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  1. 1 Tuesday, 14 July 1998

    2 --- Upon commencing at 10.06 a.m.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: The court is in session.

    4 Please have the accused brought in.

    5 (The accused entered court)

    6 (Open session)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Good morning to everybody, to

    8 the interpreters. Does everybody hear me? The

    9 Prosecution, the Defence, does the accused hear me?

    10 Very well. We can resume. We had reached the

    11 cross-examination of Major Whitworth. Please have the

    12 witness brought in. I can see that Mr. Kehoe is

    13 standing: I thought the Defence was supposed to be

    14 standing up, not you, Mr. Kehoe.

    15 MR. KEHOE: It is. All due respect to my

    16 colleague across the chamber, but I neglected, prior to

    17 adjourning yesterday evening, to move to admit the

    18 various exhibits that we spoke about and if I could

    19 just take care of that housekeeping chore at this

    20 juncture, I think that --

    21 JUDGE JORDA: There were many. Does the

    22 Defence have any comments to make about these?

    23 Mr. Hayman, do you have anything that you would like to

    24 say about the many exhibits that were presented as

    25 evidence, during the testimony yesterday?

  2. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Only two, Mr. President. We

    2 have no objection except for two, and one is the -- I

    3 believe it's the videotape which depicts fighting and

    4 Darko Kraljevic running across a lawn firing, I think,

    5 from both hands. There was no date for this tape, and

    6 if it's offered simply as a photograph of Darko

    7 Kraljevic, I have no objection. But I would ask,

    8 without a date, that it be admitted for that limited

    9 purpose.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Well, it is admitted not only for

    11 identification purposes, but also to admit it for the

    12 fact that Darko Kraljevic is, in fact, fighting on

    13 behalf of the HVO. We do not have the date for that.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, you yourself were

    15 suggesting that we take a still. You said you wanted a

    16 still. What was interesting to you was that there was

    17 a particular sequence, and you said that we could even

    18 make a still of something here. Wouldn't that be

    19 enough or do you want the entire video to be admitted?

    20 MR. KEHOE: Well, I would like the entire

    21 video to be admitted, Mr. President. With regard,

    22 there were many stills taken, some at the request of

    23 Defence, and certainly the Prosecutor has no objection

    24 to any still taken of any video that the Prosecutor

    25 moves into evidence. Nevertheless, I think the entire

  3. 1 video is instructive on several different levels for

    2 the Chamber. When the BBC gave us that particular

    3 piece of video, we did not have a date for that video.

    4 I wish we did. I simply don't have it.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, if you want this to

    6 be moved into evidence, couldn't you ask the BBC to

    7 identify it?

    8 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I will go become

    9 to the BBC and ask them to go through their archives

    10 and attempt to give a more certain date.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well.

    12 MR. KEHOE: We will just hold that

    13 particular --

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, do you maintain

    15 your objection? We will ask for the date to be found

    16 out, but does that now satisfy you?

    17 MR. HAYMAN: I understand counsel to be

    18 offering to try again and find the date and I suggest

    19 we hold him in abeyance and see if the BBC can come

    20 through. My only other objection, Mr. President, is to

    21 447 which are photographs of Grbavica purportedly from

    22 1997, and our objection there is one of relevance.

    23 1997 is two years after the indictment in this case,

    24 and some four years after or three and a half years

    25 after the end of the time period of the allegations.

  4. 1 So we have a relevance objection to 447.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We can't sustain that objection

    3 because the Judges are the ones who decide on

    4 relevance. All right, so we are going to take the

    5 exhibit. Mr. Hayman, proceed.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: I need a witness to proceed,

    7 Mr. President.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that does seem to be

    9 important. You just had to ask it and there you have

    10 it.

    11 (The witness entered court)

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, you may be seated.

    13 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, you are now going to

    15 be asked questions by the accused's Defence counsel,

    16 the accused who is in this room. Did you have a

    17 restful evening?

    18 THE WITNESS: I did, sir, yes, despite the

    19 weather.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The weather, that we

    21 can't do anything about it and you can't either.

    22 Mr. Hayman, the floor is yours.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.


    25 Cross-examined by Mr. Hayman:

  5. 1 Q. Good morning, Mr. Whitworth. My name is

    2 Russell Hayman and together with my colleague Anto

    3 Nobilo, I represent General Blaskic in these

    4 proceedings. You arrived in Central Bosnia in May of

    5 1993; is that correct?

    6 A. Yes, sir.

    7 Q. And you took over the liaison officer

    8 position sometime later in June of 1993; is that

    9 correct?

    10 A. No, sir, it was the last week of May.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, when you are asked the

    12 questions, look at the counsel, but when you answer,

    13 please answer facing the Judges. Thank you very much.

    14 THE WITNESS: My apologies, sir.

    15 MR. HAYMAN:

    16 Q. In your statement of the 14th of May 1997,

    17 paragraph 2, you indicated you were introduced as the

    18 Vitez liaison officer at the beginning of June 1993.

    19 Is that no longer your recollection?

    20 A. Would it be possible for me to have a copy of

    21 my statement, please?

    22 MR. HAYMAN: I have no objection to that. If

    23 the court permits it, I would welcome it.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe?

    25 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, at the request of

  6. 1 the witness, there is a statement -- copy of his

    2 statement that counsel is referring to, and I just was

    3 providing it to him.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    5 MR. HAYMAN:

    6 Q. I would direct your attention to page 2,

    7 paragraph 2, the top line.

    8 A. In reply to your question, this was a

    9 statement taken, I think, nearly two years ago, and the

    10 circumstances under which I made the statement were

    11 quite difficult for me in that it was sometime since I

    12 had been in Bosnia. I had nothing to do with the armed

    13 forces at all and had made every effort to put my

    14 memories of my experiences there, to the back of my

    15 mind. And it's since I've been called to the court

    16 that I've actually taken the time to recall these

    17 things, look at the photographs that I've had, and do a

    18 bit of background that's helped me fill in some of the

    19 details. So I think there are probably one or two

    20 things in here that are not quite correct.

    21 Q. So your testimony is your memory today is

    22 better than it was in May of 1997 when you gave this

    23 statement because you've had the opportunity to study

    24 some documents and refresh your recollection?

    25 A. I have had the opportunity to look at the

  7. 1 MILINFOSUMs which I filled in personally at the end of

    2 each day with the intelligence officer.

    3 Q. You have looked at, and I take it, all the

    4 Prince of Wales own unredacted MILINFOSUMs?

    5 A. A fair number of them, yes.

    6 Q. Anything else that you've used to help

    7 refresh your recollection?

    8 A. Just the extensive collection of photographs

    9 that I took at the time as well.

    10 Q. What in those MILINFOSUMs indicates that you

    11 took over your liaison officer position in May and not

    12 in June of 1993?

    13 A. I'm specifically referred to in the

    14 MILINFOSUMs as the Vitez LO, but in about the 25th or

    15 26th of May. That position had not existed up until

    16 that time, and as such was referred to from there on in

    17 for the most part.

    18 Q. Now, did you receive a briefing prior to

    19 taking over your position from your predecessor

    20 Mr. Hay?

    21 A. I did indeed so, yes, it was a brief one

    22 which involved, really, a tour around the area and an

    23 introduction to a few of the senior people, both

    24 Muslims and Croats, army representatives and HVO

    25 representatives of the area.

  8. 1 Q. Did Mr. Hay tell you whether he had had a

    2 meeting with Colonel Blaskic earlier in May 1993?

    3 A. He intimated at the time, if I recall, that

    4 that was, in fact, the case, that he had had a

    5 meeting. He had actually met Colonel Blaskic prior to

    6 my meeting Colonel Blaskic.

    7 Q. I'll pause briefly after your answers to

    8 allow the interpretation to be completed. Did he tell

    9 you anything about that meeting or conversation?

    10 A. Not that I can recall, sir, no.

    11 Q. I take it you do not have any notes or

    12 diaries or calendars of your service in Bosnia that you

    13 can use to further refresh your recollection; is that

    14 right?

    15 A. That's correct. At the time, I did keep a

    16 detailed notebook, but that was -- and that's what I

    17 used to return the information that I had at the end of

    18 each day which became part of the MILINFOSUMs, but

    19 those notebooks were handed in at the end of my

    20 operational tour.

    21 Q. Handed in to whom?

    22 A. Handed in to the MILINFO people.

    23 Q. The British battalion?

    24 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    25 Q. Now, you spoke to the court yesterday of

  9. 1 meeting Colonel Blaskic in the Hotel Vitez?

    2 A. That's correct, sir.

    3 Q. How many meetings did you have with Colonel

    4 Blaskic?

    5 A. In total, maybe a dozen throughout the entire

    6 period, the majority of which I'd organised on behalf

    7 of Colonel Alastair, but most of the meetings were with

    8 the absence of Colonel Blaskic and were with his

    9 liaison officer, Darko Gelic.

    10 Q. Do you remember the specific discussions or

    11 content of any of those 12 meetings?

    12 A. One particular occasion, Colonel Blaskic was

    13 concerned about the Nova Bila hospital evacuations.

    14 That was a meeting between he and Colonel Alastair.

    15 Q. What was he concerned about?

    16 A. The number of casualties in the area.

    17 Q. Had there been a request to evacuate

    18 critically wounded from Nova Bila to more adequate

    19 medical facilities outside of the Vitez enclave?

    20 A. That was a repeated request that we had had

    21 from the hospital on numerous occasions prior to

    22 Colonel Blaskic's request to Colonel Alastair, yes.

    23 Q. Was there a party that objected or delayed,

    24 in some way, those evacuations?

    25 A. Not to my knowledge. Whenever a request was

  10. 1 made, we passed that request on behalf of the HVO to

    2 Kiseljak because, of course, we were bound by their

    3 direction as to whether we could or could not evacuate

    4 those people.

    5 Q. What concern did Colonel Blaskic express

    6 about a pending evacuation, then, at this meeting?

    7 A. My recollection is vague, but I would have

    8 assumed it would be about the number of casualties and

    9 the ability of the limited medical facilities to deal

    10 with the number of those casualties.

    11 Q. Mr. Whitworth, weren't there significant

    12 delays in the ability of the HVO to evacuate their

    13 critically wounded from Nova Bila due to conditions and

    14 restrictions imposed on those evacuations by the BH

    15 army?

    16 A. I think there was a time on, one or two

    17 occasions, from my recollection, where we looked on

    18 behalf of 3 corps representatives to allow movement of

    19 any vehicles including those from Nova Bila hospital,

    20 because the accusation was that we were evacuating

    21 soldiers in amongst those casualties, regardless if

    22 those soldiers were injured themselves. Hence we went

    23 through quite a promulgated and complicated triage

    24 system involving myself and several U.N. medical

    25 officers to determine whether people being evacuated

  11. 1 from Nova Bila when they actually happened, the

    2 evacuations occurred, were actually medically in need

    3 of evacuation.

    4 Q. Thank you for scouring your memory on that

    5 point. We will return to the Nova Bila facility, but

    6 for now do you recall the specific content of any other

    7 discussions which you personally participated in with

    8 Colonel Blaskic?

    9 A. Not at the moment, sir, no.

    10 Q. You said in your testimony on direct that

    11 Colonel Blaskic was informed about far away places like

    12 Vares. Can you give us any examples in what ways he

    13 was informed about distant locales?

    14 A. We would or I would be given information via

    15 Colonel Blaskic's liaison officer, Darko Gelic, about

    16 incidents and military activity in areas outside the

    17 Lasva Valley. It was particularly common that we would

    18 get -- I can't remember the name of the place, but

    19 somewhere north-east of the Lasva Valley area.

    20 Q. In terms of Colonel Blaskic's own ability to

    21 go and inspect these other parts of his operational

    22 zone and area of responsibility; if Colonel Blaskic,

    23 during your tour, wanted to head to the west to

    24 inspect, how far could he go without UNPROFOR's

    25 security and assistance? How far could Colonel Blaskic

  12. 1 travel to the west from the Hotel Vitez?

    2 A. He could go as far as the Travnik T-junction,

    3 then head south towards the Prozor, Gornji Vakuf area.

    4 The Croat pocket was actually quite small and went as

    5 far east as Busovaca, but our impression was that he

    6 was regularly moving in and out of the area using the

    7 regular helicopter flights that occurred in and out of

    8 the Lasva Valley.

    9 Q. We will return to the subject of helicopters

    10 later this morning. But for now, my question was how

    11 far to the west could he go, and I take it he could go

    12 as far as the T-junction?

    13 MR. KEHOE: Excuse, Mr. President, that's not

    14 what the witness said. The witness (sic) said how far

    15 could he travel in the west and the witness said he

    16 could travel down to Prozor and Gornji Vakuf.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, the objection is

    18 sustained. The witness already answered the question,

    19 Mr. Hayman. Move to another question, please.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: The record should reflect I was

    21 interrupted in the middle of my question and the

    22 objection was on the grounds that I was misstating the

    23 testimony which I had not finished stating. I will

    24 proceed.

    25 Q. Mr. Whitworth, if Colonel Blaskic --

  13. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, continue. We're just

    2 talking about the Croatian pocket and the ability of

    3 the accused to move around in that area. You were

    4 given an answer about that, unless you really are

    5 asking a different question.

    6 MR. HAYMAN:

    7 Q. How far could Colonel Blaskic travel to the

    8 north from the Hotel Vitez without UNPROFOR security?

    9 A. That was actually quite limited. The BiH

    10 frontlines were quite far south from Zenica and

    11 literally around --

    12 Q. A kilometre?

    13 A. Yes, maybe a kilometre north from that

    14 location, yes.

    15 Q. How far to the east of the Hotel Vitez could

    16 Colonel Blaskic travel on the ground without UNPROFOR

    17 security and assistance?

    18 A. Busovaca, the Busovaca on the way to Kiseljak

    19 road.

    20 Q. Lastly, if my compass serves me well, how far

    21 could Colonel Blaskic travel to the south from the

    22 hotel Vitez without UNPROFOR security and assistance?

    23 A. Three or four kilometres.

    24 Q. Through Kruscica?

    25 A. No, it could get further up towards Zacilja

  14. 1 which is where the original HVO territory was.

    2 Q. But going around through Gacice or Donje

    3 Vecerska, if he travelled literally to the south of

    4 Vitez towards Kruscica, how far could he go?

    5 A. A kilometre, a thousand metres, not much

    6 further.

    7 Q. To the edge of Kruscica?

    8 A. Yes, yes.

    9 Q. If Exhibit 433/1 could be provided to the

    10 witness, that's the first in the series of photographs

    11 which I believe you took? Do you recall when this was

    12 taken?

    13 A. This was quite early on during my tour. I

    14 think maybe I had been a liaison officer four weeks.

    15 Q. Very well. Let me ask my colleague to read

    16 the banner or title which appears to the left or,

    17 actually, in the centre of the photograph so that it

    18 can be translated and then we can discuss it.

    19 MR. NOBILO: On the left-hand side, it says

    20 the municipal headquarters of Vitez HVO and to the

    21 right, the military police of the HVO.

    22 MR. HAYMAN:

    23 Q. Did you know what these signs said or meant

    24 during your tour of duty?

    25 A. I did so, yes.

  15. 1 Q. What was meant by municipal headquarters HVO,

    2 the left hand sign over this doorway?

    3 A. As far as we were concerned, that was just

    4 the central headquarters where all units had some

    5 representative based, so we could access most people

    6 via the HVO hotel.

