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  1. 1 Thursday, 2nd July, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 10.00 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Would the

    5 registrar please bring in the accused?

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Good morning to the

    8 interpreters. Can you hear me? Good morning also to

    9 the parties, the Prosecution and the Defence, and

    10 Mr. Blaskic.

    11 We can now then continue. Mr. Prosecutor,

    12 Mr. Harmon?

    13 MR. HARMON: Yes, good morning,

    14 Mr. President, Your Honours, and good morning counsel.

    15 The next witness we have who will testify is

    16 a witness who has no protections --

    17 THE REGISTRAR: I have no transcript.

    18 MR. HARMON: We have a technical difficulty,

    19 Mr. President, I'm informed.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: What is the technical problem

    21 we have?

    22 THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me for the

    23 interruption, but we have no transcript on our screens,

    24 so it will be delayed to some degree. We do not have

    25 any except on the small laptop computers. That's the

  2. 1only place we have the transcripts.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: When you say that will delay

    3 us, what do you mean by that? I see now. I think

    4 perhaps it's corrected.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: What I mean is that

    6 apparently it is in the process of being repaired.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Registrar. I

    8 like your expression, it's "on the way."

    9 THE REGISTRAR: All right. Now I believe

    10 that we are ready.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We are in agreement

    12 with the first sentence which is on the transcript. We

    13 are all ready indeed.

    14 Mr. Harmon, you may now resume with your

    15 comment.

    16 MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President and Your

    17 Honours. Let me first of all begin by introducing a

    18 new colleague in the courtroom, Mr. Jan Vos who is

    19 seated to my left who will be sitting in for a few days

    20 for Mr. Emil van der Does de Willebois who is

    21 unavailable to the Prosecutor's Office. Let me also

    22 indicate to the Court and to counsel that --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: I see on the transcript it's

    24 Vos, V-O-S, is that correct?

    25 MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President. It's one of

  3. 1the few Dutch words I'm capable of pronouncing.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Congratulations and

    3 at the same time I welcome this new member, Mr. Jan

    4 Vos. I hope I have correctly pronounced his name.

    5 Please continue, Mr. Harmon. Which witness will you be

    6 presenting today.

    7 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I will be

    8 presenting a career Dutch military officer,

    9 Lieutenant-Colonel Hendrik Morsink, and I should say at

    10 the outset, at the request of the Dutch government, a

    11 Dutch language interpreter will be assisting him.

    12 Mr. Morsink speaks very good English but the request

    13 has been made of the Dutch government to have him give

    14 his answers in his native tongue, so that request has

    15 been honoured.

    16 Now, as I said, Mr. Morsink -- Colonel

    17 Morsink, is a career Dutch officer. He holds the rank

    18 of Lieutenant-Colonel, he is currently the commander of

    19 the 42nd tank battalion in the Royal Dutch army. From

    20 the 13th of April, 1993, until the 13th of July, 1993,

    21 Colonel Morsink served in Central Bosnia as an ECMM

    22 monitor, and he spent the majority of his time in the

    23 field in Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Zenica, and Travnik

    24 municipalities. You will hear from him that he didn't

    25 spend much time behind the desk, that he was operating

  4. 1at all times driving through the field, having

    2 conversations with HVO officers of various rank and

    3 levels, as well as their Muslim counterparts.

    4 His testimony will focus on a number of

    5 distinct areas. First he will testify about the

    6 Busovaca joint commission and how this institution

    7 evolved into local commissions in Vitez, Busovaca, and

    8 Kiseljak municipalities. In this respect, he will

    9 identify the important HVO and Armija personalities who

    10 were involved in these meetings, and he will tell you

    11 why these institutions were created and how these

    12 institutions functioned.

    13 The next subject about which he will testify

    14 briefly is about the truck bomb explosion that occurred

    15 in Stari Vitez, and specifically his testimony will

    16 focus on complaints that he made to Mario Cerkez about

    17 the truck bomb explosion and about conversations that

    18 were made in the presence of Colonel Blaskic about that

    19 same event. He will testify that Mario Cerkez promised

    20 to investigate this crime, but to his knowledge, no

    21 such investigation was ever done.

    22 The next broad area about which Colonel

    23 Morsink will testify is about the use of HVO propaganda

    24 and disinformation and how the HVO and the HDZ used

    25 this to incite fear in the minds of Bosnian Croats who

  5. 1were residing in areas held by the Armija, and this

    2 resulted in the movement of large numbers of Croats

    3 from these Muslim-controlled areas.

    4 The next area about which he will testify is

    5 he will contrast the attitudes between the HVO and the

    6 ABiH, the Armija, in respect of allegations of serious

    7 allegations of humanitarian law, how the parties, the

    8 respective parties, reacted to these particular serious

    9 allegations.

    10 The next area about which he will testify

    11 will be the HVO interference with humanitarian aid, and

    12 he will provide to Your Honours three examples of that

    13 interference, including two events where he was

    14 personally involved and where he was physically

    15 threatened in the process of trying to ensure that this

    16 humanitarian aid went through.

    17 The next subject he will discuss will concern

    18 an individual that he was in contact with by the name

    19 of Djuti. Djuti was an individual that was described

    20 by the HVO as an uncontrolled element but who, in

    21 reality, was under the control and command of the HVO,

    22 and Colonel Morsink will describe his contacts with

    23 Djuti.

    24 Next, Colonel Morsink will discuss a series

    25 of orders that have the name Tihomir Blaskic on the

  6. 1bottom of those orders and copies of which he received

    2 from BRITBAT. He will identify those orders, and we

    3 will go through those orders with the assistance of

    4 Colonel Morsink.

    5 The next area, Mr. President and Your

    6 Honours, is he will testify about the HVO use of Muslim

    7 civilians to dig trenches and the awareness at all

    8 levels in the chain of command in the HVO of this

    9 illegal practice. He will next discuss the systematic

    10 burning of houses by the HVO, including threats by

    11 Mario Cerkez, who was the Vitez Brigade commander, and

    12 a direct subordinate of the accused, to burn Kruscica,

    13 which was a Muslim village.

    14 The next area about which he will testify

    15 will be to discuss the forcible expulsion of civilians

    16 by the HVO from the village of Gacice and his

    17 complaints about that illegal act. He will testify

    18 that Mario Cerkez explained that the people who were

    19 responsible for that were not the HVO but extremists.

    20 He will briefly tell you about Franjo Nakic,

    21 a man with whom he had frequent dealings and whom, at

    22 the end of his tour of duty, he socialised with

    23 briefly.

    24 Now, as a professional soldier and someone

    25 who spent almost every day on his tour of duty meeting

  7. 1with HVO officers at all levels, he will give you his

    2 opinion about command and control in the HVO and he

    3 will tell you that the HVO was an army that had an

    4 excellent chain of command and he will also tell you

    5 that, in his opinion, Blaskic and his subordinates had

    6 control over their forces in Central Bosnia.

    7 Lastly, he will testify, Mr. President, about

    8 his experiences there and what his experiences led him

    9 to believe occurred to the Muslim population in the

    10 areas commanded -- in the areas controlled by the HVO.

    11 Now, that concludes my summary of the

    12 testimony of Colonel Morsink. Mr. President, in

    13 respect of the indictment, certainly his testimony

    14 relates to command and control issues, his testimony

    15 relates to paragraph 4 and paragraph 5.2 of the

    16 indictment, and it relates to virtually every count in

    17 the indictment. I would note that it relates to Count

    18 1, persecution, and specifically the paragraphs in that

    19 persecution count 6.1, 6.3 through 7 of Count 1, it

    20 relates to Counts 2 through 4, Counts 5 through 10, 11

    21 and 13, and Counts 15 through 18.

    22 That concludes my remarks, Mr. President and

    23 Your Honours.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. You have given us a

    25 summary, and now I would like for this summary to be

  8. 1useful to us. I hope, Mr. Harmon, that you are not

    2 going to have, in detail, a description of the entire

    3 two months spent by Mr. Morsink. I note 13 points that

    4 the witness can comment on, on the joint commission, on

    5 the explosion of the truck, on the times at which he

    6 met with Tihomir Blaskic, and also his dealings with

    7 civilians, and all these matters have been dealt with

    8 by other witnesses.

    9 I also observe, however, that, and I'm not

    10 going to say that we should not talk about this, this

    11 is for you to decide, you are conducting the

    12 examination-in-chief, but please try to deal only on

    13 those aspects which will be new, not to describe the

    14 entire time there from the 13th of April to the 13th of

    15 July, but only on those matters which are new.

    16 Now, with regards to the HVO and the Bosnian

    17 army and also those dealings with humanitarian groups,

    18 perhaps -- I'm not saying this is new -- but perhaps

    19 you might give new light on this subject, perhaps also

    20 the meeting with Djuti, and also orders from Tihomir

    21 Blaskic, all right. I've also noted what you might say

    22 about Franjo Nakic and also responsibility as far as

    23 the chain of command is concerned. All this could

    24 bring something to the Defence and also to the

    25 Tribunal.

  9. 1So as regards the command structure,

    2 Mr. Harmon, and everything else, I would ask,

    3 Mr. Harmon, that you concentrate and focus this

    4 testimony and not that he describe what he did on the

    5 morning of the 13th of April all the way to what

    6 happened on the 13th of July. I want you to focus this

    7 testimony and make sure that this testimony serves its

    8 purpose.

    9 I note all the counts are indeed concerned,

    10 in particular regarding command responsibility.

    11 Now, with regards to the technical

    12 organisation of this courtroom, I see we have a

    13 colleague in the courtroom who is an interpreter. What

    14 arrangements have been made? I believe you stated that

    15 the Dutch government has requested that there be an

    16 interpreter present to work with

    17 Lieutenant-Colonel Morsink, and I simply wish to remind

    18 the interpreter that Rule 76 requires that she make a

    19 solemn declaration according to which she will state

    20 that she will carry out her task with impartiality,

    21 with devotion, and with full conscious of

    22 confidentiality. Madam, will you please take the note

    23 from which you will read the solemn declaration? Your

    24 name is.

    25 THE INTERPRETER: Eva Bodor.

  10. 1JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Madam Eva Bodor,

    2 will you please read the solemn declaration of Rule 76.

    3 THE INTERPRETER: I solemnly declare that I

    4 will interpret faithfully, independently, impartially,

    5 and with full respect for the duty of confidentiality.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. We may

    7 now bring in Lieutenant-Colonel Morsink.

    8 (The witness entered court)

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Does the registrar hear me?

    10 Would you please indicate -- it has been one year now

    11 since we have begun with these proceedings, and the

    12 first thing we should do is to give a headphone to the

    13 witness. Otherwise, he cannot express and we cannot

    14 understand him, thank you.

    15 Now, madam, would you please explain to the

    16 Lieutenant-Colonel that he should give us first his

    17 identity and he should remain standing so that he can

    18 make his solemn declaration.

    19 Very well, first his rank, last name and

    20 first name.

    21 THE WITNESS: My name is Hendrik Morsink, I

    22 am a Lieutenant-Colonel.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel

    24 Morsink. Please remain standing so you that can also

    25 read your solemn declaration.

  11. 1THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare to speak the

    2 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. You may be seated.

    4 Lieutenant-Colonel, we wish you -- rather, we welcome

    5 you here to this courtroom to testify in the case of

    6 the Blaskic case. The accused is here present in this

    7 courtroom.


    9 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Lieutenant-Colonel, we know

    11 about the general outline of your testimony following a

    12 presentation by the Prosecutor. You are going to

    13 receive questions from the Prosecutor. You will then

    14 respond to those questions. And then after that, you

    15 will be receiving questions from the Defence and from

    16 the Judges.

    17 Mr. Harmon, you have the floor. The

    18 Prosecutor may begin.

    19 MR. HARMON:

    20 Q. Colonel Morsink, would you like to put those

    21 headsets on and listen to the English translation? Is

    22 that all right? Okay. And then you can move one of

    23 those off one of the ears and you can listen to the

    24 Dutch colleague to your side. All right.

    25 Colonel, let me ask you, first of all, are

  12. 1you a professional soldier holding the rank of

    2 Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Dutch Army?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Could you please tell the Court about your

    5 background and your training?

    6 A. In 1976, I entered the military academy of

    7 Breda, and I was there, I received a four year training

    8 there, I was recruited in the cavalry in 1980, after

    9 having taken oath as an officer. I then became a

    10 platoon commander.

    11 My following occupation was that of a squad

    12 commander, second in command, and then I followed the

    13 training becoming squadron commander, and then I became

    14 an officer in charge of personnel, personnel officer,

    15 and then I received a promotion, I became the commander

    16 for the Mechanised Brigade, commander of a tank

    17 company, and then I became a liaison officer for that

    18 same battalion. Then I was appointed to the military

    19 school in The Hague where I then was a member of the

    20 army staff. There I underwent training in order to

    21 work at this staff headquarters, and during that

    22 training, I was selected in order to undergo a year and

    23 a half of training for additional training as a

    24 superior officer.

    25 After having undergone that training, I

  13. 1became a major. I then became head of the G-3

    2 operations in a mechanised unit. At the end of that

    3 time period, I then volunteered to be sent and to

    4 participate in a peacekeeping operation in 1993, from

    5 the 13th of April to the 13th of July. I was sent into

    6 Central Bosnia as a member of the European Community.

    7 After that, I was selected by the superior

    8 military school, German military school, or German War

    9 College, and there I was selected to participate in a

    10 course, of course, that was being given there. That

    11 was a two-year training, after which one could become

    12 an officer, superior officer, and I received a

    13 promotion. I was appointed to the rank of

    14 Lieutenant-Colonel. After that, I was stationed or

    15 posted in The Hague for the army staff.

    16 After having worked for three years in this

    17 army staff, I then became the commander of an armoured

    18 company, tank battalion, and that's still what I am

    19 doing today.

    20 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel Morsink. Now

    21 let me turn your attention immediately to your tour of

    22 duty as an ECMM monitor in Bosnia. First of all, could

    23 you tell the Judges about an organisation, an entity

    24 known as the Busovaca Joint Commission and could you

    25 tell the Judges about the nature of its work?

  14. 1A. I was introduced to the joint Busovaca

    2 commission when I first arrived in the Vitez area. I

    3 was given some explanation with regards to this joint

    4 commission by one of my colleagues, my colleague

    5 furnished me with this information, this person was

    6 Remi Landry who was a Canadian member of this mission.

    7 He explained to me that the Busovaca Joint Commission

    8 was created in January of that same year. He also

    9 stated that the purpose of this joint commission was to

    10 bring together the warring factions in the area. At

    11 that time these dealt with the ABiH and the HVO warring

    12 factions, and this was in the Busovaca area.

    13 When I arrived there in April, in the area of

    14 Vitez, the fighting had just broken out and we were

    15 then trying to carry out the purposes of this joint

    16 commission in the area of Vitez. The mission was made

    17 up of a number of monitors. These were members of this

    18 mission. And also a certain number of members of

    19 United Nations battalions.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, we know what the

    21 components were of this commission. But what were you

    22 yourself doing, please?

    23 A. My role during these first days as a member

    24 of this commission was to take notes during meetings

    25 and as a member of one of these teams, I was sent into

  15. 1the field in order to carry out investigations, and the

    2 findings were then related during the meetings on the

    3 following day.

    4 The Busovaca Joint Commission was presided

    5 over by the most senior ranking person in the area.

    6 After a certain number of times, certain number of

    7 days, I myself assumed this post. Actually -- the

    8 actual term Busovaca Joint Commission also, if you

    9 will, transformed itself into a joint command, if you

    10 will. Indeed, in this joint command, you would find

    11 representatives from various military bodies in the

    12 highest levels in that area, also there were

    13 representatives from the Bosnian army, who was

    14 Mr. Merdan, and there was also representatives from the

    15 HVO for the Central Bosnian area and that person was

    16 Mr. Franjo Nakic. And it was with these two people

    17 that we continued to do our work in the framework of

    18 this joint command effort.

    19 The representatives of the

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina army and also the Red Cross were

    21 invited. The Red Cross, the International Red Cross,

    22 and the UNHCR were also invited, and with this group of

    23 eight to ten people, we would have daily meetings. The

    24 purpose was to obtain more information from the two

    25 parties with regards to the conflict. By discussing

  16. 1with the two parties, we would hope to arrive at a

    2 cease-fire.

    3 After having reached a cease-fire, then our

    4 efforts were to go into trying to free the prisoners of

    5 war as soon as possible. Another goal of ours was to

    6 help those who had been wounded and also to take care

    7 of the dead, and the last objective was to implement

    8 humanitarian aid for the area.

    9 At the end of the month of April, I believe,

    10 the military leaders at the highest levels came

    11 together in the same building where the commission was

    12 located, that is to say, a building which is next to

    13 the BRITBAT building, and during the course of this

    14 meeting, it was decided that a cease-fire agreement

    15 should be signed.

    16 Shortly thereafter, it was decided that they

    17 should put together a joint command in Travnik, and we

    18 then put together four joint local commands, and these

    19 four commissions would move about in the Vitez area,

    20 the Busovaca area, and Kiseljak, and also in Travnik.

    21 We were also chosen to carry out such an operation, and

    22 as the head of this team and also as the leader of a

    23 local division, I myself worked in the field on a daily

    24 basis.

    25 The purpose of this joint commission, which

  17. 1is quite similar to this idea of a joint command, was

    2 to ensure that the cease-fire is enforced and that this

    3 can be enforced, and also to ensure that any violations

    4 of the cease-fire would be prosecuted and also to

    5 investigate any violations of human rights and to

    6 coordinate humanitarian aid in that area.

    7 The local commission would meet every two or

    8 three days, and the work of these commissions would

    9 continue or were to continue to around the 20th of May,

    10 approximately.

    11 There were various results based on where

    12 they were located, but the Kiseljak commission was put

    13 together with a great deal of effort and difficulty,

    14 and the results of that particular commission were

    15 quite poor, and the results of the commission in

    16 Busovaca were quite good. In Vitez, the results were

    17 moderate. In the Travnik area, the results were not

    18 satisfactory either because we rarely had an

    19 opportunity to meet with both parties.

    20 Indeed, we had to carry out what is called

    21 "shuttle diplomacy" which is very difficult to do;

    22 indeed, it was very difficult to bring both parties to

    23 the table. It was also difficult to try to control the

    24 various participants because they would not always

    25 respond, but we maintained contact just by the fact

  18. 1that the actual joint command was no longer active

    2 after the 20th of May. We then made an attempt to

    3 visit some of the joint commands as often as possible,

    4 every day or at least every other day. I believe that

    5 all I can tell you with regards to the joint commission

    6 of Busovaca, the Busovaca Joint Commission, and also

    7 the forward joint commands.

    8 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I have some questions I

    9 would like to ask you.

    10 First of all, you mentioned that the joint

    11 commissions, as well as the Busovaca Joint Commissions,

    12 were attended by Dzemal Merdan.

    13 A. He was the local commander of the 3rd BiH army

    14 in Zenica.

    15 Q. What was the position held by Franjo Nakic

    16 and the HVO?

    17 A. He introduced himself as the local commander

    18 of the Central Bosnia operational zone.

    19 Q. The transcript says local commander. Is that

    20 a correct --

    21 A. Deputy commander.

    22 MR. HARMON: It should be corrected,

    23 Mr. President, it should be deputy commander.

    24 Now, if I could have the usher, please, take

    25 the first exhibit and put it on the ELMO, I would like

  19. 1to show you this exhibit. Mr. President, this is an

    2 exhibit that unfortunately only has an English

    3 translation.

    4 THE REGISTRAR: This is document 407.

    5 MR. HARMON:

    6 Q. Now, there is an English translation behind

    7 that document, Colonel Morsink. First of all, do you

    8 recognise -- I'm sorry. I said English translation.

    9 This is in the Croatian and Bosnian language, and it's

    10 a document -- can you recognise that document?

    11 A. I received this during the first meeting, and

    12 in the document, among other things, was Franjo Nakic

    13 was present as part of the operational zone command.

    14 Q. If you would turn, first of all, to that

    15 document, the last page -- or the bottom of the

    16 Croatian version. Whose signature or whose name

    17 appears on the bottom of that document?

    18 A. -- Blaskic (no interpretation).

    19 Q. Can you tell me, in the document itself, how

    20 Mr. Franjo Nakic is identified? In this particular

    21 document it is paragraph 1.1.

    22 A. It's in Croatian.

    23 Q. Take a look at the translation in English,

    24 please, and how is Mr. Nakic identified?

    25 A. As the deputy commander of Central Bosnian

  20. 1operational zone.

    2 Q. Did you -- how did Mr. Nakic get to and from

    3 the joint commission meetings?

    4 A. The meetings were in the house next to the

    5 British -- the BRITBAT, and he'd get picked up by a

    6 British tank corps.

    7 Q. Picked up from where?

    8 A. Sometimes from the middle Bosnian operational

    9 headquarters, the hotel in Vitez, and sometimes he

    10 would come on foot from his own house.

    11 Q. And when he left the meetings, how would he

    12 be taken back, either to his home or to his --

    13 A. Depending on what time it was that the

    14 meeting was being held, if it would be early, he would

    15 go back by himself to the hotel, or sometimes he would

    16 be brought back, and if it was late, then he would go

    17 on foot.

    18 Q. Now, was he, in essence, supposed to be the

    19 eyes and ears of Colonel Blaskic at those meetings?

    20 A. Because he was the deputy commander of

    21 Blaskic, I realised that he had gotten orders from

    22 Blaskic and to report to his direct superior.

    23 Q. Let me focus on another part of your

    24 testimony. You said that in late April, military

    25 leaders at the highest level met at the ECMM house to

  21. 1create a joint command in Travnik. Who were those

    2 military leaders who met?

    3 A. The commander of the HVO was Petkovic and on

    4 the ABiH army was General Halilovic.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please turn to the

    6 Judges when you answer? Give your answers directly to

    7 the Judge. You hear the questions from the

    8 Prosecutor. Please answer to the Judges because the

    9 Judges have to be made aware of what you say.

    10 MR. HARMON:

    11 Q. I noted an error in the transcript. At the

    12 end of the meeting that took place on the 29th of April

    13 where the local joint commissions were created, the

    14 transcript said at one point local commands were

    15 created. Were they local commissions or were they

    16 local commands?

    17 A. (No translation).

    18 Q. I did not get an interpretation on that, I'm

    19 afraid.

    20 A. In my opinion, they were commissions. When

    21 you talk about command, they are the jurisdiction over

    22 giving orders, whereas a commission is an organ which

    23 is consulting needs, which can carry out

    24 investigations.

    25 Q. You testified, Colonel Morsink, that after

  22. 1these local commissions were created in various

    2 municipalities, that they were attended by

    3 representatives from both sides. Which representatives

    4 from both sides attended the local commission meetings

    5 in Vitez municipality, Busovaca municipality, and the

    6 Kiseljak municipality?

    7 A. To start with Vitez, the two brigade

    8 commanders on the BiH side and the HVO, both of them had

    9 immediately designated a liaison officer. When these

    10 brigade commands began to participate in this, there

    11 began to be a structure. In Busovaca, the two brigade

    12 commanders, a certain number of their staff officers

    13 participated as well. In Kiseljak, it was the same

    14 thing, the brigade commander and a certain number of

    15 staff officers who were there.

    16 Q. And did Franjo Nakic attend the local

    17 commission meetings as well as his ABiH counterpart

    18 General Merdan?

    19 A. At the beginning, they were local

    20 commissions, and they would go with us -- they would be

    21 with us at the first three or four meetings. For the

    22 first three or four weeks, rather, first three or four

    23 weeks, they were there.

