1 Thursday, 23rd April 1998
2 (2.45 pm)
3 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated.
4 Have the accused brought in, please.
5 (The accused entered court)
6 JUDGE JORDA: Does everybody hear? Very
7 well. Before we proceed with the cross-examination,
8 the cross-examination of Colonel Landry, I would like
9 to turn to the Prosecutor for an organisational
10 matter. For various reasons -- some of which have to
11 do with myself, others with the Tribunal -- there may
12 not be a hearing tomorrow afternoon, which would mean
13 there would not be a hearing. This would mean that we
14 should finish with the cross-examination and the other
15 questions to be asked of Colonel Landry this morning.
16 Does this seem possible, yes or no, please?
17 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, it is not in my
18 hands because, obviously, the Defence have to
19 cross-examine the witness. I think the estimate that
20 has been given is between two and four hours. If it is
21 four hours, we will not be finished today.
22 I have a number of questions. You and your
23 colleagues will have a number of questions of the
25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that is right. If I turn
1 to you, it was to ask if you had other witnesses now.
2 MR. CAYLEY: We have one more witness who we
3 expected to put on tomorrow. I will just confer with
4 my colleague, who is dealing with that witness.
6 MR. KEHOE: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
7 Yes, we have another witness. Your Honours, we have
8 another witness scheduled. The individual we have
9 given notice to, counsel to, is Mr. Ed Vulliamy, who has
10 flown in from the United States. He is a reporter for
11 their Guardian newspaper. He has been here for several
12 days. This is, in fact, his second trip here. We did
13 not get him on the last time for other scheduling
14 reasons. That is the schedule we expected to move on.
15 JUDGE JORDA: We will try to work
17 Let us have the witness brought in. At the
18 end of the day, we will decide what has to be decided.
19 Let us have the witness brought in and see if we can
20 finish this afternoon. Thank you.
21 (The witness entered court)
22 MR. HAYMAN: I can produce the first document
23 I will be showing the witness in a few moments to the
24 Registrar to save a few moments time. (Handed). May
25 I proceed?
1 JUDGE JORDA: First I would like to say good
2 afternoon to Colonel Landry. Now we can proceed. Go
4 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL LANDRY (continued)
5 Cross-examined by MR. HAYMAN (continued)
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
7 Once again, good afternoon,
9 You have a collection of documents, some HVO
10 documents, some BiH Army documents, some ECMM
11 documents, which you have kept, as a result of your
12 service in BiH; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, that is correct. I also have some from
14 the United Nations.
15 Q. In 1996, investigators from the Prosecutor's
16 Office came and spent a week with you, interviewing you
17 and reviewing that private archive; is that correct?
18 A. When you say that they spent a week with me,
19 it was not five days in a row, eight hours a day. They
20 were in Montreal for about a week, but they did not --
21 not all of them saw all of my documents, but only those
22 that they were particularly interested in. When we
23 spoke about a subject, I would show them what I had.
24 Q. The last time you and I corresponded in 1997,
25 you said that you would give access to that archive to
1 the Defence but only after you arrived here in
2 The Hague for your testimony. Is that still your wish?
3 A. Yes, that is my intention, but I have to tell
4 you that I do not have all my documents with me and
5 I have to tell you also that you never answered my
6 letter saying that you wanted all the things I had with
7 me, but simply to have the opinion of my Canadian
8 attorneys. I spoke about more than what you asked with
9 you and afterwards my attorney said to me: "I will see
10 you in court". After that, I had no further news.
11 I do not have all my documents with me here.
12 MR. HAYMAN: Are you willing to make them
13 available to the Defence in Montreal?
14 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I am objecting at
15 this point.
16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes.
17 MR. CAYLEY: This is beyond the scope of the
18 examination-in-chief. This has absolutely nothing to
19 do with the content of the witness's testimony,
20 particularly bearing in mind that we need to actually
21 finish him this afternoon.
22 If we indulge in this type of discussion,
23 this cross-examination will be going on for hours and
24 hours and hours.
25 MR. HAYMAN: Except, Mr. President, that the
1 documents he produced with his signature on them are
2 from that archive, an archive of a number of bankers'
3 boxes that has never been made available to the
5 If the Lieutenant-Colonel meant what he said
6 yesterday, that he would be pleased for Colonel Blaskic
7 if he is not guilty, then it is relevant whether or not
8 he is willing to make those documents from available to
9 the Defence. If he is not, the court can draw certain
10 conclusions from that, I think.
11 JUDGE JORDA: I think there is a rule which
12 has to applied in the context where the
13 cross-examination should remain within the confines of
14 the examination-in-chief. We have established that
15 rule, it can be applied -- it will be applied to your
16 advantage when you bring in your own witnesses,
17 Mr. Hayman.
18 MR. HAYMAN: Very well, I will move on.
19 I think it was within the scope and it goes to bias.
20 I will move on if that is the court's order.
21 You have a document before you,
22 Lieutenant-Colonel --
23 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, excuse me,
24 Mr. Hayman. Decisions are always subjective, you know.
25 You should know that as much as possible, I try to
1 maintain balance, which is complicated. I am not
2 saying that it is completely equal. Try to reformulate
3 your question so that we can remain positive. I can go
4 back partially, if you like.
5 I do not want you to feel at all that I might
6 have in any way prejudiced the rights of General
7 Blaskic. I am simply trying to work in such a way that
8 in the Tribunal, in which if we were to have the
9 Tribunal, hours and hours testifying for so long, we
10 would not be surprised that the trials are so long,
11 lengthy, as well. That is what I am saying and my
12 colleagues as well. That is my -- the decision is
13 subjective. I would ask that you reformulate your
15 MR. HAYMAN: I will ask one last question in
16 this area, if the court will allow it, I will be done.
17 Will you make those documents available for
18 Defence review on whatever terms you would like to set,
20 A. I cannot give out the documents the way I did
21 with the attorneys who came to see me. I was there,
22 I would not authorise that. I do not want just to
23 manipulate my documents without my being there, as they
24 are mine. As I did last time, they were documents for
25 a specific period, I showed them to you. Tell me what
1 it is you want. I could not show you all of them,
2 I have at least 50 books. These respect -- it was my
3 six months stay in Bosnia, plus three years of research
4 that I did in the university in order to understand
5 what had happened. I cannot give you all of my
6 research without knowing what it is you are looking
8 Q. You have answered my question.
9 You have a document in front of you which has
10 been marked as Defence Exhibit 112. This is an ECMM
11 teletype to regional centres dated 25th April 1993.
12 Would you have received this document in your position
13 as the operations officer at the time in RC Zenica?
14 A. Yes, I must have received it because I was
15 there at that time.
16 Q. And was it authored by your fellow EC
17 Monitors at the time?
18 A. No, three of them, I worked them during the
19 time that I was in Bosnia.
20 Q. You spoke yesterday about provocations and
21 reactions. I would like to read you part of paragraphs
22 2C of this teletype, then ask you a question or two
23 about it. Paragraph 2C -- Defence Exhibit 112:
24 "In the Croat village Miletici, [grid
25 reference given], five inhabitants were murdered by
1 shoots and knives yesterday. They were all men, aged
2 between approximately 20 and 60. According to
3 eye-witnesses, [appears to be 15] Arabic speaking men,
4 dressed in ordinary uniforms, surrounded the village at
5 1500 hours on 24th April. Their leader was called
6 Rahmadan, and a few of them had police badges on their
7 shoulders, including a triangle. They demanded the
8 villagers to lay down their arms, which was refused.
9 In the following fight, one of the attackers was shot
10 dead. As a retaliation, the five men were caught,
11 while the other [appears to be either 36 or 56]
12 villagers escaped to a neighbour village. The hands of
13 the five men were tied behind their backs, they seemed
14 to have been tortured or mistreated, whereafter they
15 were murdered, some by shots, some by knives."
16 Then the paragraph continues.
17 Would you agree, Lieutenant-Colonel, that
18 this is an example of a reaction to the death of
19 a soldier, in this case the Arabic soldier, then his
20 fellow soldiers reacting by executing a certain number
21 of villagers; would you agree with that?
22 A. Yes, I agree with the description, since one
23 of my colleagues brought it in, yes.
24 Q. Is this a fact-pattern you heard on other
1 A. Yes, I think that it was a common way of
2 responding to provocative incidents that were committed
3 by one or the other sides. You also should not forget
4 that this was 24th April, there was already a great
5 many incidents of provocation. We were really at the
6 summit of the violence which occurred between the two
7 ethnic groups.
8 Q. Were you ever told that a similar
9 fact-pattern had occurred in Rotilj, at the time some
10 seven or eight Muslim villagers were, in fact, killed?
11 That is, that a Croat combatant was killed in the
12 course of attempting to disarm the village, and then in
13 an act of retaliation those Muslim villagers were
14 killed? Were you ever told that by any briefing or any
15 resident of that village?
16 A. What I was told about Rotilj was that it was
17 not a reaction to -- to the contrary, they were old
18 people, they were women, young people, both boys and
19 girls, who one evening -- when there was an armed group
20 dressed in black which decided to carry out ethnic
21 cleansing. Then after that there was evidence that all
22 the other Muslims had been confined at the edge of the
23 village in Rotilj. If I remember correctly, there was
24 an incident in Rotilj where there was a woman who was
25 raped and then afterwards she was killed with several
1 shots. So I think that both of those incidents might
2 be the same one.
3 I think that there was one -- I do not know
4 whether there was one, it was a provocation, then
5 a reaction, but it does show that there was a lack of
6 control among the Mujehadeen forces that were operating
7 in that sector.
8 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 287 could be provided
9 to the witness.
10 I will ask you, Lieutenant-Colonel,
11 a question first: you have told us that there was --
12 appeared to be a strategy on the part of the HVO to
13 delay implementation of the February 13 1993 orders
14 which we have seen. Was that true regarding the
15 release of detainees and prisoners by both sides, if
16 you could try to answer that question.
17 If you need to refer to paragraph 3.2.3.,
18 Exhibit 287, please feel free.
19 A. No need to consult it. What I can say is
20 what -- we wanted to tell us about both sides but
21 I can -- there were other things which appeared in the
22 beginning of March when they spoke about Muslim
23 civilians who had been arrested who had been
24 illegitimately detained in the Kaonik prison. That
25 cease-fire involved mostly military prisoners,
1 either Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats -- Bosnian
3 Yet once again, I never had the authorisation
4 to go to visit the Kaonik prison. Therefore, I had to
5 rely on the people in the Commission, on the reports
6 I received. It would appear at that point, yes, the
7 prisoners had been released.
8 Q. Tell me, what was the date of this document,
9 Exhibit 287? Do you know when it was generated and by
11 A. I would have to look at the rest of the other
12 document. I think that it was -- it was around the
13 middle of March. I said to you yesterday or the day
14 before that the Busovaca Committee met every day and
15 that on occasion the Commission, with the Ambassador
16 and the General Blaskic and others would meet twice
17 a month, so that they might see how things moved
18 forward. I think that this report is one of those that
19 was made at the time of those meetings. It was written
20 in April 1993. I just saw the date.
21 Q. You are referring to a hand-written date in
22 the upper right-hand corner with a question mark above
24 A. (Witness nods head). Yes, that is right. In
25 fact, I think that it is my handwriting on the top.
1 Yes, I am the one who wrote that, I have the original.
2 Q. So you drafted the document, itself; the
3 typed portion?
4 A. Well, I participated in it, but you
5 understand that this document was the result of the
6 Commission, as such, which was re-vivified by
7 Mr. Thebault.
8 MR. HAYMAN: For the record and for
9 translation, paragraph 3.2.3 reads:
10 "Order 433, release of prisoners and
11 detainees: joint order has been totally fulfilled."
12 If the ELMO could be activated, please.
13 I would like to ask you, Lieutenant-Colonel, simply for
14 a general reference purposes, indicating where the
15 village of Solakovici is. The map would need to be
16 moved down slightly, if you would like that
18 If we zoom in just a touch you can see the
19 area. You are indicating with the pointer the village
20 of Solakovici; is that right?
21 A. Yes, Solakovici. I have to tell that you as
22 the years have gone by, my understanding of Serbo-Croat
23 has diminished. The names of the villages all sound
24 alike to me. Talking about Solakovici, is that the one
25 you mean?
1 Q. Yes, the village of Solakovici, have you
2 found that and indicated that?
3 A. (Indicating on map).
4 Q. Did you visit Solakovici between January and
5 April 1993?
6 A. As I told you, I only arrived in March of
7 1993. Therefore, I assume that I must have mostly gone
8 to Solakovici around the end of March or around the
9 middle of March. I have to check my notes in order to
10 be sure of the date but from mid-March, perhaps until
11 my departure in August.
12 Q. You believe it was between March and August,
13 but you are not able to more specifically identify it?
14 A. I am asked to be concise and then I am asked
15 to give specific dates, which means I have to look in
16 my notes. I prepared myself, but I did not prepare to
17 answer specific questions -- questions about specific
18 dates and times, I can tell you that.
19 Q. I do not need a date and I do not need
20 a time. I was asking for a month. If you cannot
21 recall the month, we will come back to this. You can
22 review your notes during the break and we need not take
23 time now, if that is acceptable to the court.
24 A. The first time I was there was on
25 23rd March. I can tell you that -- it is in my
1 notes -- I have two pages of notes --
2 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, I think that you are
3 right, you cannot answer specifically without looking
4 at your notes, but please try not to get annoyed by the
5 questions. Try to answer. We are asking you to be
6 brief. I have explained why. Having said this, the
7 Tribunal will listen to everything that you have to
8 say. I would just like the response -- the answers
9 match the questions. There is no need to make comments
10 which are really not necessary.
11 A. Excuse me.
12 JUDGE JORDA: You do not need to apologise,
13 we are all trying to make the Tribunal communicate
14 properly. The Defence slightly altered its questions.
15 Are you satisfied with the answer, Mr. Hayman?
16 MR. HAYMAN: Absolutely.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Then we can go on.
18 Proceed, Mr. Hayman.
19 MR. HAYMAN: In the village between which you
20 have described as "Gornji" and "Donji", Solakovici,
21 were there two sets of trenches facing each other in
22 a parallel manner?
23 A. Yes, that is what I thought that I explained
24 last time, that Gornji Solakovici, if I remember, was
25 the upper part of the village on the top of the hill
1 and Donji was the bottom and there was a large field
2 between the two of them and the positions were at the
3 extremities of that field, facing one another. That is
4 the Muslim part was on the top and the Croatian part on
5 the bottom.
6 Q. Can you tell us whether in fact the front-line
7 between the BiH Army and the HVO at the time ran
8 through the village of Solakovici and that those
9 trenches represented trenches on the front-line of the
10 conflict itself?
11 A. That is why we were there, in order to have
12 the trenches filled.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Please answer, Colonel. When
14 you have a very significant comment, make it, but this
15 is simply a question; say "yes", "no" or "do not
16 know". I think that would be better, otherwise you put
17 yourself into a position in which you are going to
18 bring out further questions. It was -- "yes, it was
19 the trench line" or "it was not" or "I do not know".
