International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

  1. 1 Wednesday, 28th January 1998

    2 (10.10 am)

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Mr Registrar, please have the

    4 accused brought in.

    5 (Accused brought in)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to resume work

    7 now. I wish to see whether the interpreters' booths

    8 are ready, our faithful interpreters. Very well, can

    9 everyone hear me, the Prosecution, the Defence, General

    10 Blaskic, my colleagues, can you hear me? Very well, in

    11 that case, we are ready. Mr. Prosecutor, it is up to

    12 you now to bring your witness. Let me look at our

    13 list.

    14 MR. HARMON: Good morning, Mr. President and

    15 your Honours, good morning counsel. Mr. President and

    16 your Honours, the next witness we will call is Charles

    17 McLeod. Mr. McLeod will testify about a report which he

    18 prepared for ECMM in May 1993. First of all, let me

    19 give you some background about Mr. McLeod.

    20 Mr. McLeod was appointed to ECMM as a Monitor

    21 and spent a year as a member of the United Kingdom

    22 delegation to the ECMM which was based in Zagreb and

    23 that was in 1992. In December 1992, Mr. McLeod was sent

    24 to General Morrillon's headquarters in Kiseljak where

    25 he was an ECMM liaison officer between ECMM and

  2. 1 UNPROFOR.

    2 Following the events in the Lasva Valley in

    3 April 1993, Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault, who was

    4 head of the Regional Centre for ECMM in Zenica, and Ole

    5 Brix-Andersen, who was deputy head of mission,

    6 political section, sent Mr. McLeod to make an appraisal

    7 of what had occurred in the Lasva Valley in April 1993.

    8 Mr. McLeod then travelled to Zenica on 3rd May

    9 and remained in the area until 12th May, during which

    10 time he interviewed a variety of people, including

    11 various members of the parties, political, military and

    12 religious leaders. He also visited the villages of

    13 Ahmici and Loncari. He prepared a report on

    14 inter-ethnic violence in Vitez, Busovaca and Zenica in

    15 April 1993 on behalf of the ECMM humanitarian section.

    16 His report was then distributed to each of the member

    17 states of the European Community, amongst others.

    18 In July 1993, he joined the international

    19 conference on the former Yugoslavia as a political

    20 advisor and worked in that capacity to Mr. Stoltenberg's

    21 deputies, Ambassador Knut Vollebaek and Ambassador Kai

    22 Eide. We will present his report to your Honours and

    23 his testimony will concentrate on various aspects of

    24 that report and on interviews which he conducted,

    25 including interviews with Ivica Santic, Pero Skopljak,

  3. 1 the accused Tihomir Blaskic, and Zlatko Aleksovski and

    2 others.

    3 Finally, Mr. President and your Honours, he

    4 will testify about his conclusions regarding the events

    5 in the Lasva Valley in April 1993. In respect of the

    6 indictment, your Honours, his testimony relates to

    7 virtually all counts contained in the indictment. That

    8 concludes my summary, Mr. President.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, thank you very

    10 much. This report that you mentioned which he

    11 submitted, has it been communicated to the Defence?

    12 MR. HARMON: Yes, it has.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. In that case all

    14 the conditions having been established for an

    15 adversarial debate.

    16 Please have Mr. McLeod brought in,

    17 Mr. Registrar.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: For the record, Mr. President, we

    19 wish to preserve our hearsay objection as to apparently

    20 interviews of other individuals that this witness is

    21 going to be recounting wholesale. Obviously we are not

    22 going to have the opportunity to cross-examine those

    23 other individuals.

    24 (Witness entered court)

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but the Chamber has made a

  4. 1 ruling about hearsay, I wish to remind you. You cannot

    2 continue to insist on your objection, except if you

    3 wish it to enter the transcript, is it just a moral

    4 protest? If it only has a moral meaning, then it is

    5 all right. Thank you.

    6 Can you hear me, Mr. McLeod?

    7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please confirm your

    9 name and first name, please?

    10 THE WITNESS: My name is Charles McLeod.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: McLeod. Please read the solemn

    12 declaration that is being given to you by the usher,

    13 standing.

    14 MR. CHARLES McLEOD (sworn)

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. The Tribunal

    16 thanks you for having accepted to come and appear in

    17 the trial against General Blaskic, who is here

    18 present. The Prosecutor has outlined the general

    19 framework of your testimony, and for an expert such as

    20 you, I will not reiterate what has already been said,

    21 so we are waiting for your testimony which will focus

    22 on the particular points underlined by the Prosecution

    23 in connection with the case against General Blaskic.

    24 Please feel free to present your testimony after which

    25 the Prosecutor will have some additional questions for

  5. 1 you. Thank you.

    2 Examined by MR. HARMON

    3 Q. Mr. McLeod, I am going to be asking you a

    4 number of questions in respect of your report on

    5 inter-ethnic violence in Vitez, Busovaca and Zenica in

    6 April 1993 and as I ask you these questions if you

    7 would pause after the conclusion of my question to give

    8 time for the interpreters to interpret my question

    9 before answering, otherwise my questions will merge

    10 with your answers and it will not be an effective

    11 presentation.

    12 A. Certainly.

    13 Q. Before turning to the substance of the

    14 report, Mr. McLeod, can you please tell the judges about

    15 your background and training, with particular emphasis

    16 on your training as a military officer and your

    17 experiences as a member of the ECMM in the former

    18 Yugoslavia.

    19 A. Certainly. I was born in London in 1963, and

    20 educated in England, and I joined the British army in

    21 1982. I was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the

    22 infantry in 1983 and I served with my unit in Germany,

    23 I did a four month tour in west Belfast in Northern

    24 Ireland.

    25 While I was in the army, I then went to

  6. 1 London University and read a Bachelor's degree in

    2 German for three years, and rejoined my unit in

    3 England, went back to Northern Ireland for a further

    4 two year tour, attended a junior command and staff

    5 course and my final job in the army was as adjutant of

    6 a training depot. As adjutant, amongst other things

    7 I was responsible for military discipline within the

    8 unit and I had experience of prosecuting at court's

    9 martial, prosecuting at about a dozen court's martial

    10 over a 18 month period.

    11 I left the army in 1992 and immediately

    12 joined the ECMM as a member of the UK delegation. With

    13 the ECMM, I was on two month contracts and completed a

    14 total of six contracts. Following my time with ECMM,

    15 I will come back and talk in some detail about what

    16 I was doing with ECMM in a moment, I spent a further

    17 year in the former Yugoslavia working for an

    18 international conference for the former Yugoslavia,

    19 working as political advisor to Mr. Stoltenberg's

    20 deputies, initially Ambassador Knut Volebaek and then

    21 Ambassador Kai Eide, and we were responsible for the

    22 negotiations which we were attempting to conduct

    23 between the Croatian government and the Serbs who

    24 occupied the Krajina region of Croatia at that time, so

    25 that was for a further year.

  7. 1 At the end of that, I then did a Master's

    2 degree in business administration back in England, so

    3 turning with a bit more detail to what I was doing as a

    4 member of ECMM, initially I was a member of the

    5 Regional Centre in Zagreb, working as a Monitor,

    6 working on the separation of forces within Croatia on

    7 both sides of the internal contact line inside Croatia,

    8 so this is Serbs and Croats, and I was responsible for

    9 ensuring that troops had been withdrawn from the

    10 front-line and then that heavy weapons were being stored

    11 in the correct areas, and this meant liaising with

    12 military forces on both sides within Croatia.

    13 Fairly soon, I was then moved to the

    14 headquarters of the ECMM within the humanitarian

    15 section, and as a member of the humanitarian section,

    16 I was responsible for attempting to implement

    17 humanitarian policies such as there was. ECMM did not

    18 have great resources to carry out humanitarian works,

    19 but we did have teams deployed on the ground who

    20 observed things and who had information about

    21 humanitarian problems and issues, so one of the things

    22 I did was attempt to improve the information flow from

    23 our teams on the ground by then calculating a weekly

    24 humanitarian activity report, which we then

    25 disseminated to the international humanitarian agencies

  8. 1 based in Zagreb, so they would have the benefit of the

    2 information we had from Croatia and Bosnia and this

    3 seemed to be fairly effective and well received.

    4 As a member of the humanitarian section,

    5 I was involved in ECMM's attempts to regain a position

    6 in northern Bosnia, Serb-controlled Bosnia, and so this

    7 took me on a couple of trips to Banja Luka, which was

    8 the headquarters of the Serb-controlled area in

    9 northern Bosnia. As a result of this, the ECMM was

    10 then approached by John Thompson, who was the head of

    11 what was then CSCE, Conference on Security and the

    12 Co-operation in Europe, a rapporteur mission which was

    13 sent to the camps of Manjaca and Trnopolje in northern

    14 Bosnia. Because ECMM had some limited access to Banja

    15 Luka, we were asked by John Thompson to take his

    16 rapporteur mission in, so I accompanied him to Manjaca

    17 and Trnopolje.

    18 Because of the liaison we had with the ICRC,

    19 we were then invited by the ICRC to accompany them as

    20 an international presence when they were removing

    21 detainees from these camps, which was an interesting

    22 experience.

    23 In Christmas 1992, I was at

    24 General Morrillon's headquarters in Kiseljak outside

    25 Sarajevo as the liaison officer for a four week period

  9. 1 and during that time, I travelled from Kiseljak to

    2 Zenica and so saw what conditions were like on the road

    3 from Kiseljak through Busovaca to Zenica over the

    4 Christmas period in 1992. During March 1993, one of my

    5 key activities was attempting to, I think successfully,

    6 to set up a process of negotiation between the Croats

    7 and the Serbs in the Krajina to facilitate the

    8 collection of bodies who were stuck on the

    9 confrontation line near the Maslenica bridge in Croatia

    10 where there had been a fight in the January of that

    11 year. The fact there were dead bodies lying up in

    12 no-man's land was causing great concern, so with the

    13 headquarters, the Danish management of the ECMM

    14 established a programme and then negotiated with the

    15 Croats and the Serbs to facilitate the collection of

    16 these dead bodies and their repatriation across an UN

    17 controlled checkpoint which was I think of some

    18 benefit, because people were getting very concerned

    19 about this.

    20 Then in April of that year, the events which

    21 are all quite familiar took place in the Vitez area,

    22 and immediately after the events of 16th, 17th,

    23 18th April, Jean-Pierre Thebault, who was a French

    24 Ambassador working for the ECMM as head of the region

    25 centre based in Zenica, came to Zagreb to the

  10. 1 headquarters and met with Ole Brix-Andersen who was

    2 deputy head of the mission on the political side, so a

    3 Danish diplomat, to discuss the events, to discuss his

    4 concern about what was going on and he suggested that

    5 somebody should go and attempt to establish as clearly

    6 as possible what had actually taken place. He said

    7 that he could spare somebody to do this, but most of

    8 his teams were working flat out with bilateral meetings

    9 and trilateral meetings between the parties to try and

    10 stabilise the situation.

    11 At the same time, Thomas Osario, who was

    12 working for the UN Centre for Human Rights, also

    13 approached the headquarters of ECMM, said he was going

    14 down specifically to Ahmici to see what had gone on,

    15 and asked if somebody could go, so the decision was

    16 taken by the headquarters at ECMM that I, as somebody

    17 who had been working in the humanitarian section,

    18 should go to the Regional Centre in Zenica, very

    19 briefly try to establish what had gone on, and to come

    20 back and report.

    21 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much for that

    22 information. Could I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 242,

    23 Mr. Dubuisson, distributed to the various persons in the

    24 courtroom?

    25 Mr. President, Prosecutor's Exhibit 242 is a

  11. 1 copy of Mr. McLeod's report on inter-ethnic violence in

    2 Vitez, Busovaca and Zenica in April 1993. There is an

    3 English and a French version of this report.

    4 Before turning our attention to that report,

    5 Mr. McLeod, let me ask you ultimately to whom was this

    6 report disseminated?

    7 A. Once the report was written, it was passed to

    8 the heads of each of the delegations of the ECMM, who

    9 then sent it on to their capitals, so each of the

    10 European Union capitals and various others.

    11 Q. Mr. McLeod, can you inform the judges the

    12 dates that you actually went down to Central Bosnia to

    13 prepare this report?

    14 A. Certainly. I travelled into Zenica via Split

    15 on 3rd May and I left again on 12th May 1993.

    16 Q. In preparing your report, did you consult

    17 with ECMM monitors who were in the region and UNPROFOR

    18 personnel as well?

    19 A. Certainly. When I arrived, my first action

    20 was to gather together all of the reports which had

    21 been written by ECMM and UNPROFOR and I sat down and

    22 spent a day or two days reading through all the reports

    23 and producing a digest of the events as they were

    24 reported, which is actually contained at the back of

    25 this report, plotted out all of the locations on the

  12. 1 map so that I could build up a picture in my own mind

    2 of what we had seen, what the UN had seen, before

    3 I started talking to people so that I would have as

    4 clear an idea as possible, in advance, of what we

    5 thought had happened as a background against which I

    6 could then hear other people's versions of events.

    7 Q. In the preparation of this report, did you

    8 travel on the ground to villages that had been

    9 essentially destroyed?

    10 A. Yes, on 4th May I travelled with Jean-Pierre

    11 Thebault, Ambassador Thebault, to visit the British

    12 battalion headquarters in Vitez and then accompanied

    13 Colonel Bob Stewart on a visit that he was making to

    14 the village of Ahmici, amongst others.

    15 Q. Did you also visit the village of Loncari?

    16 A. Yes, we did, we went to Ahmici and then up to

    17 Loncari.

    18 Q. In the course of preparing this report,

    19 Mr. McLeod, did you also interview political, military

    20 and religious leaders from the Muslim side and from the

    21 HVO side?

    22 A. Yes, my objective had been as far as possible

    23 to get a balanced view and therefore to speak to the

    24 political -- in other words the mayors -- military

    25 commanders on both sides and also in order to be able

  13. 1 to meet people who would be civic leaders on sides

    2 controlled by the opposition in each case, I met

    3 religious leaders because on both sides the religious

    4 leaders were the only people in territory controlled by

    5 the opposing parties whom I could find to build up as

    6 clear a view and as balanced a view as possible of what

    7 had happened.

    8 Q. Your report contains the interview statements

    9 of various persons whom you interviewed from the

    10 parties, is that correct?

    11 A. That is right. I wrote up detailed notes as

    12 I was actually meeting people and talking to people and

    13 then at the end of the period in Zenica and immediately

    14 on returning to Zagreb typed up those notes into the

    15 report and in almost every case attached them as an

    16 appendix to the report.

    17 Q. Could you summarise, very briefly, the

    18 identities of the parties you interviewed? How many

    19 were there and who were they?

    20 A. Certainly. I will do that by simply turning

    21 to the report and reading down the contents page, which

    22 is the second page in the report, and you can see there

    23 the dates of the meetings and who I was talking to.

    24 You can see that I met the mayor of Zenica,

    25 Father Stjepan, who was a Croatian priest, Catholic

  14. 1 priest in Zenica; the head of the ICRC in Zenica,

    2 because I felt it was important to liaise with them as

    3 well; the commander of III Corps BiH in Zenica, so he

    4 was the Muslim military commander in the area and then

    5 the following day meeting with Father --

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me for a minute. It

    7 seems to me that in the French version I am missing the

    8 first two pages .

    9 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, that is absolutely

    10 right.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Microphone, please, Mr. Harmon.

    12 I have a report which begins with a statement of the

    13 mayor of Zenica and Vitez, so I suppose a report must

    14 start with an introduction, but I do not know --

    15 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I apologise, I was

    16 informed that this whole report had been translated

    17 into French and it was given to me and it appears the

    18 table of contents in the French version is not

    19 included.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Maybe what is important is the

    21 actual introduction, these two pages. Perhaps the

    22 witness in that introduction explains his mission.

    23 MR. HARMON: It appears, Mr. President, that

    24 your report, the French translation is not in the

    25 correct order. I do not see a table of contents.

  15. 1 A. I have found it.

    2 MR. HARMON: Can you direct Judge Jorda to

    3 where it is in the French translation? That would be

    4 helpful, Mr. McLeod. Apparently it is in there,

    5 apparently this has been assembled in the wrong order,

    6 Mr. President, I apologise. Mr. McLeod has found the

    7 index he is referring to and he can direct your Honour

    8 to it.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that is better now.

    10 I have a schematic attitude, which may be a bit

    11 archaic, but this is much better now. I wish to thank

    12 the witness for helping me out. I apologise for not

    13 listening very carefully to your last answer, so could

    14 you please repeat it? Thank you.

    15 A. Certainly, sir.

    16 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, would you please then

    17 continue -- just start at the beginning of your answer,

    18 if you would. Identify please again the parties who

    19 you interviewed and whose reports are contained in the

    20 report itself.

    21 A. Certainly, sir. As Mr. President can see on

    22 the table of contents, we have the dates down the

    23 left-hand side and then the details of the people that

    24 I met. You can see that I met with the mayor of

    25 Zenica, Father Stjepan, who was a Catholic priest, a

  16. 1 Croat living in Zenica; the head of the ICRC mission in

    2 Zenica; the commander of III Corps of the BiH Army, so

    3 he was the senior Muslim military commander in the

    4 area, Father Bozo, who was another Croat Catholic

    5 priest in a village Cajdras just outside Zenica in an

    6 area controlled by the Muslims; the mayor of Vitez;

    7 General Blaskic, who was commander of the operational

    8 zone of Vitez, Colonel at that time; the deputy

    9 commander of the Kruscica brigade, which was a BiH Army

    10 brigade just outside Vitez; various members of

    11 BritBat. I actually noted the meeting I had with the

    12 second in command, Enver Hodza, who was the Imam of

    13 Busovaca, so clearly a Muslim living in Busovaca; the

    14 chief of police and a number of other policemen in

    15 Busovaca; the mayor of Zenica again; various people at

    16 the Centre for Human Rights in Zenica. I had a visit

    17 to Kaonik Prison which was the Croatian prison just

    18 outside Busovaca; a gentleman called Hasan Sadibasic

    19 who was a Muslim living in Vitez; and then finally

    20 another meeting with the deputy commander of III Corps

    21 of the BiH Army, a man named Dugalic.

    22 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, before turning to the

    23 substance of those interviews, could you please explain

    24 your method of interviewing each of these people, what

    25 you did, what you said before the interview started?

  17. 1 A. Certainly. Because my aim had been to try

    2 and gather as clear a view as possible of what had

    3 happened, having initially armed myself with our own

    4 view of events as we had seen them and reported them,

    5 when I met each person, I explained to them that I had

    6 come from Zagreb, that the international community was

    7 extremely concerned about the events that had just

    8 taken place, that I had been sent here to meet

    9 everybody, to talk to them, that I was having this

    10 series of meetings balanced on both sides of the two

    11 parties, and I invited everybody to explain to me in

    12 their own words what they thought had happened.

    13 In order to facilitate this, I had a

    14 photocopied map of the area and a set of coloured pens

    15 and I would put the map in front of them and say

    16 "please show me on the map", which made life a lot

    17 easier, because otherwise they would talk about areas

    18 and places which would mean nothing to me, but when

    19 they pointed them out on the map, it was clear what

    20 they were talking about. As far as possible I tended

    21 not to contradict what they were saying when they were

    22 saying something I thought was wrong, but allow them to

    23 explain their point of view. My hope was that by

    24 hearing the points of view of the parties at different

    25 levels, the military, political and religious, at the

  18. 1 end of it I would be able to build up a picture of what

    2 they thought had happened and then cross-reference that

    3 with what we had actually seen or what we believed had

    4 happened and that way, get as clear a view as possible

    5 of the events that had taken place.

    6 I also explained that our intention was to

    7 establish what had happened and then if possible work

    8 out ways of preventing it from happening again, but

    9 that was an ambition which at the time I think one

    10 would have admitted was slightly ambitious and probably

    11 was over ambitious.

    12 Q. Were you accompanied by an interpreter and

    13 was another third party present with you during the

    14 conduct of these interviews?

    15 A. Yes, it was the normal policy of ECMM that we

    16 would work in two-man teams, almost exclusively two

    17 people of different nationalities and so for each of

    18 the meetings that I had here, I was accompanied either

    19 by Ambassador Thebault or by a Danish Monitor called

    20 Erik Friis-Pedersen, who was a member of the Regional

    21 Centre in Zenica. Again, because my linguistic ability

    22 in Serbo-Croat by the end of two years meant that

    23 I could understand conversations, at this point, about

    24 ten months into my tour, I was certainly not in a

    25 position to be able to have a conversation with

  19. 1 anybody, so all of the meetings were held working

    2 through interpreters. For most of them, I was using an

    3 interpreter who was provided by the Regional Centre.

    4 For some of them, I was using interpreters provided by

    5 the parties.

    6 Q. Mr. McLeod, I would like to focus your

    7 attention on certain of the interviews that are

    8 contained in your report. Let me start with the

    9 interview with Besim Spahic, who was mayor of Zenica.

    10 Could you please inform the judges about that

    11 particular interview.

    12 A. Certainly. To help your Honours, this is

    13 summarised at annex A to the report, I am not quite

    14 sure where this will be in the French version.

    15 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, I am not sure for

    16 Judge Jorda's purposes whether or not this is in the

    17 right order, so Mr. President, do you have the interview

    18 before you of Mr. Spahic?

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I found it. I found it,

    20 thank you very much for your concern. This is the

    21 Exhibit 609.

    22 MR. HARMON: Please proceed then, Mr. McLeod.

    23 A. Certainly. I met Mr. Spahic, who was the

    24 mayor of Zenica, on a couple of occasions, but he was

    25 initially the first person that I met in Zenica once

  20. 1 I had started actually meeting the parties. I was

    2 accompanied by Erik Friis-Pedersen during the meeting.

    3 The mayor, Mr. Spahic, spoke for some time about the

    4 events and you can see the notes that I wrote as the

    5 interpreter spoke at the time and you can see certainly

    6 in the English version -- I am not sure my French is

    7 good enough to check the French version -- in the

    8 English version you can see the way the grammar moves

    9 slightly as the interpreter was speaking and I was

    10 simply scribbling notes as we went.

    11 He said basically that they had had this

    12 conflict, that the situation had deteriorated

    13 dramatically, that they had attempted to stabilise the

    14 situation within Zenica, he acknowledged that on the

    15 Muslim side in Zenica, various things had been done to

    16 the Croatian population and people had been arrested,

    17 people had been displaced, houses had been burnt, but

    18 what he was trying to stress was that they were

    19 attempting as far as possible to stabilise the

    20 situation, to get the Croatian population back to their

    21 houses where they had left their houses, and that where

    22 people were being victimised or had been evicted that

    23 the military and police -- the Muslim military and

    24 police formations were instructed to protect them, to

    25 provide local protection and that as far as possible,

  21. 1 they were also trying to integrate the Croatian

    2 military formations who had been in Zenica anyway

    3 beforehand back into this "joint patrol", was the way

    4 it was described. So he quite clearly acknowledged

    5 that things had not been perfect, but that they were

    6 doing their very best to get back to some sort of

    7 normality.