    24 MR. HARMON: Now, Mr. President, I'm going to

    25 show a video, and I'm going to ask the witness, first

  23. 1of all, to take a look at Prosecutor's next exhibit,

    2 which would be 408. If that could be distributed to

    3 the witness?

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, go ahead.

    5 MR. HARMON: What I propose to do,

    6 Mr. President, with 408 is, 408 is a photo album with

    7 stills from the video that Your Honours will hear, and

    8 it will show you and identify certain important figures

    9 and personalities who you will see in the ensuing

    10 video, and very quickly, we don't have to put this on

    11 the ELMO.

    12 Q. Sir, will you go through these -- the

    13 individual who is marked with No. 1, can you tell the

    14 Judges who is that individual?

    15 A. No. 1 is Mr. Franjo Nakic. He was the second

    16 in command of the operational zone in Central Bosnia.

    17 Q. Now, would you turn to photograph number 2 in

    18 that exhibit and identify that individual?

    19 A. No. 2 is Dzemal Merdan. He was the commander

    20 of the 3rd Bosnia-Herzegovina army.

    21 Q. And who is the individual on the next page,

    22 No. 3?

    23 A. No. 3 is Mario Cerkez. He is the commander

    24 of the HVO brigade in Vitez.

    25 Q. Now, even though we'll come back to the

  24. 1individual marked in No. 4 later in your testimony, can

    2 you tell the Judges who that individual is?

    3 A. This is an HVO soldier. I think he was a

    4 battalion commander in the Vitez region, and he had

    5 threatened me, saying that if I intervened again, going

    6 through a checkpoint.

    7 Q. And we will get to further details on that

    8 threat later in your testimony. And who is the

    9 individual in No. 5?

    10 A. No. 5 is Mr. Borislav Jozic. He was present

    11 with Cerkez as a liaison for the HVO Vitez brigade in

    12 the joint operation command and later in the local

    13 Vitez commission.

    14 Q. The next exhibit you will see, Colonel

    15 Morsink, is a video film taken of a meeting. I'd like

    16 you to just tell the Judges, give them a preview of

    17 what they're going to see in that film so they can --

    18 we're going to go through the film fairly quickly, but

    19 if you can give them a preview, it will assist them,

    20 and if, during the film itself, you care to comment on

    21 who is doing what or who is who, please feel free to do

    22 that as well.

    23 A. The film takes place at the ECMM house near

    24 the British camp. In it are a number of British

    25 soldiers coming. There were tanks that came, that were

  25. 1brought in by the British brigade. They were kind of

    2 taxis in the region because it was (sic) always safe to

    3 go home in the evening and you had to go by the

    4 front-line. You see a table in a meeting room. On the

    5 table on the ABiH side.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: There is a mistake. It should

    7 be not.

    8 MR. HARMON:

    9 Q. Colonel Morsink, your testimony as reflected

    10 in the transcript says, "they were kind of taxis in the

    11 region because it was always safe to go home in the

    12 evening?"

    13 A. Unsafe because there was fighting along the

    14 frontlines day after day. Across the frontlines

    15 several sometimes.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: I hope you will change it.

    17 MR. HARMON: It has been changed.

    18 Q. Colonel Morsink, does the film itself fairly

    19 depict the kind of meetings that were had, show the

    20 representatives, how they were present, how they took

    21 notes, who participated in these meetings?

    22 A. It gives you a very clear picture of the

    23 level of the representatives there, very specific idea

    24 also of how these kinds of meetings were conducted.

    25 The meetings were presided over by the ECMM, we would

  26. 1take notes, it was the note keeper from the ECMM that

    2 would write up the report, and the participants would

    3 take their own notes and they would react frequently to

    4 the accusations.

    5 MR. HARMON: Now, thank you very much. If we

    6 could have the next exhibit, which would be

    7 Prosecutor's 409, I believe, Mr. Dubuisson, if we could

    8 have that film shown and the lights dimmed?

    9 Colonel Morsink, if you care to comment in

    10 the course of this film. It should appear on your

    11 monitor.

    12 (Videotape played)

    13 A. This is the location in Vitez where the bomb

    14 exploded. This was the car bomb that went off. This

    15 here are the BiH army officers, the brigade commander

    16 who is arriving home. They were accompanied by a

    17 British officer and a British soldier. Here's the

    18 house where we would hold our meetings.

    19 Here's another British vehicle arriving with

    20 Captain McBraid.

    21 Q. Mr. President, I note when this cassette was

    22 given, there was sound as well -- now it appears to be

    23 back.

    24 A. This is the liaison officer of Vitez,

    25 Borislav Jozic. There is several observers here. You

  27. 1can see them. This is a brigade commander from the HVO

    2 in Busovaca, Dusko Jusic, and this is Mr. Merdan,

    3 Mr. Jozic, this is the one that threatened me, and here

    4 are the BiH army officers coming into the room. That

    5 was the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 This is Mr. Merdan, and behind him is Major

    7 Michael Hardling, is Mario Cerkez, the brigade

    8 commander, with some of his officers. This is

    9 Mr. Nakic, Mr. Merdan. They were always sitting next

    10 to one another at the table. On the other side are the

    11 monitors, the observers. Here you have the President

    12 of the meeting. The presiding officer has just come

    13 in. In the middle is the interpreter.

    14 There was the British liaison officer coming

    15 in with his own interpreter.

    16 MR. HARMON: That concludes the film,

    17 Mr. President. If we could have the lights? Thank

    18 you.

    19 Q. Colonel Morsink, other than the participation

    20 that you had in these meetings, can you describe the

    21 other work that you did, how much time you spent in the

    22 field and with whom you spent that time?

    23 A. The work days were long. We begin early in

    24 the mornings as soon as it would get light. It was

    25 difficult to recognise what car you were riding in as

  28. 1you would go through the area, and we would stop

    2 working at night when it would get dark. Our mission

    3 was not to move about at night.

    4 We would meet about once a day for two or

    5 three hours, and as regards the rest of the day, we

    6 would make visits to areas where there were

    7 allegations. We had to gather information from the

    8 various headquarters. We would visit the prisons as

    9 well. We would be present in order to repair the

    10 telephone and electricity lines. We would be there

    11 when victims had to be buried. We would be there for

    12 the exchange of remains and of wounded people, and we

    13 would draft reports which we would give to both of the

    14 parties directly.

    15 In the evening, we would draft our own

    16 reports summarising the events of the day. The reports

    17 would be sent to Zagreb, to the ECMM headquarters, and

    18 then every evening, we also had contacts at the

    19 headquarters of our own headquarters, the seat of our

    20 own headquarters.

    21 Q. Would it be fair to say, Colonel Morsink,

    22 that you spent the majority of your time in the field

    23 in the Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Travnik, and Zenica

    24 municipalities?

    25 A. Yes.

  29. 1Q. You had daily contact with officers of all

    2 levels and soldiers of ordinary rank and file on both

    3 sides of the conflict?

    4 A. I would have daily contact, and we would try

    5 to balance out the contacts.

    6 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, were the

    7 orders of Dzemal Merdan followed and respected by his

    8 subordinates in the field since you went around the

    9 field with him for a considerable period of time?

    10 A. My impression was that they were followed,

    11 yes.

    12 Q. I have the same question in respect of Franjo

    13 Nakic. Were his orders respected and followed by his

    14 sub-commanders?

    15 A. I believe the same. The results were not

    16 always satisfying, but the occasions that I saw when he

    17 gave an order, there would be generally a proper

    18 military reaction to them.

    19 Q. Could you give an example -- I'm sorry. Can

    20 you tell the Judges about an instance that you observed

    21 in Kiseljak municipality where the order of Franjo

    22 Nakic was followed?

    23 A. I believe we would come with the ECMM team to

    24 the headquarters of the HVO brigade in Kiseljak, and

    25 there we would meet Mr. Bradara --

  30. 1JUDGE JORDA: I haven't got an interpretation

    2 in French to the last few answers. There was a

    3 previous question as well that was not answered in

    4 French. I think we have to have -- yes, that's

    5 correct, there was a missing -- the French

    6 interpretation was missing.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: Could you ask the question

    8 again so that the French transcript can be completed?

    9 MR. HARMON: I'm not quite sure,

    10 Mr. President, where you lost the translation.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: I can tell you. You said: Were

    12 his orders, speaking of Franjo Nakic, were his orders

    13 respected and followed by his sub-commanders? He

    14 answered: "I believe the same results were not always

    15 satisfying but the occasions that I saw when he gave an

    16 order, there would be generally a proper military

    17 reaction to them."

    18 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Judge Riad.

    19 Q. The next question I had then, Colonel

    20 Morsink, is: Can you give an example of an instance

    21 where Franjo Nakic's order was followed, and

    22 specifically in Kiseljak?

    23 A. An example, at the beginning of May in

    24 Kiseljak, we went with an ECMM team on site, Nakic and

    25 Merdan as well. We went to the HVO headquarters in

  31. 1Kiseljak. There we met Mr. Bradara. The subject was

    2 the release of prisoners from the Kiseljak prison.

    3 Mr. Bradara said to us that he had received

    4 the order to release them but that he was not prepared

    5 to obey the order because, in his own opinion, the

    6 other camp had not -- the other side, rather, had not

    7 done the same thing. He meant that there was a group

    8 of prisoners in Klokoti, and I remember that Mr. Nakic

    9 had given him the order to obey the -- to obey the

    10 order anyway, that is the order to release the

    11 prisoners. Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan, with the ECMM

    12 team, we all decided to make sure that the other side

    13 did the same thing.

    14 After some time, that is the same day, some

    15 prisoners, in fact, were released.

    16 Q. So you observed the HVO officer, Mario

    17 Bradara, obey the order of Franjo Nakic?

    18 A. Yes, he did.

    19 Q. Now, I would like to turn your attention

    20 very, very briefly to the truck bomb incident in Vitez

    21 that occurred on the 18th of April, 1993. Were you

    22 present in the area when the truck bomb was detonated?

    23 A. When the bomb exploded, I was with an ECMM

    24 team in a place that was called Gornja Ravna which was

    25 five kilometres away from the centre of Vitez. Gornja

  32. 1Ravna is on the hill, and from it you can see Vitez

    2 very clearly.

    3 When we would have a discussion with the

    4 local commanders on the frontline, we could see that

    5 there was artillery fired on the neighbouring hills,

    6 and all of a sudden, I think it was at the end of the

    7 afternoon, around 5.00, when I heard an enormous

    8 explosion in Vitez. We saw that there was smoke, there

    9 was a huge cloud of smoke that was rising, and at that

    10 time, we did not react.

    11 In the evening, when we went by, in order to

    12 go to the British battalion headquarters, we heard, at

    13 the British battalion, that there had been a car bomb

    14 which had gone off.

    15 Q. And that truck bomb resulted in numerous

    16 civilian deaths and casualties; is that correct?

    17 A. The British told us that many people from

    18 that region had to be evacuated, 200 people. The

    19 evacuation was organised by the English without any

    20 help from the local authorities, and there were many

    21 casualties who were cared for partly by the British who

    22 were on site. There was no sign of death; in fact, no

    23 one was buried at that point. There were no deaths.

    24 THE WITNESS: There was no sign of dead

    25 bodies being recovered.

  33. 1Q. Thank you for the correction.

    2 Now, Colonel Morsink, the next day, the 19th

    3 of April, 1993, was the matter raised -- was the issue

    4 of the truck bomb and the explosion in a civilian area

    5 of Stari Vitez raised with local military and political

    6 figures?

    7 A. In the morning of the 19th of April, the HVO

    8 Vitez brigade commander, Mr. Mario Cerkez, in his

    9 office, I brought up the subject, together with my

    10 monitor, colleague Pedersen, and I remember that

    11 Mr. Pedersen said that this was not a normal thing that

    12 one would do in a war, that it really was a terrorist

    13 act, and I remember that shortly afterwards somebody

    14 from the meeting came who was outside the meeting. He

    15 introduced himself as Mr. Anto Valenta. He had a

    16 political function in the region, I don't quite

    17 remember which one exactly it was, but I think that it

    18 was -- it was the -- he was the vice-president of the

    19 HDZ.

    20 When Mr. Valenta came in, we went back to the

    21 issue of the truck bomb, and Mr. Valenta, like

    22 Mr. Cerkez, recounted the event as they saw it.

    23 I remember that Mr. Valenta said that there

    24 had been a munitions depot which had been hit by a

    25 shell, and that was why the truck had exploded.

  34. 1Mr. Cerkez explained things to us somewhat

    2 differently. He said that the truck had been hit by a

    3 grenade or by firing, and I remember that my colleague,

    4 Pedersen, insisted on the fact that this was not a

    5 sufficient explanation. He insisted by saying that an

    6 investigation needed to be carried out, and Mr. Cerkez

    7 stated that he would do so.

    8 Q. At any time while you were in the theatre in

    9 Central Bosnia, did you ever hear that an investigation

    10 of this incident was, in fact, performed?

    11 A. No, I never heard anything about any type of

    12 an investigation nor the results of any investigation.

    13 Q. Now, while we're on the subject of Mario

    14 Cerkez. You were in his office. Did you often go to

    15 his office, and did you find it unusual that Anto

    16 Valenta could gain access to his office so easily?

    17 A. Well, during the first week, we would often

    18 meet in his office. Indeed, the headquarters was

    19 located in the Vitez cinema. It was difficult to go

    20 into his office. You had to go through a whole series

    21 of guards that were posted, and when we would finally

    22 arrive at his office, then we would have to wait.

    23 There was another guard in front of his office, and one

    24 could never disturb him.

    25 Q. Were you surprised to see Anto Valenta walk

  35. 1into the office?

    2 A. Yes, I was quite surprised to that somebody

    3 could simply walk in during a discussion.

    4 Q. Let me ask you, the next day, on the 20th of

    5 April, 1993, were you at a meeting with Colonel

    6 Stewart, Clare Podbielski, who was from ICRC, and

    7 Colonel Blaskic when the incident of the truck bomb was

    8 raised?

    9 A. Yes, I was present. It was in the

    10 headquarters, it was at the Hotel Vitez, and I remember

    11 that it was the first time that I was in that

    12 particular headquarters building. I also remember

    13 quite well that Mr. Bob Stewart was also quite

    14 excited. He was furious. He was furious to see that

    15 the HVO were not reacting after this truck exploded.

    16 He was also furious because the Croats had accused the

    17 British of having participated or to have been active

    18 in that event because there were only Muslims that were

    19 wounded and also -- only the Muslims, rather, were

    20 being evacuated by them. He protested very strongly.

    21 Q. What was Colonel Blaskic's reaction to those

    22 protests?

    23 A. I recall that he was listening, but he didn't

    24 make any objections. He simply listened to the

    25 statements made by Stewart. Nor did he exclude the

  36. 1possibility of carrying out an investigation but nor

    2 did he really react.

    3 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was the

    4 detonation of that truck bomb in the civilian section

    5 of Stari Vitez an obvious violation of international

    6 humanitarian law?

    7 A. (No translation)

    8 MR. HARMON: I did not get an answer.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. In your opinion, was Colonel Blaskic fully

    11 aware -- now I'm getting the translation of English in

    12 my headphones, so perhaps the interpreter could --

    13 thank you.

    14 Let me ask the question again: Based on your

    15 presence with Colonel Stewart in Colonel Blaskic's

    16 office on the 20th of April, 1993, and based on your

    17 presence in Mario Cerkez's office the day before, in

    18 your opinion, was Colonel Blaskic fully aware of the

    19 truck bomb explosion, where it had occurred, and that

    20 there was a demand for an investigation into that

    21 event?

    22 A. Yes. That happened a few days earlier not

    23 more than a kilometre from his headquarters, so the

    24 explosion could be heard from 5 kilometres away. Of

    25 course, yes.

  37. 1Q. Now, let me turn to a different subject,

    2 Colonel Morsink, and that is HVO and HDZ propaganda and

    3 disinformation.

    4 In your opinion, did the HVO and political

    5 entities of the Bosnian Croat side use propaganda to

    6 incite fear in the minds of Croats who were residing in

    7 areas held by the Bosnian Muslims and did that result

    8 in a large movement of Croat civilians from those

    9 areas? Could you explain to the Judges your views on

    10 that question, and can you cite some examples, please?

    11 A. Yes, indeed. We (sic) used propaganda, using

    12 radio and television, both HDZ and also HVO --

    13 Q. Excuse me, Colonel. There seems to be an

    14 error on the answer. The answer that is recorded on

    15 the transcript says "We" used propaganda?

    16 THE WITNESS: It should be "they" used

    17 propaganda. HVO and HDZ used propaganda.

    18 Q. Thank you for the correction. Please

    19 continue your answer.

    20 A. One of the first examples that I experienced

    21 was the following: In the Grahovcici area --

    22 Q. Colonel, before you begin that particular

    23 example and your series of examples, if I could have

    24 the next exhibit shown to the witness placed on the

    25 ELMO?

  38. 1You're going to be giving examples in

    2 Grahovcici and Guca Gora, and you have assisted me by

    3 marking a map and indicating the locations of those

    4 villages, and just as an aid for the Judges and for

    5 counsel to follow your testimony, I'd like you to

    6 identify this next exhibit.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: This will be document 410.

    8 MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, if you could move

    9 that down a little bit? It only shows one of the two

    10 locations. That's fine.

    11 Q. Now, you're going to give us examples, are

    12 you now, from the time of Grahovcici and the town of

    13 Guca Gora; is that correct?

    14 A. Yes, it is.

    15 Q. Could you mark in orange on the Prosecutor's

    16 next exhibit the location of those towns?

    17 A. This is Grahovcici and this is Guca Gora.

    18 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel Morsink. Now,

    19 please, if you would give some examples of the use of

    20 propaganda by the HVO and the HDZ?

    21 A. I'd like to talk to you about an incident

    22 which is quite important which occurred in the

    23 Grahovcici area. This incident occurred in the end --

    24 in the month of April. Mr. Stejpan invited me to visit

    25 this area and -- this was Mr. Stejpan. This was a

  39. 1Catholic father or priest, rather, from the Zenica

    2 area. He explained to me that in a certain number of

    3 areas, a large number of Croats had fled. Two or three

    4 thousand Croatian families had fled, and they had fled

    5 towards Grahovcici, and that he had been able to visit

    6 with these people to see whether or not they were able

    7 to return to their houses.

    8 THE WITNESS: That's not fully correct. We

    9 planned to visit those families in Grahovcici, so he

    10 had not been able before to visit them.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Could you repeat that again,

    12 please?

    13 A. I had the impression that in the

    14 interpretation it was stated that Stejpan had

    15 previously had the opportunity to go to that village,

    16 the village of Grahovcici. That was not correct.

    17 Father Stejpan had not yet gone to Grahovcici; he had

    18 asked for our assistance in order to go to that

    19 location.

    20 We requested authorisation at the ABiH -- or

    21 BiH headquarters, and there we received authorisation in

    22 order to cross the frontlines, in order to go to that

    23 location in Grahovcici, and there we were able to

    24 attempt to make a contact with the authorities, the

    25 spiritual Croatian authorities there, and on that same

  40. 1day, we tried to come into contact with the military

    2 authorities of the HVO in Grahovcici.

    3 We then visited with the oldest person among

    4 the refugees, and with that person, we were able to put

    5 together a plan. This consisted of three stages. The

    6 first stage consisted of going to visit the inhabitants

    7 who were occupying the houses of those who had fled. I

    8 will now show you, indicate to you on the map, where

    9 that took place. It took place in Janjac, in Dolac, in

    10 Stranjani and also in a number of Croatian houses.

    11 Q. Colonel Morsink, as a result of propaganda,

    12 fear-mongering by the HVO and the HDZ, did Croats in

    13 those villages flee to Grahovcici?

    14 A. Well, this is due in part to propaganda and

    15 in part to fear. During our investigations, it was

    16 apparently that a small number of houses were indeed

    17 burned. We also collected some testimonies from

    18 witnesses who had been fired upon and also from

    19 persons -- we also noted that some persons had lost

    20 their lives. The best example of propaganda came later

    21 on. If I can go on then to the second phase of our

    22 plan?

    23 This was to organise a movement of a large

    24 number of ambulances and buses so that these people

    25 could return to their houses. We implemented this plan

  41. 1with the authorisation of the headquarters of the BiH

    2 army. We were not able to bring the ambulances through

    3 because there was artillery fire. The buses were

    4 stopped at the military -- Croatian military police

    5 checkpoint, and the buses were then taken away at that

    6 time.

    7 We strongly protested against this. I myself

    8 tried to prevent that from happening. But it was

    9 necessary that -- it took us a lot of time, rather, to

    10 make contact once again with the Grahovcici

    11 authorities, and when contact was made, the Croatian

    12 authorities and the religious authorities and also the

    13 oldest refugee indicated to us that the Travnik and

    14 Vitez radio, if you will -- then on the radio, on the

    15 Croatian radio, it was stated and explained that a

    16 large group of Croatians had been killed in Zenica, and

    17 that therefore these people could not return and be

    18 safe in their homes. The radio also stated that it

    19 would no longer be safe for these people to go to Novi

    20 Bila and to Vitez.

    21 THE WITNESS: That's not correct. It would

    22 be safer for them to go to Novi Bila and to Vitez.

    23 MR. HARMON:

    24 Q. So the radio said, the HVO -- I mean the

    25 Croatian radio said it would be safer for the refugees

  42. 1not to return to their homes in Muslim-held territory

    2 but to go to HVO-held territory; is that correct?

    3 A. That's correct, yes.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: We have to correct it to say

    5 that it would no longer be safe to go to -- it would no

    6 longer be safe for these people to go to Novi Bila and

    7 to Vitez.

    8 MR. HARMON: That is the error in the

    9 transcript that I tried to --

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Yes. But to me, it is there. I

    11 mean, we have to correct it.

    12 MR. HARMON: Yes. Judge Riad, that's what I

    13 endeavoured to do by asking a question to clarify and

    14 correct that, so as the witness has now testified to

    15 the corrected version, I think the transcript will be

    16 corrected itself.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: I hope so. Thank you.

    18 MR. HARMON:

    19 Q. Colonel Morsink, continue or -- have you ...

    20 A. A second example of a very apparent --

    21 Q. Before we get to that --

    22 A. -- propaganda was in Guca Gora.

    23 Q. A clarification, and I'm not sure whether we

    24 will --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, I think we're

  43. 1going to take a break here now. I was waiting to see

    2 perhaps if we could finish with the propaganda issue,

    3 but I see we're not going to finish with that right

    4 away, so I propose a 20-minute recess.

    5 The court now stands in recess.

    6 --- Recess taken at 11.25 a.m.

    7 --- On resuming at 11.50 a.m.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: The Tribunal is now in

    9 session. Please bring in the accused.

    10 (The accused entered court)

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon.

    12 MR. HARMON:

    13 Q. Colonel Morsink, let me begin by correcting

    14 an error in the transcript. The transcript shows that

    15 in your testimony, when you testified that buses were

    16 stopped, that they were stopped by Croatian military

    17 police. Did you mean HVO military police and not the

    18 military police from the Republic of Croatia?

    19 A. HVO. Yes, that's what I meant.

    20 Q. Will you tell the Judges the exact nature of

    21 the propaganda that you were aware of that attempted to

    22 get the Croat population from returning to their

    23 homes? What was said?

