Do you know who occupied the

15 Swiss chalet at this time?

16 A. My recollection is describing them as a HOS-type unit.

17 We may have been able to identify them in our Mil Info

18 Summs. I do not remember the exact detail of them, but

19 they did certainly seem to keep themselves to themselves

20 within that military base.

21 Q. You spoke to an individual who held himself out to be a

22 commander, is that right?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. Do you know who that was?

25 A. I do not know his name. He would not give his name,

1 actually.

2 Q. Do you know his rank?

3 A. I do not recollect his rank. He was about six foot two

4 or six foot three, had very fair hair and was

5 athletically built.

6 Q. Based on the number of soldiers he was directing, can

7 you estimate whether he commanded a platoon or a company

8 or a unit of ten men?

9 A. I do not have a recollection of what rank he was and how

10 many soldiers he controlled.

11 Q. I take it you cannot tell us who his superior commander

12 was, his immediate superior commander?

13 A. No, I cannot.

14 Q. On 22nd April 1993, you went to Jelinak and then you

15 went into Ahmici, correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Prior to your visit on 22nd, had you received reports on

18 the 16th April 1993 concerning your units, that is

19 UNPROFOR Warriors visiting Ahmici?

20 A. Yes, I had. Ahmici one of many villages, Santici and

21 villages up that side of the Lasva Valley.

22 Q. Do you remember how many Warriors visited Ahmici on

23 16th April 1993?

24 A. The exact number of Warriors, no, I do not. It is not

25 something I would focus on. I would know that several

1 different call signs had visited it.

2 Q. Which would mean several different vehicles?

3 A. No, several different groups of vehicles, or the same

4 group of vehicles several times.

5 Q. So perhaps nine or ten Warriors, either different or the

6 same Warriors, visited Ahmici at different times on

7 16th April 1993?

8 A. The Warriors travel in groups of four or groups of two

9 and a call sign was four Warriors. I do not have a

10 recollection of how many Warriors visited, but

11 I certainly know that several call signs visited.

12 Whether all the Warriors turned into Ahmici or not, I do

13 not know the exact detail of it.

14 Q. Do you remember what report you received during

15 16th April 1993 from the Warriors that visited Ahmici

16 concerning civilian casualties in Ahmici?

17 A. There were certainly civilian casualties in Ahmici.

18 I have a recollection of one of our Warriors actually

19 removing women and children from Ahmici who were under

20 fire on the 16th, or the environs of Ahmici, in a closed

21 down Warrior. It is quite difficult to work out exactly

22 where you are, just roads within a village complex.

23 Certainly reports of heavy fighting, considerable

24 destruction and casualties, yes, I recollect that.

25 Q. Do you remember how many civilian casualties were

1 reported to you by the Warriors that visited Ahmici on

2 16th April 1993?

3 A. As specific to Ahmici, I do not.

4 Q. It is not something that sticks in your mind?

5 A. There were reports of casualties all up the

6 Lasva Valley, and the figure at that time, by mid

7 morning, we were very reticent to actually state how

8 many casualties there were, because the reports of

9 soldiers coming in were repeating the casualties seen by

10 the road and there was a danger we were going to

11 multiply the number of casualties. It was one of the

12 reasons why I myself went out. I think we put a figure

13 on the 16th of 30 to 50 or 50 to 100, I cannot remember.

14 Q. In the entire Lasva Valley?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. That is dead and wounded?

17 A. No, they were bodies, not wounded.

18 Q. Dead?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Were you told by your units that visited Ahmici on the

21 16th when the fighting began in Ahmici on that day?

22 A. The fighting was happening on the morning of the

23 16th and it appeared that a great deal of destruction

24 within the village had already taken place.

25 Q. Were you told by your units when the fighting ended in

1 Ahmici on 16th April 1993?

2 A. I do not have a recollection of that. There was no

3 reason on the 16th to specifically focus on Ahmici. At

4 that time Ahmici was, to our knowledge, no worse than

5 Santici or any of the other villages up the

6 Lasva Valley. Vitez was actually the area of most

7 interest.

8 MR. HAYMAN: While I am asking the next few questions, your

9 Honour, I would ask that the Registrar assist by putting

10 up what is a map or aerial photograph of Ahmici and

11 should be at hand. I believe it is 53 -- no, Exhibit

12 50.

13 You described for us yesterday visiting Ahmici and

14 identified a number of photographs taken at three

15 different houses that you visited. Do you recall that?

16 A. Yes, I do. That was on 22nd April.

17 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, on 22nd April. If you could look at

18 Exhibit 50 with me and tell us whether you can identify

19 the three houses that you visited.

20 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe, if you like.

21 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Nobilo is retrieving an overhead

22 transparency, your Honour, in case the witness is able

23 to identify the specific houses.

24 Using Exhibit 50, Colonel, can you identify the

25 first house that you visited?

1 A. It is very difficult. It was in this area here

2 (indicates).

3 MR. HAYMAN: Could you stand to the side slightly so the

4 court can see?

5 A. It was in this area here. I am afraid at this time I am

6 unable to accurately point at it. If I was to guess

7 I would think it was one of the houses here on the

8 right-hand side, but I cannot exactly point out the

9 house. We did not use air photographs, we just used

10 maps that did not show the individual houses on that

11 morning.

12 Q. But I take it there is an area within which you can

13 definitively say the house was located?

14 A. I said I am guessing, it was in the upper part of the

15 village.

16 Q. Are you able to say with any more specificity, other

17 than the upper half or part of the village?

18 A. As I said, I would be guessing if I did.

19 Q. Which house was this, was this the house with the

20 line of bodies or skeletons in the basement, or one of

21 the other two houses?

22 A. The first house was the one with the largest number of

23 bodies, the one with the skull I think was in the lower

24 part of the village, but again it was a very short visit

25 to the village.

1 Q. Are you able to identify the other two houses you

2 visited? You have identified to the best of your

3 ability the one with the line of corpses or skeletons in

4 the cellar; are you able to identify the other two

5 houses with any greater specificity?

6 A. No, sir.

7 Q. Thank you, you may be seated. I may have asked you to

8 sit down prematurely. You said that on your visit on

9 22nd April to Ahmici, you found certain locations where

10 the grass had been matted or tramped down and there were

11 shell casings nearby?

12 A. Yes, it was in the lower part of the village.

13 Q. Can you identify that location? I am sorry to ask you

14 to hop up and down, my apologies.

15 A. Again, I would not be able to do it with accuracy.

16 There were sniper positions in this area here covering

17 the road into Ahmici and we were shot at from there on

18 that morning and in the afternoon. We got out about

19 here (indicates) and we foot-patrolled up here with the

20 Warriors coming behind us giving us cover.

21 Q. Indicating towards what is marked as the upper mosque

22 Ahmici?

23 A. Yes. I think the positions we identified were in the

24 area where we dismounted from our Warriors, so at a

25 guess I would talk around here (indicates). Again, I am

1 afraid four years later to point on a photograph is very

2 difficult, I apologise.

3 Q. We understand it is very difficult, but I take it your

4 best evidence is that the areas with matted down or

5 tramped down grass containing numerous shell casings was

6 in the middle portion of Ahmici where you believe you

7 disembarked from your Warriors, is that correct?

8 A. That is as best as my memory serves. I might be wrong

9 but that is what I remember.

10 Q. To make it clear for purposes of the record, the middle

11 portion you are indicating is the area adjacent to the

12 large white area, it could be paved, it could be dirt,

13 white area approximately halfway up the Ahmici road on

14 Exhibit 50, correct?

15 A. As west as I remember it sir, yes.

16 Q. Thank you, you may sit down. Let me direct your

17 attention forward in time to April 24th. Did you learn

18 of a meeting on that day in the Hotel Vitez between

19 Colonel Stewart, Ambassador Thebault and

20 Colonel Blaskic?

21 A. There were several meetings, I do not have an immediate

22 recollection of that particular one, I am afraid.

23 Q. Were you briefed by Colonel Stewart or anyone else

24 concerning discussions at that meeting regarding whether

25 a joint commission should be formed, a multi-ethnic

1 joint commission, including international organisations,

2 to investigate the events in Ahmici?

3 A. We already had a joint commission, I am trying to

4 disentangle that from other thoughts. I do not remember

5 a joint commission for that purpose ever manifesting

6 itself, and I do not have specific memories of Colonel

7 Stewart discussing that with me.

8 Q. The UNPROFOR force, together with other international

9 organisations, had, would you agree, gathered and was

10 gathering a certain amount of information from victims

11 and survivors of Ahmici, correct?

12 A. Certainly the Red Cross was.

13 Q. Did you discuss with Colonel Stewart whether that

14 information should be shared with the HVO to facilitate

15 their investigation of what happened in Ahmici?

16 A. The ICRC would not share that information with us.

17 Q. To your knowledge, they would also not share that

18 information with the HVO, correct?

19 A. I would not think so.

20 Q. So to your knowledge, the HVO was never given any

21 information derived from the victims and survivors of

22 Ahmici from which they could build and further their own

23 investigation, correct?

24 A. That I would think would be correct.

25 MR. HAYMAN: I am going into a new area, your Honour. I am

1 happy to continue, but I would just advise the court.

2 JUDGE JORDA: You can go on until 11.20.

3 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. On 17th April 1993, do you recall

4 receiving reports that the Army of BiH was advancing

5 from Kuber mountain towards the Croat enclave, the

6 Vitez/Busovaca enclave?

7 A. I have a memory of that, yes.

8 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist, your Honour? I would

9 ask that this document be placed on the ELMO before the

10 witness, it is short.

11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Colonel Watters, I would not like

12 that there be any more incidents about identifying of

13 documents. Are you able to identify this document, to

14 talk about what is on it?

15 A. It is in the format of our documents, sir. It is not a

16 whole document, but it is in the format of our

17 documents.

18 JUDGE JORDA: So from the point of view of form, at least

19 theoretically, unless there are any other conditions you

20 would like to make, you do identify this.

21 All right, go ahead, Mr. Hayman.

22 MR. HAYMAN: Before I go further, is this a document that

23 appears to have been created during your tour in Central

24 Bosnia?

25 A. Yes, that would appear to be one of our documents.

1 Q. The top handwritten line reads, "Cheshire Mil Info

2 169 17 April 93". The body of the document, that which

3 has not been redacted, reads:

4 "I. 12.40 hours. The mayor of Vitez claimed that

5 the Croat village of Poculica, grid reference 2794, had

6 been attacked, resulting 1 HVO soldier and two civilians

7 being badly injured.

8 "J. 13.06 hours. It was reported that the

9 village Donje Veceriska, grid reference 2092, was under

10 attack from the HVO.

11 "K. 13.56 hours. It was reported that the

12 village of Kuber, grid reference 3094 (Croat), was under

13 attack from BiH forces."

14 Is this Mil Info Summ, Colonel, consistent with

15 your recollection of the reports you were receiving on

16 17th April 1993?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 MR. HAYMAN: I offer the document, Mr. President.

19 MR. KEHOE: No objection, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, this will be exhibit D64 and no

21 conditions attached to it.

22 I think we can now take our break, Mr. Hayman,

23 unless you have any other questions on this specific

24 document? We will resume at 11.40.

25 (11.20 am)

1 (A short break)

2 (11.40 am)

3 JUDGE JORDA: We can now resume the hearing. Have the

4 accused brought in now please.

5 (Accused brought in)

6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?

7 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honour, I have

8 three additional short Mil Info Summ excerpts that

9 I would ask be placed before the witness and provided to

10 your Honours and the Prosecution.

11 Colonel Watters, if you could take the first one,

12 with the usher's assistance, 19th April 1993, and we

13 will put that on the ELMO. At the top of the document,

14 "Cheshire Mil Info 171 19 April 93". Now moving on the

15 body, paragraph F:

16 "11.06 hours. Colonel Blaskic, HVO Central

17 Bosnia, claimed that there had been a BiH offensive on

18 the area to the north of Busovaca, contravening the

19 cease-fire agreement."

20 First, Colonel, do you agree that reference would

21 be to the cease-fire agreement that was the subject of a

22 Mil Info Summ that you saw yesterday during your

23 testimony?

24 A. Yes, it was reference to a HVO cease-fire agreement

25 which we never actually saw ratified by the BiH. It

1 appeared to be a HVO initiative at that time.

2 Q. You think it was an offer that was never accepted by the

3 BiH?

4 A. We never saw any evidence of the BiH accepting that on

5 the ground, and other Mil Info Summs of the same time,

6 we did not actually see it in place within the HVO on

7 the ground either. It was a rather spurious document in

8 our view.

9 Q. Do you know whether the BiH representatives ever signed

10 that cease-fire agreement of 18th April 1993?

11 A. I never saw a copy of that, I only saw a copy of the

12 agreement signed by Colonel Blaskic.

13 Q. Do you have a belief one way or the other?

14 A. I really did not know. There was a rumour that a

15 cease-fire had been agreed on the 18th by Mr. Izetbegovic

16 and Mr. Boban, and the first evidence that that might be

17 the case we saw was the HVO document that was in the Mil

18 Info Summ you showed me yesterday. There were

19 negotiations with Colonel Stewart with Mr. Hadzihasanovic

20 and Colonel Blaskic, but none of those negotiations ever

21 manifested anything on the ground. From our view, they

22 were just becoming meaningless and it was not until

23 General Morien on the 20th had a meeting with

24 Colonel Blaskic and Mr. Hadzihasanovic in Zenica, from

25 that followed the conference on the 21st that any will

1 on either side appeared to manifest itself on the ground

2 for a cease-fire, although the HVO were manifestly keen

3 for a cease-fire from about the 18th, as at that point

4 they had achieved their objectives.

5 Q. Let us return to the text and I read from it:

6 "The attack was reported to be centred on the

7 villages of Kuber, grid reference 29993, Jelinak, grid

8 reference 3092, and Kaonik, grid reference 302903."

9 Is that report, did you find that report to be

10 consistent with other information and other reports you

11 were receiving at the time?

12 A. Yes, that was during the offensive by the BiH. Whether

13 they had actually achieved those objectives at that time

14 I cannot comment on, but it would be consistent with the

15 fact that there was a BiH counter-offensive during the

16 19th.

17 Q. Turning to the second page, please, there is a short

18 paragraph I will read as well, which begins:

19 "2002. It is interesting to note that the

20 hospital which is guarded by HVO soldiers has been

21 clearing both Croat and Muslim casualties. Muslim

22 casualties have also been allowed to be evacuated to the

23 hospital in Travnik by UN call signs."

24 Do you take this to mean, first of all, that

25 Muslim casualties, soldiers from the battlefield as well

1 as civilians, were being evacuated to the so-called

2 Croat hospital at Nova Bila, is that your understanding

3 of the first sentence of this paragraph?

4 A. I would guess it is, because the Croat hospital or HVO

5 hospital was in Nova Bila. I have no way of knowing if

6 this refers to it, but that was the main hospital for

7 HVO forces in the Vitez area.

8 Q. Was it the only hospital in the Vitez/Busovaca enclave?

9 A. Hospital, yes.

10 Q. Then the second sentence, would that refer to the

11 evacuation, or appear to refer to the evacuation across

12 the frontlines from Nova Bila to Travnik hospital of

13 Muslim casualties?

14 A. Yes, it would. Could you put it in context, please?

15 What date was this?

16 Q. The Mil Info Summ is dated 19th April 1993.

17 A. That is part of the same Mil Info Summ.

18 Q. It was provided to the Defence as part of the same

19 document, yes. Is that consistent with the reports that

20 you received at the time that the Croat hospital in Nova

21 Bila was assisting wounded, regardless of ethnicity?

22 A. I have to confess, it certainly was not a feeling of

23 mine. We evacuated Croat casualties to Nova Bila and we

24 evacuated Muslim casualties to Travnik and both parties

25 agreed to our assistance in moving casualties. I do not

1 know the origin of the report that there were Muslim

2 casualties in the hospital. It is not something I have

3 a memory of, I have to be honest. It could have

4 happened.

5 Q. Do you have any information that would cause you to

6 doubt the report on page 2 of this document, the Mil

7 Info Summ, 19th April 1993?

8 A. No, I do not.

9 MR. HAYMAN: If you could turn to the next document, please,

10 perhaps with the assistance of the usher. This

11 document --

12 JUDGE JORDA: Do you want these to be entered into the

13 record?

14 MR. HAYMAN: I did. I was going to address all three at

15 once, your Honour, but we can do them one at a time.

16 JUDGE JORDA: Does the Office of the Prosecutor have any

17 objections?

