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  1. 1 Monday, 13th July 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 2.38 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Would you have the accused

    5 brought in, please?

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, we can now

    8 resume. Who is the witness today? I see you have a

    9 new assistant with you. Would you introduce her to us,

    10 please.

    11 MR. KEHOE: I will, Your Honour, a new

    12 assistant that is ultimately going to take over for

    13 Emil van der Does de Willebois is Ijeoma Udo, and she

    14 will be working with us until the end of the case.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: We would like to wish her

    16 welcome and at the same time say good afternoon to our

    17 interpreters, to the Defence as well.

    18 Now, Mr. Kehoe, would you begin, please?

    19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Good

    20 afternoon, Mr. President, and good afternoon, Your

    21 Honours.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: The name -- I hope it will be

    23 spelled properly, both for my colleagues and for

    24 myself, that is in the transcript. I want to make sure

    25 that there is no error in the transcript with the

  2. 1spelling of the name.

    2 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, I-J-E-O-M-A and the

    3 last name is Udo, U-D-O.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. We can

    5 begin now. Please go ahead.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I think all

    7 of us can congratulate you and France on the win

    8 yesterday. There were some bets on whether or not you

    9 were going to make it this morning but ...

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Well, Mr. Kehoe, I didn't think

    11 that you were going to congratulate me in that

    12 nationalistic way, but I am touched by that of course.

    13 Every one knew that as far as the France-Croatia match

    14 was one that was of interest to everybody, I suppose

    15 that is what you are talking about. Thank you very

    16 much.

    17 We can now resume, but more seriously, since

    18 we are dealing with a serious case here, I can say to

    19 you, please go ahead.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Our next

    21 witness is a man by the name of Lee Whitworth.

    22 Mr. Whitworth was a captain in the Prince of Wales' Own

    23 Regiment of Yorkshire during their tour of duty in

    24 Bosnia from May of 1993 until early November of 1993.

    25 Subsequent to the tour in Bosnia, Captain Whitworth

  3. 1resigned from the British military and has been in the

    2 education field as a teacher since that time.

    3 I will say, and he's rather a modest man,

    4 that he was awarded the Queen's Gallantry medal for his

    5 actions in Bosnia during his six-month stay.

    6 We will not, Mr. President and Your Honours,

    7 engage in a repetition of much of the testimony that

    8 Your Honours have heard concerning various events that

    9 took place during the tour of the Prince of Wales' Own

    10 Regiment of Yorkshire. What we would do with this

    11 witness and at the Prosecutor's request is to present

    12 the evidence in a more episodic fashion, that is,

    13 particular instances of this particular witness's

    14 experience that will tie in much of that has been

    15 raised by the Prosecution and also by the Defence

    16 during the months of trial we've been talking about,

    17 the six months of the Prince of Wales' Own tour.

    18 So in that sense, Mr. President, it will be a

    19 testimony that focuses on connections. This particular

    20 individual was a liaison officer with the Hotel Vitez.

    21 In that capacity, he met the Defendant on occasion, and

    22 most of the time he spent speaking with an individual

    23 by the name of Darko Gelic, G-E-L-I-C, Darko Gelic was

    24 the Defendant Blaskic's liaison officer and did the

    25 speaking for then Colonel Blaskic during this period of

  4. 1time.

    2 He will speak to you about the structure of

    3 the Hotel Vitez, he will speak to you about his

    4 observations concerning Blaskic as a commander, he will

    5 speak about the communication capabilities of the HVO

    6 during this time frame. In conjunction with this

    7 testimony, he will speak about the use of helicopters

    8 moving in and out of the Lasva Valley at one particular

    9 location controlled by the HVO. He will talk about the

    10 Defendant being a commander who was out on the ground

    11 at various points.

    12 He will then talk about some of the men in

    13 the HVO that Your Honours have heard of to date. He

    14 will talk about his rather shocking conversations with

    15 Anto Valenta in the Hotel Vitez, his meeting of Mario

    16 Cerkez and his dealing with Mario Cerkez, those will be

    17 the two prominent individuals that he will talk about

    18 at the outset. He will then talk about a conversation

    19 that took place in late May, 1993 concerning the

    20 Jokeri, the Jokeri being housed at the Bungalow just

    21 past Ahmici on the way to Busovaca, and he will talk

    22 about the conversations that he had with the Jokeri,

    23 their identification of an individual as their leader,

    24 that individual being Pasko Ljubesic, and the

    25 subsequent attempts by Mr. Whitworth to talk to Pasko

  5. 1Ljubesic, and how he can relate Ljubesic and the

    2 military police, and connect them with Darko Gelic and

    3 the Hotel Vitez vis-a-vis the Defendant.

    4 He will then testify as to the Jokers in an

    5 actual military operation. That military operation

    6 obviously was not the one observed -- Ahmici was not

    7 observed by this witness, but the attack on the village

    8 of Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of 1993 was observed by

    9 this witness, and he will talk about the participation

    10 of the Jokeri in that attack along with the

    11 participation of other HVO soldiers.

    12 He will then talk about the Vitezovi, his

    13 knowledge of Darko Kraljevic. Darko Kraljevic was

    14 under the command and control of the Defendant Blaskic

    15 and part of the HVO military structure, and to that

    16 end, he will not only describe what the role was of the

    17 Vitezovi but he will also describe the particular

    18 instance, an offensive operation, where the Vitezovi

    19 moved into Donji Vecerska and actually participated in

    20 an operation where they fought against the ABiH,

    21 defeated the ABiH, and subsequently the person who

    22 spoke to the media about that particular event in

    23 praiseworthy fashion was the Defendant's liaison

    24 officer, Darko Gelic.

    25 We will not go through a long participation,

  6. 1Your Honours, of Stari Vitez. We will talk about Stari

    2 Vitez to a minor degree in the sense of how this

    3 witness viewed Stari Vitez and how the HVO viewed Stari

    4 Vitez in light of many of the military activities that

    5 were going on in the valley.

    6 He will then be the individual who, with

    7 Darko Gelic, on Blaskic's word, recovered the trucks

    8 that were taken in the Convoy of Joy. That recitation

    9 will be quite brief. He will also talk about the

    10 investigation of Dobrila Kolaba as he was the

    11 individual that was on the scene, we've heard some

    12 testimony about the killing of Dobrila Kolaba, the

    13 BRITBAT interpreter by Brigadier Duncan, but this

    14 particular witness was one that was actually there on

    15 the scene. He will talk about the investigation and

    16 the conclusions by the HVO on Dobrila, and he will also

    17 talk about the conclusions of the killing of the UNHCR

    18 driver Boris and the actual firing point and the weapon

    19 that was employed. He will touch to some degree on the

    20 use of propaganda on behalf of the HVO and how the HVO,

    21 and specifically Cerkez, had control over much of what

    22 was played on the radio.

    23 Lastly, he will talk about the attack on

    24 Grbavica and the actual looting and burning that took

    25 place in Grbavica after it was secured.

  7. 1As you can see from the indictment,

    2 Mr. President and Your Honours, the Prosecutor doesn't

    3 charge that the attack on Grbavica was unlawful, but it

    4 was the destruction and plunder of property after the

    5 attack by Blaskic's soldiers that is the crime.

    6 Suffice it to say, Mr. President and Your

    7 Honours, the testimony of Mr. Whitworth will focus on

    8 any number of counts, virtually all of the counts,

    9 because in this episodic fashion, it will touch on

    10 connections between participation by individual units,

    11 that Your Honours have heard to date, as well as the

    12 connections back to the Defendant Blaskic. The only

    13 actual attack he will talk about in some detail is the

    14 attack on Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of 1993.

    15 In any event, virtually all of the counts in

    16 the indictment, certainly the persecution count in

    17 Count 1, the wilful killing and serious injury in

    18 Counts 5 through 10, the destruction and plunder of

    19 property, Counts 11 through 13, and destruction of

    20 religious monuments to some degree as he will be unable

    21 to testify directly of the burning of the mosque in

    22 Grbavica, but he will testify that all of the

    23 individual structures around it were burning at the

    24 time.

    25 That is basically the presentation to be made

  8. 1by Mr. Whitworth. As I noted at the outset, it is

    2 basically testimony that connects various people and

    3 events that we have spoken about to date, and that

    4 would be the Prosecutor's presentation at this

    5 juncture.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: About how long do you expect

    7 this to take, Mr. Kehoe?

    8 MR. KEHOE: I would say, Mr. President,

    9 probably a couple hours, I would think, depending --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: When you say a few hours, what

    11 do you mean? A couple of hours? What does that mean,

    12 a couple of hours? That could go from two to 24.

    13 MR. KEHOE: Closer to two than 24. No, I'm

    14 kidding. Probably two and a half hours in toto.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: That's it, two and a half

    16 hours. What I would like to ask you, in light of all

    17 of the questions that are going to be asked, is for you

    18 to focus on what is most important in the testimony.

    19 Please do not forget that if it's a long examination,

    20 if you have the witness speak about all of the

    21 subjects, necessarily we're going to have a long

    22 cross-examination and it will be very complicated and

    23 very subtle discussions in order to know whether the

    24 cross-examination is going to be on the scope of the

    25 direct examination.

  9. 1Therefore, Mr. Kehoe, please try to focus on

    2 the essential points. A witness is not a witness to

    3 everything that he saw throughout his stay. If you

    4 want to make him that, you can, of course, but then

    5 it's going to take very, very long.

    6 Try to be as concise as possible. Thank you

    7 very much. The witness can now be brought in

    8 (The witness entered)

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Do you hear me? Would you tell

    10 us your name and your given names and what your rank

    11 was at the time of the events, and then please remain

    12 standing until you have read your oath, and after that,

    13 you might be seated.

    14 Please go ahead.

    15 THE WITNESS: My name is Captain Lee

    16 Whitworth, a Captain and liaison officer with the 1st

    17 Battalion Prince Of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire

    18 during the battalion's tour in Bosnia.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Read the oath,

    20 please, the solemn declaration.

    21 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I shall

    22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    23 truth.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Captain. Please be

    25 seated. You have been called to this Tribunal as part

  10. 1of the trial of General Blaskic who is in this

    2 courtroom now and whom you knew at the time. Mr. Kehoe

    3 is going to ask you several questions. Please testify

    4 freely. He has given us the general framework of your

    5 testimony. Please answer as close to the questions as

    6 you can.

    7 Mr. Kehoe?


    9 Examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Your Honours,

    11 counsel. Good afternoon, Captain.

    12 Captain, you noted at the outset of your

    13 testimony that you were formerly a member of the Prince

    14 of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire and a liaison

    15 officer, I believe, during the six-month tour in Bosnia

    16 from May of 1993 through early November 1993; is that

    17 correct?

    18 A. That's correct, sir, yeah.

    19 Q. I am pausing one moment just to allow the

    20 interpreters to catch up. You and I have spoken about

    21 that before. Also I would ask you, when you are

    22 testifying, to direct your attention to the Judges.

    23 Captain Whitworth, tell the Judges about your

    24 military career, time of service, what you did in the

    25 service, and the specifics concerning your role as a

  11. 1liaison officer in Bosnia during your six-month tour?

    2 A. I was -- prior to Bosnia, I was serving in

    3 Northern Ireland, working and liaising with the Royal

    4 Ulster Constabulary. On my initial deployment to

    5 Bosnia, I was employed as the regimental signals

    6 officer, that is responsible for the communications and

    7 running of headquarters of the battalion. It was only

    8 after a period of two or three weeks, after the Colonel

    9 had reassessed the situation in the Lasva Valley, that

    10 he directed that we would have several of the liaison

    11 officers and I was appointed as the liaison officer to

    12 the Vitez-Lasva Valley area.

    13 Q. Now, as liaison officer to Vitez and the

    14 Lasva Valley area, what did you do?

    15 A. I was effectively the eyes and ears of the

    16 Colonel, and my job really was to develop a rapport and

    17 relationship with the people on the ground in order to

    18 facilitate our mission in supporting the UNHCR on their

    19 delivery of humanitarian aid to the people in the

    20 Lasva-Central Bosnia area.

    21 Q. As part of that, Captain, did you become

    22 familiar with the Hotel Vitez and the various

    23 personalities in the Hotel Vitez?

    24 A. I did indeed, sir. The Hotel Vitez was

    25 pretty much a pivotal point as far as I was concerned,

  12. 1there were several key personnel in there who held

    2 great prominence in the Lasva Valley area, primarily

    3 Colonel Blaskic.

    4 Q. During your tour there, did you meet the

    5 Defendant Blaskic?

    6 A. I did indeed, sir, on numerous occasions.

    7 Q. And were mostly your dealings with his

    8 liaison officer?

    9 A. A good number of those dealings were not with

    10 Colonel Blaskic directly but his personal liaison

    11 officer who was Darko Gelic.

    12 MR. KEHOE: If we can, we might as well start

    13 moving in through the photographs that we have

    14 identified, if we can, with the assistance of the

    15 usher, just pull out the first four photographs in the

    16 batch that we have? And Mr. Dubuisson, the photograph

    17 series is ...

    18 THE REGISTRAR: This is 432.

    19 MR. KEHOE:

    20 Q. If we can move these in series. Now,

    21 Captain, where is that photograph taken and are you in

    22 that photograph?

    23 A. That photograph is the front steps of the

    24 Hotel Vitez in the centre of Vitez itself. It was the

    25 operational headquarters of the HVO military command

  13. 1and military police.

    2 Q. And is, in fact, the military police insignia

    3 on the front of the Hotel Vitez?

    4 A. It is. I can't see it very well on my

    5 screen, but it says there.

    6 MR. KEHOE: If I may just stop at some point.

    7 Counsel doesn't have his copies of his

    8 photographs, so before I move ahead, I apologise.

    9 Q. That is you, is it not, in the lower

    10 left-hand corner with the beret on?

    11 A. That's right, sir, it is, and one of my

    12 drivers sat on the steps also with several members of

    13 the military police and HVO.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Let us turn to the next

    15 photograph. The next photograph I believe would be

    16 432/2.

    17 Q. Is that a photograph that's taken inside the

    18 Hotel Vitez?

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Why is it 432/2? I don't

    20 understand.

    21 THE REGISTRAR: I think there are about 40

    22 photographs, so it's going to be 432/1 for the first,

    23 then/2.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Then the whole

    25 series represents Exhibit 432; is that correct?

  14. 1THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's right.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: And there will be slash 1, 2,

    3 3. So this is 432/2; is that correct?

    4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct, Your

    5 Honour.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. This photograph, 432/2, is that a photograph

    8 with you and other military policemen inside the Hotel

    9 Vitez?

    10 A. It is, sir, yeah, in the foyer/entrance area.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: Correction. No, it's 433/2.

    12 MR. KEHOE: I apologise. 433.

    13 Q. And 433/3, the next one, sir. Now, is that

    14 likewise taken inside the Hotel Vitez?