    8 He said that on the other side, there was a

    9 lack of information about what was going on. He was

    10 particularly concerned about what was going on in

    11 Vitez, they knew that terrible things had happened in

    12 Ahmici because they had some refugees from Ahmici.

    13 During the conversation, he gave me a list of names of

    14 people that they understood had been arrested or were

    15 missing in Vitez. That list of names is attached as an

    16 annex to the report. In my copy of the French version,

    17 it occurs immediately afterwards as annex 2A. He gave

    18 me this piece of paper and said, "in your travels,

    19 McLeod, if you can find out anything about these

    20 people, we would be very grateful".

    21 He struck me as somebody who was trying to be

    22 fairly reasonable under very difficult circumstances

    23 and I think he acknowledged quite clearly that life was

    24 not perfect, but he was attempting to get to a stable

    25 integrated mixed, an ethnically mixed community. That

  22. 1 seemed to be his aspiration, at any rate.

    2 Q. Mr. McLeod, did he tell you what had happened

    3 to 2,000 Croats who had lived in south west Zenica?

    4 A. Yes, he said that at the outbreak of

    5 hostilities, again on 16th April, a large proportion of

    6 the Croatian population had, for whatever reasons,

    7 decided they wanted to leave. I think that there had

    8 been a lot of propaganda -- I do not know if

    9 "propaganda" is the right word, there had been strong

    10 suggestions on the Croatian media from Vitez that these

    11 people ought to leave, so a lot of them had left their

    12 houses and moved across to Vitez. Some of them were

    13 now attempting to come back, but were being prevented

    14 from coming back to their houses, not by the Muslims,

    15 they were in Croatian-controlled territory and not able

    16 to get back to their houses in Zenica, so there had

    17 been quite a lot of displacement of people.

    18 Q. Mr. McLeod, who did he say was preventing the

    19 Croats who had been displaced from coming back into the

    20 Zenica municipality?

    21 A. His understanding was that the Croats were

    22 not allowing these people to leave Croatian-controlled

    23 territory to come back into the Zenica area.

    24 Q. Okay. Now you said, Mr. McLeod, that he was

    25 attempting to make sure that the population, the Croat

  23. 1 population was safe in Zenica. Did he also give you

    2 copies of two decrees that were to the effect that

    3 those populations should be protected?

    4 A. Yes, and you can see -- I think we are going

    5 to have trouble finding them again in the French copy.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Do not look for it, please

    7 continue with your statement. I will try and find it.

    8 In case I have a problem, I will tell you, but please

    9 go on with your statement.

    10 A. Certainly, sir. We are looking for

    11 appendix 1 to the report, which is, "records for the

    12 return of refugees to Zenica". He gave me two

    13 documents, the first one dated 17th April, which is a

    14 decree on the establishment of the War Presidency of

    15 Zenica, and this document was basically saying that

    16 joint checkpoints -- in this case "joint" means joint

    17 Muslim and Croat within Zenica -- checkpoints and

    18 patrols should be set up to prevent atrocities being

    19 committed against minority population; that barricades

    20 which had been set up within the town preventing

    21 movement within the town should be taken down;

    22 investigation of crimes by the civil police; the

    23 provision of security by the civil police and the ABiH

    24 for all civilians within Zenica, both parts of the

    25 population; free access to hospitals; security of

  24. 1 hospitals to be taken over by mixed civil police, mixed

    2 being Croat and Muslim; orders for a cease-fire and

    3 cessation of digging of trenches and filling in of

    4 trenches.

    5 Again, this is internally within Zenica, so

    6 on both sides, Muslim and Croat, within Zenica to stop

    7 digging trenches around their houses, and a Joint

    8 Commission consisting of the Civil Defence, the HVO, so

    9 the Croat military formation within Zenica, and ECMM,

    10 to go to the village Dobriljeno and stop the fighting.

    11 This is a reference to -- ECMM to a very large extent

    12 had tried to set up Joint Commissions where they would

    13 take military commanders from both sides, bring them

    14 together and share a meeting between them and get them

    15 to agree in a village if there was a problem, what the

    16 problem was and then get them to agree to stop, then

    17 the military commanders on both sides would persuade

    18 the local military commanders they had to stop whatever

    19 they were doing.

    20 This had been first tried in January of that

    21 year, when the conflict first started in Busovaca, and

    22 we were attempting to replicate the same thing, so this

    23 was a reference to a commission of that sort, to go to

    24 this village and stabilise the situation.

    25 The second document that he gave me, dated

  25. 1 18th April, again simply says that there should be an

    2 unconditional cease-fire and withdrawal of units from

    3 the contact line, and that the civil police and Civil

    4 Defence were obliged to provide security for people and

    5 property, and that conditions should be established for

    6 everybody who had left their houses to return to their

    7 houses, and that residents' committees should organise

    8 duty rosters, in other words security but without

    9 weapons, to ensure the security of houses and blocks of

    10 flats and so on.

    11 MR. HARMON: Lastly, Mr. McLeod, did the mayor

    12 give you a list of 13 men who were missing from Vitez?

    13 A. Yes, as I mentioned earlier, he gave me this

    14 list of people. In my copy of the report what you can

    15 see at appendix 2 is the original list that he gave me

    16 and then a translation in English and -- yes, I then

    17 took that with me when I went to Vitez and spoke to

    18 people.

    19 Q. Now turning to another set of interviews,

    20 Mr. McLeod, interviews with two Catholic priests who

    21 were Croats obviously, from the Zenica parish; can you

    22 tell the judges about those interviews?

    23 A. Certainly. Here we started annex B to the

    24 report, which was a meeting I had with Father Stjepan.

    25 I believe he was the senior Catholic priest within

  26. 1 Zenica, I met him in his house, accompanied by

    2 Ambassador Thebault. I again explained who I was, what

    3 I was doing there and asked him to tell me what, in his

    4 view, was going on. He was clearly a man who was

    5 working under a lot of pressure. He was very concerned

    6 about the welfare of his parishioners. He described

    7 the situation, as you can see in the report, listing in

    8 some detail things which had been done to the Croatian

    9 population in Zenica, the fact that some people had had

    10 their houses burnt, the fact some people had been

    11 robbed and some people killed, but overall what he was

    12 stressing was that there was an attempt being made with

    13 the authorities, this is the Muslim authorities, to

    14 engage with him to stabilise the situation, that his

    15 good offices were being used to try and bring back as

    16 far as possible a feeling of calm, that he had access

    17 to his parishioners, that he had some access to people

    18 who were in prison -- not complete access, this is one

    19 of the things which he raised with us; that quite a lot

    20 of people had left, this is Croats, had left Zenica,

    21 but that actually what people wanted to do now was to

    22 come back, the majority of them, to their houses, and

    23 this was being facilitated as far as possible.

    24 So he described a situation which was not

    25 pleasant, but where he gave the impression that the

  27. 1 local authorities were doing their best under very

    2 difficult circumstances to return to the situation as

    3 it had been beforehand.

    4 Q. And in fact did he not say that all of the

    5 authorities:

    6 "... all of them, except MOS, are doing

    7 their job very well and are very correct."

    8 That is on the third page, B3, top paragraph.

    9 A. Thank you. Yes, he was talking about the

    10 joint patrols and he said that in critical positions or

    11 critical situations, they needed to have these joint

    12 patrols because there was a risk of panic and he said

    13 that people did not trust the BiH, this is the army, or

    14 the MUP, who were the police, the civilian police. The

    15 note that I have of what he said is:

    16 "All I have to say is that all of them,

    17 except for MOS, are doing their job very well and are

    18 very correct."

    19 This is him sitting at his dining room table

    20 in his house in the middle of Zenica.

    21 Q. Mr. McLeod, in your opinion, did Father

    22 Stjepan appear to you to be a moderate who advocated

    23 ethnic reconciliation not ethnic division?

    24 A. Absolutely, he was under immense pressure, as

    25 one can imagine -- we cannot imagine, but he was under

  28. 1 immense pressure, but he was trying as far as possible

    2 to allow his people, his parishioners to live in their

    3 houses and to, if possible, to return to the way they

    4 had been working before, which was an integrated ethnic

    5 city.

    6 Q. Could you also turn your attention to the

    7 interview you had with Father Bozo?

    8 A. My note of the meeting with Father Bozo is at

    9 annex E to the report. Father Bozo was another

    10 Catholic priest in the village of Cajdras, which was

    11 south west of Zenica going up the road across the

    12 direct road from Zenica to Vitez. I met with him on

    13 the morning of 8th May, accompanied by Erik

    14 Friis-Pedersen. This meeting started off again with a

    15 meeting with him in his house, we then went on a tour

    16 of a village further up the road where a number of

    17 houses had been burnt and he wanted to show me this.

    18 We then returned back down to his house and the church

    19 and he stood on the steps of the church and a number of

    20 his parishioners, Croats -- it was a sort of public

    21 meeting and he read out a list of issues or complaints

    22 or concerns which he had.

    23 I believe that he was also of the team of

    24 Catholic priests working in the Zenica area, he was the

    25 priest who had responsible for visiting prisoners, so

  29. 1 this is Croatian prisoners -- Croats being held in

    2 Muslim prisons. I think that because he was out on the

    3 edge of the town, closer to the confrontation line, the

    4 contact line, his perspective was slightly more

    5 extreme, because his parishioners had been exposed to

    6 more direct fighting up at the top of the contact line,

    7 on the high ground. He again felt that, and listed in

    8 detail, quite a lot of things had been done against his

    9 parishioners, the Croatian population. He listed in

    10 detail houses that had been burnt, people who had been

    11 robbed, people who had been attacked, a number of

    12 people who had been killed. There seemed to be quite a

    13 lot of consistency about the details of a number of

    14 incidents which were mentioned by people on all sides,

    15 so clearly there had been a series of incidents which

    16 had built up to this.

    17 One of the points which he made quite clearly

    18 was that when the confrontation initially started very

    19 few houses had been burnt, but then in the intervening

    20 couple of weeks, I think he said about 40 houses had

    21 been burnt, so clearly as people had moved out of their

    22 houses, Muslims or whoever, I assume it was Muslims,

    23 had come in and burnt the houses, so there was now an

    24 issue about people being able to return to their

    25 houses. But he was quite clear that at the very

  30. 1 beginning there had been relatively little. He talked

    2 about four or five houses that had been burnt, when

    3 this particular confrontation had actually started. He

    4 said that he had initially had some access to Croats

    5 being held in Muslim jails. He indicated that there

    6 were some prisons to which he did not have access, and

    7 he said that at this stage, he did not have access to

    8 everybody, so he was again giving a pretty clear and

    9 frank exposition of what he thought was going on.

    10 It was a very strange experience standing on

    11 the steps with him, with his parishioners standing in

    12 front of us as he went through the list of issues and

    13 then a number of then said, "what about this and

    14 that?", talking about friends and relatives who were

    15 missing, a very strange experience.

    16 Q. Thank you, Mr. McLeod, now let us turn our

    17 attention to the interviews that are found -- sorry,

    18 your interviews with Mr. Santic and Mr. Skopljak. Those

    19 are found at annex F in your report. First of all, can

    20 you identify how they identified themselves to you and

    21 inform the court who they were and the circumstances of

    22 that interview?

    23 A. Certainly. Having been to Cajdras and had

    24 the meeting with Father Bozo, we then drove over the

    25 hill down into Vitez, and the first meeting which had

  31. 1 been set up was with the political and civil

    2 authorities -- this is now the Croat authorities in

    3 Vitez -- and I met the mayor and Mr. Skopljak, who was

    4 introduced to me as the chief of police. I have

    5 written his title down as commander of police in Vitez,

    6 I understand there may be some discrepancy about his

    7 precise title, but my understanding was that he was a

    8 senior policeman in Vitez.

    9 This meeting took place in the late morning

    10 up towards lunch-time on 8th May. It was quite a long

    11 meeting, because Mr. Santic seemed to be quite keen to

    12 keep talking to me and to explain to me in ever

    13 increasing detail his political views. He started off

    14 by explaining that I ought to read a novel, I have

    15 never actually got my hands on it, but he said if

    16 I read this novel this would explain everything to me

    17 in some detail.

    18 He started off by explaining that the Croats

    19 and the Muslims in Vitez actually had no reason to

    20 fight, there was no particular justification for them

    21 having a conflict, because actually the Croats had all

    22 the positions of power in Vitez anyway, so there was

    23 no -- his initial position was there was no particular

    24 justification for this. He then went on to explain in

    25 his view -- the view of events which he wanted to give

  32. 1 to me, anyway -- what had happened on 16th April. He

    2 explained that in his view the Muslims had attacked and

    3 that the Croats in Vitez and the surrounding villages

    4 had been taken completely by surprise. They had

    5 managed to rally their forces and mount a defence.

    6 He also explained that incidentally to this,

    7 a number of Muslims in Vitez had been arrested.

    8 I cannot remember exactly how many he said, if he gave

    9 a number, but he did say that all the Muslims had now

    10 been released apart from 13 who were being held in

    11 Kaonik Prison for questioning and that now the

    12 situation was being stabilised and by the end of this

    13 fairly long meeting, he explained in his view what

    14 ought to happen next was the international community,

    15 so he is saying, "you, the international community,

    16 UNPROFOR, need to create a buffer between us and the

    17 Muslims in Zenica, as opposed to just allowing the

    18 fighting to continue. So it is the international

    19 community's obligation to establish a buffer. We can

    20 then allow the population to move", and he said quite

    21 clearly that he did not see this as being ethnic

    22 cleansing, it would be the will of the people that they

    23 wanted to move, so all the Muslims would leave Vitez

    24 and all the Croats would leave Zenica. Than he

    25 concluded by saying, "once we have done this, once

  33. 1 there has been this population movement, which would

    2 not be ethnic cleansing, his view, then we could

    3 proceed to implement the Vance plan, then we could have

    4 democracy". But it was a precondition of elections and

    5 democracy and all the rest of it that first of all

    6 there was a buffer and then a movement of population.

    7 During the course of the conversation, again

    8 they marked a map for me to explain the tactical

    9 situation on the ground. Unfortunately I no longer

    10 have that particular map, but yes, it was quite an

    11 interesting conversation that we had.

    12 Q. Mr. McLeod, on the second page of your annex

    13 at the bottom of that page, the last sentence, is there

    14 an error in your report? Could you read the sentence

    15 as it is in the report in English and then inform the

    16 court of the correction?

    17 A. Yes. This is down at the bottom of page F2,

    18 where he was talking about the need to provide

    19 protection for local civilian population. In the

    20 report, what I actually typed up was:

    21 "There is a problem with some people who come

    22 into people's houses, so Blaskic has ordered his forces

    23 not to enter Muslim's houses."

    24 When I went through and checked the actual

    25 scribbled note --

  34. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Where is it, please, in the

    2 French version, could you tell me? So we have managed

    3 to find that paragraph. Could you please tell me which

    4 is the correct version in French? Could you tell me

    5 about the correction? Is it the paragraph starting:

    6 "They made some plans to avoid genocide."

    7 Is that it, Mr. McLeod?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, could you tell me

    10 what is the correct wording now?

    11 A. I am just attempting to find my note.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: I will try and help you now.

    13 So in the French version, it is marked 626, and now

    14 I would really like to know which is the correction

    15 that has been made, so it is the one but last

    16 paragraph in the French version and the numbers are 573

    17 to 626, and according to Mr. Dubuisson, the

    18 paragraph starts:

    19 "They really made some plan to avoid

    20 genocide, but did obtain the same results and the

    21 government insists the military police makes important

    22 changes ..."

    23 And so on, and saying that the situation in

    24 Vitez is going to improve and later on that, "Blaskic

    25 ordered his forces not to enter the Muslim houses".

  35. 1 Could you please tell me what is the

    2 correction that has to be made? "Blaskic ordered his

    3 forces not to enter Muslim houses"; is there a

    4 correction that has to be made about that?

    5 A. Yes. The note that I actually wrote was

    6 that, "Blaskic has to order his forces not to enter

    7 Muslim houses".

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I have got the correct

    9 version. Could you tell me what is the bottom line?

    10 What do I have to read here, that Blaskic has to or

    11 that he had already ordered?

    12 A. In this version in my report, I said that he

    13 had, but in the note that I wrote at the time, that he

    14 has to.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: All right, so the remark should

    16 be -- your comment was that Blaskic had to order, still

    17 has to do it. That is what I would like to hear, what

    18 is your feeling about it in the end, what your

    19 conclusion was.

    20 A. That this was something which he still had to

    21 do.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I have understood.

    23 Thank you very much.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, which means that he

    25 had not ordered?

  36. 1 A. Yes, was the note that I wrote at the time of

    2 what I was told at that meeting.

    3 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, let us continue now

    4 with your examination, in particular, can you now

    5 indicate whether or not Mr. Santic and Mr. Skopljak

    6 informed you whether the Muslim population and the

    7 Croat populations could live together; in other words,

    8 were they advocating polarisation as opposed to

    9 reconciliation?

    10 A. Yes, the view which was being expressed

    11 started off fairly moderately but became, in my view,

    12 rather extreme, just my opinion, and Mr. Santic was

    13 saying that the Muslim population, initially he was

    14 saying, "we have no reason to fight them because we

    15 have all the positions of power", he said their

    16 headquarters was on the rubbish tip, for example, so he

    17 was attempting to -- maybe it was, but the impression

    18 I had was that he was trying to suggest the Muslim

    19 population were lesser.

    20 Then, as part of his explanation of why

    21 tension had developed, he said that the -- as the war

    22 had broken out with the Serbs initially in Bosnia, the

    23 Croats had had to form themselves into a defence force,

    24 many of the Muslims had left and so I think he was

    25 implying that they had run away to go and do business

  37. 1 in Zagreb, as opposed to staying to fight. He then

    2 made references to the Muslim population having become

    3 somewhat extreme in their religious views. He said

    4 that he felt that the Muslims were trying to take them

    5 back 200 years to the time of the Turks.

    6 He said that the wives of leading Muslims

    7 within Vitez had started to wear head scarves -- been

    8 obliged to wear head scarves. He made reference to the

    9 fact they had been driving through the streets speaking

    10 with loud speakers and making statements about Allah

    11 from the backs of trucks, so he was trying to build a

    12 picture of the Muslim population becoming polarised and

    13 extreme in their religious views and suggested this was

    14 an intolerable situation from the Croats' point of

    15 view, and that this was partially seen as a

    16 justification for anything which then took place

    17 vis-à-vis the Muslim population.

    18 I formed the view from the whole feeling of

    19 his conversation as he developed his political thoughts

    20 over an hour or so that he did not see any particular

    21 place for the Muslims within his community, and this

    22 was summarised right at the end by saying, "what we

    23 need is the international community to set up this

    24 buffer zone for us and then we will move the population

    25 and then we can be democratic just like you", but he

  38. 1 did not see any room for democracy until he had an

    2 ethnically pure state, was the impression that

    3 I formed.

    4 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, after the population

    5 was removed and the Vance-Owen Peace Plan could be

    6 implemented, is that what he said?

    7 A. Exactly. I no longer have a copy of the

    8 Vance-Owen Plan as it was at that particular time, but

    9 from recollection, what was being suggested I think was

    10 that the country would be broken into cantons and that

    11 the military and political leadership of each canton

    12 would be based on the ethnic composition of the canton

    13 at that time, so clearly if one had a mixed canton then

    14 the military and political leadership would be mixed,

    15 whereas if one had a bias in one direction or the

    16 other, the political and military leadership would be

    17 biased in favour of Muslim or Serb or Croat, whichever

    18 controlled that canton. His aspiration was to achieve

    19 a locally balanced, in his view, situation and then

    20 immediately to implement the Vance-Owen Plan before the

    21 conditions throughout Bosnia were right. That was what

    22 he told me.

    23 Q. Mr. McLeod, he also gave you three documents,

    24 did he not? Can I direct your attention to those three

    25 documents that are attached to the interviews of Messrs

  39. 1 Santic and Skopljak. The first document is a document

    2 that was signed by Dr. Muhamed Mujezinovic and Ivan

    3 Santic, is that correct?

    4 A. Yes, that is correct.

    5 Q. It lists five separate points.

    6 A. Yes, and again I am checking to see where the

    7 French version is and I have lost it.

    8 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we during the

    9 recess will put this French version in the correct

    10 order, I apologise and it will facilitate your review

    11 of this portion of the evidence.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I would like it to be in

    13 proper order, but the documents we are talking about

    14 just now, are they annexed to this report? Do they

    15 appear in this version?

    16 MR. HARMON: They do, Mr. President.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: And they come under which

    18 number?

    19 MR. HARMON: They should follow the interviews

    20 of Messrs Santic and Skopljak. There should be three

    21 documents.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, I propose since it

    23 is 11.15, I give my copy to the Registrar and I hope --

    24 I think we will have a break now and we will resume

    25 work in 20 minutes.

  40. 1 (11.15 am)

    2 (A short break)

    3 (11.35 am)

    4 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed, bring

    5 in the accused, please.

    6 (Accused brought in)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, you have

    8 reassembled my document, thank you very much.

    9 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, the deck that was

    10 shuffled improperly has now been shuffled in the

    11 correct order. I would like to direct your attention

    12 first of all, Mr. President, I have taken the liberty of

    13 placing a yellow tab at a point in the French

    14 translation. Mr. McLeod and I, as we were going through

    15 these and putting them into the right order, noticed

    16 that there was an incomplete translation, and we would

    17 like to direct your attention to it. I have marked II

    18 in the French version and that last sentence in II is

    19 missing in the French translation. If I could have

    20 Mr. McLeod read for your Honour the last sentence in II,

    21 then you will be fully informed as to this particular

    22 exhibit. Mr. McLeod, could you please read --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. For my

    24 personal benefit, Mr. McLeod, can you tell me that last

    25 sentence?

  41. 1 A. Certainly sir. In fact it is the last

    2 sentence of I leading on after Zenica and it says:

    3 "The municipal Civil Defence headquarters is

    4 also obliged to provide return of refugees" --

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Slowly please. "The

    6 headquarters of the Civil Defence"?

    7 A. "... is also obliged to provide return of

    8 refugees from Vardiste to Bilivode".

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, thank you. We can

    10 continue now.

    11 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, when we stopped at the

    12 recess, I was directing your attention to three

    13 documents that were provided to you by Mr. Santic and

    14 Mr. Skopljak. Can we start with the first document

    15 which is a joint statement, it is appendix 1 to

    16 annex F? Without spending too much time on this

    17 particular document, because this has previously been

    18 introduced into evidence, can you just inform the court

    19 how you received this particular document?