    7 Q. Was Colonel Blaskic the head of the municipal

    8 HVO or the municipal headquarters of the HVO?

    9 A. Colonel Blaskic, as far as we were concerned,

    10 was commander of Third OP zone as it was entitled later

    11 on and his headquarters was centred in the hotel Vitez

    12 so he was the senior commander involved in that

    13 municipal.

    14 Q. Did you have an understanding of why there

    15 were separate signs for the municipal HVO headquarters

    16 and the Vojne Policije HVO or military police of the

    17 HVO?

    18 A. No, I didn't, sir.

    19 Q. What element of the HVO Vojne Policije or

    20 military police were resident in the Hotel Vitez?

    21 A. As far as I was aware, the military police

    22 came under the same heading with the exception of small

    23 subunits like the Jokeri. The military police were a

    24 part of a battalion structure providing various

    25 aspects, military police units on the ground in the

  16. 1 area of Vitez, part of which of their function was

    2 protection of the likes of Colonel Blaskic when on the

    3 ground.

    4 Q. My question was, were you aware of what

    5 element of the military police were resident in the

    6 Hotel Vitez?

    7 A. My understanding, sir, was that there were

    8 representatives of all elements of the military police

    9 in the hotel.

    10 Q. You said yesterday the commander of the

    11 Jokers was Pasko Ljubicic?

    12 A. Yes, sir.

    13 Q. Was his office in the hotel Vitez?

    14 A. I never actually met him in the Hotel Vitez.

    15 The only character I met connected was the Jokeri and

    16 military police was the character I knew as Vlado, but

    17 on the occasion where the senior military police,

    18 commander Pasko Ljubicic, was overseeing a convoy

    19 delivery to Vitez and the Kruscica area, he emerged

    20 from the Hotel Vitez with Darko Gelic. I then assumed

    21 that having already met Vlado there, who I knew as part

    22 of the military police structure, that I assumed Pasko

    23 Ljubicic was also centred in the same building.

    24 Q. Jumping ahead for a moment, when you talked

    25 to several young soldiers at the Swiss chalet or

  17. 1 bungalow, where did they tell you to go to find Pasko

    2 Ljubicic?

    3 A. They just told me to go down to the Vitez

    4 area.

    5 Q. Did they tell you to go to the police

    6 station, Mr. Whitworth?

    7 A. No, that was an assumption on my part.

    8 Q. What do you mean that was an assumption on

    9 your part? What did they tell you?

    10 A. They had already told me that they were part

    11 of an elite military police unit, therefore, when they

    12 directed me to Vitez, I went to visit the civilian

    13 police first and then the Hotel Vitez where, as far as

    14 we were concerned, the military police were located.

    15 Q. So your current recollection is that no one

    16 at the bungalow told you to go to the civil police

    17 station, you just went there of your own accord; is

    18 that your testimony?

    19 A. The reason that was done was very simply I

    20 had made no introductions to the civil police. It was

    21 relatively early on in my tour, and I used my meeting

    22 with the military police as an excuse to turn up the

    23 civilian police and familiarise myself with the key

    24 personnel in there, which is obviously an important

    25 aspect of my job, in liaising with the people in the

  18. 1 Vitez area.

    2 Q. In the police station, did you ask where

    3 Pasko Ljubicic's office was?

    4 A. I did not, sir. I just asked if I could

    5 speak to the senior military police commander and

    6 feigned that it was a mistake on my part that I

    7 actually turned up at the civilian police.

    8 Q. Did you ever during your tour ask anybody

    9 else where Pasko Ljubicic's office was?

    10 A. Not that I can recall, sir, no.

    11 Q. Exhibit 257 could be provided to the witness

    12 and, perhaps, placed on the ELMO? If you could examine

    13 that exhibit briefly. Do you recognise it as a

    14 schematic drawing of at least portions of the Hotel

    15 Vitez ground floor and, perhaps, -- I believe ground

    16 floor. The diagram is limited.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, take your time to look

    18 at the document. Since you are not familiar, it will

    19 take a minute or two to have a look at it, get to know

    20 it.

    21 A. Your Honour, as I hope people appreciate,

    22 it's a little difficult when walking around a concrete

    23 building to orientate yourself, so I'm just trying to

    24 do exactly that.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. That's why I'm telling

  19. 1 you to take your time, to familiarise yourself with the

    2 document before you answer the question.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: Let me know when you have had

    4 sufficient time, Mr. Whitworth, to familiarise yourself

    5 with the document, okay?

    6 A. My recollection, sir, is slightly different

    7 from that, and the area which I met Colonel Blaskic and

    8 escorted Colonel Alastair to meet Colonel Blaskic was

    9 somewhere around this area here.

    10 Q. Indicating, for the record, just to the left

    11 of the notation "stairs to warehouse"; is that correct?

    12 A. Yeah, I don't recall -- there were numerous

    13 doors. I don't know where most of them went to.

    14 Q. Let me -- have you completed your answer?

    15 A. Yes, sir.

    16 Q. Let me direct your attention to the notation

    17 in the centre of the diagram, "first company of active

    18 military police office" and then there's an arrow down

    19 below that to a box which is adjacent to something

    20 entitled "resting room"; do you see that?

    21 A. I do see it, yes.

    22 Q. Do you know who the first company of the

    23 active military police was commanded by? Who was the

    24 commander of that unit?

    25 A. No, sir, I didn't have that knowledge.

  20. 1 Q. Was that Pasko Ljubicic's job?

    2 A. I was aware, sir, has there were several

    3 units within the military police, and so let's say we

    4 addressed matters concerning any military police issue

    5 to Hotel Vitez, assuming that they would pass on the

    6 necessary information to the respective department.

    7 Q. Have you already testified that Pasko

    8 Ljubicic was the battalion commander not the company

    9 commander of the HVO Vojne Policije?

    10 A. Yes, sir. I have.

    11 Q. Does that say to you that the office of the

    12 first company of the acted military police would not

    13 have been Pasko Ljubicic's office?

    14 A. Not likely --

    15 MR. KEHOE: Now, the witness said he doesn't

    16 know. If counsel is unhappy with that testimony, he

    17 can change the question but he said he does not know

    18 who was in that office.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, answer the last

    20 question clearly, the last question that Mr. Hayman

    21 asked, and then he will move on. Did you know, did you

    22 not know, to what extent did you know? Take your

    23 time.

    24 A. I didn't know the person resident in that

    25 office, sir.

  21. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Please continue, Mr. Hayman.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    3 Q. Down across the street from the Hotel Vitez,

    4 do you see a box titled "civilian police"?

    5 A. I do, sir, yes.

    6 Q. Was that the location of the civilian police

    7 station to which you referred earlier, approximately?

    8 A. Approximately, yes, sir.

    9 Q. Next to that box, do you see a box that says

    10 "one office Zvonko Vukovic, later Pasko Ljubicic"?

    11 A. I do, sir, yes.

    12 Q. Does that, in any way, refresh your memory

    13 with respect to the location of Pasko Ljubicic's

    14 office?

    15 A. Many of the meetings that I had in the Hotel

    16 Vitez took place in the reception area, and people were

    17 very reluctant, in fact, on very rare occasions only

    18 were we allowed into people's offices. The hotel

    19 Vitez, as far as I was concerned, was a place I could

    20 go and arrange to meet people. On the occasion I gave

    21 earlier, I met Pasko Ljubicic in the Hotel Vitez. I

    22 also met numerous other people in the Hotel Vitez after

    23 requesting to speak to them. On the occasion I visited

    24 the civilian police, I was directed to go to the Hotel

    25 Vitez and there are several other names in those boxes,

  22. 1 Ivan Santic and Pero Skopljak which were, as far as I

    2 was aware, were not in the civilian police building,

    3 but were in the civil building which was to the rear of

    4 the Hotel Vitez.

    5 Q. This is a Prosecution exhibit, so I'm not

    6 reaching for it. I don't want to mislead you in that

    7 regard, if you disagree with the exhibit, so be it, but

    8 I don't want to you suggest that I'm suggesting to you

    9 that it's either accurate or inaccurate.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Then I think the proper

    11 suggestion should be to put it in its proper time frame

    12 which was up to the early part of April of 1993, which

    13 was what the witness testified concerning this exhibit

    14 and not during the time frame when this witness was in

    15 theatre.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman and Mr. Kehoe, I

    17 know that your comments are very important, but the

    18 Judges will be able to evaluate the questions

    19 themselves. Each of us has his work to do.

    20 Mr. Hayman, please move to another question.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: I am moving to another question,

    22 Mr. President, gladly.

    23 Q. You mentioned Mr. Valenta and that you were

    24 told by Santic and Skopljak that Valenta would be the

    25 liaison officer to UNPROFOR; do you remember that

  23. 1 testimony?

    2 A. Sorry, could you repeat that again, please?

    3 Q. You mentioned yesterday that I believe it was

    4 Mr. Santic and/or Mr. Skopljak informed you that Anto

    5 Valenta would be or was the liaison officer to


    7 A. No, I didn't say that.

    8 Q. Then please, the record, in some way, is not

    9 accurate. Can you tell us what did they tell you about

    10 Mr. Valenta?

    11 A. When I started my duties as the liaison

    12 officer, the first people that I met were Mayor Santic

    13 and Pero Skopljak, the local HDZ leader. After

    14 initially a few meetings with them, they said it would

    15 be of use to me and assist if I was to familiarise

    16 myself with characters in the Hotel Vitez and they

    17 arranged a meeting between myself and Anto Valenta, who

    18 was the senior political figure in the area.

    19 Q. Did you ever receive a more specific title

    20 for Mr. Valenta? You say he was the senior political

    21 figure. Did you know what his title or position was?

    22 A. No, I can't recall that as such.

    23 Q. Approximately, when did you first meet him in

    24 the Hotel Vitez?

    25 A. I would say it was sometime before the middle

  24. 1 of June, quite early on in my tour.

    2 Q. But in June 1993?

    3 A. Yeah, I would guess so.

    4 Q. After the fall of Travnik to the BiH army, on

    5 or about the 10th or 12th of June, or are you not sure?

    6 A. I would say it was before that period of

    7 time.

    8 Q. What do you use to find that date in time,

    9 your memory, or have you refreshed it with some

    10 reference in a document?

    11 A. It's purely memory.

    12 Q. On Exhibit 257, can you indicate where you

    13 met Anto Valenta in the Hotel Vitez?

    14 A. This is an unfamiliar layout to me, but I

    15 remember going off a corridor somewhere I thought was

    16 down here, into this area of the building, because

    17 there was quite clearly a window that looked somewhere

    18 out towards the back of the building.

    19 Q. So you're indicating up around where there's

    20 a legend, first floor offices, in that general area?

    21 A. In this area here (indicating).

    22 Q. And, thereafter, did you have a series of

    23 meetings with him in the Hotel Vitez or only one

    24 meeting?

    25 A. I think it might have been twice and then the

  25. 1 third time I met him was arranging an escort to

    2 Kiseljak for a meeting.

    3 Q. How many times did you meet him in the Hotel

    4 Vitez?

    5 A. Twice.

    6 Q. In the same month?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Don't repeat the questions too

    8 much, Mr. Hayman. You've just asked the question. He

    9 said that he met him twice. Avoid references -- avoid

    10 too many references to this document which does date

    11 from 1993, after all. Let's get to the principal

    12 objectives, Mr. Hayman, to the essential points. Thank

    13 you very much.

    14 MR. HAYMAN:

    15 Q. In the Hotel Vitez, that was my question, how

    16 many times did you meet him in this office you've

    17 described and when, please?

    18 A. I'm pretty sure it was twice and it was early

    19 on towards my tour.

    20 Q. Were you ever told that Anto Valenta took an

    21 office temporarily in the Hotel Vitez after he lost his

    22 office in Travnik due to the fall of Travnik in the

    23 first half of June 1993?

    24 A. I was never aware, and to the best of my

    25 knowledge, the MILINFO people were never aware that he

  26. 1 was based in Travnik. We always knew him as located in

    2 the Hotel Vitez. On numerous occasions, I saw his

    3 personal assistant in the Hotel Vitez, and whilst I

    4 didn't see Anto Valenta, I saw his personal assistant

    5 on several occasions around the time I met him twice in

    6 the office.

    7 Q. Around that same time, you mean. You said in

    8 your first conversation with him that Mr. Valenta took

    9 the position that a particular area would be entirely

    10 Croat in ethnic composition?

    11 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    12 Q. Do you understand that position to be

    13 contrary to the terms of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan

    14 which was then being actively discussed, if not, in

    15 fact, agreed upon by at least two of the warring

    16 parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

    17 A. I can't recall which particular agreement,

    18 yes, but it was contravening what was being agreed to

    19 at higher levels, politically speaking.

    20 Q. Were there later points in time in your

    21 discussions with the civil authorities in Vitez,

    22 Santic, Skopljak, Valenta, where they indicated that

    23 they didn't care for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and/or

    24 they didn't care for agreements reached by Mate Boban?

    25 A. I had various conversations with Mayor Santic

  27. 1 and on occasions he was quite adamant that the current

    2 plans were not going to work, but he was also fully

    3 aware of the fact that there was a need to keep Muslim

    4 and Croat communities integrated to a certain degree,

    5 and he was one of the people -- the mayor was one of

    6 the people I worked quite closely with early on in the

    7 tour. So there was agreement and disagreement

    8 depending on the time of day of the week, depending on

    9 what the particular level of tension was in the area.

    10 Q. Did you not also perceive disagreements

    11 within the circle of civil authorities in Vitez;

    12 Santic, Skopljak and Valenta, they disagreed on issues

    13 such as those that you have been mentioning? Correct,

    14 at times?

    15 A. I can't recall any as such.

    16 Q. You've just said that Mayor Santic was in

    17 favour of some degree of integration between the

    18 Croatian and Muslim communities. Is that a different

    19 perspective than that provided by Mr. Valenta when you

    20 met with him on the first occasion?

    21 A. It is, yes.

    22 Q. Was Mr. Valenta held in high regard by the

    23 towns people, that is, the ordinary persons of Vitez?

    24 A. I took it as so, based on his location in the

    25 Hotel Vitez, but he was not a local figure, so not

  28. 1 particularly well-known.

    2 Q. Did you ever discuss Anto Valenta's views

    3 with Colonel Blaskic?

    4 A. No, sir, I didn't.

    5 Q. In your presence, did Colonel Blaskic ever

    6 express such views, views of racial prejudice or

    7 animosity?

    8 A. No, sir, he didn't.

    9 Q. If Exhibit 80/8 could be provided to the

    10 witness? This, Mr. Whitworth, is one of a series of

    11 photographs of various persons walking, apparently,

    12 down a street or plaza, one of them being Anto

    13 Valenta. Did you take this picture?

    14 A. I did so, yes.

    15 Q. When was it taken?

    16 A. It was taken, I can't remember the date, it

    17 was an organised movement of senior HVO and Croatian

    18 officials to Kiseljak and an attempt to negotiate some

    19 local arrangements at the U.N. headquarters there.

    20 Q. So all these persons got together for the

    21 purpose of, first of all, I take it, being transported

    22 by UNPROFOR securely to Kiseljak; is that right?

    23 A. That's correct, sir.

    24 Q. And that transport was necessary because

    25 Vitez was in an enclave surrounded by the BiH army at

  29. 1 that time; correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. And the purpose of there being transported by

    4 the United Nations to Kiseljak was to engage in some

    5 type of negotiations?