    15 A. It is indeed, with Darko Gelic, the liaison

    16 officer for the HVO.

    17 Q. Could you use your pointer and point to Darko

    18 Gelic?

    19 A. (indicated).

    20 Q. And he is to your right; is that correct?

    21 A. Right.

    22 Q. And the next photograph, 433/4. Again, is

    23 that you and Darko Gelic?

    24 A. That's Darko and myself and that's on the

    25 road outside Vitez (indicated).

  15. 1Q. Now, Captain, during your period of time

    2 there, did you become very comfortable walking around

    3 the Hotel Vitez?

    4 A. That's correct, yes, sir.

    5 Q. Did you become familiar with the

    6 communication capabilities that were located in the

    7 Hotel Vitez and elsewhere that were available to the

    8 HVO?

    9 A. Yes, sir. They had a system of -- they had

    10 computers in there, fax facility, telephone, and what

    11 appeared to be some form of transmittable

    12 radio/telephone system in there which didn't require

    13 telephone lines to operate, but they also had workable

    14 telephone lines going in and out of the building.

    15 Q. Did you see any other communication

    16 capabilities in and around the Hotel Vitez or the Lasva

    17 Valley that indicated to you the ability of the

    18 Defendant to communicate with his troops in Central

    19 Bosnia?

    20 A. There were -- there was also -- had the

    21 ability to transmit radio, there was a local radio

    22 station, they also had the ability to receive satellite

    23 television, and as I think -- I hoped I explained

    24 earlier, they seemed to have some system of satellite

    25 telecommunications, i.e. telephone system as well as

  16. 1the computers.

    2 Q. Now, Captain, during your tour, you said that

    3 you met the Defendant. Did you come to have some

    4 understanding as to what type of commander the

    5 Defendant was, and by that I mean, did he spend all his

    6 time in the Hotel Vitez? Was he a commander who was

    7 out on the ground inspecting his troops or consulting

    8 with them? I mean, what's been your experience?

    9 A. Colonel Blaskic seemed a very active

    10 commander, he seemed to be well-informed, had a very

    11 good understanding of the situation, not just in the

    12 Lasva Valley area but also up and down all the HVO

    13 pockets as far as Vares. Often, when delivering

    14 messages for my own Colonel, it would be impossible for

    15 me to see Colonel Blaskic, I would be given the excuse

    16 that he wasn't in the building, he was out with the

    17 troops or he would be out at some other location in and

    18 around the Lasva area, and that was one of the reasons

    19 I didn't meet him directly as many times as I was

    20 instructed by my Colonel, and I also had the

    21 opportunity to meet him in other areas up and down the

    22 Lasva Valley, so he was quite active in terms of not

    23 centrally located on all occasions in the Hotel Vitez,

    24 taking an active role as the commander in the area.

    25 Q. Did you have occasion, Captain, to meet the

  17. 1Defendant at a headquarters other than the Hotel Vitez?

    2 A. Yes, sir. On one particular occasion, prior

    3 to the fall of the Travnik area, I met Colonel Blaskic

    4 in what looked like an operational headquarters

    5 location which was out of the Hotel Vitez and located

    6 near the wood yard forward toward the Travnik, Novi

    7 Travnik area. He was supported by his usual entourage

    8 of military police protecting that particular tactical

    9 headquarters.

    10 Q. Was he upset in any way that you had found

    11 him in this forward headquarters?

    12 A. He was extremely upset as was his liaison

    13 officer, Darko Gelic, who I had managed to trick, as it

    14 were, into leading me to him in the first place. Darko

    15 was very worried because he appreciated that Colonel

    16 Blaskic didn't want people to bother him at this

    17 particular location because obviously it was a very

    18 busy time at this tactical headquarters.

    19 Q. Now, you noted, Captain, that Blaskic was in

    20 contact with other areas in his area of command. Did

    21 he, in fact, use Darko Gelic to introduce you to other

    22 individuals within his area of command?

    23 A. Yes, sir, there were numerous occasions when,

    24 for example, if I wanted to do any particular work in

    25 an area, then Darko Gelic would be assigned to me as

  18. 1Colonel Blaskic's liaison officer, and Darko would then

    2 assist me in gaining access to particular areas that

    3 would have otherwise been difficult had I not had a

    4 senior HVO liaison officer and representative of

    5 Colonel Blaskic with me.

    6 Q. Captain, let's turn our attention to 433/5,

    7 and if we can put that on the ELMO? Now, that is Darko

    8 Gelic in the blue shirt; is that right?

    9 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    10 Q. And what was happening here?

    11 A. This was -- Darko had taken me over to

    12 introduce me to commander Grubesic, who was the brigade

    13 commander in the Busovaca area, and the chap on the

    14 right of Darko, i.e. on the left of the photograph, is

    15 Commander Grubesic in the white T-shirt.

    16 MR. KEHOE: If we can stay there, usher, and

    17 I just want to ask you about some capabilities of

    18 travel inside and out of the Lasva Valley area.

    19 Q. Did there come a time, sir, when the

    20 Defendant and the HVO had capabilities of moving in and

    21 out of the Lasva Valley by air?

    22 A. That's the -- there were very, very frequent

    23 helicopter movements, HVO helicopter movements, in and

    24 out of the Lasva Valley despite the U.N. restriction of

    25 air movement. HIP helicopters would come in once,

  19. 1maybe twice a week, land by a quarry facility not far

    2 away from the British battalion location, stay for five

    3 to ten minutes, and leave, and there were periods of

    4 time when Colonel Blaskic was unavailable for us to

    5 speak to, but we assumed that he was moving, very

    6 probably moving in and out of the area to discuss

    7 matters with other commanders in the Kiseljak area or

    8 maybe down south in Prozor area. That is purely

    9 supposition, but it became very difficult to ascertain

    10 his location at times, and that was an assumption on

    11 our part that was quite feasible.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Before I move to the next

    13 photograph, if, Mr. Dubuisson, I could move to this

    14 particular map? And I believe that will be Exhibit

    15 434.

    16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that's correct, 434.

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Q. Now, Exhibit 434, of course, Mr. President

    19 and Your Honours, is a portion of Exhibit 172. The

    20 area is circled to the right of this. Did you identify

    21 that location as the spot that the helicopter came and

    22 went from?

    23 A. On several occasions, that area, yes, was

    24 identified as the place where the helicopter was

    25 actually landing and taking off from.

  20. 1THE INTERPRETER: Could you ask the witness

    2 to slow down a little bit, please, for the sake of the

    3 interpreters?

    4 MR. KEHOE: Did you hear that, Captain?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Using the pointer, Captain, could you point

    7 to where the British battalion base was, and you are

    8 pointing to that area on the left-hand side of the

    9 photo.

    10 A. (indicated).

    11 Q. Now, this area that is circled as a helipad,

    12 why do you believe that area was chosen?

    13 A. Because of the nature of the ground around

    14 that area, it would have been very difficult for BiH

    15 troops in the area to engage the helicopter with direct

    16 fire weapons or indirect fire weapons once it was on

    17 the ground because there were hill features around it,

    18 so the helicopters always engaged -- were engaged by

    19 some small arms on the way, but once it actually

    20 touched down, they were out of sight whilst static on

    21 the ground.

    22 Q. The helicopter coming in and going out was

    23 still fired on by Armija soldiers?

    24 A. Indeed it was, yes.

    25 Q. If I can, Mr. Usher, if we can move back to

  21. 1our series of photographs 433/6, I believe. Now,

    2 Captain, 436/6 is a photograph that was taken by you in

    3 Kiseljak; is that right?

    4 A. It is so, yes.

    5 Q. Was this some of the evacuation of medical

    6 wounded from Kiseljak to some other location?

    7 A. Yes, sir, this was a helicopter lift from

    8 Kiseljak. I organised the vehicle evacuation from Novi

    9 Bila hospital to Kiseljak, and the HVO liaison officers

    10 and officers in Kiseljak then arranged for an

    11 HV helicopter to pick up those casualties and take them

    12 further south to Croatia for medical treatment.

    13 Q. Captain, was this the type of helicopter or

    14 variations of this helicopter that -- the ones that

    15 flew into the quarry area that you just described on

    16 the prior exhibit?

    17 A. They were indeed, sir, yes.

    18 Q. Let's turn to the next photograph which

    19 should be 433/7. Did you take that photograph?

    20 A. I did, sir, yes.

    21 Q. What is that?

    22 A. That's one of the helicopters spiralling down

    23 into the motion quarry area that we indicated on the

    24 map earlier.

    25 Q. Now let me change subjects, if you will, and

  22. 1if I can ask the usher just to remain there for one

    2 moment.

    3 During the period of time you had the

    4 opportunity to observe the HVO and the operation of the

    5 HVO, was there a chain of command?

    6 A. There was a very comprehensive chain of

    7 command, sir, yes. Colonel Blaskic was the senior

    8 military figure in the Lasva Valley area, and he had

    9 numerous subordinate brigade commanders and sub-unit

    10 commanders in the Lasva Valley.

    11 Q. Did he appear to be taking steps to train his

    12 troops as well as other steps to defend the Lasva

    13 Valley area during the period of time that you were

    14 there?

    15 A. Yes, on a few occasions we came across what

    16 appeared to be young soldiers being trained up to take

    17 their place as members of the local militia and

    18 brigades defending the Lasva pocket.

    19 Q. Let me turn your attention to 433/8. Again,

    20 is that another photograph that was taken by you,

    21 captain?

    22 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    23 Q. What does it depict?

    24 A. Several young men I assessed at about the age

    25 of 15, 16, some a little bit older, in military

  23. 1uniform, formed up as a squad marching up the road, and

    2 that's just outside the wood yard area near one of the

    3 tactical headquarter locations that Colonel Blaskic had

    4 used.

    5 Q. Captain, based on your military experience,

    6 is that type of training you, as an officer, would

    7 expect to see with an army in theatre?

    8 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    9 Q. You also noted that Blaskic was an effective

    10 commander in the defence of the Vitez area, and that

    11 included a large trenching system, did it not?

    12 A. Yes, there was a very comprehensive series of

    13 trenches laid out around the -- all areas of the Lasva

    14 pocket. There were also detailed secondary defensive

    15 trenches which made it very difficult for the Armija to

    16 make any progress, so it was obviously a very carefully

    17 planned defensive system.

    18 Q. Let me just show you an example of some of

    19 this trenching system, a photograph that you took,

    20 433/9. Is that one such photograph of an HVO trench

    21 that you took during your tour?

    22 A. It is, sir, yes.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Now, if I can change subjects

    24 with you and move, Captain, to some of the

    25 personalities, and I'm just going to take a little bit

  24. 1of a break from those photographs, Mr. Usher, and to

    2 move to some photographs that were in evidence.

    3 The first photograph that I would like to

    4 talk to you about is a -- if I may, Mr. Dubuisson, this

    5 is part of Exhibit 80, eight zero.

    6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. This is Exhibit 80/8.

    7 MR. KEHOE: Thank you.

    8 Q. Captain Whitworth, these photos of these HVO

    9 leaders are a series of photographs that were taken by

    10 you, were they not, sir?

    11 A. They are indeed, sir, yes.

    12 Q. And within these photos, is an individual by

    13 the name of Anto Valenta depicted?

    14 A. Yes, sir. That's Mr. Valenta there.

    15 Q. And you're pointing to the man with the

    16 moustache carrying the suitcase on the left half of

    17 that photograph; is that right?

    18 A. Yes, sir.

    19 Q. Did you have occasion early in your tour,

    20 Captain, to meet with Valenta and to discuss the

    21 political goals of the HVO and the Lasva Valley, and if

    22 so, tell the Judges in your own words what was that

    23 conversation?

    24 A. During the early part of my tour, I was

    25 introduced to Anto Valenta by mayor Santic and Pero

  25. 1Skopljak, some political leaders. They took me to the

    2 Hotel Vitez and introduced me to Mr. Valenta as the new

    3 liaison officer for UNPROFOR in the Vitez area.

    4 Mr. Valenta went into great detail and described to me,

    5 using a series of maps and diagrams, what was happening

    6 in the area and what the future intentions as far as he

    7 was concerned were. That involved using a map and

    8 indicating to me an area of Central Bosnia that was

    9 covered in pie charts depicting the current

    10 distribution of different ethnic groups. The pie chart

    11 would show the percentage of Serbs, the percentage of

    12 Muslims, the percentage of Croats in each of the large

    13 towns, and Mr. Valenta then indicated the area that, as

    14 far as he was concerned, was going to be in the near

    15 future declared as Herceg-Bosna and indicated to me

    16 that this would be an entirely Croat area, not as it

    17 was then with three different ethnic groups of Serbs,

    18 Muslims, and Croats living in that area.

    19 Q. Did that shock you, Captain?

    20 A. It shocked me a great deal as it was at the

    21 beginning of my time in Bosnia and it was contradictory

    22 to what the U.N. had been working to and what the

    23 politicians in various organisations had said that they

    24 were working towards, it contradicted all those things

    25 that we expected to hear from a character who was

  26. 1allegedly the most senior political Croatian figure in

    2 the Lasva Valley at that time.

    3 Q. Captain, where was Valenta's office?

    4 A. It was in the Hotel Vitez on the ground floor

    5 just a little bit down from the place I met Colonel

    6 Blaskic on several occasions, the place I came to know

    7 as his office or working place.

    8 Q. And, Captain, did you come to any conclusions

    9 in what regard Valenta was held by the other members of

    10 the HVO in the Hotel Vitez?

    11 A. Valenta was seen as a key political figure, a

    12 figure who was revered, as far as I saw it, by the

    13 Croatian people in general, and also one of the

    14 policymakers in the Lasva Valley area as far as

    15 dictating military -- he obviously had an influence on

    16 military activity in the area. That was certainly the

    17 impression I got because of his proximity to Colonel

    18 Blaskic, the key military personnel in the Lasva

    19 Valley.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Let us now touch on another

    21 personality, and if I may have, Mr. Dubuisson, Exhibit

    22 254?

    23 Mr. Usher, it's this photograph (indicated).

    24 Q. Captain, do you know that individual?

    25 A. Yes, sir. That's Mr. Mario Cerkez, a

  27. 1commander of the Vitez brigade, i.e., the local militia

    2 commander in the centre of Vitez.

    3 Q. He was the Vitez brigade commander?

    4 A. He was indeed, sir, yes.

    5 Q. Was he subordinate to Blaskic?

    6 A. He was one of Colonel Blaskic's brigade

    7 commanders, that's right, sir, yes.

    8 Q. Did you ever see Blaskic and Kordic relate to

    9 one another or did you see -- let me take -- in the

    10 Convoy of Joy situation, did you see Blaskic and

    11 Cerkez -- did I say Kordic? I apologise. Did you ever

    12 see Blaskic and Cerkez relate to one another?