20 Please go on.
21 MR. HAYMAN: You told us of a tragic suicide
22 of an elderly man whom you helped or convinced to cross
23 the front-line in Solakovici. Did he leave a note or
24 make other statements that you are learned of
25 indicating the cause of his tragic suicide?
1 A. I had very close relationship with that
2 couple for about one month. Then I received
3 information from his wife, who, herself, told me that
4 the evening before he committed suicide they had been
5 bombed, shelled. I saw where they were hiding. The
6 door had been ripped off by a shell. The wife told me
7 her husband was extremely upset, did not understand
8 what was going on. On the night of his suicide, he got
9 up at three o'clock -- he got up every night at three
10 o'clock because he had incontinence problems, then he
11 committed suicide. When his wife told me that, nobody
12 else was with me except for the interpreter. That is
13 what happened every time I went to see them, I was
14 never accompanied by any escort, either by the HVO or
15 a Bosnian one.
16 Q. You have said that in the period March to May
17 of 1993, the tactical situation in Central Bosnia was
18 in favour of the Croats. At the time -- at the
19 beginning of that time period, March, would you agree
20 that the BiH Army had a numerical advantage over the
21 HVO? If so, can you tell us the size of that advantage
22 in the Lasva Valley?
23 A. What I can honestly tell you is that the
24 information that we had at that time was that it was
25 the opposite of March, from what I could see, is that
1 the tactical advantage was definitively on the Croatian
2 side, on the HVO side.
3 Q. My question was, the number of forces, the
4 number of troops. If you had the information I would
5 be interested in it, if you do not that, is fine, you
6 can tell us, please.
7 A. I do not know.
8 Q. At the time, did Colonel Blaskic's area of
9 responsibility include Zepca?
10 A. It was later on that I learned that there
11 were HVO troops in the Zepca region as well as in the
12 Kakanj region.
13 Q. Would you agree that at the time, March 1993,
14 Colonel Blaskic's area of responsibility included an
15 enclave that was cut off and isolated, containing
16 Croats and HVO forces in the environs of Zepca?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The same was true of an isolated enclave with
19 Croat civilians and HVO forces in the area of Vares;
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did there come a time in 1993 when the BiH
23 Army controlled the road running north from Gornji
24 Vakuf towards Central Bosnia and the Lasva Valley? Did
25 there come such a time?
1 A. What dates are you saying, I did not quite
2 get the dates you are referring to?
3 Q. Did there come a time in 1993 when the road
4 running from Gornji Vakuf to the Lasva Valley and
5 Central Bosnia fell in part under the control of the
6 BiH Army?
7 A. Yes, there was a time when, on the
8 elevations, not necessarily the village of Gornji Vakuf
9 but the elevated parts, were in fact controlled by the
10 Bosnian troops.
11 Q. Was that by March or April 1993; can you give
12 us a general timeframe or not?
13 A. I think that it was much more likely at the
14 end of April or even towards the middle of May. Really
15 towards the middle of May. But I would have to tell
16 you that at the end of 1992, the cities of Vonje
17 Korevokof and Prozor had a Muslim majority, then there
18 was tremendous fighting that took place.
19 JUDGE JORDA: You answered the question.
20 That is enough, thank you. Proceed, Mr. Hayman.
21 MR. HAYMAN: Would you agree that at the point
22 in time at which the BiH Army held that high portion of
23 the road from Gornji Vakuf into Central Bosnia that any
24 aid or material supplies coming into the Lasva Valley
25 had to -- by road had to first pass through Croatia and
1 Dalmatia, then through HVO territory in Herzegovina,
2 then through BiH Army north of Gornji Vakuf, then
3 finally would come into the Lasva Valley itself; do you
4 agree with that proposition?
5 A. No, I do not agree with your description
6 because it is not exact.
7 Q. What other road routes were available to
8 bring aid or material into the Lasva Valley after the
9 point in time in which the BiH Army gained control of
10 portions of the road running north from Gornji Vakuf
11 into the Lasva Valley? What is the other route?
12 A. I would tell you that some of the elevations
13 were controlled by Gornji Vakuf and Travnik, some of
14 them. Therefore I could not tell you that the area was
15 always under Bosnian control, because that is not what
16 happened, not at all. I told you that possibly after
17 May, some of the elevated points were under the
18 control, but the control which before that had been
19 held by the HVO was no longer as it had been. As
20 concerns the supply routes, we knew that from the very
21 beginning there were three ways for the central troops
22 to supply themselves.
23 It would take some time, your Honour, but
24 I think it is important.
25 JUDGE JORDA: Let us be clear, Colonel. The
1 question of time is not an abstract and absolute
2 value. Take the time you need to answer. What we do
3 not want is that once you have answered the questions
4 you make comments, unless the comments do appear very
5 important. Do not apologise. Simply answer if you
6 have to. Continue, please.
7 A. Everything that was with weapons that related
8 to the Muslims came from three major sources: the first
9 was the tactical capture. At that time the Muslims,
10 starting in April and May, had a great deal of success
11 in their offences against the Serbs and some of the
12 Croatian regions and captured a great deal of weapons.
13 Secondly, it was an open secret. There
14 was -- in Bosnian -- in Zenica, we were not allowed to
15 go because there were munitions there and specifically
16 mortars that were in Zenica.
17 Third, I had heard that with the checks that
18 had taken place on the roads which gave access to
19 Central Bosnia, in Croatian and HV territory, it was
20 almost impossible to get supplies of arms and other
21 weapons. But I did learn on several occasions that
22 there were convoys, mule convoys that would go through,
23 so I learned that it might be possible for anything
24 that had to do with munitions or other arms could come
25 through the mountain roads.
1 MR. HAYMAN: After the conflict began in
2 January 1993 and continued into April, in the Lasva
3 Valley, when -- at what point did the HVO, if you know,
4 control the most territory? What was the high water
5 mark of HVO territorial control in the Lasva Valley, if
6 you can tell us?
7 A. I think that was a time when I arrived, as
8 I mentioned. I had been present at -- the Croats had
9 a much more interesting tactical position than those of
10 the Muslims --
11 JUDGE JORDA: Please be more precise.
12 A. The month of March, the month of March when
13 I arrived.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, thank you.
15 MR. HAYMAN: Would you agree -- here I am
16 going to generally refer for illustrative purposes, not
17 in an attempt to make a specific record, to what
18 I believe is Exhibit 29. Do you agree that as a result
19 of the January 1993 conflict -- a stretch of territory
20 running roughly from Kacuni to the south-west of
21 Busovaca to Bilalovac, which is to the north-west of
22 Kiseljak, that that swathe of land, of territory, came
23 under BiH Army control? Would you agree that that
24 occurred as a result of the January 1993 conflict?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Would you agree that, as a result of that,
2 the BiH Army Third Corps, which was located on the
3 northern side of that road in and around Zenica and its
4 environs and the BiH Army Fourth Corps, based in Mostar
5 but also present to the west and south-west of Kiseljak,
6 were able to meet up; do you agree with that?
7 A. I think it is what I said in the beginning
8 when I said there was a group of mountains -- there was
9 a mountain road that went all the way to Mostar.
10 Q. Just because there may have been
11 a translation problem, I would like to restate the
12 question: would you agree that, as a result of the BiH
13 Army controlling this zone from Kacuni to Bilalovac,
14 that the Third and Fourth Corps of the BiH Army had
16 A. This did occur on occasion, but, at the same
17 time, it would be difficult for me to say this occurred
18 all the time because at that time there was a great
19 deal of combat in the Zenica area. They were very
20 close to Sarajevo and also the Croats were in control
21 of Mostar so, at that particular time, the Bosnian
22 troops were in a sandwich, if you will, between the
23 Serbs and the Croatians. At some point in time it was
24 possible, indeed, to come to contact with the Mostar.
25 Q. Again, there is a slight misunderstanding.
1 I am not asking you whether one could drive from that
2 area of territory between Kacuni and Bilalovac to
3 Mostar. I am asking you, was the Fourth Corps present
4 below the Kiseljak Busovaca road such that they had
5 contact with the Third Corps once that piece of
6 territory was taken by the BiH Army in January 1993?
7 A. It was possible.
8 Q. You have posited the thesis that the HVO
9 provoked, the BiH Army responded, in some -- and I am
10 not asking you to confirm that, I am just framing my
11 question. Yet, you arrived in theatre in March 1993,
12 when the conflict had already begun; correct? January
13 1993 was the beginning of a war; would you agree?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. HAYMAN: I would ask my colleague and
16 co-counsel to read the body of Defence Exhibit 88,
17 which is a report from a military policeman in the HVO
18 to the military police in Mostar. My question, so you
19 can be considering it while he is reading this short
20 document, is: did you ever receive this information in
21 your capacity as an EC Monitor, please?
22 MR. NOBILO: "The command of the Fourth
23 Military Police Brigade of Vitez, on 27th January 1993,
24 writes to the command of the military police in Mostar,
25 to Calic in person."
1 The document is headed, "An extraordinary
3 "On 24th January 1993, at 1445 hours, on the
4 main road from Kiseljak to Busovaca, at a locality
5 called Kacuni, fire was opened from small arms on
6 members of the military police from Busovaca. A member
7 of the military police, Ivica Petrovic.
8 "The same person was on that occasion
9 killed, together with another civilian, who was with
10 him. Fire was opened by Muslim forces and the army of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both persons were massacred and
12 knifed. On 25th January 1993 the conflict spread to
13 the whole area of Busovaca municipality.
14 "We have received reports that the deputy
15 commander of the first companies around Ljubicicic was
16 injured in conflicts with Muslim extremists. We were
17 unable to transport him to hospital, so he may have
18 passed away. The conflicts continue. The commander,
19 Pasko Ljubicicic -- "
20 MR. HAYMAN: In connection with the
21 commencement of the January 1993 conflict in Busovaca,
22 were you ever given, in substance, that information?
23 A. You asked me the same question yesterday.
24 I told you that when I arrived in March, I did not see
25 these reports but I had heard about certain incidents
1 dealing with the Muslims and the Croatians and that an
2 interpreter from Busovaca had told me this story but
3 I do not have the details that you just related,
4 I never saw this.
5 JUDGE JORDA: This document was produced by
6 you, yourself, Mr. Hayman?
7 MR. HAYMAN: This was shown to a prior
8 witness. It is a Defence exhibit. It has not yet been
9 admitted, I understand.
10 JUDGE JORDA: It has not been tendered; that
11 is correct?
12 MR. HAYMAN: Yes.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.
14 MR. HAYMAN: Again, with respect to your
15 provocation/reaction thesis, let me ask you about some
16 additional events and ask if you were given the
17 information and if you considered them in connection
18 with your thesis.
19 I would ask my colleague, again, to read only
20 the introductory paragraphs of Defence Exhibit 94, as
21 the rest of the document is largely lists of peoples
22 names and the list need not be read.
23 If you could read -- again, this is
24 a document from a military policeman to military police
25 Mostar and Operative Zone Central Bosnia, Vitez. If
1 you read the title, the first paragraph, then describe
2 the list of 15, then what the heading is before the
3 second paragraph.
4 MR. NOBILO: The document is dated 29th
5 January 1993. The report is addressed to the police
6 headquarters in Mostar and the command at Vitez. In
7 the preamble it says:
8 "Through operative work in the municipality
9 of Zenica and in the villages of Lasva, Dusina and
10 Visjnica and on the basis of statements of numerous
11 witnesses of an unheard of crime against Croats, who in
12 the mentioned villages of the Zenica municipality,
13 which were committed by Muslim extremists in these
14 villages, it has been established without any doubt
15 that the following have been killed."
16 Now we have 15 names, mostly last name
17 Kegelj. Then there are the names of 29 people taken to
18 prison and eight people who are missing, listed as
20 MR. HAYMAN: Did you learn of events in the
21 villages Lasva, Dusina and Visnjica in the end of
22 January 1993?
23 A. Your Honour, I do not recall having seen or
24 received anything during this period when I arrived.
25 I must reiterate what I said before, I heard certain
1 things, but I received no report. These reports were
2 not sent to the ECMM. The only report that the ECMM
3 received, and, in fact, I can produce these if you
4 wish, were always addressed to the headquarters of the
5 ECMM. The practice that was very commonplace is that
6 each time a protest was issued, both sides received
7 a copy of these protests, that way both sides could
8 investigate on their own accord. Indeed, there were
9 stories on both sides, both quite horrible. The way we
10 ourselves could try to demystify what was true and what
11 was false was, indeed, to investigate together.
12 I am not trying to be disrespectful towards
13 the Defence, he can list as many documents as he
14 wishes, but I would not have seen any documents
15 produced before the month of March. I began to work in
16 March with documents presented to me. I do not know
17 about documents that may have been produced in
18 February. I believe that there were perhaps errors on
19 both sides and perhaps it was the Muslims that began,
20 that is a possibility as well.
21 Q. Did you say that your interpreter lost family
22 members in the January 1993 conflict?
23 A. Yes. Two members, two brothers.
24 Q. Were those Croat or Muslim victims?
25 A. These were Croatian Bosnians.
1 Q. Without identifying the interpreters, if you
2 look at Defence Exhibit 94, which is before you, do you
3 see the surname of your interpreter -- of that person's
4 family on the exhibit, if you look on the first page,
5 numbers 1 to 15, indicating the dead?
6 A. Unfortunately, all I know is the name -- the
7 first name of the interpreter. I can bring you to the
8 site in the field but I only know his first name.
9 Q. Very well.
10 One last question concerning January: were
11 you briefed, did you learn anything concerning what
12 happened to the Croat villages, such as Gusti Grab and
13 Oseliste, which were located between Kacuni and
14 Bilalovac in the area taken by the BiH Army; did you
15 learn about those things or not?
16 A. The names do not mean anything to me. The
17 first thing I did when I arrived there was to look at
18 all the events that had taken place and all the roads.
19 Indeed, I saw there were indeed houses that had been
20 burnt. But as far as the names of the villages, the
21 names of the list you listed for me, they mean nothing
22 to me, I really do not recognise them at all.
23 Q. When you say you saw houses that had been
24 burnt, you are referring to Kacuni and Bilalovac? Did
25 it include that terrain?
1 A. Yes, indeed, it did include that area.
2 Q. Let us turn to your visit to Travnik in
3 April, on or about 12th or 13th April 1993.
4 Was Colonel Blaskic present on that occasion
5 in Travnik?
6 A. What I remember quite well is that at that
7 particular time, we had been received by HVO
8 representatives in Vitez and all of the Monitors from
9 Zenica from the ECMM were present, so I myself was
10 present. In the end of the afternoon we received
11 information about the catastrophe which had occurred
12 and a few Monitors and a few vehicles went to Travnik
13 to find out happened there. At that moment I must
14 admit -- the day on which Easter was celebrated,
15 I think it was 12th or 13th April, I believe, that they
16 already reported that in Travnik there had been some
17 protests and this had started around 8th April and that
18 even around 8th April, I believe there were already
19 some people who had been killed. I think there were
20 two Bosnian Muslim soldiers who had been killed. All
21 I can tell you is I think around the 12th or 13th,
22 following the Easter celebrations, that I heard about
23 the fact that there was unrest in that area, in Vitez.