    6 A. That's correct, sir.

    7 Q. With whom, with the BiH army or with other

    8 civil leaders? Who were the parties involved?

    9 A. From my understanding, it was chaired by the

    10 U.N. representatives in Kiseljak, but there would be

    11 several key figures from the Armija and the Muslim

    12 communities in the area.

    13 Q. Do you have any way to date the event? Can

    14 you give us a month, if not a date?

    15 A. I would say June, the June period.

    16 Q. You suggested yesterday that Mr. Valenta had

    17 influence on military activity in Central Bosnia. Can

    18 you give the court an example of in what way or ways

    19 Mr. Valenta influenced military activity in Central

    20 Bosnia?

    21 A. The assumption of his military involvement

    22 was based on the fact that his office, as far as we

    23 were concerned, was co-located with the senior military

    24 commanders of the area in the centre of Vitez. He was

    25 the senior political figure, and we assumed, therefore,

  30. 1 that he had an influence over the policy and strategic

    2 decisions that were being made by the military

    3 commanders in the hotel.

    4 Q. Those are assumptions. I asked for an

    5 example. Do you have an example to give to the

    6 court --

    7 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me. I would ask the

    8 counsel to ask him questions and with regard to the

    9 witness, that counsel's editorialising or commenting on

    10 the witness's testimony, I would ask him to refrain

    11 from that.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Avoid comments, Mr. Hayman, if

    13 you want to make any. Let the witness have the time to

    14 answer. These are, of course, hypotheses.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: The record, Mr. President, my

    16 goodness, I don't think counsel's comments are well

    17 taken. The witness stated that they made an

    18 assumption, and I said thank you, those are

    19 assumptions. Can you give us an example.

    20 Q. Mr. Whitworth, can you give the court an

    21 example, one example, during your six-month tour in

    22 Central Bosnia when Mr. Valenta influenced military

    23 activity in the region?

    24 A. To my knowledge, I saw no example. I just

    25 restate the assumption that we made earlier which was

  31. 1 based on our observations.

    2 Q. Thank you. Now, you described HVO

    3 communications capabilities. I would like to ask you

    4 two or three questions about that subject. Were you

    5 ever given a tour of the communications facility or

    6 room that provided communication support to the Hotel

    7 Vitez?

    8 A. Not an official tour, sir, no.

    9 Q. Do you know where it was?

    10 A. I walked into the room, I saw it was -- the

    11 communications, it was actually down some stairs, if I

    12 remember correctly.

    13 Q. Was this room in the Hotel Vitez or in the

    14 PTT building?

    15 A. This was in the Hotel Vitez.

    16 Q. Is that where you think communications were

    17 based for the central operative zone of the HVO

    18 headquarters?

    19 A. No, I didn't say that, sir. I just said I

    20 cited examples of types of communications I saw and --

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, please wait for the

    22 witness's answer and speak a little bit more slowly so

    23 that the interpreters can work more easily. And then

    24 the witness is asked to speak to the Judges when he

    25 answers.

  32. 1 MR. HAYMAN: I apologise, Mr. President.

    2 MR. KEHOE: I would ask that the witness be

    3 permitted to complete his answer, Your Honour.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: I didn't interrupt him, Your

    5 Honour, with all due respect. The court did.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Counsel, I understand. I just

    7 ask that the witness be permitted to complete his

    8 answer.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. Whitworth, please, complete

    10 your answer.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Are you asking for an apology

    12 from the Judges?

    13 MR. HAYMAN:

    14 Q. Mr. Whitworth, do you have a further answer

    15 to give on that question?

    16 A. I do. To restate what I said earlier, I

    17 didn't actually claim to have been in the operational

    18 headquarters within Hotel Vitez, but just to give

    19 examples of the types of communications that I had seen

    20 in the various parts of the Hotel Vitez.

    21 Q. Did you see any equipment in the Hotel Vitez

    22 that, in your judgement, was designed to provide secure

    23 communications capabilities to the commanders and the

    24 commander of the operative zone?

    25 A. No.

  33. 1 Q. Do you know what is meant by the term "packet

    2 radio"?

    3 A. It's not a term I'm familiar with, sir, no.

    4 Q. You said you saw a satellite TV piece of

    5 equipment. By that, do you mean a dish that can be

    6 used to receive cable television, sometimes without

    7 paying a monthly fee?

    8 A. Yes, that type of equipment also, yes.

    9 Q. Is that what you mean, you did see such a

    10 dish?

    11 A. Certainly if not on the actual hotel, up and

    12 down the Lasva Valley, I saw a couple of examples of

    13 that, yes.

    14 Q. Now, you also said something about a

    15 satellite phone or telephone. What did you see in that

    16 regard?

    17 A. They appeared to have what was a telephone

    18 system, and I assumed it was a box, like, a briefcase

    19 box with a telephone, that is similar to ones I have

    20 seen before that don't require a land line, but simply

    21 wired up to an antenna system.

    22 Q. Could such equipment be either a radiophone

    23 or something else?

    24 A. Yes, sir.

    25 Q. Thank you. If Exhibit 433/7 could be

  34. 1 provided to the witness, we're turning now,

    2 Mr. Whitworth, to the subject of helicopters. Can you

    3 tell us when you took this photograph?

    4 A. No, sir, I can't. There were numerous

    5 instances where a helicopter landed in the Lasva

    6 Valley, and that could have been one of many occasions.

    7 Q. When did these helicopters first start coming

    8 to the Lasva Valley, what month, if you recall?

    9 A. I would have said quite early on in June

    10 again.

    11 Q. Do you have any way to date that, other than

    12 your recollection? Do you have any notations, reports,

    13 MILINFOSUMs you've reviewed to provide a date for when

    14 you saw the first helicopter come to the Lasva Valley?

    15 A. No, it's just memory. I know there was a

    16 constant low-level stream, maybe one every day, every

    17 two or three days, land for five minutes. A lot of

    18 them were night flights in the evening, so it would be

    19 11, 12.00 at night. Because of the proximity of the

    20 BRITBAT location to the landing site near the quarry it

    21 was quite easy either to hear them or to see the small

    22 arms fire, particularly at night.

    23 Q. You always heard small arms fire when these

    24 helicopters came in, or no?

    25 A. No, you rarely hear the small arms fire. You

  35. 1 just see if they're using tracer if they are firing at

    2 night.

    3 Q. This particular helicopter, did it land?

    4 A. It did, sir, yes.

    5 Q. Whose helicopter was it?

    6 A. Our understanding is that it was an HVO, HV

    7 helicopter that had come from the south.

    8 Q. Do you know for what purpose?

    9 A. No, there was, again, supposition on our

    10 part. It didn't appear to be evacuating casualties,

    11 because we made regular checks on Nova Bila hospital.

    12 The situation didn't change there unless we assisted in

    13 that.

    14 Q. If Exhibit 434 could also be provided to the

    15 witness, please? When these helicopters landed, can

    16 you describe the way in which they landed?

    17 A. Yes, sir, they spiralled down very quickly

    18 because of the danger they are in as they approach the

    19 ground from BiH army troops in the surrounding area.

    20 Q. Is that a dangerous way to land a helicopter?

    21 A. Quite an uncomfortable way, yes.

    22 Q. You mentioned the small arms fire directed

    23 against these helicopters. What happens when a

    24 helicopter is hit by a small arms fire?

    25 A. Depending on where the small arms fire hits.

  36. 1 Q. What if it hits the engine?

    2 A. It depends which bit of the engine it hits.

    3 Helicopters are pretty delicate pieces of equipment so

    4 they can't take too much damage.

    5 Q. You mean if they are hit in a place such as a

    6 functioning part of the engine --

    7 A. A fuel line or something like that.

    8 Q. -- or a fuel line, then they are going to

    9 crash; is that right?

    10 A. That's right.

    11 Q. And the inhabitants will most likely be

    12 killed; is that right?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Did you ever ride on one of these

    15 helicopters?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Please speak a little bit more

    17 slowly, Mr. Hayman. The Judges do believe that if the

    18 helicopter is hit it might be dangerous. Let's try to

    19 get to the essentials, please.

    20 MR. HAYMAN:

    21 Q. You have Exhibit 434 which indicates a

    22 helicopter pad with a circle around it?

    23 A. No, sir, I said in that particular area, we

    24 weren't exactly sure. We never managed to get troops

    25 near it, but that was where the helicopter area came

  37. 1 around, so it could quite easily have been on the other

    2 side of the ridge, in this area here.

    3 Q. If you could indicate where it could have

    4 been?

    5 A. Several areas where it could have touched

    6 down.

    7 Q. Indicating to the upper right-hand corner of

    8 the ridgeline which also has a white road along -- near

    9 the top of the ridge; is that correct?

    10 A. Yes, sir.

    11 Q. So you're not sure where the location was

    12 that these helicopters came closest to -- or it may

    13 have been outside of this circle; is that right?

    14 A. It may well have been, sir, yes. The

    15 helicopters were observed on numerous occasions during

    16 their landings and takeoffs by the guards who were

    17 constantly on duty outside BRITBAT location. As you

    18 can see from the proximity of the BRITBAT location,

    19 which is here, once the helicopter drops, it's

    20 difficult on the ground to actually see which

    21 particular feature it's dropping behind when it goes

    22 out of sight.

    23 Q. Did you personally ever see any of these

    24 helicopters land and touch the ground?

    25 A. No, I didn't, sir, no.

  38. 1 Q. Did any of these guards whom you've

    2 referenced, ever tell you that they personally saw a

    3 helicopter land or touch the ground?

    4 A. As I stated earlier, sir, once the helicopter

    5 disappears out of view behind one of these small ridges

    6 or hills, it's impossible to say.

    7 Q. Am I correct that helicopters can also be

    8 used to drop supplies from a fairly low elevation and

    9 in that instance, the helicopter, in fact, doesn't land

    10 at all; correct?

    11 A. By the very nature of the terrain, that would

    12 be an unnecessary thing to do. You can quite easily

    13 put a helicopter down there and be completely covered

    14 from view of Armija positions, load and unload whatever

    15 you like to, and then take off again.

    16 Q. This circle on Exhibit 434 that says

    17 "helicopter pad," what was the pad made of concrete,

    18 asphalt?

    19 A. I actually went up and recorded the area and

    20 found several large expanses of grass that quite easily

    21 could be used as a helicopter landing pad that had

    22 roads close by, which meant that pad area could be

    23 accessed by vehicles.

    24 Q. I take it there was no constructed pad in the

    25 sense of a concrete landing pad, perhaps with a large

  39. 1 bright cross where people could see where they were

    2 going at night, that type of thing?

    3 A. Absolutely not, sir. Bearing in mind, as I

    4 said earlier, the nature of the ground it would be

    5 quite easily to put lights on the ground, during a

    6 night landing, and nobody would have been aware of the

    7 fact because of the hills and the ridges surrounding

    8 that particular area. Only the person coming down from

    9 above would be able to see those markers.

    10 Q. Did you ever participate in a helicopter

    11 medivac or a medical evacuation out of the Vitez area?

    12 A. I did, yes.

    13 Q. Where did the helicopters come for such

    14 evacuations?

    15 A. They used a local football field in Kiseljak.

    16 Q. In Kiseljak?

    17 A. That's right, sir.

    18 Q. I would like to talk about that for a moment,

    19 but one or two questions first. You said that BRITBAT

    20 had a belief that Colonel Blaskic left the theatre for

    21 some period of time for three to four weeks on one

    22 occasion. Can you tell us when that was? What month

    23 did BRITBAT form the opinion that Colonel Blaskic had

    24 left the theatre for approximately three to four weeks?

    25 A. We saw earlier a photograph of several key

  40. 1 HVO and Croat personalities being driven to Kiseljak in

    2 armoured vehicles. The return trip was organised some

    3 several days later, and there were numerous of those

    4 HVO Croat personalities that did not return in that

    5 transport, and yet reappeared in the Lasva Valley area

    6 sometime later. So they did not move via armoured

    7 vehicle provided by U.N. from Kiseljak, but,

    8 nevertheless, managed to re-enter the Lasva Valley.

    9 Q. Was Colonel Blaskic one of those persons on

    10 this occasion, the occasion you're describing, that he

    11 went to Kiseljak with the U.N. but he didn't come back

    12 with the U.N.

    13 A. I can't honestly recall whether that was the

    14 case, sir. There were eight armoured vehicles, and I

    15 didn't actually supervise the return journey, but the

    16 drivers actually recorded those people who were

    17 returned because they had a list to compare against

    18 those they had actually taken.

    19 Q. So those persons would be in U.N. and

    20 UNPROFOR records, lists of those persons?

    21 A. I would hope so, sir.

    22 Q. You said a list was made?

    23 A. Yes, sir.

    24 Q. My initial question was, you said BRITBAT

    25 formed an opinion collectively and individually, you

  41. 1 yourself, that at one point Colonel Blaskic was out of

    2 the theatre for three to four weeks. Can you tell us

    3 when was that? Can you give us even a month,

    4 Mr. Whitworth? Was it after the Grbavica battle?

    5 A. I'm afraid I can't recall that.

    6 Q. Now, these helicopter medivac's from

    7 Kiseljak. Let's turn to that. Was there one or more

    8 than one of these operations?

    9 A. I can only remember one, sir.

    10 Q. Do you know why the helicopters did not come

    11 to Vitez to pick up these seriously and critically

    12 wounded persons?

    13 A. Because of the danger of flying into the

    14 Lasva area posed by the armija on the surrounding

    15 hills.

    16 Q. So I take it these critically wounded persons

    17 were put in trucks or ambulances and driven to Kiseljak

    18 and then airlifted out?

    19 A. It sounds simple, sir, but there is a lot

    20 more to it then that.

    21 Q. I don't mean to suggest, in any way, that it

    22 was a simple matter. But they were transported by

    23 surface to Kiseljak and then helicoptered out?

    24 A. They were indeed, sir, yes.

    25 Q. Can you tell the court over what -- what

  42. 1 route did this ambulance convoy or truck convoy of

    2 wounded take to get to Kiseljak?

    3 A. We would transit through the Lasva Valley

    4 area, exiting around Busovaca and then going through

    5 the BiH areas and entering into the Kiseljak area.

    6 Q. Did the medivac convoy go through Visoko or

    7 did it go through Kacuni and Bilalovac?

    8 A. I think it was Visoko, the route we took.

    9 Q. That's the long way, correct, going up around

    10 Visoko, rather than taking the direct road from

    11 Busovaca to Kiseljak through Kacuni and Bilalovac?

    12 A. We might have actually used both, because

    13 there were a couple of evacuation, but only one of them

    14 involved the helicopters, to my knowledge.

    15 Q. Do you know why this convoy would have taken

    16 the long way around Visoko rather than the direct route

    17 from Busovaca to Kiseljak?

    18 A. Yes, sir, because we didn't have the support

    19 of the Armija in the army.

    20 Q. You're saying the Armija in the

    21 Kacuni/Bilalovac area would not let this medical

    22 evacuation convoy pass; is that correct?

    23 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    24 Q. Did any of the wounded, the seriously wounded

    25 individuals in this medical convoy, die on the trip,

  43. 1 that is, on the surface trip?

    2 A. Not that I'm aware of, sir.

    3 Q. You discussed the Convoy of Joy. Let's turn

    4 to that subject. This was approximately the 10th or

    5 11th of June, 1993; correct?

    6 A. That's correct, sir.

    7 Q. You described an occasion when Colonel

    8 Blaskic came to a scene where civilians were

    9 obstructing the convoy and Mario Cerkez was somehow

    10 spotted in the crowd; is that right?