    13 A. On one particular occasion during the Convoy

    14 of Joy, Colonel Blaskic was attempting to bring all the

    15 elements of the Convoy of Joy together and assist it on

    16 its way up towards the Tuzla area. There had obviously

    17 been considerable disruption to the convoy by the local

    18 civilians and HVO and pressure from Ambassador Thebault

    19 and Colonel Alastair, along with Colonel Blaskic, were

    20 literally going around trying to pressure people into

    21 releasing the vehicles so the convoy could re-form.

    22 On this particular occasion, at the Vitez

    23 checkpoint, Colonel Blaskic was trying to defuse the

    24 situation with a lot of Croatian civilians, and I could

    25 make out Commander Cerkez in the background trying to

  28. 1avoid being seen but nevertheless a witness, witness

    2 what was taking place. When Colonel Blaskic noted the

    3 presence of Commander Cerkez, he reprimanded him very

    4 strongly in front of the crowd of people and told him

    5 that what was happening to the Convoy of Joy was wrong

    6 and that he was to assist in releasing the vehicles and

    7 encouraged the local civilian population to do

    8 likewise. Commander Cerkez wasn't particularly happy

    9 or enthusiastic about this idea but nevertheless

    10 concurred with Colonel Blaskic's wishes.

    11 Q. Was it clear to you that Cerkez was a

    12 subordinate to Blaskic?

    13 A. I had always thought that, and that instance

    14 was, for me, said exactly that, whilst Commander Cerkez

    15 was at times disrespectful of Colonel Blaskic and

    16 didn't always like what he wanted to happen,

    17 nevertheless, as his superior commander, he obeyed when

    18 directed to by Colonel Blaskic.

    19 Q. And based on the word of Blaskic, did you

    20 recover the trucks that were taken from the Convoy of

    21 Joy with the assistance of Darko Gelic?

    22 A. That's correct, sir. Darko Gelic and another

    23 one of the staff from the Hotel Vitez, one of Colonel

    24 Blaskic's staff, assisted me for the following two or

    25 three days in visiting all the HVO and local militia

  29. 1that were holding the vehicles and Darko and another

    2 HVO representative from the Hotel Vitez assisted me in

    3 getting those vehicles released and reforming the

    4 Convoy of Joy so they could move north of Tuzla.

    5 Q. Did they obey, did the HVO local authorities

    6 obey the order of Blaskic as conveyed by Gelic?

    7 A. They did indeed, sir, yes.

    8 MR. KEHOE: We're going to move to another

    9 subject, Captain, and the subject I'd like to talk to

    10 you about begins with a photograph 152? It's this

    11 photograph (indicated).

    12 THE REGISTRAR: This is 152/3.

    13 MR. KEHOE:

    14 Q. If I may put the larger one on there, it's a

    15 little easier to see.

    16 Now, Captain, I know you recognise that

    17 rather handsome chap depicted in that photograph as a

    18 colleague of yours, now Major Bower; is that right?

    19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    20 Q. But for the purposes of our testimony, we're

    21 going to be talking about the building that is situated

    22 behind Major Bower in this photograph, and I ask you,

    23 do you recognise that building?

    24 A. Yes. It was a building we referred to as the

    25 Swiss cottage, the French alpine hut, we used some

  30. 1other names, and it was on the road at Nadioci on the

    2 main road between Zenica and Vitez, a place called

    3 Nadioci.

    4 Q. And several hundred metres from Ahmici?

    5 A. Yes, sir, several hundred metres from Ahmici.

    6 Q. Early on in your tour, did you have the

    7 opportunity to go to this location and talk to the

    8 soldiers that were garrisoned in that building?

    9 A. Yes, sir. During the early days of my tour

    10 as a liaison officer, I took it upon myself to drive

    11 around to familiarise myself with all the different

    12 parts and soldiers and commanders in the area. On one

    13 particular occasion, I noticed several youngish

    14 soldiers sat on the balcony area of the alpine hut, so

    15 I drove up in my Land Rover with my interpreter, got

    16 out, and tried to make conversation with them.

    17 Initially, this was very successful. I

    18 talked to several young soldiers, all of whom were

    19 dressed in black carrying large knives, maybe one or

    20 two hand guns apiece, and there were plenty of

    21 weapons. Actually inside the building and on the porch

    22 area. A gentleman of similar description but slightly

    23 older kept coming out of the back of the cottage and

    24 looked at me with disdain and obviously was not happy

    25 about me talking and making conversation with the

  31. 1younger chaps on the front.

    2 He made some reference to my interpreter, who

    3 was Muslim, and the situation got a little bit tense,

    4 but after calming that down, they divulged to me that

    5 they were part of an elite military police unit they

    6 described as the Jokeri, and they boasted quite happily

    7 about the fact that they had been involved in all the

    8 major HVO successes and offensive operations in and

    9 around the Busovaca-Vitez-Lasva Valley area.

    10 Throughout this, a gentleman kept coming out

    11 the back, again grunting and making comments to the

    12 effect that the chaps that sat on the front shouldn't

    13 be talking and divulging this information to me. I

    14 asked them -- I introduced myself as the liaison

    15 officer and said to them that, you know, it would be of

    16 use to me and maybe I might be of assistance to them if

    17 I was to meet their commander. They told me his name

    18 was a gentleman named Pasko and I should go to Vitez

    19 and look for him, and at this particular point the chap

    20 came out of the back and said that enough was enough

    21 and I had to leave and the younger gentlemen shouldn't

    22 talk to me any further.

    23 On that particular occasion, I then went into

    24 Vitez to continue exploring the sort of HVO hierarchy

    25 in the Vitez area.

  32. 1Q. Before we talk about that, can you use this

    2 photograph and the pointer and just tell the Judges

    3 exactly where this conversation took place?

    4 A. Yes, sir. It took place actually on the

    5 balcony, up here (indicated). So I could see quite

    6 plainly into the actual Swiss cottage itself, and we

    7 sat on chairs out front with five or six members of the

    8 Jokeri, the elite military police unit.

    9 Q. Captain, how long did this conversation go on

    10 for?

    11 A. I was there for approximately 30 minutes.

    12 Q. Now, Captain, did they indicate to you

    13 anything about Ahmici or did you reach any conclusions

    14 about their participation in Ahmici after this

    15 discussion?

    16 A. At the time they said to me, they elaborated

    17 on the fact that they had been involved in all the

    18 major successful military operations, and I actually

    19 mentioned Ahmici, and they said -- they reiterated to

    20 me that it was all the successful military operations,

    21 so I took it from that that, yes, they were directly

    22 involved in Ahmici.

    23 Q. Continue on, Captain. You said after this

    24 conversation you went back into Vitez to try to

    25 continue to find out who the leader was of this

  33. 1organisation. Can you tell the Judges what you did?

    2 A. I had already been directed to Hotel Vitez

    3 and Vitez area by these young members of the Jokeri. I

    4 had already made contact there, so I decided to use

    5 this as an excuse to introduce myself to the civilian

    6 police. I introduced myself to them, and they directed

    7 me to the Hotel Vitez and said I need to speak to the

    8 senior military police commander in the Hotel Vitez.

    9 They weren't actually part of the Jokeri, but the

    10 commander of such would be found or the gentleman

    11 responsible for them would be found in the Hotel Vitez

    12 area.

    13 Q. Let me follow up something you just said.

    14 Who was not part of the Jokeri?

    15 A. The normal civilian police, which is whom I

    16 had visited to explore who the commander was of the

    17 Jokeri, this Pasko chap.

    18 Q. So the Jokeri was part of the military

    19 police?

    20 A. That's right, so I used this as a way of

    21 brokering myself into the local civilian police, but

    22 they directed me quickly over to Hotel Vitez and said

    23 that I would find the chief of military police in

    24 there.

    25 Q. Now, this is the same location that has

  34. 1"Military Police" on the front of it as we saw in one

    2 of the initial photographs that I believe was 433/1; is

    3 that right?

    4 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    5 Q. Did you go in there and meet a member of the

    6 military police?

    7 A. Yes, sir. I went in and asked if I could

    8 speak -- introduced myself to the senior military

    9 policeman because he was obviously a key figurehead in

    10 the area that I needed to be familiar with, and

    11 after -- after a brief wait, a gentleman, maybe late

    12 40s, early 50s, bald head came to me and looked

    13 disdainfully and disinterested at me, wasn't really

    14 interested in meeting me, but introduced himself as one

    15 of the senior military police figures in the Vitez

    16 area.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Let me show you Exhibit 258, this

    18 photograph.

    19 Q. Captain, do you recognise Exhibit 258?

    20 A. Yes, sir. It was the gentleman who was

    21 introduced to me as one of the senior military police

    22 figures in the Hotel Vitez, I think his name is Vlado.

    23 Q. Now, after this meeting, did you come to

    24 certain conclusions about the connection between the

    25 military police and the Jokeri?

  35. 1A. I did so and I reported that I had met the

    2 Jokeri and as far as I was concerned that they were a

    3 sub-unit based in the Lasva area, but their command was

    4 located in Hotel Vitez as part of the HVO hierarchy.

    5 Q. Now, did there come a time when you, in the

    6 presence of Darko Gelic, were finally introduced to

    7 this individual, Pasko, who was head of the military

    8 police?

    9 A. That's right, sir. One of my functions as

    10 liaison officer was to supervise the delivery of

    11 humanitarian aid, and during a particular part of the

    12 tour, there was a lot of tension. Consequently, the

    13 HVO insisted that they would only allow aid to be

    14 delivered to the Muslim areas as long as it was

    15 delivered simultaneously to the Croat area of Vitez,

    16 and this would only happen after the vehicles had been

    17 inspected by the senior military police commander. I

    18 arranged for the delivery to Vitez, the vehicles turned

    19 up, and Darko Gelic introduced me to a gentleman named

    20 Pasko Ljubesic who Darko introduced him as the senior

    21 military police commander from the HVO.

    22 Q. Was it clear to you at this point that Darko

    23 was working together with Pasko on this?

    24 A. Absolutely, sir, yes. He was again a

    25 sub-unit commander, part of the HVO based in the Hotel

  36. 1Vitez, and was a very close liaison between him and

    2 Darko Gelic, Colonel Blaskic's liaison officer.

    3 Q. Was it also clear to you, Captain, that this

    4 Pasko was the Pasko who was also the overall commander

    5 of the Jokeri?

    6 A. That's right, sir. Pasko was the name, first

    7 name I had been initially given by the Jokeri on my

    8 first meeting with them, and it fitted the

    9 circumstances.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Let me turn our attention,

    11 Mr. Dubuisson, to photographs 255 and 256.

    12 Q. Captain, if I may, I'd like to show you a

    13 series of photographs, two photographs. If we can get

    14 over to the left a little bit? The chap is not --

    15 there he is, okay.

    16 See it on the screen, Mr. Usher? Okay.

    17 That's good. That's good. That's great.

    18 This is Exhibit 255, and this again is

    19 another photograph that was taken by you, was it not,

    20 Captain?

    21 A. It was indeed, sir, yes.

    22 Q. Who is the individual in the right-hand side

    23 of this photo?

    24 A. He was the chap introduced to me by Darko

    25 Gelic as Pasko Ljubesic, commander of the military

  37. 1police in the HVO.

    2 Q. And, if I may, Mr. Usher, the next

    3 photograph, 256?

    4 How about the individuals in that photograph?

    5 A. That is Darko Gelic, Colonel Blaskic's

    6 liaison officer --

    7 Q. Excuse me a second. Can you put the pointer

    8 on? That is the individual in the uniform to the left

    9 talking to the blue uniformed gentleman in the back; is

    10 that right?

    11 A. That's right, sir, yes. And that's Pasko

    12 Ljubesic (indicated) and these were the two local

    13 policemen who were just on the checkpoint who were just

    14 being informed of what was actually happening but

    15 weren't actually involved in the search themselves.

    16 Q. This individual -- this photograph was taken

    17 by you as well; is that right?

    18 A. It was indeed, sir, yeah.

    19 Q. Now, you observed with me a videotape of an

    20 event where various individuals have been identified by

    21 you; is that right?

    22 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    23 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Mr. President, just go

    24 to the clip that is 270, we would ask for a still, but

    25 I think the Defence counsel had a still of

  38. 1Mr. Ljubesic. If I could just have Defence counsel's

    2 number, I don't really understand -- know the number we

    3 had on that. We can take another one or take the

    4 Defence's Exhibit.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Dubuisson?

    6 THE REGISTRAR: Are you going to --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: What is your position here,

    8 Mr. Kehoe? I didn't quite understand. What do you

    9 want to show?

    10 MR. KEHOE: We'll play the video and then

    11 stop.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: This is the cassette 270; is

    14 that right?

    15 MR. KEHOE: That's correct.

    16 (Videotape played)

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Stop, please.

    19 Q. My first question to you, Captain, is: Does

    20 that video, and I realise there is more on the video,

    21 does that appear to be the inside of the Swiss chalet?

    22 A. I examined it closely, sir, earlier on, and

    23 it does appear to be what looked like the inside of the

    24 Swiss chalet.

    25 Q. Can we go back on the monitor, the still on

  39. 1the monitor? That individual, do you recognise him?

    2 A. That's Pasko Ljubesic, sir.

    3 Q. Is he the individual that you previously met

    4 or you had met after with Darko Gelic?

    5 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    6 Q. That particular still is a still that was put

    7 into evidence by Defence counsel last week, and for the

    8 purposes of the record, we can just duplicate that

    9 effort as opposed to taking yet another still. There's

    10 no need to clutter up the record in that regard,

    11 counsel, I really don't know what the number is, but we

    12 can clarify it later.

    13 If we can continue on with that video?

    14 Better still, can you go back a little bit, just back a

    15 bit to the prior person on that video. Just a little

    16 bit?

    17 (Videotape played)

    18 MR. KEHOE:

    19 Q. That man, do you recognise him?

    20 A. I'm quite -- I'm reasonably as certain as I

    21 can be bearing in mind the length of time that that was

    22 one of the gentleman I spoke to, sat on the front of

    23 the Swiss cottage that day.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Can we continue to play?

    25 (Videotape played)

  40. 1Q. Stop. How about the individual -- the bald

    2 individual with the hand on his head?

    3 A. I'm as certain as I can be that that's the

    4 gentleman that I was introduced to as one of the senior

    5 military police officers in the Hotel Vitez that day.

    6 Q. Now, the Jokers informed you that they were

    7 involved in the HVO military successes in the Lasva

    8 Valley; is that right?

    9 A. They indeed, sir, yeah.

    10 Q. Just for clarification sake, approximately

    11 when was this conversation you had with these Jokers?

    12 A. It was very early on in my tour, I think it

    13 was about the end of May, beginning of June, 28th, 29th

    14 of May, something like that.