    24 A. It was explained to me that the propaganda

    25 consisted of stating that a large number of Croatians

  44. 1-- or Croats, rather, had been assassinated. This was

    2 in the Zenica region. The propaganda stated that a

    3 large number of houses had been burned. It also stated

    4 that other houses had been looted and that the

    5 Mujahedin had the intention to exterminate the

    6 remaining Croats.

    7 Q. Based on the results of your investigation,

    8 that was grossly exaggerated; is that correct?

    9 A. We ourselves went to these areas in the first

    10 stage, and we found that a very small number of houses

    11 had been burned. We also discovered that there were

    12 very few cases of pillaging, and that the number of

    13 victims was very, very low. The radio and television

    14 propaganda was extremely exaggerated.

    15 MR. HARMON: Now, if I could have the next

    16 exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson, which is an ECMM daily report

    17 dated the 26th of April, 1993, prepared by Lars

    18 Baggesen and Hendrik Morsink. Mr. President, the next

    19 exhibit does have a French translation attached to it.

    20 It is 411; is that correct?

    21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is indeed 411, and

    22 411A for the French version.

    23 MR. HARMON: There is no reason to put that

    24 on the ELMO. If you could just hand that to Colonel

    25 Morsink?

  45. 1Q. Colonel Morsink, can you identify

    2 Prosecutor's Exhibit 411?

    3 A. Yes, indeed, this is a daily report. It was

    4 made on the 26th of April, which I wrote along with

    5 Lars Pedersen (sic).

    6 THE WITNESS: Lars Baggesen.

    7 Q. It should be not Lars --

    8 THE WITNESS: Lars Baggesen.

    9 MR. HARMON:

    10 Q. It should be Lars Baggesen as opposed to Lars

    11 Pedersen; is that correct?

    12 A. Yes. Lars Baggesen and myself.

    13 Q. Does this recount the details of some of the

    14 investigation, Colonel Morsink?

    15 A. This document talks about three phases, three

    16 stages, and in the first phase, you see here that we

    17 carried out an investigation concerning the three small

    18 villages. It is also stated here that a certain number

    19 of houses had been burned and also that a very small

    20 number of persons had been killed.

    21 Q. It also describes the issue of military

    22 police interference, does it not, in trying to return

    23 these displaced persons on buses?

    24 A. Yes, that point indicates that the military

    25 police took away these vehicles from us. We protested,

  46. 1but there was no account taken of our protests. It is

    2 also stated that the local television was present, and

    3 at that meeting -- which allowed us to prove that these

    4 rumours were not true.

    5 Q. All right. Colonel, thank you. Now, would

    6 you kindly turn to the next example that you

    7 experienced of HVO propaganda being used to attempt to

    8 create fear in the hearts and minds of Bosnian Croats

    9 who were residing in Muslim-occupied territory.

    10 A. The following example concerns the Guca Gora

    11 area. This was in the early part of 1993. In the

    12 early part of June 1993, in the morning, I went to the

    13 headquarters of the operational zone of Central Bosnia

    14 in Vitez, and there I had a meeting with a liaison

    15 officer for Mr. Blaskic. The name of this liaison

    16 officer was Darko Gelic, and this liaison officer

    17 explained to me that a large group of civilians, of

    18 civilian Croats, had fled from the Guca Gora region and

    19 that their houses had been burned and that a large

    20 number of these persons were killed in their houses or,

    21 after having left their houses, their houses were

    22 looted, and the best evidence of this crime was the

    23 fact that the church in Guca Gora was allegedly

    24 burned. The liaison officer was extremely affected by

    25 these events. And then we went to Travnik.

  47. 1In Travnik, we encountered Mr. Alagic.

    2 Mr. Alagic was the commander of the BiH army in the

    3 operational zone of Central Bosnia -- no, rather, he

    4 was operating at the same level as Mr. Blaskic. He was

    5 sort of a commander of a division of the BiH army.

    6 We talked with him about the Guca Gora area,

    7 we talked to him about the rumours in the Guca Gora

    8 area, and the fact that these crimes had been

    9 committed. He denied it. He denied that these crimes

    10 had taken place. At our request, that an investigation

    11 be carried out in that area, he suggested that two

    12 Croat participants and a Croat priest and himself

    13 accompany us to Guca Gora, and this to see whether or

    14 not these accusations could be verified.

    15 So along with an escort from the BRITBAT, we

    16 went to Guca Gora, and along with these Croat

    17 representatives, we were able to note that the

    18 accusations which had been made about this region were

    19 not at all true. The church was not on fire, the

    20 church had not received any damage inside the church

    21 either, and near the church we saw a large number of

    22 Croat refugees, some 200 of these, and the only

    23 location in which something had been set fire was

    24 Bandol, and Bandol is a Muslim village. We reported

    25 our findings, as we always do.

  48. 1Then we went back to Guca Gora the next day,

    2 and we met with the representatives of the UNHCR,

    3 Miss Margaret Green, and we also met the English

    4 battalion commander, Mr. Duncan. We discussed things,

    5 and together we decided that we would evacuate the

    6 refugees who were in the church to Novi Bila.

    7 Additional investigations were carried out in

    8 the entire region of Guca Gora, and all of these

    9 investigations indicated the propaganda was false and

    10 that all the accusations were very, very much

    11 exaggerated. It also appeared that because of the

    12 propaganda, large groups of Croatian citizens had

    13 decided to flee, and fled, in fact, toward a region

    14 under HVO control, Novi Bila and Vitez.

    15 Q. Colonel Morsink, let me show you two

    16 exhibits, two photographs, that will be the next

    17 exhibits in order.

    18 If I could have the first exhibit,

    19 Mr. Dubuisson, the one with the priest in it, as 412,

    20 and the church 413? And if 412 could be placed on the

    21 ELMO.

    22 Very briefly, Colonel Morsink, could you

    23 identify this photo, and was this photo taken when you

    24 were conducting your investigation into the allegations

    25 at Guca Gora?

  49. 1A. I recognise it. It's one that I actually

    2 took myself. I recognise the people that one sees in

    3 it: the Croatian priest from Travnik, my interpreter,

    4 my fellow observer, Philip Watkins, the liaison

    5 officer, the British captain, the liaison officer for

    6 Travnik, and an interpreter working for the British

    7 battalion (indicated). The photograph was taken on the

    8 road between Guca Gora and Travnik. We were stopped

    9 there and we had to negotiate in order to get through

    10 the front-line.

    11 Q. If I could have the next exhibit placed on

    12 the ELMO? Colonel Morsink, before starting your

    13 investigation into Guca Gora on that particular day,

    14 you were informed that the Catholic church had been

    15 burned; is that correct?

    16 A. Yes, that's correct.

    17 Q. Can you identify this photograph?

    18 A. This is a photograph that I myself took as

    19 well on the same day, the day after. It shows the old

    20 Catholic church in Guca Gora, and you can see a number

    21 of representatives of the English battalion and some

    22 soldiers as well, and on the photograph you can see

    23 that there's obviously no damage to the church at all.

    24 Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, when you conducted the

    25 investigation in and around Guca Gora, the only village

  50. 1that you found burning was a Muslim village; is that

    2 correct?

    3 A. This is correct.

    4 MR. HARMON: Now if I could have the next

    5 exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson? It is a special report on

    6 Travnik, it is dated the 8th of June, 1993.

    7 Mr. Usher, could you just pass this to

    8 Mr. Dubuisson so he can recognise the exhibit?

    9 Mr. President, this exhibit also has a French

    10 translation attached to it. This is Exhibit 414.

    11 Q. Colonel Morsink, this exhibit has actually a

    12 cover sheet, and that appears to be the first page of

    13 this document. It is written by an individual by the

    14 name of Jean Pierre Thebault. Do you see that?

    15 A. Yes, I do.

    16 Q. Can you tell the Judges who Jean Pierre

    17 Thebault was?

    18 A. Mr. Thebault was a French diplomat. His

    19 position was the head of the regional Zenica -- centre

    20 and one of the top organisations within the ECMM in

    21 Yugoslavia.

    22 Q. The next page of the report is entitled

    23 "Special Report on Travnik," and it's dated 8 June,

    24 1993; is that correct?

    25 A. Yes, that's correct.

  51. 1Q. Did you prepare that report yourself?

    2 A. I recognise it. Together with my colleague,

    3 Philip Watkins, I prepared this.

    4 Q. This report and the report of Jean Pierre

    5 Thebault indicate that the allegations of atrocities

    6 and ethnic cleansing made by the Bosnian Croats are

    7 intentionally exaggerated, if not completely false; is

    8 that correct?

    9 THE INTERPRETER: "Not completely false"?

    10 I'm sorry. Could you repeat?

    11 Q. ... when not completely false?

    12 A. Yes, that's correct, that was our opinion,

    13 and it was also the result of the research that we did

    14 into it, the investigation that we carried out.

    15 MR. HARMON: I would like to turn to the next

    16 exhibit, if I could, please, Mr. Dubuisson? It will be

    17 Exhibit 415. It is another special report dated the

    18 19th of June, 1993.

    19 Mr. President, Exhibit 415 also has a French

    20 translation accompanying it.

    21 Q. Colonel Morsink, do you recognise this

    22 report?

    23 A. I recognise it, but I didn't prepare it

    24 myself.

    25 Q. Who was it prepared by?

  52. 1A. This was written by Philip Watkins and

    2 Torbjorn Junhof.

    3 Q. Does this also deal with the subject matter

    4 of the events in and around Grahovcici -- Guca Gora,

    5 I'm sorry?

    6 A. In my opinion, this was after the

    7 investigation in the Guca Gora region where once again

    8 it was sought to learn what the situation in the

    9 various Croatian locations was.

    10 Q. This report also summarises and concludes

    11 that there are exaggerations in respect of claims made

    12 by the Bosnian Croats, does it not?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much. Now if I

    15 could have the next exhibit, please, and it is an

    16 exhibit that is entitled "Calls for Help."

    17 Mr. Dubuisson, it is this exhibit.

    18 Exhibit 416, Mr. President, also has an

    19 accompanying French translation.

    20 If you could place that on the ELMO, please?

    21 Q. Colonel Morsink, you have had an opportunity

    22 to examine this document before coming to court; is

    23 that correct?

    24 A. This is correct.

    25 Q. Is this a document that was issued from the

  53. 1Central Bosnia operation zone command post in Vitez?

    2 A. Yes, that's correct. It's dated on top, and

    3 it is also signed by Mr. Blaskic.

    4 Q. Now, was this particular document sent to

    5 ECMM, to the UNHCR commissioner?

    6 A. Yes, that's correct. On the distribution

    7 list, you can see that, to the U.N. High Commissioner

    8 on Refugees.

    9 Q. Was it also sent to Croatian TV?

    10 A. That's also true. It was on the same list,

    11 you see HTV, Croatian TV, and HINA.

    12 Q. Would you take that document, please, and

    13 read the first two paragraphs of it? First of all,

    14 before you read those, Colonel, what is the date on

    15 this particular "Call for Help"?

    16 A. It says 4 May, 1993.

    17 Q. So this document was issued shortly after

    18 your investigation at Grahovcici?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. After your findings of your investigation in

    21 Grahovcici were relayed to Franjo Nakic and other

    22 military commanders who were present at local

    23 commission meetings; is that correct?

    24 A. This is correct. They would give a report

    25 every day or the next day what had happened the day

  54. 1before.

    2 Q. Will you just read the first two paragraphs?

    3 Read it aloud, please?

    4 THE WITNESS: "You are acquainted with the

    5 suffering of the Croatian people in Central Bosnia.

    6 However, I feel the need and responsibility to inform

    7 you once again about the difficult position of the

    8 Croats --"

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Could you go more slowly,

    10 please, because the interpreters don't have the text in

    11 front of them, so they're interpreting as you go along,

    12 so you have to go more slowly, please.

    13 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I'll start again.

    14 "You are acquainted with the suffering of the Croatian

    15 people in Central Bosnia. However, I feel the need and

    16 responsibility to inform you once again about the

    17 difficult position of the Croats in Zenica who have

    18 been living in total isolation for quite some time,

    19 waiting for it to be their turn to go to the one of the

    20 KPD/correction house/prisons or to a mine for forced

    21 labour.

    22 "Croatian villages in Zenica have been

    23 plundered, 5.000 Croats have been expelled from their

    24 homes. Most villages have been set ablaze, Croats are

    25 being fired from their jobs and mistreated."

  55. 1MR. HARMON:

    2 Q. Thank you, Colonel. There's no reason to

    3 read further into this document.

    4 Now, are those allegations that are made in

    5 this "Call for Help" issued by Colonel Blaskic

    6 consistent with the findings that were made by ECMM or

    7 the gross exaggerations?

    8 A. They don't correspond with the findings from

    9 the investigations that had been carried out. Except

    10 for the forced work in the mines, all the other

    11 accusations were denied by us.

    12 Q. In respect of the forced labour in mines, do

    13 you have any information at all about whether or not

    14 Bosnian Croats were forced to work in mines?

    15 A. I have no information, no concrete

    16 information about that. In fact, this subject was not

    17 dealt with during the meeting of the joint commission,

    18 and we were not able to verify it --

    19 THE WITNESS: No. We were not asked to

    20 verify it.

    21 Q. What can you conclude from this particular

    22 document, Colonel Morsink?

    23 A. My conclusion is that despite the fact that

    24 we had reported that all of these rumours were untrue,

    25 nonetheless they were brought up again in an official

  56. 1document and they were even broadcast on television.

    2 Q. Do you conclude from this that Colonel

    3 Blaskic participated in this campaign of propaganda?

    4 A. My opinion is that he was aware of that and

    5 so consciously used this false information, then it

    6 must have been an attempt at using propaganda.

    7 Q. Let me turn, if I can, to the last paragraph,

    8 second-to-last paragraph on this document, starting

    9 with "If you continue to remain silent." Would you

    10 kindly read that paragraph into the record, please?

    11 A. "If you continue to remain silent about the

    12 most brutal human rights violations, the public will

    13 come to know about it, and we will have the obligation

    14 to tell the world what is happening in Zenica and what

    15 is happening to the Croats."

    16 Q. Colonel Morsink, can you conclude from this

    17 document that Colonel Blaskic was fully aware that

    18 forced labour of civilians, plunder, forced expulsion

    19 of civilians from their homes, the setting of villages

    20 ablaze, the illegal arrest of civilians were human

    21 rights violations?

    22 A. Yes. When you are so aware of this and then

    23 in relation with the expression, what human rights

    24 relations are all about, then you have to be ...

    25 THE WITNESS: Then you have to be aware.

  57. 1MR. HARMON: Now if I could have the next

    2 exhibit placed on the ELMO, Mr. Dubuisson? It is a

    3 one-page document with the caption "Appeal" on it.

    4 Colonel Morsink, do you recognise this

    5 particular document?

    6 A. Yes, I recognise it. It is one of my own. I

    7 received it at a meeting in Vitez.

    8 Q. From where is this particular document

    9 issued?

    10 A. In the heading, it says that it comes from

    11 the headquarters of the Central Bosnian operative

    12 zone. You can see Mr. Blaskic's name on the bottom,

    13 but there's no signature.

    14 Q. Now, you've had an opportunity to examine the

    15 contents of this particular document before coming to

    16 court, have you not?

    17 A. Yes, it's my own. I'm aware of this

    18 document.

    19 Q. And you were in the theatre in Central Bosnia

    20 before and after this particular document was issued?

    21 A. Yes. The document appeared on the 14th of

    22 June, and I arrived in June -- I arrived in April,

    23 rather, and I remained there until the middle of July.

    24 Q. What's your impression and opinion about this

    25 particular document?

  58. 1A. In my opinion, this is an extension or a

    2 continuation of the propaganda. There are extreme

    3 exaggerations about rumours that had been spread. In

    4 my opinion, it fits right into what happened later on,

    5 and, in my opinion, it also fits into the intention of

    6 the HVO and of the HDZ, and the intention was to make

    7 their own population extremely fearful. Based on that

    8 fear, they wanted to try to push them out of certain

    9 regions.

    10 MR. HARMON: If I could have the next

    11 exhibit, please, Mr. Dubuisson? It will be Exhibit

    12 418.

    13 A. I'm not sure that the last sentence was

    14 properly translated. I didn't mean that they wanted

    15 to -- not to chase them out of one but, rather, to draw

    16 them into one.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry, I did not understand

    18 that.

    19 A. Let me explain. The propaganda, in my

    20 opinion, was used so that the Croatian minorities in

    21 certain areas which were under Muslim domination were

    22 to be convinced that they should leave these regions

    23 voluntarily in order to go to Vitez and to Novi Bila

    24 and Busovaca.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Since I'm asking you: And what

  59. 1was the purpose of that?

    2 A. The purpose of the HVO and the HDZ was to

    3 concentrate the Croats in the areas that were under

    4 their own domination.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    6 MR. HARMON:

    7 Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, you have in front of

    8 you Exhibit 418, and can you tell the Judges what

    9 Exhibit 418 is?

    10 Let me rephrase that question. Is this a

    11 communication to General Morillon from Mate Boban?

    12 A. The first page states that it's a fax, it's a

    13 fax cover sheet. The intention was for it to be sent

    14 to General Morillon. It was sent on behalf of Mate

    15 Boban.

    16 Q. Now, turning to the document on the next

    17 page, do you see the caption to whom it's addressed?

    18 Is it addressed to Philip Morillon?

    19 A. Yes, that's correct. It's addressed to

    20 General Philip Morillon.

    21 Q. What is the date on that, please?

    22 A. The date is 22 June, 1993.

    23 Q. And can you see who sent that letter to

    24 Philip Morillon?

    25 A. The name that's on there is Mate Boban.

  60. 1Q. Now, very slowly, if you would, please,

    2 Colonel Morsink, would you read the first paragraph of

    3 this document?

    4 THE WITNESS: "Dear Sir: The Croatian people

    5 of Central Bosnia are on the verge of extinction and

    6 being expelled from areas where they have lived for

    7 over 13 centuries. UNPROFOR and yourself have

    8 witnessed the barbaric Muslim devastation and

    9 desecration of sacred Catholic objects of our people.

    10 The Kraljeva, Sutjeska, Guca Gora monasteries and many

    11 other similar places are the soul of Bosnia &

    12 Herzegovina which we Croats have defended and attempted

    13 to recreate on a new basis. More than 100.000 people,

    14 women, children and the helpless are in extreme danger

    15 of losing their lives. It seems the tragic destiny of

    16 Travnik, Kakanj, Kraljeva, Sutjeska, Kresevo, Fojnica

    17 Busovac, Vitez, Kiseljak and Novi Travnik means nothing

    18 to you. Do Sarajevo, Vares, Bugojno, Zenica, Zepce and

    19 Tuzla have to experience the same fate tomorrow, as you

    20 further ignore the cause of the evil."

    21 Q. You don't have to read further. Thank you,

    22 Colonel Morsink.

    23 Now, again, you were in Central Bosnia at the

    24 time this letter was sent to --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Mr. Harmon. The

  61. 1Judges have an official responsibility. Have you

    2 completed this point, that is Point 3, dealing with

    3 propaganda?

    4 MR. HARMON: This is the final point,

    5 Mr. President.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Yes, go ahead.

    7 MR. HARMON:

    8 Q. Colonel Morsink, you were in Central Bosnia

    9 when this letter was sent to Philip Morillon from Mate

    10 Boban; is that correct?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Now, you have read the first paragraph of

    13 this particular letter to Colonel Morillon. What is

    14 your view of that particular paragraph?

    15 A. My opinion is that it was not true, and I was

    16 on site myself because I went on site, from Travnik and

    17 Guca Gora, I visited then. In my opinion, I think this

    18 was an extension of the propaganda. It's the same

    19 thing. Whereas we had told the local people that these

    20 allegations were not grounded.

    21 Q. Colonel Morsink, Mate Boban, in this letter,

    22 makes reference to the desecration of certain Catholic

    23 monasteries and religious sites. Tell me the reaction,

    24 if you will, to the Bosnian Muslim military leadership

    25 when receiving allegations of this type?

  62. 1A. I remember that once, after the incident in

    2 Guca Gora, that we had to go visit General Alagic and

    3 report these accusations, saying that in the Guca Gora

    4 church several weeks before, certain sacred objects had

    5 been damaged. General Alagic was impressed by the

    6 accusations, he apologised immediately, and said to us

    7 immediately that he would have this kind of activity

    8 stopped immediately, that he would attempt to track

    9 down the guilty parties in order to punish them.

    10 Q. Can you contrast the degree of damage done to

    11 Catholic religious sites in Muslim-held territory

    12 versus the amount of damage and the scale of damage

    13 done to Muslim religious sites in HVO-held territory?

    14 A. The Catholic objects were practically never

    15 damaged. I saw one minor example in a Catholic church

    16 near Busovaca. There, there was a little bit of damage

    17 to the church. I saw many examples of

    18 mosques, minarets, including others in Ahmici, where

    19 the mosque and minaret had been completely destroyed.

    20 This also happened in other places. The ratio between

    21 the damage to Catholic buildings as opposed to Muslim

    22 buildings was something really that one cannot say was

    23 comparable.

    24 Q. Now, you've described the reaction of General

    25 Alagic to getting information that Catholic sites had

  63. 1been destroyed or damaged. Can you tell the Judges the

    2 reaction of HVO officers in respect of claims that

    3 Muslim sites had been damaged or destroyed by their

    4 forces?

    5 A. Well, the allegations, first of all, were

    6 submitted to find out their immediate reaction to

    7 these, and in my experience, we found that the reaction

    8 of the HVO military personnel was of general

    9 disinterest or they would simply deny or put these

    10 accusations onto the backs of "uncontrolled elements,"

    11 as they called them. At times they would promise to

    12 carry out an investigation, but there was never any

    13 report of any type of such an investigation being

    14 carried out.

    15 MR. HARMON: Thank you. Mr. President, that

    16 concludes the presentation of evidence in respect of

    17 the propaganda and related issues.

    18 I'll now turn to a different subject, and

    19 that is: Colonel Morsink, can you please --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I have to interrupt you here

    21 because you said you've just completed, but we have a

    22 prior obligation, so we will resume at 2.45. Thank you

    23 very much.

    24 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.34 p.m.


  64. 1--- On resuming at 2.57 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume our hearing

    3 now. Have the accused brought in, please.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, Mr. Hayman, I

    6 believe we are supposed to finish with this witness

    7 this afternoon, including the cross-examination. There

    8 are interpretation problems, and we have to accept the

    9 fact that they exist and we try to be as concise as we

    10 can. We only have reached Point 3 out of 13, and so we

    11 have to try to focus things, to make things short

    12 because there's got to be a cross-examination, there

    13 are technical problems which just exist, and that's

    14 what happens, and we can't do anything about it.

    15 We'll take the time we need. I spoke to

    16 Maja, our wonderful chief of service. If necessary,

    17 we'll even work until 7.00, but we'll shorten, if

    18 necessary, the break, we'll take extra time now because

    19 we were talking about that issue, but I say very

    20 clearly that I insist upon the cross-examination being

    21 completed this afternoon. We will stay as long as we

    22 need. You must also understand that there are

    23 administrative and organisational problems as well.

    24 Justice is eternal, but alas, alas, there are human

    25 problems that come into play as well.