24 Q. I understand you left the Easter dinner with
25 other Monitors and went to Travnik. Did
1 Colonel Blaskic go with you or to your knowledge did he
2 stay in Vitez?
3 A. I have no idea. All I know is that
4 I received very specific instructions from Mr. Thebault,
5 but I do not know exactly with whom he was dialoguing.
6 Q. When you got to Travnik, did you meet with
7 a representative of the HVO?
8 A. What I can remember about these incidents is
9 that we met with military authorities there, on that
10 location, and at that time I was convinced that the
11 military authorities there in that location were
12 cooperating and one or two cooperated. I encountered
13 with some of the civilian authorities and it was at
14 that time that I learned that some of the Muslims were
15 being pushed out of this municipality and, indeed, this
16 is what provoked a series of incidents and at that time
17 in the city of Travnik, that there was a civil war
18 under way and that people were raising barricades
19 everywhere and, as I said before, it was indirectly --
20 the situation seemed to have calmed down when the
21 BritBat forces from UNPROFOR sent some vehicles there
22 to get an idea of the situation.
23 Q. Perhaps I can cut to the quick. Let me ask
24 you if the following statement, which you made on page
25 4 of your statement to the OTP investigators, is
1 correct, referring to 13th April 1993 in Travnik in the
2 late afternoon:
3 "We met the local authorities of both sides
4 and tried to calm down everyone. One of the
5 authorities I met that evening in Travnik was Dario
6 Kordic, who seemed to be the highest authority on the
7 HVO side."
8 Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that is correct.
10 Q. You said there was a civil war in Travnik.
11 Did Travnik -- was it taken control of by the BiH Army
12 in early June 1993?
13 A. Yes, much later, yes.
14 Q. And were there about 10,000 Croat refugees
15 that left Travnik as a result of that incident, or do
16 you know? If you do not know I am not asking you to
17 look. I am just asking if you have a current
19 A. I have some memory, but it is quite a long
20 story. At that time I had a mission -- Mr. Thebault
21 himself reported a two-page document on that incident.
22 If the Defence counsel wishes, I can present this
23 document which will explain exactly the incident at
25 JUDGE JORDA: No, I think that Defence
1 counsel simply asked you the question to see whether
2 you know about it or not. You can say whether you were
3 aware or not.
4 Is that the question you asked?
5 MR. HAYMAN: I will move on if he has no
6 personal knowledge of it.
7 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue.
8 MR. HAYMAN: You told us of the kidnapping of
9 the four HVO officers on or about 12th April 1993.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the kidnapping of HVO Brigade Commander
12 Todic on the 15th. Did you learn that on the
13 intervening day, 14th April, there was an assassination
14 attempt on -- on the commander of the Vitezovi, Darko
15 Kraljevic. Is that information that came to you as the
16 operations commander at RC Zenica?
17 A. I must admit that on 15th April, I was not
18 the head of the operations, I was still under the
19 Busovaca Commission.
20 Q. My mistake. This was 14th April. Did you
21 come by that information on that day, or do you have no
22 knowledge of it? You are shaking your head side to
23 side --
24 A. No, no.
25 Q. In connection with the subsequent exchange of
1 prisoners, you have referenced certain Mujehadeen
2 fighters imprisoned in the Kaonik prison. Would you
3 agree that most nations have criminal laws forbidding
4 citizens of other nations from entering the country and
5 bearing arms; that is, foreign nationals from entering
6 the territory of one country bearing arms? Do most
7 countries have laws criminalising that activity?
8 A. I am sure that you are completely right,
9 yes. There are, indeed, laws, that indeed prevent
10 someone from moving about with weapons, but I must also
11 add that everyone had weapons in Central Bosnia. Only
12 people from ECMM, which did not have arms, which were
13 moving about.
14 Q. And you learned, in fact, in the course of
15 your work, that the BiH Army denied giving any
16 authority or permission to these Mujehadeen fighters to
17 be in Bosnia-Herzegovina with arms; correct? They did
18 not give them such permission; correct?
19 A. I think you are right. Later on, indeed,
20 that is what happened. That is what I was told,
21 because eventually Bosnians told us that it seemed that
22 the Mujehadeen activities were more and more violent
23 and that they should do everything they could to try to
24 move away from them and try to do the best they could
25 to return to the area. It is difficult to say, of
1 course, at that time, whether or not they were under
2 the control of Bosnian forces.
3 Q. Do you know whether any of these Mujehadeen
4 fighters possessed any explosives or other weapons
5 other than firearms at the time they were arrested and
6 imprisoned in Kaonik?
7 A. On the story I can recall, these people have
8 vehicles and had lots of money with them. This is the
9 part of the story I can remember, because at no point
10 in time when the stops were made, did the request for
11 the intervention of UNPROFOR which should have been
12 done at that time, or at least for ECMM to see what was
13 going on. It was this aspect which I am finding with
14 this capture of these prisoners to be a bit
16 Q. Would you concede that the February 13 1993
17 joint orders from Colonel Blaskic and
18 General Hadzihuseinovic did not require the release of
19 prisoners held due to violation of applicable national
20 laws; that there was an exception in the order for
21 persons who had violated criminal laws?
22 A. I must admit that you have lost me there in
23 this discussion with international law and all I can
24 tell you is that what I was able to establish was that
25 there were two belligerent forces and I was trying to
1 calm those forces and at no time was such an argument
2 presented to me.
3 Q. These two sets of prisoners or detainees were
4 exchanged later in May of 1993. With respect to the
5 HVO prisoners, the four officers from Travnik,
6 Novi Travnik and commander Todic, were they held at
7 a secret location by the Mujehadeen fighters, such that
8 ECMM and the Red Cross did not have access to them?
9 A. Yes, that is right.
10 Q. Indeed, would you agree, as stated in Exhibit
11 290, that the Mujehadeen's demand was, in the last
13 "They wanted all detained foreigners held by
14 the HVO to be released, otherwise they would start to
15 kill the hostages."
16 Did they make such a demand?
17 A. Yes. Yes.
18 Q. Now, at the actual exchange, you were
20 A. Yes. The prisoner exchange took place in
21 three locations, Zenica at the Kaonik prison and
22 I believe in Travnik or Novi Travnik. I personally was
23 present in Zenica, I was the one co-ordinating the
24 operation in that location in Zenica, so I was the
25 person who facilitated, in very difficult conditions,
1 I must admit, the freeing of the HVO brigade.
2 Q. Is it correct that approximately 100
3 Mujehadeen fighters appeared at the hotel in Zenica for
4 this exchange, as set forth in Exhibit 290?
5 A. Not 100 soldiers, 100 Mujehadeen combatant
6 forces. There were many people dressed as Mujehadeen,
7 but they were Bosnians dressed -- Bosnian troops, if
8 you will, but from a Muslim brigade. I have
9 photographs, if you wish to see the troops. I took
10 photographs because it would be quite clear you can see
11 the distinction between the Mujehadeen and the Muslim
13 Q. Very well. My apologies for not making that
14 distinction properly.
15 You would agree with paragraph 24 of Exhibit
16 290, I take it, that:
17 "At Zenica ... about 100 masked and heavily
18 armed soldiers (probably members of the 7th Muslim
19 Brigade) surrounded the place deploying also
20 a three-barrel 20 mm (?) Machine-gun mounted on a 5 TO
21 (probably tonne) truck, shoulder-launched anti-tank and
22 anti-aircraft missiles.
23 "A crowd of some 100 people cheered
24 prisoners when they left the UNPROFOR armed carriers
25 that brought them into the town. They were then
1 escorted from the spot by the masked soldiers who fired
2 their guns into the air when they left."
3 Would you agree with that description?
4 A. I am the one who wrote it, yes. That is what
5 happened. As I stated, it was very dangerous. I was
6 the one of the only persons from the Mission at that
7 point in time who was able to go to that location and
8 to ensure that no violence was committed against the
9 General and I was the one -- and I realise, rather,
10 that this exchange would take a long time, even at the
11 risk of my own life. I wanted to make sure nothing was
12 to happen to the General of this HVO brigade.
13 Q. Were the persons responsible, behind these
14 kidnappings of Todic and the four officers, and the
15 execution-style killing of the four men with Todic,
16 were they ever identified, to your knowledge?
17 A. I think that they were, through the UNPROFOR
18 intelligence session, because I have one or two
19 pictures which I took which show the Algerian with whom
20 I had negotiated and who said he was the instigator of
21 the hostage taking, mainly having to do with the
22 violence against the HVO brigadier-general in Zenica.
23 Q. Was any action taken? Was this person
24 detained, do you know?
25 A. I have no idea. No idea. All I can say is
1 that we drafted a report. I submitted my photographs
2 to the UNPROFOR authorities. After that I really
3 cannot say anything else.
4 Q. With respect to whatever atrocities or other
5 improper acts took place against Croat victims, whether
6 in Dusina, Lasva, Gusti Grab, with respect to the Todic
7 kidnapping, were you ever given a report by the BiH
8 Army indicating that they had looked into or
9 investigated any of them?
10 A. I have a clear recollection of having seen
11 instructions, among other things in order to limit the
12 looting which seemed to be a common thing in all the
13 villages. I also remember that at no time was there
14 a lack of cooperation on the part of the Bosnians when
15 we were told that crimes had been committed. That is
16 why I can, without any difficulty, say to you that even
17 in August, with Father Stefan, who escorted the Bosnian
18 authorities, we went back to the Bosnian villages that
19 had been evacuated during the April incidents around
20 Zenica. For me, that was enough. I could see that on
21 the ground there was goodwill. There were directives
22 that had been given in order to reduce to a minimum
23 this type of action.
24 Q. So, in and around Zenica, you have described
25 and the ECMM teletype describes the deaths of some 15
1 or so Croats, burning of perhaps 50 houses, looting of
2 perhaps 100 house, displacement of hundreds and
3 hundreds of people. Your view was that there was no
4 need for an investigation by the BiH Army because
5 ECMM's Mission was forward-looking, focusing on
6 protecting those who were alive and protecting things.
7 You were not a law enforcement agency; is that correct?
8 A. We tried to do whatever we could do. We had
9 full days but we could not do everything. We worked
10 a great deal with the Red Cross, with the UNHCR and
11 other humanitarian organisations, but since you are
12 raising this point, I do remember in August we received
13 a complaint stating that there may have been -- that
14 there were civilians or Croatians who had been buried.
15 There was a mass grave burial ground. After having
16 received that complaint, I decided with Father Stefan,
17 with the Bosnian authorities to go there. We did not
18 attribute a great deal of importance to this in light
19 of the degree of truth in respect of any unilateral
20 investigation carried out either by the Bosnians or
21 Croats. I wanted to be there and see for myself and
22 see if there was anything that should be added from the
23 other side in order to add credibility to what the
24 other side was saying.
25 Q. Other than what you have described, did you
1 receive any reports from the BiH Army concerning any
2 Croat deaths or the like?
3 A. I do not remember. I cannot say yes,
4 I cannot say no.
5 Q. None that you recall?
6 A. None that I recall.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 Let us turn to 16th April 1993. You have
9 told us your notes reflect that you attempted to reach
10 Colonel Blaskic and was told, in substance, he was not
11 available; do you have any present recollection of that
12 event, as you sit here today?
13 A. In light of the fact that this goes back more
14 than five years, I do have recollection, as I told
15 you. I remember the morning's activities; I remember
16 that I saw the burnt village; I heard shelling, it went
17 on all day long around the British camp. I would have
18 to go back to my notes, because I took personal notes
19 and working notes, which appear in my notebooks.
20 Afterwards, I drafted a report.
21 Q. I am afraid you misunderstood my question.
22 It was: with respect to the entry in your notes that
23 you attempted to reach Colonel Blaskic on 16th April
24 1993, do you have an independent recollection of that
25 event, or do you simply have your notes today?
1 A. Well, I could tell you that my records are
2 based on my recollection). If it is noted in my --
3 JUDGE JORDA: I think that is clear. The
4 question was asked; you answered; you only remember by
5 consulting your personal log.
6 A. As regards General Blaskic, yes, that is
8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, move to another question.
9 MR. HAYMAN: Directing your attention to your
10 observations on that day, the day of Ahmici, you said
11 you saw no evidence of any defence of the village; do
12 you know whether there was a BiH Army unit based in
13 Ahmici, or resident in Ahmici?
14 A. No, I have no idea.
15 MR. HAYMAN: Do you know whether that unit had
16 a plan of defence for the village of Ahmici?
17 JUDGE JORDA: The witness has answered that
18 he does not know. Like my colleague here, I am
19 reacting also. Do not ask trick questions, please.
20 You said all questions were subjective, Mr. Hayman.
21 That is what you said, remember.
22 MR. HAYMAN: I will forego the last question.
23 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, thank you.
24 MR. HAYMAN: You said you saw no HVO soldiers
25 or combatants in Ahmici on the night of 16th April,
1 when you came back or made another pass by. Did you
2 stay on the road in the evening or did you leave the
3 road and go up into the village?
4 A. Once again, I did not write everything that
5 I saw down in my notebook. What I did say is that
6 I got rather close to the village of Ahmici in order to
7 have a very, very clear image of the mosque that had
8 been split into two and everything was burning around
9 it. I do not remember that I saw HVO soldiers in the
10 Ahmici village. What I do remember later on is that
11 I have a very clear recollection of bodies lying on the
12 road, when we continued driving through.
13 Q. So, did you leave the Vitez/Busovaca road
14 that evening or did you stay on the road and make your
15 observations from the road?
16 A. In order to be able to answer the question,
17 I would have to go back to the place physically in
18 order to see that. From that road I could see the
19 mosque burning, as I said. As I said to you, I have
20 a very specific image in my mind of the mosque.
21 Whether you could see it from the road or the main
22 road, I am not sure, I would have to go and see again.
23 I am sorry, that is all I remember right now. I recall
24 the burning mosque and that was very close by.
25 JUDGE JORDA: We will now take a 15 to 20
1 minute break, which will allow everyone to rest a bit.
2 That includes the witness as well.
3 (4.10 pm)
4 (A short break)
5 (4.30 pm)
6 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume the hearing.
7 Have the accused brought in again.
8 (The accused entered court)
9 (The witness entered court)
10 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.
11 Again, the evening of 16th April, 1993, can
12 you tell us whether a front-line had formed north of the
13 village of Ahmici between the HVO and the BiH Army and,
14 if so, approximately where? Feel free to use the ELMO
15 to your right, if you can.
16 A. I do not know where the front was at that
17 time. I have absolutely no idea. It was only a few
18 days later that I learned that -- it was either the
19 next day or the day after that -- the front-line was on
20 the elevation between Zenica and Vitez. That is the
21 only information I had at that point, because you could
22 not go on site, oneself.
23 Q. Indeed, the village of Poculica was a BiH
24 army village; correct? If you would like to refer to
25 the map, feel free.