    11 A. He was, indeed, sir, yes.

    12 Q. Do you know what Cerkez was doing at the

    13 scene? Could you tell?

    14 A. As far as I was concerned, he was one of the

    15 people orchestrating the crowd's participation in

    16 delaying the convoy's movements.

    17 Q. What was Colonel Blaskic's reaction when he

    18 saw that?

    19 A. Colonel Blaskic tried to attract Commander

    20 Cerkez's attention at the time, and reluctantly Cerkez

    21 came forward. There was some exchange, some

    22 conversation between them in which, as far as I could

    23 see, the tone of Colonel Blaskic's voice was obviously

    24 one of reprimand towards Commander Cerkez.

    25 Q. Did it appear to you that Colonel Blaskic had

  44. 1 instructed Mr. Cerkez to obstruct this convoy or that,

    2 on the contrary, he had given no such instruction and

    3 he was displeased that Mr. Cerkez was engaged in such

    4 activity?

    5 A. Yes, he was expressing displeasure at what

    6 was actually happening.

    7 Q. You said after this incident, you and Darko

    8 Gelic visited all the local militia commanders to

    9 reconstitute the trucks that had been in the Convoy of

    10 Joy; is that correct?

    11 A. No, not all the local militia commanders. We

    12 obviously aimed our activities at the areas we found

    13 the largest collection of vehicles, and we had to

    14 negotiate with the local commanders and the HVO

    15 soldiers who were responsible for supervising and

    16 guarding those vehicles.

    17 Q. What local militia commanders did you visit

    18 in an attempt to reconstitute and free the convoy?

    19 A. Carlo Grabovac and his name escapes me, but

    20 the battalion commander -- sorry, the HVO battalion

    21 commander, who was located near BRITBAT area, who was

    22 responsible for the quarry area.

    23 Q. Why was it necessary for you and Darko Gelic

    24 to go around and visit these people? Why couldn't

    25 Colonel Blaskic have simply issued an order to these

  45. 1 local malitias telling them "Bring the trucks to this

    2 location. Reconstitute the convoy so it can go on its

    3 merry way."

    4 A. I don't know. Why couldn't Colonel Blaskic

    5 issue an order to that effect? That is what we asked

    6 him.

    7 Q. What did he say? Did you discuss it with

    8 him?

    9 A. I didn't discuss it with him personally,

    10 that's why Darko and Vanja ended up coming along with

    11 me, because we had been given assurances by Darko,

    12 allegedly from Colonel Blaskic, that everything would

    13 be okay and we would be able to remove the trucks.

    14 But, on my own, when I tried to collect all the trucks

    15 together to reform the Convoy of Joy, that wasn't

    16 allowed, so an order, obviously as far as we were

    17 concerned, hadn't been issued.

    18 Q. Did you have your interpreter on this odyssey

    19 visiting the local militias?

    20 A. I did indeed on the first day and on the

    21 second day, I used Vanja, who was the daughter of one

    22 of the staff officers in Hotel Vitez, as my personal

    23 interpreter as a way of saying this is a bona fide

    24 authorised act from the hotel.

    25 Q. Did any of the interpreters interpret for you

  46. 1 the conversations between Darko Gelic and the local

    2 militia commanders concerning the release of the

    3 convoy? What did Gelic tell them?

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Captain, would you please look

    5 at the Judges when you answer. It's unpleasant to have

    6 the impression that this is a discussion between two

    7 other people. You are being asked questions but you

    8 have to direct your answers to the Judges.

    9 THE WITNESS: My apologies, Your Honour.

    10 A. I don't recall any such conversations,

    11 conversations like that between Gelic and the local

    12 commanders usually took place in private. So I can't

    13 fulfil anything on that one.

    14 Q. Were you present at any incidents involving

    15 the Convoy of Joy that involved either Dario Kordic or

    16 General Petkovic?

    17 A. No, I wasn't.

    18 Q. Do you agree with the statement that Mario

    19 Cerkez did not visibly accept Blaskic's orders? Do you

    20 agree with that statement, sir?

    21 A. He complied with the orders, but it was with

    22 extreme reluctance on his part, and on numerous

    23 meetings with Cerkez, he was never -- rarely in

    24 agreement with Colonel Blaskic's intentions, but was,

    25 nevertheless, compliant when under pressure.

  47. 1 Q. In what way did he vary? Was he more

    2 conciliatory towards the BiH army or the Muslim

    3 community, or was he less conciliatory then the views

    4 being advocated by Colonel Blaskic?

    5 A. He didn't express any views in that

    6 particular way. I think, really, his focus was more on

    7 the smaller, local issues in the Vitez/Lasva Valley

    8 pocket as opposed to the larger strategic issues of

    9 which we expected Colonel Blaskic to be more concerned

    10 with anyway. So I think it was difficult for Mario

    11 Cerkez to appreciate why Colonel Blaskic might have

    12 been doing what he was trying to do and disagreed with

    13 it at a local level. He also had a lot closer contact

    14 with the local population, so he was very, very

    15 concerned about his popularity in the Vitez area, Mario

    16 Cerkez, that is, and so would not do anything that

    17 would risk his popularity.

    18 Q. And you apprised that Colonel Blaskic was

    19 less concerned with his popularity in the local Vitez

    20 area; is that correct?

    21 A. No, I don't have any thoughts on that

    22 particular subject.

    23 Q. What was the source of these disagreements,

    24 of this resistance you're indicating there was on the

    25 part of Mr. Cerkez to direction or orders being given

  48. 1 by Colonel Blaskic? Where was the rub?

    2 A. As I stated earlier, Mario was -- Mario's

    3 focus was more on local issues, not on the larger

    4 strategic ones up and down the Lasva pocket.

    5 Q. Did you tell the office of the Tribunal

    6 Prosecutor in your written and signed statement of May

    7 14th, 1997 that Cerkez did not visibly accept Blaskic's

    8 orders, page 7, third line?

    9 A. I would rephrase that and say that he did not

    10 visibly agree with Blaskic's orders, but, nevertheless,

    11 he carried them out.

    12 Q. So you don't agree with your prior statement,

    13 and you would like to revise it; is that correct?

    14 A. That's correct, sir.

    15 Q. Now, what have you reviewed since you made

    16 this statement that refreshes your recollection or

    17 gives you further information that changes your view on

    18 that issue?

    19 A. Since my initial interview which has

    20 refocused my attention on this subject, I have had time

    21 to think and dwell upon it and reflect. I came away

    22 from Bosnia with very lasting impressions about the

    23 relationships between people in the Lasva Valley area,

    24 and those have resurfaced since I started digging into

    25 this.

  49. 1 Q. How long have you been in The Hague preparing

    2 your testimony for yesterday and today? How many days?

    3 A. A couple of days during which time I have

    4 really read through the MILINFOSUMs which has helped me

    5 a great deal in putting things in chronological order.

    6 I had a lot of memories and recollections but it didn't

    7 make sense to me, chronologically speaking, but having

    8 referred to the MILINFOSUMs now, it's made sense to me,

    9 in terms of knowing why that happened.

    10 Q. You described Cerkez as the local militia

    11 commander, and I would like to ask you about what the

    12 brigades were made of. Would you agree that the HVO

    13 brigades were formed on a territorial principle?

    14 A. Yes, I would.

    15 Q. In essence, one village would -- the men from

    16 one village would comprise a company or satnija?

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, since we have

    18 changed subjects. Perhaps we will take our break now.

    19 We will wait -- about how much longer do you plan to

    20 ask questions, Mr. Hayman? We're going to resume in

    21 about 20 minutes.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: I have completed about one-third

    23 of my cross-examination, Mr. President.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We will resume in

    25 twenty minutes. The court stands adjourned.

  50. 1 --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m.

    2 --- On resuming at 11.45 a.m.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    4 hearing. Have the accused brought in, please?

    5 (The accused entered court)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, would you continue,

    7 please?

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    9 Q. We were discussing the nature of the

    10 brigades, and I believe I had asked whether you would

    11 agree that, in general, the men in a particular village

    12 would provide the manpower for perhaps a company or

    13 satnija?

    14 A. That's correct, yes.

    15 Q. And then a group of villages adjacent to one

    16 another might combine several companies into a bojna or

    17 battalion?

    18 A. That's correct, sir.

    19 Q. The men in these HVO brigades, would you

    20 agree that they generally lived in their homes and did

    21 not live in military barracks?

    22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    23 Q. Would you agree that they had their weapons

    24 and uniforms, for the most part, in their homes when

    25 they were not actively on duty?

  51. 1 A. That's correct.

    2 Q. Do you know if these individuals served full

    3 time, generally, these local militia in the brigades,

    4 or did they, rather, have a certain period such as a

    5 week or two during the month where they were on duty,

    6 and the rest of the time they led their lives, whether

    7 it's tending the garden or having some other type of

    8 job?

    9 A. Our impression was a little bit of both,

    10 depending on the proximity of the soldiers' homes to

    11 the front-line positions. But they obviously did duties

    12 as such. Whether that was a week on, a week off, I'm

    13 not quite sure about that, but I'm sure it was on that

    14 basis.

    15 Q. How is this territorial principle different

    16 from a professional army that would take conscripts,

    17 for example, from a larger geographic area, combine

    18 them and mix them, and put them in barracks. Can you

    19 compare the two? Are you able to?

    20 A. A normal battalion would have a very large

    21 catchment area because not everybody is a soldier,

    22 obviously. They would be barracked separately and away

    23 from their homes all together as soldiers, and they

    24 would be centralised with their equipment and uniforms

    25 whilst in barracks and on duty.

  52. 1 Q. Would you agree that the territorial nature

    2 of the HVO brigades was one reason that a brigade

    3 commander like Mario Cerkez was very concerned with

    4 local issues and problems, because he was from the

    5 local area and all of his men were from the local area;

    6 correct?

    7 A. Yes, sir.

    8 Q. Would you also agree that as a result, in the

    9 case of Mario Cerkez, the name "Cerkez" had more

    10 influence around the Vitez pocket than did the name

    11 "Blaskic"?

    12 A. I would agree with that as far as the local

    13 civilians were concerned. If I was talking to people

    14 living in and around the Vitez area, for the most part,

    15 Mario Cerkez was their key military reference point.

    16 He was the person, being a local person, that they knew

    17 best out of the military personnel.

    18 Q. Would you agree with the statement that

    19 Cerkez did not seem to accept subordination of or from

    20 Colonel Blaskic?

    21 A. Can you repeat that, please?

    22 Q. Would you agree with the statement, "Mario

    23 Cerkez. He was the commander of the Vitez HVO troops,

    24 and did not seem to accept subordination of Colonel

    25 Blaskic"?

  53. 1 A. I wouldn't agree with that.

    2 Q. I'm reading from page 3 of your signed

    3 statement in the middle under "Personalities: Mario

    4 Cerkez." If you disagree with this statement now, can

    5 you tell the court what examples or other material in

    6 the MILINFOSUMs or other material you have studied this

    7 week has caused you to now disagree with your statement

    8 of May 14, 1997 in that regard? Or, on reflection, if

    9 you --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, would you please

    11 repeat the last thing you said? I didn't quite

    12 follow. What was that part of the statement that you

    13 are referring to, that you're trying to have the

    14 witness explain why he retracted his first statement

    15 and has now made another one. I'm looking at the

    16 transcript, but I'm not quite sure I understand what

    17 the witness said about that.

    18 Would you mind going back over that again,

    19 please?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: I will, Mr. President. It's a

    21 slightly unusual use of English, so I'm not surprised

    22 the translation is difficult as well.

    23 Q. Page 3, middle of the page, "Personalities:

    24 Mario Cerkez. He was the commander of the Vitez HVO

    25 troops, and did not seem to accept subordination of

  54. 1 Colonel Blaskic."

    2 A. Would you like me to clarify that?

    3 Q. Would you tell us, again, whether you agree

    4 or disagree, and if you disagree, what is it that has

    5 caused you to change your views?

    6 A. I agree with that statement. If I was to

    7 visit Mario at the cinema, I am not under the influence

    8 of Colonel Blaskic or anybody else in the HVO, if I

    9 went to him and said, "I would like to do this" or "to

    10 do that," he would say, "No, it's not happening," or

    11 "No, I don't agree. I will not allow that to happen."

    12 I would then go to the Hotel Vitez and petition Colonel

    13 Blaskic, usually through Darko Gelic, as to what I was

    14 trying to do and why I was trying to do it. Usually,

    15 after a period of time, they would say, "Okay, you

    16 should be able to do that now."

    17 I would then attempt to move to wherever it

    18 was or deliver whatever it is I was trying to do, and

    19 not being able to achieve that, I would then return to

    20 Mario Cerkez, as it was him who directly commanded the

    21 troops in the Vitez area who would stop me doing what I

    22 was trying to do. And I would say to Mario, "This has

    23 been issued from Colonel Blaskic. Can you make sure

    24 that your soldiers on the ground are informed as such,

    25 and that will allow me to complete whatever task I'm

  55. 1 trying to undertake." Mario's usual response would be,

    2 "I have received no such order. Show me a piece of

    3 paper with the order issued on it."

    4 On several occasions, he was quite adamant

    5 that he did not agree with the decision, but when

    6 confronted, as I think I gave an example earlier, by

    7 Colonel Blaskic in the presence of Colonel Blaskic,

    8 then Mario would follow suit. Mario Cerkez would

    9 comply with Colonel Blaskic's orders, as was the case

    10 with the Convoy of Joy.

    11 Q. Can you give the court any other examples

    12 with respect to which Mario Cerkez said, "No, I won't

    13 do it. I have not received an order from Blaskic"?

    14 A. I can't recall any specific examples, but my

    15 entire time during the tour of Bosnia was spent trying

    16 to move aid in and out of the area, and there were

    17 numerous examples, numerous occasions, when I was

    18 rebuffed by the likes of Mario in an attempt to move

    19 into, say, a Muslim area or into Stari Vitez, for

    20 example, on the basis that Mario said he did not

    21 receive an order or he was not willing to comply with

    22 that, that was not part of what was being agreed to.

    23 Q. Am I correct then that on repeated occasions,

    24 Mario Cerkez told you he had not received an order for

    25 free passage of UNHCR aid convoys within the Vitez

  56. 1 enclave; is that correct?

    2 A. That's correct.

    3 Q. You described an incident with three young

    4 Croat boys, apparently in Kruscica, and an attempted

    5 exchange involving two wounded and so forth. Do you

    6 know what the three young boys were being held for?

    7 What was the purpose of their detention or

    8 imprisonment?

    9 A. They were actually picked up by a BiH patrol

    10 in the area of Kruscica. Their parents had actually

    11 told me that they had been sent out to collect wood.

    12 When I met Sivro Sifet, the Armija commander who was in

    13 possession of these children, he said they had been

    14 picked up wandering around the woods by one of the

    15 Armija patrols and returned to Kruscica area. All

    16 three of the children were well looked after and had a

    17 good relationship with the civilian police officers who

    18 were actually overseeing them.

    19 Q. That explains why they were picked up. Why

    20 were they being held, if you know?

    21 A. As far as I was aware, there are, actually,

    22 no facilities in place, unless it's through the likes

    23 of myself or the ICRC, for one side to exchange people

    24 with the other side. So they couldn't, basically, walk

    25 up to the front-line with three kids, pass them over.