  65. 1Mr. Harmon, let me remind you that we are

    2 only on Point 3, we finished with the HVO propaganda, I

    3 noted that there are 13 points. If you want to deal

    4 with them with the same care, which is praiseworthy and

    5 legitimate in your opinion, that means we're going to

    6 have him here for two days. Can we afford this

    7 luxury? I'm not sure that we can. There you go. And,

    8 of course, there's the cross-examination, I know that

    9 it's going to be an important one, and I do not want to

    10 limit the rights of the Defence, I say very clearly, I

    11 do not want to limit the Defence's rights. The accused

    12 has the right to explore all defence opportunities

    13 available to him.

    14 You know, Mr. Harmon, that when the

    15 Prosecutor takes a long time then the cross-examination

    16 is long as well. That is obvious. What I say to you I

    17 will say in a few weeks to the Defence, when you have a

    18 long examination-in-chief, then you have a long

    19 cross-examination and the Judges ask a lot of questions

    20 about it. You know justice is a human affair, and even

    21 if we try to make it --

    22 JUDGE RIAD: It is not the Court's fault, it

    23 is the problem of interpreters. So if the problem was

    24 not to translate from Dutch to English and French,

    25 there would be no problem, in case you want to take

  66. 1into consideration.

    2 MR. HARMON: I understand that, Judge Riad,

    3 and thank you, I will try to expedite my examination,

    4 but obviously with the use of a Dutch interpreter, it

    5 slows proceedings down. But nevertheless, let me

    6 begin, and if I can very quickly turn to an electronic

    7 exhibit and have that immediately put on the screen.

    8 Mr. President, I'm going to return briefly to the

    9 previous testimony in Guca Gora on the mission in which

    10 Colonel Morsink went to Guca Gora.

    11 Q. Colonel Morsink, you testified in your direct

    12 examination that when you went to investigate claims

    13 that Croat villages had been burned in and around Guca

    14 Gora on the 8th of June, you found a village that was,

    15 in fact, burning and, in fact, it was a Muslim village,

    16 not a Croat village. Is the picture in front of you a

    17 picture that you took on the 8th of June, 1993?

    18 A. This is a photograph which I took on the 8th

    19 or the 9th of June.

    20 Q. And can you see the village of Bandol

    21 burning?

    22 A. Yes, you can see it clearly. To the right,

    23 in front of the vehicle to the right. Right on the

    24 horizon you can see smoke and you can see burning

    25 houses. That is, I think, the village of Bandol.

  67. 1Q. And that is a Muslim village?

    2 A. Yes, it's a Muslim village.

    3 MR. HARMON: Could I have that,

    4 Mr. Dubuisson, marked as an exhibit, however that is

    5 done electronically or otherwise, and I will continue

    6 with my examination.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, of course. It will be

    8 given a number, 419.

    9 MR. HARMON:

    10 Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, let me ask you, can you

    11 please characterise the differences in the degree of

    12 cooperation between the Bosnian Muslim army and the HVO

    13 army in respect of investigating allegations of serious

    14 violations of international humanitarian law?

    15 A. I have already given you a series of examples

    16 about collaboration with the Muslims, with the Muslim

    17 armed forces. For example, in Guca Gora, where the

    18 division commander promised to carry out an

    19 investigation. In Grahovcici, the third corps allowed

    20 us to have a meeting, and on the HVO side, things were

    21 very different. Ordinarily, we had no escort. In some

    22 exceptional cases, Mr. Jusic would accompany us, but in

    23 most of the cases, there was no escort, and we were

    24 stopped at each roadblock.

    25 When we protested, we had to go back to

  68. 1headquarters, we had to ask for authorisation again,

    2 sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't. An example

    3 when it would never work was in Kruscica. There were

    4 cases when there was an HVO authorisation saying that

    5 we could be escorted from Travnik to Zenica, there

    6 would be a large group of wounded that had been chosen

    7 in the hospital, wounded people from all the groups,

    8 and despite all authorisations, we still had to stop at

    9 the HVO checkpoints.

    10 After an hour of talking, we would be sent

    11 back, and then there were authorisations for

    12 investigations which were granted each time, but in my

    13 opinion, these investigations never took place. We

    14 were promised investigations, but we never saw any

    15 results. And so we were given a lot of promises but

    16 there were very few results.

    17 Q. Colonel Morsink, did you attempt to

    18 investigate Gomionica and can you tell the Judges what

    19 response you received from the HVO?

    20 A. When we were in Kiseljak, we heard rumours,

    21 according to which there had been fighting around that

    22 village, and that we were -- that the Muslim houses

    23 were being set on fire. We asked for authorisation to

    24 go there, and when we arrived, we were stopped at a

    25 roadblock near the front-line where the Canadian escort

  69. 1was also stopped. The Canadians were unable to get us

    2 through that roadblock. The HVO soldiers refused to

    3 authorise the passage.

    4 An argument that was used very often that is

    5 that it was too dangerous for us to go through.

    6 Q. Now let me turn to events that took place --

    7 let me start with Ahmici. You were aware, since you

    8 arrived on the 16th of April, 1993, of a serious

    9 massacre that had occurred in the village of Ahmici.

    10 Were you ever provided, as a representative of ECMM,

    11 with any investigation results that had been conducted

    12 by the HVO into the circumstances of the massacre at

    13 Ahmici?

    14 A. Never.

    15 Q. In respect to the truck bomb that occurred in

    16 Stari Vitez where Mario Cerkez said he was going to

    17 conduct an investigation, when you were in theatre, did

    18 you ever receive an investigation report from the HVO

    19 about the circumstances of that truck bombing?

    20 A. Never.

    21 Q. In respect of a shelling in Zenica that took

    22 place on the 19th of April, 1993, in which a

    23 significant number of civilians were killed, did you

    24 ever receive an investigation report or the result of

    25 any investigation from the HVO in respect of that

  70. 1particular incident?

    2 A. There were never any results from the

    3 investigation.

    4 Q. Now, let me ask you about General Alagic.

    5 General Alagic accompanied you on an investigation in

    6 respect of claims made about atrocities committed

    7 against the Croats; is that correct?

    8 A. This is correct.

    9 Q. And General Alagic had an equivalent position

    10 to that held by Colonel Blaskic; is that correct?

    11 A. That's correct.

    12 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic ever accompany you on any

    13 of your investigations?

    14 A. No, he never went with me.

    15 Q. Now, were any investigations, to your

    16 knowledge, ever conducted into violations relating to

    17 the forced use of civilians, Muslim civilians, to dig

    18 trenches?

    19 A. We were promised that several times, but I

    20 never saw any result from any inquiry.

    21 Q. Were any investigations, to your knowledge,

    22 ever conducted by the HVO into allegations about the

    23 intentional setting afire of Muslim houses?

    24 A. I never got any results at all in that

    25 respect.

  71. 1Q. Now, I'd like to turn to a different topic,

    2 and that is interference with humanitarian aid by the

    3 HVO. Let me ask you this first question that calls

    4 merely for a "Yes" or "No" answer. While you were in

    5 Central Bosnia, did the HVO interfere with the delivery

    6 of humanitarian aid?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Okay. Now, you were in Central Bosnia, were

    9 you not, on the 10th of June when the Convoy of Joy was

    10 attacked; is that correct?

    11 A. That's correct.

    12 Q. And I don't want you to go into any details

    13 in that incident because we have already had

    14 significant testimony about that event here, but did

    15 you see the aftermath of that particular attack on that

    16 humanitarian aid convoy?

    17 A. I saw damage and things had been stolen.

    18 Q. Can you give us other examples when the HVO

    19 interfered with the delivery of humanitarian aid?

    20 A. An example where I myself, was when there was

    21 an attempt to bring humanitarian aid to Kruscica, from

    22 the end of May, Kruscica had been cut off from the

    23 surroundings, the immediate surroundings. For us and

    24 for the British battalion, there was no contact. We

    25 tried almost to go there almost every day, that is to

  72. 1Kruscica. We had daily contacts with the brigade

    2 commander, Mr. Cerkez, and the answer which we were

    3 always given was that the road was blocked by furious

    4 civilians that they could not control. We insisted

    5 that the road be opened, and even through the -- even

    6 through the assistance of the mayor, we weren't able to

    7 get through -- we were not able to achieve any concrete

    8 results.

    9 In the end, Mr. Blaskic sent an order, and in

    10 the order, he said that the road was to be opened.

    11 Q. Now, let me interrupt you right there. If I

    12 could have two exhibits, please? The first exhibit

    13 would be Defence Exhibit 141. Can that be placed on

    14 the ELMO, please?

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, we would prefer

    16 the witness not be interrupted. He was answering the

    17 question. Counsel apparently wants to stop him and

    18 direct his attention to a document before he completes

    19 his answer. We think the appropriate procedure is to

    20 allow him to complete, if the answer is responsive, and

    21 then go from there.

    22 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I disagree with

    23 Counsel. I appreciate being able to conduct my

    24 examination in the way that it's been conducted in the

    25 past. The witness referred to an exhibit -- to an

  73. 1order, the Defence has introduced the order --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Within certain limits,

    3 Mr. Harmon, however. If you ask a question, it would

    4 be proper for the witness to be able to answer all the

    5 way to the end. You can't do everything and everything

    6 here and everything there. You can't ask a question --

    7 if you ask a question, you have to wait for an answer.

    8 The final word lies with the Judges, after all. I'm

    9 trying to be pleasant about this. Either you ask a

    10 question or you don't. If you do, you have to wait for

    11 the answer.

    12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, fine. I will

    13 defer showing the witness this exhibit. He will

    14 testify to the conclusion of his testimony, and then I

    15 will ask to show him two exhibits.

    16 Mr. Usher, we'll wait for a minute with that

    17 exhibit.

    18 Q. Please, Colonel Morsink, if you continue with

    19 your evidence and then I will show you the exhibit.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

    21 A. On the 21st of June, the order arrived from

    22 Mr. Blaskic. It was an order that the road be opened

    23 and that the humanitarian convoys be allowed to go

    24 through. I accompanied the transport with the UNHCR.

    25 And to my great surprise, a second road was opened up

  74. 1as well, a road which was under HVO control. We were

    2 able to move the humanitarian aid for an hour. During

    3 that hour, we also had to treat the casualties, we had

    4 a physician with us, in order to treat the wounded.

    5 That's all I have to say for the first

    6 example.

    7 Another important example --

    8 Q. Let me interrupt you there because I have

    9 some questions to clarify your previous testimony.

    10 Now if we could show the witness Exhibit --

    11 Defence Exhibit 141 and place that on the ELMO, please.

    12 Is there an English translation with that

    13 exhibit? Will you place that in front of the witness,

    14 please, Mr. Usher.

    15 Colonel Morsink, is this a copy of the order

    16 that you were just testifying about?

    17 A. Yes, it is.

    18 Q. And did you receive this order from the

    19 British battalion?

    20 A. Yes, I received that from the British

    21 battalion.

    22 Q. Now, a couple points about this order. First

    23 of all, in the first paragraph, it refers to -- it's a

    24 command that orders -- the aid delivery to the village

    25 of Kruscica on the 21st of June, 1993; is that correct?

  75. 1A. Yes, that's correct.

    2 Q. Now, you mentioned just a few minutes ago in

    3 your testimony that there was a secondary road through

    4 which you delivered aid; is that correct?

    5 A. That's correct. The main road had been

    6 barricaded by angry civilians, and after this order,

    7 another road was opened for us because -- the second

    8 was therefore made available.

    9 Q. In your opinion, was that secondary road made

    10 available five weeks earlier when you started your

    11 request to make and deliver aid to Kruscica?

    12 A. We weren't aware that there was another

    13 road. We had demanded authorisation to go to Kruscica

    14 every single day and we were always answered the same

    15 way: The road's being blocked by dissatisfied

    16 civilians.

    17 Q. And then five weeks later you were informed

    18 of a secondary road through which you could deliver

    19 aid?

    20 A. That's correct.

    21 Q. Now, in respect of going to Kruscica to

    22 deliver aid, was your life threatened by an HVO officer

    23 and can you tell the Court about that, please?

    24 A. On the 9th of June, when I visited the HVO

    25 hospital in Nova Bila, the physicians told me that

  76. 1there were wounded people everywhere. They let me see

    2 the wounded people. And during the visit, I was

    3 suddenly confronted by an HVO officer.

    4 The officer, this HVO officer, whose

    5 photograph I have shown you this morning, was extremely

    6 angry, and he threatened to kill me if I were to come

    7 back again to a roadblock in Kruscica. I took the

    8 threat very seriously at that time, and that's why, on

    9 the 21st of June, in a United Nations' vehicle

    10 belonging to the High Commission for Refugees, that I

    11 went to Kruscica instead of using my own vehicle.

    12 Q. Now, when he threatened to kill you if you

    13 went back to a roadblock in Kruscica, you're talking

    14 about if you went back to the roadblock in Kruscica

    15 through which you were trying to deliver humanitarian

    16 aid?

    17 A. Yes, that's correct. It was the roadblock

    18 that had been set up by angry civilians, it was the

    19 roadblock that I had to go through, in my opinion, in

    20 order to get to Kruscica.

    21 MR. HARMON: Now, very briefly, if I could

    22 have the witness shown Exhibit 408?

    23 Q. Colonel Morsink, while the registrar is

    24 finding that exhibit, was the individual who threatened

    25 to kill you if he saw you again at the roadblock in

  77. 1Kruscica in this morning's video film that you saw?

    2 A. Yes, he was. He was in the video film.

    3 MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, if you could put this

    4 picture on the ELMO, please? Just fold it back. You

    5 don't have to take it out.

    6 Q. Is the individual that threatened to kill you

    7 depicted in this photograph with the No. 4 next to him?

    8 A. Yes, he's No. 4.

    9 Q. Thank you. Now, Colonel Morsink can you

    10 proceed to tell us about another incident that occurred

    11 where the HVO interfered with the delivery of

    12 humanitarian aid?

    13 A. Another example where I was very closely

    14 involved was at the beginning of July 1993 in Busovaca,

    15 four trucks carrying humanitarian aid were stopped

    16 alongside the road, they were stopped by HVO soldiers.

    17 We heard about this incident that same evening on the

    18 telephone. The next morning, I went with a

    19 representative, Medicins Du Monde, doctors without

    20 borders, who was in two of the trucks. We went to the

    21 Busovaca police commission -- station where we were

    22 told that the unloading platform for the merchandise

    23 was not ready yet.

    24 THE WITNESS: That's not correct. The cargo

    25 lists were not correct.

  78. 1A. The bill of lading was not there. After a

    2 long discussion with the police commissioner, we were

    3 authorised to release the drivers, and after a lot of

    4 talk, apparently we were authorised to get back some of

    5 the load that was on that list. In the end, the police

    6 commissioner said to us that he would first consult

    7 with his chief in Mostar and that we should come back

    8 the next day in order to pick up the merchandise.

    9 The next morning, we set up a team of ECMM

    10 members, of the UNHCR, Medicins Du Monde, and a

    11 representative of the British battalion. We had

    12 tremendous problems in arriving at Busovaca. The

    13 regular road to Busovaca was blocked by big trucks, and

    14 on the other road, along the hills, or in the hills,

    15 there was fighting. At any rate, it took much longer

    16 to get there that way. When we arrived at the police

    17 station, the commissioner was already gone, and so we

    18 tried to get to the HVO brigade commander, and we were

    19 told that he had gone to see Blaskic in Vitez for a

    20 consultation.

    21 When we again went to the police offices

    22 after that, we met the brigade commander, Gorbasic, and

    23 he told us that the drivers, the merchandise and the

    24 trucks, would be given back when there was no longer

    25 any threats to Zenica. And that is why the roads were

  79. 1blocked, because there were threats, and I said to them

    2 that that was not acceptable, combining those two

    3 things was not acceptable. We then went to the HVO

    4 barracks to see whether the merchandise was still

    5 there. The merchandise had already been taken off the

    6 trucks, and we were asked to take the trucks and to get

    7 lost.

    8 We refused. We waited in the barracks until

    9 the police commissioner returned. After waiting for a

    10 long time, we received a written order from

    11 Mr. Gorbasic to take both the driver and the truck

    12 and -- the truck should be empty. We refused again.

    13 And then a few minutes later, a soldier arrived who

    14 threatened me with his rifle, and he told me that we

    15 had two minutes to get out -- ten minutes, no longer

    16 than that, and if I hadn't left in ten minutes, some

    17 bad things -- some very bad things could happen to me.

    18 Finally, with the drivers, we decided to

    19 leave, to disappear with the trucks. We stopped at the

    20 HVO headquarters in Busovaca. I lodged a protest, a

    21 very strong protest, and after that, we went to the

    22 police offices, and there too I lodged a protest very

    23 vigorously.

    24 Finally, I was able to get back safe and

    25 sound with the drivers and with the trucks to Zenica.

  80. 1The load of the two trucks, that is, there was

    2 equipment for the physicians in Zenica, from Medicins Du

    3 Monde, among other things there was medical material

    4 for all of that in one of the trucks, they were trucks

    5 that belonged to Medicins Sans Frontiers, and the last

    6 truck was carrying 20 tonnes of powdered milk for

    7 Zenica.

    8 Q. Shortly after the merchandise that you've

    9 just described was stolen, did you see it?

    10 A. The powdered milk is something I saw in the

    11 buildings, in the barracks, and some of the medical

    12 equipment, I saw some 13 microscopes also in Busovaca.

    13 Q. What did the doctors at the hospital in

    14 Busovaca say in respect to the stolen aid that they had

    15 received?

    16 A. My monitor colleague talked to me about it

    17 and explained that they had enough materials -- rather,

    18 they did not have enough people to really deal with

    19 that, they did not really have anyone to deal with that

    20 type of material. They had 13 microscopes, but only

    21 one person, one sole operator to use them.

    22 Q. Now, you said that the aid itself was owned

    23 by Medicins Du Monde; is that right?

    24 A. Yes, one part of the load, yes, was from

    25 Medicins Du Monde.

  81. 1Q. Also Medicins Sans Frontiers?

    2 A. Yes, that's right.

    3 Q. I didn't catch the third organisation that

    4 was sending this aid?

    5 A. ECF, which was sending powdered milk.

    6 MR. HARMON: If I could have Prosecutor's

    7 Exhibit 225 put on the ELMO, Mr. Dubuisson? It's a

    8 photograph.

    9 Give me just a minute, please,

    10 Mr. Dubuisson. I've obviously made a mistake on the

    11 photograph number.

    12 Could I have in the meantime Exhibit 419

    13 placed on the ELMO? It should be a photograph as well,

    14 Mr. Dubuisson. Would this be the next ...

    15 THE REGISTRAR: This would be document 420,

    16 it's the photo we had on the screen a moment ago.

    17 MR. HARMON:

    18 Q. Can you tell the Judges if you can identify

    19 that particular photograph and tell the Judges if this

    20 particular individual was involved in the incident

    21 involving the theft of the aid, humanitarian aid, that

    22 you've just described?

    23 A. The man in the photograph was an HVO brigade

    24 in Busovaca. He was the commander of that brigade, and

    25 his name is Dusko Grbasic.

  82. 1Q. I am looking for an additional photograph.

    2 Let me ask you another question. When you met Grubesic

    3 in the police station, he linked return of the aid with

    4 the removal of a particular roadblock. Did he say

    5 where he had received those orders to make that kind of

    6 a linkage?

    7 A. He stated that he had received word from

    8 Blaskic -- he said if he didn't (inaudible) them, he

    9 couldn't do anything, and that the threat would be

    10 eliminated.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: The English translation is not

    12 coherent.

    13 JUDGE RIAD: Could you repeat that, please?

    14 We have difficulty to follow.

    15 MR. HARMON:

    16 Q. Will you please repeat your answer?

    17 A. He said that he received an order from

    18 Blaskic to only remove the roadblock if the threat had

    19 been eliminated, and he had also received as an order

    20 to turn back in the trucks only after the border had

    21 disappeared. That is to say, only to reduce this

    22 roadblock after the trucks had been returned. So when

    23 the threat had been eliminated.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: That apparently is not correct.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: No, the Defence is not in

  83. 1agreement with the interpretation, so I think we have

    2 to take this again, this being very clear, so that the

    3 Defence will be able to carry its own -- Mr. Hayman,

    4 you have the floor right now.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: One other concern. Counsel

    6 stated that there was a linkage between the delivery of

    7 the aid and the removal of a roadblock implied by the

    8 BiH army in one of his questions two or three questions

    9 ago. That has never been testified to by the witness,

    10 and so I wanted to state that for the record. Perhaps

    11 it can be clarified.

    12 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I have a

    13 suggestion, perhaps --

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, perhaps you may

    15 clarify. This is a very important point. You've made

    16 a link between the statement made by the witness,

    17 between the removal of the roadblock and the order

    18 given by Mr. Blaskic. So let's be very clear on this

    19 and make sure this is very clear for the Defence and he

    20 can also exercise his rights. Please, Mr. Harmon, you

    21 have the floor.

    22 MR. HARMON: May I make a request? Perhaps

    23 on this particular point the witness can answer the

    24 question in English. It might expedite this answer,

    25 and the witness can sense --

  84. 1Q. Could you please explain --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel, perhaps you might

    3 explain this in English?

    4 THE WITNESS: I will explain it in English.

    5 We had to deal with an HVO roadblock at the Strane or

    6 the Busovaca junction, the Busovaca T-junction at the

    7 factory. It was an HVO controlled roadblock and the

    8 four trucks in Busovaca were stolen by HVO soldiers.

    9 The order, as we were told by Grbasic, came from

    10 Blaskic to link the roadblock, the lifting of the

    11 roadblock, and giving back the four trucks, to link

    12 those two items together, and we said we do not agree

    13 with that, the roadblock doesn't have anything to do

    14 with giving back the four trucks.

    15 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Colonel.

    16 Now, Mr. Dubuisson, if I could have Exhibit

    17 255? That is the correct number.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: So the roadblock was an HVO

    19 roadblock, not a BiH --

    20 THE WITNESS: No, it was an HVO roadblock.

    21 It was put there because it was thought there was a

    22 threat from Zenica.

    23 THE REGISTRAR: Document 225 is indeed a

    24 death certificate. If you would like to specify what

    25 you're looking for, perhaps I will try to find it?

  85. 1So this is document 255.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Twenty-five or 255?

    3 THE REGISTRAR: Apparently this will be 255.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Apparently, Mr. Registrar?

    5 Very well. Is it apparently or is it not?

    6 MR. HARMON:

    7 Q. Colonel Morsink, do you identify the man on

    8 the right-hand side of that particular picture?

    9 A. Yes, the man who is at the police commission

    10 in Busovaca.

    11 THE WITNESS: Not fully correct. He

    12 introduced himself as the commissioner --

    13 A. No, that's not exactly correct. He is the

    14 one who presented himself as the police commissioner.

    15 Q. This is the man, the policeman, with whom you

    16 dealt on the stolen aid convoy?

    17 A. That's correct.

    18 Q. And what is his name, sir? Do you know his

    19 name?

    20 THE WITNESS: I think his name is Ljubasic.

    21 Q. Mr. Registrar, if I could have the next

    22 exhibit, which is a special report dated the 4th of

    23 July? The subject is the HVO Busovaca stopping of

    24 NGO trucks and taking the cargo.

    25 The exhibit number is, Mr. Dubuisson ...

  86. 1THE REGISTRAR: This would be document 421.

    2 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, this exhibit has

    3 a French translation attached to it.

    4 Q. Mr. Morsink, briefly, we won't go into detail

    5 on this particular document, but do you recognise this

    6 document?