    20 A. Certainly. Mr. Santic gave me these documents

    21 as he was attempting to build his case to explain to me

    22 how what he wanted was to have a return to normal life

    23 in Vitez, so the first document he gave me was a signed

    24 document and he presented this as proof that the Muslim

    25 and Croat authorities in Vitez had already decided they

  42. 1 wanted to return to a state of normality. If you are

    2 already familiar with the document then I will not

    3 bother to go through it.

    4 Q. Fine, Mr. McLeod. Then can you turn to the

    5 next document and identify which document it is and

    6 inform the court about that particular document.

    7 A. Certainly. So the second document is

    8 appendix 2, and this is a draft document which he gave

    9 me. He said this was a draft which he had produced

    10 which he had sent to his opposite number, the mayor of

    11 Zenica, suggesting that they should sign this together

    12 and he presented me this document and he also presented

    13 me the third document, which was a reply from the mayor

    14 of Zenica explaining why this first document which had

    15 been drafted in Vitez could not be signed immediately

    16 and suggesting some changes.

    17 So just to run very briefly through the seven

    18 points which had been proposed by Vitez to be signed

    19 jointly by Vitez and Zenica, it starts off with a joint

    20 declaration that the conflict between the Muslims and

    21 the Croats in Central Bosnia was not the desire or the

    22 will of these two nations, but actually it was all

    23 provoked by the Serbs, so it is a Serb plot to

    24 destabilise them. He invites the Muslims and the

    25 Croats to cease all hostility and immediately to go to

  43. 1 peace and that there should be an investigation and

    2 punishment of all those who have committed crimes by

    3 the regular courts.

    4 There is a request, a suggestion that there

    5 should be treatment and assistance given to the large

    6 number of refugees, a suggestion that the regular

    7 police should be used intensively to stop further

    8 atrocities being committed, which this declaration

    9 suggests are being wrongly attributed to regular forces

    10 of the HVO and ABiH. Because there is a complete

    11 blockade of the area in terms of supplies getting up

    12 from the coast from Split, there is then a joint treaty

    13 to the governments, this is the Croat and the Muslim

    14 governments, the armies of the ABiH and the HVO, to

    15 allow free passage of goods and supplies from the coast

    16 up to this area in Central Bosnia.

    17 The sixth point says that in order to

    18 stabilise the cessation of hostilities, it is a demand

    19 from the media, the information media, that in every

    20 case they should report only completely confirmed

    21 information without personal commentary; in other

    22 words, he wants to have complete control over what

    23 information is being disseminated to prevent rumours

    24 being started or information being incorrectly

    25 broadcast, and then finally it is a declaration that as

  44. 1 fast as possible, they should implement the Vance-Owen

    2 Plan, which as I explained earlier on I think was

    3 implementing government and military forces, the

    4 control of those to be based on the ethnic make-up of

    5 the areas in question.

    6 There was also a joint statement by

    7 Izetbegovic and Boban of April 25th. Unfortunately

    8 I no longer have a copy of that, so I am not sure what

    9 the statement was saying.

    10 Q. Now can you turn to the reply of the mayor of

    11 Zenica to that proposed draft statement.

    12 A. Certainly. So at the same time I was handed

    13 this reply as well as I was handed the unsigned copy of

    14 the proposal from Vitez. The mayor of Zenica was

    15 basically saying, "yes, certainly we should make a

    16 joint statement, but we should make a joint statement

    17 which recognises the actual facts as they have occurred

    18 as opposed to what has not occurred". So he was

    19 suggesting that in practice, there were HVO troops in

    20 various villages, Ahmici, Gacice, Veceriska and others,

    21 and that the statement, if they were to issue a joint

    22 statement, should condemn crimes and should suggest

    23 that investigation of crimes should be carried out by a

    24 neutral third party as opposed to the local police

    25 forces, and that they should work out exactly who was

  45. 1 going to be responsible for this, rather than just

    2 saying the regular forces should do it; that there

    3 should not be a suggestion in the joint declaration

    4 that whatever had taken place had been carried out by

    5 people who were out of control, but that whatever had

    6 taken place had actually been organised by regular

    7 forces on both sides.

    8 His fifth point I find somewhat confused in

    9 terms of exactly what he is suggesting, but basically

    10 it is reiterating the fact that there needs to be

    11 investigation before there can be reconciliation,

    12 I think. The sixth point, again he is coming back to

    13 say that he finds it inconceivable that the crimes

    14 which were referred to in the joint statement, which he

    15 has not signed, were committed by extremists. It ends

    16 up by welcoming the initiative and saying that they

    17 should do as much as they can to resolve the conflict.

    18 Q. Thank you, Mr. McLeod. Mr. McLeod, after the

    19 conclusion of your interviews with Messrs Santic and

    20 Skopljak, where did you go?

    21 A. We left the office where we had been having

    22 that meeting, walked down the stairs into Vitez, walked

    23 about 200 yards to the Hotel Vitez, where my next

    24 meeting was with then Colonel Blaskic, so what I had

    25 been attempting to do was meet the political leadership

  46. 1 in Vitez and then the military leadership in Vitez, so

    2 I could build up their view of what had happened.

    3 Q. Mr. McLeod, could you explain the

    4 circumstances of the meeting with Colonel Blaskic and

    5 what Colonel Blaskic told you had happened, the events?

    6 A. Certainly. When I met Colonel Blaskic,

    7 General Blaskic now, as I made my general introduction

    8 as I had done on each occasion. With him I emphasised

    9 the fact I had been in the army, we discussed the fact

    10 that he had been in the JNA previously, so we had what

    11 at the time felt like a very business-like meeting

    12 between two soldiers discussing the military situation,

    13 was effectively what it was. My interpreter did the

    14 initial part of the meeting and then I think she was

    15 having difficulty with the military jargon that we were

    16 using, so she stopped and his interpreter took over for

    17 the latter, probably two-thirds of the meeting that we

    18 had. His interpreter, of course, being more used to

    19 the military jargon that was being discussed.

    20 Colonel Blaskic struck me as being a fairly

    21 straightforward sort of person. It seemed to be a good

    22 meeting, his explanation of the tactical situation

    23 matched almost exactly the explanation and description

    24 that I had had from officers in BritBat. When he

    25 marked on the map for me where the forces were and

  47. 1 described what he thought the likely outcome of a

    2 continuation of the fighting would be, that again

    3 matched almost precisely the description I had had from

    4 BritBat, so as I suggested the -- he suggested to me

    5 that the conflict had only been prevented from getting

    6 a lot worse by the intervention of UNPROFOR and he

    7 suggested to me that, I cannot remember the exact

    8 dates, but soon after 16th April, the Muslim action or

    9 reaction, depending on your point of view, but the

    10 Muslim attack to cut off Vitez would have been

    11 successful if UNPROFOR had not actually been successful

    12 in arranging a cease-fire, and this bore out exactly

    13 what I had heard earlier from UNPROFOR.

    14 So all of those parts of the conversation

    15 seemed to make sense. In terms of the precise detail

    16 of what had happened on the 16th, you can see exactly

    17 what I have written down in terms of the notes that

    18 I wrote, but to summarise it, he said that there had

    19 been an increasing tension up to the 16th, he said

    20 there had been attempts to move Muslim troops on the

    21 day preceding this, on 15th April, so tensions had been

    22 quite high. On the 16th, he said that he had been

    23 woken early in the morning, 5.15, I think, by gunfire

    24 and his immediate reaction had been to phone his

    25 headquarters and he had spoken to his headquarters and

  48. 1 said, "what is going on?", and the duty officer had

    2 said that he did not know what was going on, so Blaskic

    3 had then said, "well, find out from the local brigade

    4 commander what is going on". The brigade headquarters

    5 had been phoned and the reply had been the brigade

    6 commander is not here, presumably he is asleep in bed,

    7 so he suggested they had been completely caught by

    8 surprise by what had been going on.

    9 He then said that they had rallied their

    10 forces as fast as possible and during that morning,

    11 they had initially attempted to secure the main

    12 government buildings in Vitez and then to carry out the

    13 defence of Vitez and the defence of the villages

    14 surrounding Vitez, and that eventually the situation

    15 had stabilised and the war had been stopped or that

    16 localised confrontation had been stopped eventually by

    17 the intervention of UNPROFOR arranging a cease-fire.

    18 But he was quite clear in his view that if that had not

    19 happened then the Muslims would have been successful in

    20 cutting the roads on both sides of Vitez and possibly

    21 even separating the -- cutting the road between Vitez

    22 and Busovaca.

    23 At the conclusion of our meeting, he said

    24 that as far as he was concerned, it ought to be

    25 possible to live together, this is the two parties to

  49. 1 live together, but if we were not successful in having

    2 an UN buffer of some sort, then he could not actually

    3 see much prospect of that and he expected the war to

    4 carry on again.

    5 Immediately after the meeting, he then had to

    6 go off to, I am not sure how -- he had a second meeting

    7 and I saw Mr. Santic come down, so Mr. Santic was then

    8 joining him in a further meeting to discuss whatever

    9 they were discussing.

    10 Q. So Mr. McLeod, what he told you in fact was

    11 that on the morning of the 16th at 5.15, he was taken

    12 completely by surprise, he was awakened by shells and

    13 he woke up and it surprised him that there was

    14 essentially a conflict going on in Vitez?

    15 A. Yes, he was quite clear that what had

    16 happened is the Muslims had launched a co-ordinated

    17 attack against a number of positions in Vitez and the

    18 outlying villages and that his troops had been caught

    19 on the hop and had reacted as well as they could and

    20 mounted a defence.

    21 Q. Let me turn your attention to a couple of

    22 portions of your interview with Colonel Blaskic. Did

    23 he tell you how many professional soldiers were in the

    24 Vitez brigade?

    25 A. Yes, he said that they had between 300 and

  50. 1 350 professional soldiers and that the rest of the

    2 Vitez brigade was made up of reservists and that these

    3 were spread through the various villages, where the

    4 villages still existed.

    5 Q. Did you ask Colonel Blaskic to mark a map?

    6 A. Yes, I did. As I had done in most of my

    7 meetings, I gave him a blank photocopied map and a set

    8 of coloured pens and invited him to mark on it the

    9 tactical situation as he saw it.

    10 Q. Did you ask him to mark the identity of

    11 particular villages that were occupied by the parties,

    12 Muslim, Croat or mixed?

    13 A. Yes, what he did was he marked the map with

    14 these highlighter pens with different colours for the

    15 different ethnic breakdown or composition of the

    16 villages.

    17 Q. Did he mark the village of Ahmici?

    18 A. It was of interest afterwards when I actually

    19 sat down and looked at it to see what he had done, but

    20 he missed out the villages of Ahmici, Nadioci and

    21 Loncari, and these were the villages which had been the

    22 subject of bitter fighting.

    23 Q. And which were not marked by Colonel Blaskic?

    24 A. No.

    25 Q. Let me turn your attention to a comment that

  51. 1 Colonel Blaskic made about the events in Busovaca.

    2 Could you tell the judges what he said about Busovaca?

    3 A. Certainly. He described what had happened in

    4 Busovaca -- this is, for reference, the third

    5 paragraph from the end of this particular annex. He

    6 was describing what had happened back in January when

    7 the violence had first flared up. He said on

    8 21st January the Busovaca to Kiseljak road was cut and

    9 he said that Busovaca had been occupied and ethnically

    10 cleansed. He said then, leading on from that, that if

    11 the UN did not separate the forces, it was clear there

    12 would be further conflict.

    13 Q. You said that that particular interview with

    14 Colonel Blaskic lasted approximately an hour, is that

    15 right?

    16 A. It was probably 45 minutes to an hour.

    17 Q. Your report accurately reflects then the

    18 substance of that interview, is that correct?

    19 A. Yes, I have a detailed note of those parts of

    20 the interview where I was actually taking notes and

    21 I have made a couple of comments about those parts of

    22 interview where we were having more a dialogue as

    23 opposed to his explanation of events, so fairly shortly

    24 thereafter I made a note of what my thoughts were.

    25 Q. At the conclusion of the interview, what was

  52. 1 your opinion as to whether Colonel Blaskic was telling

    2 you the truth?

    3 A. I was fairly sure that his description of the

    4 tactical situation, because it seemed to match almost

    5 exactly what I had been told by UNPROFOR officers, had

    6 been accurate. By the time that I had finished

    7 speaking to everybody and seen everything that I saw,

    8 I cannot actually imagine how, if he was the person

    9 that I thought that he was, in other words the military

    10 commander of the area, he could have been fast asleep

    11 at that point in the morning, because that just did not

    12 tally with all the other things which I heard and saw.

    13 Q. Let me just clarify one point of your

    14 examination. You have referenced "tactical

    15 situation". Could you just tell us what you mean by

    16 the term "tactical situation", so the record is

    17 perfectly clear?

    18 A. Certainly. The explanation which he gave me

    19 of the events following 16th April and his description

    20 of the locations of Muslim forces and Croat forces, his

    21 view, his opinion that the Muslim forces would have

    22 been successful in cutting the various key roads around

    23 Vitez, had they not been stopped by UNPROFOR,

    24 matched -- it was almost exactly the same explanation

    25 as I had been given by UNPROFOR officers, so by the

  53. 1 tactical situation, that is what I am referring to.

    2 Q. Lastly, can I direct your attention to part

    3 of the interview you had with Colonel Blaskic and that

    4 is any reference to outside forces being a problem?

    5 A. Yes, he said that -- his view was that the

    6 Muslims did not want to separate forces, in other words

    7 that they wanted to carry on the conflict. He said

    8 that there was no clear dividing line between the two

    9 sides and that it was a war of neighbours against each

    10 other. He said the greatest problem was forces brought

    11 in from outside. He said if they were only local

    12 forces, then they could have peace. I infer from this

    13 that by the forces brought in from outside he is

    14 referring to Mujahedin or other Muslim forces brought

    15 in on the Muslim side and it was these extremists who

    16 had been brought in that were causing the problems.

    17 That was my understanding of what he was getting at.

    18 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. McLeod. Now can we

    19 turn our attention to an interview you had with Ramiz

    20 Dugalic. Can you tell the judges who he is and the

    21 circumstances of that particular interview?

    22 A. Certainly. It is -- "Dugalic" is the

    23 pronunciation. Again, on the Muslim side I had been

    24 attempting to meet the military command structure so we

    25 could get their view of what had happened. With

  54. 1 Ambassador Thebault I had already had a meeting with

    2 the corps commander of III Corps, who suggested the

    3 best person to talk to was one of his deputy

    4 commanders, Ramiz Dugalic, I am not sure what rank he

    5 had either then or now. He had again set out his view

    6 of what the Muslim army, what the Muslim forces thought

    7 was the tactical situation, and he described in some

    8 detail what he understood had happened or was happening

    9 in and around Vitez.

    10 I am not quite sure how much detail you would

    11 like, but he described various incidents which had

    12 taken place with a degree of -- with some detail.

    13 Amongst other things, he said that they had caught a

    14 couple of Croat prisoners who had been involved in

    15 Ahmici. I, of course, said I would be very delighted

    16 if I could meet these people and eventually a couple of

    17 days later when we came back to this particular issue,

    18 he said those two individuals had been exchanged in a

    19 prisoner exchange, unofficially, which was rather

    20 unfortunate because it would have shed quite a lot of

    21 light on what may or may not have happened.

    22 Q. Mr. McLeod, if I can direct your attention to

    23 the second page of your report in the English version.

    24 Did he also describe units that were part of the HVO

    25 and can you tell the judges what he told you?

  55. 1 A. Certainly. I use the language which comes

    2 straight out of the notes which I wrote at the time.

    3 He said the HVO had two formations -- it may well have

    4 had more than that, but he was talking about two of

    5 them. He said they had one legal one which was doing

    6 "dirty jobs" as he described it. He said a chap

    7 called Darko Kraljevic, now colonel, was in command.

    8 He said he had previously been a member of HOS, which

    9 was a Croatian military formation.

    10 He then showed me a licence which he said had

    11 been given to a Muslim to allow the Muslim to leave

    12 their home, and I have got a copy of that, there is a

    13 copy attached to the report. He then also said that

    14 there was another organisation called "Joker" and he

    15 said that the leader of this group called Joker was a

    16 man called Anto Furundzija, I am sorry if my

    17 pronunciation is not right.

    18 Q. Mr. McLeod, did he make any reference to the

    19 truck bomb that had occurred in Vitez itself? Can you

    20 tell the judges what he told you about that?

    21 A. Yes, he mentioned that there had been a car

    22 bomb in Vitez and he said to me that Blaskic had given

    23 the order to put the man who drove the bomb into the

    24 truck and Darko Kraljevic had carried out the attack.

    25 He said his intelligence suggested the HVO wanted to

  56. 1 put three tonnes of explosives into the truck, but in

    2 the end they only used 700 kilograms. He said the

    3 driver had not been a local man but had come back to

    4 drive humanitarian aid. They had told him to deliver a

    5 message with the truck but had not told him about the

    6 explosives.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to note for the

    8 record, Mr. President, sorry to interrupt the witness,

    9 that the court having made its hearsay rule, the

    10 Prosecution is now driving trucks of hearsay through

    11 the door that the court has opened. This type of

    12 double or even triple hearsay is exactly what should

    13 not be the evidence in this case of allegations

    14 directly involving our client. I simply wanted to put

    15 our further objection on the record.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, this will be in the

    17 transcript. Please, Mr. McLeod, go on.

    18 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, you indicated that

    19 Mr. Dugalic gave you a document which is appendix 1 to

    20 annex I. Can you identify that as being the document

    21 which was provided to you by Mr. Dugalic?

    22 A. Yes, it is a one page, very short document.

    23 Q. It is from whom?

    24 A. I am working off the English translation

    25 which I have because I can read that and the original

  57. 1 is also part of the report. It is titled "certificate

    2 for transfer of ownership of property" and the address

    3 group at the top of the document is "the Republic of

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna,

    5 Department for Defence, Unit Vitezovi, Vitez", and it

    6 is dated 24th April 1993. Then the substance of the

    7 document is that it:

    8 "... confirms that the flat address: M Tita

    9 Lamela A5-A9, Ulaz 2, second floor, is given for

    10 temporary use to Krizanac Jako by this unit. The

    11 former owner of this flat was Ekmescic Faruk."

    12 It is signed, "by order, Colonel Darko

    13 Kraljevic".

    14 Q. All right, Mr. McLeod. Now let me turn if

    15 I can to your next interview. I would like to draw

    16 your attention to your interview with the Imam of

    17 Busovaca. Could you tell the judges when that

    18 interview took place, the circumstances of that

    19 interview and the substance of that particular

    20 interview.

    21 A. On 9th May, having by now had two meetings

    22 with Croat Catholic priests in the Zenica area,

    23 I wanted to try and balance their view with the view of

    24 a Muslim religious leader, so I went to Busovaca where

    25 I understood that the Imam was still there.

  58. 1 I eventually found Enver Hodza in his house, he was

    2 just in his back yard, having initially looked at the

    3 mosque and he was not there. To start with, he refused

    4 to speak to me, but having explained who I was and

    5 where I had come from, he eventually decided that yes,

    6 he would actually talk to me. So we went into his

    7 house and I sat in his front room with him and his wife

    8 and his two children, a young girl and a young boy.

    9 I went through my usual routine of explaining who

    10 I was, where I had come from and what I would like from

    11 him. He then explained in some detail his view of what

    12 life was like for him and his whatever the equivalent

    13 of parishioners is, I suppose, his people in Busovaca.

    14 All the time that he was talking, he started

    15 off by explaining how there was very little food and so

    16 on. His wife was cooking a meal which was then

    17 presented to me and Erik Friis-Pedersen who was

    18 accompanying me, and we were invited to eat and I said,

    19 "I will not eat unless I am joining you in a meal", so

    20 I then had to eat a meal with him and Erik while his

    21 wife and children watched, which was an extremely

    22 uncomfortable experience.

    23 At the end of the meeting, as we were just

    24 about ready to leave, the Croatian police arrived and

    25 came into the house. Presumably they had seen our

  59. 1 vehicle parked outside and they wanted to know what we

    2 were doing there and wanted to have a conversation

    3 there. I suggested that actually since I had finished

    4 having my conversation with Enver Hodza but would be

    5 delighted to talk to them, we would be delighted to go

    6 to the police station, so that is what we did.

    7 In terms of the description of what was going

    8 on that I was given by this gentleman, he said they

    9 were completely isolated, they were quite cut off, they

    10 had no communications with Zenica, said that supplies

    11 of food were quite short. He said they were unable to

    12 leave their houses without permission. He showed me a

    13 permit which allowed him to move around. I do not have

    14 a copy of that, but I made a note of the details on it

    15 in my book. He said they were unable to worship, which

    16 was borne out I suppose in part by the fact that the

    17 mosque was locked and appeared to be quite deserted.

    18 He said that he was, however, allowed to bury the dead

    19 and he then went into, I think because it was fresh in

    20 his mind, a list of people that he had just buried.

    21 As part of his explanation, he explained that

    22 a woman had been raped the night before and this was

    23 clearly at the forefront of his mind. That particular

    24 incident was then carried on, was part of the

    25 discussion with the Croatian policeman later on. He

  60. 1 said that a number of Muslim families, quite a large

    2 number of Muslim families had had to leave their houses

    3 and had gone to Zenica. I described the fighting in

    4 some of the villages to the north of Busovaca, and he

    5 described how the Croats had burnt houses and the

    6 Muslims had also burnt houses, so the Muslims had burnt

    7 Croat houses and the Croats had burnt Muslim houses.

    8 He did not attempt to describe the fact that the

    9 Muslims had also been up on the front-line burning

    10 people's houses, which is not particularly pleasant.

    11 Yes, it was a very strange meeting, sitting

    12 with his family in their front room, hearing about

    13 events which were a million miles away from these even

    14 back in Zagreb, let alone back in England.

    15 Q. Mr. McLeod, let me ask you, did he tell you

    16 that Muslims younger than 60 years old had to dig

    17 trenches for the HVO?

    18 A. He said amongst other things that they had to

    19 go and dig trenches around Busovaca.

    20 Q. Did he also tell you that Muslims were not

    21 allowed to go out of their houses and some had to leave

    22 because of HVO violence?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Referring to the third paragraph from the

    25 top?

  61. 1 A. Yes, verbatim from my notes, he said they

    2 were totally isolated in Busovaca. He said:

    3 "There is an information blockade. The

    4 Muslims younger than 60 years old have to dig trenches

    5 for the HVO. They cannot pray in Busovaca. Muslims

    6 are not allowed to go out of their houses and some have

    7 had to leave because of HVO violence. He is allowed to

    8 bury the dead."

    9 Q. Two paragraphs down, what did he say in

    10 respect of the Muslim houses that had been vacated?