    15 Q. Fair enough. Thereafter, Captain, did you

    16 see members of the Jokeri involved in any other HVO

    17 military successes in the Lasva Valley after that?

    18 A. Towards the end of our tour, during the HVO

    19 assault on Grbavica, I came -- I saw several gentlemen

    20 dressed in exactly the same manner, i.e. all in black,

    21 similarly well-equipped, who looked very familiar in

    22 terms of -- I was quite confident that they were

    23 members of the Jokeri that I had spoken to earlier on a

    24 few months earlier.

    25 Q. This attack on Grbavica was when?

  41. 1A. 7th, 8th September, beginning of September

    2 area.

    3 Q. Now, you noted just previously that based on

    4 this, there was a connection between the Jokeri, as

    5 part of the military police, and the military police in

    6 the Hotel Vitez; is that right?

    7 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    8 Q. How about Blaskic? Did you see these

    9 military policemen in Blaskic's presence on occasion?

    10 A. Colonel Blaskic, whenever he appeared on the

    11 ground, if there was some senior U.N. dignitary in the

    12 Lasva Valley, Colonel Blaskic would appear as a senior

    13 HVO commander and he would always be escorted and

    14 guarded by members of the military police unit based in

    15 the Hotel Vitez.

    16 MR. KEHOE: Let me turn ourselves to some

    17 photographs, and if we can go to this one? Is there a

    18 number on the back of that?

    19 Q. Let's go a little bit out of sequence here,

    20 433/12. Do you recognise that, sir?

    21 A. That's a photograph I took when Cedric

    22 Thornberry was visiting Novi Bila hospital. That's

    23 Colonel Blaskic in attendance, Colonel Alastair, and

    24 Cedric Thornbury visiting and assessing circumstances

    25 of the Novi Bila hospital. And those are the military

  42. 1policemen who were in abundance around the hospital

    2 during Colonel Blaskic's visit.

    3 Q. Was it quite normal to see these military

    4 policemen in and about when Blaskic was present?

    5 A. Yes, sir.

    6 Q. Now, let us talk about an instance involving

    7 the local command and also the military police in the

    8 area of Rijeka (phoen) in early June of 1993. Do you

    9 remember an instance of maybe 30 Bosnian Muslims being

    10 held in the Rijeka area?

    11 A. Yes, I came across twenty to thirty, what

    12 were actually DPs, Displaced Persons, that weren't

    13 actually native of the Lasva Valley, and they were

    14 being accommodated in a group of houses in the area of

    15 Rijeka. They were all Muslims and the HVO/BiH

    16 frontline was a couple of hundred metres up the same

    17 road. When I found them there, I decided and spoke to

    18 them that they weren't in a very good situation, and I

    19 asked them what they would like to do. They said that

    20 they would like to go to Zenica where they had

    21 relatives, but they were being prevented from leaving

    22 the area by the local HVO.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Before we go ahead with the

    24 story, if I can show you this particular map, and I

    25 believe our next exhibit is ...

  43. 1THE REGISTRAR: If you permit me to, do you

    2 want a freeze from the video clip, or do you want a new

    3 number for the cassette.

    4 MR. KEHOE: The cassette is 270, that's okay.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Then it would be 270C, and

    6 the next number is 435.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: So the cassette keeps its

    8 original number; is that correct?

    9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it keeps its original

    10 number, there's A and B for the French and English

    11 transcripts, and then C for the extract that we saw

    12 now.

    13 MR. KEHOE:

    14 Q. Captain Whitworth, I show you Exhibit 435, an

    15 area circled in green at the top of the photograph. Is

    16 that the general area where these people were kept?

    17 A. That's correct, sir, yes, it was.

    18 Q. And how far from the frontline was that?

    19 A. Two, three hundred metres. I think it's also

    20 important to point out, they weren't actually being

    21 held within buildings, they weren't actually prisoners,

    22 they were just free to -- left to roam around that

    23 particular area but they weren't allowed to move from

    24 the area of those houses. They were provided with

    25 everything they needed but weren't actually kept as

  44. 1prisoners. There were actually 5 or 6 families of

    2 people there.

    3 Q. Let me show you this next photograph which

    4 should be 433/10. Does that photograph depict the area

    5 that is right near the frontline where these

    6 individuals were kept, where they were being held

    7 although being allowed to walk around?

    8 A. They were, sir, yes. They're basic hollow

    9 houses, and in the distance behind the Land Rover, as

    10 the track goes up, you can see that there are mines

    11 along the road because just over that horizon was the

    12 declared frontline area between the HVO and the BiH.

    13 Q. What were they being held for, Captain?

    14 A. That wasn't immediately apparent to me, but

    15 it seemed like they were there as a deterrent to the

    16 BiH to not assault that particular avenue.

    17 Q. Did you determine that they were being used

    18 as human shields?

    19 A. I did indeed, yes.

    20 Q. What did you do?

    21 A. I went to see Mario Cerkez, the local brigade

    22 commander, because the soldiers in that area were under

    23 his direct command. He said -- he wasn't really

    24 interested, it was of no concern to him. He assured me

    25 that they were free to go where they wanted, but that

  45. 1was obviously not the case, and he was pretty

    2 disinterested about the whole thing.

    3 I then spoke to -- went to the Hotel Vitez

    4 and tried to address the matter to Darko Gelic, and he

    5 said again that they were free to move as and when they

    6 wanted to, so I promptly went back up to BRITBAT, got

    7 two Warriors and my Land Rover, and then went back to

    8 Rijeka and attempted to give them an opportunity to

    9 walk out in whatever direction that they chose with me

    10 as a guide. As we tried to leave, several members of

    11 the local militia HVO appeared, as did a vehicle with

    12 several military police and said that they were not --

    13 the Muslims are not allowed to go anywhere, that they

    14 were to stay in the Rijeka area.

    15 So at that point, after getting extremely

    16 angry and annoyed, I then went to address the matter to

    17 the mayor, Mr. Santic, and he appreciated that it was a

    18 difficult circumstance and he would look into it, and

    19 then I spoke to Hotel Vitez again and said that what

    20 they had told me was not true, that I had been stopped

    21 by military police escorting them or assisting them in

    22 going wherever they wanted to in the Lasva area.

    23 I left the matter that particular day and

    24 went back a couple of days later to see if the

    25 circumstances had changed, and on my return, all the

  46. 1Muslims had left and it wasn't till two or three months

    2 later, after questioning people in Zenica that actually

    3 managed to make contact with several of them, and it

    4 would appear that the HVO had actually allowed them to

    5 leave the area and walk up over the mountain road into

    6 the Muslim area.

    7 Q. Now, Captain, this is the participation of

    8 two arms of the military, the local HVO and the

    9 military police from the Hotel Vitez; is that right?

    10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    11 Q. Who was the military commander above both of

    12 those units?

    13 A. The military police were based in the Hotel

    14 Vitez, and Mario Cerkez, the brigade commander for the

    15 Vitez area answered directly to Colonel Blaskic's file,

    16 as far as I was concerned, so ultimately he was

    17 responsible for that troops' action on that particular

    18 day stopping the Muslims leaving.

    19 Q. Did you reach conclusions that who, in the

    20 military structure, ordered that these people could

    21 leave?

    22 A. I think -- I concluded that basically after I

    23 had pointed out the fact that these people could be

    24 construed as being used as a human shield, it became a

    25 bit of an embarrassment to the HVO, and the necessary

  47. 1orders were -- must have been issued by the Hotel Vitez

    2 to allow them to leave.

    3 Q. Before we move to the next point, Captain, on

    4 the military police and their sub-units, the Jokeri,

    5 based on what you've told us about your conversations

    6 with the Jokeri, about your conversations in the Hotel

    7 Vitez with Vlado Santic, your meeting with Pasko

    8 Ljubesic, with Darko Gelic, the activity of the Jokeri

    9 in the offensive operation in Grbavica, and lastly, the

    10 release of individuals who were formally being stopped

    11 from leaving by the local HVO and the military police,

    12 based on all those facts, did you reach any conclusions

    13 on what command Blaskic had over these military police

    14 in theatre?

    15 A. Commander Blaskic had the ultimate command

    16 over the military police as far as I was concerned and

    17 of the brigade commanders in the Lasva area. He had

    18 obviously lots of strategic considerations outside the

    19 Lasva Valley -- the valley area, but he ultimately

    20 demonstrated on numerous occasions that he had

    21 effective command and control on the soldiers on the

    22 ground, including the military police, and all these

    23 brigades, and the other sub-units that we came into

    24 contact with in the Lasva area.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Captain, I'm going to move to

  48. 1another segment, and you can -- we'll finish with those

    2 photographs in a little bit -- and I'd like to talk to

    3 you just briefly about your experiences with the

    4 Vitezovi, and before we begin to that, I'd like to move

    5 to yet a new tape, Mr. Dubuisson, which I believe would

    6 be 436.

    7 Mr. President and Your Honours, this is a

    8 video clip that was provided to the Office of the

    9 Prosecutor by the British Broadcasting Company, and if

    10 we can play it at this juncture?

    11 (Videotape played)

    12 MR. KEHOE: Stop, please.

    13 Q. Do you know that man?

    14 A. I do indeed, sir, yes.

    15 Q. Can you go back on the screen? Who is he?

    16 A. He's the commander of one of the elite

    17 special forces units of the HVO in Vitez, Lasva area,

    18 called Darko Kraljevic.

    19 Q. Tell the Judges how you met Darko Kraljevic?

    20 A. First time I met him, I think was the evening

    21 of 11th, 12th of June. I didn't know his name then,

    22 but he was involved in the taking of several U.N.

    23 vehicles as hostages in the centre of Vitez on the

    24 night of the 11th, 12th, during which I was the liaison

    25 officer that organised the release.

  49. 1Q. I'm sorry, the night of the 11th and 12th

    2 of ...

    3 A. June, I think it was, sir. Effectively,

    4 several vehicles on their way back from Zenica had been

    5 directed into the town centre of Vitez. Once there,

    6 mines had been placed around them and across the roads,

    7 and the local population came out in force to protest

    8 that, the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR. During this

    9 particular time the BiH were shelling, decided to shell

    10 the centre of Vitez. I was sent by Colonel Alastair to

    11 try to negotiate for the release of the vehicles from

    12 the centre of Vitez area. During that time, it was

    13 late at night, 2.00 in the morning, a gentleman held a

    14 gun to my face and threatened to kill myself and my

    15 interpreter and refused to release the vehicles on the

    16 grounds that UNPROFOR was moving weapons and munitions

    17 on behalf of the Armija and that we're not supporting

    18 the HVO in the same manner.

    19 After a heated discussion, several tense

    20 minutes, I extracted from the area, after making sure

    21 everybody was safe in the vehicles, and went to the

    22 Hotel Vitez where members of the ECMM were being held

    23 in the basement. I spoke to Darko Gelic, asked him to

    24 get Colonel Blaskic out so we could discuss the matter,

    25 pointed out the fact that this was just serving to

  50. 1upset any UNPROFOR-HVO relations, and after a few hours

    2 and a period of time when the mortaring had subsided

    3 outside during which the hotel had been hit on one or

    4 two occasions, Darko Gelic came back to me with

    5 instructions that Colonel Blaskic had said that the

    6 vehicles were to be released.

    7 I went outside, supervised removal of the

    8 mines, and spoke to the local commander, a chap called

    9 Carlo Grabovac who was a battalion commander near the

    10 entrance to Vitez town centre who made sure that the

    11 population had dispersed and we were then allowed to

    12 escort the vehicles out of the area.

    13 Q. Let me show you two photographs, one which is

    14 Exhibit 252 and this particular exhibit, which is the

    15 top one, which is part of the 433 series, if we can get

    16 both of those?

    17 Exhibit 252, can you take a look at that,

    18 Captain -- it's not coming up on the monitor for some

    19 reason. There we go.

    20 Do you recognise the individual facing --

    21 A. That's Carlo Grabovac. He's one of the

    22 battalion commanders of the Vitez brigade, i.e. he's

    23 subordinate to Mario Cerkez and he was one of the

    24 commanders he had to liaise closely with on the ground

    25 to be able to get the civilians dispersed who were in

  51. 1part responsible for holding the vehicles hostage.

    2 Q. The next photograph that is in the series,

    3 433, and what is that number? 11, and is Carlo

    4 Grabovac in that photograph as well?

    5 A. He is indeed, sir, yes. He stood on my left

    6 or your right as you look at the photograph, and that's

    7 taken outside the cinema in Vitez, which was Mario

    8 Cerkez's, the brigade commander, headquarters which is

    9 about 100 metres away from the Hotel Vitez.

    10 Q. So in this particular instance, you had Darko

    11 Kraljevic and his Vitezovi operating in conjunction

    12 with the Vitez brigade on the command of Cerkez and

    13 Carlo Grabovac; is that right?

    14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    15 Q. And Blaskic was the one that ordered the

    16 release of this convoy of U.N. vehicles; is that right?

    17 A. That's right, sir. I was -- went straight to

    18 the top in terms of -- it was obvious that it was

    19 difficult to quell the situation at a local level, so I

    20 went straight to the head man, spoke to Darko, who then

    21 went to speak to Colonel Blaskic, and then after

    22 several discussions Darko eventually came back with

    23 permission that the vehicles should leave.

    24 Q. Did they obey?

    25 A. Very soon afterwards, yeah, after I had

  52. 1supervised it, everybody doing what he had been

    2 instructed to doing by Darko Gelic, they did, yes.

    3 Q. So they obeyed Blaskic?

    4 A. They did.

    5 Q. Let's go to this map briefly, which is the

    6 map marked 124 --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps you're going to take a

    8 break here. This might be a time to take a break. We

    9 can start in about 20 or 25 minutes.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.

    11 --- Recess taken at 4.03 p.m.

    12 --- On resuming at 4:35 p.m.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume the hearing, and

    14 please have the accused brought in.

    15 (The accused entered court)

    16 THE REGISTRAR: Now we are ready.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We can continue.

    18 MR. KEHOE:

    19 Q. Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. If I

    20 can just move to the next exhibit, which is --

    21 THE REGISTRAR: This is 437.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. Captain, just briefly going through Exhibit

    24 437, this is a depiction of the locations of the

    25 various events, about which you just discussed on the

  53. 1night of the 11th of June, 1993; is that right?

    2 A. It is, sir, yes.

    3 Q. And number 1 is the area where the U.N.

    4 convoy was stopped by the HVO and the Vitezovi; is that

    5 right?

    6 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    7 Q. At the general location where you had a gun

    8 put in your face by Darko Kraljevic?

    9 A. That's correct, sir.

    10 Q. Number 2, does that indicate the place where

    11 mines were put across the road to prevent a BRITBAT

    12 Warrior from getting into Vitez?

    13 A. That's correct, sir, the road was cut off,

    14 mines were placed across, and there were civilians in

    15 area 3 as well.