  57. 1 Q. I take it that was true with respect to both

    2 sides, that if there were people who wanted to cross

    3 the front-line, they might be detained because there was

    4 no safe way to cross the front-line, other than through

    5 an organised exchange of some sort; correct?

    6 A. I presume there was a lot of suspicion

    7 attached by either side to anybody attempting to cross

    8 the front-line, but, yes, what you say is correct.

    9 Q. Do you know what happened to the two wounded

    10 that were taken to Cerkez's headquarters? What

    11 ultimately happened to them? Did they get out? Did

    12 they get the treatment they needed?

    13 A. On that particular occasion, yes, they were

    14 released to my sergeant who escorted them to Zenica,

    15 and I returned from Kruscica into Vitez with the three

    16 children.

    17 Q. Is this incident a good example of the kind

    18 of tit-for-tat provocation and incidents which

    19 occurred on both sides of this conflict?

    20 A. It is typically the type, yes.

    21 Q. You spoke of your conversation with a number

    22 of young soldiers at the bungalow, members of the

    23 Jokers. Let's turn to that now, please. Were they

    24 better equipped than the territorial militia or the

    25 brigade militias within the HVO?

  58. 1 A. Yes, they were, indeed, yes.

    2 Q. Did they tell you how they got their

    3 equipment?

    4 A. No. Obviously, under the circumstances,

    5 people are very suspicious when you start questioning

    6 them intensely on where they come from, where their

    7 supplies come from, et cetera, et cetera. It's a very

    8 delicate discussion. So, no, I didn't ascertain that.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit D138 could be

    10 provided to the witness and put on the ELMO, we are

    11 concluded with Exhibit 434.

    12 Q. Mr. Whitworth, why don't you take a moment to

    13 look at this portion of a MILINFOSUM dated 10 August

    14 1993, and I would like to direct your attention to the

    15 second line which states: "The Jokers are a subunit

    16 within the Fourth BN of the HVO MP." Do you see that

    17 passage?

    18 A. I do, indeed, sir, yes.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: I believe, Mr. President, there

    20 is a French translation of this exhibit. Just for your

    21 assistance, I note that.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Yes, I think I'm

    23 doing all right with the interpreters, unless the

    24 registrar gives it to me. Go ahead.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

  59. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Dubuisson.

    2 MR. HAYMAN:

    3 Q. Was Pasko Ljubicic the commander of the

    4 Fourth Battalion of the HVO police. Was that your

    5 understanding?

    6 A. That was my understanding, sir, yes.

    7 Q. Did you have an understanding of where the

    8 First, Second, and Third Battalions of the military

    9 police served?

    10 A. No, sir, I wasn't aware of that.

    11 Q. Did you have an understanding of to whom

    12 these four military police battalions report, if

    13 anyone?

    14 A. I think it might have been to Mostar or

    15 somewhere like that.

    16 Q. Now, let me ask you about the incident in

    17 Rijeka with the displaced persons.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit 56, it's a large

    19 exhibit, if I could see it first. If Exhibit 435 could

    20 be provided to the witness right now, we will see if we

    21 can conclude this area with the smaller exhibit. For

    22 the record, 435 is a portion of Exhibit 56, but it

    23 borders the northern edge or the upper edge of the

    24 photograph. So there's no additional portion of the

    25 photograph above what is depicted at the top of

  60. 1 Exhibit 435.

    2 Q. Did you learn, Mr. Whitworth, how these

    3 displaced persons came to be in the area of the green

    4 circle on Exhibit 435?

    5 A. They were DPs from, what I understood, the

    6 Turbe area who had been moved into the Lasva Valley.

    7 Q. Did you learn when they came to the Lasva

    8 Valley?

    9 A. Not that I can recall, sir, no.

    10 Q. Where was the front-line from this

    11 photograph? Could you indicate on the ELMO with the

    12 pointer, if you're able? I understand it may be off

    13 the photograph, but can you give us some indication of

    14 how it ran?

    15 A. Probably somewhere there.

    16 Q. Thank you. If you could leave that pointer

    17 in that position, for the record, the pointer is

    18 running along the right-hand side of the photograph

    19 with the words "Portion of Exhibit 56" at the bottom at

    20 a slight angle intersecting the upper right-hand corner

    21 of the exhibit.

    22 Do you see the houses which are along a road

    23 and are, in fact, closer to the front-line than the

    24 houses in the green circle? If you can look at where

    25 I'm pointing - I have a copy of the exhibit in my

  61. 1 hand - you may be able to see it from the distance

    2 where you are.

    3 A. Firstly, the front-line is probably a little

    4 bit further in that direction to where I have put the

    5 marker. The other thing I would say is this was the

    6 only photograph that had the area closest on it. That

    7 green circle was the approximate area. It was actually

    8 somewhere along this track that the collection of

    9 houses were located where these people were held.

    10 Q. Let me ask you: If you look where I'm

    11 pointing, do you see this row of houses along this road

    12 which runs parallel to the right-hand edge on the upper

    13 right-hand portion of the exhibit, which is 435?

    14 A. I do, indeed, sir, yes.

    15 Q. Who lived in those houses?

    16 A. They were within the Croat area of the Lasva

    17 Valley. I'm not quite sure who was occupying them or

    18 if they were occupied at all.

    19 Q. Did you ever go there?

    20 A. I visited that area on one occasion, yes.

    21 Q. Were there Croat families living in those

    22 houses at the time?

    23 A. Specifically those houses there, I cannot

    24 recall. I remember on that road out somewhere meeting

    25 a local HVO militia soldier who was very aggressive

  62. 1 towards me when I was trying to transit towards the

    2 Muslim area.

    3 Q. It's generally correct, is it not, that there

    4 were Croat families living in virtually all of these

    5 houses around the area of the green circle on

    6 Exhibit 435?

    7 A. Quite possibly, yes.

    8 Q. Were they being used as human shields?

    9 A. I think you obviously missed the point I made

    10 earlier. The green circle is not necessarily the

    11 location. That was the only map I was given to

    12 indicate the area where the houses were situated. I

    13 did, indeed, provide a photograph earlier which showed

    14 empty houses with mines across the road, and that was

    15 the area I clearly remember as being adjacent to

    16 where --

    17 THE INTERPRETER: Would you speak a little

    18 bit more slowly for the interpreters?

    19 THE WITNESS: My apologies.

    20 A. So not specifically that group of houses, but

    21 an area up that particular track, and that was the only

    22 available photograph to which I marked on the closest

    23 thing.

    24 MR. HAYMAN:

    25 Q. Thank you. Did you determine who, if anyone,

  63. 1 was actually trying to keep these displaced persons in

    2 the houses they were in? Were they locals, local

    3 soldiers, local civilians, the Vitez brigade, someone

    4 else? Who was trying to do this?

    5 A. On the occasion that I tried to allow them

    6 free passage out of the area, there were local militia

    7 and a military police vehicle with three occupants all

    8 quite clearly labelled as military police that stopped

    9 my escort of these people out of that area.

    10 Q. Do you know if, on that occasion, were they

    11 acting on anyone else's orders or were they acting on

    12 self initiative?

    13 A. I'm unaware of that.

    14 Q. Is that to say you don't know?

    15 A. I can not recall at the time.

    16 Q. Were any of these displaced persons injured

    17 in any attacks or fighting between the HVO and the BH

    18 army that you know of?

    19 A. Not to my knowledge.

    20 Q. Now I'd like to ask you about Darko

    21 Kraljevic. You said you met him on or about the 11th

    22 or 12th of June on an occasion when there was shelling

    23 by the BiH army of what portions of Vitez?

    24 A. The actual town centre area.

    25 Q. What was in the town centre? What was the

  64. 1 target of that mortar attack?

    2 A. I wouldn't like to say. It could be it was

    3 just a shelling of the town centre area.

    4 Q. So I take it you're unaware of any military

    5 targets in that area; is that correct?

    6 A. Other than the OP zone, Third OP zone

    7 headquarters, which was actually hit during the

    8 barrage, the only other place might have been the

    9 ammunition factory, but I don't think they were rounds

    10 falling in that particular area.

    11 Q. The Vitezit or Slobodan Princip factory was a

    12 kilometre or two outside the centre of town; is that

    13 correct?

    14 A. That's correct, yes.

    15 Q. What else was happening on the 11th or 12th

    16 of June, 1993? Was the HVO withdrawing from Travnik

    17 because the BiH army had taken over Travnik on about the

    18 12th of June, 1993, within a day or two. I'm

    19 suggesting there was action going on in Travnik which

    20 either had led to the fall or the imminent fall of

    21 Travnik?

    22 A. I find that very difficult to recall specific

    23 times. It was an extremely busy time of year, and

    24 there were several major actions taking place on and

    25 around the same time. I'll be honest and say that they

  65. 1 all sort of blur into one, as far as I'm concerned. I

    2 can't recall specific dates, other than generally

    3 saying that they all happened on or around the same

    4 time.

    5 Q. I apologise if I am asking you to repeat any

    6 of your testimony yesterday, but I didn't understand

    7 completely. Who stopped you? What soldiers from what

    8 unit stopped you?

    9 A. With respect to which specific event?

    10 Q. The event when Kraljevic put the gun to your

    11 face?

    12 A. They were HVO militia, local Croatians, and

    13 there were the battalion commander and his soldiers in

    14 the crowd of people who were the immediate barrier to

    15 the warriors, along to the mines that were placed

    16 across the road transiting past Vitez. Likewise, those

    17 HVO militia, as well as Kraljevic and his troops and

    18 civilians, were also gathered around the vehicles in

    19 the centre of Vitez on that particular evening.

    20 Q. Was this a highly agitated crowd?

    21 A. It was a very agitated crowd under the

    22 circumstances. It was a very emotive time. If I

    23 remember correctly, the Convoy of Joy was also trying

    24 to transit through the area, and there were shells

    25 falling in the centre of Vitez area. People were being

  66. 1 injured while this was actually happening.

    2 Q. How were Kraljevic's Vitezovi soldiers

    3 dressed? What kind of uniforms were they wearing?

    4 A. I can't recall them being any different to

    5 the other members of the local militia. It was dark,

    6 obviously. There was no street lighting.

    7 Q. Kraljevic, apparently, told you he would or

    8 might kill you because he believed UNPROFOR was

    9 assisting the BiH army. Were you convinced by his

    10 threat that he held that belief at that time, that he,

    11 in fact, believed that UNPROFOR was assisting the BH

    12 army?

    13 A. Under the circumstances, I was not in a

    14 position to ignore what he was saying.

    15 Q. Now, at the same time, you learned that there

    16 were one or more ECMM, EC monitors, in the basement of

    17 the Hotel Vitez?

    18 A. That's right, yes.

    19 Q. Do you remember who they were, what monitors

    20 were there?

    21 A. There was an English chap who is an ex-army

    22 officer. I think there was an Italian gentleman,

    23 large, rotund, but, nevertheless, jolly chap with a big

    24 black moustache. I can't remember his name. He was

    25 very approachable, amenable. I think there was an

  67. 1 older gentleman, bald, slimmer build. The names,

    2 specifics, in that respect, I can't recall.

    3 Q. Were there HVO also taking cover in the

    4 basement of the Hotel Vitez with these EC monitors?

    5 A. I was reasonably happy with the situation of

    6 the ECMM. As far as I was concerned, they were not

    7 being held as hostages but were taking refuge in the

    8 Hotel Vitez for their own protection. The HVO seemed

    9 quite happy with that. The ECMM were regular

    10 frequenters of the Hotel Vitez, obviously, with it

    11 being the centre of HVO operations.

    12 Q. Is it a fair statement, in your view, that

    13 Darko Kraljevic was worshipped by the local Croat

    14 community in Vitez?

    15 A. I think the phrase I used at the time was

    16 "feared and revered," and that's how I think he was

    17 looked upon by the local people. He was, obviously, a

    18 very effective military commander, but also he was very

    19 unpredictable, unstable. They were quite fearful of

    20 him. They were very wary of his presence.

    21 Q. He was an extremely violent personality;

    22 correct?

    23 A. I saw nothing to the contrary.

    24 Q. Do you know whether he had a rank?

    25 A. He called himself -- he was a colonel, as in

  68. 1 on par with -- I correct myself. I don't recall him

    2 actually having a rank, not that he referred to

    3 himself, but he might have been referred to by others,

    4 by members of the civilian population, in some

    5 particular way.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit D73 could be provided

    7 to the witness?

    8 Q. If you could just take a moment to look at

    9 that and tell us if that refreshes your recollection as

    10 to whether Darko Kraljevic held himself out as a

    11 colonel.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: D73, it can be put on the ELMO,

    13 although I'm not sure if that's the English translation

    14 or the BSC.

    15 Q. If you would direct yourself --

    16 JUDGE JORDA: This exhibit was not admitted.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: I don't recall, Mr. President.

    18 I'm going to ask the witness if it refreshes his

    19 recollection. If the exhibit could be moved up so the

    20 signature line appears - this is the English

    21 translation - if it could be moved up slightly. Thank

    22 you.

    23 Q. This is an English translation of an order

    24 which you also have the BCS copy of, and it's signed,

    25 by order, "Colonel Darko Kraljevic." Does that refresh

  69. 1 your recollection in any way with respect to any

    2 encounters you may have had with Kraljevic in which he

    3 may have held himself out as having a certain rank?

    4 A. Can you just clarify what it is you're asking

    5 me, please?

    6 Q. If, in any encounters, Kraljevic held himself

    7 out to you as a colonel, as having the rank of colonel?

    8 A. I never addressed him formally, and I can't

    9 recall any of his troops referring to him in such a

    10 light either.

    11 Q. How did his troops refer to him?

    12 A. "Darko."

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you. We're concluded with

    14 those exhibits.

    15 Q. You were shown a BBC tape of the exploding

    16 trenches. Do you know how the BBC came to be present

    17 at this event?

    18 A. That was actually a home video filmed by

    19 Kraljevic himself, to my knowledge, to the best of my

    20 knowledge, provided by him to the BBC.

    21 Q. When then was the BBC tape made; do you

    22 know? Was it made on the day of the explosion or was

    23 it a retrospective piece made a week or ten days later

    24 or do you know?

    25 A. You would have to ask them. I don't know.

  70. 1 Q. I take it BRITBAT had no advance notice, to

    2 your knowledge, of this explosion in the trenches?

    3 A. No, we didn't.

    4 Q. Whose initiative was it; do you know?

    5 A. Who initiated the plan and executed the

    6 explosion?

    7 Q. Yes.

    8 A. I don't know, no. I know Darko was

    9 responsible for -- boasted to me that he had been

    10 responsible for initiating it.

    11 Q. That's what he told you?

    12 A. When I say "initiating it," I mean actually

    13 planting the explosives, pressing the button, the

    14 actual on-the-ground execution of it.

    15 Q. What did he say in that regard? Did he say

    16 "I did it" or "I initiated it"; do you remember what

    17 he said?

    18 A. I can't recall the specific conversation, but

    19 he said, "I'm responsible for that. I've blown up

    20 those trenches." He didn't intimate whether -- I can't

    21 recall whether he intimated it was a command decision

    22 on his part or whether he was just saying that he was

    23 responsible for the action itself.

    24 Q. The BBC narrator says on this tape "Darko

    25 Kraljevic promises a fierce defence of the Vitez

  71. 1 pocket." Do you recall that statement?

    2 A. Yes, I do, yes.

    3 Q. Do you find it odd that Darko Kraljevic is

    4 speaking to the world, to the international press,

    5 about his defence of the Vitez pocket, or do you find

    6 that consistent with his view of himself and of his

    7 role in the Vitez enclave?