18 MR. KEHOE: No, Mr. President. No objection.

19 JUDGE JORDA: No reservations, no objections, so these will

20 be 65 and 66?

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, 65 and 66.

22 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead, Mr. Hayman.

23 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Directing your attention to what has been marked

25 as exhibit D66, it begins at the top in handwritten

1 notation:

2 "Cheshire Mil Info 174 22 April 93.

3 "1. Vitez. The town of Vitez and its

4 surrounding villages were reported to be generally

5 quiet, with the exception of the villages of Sadavace,

6 grid reference 2196 and Brdo, grid reference 2297.

7 Recce", is that a reference to reconnaissance?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. "Reconnaissance call sign were stopped at a well manned

10 BiH" -- CP for checkpoint?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. "Reconnaissance call signs were stopped at a well manned

13 BiH checkpoint at grid reference 214959. There were

14 approximately 30 to 40 well equipped BiH soldiers armed

15 with RPG-7s whose commander (a woman) stated that", that

16 is the end of that paragraph.

17 Then turning your attention to the second page, at

18 the top:

19 "Reconnaissance call sign reported that the two

20 HVO checkpoints north and south of Busovaca have now

21 been collapsed."

22 What would that mean?

23 A. That the two checkpoints that had prevented movement

24 through the town of Busovaca from the period of about

25 16th April until this day had been removed.

1 Q. "The BiH have inserted two checkpoints on the route from

2 Kacuni to Kiseljak at grid reference 390803 and", and

3 there is a letter that may be "3" on the next line,

4 "407794. Soldiers at the latter grid placed a RPG-7 in

5 the fire position and pointed it at a reconnaissance

6 call sign. The BiH have stated that no UN vehicles will

7 be allowed through these checkpoints for the next ten to

8 fifteen days."

9 Does this portion of the Mil Info Summ indicate

10 that the BiH was putting additional pressure on Kiseljak

11 from the direction of Kacuni?

12 A. What it refers to is the 24 hour period after the

13 signing of the cease-fire agreement on the 21st April,

14 when General Halilovic came back and asked for an

15 additional 24 hours, because due to the spacing of his

16 forces and the fact that they had been fighting

17 continuously for the last three days, it would require

18 his personal intervention on the field of battle to

19 actually bring the fighting to an end with the BiH

20 forces, and these reports are consistent with the

21 fighting that the BiH were continuing to do on the early

22 morning of the 22nd because the 3rd Corps had been

23 unable to get their orders down, and we had to put

24 General Halilovic in one of our vehicles and actually

25 take him out to these various places for him to

1 personally give the orders.

2 MR. HAYMAN: I offer exhibit D66, your Honour.

3 MR. KEHOE: No objection, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE JORDA: It will be both pages?

5 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it will have both pages.

6 MR. HAYMAN: Was the process, Colonel, of containing

7 adherence to the cease-fire, was it a process that

8 continued over a number of days after 22nd April 1993?

9 A. Yes, it was. There continued to be fighting on both

10 sides sporadically at the tactical level over the next

11 few days, which we interdicted. The most difficult area

12 to actually bring the fighting to an end was in the

13 Kiseljak valley.

14 Q. Let me direct your attention to the third document,

15 marked for identification as D67, which is titled in

16 handwritten form, "Cheshire Mil Info 180 28 April 93".

17 I will read it:

18 "Warrior call sign patrolling in the

19 Busovaca/Kiseljak road reported that there was heavy

20 fighting in the area of Kazagici, grid reference 6279,

21 with the village now under the control of the BiH. The

22 HVO had occupied positions around the village yesterday,

23 see Mil Info Summ number 179. However, the BiH appeared

24 to have retaken Kazagici over the last 24 hours. The

25 village was reported to be extremely badly damaged, with

1 almost every house having been set fire to. The central

2 operations group commander, Colonel Blaskic, demanded

3 that BritBat should try harder in their peacekeeping

4 efforts this morning."

5 Is this report consistent with the other reports

6 you were receiving at the time concerning the difficulty

7 of enforcing the cease-fire agreement of 21 April 1993?

8 A. Yes, there was continued fighting between HVO and BiH in

9 the Kiseljak valley, especially over contested villages,

10 which was a fall-out from fighting going even as far

11 back as January. We also asked, I remember distinctly,

12 because this message rather annoyed me from

13 Colonel Blaskic, that he also redouble his efforts along

14 with our own to stop his fighting and we said the same

15 to the BiH.

16 Q. Would you agree that where a village had been taken and

17 retaken and perhaps retaken again by opposing military

18 forces, at the end of that process of fighting, the

19 village is likely to be very heavily damaged?

20 A. I would certainly think so, yes.

21 Q. Is that reflected here in this report concerning

22 Kazagici?

23 A. I have memories of the destruction of Kazagici, yes.

24 MR. HAYMAN: I offer D67, your Honour.

25 MR. KEHOE: No objection, Mr. President.

1 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel, I have had placed on the easel a white

2 tablet of paper and I would like to ask you some

3 questions and then make certain notations on the chart.

4 I will ask you if they are fair and accurate, to help us

5 and the court understand the number of levels of command

6 from the level of the operative zone to that of actual

7 fighting units who would have taken part in the

8 fighting, for example, on 16th April 1993. May

9 I approach the tablet, your Honour?

10 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead, and if the Prosecution wishes to go

11 over to the easel, please do.

12 MR. KEHOE: I have one comment. Is Mr. Hayman planning on

13 doing the writing?

14 JUDGE JORDA: Well, we have tried all kinds of things.

15 Sometimes it is the Defence writing, sometimes the

16 Prosecution writing. Mr. Hayman, what do you have in

17 store for us now? Are you going to be doing the drawing

18 or writing, the different command levels?

19 MR. HAYMAN: There are a number of levels, your Honour.

20 I would like to elicit from the witness what the names

21 of those levels are and then I will simply write and

22 repeat the names of those levels on top of each other on

23 the tablet. I think that is the most efficient way to

24 proceed.

25 JUDGE JORDA: Are you the one who is actually going to do

1 the writing?

2 MR. HAYMAN: I propose to, yes, your Honour. I think that is

3 the most efficient way to proceed.

4 JUDGE JORDA: It would have perhaps been more efficient if

5 you had prepared a document on which you would have

6 listed what in your opinion represents the chain of

7 command, which would have been put on the ELMO and we

8 could have asked the witness to make his comments about

9 it. Now we are going to see you drawing and writing for

10 a little while, which is not unpleasant, but it is going

11 to waste some time. All right, you could not have done

12 it any other way. Have it put on the ELMO.

13 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, at this point I would object to

14 Mr. Hayman writing anything and if this is going to be

15 some type of exhibit that Mr. Hayman intends to use, let

16 the Colonel do the writing and not counsel.

17 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, if Mr. Kehoe objects to my writing,

18 he certainly would have objected to my predrafting the

19 document, but with all respect to my learned friend

20 across the bar --

21 JUDGE JORDA: And all the respect I owe to Mr. Kehoe as well,

22 I have to overrule the objection. We have to have a

23 clear vision of what we are doing as to answers and

24 questions. I simply wanted to say that in the future,

25 I would have preferred a more effective method to use,

1 but now we will have Mr. Hayman going to be writing,

2 asking questions, writing it down, it is going to take

3 some time. If we could have done it differently it

4 would have been better, but it is too bad. Since we are

5 talking about Mr. Hayman writing, I do not see any

6 problem with that. Mr. Hayman will write it, then it

7 will be tendered as evidence, but we have to also note

8 specifically and very clearly are the witness's answers

9 and any other questions that Mr. Kehoe will want to ask.

10 Mr. Hayman if you have no other documents you wish

11 to produce, perhaps you should do this quickly, that is

12 to describe the command levels so that we can get to the

13 crux of the matter, which is the answers from Colonel

14 Watters.

15 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to, your Honour. Colonel Watters,

16 first of all, would you agree that the level of command

17 at which Colonel Blaskic was located in 1993 was that of

18 the operative zone?

19 A. Central Bosnia, yes.

20 Q. Which we could represent by "operative zone"?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Below the operative zone level, would you agree that the

23 next level of command in the command structure of the

24 HVO in place at the time was that of the operative

25 group?

1 A. Yes, I would. I explained this yesterday.

2 Q. Would you agree that under the operative group comes the

3 brigade, or a number of brigades?

4 A. Yes, I would.

5 Q. Under the brigades, are there battalions?

6 A. We never really understood it as that, because the size

7 of the brigade could be -- by and large villages were

8 named as brigades or brigades named after people. The

9 size of the brigades depended very much on the size of

10 the village or area that the brigade was raised from.

11 We never focused below brigade, which we considered to

12 be the tactical level.

13 Q. During your tour in the theatre, did you hear the use of

14 the term "Boyna" to refer to a unit of soldiers,

15 B-O-Y-N-A?

16 A. I have no memory of it. I might have done.

17 Q. In the military structure of your military, would you

18 agree that the battalion comes under the brigade in

19 terms of the structure or command structure?

20 A. Yes, indeed.

21 MR. HAYMAN: Then, your Honour, I am going to put battalion

22 down as a general representation of military structure.

23 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, you have an objection you wish to

24 make.

25 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, that is not what the witness said.

1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I agree with Mr. Kehoe. This is not what

2 the witness said. Mr. Hayman, this is the disadvantage

3 of the method you are using. It would have been better

4 for you to prepare the document, give it to the witness,

5 which would have gone more quickly. Now for each of the

6 points you are going to ask questions and you have to

7 wait until you get the answer that you are looking for.

8 If this document is to be put in as an exhibit, it must

9 be clearly marked, putting in question marks where it

10 would be that the witness does not agree with your

11 definition of brigade as you explained it. I am sorry.

12 MR. HAYMAN: That is fine, your Honour, but this illustrates

13 why I could not prepare the exhibit in advance.

14 JUDGE JORDA: Not at all, I do not agree with that. You

15 could have put in a document and the witness would have

16 made comments, it would have gone much more quickly. It

17 does not work for brigade. There is something which is

18 not accepted there and I sustain the objection of the

19 Prosecutor and whatever questions that the witness has,

20 it has to be indicated on the transcript.

21 MR. HAYMAN: Let us go back, Colonel. Operative zone, that

22 is a level of command you know to have existed in the

23 HVO in, for example, 1993, correct?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Then I am going to place next to "operative zone",

1 "(HVO)"?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. And the same with respect to the operative group

4 formation, correct?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. You know brigades, at least the term brigade, to have

7 been used by the HVO, correct?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. How would you describe the command structure, that is

10 the existence of units with commanders within the HVO

11 during the period of your tour of duty below the brigade

12 level?

13 A. I was not actually aware of a structure that was below

14 brigade level. I did not deal below brigade level, and

15 when studying the daily reports, as one village appeared

16 to be attacking another village, we did not, at the

17 battalion operational level, involve ourselves in the

18 structure of the village force, the brigade. That is

19 not to say that through reports we might not have put

20 together structures that we would have processed through

21 Mil Info Summs, but I would not actually have involved

22 myself in the detail of that, at battalion level. Our

23 company commanders might have done.

24 Q. Are you able to tell us whether there were smaller units

25 of organisation such as based on a territorial principle

1 within the HVO in 1993 under the brigade level, or do

2 you simply not know?

3 A. I do not know. Sorry, the one exception to that would

4 be the unit that you talked about earlier, in the

5 bungalows, which appeared to be a small, self-contained

6 unit and I never penetrated exactly which of the

7 brigades it belonged to.

8 Q. So there were other smaller units, but you cannot

9 further describe them?

10 A. That is the only one that I ever identified personally.

11 Q. Let me ask you, if a military action was to be ordered

12 at the level of operative zone, for example an action to

13 attack military targets and eliminate military targets

14 in Kruscica, Stari Vitez, Ahmici and other locations

15 where there were military targets, what would that order

16 look like? What kinds of elements would be contained in

17 that order at the level of the operative zone?

18 A. I never saw an order promulgated at the operatal zone.

19 I can only tell you how I would imagine it would be,

20 because most of the senior officers within the HVO had

21 been former JNA officer, and had been trained formerly

22 in military doctrine. I would imagine that it would

23 give specific mission statement and specific tasks to

24 subordinate units.

25 Q. For example:

1 "Subordinate unit X, you are to attack BiH

2 military positions in Kruscica and eliminate them"?

3 A. Again, that is what I would write.

4 Q. Based on your 25 years of military experience, that is

5 the type of order you would expect coming from the

6 operative zone level, correct?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. What about at the level of the operative group? Would

9 it be any more detailed at the operative group level, or

10 not? That is the order, for example, to attack military

11 targets and eliminate or neutralise them in the village

12 of Kruscica?

13 A. Yes, essentially what you are talking about is the

14 allocation of resources to tasks, so at the operational

15 zone a specific area controlled by the operational group

16 would be given a series of tasks. It would be up to the

17 operational group commander to allocate his resources to

18 achieve the task set by him, by the operational zone.

19 That process cascades down through brigade, and the

20 brigade would organise its forces in whatever groupings

21 it had and give people specific tasks, down to which

22 side of the road, left or right, particular groups would

23 assault a position, where the fire bases would be,

24 et cetera.

25 Q. Just slow down for just a moment. The operative group

1 order, is it correct, would likely allocate resources at

2 the brigade level among the different tasks which

3 comprised the overall mission or goal set forth at the

4 operative zone level, correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Then at the brigade level, for example, with that order,

7 under the situation we are discussing, the scenario or

8 hypothetical if you will, the brigade order would

9 specifically target resources or allocate resources to,

10 for example, three different --

11 A. Manoeuvre units, yes.

12 Q. Manoeuvre units to attack one village at three different

13 locations or perhaps two villages, something like that?

14 A. Absolutely.

15 Q. Based on your general military experience, is that the

16 end of the chain of orders, or are there further more

17 detailed orders to lower level and smaller units of

18 soldiers, telling them what their task is and what they

19 are to do in fulfilling the overall order from above?

20 A. I can only explain from the British army's doctrine and

21 that would be the case. The battalion commander would

22 give orders to his company commanders. The company

23 commander gives orders to the platoon commanders, a

24 platoon is three ten-man manoeuvre units, and the

25 section commander, the ten-man manoeuvre unit, would

1 give orders to his two fire teams, each of four men.

2 Q. So at least within the military structure from your

3 tradition, there are four additional levels of command

4 below the brigade level, correct?

5 A. Correct, to achieve the mission statement at each level.

6 Q. That is battalion level, company level, platoon level

7 and section level, roughly units of ten men?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Based on your knowledge and training and experience,

10 would you agree that at the battalion level, which you

11 described as being one below the brigade level, that

12 typically a battalion order would typically, for

13 example, direct an attack or an assault on one location,

14 one hill, one village, something of that sort?

15 A. No, it would really depend on the strength of the enemy,

16 and in attack you would want to establish probably a

17 three-to-one ratio, so, dependent on the strength of the

18 enemy position, would probably depend the size of force

19 you committed to it. A battalion, if it was attacking

20 three platoon locations, might allocate a company to

21 attack each platoon. If a battalion was attacking a

22 company defence position on a hill, then the battalion

23 would attack it as a whole.

24 Q. Coming down below the battalion level and the company

25 level to the platoon level, would it be common, for

1 example, in fighting in built-up areas, for a platoon

2 commander to give an order to his units, his 30 or so

3 men, to secure a group of buildings or a single building

4 within a built-up area?

5 A. Within the company plan, within the battalion plan,

6 within the brigade plan, absolutely.

7 Q. How about at the lowest level --

8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, could you try to summarise where

9 you are getting? I would like us to go a little more

10 quickly. We are going through a military course here,

11 very interesting, of course, to show that there was a

12 command chain from the commander down to the platoons to

13 the soldiers. What are you getting at? Let us try to

14 get there as directly as possible, please.

15 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, what I will -- I will move as

16 quickly as I can. What we are trying to establish is

17 the nature of the orders that would be given at each

18 level in this chain and at the operative zone level, as

19 the witness has described, basically a mission is set

20 forth, but the decisions of how that is to be carried

21 out, what resources are to be allocated where, and as we

22 will see in a moment whether a particular building is or

23 is not to be attacked, those decisions are made, five,

24 six, seven levels of command below the level of the

25 operative zone. That is the line of enquiry I am

1 pursuing.

2 JUDGE JORDA: The witness answered you, answered you

3 quickly. He said it depended on the force of the enemy,

4 if it was an important zone, if there was great

5 potential for the enemy, if he had a great ability to

6 resist. Obviously his resource allegation would be

7 given to more important commands for various

8 situations. It is part of military logic it seems to

9 me. Go ahead, but try to go about it more quickly,

10 please.