    16 Q. From 3, you went and tried to get assistance

    17 of Carlo Grabovac who was headquartered in number 4; is

    18 that right?

    19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    20 Q. The place where you got relief was from

    21 Blaskic in the Hotel Vitez; is that correct?

    22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    23 Q. Now, this event took place before you had

    24 been formally introduced to Darko Kraljevic, I take

    25 it. Let me show you a document, Exhibit 422, if I may,

  54. 1Mr. Dubuisson? This is a document that is in both

    2 English and Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian. Now, this is a

    3 document that you saw while in theatre; is that right,

    4 Captain?

    5 A. It is one of several we saw produced by the

    6 Hotel Vitez, yeah.

    7 Q. And normally did you get such documents from

    8 Darko Gelic?

    9 A. Yeah, I was the mail boy between Hotel Vitez

    10 and Colonel Alastair, and these things would then be

    11 disseminated accordingly to Kiseljak or wherever,

    12 depending on what the content was.

    13 Q. If you could turn to page 2, the distribution

    14 list on that document? Can you read that distribution

    15 list, sir?

    16 A. All HVO brigades, all the independent units

    17 under the command of the HVO 3rd operational zone

    18 commander.

    19 Q. And that was Blaskic; right?

    20 A. That is Colonel Blaskic, sir, yes. Which

    21 included the MTD, which is -- I think it's the

    22 transport one. It could have been the artillery. The

    23 ones I'm familiar with are the last ones which are the

    24 4th military police battalion which is Pasko Ljubesic

    25 and the guys based in the Hotel Vitez, the Vitezovi

  55. 1which is commanded by Darko Kraljevic, and TURTKO 2nd,

    2 which were another sort of elite offensive fighting

    3 force based around the Travnik, Novi Bila, Novi Travnik

    4 area, and lastly a chap called Djuti who was a local

    5 dodgy car salesman, criminal, entrepreneur, and also

    6 involved militarily in several things that went on,

    7 particularly around the Novi Travnik area.

    8 Q. Did you see how these individual units were

    9 used in the overall tactical structure of the HVO?

    10 A. We saw the same pattern throughout our tour

    11 in Bosnia, which was that the local brigades, either

    12 local militia, would maintain the military positions

    13 around the Lasva Valley, but when it came to any

    14 offensive action or any attacks by the BiH that

    15 required supplementary troops, then the 4th military

    16 police, or the Vitezovi, or the TURTKO, or the Jokeri,

    17 people like that would be put to use if there was any

    18 particular area, for example, if the BiH were making an

    19 advance or an attempted advance into the Lasva area,

    20 then one of those specialist units would be drafted in

    21 to substantiate and increase the strength of the local

    22 brigade and militia position in that particular area,

    23 and if there were any offensive activities, military

    24 operations taking place, those were not undertaken by

    25 the HVO brigades, the local militia in the area, but by

  56. 1those specialist units, the Vitezovi, the TURTKO, and

    2 the military police sub-units.

    3 Q. Did you consider that the use of these

    4 independent units was intricately involved in the

    5 tactical strategy of the HVO in the Lasva Valley?

    6 A. Absolutely. They came under command of

    7 Colonel Blaskic and they were used in augmenting --

    8 correction, wrong, in actually carrying out the HVO's

    9 military intention; establishing, strengthening, and

    10 regaining ground lost to the BiH.

    11 Q. Let's take your point on ground lost to the

    12 BiH, and I direct your attention to the latter part of

    13 October of 1993. Omit October of 1993. Did you

    14 observe an instance when the Vitezovi came in for the

    15 goal of doing exactly what you did, take over ground

    16 lost to the BiH, and if so, tell the Judges what

    17 happened, what you observed, and what ultimately

    18 transpired?

    19 A. I was visiting one of the local battalion

    20 commanders in the area of Donji Vecerska, we sat

    21 drinking coffee, exchange the niceties of the day, I

    22 was there with my Muslim interpreter when a chap came

    23 in who was -- who became known to me as Darko

    24 Kraljevic, the leader of the Vitezovi. He took over

    25 the meeting. It was quite obvious to me that he was

  57. 1revered by the battalion commander who gave up his seat

    2 for Darko Kraljevic, and Kraljevic told me that he was

    3 here to take command of the HVO in this particular

    4 area, just to explain that the Sesilja (phoen) area had

    5 fallen to the BiH recently, and that Kraljevic was

    6 saying that he had been instructed to take charge of

    7 the situation and to regain the ground lost to the

    8 Armija in that particular brigade area.

    9 Q. Captain, was this local commander in Donji

    10 Vecerska a member of the HVO?

    11 A. He was indeed, sir. He was a battalion

    12 commander that came under the Vitez brigade.

    13 Q. And did Kraljevic then came up headquarters

    14 in Donji Vecerska?

    15 A. He did so. He took over the headquarters,

    16 and I had cause to meet him there on several occasions

    17 after that, and also to bump into him further south

    18 from that position, i.e., in the direction of the HVO

    19 positions that had been lost to the BiH.

    20 Q. During these meetings that you had with Darko

    21 Kraljevic, on some occasion did you have a pistol

    22 contest with Darko Kraljevic that you won?

    23 A. Yes, sir. Darko is a very egocentric

    24 character, enjoys demonstrating his machismo and

    25 soldiering prowess. He challenged me to a pistol duel

  58. 1by way of me establishing myself with him as an equal,

    2 as it were, and I undertook the competition, won the

    3 competition, and he handed me over as a prize a .357

    4 Smith & Wesson Magnum which contained dum-dum bullets

    5 that he claimed he had used during Ahmici.

    6 Q. Let me turn your attention back to Darko in

    7 October of 1993, and if I can move to these two

    8 exhibits, Mr. Dubuisson.

    9 THE REGISTRAR: This is 438 for the part of

    10 the exhibit which comes from Exhibit 55.

    11 MR. KEHOE:

    12 Q. Just going with 438 first. There is a

    13 particular building circled in that exhibit. Is that

    14 the building that you circled as the location of the

    15 Vitezovi when you were there in October of 1993?

    16 A. Yes, it is, sir, yeah.

    17 Q. Let's go to the next exhibit, the map, 439.

    18 And there are three locations depicted in orange, one

    19 Donji Vecerska, but the other two, what are those other

    20 two locations?

    21 A. If you go southwest, you come to the ring,

    22 the orange ring, that's Sesilja, that's a village that

    23 I visited early on that had an ethnic mix that was in

    24 the possession of the HVO but fell about this time to

    25 the BiH, and that's what Kraljevic had told me that he

  59. 1had been sent to re-establish or to repossess on behalf

    2 of the HVO.

    3 Q. And how about feature 1105?

    4 A. Feature 1105 was a key strategic point as far

    5 as both the HVO and the BiH were concerned because it

    6 overlooked the area, Muslim area, of Kruscica and

    7 was -- the troops in charge of that particular point

    8 were allowed to see vantage and viewpoint over the

    9 Lasva Valley in order to coordinate fire, so it was

    10 important to both of them. It was initially the

    11 territory of the HVO but fell again at about the same

    12 time to the BiH who were subsequently able to organise

    13 movements through the -- from the south into Kruscica

    14 and supplement their own position.

    15 Q. Was the taking position of feature 1105

    16 important to the military strategy of the HVO in the

    17 Lasva Valley?

    18 A. Yes, it was.

    19 MR. KEHOE: If I can, Mr. President, move to

    20 the next video, which is Exhibit 440. Again, this is a

    21 BBC video commentary by Martin Bell, you will see the

    22 date in the video itself I believe is the 14th October,

    23 1993, and if we could dim the lights and move to that

    24 next video?

    25 (Videotape played)

  60. 1MR. KEHOE: If we can wind that back,

    2 please? Stop there. Back up.

    3 (Videotape played)

    4 MR. KEHOE: Stop.

    5 Q. That's the man you know as Darko Kraljevic;

    6 is that right?

    7 A. Kraljevic is on the right and the chap to his

    8 left was his deputy.

    9 Q. And the feature that they were exploding was

    10 feature 1105; is that correct?

    11 A. Correct.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Continue on with the tape.

    13 (Videotape played)

    14 MR. KEHOE: Stop there.

    15 Q. The person speaking on behalf of this action

    16 was Blaskic's liaison officer, is it not?

    17 A. That's correct, sir, it's Darko Gelic.

    18 Q. Now, based on your activity as a liaison

    19 officer in Central Bosnia, in conjunction with the

    20 evidence that you've discussed here today, did you see

    21 or did you conclude that what Blaskic wrote in this

    22 order, Exhibit 422, was, in fact, correct, that the

    23 Vitezovi was an independent unit under his command?

    24 A. I did, sir, yeah. The fact that Gelic was

    25 making the statements he was making on behalf of the

  61. 1HVO and Kraljevic clearly had been instructed to carry

    2 out that action on behalf of HVO and Colonel Blaskic.

    3 Q. Let me show you a Defence Exhibit, Defence

    4 137, if I may, which is a portion of a milinfosum

    5 introduced by counsel of the 8th of August, 1993.

    6 MR. KEHOE: I'm having a bit of a tough time

    7 with the monitor here, Judge.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: It's not just you. We're also

    9 having difficulty. All right. Is that okay now?

    10 MR. KEHOE: I figured out the combination.

    11 My colleague, Mr. Harmon, said press the top button

    12 first so ... the top button and the second button, and

    13 it seems to work.


    15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, you're a real star

    16 because the only thing I see on the screen is you. I

    17 don't see any document here.

    18 MR. KEHOE: How depressing.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: No. For the time being -- oh,

    20 I see -- is you. Okay. Now I have the transcript. I

    21 don't have the video. There you go.

    22 Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen. Very well.

    23 We can go forward.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Can you see the document D137?

  62. 1A. Yes, sir.

    2 Q. That is a conversation by a Borislav Jozic

    3 related to you; is that right?

    4 A. It was indeed, sir.

    5 Q. Who was Borislav Jozic?

    6 A. He was one of the officers of Mario Cerkez

    7 who was responsible for supervising and organising the

    8 exchange of bodies with his opposite number in the

    9 BiH. I liaised between the two. Wasn't a key military

    10 figure and was pretty poorly informed in that respect,

    11 but he was a local -- I think he was an ex-policeman or

    12 something like that who was quite a nice chap but had

    13 the onerous task of doing the body exchanges.

    14 Q. Now, Captain, in the second-to-last line of

    15 this Jozic note, it tells you that he, Jozic, further

    16 claimed that they, the Vitezovi, were not effectively

    17 under Blaskic's control. Do you see that?

    18 A. Yes, sir, yes.

    19 Q. Did he tell you that?

    20 A. That was his impression, yes, sir.

    21 Q. Do you agree with that impression?

    22 A. No, I don't, sir. I think that was

    23 effectively supposition on his part. He was not

    24 really, as I mentioned earlier, conversant with the

    25 structures that were operating in the Hotel Vitez and

  63. 1didn't really have a lot to do with military matters

    2 and the HVO, was simply an HVO representative for

    3 organising the body exchanges.

    4 Q. Did Gelic or Blaskic or anybody in the Hotel

    5 Vitez indicate to you at any time that the Vitezovi was

    6 not under the command of the Defendant Blaskic?

    7 A. Not at any time, sir, no.

    8 Q. In fact, sir, did you see any linkage between

    9 the local HVO brigades, under Mario Cerkez, and the

    10 Vitezovi?

    11 A. Mario Cerkez was actually a close friend and

    12 comrade of Darko Kraljevic, they spoke very fondly and

    13 often about each other, and on one particular occasion,

    14 I met them together up at the Donji Vecerska

    15 headquarters because obviously it was Mario Cerkez's

    16 brigade area that Kraljevic was trying to regain ground

    17 for.

    18 Q. During any of your negotiations or any

    19 conversations with Cerkez concerning the release of any

    20 hostages, did Cerkez try to factor in any release of

    21 HVO soldiers?

    22 A. Yes, he did so, on one particular occasion,

    23 some members of the Croat population in Vitez came to

    24 me and explained that their three sons had been taken

    25 hostage and captured by the Armija in Kruscica. I

  64. 1visited Kruscica, spoke to their local Armija commander

    2 in Kruscica, and he allowed me to see the three young

    3 lads who were about 13, 14, and 15, and they were being

    4 housed quite comfortably in the local civilian police

    5 quarters in Kruscica area.

    6 I arranged with the local -- I tried to

    7 arrange with the local commander for the release of the

    8 three boys but was ineffective initially. Shortly

    9 afterwards, Mario Cerkez stopped an ICRC vehicle who

    10 were removing people from Stari Vitez on medical

    11 grounds, they were evacuating two casualties from Stari

    12 Vitez. Mario Cerkez's troops stopped the ICRC vehicle

    13 and removed the two casualties and held them captive as

    14 prisoners and then offered them in exchange for the

    15 three children who were being held in Kruscica.

    16 I then re-set up an exchange of -- exchange

    17 the three boys for the two casualties that Mario Cerkez

    18 was now holding in the cellar of the cinema. On that

    19 particular day, I went to collect three boys and left a

    20 representative of mine with Mario Cerkez's headquarters

    21 and the two casualties. I retrieved the three boys in

    22 an armoured vehicle and was sat in no man's land

    23 between the HVO and BiH frontlines waiting for

    24 confirmation from my sergeant that the boy -- the two

    25 casualties had been released to him, and it was at this

  65. 1time that Mario Cerkez said that the exchange was not

    2 going to go ahead until, in addition to the three boys,

    3 three members of the Vitezovi that were allegedly in

    4 the possession of the BiH were also added to the

    5 exchange, i.e., so the two casualties taken from the

    6 ICRC would be released when we -- the three boys and

    7 the three members of the Vitezovi who were allegedly

    8 held by the BiH were released into my possession to be

    9 brought back to Mario Cerkez and the HVO.

    10 Q. Mario Cerkez was the HVO brigade commander in

    11 Vitez?

    12 A. That's right, sir.

    13 Q. And he wanted to get three Vitezovi soldiers

    14 back as part of this exchange?

    15 A. He did indeed, sir.

    16 Q. Was there some connection there between the

    17 Vitezovi and the Viteska brigade?

    18 A. There was a very strong connection as far as

    19 I was concerned. Not only were they the Vitezovi

    20 working on behalf of the HVO to support and help them

    21 attain their military goals in regaining the ground

    22 lost, but there was a close liaison and friendship

    23 between Mario Cerkez and Darko Kraljevic.

    24 MR. KEHOE: We can move ahead, and we'd like

    25 to go back to some of these photos and before we talk

  66. 1about Stari Vitez very briefly let me just chat for one

    2 moment about the first two photographs, these two,

    3 which will be -- which are these? 433/13 and 433/14

    4 again, Captain, these are a series of photographs which

    5 you took, many of which are now in evidence, where

    6 General Prelak with Blaskic came to Novi Bila hospital,

    7 is that right?