1 Poculica is on the mountain road from Vitez
2 to Zenica, about 60 per cent of the way towards Vitez
3 from Zenica. More like 70 per cent of the way. To the
4 north-east of Sivrino Selo and directly --
5 A. Well, I saw it on the map when I was
6 investigating atrocities committed by the Croats,
7 I think that I went there or was near there. I suppose
8 that it was the no-man's-land between the two
10 Q. Very well. On the night of the 16th, you
11 returned to Zenica; is that correct, ultimately?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Were you briefed or do you remember anything
14 about events in Zenica on the 15th, other than the
15 Todic kidnapping?
16 A. Not really, no.
17 Q. You said at some point the HVO brigade in
18 Zenica was attacked by the BiH Army. Do you know when
19 that was? You mentioned, I believe, the 17th or 18th
20 in your testimony. Can you give us any more precise
21 time on that?
22 A. No, I cannot be more specific than that.
23 Q. I believe you said that on the night of the
24 16th, you could see certain villages from your hotel.
25 Is that correct? If so, can you tell us what villages?
1 A. I do not think it was the night of the 16th.
2 I think on the night of the 16th -- let me check my
3 notes. Give me a minute, please.
4 MR. HAYMAN: While you are looking, perhaps
5 Exhibit 292 could be made available to the witness,
7 A. No, it was not the 16th, it was the morning
8 of the 17th, when I woke up and I saw that there had,
9 in fact, been fighting in the general direction that
10 I had just mentioned to you and I saw a column of
11 Muslims all along the mountains in the direction of
13 Q. You were in Zenica; correct, on the morning
14 of the 17th?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Sorry, where was the column of -- I take it
17 Muslim soldiers or do you mean Muslim civilians?
18 A. They were Muslim civilians, who were
19 coming -- who were leaving the combat zone and moving
20 towards Zenica. They were entering the city of
22 Q. That is what your notes reflect?
23 A. Yes. Yes, if you would like to read them.
24 They are in French, yes. Here they are.
25 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, please do not make
2 A. I was not doing it in order to be nasty,
3 I was just trying to cooperate with the court.
4 MR. HAYMAN: If you could put your notes aside
5 and turn to Exhibit 292, which I believe has been made
6 available to you. It is the protest, the concern
7 expressed by Colonel Blaskic concerning treatment of
8 Croats in Zenica and the villages around Zenica.
9 You will note that the time of the document
10 is 1.15 am on the morning of 18th April 1993. Would
11 you agree that, at the time, rumours were rife
12 concerning the scale and nature of the conflict that
13 was going on, including in and around Zenica?
14 A. You mean whether there were rumours during
15 the day of the 18th? Are you talking about rumours?
16 What rumours are you talking about? I am not sure
17 I got that.
18 Q. I will rephrase the question: would you agree
19 that at the end of the day on the 17th and the night of
20 the 17th to 18th April 1993, there was a lot of
21 information, including some miss-information in the
22 form of rumours, concerning what was being attacked,
23 who was being attacked, how many people had been killed
24 on both sides, et cetera?
25 A. Yes. Yes, yes.
1 Q. Would you also agree that, at the time,
2 Colonel Blaskic did not have the ability to undertake
3 his own investigation of the Croat villages in and
4 around, including to the west, of Zenica. That was BiH
5 Army-controlled territory; correct?
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 MR. HAYMAN: Later, on the 18th April 1993,
8 you met with General Merdan, you have described. If
9 Exhibit 294 could be made available to the witness.
10 It contains certain minutes from that
11 meeting, specifically paragraphs 4 and 6. (Handed).
12 I would like to ask you about a comment in
13 paragraph 4, titled "political assessment ":
14 "According to the D commander" -- presumably
15 that is "deputy commander" -- "of Third BiH Corps,
16 this" -- which has an antecedent in the document which
17 will become clear I think -- "seems to be part of
18 a master plot against the Muslims from the extremist
19 Croat movement. They have proof that Mr. Kordic had
20 seen the Serb leader, Mr. Karadzic, and they may have
21 discussed the future of BiH."
22 My question is: at your meeting with
23 General Merdan, did he provide any proof or evidence of
24 such a meeting between Mr. Kordic and Karadzic?
25 A. No, the only thing I remember was the content
1 of the sentence here in the paragraph. I think they --
2 had we wanted to go further we might have found that
3 proof but I did not get any direct proof, no.
4 MR. HAYMAN: Also on the 18th, you received
5 the cease-fire order from Colonel Blaskic which is
6 Exhibit 293.
7 Perhaps that should be placed before the
8 witness so that he can have it clearly in mind.
10 Do you have Exhibit 293 in mind?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. My question is: did General Hadzihuseinovic
13 issue a comparable cease-fire order to his troops at
14 the time?
15 A. I would have to check with my papers. I do
16 not think so. I do not think it was at the same time.
17 I do not think we got it exactly the same time. All
18 I remember now is that there were directives issued in
19 order to ensure the safety of the Croatian civilians.
20 No, I cannot tell you whether I received anything of
21 this type.
22 Q. To your knowledge, did you receive such an
23 order from General Hadzihuseinovic prior to the joint
24 order by Generals Petkovic and Halilovic which was
25 issued on 20th April 1993, and which included
1 a cease-fire order?
2 A. I do not remember. I would have to check.
3 I would have to check. I do not have a recollection of
5 Q. You testified concerning whether the HVO
6 cooperated in an investigation into the events in
7 Ahmici. Let me ask you, first: at the meeting in
8 Zenica, on 20th April 1993, attended by General
9 Hadzihuseinovic, General Petkovic, Colonel Blaskic,
10 Ambassador Thebault, and you were present, I believe,
11 during portions of the meeting, was there any
12 request -- general or specific -- made for an
13 investigation into the events in Ahmici?
14 A. As far as I recall, I was only a partial
15 observer because at that point I was working in the
16 operations office, whereas that meeting had taken place
17 in the meeting room.
18 Q. Are you aware of any request, ever, by
19 Ambassador Thebault of Colonel Blaskic that he
20 undertake a specific investigation into events in
22 A. No, I cannot tell you. I do not remember.
23 I cannot remember whether this took place or not.
24 Q. Were you aware of Colonel Stewart of BritBat
25 did ask -- indeed demand -- that Colonel Blaskic
1 commence an investigation? Are you aware of that?
2 A. I do not remember that, but I do remember
3 that the BritBat commander did decide to investigate
4 himself. Now, I do not know whether he did this with
5 the HVO authorities helping, I do not know. What I do
6 remember very well is that when we went to visit
7 Ahmici, with the BritBat commander, that was -- the
8 visit was made in armoured vehicles.
9 Q. Have you been informed that Colonel Blaskic,
10 indeed, ordered an investigation into the events in
11 Ahmici and the Prosecution has a copy of that order?
12 Did you know that prior to or during your testimony in
13 this case?
14 A. I do not remember whether I saw that type of
15 order. I have no idea.
16 MR. HAYMAN: Let us turn to your April 25th
17 1993 visit to the village of Rotilj.
18 If Exhibit 298 could be provided to the
19 witness. I will describe my question, then feel free
20 to refer to the document if helpful. (Handed).
21 On page 2 of the teletype which you drafted,
22 there are comments concerning some 600 inhabitants of
23 the village living in a particular part of the village,
24 I believe it is the part further away from Kiseljak
25 than the portions of the village that are closer to
2 Do you see those references?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did you visit that other portion of the
5 village containing the supposed 600 or so residents, or
6 was that information relayed to you by others?
7 A. That was information which was relayed to
8 us. As you can see, there were two of us, there was
9 myself and there was Dimitrios Dagos, who, at the time,
10 was Chief of Operations.
11 The day -- it was late in the day and we went
12 forward a little bit to see whether there were any
13 people there, but we did not investigate any more. If
14 I remember correctly, we contacted UNHCR and the
15 doctors at the borders to see if we could bring any
16 medical assistance that had been asked for. Then
17 a report was to be drafted, then my colleague was
18 supposed to take the measures which might eventually
19 normalise the situation with the HVO authorities.
20 Q. Thank you, you have answered my question.
21 With respect to the "convoy of joy" or the
22 "Tuzla convoy", did you witness any events in
23 connection with attacks on that convoy personally?
24 A. All I saw were the -- was the results. I can
25 tell you that throughout these misadventures, or the
1 saga of that convoy, I was in the operations room.
2 I am the one who co-ordinated all the activities of all
3 the detachments that were monitoring what was going
4 on. I could not be in two places at the same time.
5 I was absolutely limited to my office in Zenica.
6 Q. When you say you saw the results, do you mean
7 you saw the convoy pass through Zenica, or you heard
8 reports in your capacity as the operations officer of
10 A. Perhaps I did not express myself well.
11 At the time of the convoy I was in my
12 office. I would receive the reports from our
13 detachments. After that, especially in the Nova Bila
14 and Vitez region, I was then in a position to see some
15 of the vehicles that had been destroyed and some of the
16 places where it was clear that there had been rather
17 serious clashes between the people who had tried to
18 hijack the convoy and the people in the convoy.
19 Q. You said that the HVO guaranteed the security
20 of this convoy.
21 Do you know who in the HVO guaranteed this
22 security and to whom?
23 A. No, I do not have those details in mind.
24 What I do remember very clearly was that the Second
25 Corps authority and the HVO authorities of the Tuzla
1 region came to see us, expressed their ideas to
2 Mr. Thebault and then subsequently with that
3 information, I believe that the HVO representative went
4 to see the HVO representatives in Vitez, since their
5 communications with the major HVO headquarters of the
6 Mostar region was excellent, they made arrangements.
7 Then Mr. Thebault just told me that the local
8 authorities had accepted to -- had agreed to escort the
9 convoy and to ensure its safety throughout the
11 If it was Muslim region, it would be the
12 Muslims who would be in charge. If it was HVO region
13 then the HVO would be in charge. It was always being
14 escorted by ECMM detachments with some UNPROFOR
15 observers whose role was really to be observer more
16 than anything else.
17 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 302 could be provided
18 to the witness, please.
19 This is an ECMM teletype on the subject of HV
20 involvement in BiH. (Handed).
21 Let me ask you, first: when did you first see
22 this document, if you know?
23 A. I think on 18th June, because during that
24 time period I was the head of the operations, so this
25 communication was sent to the head of the operations
1 and I was, indeed, head at that time, so I must have
2 been the first of the persons to actually read this
4 Q. Let me direct your attention to the middle of
5 paragraph 5, which reads, referring to General Praljak:
6 "The general also acknowledged that HV
7 troops are present inside Bosnia-Herzegovina along the
8 cease-fire line, south-west of Trebinje, a fact already
9 known to ECMM."
10 Do you know where Trebinje was?
11 A. Perhaps at that time I knew, but right now
12 know, nothing at all.
13 Q. Is it south-east of Mostar, the cease-fire
14 line with the Serbs in Herzegovina, or you have no
15 recollection? No recollection? If you could indicate
16 "no" for the record, you are shaking your head?
17 A. No, I would actually have to see the map to
18 tell you exactly where it was, but right now, the name
19 of that city means nothing to me.
20 MR. HAYMAN: The next sentence --
21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, would you like for
22 the witness to see the map?
23 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, it is a fact --
24 JUDGE JORDA: No, because I am sorry for
25 interrupting you, but you seem to be drawing the
1 conclusion that simply since the witness -- or the
2 Colonel said he does not know, he did indeed say if he
3 saw the map he could tell you. I do not want you
4 prolonging these proceedings, but I do not want you to
5 draw the conclusion, one way or the other. That is
6 simply what I wanted to say.
7 MR. HAYMAN: Ultimately the court will have
8 a map and it will show where this city is, so I do not
9 think it is necessary to take time in the
10 cross-examination to further establish it.
11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Please continue.
12 MR. HAYMAN: The next sentence refers to
13 sightings of personnel wearing HV uniforms in
14 Central Bosnia.
15 Was it of interest to ECMM whether there were
16 HV troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. Yes, indeed there were. Yes, we were asked
18 to produce information to that effect in order, once
19 and for all, to confirm -- or rather not to confirm the
20 rumours that were circulating on that.
21 Q. Did you ever observe any HV units in the
22 municipalities of Vitez, Busovaca or Kiseljak during
23 your tour of duty?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Did you ever receive any reports -- reported
1 sightings of such units in those municipalities?
2 A. No.
3 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist in
4 providing a document to the witness. (Handed).
5 If it could be marked as the next Defence
6 exhibit in order, please. I believe that is 113.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that is right.
8 MR. HAYMAN: Lieutenant-Colonel, if you could
9 look at the document. I am not going to ask you to
10 read it unless you would like to read the whole thing.
11 My question is simply: is this an ECMM report to RC
12 Zenica prepared by your fellow Monitors during your
13 tour of duty?
14 A. Yes, that is how we operated. A detachment
15 would send a report and then later on, as the head of
16 operation -- the head of operation would compile all
17 these documents and also to share them with UNPROFOR
18 and other organisations with which we had affairs.
19 Q. Would you recognise Mr. Friis-Peterson's
20 signature in the upper right-hand corner of the first
21 page of the document?
22 It is the upper right-hand corner of the
23 first page, I am indicating, if you are having trouble
24 finding it, where I am pointing?
25 A. Yes, yes. I see the place, but in my
1 presence, Mr. Friis-Peterson never signed anything. The
2 documents were sent by pouch, and so simply at that
3 time it seems that Mr. Friis-Peterson was in that
5 MR. HAYMAN: I have one more document to
6 provide to the witness, Mr. President, if the usher
7 could assist. This, I believe, will be Defence 114.
9 JUDGE JORDA: Have you finished with document
10 213 or is this 214 you are basing your question on?
11 MR. HAYMAN: I am done with 213 for now,
12 Mr. President, yes.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.
14 MR. HAYMAN: Does this also appear to be an
15 ECMM teletype you would have received as operations
16 officer of the Regional Centre Zenica at the time?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Let me ask you, with respect to paragraph 4,
19 do you have any recollection of receiving this report
20 of a Joint Operational Centre meeting, which, among
21 other things -- and I am referring to bullet points 3,
22 4 and 5 now -- in which agreement was reached on a safe
23 corridor to all Vitez, that is bullet point number 3;
24 agreement was reached on clear orders given to clear
25 the AOR (Area of Responsibility) from snipers, that is
1 bullet point number 4; lastly, release of all
2 prisoners, except from criminals, point number 5? Do
3 you have any recollection of receiving that information
4 at approximately this time?
5 A. Yes. When I say "yes", this is absolutely
6 the report that I received and the decisions that were
7 made. Yes, they were in conformity with the rules,
9 Q. You can put that exhibit aside. I am done
10 with it.
11 You said yesterday that "people in positions
12 of authority" -- this is page 14 of the draft
13 transcript of yesterday's proceedings -- "did not do
14 everything they could in order to prevent the loss of
15 life in Central Bosnia".
16 When you say: "persons in positions of
17 responsibility did not do everything they could to
18 prevent loss of life", are you intending to reference
19 any particular standard of conduct, be it a moral
20 standard or a standard that may be embodied in the
21 Canadian Armed Forces Handbook, or a standard found
22 elsewhere, or are you simply speaking from a personal
23 standpoint; your own personal moral conviction is the
24 standard that you are referring to when you make the
25 statement I referenced? Can you tell us?
1 A. Yes, it is quite simple, I served with the
2 NATO forces; I also served with the American forces,
3 and I am a career officer, who has also been trained as
4 an intelligence officer so I am very aware of the
5 military procedures in the Soviet Union at the time.