11 MR. HAYMAN: In the context of fighting in built-up areas,

12 Colonel, at what level in these seven or so levels of

13 command that you have set forth would a decision be made

14 whether a particular structure represented a military

15 target and whether a grenade should be thrown into that

16 structure prior to entering? At what level of command

17 would that decision be made?

18 A. Who was to attack which house would obviously depend on

19 the size of the force attacking, which would be

20 predicated by the size of the resistance you were

21 expecting. When you get down to the actual assaulting

22 of a specific house within the plan of the platoon

23 commander, the company commander, the battalion

24 commander, the actual house would probably be attacked

25 by a section of ten men, and as to the throwing of a

1 grenade into a house, that would be the decision of

2 probably the section commander when he came up with his

3 tactical plan as to how the section would assault the

4 house. He would decide which soldiers would put down

5 the initial fire, which soldiers would enter the house

6 and the individual soldier would throw the grenade.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MR. KEHOE: Has counsel completed with his chart?

9 MR. HAYMAN: I have completed my work with that tablet, your

10 Honour.

11 JUDGE JORDA: Do you wish to have it admitted into evidence,

12 the first three lines, Mr. Hayman?

13 MR. HAYMAN: It is not necessary, your Honour.

14 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Continue, please.

15 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Mr. President.

16 Colonel Watters, on 19th April 1993, did you

17 receive a report from one of your call signs of HVO

18 artillery firing from the artillery location at Mosunj.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 A. I am sorry, we had hundreds of reports of artillery fire

21 over that period. I cannot be specific as to one of

22 them.

23 MR. HAYMAN: At approximately 12.30 pm on 19th April, do you

24 have any recollection of receiving a report of the

25 firing of an HVO artillery at Mosunj, that being

1 approximately the time at which the city of Zenica

2 received a number of shells, artillery shells?

3 A. As I stated yesterday, we cross-referenced reports of

4 firing at approximately the time we were told that the

5 artillery shells landed in Zenica. There were examples

6 where they cross matched. I cannot remember what they

7 were. That in itself did not mean those guns actually

8 fired at Zenica, of course.

9 Q. In your prior interview with the Office of the

10 Prosecutor, did you indicate or tell them:

11 "Our call signs reported HVO artillery firing from

12 the Mosunj feature at 12.30, grid reference 1994", that

13 being a reference to 19th April 1993?

14 A. I have had a lot of conversations with the Prosecution

15 counsel. When cross-referencing Mil Info Summs and

16 situation reports, I may have been able to establish

17 that. I apologise that I cannot recall the detail right

18 now.

19 Q. So if you said that and you had those materials before

20 you now, you believe you could answer the question?

21 A. Yes, I probably could. As I said, we did

22 cross-reference and there were examples of HVO artillery

23 firing at the reported time of the rounds falling in

24 Zenica.

25 Q. Was any overall report or summary of that incident or

1 event prepared by UNPROFOR, if you know?

2 A. It was recorded in a Mil Info Summ, the incident.

3 Q. You said earlier that you visited the Serb artillery

4 positions on the Vlasik feature?

5 A. No, I did not. I did not say I did.

6 Q. Did someone else visit that?

7 A. I said Colonel Stewart spoke to the Serb regional

8 commander that controlled that artillery on Vlasik

9 mountain.

10 Q. Did you tell us that Colonel Stewart determined that the

11 Serb artillery on the Vlasik feature could not reach

12 Zenica?

13 A. I have a vague memory that it had 17 kilometres range

14 when our people checked the type of artillery they had

15 but 17 kilometres was not in range of Zenica. Again,

16 I am recalling a conversation four years ago.

17 Q. You were aware during your tour of duty that the Serbs

18 were regularly shelling Zenica during the time period of

19 April and May 1993, correct?

20 A. No, I was not aware that the Serbs were regularly

21 shelling Zenica. The fall of artillery on Zenica on the

22 18th was a cataclysmic event. They might have been

23 shelling the areas around, but not the city itself.

24 I have no recollection of that.

25 Q. If they were, would that be inconsistent with the report

1 that Colonel Stewart gave you, that the Serb artillery

2 on the Vlasik feature was out of range of Zenica?

3 A. I am sorry, can you repeat that question?

4 Q. If in fact the Serbs were shelling Zenica, and did shell

5 Zenica on a number of occasions in April and May 1993,

6 would that be inconsistent with the representation, the

7 information that Colonel Stewart gave you, that he had

8 determined that the Serb positions on the Vlasik feature

9 could not reach Zenica?

10 A. The only two recollections I have of artillery falling

11 on Zenica were on the 18th and 24th April. I have no

12 recollection of any other, that is the first point.

13 Secondly, in theoretical terms, had artillery which

14 could have been unequivocally traced to the Serbs been

15 falling on Zenica, then we would have not been accurate

16 in our assumption that the Vlasik mountain could not

17 reach Zenica, that is correct.

18 Q. Let us return for a moment to the group of soldiers that

19 dressed in black and that were based in the Swiss chalet

20 near Nadioci. Do you have them in mind?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Based on your experience in the theatre, did you

23 determine that they appeared to respond to a higher

24 authority than Colonel Blaskic?

25 A. Yes, that is correct.

1 Q. Do you know what higher authority that was?

2 A. We thought they responded on a dual military and

3 political chain of command, and we assessed that their

4 political chain of command was possibly Mr. Dario Kordic

5 in Busovaca, and that was reinforced by the capturing of

6 the aid convoy, but that was the only incident we have

7 to support that hypothesis.

8 Q. Do you know an individual named Nick Iljic?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. Was he a member of 1 Cheshire Regiment?

11 A. I am not prepared to answer that question.

12 Q. Can you tell us -- I take it you decline to answer the

13 question of whether he was a soldier with the

14 1 Cheshires in Bosnia, is that right? I just want to

15 make clear what you are and are not willing to say to

16 us.

17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor?

18 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, we are straying potentially into an

19 area about which by the law of the United Kingdom the

20 Colonel is not permitted to discuss. If the court wants

21 to go into private session, I will gladly elaborate on

22 what the Colonel is permitted by United Kingdom law to

23 say and not say.

24 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, why do I not finish the rest of my

25 examination and then over the lunch hour perhaps I can

1 discuss this with the Prosecutor? There may be a more

2 efficient resolution to the issue.

3 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I agree with Mr. Hayman. Complete your

4 cross-examination and the question may possibly be

5 raised in the afternoon.

6 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel, there was a videotape prepared to

7 memorialise in some ways the service of your regiment in

8 Bosnia, correct?

9 A. In exact detail, two ITN technicians created a video for

10 a sergeant who saved their life as a thank you to him,

11 and they took a series of film from ITN network and put

12 tracks of music to it and gave it to that particular

13 sergeant. His company commander then used the picture

14 to -- used the video as a commemoration -- that is the

15 wrong word, as a momento of the tour.

16 Q. Did that tape contain footage of actual events that

17 occurred in Bosnia during the tour of one Cheshires?

18 A. Yes, it did. I am very familiar with that tape.

19 Q. You have viewed it personally?

20 A. Yes, I have.

21 MR. HAYMAN: What I would like to do, your Honour, is play a

22 tape which has previously been played, exhibit D58. It

23 is in three segments and I would ask that it be played

24 one segment at a time.

25 We will pause after each segment, Colonel, and

1 then I will ask you, among other things, whether you

2 recognise any portion of that segment as having been

3 taken from the Mostar tape which you have described.

4 Very well, if we could play the first segment, please.

5 (Videotape played)

6 (Videotape stopped)

7 Q. If we could hold the tape for a moment, first what you

8 have seen so far, Colonel, do you recognise it as having

9 been taken from the Mostar tape that you have described?

10 A. Parts of are, parts of it are not. The original tape is

11 90 minutes long and I know it very well.

12 Q. If we could call back the image that was on the screen

13 when we paused, do you recognise this segment as being

14 from the Mostar tape, produced by ITN for a soldier in

15 the 1 Cheshire Regiment?

16 A. I have to confess I do not remember that particular bit,

17 no.

18 Q. Do you recognise the vehicle type in this picture?

19 A. Yes, I do, it is a -- I cannot actually tell if it is

20 one of our own and the timeframe. It is certainly a

21 British army Scimitar working for the United Nations.

22 Whether it is one of our own or not, I cannot see the

23 call sign markings on the side from this angle, so

24 I could not identify that. If it was taken during the

25 period November until May, it would be one of ours. If

1 it was taken afterwards, it would be one of the PWO's.

2 Q. Do you have any other way of assisting us to identify

3 the photograph?

4 A. It is certainly an UN vehicle and as I said, if you

5 could tell me when the tape was taken I could place it

6 in context. I cannot put this piece of picture in

7 context. It appears to be somebody either handing up a

8 shotgun or handing down a shotgun.

9 Q. You do recognise the weapon as a shotgun?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. That is not an UN-issued weapon, is it?

12 A. No, it is not.

13 MR. HAYMAN: If we could continue with the tape, please?

14 (Videotape played)

15 (Videotape stopped)

16 Q. That is the second segment. Did you recognise portions

17 of that?

18 A. No, I did not. I think we are talking about two

19 different tapes here. This is not the tape that I was

20 referring to earlier that was given to Sergeant

21 Kudavinski, which was adopted by A Company as their

22 tape. This appears to be an amalgam of footage from

23 television, and it is not the tape I was talking about.

24 Q. Did you recognise Lieutenant Colonel Thomas in the

25 second segment?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 MR. HAYMAN: If we could play the third segment, please.

3 (Videotape played)

4 (Videotape stopped)

5 Q. If we could freeze there, if that is possible, do you

6 recognise that vehicle?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Whose is it?

9 A. It is a Warrior. Do you mean whose actual vehicle is

10 it?

11 Q. Do you know, can you tell?

12 A. It is the commander officer's.

13 Q. Does it appear to be firing in this picture?

14 A. I actually know the circumstances and I viewed that

15 whole piece of film. I know it is returning fire at two

16 HVO soldiers who have just fired a RPG-7. If you look

17 at the earlier part of the picture you will see the

18 RPG-7 impacting on the wall just to the right of the

19 Warrior.

20 MR. HAYMAN: Maybe we can turn back and see that, if that is

21 possible. If we could go forward now, please?

22

23 A. You can see it impacting.

24 Q. You can point it out on the brick wall?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. If we could go back to the brick wall, please?

2 (Videotape played)

3 (Videotape stopped)

4 Q. Are you able to determine the impact of the round?

5 A. You can see the smoke of the round just there

6 (indicates). When you look at the whole piece of film,

7 you actually see the impact of the round, and the

8 contact report that was sent was that they had been

9 engaged by a RPG-7 and had returned fire at the firing

10 position.

11 Q. Do you know where and when this incident occurred?

12 A. I think it occurred during the monitoring of the

13 cease-fire after 21st April. I could be wrong.

14 I cannot remember the exact village, I just remember the

15 piece of film, I am afraid.

16 Q. Who has the complete tape of that event, if you know?

17 A. The complete event was shot by television, I do not know

18 which company owns it.

19 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. That will complete the viewing of

20 the tape.

21 A. Could I just make a point?

22 Q. Please.

23 A. You played that piece of film backwards. Could you play

24 the piece of film backwards showing the soldiers in the

25 Scimitar in what appears to be passing a weapon down to

1 soldiers, because I think is a very misleading bite of

2 film which makes it appear that United Nations soldiers

3 were actually passing weapons down to the warring

4 factions within Bosnia, and I find that to be quite a

5 dreadful piece of film. What I am saying is if you play

6 that film backwards the soldier is having it passed up

7 to him, and if you were to look at a larger piece of

8 film and put it in context, you would see exactly what

9 is happening in that piece of film, and I think you will

10 find the soldier passed the shotgun he was carrying up

11 to the soldier in the Scimitar to have a look at and the

12 soldier in the Scimitar passed the weapon back down to

13 him.

14 Q. Do you have that tape? Do you know where we can find

15 that tape, a larger tape of that incident?

16 A. Yes, I think that is available.

17 Q. Who would have that?

18 A. I have seen that piece of tape, I think the Prosecution

19 have a copy of it.

20 MR. KEHOE: We have it, judge. This tape has been edited and

21 we are more than willing to play it.

22 JUDGE JORDA: I think that is a slight procedural problem,

23 Colonel. Perhaps we can leave that for the response of

24 the Prosecutor when he can ask the context of this video

25 on which the witness was questioned, and then we can

1 have it shown. However, Mr. Hayman, this proves that the

2 witness has the impression that he is being asked to

3 respond on the basis of very partial material, but the

4 judges are here to appreciate what is being shown, and

5 we are able to say things which we do not always want

6 to.

7 First of all, Colonel, I quite understand your

8 remark. It will be up to the Prosecutor, who is in

9 charge of his case, to refer to it in his

10 re-examination, and then he can ask for the previous

11 part of the tape to be played. Thank you.

12 Continue, Mr. Hayman.

13 MR. HAYMAN: We have played everything we have pertaining to

14 that incident, your Honour. If there is another more

15 complete tape, we would certainly welcome it being

16 presented.

17 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, on that line, it begs the question

18 as to where this tape came from.

19 MR. HAYMAN: If I could continue with my examination, your

20 Honour, I would like to.

21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you can continue your cross-examination,

22 but the question will arise as to the source of this

23 video, which we have already seen. It seems to me that

24 we have already seen these three sequences.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, this tape and the film was shown.

1 JUDGE JORDA: By whom and during which testimony, please?

2 Do not hurry.

3 THE REGISTRAR: It was when Tudor Ellis was testifying on

4 30th September.

5 JUDGE JORDA: It has been admitted into evidence?

6 THE REGISTRAR: No, it has not been admitted into evidence.

7 JUDGE JORDA: So it is still under the previous reservation

8 that we had for some documents. Mr. Hayman, if

9 I remember well, I think Mr. Hayman said that he reserved

10 the right to give the source of this video later, was

11 that not so, Mr. Hayman?

12 MR. HAYMAN: We did, we also showed the tape to Captain Ellis

13 to see what portion or portions he could authenticate,

14 and we are doing the same thing with this witness, your

15 Honour.

16 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, you got the answer of the witness,

17 he has not identified everything and for the moment we

18 will not admit it into evidence until it has been

19 identified, and we will retain in the record the

20 reservations expressed. Perhaps if we had seen it in

21 its totality, we would have a completely different

22 understanding, precisely the question of who was handing

23 the weapon to whom.

24 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel, yesterday you discussed a criticism you

25 had of Colonel Blaskic for not arresting any suspects

1 whose names he may have relayed to the military

2 prosecuting authorities within the HVO, or up his chain

3 of command, if you will. I would like to ask you if you

4 have undertaken any study of the law in the former

5 Yugoslavia or in Bosnia that would set forth what the

6 standards are for referring suspects for further

7 investigation and possible prosecution, as well as the

8 standards for arresting a soldier who may be the subject

9 of that type of procedure?

10 A. No, I had not. I was only applying the regulations that

11 exist in our own army and in the United Nations.

12 Q. But you would agree those are not regulations that would

13 have applied on the territory of Central Bosnia in 1992,

14 1993 and 1994?

15 A. I do not know that.

16 Q. The law of England did not apply to soldiers in the

17 former Yugoslavia, correct?

18 A. The law of England did not, no, but the Articles of War

19 did.

20 Q. Tell us. Within United Kingdom military law, is the

21 same standard of proof required for referring an

22 individual to a military prosecutor for further

23 investigation and for arresting and detaining an

24 individual? Is that your testimony?

25 A. No, what I am saying is that if I was commanding an

1 organisation that had or was accused of committing an

2 atrocity the like of Ahmici and I knew, I would initiate

3 an investigation with all the resources at my command,

4 and if I identified people who had been involved in it,

5 yes, I would arrest them and I would detain them pending

6 further investigation by our military police

7 authorities. That I am entitled to do as a commander.

8 I would certainly not want those soldiers continuing to

9 operate under my command if I suspected them of doing

10 such a thing.

11 Q. Is there a procedure under UK military law for further

12 investigation directed by the military prosecutor?

13 A. Yes, there is, by the military police.

14 Q. Under some circumstances under UK military law are those

15 suspects detained, and then under other circumstances

16 not detained, pending that investigation?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you telling this court that the UK military law

19 requires a suspect to be detained under certain

20 circumstances and not under others?

21 A. There are certain circumstances in which a suspected

22 person is required to be detained by our regulations and

23 the remainder of that area of jurisdiction is up to the

24 judgment of the commanding officer or the brigade

25 commander, or the divisional commander.