    7 A. Yes, this is a report which I have written.

    8 Q. You have written this report. Does this

    9 report reflect the events that you've just testified

    10 about, that is, the stolen convoy of aid that was

    11 looted at the HVO barracks in Busovaca?

    12 A. Yes, indeed, we wrote about this entire

    13 episode.

    14 Q. I would like to turn to another subject, and

    15 that is an individual by the name of Zute. Did you

    16 have contact with an individual by the name of Zute?

    17 A. Yes, I had one meeting with this person.

    18 Q. Can you tell the Judges about the

    19 circumstances under which you met Zute?

    20 A. In the evening of the celebration of Bajram

    21 in July, General Alagic and his group were attacked on

    22 the road, and a large amount of their personal weapons

    23 were stolen. He called upon the commander of the

    24 BRITBAT and also on the European observers or monitors

    25 and on the local commanders of the HVO and the BiH army,

  87. 1and during this meeting, it was decided that the

    2 following day Mr. Alagic and myself would go and meet

    3 with the believed perpetrator, Mr. Initic (phoen).

    4 Mr. Zute was believed the person responsible.

    5 The following day, we went to the

    6 headquarters of the HVO in the northern part of

    7 Travnik, and there, Mr. Alagic and myself, met with

    8 this person, Mr. Zute. The brigade commander was also

    9 present there, the commander of the brigade, it was a

    10 Mr. Leotar, and afterwards, after a long discussion,

    11 Mr. Initic said that he would return the equipment.

    12 And then, in that same afternoon, all of the equipment

    13 was returned.

    14 Q. Was this man Zute described by the HVO as

    15 somebody who was one of the "uncontrolled elements" in

    16 Central Bosnia?

    17 A. Yes, he was described as an uncontrolled

    18 element, as a criminal even.

    19 Q. Did you meet with that individual on the 2nd

    20 of June, 1992, just to make the date precise?

    21 A. Yes, that's true. However, it was on the 1st

    22 of July. It was the following day. The Bajram holiday

    23 was perhaps on the 1st of July -- my memory is not very

    24 good on the actual date of that holiday -- the 1st of

    25 June, rather, or the 2nd of June.

  88. 1Q. Did the HVO frequently use the excuse, when

    2 crimes were committed, when houses were burned, when

    3 houses were looted, when Muslim civilians were killed,

    4 that those events were the result of people who were

    5 uncontrolled elements? Was that a frequent excuse used

    6 by the HVO?

    7 A. Yes, it was said quite often.

    8 Q. Did it appear to you that this individual by

    9 the name Zute was under the control of the HVO?

    10 A. Yes, he came to attend these meetings, and I

    11 think he came to follow the orders so, yes, I believe

    12 he was under some form of control.

    13 Q. If there was a group of 20 or 30 individuals

    14 who were known to be committing crimes in Central

    15 Bosnia, who were uncontrolled elements, in your

    16 experience and your observations, did Colonel Blaskic

    17 have the resources, soldiers, and sufficient police, to

    18 eliminate those "uncontrolled elements" at any time?

    19 A. I believe that they had so many soldiers and

    20 so many police that it should have been no problem at

    21 all to control a small group of persons.

    22 Q. Having seen the scale of damage that you saw,

    23 scale of damage to Muslim villages, the loss of life to

    24 Muslim civilians, the cleansing of civilians from the

    25 municipalities of Busovaca, Kiseljak, and Vitez, the

  89. 1use of systematic use of forced labour, do you believe

    2 that those crimes were perpetrated by "uncontrolled

    3 elements?"

    4 A. I believe that one or two minor cases may

    5 have been committed by small, uncontrolled groups, but

    6 the large-scale and systematic manner in which these

    7 events took place, entire villages being burned, and

    8 other villages, we saw that it was the Muslim houses

    9 that were systematically selected, and we saw that the

    10 same type of events were taking place at the same time

    11 period in different locations, and it would be

    12 impossible, in my opinion, for this to have been

    13 carried out by uncontrolled groups.

    14 Q. Now I'd like to turn to another subject area,

    15 if I could, and Mr. Dubuisson, could I have the next

    16 exhibits, which are three commands issued by General

    17 Blaskic marked in order, starting with the order that

    18 has the number 441 in the upper left-hand corner as the

    19 next exhibit followed by 443 and 444?

    20 THE REGISTRAR: So document 441. This would

    21 be document 422.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, I need to interrupt

    23 you one moment. Looking at the organisation of this,

    24 we're going to take a break at 4.20, and you said that

    25 you would be with this witness until four o'clock is

  90. 1that not right? Rather, you were expecting four hours

    2 for this witness, but I see now that you have already

    3 had two hours, we resumed at, let's say, 3.00, fifteen

    4 minutes to 3.00. Do you think you might be able to

    5 finish with this witness by 4.20, and I'll ask the

    6 Defence whether or not he feels he will be able to

    7 finish with his cross-examination before the end of the

    8 day.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: I do not believe so, in all

    10 candour, Mr. President. We have been given a number of

    11 long documents we haven't seen before and there are

    12 matters in the documents we need to question the

    13 witness about in addition to his extensive oral

    14 testimony.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I see. I don't want to

    16 put too much pressure on -- too much pressure on the

    17 interpreters, I know they are tired, but I think the

    18 witness will have to return, and at that point he will

    19 return for cross-examination.

    20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters unclear

    21 whether the last statement made by the Judge needed to

    22 be clarified.

    23 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I would note that

    24 these three exhibits are exhibits that have not yet

    25 been submitted for official translations.

  91. 1Q. Colonel Morsink, would you look at

    2 Exhibits -- would you look at the three exhibits in

    3 front of you, that should be 422, 423, and 424. Do you

    4 recognise those exhibits?

    5 A. Yes, I recognise them, but the numbering is

    6 not the same, 441, 443, 444. You did not say that in

    7 English.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I don't have the same numbers

    9 here. Mr. Dubuisson?

    10 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, indeed, these are the

    11 references which are given in the original documents

    12 and not the references that the registrar has given.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I see. There is some

    14 connection between the two. I see. Excuse me.

    15 MR. HARMON:

    16 Q. When I'm referring to the numbers 422, I'm

    17 referring to the Exhibit number and not the number in

    18 the order that appears in the left-hand corner --

    19 A. Yes, I have all the documents you spoke of,

    20 yes.

    21 Q. Now, did you receive those documents at

    22 BRITBAT?

    23 A. That's correct.

    24 Q. And did you also receive these documents in

    25 conjunction with the previous exhibit I showed you,

  92. 1Defence Exhibit 141?

    2 A. That's right.

    3 Q. I'd like to -- and you received them in the

    4 form in which they appear before you, that is, there's

    5 an English translation, and a Croatian language version

    6 of it?

    7 A. That's right.

    8 Q. So you received both versions.

    9 A. That's correct.

    10 Q. I'd like you to take Exhibit 422, please,

    11 which is the order number 441, and ask you, first of

    12 all, from where was this particular order issued?

    13 A. It was at the headquarters of the operational

    14 zone of Central Bosnia.

    15 Q. And was this an order that was initiated

    16 on -- from reading of this order, was it initiated on

    17 General Blaskic's order or was it something that he was

    18 doing as a result of some other situation that had

    19 developed in the theatre?

    20 A. This is based on an order which came from

    21 high up.

    22 Q. Is this document that is in front of you in

    23 the form of a command?

    24 A. Yes, I am reading. It says "I command." In

    25 my mind, that's a command.

  93. 1Q. Can you turn the page to the distribution

    2 list on the lower left-hand corner, and would you

    3 kindly read in English the distribution list of that

    4 document?

    5 THE WITNESS: Distribution. First, all the

    6 HVO brigades. Second, all the independent units under

    7 the command of the HVO 3rd operational zone commander

    8 (MTD TV LTRD 4th military police Bat., Vitozovi, Trvtko

    9 II, and Zuti).

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen, you have

    11 the floor.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I'd like to ask the

    13 witness a question. You read 4 military police but.

    14 Is it but or battalion?

    15 THE WITNESS: I can't read that very clear,

    16 Your Honour.


    18 THE WITNESS: It's maybe the copy. It could

    19 be "battalion." It makes sense.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What do you think it is

    21 as a military man?

    22 THE WITNESS: I think it's "battalion."

    23 MR. HARMON:

    24 Q. In comparing the Croatian language version

    25 with the English language version, there appear to be

  94. 1nine items on the English version, English version, and

    2 ten items on the Croatian version; is that correct?

    3 A. That's right.

    4 Q. Would you please place that order, the

    5 Croatian version, so number 10 appears on the ELMO?

    6 Could the ELMO be illuminated? And could the

    7 interpreters please read number 10?

    8 THE INTERPRETER: The number 10 in Croatian

    9 says; "for the implementation of this command, all the

    10 brigade commanders responsible and those of independent

    11 units."

    12 MR. HARMON: Thank you. You can take that

    13 from the ELMO again, Colonel.

    14 Q. Now, Colonel, first I'd like to draw your

    15 attention to item number 2 on that, and is that a

    16 command or an order that every subordinate commander,

    17 independent HVO unit commander, should issue commands

    18 to his subordinates?

    19 A. Yes, it asks for everyone to obey the orders

    20 and also submit their reports -- submit orders to their

    21 subordinates.

    22 Q. Would you take a look at item number 4. What

    23 does that require?

    24 A. Every day, at 10.00, 10.00 or 9.30 -- I can't

    25 read it quite well here -- all the brigade commanders

  95. 1and also the independent units are to send their

    2 special reports to the 3rd command of the operational

    3 zone. In these reports, it is important to refer to

    4 all the details in the military situation as well as

    5 all efforts that are being made in order to arrive at a

    6 cease-fire.

    7 Q. Colonel, what was item number 2 and item

    8 number 4 suggest to you as a military officer?

    9 A. I would deduce this is a very clear order

    10 that would then be passed on to all the commands;

    11 therefore, there is a clear hierarchy here which

    12 exists. This is a clear order to present a report on

    13 the results of having carried out an order. I would

    14 deduce then that there truly existed a command

    15 structure and that there was very good control there.

    16 Q. Let me turn your attention to item number 9

    17 on this particular order. Can you read that, please?

    18 THE WITNESS: "All the HVO units are obliged

    19 by the Geneva Convention and its additional protocols,

    20 as well as all other instruments of the war law and the

    21 international laws."

    22 Q. Can you deduce from that that Colonel Blaskic

    23 was aware of the obligations under the Geneva

    24 Conventions, the additional protocols, and other

    25 instruments of the war law and international laws?

  96. 1A. Yes, absolutely. It's giving an order for

    2 everyone to follow orders. Therefore, he was aware,

    3 yes.

    4 Q. This order, this command that is in front of

    5 you, was issued on the basis of a cease-fire agreement

    6 that was signed by Colonel Blaskic's superior, Milivoj

    7 Petkovic; correct?

    8 A. Yes, that's right.

    9 Q. I would like to turn to the next order in

    10 front of you. It is Prosecutor's Exhibit 423, and it

    11 has the number 443 in the upper left-hand corner. Was

    12 this issued from the 3rd operation zone headquarters in

    13 Vitez?

    14 A. That's right.

    15 Q. Does Colonel Blaskic's name appear at the

    16 bottom of this particular command?

    17 A. Yes, it does.

    18 Q. Can you read to whom this order was sent, the

    19 distribution list in the lower left-hand corner?

    20 THE WITNESS: Distribution: All the HVO

    21 brigade commanders, 4th battalion military police

    22 commander, special unit Vitezovi commander, special

    23 department Zepce commander, police station commanders

    24 in Busovaca, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Kiseljak, Fojnica,

    25 and Kresevo.

  97. 1Q. Now, a couple questions. First of all, if

    2 you turn to the last of the distribution list and item

    3 number 3 in that exhibit, does it appear to you that

    4 Colonel Blaskic is issuing commands to police station

    5 commanders?

    6 A. Yes, that's what it appears.

    7 Q. Now, he issues orders -- in this particular

    8 document does it appear that he's issuing a command or

    9 an order to areas that were not physically in contact

    10 with Vitez and Busovaca municipalities?

    11 A. Yes. The distance between Zepce was very

    12 long. In fact, you had to go through an area that was

    13 under the BiH army control, and to go to these various

    14 other villages was the same thing, Kiseljak, Kruscica.

    15 The order demonstrates that there were other contacts

    16 that existed.

    17 Q. Now, Colonel Morsink, does this particular

    18 order concern itself with forbidding the violent moving

    19 out of their houses the civil population?

    20 A. Yes, that's clear from that.

    21 Q. Can you conclude from this order that Colonel

    22 Blaskic was aware that the forcible eviction of

    23 civilians was contrary to international humanitarian

    24 law?

    25 A. They don't mention human rights in this

  98. 1order, but it does say that it was forbidden to expel

    2 people by using violence.

    3 Q. Was this order that was issued by Blaskic

    4 issued on his own initiative or was it issued as a

    5 result of something else?

    6 A. He says in the beginning that it's based on

    7 the agreements at higher levels. That's what it says

    8 in the beginning.

    9 Q. I'd like to turn to the Prosecutor's Exhibit

    10 423 which has an order number 443 in the upper

    11 left-hand corner, and was that issued also from the

    12 third operational zone headquarters in Vitez?

    13 THE WITNESS: The 443 or on the back 423 is

    14 what you just said?

    15 Q. Prosecutor's Exhibit 423 which is the

    16 Prosecutor Exhibit number, and in the upper left-hand

    17 corner is 443?

    18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    19 Q. Was that issued from the 3rd operational zone

    20 in Vitez?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Does the name "Tihomir Blaskic" appear on the

    23 bottom of that order?

    24 A. Yes, it does.

    25 Q. I'm sorry, I have the wrong exhibit. Would

  99. 1you now turn your attention to Exhibit 424 with the

    2 numbers 444 in the upper left-hand corner? Was that

    3 order an order that was issued from the third

    4 operational zone headquarters?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. And does the name "Blaskic" appear on the

    7 bottom of that order?

    8 A. Yes, it does.

    9 Q. Does this appear also to be a command?

    10 A. It says on the top "The high command."

    11 Q. Does this also have a similar distribution

    12 list to the previous orders?

    13 A. Zute also.

    14 Q. Is this an order dealing with the arresting

    15 of civilians and forbidding the arresting of civilians?

    16 A. Yes, that's correct.

    17 Q. Also deal with forbidding putting houses on

    18 fire?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Does it deal with the protection of sacred

    21 objects, mosques, et cetera?

    22 A. That's true also.

    23 Q. Does it indicate that everybody who steals

    24 and holding of property shall be punished and solved

    25 through the normal disciplinary measures in courts?

  100. 1A. Yes.

    2 Q. Now, was this order issued on the basis -- or

    3 was it issued on Blaskic's initiative or was it issued

    4 as a result of some other agreements?

    5 A. It's based on a cease-fire agreement issued

    6 from above.

    7 Q. Can you conclude from this particular order

    8 that Colonel Blaskic was aware that the evicting of

    9 civilians, putting houses on fire, destruction of

    10 sacred objects, and stealing property was illegal?

    11 A. Yes, he forbade that.

    12 Q. Now I'd like to turn to another topic, if I

    13 can -- thank you very much.

    14 I'd like to turn to another topic, and that

    15 would be the subject of the use of civilians to perform

    16 forced labour, specifically trench-digging. While you

    17 were in Central Bosnia, were you aware of this

    18 particular practice?

    19 A. I was given protests, according to -- which

    20 said that civilians had been forced to dig trenches. I

    21 was given this during the meeting of the joint

    22 commission. During the meeting, I was made aware of 15

    23 protests in that respect, 10 to 15, 10 to 15.

    24 Q. And did both sides complain about this

    25 practice?

  101. 1A. There were complaints about the HVO soldiers

    2 who forced the Muslim soldiers to dig trenches. That's

    3 how it always was said.

    4 THE WITNESS: Not really correct.

    5 A. The HVO soldiers forced Muslim civilians to

    6 dig trenches. The protest came from one side only.

    7 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether or not the

    8 HVO, in fact, engaged in this practice?

    9 A. There is one case to which I was a witness

    10 with HVO soldiers accompanying civilians who were

    11 carrying shovels, and who had to dig a hole or to dig

    12 trenches. When we asked the question of the local HVO

    13 commander in that respect, he felt that he had been a

    14 little bit cornered, at least that was the feeling that

    15 I had, that he was a bit cornered. He became very

    16 aggressive and did not allow me to speak with his

    17 soldiers or to the civilians concerned by the matter.

    18 And this incident was presented to the joint commission

    19 subsequently. This happened in May -- I think it was

    20 May, I don't quite remember anymore -- it was near

    21 Stranje. The military commander had a nickname,

    22 Marinac.

    23 Q. Now, two exhibits, please, Mr. Dubuisson.

    24 The first is a map, and if I could have the second

    25 exhibit also taken up to the witness as well as an

  102. 1aerial image? If you could give me the numbers on

    2 each, I'd appreciate it.

    3 THE REGISTRAR: This is document 425 where

    4 the word "Vitez" is underlined in orange, and 426 is

    5 the big map.

    6 MR. HARMON:

    7 Q. Very quickly, Colonel Morsink, Prosecutor's

    8 Exhibit 425 appears on the ELMO now. Did you mark the

    9 location where you observed this forced use of labour,

    10 forced labour by the HVO?

    11 A. That is correct.

    12 Q. Can you point out to the Judges where you

    13 observed the people who were digging trenches under the

    14 control of the HVO?

    15 A. It's not easy to show you that on this scale,

    16 but it was in the north. We were coming from Jelinak.

    17 Q. We will get to that in the next exhibit. Can

    18 you just point on the exhibit that's before you,

    19 Colonel Morsink. You're pointing to an orange circle.

    20 Is that the area where you saw the Muslims digging

    21 trenches?

    22 A. It was that area where the orange -- which is

    23 the part which is circled in orange.

    24 Q. Then if we could take the next exhibit,

    25 Prosecutor's Exhibit 426, and place that on the ELMO?

  103. 1Could you turn it the other way, please?

    2 Colonel Morsink, did I show you an aerial

    3 image and did I ask you to indicate on this particular

    4 aerial image two things: One, the direction from which

    5 you came when you saw the people digging trenches and

    6 did I also ask you to put a circle around the area

    7 where these people were digging trenches?

    8 A. Yes, that's correct.

    9 Q. Please go ahead and explain this diagram.

    10 A. Here, in this region, Jelinak, the village of

    11 Jelinak, we were supposed to conduct an investigation

    12 because there had been some houses burned -- set on

    13 fire, rather. After the investigation, after we did

    14 it, we took this road, along this road. Part of the

    15 road had just been built.

    16 Here, at this point, rather high up, it was

    17 an elevated point, we met Mr. Marinac and his soldiers

    18 who had civilians with them. We tried to speak to him,

    19 but he was very angry. Afterwards, we continued along

    20 the road toward the Busovaca junction.

    21 Q. Colonel Morsink, did you subsequently return

    22 to Stranje on the 13th of May with HVO representatives

    23 and did you meet with local Muslims who were still

    24 residing in the community?

    25 A. We had a meeting at the Busovaca commission,

  104. 1regular ones, with both parties, and we tried to go on

    2 site with them.

    3 Q. When you went on site to Stranje, on the 13th

    4 of May, what did the population, the local Muslim

    5 population, tell you had occurred to them with respect

    6 to trench-digging?

    7 A. They complained that on several occasions

    8 they had been forced to dig trenches. They also

    9 complained that many men from that area had been taken

    10 prisoner at the county prison and that the remaining

    11 men were forced to dig trenches. They were the men who

    12 had been taken out of the prison and ordered to dig

    13 trenches.

    14 While they were digging the trenches, several

    15 of them were wounded, some of them even died doing the

    16 forced labour.

    17 Q. Now, at this location in Stranje, was there

    18 an HVO representative with you when those complaints

    19 were made?

    20 A. Yes, there were members of the joint

    21 commission on both sides.

    22 Q. Now, you mentioned that there were a large

    23 number of complaints made at the local commission and

    24 at the joint commissions about civilian forced labour.

    25 Were those complaints being made in front of Franjo

  105. 1Nakic?

    2 A. Mr. Nakic was present several times at

    3 various meetings, and he was spoken to.

    4 Q. Were those complaints also made in front and

    5 in the presence of local brigade commanders as well?

    6 A. Yes. The HVO Busovaca command was always

    7 there at that type of meeting.

    8 Q. Can you tell the Judges what was the response

    9 of the HVO in the face of these continuous allegations

    10 that civilians were forced to be trench-diggers?

    11 A. There were different reactions. Sometimes

    12 they said furious civilians had forced other civilians

    13 to dig the trenches and sometimes we were told that

    14 there had been abuses, that some had used HVO uniforms

    15 in an inappropriate manner, and on other occasions we

    16 were told that the HVO had already lost a great deal of

    17 ground and were therefore forced to have recourse to

    18 all type of reserve forces and that they had to call

    19 upon civilians to dig the trenches, and yet on other

    20 times there was no reaction at all. They just didn't

    21 answer the allegations.

    22 Q. Were you also told that it was uncontrolled

    23 elements who were forcing civilians to dig trenches?

    24 A. Yes. That's what they meant when they talked

    25 about furious civilians. That's what they meant.

  106. 1Q. In addition to complaints that were made to

    2 the HVO at the local joint commissions, did other

    3 international organisations make complaints to the HVO

    4 about this pervasive practice?

    5 A. The International Red Cross and the UNHCR

    6 were present at that those types of meetings, and I

    7 remember that Margaret Green from the UNHCR had

    8 protested because she had noted there were gypsies in

    9 the Vitez region who had been forced to dig trenches.

    10 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was Colonel

    11 Blaskic aware of this illegal practice?

    12 A. He had to have been because his

    13 representatives were present at the meetings when we

    14 talked about it.

    15 Q. To your knowledge, did the HVO ever take any

    16 action to stop this illegal practice?

    17 A. No. I never heard of any kind of measures

    18 taken at all.

    19 Q. Did you ever hear of a single HVO soldier

    20 being punished for engaging in this illegal practice?

    21 A. Never.

    22 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, why did the

    23 HVO engage in this practice?

    24 A. I think that it is dangerous to work on the

    25 front-line, and I think that they did not want to put

  107. 1their own soldiers in danger by forcing them to dig

    2 this type of trench.

    3 Q. Let me turn next, Colonel Morsink, to the

    4 issue of the intentional burning of civilian homes by

    5 the HVO.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, it's twenty after

    7 four. We're going to take our break. You said four

    8 hours. You can do what you like, of course. You still

    9 have several days left. But I don't think that the

    10 cross-examination will be able to take place under

    11 proper conditions today. We're going to have to ask

    12 the Colonel to come back, and this will be counted

    13 against you.

    14 You have, if I'm counting correctly, one,

    15 two, three, four, five, five points to deal with -- is

    16 that correct? -- five points. In the meantime, I think

    17 the interpreters have to take a break, in fact

    18 everybody has to take a break, including the witness,

    19 we will take a good 20 minutes in order to rest up a

    20 bit.

    21 --- Recess taken at 4.20 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 4.50 p.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: We will now continue.

    24 Registrar, have the accused brought in, please.

    25 (The accused entered court)

  108. 1JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon?

    2 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, and

    3 Counsel, because of the considerable difficulties we

    4 have had today in using the procedures that have been

    5 devised, I have made a request of the Dutch government

    6 to make an exception of their general policy that Dutch

    7 officers are required to testify in their native

    8 language, and I have received permission from the Dutch

    9 government to allow Colonel Morsink to testify in

    10 English, and therefore, Mr. President and Your Honours,

    11 and Council we will now proceed with the Court's

    12 permission in that fashion.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. First, I would like

    14 to turn to the witness. You do agree to that, Colonel,

    15 since you speak English very well, do you feel

    16 comfortable speaking in English.