    11 A. This was in the context of the meeting which

    12 he had had with the president of Busovaca, a man called

    13 Zoran Marinic, apparently, and he said he had had a

    14 meeting with this gentleman the day before. He had

    15 asked for some protection, he had asked for a telephone

    16 line so they could have contact outside, in other words

    17 back to Zenica. This had been promised, apparently.

    18 He then went on to say that all the Muslim houses that

    19 were empty had been taken over by Croats and they had

    20 all been robbed. Obviously there was a refugee

    21 problem, so empty houses were being taken over by Croat

    22 refugees who had been moved out of Zenica.

    23 Q. Lastly, did he tell you that civilians who

    24 had been taken to dig trenches, some of them had been

    25 killed?

  62. 1 A. Yes, I think he described a particular

    2 incident.

    3 Q. I am referring to the second page of your

    4 report, Mr. McLeod, second paragraph.

    5 A. He said that a man by the name of Skandro

    6 Kemal had been buried on 24th April, he had been a

    7 driver who was arrested between Vitez and Travnik, one

    8 of 90 drivers who had been arrested and he had been

    9 killed by a sniper digging trenches. He then mentioned

    10 another man by the name of Lugonjic Omer who had been

    11 buried the day I was there and he said he was also a

    12 driver who was killed.

    13 Q. Thank you. Let me direct your attention to

    14 the paragraph three down below that, there is a

    15 statement that says:

    16 "Kordic seems to be the man calling the

    17 shots."

    18 Is that a quote from the Imam?

    19 A. No, this was in the context, he showed me

    20 this pass which he had and I wrote down in my book the

    21 details which are then here --

    22 Q. This was a pass to pass through from one

    23 point in Busovaca municipality to another point, is

    24 that correct?

    25 A. It is my understanding that it allowed him to

  63. 1 move around the town. So the pass was dated 1st May

    2 and it was signed by Drsko Grubersic, who was commander

    3 of the HVO brigade and Zoran Marinic, President of HVO

    4 in Busovaca and Dario Kordic of HDZ and then I wrote in

    5 my note, in light of the conversation around this, that

    6 Dario Kordic seemed to be the man calling the shots.

    7 Clearly that is my jargon as opposed to the jargon of

    8 the Imam. I think I had formed the impression at that

    9 point that he was clearly the political boss in

    10 Busovaca who was directing what was going on.

    11 MR. HARMON: Can you tell the judges the

    12 demeanour of the Imam and his family once the HVO

    13 police arrived.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon. Just

    15 about something that I have just heard. I have got a

    16 French translation at the end of the paragraph, the

    17 reference is 642:

    18 "Kordic seems to be the man of the

    19 shootings."

    20 Is this exactly what you said, Mr. McLeod? In

    21 the transcript that I have just had, it says:

    22 "Kordic seems to be the man which called the

    23 shots."

    24 Here in French it says:

    25 "Kordic seems to be the man of the

  64. 1 shootings."

    2 I do not know what is the correct

    3 translation? Could somebody give me the answer?

    4 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I think that is a

    5 literal or perhaps incorrect translation. It is not

    6 what is intended and perhaps Mr. McLeod could explain

    7 again his reference to that statement. That was a

    8 statement to by McLeod using English jargon and

    9 grammar.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: In French you order to shoot.

    11 It seems to be an idiomatic expression. All right,

    12 excuse me, I have been surprised but I thank my

    13 colleagues for enlightening me. For now I will know

    14 that when somebody speaks about the shootings, I will

    15 know that that means that person has got the situation

    16 under control. Thank you very much, please proceed.

    17 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, I had asked you to

    18 describe to the judges the demeanour of the Imam and

    19 his family upon the arrival of the HVO police?

    20 A. I think as one can possibly imagine, they

    21 were rather frightened to have their -- I think it is

    22 worth clarifying, from memory I do not think they were

    23 HVO police, I think they were civil police, they were

    24 wearing blue uniforms as opposed to military uniform.

    25 I think they were, as anybody would be, slightly upset

  65. 1 to have a couple of policemen come into their living

    2 room. They were rather frightened.

    3 Q. What happened next?

    4 A. I did not feel particularly comfortable

    5 having a second meeting with the Imam and the policemen

    6 in his front room so since I had finished my

    7 conversation with the Imam anyway, I said to the

    8 policemen that I would be delighted to talk to them,

    9 but suggested I should come with them back to the

    10 police station. So that is exactly what happened, they

    11 went back into their police car, we went back into our

    12 vehicle, followed them down the road to the police

    13 station and immediately afterwards had a meeting with

    14 three policemen in the police station in Busovaca.

    15 Q. Can you identify the three policemen and the

    16 units to which they belonged?

    17 A. Yes, I made a note having asked them exactly

    18 who they were. I believe I was talking to Nikica

    19 Petrovic, who was introduced as the chief of the civil

    20 police in Busovaca, Zeljko Lastro of the regional

    21 police, I do not know what his title was, but he was

    22 described as being of the region police as opposed to

    23 any other form of police, and a man called Zoran

    24 Vareskovic, who was introduced as deputy chief of the

    25 military police. So I had a civil policeman, a

  66. 1 military policeman and a member of the regional police,

    2 I am not sure what the difference was between the

    3 regional police and any of the other organisations.

    4 Q. Can you describe the circumstances of that

    5 meeting?

    6 A. We were sitting upstairs in the police

    7 station in what I assume was a conference room or

    8 something like that. They were explaining to me from

    9 their point of view what was going on in terms of

    10 police matters and they started off by saying that they

    11 had problems with a military policeman had just been

    12 shot by a sniper, presumably a Muslim sniper.

    13 We then rapidly got into discussing the case

    14 of the girl who had been raped the night before. I was

    15 quite interested and attempted to tease out through the

    16 conversation some of the details about what the

    17 judicial system was like. I explained to them my

    18 previous experience of prosecuting at courts martial

    19 and said, "I have some understanding of what might go

    20 on", so was attempting to get them to explain the

    21 likely sentence for somebody -- they said they had a

    22 couple of suspects. I said, "what will happen to these

    23 suspects, where will they be tried; if they go to

    24 prison, where will they go to prison, how long for?",

    25 and they explained what they thought would go on. They

  67. 1 said that at that time, the only court which was in

    2 operation was the military court in Travnik, and they

    3 said that as like as not, the only operating prison was

    4 the military prison at Kaonik.

    5 They took some pains to distance themselves,

    6 or certainly the civilian policeman took plains to

    7 distance himself from the prison at Kaonik. He said it

    8 was run by Mr. Aleksovski, so he named him as the man

    9 who was running it, and said it is a military prison,

    10 it is not a civilian prison.

    11 We also talked about various other things

    12 which were going on, yes. It was a fairly technical

    13 meeting with the policemen talking about police

    14 issues. Towards the end of the meeting, I said that

    15 I had had a meeting with Father Stjepan and Father

    16 Bozo, because clearly they were interested to know what

    17 was going on on the other side, so I said, "I have had

    18 these meetings". I explained the circumstances and the

    19 situation of the Croats in Zenica as had been portrayed

    20 to me by the two Catholic priests I had met. They said

    21 that Bozo, because he brought Croats back to their

    22 houses, and the Croats had then been tortured, is what

    23 they said, that Bozo, so this is the Catholic priest in

    24 Zenica, should be seen as a criminal. He had

    25 facilitated the beating up of Croats by bringing them

  68. 1 back to their houses in Zenica, and that he was clearly

    2 thinking according to his heart and the church by

    3 bringing people back to their houses, rather than being

    4 in step with the politics, was the note I wrote of the

    5 comments they were making.

    6 Q. Mr. McLeod, when these police officers were

    7 talking to you about the HVO prison at Kaonik, did they

    8 also tell you that Kaonik Prison was under the

    9 jurisdiction of the military court in Travnik?

    10 A. Yes, they said that Zlatko Aleksovski was

    11 responsible for the prison, they said it was an HVO

    12 prison, not run by the police, and that it was under

    13 the jurisdiction of the military court in Travnik.

    14 Q. After those interviews, Mr. McLeod, did you

    15 have occasion to go to the Kaonik Prison itself and

    16 meet with Zlatko Aleksovski?

    17 A. Yes, the following day I accompanied

    18 Ambassador Thebault and we went to Kaonik and while we

    19 were there, we had a long conversation -- yes, a long

    20 meeting with Mr. Aleksovski, the details of which are at

    21 annex O, so leafing through a little bit.

    22 Mr. Aleksovski explained in some detail the

    23 difficulties that he had running the prison, what he

    24 was doing with the prisoners. He then took me for a

    25 tour of the prison block and we then continued the

  69. 1 conversation back in his office again. It was quite a

    2 bizarre meeting. He discussed the problems that he

    3 had, or he explained the problems that he had providing

    4 security for prisoners. He said that -- he invited us

    5 to understand that because people had lost relatives

    6 and then would get drunk, perhaps they would come up

    7 and want to beat up a prisoner. As a rhetorical

    8 question, he asked whether we would want to shoot

    9 someone who had lost a brother to prevent them from

    10 beating up a prisoner.

    11 His view of that was obviously no, so he

    12 explained that we would see none of the jailers in

    13 contact with prisoners were carrying weapons, so they

    14 would not be put in this difficult position of having

    15 to shoot somebody to prevent them from beating somebody

    16 up.

    17 He talked in some detail about the

    18 difficulties of the defence of Busovaca and the fact

    19 that there were not enough people to dig trenches and

    20 so the fact that prisoners had to go and dig trenches.

    21 He said that he knew that this was wrong according to

    22 Geneva Conventions but that given the alternative of

    23 being overrun by the Muslims, he thought it was

    24 justified. He explained that he knew that it was wrong

    25 and that one of the ICRC delegates had actually been

  70. 1 and explained to him that it was wrong, and that he had

    2 gone with her to the local brigade commander in

    3 Busovaca where she had remonstrated with the brigade

    4 commander.

    5 He described an incident where they had been

    6 digging trenches and a fire fight had broken out. Once

    7 the shooting had stopped they realised two of the

    8 prisoners had run away or disappeared, they lost them

    9 during the fire fight.

    10 All the time that we were having the first

    11 part of the conversation, he was attempting to produce

    12 a list of prisoners, because he had initially explained

    13 that he had a computer with records of who the

    14 prisoners were and I said it would be very useful if we

    15 could have a copy of this list, so a list was produced

    16 and once the list had been printed off, we then went a

    17 met a number of people walking -- going into each of

    18 the prison cells. In most of the cells there were six

    19 or eight people. I had a conversation with some of

    20 them. In each of the cells at least one prisoner piped

    21 up and asked if they could make a statement about how

    22 well they were being treated.

    23 In one of the cells, an elderly man asked if

    24 he could ask us a question, and I said certainly he

    25 could, so through the interpreter, he asked what he was

  71. 1 doing there. I, of course, said, "I have no idea what

    2 you are doing here". Aleksovski said he knew because

    3 he had been speaking to the people who had brought this

    4 prisoner in the night before and he had been brought

    5 there for his own protection. He had been found

    6 wandering around on the contact line, so he was here

    7 for his protection. I said, rather quietly, that if

    8 I had wanted to protect this person and that was the

    9 only reason I had for bringing him to prison, what

    10 I would have done was send him to Zenica, say "do not

    11 be stupid, walking around in the middle of a front-line,

    12 go to Zenica and do not come back again".

    13 Aleksovski's reaction to this was to say,

    14 "yes, clearly that is right, this is an old man, he

    15 can go". Initially he said he could come back with us

    16 and then he said in fact he would simply arrange for

    17 him to be taken and dropped back at the point where he

    18 was picked up. So the man picked up his coat, shook

    19 hands with everybody else in the cell and left and

    20 there was some toing and froing while they arranged for

    21 somebody to take him away. At the end when we left the

    22 prison, Aleksovski did not know what the man's name was

    23 and I do not know if he was taken back to where he was

    24 picked up or taken round the block and back into his

    25 cell, but it was a fairly bizarre indication of the

  72. 1 degree of control over prisoners which Aleksovski

    2 appeared to have, because he appeared to be able to

    3 summarily decide that somebody could just leave. Very

    4 strange.

    5 Q. Mr. McLeod -- so in essence, in fact,

    6 Mr. McLeod, he acknowledged the following things; number

    7 one that the prison at Kaonik was an HVO prison, is

    8 that correct?

    9 A. Yes, it was quite clearly an HVO prison.

    10 During his explanation of what was going on,

    11 Mr. Aleksovski had explained that he did not select

    12 people to come in, the selection was made by the HVO,

    13 that he was actually under the orders of the two

    14 brigade commanders in Vitez and Busovaca, so they were

    15 responsible for giving him prisoners. We had quite a

    16 long debate following the release of this one

    17 individual, the apparent release of this one

    18 individual, about whether all civilian prisoners should

    19 be released or not. We debated the definition of a

    20 civilian as opposed to a soldier. Aleksovski put

    21 forward the view that a civilian was clearly a

    22 civilian, but any man aged between 16 and 60 or

    23 thereabouts under these circumstances was a soldier and

    24 therefore all the men we had seen were soldiers and

    25 therefore by definition could not be released.

  73. 1 He eventually said that the decision as to

    2 the definition of who was civilians and who was

    3 soldiers would have to be taken by the police, as

    4 opposed to by him.

    5 Q. Mr. Aleksovski also acknowledged that sending

    6 prisoners out to dig trenches was in violation of the

    7 Geneva Conventions, is that correct, that he knew that

    8 was the case?

    9 A. Yes, he said quite clearly that he knew that

    10 it was wrong, but that under the circumstances, he felt

    11 he had no choice, because the alternative was not to

    12 have the trenches dug and if the trenches were not dug,

    13 then the Muslims would have overrun Busovaca and he

    14 said, "what would happen to us if that happened?".

    15 Given that he explained that he knew it was wrong, he

    16 knew that the ICRC had told him it was wrong, I am not

    17 sure he knew chapter and verse what the Geneva

    18 Convention said in every respect, but he knew that was

    19 wrong.

    20 Q. He also referenced a specific instance where

    21 the ICRC accompanied Aleksovski to Busovaca to talk to

    22 the Busovaca brigade commander and inform the Busovaca

    23 brigade commander that the use of civilians to dig

    24 trenches was in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

    25 A. Yes.

  74. 1 Q. Mr. McLeod, did he tell you how many Muslim

    2 prisoners had been in the Kaonik camp in January 1993?

    3 A. Yes, he said that in January of this year, he

    4 had been in the prison when 400 Muslims were arrested.

    5 Q. Did he tell you how many prisoners had been

    6 then in the prison at the time you were visiting and

    7 the time in and around the time you had visited?

    8 A. Yes, he said that at that point there were 79

    9 Muslim prisoners. There had been more. He said on

    10 16th April they had 107 prisoners, on 6th May they had

    11 109 prisoners and on 9th May they also had 109

    12 prisoners. I am not sure that their statistics were

    13 completely precise, because they had some difficulty

    14 reconciling the list he produced with the people we

    15 actually saw, but there or thereabouts I am sure he

    16 knew more or less how many he had.

    17 Q. Your visit to the Kaonik camp had been

    18 prearranged, had it not?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. You did not just appear at the gates of the

    21 of the camp, knock on the door and say, "I would like

    22 to see the commander of the prison camp", did you?

    23 A. No. I am not sure exactly what the route was

    24 by which the message was passed, but we had certainly

    25 passed a message, or ECMM had passed a message saying

  75. 1 that we would like to visit.

    2 Q. Okay. When you arrived at the camp, you were

    3 given an opportunity to inspect the cells, were you

    4 not; some of the cells?

    5 A. We went into one building and we looked into

    6 most, if not all of the cells. We saw all the cells

    7 that had people in them in that one building. At the

    8 time I had the -- I understood that there were more --

    9 a further facility or another building or buildings

    10 further down the road. We would have had the

    11 opportunity to look at these buildings if we had wanted

    12 to, we certainly were not prevented from doing that,

    13 but by the end of our visit, we were making some

    14 progress around the issue of whether or not civilian

    15 prisoners could be released, so we decided we would

    16 actually go back to Zenica to try and make progress

    17 with that, as opposed to inspecting the rest of the

    18 facility.

    19 Q. You said that there were usually six to eight

    20 people inside an individual cell: you are talking about

    21 six to eight Muslims inside a cell?

    22 A. Yes, I imagine that the cells were probably

    23 designed for one or two people. I would guess they are

    24 designed for about that. I cannot remember precisely

    25 how many people were in each cell, but it was in that

  76. 1 sort of range. There was certainly one cell that we

    2 went into off the same corridor which had two Croatian

    3 military prisoners. I do not know what they had been

    4 charged with, but they were there and there was a stark

    5 contrast between them and their circumstances and the

    6 circumstances of the other people that we had seen,

    7 Muslims we had seen. Possibly they would have put more

    8 Croats into a cell if there had been more of them, I do

    9 not know, but these two characters had a significant

    10 amount of what appeared to be personal possessions.

    11 The room was full of bags and rucksacks and bits and

    12 pieces which clearly belonged to them, whereas the

    13 other people we had seen did not seem to have anything

    14 with them and there was certainly a lot more of them in

    15 each room.

    16 Q. Aleksovski did, in fact, inform you that the

    17 civilians that were being kept in the conditions that

    18 you have described were being kept there for their own

    19 protection, is that not right?

    20 A. Yes. The basic explanation for having

    21 civilians there -- although as I have said, we had this

    22 debate about whether they were civilians or soldiers,

    23 and they seemed to be either civilians or soldiers

    24 depending on how the debate was going, but civilians

    25 were there for their protection. It was rather

  77. 1 bizarre.

    2 Q. So the conditions in which you saw the two

    3 Croat soldiers, who presumably had been charged with a

    4 crime, were considerably better than the conditions in

    5 which the Muslims were being kept for their own

    6 protection, is that correct?

    7 A. On the basis of the number of people in the

    8 cell and the amount of personal possessions which they

    9 had, then yes, there was a difference. It may well

    10 have been that the Muslims did not have any possessions

    11 with them at the time they were brought to the prison,

    12 but yes, there was very clearly a difference.

    13 Q. Did it appear to you that the Muslim

    14 prisoners in the Kaonik Prison that you saw were

    15 civilians?

    16 A. Yes, the people that I saw were all wearing

    17 civilian clothes. There may have been some people

    18 wearing a mix, I do not have any particular memory of

    19 people wearing mixed uniform and civilian clothes, I am

    20 pretty sure I did not see any Muslims wearing uniform.

    21 There may have been one or two, but I certainly do not

    22 remember them.

    23 Q. Did you have an opportunity to talk to any of

    24 those prisoners and identify them as people who had

    25 been previously identified to you by the Muslim

  78. 1 authorities as being in custody in Kaonik camp, some of

    2 the 13 civilians?

    3 A. Yes. As I was going into each of the cells,

    4 after a while -- rather stupidly, only after a while --

    5 it occurred to me that I ought to make a mark on the

    6 list that I had of the people I had actually seen, and

    7 so I did eventually realise that I should make a little

    8 mark on the list and did so. Certainly there were a

    9 couple of people whose names occurred on the list of

    10 prisoners which I was given by Mr. Aleksovski which

    11 tallied with the list of names I had been given by the

    12 mayor of Zenica.

    13 Q. Did Mr. Aleksovski also talk to you about the

    14 removal of the population from the village of Jelinak?

    15 I am referring to page 4 of your report, approximately

    16 middle of the page?

    17 A. Yes, he described to me how in Jelinak, they

    18 had gathered all the women and children into one house

    19 to protect them from the men who had lost brothers, so

    20 presumably this is protecting them from the Croatian

    21 men who had lost brothers, and he said:

    22 "Then we told them to go to Zenica. They

    23 escorted them on foot to the petrol station, then told

    24 them to go to Zenica."

    25 The petrol station he was referring to was

  79. 1 near the Busovaca T junction, so quite close to the

    2 prison; also quite close to the no-man's land between

    3 the Croats and the Muslims on that road.

    4 Q. What did he tell you about the village of

    5 Jelinak and when it was burned?

    6 A. He said that the BiH now controlled Jelinak,

    7 he said the village had been burnt at the very

    8 beginning, on the second day of fighting. He said that

    9 we were on one side, the Croats were on one side and

    10 they, the Muslims, were on the other side. They, the

    11 Muslims, had started shelling and the Croats had

    12 withdrawn from their positions. Then they, presumably

    13 the Muslims had burnt the houses and all of them had

    14 been burnt.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, have you completed?

    16 MR. HARMON: I am sorry, Mr. President.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I was going to suggest, if

    18 you have completed this section on Aleksovski, we could

    19 have the break, except if you have more questions on

    20 Aleksovski. Of course, let me note that this is the

    21 Blaskic trial, not the Aleksovski trial.

    22 MR. HARMON: I understand, Mr. President.

    23 I have a couple more questions and then I will

    24 conclude --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Still on Aleksovski?

  80. 1 MR. HARMON: Related briefly to the Kaonik

    2 Prison, however.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: I realise that, you have done

    4 well to remind me of that. I know that the Kaonik

    5 Prison is part of the indictment. I am seeking to

    6 ensure efficiency of the proceedings and I notice that

    7 sometimes we repeat things that have already been said

    8 in the report. But this is just a comment in passing.

    9 I should like us to adjourn now and resume at 3.00 pm.

    10 (12.45 pm)

    11 (Adjourned until 3.00 pm)















  81. 1 (3.10 pm)

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume now. Please

    3 have the accused brought in.

    4 (Accused brought in)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, we will continue

    6 with the statement by Mr. McLeod.

    7 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President and

    8 your Honours.

    9 Mr. McLeod, before we continue with your

    10 testimony, I would just like you to clarify one portion

    11 of one of the parts of your report that you referenced

    12 earlier this morning, and that is a joint statement

    13 that is attached to the materials that were given to

    14 you by Mr. Santic and Skopljak and I am referring to

    15 appendix 2 to annex F. Specifically, I am referring to

    16 the first paragraph in that proposed draft joint

    17 statement, and there is a reference on the

    18 fourth line down in paragraph 1, the letters "KOS" and

    19 I am referring to the sentence that says as follows:

    20 "The conflict was provoked by the extreme

    21 forces aided by the members of KOS with the purpose of

    22 weakening the resistance toward the Serbo-Chetnik

    23 aggressor."

    24 Can you please tell the judges what you

    25 understand to be "KOS", what it means?

  82. 1 A. Certainly. I am afraid I do not know exactly

    2 what KOS stands for. My understanding in this context

    3 is that it might be a Serbian intelligence agency, but

    4 I am not certain.

    5 Q. Thank you for that clarification, Mr. McLeod.

    6 Now let me turn to your conclusions in this, based on

    7 your experiences on the ground in Central Bosnia, based

    8 on your interviews with people from ECMM, from UNPROFOR

    9 and from the parties themselves, could you tell the

    10 court what conclusions you reached?