1 Q. You are talking about an area about which under UK

2 military law there is discretion in the commander?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. We are not talking about a violation of UK military law,

5 correct?

6 A. I would consider it a severe error of judgment by a

7 commander, but technically, he has that jurisdiction.

8 MR. HAYMAN: Let us return to 16th April for just a moment

9 and then I will conclude. I am going to approach, your

10 Honour, with permission.

11 Directing your attention back to Exhibit 29J and

12 the overhead transparency upon it, and calling your

13 attention to 16th April, you drew two blue lines to

14 indicate the separation lines, if you will, of the HVO

15 and then two additional lines to indicate the withdrawal

16 points, if you will, of the BiH following the cease-fire

17 of 21 April 1993, correct?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Can you tell us, on 16th April 1993 how far towards the

20 line marked "A" did the HVO advance?

21 A. I have a recollection that line A was significant within

22 the requirements of the HVO, and I think it marked the

23 forward limit of quite a long-standing HVO presence.

24 Q. Sorry, you believe the HVO advanced across the

25 line marked "A" on 16th April 1993?

1 A. No, they had positions up there in the hills dug in and

2 they advanced along the valley floor, was our reading of

3 the battle as it was reported to us.

4 Q. At what time was the maximum advanced or securing of

5 territory north of the spinal road from Vitez to

6 Busovaca achieved by the HVO? Was that on the 16th?

7 A. No, the major attack started on the morning of the

8 16th and there was continuous fighting in that area

9 through the 17th and 18th, but the major offensive

10 appeared to be on the morning of the 16th.

11 Q. When would the maximum amount of control of territory

12 have been achieved by the HVO?

13 A. I would suspect by the end of the 17th.

14 Q. In relation particularly to the village of Ahmici, how

15 far north of the spinal road did the HVO go?

16 A. They were, I would say, about line alpha, as far as we

17 could determine. We did not actually patrol into that

18 area. As you can see, there are no roads and we did not

19 take our Warriors. There are roads, but our Warriors

20 had terrible problems getting up them. They are very

21 small roads. It is quite mountainous.

22 Q. Are you familiar with the location of Barangaj, above

23 Ahmici on this map?

24 A. I am not aware of that place, no.

25 Q. Kratine, is that a location you believe was overtaken by

1 the HVO on 16th or 17th, or not?

2 A. Kratine is shown as a ridgeline. We understand the HVO

3 were in positions up on these ridges by the 17th.

4 Q. Beyond or just up to the ridge?

5 A. This was a Croat village, to the best of my memory.

6 Q. Poculica?

7 A. Yes, and there were certainly Croat positions up here

8 and Jelinak was held by the Croatians as well.

9 Q. Are there other villages in the Lasva Valley within

10 canton 10 that were not the subject of fighting or

11 conflict on 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th April and so forth

12 1993?

13 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, I would object. We asked those

14 questions yesterday, I recall.

15 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that is correct. The question was asked

16 yesterday, Mr. Hayman. Change your question, please.

17 MR. HAYMAN: How many villages are there, if you know, in the

18 Lasva Valley area, within the canton 10 designated

19 region of either Muslim or mixed Muslim Croat

20 population? Ten or 100 or 200? Can you give us an

21 estimate?

22 A. There are dozens of them, you can see them on the map.

23 Q. Many, many, many villages, correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. On 16th April, how many Muslim or mixed Muslim Croat

1 villages were attacked by the HVO in the Lasva Valley?

2 Were they all attacked?

3 A. They were not all attacked.

4 Q. Were ones adjacent to the spinal road from Vitez and

5 Busovaca and Kruscica which we have already discussed,

6 are those the villages that were attacked?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR. KEHOE: These are the questions that were asked

9 yesterday, Mr. President.

10 A. And there were others as well.

11 JUDGE JORDA: The same objection and the judge is telling

12 you, change the question, Mr. Hayman. These questions

13 have been asked in one way or another. You may have

14 changed the form, but the judges are aware of what you

15 are doing.

16 MR. HAYMAN: They were not asked, your Honour, and the record

17 will speak for itself. One moment. (Pause).

18 JUDGE JORDA: Not in that form, that is true, Mr. Hayman.

19 The previous question was put in that form, but I agree

20 with you that this one was not put in that form, but

21 I am saying that the judges are fully aware that you are

22 trying to put the same question in a different form, so

23 let us not play around with words.

24 MR. HAYMAN: That is not my intent, your Honour.

25 JUDGE JORDA: I am convinced. Thank you.

1 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel, other than the villages along the

2 spinal road from Vitez to Busovaca, and other than

3 Kruscica which we have discussed and Stari Vitez, what

4 other villages not adjacent to the spinal road were

5 attacked on 16th April 1993?

6 MR. KEHOE: Again, Mr. President, this is the ground that we

7 covered when counsel was going through the list of these

8 particular villages yesterday.

9 MR. HAYMAN: I asked about three or four villages, your

10 Honour. Now I am asking an open-ended question to end

11 the inquiry and I think I should be allowed to do that,

12 despite counsel's repeated objections.

13 JUDGE JORDA: Listen, I propose, Mr. Hayman, that you put for

14 the last time an open-ended question on a subject that

15 was discussed yesterday. We are prolonging the debate

16 unnecessarily. The day will come when we will fix a

17 period of time for each party. The parties do not have

18 every right in proceedings. The Trial Chamber also has

19 certain rights and it is its responsibility to guide the

20 debate within a certain time period. Tell us exactly

21 what is your objective and then the Trial Chamber will

22 know whether that is in line with that objective or

23 not. It is 12.52. We are going to end this

24 cross-examination this morning, so please choose your

25 questions and we are stopping at 1.00 sharp.

1 MR. HAYMAN: I have stated the question, your Honour,

2 although it continues to be interrupted so the witness

3 cannot answer. I will state it again and if Mr. Kehoe

4 will abstain from objecting, I can conclude my

5 objection.

6 JUDGE JORDA: It is not Mr. Kehoe, it is the judge who is

7 speaking to you.

8 MR. HAYMAN: Colonel, other than Kruscica and Stari Vitez

9 which we have discussed, and other than the villages

10 along the spinal road from Vitez to Busovaca, namely

11 Ahmici, Santici, Pirici, Nadioci and others, what other

12 villages did you observe, or did you hear reports of,

13 within the Lasva Valley were attacked on the morning of

14 16th April 1993? Can you tell us, please?

15 A. On the morning of 16th April 1993, they were the

16 villages that we initially had reports were being

17 attacked.

18 MR. HAYMAN: No further questions, your Honour.

19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We will resume work at 2.30.

20 Mr. Prosecutor, you have your right to re-examine, after

21 which the judges will have their own questions. The

22 meeting is adjourned until 2.30 pm.

23 (12.55 pm)

24 (Adjourned until 2.30 pm)

25

1 (2.30 pm)

2 JUDGE JORDA: We can resume the hearing now. Please have

3 the accused brought in.

4 (Accused brought in)

5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, I would like to remind you that your

6 rebuttal must follow very strict limits and you are not

7 to start the principal examination again, but simply

8 limit yourself to make any clarifications or

9 rectifications of points you feel should be clarified or

10 supplemented in light of what took place during the

11 cross-examination. Do we agree on that?

12 Re-examined by MR. KEHOE

13 Q. Yes, Mr. President.

14 Good afternoon, Colonel.

15 A. Good afternoon, sir.

16 Q. Colonel, could we turn to the documents to your right on

17 the table which are the documents that Defence counsel

18 introduced during his cross-examination. They relate to

19 various excerpts from 1 Cheshire Mil Info Summs. Do you

20 see those, sir?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. The first one is Defence Exhibit D59, that is

23 19th January 1993, is that not right?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Next to that document, and you can take it out of the

1 sleeve, is what we would call a draft notice, a call-up

2 order, is that right?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. This was before you arrived in Bosnia, correct?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. This particular Mil Info Summ that has been related by

7 the Defence counsel, and I am reading seven lines down,

8 the sentence beginning with, "the recruitment", do you

9 see that?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Can you read that for me?

12 A. "The recruitment of civilians, i.e. people who have no

13 involvement in the BiH/HVO forces, is a reflection of

14 the assessed need by the BiH forces to strengthen

15 themselves against the perceived increased threat from

16 the HVO."

17 Q. Stop there, Colonel. Later on that month, was there in

18 fact an attack by HVO forces against the Muslims in

19 Busovaca?

20 A. I understand there was.

21 Q. So this particular assessment was correct?

22 A. There was indeed a threat against the Muslims by the HVO

23 at that time, and that initial period of our deployment

24 in Vitez was dominated by the interethnic fighting in

25 the Kiseljak valley.

1 Q. Let us turn ourselves to the next exhibit that is to

2 your left in the sleeve. Again, could you take that out

3 of the sleeve?

4 JUDGE JORDA: Would you speak more slowly, please? The

5 interpreter has not finished interpreting the witness's

6 answer, and here you are quickly rushing into a second

7 question. We want to save some time, but that does not

8 necessarily mean that we have to speak as quickly as

9 that. We are trying to work with the proceedings, not

10 only about speaking faster. Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe.

11 MR. KEHOE: I apologise, Mr. President, your Honours, and

12 I apologise to the booth.

13 Let us turn our attention to D60. That particular

14 document is dated on 18th April 1993, again a 1 Cheshire

15 Mil Info Summ, correct?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. On this particular Warrior -- this Warrior call sign

18 reflected a checkpoint at grid reference 134001, do you

19 see that?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Where is that?

22 A. I have to double check the map, but I think it is just

23 south of Travnik.

24 Q. Could you check the map very briefly?

25 A. It was a BiH checkpoint just to the east of Travnik

1 which had been put in place after -- initially during

2 the tense period following Boban's visit on 8th April

3 and then reinforced and strengthened after the HVO

4 attacks on the morning of the 16th April.

5 Q. So it had been there some time prior to 18th April?

6 A. Yes, it had.

7 Q. Turn the page . Annexed thereto is the four

8 paragraph cease-fire signed only by Blaskic; do you see

9 that?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. You mentioned on cross-examination that you did not see

12 any such document signed by the Bosnian forces, is that

13 right?

14 A. That is correct, sir.

15 Q. Did you to your knowledge or anybody within the British

16 battalion or the ECMM monitors, did anybody negotiate

17 any such cease-fire?

18 A. Not at this point on 18th April. We had been

19 negotiating with brigade commanders continuously in the

20 school, and this is the first time we had seen, to my

21 memory, a document from Colonel Blaskic's headquarters.

22 Q. At this point, the date 18th April 1993, would it have

23 been to the strategic and operational advantage of the

24 HVO to sue for peace on this date?

25 A. When we first saw it, we initially thought, "thank God,

1 a bit of sanity is returning to this place" and then

2 realised quite quickly that it really was not a valid

3 document. The key thing that was missing was any

4 suggestion that the HVO forces would withdraw to former

5 lines of conflict. It appeared a rather crude and naive

6 attempt to seize land in an operational offensive and

7 then sue for peace when you had achieved your

8 objectives, with no intent within your statement of your

9 cease-fire document of relinquishing that land you had

10 captured. So we did not give it any validity at all.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MR. KEHOE: Was there any reference in this document signed

13 by Blaskic to give up any ground that he had gained and

14 that the HVO had gained?

15 A. No, there is no mention at all.

16 Q. Likewise, let us go to the last document -- excuse me,

17 not the last document, I believe it is Exhibit D65. If

18 you could refer to the back of it, you can see the

19 numbers on there, Colonel, the exhibit stickers on the

20 back. So do you see that particular reference on D65,

21 beginning with, "Colonel Blaskic claimed that there had

22 been a BiH offensive on the area, contravening the

23 cease-fire"?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. Is it your conclusion, Colonel, that he was complaining

1 about a cease-fire when there was in fact never any

2 agreed cease-fire?

3 A. He is complaining about the cease-fire document that he

4 had sent to us, we had not seen any cease-fire document

5 signed by the BiH, and it was usual, and it had been the

6 case on 17th, 18th and 19th, for negotiations to proceed

7 such a cease-fire involving all parties to agree it, so

8 this appears to be a claim by Colonel Blaskic that his

9 offered cease-fire or the document which he had signed

10 stating there was a cease-fire had been contravened.

11 Q. Let us turn to the last of those documents, Colonel.

12 I believe it is, for the record, D67. That is the one

13 with the Mil Info Summ 180 for 28th April 1993. Do you

14 have that before you, Colonel?

15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. It refers, does it not, to a village, Kazagici?

17 A. Yes, it does.

18 Q. Kazagici was a Muslim village, was it not?

19 A. Yes, it was.

20 Q. Did you visit Kazagici?

21 A. Yes, I did. I visited Kazagici on 28th April, 27th or

22 28th, some time around there. At that point, the

23 cease-fire negotiated on the 21st was largely being

24 honoured in the Vitez/Kiseljak, Busovaca area, but south

25 of Busovaca in the Kiseljak valley, the cease-fire

1 seemed to be being totally ignored by both sides and

2 that had become our main area of effort in that time, to

3 try and bring that cease-fire to a conclusion.

4 Q. You were asked on cross-examination whether or not the

5 destruction in a village could be caused by collateral

6 damage, and I think you responded that a village could

7 be destroyed by collateral damage?

8 MR. HAYMAN: With all due respect, your Honour, that was not

9 the question and answer that occurred during my

10 cross-examination.

11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Would you perhaps modify your

12 question, Mr. Kehoe?

13 MR. KEHOE: Certainly, Mr. President. You went to see this

14 village, correct, Colonel?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. On 28th April 1993?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. It was a Muslim village?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. What did it look like?

21 A. I remember reporting over the radio that a great many of

22 the houses had recently been burnt, and by that, I mean

23 they had been torched, systematically destroyed.

24 Q. Was that similar to the houses that you saw torched in

25 Ahmici?

1 A. Yes, it was.

2 Q. Santici?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Nadioci?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And in various other locations in the Lasva Valley?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you conclude when you were there that the Muslims

9 torched their own houses?

10 A. No. It is a daft question. No.

11 Q. Going back to some questions that were asked by Defence

12 counsel during cross-examination concerning what Blaskic

13 and whether Blaskic fulfilled his responsibilities in

14 putting together a list of soldiers responsible for the

15 massacre in Ahmici, do you recall those questions?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Did that list indicate to you that these were HVO

18 soldiers who were on this list?

19 A. Yes, it did, although initially Colonel Blaskic accused

20 the Serbs of attacking Ahmici.

21 Q. So was there a change in his position from the Serb to

22 this list of HVO soldiers?

23 A. Yes, there was.

24 Q. Did you ever find out directly or indirectly during this

25 time that Blaskic claimed that Muslim HOS units from

1 Zenica committed this crime in Ahmici?

2 A. I have no recollection of that, sir.

3 Q. How about Muslim MOS units from Zenica?

4 A. You are saying Muslim people attacked Ahmici?

5 Q. That is right. Did you ever hear Blaskic maintain that

6 Muslim people attacked Muslims and burnt their houses

7 and murdered them in Ahmici?

8 A. No, I did not, but if I had I would have considered it

9 as ridiculous as the accusation that the Serbs had done

10 it.

11 Q. Why?

12 A. Because it was practically impossible for the Serbs to

13 do it and why Muslim people should shoot and murder

14 themselves is just -- it defies any logic that I can

15 think of, and also there were statements made by some of

16 the refugees --

17 MR. HAYMAN: Excuse me, Colonel. Your Honour, there is no

18 testimony that the accused ever said this --

19 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment. Things are going so fast

20 here. I have to understand the interpreters. I am

21 still listening to the interpretation of the witness's

22 answer. I would like things to go more slowly so the

23 judges can understand and then listen to you with all

24 respect that would be due to you. Has the witness

25 completed his answer?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, what is your objection? Please do

3 it calmly, slowly, so that it can be interpreted

4 properly.

5 MR. HAYMAN: I apologise to the witness and the court for

6 interrupting, but I think the question is

7 impermissible. The question initially was: did Blaskic

8 ever blame MOS, some Muslim group; witness: no.

9 Question: would that have been a ridiculous accusation,

10 and we were hearing a recitation as to how it would have

11 been absurd to blame MOS for the attacks when the

12 witness said Blaskic never blamed MOS for the attacks.