    17 THE WITNESS: I feel comfortable.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: This will therefore allow us --

    19 thank you, Mr. Harmon, first of all, for having taken

    20 those measures, and I'd like to, through you, the Dutch

    21 authorities as well. This will allow us, since there

    22 are difficulties in having the interpreters come here

    23 to work in Dutch tomorrow morning, so that means we

    24 will be able to work the cross-examination this evening

    25 and to continue tomorrow as well which will safeguard

  109. 1the rights of the accused who -- for whom the

    2 cross-examination will follow the

    3 examination-in-chief. Very well. This does not mean

    4 that you can take more time than the time allotted to

    5 you; correct?

    6 MR. HARMON: Correct.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Very well.

    8 MR. HARMON:

    9 Q. Colonel Morsink, I would like to return to

    10 one topic about which there was considerable confusion

    11 before the recess, and that was you mentioned an HVO

    12 roadblock being linked with the return of humanitarian

    13 aid that had been taken by the HVO in Busovaca. Can

    14 you explain the linkage between the roadblock and the

    15 return of the humanitarian aid, please?

    16 A. I can explain that. I'm sorry that I caused

    17 misunderstandings. I can point out the location of the

    18 roadblock at the map, at this map. The location at the

    19 roadblock was here in the area of the blue factory --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me. Perhaps we could

    21 let the Dutch interpreter leave. Of course, it's your

    22 decision. Unless, according to the Dutch authorities,

    23 there is a litigious point here, but since you can't be

    24 here tomorrow. What do you think, Mr. Harmon?

    25 MR. HARMON: Colonel, it is your presence at

  110. 1this point?

    2 A. If you agree, Your Honour, I would like her

    3 to stay here for a while, just in case I don't find the

    4 right English words.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: But tomorrow it wouldn't work

    6 that way because tomorrow we will be able to continue.

    7 That's what he said. Which means that you're going to

    8 stay, and we're pleased about that. But we will

    9 continue working with you tomorrow without a Dutch

    10 interpreter. I want to say that we will complete our

    11 work -- the work, including the cross-examination, by

    12 the end of tomorrow morning. Excuse me for

    13 interrupting. Continue, please.

    14 A. So the location of the roadblock was here, it

    15 was an HVO-controlled roadblock, and it was put there,

    16 told by the HVO brigade commander, because they were

    17 afraid of an attack coming from Zenica towards

    18 Busovaca. So the linkage that has been made was that

    19 the HVO commander asked us to take away the threat from

    20 Zenica, and if that threat was taken away by us, by

    21 ECMM, then they would be able to lift the roadblock and

    22 to let go the trucks, and that linkage was not accepted

    23 by us.

    24 MR. HARMON:

    25 Q. Thank you for the clarification. Now let me

  111. 1turn to the issue of the intentional setting afire of

    2 Muslim houses. First of all, were complaints made to

    3 the HVO by the ECMM and other international

    4 organisations about the intentional burning of houses,

    5 of Muslim houses, by the HVO?

    6 A. Yes, they were made several times during

    7 several meetings.

    8 Q. In your opinion did the HVO engage in the

    9 systematic burning of Muslim houses?

    10 A. I think so, yes, because the burning of

    11 houses was done very systematically in several places.

    12 They burned all Muslim houses. In other places, where

    13 the population was more or less mixed on an equal

    14 basis, they only burned the Muslim houses, and it was

    15 in another way systematically done because it happened

    16 simultaneously in different villages, around Busovaca,

    17 around Vitez, and in the same period around Kiseljak.

    18 So that requires quite an organisation, to do it in a

    19 way like that.

    20 Q. Colonel Morsink, did you visit the villages

    21 of Ahmici, Nadioci, Preocica, Sivrino Selo, Gacice

    22 Gomionica, Gromiljak, and Rotilj did you inspect the

    23 damage to Muslim houses in those villages?

    24 A. I visited almost all of them you named except

    25 for Gomionica since I was not allowed to go in there.

  112. 1I visited all the other places and what I saw there was

    2 that almost all Muslim houses were burned, in some

    3 places they were all burned or 100 per cent of the

    4 Muslim houses.

    5 Q. And are you able to distinguish between

    6 battle damage and non-battle damage in respect of those

    7 burned houses?

    8 A. I think I am able to distinguish between

    9 battle damage and ordinary fire.

    10 Q. And what were the -- how were the majority of

    11 the Muslim houses damaged, in your opinion?

    12 A. The majority of the houses was damaged by

    13 severe fire, maybe lit with petrol or gasoline, but

    14 they were damaged by fire and definitely not by

    15 artillery fire or something else.

    16 Q. Now, did you base your opinion on any

    17 conversations that you had with HVO commanders as well?

    18 A. I remember a conversation quite well which

    19 happened at the joint commission Vitez with the brigade

    20 commander HVO Vitez president, Mr. Mario Cerkez, and he

    21 was very upset that the army of BiH was trying to get

    22 in new forces into Kruscica through the mountains,

    23 there's a small goat trail through the mountains, and

    24 he said that that should be stopped, and if not, he was

    25 willing to burn down all Kruscica. And I was really

  113. 1surprised by an outcry like that because he was an HVO

    2 officer, he was the brigade commander in the area, he

    3 was wearing his uniform, and I didn't expect an officer

    4 at all making a statement like that.

    5 Q. Was that statement made on the 24th of May,

    6 1993, a matter of weeks after the burning of Ahmici and

    7 other villages in and around Central Bosnia?

    8 A. I do not recall the exact date, but it was

    9 made several weeks after all the villages in the area

    10 had been burnt.

    11 Q. Did you take that threat of Mario Cerkez

    12 seriously?

    13 A. Well, he said it in a very clear way, and he

    14 was on duty when he said it, he was an active member of

    15 the local joint commission.

    16 Q. Now, in your opinion, could all the burning

    17 that you've just described that you saw been committed

    18 by uncontrolled elements?

    19 A. I do not believe that all the burning was

    20 done by uncontrolled elements since it was done in a

    21 systematic way all more or less in the same time.

    22 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, was Colonel

    23 Blaskic aware of this illegal HVO practice?

    24 A. He must have been aware of it since it was in

    25 his area of operation, and it was -- it was mentioned

  114. 1in several meetings where his people were present.

    2 Q. So complaints were made about it at the joint

    3 commissions where his designees were present?

    4 A. That's correct.

    5 Q. Did you ever, at any time while you were in

    6 Central Bosnia, ever hear of any HVO soldier being

    7 punished or disciplined for burning down a Muslim

    8 house?

    9 A. None whatsoever.

    10 Q. In your opinion, Colonel Morsink, why did the

    11 HVO engage in this practice?

    12 A. I think it was one way to clear the area of

    13 all Muslims.

    14 Q. Now, I'd like to turn your attention next to

    15 the forcible expulsion of Muslims from their homes and

    16 ask you if you can relate to the Judges events that

    17 related to the forcible expulsion of Muslim civilians

    18 from the village of Gacice.

    19 A. The village of Gacice is in the area, in the

    20 vicinity, of Vitez, it was under control of HVO, and

    21 approximately 100 or 200 people living there were part

    22 of the Muslim community, they were forced to leave

    23 Gacice, they were brought to Dubravica, that is the

    24 T-junction in the road from Vitez to Zenica, they were

    25 brought there, we were told, with trucks, with cattle

  115. 1trucks, and they were asked to get off the trucks in

    2 Dubravica and they were told to walk towards Zenica

    3 through the frontlines.

    4 We got a report on this during one of the

    5 meetings in Vitez from Mrs. Margaret Green from the

    6 UNHCR, and we got similar reports from the British

    7 battalion on the same incident.

    8 Q. Now, Colonel, let me stop you right there.

    9 Were these complaints also made on the 4th of May,

    10 1993, at a meeting of the ECMM house where the

    11 ambassadors from Spain, France, and Britain were

    12 present?

    13 A. Yes, I recall that Mr. Merdan was very upset

    14 when he got the chance to explain to these three

    15 ambassadors what had happened in the previous three

    16 weeks in the area of Vitez, and he called upon this

    17 example of Gacice as one of the newest examples of

    18 expulsion of Muslim people.

    19 Q. Was the report that the HVO had forcibly

    20 removed these civilians or that other people had

    21 removed these civilians? What was the complaint that

    22 was made?

    23 A. The complaint was made that they were forced

    24 out of Gacice by HVO and, as I recall it, the answer

    25 was that they were forced out by angry civilians.

  116. 1Q. Now, who told you that? Did you go see an

    2 HVO commander, brigade commander, the following day?

    3 A. I'm not sure. I will have to look that up in

    4 my notes, if necessary. I'm not sure who told it to

    5 me.

    6 Q. Could you take a look at your notes, please,

    7 refer to your notes of the 4th of May?

    8 A. I read in my notes that on the 4th of May, at

    9 the joint operation command, the complaint was made by

    10 Mrs. Margaret Green and by Jorge, I forget his last

    11 name, he's a field officer of UNHCR as well. And on

    12 the 4th of May, we spoke to this item with the mayor of

    13 Vitez, Mr. Santic, and during that meeting, Colonel

    14 Stewart and Mrs. Clare Podbielski from the

    15 International Red Cross were present and I recall that

    16 also Colonel Blaskic was present and they were told at

    17 that meeting that -- as I recall it, it was told by the

    18 mayor of Vitez, Mr. Santic, that they needed the houses

    19 in the area of Vitez, all the available houses, to be

    20 able to house Croat DPs, displaced persons, coming from

    21 outside, so they made kind of a plan to use all

    22 available houses or to make houses available so that

    23 they could house Croats in their own region.

    24 Q. Now, did you continue to receive reports

    25 after this incident in Gacice that Muslims were being

  117. 1continually forced out of their homes by the HVO?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. To your knowledge, was Colonel Blaskic aware

    4 of this illegal practice?

    5 A. Again, these allegations were made during the

    6 local joint commissions, and his subordinates were

    7 present during those meetings, so he must have known

    8 about it.

    9 Q. To your knowledge, while you were in theatre,

    10 did you ever hear of a single instance where an HVO

    11 soldier was arrested and punished for evicting a Muslim

    12 from his home?

    13 A. No, I never heard about it.

    14 Q. I'd like to turn briefly to your contacts

    15 with Franjo Nakic. You ever have occasion to socialise

    16 with Franjo Nakic?

    17 A. Yes, at the end of my tour, I was invited by

    18 Mr. Nakic to say good-bye to him at his private house,

    19 and I met his wife there, we had a drink together for

    20 approximately one hour, I said good-bye, and the next

    21 day I left for the coast.

    22 MR. HARMON: Mr. Dubuisson, if I could have

    23 two exhibits shown to the witness? The first is an

    24 aerial image and the second is this item which is a

    25 list.

  118. 1THE REGISTRAR: The aerial photo is 427 and

    2 the list will be 428.

    3 MR. HARMON: Could you please place 427 on

    4 the ELMO, Mr. Usher?

    5 Q. Colonel Morsink, can you identify what this

    6 particular exhibit represents and orient the Judges a

    7 little bit to the items contained in that particular

    8 photograph?

    9 A. Your Honour, the main feature you see on this

    10 aerial photograph is the location of the British

    11 battalion in the small town call Bila. Our house was

    12 on this side, on the upper side of this camp. This

    13 road was called by us the press road since a lot of

    14 houses were occupied by international press. And

    15 either in this circle or in this circle, I'm not sure,

    16 but I'm very positive that the house of Mr. Nakic was

    17 watching over on the fields on this side, either in

    18 this circle or this circle, there was this house where

    19 I met him at the end of my tour.

    20 MR. HARMON: Can we have the next exhibit

    21 placed on the ELMO, please.

    22 Q. Can you tell the Judges what that exhibit is?

    23 A. This is a list of names. These people were

    24 taking part in the joint command in Travnik that was

    25 established in the beginning of May, and this list is

  119. 1signed by Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan themselves, they

    2 were themselves members of this joint command in

    3 Travnik.

    4 Q. Does this list indicate where Mr. Nakic

    5 lived?

    6 A. On number 2, it says Franjo Nakic and his

    7 function, deputy commander, his private telephone

    8 number, and the address says Stara Bila, and that's the

    9 area I pointed out on the map, that's known as old

    10 Bila, Stari Bila.

    11 Q. Let me change the topic and ask you. What's

    12 your position of the command structure of the HVO, and

    13 can you tell the Judges in your own words, whether, in

    14 your opinion, Blaskic and his staff, his subordinate

    15 officers, had control over HVO forces in and around

    16 Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak?

    17 A. I think the HVO forces in the area, the

    18 operational zone middle Bosnia, were well-structured,

    19 since they had this operational zone level, I compare

    20 it to our division level, they had brigades under this

    21 division, several brigades under their control, they

    22 had separate units under their control, they had

    23 military police, they had divisional artillery under

    24 this operational zone command. The area of operations

    25 of their command was clearly defined, including areas

  120. 1like Zepce and Fojnica. That's for the structure of

    2 the organisation, the HVO organisation.

    3 I think they were capable in issuing orders.

    4 They had good telephone communications, they had good

    5 fax communications, and I saw several HVO officers

    6 carrying small portable radios, so I think also the

    7 communication part was well-organised. They controlled

    8 all the switching stations of the telephone lines, so

    9 they could, in fact, decide who was having connections,

    10 who not.

    11 I think they were well-structured in the way

    12 that they issued written orders in the military way,

    13 correctly-written orders, shaped in the right military

    14 way with proper addresses on it. They asked for

    15 reports in these orders, it's also another military way

    16 of organising things, you do not just order anything

    17 that you ask for a report afterwards.

    18 So I think that I can say that the HVO was

    19 well-organised, they had a good organisational

    20 structure, they were capable to command, to order

    21 things, and I think they were also capable to control

    22 since everything was reported in these local joint

    23 commissions, since they had good communication, the

    24 subordinates must have been able to report all their

    25 findings from the ground.

  121. 1Q. Did the HVO and Colonel Blaskic in particular

    2 have the ability to control what was described to you

    3 as "uncontrolled elements?"

    4 A. I think so, yes. I think this Djuti is the

    5 best example, to me. He looked like an uncontrolled

    6 individual, the way he was dressed; but, on the

    7 contrary, he immediately reacted on the invitation to

    8 come to a meeting, and he responded to Nakic, the

    9 second in command of this operational zone, and he

    10 followed the orders of Mr. Nakic by returning all the

    11 stolen goods.

    12 Q. Based on your experiences in Central Bosnia

    13 and what you saw, what conclusions did you draw in

    14 respect of what happened to the Muslim population in

    15 the areas controlled by the HVO?

    16 A. My conclusions were, and they were based on

    17 certain things I saw, they're also based on things we

    18 discussed at ECMM meetings at our headquarters in

    19 Zenica and they're also based on findings by other

    20 monitors, and the conclusions are that the HVO and/or

    21 the HDZ, I'm not sure, I think in combination, so the

    22 military leaders and political leaders, I think they

    23 made a plan to control the whole area where the

    24 majority of Croats lived, to really control it by

    25 expelling all Muslims, and they used tactics of fear,

  122. 1tactics of burning houses, tactics of killing Muslims,

    2 to scare the rest away, and they used, on the other

    3 hand, tactics of propaganda to pull in Croat minorities

    4 from other areas which they would not be able to

    5 control at all. So the incident of Gacice, where they

    6 tried to pull the Croats from that area into Vitez, and

    7 examples of Ahmici and Rotilj, around Vitez and

    8 Kiseljak, where they tried to expel all Muslims by

    9 killing, by burning, by fear, so I think it's a plan,

    10 and it was carried out as they planned it.

    11 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Colonel

    12 Morsink. Mr. President, I have concluded my

    13 examination. I would now ask that items 407 through

    14 428 be introduced into evidence.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I only have

    16 exceptions on a few of those, and they are exhibits

    17 that were not authenticated by the witness.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Which ones?

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Those are --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Not identified. Please, when

    21 you say authenticated and identified, they are very

    22 delicate terms. Please, first of all, tell us which

    23 ones you are talking about, which ones you have

    24 problems with.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: I'm looking in my notes,

  123. 1Mr. President.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Take your time.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: 417, 418.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: 417. 417. I have it before me

    5 now. It is the note signed by the accused, and it's an

    6 instruction, an order.

    7 Colonel, you recognised this document, did

    8 you not, this document 417? It is not the witness who

    9 wrote it, of course, but it corresponds to a time

    10 period in which he was on duty, 417.

    11 Could you identify this document?

    12 A. I do recognise this document, and I recall

    13 that I said it was handed out to me at one of the

    14 meetings, and I recall that I only said it wasn't

    15 signed by Mr. Blaskic himself since -- it might be a

    16 copy or a draft or a translation of the original order

    17 into English.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: I see. Then, in that case, it

    19 is admitted. Now, 418; is that right? 418?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: So let's go on to 418 then. I

    22 have the French version here before me. This is a

    23 letter or notes or a report written by Mate Boban

    24 addressed to General Mario, and it seems to me that the

    25 witness identified and made some comments about this.

  124. 1Colonel? Let's go back to that document,

    2 418.

    3 A. That's right, I identified the document

    4 because I was asked to read what is on it, and I'm not

    5 positive whether I got this order myself or whether I

    6 read it in the ECMM headquarters.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: So long as he saw it at the

    8 time, I don't have an objection, Mr. President. But as

    9 to 416, 417, and 418, I did not have in my notes that

    10 he recognised these from the time of his service as

    11 opposed to being shown them yesterday in the

    12 Prosecutor's Office or something like that.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I cannot guarantee you,

    14 Colonel, whether or not you saw it at the time, I don't

    15 know whether you recall or not, but I think perhaps it

    16 is important. Colonel, do you recall seeing it during

    17 your time of service? We're asking a lot of you now,

    18 but try to remember.

    19 A. I don't think I saw this one in Zenica during

    20 my duty.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I see. But today can you

    22 identify this document as having been the reality of

    23 something issued by Colonel Blaskic at that time and

    24 addressed as a request for assistance? Let me see.

    25 Where is it addressed exactly? It's -- I see it's

  125. 1addressed to the UNHCR, to the European Union as well.

    2 Do you feel this would be a plausible letter given the

    3 fact there was also a fax attached to it, I believe?

    4 A. Excuse me, Your Honour. I think we are

    5 talking about two different orders. The one I was

    6 referring to that I haven't seen --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: 416, 416. 416 in front of me.

    8 Yes. What I have here before me is 416, a document

    9 signed by Blaskic and which is addressed to the High

    10 Commissioner for Refugees and also the European Union

    11 or Community, Nations, and also some Croatian members,

    12 and this is a request for assistance. Can you identify

    13 at least today before us this as something that's

    14 identifiable, in your mind?

    15 A. Yes, I can identify this, Your Honour.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Let's see. Very well. Now,

    17 whether or not you saw it at the time, Mr. Hayman, it's

    18 difficult to state, isn't it, difficult to ask a

    19 witness whether or not, several years later on, five

    20 years later, whether or not he has seen all of these

    21 reports. So I think perhaps it should be admitted.

    22 I'll look to my colleagues first, whether or not they

    23 have any comments.

    24 This shall be admitted as evidence.

    25 Mr. Hayman, do you have any other problems?

  126. 1MR. HAYMAN: Those were the only three that

    2 my notes reflected the witness had not identified them.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Very well,

    6 Mr. Hayman. I hope that you know that it is now 5.20,

    7 and you have another hour or so to work on the

    8 cross-examination.

    9 Colonel, you're now going to be receiving

    10 questions from the Defence.

    11 Mr. Hayman, you have the floor.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. Good

    13 evening, Lieutenant-Colonel.

    14 Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman:

    15 Q. When you arrived in the theatre, you said you

    16 were briefed on the purposes and goals of the Busovaca

    17 joint commission. Were you told what events had given

    18 rise to the founding of the commission?

    19 A. I was informed by two colleague monitors

    20 about the Busovaca joint commission, and I was briefly

    21 informed by Remi Landry, the Canadian monitor, on what

    22 happened in the previous months before I arrived in

    23 theatre.

    24 Q. Did Mr. Remi Landry tell you about the

    25 conflict in January in the Busovaca municipality?

  127. 1A. He told me something about that. I do not

    2 exactly recall what was said, but it had to do with the

    3 conflict between HVO forces and army of BiH forces in

    4 the area of Busovaca, Kacuni, and Bilalovac.

    5 Q. Did he tell you in substance that the BiH army

    6 had attacked, the HVO had the enclave from roughly

    7 Bilalovac to Kacuni and had expelled Croats from that

    8 zone in between those two locations?

    9 A. I'm not sure whether he told me that at that

    10 event, but I at least was aware of that later on. I

    11 was told by several people that there had been

    12 fighting in that area, and as a result of that

    13 fighting, the area of -- let's say the HVO-controlled

    14 area Kiseljak and the HVO-controlled area of Busovaca

    15 were not linked anymore.

    16 Q. So is it fair to say the purpose of the

    17 commission was, among other things, to implement and

    18 monitor the cease-fire that was reached after that

    19 January 1993 conflict in Busovaca?

    20 A. I think that was the main reason why the

    21 first Busovaca joint commission was raised.

    22 Q. Now, did you tell us when you first arrived

    23 in either the Lasva or Kiseljak valleys, what the date

    24 was?

    25 A. The first day I arrived in the area of middle

    1 Bosnia was the night of the 16th, I arrived at the U.N.

  128. 1BH command in Kiseljak. I was taken with an ECMM car

    3 during the night through Kiseljak, Visoko to Zenica. I

    4 was briefed only for a few minutes at the first

    5 evening. I got my first proper briefing at the 17th.

    6 So that was, in fact, my first appearance in the area,

    7 the 17th in the morning, 17th of April.

    8 Q. On the evening of the 16th, did the

    9 EC monitors you were with, did they have an assessment

    10 of the situation at the time, or was there general

    11 confusion in the Lasva Valley?

    12 A. I myself did not get a clear picture at that

    13 time. I asked for a briefing, but everybody was very

    14 busy, and they seemed not to have enough time to brief

    15 a new monitor during that evening.

    16 Q. In the car, did anyone tell you that they

    17 thought they knew what was going on and what was going

    18 on? Were you driven by another EC monitor on the night

    19 of the 16th?

    20 A. Yes, I was driven by a German monitor

    21 together with his interpreter.

    22 Q. Did he tell you whether he had a clear

    23 understanding on the night of the 16th of what was

    24 going on or whether there was general confusion in the

    25 Lasva Valley?

  129. 1A. I don't know whether he told me that he had a

    2 clear picture. He was not able to bring it over to

    3 me. I did not have a clear picture.

    4 Q. The next day, did you go to the headquarters

    5 of the Vitez brigade of the HVO, that is, the 17th of

    6 April?

    7 A. That's right. I went there together with

    8 Eric Friis-Pedersen, the Danish monitor, he was in the

    9 area already for a long time, so he was more or less

    10 the head of the mission in the Vitez area.

    11 Q. Was there fighting going on around that

    12 location at the time you went on the 17th of April?

    13 A. Yes. There was shooting around the

    14 headquarters, small arms fire.

    15 Q. What building was the headquarters in at that

    16 time; do you recall?

    17 A. As I recall, it was the cinema building,

    18 since, at the entrance, there were posters of films.