    8 A. General Petkovic.

    9 Q. Petkovic, I'm sorry.

    10 A. Is the bald chap in the middle, to the right

    11 of him is Colonel Blaskic, and to the right of him, in

    12 the background, is one of the military police personal

    13 bodyguards of Colonel Blaskic and to the right but to

    14 the foreground is the liaison officer from Kiseljak of

    15 the HVO. The people to the left of Colonel Petkovic,

    16 General Petkovic, are in the background are two

    17 representatives from Kiseljak and the U.N. overseeing

    18 the triage and the two people in white coats are the

    19 doctors from the Novi Bila hospital.

    20 Q. The next photograph is, in fact, you and

    21 Petkovic and the liaison officer, Vinko Lucic, from

    22 Kiseljak; is that correct?

    23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    24 Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Usher. Let us

    25 turn, if you will, to Stari Vitez very briefly.

  67. 1Captain, what was your assessment of the HVO strategy

    2 in Stari Vitez?

    3 A. Stari Vitez seemed a very convenient

    4 bargaining chip, really, for the HVO, it was a very

    5 small pocket of Muslims, there was no real Armija

    6 soldiers in there, they were all local militia, there

    7 was a large number of women and children, families who

    8 were originally living in the Stari Vitez area, and

    9 really, I saw that as a bargaining chip/lever used by

    10 the HVO on numerous occasions to release pressure

    11 brought to bear by them by the BiH from the Zenica

    12 area.

    13 Q. In what sense? Explain that.

    14 A. If there were any military action conducted

    15 against the Lasva Valley area or any shelling or any

    16 military activity, then they had on their doorstep a

    17 small Muslim enclave in the form of Stari Vitez which

    18 they could apply pressure to. The commander Sefkija,

    19 in the centre of Stari Vitez, had direct communications

    20 to the troops and people in the Muslim community in

    21 Zenica, and so, very quickly, he could communicate to

    22 them that a lot of pressure was being brought to bear

    23 on Stari Vitez. So, for example, if there were any

    24 military action by the BiH onto the Lasva pocket, then

    25 it was very easy for the HVO to then -- to shell or to

  68. 1apply military pressure to Stari Vitez. Stari Vitez

    2 would then communicate to Zenica to say, "Stop whatever

    3 it is you're doing because we're taking casualties at

    4 this particular end." And that seemed an effective

    5 tool as far as we were concerned.

    6 Q. What type of pressure did the HVO put on

    7 Stari Vitez?

    8 A. They employed what were affectionately known

    9 as "babies," there was regular small-arm sniping on a

    10 daily basis, but periodically they would up the level

    11 of activity and aggression towards Stari Vitez by

    12 launching mortars and these improvised mortar bombs

    13 called "babies" or fire extinguisher bombs into the

    14 Stari Vitez enclave, obviously causing a considerable

    15 amount of damage and numerous casualties.

    16 Q. Explain to us something about these "babies."

    17 Are they indiscriminate and why are they

    18 indiscriminate?

    19 A. A "baby" is a fire extinguisher packed full

    20 of home-made explosive or explosive that is obviously

    21 produced in the ammunition factory. It doesn't really

    22 have a cushion cap, it just has a fuse, and there is an

    23 improvised tube welded together in which its led and

    24 then a firing charge is put underneath it which

    25 launches the fire extinguisher through the air,

  69. 1throwing it maybe 400 or 500 metres up in the air and

    2 forward a couple of hundred metres. That then lands,

    3 the fuse burns down, and the fire extinguisher full of

    4 home-made explosive explodes to great effect with a

    5 rather large bang. It's a very poorly aimed weapon

    6 with a very limited range and you can't guarantee it

    7 going off when it lands and neither can you guarantee

    8 the direction in which it's going to -- or the area in

    9 which it's going to fall, so they're just lobbed in the

    10 general direction of where you want to create the most

    11 damage.

    12 Q. So it can hit either civilians or a military

    13 target?

    14 A. Absolutely.

    15 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 82/7, and I believe

    16 this is another photograph taken by you. I may be

    17 mistaken --

    18 THE REGISTRAR: This is 82/5.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Five. I apologise.

    20 Q. Is that a photograph of one of the "babies,"

    21 sir?

    22 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    23 Q. Did you take that photograph?

    24 A. I did indeed. That was taken in Stari

    25 Vitez. It's actually got the date on it that it landed

  70. 1within the confines of the Stari Vitez enclave.

    2 Q. And that would be what date?

    3 A. It's the 9th of September -- 9th of July,

    4 '93.

    5 Q. Now, did there come a time when you were

    6 blocked from going into Stari Vitez?

    7 A. Quite early on in the tour. The west -- the

    8 road coming from the West I. from BRITBAT into Stari

    9 Vitez was completely blocked off by a large lorry

    10 allegedly stuffed full of local home-made explosive, it

    11 actually had the words "Dynamite" painted on the side,

    12 but in addition to that, there was rocks and earth

    13 piled up and several anti-personnel and anti-armour

    14 mines placed around the vehicle itself, so it was a

    15 complete obstacle as far as we were concerned.

    16 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn to this photograph

    17 which is part of the 433 series. That's 433 -- I'm

    18 sorry, Mr. Usher, what's the number on the back of

    19 that?

    20 THE USHER: The number is 15.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. 433/15. Is that a photograph that you took,

    23 Captain?

    24 A. It is indeed, sir, yes.

    25 Q. Can you point to the explosive device that

  71. 1you were just discussing in your testimony?

    2 A. Yeah. This is the road coming from -- so

    3 BRITBAT is approximately about a mile off the bottom of

    4 the picture, it approached Stari Vitez which is

    5 literally on the other side of this vehicle here that's

    6 got "TNT" written on it. There are several mines

    7 placed underneath the vehicle and around the vehicle

    8 and a large pile of earth and rocks, and allegedly

    9 there was TNT stuffed in the vehicle as well as the

    10 mines placed in the water around the front of the

    11 obstacle itself.

    12 Q. Now, that is on the backside of Stari Vitez

    13 going towards BRITBAT.

    14 A. That's correct, sir.

    15 Q. On the front side, moving toward Vitez, did

    16 that receive the brunt of the attack on the "babies"?

    17 A. It did indeed so, yeah. It was the eastern

    18 side, where the majority of the "babies" were launched,

    19 were either Vitez town centre side of Stari Vitez.

    20 Q. Could we turn to the next photograph? This

    21 is 433/16. Again, a photograph taken by you?

    22 A. It is indeed, sir, yeah.

    23 Q. Housing in the back; is that an example of

    24 the blast damage from "babies"?

    25 A. It is, sir, yeah.

  72. 1Q. And just for -- to put this in perspective,

    2 let's move to the next photograph, which is 433/17. Is

    3 that the trenching area on the Muslim side of Stari

    4 Vitez?

    5 A. Yeah, it is, sir. The wall, the perimeter

    6 wall there, you can see is about 200 or 300 metres. On

    7 the other side of that is Vitez town centre. In fact,

    8 you can actually make out, on the right-hand side, the

    9 blocks of flats in the centre of Vitez there. That's

    10 at the top end of the town.

    11 Q. How far is this, as the crow flies, if you

    12 will, from the Hotel Vitez?

    13 A. Five hundred, 600 metres.

    14 Q. Would someone sitting in the Hotel Vitez be

    15 aware of the indiscriminate shelling with "babies"

    16 being done on Stari Vitez?

    17 A. Absolutely so, yes.

    18 Q. Now, there was a time -- thank you, sir.

    19 There was a time when aid was cut off, was it not?

    20 A. There was indeed, yes.

    21 Q. Why was that?

    22 A. The HVO alleged that I had been supplying

    23 weapons, munitions, to the BiH and also moving troops

    24 in and out of the area.

    25 Q. Was that true?

  73. 1A. No, sir.

    2 Q. Was there ever an occasion that ammunition

    3 was smuggled in without your knowledge?

    4 A. There was one occasion where an attempt was

    5 made to use me to smuggle a small amount of ammunition

    6 in, that's correct.

    7 Q. And what was that about?

    8 A. I had been asked to take some medical

    9 supplies into Stari Vitez and picked up several small

    10 boxes of medical supplies from the UNHCR building in

    11 Zenica, which was a Muslim enclave, took them into

    12 Stari Vitez, handed them over to Commander Sefkija. He

    13 immediately handed them over to one of his subordinates

    14 who took them away to another room. I sat and drank

    15 coffee and exchanged pleasantries of the day, assessing

    16 the situation with Commander Sefkija, and then shortly

    17 after decided -- made an excuse to leave and took a

    18 walk around the houses and buildings adjacent to

    19 Commander Sefkija's headquarters.

    20 I walked into a room and found them unpacking

    21 the boxes that were allegedly full of bandages, and

    22 inside each of the bandages was a box of 20 rounds of

    23 ammunition. So there was maybe 600 or 1.000 rounds in

    24 total that if each box had contained, you know, 400 or

    25 500 rounds, so they had managed to wrap a carton of 20

  74. 1rounds in a bandage, basically, and then stick a box

    2 full of bandages in the back of my vehicle.

    3 When I found that out, I got very annoyed

    4 with Commander Sefkija, left after expressing my

    5 disappointment that, as far as I was concerned, he must

    6 have been aware that this was going to happen or it had

    7 been happening and that he had betrayed my trust, and I

    8 stopped all subsequent deliveries of medical supplies

    9 into Stari Vitez and those were only conducted by the

    10 ICRC on an official basis from that point onwards.

    11 Q. During this period of time, during your tour,

    12 did you have conversations with Darko Gelic as to what

    13 the overall strategy was of the HVO if the army of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted to take over the Lasva

    15 Valley?

    16 A. They said it wasn't going to happen, that it

    17 would be met with determined resistance, and if all

    18 else failed, they would end up blowing up the

    19 ammunition factory and everything in the vicinity.

    20 Q. Did Blaskic make such allegations as well?

    21 A. If I remember correctly, he did so, yes. He

    22 actually informed Colonel Alastair of that at a meeting

    23 that I had arranged.

    24 Q. What would have been the net result to the

    25 Lasva Valley of such an explosion?

  75. 1A. There would have been a large number of

    2 casualties, both civilian and military, in the area.

    3 Q. Did Gelic ever comment to you about what they

    4 would do to Zenica if such an invasion by the army of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina took place?

    6 A. He did indeed. On one of the regular

    7 replies, as I think I mentioned earlier, to any

    8 determined BiH military offensive onto the Lasva Valley

    9 was for them to employ one of their large howitzers,

    10 effectively known as "Nora," they would lob

    11 155-millimetre shells into the centre of Zenica, and on

    12 several occasions, civilians were killed due to the

    13 blast from these shells.

    14 Q. What did you conclude was the reason for such

    15 a strategy?

    16 A. It was a tit-for-tat exchange saying quite

    17 clearly to the BiH, "Don't try anything because we're

    18 quite prepared to do whatever it takes to put you off."

    19 Q. And "put you off," what do you mean "put you

    20 off"?

    21 A. "To deter you launching any offensive onto

    22 the Lasva Valley area."

    23 Q. We're going to change subjects again,

    24 Captain, and move to the 5th of July, 1993, and the

    25 killing of Dobrila Kolaba and your participation in

  76. 1that investigation. Can you talk to the Judges briefly

    2 about that, your participation in the investigation,

    3 and what the HVO conclusion was?

    4 A. Do you want me to recount the incident

    5 itself?

    6 Q. Please, briefly.

    7 A. I can't quite remember the dates. On one

    8 particular evening, a small arms exchange had broken

    9 out around the BRITBAT location. Several of the

    10 officers were accommodated in buildings outside the

    11 actual fence of the BRITBAT location, and living in

    12 amongst us in those houses were some of the

    13 interpreters who were local to the area, one of which

    14 was the Colonel's personal interpreter, a young lady

    15 named Dobrila who was actually a Serb.

    16 On one side of the BRITBAT location, there

    17 were HVO Croats' trenches and frontlines, and on the

    18 other were the BiH, and so there were regular small

    19 arms exchange in and around the camp area.

    20 On this particular occasion, after two or

    21 three hours, there was an increase in the level of

    22 small arms fire, and the Captains' House, as it was

    23 known, where two of the interpreters resided downstairs

    24 and myself and two of the captains lived on the

    25 upstairs floor, was raked with small arms fire.

  77. 1Dobrila was shot through the head during that

    2 exchange.

    3 I was made responsible by the Colonel for

    4 investigating the incident with a view to finding out

    5 who had been responsible and punishing those

    6 responsible, bearing in mind it was a U.N.

    7 representative, an interpreter, who had been injured.

    8 I went to the Hotel Vitez, and Colonel

    9 Blaskic expressed his sympathies about what had

    10 happened and said that he would provide an

    11 investigative team to assist in finding out who was

    12 responsible for Dobrila's death.

    13 The investigation lasted two to three days,

    14 which I oversaw, I escorted the HVO representatives

    15 around the firing point and the impact point where

    16 Dobrila had been murdered, and after three days, they

    17 reached a conclusion. The conclusion they offered was

    18 that a BiH soldier must have crossed over the road into

    19 Croat lines, assumed one of the sniper positions in the

    20 houses opposite the officers' mess, fired the rounds,

    21 and then returned over the road back into the Armija

    22 lines.

    23 Q. What did you think about that?

    24 A. I think it was rubbish.

    25 Q. You didn't believe it?

  78. 1A. Absolutely not.

    2 Q. Was any HVO soldier ever punished for this?

    3 A. Absolutely not.

    4 Q. Let's move to the next instance a little more

    5 than a month later, the 14th of August, 1993, the

    6 killing of a UNHCR driver by the name of Boris in Stari

    7 Vitez. Are you aware of that?

    8 A. I am indeed, sir, yes.

    9 Q. Tell us about it.

    10 A. The UNHCR at this particular point had

    11 relatively free and safe passage in the area but would

    12 nevertheless come into BRITBAT, register with myself as

    13 the area liaison officer, and tell me what they were up

    14 to and leave instructions with the headquarters.

    15 On this particular occasion, they came in. I

    16 wasn't there. They left, headed back down the road to

    17 Vitez because -- went and drove through the town centre

    18 of Vitez, entered Stari Vitez through the chicane, and

    19 on entering Stari Vitez, were sniped at with a large .5

    20 inch calibre weapon which resulted in the death of

    21 Boris.

    22 Q. Let me turn your attention to -- by the way,

    23 a .5 inch round is also known as a 12.7 --

    24 A. 12.7 millimetre.

    25 Q. -- millimetre round. It's a pretty

  79. 1significantly sized round, is it not?

    2 A. A very significantly sized round, yes, sir.

    3 Q. Just to put this in perspective, if we could

    4 then move to this particular map.

    5 Before we move to this map, after the killing

    6 of Boris, did you go back and analyse the ground to

    7 check the firing point and to see, based on the point

    8 of impact, where the firing point was?