13 It is not relevant, that is my objection.

14 JUDGE JORDA: I sustain that objection.

15 MR. KEHOE: May I be heard on that, Mr. President?

16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course you can be heard. Nonetheless,

17 I do feel that the objection is well grounded.

18 MR. KEHOE: I understand, Mr. President. However, if I might

19 say that based on the questions given by Defence

20 counsel, this particular issue has become an issue, this

21 particular question has become an issue and we will

22 present evidence that in fact Blaskic did maintain that

23 Muslims from Zenica murdered these people in Ahmici. My

24 question at this point is with his varied responses,

25 first the Serbs and then the HVO, I think it is

1 probative at this point whether or not Blaskic blamed

2 Muslims during this timeframe as well.

3 JUDGE JORDA: Proceed, please.

4 MR. KEHOE: Bear with me a moment, Colonel, I am just going

5 to shift from topics, because obviously we are not going

6 to cover everything covered in cross-examination.

7 I will shift topics at this juncture and move ahead to

8 troops and the number of troops. You were asked some

9 questions on cross-examination about whether or not the

10 number of troops that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had

11 outnumbered the number of troops that were in the

12 employ, if you will, of the HVO. Do you recall those

13 questions?

14 A. Yes, I do. I could not remember the exact numbers, but

15 I was aware that the BiH outnumbered the HVO in terms of

16 numbers.

17 Q. As a lieutenant colonel in the British army, in

18 examining such issues over the course of your career, is

19 the number of troops on each respective side an accurate

20 assessment of how strong each individual army is?

21 A. No, it is too simplistic a measurement.

22 Q. Can you explain that?

23 A. You can look at the Korean war where small groups of

24 British soldiers held out against mass wave attacks of

25 Chinese and North Koreans. The numbers are not actually

1 relevant, it is more to do with the other factors of

2 combat power and these are the actual fire power, direct

3 and indirect, available to the commander; the state of

4 motivation and morale of his troops, which we call the

5 moral aspect of fighting power. There are a great many

6 measurements of military capability before you would be

7 in a position to assess which is a greater force. Sheer

8 numbers is just simplistic.

9 Q. The fire power in the Lasva Valley and in Central

10 Bosnia, who had the upper hand in fire power?

11 A. The Croats without a doubt --

12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, please wait for the answer. I am

13 not able to hear the answer being completed and there

14 you are already asking the question again. The judges

15 do, after all, have the right to hear the entire

16 answer. Please think about the French-speaking judge.

17 MR. KEHOE: Again, Mr. President, I apologise.

18 Going back to my question, Colonel, who had the

19 upper hand in fire power?

20 A. The HVO had the upper hand in fire power and had greater

21 access through their munitions factories within Vitez to

22 ammunition and artillery and mortars.

23 Q. Did you see any weapons such as the size of a 40

24 millimetre anti-aircraft weapon being used by the HVO?

25 A. Yes, I did. I actually saw one in Busovaca, a 40

1 millimetre anti-aircraft cannon mounted on a flat bed

2 truck, with an enormous amount of 40 millimetre

3 ammunition. It is an extremely formidable force

4 multiplier in terms of the devastation it can cause in a

5 ground role. I certainly would not want to go up

6 against it, even with my Warriors.

7 Q. Let us turn our attention to Dario Kordic. You

8 discussed on direct and cross-examination the issue

9 concerning a convoy being diverted to Busovaca.

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Who diverted that, sir?

12 A. Soldiers in black uniforms was how it was relayed to me,

13 which I presumed were the people who lived down in the

14 cottages, as they were called.

15 Q. Were these the individuals --

16 A. Yes. I personally debriefed the officer who led that

17 convoy because it was so badly conducted. He said that

18 the soldiers who hijacked the convoy, when challenged by

19 the fact that Colonel Blaskic had given permission for

20 that convoy, moving from the depot in Zenica up to

21 Travnik, a soldier said, "we do not take our orders from

22 Blaskic, we take our orders from Dario Kordic".

23 Q. Did that incident relate to that particular convoy?

24 A. It was the abducting of that convoy. It later

25 transpired that Dario Kordic did not believe that the

1 Croat community within Central Bosnia, and specifically

2 Busovaca, were receiving a fair share of the available

3 aid and so he instigated the abducting of that convoy

4 into Busovaca to bring aid to the town.

5 Q. Had you had any experience of Kordic doing that before

6 that or after that?

7 A. No, sir. When convoys had been hijacked by HVO forces

8 in the past we had rung up the headquarters of

9 Colonel Blaskic and he had secured the release. I can

10 think of a very specific convoy of flour and yeast that

11 he returned to us.

12 Q. Was that an isolated incident, Colonel?

13 A. In my experience, yes, sir.

14 Q. With regard to Dario Kordic, you attended various

15 meetings where Blaskic and sometimes General Petkovic

16 were present, is that correct?

17 A. That is correct, sir.

18 Q. Was Kordic at any of these meetings?

19 A. No, he was not.

20 Q. You also participated in cease-fire negotiations, did

21 you not?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. And were there when documents were signed concerning

24 cease-fire negotiations, is that correct?

25 A. Yes, I was.

1 Q. Was Kordic there?

2 A. No, he was not.

3 Q. Did he sign those agreements?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did Blaskic?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. With regard to those individuals who diverted that

8 convoy, other than this particular diverting of a convoy

9 to Busovaca by Kordic, was there any indication to you

10 that those soldiers were otherwise not under Blaskic's

11 command?

12 A. That incident led me to believe that they did obviously

13 take orders from Dario Kordic, so they seemed therefore

14 to respond to a parallel or different chain of command

15 on that occasion. I have no reason to believe in our

16 studying of the HVO forces within the Lasva Valley that

17 they were not under the routine command of

18 Colonel Blaskic.

19 Q. You were present during the negotiations on 21st April

20 1993 with Petkovic and Blaskic, is that right?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. During the negotiations, was an issue raised concerning

23 whether Kordic would go along with any agreement that

24 was reached?

25 A. Yes, there was. I cannot remember the exact

1 circumstances. I may even have raised it myself because

2 of this confusion of Kordic being able to interject in

3 this kidnapping of this aid convoy. I wanted to make

4 sure that when we had a cease-fire agreement signed by

5 Colonel Blaskic that Dario Kordic would honour the

6 conditions of that cease-fire and was not some form of

7 rogue missile in Busovaca. General Petkovic made it

8 quite clear, in his inimitable way, that Dario Kordic

9 would do as he was told.

10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, go ahead, ask your question.

11 MR. KEHOE: I am sorry about the pacing, Mr. President.

12 I will slow down as much as I can.

13 JUDGE JORDA: You are excusing yourself with the President,

14 but do it for the interpreters as well. It is very

15 difficult to interpret if you work under those

16 conditions.

17 MR. KEHOE: Colonel, you were asked on cross-examination with

18 the easel about a chain of command that moved from the

19 operative zone to the operative group down through a

20 brigade level.

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. And down to what you would call ground troops, is that

23 right?

24 A. Down to the lowest chain of command, a section in the

25 British army.

1 Q. Is that a normal chain of command in the British army?

2 A. It is the chain of command in the British army,

3 division, brigade, battalion, company, platoon and

4 section.

5 Q. What does a commanding officer in your capacity,

6 Colonel, or in Blaskic's capacity, what do they

7 delegate?

8 A. They delegate the tasks, in the form of mission

9 statements, and they delegate the resources to complete

10 those tasks. What they do not delegate is the

11 responsibility.

12 Q. Explain that, Colonel.

13 A. Whoever is the commander who sets the overall mission is

14 responsible for the planning and conduct of that

15 operation, and he will be given the resources to conduct

16 that operation for the number of brigades he has, or

17 battalions or whatever.

18 Q. Colonel, could you slow down a little bit?

19 A. Sorry. He will conduct what we describe as an

20 "estimate", which is a decision-making progress, until

21 he comes up with his plan. He will then construct a set

22 of orders based on his plan. He will then give those

23 orders to his subordinates to execute his plan. That

24 does not matter whether it is a divisional plan, two or

25 three star General level, the brigade commander's plan,

1 the battalion commander's plan, the company commander's

2 plan as we discussed before. It depends on the size of

3 the objective and the resources. Implicit in the plan

4 is the intent of the commander and the commander remains

5 responsible at whatever level he has set the goal to

6 ensure that the plan is conducted according to his

7 orders, and his responsibilities are to check that is

8 the case with his chain of command which functions

9 throughout the battle.

10 The commander does not go away when the battle

11 starts, he stays and fights the battle and puts himself

12 in a position where he can influence the effect of his

13 plan as it unfolds on the battlefield. He remains

14 responsible for the conduct of that plan and the success

15 or failure of the operation, and the conduct of his

16 troops conducting that operation. That remains his

17 responsibility. In summary, you can delegate the task,

18 but you do not delegate your responsibility. That is

19 why you are a commander.

20 Q. Accordingly, would it be fair to say, Colonel, that

21 Blaskic or you yourself have to take steps that your

22 orders are carried out in the way that you want them

23 carried out?

24 A. Yes, of course. You train your force to do that, and

25 one of your responsibilities as a commander is to train

1 and discipline your force to conduct the operations in

2 the way you require them to be done.

3 Q. Colonel, does this include following mandates of the

4 Geneva Convention and the Articles of War?

5 A. Yes, it does and that is reinforced in my own army with

6 a mandatory requirement every year for all ranks, from

7 the highest to the lowest, to actually be formally

8 taught the Geneva Convention. You conduct all your

9 operations according to the Geneva Convention, otherwise

10 you are a war criminal.

11 Q. What is the requirement, Colonel, of a commander who is

12 giving an order to attack to protect civilians in the

13 area?

14 A. It is implicit in the Geneva Convention, and it is one

15 of the paragraphs in our orders card, so when a

16 commander gives a set of orders, we have an aide memoire

17 covering the paragraph headings that he must address

18 within his orders according to our doctrine, and in

19 "service support", which is the final generic

20 paragraph heading, one of the listed factors he must

21 take into account in both his plan and the execution of

22 his plan is refugees. They are implicit in his plan,

23 how he is going to deal with the refugees, how he is

24 going to protect the refugees. It is an extremely

25 difficult thing.

1 Q. So after a battle has been completed?

2 A. No, before a battle is completed.

3 Q. Hypothetically before, is his responsibility to

4 civilians, both before, during and after a battle?

5 A. If you are attacking, your plan must address and you

6 must allocate the resources within your plan to address

7 how you will ameliorate the effects of your attack on

8 the civilian population that may or may not be in the

9 area.

10 Equally, after the attack, you have to allocate

11 the resources to look after the civilians and you may

12 well injure or kill some of those in your attack. That

13 is one of the costs of war, but you must, and you are

14 required by the Geneva Convention, to treat them and the

15 enemy as your own when they are wounded.

16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?

17 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I apologise for interrupting, but

18 I would like to note that this subject of protecting

19 civilians and avoiding civilian casualties in wartime

20 was not gone into on cross-examination by me. This is

21 new material, and the problem with raising new material

22 on redirect is if we, the Defence, do not have the

23 opportunity to cross-examine, we are deprived our right,

24 the accused's right to cross-examine on this subject

25 matter at all, so I am raising it for the court, I think

1 redirect should be limited to matters raised on

2 cross-examination.

3 JUDGE JORDA: I take a quick look at my colleagues here, who

4 tell me that I really have to answer, something which

5 I would answer anyway. Yes, I think that is true. If

6 you ask a question in a rather general way about the

7 situation of the British army, the way it is trained,

8 the way it carries out orders, the way it respects the

9 rights of civilian populations and refugees, that is one

10 thing, but if you go into too long a development of this

11 point, that does deprive the Defence, who only very

12 slightly touched on that subject. You deprive them of

13 the right of reply. Since we do not have this right,

14 I ask you now to move to another question.

15 MR. KEHOE: You were asked, Colonel, with regard to

16 conversations that the British battalion had with

17 Blaskic regarding the 400 civilians outside the garage.

18 A. That is correct, and I remembered that we were requested

19 or told, I am not sure which, by Colonel Blaskic to deal

20 with the snipers ourselves.

21 Q. Under the Articles of War, Colonel, contrary to you

22 dealing with the snipers, whose responsibility was it

23 for those civilians?

24 A. Colonel Blaskic's forces attacked Vitez that morning and

25 implicit in what we have just talked about was

1 Colonel Blaskic having resources and a plan to protect

2 and look after those refugees and civilians.

3 Q. Did he appear to want to?

4 A. Again, it is difficult to remember one's exact emotions

5 four years ago, but I remember being quite horrified at

6 the prospect that these HVO soldiers who were shooting

7 at these Muslim civilians were now about to be attacked

8 and possibly killed by the United Nations UNPROFOR.

9 That is not what we were there to do and we were very

10 reluctantly did it, especially against the backdrop of a

11 great deal of accusations on the part of Colonel

12 Blaskic's headquarters as to our attacking Croats, which

13 was patently untrue, and supporting the BiH offensive,

14 which was patently untrue, and now being told by him

15 that if we wanted to protect the refugees, then we

16 ourselves should attack his forces. We did it; very

17 reluctantly.

18 Q. Blaskic was put on notice about these civilians outside

19 of the garage, and you were asked some questions by

20 Defence counsel concerning the work of ICRC and the

21 conducting of the investigation involving a massacre in

22 Ahmici and other issues; do you recall those questions?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Blaskic had prisoners in custody shortly after the

25 battle, did he not?

1 A. Yes, we knew of at least two prisoner locations. One

2 was in the cinema complex in Vitez and the other one was

3 in the Dubravica village, I think in the school. There

4 were a large number of prisoners held by both sides at

5 this point.

6 Q. Did you believe, Colonel ...

7 A. Did I believe?

8 Q. I am just waiting for the translation, if you will. Did

9 you believe, Colonel, based on the information that you

10 had, that Blaskic had the means at his disposal to

11 conduct an investigation?

12 A. Colonel Blaskic was the regional military commander.

13 Within his organisation he had military police, he had

14 within the witnesses -- sorry, within the prisoners he

15 had people from that village, and it was blatantly

16 obvious that he had the means and the ability to conduct

17 an investigation, he just did not appear to have the

18 will.

19 Q. Again on cross-examination you mentioned ICRC.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And their requirement not to disclose information.

22 A. That is correct. It is core to their entire work that

23 they have to remain bluntly impartial.

24 Q. After 16th April, were members of the ICRC complaining

25 to Blaskic and everyone else about prisoners being

1 forced to dig trenches?

2 A. At that time, their two greatest complaints to the

3 United Nations was their ability to access areas of

4 confrontation, and on various times we provided them

5 with Warrior support to move round the field of battle,

6 and the other vociferous complaint from ICRC at the time

7 was their lack of access to prisoners held within the

8 Lasva Valley, specifically in Dubravica school and in

9 Vitez, which they believe was absolutely contrary to the

10 Geneva Convention, as the ICRC.

11 Q. So with this information concerning digging trenches and

12 access to prisoners, did Blaskic appear to do anything

13 about it?

14 A. Appear to do anything about access to prisoners, or

15 digging trenches?

16 Q. Did he appear to want to stop the forced digging of

17 trenches by prisoners?

18 A. I think at that stage it had become a matter of virtual

19 survival at the tactical battle, as the momentum of the

20 Muslim advance came. I do not think the Croats had the

21 resources to dig trenches and were utilising their

22 prisoners to do that. I cannot comment on the state of

23 Colonel Blaskic's mind over that issue, but on the

24 ground, we saw no manifestation of an order to rescind

25 the illegal use of prisoners for digging trenches. It

1 was a major issue with the ICRC.

2 Q. During your time there, you described previously the

3 truck bomb in Stari Vitez on 18th April as a terrorist

4 act. Did you see any steps taken by Blaskic to

5 investigate that terrorist act?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 Q. With regard to the shelling of Zenica, following your

8 phone call from the British battalion to the Hotel

9 Vitez, did you see any steps by Blaskic to investigate

10 the shelling and killing of civilians in Zenica on

11 19th April 1993?

12 A. No, I did not, other than there was another engagement

13 of Zenica on the 24th.

14 Q. Did his failure to protect the civilians at the echelon,

15 stopping the digging of trenches, the truck bomb and the

16 shelling of Zenica, was his failure to do that

17 consistent throughout this?

18 A. He did not appear to address those issues.

19 Q. Did he demonstrate any desire to do so?

20 A. Not as far as I was aware, no.

21 Q. You were the second in command at that time, were you

22 not, Colonel?

23 A. Yes, I was. I also know the commanding officer was

24 entreating Colonel Blaskic to actually do something

25 about it, and was very disappointed at the lack of

1 response to this entreatment.