    11 A. Certainly. It is worth starting by saying

    12 that the report was written at the time for people who

    13 were already thoroughly immersed in the situation as it

    14 was there and who had access to and were constantly

    15 reading a lot of material reporting what was going on,

    16 so it was assumed that people understood exactly what

    17 the background was, and the conclusions that I wrote

    18 were kept deliberately extremely short with all of the

    19 other detailed notes of the meeting I had had appended

    20 to it.

    21 The conclusion that I reached was that on

    22 16th April, the Croatian forces in the Lasva Valley had

    23 launched a series of attacks on Muslim positions in

    24 Vitez and the villages in the Lasva Valley. At the

    25 same time, they had arrested a number of prominent

  83. 1 Muslims within Vitez early in the morning of 16th April

    2 and I had met some of those people then in Kaonik

    3 Prison, I had actually seen them with my own eyes.

    4 The most violent attack which they had

    5 carried out appeared to be in the village of Ahmici,

    6 where as I saw, the majority of the houses which as far

    7 as I could tell had been occupied by Muslims had been

    8 burnt. I was told that a lot of people had been killed

    9 in the village, and I think that was the general

    10 understanding at the time, but I certainly saw the

    11 village had been razed to the ground and what appeared

    12 to have been a fairly serious and a co-ordinated

    13 attack. It certainly was not a couple of isolated

    14 incidents in the village, it was thoroughly razed.

    15 At the same time, there appeared to have been

    16 moves to move the Croatian population out of Zenica and

    17 there was evidence of this, I was told this, I could

    18 see some of the houses that had been burnt after people

    19 had moved out and I had the impression that this had

    20 been done at least as much at the instigation of the

    21 Croats in Vitez in order to justify what they were then

    22 doing as a result of fear or intimidation on the part

    23 of the Muslims, so it struck me that this movement of

    24 Muslim population out of Zenica had been on a different

    25 basis, if you like, to that of the Muslim population

  84. 1 out of Vitez.

    2 MR. HARMON: Mr. McLeod, let me just correct

    3 you, you said movement on the part of the Muslims out

    4 of Zenica. Did you mean movement on the part of Croats

    5 out of Zenica?

    6 A. Yes, I apologise. It is movement of the

    7 Croatian population, Croats living in the Zenica area.

    8 Thank you for the correction.

    9 By the time that I was in the area in the

    10 second week of May, so some three weeks later, it

    11 seemed that quite a lot of the Croatian population had

    12 been able to return to their houses and there seemed to

    13 be evidence -- I was shown things by the Muslim

    14 officials but the Croatian priests in Zenica gave the

    15 impression that there were steps being taken which

    16 while not perfect, they were content that steps were

    17 being taken to try and allow Croats to come back to

    18 their houses and to allow some semblance of normality

    19 to be returned slowly. It was not perfect, but there

    20 was progress in that direction.

    21 Again, by the time that I got there in the

    22 second week of May, in Vitez the Muslim population were

    23 concentrated or certainly appeared to be concentrated

    24 either in villages which were isolated on the edge of

    25 Vitez or in Stari Vitez, old Vitez, in the middle of

  85. 1 town, and as far as I could see, there was no freedom

    2 of movement, either out of these villages or out of the

    3 old sector of town and I went into old Vitez once and

    4 there was clearly a degree of fear and people were not

    5 able to move out and in, they were not getting supplies

    6 of food. I was certainly told about various attacks

    7 which were continuing, although while I was actually

    8 there there was no artillery fire or sniping against

    9 us, probably because we were actually in that part of

    10 the town.

    11 As far as I could see, and this is based on

    12 both what Colonel Blaskic had told me and what UNPROFOR

    13 and the ECMM monitors had told me, the Muslim reaction

    14 to the attacks on the 16th April had been to try and

    15 counterattack, to cut the roads on both sides of Vitez,

    16 so as to isolate Vitez and Busovaca, and I think that

    17 they had been successful in their counterattacks up to

    18 the point when the international community intervened

    19 and arranged a cease-fire. I am not quite sure how far

    20 things would have got, but I think Colonel Blaskic's

    21 appreciation of what might have happened thereafter was

    22 probably quite accurate, that the Muslim counterattack

    23 would have been quite effective and would have isolated

    24 the Croats in Vitez.

    25 It struck me, as I sat back at the end of my

  86. 1 visit and as I returned back to Zagreb and wrote my

    2 conclusions, that on the one hand the Croats that I had

    3 met, they left me with the clear impression that what

    4 they had been trying to do was to establish a Croatian

    5 state in Central Bosnia linked to the Croatian areas

    6 further to the west up towards the coast, that what

    7 they wanted was to have a largely Croatian or majority

    8 Croatian state which they controlled, that they had

    9 attempted to force the Muslim population to move out of

    10 the area that they wanted to control, that they had

    11 been using fairly extreme methods. As a modest

    12 Englishman, that is how I would put it, they had been

    13 using fairly extreme methods to try and encourage the

    14 Muslim population to move. I do not know whether

    15 Ahmici was a one-off and it was intended as an example

    16 to terrorise people or whether they would have

    17 replicated that degree of burning of houses throughout

    18 other villages had they been able to. I just do not

    19 know, but quite clearly in one particular village they

    20 had caused very extreme damage, with the result that

    21 the majority of the Muslim population were then either

    22 cooped up in a couple of completely surrounded areas or

    23 had moved, so by that token, I think they were

    24 achieving what they were trying to do.

    25 I think they were only prevented from being

  87. 1 completely successful by the reaction of the Muslim

    2 army, and then intervention of the international

    3 community, which stabilised the position in the terms

    4 in which I found it some three weeks later, and by the

    5 time that I was writing my report, I think it was fair

    6 to say -- it would be fair to say that what I would

    7 seen in a microcosm in Vitez, Busovaca and Zenica was

    8 being played out throughout Central Bosnia and indeed

    9 down to Mostar by then, where again, from my point of

    10 view, the impression that I formed in light of the

    11 information which I could see and all the reporting

    12 that I was reading in ECMM was that the same pattern

    13 was being replicated, with extreme violence or terror,

    14 however you want to describe it, being used to try and

    15 move the Muslim population in order to create an

    16 one-party state, with only one particular type of

    17 people with one religion.

    18 So that I think is probably the substance of

    19 the conclusions I reached. It is worth noting that the

    20 report, the brief one page at the front which I wrote

    21 was vetted by headquarters of ECMM, because clearly

    22 what I was saying was not to be taken lightly, having

    23 been down there, and the deputy head of the mission on

    24 the political side, Ole Brix-Andersen, read this and we

    25 actually changed the precise detail of some of the

  88. 1 elements of what I had written, in fact in order to

    2 tone it down. They said, "you could be seen as a young

    3 man who has been here, who has witnessed something

    4 which is quite terrible and is painting a slightly more

    5 extreme view than is necessary", so we actually toned

    6 down what I had written a little bit and then they were

    7 quite -- by the time we had finished revising it, very

    8 rapidly on 15th May, they were content that what we had

    9 was as balanced a view as the ECMM could get, and at

    10 that point it was published and disseminated as I have

    11 described earlier on.

    12 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Mr. McLeod.

    13 Mr. President, I would move Prosecutor's

    14 Exhibit 242 into evidence and I have concluded then

    15 with my direct examination of Mr. McLeod.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. So we

    17 have ended now the examination-in-chief, is it

    18 Mr. Hayman who is going to do the cross-examination?

    19 Cross-examined by MR. HAYMAN

    20 Q. Yes, Mr. President, and we have no additional

    21 objections to the report other than those previously

    22 reserved.

    23 Good afternoon. Let me ask you, how many

    24 days were you on the ground in the Lasva Valley

    25 gathering the data for your report?

  89. 1 A. I travelled in on 3rd May and I left on

    2 12th May, so that is nine days.

    3 Q. Were you working all nine days?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. In that time, you received a briefing from --

    6 one or more briefings from BritBat, is that right?

    7 A. Yes, that is correct.

    8 Q. And a briefing from your ECMM colleagues,

    9 I presume?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Any other briefings from international

    12 organisations that you received?

    13 A. I also had conversations with members of the

    14 ICRC and also a conversation with a member of UNHCR.

    15 Q. In addition to the interviews you have

    16 recounted, and the documents attached as annexes, did

    17 you receive any other documents or have access to any

    18 other documents from either of the warring parties?

    19 A. As I think I said earlier on, there were also

    20 maps which were marked by people in the other

    21 interviews, but unfortunately I have lost those

    22 subsequently. But in terms of documents that were

    23 given to me, I think I have actually managed to keep

    24 everything which I was given, they are included in the

    25 report.

  90. 1 Q. So you received no other military records

    2 other than what we have here in Exhibit 242, is that

    3 right?

    4 A. I am pretty sure I managed to hold on to

    5 everything and include it in the report.

    6 Q. Were you able to interview any BiH army

    7 soldiers or commanders in the Vitez municipality as

    8 part of your study?

    9 A. Yes, and as I think you can see there is a

    10 report of a meeting that I had.

    11 Q. Is that with a commander in Kruscica?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Any others?

    14 A. No, I did not talk to any of them. The only

    15 other people I could have spoken to I think would have

    16 been in Stari Vitez and I did not speak to anybody

    17 there.

    18 Q. Other than what you have said in your report,

    19 did you gather any additional information concerning

    20 the placement or existence of BiH army or Territorial

    21 Defence Forces in the Lasva Valley in April 1993?

    22 A. Could you explain exactly what you are after

    23 there in terms of, "did I gather"?

    24 Q. You have said you visited the BiH army command

    25 post in Kruscica.

  91. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. And you visited Stari Vitez.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Was there a BiH army presence in Stari Vitez

    5 when you visited that position?

    6 A. There were certainly -- mm. I am trying to

    7 remember seeing people with guns. I think there must

    8 have been some people with guns, because otherwise they

    9 would have been overrun.

    10 Q. It seems like a reasonable assumption to me.

    11 Tell us what you recall.

    12 A. I am attempting to recall precisely what

    13 I saw. On the occasion we went into Stari Vitez, there

    14 was a meeting taking place and Ambassador Thebault,

    15 I think, went to that meeting, but I did not go to the

    16 meeting, I sat on top of the vehicle and looked at what

    17 was going on.

    18 Q. Did you meet an individual called Sefkija

    19 Dzidic during your visit to Stari Vitez?

    20 A. No, I do not think so.

    21 Q. My question a moment ago was in addition to

    22 those experiences, in the course of your study, did you

    23 learn, for example, whether there was an Armija or

    24 Territorial Defence position or group in, for example,

    25 Donje Veceriska at or about the time it was attacked in

  92. 1 mid April 1993? Did you gather any information on that

    2 subject, for example?

    3 A. Can I just work out where Donje Veceriska is

    4 and then maybe I can answer you.

    5 Q. Certainly. Do you have something that would

    6 assist you in that regard?

    7 A. Yes, I have a map at the back of my report,

    8 so perhaps I can find it.

    9 Q. If you know where it is, perhaps you could

    10 point it out for me.

    11 A. To the south west of Vitez.

    12 Q. We have better maps if that would be helpful

    13 Donje Veceriska is directly west of Vitez. Gacice is

    14 south west of Vitez.

    15 A. To aid me, I am actually using the map marked

    16 by Colonel Blaskic, so I see where Veceriska and Gacice

    17 are. If I use the information which he gave me, he

    18 marked it as being a mixed village and therefore

    19 I would assume that there would have been units from

    20 both sides in that village, but I am not sure if that

    21 is a suitable answer for you.

    22 Q. That is an assumption, I am glad you have

    23 stated it. Can you tell us, as part of your study, did

    24 you attempt to gather any more specific information

    25 about which of the villages that were the subject of

  93. 1 conflict in mid April 1993 had BiH army or Territorial

    2 Defence units in them at the time of those conflicts?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. Now I would like to direct your attention to

    5 your interview with Mayor Spahic, which is found in

    6 your report, beginning at page A-1, if you would like

    7 to have that available for reference.

    8 A. Certainly.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: You told us that you learned in

    10 the course of your study --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, which annex? Is it

    12 annex A?

    13 MR. HAYMAN: I believe it is beginning on

    14 page A-1, Besim Spahic, mayor of Zenica.

    15 A. The French version does not have the

    16 page numbers at the bottom of it.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: You learned in this interview or

    19 in another that some 2,000 Bosnian Croats had fled the

    20 Zenica municipality during the conflict in mid April

    21 1993, is that correct?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Did someone tell you that that was due

    24 principally to propaganda disseminated by Bosnian

    25 Croats themselves?

  94. 1 A. That was the impression that I was given,

    2 yes.

    3 Q. Who gave you that impression?

    4 A. I think I probably formed that impression

    5 based on my meetings and conversations with people in

    6 Zenica, a combination of the Muslim officials I spoke

    7 to and then also the priest that I spoke to, as well as

    8 what I was told by members of ECMM.

    9 Q. Did anyone tell you that any such propaganda

    10 emanated from then Colonel Blaskic?

    11 A. Nobody was being precise about exactly who

    12 was disseminating that information, no.

    13 Q. Did anyone suggest that any such propaganda

    14 emanated from the operative zone level of the HVO

    15 command in Central Bosnia; that is Colonel Blaskic's

    16 headquarters?

    17 A. Nobody was saying precisely where the

    18 propaganda was being generated.

    19 Q. Did you interview any of the 2,000 displaced

    20 persons to determine from them why they fled the Zenica

    21 municipality?

    22 A. No, I did not have that opportunity.

    23 Q. Did you learn from your interviews whether

    24 during this period of time in the middle of April 1993,

    25 whether the Zenica municipality, was it a safe or was

  95. 1 it an unsafe locale, generally speaking, for Bosnian

    2 Croats?

    3 A. During the period leading up to the middle of

    4 April?

    5 Q. From the 16th on, beginning on 15th or

    6 16th April and in the following days.

    7 A. I think it was probably relatively unsafe in

    8 comparison with the way it had been immediately before

    9 that and I would evidence that by the fact that people

    10 were taking steps to make it safe again.

    11 Q. You described one meeting with Father Stjepan

    12 and a meeting with Father Bozo. I would like to ask

    13 you about apparently a second meeting you had with

    14 Father Stjepan, which is recounted, and again

    15 I apologise, Mr. President, the best way for me to find

    16 pages is to use the alpha-numeric designation at the

    17 bottom of the page. This is on page E-2, and that is

    18 the second page in the English version of your notes or

    19 write-up of your meeting with Father Bozo of Cajdras.

    20 A. I see what you are referring to, it is the

    21 second and third paragraphs on that page.

    22 Q. Let me ask you, in connection with your

    23 meetings on this day, did you also meet with

    24 Father Stjepan and did he present you with a list of

    25 problems and difficulties that the Croat population in

  96. 1 the Zenica municipality had been facing or was facing?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Did those include the statement by

    4 Father Stjepan that:

    5 "We are now in danger."

    6 And:

    7 "MOS come at night to their homes", referring

    8 to the homes of Bosnian Croats or HVO soldiers, "and

    9 take them."

    10 Did he make that statement to you, in writing

    11 or orally?

    12 A. Yes, and I think that if we turn to appendix

    13 1 to that annex, then you can see the English

    14 translation and the original typed report as I was

    15 given it.

    16 Q. Did he also tell you, two paragraphs further

    17 down in your statement of your meeting with Father Bozo

    18 that:

    19 "They shoot pigs and steal cows and they take

    20 food day and [something]. Criminals take everything

    21 and destroy everything."

    22 Was that also a statement he made to you,

    23 Father Stjepan?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Did he say a couple of paragraphs further

  97. 1 down in your report that to date, and that would have

    2 been as of 8th May, 65 or 70 homes have been burnt; did

    3 he make that representation to you?

    4 A. Yes, he said only one house was burnt during

    5 the conflict and now, so presumably that is in the

    6 intervening three weeks, 65 or 70 houses have been

    7 burnt.

    8 Q. In the aftermath of 16th April 1993, some 65

    9 or 70 homes of Bosnian Croats in the Zenica

    10 municipality have been burned; was that your

    11 understanding of what you were being told?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. He summed up two paragraphs later by stating:

    14 "Increasingly there is no security so people

    15 leave."

    16 Is that correct?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Later on, over on the next page, he recited

    19 various statistics of the number of dead, houses burned

    20 and robbed, including a total of 12 civilians killed in

    21 the conflict, is that right?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. You said earlier I believe that

    24 Father Stjepan, he was a moderate who advocated ethnic

    25 reconciliation, is that correct?

  98. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. In your interview with Mayor Spahic, did he

    3 tell you in substance that he was doing everything he

    4 could to prevent violence and attacks against Croats in

    5 the municipality of Zenica?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Did you believe him?

    8 A. I think when I took what he said in context

    9 with what other people were saying as well, that seemed

    10 to be what they were trying to do. I think as I said

    11 earlier on, the circumstances were fairly difficult.

    12 Q. They were very difficult, so despite the best

    13 efforts of the authorities in the Zenica municipality,

    14 some 70 Bosnian Croat houses had been burned, 12

    15 civilians had been killed and there was a general state

    16 of lawlessness and lack of security, is that correct?

    17 A. That is what one can deduce by taking this at

    18 face value, yes.

    19 Q. That is a fair inference, would you agree?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: Please give us an audible answer,

    22 that would help for purposes of the transcript.

    23 Now Mayor Spahic also showed you a decree,

    24 did he not, which he issued on 18th April 1993 and

    25 which is found in your report at page A1-1.

  99. 1 For purposes of the French version,

    2 Mr. President, that is appendix 1 following the

    3 statement of Besim Spahic titled, "orders for the

    4 return of refugees to Zenica".

    5 In that decree or statement, directing your

    6 attention to I, did the mayor call for the

    7 establishment of joint checkpoints and joint patrols to

    8 include both Armija and HVO forces?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Did you learn from your study that at the

    11 time this was issued -- and I apologise, this is dated

    12 April 17th 1993, not 18th -- did you learn from your

    13 study that at this time in fact the BiH army had

    14 attacked the HVO in Zenica and there was ongoing armed

    15 confrontation between the two?

    16 A. Yes, that was the case and so what they were

    17 trying to do was to stop that. My recollection is not

    18 perfect, but I think that there was an area of Zenica

    19 where there was still a fight going on, or had been

    20 going on, but I think there were other areas which were

    21 returning to calm and they were probably, this is my

    22 inference, suggesting that in those areas where there

    23 was not a fight going on, they ought to have joint

    24 patrols.

    25 Q. Although at this time, would you agree in

  100. 1 those areas where the Armija and the HVO was not in

    2 actual conflict, that was because the HVO had been

    3 captured and they were locked up?

    4 A. I am not sure if all of them had been locked

    5 up, but yes, certainly a number of them had been, as

    6 evidenced by the priest that I spoke to, who talked

    7 about the people in those circumstances.

    8 Q. Turning to the next page, I think it is a

    9 different decree, although there is no real title, it

    10 is title, "Conclusions", I and II, and it is dated

    11 April 18th 1993. Let me first direct your attention to

    12 that. Have you found it? In the bottom numbering in

    13 the English it is A1-2.

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. In this document, Mayor Spahic called, in I,

    16 for the respective headquarters of the warring parties

    17 to "immediately give orders for unconditional

    18 cease-fire"; do you see that?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit D76, Mr. Registrar, if

    21 D76 could be retrieved to be provided to the witness.

    22 While that is being retrieved, let me ask

    23 you, in the course of conducting your study, did you

    24 learn that in fact Colonel Blaskic issued an order on

    25 this day, 18th April 1993, calling for a cease-fire on

  101. 1 the part of the HVO? If you would provide it to the

    2 witness, please? Specifically I would direct you to

    3 paragraph 1 of that order. Did you learn that in the

    4 course of your study, that Colonel Blaskic ordered a

    5 cease-fire on the date Mayor Spahic called for it,

    6 18th April 1993?

    7 A. No, but it sounds as if they were working

    8 quite closely in co-operation and looking at the

    9 addresses on this, I imagine that this was the product

    10 of one of the Joint Commissions which was being run at

    11 that time by Colonel Stewart and Ambassador Thebault,

    12 so the fact we have the two things at the same time is

    13 probably on both sides the result of the same meeting,

    14 I suspect.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Do you know whether the BiH army

    16 command issued a similar order?

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Can we put the exhibit on the

    18 ELMO, please?

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, please, Mr. President. My

    20 mental lapse.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Because this dialogue between

    22 the Defence and the witness is something that the

    23 judges would like to participate in. I think this is

    24 an exhibit that you have already offered? Yes, I think

    25 I remember that.

  102. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Yes. There is a French written

    2 translation available. I was calling the witness's

    3 attention to paragraph 1.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: I still do not see it.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, if we could zoom in on the

    6 order, please? If we could enlarge the middle portion

    7 of the text of the order, please. Thank you.

    8 Calling the witness's attention, I was,

    9 Mr. President, to paragraph 1 and I will read it so we

    10 can obtain a sight translation:

    11 "I command 1. All the subordinate HVO units

    12 are to stop immediately all combat actions against the

    13 units of the ABiH."

    14 I was posing a follow-up question and that

    15 is: did you learn in the course of your study whether

    16 the BiH army command issued a similar call or order for

    17 a cease-fire on 18th April 1993, or do you not know?

    18 A. On the English translation of the document

    19 dated 18th April, you do not see the address list, but

    20 if you turn to the original, which is a few pages on,

    21 it is A1-6, then down at the bottom I think we can see

    22 the address list.

    23 Q. So a copy of this document, the decree, if

    24 you will, of 18th April 1993, we can tell from this

    25 copy which is part of your report that it went to the

  103. 1 HVO in Zenica.

    2 A. Yes, so it goes to III Corps of the ABiH --

    3 shall I put this on the projector as well, sir?

    4 Q. Please. You are directing your attention to

    5 the lower left-hand corner which is the distribution

    6 list in Serbo-Croat, correct?

    7 A. Yes. I think what we can see here is -- this

    8 is the document signed by the president, by the mayor

    9 of Zenica, it is going to III Corps of the ABiH and

    10 then is also going to the HVO in Zenica, so he is

    11 disseminating the same order in the area that he

    12 controls and I assume that the original document you

    13 would have shown me would have been disseminated on the

    14 Vitez side.

    15 Q. This document, would you agree, this is a

    16 conclusion of the mayor that the respective

    17 headquarters are requested to give an order for a

    18 cease-fire; that is the contents of Mayor Spahic's

    19 document in I, correct?

    20 A. Yes, I would infer that what was happening

    21 was that the political control was saying, "stop

    22 fighting", and then I imagine, but I do not have a copy

    23 of, an order which would then have been disseminated

    24 from III Corps.