6 What I can tell you is that all commanders must be in
7 a position to be able to assure his command, and also
8 to take appropriate measures to ensure that his command
9 has been carried out.
10 I also stated here in this courtroom that
11 I did not expect for any crimes to be committed. That
12 is not what I was saying. What I was saying, to my
13 memory, I do not remember seeing any concrete steps
14 taken to limit the actions which were committed either
15 by out of control soldiers or by units within their
16 control. This is what I expected to see.
17 During the period in which I was there, there
18 were several incidents which should have been brought
19 to the local HVO authorities and we, indeed, reported
20 to them. These should have been clues to them and
21 enough to realise there had been some break in the
22 chain of command and that someone had not done there
23 job. So some action should have been taken and perhaps
24 some action of the commander of Busovaca, who seemed to
25 be disobeying his orders or taking his orders from
1 another commander. I expected this commander to
2 continue to assume his authority and to demonstrate
3 that he is, indeed, the ultimate commander of that
4 area, or at least to go there and reprimand this man or
5 at least to change the command there. I did not see
6 this type of action taken by the authorities in the
7 presence of the HVO -- HVO authorities.
8 So, I am saying this has nothing to do with
9 what army you are in. This is a military type of order
10 and that a commander is responsible for its troops and
11 for the actions of his troops. So, the commander is
12 ultimately responsible for all the actions of his men.
13 This is the only way, in my mind, that one
14 can truly defend oneself before a court of law, that
15 one can say that one has taken simple steps in order to
16 prevent such a situation from occurring. Thank you.
17 MR. HAYMAN: Other than what you have just
18 said, are you referencing any particular standard of
19 national law, international law, or from any other
20 source, other than a standard which is within yourself
21 as a result of your training and professional
22 experience and which you have articulated very well.
23 JUDGE JORDA: I am sorry, it seems to me that
24 the witness has answered this question. He has
25 answered this question. He stated that what he said
1 was his personal opinion, no matter what army one
2 belonged to. So, please do not ask the question
4 MR. HAYMAN: I will not, your Honour. The
5 question is: is it a standard within, or is it one
6 thought, if so, where is it taught --
7 JUDGE JORDA: No, not at all. No, Mr. Hayman,
8 he has already answered quite well to that question.
9 I am not going to say "very well", as far as relevance,
10 I am saying that he responded very exactly to the
11 question you asked. He said he has a knowledge of
12 other armies and that he is familiar with the actions
13 and he said he feels there are certain rules which
14 should govern all commanders. So please go on to your
15 next question.
16 MR. HAYMAN: Prior to reaching this opinion,
17 as to Colonel Blaskic, have you seen the reports or
18 obtained information concerning the reports that he
19 received from subordinates concerning events during the
20 war in Central Bosnia? Have you had access to that
22 A. Initially -- I simply reiterate -- that
23 I never mentioned the name of Colonel Blaskic.
24 I mentioned authorities responsible for the HVO.
25 Secondly, if this report was submitted to me,
1 I would have been in a position -- in a much more
2 credible manner to assess the actions taken by the HVO
3 authorities and to see whether or not there were any
4 problems linked to command.
5 Q. So you agree those reports would be very
6 important in determining and judging the acts of
7 a commander; what information did the commander
8 receive; correct? That is very important information?
9 A. It is not really relevant to see whether or
10 not there is something written on a piece of paper.
11 A piece of paper means nothing. What is important is
12 to see whether or not in the field there were actions
13 that were taken and which were applied and whether or
14 not a different type of behaviour took place. This was
15 a war of paper, we received a lot of different protests
16 from the left and from the right with perhaps good or
17 perhaps poor intentions. It is one thing to have good
18 intentions, another thing is to actually apply them.
19 I am telling you that I could not see
20 anything that would lead me to believe that one was
21 making an effort to try to maintain a true sense of
22 command in the chain of command within all the troops.
23 If that did take place, very well, but I did not see
24 this myself.
25 Q. Do you agree that the information a commander
1 receives is important to the commander's ability to
2 react and respond appropriately?
3 A. I do understand what you want, in the way of
4 a response. If you want to know whether or not
5 a commander needs information or not to act, of course,
6 yes. A commander must be able to have trust that the
7 information --
8 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, wait a minute. I am
9 sorry. I think that Mr. Hayman asked you a question.
10 He has asked you twice because you have not responded
11 to the question. You did not respond the first time,
12 whether or not, in your opinion, the knowledge --
13 objective knowledge of some documents would then enable
14 one to determine the actions of a chief. This is the
15 question. Please respond to it?
16 A. I am sorry, but my lack of comprehension,
17 I do not understand the question, the nature of the
18 question. I can answer "yes" or "no".
19 JUDGE JORDA: Please, Mr. Hayman, go on to the
20 next question.
21 MR. HAYMAN: Other than what you may have in
22 your private archive, have you obtained access to the
23 other orders issued by the accused, some of which are
24 already in evidence in this case? Did the Prosecutor
25 make those materials available to you so that you could
1 see for yourself what steps Colonel Blaskic did take
2 during the conflict or have you not had access to that
3 body of information?
4 A. Well, the only documents I consulted were the
5 documents I was able to see, either documents which
6 came from the Zagreb headquarters or those sent from
7 all the detachments which came from all the UN troops,
8 the UNPROFOR troops, who were -- which were sent to us
9 or which were sent to us in one way or another. That
10 is all the ones I saw.
11 Q. If an HVO order was not sent to the ECMM, is
12 it safe to presume you did not see it?
13 A. Yes, you are absolutely right.
14 Q. You said yesterday that a commander has the
15 responsibility, in your opinion, to establish a system
16 for gathering information and disseminating orders.
17 Would you agree that that includes setting up
18 a headquarters staff, composed or comprised of the best
19 people available?
20 A. I hesitate to answer, Mr. President, because
21 the term "competent".
22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Defence, would you please
23 clarify your question, because the term used
24 "competent" could be vague?
25 MR. HAYMAN: I did not use the term
1 "competent", so there has been a mistranslation.
2 Would you agree that setting up the type of
3 system I referenced includes setting up a headquarters
4 staff composed of the best people available?
5 A. Yes, naturally you are going to take the best
6 people available for your headquarters.
7 Q. Then it is the duty of the commander to have
8 regular meetings, regular interaction and
9 communications with that staff so that the staff is
10 used effectively; correct?
11 A. Yes, indeed. In fact, that is why you have
12 a head of the headquarters, who is in charge of working
13 on a regular basis with the staff and then to be able
14 to go to visit the troops in the field. There should
15 be then a link between the head of the headquarters and
16 the commander and they should have regular meetings.
17 Q. It is also the responsibility of a commander,
18 is it not, to communicate clearly with that staff and
19 other subordinates, including at times in writing, so
20 that directions are clear; would you agree?
21 A. Not in agreement.
22 Q. Not in agreement?
23 A. I am sorry, I said I am completely in
24 agreement. I am in agreement with you.
25 JUDGE JORDA: Please try to put your
1 questions more directly, Mr. Hayman.
2 MR. HAYMAN: I will, Mr. President. I am not
3 sure what the problem was on that last exchange.
4 Can you tell us, Lieutenant-Colonel -- and
5 I am -- Mr. President, I am nearing the conclusion,
6 I have one more area of inquiry.
7 Can you tell us: the HVO soldiers in the
8 Lasva Valley, were they housed in barracks or did they
9 live in their own homes and were they dispersed in
10 their own homes?
11 A. Some were in barracks and others lived in
12 various buildings which were -- various areas on the
13 line of -- on the front-lines.
14 Q. Where were the barracks in the Lasva Valley,
15 housing HVO troops?
16 A. I was never invited to visit them. There
17 were some in Vitez, some in Busovaca and some in
18 Kiseljak, that is what I remember.
19 Q. At times when you were serving on the
20 Busovaca Joint Commission, did you and General Merdan
21 and Mr. Nakic go to the front-line so that Merdan or
22 Nakic could communicate directly or talk to the local
23 commanders at the front-line and urge them to obey
25 A. Yes, absolutely, on a regular basis.
1 Q. Was that necessary because, in this
2 particular theatre, there was great difficulty in
3 obtaining respect and adherence to cease-fire orders?
4 A. This was how the Commission worked. No
5 action was carried out alone or only with the HVO or
6 only with the Bosnians. You should know that the
7 Commission had to be sure that there were some
8 agreement on the cease-fire and that this was indeed
9 carried out. This was the main mission of the
10 Commission, to go into the field and to investigate and
11 confirm that it was being applied.
12 So, at that time period, these kind of visits
13 had two purposes: for those troops which were isolated
14 it enabled the other camp to send on information and
15 orders. For the other troops which were not as
16 isolated from the chain of command, while this enabled
17 the commanders then to have a visit and also to make
18 sure that everything was moving in the right
20 Q. Would you agree with the proposition that, at
21 the level of foot soldiers, the war in Bosnia was
22 mainly fought by civilians; would you agree with that
23 proposition? It is page 319, "Broken Lives",
24 Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Stewart. Do you agree with that
1 A. My own research seems to tell me not the
2 contrary, but rather it was a little more ambiguous
3 than that. I can tell you that in -- under the Tito
4 regime that nearly all the civilians were called upon
5 to enlist and to do some military service at one point
6 or another.
7 So, it is for this reason that the majority
8 of the civilians did, indeed, have HVO -- or rather had
9 Yugoslavian uniforms. That is why at one point I said
10 that as far as -- in confirming one person is from one
11 army or another, would depend on one's identity cards
12 and the identity they had on their shoulders.
13 What I can say is that there was a bit of all
14 of this, there were civilians, yes, I saw them, and
15 there were also other young people who seemed to have
16 carried out some military training, then there were
18 Q. Have you ever commanded a military unit in
19 combat yourself?
20 A. I never commanded any military troops in
21 a time of combat, but I have commanded the ECMM in
22 Zenica during the time at which we were, indeed, under
23 mortar fire and under artillery fire. I think this
24 experience, perhaps, it can be significant to say, yes,
25 I have been under that experience.
1 There was a baptism of fire, because during
2 that time period I was responsible for evacuations or
3 to explaining whether or not we would go from point A
4 or point B. Indeed, I was responsible for the
5 evacuation of Travnik, even though it was under fire at
6 that time.
7 Q. On 18th April 1993, or thereabouts, you
8 concluded that Franjo Nakic had been demoted from the
9 position of deputy commander to the position of chief
10 of staff, HVO Operative Zone Central Bosnia; is that
12 A. Well, what I said, on 18th April, this is in
13 my notes, is that Mr. Nakic was no longer the commander,
14 but later on when the new Joint Commission was
15 established it was at this time that I saw Mr. Nakic
16 reappear as head of operations.
17 In the central zone, the Central Operational
18 Zone of the HVO.
19 Q. So that the terms are perfectly clear --
20 because they are being translated back to me in
21 something less than the terminology that I think is the
22 specific terminology here. Prior to 16th April 1993,
23 did you believe Franjo Nakic to be the deputy commander
24 of the HVO, Central Bosnia Operative Zone?
25 A. Yes, all of the documents at the time were
1 signed, showed Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander.
2 Indeed, I saw a document from 13th February indicating
3 he was the deputy commander or at least as an
4 individual representing Colonel Blaskic, as a deputy
6 Q. After the conflict, be it the 16th or 18th or
7 20th April, you concluded that Mr. Nakic was no longer
8 the deputy commander, but was the Chief of staff;
10 A. Yes, once again, based on the documents which
11 show the joint command at that time, indeed, at that
12 time it showed he was the deputy commander of this camp
13 and then also that Mr. Nakic was no longer the deputy
14 commander and that he was, instead, head -- or chief of
15 staff of the unit of Colonel Blaskic.
16 Q. Is that particularly significant from
17 a military perspective, because a deputy commander is
18 in the chain of command and has command over the body
19 of troops within that element or body of organisation,
20 whereas a chief of staff does not have direct command
21 over the forces? If not, what is your understanding of
22 the distinction?
23 A. No, that is not quite the way -- it is not
24 quite the way you said it. In the armies I am familiar
25 with, perhaps it was different in Bosnia, but in the
1 armies I know, the deputy commander is the person who
2 is designated in order to replace the commander if
3 anything should happen to him. Among other things,
4 when the commander must be away for rather long
5 periods, it would be the deputy commander who takes
6 control of the operations.
7 However, the Chief of Operations, even if it
8 is not specifically command of an operational unit, he
9 is the one who commands the headquarters on that level
10 of the formation. If you are looking at an army corps,
11 you will see there was a general who was going to act
12 as a Chief of Operations and that general will command
13 all the staff working within those headquarters, so
14 that he can apply the directives which have been issued
15 by the commander when he was not there and would not be
17 Q. Did you conclude that this change in
18 Mr. Nakic's status was a demotion?
19 A. What I conclude is that Mr. Nakic was no
20 longer Colonel Blaskic's replacement when he was not
21 there. In addition, I concluded -- I could not explain
22 the reason why he was given the title of Chief of
23 Operations or the person responsible for the
24 headquarters, because he was no longer in the
1 Therefore, the conclusion that I drew was
2 that he had been given some type of title and that he
3 was not really in authority, in a position to do
4 anything at all.
5 Q. So, you concluded he had been pushed aside,
6 in substance?
7 A. Basically that. I would just like to repeat
8 here, something which is very important: it is not only
9 my opinion, I tell you again that all of the reports
10 that were drafted by the Zenica headquarters according
11 to what I have -- were not only my opinion but of the
12 regional Zenica command, so those -- even if I were to
13 write something had been done under the authority that
14 I have just mentioned.
15 Q. You have said you drew these conclusions from
16 documents. Did Mr. Nakic or anyone else in the HVO tell
17 you that his position had changed from deputy commander
18 to chief of staff?
19 A. I think that I said that the first time it
20 appeared was on the documents that had been signed, the
21 documents dated 13th February, which describe Mr. Nakic
22 as being the deputy commander and which implement the
23 Operative Zone or the joint -- where the Joint
24 Commander says that he was the Chief of staff. This is
25 a document signed by Hadzihuseinovic and by
1 Colonel Blaskic.
2 Q. Putting documents aside, did Nakic or anyone
3 else in the HVO tell you, did you have a discussion or
4 conversation with them in which they told you that:
5 "Nakic has been pushed aside, he is no longer the
6 deputy commander, he is the chief of staff"?
7 A. I do not remember having had any specific
8 discussion to that effect concerning Colonel Blaskic.
9 The only thing -- I saw Mr. Nakic in the middle of that
10 crisis, he was not there, he was at home.
11 Q. You went to see him at home. If the map
12 could be replaced on the ELMO, can you tell us where
13 his home was?
14 A. I do not remember, I could do better than
15 that. I have a photograph of myself with Mr. Nakic and
16 his wife at their home. I can go get the photograph,
17 then you can tell me exactly where -- where in the
18 region he had his house. I do not remember right now.
19 Q. That will not be necessary to do that,
21 Do you remember, in going to his house, did
22 you pass the BiH Army territory? In other words, was
23 he cut off at his house on 18th April 1993 when you
24 went to go see him?