2 Q. Again I am going to change subjects, Colonel. I want to

3 raise with you the tape recording that was played by the

4 Defence just prior to lunch. You recall that, do you

5 not, Colonel?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. Did you detect a certain insinuation emanating from that

8 tape regarding the conduct of the British battalion and

9 specifically 1 Cheshire in Bosnia during your tour?

10 A. That piece of film was similar to pieces of film that

11 had been broadcast on Croat television during the period

12 17th to about 28th or 30th April, alleging that the

13 United Nations and specifically BritBat were actively

14 supporting the Muslim offensive against the Croat

15 peoples, and pieces of edited film from the world's

16 media were being put together to illustrate these

17 accusations, and we had seen a great deal of these

18 pieces of film in their entirety and were outraged,

19 actually, that this crude black propaganda was being

20 exercised to discredit us, and the only logical

21 conclusion we could draw is that if the Croat government

22 were able to discredit us, then the accusations that we

23 at the time seemed to be the only people making of these

24 massacres would lose validity, and it just appeared a

25 very simple piece of propaganda, more akin to the sort

1 of thing that was perpetuated in the former Soviet Union

2 than in a democratic country.

3 Q. Did Blaskic engage in that propaganda?

4 A. Yes, he did. He sent many faxes and made accusations on

5 the phone, some of them personally to me, as to the

6 conduct of our soldiers, such allegations as wantonly

7 and indiscriminately firing our 30 millimetre cannon in

8 the centre of Vitez, which was an absolute lie; faxes

9 alleging desecration of the catholic church in Vitez,

10 which as many of my battalion, including myself, were

11 Roman Catholics, as well as myself, we found absolutely

12 appalling, and general assistance to the BiH by the

13 movement of weapons and soldiers around the battlefield

14 in support of the BiH offensive. The whole thing was

15 absolutely ridiculous.

16 Q. Colonel, did you think the insinuation from the tape was

17 that British battalion and British soldiers were arming

18 the Muslims?

19 A. That is exactly what it looked like it was trying to

20 show to me, yes.

21 Q. Did it ever happen?

22 A. To the best of my knowledge, no it did not. We were

23 quite ruthless in ensuring that our people did not gain

24 a particular allegiance of sentiment with any particular

25 one of the warring factions. To do that, we moved our

1 companies, with the exception of B Company in Gornji

2 Vakuf, around Bosnia so that our soldiers would realise

3 that within this extremely savage and complex civil war

4 there really were no good guys and nobody that actually

5 deserved their personal support. There were only

6 victims and aggressors and who the victims or the

7 aggressors were really depended on the ethnic balance of

8 the area they were working in and no single warring

9 faction had a monopoly on being the victim or the

10 aggressor. That was a message we were determined our

11 soldiers would understand. The idea that we would arm

12 either faction, Serb, Croat or Muslim, was ridiculous.

13 It just is an insult to the work that we were doing

14 there, the things we did.

15 Q. There was also a clip -- excuse me. There was also a

16 clip played by the Defence of now Lieutenant Colonel

17 Martyn Thomas standing in front of a burning building.

18 Could you recall that?

19 A. Yes, I do.

20 Q. Did the soldiers of 1 Cheshire burn villages?

21 A. Of course not.

22 MR. HAYMAN: We are about to review a tape which for the

23 record, Mr. President, your Honours, is numbered

24 Prosecutor's Exhibit 112. Does this tape --

25 JUDGE JORDA: Just one moment, please. I would like to

1 confer with my colleagues. (Pause).

2 Mr. Kehoe, excuse us, because we wanted to confer

3 about the questions we will ask in a little while. For

4 the time being, please continue. I think you wanted to

5 move to the video now, is that right?

6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. If I could just have the

7 witness state who is speaking on the video; if you

8 could, Colonel, who is the one speaking on the video?

9 A. It is Mr. Martin Bell, a BBC defence correspondent.

10 MR. KEHOE: Your Honours, this particular video clip is a BBC

11 video clip. This particular clip was given to Defence

12 counsel and we have a transcript in both French and

13 English, and at this point before we do play the

14 videotape, I would just ask the court if I could hand

15 out this particular transcript.

16 JUDGE JORDA: It is a translation in French?

17 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Do you have a copy for the interpreters,

19 please, in English? (Handed).

20 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Mr. President, if I could go to this

21 videotape.

22 (Videotape played)

23 (Videotape stopped)

24 MR. KEHOE: If I could ask the video booth to go back to the

25 segment where the shotgun is being examined by the

1 British soldier, please.

2 (Videotape played)

3 (Videotape stopped)

4 MR. KEHOE: Can you stop there, please? If we could go to

5 the beginning of that, please? The beginning of the

6 first frame where the weapon is up in the top of the

7 vehicle, please.

8 (Videotape played)

9 MR. KEHOE: Stop right there, please.

10 (Videotape stopped)

11 MR. KEHOE: Colonel, was that portion of the tape on the tape

12 shown to you this morning?

13 A. Yes, it was.

14 Q. The portion of the tape where he was looking at the

15 weapon?

16 A. No, it was the part where he was handing it down to the

17 Muslim soldier, handing it back to him.

18 Q. What does the commentary reflect that the British

19 soldier was doing with that weapon?

20 A. He had obviously asked the BiH soldier if he could have

21 a look at it, not an uncommon thing at all. It was a

22 soldier who was curious to look at a weapon that was

23 unusual to see. The AK derivative weapon systems were

24 in common use throughout Bosnia, it was quite unusual to

25 see a pump action shotgun, which is not really an

1 infantry weapon. I would have done the same myself.

2 Q. That is likewise reflected in the transcript, is it not?

3 A. Yes, Mr. Bell says that the soldier is inspecting, having

4 a look at the weapon.

5 Q. That is a little different, Colonel, from handing out

6 weapons to Muslims?

7 A. It is just my point. That is just straightforward

8 propaganda in that previous piece of film.

9 Q. Did you consider that first time you were shown this

10 morning misleading?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Mr. President? (Pause).

13 A. In fact I would probably even use stronger language,

14 sir.

15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, again this particular tape we just

16 showed was offered to the Defence, acknowledged by

17 Mr. Nobilo in April 1997, and we have no further

18 questions of this witness. Thank you, Colonel.

19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Before giving the floor to my

20 colleagues and after having conferred with them, I would

21 like to turn to Mr. Hayman and call to his attention and

22 Mr. Nobilo as well, that is to both the Defence counsel,

23 indirectly to Mr. Blaskic as well, to Rule 85 of the

24 rules. In 85, I would like you to look at paragraph C

25 which says that the accused may, if he so desires,

1 appear as a witness in his own Defence. I turn to you,

2 Mr. Nobilo and Mr. Hayman, you must decide, in light of

3 several things that were stated by Colonel Watters

4 throughout his testimony, you are the ones who have to

5 answer this question, but would you like Colonel Blaskic

6 to appear as a witness before us, that is under oath, in

7 his own Defence, given the fact that we will not go back

8 to Colonel Watters. If you would like to confer about

9 this, of course do, speak together and speak with the

10 accused as well, of course, if you want to.

11 MR. HAYMAN: Are you suggesting that General Blaskic speak

12 now?

13 JUDGE JORDA: I am suggesting that if you like, you can

14 have, in his own Defence, Colonel Blaskic appear as a

15 witness.

16 MR. HAYMAN: Now?

17 JUDGE JORDA: It is a question I am asking. You should

18 answer. I am asking you whether you would like that

19 Rule 85(C) be used, stating that the accused may if he

20 so desires appear as a witness in his own Defence.

21 MR. HAYMAN: We expect he will, but we will not make that

22 decision finally until the Prosecution's case is

23 concluded and whether we see if after we bring motions

24 to the court whether the motions are dismissed, after

25 the end of the Prosecution's case, or whether the

1 Defence must even put on a case.

2 JUDGE JORDA: I know that in your system that is how things

3 are done. In my own, things are done very differently.

4 In fact, after each testimony, the accused is invited to

5 speak about what was said, because things are clear,

6 they have just been said, and that, of course, once --

7 I am not asking you, I am simply calling your attention

8 to this provision of the text. The fact that the trial

9 is this long, when you want to, in a year or a year and

10 a half, maybe quite a while from now, together with my

11 colleagues and without making any suggestions, I simply

12 wanted to draw your attention to Rule 85(C). I have

13 understood your answer that for the time being in any

14 case you do not wish to make use of Rule 85(C) and to

15 ask in a separate application that you will, if you

16 later on decide that you want to, call your witness. Do

17 we agree with that then?

18 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President, for advising us of your

19 interpretation of Rule 85(C). It had never occurred to

20 me, coming from my system, that the accused might have

21 the opportunity to rebut each Prosecution witness who

22 states they had personal dealings with him, or perhaps

23 even other witnesses. It is something that Mr. Nobilo

24 and I have never discussed, nor have we discussed it

25 with the client, but we will do so in light of your

1 comments.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, thank you. I will now ask my

3 colleagues whether they have any questions they wish to

4 ask Colonel Watters. First, Judge Riad. Have you any

5 questions that you would like to ask? The floor is

6 yours. Excuse me, I would like us to settle the

7 tendering of this video clip. I suppose it will be

8 tendered as evidence, is that correct?

9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I apologise for not doing

10 that earlier, but I would offer that into evidence as a

11 Prosecution exhibit, number 112.

12 MR. HAYMAN: We have no objection.

13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar?

14 THE REGISTRAR: This is 112 and the English would be 112A

15 and 112B. If you would allow, I would also like a

16 decision to be made about the transparent film which is

17 on the easel, that is the Defence Exhibit D61.

18 JUDGE JORDA: No objections?

19 MR. HAYMAN: We offer it.

20 MR. KEHOE: No objections, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Judge Riad. It is your turn to

22 speak now.

23 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon, Colonel Watters.

24 A. Good afternoon, sir.

25 Q. Judging by your long military experience and your

1 first-hand knowledge of the events which took place in

2 this critical period, you may be in a condition to

3 clarify some, I would call global issues, without

4 perhaps going into small technicalities. My first

5 question is: was the HVO a regular army, a disciplined

6 army, or was it a gathering of undisciplined factions?

7 As simple as that.

8 A. My personal observations and in discussions with members

9 of the HVO, and paying due cognisance to the majority of

10 the commanders having served in the regular JNA, it had

11 all the organisation and trappings of a disciplined

12 regular military force.

13 Q. My second question is: was General Blaskic the

14 undisputed commander of this, what you call it, canton

15 10, the regional commander, or was he in no condition to

16 command?

17 A. He represented the HVO forces at all negotiations

18 I attended and in my presence related directly to his

19 superior officer, General Petkovic, so I am quite clear

20 that Colonel Blaskic was the military commander, HVO,

21 Central Bosnia.

22 Q. You related various major actions which I am not going

23 to repeat, but it goes from artillery shelling of

24 civilians with what you called an unprecedented scale;

25 let us say destruction of civilian houses in what you

1 qualified as ethnic cleansing; civilians digging

2 trenches; officers ordering people out of their houses

3 under threat of killing them, and other major actions.

4 Could such major actions be taken without the knowledge

5 of the commander?

6 A. Not in my opinion, sir, no.

7 Q. Could it be taken without his consent?

8 A. Isolated incidents could happen without his consent,

9 yes.

10 Q. Were some of these isolated incidents or was it some

11 kind of organised enterprise?

12 A. The co-ordination of the activities specifically on

13 16th and 17th April, in my experience, could not have

14 happened without a great deal of planning and

15 co-ordination at the relevant level, sir. There was too

16 much going on at the same time for it to be spontaneous

17 or out of control.

18 Q. It seems that not all the Muslim villages have been

19 attacked, some of them were spared. What was the

20 criterion of the choice of what you call the ethnic

21 cleansing? Why did they choose, for instance, Ahmici

22 and not other places?

23 A. It is a conundrum, sir, that I do not think I have ever

24 got to the bottom of. The logics that I believe were

25 applied were the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim villages

1 on the boundary of the proposed Vance-Owen Plan canton

2 10, which ran between the Travnik/Vitez/Kaonik road and

3 Zenica, embracing Travnik, which itself was strange,

4 being a Muslim village.

5 The second was the securing of that route within

6 Central Bosnia, linking the major Croat centres of

7 population, and the other reason for the devastation in

8 Ahmici was the idea that Ahmici was very special to the

9 Bosnian Muslim people, as I explained in my evidence,

10 and looking at the other terrorist operations such as

11 the lorry bomb, a brutal and savage lesson to the people

12 of Ahmici would aid the ethnic cleansing in the

13 remainder of the Lasva Valley by terrorising the people

14 to leave, and it certainly worked. They were terrified

15 and they left.

16 Q. Yes, you mentioned Ahmici. I recall now that you said

17 that it was a holy place and it was perhaps a gathering

18 of holy people. What was the purpose of destroying the

19 holy people?

20 A. To terrorise the remainder of the Muslim people living

21 in the environs and show them what would happen to them

22 if they did not leave, and if it had happened to Ahmici,

23 then it could happen to all the other Muslim villages.

24 If you terrorise one village, sir, then the amount of

25 military effort and terror you might have to apply to

1 subsequent villages will be less, because they will be

2 in absolute terror of their lives, as they were.

3 Q. Did it have any cultural and religious value in the

4 area, Ahmici?

5 A. We understood that it did, as a town that produced a

6 higher proportion of holy people, of mullahs, to the

7 Bosnian Muslim religious community. It had a special

8 place in the minds of people as a holy town.

9 Q. In the towns which have been destroyed, there were

10 Croatian areas?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Why were not the other Croatian areas destroyed? Was it

13 so minutely and deliberately, let us say, attacked and

14 the shelling was very clearly addressed to certain

15 parts, or was it just indiscriminate?

16 A. I never saw evidence of shelling in Ahmici, sir.

17 Q. The other places.

18 A. Yes, the artillery shell and the mortar are not a very

19 accurate weapon, and it is very difficult to judge where

20 they will fall. It would have been impossible, really,

21 to use artillery and mortars in mixed villages without

22 inflicting collateral damage in areas you did not intend

23 to attack. It is not a precision weapon, it is an area

24 weapon.

25 Q. But you mentioned that the houses of the Croats were

1 safe.

2 A. Yes, that was specifically, sir, in Ahmici. It was a

3 very stark difference between the Croat end of the town

4 and the Muslim end of the town. The Muslim end of the

5 town had just ceased to exist and the Croat end of the

6 town was as if nothing had happened, it was surreal.

7 Q. Speaking of the truck, the bomb truck explosion, what

8 was the dimension of this truck explosion? Was it on a

9 military, let us say, size or could it be a private

10 endeavour?

11 A. It was on a tarmac road. The crater was very large.

12 The devastation to the houses was very large. It was

13 certainly no smaller than, I would say, 1,000 pounds of

14 explosive, given my own experience. I would not really

15 know, sir, the access there might be to quantities of

16 explosives like that in Vitez. Our view was that it was

17 part of a continued intimidation of the Muslim people,

18 and was a further -- it was out of character, sir, of

19 what we had seen up to then of Croat forces and it was

20 shocking from that point of view. We do not know who

21 did it, it reinforced the operation that was ongoing

22 with the HVO and it continued to contribute to their

23 actual tactical effort. I would not -- I have no

24 personal knowledge of who actually drove that bomb into

25 the middle of an occupied Muslim area of Vitez.

1 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Riad. Judge Shahbuddeen.

3 JUDGE SHAHBUDDEEN: Colonel, I want to take you back to this

4 episode concerning the shotgun. What was the nature of

5 the vehicle which appeared in the photograph with this

6 shotgun? Was that a Warrior vehicle?

7 A. No, sir, that was a reconnaissance vehicle, which in the

8 British army is known as a Scimitar.

9 Q. Scimitar. Now then my question to you is this: would a

10 shotgun be the type of weapon which was likely to be

11 taken around in a Scimitar vehicle?

12 A. No, sir, there is no room inside a Scimitar for anything

13 but the commander and gunner and their personal weapons,

14 sir. A very small, tight vehicle. The idea of

15 transporting weapons in a vehicle like that is just not

16 practical.

17 Q. What is the range of such a pump action shotgun?

18 A. It would be lethal at about 30 yards, sir. Beyond that,

19 it would degrade to about 100 metres, where it would be

20 largely ineffective.

21 Q. Is that kind of weapon of substantial use in a military

22 confrontation?

23 A. There are certain applications in close quarter fighting

24 where a shotgun would have a degree of military utility,

25 sir, but in terms of a weapon that is carried in my own

1 army, no, it is not carried by the infantry.