    9 A. I did indeed, sir, conduct a very thorough

    10 investigation over the next two days and then I had to

    11 present myself to several senior U.N. representatives

    12 who flew up from Zagreb who wanted me to present all

    13 the information and evidence to them.

    14 Q. Let's turn our attention to this map --

    15 THE REGISTRAR: This is 441.

    16 MR. KEHOE:

    17 Q. Using the pointer with Exhibit 441, could you

    18 help us, first, to show the path that Boris took when

    19 he was driving up to the BRITBAT camp and the path he

    20 took returning to go back into Stari Vitez?

    21 A. Can we open the picture out a little bit

    22 more?

    23 MR. KEHOE: Can we just pan it back just a

    24 little bit? Maybe just move it down just a little bit,

    25 Mr. Usher?

  80. 1A. This is the main road coming from Zenica and

    2 the BRITBAT location is down this end here, so Dorothy,

    3 who was the UNHCR field officer, and Boris would have

    4 driven along this road, past -- along the road to

    5 BRITBAT, left a message that they were going to Stari

    6 Vitez; then they would have gone back along this road,

    7 because there was no access into Stari Vitez because of

    8 the blockade that we saw earlier down here, they would

    9 have gone back down past this point, turned right,

    10 entering the town of Vitez, passing through the chicane

    11 about here, and entering the area of Stari Vitez, and

    12 at this point here, the vehicle would have been slowing

    13 down to turn and meet with Commander Sefkija whose

    14 headquarters are about here.

    15 Q. Now, on the left-hand side of this

    16 photograph, there's a somewhat broken line in orange.

    17 What does that depict, sir?

    18 A. There was somewhere along this particular

    19 stretch, and my memory escapes me which side of this

    20 garage thing it was, what we call a sanger, which is a

    21 trench with overhead cover, a well-established firing

    22 trench.

    23 Q. Controlled by what unit?

    24 A. By the HVO.

    25 Q. All right.

  81. 1A. And I examined closely the impact point and

    2 the vehicle. The round went through the right-hand

    3 side of the vehicle, i.e. it was moving in this

    4 direction, so it could only have come from this

    5 particular side of the road, and this was an account

    6 given to me by the woman who survived the incident, who

    7 was the UNHCR field officer. And this area here, this

    8 junction (indicated) --

    9 Q. You're pointing to the arrow, where the arrow

    10 is.

    11 A. Where the arrow is -- whilst there are houses

    12 there, there are several large gaps between the houses

    13 that allow a clear field of view across to this sanger,

    14 and, in fact, all these houses and trees here are

    15 riddled with small arms marks because this was a

    16 regular site where the occupants of Stari Vitez were

    17 sniped at by the HVO forces from this established

    18 trench position on this side.

    19 Q. Is there any question in your mind that there

    20 was no mistake, that this was a UNHCR vehicle?

    21 A. The vehicle is white, it would have transited

    22 this point on three occasions immediately prior to

    23 going -- on two occasions immediately prior to going

    24 into here, and at several points along its journey,

    25 it's quite easy to see the vehicle's progress as it

  82. 1progresses along this road. This is open field area.

    2 Q. How far is it from the firing point into

    3 Stari Vitez?

    4 A. About 700 metres.

    5 Q. Let's turn your attention to the next

    6 photograph in the 433 series. Mr. Usher ...

    7 THE USHER: Number 18.

    8 MR. KEHOE:

    9 Q. 433/18. What is that, sir?

    10 A. That's the round that was embedded in the

    11 front windscreen. It's actually finished its journey

    12 there. It entered through the right-hand side of the

    13 vehicle, it was deflected by the kevlar plating, went

    14 through the back of Boris, out through his heart, and

    15 then wedged itself, embedded itself in the front

    16 windscreen.

    17 Q. This round is not coming in, it's actually

    18 after going through his body, lodging itself with the

    19 blunt end in the windscreen?

    20 A. What it hit the kevlar, it started spinning,

    21 which is what ripped the front of his chest out, and

    22 therefore it stuck, in an obtuse angle, into the

    23 windscreen.

    24 Q. Subsequent to this, did you have

    25 conversations with anyone in the HVO about this event?

  83. 1A. I attempted to investigate it in the same way

    2 that I had with Dobrila, got the military police

    3 involved from BRITBAT, and they were offering to assign

    4 a team from Hotel Vitez, from the HVO as well. There

    5 was instant denial of it being any HVO soldier --

    6 Q. Who instantly denied that?

    7 A. Darko Gelic. And when I showed him the

    8 round, he said, "Well, we don't have any weapon of that

    9 calibre, we don't possess anything of that particular

    10 type, but I do know that they produced those calibre of

    11 weapons in the Zenica steel factory."

    12 The investigation quickly ground to a halt

    13 because Commander Sefkija, the BiH commander in Stari

    14 Vitez, would not let any member of the HVO into the

    15 area to investigate the impact point, i.e. where Boris

    16 had actually been shot.

    17 Q. Let me turn your attention to a couple of

    18 exhibits in the 82 -- Exhibit 82, Mr. Dubuisson?

    19 THE REGISTRAR: This is 82/9 and 82/10.

    20 MR. KEHOE: If we could also use this

    21 photograph as well, which is part of the 433 series,

    22 which is 433 -- which one, Mr. Usher?

    23 THE USHER: Nineteen.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Now, Gelic told you that they didn't have any

  84. 1such weapon to fire a 12.7 millimetre round or a .5

    2 inch round; is that right?

    3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    4 Q. And that such rounds were made in Zenica?

    5 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    6 Q. Thereafter, did you find such a weapon?

    7 A. I did indeed, sir, yeah. There was one in

    8 possession of Darko Kraljevic.

    9 Q. Or the HVO?

    10 A. Indeed, sir.

    11 Q. Did you take photographs of have weapon?

    12 A. I did, sir.

    13 Q. Let's go to the first photograph --

    14 THE INTERPRETER: Will you please slow down a

    15 little bit because of the interpreters?

    16 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    17 Q. 82/9. Using the pointer, point to the weapon

    18 that would shoot a 12.7 millimetre round.

    19 A. (Indicated)

    20 Q. That is the weapon that the individual has in

    21 his left hand? I think there is yet another angle of

    22 it in 82/10, and lastly, a single photograph of it on

    23 433/19.

    24 Now, how rare is that weapon, Captain?

    25 A. They're an American specialist sniper rifle.

  85. 1They're very rare, used by the IRA, but they're pretty

    2 manufactured-to-order.

    3 Q. Did you ever see another one in Bosnia when

    4 you were there, much less in the Lasva Valley?

    5 A. Nope.

    6 Q. What did you conclude when you saw this

    7 weapon in the possession of the Vitezovi?

    8 A. They were a specialist branch of the HVO

    9 forces. They were equipped with everything that they

    10 needed.

    11 Q. What did you conclude about this weapon in

    12 relation to the killing of Boris?

    13 A. That that was the only weapon I saw during my

    14 time in Bosnia that was capable of taking one single

    15 shot from 700 metres and doing that sort of damage.

    16 Q. Did you report back to your headquarters that

    17 you had, in fact, found the weapon that killed Boris?

    18 A. As far as I was concerned, yes, I reported

    19 back that that was the weapon, the only weapon that

    20 could have been responsible for it.

    21 Q. Now, let me change subjects, and thank you

    22 again. We will move back to the balance of the

    23 photographs in one moment.

    24 Before we move into the attack on Grbavica,

    25 I'd like to talk to you just briefly about the use of

  86. 1the media by the HVO. Did there come a time in August

    2 of 1993 where Radio Vitez threatened white vehicles or

    3 U.N. vehicles in the Lasva Valley?

    4 A. There was a time, yes, sir.

    5 Q. During that period of time, were you also

    6 personally threatened over the radio or Radio Vitez in

    7 the Lasva Valley?

    8 A. There were incidents where I was made

    9 particularly unwelcome by members of the HVO at

    10 frontline locations as I tried to transit from one area

    11 to another, and when asked why, they told me that I was

    12 no longer a friend of Croatian people in the Lasva

    13 Valley and that they had been instructed that they were

    14 not to cooperate with me in any way whatsoever.

    15 Q. Were you informed by Darko Gelic that such a

    16 threat had been placed over Radio Vitez?

    17 A. I was indeed, yes.

    18 Q. Do you have any instances to conclude that

    19 any member of the HVO military staff had some control

    20 over what was broadcast on Radio Vitez?

    21 A. I had the pleasure of visiting Mario Cerkez

    22 on one day, and he was boasting about some new song, a

    23 propaganda song, that had been written locally in an

    24 attempt to raise morale of the HVO and the Croatian

    25 people, and he had a radio on his desk, and he said to

  87. 1me, you know, "Listen to this. You can hear how good

    2 it is." And he promptly banged on the wall, and within

    3 minutes, this song appeared on the radio playing on his

    4 desk, and understandably, I was quite amazed by this,

    5 and he disclosed to me that next door to his office

    6 they had a radio station broadcasting news and whatever

    7 they thought was necessary to the local people in the

    8 cinema.

    9 Q. Let's turn our attention to another subject

    10 at this point, Captain, and that is the attack on

    11 Grbavica on the 7th and 8th of September of 1993.

    12 Now, prior to this attack, had both Blaskic

    13 and Cerkez noted to you that they were going to have to

    14 do something about the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    15 positions in Stari Bila -- or in Grbavica?

    16 A. Yeah. The Armija had the high-point

    17 positions in Grbavica overlooking BRITBAT and the Croat

    18 positions on the other side of the road. There were

    19 regular small arms exchanges, and therefore, regular

    20 casualties, usually on the part of the Croatian

    21 populace and military forces, around the BRITBAT

    22 location. There were repeated threats by Commander

    23 Blaskic that he was going to have to deal with this

    24 problem and likewise from Commander Cerkez because they

    25 were taking far too many casualties.

  88. 1This threat wasn't actually carried out for

    2 some considerable period of time because we regularly

    3 reminded Colonel Blaskic that we had -- the colonel had

    4 set up an agreement wherein there would be no military

    5 action within 500 metres of the BRITBAT location, and

    6 that agreement lasted until about the 7th, 8th of

    7 September when the HVO launched a full military assault

    8 onto the Grbavica position.

    9 Q. Now, militarily speaking, the attack to

    10 remove Bosnian army forces from that ridge was a

    11 legitimate military objective; is that right?

    12 A. Absolutely. And very well-executed.

    13 Q. Explain the execution to the Judges, if you

    14 can?

    15 A. From a tactical point of view, it was

    16 well-thought and planned out, and troops, they --

    17 what's the word I'm looking for? -- they pummelled and

    18 suppressed the position for about 24 hours with small

    19 arms, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, in an attempt to

    20 soften up the BiH troops in the Grbavica area, and then

    21 that following morning, at dawn, they then launched a

    22 carefully planned military assault after taking out the

    23 high-point feature.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Let's turn to one of our last

    25 exhibits, and that will be this exhibit, Mr. Dubuisson.

  89. 1THE REGISTRAR: This is 442, 442A for the

    2 caption.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. Using this photograph by the numbers,

    5 Captain, can you just tell the Judges exactly how this

    6 assault took place following sequentially on the

    7 numbers?

    8 A. Point 1 is a high feature and along which

    9 were located several large weapon systems like machine

    10 guns, anti-aircraft weapons, and they were involved for

    11 the first 24 hours in firing into and suppressing the

    12 BiH positions, particularly at this point here, Point

    13 3, which was the high point which overlooked all the

    14 HVO positions all along here on this side of the road.

    15 This is the BRITBAT location here (indicated), and so

    16 on -- this is the main road feature. It runs up here.

    17 And on this side effectively is the BiH, and on this

    18 side is the HVO.

    19 After the first 24 hours, during that 24

    20 hours, there was a lot of fire laid down onto these

    21 positions where the Muslim -- there were lots of Muslim

    22 people and there were also soldiers of the Armija.

    23 The following morning, what then happened was

    24 an infantry assault from this point here (indicated),

    25 they used the low ground here to move soldiers up the

  90. 1banking, and from this point, they then launched a

    2 systematic clearance through these houses, and that's

    3 indicated by the large arrow there, clearing through

    4 all the houses in this way. There were also troops

    5 that came from this area.

    6 So 2 is the movement, the infantry movement

    7 of troops in, and 3 is then the clearance, systematic

    8 clearance, of enemy soldiers and Muslims from that --

    9 from the Grbavica community there.

    10 Q. How about 4, over to the left?

    11 JUDGE RIAD: Just a second. Excuse me. What

    12 do you mean by "clearing the houses"?

    13 A. It's a term we use, i.e. checking each

    14 individual house, it's got no soldiers in it, no people

    15 in it, so making sure there is nobody in there.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Making sure there is nobody in

    17 it?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Or no weapons in it?

    20 A. Nobody alive left in them.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: And if there was somebody alive?

    22 A. If there were soldiers, then they would be

    23 dealt with accordingly. However, if they surrendered,

    24 you would take them as prisoners --

    25 JUDGE RIAD: And civilians?

  91. 1A. That's entirely up to the troops doing the

    2 assault.

    3 JUDGE RIAD: What happened?

    4 A. And here I don't think we found any civilian

    5 casualties. We did find two or three bodies, one of

    6 which had been beheaded in there, but they did have the

    7 items of uniform on them, so we assumed that they were

    8 soldiers of the Armija.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    10 MR. KEHOE:

    11 Q. The point designated number 4?

    12 A. Four represents the arrow and that was the

    13 route taken, the general exodus of the Muslim community

    14 during the night of the 7th, still in dark in the

    15 morning of the 8th before the infantry attack actually

    16 took place.

    17 Five was the infantry attack that actually

    18 took place in the morning, and during that time, we're

    19 assuming that all the civilians had actually left, and

    20 there were only a few Armija soldiers still left

    21 defending the position. The area had taken a

    22 considerable beating with various weapon systems

    23 throughout the previous 24 hours.

    24 Q. Captain, after -- just taking up from Judge

    25 Riad's question -- after the village itself was cleared

  92. 1of people, what did the HVO soldiers then do in the

    2 village?

    3 A. After they had actually been through and

    4 cleared it, there was a systematic burning of all the

    5 buildings that we saw in there. I actually was sent by

    6 Colonel Alastair to go into Vitez and to address

    7 Colonel Blaskic and say, "Look, this must stop. It's

    8 getting out of hand." I was told that Colonel Blaskic

    9 was not available by Darko Gelic who ignored -- who

    10 said to me, as far as he was concerned, there was no

    11 military action taking place anywhere in the Lasva

    12 Valley. And then as I journeyed back up the road from

    13 Vitez, I observed numerous soldiers and literally

    14 all -- there was some looting going on by the HVO

    15 soldiers and all the buildings had been set on fire.