    8 A. I find that consistent with his opinion about

    9 himself. He was a very egocentric character, as I

    10 think I said earlier, enjoyed press coverage and a lot

    11 of attention. He was quite happy to put himself to the

    12 fore as this elite HVO special forces commander.

    13 Q. Would you agree that wherever he was, he held

    14 himself out as being in charge?

    15 A. Wherever he was on the ground, I would say

    16 yes. As far as the local militia and battalion

    17 commanders were concerned, if he was there, then he

    18 obviously was quite a key figure.

    19 Q. Do you know of any examples in which Darko

    20 Kraljevic did not want to do something and yet he did

    21 it because Colonel Blaskic either asked or attempted to

    22 order him to do it?

    23 A. Can you give me an example of what that might

    24 be?

    25 Q. Well, if Blaskic spoke to Kraljevic and said,

  72. 1 "We need some of your men at the front-line."

    2 Kraljevic said, "No, we don't want to go to the

    3 front-line," and Blaskic said, "I order to you send 20

    4 men to the front-line at Poculica," and Kraljevic did

    5 it, sent the men. Can you think of any examples

    6 wherein Kraljevic didn't want to do something but did

    7 it because Blaskic asked or ordered him to do it?

    8 A. Kraljevic's Vitezovi were approximately 20 to

    9 30 in strength, and their role, as such, would not have

    10 encompassed that type of activity. They were ample HVO

    11 troops who were available should that type of

    12 circumstance arisen and that Colonel Blaskic would have

    13 had at his command to task.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry. I didn't understand

    15 what you said. Could you repeat it?

    16 A. Certainly, sir, sorry. The Vitezovi were a

    17 group 20 to 30 in strength, and their function within

    18 the HVO, as we saw it, was not to assist in the defence

    19 of front-line positions. So the circumstances, when

    20 Colonel Blaskic would have had to order Darko Kraljevic

    21 to do those things, never actually existed. Colonel

    22 Blaskic had plenty of other troops and units which were

    23 more specifically directed to do tasks like that. I

    24 cannot think of a set of circumstances when Kraljevic

    25 would have had the opportunity to refuse an order from

  73. 1 Colonel Blaskic.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    3 MR. HAYMAN:

    4 Q. Can you think of any examples in which

    5 Kraljevic wanted to do something and didn't do it

    6 because Blaskic either asked or ordered him not to?

    7 A. I think the same applies. I can't see

    8 circumstances when any of the military activity that

    9 the Vitezovi were involved in would not be of benefit

    10 to the strength of the HVO position in the Lasva

    11 Valley. So I don't think those circumstances would

    12 have arisen either.

    13 Q. I take it you can't think of any examples, as

    14 you say; is that correct?

    15 A. That's right.

    16 Q. Thank you. Now, you described another

    17 individual, Zuti, as a local criminal. Did you have

    18 encounters with Zuti?

    19 A. I met him very briefly on one occasion, and

    20 that was a very fleeting meeting. My only real

    21 knowledge of Zuti was regular accounts from the liaison

    22 officer for the Novi Travnik area who, obviously, I

    23 spent a lot of time with at the end of every day,

    24 exchanging stories and tales of characteristics that we

    25 had met. That's my only real recollection of the

  74. 1 character Zuti.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: If Exhibit D135 could be

    3 retrieved and provided to the witness on the ELMO while

    4 I ask the next question.

    5 Q. Would you agree from the information you

    6 received that Zuti had a great deal of influence in the

    7 Bila and, at least portions of, the Travnik region?

    8 A. He was certainly a very active character, but

    9 from what Captain Hay Angus told me, he wasn't active

    10 in any great military sense, other than having a

    11 seemingly endless supply of weapons, a ready supply of

    12 cache, vehicles, and the like. I think he was -- he

    13 gave me the impression he was an opportunist who was

    14 taking advantage of the circumstances in the Lasva

    15 Valley.

    16 Q. Exhibit D135 is a memorandum by Colonel

    17 Duncan relating, in paragraph 3, a conversation that

    18 Colonel Duncan had with Colonel Blaskic wherein, among

    19 other things, it is said in the middle of paragraph 3:

    20 "It would appear that Zuti has considerable influence

    21 with the people of the Lasva Valley, whereas Blaskic

    22 has not, as proved by the events of the Convoy of Joy

    23 where Blaskic proved to be nothing more than a puppet

    24 commander ignored by the locals."

    25 Were you present at this meeting with Colonel

  75. 1 Duncan and Colonel Blaskic?

    2 A. I don't recall being so.

    3 Q. Did you ever discuss the meeting with Colonel

    4 Duncan?

    5 A. Not that I can recall.

    6 Q. Would you agree that during your tour of

    7 duty, for the most part, the HVO fought a defensive war

    8 attempting to preserve the Vitez enclave?

    9 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

    10 Q. Did the HVO, none the less, lose a

    11 significant amount of territory of that enclave, during

    12 your tour, to the BiH army?

    13 A. You're referring to Travnik; is that what

    14 you're referring to in.

    15 Q. Travnik would be one area but not the only

    16 areas?

    17 A. Does that mean that you're saying that the

    18 HVO considered Travnik theirs before it fell to the

    19 BiH, rather than being a multi-ethnic community.

    20 Q. Why don't I rephrase the question and we will

    21 try to get back to that format. Once confrontation

    22 lines are --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Please ask your questions

    24 clearly, because in a little while we're going to have

    25 the witness asking you questions. Be more direct,

  76. 1 please.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, that's why I'm

    3 going to reformulate the question. The witness's

    4 question was a good one. I concede that.

    5 Q. From the point that confrontation lines or

    6 frontlines were formed in the April and/or May time

    7 period when you arrived, are you able to say whether

    8 those lines moved in such a manner that the area under

    9 HVO control shrunk or enlarged or remained the same

    10 during your tour of duty?

    11 A. That's difficult. When we took over, as you

    12 will be aware of the tour before ours, there were no

    13 actual frontlines between the Croat and Muslim

    14 communities. It was not for some considerable period

    15 of time after we had arrived that these frontlines

    16 started to actually take shape. I would conclude that

    17 by saying I would -- from the point of when we decided

    18 where those frontlines approximately lie, the HVO lost

    19 no appreciably large territory during our tour. They

    20 had minor losses - nothing that would be considered

    21 major in terms of the area of ground - but they lost a

    22 few strategic ones like the Zacilja point that

    23 overlooked the Lasva Valley, but not substantially

    24 large in terms of ground.

    25 Q. The beginning point of the time period you're

  77. 1 evaluating is approximately when?

    2 A. From the middle of the tour onwards, the last

    3 three, four months.

    4 Q. August on, something like that?

    5 A. Yes, probably.

    6 Q. From August on, the frontlines were

    7 relatively stable; is that your testimony?

    8 A. There were some minor incursions and

    9 counterattacks, regular exchanges, frontlines moved a

    10 little bit. But from my recollection, it didn't move

    11 in any appreciably large amount.

    12 Q. If Exhibit 433 could be provided to the

    13 witness, and if you could examine subexhibit numbers 13

    14 and 14 which are, I believe, pictures taken at the --

    15 one of them, at least, at the Nova Bila hospital. I

    16 believe this is 433-13 on the ELMO. You took this

    17 photograph, as I recall; correct?

    18 A. I did so, yes.

    19 Q. Can you give us a date?

    20 A. Around the middle of the tour. I spent quite

    21 a lot of time at Nova Bila hospital, and I think I

    22 would have said probably a little bit earlier than

    23 that. General Petkovic's visit was an attempt to get

    24 our support to allow HVO, HV helicopters or helicopters

    25 to come into the Lasva Valley to evacuate casualties.

  78. 1 I think that's a little bit before the middle of the

    2 tour, towards the beginning.

    3 Q. Was this around the Convoy of Joy incident,

    4 around the 10th of June, 1993, or do you know?

    5 A. I can't say, sir, no.

    6 Q. When Petkovic came to meet with the U.N. in

    7 the Vitez enclave, how did he get there?

    8 A. As far as I was concerned, he was brought

    9 there from Kiseljak by a U.N. vehicle. I think it was

    10 one of ours.

    11 Q. Thank you. Now, Stari Vitez, let's discuss

    12 that subject briefly. Would you agree that at the

    13 beginning of your tour, Stari Vitez was well supplied

    14 with stockpiles of weapons and explosive devices?

    15 A. Not that I ever saw. They did boast that

    16 there had been a cache there when the Croat and Muslim

    17 population were working together before it became

    18 a tripartite confrontation in the area, but I never saw

    19 any evidence of that. In fact, I did see evidence of

    20 plenty of improvised grenades, and the weapon systems

    21 that they did have were very old, quite primitive.

    22 Q. Let me ask you then if you agree with the

    23 statement that you made on page 6 of your prior

    24 written, signed statement, wherein you said: "As an

    25 enclave, Stari Vitez was fairly well supplied

  79. 1 (initially) with stockpiles of weapons and improvised

    2 explosive devices." Do you agree with that?

    3 A. Initially, I think that was the case, yes.

    4 Q. When you said "initially," what do you mean?

    5 A. I often questioned Sefkija about how he could

    6 maintain, under Stari Vitez, how he could maintain and

    7 resist the action of the HVO from Vitez. He explained

    8 to me that in Stari Vitez, there had been a weapons

    9 cache because it was initially like a local militia

    10 headquarters in there, that both the Croat and the

    11 Muslim populations had actually centred and stockpiled

    12 various resources there, and, fortunately for them,

    13 that had been there when the relationship between the

    14 Croat and Muslim populations broke down, that they had

    15 that to fall back on and maintain their position.

    16 That was the situation, as far as I was

    17 concerned, as far as he explained it to me, when,

    18 during the Cheshire's tour, the relationship broke down

    19 between the Croats and the Muslims.

    20 Q. It is true that Djidic never admitted to you

    21 that they had a means to resupply Stari Vitez with

    22 materiel; correct?

    23 A. He never admitted a resupply method. I had

    24 never seen any evidence of stockpiled weapons, and the

    25 intelligence officer, the MILINF officer, and I often

  80. 1 deliberated on if they were resupplying, how they could

    2 have gone about that. It would have been very

    3 difficult for them.

    4 Q. You believed, did you not, that the BiH army

    5 in Stari Vitez had to be receiving some type of

    6 military resupply to be able to sustain their defence

    7 of Stari Vitez; correct?

    8 A. I thought that was a possibility.

    9 Q. Did you think, and I'm quoting from your

    10 statement six or seven lines down: "My colleagues and

    11 I thought that supplies must have been getting through

    12 to the enclave in some form, but we never saw any

    13 evidence of this whatsoever." Do you agree with that?

    14 A. Yes, I would agree with that.

    15 Q. Is that because, among other things, there

    16 was no munitions factory in Stari Vitez to produce

    17 munitions locally?

    18 A. That's correct. There was no facility in

    19 there, as far as I was aware, that could do that. It

    20 was actually an extremely small pocket, maybe 500

    21 metres in diameter.

    22 Q. Were you also suspicious on this point

    23 because you knew, as a trained soldier, that without

    24 resupply, an army will run out of needed items; it's

    25 simply a matter of time?

  81. 1 A. That's common sense. I was about to say, but

    2 regardless of any investigation that we made, we never

    3 actually found out any method of resupply, other than

    4 that one minor incident where they probably managed to

    5 smuggle several hundred rounds in, as I recounted

    6 yesterday.

    7 Q. Is it also correct that the HVO generally

    8 shared your belief that somehow, someone was

    9 re-supplying Stari Vitez with military materiel?

    10 A. There were accusations and

    11 counter-accusations on all parts from every faction

    12 involved, that one side was being favoured by

    13 organisations in supplying people with aid and

    14 weapons. So, yes, that's true.

    15 Q. Were these suspicions on the part of the HVO

    16 directed at the only entities that did have access into

    17 Stari Vitez at the time, which was UNPROFOR and certain

    18 humanitarian relief agencies?

    19 A. That's correct. They were directed at us.

    20 Q. Is it also correct that upon expression of

    21 these suspicions, UNPROFOR, understandably, and its

    22 personnel took strong offence?

    23 A. I think the first time you get that

    24 accusation, then you would be offended, because you are

    25 there doing what you think is a worthwhile job to the

  82. 1 best of your ability. But that accusation came with

    2 such regularity that it became commonplace, and we just

    3 ignored it and got on with what we were trying to do.

    4 Initially, for a few minutes, offence, but after that,

    5 for the rest of the six months, it was just accepted as

    6 the norm.

    7 Q. You would agree, though, I take it, that

    8 these HVO suspicions, they were rational, they were

    9 based on rational facts?

    10 A. I think anybody under the circumstances would

    11 have probably said the same thing. I didn't hold that

    12 against the HVO at all. We did go to whatever lengths

    13 were possible and that we were allowed to instil

    14 some confidence in them that we were trying to do the

    15 job to the best of our ability and they were unbiased

    16 and neutral on all sides.

    17 Q. You related the incident in which you,

    18 unknowingly and unwittingly, transported a certain

    19 amount of rounds of ammunition into Stari Vitez. You

    20 had collected these boxes of purported medical supplies

    21 from the UNHCR warehouse in Zenica; is that correct?

    22 A. That's correct, yes.

    23 Q. Was this the same warehouse, UNHCR warehouse

    24 in Zenica, where UNHCR food was delivered upon coming

    25 to Zenica?

  83. 1 A. It was the same warehouse that packed food

    2 for all the Lasva Valley area, Muslim and Croat

    3 communities alike, yes.

    4 Q. Under whose control was this warehouse?

    5 A. The UNHCR.

    6 Q. Do you recall the date or month of this

    7 incident?

    8 A. I'm afraid I can't, no.

    9 Q. Prior to this incident, on how many occasions

    10 had you or other members of BRITBAT been asked to

    11 transport boxes of medical supplies or other supplies

    12 from this warehouse into Stari Vitez?

    13 A. We were asked quite regularly to move things

    14 in, but it was common practice to refuse and encourage

    15 the respective organisation to make a journey and

    16 delivery, as was required, rather than us doing it. We

    17 tried to keep ourselves -- use the correct agencies and

    18 organisations, rather than taking over their role and,

    19 obviously, it detracted us from doing what we were

    20 trying to do on the ground in other areas.

    21 Q. How many prior occasions had you escorted or

    22 transported these types of supplies, medical or food

    23 aid, into Stari Vitez?

    24 A. I think that was the second time I ever did

    25 it.

  84. 1 Q. These items were routinely transported into

    2 Stari Vitez by UNHCR itself; correct?

    3 A. Yes, under my supervision.

    4 Q. After you saw the BiH army soldier unpacking

    5 the rounds from the medical supply boxes, did you try

    6 and get the rounds back or did you conclude that that

    7 was not feasible or not appropriate?

    8 A. Both, I think. I didn't feel it was

    9 appropriate, and the boxes were already broken open.

    10 My immediate reaction was to go to see Commander

    11 Sefkija and express my displeasure of what exactly had

    12 happened, as I think I said earlier, that he had sort

    13 of let me down and betrayed my trust, because I had

    14 obviously put myself out to do this for him.

    15 Q. What did commander Djidic say to you when you

    16 told him that you felt he had betrayed your trust?

    17 A. He shook his shoulders. He didn't say a lot

    18 and he said these things are necessary and at that

    19 point I left very shortly afterwards.

    20 Q. After the incident, did you report it up the

    21 chain of command within BRITBAT?