    19 Q. And that is in reasonably close proximity to

    20 the Hotel Vitez; correct?

    21 A. As I recall it, it was 300 or 400 metres.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Colonel Morsink, when you

    23 respond, please turn towards the Judges, and when you

    24 are receiving questions, you can turn towards the

    25 Defence. Thank you.

  130. 1THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

    2 MR. HAYMAN:

    3 Q. While you were meeting with personnel at the

    4 Vitez brigade headquarters on the 17th of April, did

    5 live rounds come in through the windows?

    6 A. All windows were covered with wood, and I

    7 recall that the wood on the windows in the hallway next

    8 to the room where we met, the wood was hit several

    9 times.

    10 Q. By rounds from rifle fire, presumably?

    11 A. Rifle fire, small arms fire.

    12 Q. Do you recall whether that was from the

    13 general direction of Stari Vitez or Old Vitez or from

    14 some other direction, if you're able to tell us?

    15 A. It was impossible to tell since the windows

    16 were all covered.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 407 could be provided

    18 to the witness, please? That is the order of

    19 appointment of personnel to the joint command.

    20 Q. Do you have that?

    21 A. I have it in front of me now.

    22 Q. Now, you told us that it was your belief at

    23 the time, and this is dated the 1st of May, 1993, that

    24 Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander of the Central

    25 Bosnia operative zone; correct?

  131. 1A. That's correct.

    2 Q. Let me ask you if you agree with the

    3 following:

    4 Question: Prior to 16 April, 1993, did you

    5 believe Franjo Nakic to be the deputy commander of the

    6 HVO Central Bosnia operative zone? Answer: Yes. All

    7 of the documents at the time were signed, showed

    8 Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander. Indeed, I saw a

    9 document from 13 February indicating he was the deputy

    10 commander or at least as an individual representing

    11 Colonel Blaskic as a deputy commander. Question:

    12 After the conflict, be it the 16th or 18th or 20th of

    13 April, you concluded that Mr. Nakic was no longer the

    14 deputy commander but was the chief of staff; correct?

    15 Answer: Yes.

    16 And then there is additional narrative

    17 consistent with the answer "Yes."

    18 Am I correct then, that is not your

    19 understanding, that as a result of the conflict in the

    20 middle of April 1993, that Mr. Nakic lost his position

    21 as deputy commander of the operative zone Central

    22 Bosnia and became the chief of staff of that command?

    23 A. I'm not aware of the facts or the things you

    24 just read from your computer. I don't believe they

    25 were told by me -- sorry -- I don't really understand

  132. 1the --

    2 Q. It's not your testimony.

    3 A. -- where you would like me to answer you on

    4 that.

    5 Q. No, I'm just asking: Do you disagree with

    6 the statements I read to you, the question and answer I

    7 read to you? Do you disagree with it? That is, you

    8 believe that Mr. Nakic was the deputy commander on or

    9 about May 1st and at other relevant times all after the

    10 conflict in the middle of April 1993?

    11 A. I do believe that Mr. Nakic was, when I

    12 arrived, the deputy commander of the operational zone.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. For the record, I'm

    14 reading -- I read from the testimony of Mr. Remi Landry

    15 at pages 7695 and 7696 of the transcript in this case.

    16 A. Your Honour, can I add as an officer, as a

    17 Dutch military officer, the position of deputy

    18 commander and the chief of staff? In the Dutch army,

    19 the deputy commander and the chief of staff are one

    20 person, so there's not a distinction in level, whether

    21 you're more important or less important. In the Dutch

    22 system, and I think it's the same in the Canadian

    23 system, the chief of staff and the deputy commander are

    24 the same person.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

  133. 1JUDGE RIAD: Could it be a promotion to be a

    2 chief of staff?

    3 A. Not according to our system. Maybe in

    4 another system.

    5 MR. HAYMAN:

    6 Q. Now I'd like to ask you about Exhibit 408,

    7 the videotape, and perhaps -- I'd like the technical

    8 room -- I haven't been able to coordinate this so far,

    9 but perhaps they could roll the tape and find a passage

    10 about a minute into the tape where one of the BiH army

    11 officers has a flag patch visible on his right

    12 shoulder? If they could perhaps queue that up and hold

    13 that for a question.

    14 Let me ask you, though: This tape, was it

    15 made of a local joint commission meeting or of the

    16 joint operative or operational command meeting?

    17 A. It's not very clear since, during that

    18 period, the decision was made to organise the Busovaca

    19 joint commission, the old one, into an interim phase,

    20 an interim phase, the joint operational command in the

    21 same ECMM house in Bila; and after that, one or two

    22 weeks after that, we were asked to organise the four

    23 local joint commissions. So it's more or less like an

    24 interim phase. We ourselves called it the JOC, the

    25 Joint Operational Command or Joint Operational

  134. 1Commission, if you wish.

    2 Q. Do you know the date of the meeting depicted

    3 in the videotape, Exhibit 409?

    4 A. I can look it up in my notes. I'm not sure

    5 when it was. I think it's the beginning of May or the

    6 end of April. More likely the beginning of May.

    7 Q. Were you present?

    8 A. I was present for sure. I'm shown on the

    9 tape itself.

    10 Q. Do you know who made the tape?

    11 A. I'm not sure, but I think the tape was made

    12 by ITN, since I got the whole recordings of ITN made

    13 during that period, and I think this is picked out of

    14 that original tape.

    15 Q. Did they tape the whole meeting?

    16 A. No, they did not. At least I did not get

    17 that from ITN. I got the tape of all the recordings

    18 they made during my presence in the area of middle

    19 Bosnia.

    20 Q. Do you know the tape that was shown, is that

    21 the entire ITN tape, or was it edited?

    22 A. I'm not sure. I don't know.

    23 Q. I take it you did not prepare the tape; is

    24 that right?

    25 A. That's right.

  135. 1Q. Now, we saw in the tape Mr. Nakic, you

    2 pointed out Mr. Nakic, as well as Mario Cerkez. Would

    3 Mario Cerkez have been attending a meeting of the joint

    4 operational command or only of the local Vitez joint

    5 commission?

    6 A. Only the local commissions would be attended

    7 by the local brigade commanders.

    8 Q. Such as Mario Cerkez?

    9 A. Such as Mario Cerkez.

    10 Q. Does that suggest to you that that was a

    11 meeting of the local Vitez joint commission?

    12 A. That's right. But as far as I can recall it,

    13 the real local joint commission Vitez was not active at

    14 that time, so it's really an interim phase, starting

    15 up.

    16 Q. You said that Mr. Nakic and Mr. Merdan

    17 attended some of the local joint commission meetings

    18 for a few weeks but then generally did not attend such

    19 meetings; is that correct?

    20 A. That is correct. They attended, I think,

    21 approximately three weeks most of the local joint

    22 commissions in Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and after

    23 that, they asked us to continue the work, and they told

    24 us that they had to be present in the joint command in

    25 Travnik, in the PPT building in Travnik, since that

  136. 1joint command was active after those three weeks.

    2 Q. And thereafter they were not able to attend

    3 the local joint commission meetings; correct?

    4 A. I think that's the reason, yes.

    5 Q. Now, the tape, Exhibit 409, also depicts

    6 officers from both warring parties being escorted home

    7 or back to residences or other offices. Is that

    8 similar to the type of escort, if you know, that was

    9 provided on the 17th of April, 1993, to Marko Priscalo

    10 (phoen), and Zoran Pilicic (phoen), two HVO officers

    11 who were shot while entering or about to enter going

    12 from an UNPROFOR Warrior to the Hotel Vitez?

    13 A. I'm not aware of that incident, but this --

    14 carrying people in armoured cars was meant to bring

    15 them through frontlines because there was still

    16 fighting around the British camp, so we had to bring in

    17 the HVO officers in armoured vehicles, and the army of

    18 BiH officers were not able to go through HVO-controlled

    19 area without protection, so that's the reason why

    20 BRITBAT offered to support us in these local

    21 commissions and they offered to transport these people

    22 in armoured cars.

    23 Q. And, similarly, when the joint commission

    24 teams went out and did their work in other areas, HVO

    25 officers were not able to travel without ECMM and

  137. 1UNPROFOR support; correct?

    2 A. That's correct, but the meetings in Kiseljak

    3 took place at the base of the Canadian company in

    4 Kiseljak, at Camp Padberg (phoen), so they only asked

    5 for armoured cars for the army of BiH side. And the

    6 same thing happened in Busovaca. There, we had most of

    7 the meetings at the headquarters of the Dutch transport

    8 battalion in Busovaca itself, so also that only

    9 required the transport of the army of BiH officers into

    10 Busovaca.

    11 Q. I'm allowing the translators to complete

    12 their translation, and that was why I'm making an

    13 awkward pause between answer and question.

    14 On those occasions when Mr. Nakic went to

    15 Kiseljak, for example, for a local joint commission

    16 meeting there, he would have to be transported in an

    17 UNPROFOR Warrior; correct?

    18 A. That is correct, but several times he came

    19 with us in our armoured Mercedes since that was

    20 comfortable and safe enough to travel.

    21 Q. And you were able to get through the BiH army

    22 checkpoints en route to Kiseljak?

    23 A. Most of the times, we were able, since

    24 Mr. Merdan travelled with us as well and he was able to

    25 lift any roadblocks if they were there.

  138. 1Q. Do you know whether any other meetings of the

    2 joint operational command or the local joint

    3 commissions were videotaped?

    4 A. I don't think that other combined meetings

    5 were videotaped. I know of some separate meetings we

    6 had during this shuttle diplomacy phase that were taped

    7 but then only one side was present.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: I cannot see, Mr. President,

    9 into the technical room. Perhaps if they have been

    10 able to locate this still image, they could put it on

    11 the video monitor? If it doesn't appear, then the

    12 answer will be "No," and I'll proceed in another

    13 fashion.

    14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Yes. Thank you very much to the

    16 technical personnel in the booth.

    17 Q. You have before you, Lieutenant-Colonel, a

    18 still from Exhibit 409, the videotape. First of all,

    19 there is a gentleman seated who takes up about the left

    20 50 per cent of the screen. Do you know who that is?

    21 A. That is Mr. Sivro Sivet. He was the local

    22 commander of the army of BiH forces in Kruscica.

    23 Q. Do you recognise the patch on his right

    24 shoulder?

    25 A. Yes. That is the German national flag, and

  139. 1it's part of, let's say, a German shirt that was used

    2 by German soldiers in the '60s and '70s, so it's a

    3 uniform part used by the Dutch army (sic) in the '60s

    4 and '70s.

    5 Q. You said the Dutch army. You mean the

    6 German --

    7 A. I'm sorry. I mean the German army, of

    8 course.

    9 Q. I take it Mr. Sivet, at the time he wore this

    10 uniform, he was not a member of the German army, he was

    11 a member of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    12 correct?

    13 A. That's correct. That's the way he introduced

    14 himself.

    15 Q. Did you learn that it was common practice for

    16 soldiers on both sides of the warring factions in

    17 Bosnia to wear whatever bits of decent uniform they

    18 could get their hands on, and that sometimes included

    19 patches of the armies of foreign nations? Did you come

    20 into such information in addition to the image on

    21 Exhibit 409 which you've just seen?

    22 A. I recall that I saw a lot of these examples

    23 on the army of BiH side. They told me that they were

    24 short of uniforms, and I recall that I only saw a few

    25 of these examples on the HVO side. They were normally,

  140. 1let's say, military properly-dressed soldiers on the

    2 HVO side.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. That concludes the

    4 use of that tape, and I again thank the technical

    5 booth.

    6 THE REGISTRAR: I think it would be useful to

    7 give a number to this since -- we could perhaps give

    8 the number of D144 to that photo?

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Registrar, a still can be

    10 produced of that?

    11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, absolutely.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you very much.

    13 Q. Now let me direct your attention forward in

    14 time to a meeting you described on April 19, 1993, with

    15 Mario Cerkez concerning the truck bomb incident. Do

    16 you know what happened to the physical evidence of the

    17 truck bomb, i.e., the truck chassis and any other

    18 physical evidence at the scene?

    19 A. I don't know what happened to that. The only

    20 thing I recall seeing myself was part of the engine of

    21 the truck laying next to a large hole on the road, and

    22 I don't know whether the rest of the truck was moved

    23 during the explosion to the side of the road or whether

    24 it was removed by anybody else. I don't know.

    25 Q. This location, this was a location within

  141. 1Stari Vitez, within BH-controlled portions of Stari

    2 Vitez; is that right?

    3 A. I'm not sure whether this part of town is

    4 called Stari Vitez. It was very close to the mosque,

    5 some 200 metres from the mosque, and it was quite close

    6 to the area of Stari Vitez that I later found out was

    7 controlled by army of BiH.

    8 Q. Was there any attempt, if you know, to form a

    9 joint investigation of the incident that would combine

    10 information available to the BiH army, the HVO, and

    11 international organisations to try to investigate the

    12 truck bomb incident?

    13 A. I'm not aware of any attempt to form a

    14 combined task-finding mission. I recall that we asked

    15 Mario Cerkez to investigate this matter, and he

    16 promised us that he would do so. So as I recall it,

    17 there was no need for an extra investigation party.

    18 Q. Did you ever discuss the issue with Mario

    19 Cerkez again, or was it only mentioned on one occasion,

    20 this issue of an investigation into the truck bomb?

    21 A. I did not personally discuss it with him

    22 again since I was a young monitor at the scene. Eric

    23 Friis-Pedersen was the one who did most of the speaking

    24 and I was just taking notes, and after a few days, I

    25 was team leader but then busy in other areas and other

  142. 1jobs, so I don't recall that it was asked or raised

    2 again, this question. I did not do that myself.

    3 Q. And it was not done in your presence, is that

    4 correct, to your knowledge?

    5 A. That's correct. It was not done in my

    6 presence.

    7 Q. Now, you said, I believe, you met the next

    8 day in the Hotel Vitez with a group that included

    9 Colonel Blaskic, is that correct, on the 20th of April,

    10 1993?

    11 A. That's correct. A joint -- Colonel Bob

    12 Stewart and Mrs. Clare Podbielski, since they planned

    13 to go to Colonel Blaskic and they asked me to come.

    14 Q. What time was that meeting?

    15 A. I'm not sure. As I recall it in my memory,

    16 it was the beginning of the afternoon. 1.00, maybe

    17 2.00.

    18 Q. In whose office was the meeting held?

    19 A. The meeting was held in the Hotel Vitez, so

    20 that's the headquarters of the operational zone Middle

    21 Bosnia, and as I recall it, we went through the hall

    22 where the HVO guards, and then opposite to the

    23 entrance, on the other side of the hall, there's a

    24 large room with, I think, large brown seats, and that's

    25 where we spoke to Mr. Blaskic.

  143. 1Q. Do you have any recounting of this meeting in

    2 your notes or diary?

    3 A. I think I do. Just a second.

    4 Q. Thank you.

    5 A. I have notes that it happened on the 20th of

    6 April. I'm not sure whether you asked me if it was on

    7 the 19th?

    8 Q. No, I asked about the 20th of April.

    9 A. The 20th. I've got notes on the 20th of

    10 April.

    11 Q. What do they reflect?

    12 A. They reflect the meeting we had with Colonel

    13 Blaskic.

    14 Q. How was Colonel Blaskic identified in your

    15 notes, if I may ask?

    16 A. Well, I just put his name in. I was informed

    17 by Bob Stewart that Colonel Blaskic was the commander

    18 of the operational zone Middle Bosnia, so as I recall,

    19 it excited me that I was to meet the highest commander

    20 in the area.

    21 Q. Do you remember meeting him on that day? Do

    22 you actually remember sitting down face to face with

    23 Colonel Blaskic on the 20th of April, 1993, or could it

    24 be a mistake?

    25 A. It's hard to say. I remember the excitement

  144. 1meeting the highest commander, I remember entering the

    2 headquarters, I remember passing the guards in the

    3 presence of the British battalion commander who I

    4 admired already after a few days, and as I recall it, I

    5 was introduced to the upper commander, as far as my

    6 knowledge goes. That was Mr. Blaskic.

    7 Q. Please look at him in the face, General

    8 Blaskic. Is this the man you met on the 20th of April,

    9 1993, in the Hotel Vitez? Do you recall that? Or are

    10 you not sure?

    11 A. It's hard to say. You see so many faces in

    12 the first two, three days, in the middle of war.

    13 Q. If you had and if Colonel Stewart had chewed

    14 out Colonel Blaskic concerning the truck bomb as you

    15 described, is that something you would have put in your

    16 daily operational report, attending such a meeting,

    17 meeting the commander of the operative zone for the

    18 first time, and witnessing this rather dramatic,

    19 perhaps, exchange, between the British battalion

    20 commander and the HVO operative zone commander? Is it

    21 something you would have put in your daily operational

    22 report?

    23 A. I think later, when I was in the area for

    24 already several weeks, I would have. But according to

    25 this incident -- I was not in charge. Colonel Bob

  145. 1Stewart was in charge. He was the one who did the

    2 talking. He introduced me or asked me to come with

    3 him, together with ICRC, so it was not a proper ECMM

    4 meeting, so there was no ECMM need to report to Zagreb

    5 about this meeting, as I recall it now. Later on, I

    6 would have reported on more than just my own meetings,

    7 but since I was not in charge and I was still a young

    8 monitor, in my third day on the scene, I can understand

    9 why at least I did not report this.

    10 Q. What about when you were interviewed over six

    11 days by representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor

    12 in 1996, an interview which resulted in a 23-page

    13 single-spaced typed statement? In that statement,

    14 there is a discussion for over about a third of the

    15 page of your meeting on the 20th of April, but there's

    16 no mention of Colonel Blaskic, no mention of a meeting

    17 with Colonel Blaskic, and no mention of any comments by

    18 anyone else, including Robert Stewart, directed at

    19 Colonel Blaskic in connection with the truck bomb or

    20 otherwise.

    21 Isn't that something that would have been

    22 discussed over the course of six days of interviews and

    23 recorded in a 23-page single-spaced typed statement?

    24 MR. HARMON: Objection to that,

    25 Mr. President. That's not a proper question, whether

  146. 1it would have --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Yes.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: I'll rephrase it.

    4 Q. Were you asked over those six days of

    5 interviews to describe your meetings with Colonel

    6 Blaskic?

    7 A. That's right, but I --

    8 Q. Were you asked, please --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: No, the objection has been

    10 sustained, to the Prosecutor. You cannot ask the

    11 question where you have the statement made by the

    12 Office of the Prosecutor. You have analysed it, you

    13 have drawn certain conclusions from it, but you cannot

    14 go beyond that. You know exactly the conditions under

    15 which the witness was questioned. Please, if you would

    16 like to ask another question, but please reformulate

    17 your question. Rephrase it.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: I will rephrase it,

    19 Mr. President.

    20 Q. Over those six days, were you asked to

    21 describe your meetings with Colonel Blaskic and did

    22 you?

    23 A. I was not specifically asked to describe

    24 meetings with Colonel Blaskic. I was asked to describe

    25 anything I remembered from the period I was in the area

  147. 1of Middle Bosnia. So from the 13th of April until the

    2 13th of July.

    3 You must understand that this was the first

    4 time I was debriefed on these three months. I stayed

    5 in Germany for two years, did my German course there, I

    6 worked at the army staff for more than one and a half

    7 years, and then suddenly somebody from the Tribunal

    8 comes and debriefed me for the first time, and it's

    9 really very hard to get back all these memories from

    10 such a long time ago. I used my small notebooks, my

    11 big notebooks, I used my diary to recall things as good

    12 as possible. And, of course, more memories come back.

    13 They even come back now when I speak. Like, for

    14 instance, the colour of the furniture. It's just

    15 something you remember all of a sudden how a certain

    16 situation was.

    17 Q. Then tell us, with your refreshed memory,

    18 what did Colonel Stewart say in this meeting?

    19 A. As I recall it, Colonel Stewart was really

    20 very upset that the HVO and HDZ accused the Brits of

    21 being partial, being partial in just evacuating Muslim

    22 homeless people, homeless because of the car bomb. He

    23 told about alleged people being thrown out of trucks,

    24 British trucks and British Warriors, and he told us

    25 that -- or Colonel Stewart was very upset that he was

  148. 1accused of being impartial (sic) since the British

    2 battalion were the only ones to give aid to those

    3 people, they were the only ones to give help during the

    4 evacuation after the car bomb, and he was very upset

    5 about the accusation that they were impartial. So he

    6 asked again, "Where was your organisation to help?

    7 What did you do to help the homeless people? What did

    8 you do to help the wounded people? Why was HVO not

    9 there? Why was the local organisation not there?" So

    10 that was the main point of the meeting, his anger about

    11 the --

    12 Q. The lack of a response?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 MR. HARMON: Excuse me. Excuse me, counsel.

    15 There appears to be an error in the transcript and I'd

    16 like to correct it before it rolls up. It says the

    17 following, it says: "Colonel Stewart was very upset

    18 that he was accused of being impartial." You mean --

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Counsel, thank you. I agree,

    20 there's an error?

    21 A. I meant "partial."

    22 Q. You meant partial or the record should be

    23 that he was upset at being accused of being partial?

    24 A. That's right.

    25 Q. Thank you. Thank you, counsel.

  149. 1In sum then, quickly, and we'll move on,

    2 Colonel Stewart was angry at the lack of a response to

    3 the situation in terms of helping the victims, the

    4 homeless, the wounded, and he was angry at both the

    5 residents of Stari Vitez and at the HVO for not

    6 responding better; is that correct? Is that accurate?

    7 A. I don't think so because he would not show

    8 his anger about the Muslim side, I think, when he met

    9 Colonel Blaskic, and according to my knowledge, the

    10 Muslims did not have control in Vitez, so they were not

    11 able to organise any evacuation at all.

    12 Q. So the BiH army was not in control of Stari

    13 Vitez; is that your understanding at the time?

    14 A. I know that they were in control. Later on,

    15 I found out that they were in control over part of

    16 Stari Vitez, but I don't think they had the opportunity

    17 or the means to evacuate a large number of people out

    18 of this endangered area.

    19 Q. At the time of this conversation, I take it

    20 the effort to assist the wounded, evacuate them, was

    21 completed; correct?

    22 A. As far as I know, the British battalion took

    23 out all the homeless and wounded people and the dead

    24 were recovered a few days afterwards, also by BRITBAT.

    25 Q. Now let me ask you about the subject of

  150. 1propaganda.

    2 You mentioned both the HDZ, H-D-Z, and the

    3 HVO. What channels did the HDZ use for putting out

    4 propaganda?

    5 A. I was told that they used radio and

    6 television, local radio and local television, and since

    7 I cannot understand the Croatian language, I was told

    8 by interpreters on duty with the ECMM.

    9 Q. Were you ever told that Colonel Blaskic had

    10 made any inflammatory or ethnically prejudicial or

    11 derogatory remarks on TV, radio, in speeches or

    12 otherwise during your tour of duty? Did you ever

    13 receive such information?

    14 A. I did not.

    15 Q. I --

    16 A. I did not.

    17 Q. You did not. What channels did the HVO

    18 utilise, in your view or judgement, to disseminate

    19 propaganda?

    20 A. It's hard for me to say whether they took

    21 influence on the local radio and local television, but

    22 the same message was spread out, and it was supported

    23 by HVO officers like, for instance, as liaison officer

    24 at the headquarters of the operational zone in Vitez,

    25 he was the one who told me that Guca Gora was in

  151. 1flames, he was the one who told me that thousands of

    2 Croats were forced to leave the area or fled in the

    3 direction of Novi Bila.