    16 Q. Were you sent there by Colonel Duncan or the

    17 2-IC?

    18 A. It wasn't Colonel Duncan, it was Richard

    19 Watson, the 2-IC who was present at the time.

    20 Q. Captain, can you tell the difference between

    21 damage from artillery fire and damage to houses that

    22 are purposely set on fire?

    23 A. Absolutely, yeah. If it has just been burnt,

    24 there is obviously no shrapnel damage, no obvious

    25 damage from small arms, and very limited blast damage.

  93. 1A fire is a fire, really.

    2 MR. KEHOE: If we can go to the next video,

    3 Mr. President, and I believe the next video is

    4 numbered ...

    5 THE REGISTRAR: 443.

    6 MR. KEHOE: 443. Again, this is another BBC

    7 video, Mr. President and Your Honours, from the 8th of

    8 September, 1993.

    9 (Videotape played)

    10 MR. KEHOE: If you can roll it back? Stop

    11 right there. A little bit further.

    12 (Videotape played)

    13 MR. KEHOE: Stop there. Just back up a

    14 little bit. That's good.

    15 Q. Now, Captain, as a military officer, was it

    16 necessary for the HVO to burn those houses

    17 systematically?

    18 A. Absolutely not. There were several examples

    19 you can see in this film where the buildings have

    20 deliberately been set on fire in their foundations to

    21 make sure that there was nothing left for anybody to

    22 come back to and that they were uninhabitable.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Before we go to those particular

    24 houses, I would like to put that frame back on the

    25 screen. Can we put that frame back on the screen?

  94. 1I'm not sure it's coming on your screen,

    2 Mr. President. It's coming on one screen but not the

    3 other screen.

    4 Counsel, is it on your screen?

    5 MR. NOBILO: I have it.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I've got the picture.

    7 MR. KEHOE: It just came, Mr. President.

    8 Q. Early on in your testimony, you said you

    9 observed members of the Jokeri -- can you leave that on

    10 the screen, please? -- members of the Jokeri that were

    11 involved in the attack on Grbavica.

    12 A. I did indeed so, yeah.

    13 Q. Do you see anybody in that photograph that

    14 fits that description from that day?

    15 A. The gentleman to the rear dressed in black is

    16 typically wearing the type of uniform that I witnessed

    17 that day when I met the Jokeri, and I did see that day

    18 several insignia and faces that looked familiar to me

    19 as if they actually belonged to that organisation. For

    20 the most part, these are soldiers I recognise as being

    21 part of the TURTKO before the second which is the one

    22 we saw detailed on Colonel Blaskic's orders earlier as

    23 well.

    24 Q. If we can move ahead on that tape --

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Can we make a still,

  95. 1Mr. President, for ease of future reference?

    2 MR. KEHOE: Sure. If we could do that, that

    3 would fine, make it the next Prosecutor's Exhibit.

    4 (Videotape played)

    5 MR. KEHOE: Stop right there.

    6 Q. Captain, is that burning from artillery fire

    7 or intentional burning, in your opinion?

    8 A. The building to the fore looks like it has

    9 small arms marks on the outside, but that looks like

    10 it's been burnt, the one in the background looks like

    11 it's just been set on fire.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Could we have another still,

    13 Mr. President, to speed my examination so we won't have

    14 to take extra time to find these locations?

    15 MR. KEHOE: No problem. We'll make that

    16 another Prosecutor's Exhibit. We'll move ahead to

    17 another series --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: You'll have all the time you

    19 need, Mr. Hayman. If you think it's taking a long

    20 time, that's how it is.

    21 Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe.

    22 Mr. Hayman, you will have the time that you

    23 need.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Continue just a little bit more

    25 on the tape?

  96. 1(Videotape played)

    2 MR. KEHOE: Stop right there.

    3 Q. How about that burning?

    4 A. That's the woodpile underneath the house

    5 that's been deliberately set on fire to make sure it's

    6 levelled to the ground or uninhabitable, at least, by

    7 anybody who wants to live in it. So that's not been

    8 set on fire by artillery or small arms fire or anything

    9 like that.

    10 MR. KEHOE: We can make a frame of that as

    11 well, whatever the next exhibit happens to be.

    12 Q. Subsequent to the attack on Grbavica, did you

    13 have a conversation with Mario Cerkez about this

    14 particular event?

    15 A. Yes. I was attempting to find out who had

    16 been responsible for it, it was a very well-executed

    17 and well-planned attack, so I went to see Mario,

    18 flattered him about it, said as such, and he admitted

    19 to me that he hadn't been responsible for it but it had

    20 been planned by the staff officers in the Hotel Vitez

    21 and intimated that it had been by, in fact, a chap I

    22 know as Filipovic who was a former JNA officer.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Can we turn to -- this is a part

    24 of Exhibit 80, this particular photograph. It's part

    25 of the 80 series, I'm not sure which one in 80 it is.

  97. 1JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, we've got to think

    2 about when we're going to stop. How much more do you

    3 have to -- how much more time do you need? Do you

    4 think you're going to be finished by 6.00?

    5 MR. KEHOE: I think so, Mr. President.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Then continue.

    7 MR. KEHOE: That's the photograph, yeah.

    8 THE REGISTRAR: This is 80/6.

    9 MR. KEHOE:

    10 Q. The photograph that has been received in

    11 evidence, 80/6, is the individual that Cerkez -- or

    12 that you came to understand was responsible for the

    13 success at Grbavica, is he depicted in that photograph?

    14 A. He is indeed. He's the gentleman with the

    15 white hair, sat on Colonel Blaskic's right or on the

    16 left as we look at it.

    17 Q. Can you point to him with the pointer,

    18 please?

    19 A. (Indicated)

    20 Q. So it's just to Blaskic's right and our -- is

    21 that right?

    22 A. (Indicated)

    23 Q. Okay. The individual in the gray hair to his

    24 right.

    25 When you were up there observing what was

  98. 1going on and the houses were being systematically

    2 burnt, did you notice any looting going on as well?

    3 A. Yeah, there was -- I saw numerous instances

    4 of soldiers removing items from the houses, I think I

    5 actually photographed one of them removing a tape

    6 recorder, and there was a lot of looting that took

    7 place immediately afterwards by the local population,

    8 in fact, who started turning up in large numbers with

    9 flatbed trucks, et cetera, to reclaim whatever they

    10 could quickly before the place was burnt to the ground.

    11 MR. KEHOE: If we could quickly go through

    12 the last series of photographs, Mr. Usher, in the 433

    13 series, and what's the first number?

    14 THE USHER: First number is number 20.

    15 MR. KEHOE: Starting with 433/20.

    16 Q. Captain, that's a photograph that you took,

    17 is it not?

    18 A. It is, sir, yes.

    19 Q. Is that of Grbavica prior to the events of

    20 the 7th and 8th of September?

    21 A. It is indeed, sir, yeah, with the mosque in

    22 the bottom there.

    23 Q. Let's go to 433/21, the next photograph.

    24 What is that, sir?

    25 A. That's a photograph I took as I left Vitez on

  99. 1the way back to BRITBAT, approaching Grbavica. You can

    2 make out the mosque which is on the Vitez side as I'm

    3 approaching it, and basically all the buildings are on

    4 fire.

    5 Q. Are the buildings in and about the mosque on

    6 fire as well?

    7 A. They are indeed, yes.

    8 Q. Let's turn to the next one, 433/22.

    9 A. I think that's the photograph I took

    10 originally as I left Vitez. When I turned around, as I

    11 was approaching the road, I was quite astounded by the

    12 sight of it as I was returning, so that's the first

    13 photograph I took, just showing the extent of what was

    14 actually burning.

    15 Q. Next photograph, 433/23. Is that just house

    16 damage and ...

    17 A. Yes, those are the two houses really where

    18 the Armija set themselves which are the two houses

    19 which overlook BRITBAT and the HVO position, so it was

    20 those two houses which all the sniping came from

    21 effectively.

    22 Q. How about the next photograph, 433/24?

    23 A. That's a picture I took of some of the

    24 soldiers who had been looting in the area. One of

    25 them's got a cassette, the other one's carrying what,

  100. 1in fact, was a large butcher's axe, chopping axe.

    2 Q. The other has a radio in his hand?

    3 A. He has indeed, sir, yes.

    4 Q. Can you point to that and point to the axe?

    5 The one on the left has the radio --

    6 A. That's a large chopping axe.

    7 JUDGE RIAD: What was it used for?

    8 A. I don't know, Your Honour, I'm afraid. I

    9 can't honestly say other than one of the bodies that

    10 was found in there had been decapitated, but I wouldn't

    11 make the assumption that that person and weapon was

    12 responsible for that.

    13 JUDGE RIAD: But this is a soldier, the one

    14 holding it?

    15 A. It is, yes.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Q. Let's go to the next photograph, 433/25.

    19 A. That's a similar photograph, just panning

    20 back so you can see at close quarters the number of

    21 buildings that are being burnt out and the soldiers in

    22 the vicinity immediately after the attack.

    23 Q. 433/26? Just houses burning in Grbavica?

    24 A. That is, in fact, the house of -- that we saw

    25 earlier that my Land Rover was parked outside of that

  101. 1belonged to a woman and her daughter that I knew.

    2 Q. You mean the same prior to the actual attack?

    3 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    4 Q. 433/27?

    5 A. Same houses. It's another house in Grbavica.

    6 Q. 433/28.

    7 A. That's actually a picture capturing the HVO

    8 using "babies" in their infantry assault the morning of

    9 the 8th of September.

    10 Q. Can you point to that "baby" in there?

    11 A. Yeah. That black mark is actually a fire

    12 extinguisher tumbling through there, and you can't make

    13 it out very clearly on the screen, but on here there is

    14 a white flash -- this photograph actually was in

    15 colour, and that was an orange flash. That was the

    16 detonation point which launched the "baby" through the

    17 air.

    18 Q. The next series of photographs, 29, 30, and

    19 31, if you can just look at those? Those are just a

    20 series, I believe, of houses burning in Grbavica. If

    21 you can just have the witness look at those, that would

    22 be fine.

    23 That one, the next one, 30, and 31, all

    24 houses burning, Captain, on the --

    25 A. Yes.

  102. 1Q. Next photograph as well?

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Which village is that, please?

    3 MR. KEHOE: It's all Grbavica, Your Honour.

    4 Q. Captain?

    5 A. It's the same village, Your Honour. They're

    6 all just shots taken surveying the damage after the

    7 attack and the extent to which the burning took place.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    9 MR. KEHOE:

    10 Q. Next photograph? What number is that?

    11 THE USHER: It is 33.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Thirty-three and 34. I believe those both

    14 mark the top of the feature that was taken by the HVO?

    15 A. That's right, sir. Can you leave that one?

    16 That was the area the troops came up and that's where

    17 the "baby" was being launched from and that's where the

    18 BiH snipers were originally flying from but now it's

    19 flying a Croat HVO flag.

    20 Q. Thirty-five is the same point from a

    21 different angle?

    22 A. That's right.

    23 Q. Next one, sir?

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Are you concluding now because

    25 we're going to stop soon. Please conclude within two

  103. 1or three minutes so we can do the cross-examination

    2 tomorrow, and now the direct examination in the next

    3 three minutes should be completed.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm just

    5 trying to get through these photographs and I'll be

    6 through right here.

    7 Q. The next photograph, sir, is just the troops

    8 themselves. The next several photographs are just

    9 again the firing point?

    10 A. (No audible response)

    11 Q. The next two photographs being burnt houses

    12 again, is that right, sir, all from Grbavica?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. Let's go to the last photograph, last

    15 photograph of the individuals, and what is that, sir?

    16 A. Those are some triumphant HVO troops

    17 immediately after the attack and that was their tea

    18 that they were dragging around with them.

    19 Q. Where was that taken?

    20 A. That was taken literally as the flag was

    21 going up on top of the hill. The attack had finished

    22 and the buildings were on fire, as you can see, by the

    23 haze and the smoke that was making the camera shot very

    24 hazy, and those are the troops that had been -- some of

    25 the troops that had been involved in the actual attack

  104. 1itself.

    2 Q. You noted that all these houses were burnt

    3 and you also noted that it wasn't necessarily

    4 militarily in securing that area to burn all those

    5 houses; is that right?

    6 A. Absolutely not, sir. During the night, all

    7 the civilians had had a chance to move from the area,

    8 and so I assume that those remaining and keeping the

    9 fight up for Grbavica were the Armija soldiers left,

    10 the handful of Armija soldiers left, so there was very

    11 few people actually left in the Grbavica area by the

    12 morning of the 8th. So there was no reason, really.

    13 They had taken possession of the hill, they had secured

    14 it to the high point, and so it was completely

    15 unnecessary.

    16 Q. What message do you think the HVO was sending

    17 to the Bosnian Muslims in burning every house in the

    18 village?

    19 A. It was a message that I saw repeatedly

    20 throughout the year, one that -- they did not want to

    21 encourage the return of the Muslims to the area. They

    22 weren't -- they didn't want to -- they weren't happy to

    23 coexist as such. They were determined to make the

    24 place unlivable for anybody else but themselves.

    25 Q. Is that consistent with what Anto Valenta

  105. 1told you in one of your first meetings in the Hotel

    2 Vitez?

    3 A. It is, sir, yes.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, the last exhibit

    5 is just a series are photographs that were taken on the

    6 16th of September, 1997, after this individual's tour.

    7 It shows the complete continued devastation of

    8 Grbavica. They were taken by an investigator of the

    9 Office of the Prosecutor.

    10 We have no intention of going through these

    11 photographs, and we offer them in evidence as to the

    12 state of affairs in 1997 to be taken in conjunction

    13 with the photographs that were taken at the time.

    14 So that would be a series of photographs, and

    15 I am not sure what the next photograph number would be,

    16 but if I might hand those up to the Defence counsel,

    17 Your Honours, and to --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: You're asking that things be

    19 put back -- I don't really understand what the last

    20 sentence was. What are you asking?

    21 MR. KEHOE: These photographs, this last

    22 series of photographs that we haven't shown that are in

    23 this binder, are photographs that were taken in 1997 by

    24 an investigator for the Office of the Prosecutor. We

    25 offer those in evidence at this point. We could call

  106. 1the investigator, but I believe everybody would

    2 stipulate that these are, in fact, photographs taken in

    3 1997 and were not taken during the tour and they're

    4 offered simply as an example of what this village

    5 looked like in September of 1997. We don't intend to

    6 go through those photographs seriatum, we just offer

    7 them to the court by way of information.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We have noted that

    9 it is for information purposes.

    10 Very well. The direct examination is

    11 complete. We will resume tomorrow at 10.00 for the

    12 cross-examination.

    13 Court stands adjourned.

    14 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at

    15 6.05 p.m., to be reconvened on

    16 Tuesday, the 14th day of July, 1998,

    17 at 10.00 a.m.