    25 Q. You would expect that III Corps would have

  104. 1 issued a similar cease-fire order on 18th April 1993,

    2 is that right?

    3 A. I would assume so. If, as I imagine, there

    4 was a tripartite meeting, a Joint Commission, they

    5 would have agreed they were going to do it and what we

    6 see on both sides is that information being

    7 disseminated.

    8 Q. They would have done so if they were working

    9 with the political forces and the HVO to achieve a

    10 cease-fire in the same way that the HVO command was,

    11 correct?

    12 A. That is what I would assume, although I do

    13 not have that piece of paper.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Let me turn your attention to

    15 your interview with Father Stjepan which begins on

    16 page B-1 of the English version and that is annex B,

    17 Mr. President. In paragraph 4 of this statement, it

    18 appears Father Stjepan described a process of

    19 action/reaction that he stated was occurring within

    20 Central Bosnia and he described, for example, a family

    21 expelled from Vitez causes a reaction here, meaning in

    22 Zenica. Did you hear this concept described by others,

    23 such as when the Imam of Busovaca described threats

    24 being made to Muslim residents of Busovaca by Croat

    25 refugees from surrounding villages who had been

  105. 1 expelled and were in Busovaca?

    2 A. Yes, I think that despite the breakdown in

    3 communications, in practice people could communicate

    4 and there were a number of examples both in terms of

    5 what was happening to people in their houses and also

    6 what was happening to prisoners to suggest yes, there

    7 was a degree of tit for tat, if you like.

    8 Q. On the next page of your report, again this

    9 same interview with Father Stjepan, did he complain of

    10 a problem of discrimination against Bosnian Croats in

    11 Zenica in that, for example, former steelworkers who

    12 were of Croatian ethnicity, or at least those who had

    13 been said to have joined the HVO, were not given food

    14 rations which were at the time a substitute for salary

    15 or pension?

    16 A. Yes, I think that the justification -- not

    17 justification, the explanation which he gave was that,

    18 or that he had been given was that these people were

    19 now in prison, and because they were in prison, they

    20 were not working and therefore not getting their food

    21 ration, but the substance is exactly that, yes.

    22 Q. Because others similarly situated, fighting,

    23 otherwise not employed, they were getting a food ration

    24 as you understood it?

    25 A. Correct.

  106. 1 Q. Let me direct you to the next interview you

    2 document in your report, the head of ICRC Zenica,

    3 I will not use his name in case there is an issue, but

    4 you met with the head of ICRC Zenica on 7th May 1993,

    5 is that right?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Did you ask him what access ICRC had to

    8 Bosnian Croat prisoners who were being held in Zenica?

    9 A. Yes, in light of my previous experience

    10 working in the humanitarian section, I was aware of the

    11 need to be in close co-operation with the ICRC and so

    12 one of the things that I did, as you can see fairly

    13 early I wanted to go and meet them and say, "we are

    14 taking various steps as best we can" and to make sure

    15 we did not tread on their toes.

    16 Q. Did he tell you how many prisons there were

    17 in Zenica holding Bosnian Croat prisoners at the time,

    18 7th May 1993? Paragraph 2 I would direct your

    19 attention to.

    20 A. He alluded to three prisons, one of which

    21 they had access to and two of which they did not.

    22 Q. Can you name them, please?

    23 A. Certainly. He said they had access to the

    24 main prison, I do not know what the main prison was

    25 called other than being the main prison, and then he

  107. 1 said not to the MUP, which I assume is the police

    2 prison, or the music school.

    3 Q. The MUP is the Ministry of State Security?

    4 A. Yes, I am not sure if that is exactly what

    5 the initials stand for, but that is what I understand.

    6 Q. The music school, did you understand that was

    7 the headquarters of 7th Muslim Brigade?

    8 A. I did not know it was the headquarters of the

    9 7th Muslim Brigade, but I did understand it was a

    10 facility controlled by that entity.

    11 Q. Now let me direct your attention to your

    12 interview with Father Bozo, which is in Appendix E of

    13 your report. I take it when you spoke to him, was this

    14 the meeting at which you were on the steps of a church

    15 or a building, and there were a number of parishioners

    16 surrounding you and the Father?

    17 A. Yes, as I said earlier on, we started off in

    18 his house, we then went for a tour to a village at the

    19 top of the hill, and then came back to the church, yes.

    20 Q. Did he describe, as set forth in paragraph 2

    21 of your report, that parishioners in his area, the

    22 Cajdras area, left their homes after they were

    23 subjected to pressure and houses were burned?

    24 A. Yes, so my note is that he said that

    25 80 per cent of people stayed in their homes and after

  108. 1 that there was high pressure and burning of houses and

    2 threats, so after that, all of them ran away.

    3 Q. Then two paragraphs later, does he describe

    4 an incident of looting in which the looters had

    5 military uniforms, and when the military police from

    6 the III Corps of the Armija arrived, they let the

    7 robbers escape but they took into custody an Australian

    8 TV crew that was trying to film these events; did he

    9 relate that to you?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Can you describe the state, if there was a

    12 state of anxiety and agitation among the parishioners

    13 around you at the time; what was their state?

    14 A. They were extremely concerned to know what

    15 was going on, they were extremely concerned to know

    16 what had happened to individual members of their

    17 families, and they wanted to know what was going to

    18 happen next.

    19 Q. Did you view their concerns as real?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Let me direct your attention forward in your

    22 report to appendix F, your interview with Santic and

    23 Skopljak. At the bottom of page 1 of your report,

    24 there appears to be an allusion, I assume by Mr. Santic,

    25 to information of an impending attack on 15th April

  109. 1 1993. Can you elaborate on that for us? What was the

    2 information that Mr. Santic gave you in that regard?

    3 A. What we have here is precisely what I wrote

    4 down, there may have been some more detail which

    5 I missed. What he was saying was that on 15th April,

    6 so the day before everything broke down, that there was

    7 a rumour of an attack from Zenica to Vitez, so people

    8 were agitated. I think that would be how I would

    9 characterise that.

    10 Q. Did you learn in your study of any other

    11 events on 15th April 1993 that might have lent credence

    12 to that type of a report, such as any attacks on HVO

    13 commanders, or did you not?

    14 A. I do not think so, no.

    15 Q. Would you agree that at the time the Armija

    16 was certainly capable of launching a significant attack

    17 on Vitez from Zenica, with the forces available to it

    18 in Zenica?

    19 A. Yes, I think so and I think that one can see

    20 from what happened a few days later; we will not say it

    21 is an attack or a counterattack, but certainly they

    22 proved themselves capable of making ground.

    23 Q. In that such a military action took place?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Turning to the next page of this statement,

  110. 1 did Mr. Santic also tell you that because there was an

    2 explosives factory in Vitez, I believe he said "every

    3 tenth man has too much explosives", or explosives in

    4 his private custody; did he tell you that?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Did you determine from your study or

    7 investigation whether in fact there was an explosives

    8 factory in the immediate vicinity of Vitez?

    9 A. I believe there was, yes.

    10 Q. Now let me direct your attention to the

    11 bottom of page F-1 in the English report. This is the

    12 statement of Mr. Santic which you have advised is

    13 inconsistent with your notes, namely the statement

    14 concerning whether Blaskic had ordered his forces not

    15 to enter Muslim homes or has to order, has to make such

    16 an order. Do you find that passage?

    17 A. Bottom of F-2, yes.

    18 Q. When you prepared your report initially from

    19 your notes, did you base it solely on your notes or did

    20 you also use your actual recollection of these

    21 interviews and what was said at the interviews?

    22 A. For the most part, I just sat and typed the

    23 hand-written notes straight up as you see here, which is

    24 why the grammar is less than perfect, and then also as

    25 you can see, I interspersed with comments, bits based

  111. 1 on what I could remember, as opposed to that which

    2 I had written down.

    3 Q. After you typed it up, your notes, did you

    4 read over it to determine whether your notes were

    5 consistent with your actual recollection of the

    6 meetings?

    7 A. Yes, which is why I was able then to add

    8 comments. I started off by typing the basic text from

    9 my notebook, then ran through it and added in the

    10 comments and interspersed comment so people could tell

    11 the difference between a note and my own thoughts,

    12 recollections.

    13 Q. The comments aside, when you were writing up

    14 the actual statements of the interviews, did you also

    15 call upon your recollection of the interviews in

    16 checking, if you will, the accuracy of what you were

    17 writing, or did you not?

    18 A. I certainly did in places where what I wrote

    19 tailed off or was incomplete. In this particular case,

    20 and I could show you the note in the original if you

    21 are interested, but I think the original is fairly

    22 clear, I was working quite fast and made a mistake.

    23 Q. As you sit here today, do you recall what was

    24 said on this subject in the interview, or are you

    25 totally dependent on your notes?

  112. 1 A. I think for precision I would go back to my

    2 notes.

    3 Q. Do you have a recollection as you sit here on

    4 what was said in the interview on this issue yourself?

    5 It was four years ago.

    6 A. No, I would not be able to say with any

    7 degree of certainty, that specific element, whether it

    8 was in one tense or the other tense.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit D43 could be obtained,

    10 Mr. President, and placed before the witness. The ELMO

    11 could assist, I think, all of us.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, do you have D43?

    13 MR. HAYMAN: If we could zoom in on the text,

    14 particularly the preamble and paragraph 1, that would

    15 be helpful. Thank you. This is an order dated

    16 22nd April 1993 which in part reads, from then

    17 Colonel Blaskic, which reads:

    18 "In order to prevent incidents in which

    19 houses and other commercial facilities are set on fire

    20 and looted, I hereby issue the following order.

    21 "1. I strictly prohibit the torching of

    22 houses and other commercial facilities and looting in

    23 the zone of responsibility of the command of the

    24 Central Bosnia operation zone controlled by HVO units."

    25 Do you see that?

  113. 1 A. Yes, I do.

    2 Q. My question is: does that refresh your

    3 recollection as to any discussion you may have had with

    4 Mr. Santic concerning the fact that such an order had

    5 been issued by Colonel Blaskic concerning the

    6 protection of Muslim homes and businesses?

    7 A. I think if one takes into context the

    8 preceding sentences before the precise sentence where

    9 we think we have a potential misunderstanding or

    10 inaccuracy, and if I read the preceding sentence:

    11 "The government insists that local military

    12 police in Vitez must be larger and it was done

    13 yesterday. I think that the situation in Vitez will be

    14 better from day-to-day."

    15 I think in that context, clearly the

    16 situation was still not perfect, so clearly this is an

    17 order dated before my meeting with him. I can quite

    18 easily imagine a situation where the order was given,

    19 the order is quite clear and explicit, the order may

    20 either not have been carried out properly or there may

    21 have been a subsequent reason why things had broken

    22 down again, but at the time I was having this

    23 conversation with the mayor, I think what he was

    24 telling me was, "we still need to make things better."

    25 Q. What kind of an order did you understand

  114. 1 Mr. Santic to be suggesting; that is, do you think an

    2 order could have been issued stating, "no soldier shall

    3 enter a Muslim home for any purposes, including if the

    4 home is a source of fire", that is rifle or sniper fire

    5 or something like that; is that the kind of order that

    6 you thought Mr. Santic was actually referring to, or did

    7 it not make sense to you at the time?

    8 A. In context, I think he was referring to

    9 soldiers going into people's houses and beating them

    10 up.

    11 Q. To attack them or loot them or burn their

    12 house, is that correct?

    13 A. As opposed to military action because they

    14 thought somebody was shooting at them. In the context

    15 I think there is a difference.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Try to make a small break

    17 between the question and answer, please, for the

    18 benefit of the interpreters. Could you please answer

    19 the previous question? Could you repeat the previous

    20 question, please?

    21 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, my question was: did you

    22 understand in essence what Mr. Santic was referring to,

    23 was suggesting that an order would be appropriate that

    24 would prevent HVO soldiers from attacking Muslims in

    25 their homes or looting their homes or seeking to burn

  115. 1 or damage their homes?

    2 A. My understanding in the context of my notes

    3 was that he was saying that HVO soldiers should be told

    4 not to go into Muslim houses to beat them up or loot

    5 them, as opposed to an order to prevent HVO soldiers

    6 from firing on a Muslim house where they were being

    7 fired on, from which they were being fired on.

    8 Q. Thank you. Tell me, what caused you to

    9 compare your report with your notes on this subject?

    10 A. As you can imagine before coming here, I was

    11 refreshing my memory and going through and checking and

    12 this is a detail where there was a difference, and

    13 I think that it is reasonable to say that as far as one

    14 can, let us be as accurate as possible.

    15 Q. So you were reading your notes to further

    16 refresh your recollection before testifying?

    17 A. It was nearly five years ago, so yes.

    18 Q. Let me direct your attention forward,

    19 although it is actually appendix D, and that is your

    20 report of interview with Mr., or General Hadzihasanovic,

    21 appendix D to your report. His position at the time

    22 was commander of the Armija III Corps, correct?

    23 A. Yes, that is what I understood.

    24 Q. You met with him and had an interview with

    25 him, is that right?

  116. 1 A. I was there during a very brief meeting which

    2 was actually being run by Ambassador Thebault at which

    3 Ambassador Thebault effectively had a brief de marche

    4 and one element of that was, "that this chap McLeod is

    5 here from Zagreb, he needs to speak to somebody, could

    6 you recommend the appropriate person for him to speak

    7 to?"

    8 Q. I take it in the course of that encounter,

    9 there was a substantive discussion on a certain number

    10 of points and you have memorialised those in your

    11 report?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Did you conclude from your interview with

    14 General Hadzihasanovic that he had been truthful and

    15 candid with you in all respects?

    16 A. Given that it was a very brief meeting, as

    17 far as I could tell he was telling us what he thought.

    18 I have very little on which to base the judgement as to

    19 whether he was telling the truth or not.

    20 Q. Among the things that he told you, he told

    21 you that although he was the commander of the III

    22 Corps, he had no knowledge of any prison in the MUP or

    23 state security or any prison in the music school; is

    24 that correct?

    25 A. Yes.

  117. 1 Q. Did you find that credible?

    2 A. I think looking at the notes, there is a

    3 discrepancy, if I may be allowed to correct myself,

    4 between what he has got there and then the fact that

    5 access to the music school was not a probable, but he

    6 would have to make a phone call first. In practice

    7 I think he did have knowledge of it, yes.

    8 Q. Could one not read -- excuse me, did you want

    9 to continue?

    10 A. I am not sure that I actually noted this

    11 meeting in much detail, so I think what we have here is

    12 me working from memory as opposed to working from a

    13 verbatim account, which is why it is such a short note.

    14 Q. I am not suggesting that General

    15 Hadzihasanovic said to you in this meeting that he did

    16 not know there was a music school, I am asking whether

    17 his statement that he had no knowledge that there was a

    18 prison or a location where Croats were being held

    19 prisoner in the music school, whether you found that

    20 credible?

    21 A. I think that if one looks down to the next

    22 line where he is talking about access to the music

    23 school, I am quite confident from what I wrote there

    24 that what he was talking about was access to a prison

    25 there as opposed to simply being able to go into the

  118. 1 school. There is an inconsistency between what I wrote

    2 in the second paragraph and what I wrote in the third

    3 paragraph, for which I apologise, but this was five

    4 years ago.

    5 Q. If he said that he had no knowledge of a

    6 prison in the music school, would it not be natural for

    7 him to say, "but you can go look, access is no

    8 problem". Would that not be entirely consistent?

    9 A. That would be quite possible.

    10 Q. General Hadzihasanovic also said that he had

    11 to go slowly because he wanted to have the 7th Muslim

    12 Brigade under control rather than not; did he say that?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Then did he go on to say, "the Mujahedin are

    15 not under control and there are many elements who are

    16 not controlled"; did he make those statements?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. And did you believe him?

    19 A. I was not clear by the time that I finished

    20 exactly what the chain of command was with the

    21 7th Muslim Brigade, so I did not really have a view on

    22 that. Clearly this entity existed, the 7th Muslim

    23 Brigade. Precisely what the chain of command was, I am

    24 not sure.

    25 Q. Now let me direct your attention to

  119. 1 appendix I, your interview with Commander Dugalic. You

    2 have written in your report that Ramiz Dugalic was the

    3 deputy commander of the III Corps Armija; do you know

    4 what his responsibilities were in the III Corps?

    5 A. I believe he was an intelligence officer or

    6 something like that.

    7 Q. At the top of the second page in the English

    8 version, he told you that an HVO formation doing the

    9 dirty work was Darko Kraljevic's unit, is that correct?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. He added that Mr. Kraljevic was an illicit

    12 drug user?

    13 A. That is what he said.

    14 Q. And in connection with that discussion, he

    15 gave you a document which is attached to your report,

    16 correct?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. If you will turn to that document which is

    19 I1-1 in the report, you will see that it is signed and

    20 the title of the individual signing the ratification is

    21 "Colonel Darko Kraljevic". Did you also understand

    22 from your study that Tihomir Blaskic at the time was a

    23 colonel?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Did you learn as a result of your study what

  120. 1 the relationship was of Colonel Blaskic to Colonel

    2 Kraljevic within the HVO chain of command?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. From your knowledge of military structures,

    5 is it possible to have two colonels on the same terrain

    6 in the same chain of command?

    7 A. Yes, in the -- to complicate things slightly,

    8 in the British army you can have two people both called

    9 a colonel and one is a full colonel and one is a

    10 lieutenant colonel. I am not sure if there was any

    11 difference in rank with apparently the same sounding

    12 title and I can imagine having two people of the same

    13 rank. It certainly exists in the UK right now in the

    14 home command, where you have two people of the same

    15 rank one being superior to the other, which does not

    16 help anything.

    17 Q. When you say, "within the home command", what

    18 do you mean by that?

    19 A. I have been out of the army for five years,

    20 nearly six years now, but I understand right now in the

    21 UK the way the army is structured, there are people of

    22 the same rank, one of whom is in charge of the other

    23 one.

    24 Q. Would that be within a central command

    25 location, or would that also be true out in the field

  121. 1 during wartime, for example, or do you not know?

    2 A. I am not sure. As you asked the question

    3 I thought of an example a friend of mine told me a few

    4 weeks ago, where he found it strange when he found two

    5 people of the same rank and described the difficulties

    6 they were having getting on with that, but in response

    7 to your question is it possible, yes, it is happening

    8 right now in the UK.

    9 Q. With respect to this situation where we had

    10 apparently Colonel Blaskic and Colonel Kraljevic, did

    11 you learn what their relationship was in fact in the

    12 HVO chain of command as a result of your study or

    13 otherwise?

    14 A. No.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: In the upper left-hand corner of

    16 this ratification or order, we see the titles and

    17 I assume -- may I enquire, Mr. President, does the court

    18 have this? If not we can put it on the ELMO. This is

    19 the attachment to appendix --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Which document?

    21 MR. HAYMAN: The attachment to appendix I. It

    22 is the order signed by Kraljevic.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: The certificate? Yes, I have

    24 it.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Do you see the title at the upper

  122. 1 left-hand corner, "Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    2 Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna, Department for

    3 Defence, Unit Vitezovi, Vitez"; do you see that?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Do you know where the Department for Defence

    6 was located within the Croatian Community of

    7 Herceg-Bosna?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. Was it in Vitez, or was it somewhere else or

    10 do you know?

    11 A. I do not know. Without being an expert,

    12 I think the Department for Defence -- I infer from that

    13 address group that we are simply talking about the HVO,

    14 as opposed to as you or I would have the Department for

    15 Defence as a separate entity in Washington or London.

    16 Q. So you would expect to see the same title on

    17 other orders issued, for example, by Colonel Blaskic or

    18 brigade commanders within the central operative zone of

    19 the HVO, correct?

    20 A. Something like that, yes.

    21 Q. Let me ask you, the seal on the original

    22 version of this order has not been translated on the

    23 English copy, I do not know, Mr. President, if it is

    24 translated on the French, but you said you had

    25 developed some facility in the language during your

  123. 1 duties in the former Yugoslavia. Can you help us, if

    2 you are comfortable doing it, translate the seal?

    3 A. I think if you look closely, you will see

    4 that the words on the seal are exactly the same as the

    5 words on the address group, it is fairly clear in the

    6 version that I have. I am not sure how many times

    7 yours has been copied.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Let me ask my colleague whose

    9 pronunciation is much better than mine, let me ask him

    10 to lead the phrases in the seal, starting with the

    11 uppermost outer ring, progressing down to the middle

    12 and then the bottom rings, going from inside to the

    13 outer portion of the circle.

    14 MR. NOBILO: So the upper circle, "Republic of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina". Below that, "Croatian Community"

    16 and then the following line, "Herceg-Bosna". In the

    17 bottom part, it is first written down" Vitez, then the

    18 "Unit PN", which means for special activities, and

    19 then -- special purpose -- and in the end, "the

    20 Department for Defence".

    21 A. I think it is the same words as the address

    22 group.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: So that confirms, if you heard

    24 the translation that the booth was kind enough to give

    25 us, that confirms that the seal replicates the various

  124. 1 titles of the upper left-hand portion of this order or

    2 certificate, correct?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: May I ask that Exhibit D74 be

    5 placed before the witness?. This, I think,

    6 Mr. President, we will need to put on the ELMO. By way

    7 of background, this is a joint order and I would like

    8 the seal to be put on the ELMO, this is on the back of

    9 the document. This is a joint order of the HVO and the

    10 BiH army, also countersigned by Jeremy Fleming, the

    11 chairman of the Joint Commission, ECMM, and I would

    12 like to direct your attention, and perhaps we could

    13 zoom in on the two seals. Thank you. Again, let me

    14 ask my colleague to read in the same fashion the HVO

    15 seal, that is the written elements of that seal.

    16 MR. NOBILO: On the left-hand side, where the

    17 signature of Colonel Blaskic is, there is a seal and in

    18 the first line it says, "Republic of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina"; below that, "Croatian Community",

    20 third line, "Herceg-Bosna". The bottom part has number

    21 1, first line "Travnik", below "Travnik" it is written

    22 "Operational Zone Central Bosnia", and below that,

    23 "Department for Defence".

    24 MR. HAYMAN: So can we conclude that the seal

    25 on the Kraljevic order differs from the seal on Exhibit

  125. 1 D74 in that D74 refers to the Operative Zone Central

    2 Bosnia, while the seal on page I1-1 of Exhibit 242

    3 refers to the special purposes unit, Vitezovi?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Did you discuss with Commander Dugalic in any

    6 more detail to whom this Vitezovi unit and Colonel

    7 Kraljevic answered, who their commander was in a chain

    8 of command?

    9 A. No, not at all.

    10 Q. Let me return to the substance and text of

    11 the Dugalic interview. Is it fair to say that

    12 Mr. Dugalic attempted to persuade you that he had proof

    13 that the HVO had attacked Ahmici on 16th April 1993?