    22 A. I did, yes, I reported to the MILINFO people

    23 that that was what actually happened, and I think I

    24 spoke to the UNHCR liaison officer as well, Captain

    25 Hancock so he could pass the information on.

  85. 1 Q. Was it written up in a MILINFOSUM report or

    2 another report?

    3 A. I haven't seen one. I can't recall, to be

    4 honest.

    5 Q. Was it reported to Colonel Duncan, if you

    6 know?

    7 A. I personally didn't report it to him. I

    8 don't know whether he actually was aware of the fact.

    9 Q. Did Mark Bower occupy a position whereby he

    10 would have or did come to have this information?

    11 A. I would like to think that he did have the

    12 information. I can't recall having a specific

    13 conversation with him and telling him about it. That

    14 was the whole purpose of feeding information to the

    15 MILINFO so we all could be informed.

    16 Q. Did you or anyone else within BRITBAT inform

    17 UNHCR of this matter?

    18 A. Not that I can recall.

    19 Q. In the course of your conversations with

    20 Commander Djidic, did he tell you that Stari Vitez was

    21 well-supplied with cellars that could be used to store

    22 a large amount of military supplies?

    23 A. I don't remember him specifically using those

    24 words, other than intimating that they did have the

    25 facility to store large quantities, and that he did

  86. 1 actually say, as I think I said earlier, that they had

    2 a cache of militia stores that were a remnant before

    3 the breakdown of relationships between the Croat and

    4 Muslim communities, and that Stari Vitez was well

    5 equipped with cellars and that is where it was all

    6 stored and stashed.

    7 Q. When he referred to cellars, did you

    8 understand him to refer to cellars in private homes or

    9 residences?

    10 A. That's all there were in Stari Vitez.

    11 Q. Now, you mentioned the dynamics between the

    12 HVO and the BiH army when there would be an attack or

    13 some provocation towards Stari Vitez. Do you agree

    14 that when the HVO did attack Stari Vitez, there would

    15 be stiff resistance from the BiH army in Stari Vitez and

    16 Commander Djidic would call in mortar fire on Vitez

    17 from ABiH positions in Kruscica, to the south, and from

    18 the 325th Brigade position north of Vitez, which would

    19 result in the attack being called off?

    20 A. No, I didn't say that. I said that Commander

    21 Sefkija had communications to 325 Brigade area and

    22 Kruscica, and that as far as Stari Vitez is concerned,

    23 it was a local exchange. They only had resources

    24 within their own territory, but they could fire back at

    25 the HVO and I'm not aware whether Commander Sefkija had

  87. 1 the power to order artillery or mortar fire from either

    2 Kruscica or 325 Brigade area.

    3 Q. To ensure that I'm paraphrasing your prior

    4 statement accurately, why don't you look, as I read to

    5 you, from page 6 of your statement, two-thirds of the

    6 way down in the paragraph entitled "Stari Vitez," and

    7 let me ask you if you agree with the precise way it is

    8 phrased in your statement. "The ABiH commander in

    9 Stari Vitez was Sefkija and he had communications with

    10 commander 325th Brigade on the hills above Vitez

    11 towards Zenica. Sefkija saw the level of command

    12 opposing him as being Cerkez, i.e., brigade level. When

    13 attacks on Stari Vitez came, these would be met with

    14 stiff resistance from within the enclave, and would

    15 also quickly be supported by mortar fire being directed

    16 at Vitez town from ABiH positions in Kruscica, to the

    17 south, and ABiH 325 Brigade positions, to the

    18 north." Do you agree with that?

    19 A. I agree with the first part. Stiff

    20 resistance was met for the most part from within Stari

    21 Vitez. The regularity with which these flare-ups

    22 occurred, having now a bit more of a clearer

    23 recollection, I think the likelihood of mortars being

    24 called in onto Vitez by action on Stari Vitez is very

    25 small, but because it happened, these flare-ups

  88. 1 occurred regularly, I can fully appreciate that

    2 repeated pressure from Sefkija on to 325 or Kruscica

    3 brigades, they might have responded on the odd, one or

    4 two occasions, by doing that.

    5 Q. Is it also correct that after the mortar fire

    6 came in "The attack on Stari Vitez would then be called

    7 off by Cerkez." Do you agree with that?

    8 A. As he was the brigade commander on the

    9 ground, that was just interpretation on my part, he

    10 would have been under direct control of the troops on

    11 the frontlines surrounding Stari Vitez, so yes.

    12 Q. Lastly, do you agree with the next sentence:

    13 "Sefkija did not assess the attacks to be commanded by

    14 Blaskic's level of command but from Cerkez at brigade

    15 level."

    16 A. Yes, that was his assessment.

    17 Q. During your tour of duty, did you become

    18 familiar with the offers made by the Croat community in

    19 Vitez to the citizens of Stari Vitez to temporarily

    20 evacuate Stari Vitez and get out of the war zone?

    21 A. Yes, I was aware of those offers.

    22 Q. Do you know whether the BiH army disseminated

    23 those offers to the civilian population in Stari Vitez?

    24 A. I personally carried that message to Sefkija

    25 on some of the occasions it was issued.

  89. 1 Q. And that was on multiple occasions, was it

    2 not, that that offer was made?

    3 A. Multiple, I would say, probably two or three

    4 times, yes.

    5 Q. Do you know whether Commander Djidic ever

    6 made a sincere effort to relay that message to the

    7 civilian population in Stari Vitez?

    8 A. They were all aware of that offer, as far as

    9 I could see.

    10 Q. Was there any reason, to your knowledge, why

    11 the BiH army would have wanted civilians to stay in

    12 Stari Vitez and not evacuate?

    13 A. The people occupying Stari Vitez were local

    14 people, people who had lived in Vitez and the Stari

    15 Vitez area, probably, all their lives, as were the

    16 people in Grbavica. They were being asked to give up

    17 their homes. They were a local militia in the same way

    18 the HVO defending their respective bit of the trenches

    19 were local. So what was being asked of them was to

    20 leave their homes and to effectively remove any Muslim

    21 population from the Lasva Valley area. Sefkija and all

    22 his subordinate commanders and the people I spoke to

    23 were determined that it was their home and they were

    24 going to stay there and did not want to take up the

    25 offer. And had they taken up that offer, it would have

  90. 1 just gone further down the road to achieving Anto

    2 Valenta's initial impression that he gave me, which was

    3 removing all other ethnic groups, other than Croats,

    4 from the Lasva Valley area.

    5 Q. It would have exposed the BiH army in Stari

    6 Vitez to a military action that would not have risked

    7 disproportionate civilian casualties; correct?

    8 A. Could you explain that again, please?

    9 Q. Had the Muslims civilians left Stari Vitez,

    10 it would have exposed the BiH army in Stari Vitez to a

    11 possible military offensive by the HVO, unconstrained

    12 by the danger of excessive civilian casualties in Stari

    13 Vitez; correct?

    14 A. Who are you classifying as civilians at this

    15 point in Stari Vitez?

    16 Q. Well, why don't you tell us. Was everyone in

    17 Stari Vitez contributing towards the BiH army war

    18 effort?

    19 A. There were very few people wearing uniforms

    20 in Stari Vitez, and like most the population in the

    21 Lasva Valley, they had arms of one form or another.

    22 Q. I believe Commander Djidic told us there were

    23 250 BiH army soldiers and police in Stari Vitez. Is

    24 that consistent with your recollection?

    25 A. I know that one of the civilian police

  91. 1 officers was resident there.

    2 Q. Does 250 sound about right?

    3 A. 250 males, about the fighting age, armed with

    4 small arms, sounds about right to me, yes.

    5 Q. Were all such males in Stari Vitez active in

    6 the military defence of Stari Vitez?

    7 A. Everybody was active in the defence of Stari

    8 Vitez.

    9 Q. You're saying men and women were active in

    10 the defence?

    11 A. I saw women bearing arms as well, if they

    12 were of that ilk.

    13 Q. Well, certainly there were some old people

    14 and young children in Stari Vitez?

    15 A. Absolutely.

    16 Q. So let's call them the civilians. We'll

    17 exclude everyone else, for purposes of this question.

    18 A. I'd also like to make it clear that I'm not

    19 saying the circumstances are any different in Stari

    20 Vitez when compared to the local Croat population. The

    21 circumstances were difficult for everybody, and people

    22 were living on the front-line, be they Croat or Muslim.

    23 And so many people just bared arms if they were

    24 able-bodied enough, but didn't necessarily wear a

    25 uniform. And as to whether you could call them

  92. 1 soldiers or not, that's semantics, as far as I'm

    2 concerned.

    3 Q. The entire population of the region was

    4 armed, was it not?

    5 A. Absolutely.

    6 Q. And not just with small arms, but there were

    7 explosives to be found among the general population, et

    8 cetera; correct?

    9 A. That's correct.

    10 Q. If Exhibit 252 could be retrieved, and while

    11 that is being done, I have one last question on Stari

    12 Vitez. If the old people and the children had left,

    13 then would the BiH army in Stari Vitez have faced the

    14 possible attack by the HVO unconstrained by the risk to

    15 the HVO of a large number of civilian casualties in

    16 Stari Vitez? Do you agree with that?

    17 A. I agree with that. They would have been

    18 unconstrained in that respect.

    19 Q. Thank you. Now, Exhibit 252 was shown to

    20 you. Did you take this picture?

    21 A. I did so, yes.

    22 Q. Can you tell us roughly when and where it was

    23 taken?

    24 A. It was taken towards the end of the tour. It

    25 was probably one of the biggest body exchanges I've

  93. 1 done during the tour. It's actually near -- it's on

    2 the road to Kruscica, on the HVO front-line. That's

    3 Carlo Grabovac stood there. The local battalion

    4 commander and on his right with his back to us is one

    5 of the local Croat people. That's the plastic sheet,

    6 is a sniper screen so people can walk across the road

    7 on the Croat side without being sniped up from the BiH

    8 frontlines. You can see past the sniper screens, there

    9 are mines across the road so the Croats can control

    10 exactly who goes into the Kruscica area.

    11 Q. So this is near the front-line in Kruscica and

    12 the white sheet is to protect military and civilians

    13 against sniper; is that right?

    14 A. Absolutely, yes.

    15 Q. Were these sheets also to be found in the

    16 area of Vitez abutting Stari Vitez, these types of

    17 sheets outside of doorways, between buildings, so that

    18 people could move around and would not be hit or they

    19 would be less likely to be hit by snipers in Stari

    20 Vitez?

    21 A. For the most part, all the people were

    22 withdrawn into the centre of the Stari Vitez pocket, so

    23 there was cover from sniper fire afforded by the

    24 buildings, because there were several layers of

    25 buildings on the outside that had been damaged during

  94. 1 the attack. And so, for the most part, unless crossing

    2 a major road, these things weren't absolutely

    3 necessary, because the close quartered nature of the

    4 buildings in old Vitez.

    5 Q. You're referring to old Vitez. What about

    6 Vitez proper, across or at the Croat edge of the

    7 front-line in Vitez facing Stari Vitez; were these types

    8 of sheets also draped, to your recollection?

    9 A. I don't recall, no.

    10 Q. Was the sniping activity in the region

    11 frequently a tit-for-tat type of act, retaliation,

    12 retaliation type of exchange?

    13 A. It was indeed so, yes.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to suspend the

    15 hearing and we will resume at 2.30. Court stands

    16 adjourned.

    17 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.









  95. 1 --- On resuming at 2.37 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing will now resume.

    3 Have the accused brought in, please.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, the floor is

    6 yours.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President. If

    8 Exhibit 433-16 could be retrieved and shown to the

    9 witness.

    10 Q. I'd like to turn now, Mr. Whitworth, to the

    11 subject of Bebes, that is, this particular type of

    12 explosive device and its use in Vitez. How many Bebes

    13 did you personally see fall in Stari Vitez and cause

    14 damage or injury?

    15 A. I didn't actually see any. The only one I

    16 saw or the couple I saw were ones that hadn't gone off

    17 and that were shown to me by Sefkija's soldiers.

    18 Q. Were you ever present at the scene when one

    19 of them was fired, that is, launched towards Stari

    20 Vitez?

    21 A. No, but I did observe the firing plates in

    22 the vicinity in Vitez adjacent to Stari Vitez.

    23 Q. Where were the firing plates on the occasion

    24 or occasions that you saw them?

    25 A. They were in a couple of gardens -- one was

  96. 1 in a garden, rather, and the other several ones and

    2 parts thereof were in the welding shop, which is out in

    3 the southern side of the town of Vitez where they were

    4 actually made.

    5 Q. The ones that were in gardens --

    6 A. The one that was in the garden I saw, yes.

    7 Q. Thank you. The one that was in a garden, how

    8 far was that garden from the Croat edge of the

    9 front-line between Vitez and Stari Vitez?

    10 A. 500, 600 metres. It wasn't actually aimed at

    11 anything in particular. It just sat there adjacent to

    12 a house. So it would, in all likelihood, have been

    13 moved to a firing location as and when it was used.

    14 Q. Now, the image on photograph Exhibit 433-16,

    15 who told you that that damage was caused by a Bebe?

    16 A. That was told to me by the troops on the

    17 ground. When I examined it closely, there was a lack

    18 of shrapnel marks in the wall around, which is what you

    19 would normally expect to see if it had been a mortar

    20 shell or something like that. There were small arms

    21 marks in the walls, but it didn't appear to be the

    22 normal level of shrapnel that you would associate with

    23 a mortar.

    24 Q. Were you told when these houses had been

    25 damaged?

  97. 1 A. No, I wasn't, no.

    2 Q. Do you recall the month when you were taken

    3 to these houses and shown them in this state?

    4 A. I think that was quite later on in our tour,

    5 well after the halfway point, I think, when I was

    6 visiting that particular location.

    7 Q. Where were these houses depicted in 433/16

    8 from the front-line between Vitez and Stari Vitez?

    9 A. Very close to the front-line, 100, 200

    10 metres. These were houses that were probably in the

    11 direct line of fire. So there was bound to be an

    12 element of small arms damage as well.

    13 Q. Do you know whether these houses were used by

    14 the BiH army to direct fire towards Vitez?

    15 A. I don't know whether that was the case or

    16 not, but it was very likely.

    17 Q. They were well situated for that purpose;

    18 correct?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Were you ever in the Hotel Vitez when you

    21 heard something or you learned or were told, "That is a

    22 Bebe being fired"?

    23 A. Not that I can recall, no.

    24 Q. You referred to a threat to blow up the SPS

    25 or Vitezit factory. Is that a subject you personally

  98. 1 discussed with Colonel Blaskic?

    2 A. I think I might have been at a meeting where

    3 Colonel Blaskic expressed that to Colonel Alastair, but

    4 I can't quite remember.

    5 Q. You don't remember if it was at a meeting

    6 between Blaskic and Duncan or you don't remember

    7 whether you were present at that meeting?

    8 A. I remember the threat, or Darko Gelic

    9 mentioned it to me on several occasions, so I'm fully

    10 aware that that was said to us on several occasions.

    11 My memory fails me, but I could have quite easily been

    12 at a meeting, and Colonel Blaskic could have mentioned

    13 that to Colonel Alastair or not. I don't know. I

    14 remember Colonel Blaskic mentioning it to Colonel

    15 Alastair on one particular occasion.

    16 Q. When you were present?

    17 A. Yeah, I'm pretty sure.

    18 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic make it clear to Colonel

    19 Duncan that advance notice would be given before any

    20 destruction of the factory occurred, so that BRITBAT

    21 personnel, as well as others in the area, could be

    22 evacuated?