2 Q. How does the use of such a weapon compare with the use

3 of a military rifle?

4 A. There is just no comparison, sir. I would not want to

5 take on a man with a military rifle with a shotgun.

6 I would lose.

7 Q. You spoke of Kruscica, and my recollection tells me that

8 you said that in your memory you saw nothing leaving

9 Kruscica but that you saw, and I noted down your words,

10 "an enormous amount of RPG mortar and artillery coming

11 into Kruscica". Would I be right in supposing that you

12 were referring there not to the weaponry itself but to

13 the shells launched by weapons of this kind?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. You remember a portion of your testimony, I think you

16 were talking about the ICRC and the inhibition which

17 that organisation has against divulging information.

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. My recollection is that you said something to the effect

20 that the HVO were given no information from victims and

21 survivors of Ahmici from which they could further any

22 investigations; is my recollection correct?

23 A. What I think I said, sir, was that the HVO were given no

24 information from the ICRC as to statements they had

25 received from the survivors of Ahmici. The major

1 problem for the ICRC was accessing the survivors, the

2 majority of whom were prisoners of the HVO at that time.

3 Q. I see. So would I be right in understanding you to mean

4 that whereas the HVO got no such information from the

5 ICRC, you were not saying that the HVO had no

6 information at all?

7 A. No, I certainly would not say that, sir.

8 Q. You remember that counsel asked you about certain HVO

9 soldiers who stood outside of the Hotel Vitez and were

10 pointing their rifles, I think, in the direction of

11 Stari Vitez.

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. You were asked whether that implied that there was a

14 military threat from Stari Vitez. You remember that

15 phase?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. What I want to ask you is this: what was, in your

18 assessment, the substantial purpose of the military

19 action which the HVO took in relation to Stari Vitez?

20 Was the purpose to respond to a military threat in

21 Stari Vitez, or was the purpose to remove the civilian

22 population of Stari Vitez?

23 A. I believe that it was probably both, sir.

24 Q. Both, good. Let me ask you a question about Ahmici,

25 Santici and Nadioci. You visited those villages?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Did you see any evidence of defensive positions in those

3 villages?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. Did you see any evidence of the population in those

6 villages being capable of presenting a military threat

7 to anyone?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Let me take you back --

10 A. Sorry, can I just clarify that, are we talking about

11 when I visited it after --

12 Q. That was the only time that you visited. What I mean is

13 if there had been previously any defensive positions

14 installed in those villages, would you have expected to

15 see traces of those defensive positions at the time when

16 you later visited?

17 A. I would, sir, and I did not. I did see defensive

18 positions in other areas, but not in those villages.

19 Q. Let me take you to your interesting presentation on the

20 various levels of command, strategic, operational,

21 tactical; I think those were the three which you

22 referred to.

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Would it be possible in some circumstances for a senior

25 military officer to operate partly at one level and

1 partly at another?

2 A. I think in operational terms it would probably be quite

3 confusing, sir, if he was to do that, because his

4 subordinate commanders would de facto be removed of

5 their command if he commanded the subordinate units as

6 well.

7 Q. From the point of view of your military experience, and

8 your knowledge of military doctrine, it would not be

9 usual for a commander at the strategic level also to

10 operate at the operational level, is that right?

11 A. Right, sir. He would give direction to his operational

12 commanders.

13 Q. Let us talk a little about the organisational

14 arrangements of the HVO within Central Bosnia.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Did you in the course of your stay become aware of the

17 existence of a HVO communications system?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Now let me put this to you. Given your knowledge of the

20 area and of the existence of that communications system,

21 was General Blaskic likely to be aware of what was

22 happening in Ahmici, in the other places, regardless of

23 whether or not he was in Vitez or in some other place

24 within Central Bosnia?

25 A. I would not know if he was, sir, but he would have the

1 means to communicate with his subordinate units.

2 Q. He would have had the means to enable him to be kept in

3 touch with any developments, is that right?

4 A. Yes, sir. Whether that would be on radios, and the

5 distance from Vitez to Ahmici is quite small and the HVO

6 carried small communications systems with them, I would

7 say it would be very fair to assess that in certainly

8 the immediate environs of Vitez, Colonel Blaskic would

9 have been in radio contact with his forces.

10 Q. Are you in a position to assist the court by giving an

11 estimate as to within what period of time

12 General Blaskic would have been in a position to learn

13 of what is happening in Ahmici on 16th April?

14 A. I would be confident in saying that Colonel Blaskic

15 would have monitored his operation, and monitored the

16 success of that operation, and in his formal military

17 training, and I am sure he would have applied that, as

18 I would do, I would have placed remits on my

19 subordinates to inform me at certain schedules as to

20 what they have achieved against the timeframe I had set

21 them for their various objectives. I would expect

22 Colonel Blaskic to have that situation in place.

23 Q. Would that explanation apply also to Nadioci, Santici

24 and so on?

25 A. Yes, it would, sir.

1 Q. Would I be right in summing up your testimony to mean

2 this, that on 16th and 17th April 1993, you either saw

3 or were reliably informed of a number of acts of

4 violence occurring in different places at approximately

5 the same time?

6 A. That is correct, sir.

7 Q. Would I be right in understanding you to be also saying

8 that there was a common pattern running through those

9 incidents?

10 A. Yes, there was, sir.

11 Q. And that that pattern included the use of military

12 force?

13 A. Yes, we observed and I personally observed infantry

14 assaults.

15 Q. Was it likely that a military unit on the Croatian side

16 could have been involved in those operations and acting

17 wholly independently of General Blaskic's command?

18 A. That was not the impression I gained at the cease-fire

19 negotiations, sir. I do not think it is practical.

20 Q. You remember you spoke of some press men, who I think

21 came to you in the early hours of 16th April. They were

22 newspaper men, TV men?

23 A. They were journalists, newspaper people.

24 Q. Were they local journalists or foreign journalists, or a

25 mixture?

1 A. They were foreign journalists.

2 Q. I see. I take you back to this piece of testimony

3 concerning, shall I say the list of suspects?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Which General Blaskic said, I think to Colonel Stewart,

6 that he had had prepared and submitted upwards through

7 his chain of command; you remember that?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. You also spoke of Ahmici being followed by, I think

10 I have your words, "media and world attention", mm?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. So there was Ahmici, there was some publicity. I would

13 not put words in your mouth; could you relate the

14 presentation of that list of suspects to this media and

15 world attention? Did the media and world attention

16 occur before the list of suspects was presented, at the

17 same time when the list of suspects was presented, or

18 after the list of suspects was presented?

19 A. I would say during, sir, because the media interest

20 lasted for actually quite a long time.

21 Q. I see. It was not a one-off affair.

22 A. No, sir.

23 Q. I see. You spoke of Colonel Blaskic saying to the

24 authorities of BritBat that they could shoot at the

25 snipers who were assaulting the refugees outside of the

1 BritBat echelon.

2 A. Yes, sir, the snipers were shooting and killing the

3 refugees.

4 Q. First of all, did Colonel Blaskic say, if he said it,

5 that he did not know how those 400 refugees came to

6 leave their homes. Did he say anything about that?

7 A. I have no recollection of that, your Honour, no. It was

8 really the urgency of the situation, that these people

9 were being killed.

10 Q. Would I be interpreting you correctly this way: BritBat

11 was a neutral military force interfacing with two

12 military forces which were in confrontation one with

13 another; would that be a way of putting it?

14 A. At that time, yes, sir. We were also, in the north,

15 between the Muslim 2nd Corps and the Serbs, but in the

16 Lasva Valley that is exactly the case.

17 Q. Your force was part of or associated with the

18 United Nations exercise, is that right?

19 A. Yes, sir, we were part of the United Nations forces in

20 Bosnia.

21 Q. In a normal conflict involving the use of armed force,

22 like a major war, is there any military force which

23 interfaces with both sides?

24 A. I am not aware of it, sir. It was certainly an unique

25 experience for us in the European theatre.

1 JUDGE SHAHBUDDEEN: Thank you very much.

2 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, I have two or three clarifications

3 I would like to ask, since there were a number of

4 questions already asked by my colleagues.

5 I would like to go back to the issue of this

6 document, 60, having to do with the cease-fire, this

7 well known cease-fire, about which you said that in your

8 opinion and in the opinion of the other members of your

9 staff was not valid. How would you characterise, in

10 light of this period when you were in command of that

11 Central Bosnia mission, how would you characterise what

12 criteria, if you like, would be used for a cease-fire to

13 be valid, because you have rejected it by saying not

14 only was it not applied or implemented but it was not

15 valid in your opinion, there was no validity?

16 A. The lack of validity, sir, is attributed to the fact

17 that this was the first time we had ever received a

18 cease-fire declaration down the single chain of command

19 of the warring factions. This document was not known to

20 the BiH and its production had not followed the usual,

21 and by this stage quite often repeated procedure, of the

22 level that issues the joint declaration have sat with

23 ourselves, UNHCR, ECMM, and have actually produced a

24 consensus and out of the consensus comes the terms of

25 the cease-fire. These terms were promulgated only by

1 the HVO and only under the signature of Colonel Blaskic

2 and did not have the co-signature of Enver

3 Hadzihasanovic, who was the commander of 3rd Corps.

4 That had been the usual procedure, we had done it at the

5 brigade level and at the regional level before this. So

6 that is why I do not think it was valid, and it

7 certainly was not viewed as valid by the BiH and it did

8 not manifest any change at all on the ground, other than

9 a series of communications from Colonel Blaskic's

10 headquarters alleging contraventions by the BiH of this

11 cease-fire, which they were not committed to.

12 Q. Do you consider that it was a kind of a propaganda

13 document to be used for the international community or

14 world opinion, or do you believe that it was a document

15 to be used for strategic uses, an unilateral cease-fire,

16 for example?

17 A. My personal view was that this was part of a strategic

18 plan that the HVO, having conducted their pre-emptive

19 attack on the morning of the 16th, hoped by issuing this

20 cease-fire document on the 18th that the gains they had

21 achieved would be frozen and that they would succeed in

22 their endeavour and that the United Nations would assist

23 and enforce this cease-fire. That was quite a naive

24 strategic plan, but it did certainly serve the purpose

25 afterwards as being a document which Colonel Blaskic's

1 headquarters were able to quote ad nauseam as to

2 concentral inventions of this cease-fire, but the key,

3 the A to D in this document, were the normal measures

4 placed into a cease-fire document.

5 The one that is missing, which is the fundamental

6 one, is that the opposing forces would withdraw to their

7 previous lines of fighting, which was the implicit and

8 practical measure that achieved success on 21st April

9 when I illustrated on the map the blue lines, sir, to

10 separate the opposing forces.

11 Q. Colonel, at the negotiating tables, you often met with

12 Colonel Blaskic. Did you ever speak about the laws of

13 war?

14 A. I do not recollect discussing those, sir, no.

15 Q. Last question: the HVO soldiers, would you agree with

16 me, say, that they had been more or less trained either

17 in the former JNA or with the Croatian military forces;

18 would you agree with that opinion? This is a question

19 I am asking you, it is a question I would like to ask

20 you first before I get to the other question. Do you

21 agree with that or not?

22 A. If I could apologise and go back to the previous

23 question, which I did not fully grasp. Did I discuss

24 with Colonel Blaskic the Articles of War; not in terms

25 of an intellectual debate, but in terms of the

1 implementation of cease-fire agreements we certainly

2 did, especially in terms of the meeting on the 21st, and

3 exchange of prisoners and access to prisoners by the

4 ICRC was a fundamental condition under that cease-fire.

5 Your second question, sir?

6 Q. Let me ask for that clarification. Would you agree with

7 me when I say that the HVO soldiers had been trained

8 militarily either in the former JNA or more recently

9 with the regular Croatian forces? Would you agree with

10 that first statement?

11 A. The majority of the commanders I met, I know them to

12 have been former JNA officers. I cannot give a personal

13 account of the individual soldiers, sir, I did not talk

14 to them about it, but they were certainly trained by

15 their military commanders. We saw them training.

16 Q. This is my question: at the headquarters, from what you

17 know now, had military manuals, both in Croatia, and

18 specifically of the former JNA, dealt with applications

19 of the Geneva Conventions at all levels of command, as

20 well as respect for the laws and customs of war?

21 A. Certainly the JNA, and Yugoslavia was a signatory to

22 that Convention, sir. I did not read JNA tactical

23 pamphlets. I do not read Serbo-Croat, sir.

24 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, the Tribunal would like to thank you

25 for this long and patient testimony which you have been

1 willing to provide. You can now go back to your

2 command, to your units. I believe that it is now time

3 to take our break until 4.30. I believe that the

4 following witness is a protected one, is that true?

5 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that is correct.

6 JUDGE JORDA: So not to lose time, perhaps during the break

7 and five minutes before the judges come in, the witness

8 could be brought in once the curtains have been drawn.

9 Perhaps the usher before the judges leave could

10 accompany the witness out of the courtroom.

11 (The witness withdrew)

12 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is suspended. We will resume at

13 4.30.

14 (4.10 pm)

15 (A short break)

16 (4.35 pm)

17 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed, please bring in the

18 accused.

19 (Accused brought in)

20 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, you have the floor.

21 MR. HARMON: Thank you, good afternoon, Mr. President, good

22 afternoon, your Honours. My next witness is Witness F,

23 Mr. President.

24 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We are going to ask the Registry

25 first to verify the identity of the Witness F, who is

1 going to remain seated and who is going to read her

2 solemn declaration, but please I want to make sure of

3 the identity of the witness so that the Prosecutor and

4 the Defence are aware of it.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 JUDGE JORDA: Witness F, you have been called by the

7 Prosecution in the trial against Colonel Blaskic, who is

8 here present. You have come and we are fully aware that

9 it must be very difficult for you to come here. You

10 know that you are addressing a Tribunal and that this

11 Tribunal is going to listen to you with the greatest of

12 attention. You are first going to answer questions put

13 to you by the Prosecutor, who has called you, after that

14 I wish to remind you you will be answering questions put

15 to you by the counsel for the Defence, because all the

16 accused in all judicial systems are entitled to Defence

17 counsel.

18 Of course you are protected by very strict

19 protective measures that have been undertaken, and that

20 is the reason why you will be known anonymously as being

21 Witness F. If in the course of your testimony, there

22 are names that you do not wish to pronounce, or elements

23 of identification which might even indirectly enable

24 your identification, we are here ourselves, the

25 Prosecutor, the Registry and we have technical means to

1 remedy anything that may occur and that may be

2 considered an error. Therefore please speak without

3 fear, as serenely, as quietly as you can.

4 Mr. Prosecutor, Witness F is ready to answer your

5 questions now. No, please remain seated, but first the

6 Registry is reminding me that you have to read the

7 declaration, but this time, remain seated in doing so.

8 WITNESS F (sworn)

9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Mr. Prosecutor?

10 Examined by MR. HARMON

11 Q. Mr. President and counsel, what I propose to do is ask a

12 few preliminary questions and then moved for a closed

13 session, because some of my questions may result in the

14 identification of Witness F. If I may begin,

15 Mr. President, with some background questions:

16 Witness F, how old are you?

17 A. I am 34.

18 Q. Were you born in Vitez and raised in the village of

19 Pirici?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Are you a high school graduate?

22 A. I am.

23 Q. Are you a Muslim?

24 A. I am.

25 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, if at this point I could move for

1 a closed session, I will try to expeditiously move

2 through a series of questions and then we can return to

3 an open session.

4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, Mr. Nobilo?

5 MR. HAYMAN: We are at the court's disposal, your Honour.

6 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. My colleagues and myself feel that

7 we should go into closed session now.

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1 (redacted)

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7 (In open session)

8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor?

9 MR. HARMON: Witness F, when you arrived at Niko Vidovic's

10 house, what did you see?

11 A. As I said, the lady in white uniform was standing there

12 and there were two stands there, one had the IV and the

13 other one had blood. I passed by and went to the

14 basement and Croatian women and children were there,

15 they were all my next-door neighbours. I entered and

16 there were beds placed there, there were five of them

17 and then there was also a stove and there was some food

18 being cooked there. We were told to get in and Ivica

19 told us to stay there. He talked to us, he was saying

20 that the best solution for us would be for us to stay

21 there in the basement.

22 Q. Did it appear to you, Witness F, that preparations had

23 been made in advance for accommodating a large number of

24 people in the basement of that particular house?

25 A. Yes. The Croatian women and children were all dressed

1 up, it was cold that early in April, they all had coats

2 and some hats. My children were in their pyjamas and

3 I was barefoot, I only had slippers on my feet.

4 Q. Finka Vidovic you have identified as wearing a white

5 sort of outfit. Do you know what she did, was she a

6 nurse?