    14 A. Yes, as I said earlier, he claimed that he

    15 had two HVO prisoners who had been present at Ahmici

    16 and as I said earlier, as you can imagine I was quite

    17 keen to meet these two chaps and unfortunately by the

    18 time that I was able to push him on the point, it

    19 seemed that they had been released. He showed me

    20 uniform patches, shoulder titles or something which he

    21 claimed proved the point and I said, "thanks very much,

    22 but you could have got these from anywhere."

    23 Q. Did he show you the two HVO patches before he

    24 had even made the claim to you that he had two HVO

    25 soldiers in custody, who had been apprehended in the

  126. 1 course of the conflict in Ahmici in mid April 1993?

    2 I will refer you to your comment on page 2 of your

    3 meeting narrative.

    4 A. I am fairly sure that he talked about the

    5 people first, then he produced what he was trying to

    6 suggest was evidence and I said, this was one of the

    7 occasions that I was actually quite forceful with

    8 somebody who in my view was giving me something which

    9 was complete rubbish, and I said, "thank you very much,

    10 this proves nothing, you could have got these from

    11 anywhere. Let me see the people", and, of course,

    12 I could not see them.

    13 Q. Let me ask you if your comment is accurate or

    14 not. Your comment on this page of the report says:

    15 "After some persuasion Dugalic first said

    16 that they knew that the HVO had been there because they

    17 had badges taken from them. He produced HVO and MUP

    18 badges, which I rejected because they could have come

    19 from anywhere. Then he said that they had captured two

    20 HVO. I am not sure whether this was a complex

    21 deception, because he never actually let me see the

    22 men."

    23 Does that refresh your recollection as to

    24 whether he first offered these patches and only you

    25 rejected that as proof? Did he mention or assert that

  127. 1 he had two prisoners?

    2 A. Because this was typed so soon after the

    3 actual meeting, then I imagine that yes, that is

    4 probably the order in which it happened. At this

    5 point, looking back on it, I cannot remember which was

    6 produced first.

    7 Q. You did express interest on 9th May 1993, did

    8 you not, in seeing the men, but he told you that you

    9 could not see them at that time, correct?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. On 11th May, two days later, you went back

    12 and saw Commander Dugalic a second time, correct?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. That meeting is memorialised in appendix Q of

    15 your report. At that meeting, did you again press your

    16 request to see these two alleged HVO prisoners arrested

    17 in the act, if you will, in the village of Ahmici?

    18 A. Yes, because again as you can imagine it

    19 struck me as being very important if one could actually

    20 get to see people who had been there to meet them and

    21 ask them for their view as to what was going on.

    22 Q. He told you he had set them free in an

    23 exchange, correct?

    24 A. He said that they had been set free, not that

    25 he had set them free, but the essence was that they had

  128. 1 gone so I could not see them.

    2 Q. At this same period of time, various

    3 authorities, including military authorities in Zenica,

    4 were pressing a demand for some more information about

    5 what exactly had occurred in Ahmici, correct?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Do you find it credible that if there had

    8 been two men captured in Ahmici in the course of that

    9 conflict, suspected of participating in the massacre,

    10 that they would have been released as part of some

    11 exchange in the Lasva Valley; did you find that

    12 credible?

    13 A. I could imagine how that could have

    14 happened. As you can see from the comment that I made

    15 in the previous meeting, because of the circumstances,

    16 I was not sure whether he ever actually had any people

    17 at all and I was not sure whether he was simply trying

    18 to lead me up the garden path by saying, "yes, we have

    19 some people who were there" or not, so particularly

    20 with this level of distance from the events, I have no

    21 idea whether those two people actually existed. He did

    22 give me the names of people he said had been there,

    23 I am not sure whether they exist, whether one would be

    24 able to track them down to find out. All I can do at

    25 this stage is offer you the notes that I wrote and my

  129. 1 memory as best it is.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: So I take it in the end you were

    3 left not knowing --

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, I suppose that there

    5 are quite a number of questions that you have to ask,

    6 maybe it would be a good moment for a break now. In

    7 that case, we will have a break and we will start again

    8 at 4.45.

    9 (4.25 pm)

    10 (A short break)

    11 (4.50 pm)

    12 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please

    13 have the accused brought in.

    14 (Accused brought in)

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, you may continue

    16 with your cross-examination.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    18 I expect to conclude in perhaps 15 minutes time, with

    19 the court's permission.

    20 Let me direct your attention to your

    21 interview with Colonel Blaskic. Other than

    22 Mr. Friis-Pedersen and the interpreters, was anyone else

    23 present?

    24 A. I cannot remember.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Which annex are you referring

  130. 1 to please, Mr. Hayman?

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Annex G, Mr. President.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: At any point in the interview,

    5 did Colonel Blaskic express any ethnic animosity

    6 towards any ethnic group?

    7 A. No, I think that he was saying to me that he

    8 felt that people ought to be able to live together.

    9 I am not sure if what he was saying and what was

    10 happening were consistent, but that is what he was

    11 saying.

    12 Q. That is what he was saying he wanted or

    13 wished would happen.

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Did he make any comments suggesting that

    16 populations needed to be moved or that population

    17 movement was part of a solution that he saw? I can

    18 tell you there is nothing in your statement to that

    19 effect. Is there anything else you recall to that

    20 effect from your interview with him?

    21 A. No, he certainly said that there was a need

    22 to withdraw forces or separate forces. I am not sure

    23 if he would have gone as far thereafter to say we then

    24 need to have the same population displacement as we had

    25 very clearly from the mayor of Vitez. The mayor was

  131. 1 extremely explicit. Colonel Blaskic was not explicit.

    2 Q. Colonel Blaskic, he was not even implicit,

    3 was he? He said Croats and Muslims needed to live

    4 together in peace and that there needed to be a

    5 separation of military forces; that is what he said,

    6 correct?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. In that regard, I take it his comments on

    9 this subject were different from those of Mr. Santic

    10 and/or Mr. Skopljak, is that right?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Markedly different?

    13 A. Yes, I think I even have a note to the effect

    14 that I commented on the fact that what he was saying

    15 seemed to be slightly out of step with what I had just

    16 heard.

    17 Q. He responded, did he not, that there was a

    18 difference between his view, the view of the military

    19 in Vitez, and the politicians, correct?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. You asked him to mark a map.

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Do you have that map with you?

    24 A. I do, in fact I have the original copy and it

    25 is here, I can put it on the machine.

  132. 1 MR. HAYMAN: If you would and if we could

    2 activate the ELMO? Mr. President, I have spoken to

    3 Mr. Harmon and I think we can agree that we would ask

    4 that a colour photograph of this map be taken so that

    5 it can be used as the map in the exhibit and we need

    6 not rely on a handmade replica of the map to constitute

    7 the map that is the part of Exhibit 242.

    8 Again, if we could call up the map on the

    9 ELMO, please? Thank you.

    10 Can you tell us as specifically as you can

    11 what is you asked Colonel Blaskic to do with respect to

    12 this map?

    13 A. I would have put the map on the table with

    14 the pens and asked him to illustrate his explanation of

    15 what was going on on the map. I cannot remember

    16 whether he actually drew a second map which had arrows

    17 indicating the various lines of attack. He may have

    18 done, but I am not sure. Certainly what is represented

    19 on this map was his understanding of the ethnic makeup

    20 of the villages around Vitez. If I move the map down

    21 briefly so one can see the key which I have added, you

    22 can see that they are colour coded, orange for mainly

    23 Croatian villages or centres of population, green for

    24 mainly Muslim villages or centres of population and

    25 pink for mixed areas.

  133. 1 Q. If you could move the map up now to the

    2 middle and if we could move in slightly please on the

    3 villages that have been marked in colour. Thank you.

    4 If you look at this map, it is difficult to

    5 see on the ELMO, but are there two villages which are

    6 not yellow, they are not pink and they are not green,

    7 they are some other colour?

    8 A. Yes, as you can see I have indicated here on

    9 the map the villages of Ahmici and Nadioci are coloured

    10 in yellow and blue. This is the only marking on the

    11 map which was made subsequent to my meeting with

    12 Colonel Blaskic. I highlighted those two villages to

    13 make the point that he had omitted to put any colour on

    14 them during our meeting and there is a note to that

    15 effect in the text of the report, as you will have

    16 seen.

    17 Q. Other than those two villages, the coloured

    18 markings on the map were made by him, is that right?

    19 A. That is correct.

    20 Q. In the interview, he referred to a build-up of

    21 BiH army forces in Travnik in the week or so prior to

    22 and including April 15th 1993, is that correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Was that consistent with other information

    25 you received in the course of your study?

  134. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Directing your attention down that first

    3 page, he also described for you the location of certain

    4 BiH army brigades. Specifically in Zenica, there were

    5 three BiH army brigades, as well as the 7th Muslim

    6 brigade, correct?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. And there was a battalion of the

    9 305th BiH army Brigade in Busovaca, he also told you

    10 that?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Were those facts consistent with what you

    13 learned from other sources in the course of your study?

    14 A. I did not actually cross-reference with

    15 anybody else to find out what brigade or battalion

    16 numbers were and precisely what troop deployments were,

    17 so the fact that there were troops in those places or

    18 near those places is not inconsistent, but in terms of

    19 those particular units as numbered by him, I do not

    20 know.

    21 Q. You did not check the brigade numbers?

    22 A. No.

    23 Q. Let me direct your attention to the third

    24 paragraph from the end, beginning with the phrase, "on

    25 23rd January, the Busovaca to Kiseljak road was cut."

  135. 1 Do you find that paragraph?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. The next sentence is:

    4 "Busovaca was occupied and ethnically

    5 cleansed."

    6 When he made that statement to you, first of

    7 all, did you understand him to be referring to the fact

    8 that the road from Busovaca to Kiseljak was cut and

    9 taken by the BiH army between Kacuni and Bilalovac on or

    10 about 23rd January 1993?

    11 A. I would not be as precise as you have been in

    12 terms of the villages where it was cut, but

    13 I understood it was cut between the two main centres of

    14 Busovaca and Kiseljak.

    15 Q. Did you also understand him to be saying that

    16 that portion of the Busovaca municipality that had been

    17 taken and occupied by the BiH army in the course of the

    18 January 1993 conflict, that that territory had been

    19 ethnically cleansed of Croats; is that what you

    20 understood him to be telling you in that paragraph, or

    21 did you have an understanding as to what he was telling

    22 you?

    23 A. Given the context and my understanding of

    24 what was happening in Busovaca, the town itself, either

    25 there was a misinterpretation or he must have been

  136. 1 referring to the territory which was taken by the ABiH,

    2 because I do not think that he would have been telling

    3 me that the HVO had ethnically cleansed Busovaca.

    4 Q. So you did understand at the time that he was

    5 referring to ethnic cleansing by the BiH army forces?

    6 A. I am not sure at the time that I reached a

    7 conclusion. Sitting here, logically it has -- I think

    8 it has to be either one of those two conclusions, that

    9 there was a misinterpretation at the time, a

    10 mis-translation, so that I wrote down something other

    11 than what he said, or that he was referring to

    12 territory which the ABiH had ethnically cleansed,

    13 because I assume that he was not saying that the HVO

    14 had ethnically cleansed Busovaca.

    15 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you to return to your

    16 notes and write-up of the interview of Commander

    17 Dugalic, which is appendix I. You have told us, and

    18 this is towards the latter part of your statement, that

    19 you discussed with Commander Dugalic, the intelligence

    20 officer or commander attached to the III Corps, the

    21 issue of the truck bomb which exploded in Stari Vitez

    22 on or about April 18th 1993, correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Dugalic asserted to you that while Kraljevic

    25 had carried out the attack, Blaskic, he asserted, had

  137. 1 ordered it, correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. You had previously met with General

    4 Halilovic, correct?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Had he made that assertion to you, that

    7 Blaskic had ordered the truck bomb?

    8 A. No, that subject had not come up at all in

    9 the conversation.

    10 Q. You had previously met with Hadzihasanovic,

    11 correct?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Did he assert to you in your meeting with him

    14 that Blaskic had ordered the truck bomb?

    15 A. Not that I can remember, no.

    16 Q. Did Commander Dugalic, the intelligence

    17 officer attached to III Corps, did he provide any

    18 source for this allegation?

    19 A. No.

    20 Q. Did you ask him for his source, or a source?

    21 A. No, as with everything else, I was simply

    22 taking a note of what people were telling me without

    23 challenging them in most cases for exactly what they

    24 were saying, so I was not coming back to them and

    25 saying, "this is preposterous, please tell me more", or

  138. 1 indeed "how do you know?", with the exception of him

    2 claiming to have two Croatian soldiers, which I thought

    3 was particularly interesting.

    4 Q. So to summarise, in your interview you did

    5 not cross-examine or challenge him at all with respect

    6 to his source or basis of knowledge for this

    7 allegation, correct?

    8 A. Correct.

    9 Q. Have you been told whether the Office of the

    10 Prosecutor or their investigators have sought to

    11 interview Commander Dugalic to confirm or deny or

    12 discover any basis, whether there is any basis for this

    13 allegation; have you been told anything pertaining to

    14 that subject?

    15 A. No.

    16 Q. In the course of the rest of your study, did

    17 you make any efforts to try and confirm, deny,

    18 corroborate or whatever this allegation?

    19 A. No.

    20 Q. In the course of your study, did you obtain

    21 any evidence from any other source tending to support

    22 this allegation, the allegation that Colonel Blaskic

    23 ordered a truck bomb, that a truck bomb be deployed and

    24 detonated within Stari Vitez?

    25 A. No.

  139. 1 Q. So this allegation is the only item of

    2 information that you collected in the course of your

    3 nine day study on this subject pertaining to Colonel

    4 Blaskic, correct?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. To this day, have you heard any evidence from

    7 any source whatsoever that would tend to support or

    8 corroborate that allegation?

    9 A. Since then, I have taken absolutely no

    10 interest in following it up, so no.

    11 Q. I take it at the end of your interviews with

    12 Commander Dugalic you were not in a position to

    13 evaluate the worth, credibility or lack thereof of that

    14 item of information he had given you, his allegation

    15 that Colonel Blaskic ordered a truck bomb, is that

    16 correct?

    17 A. Yes, as I have said earlier on, in each case,

    18 all I was attempting to do was write down what people

    19 wanted to tell me.

    20 Q. Now let me direct your attention to your

    21 interview with the Imam of Busovaca, which is

    22 appendix K. He told you, I take it, that he had had

    23 certain contacts with Zoran Maric who was an HVO

    24 civilian authority; was that your understanding?

    25 A. If we look at the fourth paragraph, I have

  140. 1 the description I was given which is that he was with

    2 the president of Busovaca, currently Zoran Maric, of

    3 HVO, so I am not clear whether the president of HVO

    4 would be a civilian or a military person, HVO normally

    5 being a military entity.

    6 Q. I will refrain from commenting and simply

    7 accept your answer. Is it correct to say that the Imam

    8 told you in your interview that Zoran Maric had

    9 promised protection to the Muslim community, that is in

    10 paragraph 5, and then on the second page that:

    11 "Maric really wants to help but thinks that

    12 he cannot."

    13 Did the Imam say those things to you?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Did he say, and this is in the third

    16 paragraph from the bottom on the first page, that

    17 specifically refugees, Croat refugees were coming to

    18 Busovaca and were threatening Muslims.

    19 A. I am sorry, I am looking at the third

    20 paragraph from the end.

    21 Q. Third paragraph from the end of the first

    22 page, the bottom line of the third paragraph from the

    23 end on page 1.

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Two paragraphs above that, he provides a

  141. 1 little detail, did he not, when he recited and

    2 described how a family made homeless comes into town,

    3 Croat houses having been burned in outlying villages in

    4 the Busovaca municipality and then that family takes

    5 over a Muslim house.

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Directing your attention to the next page,

    8 you commented on the statement on this page that,

    9 "Kordic seems to be the man calling the shots", again

    10 repeating that idiomatic expression. Now I want to ask

    11 you again, in light of your explanation of when you

    12 used a comment and the word "comment" to indicate your

    13 own insights and material versus the text of these

    14 statements which you have indicated represents what the

    15 witnesses said, I want to ask you again, this statement

    16 regarding Mr. Kordic, is that something that the Imam

    17 said, or is it your own side comment, or do you know?

    18 A. It is certainly written in my notes, so it is

    19 a note made at the time and we could look at it if you

    20 want to and see how it fits into the flow of the

    21 conversation. It was a note written at the time of the

    22 meeting. Because of where it fits into the flow of the

    23 conversation where he was showing me his pass and we

    24 were having -- I was making a note of who had signed

    25 the pass, I am not sure whether we had clearly -- I had

  142. 1 broken from writing detailed notes and was looking at

    2 this thing. Given the language which is used, I cannot

    3 imagine that is actually the language which the Imam

    4 would have used, so I think that is my picking up the

    5 flow of my notes again by saying what I said.

    6 At this point, looking back, I think it is

    7 probably my summary of the situation that I was hearing

    8 as opposed to my writing town precisely what the Imam

    9 had said. Four and a half years on it is quite

    10 difficult to remember precisely.

    11 Q. Do you say that in part because you believe

    12 that the idiomatic expression "calling the shots" does

    13 not exist in the Bosnian language?

    14 A. I have no idea whether it exists or not.

    15 I am sure they have something similar. It may be that

    16 the interpreter had taken a Bosnian idiom and

    17 translated it as "calling the shots". At this stage,

    18 I just do not know.

    19 Q. Did you check your notes to see whether they

    20 reflect that this was a comment by you?

    21 A. I can do it again now if you would like me

    22 to, but I did check my notes and it is written into the

    23 flow of the notes as I was taking them, which suggests

    24 that it was either me picking up the flow of the

    25 conversation, or it was something which was actually

  143. 1 said. We can go round this as many times as we like,

    2 but I am not sure we can add much clarity to it, I am

    3 afraid.

    4 Q. I do not want to belabour it. Turning your

    5 attention to your next interview with the chief of

    6 police in Busovaca, appendix L, I take it he told you

    7 that the suspects in this rape case would have to be

    8 tried in the only court that existed at the time, which

    9 was in Travnik?

    10 A. Yes, as I explained earlier, I was attempting

    11 to establish what the judicial process was and was

    12 asking them questions about what they would do with a

    13 suspect if they arrested them, where would they try

    14 them, would they be in prison, where would they be in

    15 prison, and so on.

    16 Q. Now let me direct your attention to your

    17 overall conclusions which are set forth on pages 1

    18 and 2 of your report. You wrote in paragraph 5 that:

    19 "The Muslim reaction from Zenica", to the

    20 events of April 16th, "was to attack the key road

    21 junctions east of Vitez and north of Busovaca."

    22 When you wrote that, are you referring to two

    23 different pieces of road?

    24 A. I think what I am referring to is what is

    25 known as the Busovaca T junction, so the road from

  144. 1 Zenica to Vitez which then has a T junction and goes

    2 south to Busovaca, and I think they were attempting to

    3 cut off the road at that point, either on both sides of

    4 the T junction or at the T junction itself.

    5 Q. I ask because you used the word junctions,

    6 plural, in your report. Is it your testimony now you

    7 are referring to one junction or more than one

    8 junction?

    9 A. There is one junction. At this point

    10 I cannot remember exactly what I was thinking, or

    11 exactly what the tactical situation had been as it was

    12 described, but what they were fundamentally trying to

    13 do was cut the road, thus isolating Busovaca and Vitez,

    14 and I am quite clear about that as the intention of

    15 what they were doing.

    16 Q. Do you mean isolating Vitez and Busovaca from

    17 Zenica, or isolating Vitez and Busovaca from each

    18 other?

    19 A. From each other. At that point it was

    20 possible to move from one to the other along the road

    21 and my understanding of what the ABiH were trying to do

    22 was to cut that communications link, thus having two

    23 pockets as opposed to one pocket.

    24 Q. So the Vitez-Busovaca pocket had already been

    25 cut off from the Kiseljak enclave, correct? It was cut

  145. 1 off in January 1993?

    2 A. I think that road had been reopened,

    3 actually. I cannot remember precisely. When I left,

    4 I drove down the road -- I cannot remember who was in

    5 control of the central part of it. I think actually it

    6 was under Croatian control all the way along, but I may

    7 be wrong.

    8 Q. The record is clear on that point and I do

    9 not need to debate it with you.

    10 With respect to the Vitez-Busovaca spinal

    11 road, are you saying that the Muslim strategy was, in

    12 their attack, was to cut the spinal road between Vitez

    13 and Busovaca?

    14 A. Yes, that is my understanding of what they

    15 were trying to do.

    16 Q. Is that an obvious military strategy, a

    17 strategy of -- a well thought out military strategy,

    18 would you agree?

    19 A. I am not sure it is for me to comment on high

    20 level military strategy. If what they were attempting

    21 to do was to defeat the Croatian army, then by dividing

    22 the territory controlled by the Croats into small

    23 chunks, that would seem to make sense.

    24 Q. And indeed, if you cut the spinal road

    25 between Vitez and Busovaca, would you agree that the

  146. 1 HVO would no longer be able to marshall troops at any

    2 point in a defensive position by running those troops

    3 back and forth, up and down the spinal road in order to

    4 concentrate them at a point of defence?

    5 A. Yes, if that is what they were doing by

    6 moving troops from one end of the pocket to the other,

    7 yes.

    8 Q. You said there was a co-ordinated attack on

    9 16th April.

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Was that at about 5.30 in the morning?

    12 A. I think it is fair to say that attacks --

    13 conflict broke out, I would certainly say that conflict

    14 broke out early in the morning, 5.30, 6.30, the reports

    15 were different in different places, but the quality of

    16 the information differed depending on where there were

    17 international observers, but early on the morning of

    18 the 16th, fighting broke out in a number of places.

    19 Q. Although not in all the villages of the area,

    20 correct? In Gacice, there was no open conflict for

    21 several days?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Were you able to determine what HVO units

    24 participated in the conflict at any certain geographic

    25 point?

  147. 1 A. No.

    2 Q. Were you able to determine what orders were

    3 given at different levels of the HVO with respect to

    4 military actions on 16th April 1993?

    5 A. No.

    6 Q. Were you able to determine what reports

    7 during the course of that conflict were given up,

    8 whatever chains of command existed within the HVO

    9 concerning that conflict?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. Were those issues beyond the scope of your

    12 study?

    13 A. Quite clearly I think so.

    14 Q. Can you state again the purpose of your

    15 study?

    16 A. What I was trying to do was to meet with

    17 people in a balanced way on both sides, with both

    18 parties, with the political, the military and the

    19 religious leaders, to find out from them what their

    20 view of what had happened was, to cross-reference that

    21 with what the international community, UNPROFOR and

    22 ECMM specifically, thought had happened and as a result

    23 of this process of meeting people and hearing what they

    24 said had happened, to attempt to draw some

    25 conclusions.