25 A. I do not remember. All that my notes says is
1 that Mr. Nakic seems to have been removed from his
2 position. The reason I reach that conclusion is that
3 when you are in the midst of operations, ordinarily
4 your place is not at home but your place is at
5 headquarters and even at headquarters, there are rooms
6 which allow staff to remain on site so they could work
7 24 hours a day. That is the approach that I used in
8 order to realise that something had happened.
9 You do not send your deputy commander to go
10 sleep at home when he is in a combat area which could
11 easily be cut off from your headquarters, but you keep
12 him there, you keep him there at headquarters.
13 Q. It is the last thing you would expect if the
14 commander expected a general conflagration and
15 conflict, to send your deputy home to a location where
16 he might be cut off?
17 A. Yes. As I said, the commander who is
18 responsible for things has to keep all the staff with
19 him. That is what is ordinarily done.
20 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to show you
21 a document, the contents of which are not particularly
22 important for my purpose today, and ask you a few
23 questions. You will see it is an HVO document. The
24 date -- let me ask Mr. Nobilo to read -- the date is the
25 line beginning "DANA" in the upper left-hand corner of
1 the first page.
2 Could you read that line, please?
3 MR. NOBILO: 27th January 1993. "At 2255
5 MR. HAYMAN: Stand by for a moment.
6 Could you look at the second page,
8 First let me ask: on a daily basis, did the
9 Busovaca Joint Commission and later the Joint
10 Operational Centre issue joint orders signed by
11 General Merdan and by Mr. Nakic, on a daily basis, or
12 was that only true during the Joint Operational Centre
13 period, that they issued a daily, signed order?
14 A. Both deputy commanders throughout the
15 Busovaca -- the Joint Busovaca Commission sessions did
16 not sign things. They were simply there to investigate
17 the application of the -- to investigate the
18 implementation of the agreements of 13th February.
19 When they would come back the following day, they would
20 speak on behalf of their commanders and they would
21 often have documents which had either been signed by
22 staff from their headquarters or by their commander.
23 But, I do not remember their having signed
24 something together, jointly.
25 Q. Do you recognise Mr. Nakic's signature on the
1 second page?
2 A. Let me tell you I do not remember having seen
3 his signature. I just do not remember.
4 MR. HAYMAN: Let me ask Mr. Nobilo to read the
5 title above "Franjo Nakic" on page 2, so we can get
6 a translation of the title.
7 MR. NOBILO: "Chief of staff, Franjo Nakic."
8 MR. HAYMAN: I have another document to show
9 the witness, Mr. President. If it could be provided to
10 him, and be marked as Defence 116. (Handed).
11 This is a document, Lieutenant-Colonel, from
12 your private archive; correct? Which we can determine
13 has your signature, dated in August of 1996, in the
14 lower right-hand portion of the first page?
15 A. Yes, that is correct.
16 Q. Would you agree this is the document that was
17 created as a result of the meeting on 20th April 1993,
18 which included the parties that signed it, giving birth
19 to the Joint Operational Centre?
20 A. If my memory serves me well, what we were
21 trying to do was the same thing in the Mostar sector.
22 That is why all those people were there. It was not
23 only for Central Bosnia. We were also trying to have
24 the same thing, that is to have a joint headquarters in
25 the Mostar region, but I do know that we tried to have
1 this type of joint headquarters so that we could reduce
2 to a minimum the fighting between the two ethnic
4 Q. Paragraph 3 references, in its first line,
5 the Vitez Joint Operational Centre; correct? Do you
6 see that, on the first line of paragraph 3?
7 A. Yes, I can see that.
8 Q. Now, in this document, you see paragraph 1,
9 which speaks for itself. Paragraph 2 references
10 a cease-fire. Paragraph 3, the second sentence, do you
11 see the sentence which I will read so we have
12 a translation:
13 "This joint OC [Operational Centre] will be
14 headed at its beginning by both deputy commanders ..."
15 Then the sentence continues. Do you see that
17 A. Yes, I see it. It was always there.
18 Q. Was that the protocol envisioned by ECMM for
19 the Joint Operational Centre, that it would be headed
20 by the deputies of Blaskic on one hand and
21 Hadzihuseinovic on the other?
22 A. No, it does not say it. It says it was the
23 deputy commanders who would eventually act.
24 Q. So the deputy commanders -- the ECMM protocol
25 envisioned for the JOC was that the two deputy
1 commanders would get together and kick the thing off;
3 A. Yes, that is right. In our opinion, it was
4 the logical follow-up to Busovaca, Joint Commission,
5 that is where we had -- at that point we had the two
6 deputy commanders.
7 Q. Indeed, ECMM intended the same protocol of
8 two deputies serving in the Busovaca Joint Commission;
10 A. You have to be careful with the terms that
11 you are using. The agreement was signed by General
12 Morillon, by Ambassador Thebault and then by the two
13 commanders of the corps that were there. It was not
14 the -- only at the initiative of ECMM. The documents
15 referred to negotiations between the different levels.
16 What I conclude from this is that it was the intention
17 of these people on site to have both of the joint
18 commanders in order to give the proper credibility so
19 that the joint commands would be credible and would be
20 able to operate as they should.
21 Q. When you said "both of the joint commanders",
22 do you mean the two deputy commanders, to have them
23 together in the Joint Operational Centre?
24 A. Yes, that is right.
25 MR. HAYMAN: I have one more document for the
1 witness, Mr. President. If the usher could assist.
3 This, I believe, will be Exhibit D117. While
4 that is being distributed, let me ask you,
5 Lieutenant-Colonel, Exhibit D116, which is the joint
6 agreement, is this an authentic document from your
7 private archive?
8 A. D116?
9 Q. Correct, yes.
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. HAYMAN: This document,
12 Lieutenant-Colonel, I can tell you -- insofar as
13 I understand it, it is in the BSC language -- this is
14 the first joint order issued by the Joint Operational
15 Centre on April 22nd, 1993.
16 Let me ask my colleague to read the title.
17 Again, the contents are not so important for my present
18 purpose. I would like my colleague to read the
19 identification of the parties in the two corners at the
20 top of the page, the title of the document, then the
21 parties signing the document and their respective
22 titles. Could you do that, please?
23 MR. NOBILO: In the left-hand corner it says:
24 "The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
25 Commander of the Third Corps Zenica."
1 Below that, we have in handwriting:
2 "Bila", which is the place, "22nd April
4 In the right-hand corner it says:
5 "The Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the
6 Croatian Defence Council, the command of the
7 Central Bosnia Operation Zone, advance post, Vitez."
8 In the middle we have the heading of the
10 "The first Joint Operation Centre of the HVO
11 and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
12 We are going on to the signatures now. On
13 the left side we have the stamp of the army of the
14 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Third Corps and the
15 text says:
16 "Deputy commander of the Third Corps, Dzemo
18 On the right side is the stamp of the
19 Central Bosnia Operative Zone of the Croatian Community
20 of Herceg-Bosna, signed by deputy commander of the
21 Central Bosnia Operative Zone, Franjo Nakic.
22 MR. HAYMAN: Lieutenant-Colonel, would it
23 surprise you to learn that Colonel Blaskic never had
24 a deputy in his operational zone command; that
25 Mr. Nakic, both before the 16th April and after the
1 16th April, was the Chief of staff of the operational
2 zone, Central Bosnia and that references to him, as
3 a deputy commander were made for purposes of ECMM
4 protocol and the documents that were created that gave
5 rise to the Busovaca Joint Commission and the Joint
6 Operational Centre? Would it surprise you, sir, to
7 learn those facts?
8 A. I would be very surprised, and for several
9 reasons, one of which is that all people that I worked
10 with within Zenica on the Busovaca Joint Commission,
11 always said to me that Mr. Nakic was the deputy.
12 Mr. Merdan never contested that.
13 Secondly, all the documents -- and if the
14 Tribunal wishes, I can show you -- that the United --
15 United Nations and UNPROFOR during that period -- as
16 you know, UNPROFOR was trying to give informations for
17 intelligence purposes in order to -- all of them show
18 in their organisational charts that Mr. Nakic was the
19 deputy commander of Colonel Blaskic.
20 In addition to that, I have a very clear
21 recollection of having had discussions with Merdan, who
22 told me that further to that, Nakic was no longer the
23 deputy commander, he was the Chief of operations.
24 If Mr. Nakic had still been the chief of
25 staff, well then somebody was demonstrating bad faith
1 because I always called him the deputy commander. It
2 was really somebody was showing bad faith and people
3 would be trying to show me documents or make me say
4 things that are not -- that have mistakes in them.
5 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I offer Defence
6 Exhibits 112, 113, 114, 115, 116 and 117. I have
7 nothing further for the witness.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I cannot see how
9 Exhibits 115 and 117 are exhibits at all, since the
10 witness has never seen these documents before. They
11 are in a language which he does not understand and they
12 have just been produced by the Defence. I do not think
13 these can be exhibited into evidence at all.
14 JUDGE JORDA: As things stand now, I do not
15 think they can be tendered as evidence. They do not
16 comply with the Trial Chamber's case law in respect of
17 tendering of documents. Therefore, for the time being
18 we will keep them in abeyance. We will not accept them
19 yet and we will see what we will do later on in the
21 Mr. Cayley, I suppose you want to exercise
22 your right to re-examination?
23 MR. CAYLEY: Please, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Proceed.
25 Re-examined by MR. CAYLEY
1 Q. Colonel Landry, I will not keep you too long,
2 I will try to get through this as fast as I can.
3 You will recall in cross-examination you were
4 asked a number of questions about the briefing for new
5 ECMM Monitors. Unless you require it in front of you,
6 I will not place it in front of you because it will
7 simply add to the time.
8 In that document, Mr. Hayman questioned you
9 about paragraph 27; paragraph 27 being the paragraph
10 where it states that it is believed -- that is the HVO
11 is believed to be controlled by the Croatian army from
12 Zagreb. The HVO operates in two main areas.
13 Now, am I right in saying that the word
14 "believe" is there because it was thought to be true
15 at the time.
16 A. Yes, that is the language that one uses, one
17 was not 100 per cent sure, but when you are like 80 or
18 90 per cent sure.
19 Q. Am I right in saying that subsequent to the
20 production of this document in February of 1993, that
21 further information was gathered about this matter?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. A particular document which I introduced, it
24 is a document that you have provided to the Prosecutor,
25 which Mr. Hayman selectively referred to, is a document
1 of 18th June 1993, which is a report from headquarters
2 ECMM, in which -- and I will summarise, and if you can
3 confirm whether this is correct:
4 "In a recent discussion with ECMM
5 headquarters, Major General Praljak from the Croatian
6 Ministry of Defence acknowledged that Croatia has
7 provided military logistic support to the HVO but
8 denies direct involvement by HV combat forces in the
9 fighting in Central Bosnia."
10 Was that evidence that was subsequently
11 discovered and, indeed, was informed to all ECMM units?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Indeed, you saw a logistics unit in Prozor,
14 in Central Bosnia, an HV logistics unit?
15 A. Yes. When you talk about units, I saw
16 personnel from those units in Prozor, yes.
17 Q. Would you term a logistics unit a combat
19 A. A logistics unit is not a combat unit, even
20 if they can defend -- things set up as defence as part
21 of the organisation, but it is not a combat unit.
22 Q. Can you fight a war without a logistics unit?
23 A. Logistics units have strategic and logistical
24 advantages without them you cannot deploy; you cannot
25 resupply, you can do nothing with your forces.
1 Q. Do you believe that that logistics units that
2 you saw in Prozor was supporting the HV in combat with
3 the Bosnian Serb army?
4 A. What I could deduce is that, in fact, there
5 were decisions taken by the HV command in order to let
6 those units move about in Bosnian territory in such
7 a way that they would either support HV or HVO units,
8 fighting in Bosnia.
9 Q. Indeed, I am right in saying that
10 subsequently a substantial amount of further evidence
11 was discovered that indicated that HV units were
12 supporting the HVO in their fighting in Central Bosnia;
13 is that right?
14 A. Yes, that is right. The information we
15 subsequently received revealed that there was fighting
16 with HV troops or elements which supported the HVO
17 offensives on the road that went from Mostar to
18 Jablanica and Fojnica. This is why it was almost
19 impossible, throughout that State, to move about in
20 those areas and we were prevented from going there.
21 Q. Who are the HVO fighting in that region?
22 A. As far as I know, the reports that we
23 received told us that there was fighting between the
24 HVO and the Bosnian Muslim forces.
25 Q. Did you ever see, moving on, organised HVO
1 units out of control in the municipalities of Busovaca,
2 Kiseljak and Vitez? I will repeat the question: in
3 your time in Central Bosnia, did you ever see organised
4 HVO units out of control in the municipalities of
5 Busovaca, Kiseljak and Vitez?
6 A. "Out of control"? I am trying to listen as
7 careful as I can.
8 JUDGE JORDA: I am sure that you are tired.
9 If you could repeat the question another way,
10 Mr. Cayley, perhaps the witness would understand it
12 MR. CAYLEY: Whilst you were in the
13 municipalities -- your duties involved you going to the
14 municipalities of Busovaca, Kiseljak and Vitez. Did
15 you ever see organised units of the HVO out of
17 MR. HAYMAN: I would object to the question as
18 vague. Out of whose control? What does he mean?
19 MR. CAYLEY: Did you see units that appeared
20 to be acting --
21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, ask your question in
22 a different way, Mr. Cayley. The objection is granted.
23 MR. CAYLEY: Colonel Landry, during your time
24 in Central Bosnia, did you ever see, in the
25 municipalities of Busovaca, Vitez or Kiseljak, military
1 units of the HVO that apparently appeared to be acting
2 at their own will?
3 A. I heard about certain incidents which said
4 that there were troops acting in a way that was out of
5 control, but in respect of civil war, there was nothing
6 to say to me the HVO troops were not controlled -- that
7 they were not answerable to the chain of command.
8 Q. Now, Mr. Hayman asked you a large number of
9 questions about supply routes in and out of Bosnia and
10 whether or not they were controlled by the HVO or the
11 BiH. A very simple question: you were there for
12 a large period of time, from March of 1993 through to
13 August of 1993; who was better supplied in
14 Central Bosnia, the HVO or the BiH? When I say "better
15 supplied", I am talking about weapons, ammunition?
16 A. I think beyond the shadow of a doubt that
17 from the beginning of the period until the end of
18 June -- the beginning of June it was the HVO, because
19 they had control over the roads, the main roads, that
20 major road that brought in all supplies into
21 Central Bosnia and Tuzla, that is why there was a Tuzla
22 convoy because the supplies were not arriving where
23 they were supposed to.
24 Q. Mr. Hayman introduced a subject to you and
25 then actually closed it down before you were able to
1 fully express yourself. That concerns the events in
2 Travnik of 13th June 1993.
3 Am I right in saying that the report that was
4 prepared by Jean-Pierre Thebault on 13th June 1993,
5 stated that the HVO, through massive propaganda,
6 deliberately arranged for a massive exodus of Croats
7 from Travnik; is that correct?
8 A. That was the information that we had at that
9 time and which moved Mr. Thebault in giving much more
10 weight to the headquarters by under-scoring that book.