7 A. Yes, she was a medical nurse. I do not know what she

8 was doing on that particular day.

9 Q. Did it look like medical supplies had been positioned at

10 Niko Vidovic's house?

11 A. Yes, after about an hour, Finka arrived with a bundle of

12 medicine which she put on a table in the basement.

13 Q. Please continue with your observations.

14 A. There was terrible shooting going on outside from all

15 kinds of weapons, I am not an expert in weapons, but

16 I know for instance that there was large calibre weapons

17 being shot as well as small. I was very agitated and my

18 children as well, we were all in fear, we were standing

19 next to a small window, it was open ajar for some fresh

20 air, and I could feel the smoke that was coming in.

21 I knew that something was burning. The men were

22 not there, there were only women and children there.

23 However, occasionally they would come in, the men did.

24 They would come to check on their families and Ivica

25 told us that we must not leave the basement, even if we

1 needed to go to the bathroom. Around 9.00 or 9.30, I am

2 not sure about the time, I had to take the little one

3 outside and I asked a woman if I could take her

4 outside. She told me to ask Ivica. The first time he

5 said that I could not and the second time I asked

6 another man and he said that I could, so I passed by

7 them.

8 Q. Where did you go? Did you stay in the house or did you

9 go outside?

10 A. I went upstairs and got out. As I was coming out, I saw

11 soldiers in black and camouflage uniforms. They were

12 eating something.

13 Q. Did you notice any kind of patches or insignia on those

14 soldiers?

15 A. Yes, I did. I passed by them and they were not paying

16 any attention to me. They probably thought that I had

17 taken shelter there just like the rest of the women.

18 Q. What badges did you notice?

19 A. It said "Vitezovi" and the others said "Jokers".

20 Q. How many soldiers did you see?

21 A. There were more of those in black uniforms, maybe four

22 or five in black uniforms and three or four in

23 camouflage uniforms. They had some unusual hats, they

24 were round with a red fringe.

25 Q. Did you hear any conversations among those soldiers?

1 A. Yes, they were talking about some accomplished task,

2 they were happy, they said that everything was done. At

3 the moment when I came out, because there is a

4 staircase, you had to climb the staircase to get out,

5 I saw Ahmic Sulejman, Eso and Cazim's houses on fire.

6 I took the little one to the toilet and on the way back,

7 I saw Frano Vidovic, Anto Kupreskic and Anto Dudzo, they

8 were talking. Anto Kupreskic was an older man, he was

9 in uniform though and he had a rifle and some grenades,

10 and the other two did not have any weapons and Frano had

11 a white insignia on his sleeve. He was pointing to the

12 basement where we were, and he said, "we should not kill

13 them, because some of us may get killed. We should

14 protect them". Then I thought we were imprisoned here.

15 Then I came down and I told my brother, "we are

16 imprisoned here", and he nodded to me because he was

17 standing next to the window and overheard them talking.

18 I also came over to my husband and told him everything

19 as well and then we knew what actually was going on.

20 A few moments later, a boy of 12 or 13 came

21 running, I knew him all my life --

22 Q. Let me interrupt you for a second before you recount

23 that particular incident. You said you had seen

24 Hazim's, Eso's and Sulejman's houses burning. Were

25 those houses in the area where you lived?

1 A. Yes, they were near the stadium, yes.

2 Q. They appeared to be on fire when you saw them on the

3 morning of 16th April, is that correct?

4 A. Yes, they were on fire.

5 Q. Please continue with your testimony. You were relating

6 an incident with a young boy.

7 A. Yes, he ran into the basement, opened the door and the

8 fire, the shooting was still going on outside, it had

9 died down a little bit from what it was at 5.30. Then

10 he addressed to the Croatian women and he said, "you

11 know what is new?", they said, "what is new, Jure?",

12 that was his nickname. "All the Muslims were killed.

13 I personally was at the stadium and I turned over two

14 Muslims, Muharem and Nedzad", they were two cousins.

15 At that moment, I had an attack of something, I started

16 screaming, I wanted to get out, go out and find Nedzad

17 and Muharem. Finka did not allow me to go out. She

18 said I should sit down and not make any problems and

19 gave me a tablet to take to calm down. Then my husband

20 who was watching this took the older daughter and told

21 me to go out, he said that if they were going to kill

22 us, then we should come out and be killed as people are

23 not as mice.

24 I took my little one and started out. However,

25 Ivica who was standing outside in front of the door told

1 him, "go back and stay there where I told you to stay,

2 because you do not know what is going on". Finka also

3 asked my husband, she pleaded with him, "go back, it

4 will all change, it will not stay like this". My

5 husband was excited, then we stay there.

6 Q. While you were there in the basement and you remain in

7 the basement on the 16th, did you hear the husbands of

8 any of these women come in and mention their successes?

9 Can you tell the court exactly what you heard them say?

10 A. Yes, the husbands were not in the basement, they would

11 come down occasionally, Satko Vidovic came in, that is

12 Anto Vidovic, called Satko, came in at one point and

13 said a friend of his, Fahrudin Ahmic, was killed and he

14 was sorry he was killed. However, when they would come

15 in, they would not address us, they would talk to their

16 wives. They were talking how they were advancing and at

17 one point, Ivica, called Jevdjo, entered and said,

18 "women, victory is ours. You should not be afraid.

19 It is almost over". The women were applauding, they

20 were rejoicing and they were saying they had no losses

21 themselves.

22 Then they started talking among themselves,

23 I remember a young man came to see a young woman from

24 Busovaca and I overheard them speaking. They said that

25 the job was done, and Ivica said that this match had to

1 be played at some point, and, "we are victorious". He

2 was talking to this young woman and he said, "this is

3 ethnic cleansing and I think we will succeed pretty

4 soon". Ivica said, "we do not need to go to Zenica at

5 all, we can just stay in our Herceg-Bosna". We were

6 just listening to what was going on.

7 Q. You mentioned some individuals, you mentioned Anto

8 Vidovic, known as Satko. How was he dressed on the

9 morning of 16th April, as you recall?

10 A. He had camouflage uniform.

11 Q. Did he have any insignia on him that you can recall?

12 A. The HVO.

13 Q. You mentioned an individual by the name of Ivica

14 "Jevdjo" Vidovic, is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How was he dressed?

17 A. He wore camouflage pants, a blue jacket and throughout

18 the time he carried a rifle.

19 Q. Did you see any insignia and/or markings on him that

20 identified his unit?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. Was there any reference by Jevdjo as to who his

23 particular commander was?

24 A. (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted). Then he told him, "just

4 sit where you are, because if it were according to

5 Nenad, you would not be sitting where you are sitting".

6 Q. Let me ask you, did you also hear any conversations

7 about a rocket launcher being fired on Kruscica?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. Please tell the court what you heard in respect of that

10 conversation?

11 A. Ivica came down to the basement, his nickname is Jevdjo,

12 and he told the woman, "women, our own are advancing so

13 do not worry about anything. Seven rocket launchers are

14 shelling Kruscica and soon Kruscica will be ours".

15 Q. Did he say seven rocket launchers or a seven barrelled

16 rocket launcher?

17 A. Yes, he did, VBR, which means barrelled rocket launcher.

18 Q. Did anything else happen that particular day in the

19 basement that you can recall?

20 A. (redacted)

21 (redacted), I do not

22 know where he had been, but his brother Drago came and

23 was talking to his mother who had been sitting there all

24 the time. She started crying. She started crying and

25 shouting, "Ivica, my son, my flower", we did not know

1 what she was referring to. Then the people started

2 whispering, "Ivica was killed", then Drago looked around

3 at us and he said "if somebody needs to cut throats,

4 I am the one who is going to do it". That is how we

5 understood it, Ivica Vidovic, her son, was killed.

6 Q. How was that individual dressed who discussed cutting

7 throats?

8 A. He had the old JNA coat and a white band on his sleeve

9 and he carried a rifle.

10 Q. Did he have any insignia on him that you could remember

11 at this date?

12 A. I did not see any.

13 Q. Did you stay at that particular house the night of

14 16th April 1993?

15 A. Yes, we stayed there the 16th , in the night of the

16 16th, we stayed there all night. The morning of the

17 17th came, some Croat women were going out and then were

18 coming back. The shooting was dying down, in fact it

19 had stopped altogether. At one point we asked Ivica

20 when we were going to come out and he said that we still

21 had to wait, that there was no question about our going

22 out. It must have been very light, it must have been

23 around 9.00 already. Ivica came in and said to the

24 women who were present there, who were sitting around,

25 he said, "women, go and look for your men and tell them

1 that I cannot protect them alone by myself any more like

2 I used to, because the Jokers and the Vitezovi found out

3 that we are protecting some Muslims, so it is my head in

4 question now".

5 Then a young woman got up and said, "do not put

6 your life at risk", and then he said, "when we talked

7 about it, you were all for protecting them, but now the

8 Vitezovi and the Jokers found out, nobody wants to do

9 anything".

10 Q. Let me ask you, Witness F, was that on 18th April,

11 because I am asking you questions about the 17th April.

12 A. No, this was on 17th April.

13 Q. Okay. Let me ask you also, did you see an individual by

14 the name of Stjepan Vidovic on 17th April?

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. Did he come into the basement?

17 A. Yes, he did.

18 Q. What did he say?

19 A. He entered the basement, he spent the night of the

20 16th in the basement, but on the 17th he went to see his

21 house, and he came back. His wife stayed there all the

22 time and he was talking to her and other women who were

23 there. He was saying that the minaret of the mosque had

24 collapsed, that various houses were burned down and that

25 his own house was left intact. He said that he saw a

1 tractor going to collect Muslim bodies on the roads and

2 around the houses.

3 Q. What did he say about the condition of all the Muslim

4 houses that he had seen?

5 A. He seemed to be rejoicing, because his own was intact

6 and all the Muslim ones were burned down.

7 Q. Did he say anything about Muslims coming back into the

8 area again?

9 A. He said nothing but nobody could go back, because

10 everything was still burning, but he said that they were

11 going and he meant Croats, that they were going in a

12 tractor and collecting the bodies, the Muslim bodies.

13 Q. Okay. Now you mention that Ivica "Jevdjo" Vidovic had

14 come in and he said the Jokers and the Vitezovi had

15 found out you were in this particular house; is that

16 correct?

17 A. Yes, he said he turned to the women, but he was speaking

18 aloud so we could all hear him. He said, "Jokers and

19 Vitezovi have found out about you here", so he said,

20 "women, go and find your men, because I cannot do

21 anything on my own. When we were all making a decision,

22 we were all for it, that we protect them, and now nobody

23 wants to do anything. Now it is my head that is at

24 risk", and he showed.

25 Q. What happened next?

1 A. Ivica left and some women were talking. One said that

2 she did not know where her husband was, another one did

3 not know where her husband was and they told us to go to

4 another room, because there were two rooms in this

5 basement, there were some blankets there, but we needed

6 the blankets so we remained standing all this time, but

7 he left.

8 In the meantime, another neighbour of ours came.

9 He approached my brother -- this was about two hours

10 after Ivica had left. He was looking at my brothers, my

11 husband, myself, all of us, because we were all

12 together. He offered them cigarettes. I approached to

13 see what was going on, what he was going to tell them,

14 and he said, "I am really sorry, but I was ordered to

15 bring you out. I was ordered by them". He stood there,

16 they all smoked a cigarette, all of them, he still was

17 standing there.

18 Q. When you say he was ordered by them, what did he say he

19 was ordered to do?

20 A. They ordered him to bring out the three of them. He

21 said, "I have to bring the three of you out so that you

22 would be killed".

23 Q. When you say the three of them, I take it, is that your

24 husband and your two brothers who also would be in the

25 particular house with their families?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What happened after he informed people -- informed your

3 brothers and your husband that they had to be taken out

4 to be killed?

5 A. When he told them, he lit a cigarette with them and then

6 stood there for a while, and at that time there was a

7 sound of a personnel carrier approaching. I heard the

8 personnel carrier arriving in Niko Vidovic's yard and

9 somebody in the English language is calling out my

10 brother's name and the surviving Muslims and Ivica

11 Vidovic said there were no surviving Muslims and there

12 were no civilians in the basement and that they should

13 feel free to go back.

14 Q. Did that UNPROFOR vehicle leave then?

15 A. Yes, they were there for about 15 minutes and then they

16 returned. I heard that. They were our last hope, when

17 this UNPROFOR left.

18 Q. Witness F, you indicated that a man by the name of Anto

19 Pudja had come to the basement to talk to your brothers

20 and had informed them he had to take them out in order

21 to have them killed. How was Anto Pudja dressed?

22 A. He wore a black hat and a camouflage uniform, and he was

23 not looking -- he did not look happy. He looked sad.

24 Q. Did he have any particular insignia on him identifying

25 his unit?

1 A. The HVO.

2 Q. Okay. What happened after he left the basement and

3 after this UNPROFOR vehicle that had come to that

4 particular location left? What did you and your family

5 members and your brothers and their families do?

6 A. This was going on throughout the day of the 17th, they

7 were coming and talking, and would go out, they were

8 bragging about their victories. The night came, the

9 night of the 17th, and a woman came running in, and

10 shouted that the barns were on fire of Plavcic, and that

11 they should go towards Rovna because they may be in

12 danger.

13 Q. Was Plavcic a Croat?

14 A. Yes, this was in Mahala, as we called that section.

15 That woman was outside and she must have either seen it

16 or been told by someone. Then the basement started

17 emptying, people started leaving one by one. Then in

18 the end we were left alone, just my brothers there and

19 my family.

20 Q. So after information was passed to the Croat people in

21 the basement that a Croat barn was burning, the Croat

22 women and children in the basement left and you and your

23 families were left alone, is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You said that the Croat people in the basement fled in

1 the direction of Rovna, is that correct?

2 A. Yes, they were saying that that was the most secure

3 place to go, so they hurried there, and we were talking

4 what to do, we could not turn and go towards Pirici, we

5 could not do that, so we decided to go to Rovna, and so

6 we started. As we were coming out, there were two

7 soldiers in front of the house, they were also in a

8 hurry, they were picking up knapsacks from the ground,

9 they were all leaving in a group so we joined this group

10 too.

11 Q. So you fled along with the Croats in the direction of

12 Rovna, is that your testimony?

13 A. Yes, we did.

14 Q. Was that on the morning of -- was that on 18th April

15 1993?

16 A. It was.

17 Q. Did you go in the direction of Rovna?

18 A. Yes, we did. We went ahead and we followed. They went

19 ahead and we followed. There were bullets flying past

20 us, we were going towards Pirici, then we kept going and

21 going. We crossed the river, then some of them split

22 off and some to another, so we were left alone on the

23 road, my brother was ahead and I had my daughter --

24 Q. Witness F, I am going to interrupt you for a minute,

25 please, because you are going a little bit fast. When

1 you left the house of Niko Vidovic and you went toward

2 Rovna, did you go down the road past Nenad Santic's

3 house, which is indicated as number 5 on Prosecutor's

4 Exhibit 113A?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you cross the Lasva river across a bridge and find a

7 refuge in a house in the area of Rovna?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you remain in that house the night of 18th April

10 1993?

11 A. I did. That woman's name was Safradin and the Safradins

12 are a Croat family, but when we went in, there was a

13 neighbour of ours inside who recognised us and he was

14 surprised how come we got there. Then he got lost, he

15 went away somewhere. The woman was afraid that we were

16 going to spend the night there.

17 Q. Let me ask you, Witness F, when you say "we", are you

18 referring to yourself, your husband, your two children,

19 your two brothers, their families and their children?

20 A. Yes, there were six adults and seven children.

21 Q. So that particular night of the 18th you stayed in a

22 house near Rovna, all of you?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, do we intend to go past 5.30? If

25 we do, I can continue my examination; if not, I can

1 conclude it here.

2 JUDGE JORDA: No, not at all. The witness must be tired of

3 having to tell us about all her suffering, so we will

4 adjourn as usual. Before the Trial Chamber rises,

5 perhaps the Registry could ensure a closed session so

6 that the witness can be shown out, or would you prefer

7 us to do that after the judges leave? So Witness F,

8 please stay seated for the moment.

9 I should like to remind you that we have no

10 hearing tomorrow throughout the day, so we will be

11 resuming our work the day after tomorrow, that is on

12 13th November at the usual time, that is at 10.00 am.

13 The hearing is adjourned.

14 (5.30 pm)

15 (Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am

16 on Thursday, 13th November 1997)

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