  148. 1 Given the situation at the time and the

    2 length of time that I had been given to be there, and

    3 the fact that this was an attempt to get an overview as

    4 opposed to a very detailed and precise investigation,

    5 I did not feel that it was appropriate even to ask for

    6 things like the orders that had been given or the

    7 reports that were being made by the parties. Obviously

    8 I was seeing the reports that we were making ourselves.

    9 Q. Did you circulate your report and solicit


    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Did you circulate it to the army of BH?

    13 A. No.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: If I could be assisted in

    15 providing the witness and counsel with an exhibit? If

    16 a copy could be given to the witness, and there are

    17 copies for counsel and the court as well. I have

    18 provided you with the cover page of your report which

    19 is not a part of Exhibit 242 and my question is

    20 simple. Under, "distribution external", the third

    21 party is listed as "HQ BH COMD". Can you tell us who

    22 that refers to?

    23 A. That I think you would find would be the

    24 UNPROFOR headquarters in Kiseljak. There is certainly

    25 no intention to pass it to the ABiH.

  149. 1 Q. Very well. In a similar vein I take it it

    2 was not given to Colonel Blaskic?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. Nor was it given to anyone else in the HVO?

    5 A. No.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, I have no further

    7 questions, Mr. President.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Hayman.

    9 Mr. Harmon, you have perhaps some complementary

    10 questions within the framework of the

    11 cross-examination.

    12 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President, I have a

    13 few points of clarification.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Before that, I would like to

    15 ask Mr. Hayman whether he wants this to be admitted into

    16 evidence, the cover page of Mr. McLeod's report.

    17 I suppose you do? It needs to be identified by the

    18 witness, because it is the cover page of his own

    19 report.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, we would ask that it be

    21 admitted, Mr. President.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. What number is it

    23 going to have, Mr. Registrar?

    24 THE REGISTRAR: D84.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. It is your turn,

  150. 1 Mr. Prosecutor.

    2 Re-examined by MR. HARMON

    3 Q. Mr. McLeod, I would like to turn your

    4 attention to annex E, which is your meeting with Father

    5 Bozo of Cajdras. You were asked a number of questions

    6 in respect of your meeting with Father Bozo and in fact

    7 testified that Father Bozo and then Father Stjepan had

    8 informed you that a number of houses belonging to

    9 Bosnian Croats had been burned, damaged; is that

    10 correct?

    11 A. That is right, yes.

    12 Q. Let me also reference you to the last

    13 page and your comment, which is found on E-3. Father

    14 Bozo also gave you a copy of a letter, did he not, to

    15 III Corps in Zenica in which he stated that the

    16 situation had stabilised, is that correct?

    17 A. That is right, yes.

    18 Q. Can you explain what he meant by that, what

    19 he said to you in respect of that situation being

    20 stabilised?

    21 A. As you can see by looking at the appendix 1,

    22 which is the translation of the letter which he gave

    23 me, which is also attached, he started off by saying

    24 that, "we are glad that some less" -- the English is

    25 not particularly precise, I am not sure the original is

  151. 1 particularly precise:

    2 "We are glad some less good people have

    3 stopped with burning and mining of houses. The last

    4 number is: 15 burned houses and 4 stables and 2 mined

    5 houses.

    6 "We thank God and good people for no further

    7 killings, and our gratitude we direct to the

    8 above-mentioned titles", who are the ABiH.

    9 So what he was saying was that the situation

    10 has been stabilised by the intervention of the ABiH and

    11 the police. He then went on to list in detail what had

    12 already happened.

    13 Q. Now let me focus your attention to your

    14 interview with Ramiz Dugalic which is found at

    15 annex I. Specifically, Mr. McLeod, I am directing your

    16 attention to the second page of the English

    17 translation, which focuses on Darko Kraljevic who was a

    18 colonel of one of the HVO formations, specifically the

    19 legal formation doing the dirty jobs for the HVO; do

    20 you see that particular paragraph?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. In respect of your conversations with Ramiz

    23 Dugalic, he then gave you a ratification which we have

    24 had considerable testimony about, and it is signed by

    25 order of Colonel Darko Kraljevic, is that correct?

  152. 1 A. That is correct, yes.

    2 Q. In the address block on the upper left-hand

    3 corner of that document, it indicates from which unit

    4 this order emanated; is that correct?

    5 A. That is right.

    6 Q. The unit is indicated as the Unit Vitezovi,

    7 is that correct?

    8 A. Correct.

    9 MR. HARMON: I would like to have, with the

    10 assistance of the usher, I would like to have D42 and

    11 D42A placed on the ELMO -- if we could have all three

    12 orders given on the usher, Mr. Registrar. Defence

    13 Exhibit D42A, D77 and D43A. Now if we could have

    14 placed, Mr. Usher, Defence Exhibit 42A on the ELMO, can

    15 we focus in please on the right-hand side, upper

    16 right-hand side, the address block? That is fine,

    17 thank you.

    18 First of all, you were asked a number of

    19 questions about the chain of command between Colonel

    20 Blaskic and Darko Kraljevic, do you remember those

    21 questions?

    22 A. Yes, I do.

    23 Q. Referring to Defence Exhibit 42A, does this

    24 appear to you to be an order signed by Colonel

    25 Blaskic? You have to turn it over.

  153. 1 A. Yes, it is signed by him.

    2 Q. Could you turn that over, please, Mr. McLeod?

    3 Do you see to whom the orders were issued? Do you see

    4 "Vitezovi special task force" in that particular list

    5 of units to which this order was issued?

    6 A. Yes, it is clearly for the attention of the

    7 brigades and also the Vitezovi special task force.

    8 Q. What is the date of this order, sir?

    9 17th March 1993?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Mr. Usher, if I could have Defence Exhibit 77

    12 placed on the ELMO, does this also, Mr. McLeod, appear

    13 to you to be an order issued by Tihomir Blaskic?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. Again, referencing the units to which this

    16 order was issued, do you see in there any reference to

    17 the Vitezovi special task force?

    18 A. Yes, it is listed down there as well.

    19 Q. The date of this order is 21st April 1993, is

    20 that correct?

    21 A. That is right.

    22 Q. Lastly, let me refer you to Defence Exhibit

    23 43A, if that could be placed on the ELMO please. This

    24 order is in French, I see.

    25 A. I can read it.

  154. 1 JUDGE JORDA: This is not a defect,

    2 Mr. Harmon.

    3 MR. HARMON: No, it is a virtue. I was

    4 thinking of the witness, Mr. President.

    5 Can you see that particular order, does that

    6 appear to be an order that is issued by -- purportedly

    7 issued by Tihomir Blaskic?

    8 A. Yes, so we have the signature block here.

    9 Q. Now if we could go to the front page of that

    10 and place that on the ELMO as well. Do you see whether

    11 that order was issued to the Vitezovi special

    12 task force?

    13 A. Yes, again we can see it there.

    14 Q. All right. Considering those three

    15 particular orders that you have just seen, in your

    16 opinion as a military man, under whose chain of command

    17 were the Vitezovi special task force?

    18 A. If these are genuine, they quite clearly seem

    19 to state that Colonel Blaskic was giving orders to that

    20 unit, amongst others.

    21 Q. The unit that was -- the unit of Colonel

    22 Darko Kraljevic, is that correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions,

    25 Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. McLeod.

  155. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I turn now to Judge

    2 Riad.

    3 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. President.

    4 Good afternoon, Mr. McLeod.

    5 A. Good afternoon, sir.

    6 Q. You mentioned that on 16th April, Croatian

    7 forces, I am just summing up what you said several

    8 times, Croatian forces attacked Muslim positions in the

    9 Lasva Valley. Among other things, they arrested

    10 prominent Muslims, civilians were killed, houses were

    11 razed to the ground. Was this required by any military

    12 necessity or was it provoked in such a way that it had

    13 to be done?

    14 A. I could see no -- depending on precisely what

    15 the objectives of the Croatian army were, I can see no

    16 reason, unless they particularly wanted to drive out

    17 the Muslim population and terrorise them, why they

    18 needed to do certainly some of the things which they

    19 were doing. If their objective was a military offence,

    20 I can see no particular reason why they would need to

    21 raze a village to the ground as they did at Ahmici, for

    22 example.

    23 Q. I think in your meeting with Santic, he

    24 mentioned to you that, "there is no room for Muslims

    25 and they had to leave, so that a democracy can be

  156. 1 created like the ones you have in Western Europe". You

    2 mentioned something like that.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. That was on 15th April?

    5 A. My meeting with him was on 10th May,

    6 I think. He was describing the situation as he saw it

    7 and he was expanding on his, what I believe were his

    8 political views and his view of how things ought to

    9 happen. I understand that he was saying that, "in

    10 order to have democracy, in order to implement the

    11 Vance plan, we need to be sure that the majority vote

    12 will go the way we want to have it"; this is me

    13 paraphrasing what he said.

    14 Q. In your report at page 1, you mentioned that

    15 categorically the Croats, it is something like the

    16 third paragraph from below, that the Croats, the last

    17 three lines:

    18 "They are using extreme methods of terror and

    19 genocide to remove the Muslim population and were only

    20 prevented from total success by their miscalculation of

    21 the Muslim military."

    22 Then in the last paragraph you say:

    23 "Events throughout the rest of Central

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina and latterly in Mostar appear to

    25 follow the same pattern that emerged in the Vitez

  157. 1 area. It is hard to believe that in each case the

    2 events are the acts of isolated extremists or agents

    3 provocateurs working for the Serbs."

    4 So you think it was a scheme aiming at, you

    5 described categorically, at genocide and the removal of

    6 the Muslim population?

    7 A. Yes, that is the conclusion that I reached.

    8 Q. That was the conclusion of your assessment?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. You mentioned also that General Blaskic gave

    11 an order prohibiting any, in a few words, trespassing

    12 on the Muslim houses, beating or looting or torching

    13 Muslim houses, and this did not stop, this looting and

    14 burning and that sort of thing. Was not General

    15 Blaskic the official and legitimate commander of the

    16 area?

    17 A. I certainly understood when I met him that he

    18 was the military commander for the operational zone.

    19 I have been shown the order, I have no reason to doubt

    20 that it is a genuine order but certainly at the time

    21 that I was there, I understand that these things were

    22 still going on and so the order had either not been

    23 implemented or events had deteriorated again since the

    24 order had been implemented, yes.

    25 Q. Was his authority disputed by the lower

  158. 1 commanders in the area, according to your knowledge?

    2 A. No.

    3 Q. Was it challenged?

    4 A. I have no reason to suspect that it was and

    5 I approached him because I was told by my colleagues in

    6 ECMM that he was their interlocutor in the meetings

    7 that they were having trying to stabilise the

    8 situation, so in their view, he was the military

    9 commander, he was presented as such at the meetings

    10 they were having with him on a daily basis.

    11 Q. So his orders were supposed to be obeyed?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. And if not obeyed, he was supposed to take

    14 action?

    15 A. I would assume so, yes.

    16 Q. You spoke of the prison under the provision

    17 of Aleksovski and you said it was an HVO prison. Was

    18 that right?

    19 A. Yes, it was a military prison, HVO.

    20 Q. It was a military prison, the Kaonik Prison.

    21 Aleksovski told you that he did not select the

    22 prisoners?

    23 A. No, sir, he explained that prisoners were

    24 sent to him and that he had no ability to either accept

    25 or reject somebody who was delivered to his front door.

  159. 1 Q. And they were civilians?

    2 A. Certainly the Muslims that I saw appeared to

    3 be civilians and some of them described their jobs and

    4 they were people who sounded like civilians to me.

    5 Q. It was under the HVO command, the prison?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. You said there were 68 Muslims inside

    8 individual cells. How many were in a cell?

    9 A. I think that there were between six and eight

    10 people in each of the cells. I cannot remember

    11 precisely, but there were quite a lot of them. It was

    12 very tight inside the rooms when we went into each

    13 room.

    14 Q. Very tight?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. What was the MOS? You mentioned that all

    17 authorities joint patrols were doing their best to

    18 stabilise the situation, except the MOS. You have an

    19 idea who they were?

    20 A. I think that they were one of the irregular

    21 units. I am not sure precisely what MOS stands for.

    22 Perhaps somebody could help. I am not sure exactly

    23 which unit they were.

    24 Q. Were they a powerful group?

    25 A. I have no idea, I am afraid.

  160. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. Can I say

    2 "Lieutenant"?

    3 A. I have been a civilian for five and a half

    4 years now.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. McLeod.

    6 A. Thank you, sir.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen now.

    8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. McLeod, I am

    9 referring to that part of your summary of the meeting

    10 between you and Mr. Santic, and Mr. Skopljak, and in

    11 particular to the sentence which you say that as

    12 written here, it does not reflect what you intended to

    13 say. It is at F-2. The sentence reads:

    14 "There is a problem with some people who come

    15 into people's houses, so Blaskic has ordered his forces

    16 not to enter Muslims' houses."

    17 I take it you were recording there what was

    18 said to you.

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. In answer to Judge Riad, you said that

    21 Colonel Blaskic had the authority to issue orders which

    22 you would expect would be carried out.

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Had Colonel Blaskic already issued orders

    25 prohibiting his own forces from entering the houses of

  161. 1 Muslims? Would you expect that the speaker would still

    2 say to you that "there is a problem" or that "there

    3 used to be a problem"?

    4 A. If he had given an order and the order had

    5 been carried out, then I think the speaker would have

    6 been saying that, "there had been a problem".

    7 Q. Yes, but then you said you would expect that

    8 any orders issued by Colonel Blaskic would be carried

    9 out?

    10 A. I would imagine they should be, yes.

    11 Q. Thank you. Also, was it your impression that

    12 the speaker was saying to you, one way or another, that

    13 Colonel Blaskic had the authority to issue such orders

    14 of prohibition?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. When you were reporting your conversation

    17 with Mr. Santic and Mr. Skopljak, you ended with a last

    18 paragraph at F-4, in which you gave your final

    19 comment. In referring to what they had said you

    20 stated:

    21 "All of this was said with a straight, if

    22 slightly smug face. The suggestion that as a result of

    23 a Muslim attack there was a chaotic defence of Vitez in

    24 which the Muslims were displaced from their villages

    25 around Vitez is incredible."

  162. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. That represented your concluding impression

    3 of that interview?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. When reporting your conversation with Colonel

    6 Blaskic, it is my recollection that you said you formed

    7 the impression that he was being straightforward with

    8 you?

    9 A. During those parts of the conversation where

    10 we were discussing the military situation and he was

    11 describing what had happened after 16th April, the

    12 description which he gave matched almost exactly the

    13 description which I had been given of those events by

    14 members of UNPROFOR, so all of those parts of the

    15 conversation fitted into place and seemed to make

    16 sense. The point at which I had difficulty believing

    17 what he was saying was just to do with his description

    18 of what had happened on the morning of 16th April.

    19 Q. Of the 16th. In other words, your reference

    20 to his manners being straightforward related to his

    21 depicting of the military situation consequent on the

    22 counterattack by the BiH army and the cutting or the

    23 attempt to cut the two roads and so on.

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Right. Let us then go back to the morning of

  163. 1 the 16th where he said he was surprised early in the

    2 morning by the sounds which he heard and he woke up and

    3 so on and issued orders. He was the officer who

    4 commanded the operational zone in the area inclusive of

    5 Vitez and Ahmici?

    6 A. That was my understanding, yes.

    7 Q. In Vitez alone, I think if I look at G-1, the

    8 Vitez brigade has 300 to 350 professionals, so you

    9 state there.

    10 A. That is what he told me, yes.

    11 Q. And the rest are reservists.

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. As a military officer, would you expect that

    14 a commanding officer who has 300 to 350 professionals

    15 under his immediate control would be surprised to learn

    16 that an event of this kind was taking place in Vitez

    17 and Ahmici?

    18 A. I think that if as he was suggesting there

    19 had been a surprise attack by the ABiH just before

    20 first light or at first light that morning then

    21 conceivably he would have been taken by surprise. The

    22 reason why I eventually draw the conclusion that I have

    23 difficulty believing that is that there were a number

    24 of events which were taking place at the same time,

    25 most notably the arrest of a number of key people in

  164. 1 Vitez, and I cannot reconcile in my own logic how a

    2 number of 13 or 14 people, prominent Muslims, were

    3 being arrested in their own homes first thing in the

    4 morning on the 16th in what in my view, based on my

    5 experience of Northern Ireland, must have been a

    6 co-ordinated operation to pick them up. I simply

    7 cannot reconcile that -- and I actually saw some of

    8 them in prison, so that happened -- with a chaotic

    9 defence in response to a surprise attack. If there had

    10 been a surprise attack, I cannot imagine how a large

    11 number of people in a co-ordinated manner could have

    12 been running around Vitez arresting people. It just

    13 does not tie together.

    14 Q. I see. When you refer to a large number of

    15 people mounting a co-ordinated attack, you would be

    16 speaking about how many people in respect of

    17 Stari Vitez and in respect of Ahmici?

    18 A. I am not sure exactly how many people they

    19 would have used. If I had been doing -- I probably

    20 would have used almost all the troops which he has, on

    21 the basis that I would want to have, as a rule of

    22 thumb, a multiple of three times more people attacking

    23 than were defending.

    24 Q. That is normal military wisdom, is it?

    25 A. In the British army, yes.

  165. 1 Q. The words which you wrote down to report the

    2 interview which you had with Colonel Blaskic were

    3 these:

    4 "Later we found" -- I take it there you are

    5 reporting him in the first person, at G-1?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Fourth paragraph from the bottom:

    8 "Later we found heavy fighting in Vitez and

    9 in the villages round Vitez."

    10 Did he say who were engaged in this heavy

    11 fighting?

    12 A. My inference was that it was the ABiH and the

    13 HVO who were fighting. What I have written is as

    14 I scribbled my note, as my interpreter translated what

    15 he was saying, and so he would have said "later in the

    16 morning, we found heavy fighting going on and were

    17 reacting to it".

    18 Q. Did he actually say that, that the fighting

    19 was between the BiH Army and others?

    20 A. At that point I am not sure if he was being

    21 specific about the units, but I think we would all have

    22 assumed that those were the people he was talking

    23 about.

    24 Q. Did you ask him any questions as to the

    25 identity of the forces which were confronting each

  166. 1 other?

    2 A. I think that I was quite clear and I think he

    3 was also quite clear that this was predominantly the

    4 ABiH versus HVO.

    5 Q. So to conclude this likely inquiry of mine,

    6 when you described him as giving you the impression of

    7 being straightforward, you were not referring to the

    8 positions which he took with you in respect of the

    9 events which occurred on 16th April 1993?

    10 A. No.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: I have only one question, about

    13 your report, was it commented upon by the people to

    14 whom it was addressed, the people who read it, were

    15 there any critics, any comments?

    16 A. The only significant comment which we

    17 received was from the German delegation who objected to

    18 my use of the word "totalitarian". They felt they

    19 understood better than others what totalitarian meant.

    20 But that was the only comment of any significance

    21 within ECMM.

    22 Q. But in all the comments that are diplomatic

    23 and strategic, you have covered very many fields by

    24 your comments, sometimes you had a very global

    25 perception of what was going on. So what were the

  167. 1 remarks by your bosses, your superiors, those people

    2 who sent you in that mission? What were your

    3 procedures? Did they think that you maybe made hasty

    4 conclusions or that you have properly judged it? How

    5 did they assess your report?

    6 A. As soon as we had finished producing and

    7 disseminating this report, I was immediately involved

    8 with the deputy head of the mission and his political

    9 advisor writing a briefing based, amongst other things,

    10 on this report which was passed to an EU diplomatic

    11 mission, who I believe were convening then at a meeting

    12 in Mostar where events had also broken down. I think

    13 it is safe to say that the conclusions I had reached

    14 were then immediately adopted by the causes of ECMM and

    15 incorporated into their further reporting up the chain

    16 of command above the ECMM.

    17 Q. Is it your impression that the people you

    18 spoke to are the political or military high in rank,

    19 that you met some people, or there were some people you

    20 were not able to meet that you regret not having been

    21 able to meet?

    22 A. The only person who was missing from the list

    23 that I had drawn up at the beginning in consultation

    24 with Ambassador Thebault that I would have liked to

    25 have met was Dario Kordic, because we had the

  168. 1 impression that he was a significant player. I would

    2 have met him at the end of my series of meetings, but

    3 events and the timetable were against me and so

    4 unfortunately I had to leave him out, but between my

    5 view and that of Ambassador Thebault, he would have

    6 been a useful person to have had a conversation with.

    7 Q. My last question: one of the people you

    8 talked to, I do not know whether it was Santic or

    9 Skopljak or maybe somebody else, somebody said that

    10 maybe could the Vance-Owen Plan be implemented, that

    11 that could have improved the situation. It was not one

    12 of your comments, it was somebody you talked to who

    13 said that, but certainly it is in your report.

    14 I cannot remember who told you, I think it was Santic,

    15 maybe Skopljak, Santic I would say. How do you feel

    16 about that?

    17 A. It was Santic who was suggesting that we

    18 should -- that they should implement the Vance-Owen

    19 Plan immediately for that area of Central Bosnia.

    20 I think that the reason why he was advocating that was

    21 that the Vance-Owen Plan would have allowed the

    22 establishment of military and political structures

    23 based on the ethnic composition of the territory, and

    24 so I think that he felt that if the ethnic composition

    25 of the territory suited him, in other words if it was

  169. 1 Croat dominated, then they would be able to, with some

    2 legitimacy, establish a military and political

    3 structure which reflected that; in other words a

    4 military and political structure which was Croat

    5 dominated.

    6 Q. Could you conclude from that that in a way

    7 the players that you met were pushing in a very strong

    8 way, not to say even more, to the implementation of

    9 that Vance-Owen Plan? Maybe they applied methods that

    10 could anticipate in a way that that was the way of

    11 maybe an ethnic cleansing that was almost officialised

    12 by the international community, or maybe you did not

    13 have that impression?

    14 A. My understanding of the aim of the Vance-Owen

    15 Plan was to reflect the original ethnic makeup as

    16 opposed to any ethnic makeup which may have been

    17 achieved as a result of the war as it raged back and

    18 forth across Bosnia. So I think what one had was a

    19 partial interpretation of the spirit of the Vance-Owen

    20 Plan, which was then being assisted by a little bit of

    21 extreme violence.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, I have no more

    23 questions. My colleagues, no further questions. Your

    24 statement has ended, thank you very much for that.

    25 Now we are going to adjourn and tomorrow we

  170. 1 will resume, this will be the last day of our two week

    2 period of the Blaskic trial. So we will resume

    3 tomorrow at 10.00.

    4 (6.00 pm)

    5 (Hearing adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)