11 Q. Let us speak about the events at the Kaonik
12 camp, the imprisoned foreign Muslim nationals.
13 Did the HVO ever tell you that the Busovaca
14 Joint Commission, that there were a number of foreign
15 nationals being held at Kaonik pending criminal
17 A. No, it was the BiH troops who told us in
18 early March that there were foreigners, foreign
19 nationals. I think also two Bosnian drivers who had
20 been arrested and who were in that prison. Later on --
21 which came much later on, perhaps around middle or end
22 of March, we learned that there were foreign nationals
23 who were arrested by the HVO.
24 Q. Did the Bosnian Army representatives ask, on
25 a number of occasions, the Busovaca Joint Commission
1 for the release of those foreign nationals?
2 A. I remember unfortunately only the two
3 occasions, the two dates I mentioned to you, regarding
4 the freeing of these people, but perhaps other things
5 could have happened. But I remember those two in
7 Q. I will ask the question again, because
8 I think you may have not got a proper translation.
9 Do you recall whether representatives of the
10 Bosnian Army asked the Busovaca Joint Commission of the
11 HVO about the status of these people, actually asked
12 for their release; the individuals that were imprisoned
13 at Kaonik camp?
14 A. Yes, I remember on two specific occasions
15 where this was done, where protest was made and we
16 asked the HVO -- Bosnia asked the HVO corps for some
17 information about these foreign nationals and asked for
18 them to be freed.
19 I also recall that at some point in time we
20 wanted to visit one of these detention centres but we
21 were refused access. I also recall another occasion
22 where some pressure was put on the Red Cross
23 authorities to try to also put pressure on the HVO
24 authorities to also give us access to these detention
25 centres, but this is a very vague memory I have.
1 Q. What was the HVO response to the request for
2 the release of these Muslim nationals?
3 A. I really cannot respond directly because I --
4 I cannot remember whether there was anything really
5 official of freeing, or whether or not these prisoners
6 were to be handed over to other members, whether they
7 were to be evacuated. I cannot really remember -- I do
8 not remember what answer we received, but all I can
9 tell you is that the action which was taken was taken
10 by the HVO and that the HVO were -- rather the action
11 to be taken by the HVO did not really satisfy the
13 Q. Moving on, Mr. Hayman asked you a number of
14 questions and showed you certain documents about events
15 which occurred in January of 1993 in Busovaca.
16 Where were you in January 1993?
17 A. I was serving in the HQ in the Libyan
19 Q. Where is that located?
20 A. In province of Quebec in a country called
22 Q. You were present in March and April of 1993;
23 who, in your view, started the conflict during that
24 period of time?
25 A. The conflict initiated in March and April, or
1 the conflict initiated in January, because the conflict
2 initiated in January --
3 Q. I am referring specifically to the conflict
4 initiated in the March/April period of 1993.
5 A. What I told you was that all of the
6 information we were receiving -- in this information
7 there were many, many provocative incidents which came
8 from the HVO and that in these incidents, there was
9 violence that was committed, in which both sides
10 committed such acts, using the weapons they had in
11 their possession.
12 Q. Mr. Hayman asked you a number of questions
13 about whether or not a commander is expected to -- or
14 would expect to receive reports from his subordinates
15 and would be expected to transmit reports to his
16 subordinates. Is it not also expected of an army
17 commander to actually go out into the field and visit
18 his units to ensure that they are properly incorporated
19 within the chain of command?
20 A. As I told you, this is why there is a head of
21 operations, and also a deputy commander so that he can
22 be freed and therefore, he can ensure his authority is
23 carried out and he can have this handed down to his
24 subordinate. This is how a command is carried out.
25 Q. A couple of final questions, Colonel: you are
1 a lieutenant-colonel, do you have colleagues of your
2 age who are now generals?
3 A. At least two colleagues of my class who
4 became brigadier-generals.
5 MR. CAYLEY: What, in your view, are the
6 qualities that are required of a colonel to be promoted
7 to the rank of a general?
8 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope of
9 cross-examination, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course. The objection
11 is sustained. Please go on to another question,
13 MR. CAYLEY: I have no further questions, your
15 JUDGE JORDA: All right.
16 Now, Lieutenant-Colonel, you are going to
17 receive some questions from the judges. This one is
18 from Judge Riad. Judge Riad, you have the floor.
19 JUDGE RIAD: Hello, Colonel Landry.
20 I have a number of questions for you. First
21 of all, let us be very clear. I would like to have
22 some instances clarified even further. I have before
23 me here an order coming from General Blaskic, from
24 18th April 1993 in Vitez. It is only in English, I was
25 not able to obtain this document in French, so I will
1 read it in English. This is paragraph 4, which orders:
2 "Gather the relevant data about the actors
3 of the conflict, the causes of banishing people,
4 murdering civilians and soldiers, burning houses and
5 other buildings."
6 Actually, what he is doing here is ordering
7 to get hold of the authors or the perpetrators of these
9 Now, to your knowledge, when were these
10 orders carried out and what happened to these orders?
11 Were there measures carried out? Were there any
12 actions taken against the perpetrators, did they look
13 for these perpetrators?
14 A. To my memory I cannot remember, your Honour,
15 any reports that came subsequently that would confirm
16 that the perpetrators of these crimes were arrested or
17 whether any investigation was carried out by the HVO
18 authorities to try to learn what had happened.
19 To the best of my knowledge, I do not
20 remember having seen any report to this effect.
21 JUDGE RIAD: I will also ask you whether or
22 not you can clarify some of the issues, the fact that
23 there was nothing said. Earlier you stated that the
24 HVO did not give any assistance regarding the
25 investigations in the Ahmici village and also in Vitez
1 and that no report was submitted to the Commission, if
2 I understand what you stated correctly.
3 Now, this absence of presence of any reports,
4 would you say that was a position, or would indicate
5 the position of the HVO towards your Commission,
6 indicating they did not wish to cooperate, or would you
7 fear that perhaps -- would you think rather it was only
8 about the incidents of the Ahmici village and also
9 Vitez that they were decided not coming?
10 A. There were some reports in the month of March
11 and April. In fact, I reported in the month of March
12 that I felt that things were going well and that both
13 sides were cooperating in that they were able to
14 implement this cease-fire agreement.
15 But, from the month of April, principally in
16 the early part of the month of April, we had the
17 feeling, or I had the feeling and my colleagues that,
18 on the HVO side, it seems they were looking for any
19 excuse they could find not to cooperate, while on the
20 Bosnian side they seemed to be always ready to
21 cooperate and to assist us.
22 You talked about the Ahmici incidents; I can
23 also mention other incidents in which -- there were
24 incidents committed in the Kiseljak area. I can also
25 refer you to reports in which Canadian troops which
1 were accompanying investigators for the ECMM were fired
2 upon by HVO troops. They did not want for us to be
3 able to move on our own to be able to investigate these
4 allegations of crimes that were allegedly committed.
5 So, once again, I must say that from my own
6 memory of what happened in this field, it was never the
7 case with the Bosnians. They were always with us or at
8 least with me when we carried out our investigations.
9 So we did not really have the same type of support or
10 the same willingness to offer resources to carry out
11 such reports or these investigations.
12 JUDGE RIAD: Did you try to learn why? Which
13 conclusion did you draw?
14 A. Well, the conclusion I have drawn is that,
15 indeed, they did not want to cooperate. They did not
16 want to cooperate completely with the members of the
17 ECMM in order to put an end to this practice which is
18 being carried out. That is the conclusion I have
19 drawn, as well as the conclusions of my colleagues;
20 that there was some effort -- rather, there was not
21 a very open attitude on their behalf, which is
22 different from the other side. It seems that they
23 always wanted to push things back, to delay and delay,
24 and restricting people from being able to move about,
25 to such a point that our head of Mission told us in one
1 of his reports that 10,000 civilian Croats were forced
2 to leave the Travnik area, so that they can control the
3 area and make sure that the HVO had a better position.
4 JUDGE RIAD: I see. Perhaps you were seen
5 very poorly then, as a sort of obstacle; is that
7 A. Yes, that is correct.
8 JUDGE RIAD: You spoke of a mock execution
9 which was carried out in Skradno; do you recall? You
10 said that there was a mock execution that was being
11 carried out. Were there riots in Skradno that would
12 justify this type of terror?
13 A. No, because the people I am referring to were
14 two women, in particular, with children, who came
15 crying and told me what had happened to them. I could
16 not understand the reasons for these type of gestures,
17 even to the point at which I learned later on, during
18 other visits, that when these people tried to leave
19 Skradno village, they had to sign a paper saying that
20 they were doing so on their own free will and that
21 these people were displaced persons who were living in
22 the sector.
23 JUDGE RIAD: Are you saying they did not do
24 this freely?
25 A. When you say "not doing it freely" what do
1 you mean?
2 JUDGE RIAD: You are saying that they do not
3 leave freely, on their own free will?
4 A. No, because they had to sign a document
5 saying they left the village and they had to leave
6 their goods, but they had do so without --
7 JUDGE RIAD: You are saying then they had to
8 leave -- not of their own free will?
9 A. What I am saying to you, your Honour, is that
10 equipment was being stolen, their vehicles were being
11 stolen, life was being made very difficult for them,
12 even at the hospital in Busovaca, so it seems that they
13 were being told: "If you wish to be treated in
14 a better manner, then go to Zenica, there the Muslims
15 will take care of you. In the meantime, if you do
16 that, we will make sure that we can use your house and
17 perhaps take possession of this house for our people".
18 Later on a report was submitted and I saw
19 this later on in which people were forced, Muslims who
20 had been displaced, they were forced to leave Skradno
21 and this was organised and, indeed, I was in the field
22 when this was organised and they organised buses and
23 all the displaced persons who were occupying houses
24 were Muslims from Zenica, were quite simply forced to
25 leave this housing, even though they were there for six
1 months. That way, other displaced persons from HVO
2 were able then to take possession of Skradno.
3 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.
4 I would also like to ask you a question about
5 Rotilj. It was HOS, you said HOS had created this
6 tragedy by burning the houses, et cetera.
7 I would like to know whether this HOS was
8 a dissident of the HVO or adversary of the HVO; what is
9 this HOS?
10 A. Well, there are two views on this: either HOS
11 was the dissident of the HVO who were committing crimes
12 so that they could not be recognised. Perhaps they are
13 wearing hoods. Another theory is that HOS was quite
14 simply an extension of the elite troops which were
15 being used in order to carry out an ethnic cleansing
16 and also to create violent situations against the other
17 ethnic group to force that ethnic group to do the same
18 thing, then eventually to use the situation to show
19 that the two communities could not live together.
20 Then, eventually to force the Croatians who
21 were living in the Bosnian zone to return to their
22 Croatian zones.
23 This I was able to experience myself during
24 the entire summer-time, knowing that there were some
25 10,000 to 20,000 people in Zenica who were mainly
1 families living there and to see on a regular basis
2 pressure put upon them by the HVO, asking that these
3 people leave Zenica to go back to Vitez.
4 JUDGE RIAD: Now, this HOS, no matter how one
5 might see them, do you feel that they were able to be
6 controlled by the HVO? Were they stronger than the
8 A. Perhaps they were stronger than the HVO. One
9 thing is certain, that the number of incidents that
10 were created or instigated by HOS tells me they
11 definitely use much of the equipment that belonged to
12 the HVO, either artillery ammunitions or weapons and
14 JUDGE RIAD: You are not very clear, you
15 always talk about the command responsibility without
16 talking about Colonel Blaskic, in particular. Who was
17 the commander?
18 A. The commander at that point in time, it was
19 Colonel Blaskic.
20 JUDGE RIAD: He was the uncontested
22 A. Well, what I am telling you is that as far as
23 I know from all the documents I have and all the
24 meetings I participated in, it was Blaskic who always
25 presented himself as the commander of the HVO troops in
1 Central Bosnia.
2 JUDGE RIAD: You said that when you arrived
3 that Colonel Blaskic was captain; is that right?
4 A. No, what I stated was that what I was told
5 was that Colonel Blaskic was once a captain in the
6 Yugoslav army, while his equivalent is -- his
7 counterpart was a colonel at that point. The two knew
8 each other and that perhaps might explain why
9 Hadzihuseinvoic had occasion to sit at the same table
10 as his HVO counterpart.
11 JUDGE RIAD: So let us say then he was
12 a captain, then later on became colonel, then
13 a general. You might -- you should also agree with me
14 that this was a very fast promotion to that level; what
15 were the reasons for this very quick rise to this rank?
16 A. I can tell you that during the Second World
17 War, these type of promotions happen quite commonly.
18 If you have a lack of officers, then you will take your
19 best members and you would put them in two command
20 positions. I think that this was -- it had already
21 been one year since the operations had been carried out
22 in Bosnia -- on Bosnian soil. So I can assume, perhaps
23 in a naive fashion, that the HVO headquarters in Mostar
24 continued to maintain him in that post because he was
25 someone doing a good job and he had the responsibility
1 for all of the HVO forces in Central Bosnia and also
2 all the equipment.
3 JUDGE RIAD: So this is someone who has some
5 A. Either someone who is very intelligent who
6 was good control or someone who has a very good
7 knowledge of the military situation and has a good deal
8 of clout. I say he has a very good knowledge of his
9 men and also of the terrain because on several
10 occasions I have said that some of this troops were in
11 isolated area, so he must have a very good sense of his
12 men and be able to assess the knowledge of his men and
13 be able also to put them into very specific locations
14 and then give them human and material resources.
15 JUDGE RIAD: One last question: you also
16 spoke about the presence of logistics and the Croatian
17 forces, I think also you talked about Croatian
18 logistics and also Croatian forces. From whom would
19 these Croatians receive their orders? Would they
20 receive them from the command -- in your opinion, the
21 command that was the Bosnian command from the HVO and
22 Colonel Blaskic, or would it, instead, come from the
23 Croatian authorities?
24 A. I must admit to you, your Honour, that the HV
25 troops that I saw in Bosnia were not under the orders
1 of Colonel Blaskic, but rather within the command zone
2 which dealt with Herzegovina.
3 All I can tell you is that I had good
4 relations with the people dealing with -- later on,
5 I can see that there were relations that were
6 maintained, but I cannot -- it is difficult to say
7 whether or not -- that in some places, it is difficult
8 to say whether or not some troops, which are using some
9 areas, were co-ordinated by the country which was
10 lending these troops. So, I saw this, together with my
11 colleagues, as strategy that was being established in
12 which the Croatians were supporting certain missions or
13 certain types of operations in Bosnian soil. This
14 would be for their long-term plans that they may have
16 JUDGE RIAD: You were saying this was to
17 serve some sort of Croatian policy on a long-term
19 A. Yes, that is right.
20 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen, do you have
21 any questions?
22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Colonel, there were two
23 sides in conflict; Croats and Muslims. There was the
24 Busovaca Joint Commission. My impression is that the
25 function of the Joint Commission was to try to defuse
1 any military confrontation between the two sides; am
2 I right?
3 A. (Answer not translated).
4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you. Now, all the
5 purpose, the Commission would deal with someone on each
6 side. On the Croatian side, with whom would the
7 Commission deal?
8 A. Yes, with the senior representative who was
9 there at that time, Mr. Nakic.