    4 Q. This is Darko Gelic you're referring to?

    5 A. That's Darko Gelic I'm referring to.

    6 Q. When he made those statements to you, was he

    7 speaking to a room thronging with reporters, or was he

    8 having a personal conversation with you?

    9 A. He was having a conversation with me, and

    10 there were more monitors present and my interpreter was

    11 present, of course.

    12 Q. Was there anyone from the news media present?

    13 A. I do not think so.

    14 Q. Now, you spoke of two examples of the use of

    15 propaganda, Zenica and Guca Gora. Aside from the

    16 documents that have been discussed first regarding

    17 Zenica, do you have any information of any other

    18 propaganda put out, not by the HDZ but by the HVO,

    19 concerning the status of Croats in Zenica? Anything

    20 else? Anything to add?

    21 A. The status of the Croats in Zenica was

    22 mentioned more than once in the local commissions of

    23 Vitez and Busovaca at several meetings several times.

    24 Even into the middle of May, I recall that during

    25 several meetings, the positions of Croats in Zenica was

  152. 1discussed again and again, and these meetings always

    2 started with large accusations from both sides that

    3 their own people were harmed in another area and that

    4 it should be investigated.

    5 Q. Was the press -- I'm sorry. Are you

    6 finished?

    7 A. I'm finished, yes.

    8 Q. Was the press present at these local

    9 commission meetings that you've described?

    10 A. The press was present at several local

    11 commission meetings. The Vitez local press was there,

    12 as I recall it, at two or three meetings, and the local

    13 Busovaca press was present at more than five or six

    14 meetings.

    15 Q. Would they attend the entire meeting?

    16 A. They would be there the entire meeting.

    17 Q. Was that deemed conducive to the work of the

    18 local commissions?

    19 A. We thought they could support us because

    20 every meeting was -- we finished every meeting with a

    21 mutual statement from both commanders, an official

    22 statement, signed and written about the attempts we

    23 made during the meeting and about the agreements we

    24 made and the things we would try to do the following

    25 days.

  153. 1Q. You spoke of a particular radio broadcast

    2 which said it was safer for refugees, I believe

    3 refugees in Grahovcici, to go to Vitez and Novi Bila

    4 than to return to the Zenica municipality. Is it your

    5 opinion that at the time that was not correct, that it

    6 was either safer for the refugees, Croat refugees, to

    7 go back to Zenica or that it was equally safe for them

    8 to be in the Vitez enclave or to be in the Zenica

    9 municipality? What exactly is your opinion in that

    10 regard?

    11 A. As I told you, as I told the court, we made

    12 an investigation in this first phase together with this

    13 Catholic priest from Zenica, we made an investigation

    14 in all these villages, and we together came to the

    15 conclusion that it was safe for people to return. We

    16 broadcast it or we told our conclusion to the HVO

    17 representatives in Grahovcici, to the Croats -- let's

    18 say the oldest people of the community, of the refugees

    19 there, and we told it to the Catholic priests in

    20 Grahovcici as well, and they all agreed with our

    21 conclusion that if we said so and if Father Stjepan

    22 said so, since he was well-known priest in the area and

    23 he was loved by everybody, if that was his judgement,

    24 then people would believe him and it would be safe to

    25 go to their own houses.

  154. 1Q. The radio broadcast you quoted, though, said

    2 it was safer for refugees to go to Vitez and Nova Bila

    3 than to return to Zenica. I take it you don't agree

    4 with that. You believe it was either safer or just as

    5 safe for Croat refugees at the time to return to

    6 Zenica; is that correct?

    7 A. The essence of the broadcast was more than

    8 that, not just the matter of safety. The essence was

    9 that it was propaganda, that lots of Croats had been

    10 massacred in the area of Zenica and that their houses

    11 had been burned and that it was no longer safe or not

    12 safe or unsafe, or whatever word you would like to use,

    13 for them to go back to their own houses and they were

    14 told to go to Nova Bila and to Vitez.

    15 Q. You visited Grahovcici on approximately the

    16 8th of June, 1993; is that correct?

    17 A. Grahovcici was earlier. That was the 25th

    18 until the 27th of April. The 8th of June was the Guca

    19 Gora incident.

    20 Q. Very good. 25th to 27th of April was

    21 Grahovcici?

    22 A. I'll look it up.

    23 Q. Could you just check and make sure?

    24 A. The 24th of Zenica -- the 24th of April, I

    25 stay in Zenica and go to Grahovcici for the first time,

  155. 1and I finish the Grahovcici job on the 26th of April,

    2 so it's the 24th until the 26th.

    3 Q. In your estimation, how many Croats had been

    4 murdered in the Zenica region by that point in time?

    5 A. I did an -- we paid some visits to the areas

    6 where the people fled from, together with Father

    7 Stjepan, and we were told that -- I'm not sure how many

    8 there were. I would have to look it up in the report I

    9 made. But I think some 10 or 15 Croats had been killed

    10 in that area, and I read in another report made by two

    11 other monitors in the previous days, they did an

    12 investigation on similar incidents in more or less the

    13 same area but not in all the same villages I went to,

    14 that another number of Croats had been killed there.

    15 Q. And houses burned? Half a dozen? A dozen?

    16 Five dozen?

    17 A. I would say between 10 and 25.

    18 Q. And houses looted? 50? 25?

    19 A. I think more -- I think -- I'm not sure. I

    20 didn't count them all myself, but I think it must have

    21 been some 50 houses looted.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 295 could be placed

    23 before the witness?

    24 Q. This, Lieutenant-Colonel, is a special report

    25 on Croats in Zenica dated 20, 21 April, 1993, produced

  156. 1by the ECMM RC Zenica and authored by three of your

    2 colleagues, and I'd like to call your attention to

    3 several portions of it.

    4 There is a French translation of this

    5 exhibit, Mr. President, 295A.

    6 In paragraph 1, as a result of a visit to

    7 certain areas in the municipality, your colleagues

    8 reported that the military section of the Zenica prison

    9 had more than 200 Croat prisoners, half military and

    10 half civilian. Down in paragraph 2(a), they report

    11 that in the village of Cajdras they found four houses

    12 burned, 38 empty. In Veternica, three burned houses.

    13 In paragraph 2(d), a village that was shelled.

    14 Paragraph 2(f), Stranjani, seven burned houses and most

    15 of the 240 Croat homes were robbed. Paragraph, 2(g),

    16 Zahalie, eight burned houses, four killed Croats.

    17 Paragraph 3(c), Zalje, at least 25 houses were burned.

    18 The Father, referring apparently again to Father

    19 Stjepan, I believe, told us that in that village were

    20 killed 10 civilians, including a 90-year-old man and a

    21 three-year-old girl. And then the report concludes

    22 that this was less damage than had been expected, less

    23 killing than had been expected, less burning, less

    24 looting than had been expected.

    25 Would you agree, Lieutenant-Colonel, that the

  157. 1Croats in Zenica at this time in April, they did have

    2 reason to be concerned for their safety?

    3 A. If this is all the facts and if Croats knew

    4 about this, then I believe that they were afraid, yes.

    5 Q. Now, Colonel Blaskic at the time, he's down

    6 in the Vitez area -- correct? -- his headquarters is in

    7 Vitez, was at the time?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Did he have a way to get to Zenica to make a

    10 personal appraisal of the situation, or would he have

    11 been blocked at the BiH army front-line from going to

    12 Zenica to inspect these different villages where only

    13 240 houses were looted in one, only 10 civilians killed

    14 in Zalje, et cetera? He didn't have that kind of

    15 information, did he?

    16 A. Probably not at the 20th or the 21st. But

    17 since we reported through ECMM and in the local joint

    18 commissions what our findings were, he must have known

    19 that afterwards.

    20 Q. That is, he must have known that the numbers

    21 in Exhibit 295 were accurate; is that right?

    22 A. Well, I did not report on this special report

    23 ECMM, since when this report was written, I was in

    24 Vitez myself, and the daily and special reports were

    25 discussed in the ECMM meetings in the evening, at that

  158. 1very day, and I came back to Zenica three days later,

    2 so I did not discuss this report myself.

    3 Q. Are you surprised by these numbers? Does

    4 this sound like more killing, more burning, more

    5 looting than you had the impression occurred against

    6 Croats in Zenica during the latter half of April 1993?

    7 A. I was told by Lars, who is one of the authors

    8 of this special report and who went with me the last

    9 day I went to Grahovcici myself, it was reported by him

    10 that this was the case, but we did not face it, all

    11 these villages ourselves, and we put effort on some of

    12 these villages, and we had the impression, and Father

    13 Stjepan had the impression, that all people could go

    14 back to their own houses. We spoke to the neighbours

    15 still there, we spoke to some Croats that were still

    16 there in their own houses, and they told us, "Please

    17 ask the people to come back." So that's what we tried

    18 and that's what we arranged with all the buses. And

    19 there were HVO soldiers present, HVO local commanders,

    20 and they could have reported what our findings were.

    21 Q. Did they? You don't know, do you?

    22 A. I don't know whether they did or not, but the

    23 broadcast came, and that's why they took away our

    24 buses.

    25 Q. They got excited, these local commanders, and

  159. 1they commandeered your buses; correct?

    2 A. The local military police, the HVO military

    3 police took away our buses, and after a certain time,

    4 we were able to speak to the local HVO commanders

    5 again, and after a while, they agreed in still going

    6 back to their own houses.

    7 Q. So the HVO Vojn Policija, military police,

    8 took the buses, then you spoke to the regular HVO local

    9 commanders, and after some period of discussion, they

    10 were successful in helping you get the buses back; is

    11 that fair?

    12 A. That's correct, and meanwhile, the buses were

    13 once used to bring the people to Nova Bila.

    14 Q. Can you tell us anything about Colonel

    15 Blaskic personally -- and we'll get to the documents

    16 that have been discussed in a moment if we continue

    17 that long tonight -- other than the documents, can you

    18 tell us anything about Colonel Blaskic's involvement or

    19 lack of involvement in the issue of either returning

    20 Croats to Zenica or allowing Croats to leave Zenica if

    21 they wished?

    22 A. I didn't meet Colonel Blaskic very often, and

    23 I didn't have the opportunity to speak to him

    24 personally. I was present at a number of meetings

    25 where he was. But, on the other hand, using his name

  160. 1with brigade commanders, using his name at local

    2 commissions always gave me the impression that he was

    3 honoured by his own subordinates. Using his name put

    4 more weight on the scale.

    5 Q. Did you use his name to get the buses back?

    6 A. I don't recall that, that I used his name

    7 then, no.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Now, in speaking of Guca Gora --

    9 Your Honour, I'll try to complete the Guca Gora

    10 questioning, perhaps ten minutes, if that's

    11 satisfactory to the court.

    12 Q. In discussing Guca Gora --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: You have until 6.30.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Fine. Very well.

    15 Q. In discussing Guca Gora, you talked about

    16 Alagic and said Alagic was roughly of the same rank as

    17 Blaskic?

    18 A. That's correct.

    19 Q. What was Alagic's area of responsibility?

    20 A. As far as I know, his area of responsibility

    21 was the whole Travnik area, including places like Guca

    22 Gora, Novi Travnik, way uphill.

    23 Q. Was he responsible for Zenica as well, or was

    24 that the third corps' responsibility?

    25 A. He was not responsibility for Zenica.

  161. 1Q. Indeed, Mr. Alagic was under the third corps;

    2 correct?

    3 A. That's correct.

    4 Q. Whereas Colonel Blaskic, although he might

    5 not have had the rank, he was responsible for the

    6 entire terrain on paper at least, Lasva Valley,

    7 Kiseljak Valley, and other areas; correct?

    8 A. That's correct.

    9 Q. You said that Alagic went with you to Guca

    10 Gora, but Colonel Blaskic never went with you anywhere

    11 to investigate allegations. Did you ever ask him to go

    12 anywhere with you and investigate allegations?

    13 A. I did not ask him personally, but then I

    14 didn't ask Mr. Alagic to come. He offered himself.

    15 Q. When you went to visit Alagic, would he

    16 almost always offer you a drink, liquor, whiskey,

    17 something like that? Is that a fair generalisation?

    18 A. No, he hardly ever did. I recall only once

    19 having a drink with him.

    20 Q. Very well. With respect to the action in the

    21 area of Guca Gora, what was the BiH army trying to

    22 accomplish?

    23 A. I think they launched an attack from the

    24 northern area into the region of Guca Gora.

    25 Q. They were trying to link Zenica and Travnik,

  162. 1were they not?

    2 A. That's correct. They needed freedom of

    3 movement. They needed the road under their control

    4 from Travnik to Zenica.

    5 Q. You have told us that the church at Guca Gora

    6 was not touched in the course of that action; is that

    7 correct?

    8 A. That's correct. I visited that church myself

    9 after the fighting passed from the north across Guca

    10 Gora in a southern direction.

    11 Q. And that neighbouring Croat communities, no

    12 wanton destruction or attack on civilian structures by

    13 the BiH army, or was there such conduct in the Guca Gora

    14 region generally?

    15 A. I did not see any proof of that during that

    16 visit to Guca Gora, and an investigation was made the

    17 day after by Philip Watkins, and there was a special

    18 report made on that.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 296, which is a map,

    20 could be placed on the ELMO, and Exhibit 414 be

    21 provided to the witness, please?

    22 Q. Now, you have before you on the ELMO, and you

    23 should be able to see it on your video monitor, on

    24 Exhibit 296, this is a map including the area of Zenica

    25 and villages to the west and south-west of Zenica;

  163. 1correct?

    2 A. That's correct.

    3 Q. Do you see, towards the middle upper portion

    4 of the photograph, the village of Dolac, D-O-L-A-C; do

    5 you see that?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Let me ask you to turn your attention on

    8 Exhibit 414 to paragraph 1, "General Situation." This

    9 is the second page, not the cover letter.

    10 The next-to-last sentence, commencing with

    11 the next-to-last sentence which reads: "UNPROFOR

    12 further report the Croat village of Dolac as deserted

    13 and over 100 houses burnt. The number has not been

    14 confirmed by ECMM, although there is evidence of some

    15 houses still burning."

    16 Is that information -- and the date of this

    17 is the 8th of June, 1993 -- when was your visit to Guca

    18 Gora?

    19 A. Just a second. My visit was at the afternoon

    20 of the 8th of June.

    21 Q. So the same day that you visited Guca Gora,

    22 UNPROFOR reported that there were 100 burnt houses in

    23 Dolac and that the Croat population was absent. Would

    24 you agree that's what Exhibit 414, paragraph 1

    25 reflects?

  164. 1A. It says so in the same report, but I'm not

    2 sure whether we were aware of this fact when we visited

    3 Guca Gora or whether we heard it at the evening

    4 briefing.

    5 Q. I'll call your attention, in fairness you

    6 don't need to see it, but it's Exhibit 415, paragraph

    7 8, reflects that of those visited villages, the worst

    8 is Dolac which has approximately 15 to 20 burnt houses,

    9 and then lists burnt houses in smaller numbers in other

    10 villages. This is dated 19 June, 1993, indicating that

    11 about eleven days later, there was better information

    12 that only 15 to 20 houses in Dolac had been burnt as

    13 the BiH army advanced from Zenica towards Travnik.

    14 Now let me ask you about the documents you

    15 reviewed, beginning with Exhibit 415. Do you have 415?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. In paragraph 5, it reflects that the number

    18 of Croatian families to leave their homes in the

    19 Travnik area varies from between 5.000 and 20.000. Is

    20 that also the information you had on approximately the

    21 8th of June, 1993?

    22 A. We didn't have exact numbers or not even

    23 estimations about the number of Croats. What we saw

    24 was large groups of civilians carrying their -- I think

    25 the belongings they could take, walking in a southern

  165. 1direction through Novi Bila in the direction of Vitez.

    2 Q. Paragraph 8 of this exhibit reflects a

    3 discussion of the allegation of desecration of churches

    4 and states: "The church in Travnik has been badly

    5 damaged internally with the organ and artifacts

    6 smashed. The Guca Gora church was free of any damage

    7 when initially visited but since has been extensively

    8 damaged internally. The Dolac church was hit by a

    9 single mortar round, but this is not assessed as a

    10 deliberate attack."

    11 Did you go back to the church at Guca Gora

    12 and see in what ways it had been desecrated and

    13 destroyed?

    14 A. I did not myself. Mr. Philip Watkins and the

    15 other monitor, Torbjorn Junhof they made the second

    16 report, they made the investigations on allegations

    17 that there was more damage than we saw in the first

    18 check.

    19 Q. If Exhibit 416 could be provided to the

    20 witness. This is called a "Call for help" from then

    21 Colonel Blaskic.

    22 First I'd like to direct your attention to

    23 the original B/S/C version of this report, that's at

    24 the back. Do you see that copy?

    25 A. You mean this one?

  166. 1Q. Yes. In other words what we used to call

    2 Serbo-Croat. Do you see a small stamp about two inches

    3 down from the left-hand side of the document?

    4 A. A small square stamp with the date on it?

    5 Q. A small square stamp in a different type,

    6 different type set, from the rest of the document. It

    7 includes a large rectangle that is cut into certain

    8 rows and so forth. Do you see that?

    9 A. I see that.

    10 Q. Now let's look at the English translation and

    11 perhaps, unless everyone has a copy, we can put this on

    12 the ELMO. I don't know, Mr. President, if I can

    13 proceed without having it on the ELMO, if it is

    14 confusing. Please interrupt me if it is confusing any

    15 of Your Honours.

    16 On the face page, and I will be working from

    17 the English, do you see the translation of this stamp

    18 indicating -- would you not agree -- that this document

    19 was received in Kakanj on or about the 7th of May,

    20 1993, and it's a received stamp of sorts. Do you see

    21 that?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. What happened to the HVO in Kakanj; do you

    24 know?

    25 A. I don't know. I'm not aware of that.

  167. 1Q. Do you know where this order came from? The

    2 Prosecution provided it to the court. Do you know

    3 where they got it?

    4 A. Well, it was addressed to the European

    5 observer mission so ...

    6 Q. Yes, but this copy that they have is stamped

    7 received HVO brigade, the Kostromanac (phoen) brigade

    8 in Kakanj. How did they get that copy, if you know?

    9 A. I don't know. We were able to go to

    10 Kakanj -- I didn't receive it myself, but we were more

    11 or less free to move in certain areas so ...

    12 Q. The BiH army attacked the HVO in Kakanj and

    13 drove them out during your tour of duty, did they not?

    14 A. I was not working in that area, so I'm not

    15 aware of it. I know that there was fighting, of

    16 course, but I'm not familiar with the exact order of

    17 fighting and what happened exactly in that area.

    18 Q. Would you agree that if there was such an

    19 attack on or about the 12th of June, 1993, and 5.000

    20 Croats fled Kakanj, those who did not fled (sic) were

    21 imprisoned in a camp, that that's the kind of

    22 information --

    23 MR. HARMON: Objection, Mr. President. The

    24 witness has testified he does not know about Kakanj, so

    25 this question calls for speculation.

  168. 1MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, the witness has

    2 criticised the "Call for Help," which is Exhibit 416,

    3 and authored by my client. I'm asking him if that kind

    4 of information would affect the thinking and the

    5 psychology of anyone responsible in the area.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I'm not at all criticising what

    7 you have said, Mr. Hayman, I understand the objection

    8 of the Prosecutor as well, but I'm not criticising your

    9 question, I simply wish or think that perhaps you

    10 should rephrase it calmly, try to rephrase it, rephrase

    11 your question, very quickly and with conviction and

    12 firmly, and this is -- should be done so that the

    13 witness has some time because I believe you spoke about

    14 the attack in June 1996 or in May 1996, and -- 1993,

    15 correction, 1993, and so if you could ask your

    16 questions -- I'm not criticising the way you're asking

    17 questions but I see you're asking vehemently and very

    18 strongly, but could you please try to ask your

    19 questions calmly and quietly, because here it is very

    20 difficult for us three to understand exactly what

    21 you're looking for. Please rephrase your question.

    22 MR. HARMON: I would also object to the

    23 question because Mr. Hayman is asking about events that

    24 he says took place on the 12th of June, 1993, which is

    25 five weeks after the call for help was issued.

  169. 1JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, I don't see how I

    2 could accept your objections. Well, I am in the

    3 process of asking Mr. Hayman to rephrase his question

    4 to see whether or not his newly rephrased question is

    5 acceptable or not. I see we're almost at the break

    6 now -- Mr. Hayman, would you please rephrase your

    7 question but please be careful because it seems we're

    8 dealing with events in June or in May, so what exactly

    9 is your question?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: I'll rephrase it, Mr. President,

    11 and I'll hold the issue of Kakanj for Exhibit 417 which

    12 is dated the 14th of June and specifically references

    13 10 to 15.000 Croats exiled from Kakanj.

    14 Q. Staying with Exhibit 416, it says, in the

    15 first paragraph that,"Colonel Blaskic feels the need

    16 and responsibility to inform you once again about the

    17 difficult position of the Croats in Zenica who have

    18 been living in total isolation for quite some time."

    19 Would you agree with that statement, that the

    20 Croats in Zenica at that time, 4th of May, 1993, had

    21 been cut off and were living in Zenica, isolated from

    22 other communities of Croats?

    23 A. I think that's correct, they were isolated

    24 from other communities, but since the priest was free

    25 to move and to visit his parish, I think it's a

  170. 1different kind of isolation. They were not free to go

    2 to places outside Zenica, I think, but ...

    3 Q. Do you think it's a fair statement, Colonel?

    4 A. I don't think they live in total isolation.

    5 As I experience an expression like that, "total

    6 isolation" is more than just having to stick to your

    7 own town because they were able to shop, they were able

    8 to move from one house to another, they were able to go

    9 to the church, to visit their priest or the priest was

    10 able to visit his parish in Zenica. Of course, they

    11 were not totally free, but they were also not totally

    12 isolated, I think.

    13 Q. It says on the next page, the letter states

    14 that by blocking and isolating the Croats of Zenica,

    15 the food supply for the 4,500 Croats of the Zepce and

    16 Usora region have also been blocked. Was that true, or

    17 do you not know?

    18 A. I'm not aware of the food situation in

    19 Zepce. I know that there were problems to reach Zepce,

    20 but there was a mixed population north of Zenica, so

    21 they had to -- they had food problems for everybody, if

    22 there were any food problems, and if they wished to get

    23 transport through, then they had to bring transport

    24 through for both groups of civilians.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, this would be a

  171. 1convenient breaking point.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I think we should stop

    3 now. We've asked a great deal of the interpreters and

    4 everyone is tired. We've also asked a great deal of

    5 the witness. I'd like to remind you we only have

    6 tomorrow morning in session so the witness will return

    7 tomorrow, I'm sorry, but we will have to resume

    8 tomorrow. I believe you're going to be finishing your

    9 cross-examination tomorrow, Mr. Hayman?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, I will be able to finish it

    11 by the conclusion of tomorrow's session.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Because I don't

    13 think perhaps it will be necessary to call another

    14 witness tomorrow, but that's up to you to decide,

    15 Mr. Harmon. You know my ways and the ways of this

    16 Chamber, so then we will all meet tomorrow morning at

    17 9.45. We are adjourned.

    18 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at

    19 6.32 p.m., to be reconvened on

    20 Friday, the 3rd day of July, 1998,

    21 at 9.45 a.m.