10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: However you describe it,
11 Mr. Nakic represented whom?
12 A. He represented -- I am sorry, he represented
13 the commander of the central operational zone, that is
14 to say, Colonel Blaskic at that time.
15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you then deal with
16 Colonel Blaskic in respect of all military incidents,
17 including those involving the HOS?
18 A. It was not -- it was not my task. My task at
19 hand at that time and where I could intervene was with
20 the two deputy commanders. This was the authority
21 I had.
22 If we were to also intervene at a higher
23 level, at that time it would be Ambassador Thebault who
24 was to apprise us of the situation. Then, he was the
25 one who was going to meet with Colonel Blaskic.
1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me rephrase the
2 question slightly: you, yourself, would not deal with
3 Colonel Blaskic; right?
4 A. That is right.
5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: The Commission would
6 deal with him through Mr. Nakic?
7 A. Yes, that was my understanding of the
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So all I am asking is
10 this: when military incidents occurred which involved
11 the HOS, would the Commission deal with Mr. Nakic or
12 with Colonel Blaskic in relation to those incidents?
13 A. To the best of my knowledge, to the best of
14 my knowledge, all of the protests, no matter whether or
15 not they were committed by bandits or by the HOS or by
16 HVO troops, were subjected to the Commission, all of
17 the protests. It was the Commission then that, as
18 I explained, would take action.
19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: The machinery of the
20 Commission would ultimately involve reference to
21 Colonel Blaskic?
22 A. Yes, that is right.
23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now then, shall we move
24 on to your testimony about statements made to you about
25 the existence of a mass grave for Croats? I think it
1 was in the vicinity of Zenica. Do you recall that part
2 of your evidence?
3 A. Yes, I remember that part of my evidence.
4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: You, as in duty bound,
5 went out to investigate, did you?
6 A. I went to investigate those allegations,
8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I just want a little bit
9 of clarification about something you may have said
10 which may also have escaped my attention.
11 Did your investigations turn up evidence
12 about the existence of the mass grave?
13 A. Yes. I was not able to find out exactly how
14 many bodies there were. They did not dig them up in
15 front of me. But with the Bosnian authorities, we were
16 able to determine where the mass grave was located and
17 with the authorities of the Red Cross later on, the
18 incident was indicated in our daily reports, that is
19 what we found.
20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: You mentioned the
21 Bosnian authorities. Did they cooperate with you in
22 respect of those investigations?
23 A. Yes. I want to put things back into
24 perspective, your Honour. This happened, if I am not
25 mistaken, in July. At that point, the situation in
1 Central Bosnia had completely changed. There were all
2 types of allegations regarding violence against the
3 Croats who had remained in Zenica. This -- regularly
4 we would keep changing our attitude towards the Croats,
5 sometimes we would be against the Croats, sometimes we
6 would take negative positions against the Bosnian
7 troops who committed certain actions.
8 I remember I had gone to see the Bosnian
9 authorities and I asked them to be able to go to
10 investigate the allegation, and that I went there at
11 that time with Father Stefan and there were also
12 allegations in the same report according to which there
13 had been desecration of a Croatian church.
14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us turn briefly
15 to the incidents which occurred at Ahmici. You have
16 heard from learned counsel for the Defence of certain
17 documents signed by Colonel Blaskic in relation to
18 those events.
19 Now, if Colonel Blaskic had, in fact,
20 undertaken an investigation into those events, was that
21 investigation something which was likely to come to
22 your notice, either directly or through the Busovaca
23 Joint Commission?
24 A. It was starting at that point, that the
25 Busovaca Joint Commission ceased to exist and was
1 replaced by the joint headquarters. At that point
2 I was moved from the Busovaca Commission to the
3 Operational Centre. In all good faith, I have to tell
4 you that if this type of report had been submitted to
5 us at ECMM, I should have been made aware of it, and we
6 would have talked about it on an every-day basis.
7 I have to tell you that I have absolutely no memory of
8 having seen that. That is a report from General
9 Blaskic on the incidents at Ahmici. To the contrary,
10 I saw other reports from a special committee that was
11 done later, by --
12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: General, I am not
13 talking about reports now. I am asking you this: if,
14 in fact, he had instituted an investigation, would the
15 fact of that investigation have come to your notice?
16 A. Well, it should have. I do not remember ever
17 having seen one though.
18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: If, in fact, he had
19 instituted an investigation into the events at Ahmici,
20 would you have regarded that as a matter of importance?
21 A. Absolutely, your Honour.
22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I have a last question
23 for you, and it concerns your evidence about the
24 evolution of relations between the two sides. As
25 I understood you, you were saying that relations
1 between the two sides were improving during March, but
2 that, come early April, they started to deteriorate; is
3 that a rough summary of your evidence on the point?
4 A. Yes, that is correct, your Honour.
5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So, the threshold point
6 would have been represented by the first week of April;
7 that is the threshold point in the dip in the quality
8 of relations between the two sides, the change would
9 have occurred sometime in the first week of April?
10 A. The reason that I am hesitating is that I am
11 trying to remember the date when I tried to have --
12 together with the local commanders -- to have the
13 trenches filled in. I think it must have been --
14 I would say, yes, it was more or less around the first
15 week of April.
16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: We are agreed after
18 A. (Witness nods head).
19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you.
20 Now, you mentioned the Vance-Owen Plan, which
21 I think assigned province number 10 to the Croats. Do
22 you remember your references to the Vance-Owen Plan?
23 A. Yes, very well.
24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I think you said that
25 the Croatians were the first to sign on to the plan; is
1 that correct?
2 A. That is how I remember it, yes, that the
3 Croats were the first who agreed.
4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Then I take it you would
5 accept that there is a difference between signing
6 a plan and the implementation of the plan on the
7 ground. You recognise the distinction?
8 A. (Witness nods head).
9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, did any information
10 ever come to your notice about an ultimatum or
11 something in the nature of an ultimatum, having been
12 issued by the Croatian side to the Muslim side
13 requiring implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan by
14 15th April?
15 A. When we were on the ground, I was not given
16 that type of information. The only thing that I can
17 remember is I believe that the Muslims or Izetbegovic
18 had signed the Vance-Owen Plan at the end of March or
19 at least he had let it be understood that he had agreed
20 with the implementation, or at least the principles of
21 the Vance-Owen Plan.
22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you, Colonel.
23 JUDGE JORDA: Very quickly, Colonel, because
24 you have answered many questions of my colleagues:
25 Ahmici. I did not really understand something; at one
1 point you said there was no strategic objective. Then
2 at another point in your testimony you said that there
3 was a strategic objective. I did not grasp that.
4 Perhaps you could clarify that conclusion for me,
6 A. I would have to tell you that I must have led
7 you astray. When I spoke about strategic objectives
8 I meant that militarily I did not see any reason for
9 this kind of operation to be carried out, because as
10 far as I knew it was not a military strong point for
11 either side. Then later on, had it really been
12 a strategic point it should have been maintained,
13 troops should have been left there or at least
14 positions should have been constructed in order to
15 confront the other side. Perhaps it was in that
16 perspective that I expressed myself poorly with the
17 word "strategic" or "tactical".
18 JUDGE JORDA: One or two short additional
20 When you speak about uncontrolled or
21 uncontrollable forces, have you heard of things like --
22 uncontrolled troops such as the Jokers -- the Vitezovi?
23 A. When I did some research, I saw those words
24 were used, but the same thing was also in existence,
25 that was the HOS -- the Muslims had the same -- had
1 accounted for the HOS. They had the type of HOS
2 stripes, they were the Mujehadeen amongst the Muslims
3 who had insignia on their shoulders which would show
4 a naked woman. I have a picture of that.
5 JUDGE JORDA: I did not quite understand what
6 your answer was to the Defence counsel when he asked
7 you whether, for a military authority -- a high-ranking
8 military authority, in order to understand his
9 authority he -- one must take into account all
10 information and reports that came from his
11 subordinates. I think the question that you were asked
12 was to find out whether this type of information
13 appeared important to you, and I think the word
14 "crucial" was, in fact, used.
15 I do not know whether you answered that.
16 Could you specify that more clearly, please?
17 A. Yes. It is clearer for me in the way you
18 have asked the question. Yes, indeed. It is an
19 essential tool for any good military commander. It is
20 good to give orders and have them executed, but one has
21 to also know -- to get feedback, as we say in military
22 talk, in order to adjust the troops or to whether we
23 have to readjust our weak and strong points, we
24 absolutely need feedback from information coming out of
25 our advanced troops so that we might be able to have an
1 influence over the outcome of the battle by taking the
2 appropriate measures in order to counter or to respond
3 to the information that one has received.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.
5 When you talk about the Croatian units, the
6 strategic ones, apparently, whose visible traces you
7 found, in your opinion, were they there in respect of
8 the previous conflict against the common enemy, which
9 was Serbia, or did you have the impression from all the
10 information sources that you received that their
11 strategic objective had changed and that they were now
12 following another policy?
13 A. I believe that in the region that we saw them
14 in Prozor -- it was difficult to understand that those
15 Prozor troops were logistical and that they were in
16 order to fight against the Serbs on the front.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.
18 You spoke a great deal about the strategy;
19 this kind of two-faced game, provocation, underhanded
20 provocations in order to then give rise to a conflict,
21 then to respond to the reprisals or to the responses of
22 the Muslims. Then there was a kind of -- as opposed to
23 a kind of image that one wanted to give out as ideally
24 as possible before the international community. That
25 was very clear in how you spoke. My last question is
1 to know whether this opinion is a strictly personal
2 one, or is it an opinion that was carried along by
3 UNPROFOR, by the politicians? I am not asking --
4 talking about indirect testimony, I am just asking
5 about whether this was a personal opinion mostly, or
6 a rather widespread opinion held among political and
7 military authorities at the time?
8 A. I would have to tell you very clearly that
9 this was the opinion that was shared at that time by
10 all of the ECMM officials and which was also shared by
11 the UNPROFOR headquarters.
12 I would tell you that even if it was shared,
13 there was a hesitation, a reluctance to say it, because
14 you did not have all the details to confirm what had
15 happened -- you needed more details to confirm it.
16 But, I was in a position to give a more
17 personal opinion, a more specific opinion in that
18 respect. In fact, that is what happened.
19 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, if there are no
20 further and additional questions, we have finished.
21 You have given very, very substantive testimony to the
22 Tribunal and the Tribunal needs witnesses who have
23 strong convictions.
24 The International Criminal Tribunal would
25 like to thank you. You may now go back to your own
1 country with the feeling of having done your duty,
2 which is the principle according to which all
3 high-ranking military people adhere. Do not move for
4 the time being. We are going to end our work.
5 Mr. Harman, we will resume tomorrow afternoon
6 again, probably at 2.30. I think that we will not be
7 able to beyond 5.30. The length of the questions
8 asked, of course, will determine how far we can get and
9 I know that you do not want the witness to come back on
10 Monday, but all of us are serving the cause of justice,
11 and if he has to come back on Monday, then he will come
12 back on Monday. I was sensitive to the fact that this
13 witness has already been displaced more than once. We
14 will try to do everything we can in order for things to
15 go as smoothly as possible tomorrow.
16 I see Mr. Kehoe has stood up and has a comment
17 he would like to make or a question he would like to
18 ask. Mr. Kehoe, does it have to do with the schedule?
19 Let me remind you that we have a meeting of the
20 presiding judges of the Chambers tomorrow in the
21 beginning of the afternoon. We hope to be finished by
22 2.30. I am not quite sure, I am not the one in charge
23 of the meeting; it is the President of the Tribunal who
25 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President and your
1 Honours. With regard to Mr. Vuilliamy, he has informed
2 me that he has significant professional obligations
3 that he has put off several times and has to go back to
4 the United States on Sunday. He cannot hold over --
5 this is what he told me, he could not hold over until
6 Monday, assuming we do not finish tomorrow afternoon.
7 I will check with him and discuss it with him
8 at some length to see if he can accommodate those
9 plans, but he seemed to indicate to me that he could
10 not. Possibly I will ask what plans we could settle to
11 have him come back at another session to complete any
13 At this point, Mr. President, I cannot tell
14 you that, based on what he has told me, that he could
15 come back on Monday. He has just had some serious
16 professional problems -- concerns, I should say.
17 JUDGE RIAD: Are you more or less informed
18 about the time he would take to give his testimony?
19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I think the story he will
20 tell and, consistent with your Honours' opinion, it
21 will be in a narrative form with very, very few
22 questions on my part, it should be approximately two
23 hours, two and-a-half hours or so. Depending on how
24 quickly it goes, that is about how it would.
25 JUDGE JORDA: For things to be very clear,
1 I do not want to give the impression that the judges
2 are not available to the cause of justice, but please
3 realise that I have commitments outside the Netherlands
4 and that I have cancelled them tomorrow. I have
5 a plane that leaves at 10.30 in the evening. This does
6 not mortgage tomorrow's hearing, but as we all know,
7 one has to go to an airport in order to get an
8 aeroplane. I have cancelled all my engagements for the
9 afternoon, therefore they have been postponed until
10 Saturday morning.
11 Therefore, it is not be the judge who will be
12 the source of any delay. I am simply asking that one
13 take -- acquire the habit of asking a central question,
14 when I said around 5.30, it is so that I have a way of
15 getting to the airport, but I want things to be very,
16 very clear.
17 In any case, it is not the judges who are
18 causing delays. As regards the witness, I do not think
19 the judges are the ones either who are responsible for
20 the fact that the witness who was in front of us has --
21 and whom we thank -- took more time than he initially
22 would. Several weeks ago we agreed we would not limit
23 the testimony time of the witness, in fact, I brought
24 up that question. I think we all agreed and said that
25 this would not be done in this Trial Chamber, that is
1 to limit the number of days for a witness.
2 From that point on, I cannot say anything
3 further. My colleague judges will have to come back as
5 Tomorrow we will have more or less a regular
6 day, a normal afternoon. Perhaps we should have begun
7 Mr. Vulliamy's testimony today. Colonel Landry had many
8 things to say and the cross-examination was also very
9 detailed and very useful. Therefore, everyone is doing
10 his best, but I think things have to be very clear.
11 I cancelled all my appointments for tomorrow afternoon
12 in a neighbouring country in order to allow the witness
13 to testify. I am not the master of the
14 examination-in-chief or the cross-examination and we
15 will do what we can.
16 If Mr. Vulliamy has to come back a third time,
17 he will, but it will be another time, it will not be
18 Monday. I simply say that we all understand the rules
19 of the game. We understand we are in a legal system
20 where ordinarily, except for special occasions,
21 a witness should be able to be heard in three hours.
22 This is an old discussion. If you think that
23 this cannot be done, very well. This is not the judge
24 who can impose another rule on you and will not do so.
25 In that case, the witness would simply have to come
1 back. I think things are clear now.
2 Once again, the Tribunal thanks
3 Colonel Landry. The court stands adjourned and we will
4 resume tomorrow at 2.30 pm.
5 (6.45 pm)
6 (The hearing adjourned until 2.30 pm
7 on Friday, 24th April 1998)