    23 A. I do recall something like that, yes.

    24 Q. That was made clear; correct?

    25 A. I have a memory of something like that, yes.

  99. 1 Q. Was the factory ever blown up by the HVO?

    2 A. No, it wasn't.

    3 Q. You said that Darko Gelic made some type of

    4 threat that if Vitez was attacked the HVO would shell

    5 Zenica; do you recall that or is that correct?

    6 A. Yeah, something like that was said. I can't

    7 remember the specific circumstances, but, yes, that was

    8 said.

    9 Q. Did the HVO ever shell Zenica during your

    10 tour of duty?

    11 A. There were several occasions or a couple of

    12 occasions, rather, I can recall when Nora was reported

    13 as firing by soldiers on central duty or moving up and

    14 down the Lasva Valley, and that there were subsequently

    15 explosions in the Zenica area.

    16 Q. Were any of these investigated?

    17 A. In what respect?

    18 Q. Well, did someone attempt to substantiate

    19 that HVO artillery had shelled a location in the city

    20 of Zenica or was there no attempt to substantiate that?

    21 A. It was the same for -- if the BiH shelled the

    22 Vitez area, we would express our concern that innocent

    23 civilians were, in all likelihood, to be injured.

    24 Those protests were usually made by myself or the

    25 appropriate liaison officer to whoever in the

  100. 1 respective headquarters.

    2 Q. I take it during your tour the army of BH

    3 routinely shelled the centre of Vitez; is that correct?

    4 A. Routinely makes it sound like it was a

    5 daily/weekly occurrence. It varied, and I wouldn't say

    6 one did it more than the other, in particular.

    7 Q. Do you know of any reports or MILINFOSUMs or

    8 other documents that sought to demonstrate that, in

    9 fact, on a particular occasion during your tour, the

    10 HVO shelled a civilian location in the city of Zenica?

    11 Do you know of any such studies, documents, what have

    12 you?

    13 A. No, I'm not aware of any. I can't remember

    14 any.

    15 Q. You spoke of the death of the BRITBAT

    16 interpreter Dobrila. After her death, you went to the

    17 Hotel Vitez, as I understood your testimony, and you

    18 met personally with Colonel Blaskic or not?

    19 A. I think I might have done it on that

    20 occasion. I think I might have insisted, under the

    21 circumstances, that I speak directly to him.

    22 Q. And he met with you and he expressed sympathy

    23 and regret towards her death; is that right?

    24 A. He did, indeed.

    25 Q. Did he promise to assign individuals to an

  101. 1 investigative team who would investigate the matter?

    2 A. That was the case, yes.

    3 Q. Did he, in fact, assign those investigative

    4 resources to a team for that purpose?

    5 A. Yes, I think there was a local -- there was

    6 an HVO representative from Mario Cerkez's brigade and

    7 then two other officials that were provided by the

    8 Hotel Vitez.

    9 Q. And you participated with this team as well;

    10 correct?

    11 A. I did, indeed, so, yes.

    12 Q. And for approximately three or four days, the

    13 team conducted an investigation; correct?

    14 A. That's right, sir, yes.

    15 Q. Was that a full-time endeavour during those

    16 three or four days?

    17 A. It took a large percentage of the day on

    18 those days, yes, it did. It involved myself, also

    19 going to 325 Brigade headquarters, to the Muslim area,

    20 because obviously they had been involved in the small

    21 arms exchange, so I was trying to get their account of

    22 the incident and press them to launch their own

    23 investigation.

    24 Q. Now, was Dobrila killed as a result of a

    25 single shot or as a result of a larger, either, spray

  102. 1 of gun fire in one direction or of an exchange of gun

    2 fire between different locations; can you tell us?

    3 A. There was a small arms exchange on that

    4 particular day that started, if I remember correctly,

    5 half an hour, an hour early, which was intimated single

    6 rounds exchanged between the two sides. Immediately

    7 prior to Dobrila's death, there had been an increase in

    8 the amount of firing. There were one or two bursts,

    9 but for the most part, there was still deliberate

    10 single shots.

    11 At the time when the round hit Dobrila, there

    12 were maybe three or four single shots fired in the area

    13 of the captain's house, some of which struck the wall

    14 and the ground around on which, unfortunately, killed

    15 Dobrila.

    16 Q. Now, from where were the army of BH -- strike

    17 that. Where were the army of BH firing positions with

    18 respect to this exchange of small arms fire you have

    19 described?

    20 A. They were on the high ground to the left of

    21 the end of the house where Dobrila stood when the

    22 rounds fell into the area.

    23 Q. Is it fair to say the BiH army was firing from

    24 the houses across the street from Dobrila's house as

    25 you start up the hill, which is the Grbavica feature?

  103. 1 Is that what you mean?

    2 A. I think this explanation would be better

    3 served with a large-scale map or a drawing.

    4 Q. Such as the map to your left, yes?

    5 A. May I use a piece of paper underneath

    6 instead?

    7 Q. You would like to draw on a plain sheet of

    8 paper?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Absolutely. If the registrar could provide

    11 the witness with a pen, we will remove the aerial

    12 photo, and he can demonstrate his testimony, if the

    13 court please. No, no, I think --

    14 A. If you flip the photograph over, I will --

    15 Q. The witness will simply draw on plain paper,

    16 if we can provide him with a dark marker.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, if you would

    18 like to go over there?

    19 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    20 MR. HAYMAN:

    21 Q. I'm going to warn you that if you speak from

    22 your current location, the microphones will not pick

    23 you up, so if you could, perhaps, return to the

    24 microphone when you have oral testimony to give.

    25 A. The drawing of the house on the top actually

  104. 1 represents this end of this building.

    2 Q. Indicating the end of the diagonally-shaped

    3 building below the top house which appears to have a

    4 door or a front marked on the right-hand side of that

    5 diagram; correct?

    6 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    7 Q. Please continue.

    8 A. There were two balconies, a lower balcony and

    9 the upper balcony. Myself and another captain resided

    10 in the top balcony, and Dobrila and her fiancee resided

    11 in the bottom floor. Myself, Dobrila and her boyfriend

    12 were having a conversation early on in the day when

    13 initially the small arms fire broke out. At that

    14 point, I left and went upstairs into my room. Dobrila

    15 and her boyfriend were still downstairs at the time,

    16 and as I came out onto the top balcony, several rounds

    17 hit the side of those building, and one of the

    18 rounds was the one that went through Dobrila's head and

    19 killed her.

    20 Q. As you came out of the balcony on the top of

    21 this building, which is the side of the building facing

    22 the right hand of the diagram; correct?

    23 A. Rounds were impacting.

    24 Q. Roughly how many rounds hit the building at

    25 that time?

  105. 1 A. Two or three.

    2 Q. And you were not injured, I take it?

    3 A. No, sir.

    4 Q. But one of those same rounds hit Dobrila

    5 where, in the doorway or through a window or was she

    6 outside at the time?

    7 A. She stood just inside the house selected by

    8 the doorway.

    9 Q. Can you explain where this house stood in

    10 relation to the exchange of fire between the two firing

    11 points, the HVO and BH firing points, to the extent you

    12 knew where they were during the earlier exchange of

    13 fire?

    14 A. These houses on this side of the road

    15 belonged to the HVO.

    16 Q. Indicating the bottom of the diagram;

    17 correct?

    18 A. That's correct. And there were a series of

    19 trenches immediately adjacent to the road on that

    20 side. This side, there were several houses that

    21 belonged to the Muslim community, but served the

    22 camp --

    23 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone, please.

    24 A. -- served the camp area. That was one of

    25 the houses that we actually lived in. It was rented

  106. 1 from the Muslim family.

    2 MR. HAYMAN:

    3 Q. Where is the Grbavica feature in relation to

    4 this diagram; can you tell us?

    5 A. The high point buildings that you saw

    6 yesterday on the photographs, on the Grbavica feature

    7 that were manned by the BiH as represented by that

    8 house marked with BiH there.

    9 Q. What's the rough distance from the HVO houses

    10 below up to the BiH location you've indicated in the

    11 upper right-hand of the photograph?

    12 A. 400 metres.

    13 Q. Do you know and what's the distance -- the

    14 real question would be, degrees, but how many degrees

    15 separate the BH military installation that you've

    16 indicated in the upper right-hand of the diagram, and

    17 the front of the house where you and Dobrila were?

    18 A. You mean that angle?

    19 Q. That angle, in other words, a pyramid -- in

    20 other words, the variance of degrees from the -- well,

    21 I was thinking from the vantage point if someone was

    22 down in the HVO trench firing at the BH position, what

    23 is that? That variance of degrees, is that 5 degrees,

    24 10 degrees?

    25 A. I would say about 25 to 30 degrees.

  107. 1 Q. Were there other BH positions as you go on up

    2 the hill on Grbavica?

    3 A. Not that would have been able to engage these

    4 houses here. That's why these houses are of such

    5 the -- they were the ones that had been --

    6 MR. HAYMAN: You need to return to the

    7 microphone and repeat that, if you could.

    8 A. To explain. Those were the only houses that

    9 had a view over the area and that is why they were of

    10 such strategic importance during the attack in

    11 Grbavica. The other houses in Grbavica did not have a

    12 view over those particular HVO positions or those Croat

    13 houses. This was the house or two houses, rather, that

    14 were regularly occupied by BiH and that they sniped

    15 from those houses onto the Croat/HVO positions adjacent

    16 to camp on that side of the road.

    17 Q. Can you completed your use of this plain

    18 paper diagram?

    19 A. Other than to say that the scale is wrong.

    20 Q. It's not true to scale, in other words?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Very well. If Exhibit 172 could be returned

    23 to the easel, that is the aerial photograph, and

    24 perhaps we can just find a couple of these locations on

    25 the aerial photo so we do have a more accurate sense of

  108. 1 the scale. While that is being done --

    2 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be D155.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you.

    4 Q. While that is being done, did you visit with

    5 this investigative team, the area of the trenches and

    6 the HVO structures, to the bottom of Exhibit D155,

    7 which you have drawn?

    8 A. I did, indeed. I visited the whole area.

    9 Q. What did you find there? Did you find any

    10 evidence of value, evidence of potential forensic use,

    11 spent shell casings or the like?

    12 A. There were spent shell casings there, but

    13 bearing in mind the regularity with which there were

    14 small arms fire, that wasn't conclusive enough to say

    15 that it had come from that particular location.

    16 Q. Were there individual soldiers at those

    17 locations in these houses?

    18 A. At that particular time, there were not.

    19 Q. There was no one there?

    20 A. There was no one there. The activity in the

    21 area had considerably -- had calmed down in the three

    22 or four days afterwards. I had been around to all the

    23 local HVO, BiH positions, and obviously it was quite an

    24 upset to all the liaison officers and staff that had

    25 happened, and I think that message was quite clearly

  109. 1 put across to both sides and both communities.

    2 Q. Did you visit the BiH army firing point on

    3 Exhibit D155?

    4 A. No, I didn't. I couldn't get up to that

    5 point.

    6 Q. When you say you couldn't get up there, does

    7 that mean it wasn't safe so you weren't able to go up

    8 there and perhaps try and interview individuals there?

    9 What do you mean?

    10 A. I had already actually been up to that point

    11 on a previous occasion and new that it afforded the

    12 type of view for the area. I tried to get up there and

    13 I didn't get a lot of cooperation from the local BiH

    14 commander at the time.

    15 Q. Now, if I could just approach for a moment,

    16 Mr. President?

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to consult with my

    18 colleagues for a moment.

    19 I wanted to consult with my colleagues about

    20 a specific point of the amount of time given both to

    21 the Defence and to the Prosecution. This is the first

    22 time, as far as we remember, that the cross-examination

    23 has lasted longer than the examination-in-chief, which

    24 is causing somewhat of a problem. There are no

    25 specific rules in this matter, it's up to the Judges to

  110. 1 decide, but we consider it important to make this

    2 comment to Mr. Hayman to say that we had started quite

    3 awhile ago and that this cross-examination is longer

    4 than the examination-in-chief. You said yesterday that

    5 you would take the time today to do your

    6 cross-examination, but you have had a lot of time

    7 already. We have to think of where we're going with

    8 this and when we are going to get to the end,

    9 Mr. Hayman, all right?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I think your

    11 comments are well taken. I have, I would say, less

    12 than 45 minutes of material left. I think I have taken

    13 about the same as the direct so far, which is unusual

    14 in this case. Certainly, in the last nine or ten

    15 months, our cross-examinations generally have been much

    16 shorter than the directs, and the difficulty, with all

    17 candour, with this witness, is a lot of opinions on a

    18 lot of different subjects, and to dig into those

    19 opinions, quite frankly, at least in my judicial

    20 system, it is normal for that kind of testimony that

    21 the cross-examination take longer than the direct.

    22 Obviously we want to avoid that and we will continue to

    23 try and avoid that.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps you could try to be

    25 completed by 3.30 in respect of the reference to your

  111. 1 own legal system, we all have references to our legal

    2 systems. Perhaps it would be best to try not to refer

    3 to it too much. We are attempting to maintain a

    4 balance. Yesterday you were concerned about the

    5 possibility of being able to conduct a

    6 cross-examination. I know that the Judges took that

    7 into consideration. We are going to ask that you be

    8 finished by 3.30.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Hayman, of course, up to

    10 now, you have already taken three hours in the morning

    11 and an hour now, an hour and a half, and it's four

    12 hours, and we enjoy listening to you so don't worry.

    13 The problem is the following. This time is counted on

    14 the other parties. The same thing might happen to you

    15 and then it will be counted as hours which will be

    16 discounted from your side.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: If the court wishes to have a

    18 rule that would be any time in excess of the time on

    19 direct spent on cross be assessed against the other

    20 side, so be it. I don't think we would object to

    21 that. I think, in fact, that's been very rare during

    22 the Prosecutor's case, and I would expect, I would

    23 hope, it would be very rare during the Defence case,

    24 but I appreciate Your Honours' comment that I am not

    25 grating on Your Honours. I certainly hope not to and I

  112. 1 do hope to conclude with this witness reasonably soon.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We will then agree

    3 that you will finish by 3.30.

    4 MR. HAYMAN: I will do my very best, Your

    5 Honour. I would note, though, that the Defence gave up

    6 30 days of testimony vis-à-vis the Prosecutor when the

    7 Defence asked for a limit on the parties. They have 90

    8 days -- they had more than 90 and we agreed to take

    9 only 60. We, I think, have been a force in trying

    10 to --

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman. Mr. Hayman.

    12 Everybody is going to demonstrate great efforts,

    13 including the Judges. We will agree that your

    14 objective is to finish by 3.30. Obviously, if you

    15 can't, we will take that into consideration.

    16 MR. HAYMAN: May I proceed?

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you may proceed.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President, and

    19 thank you Your Honours.

    20 Counsel, this is the first opportunity I have

    21 had in some time to continue with my examination, and I

    22 would like to -- I think it would be helpful and we had

    23 a transparency with this exhibit sometime in the past,

    24 and I believe with Major Bower. If that can be

    25 retrieved, perhaps with a different coloured pen, we

  113. 1 can utilise that overhead because, quite frankly, I

    2 think it would be helpful to know where these three

    3 houses are, or three areas, on a map that is to scale.

    4 If we can do that quickly, if we can find that

    5 overhead, I would propose to do that. Can the

    6 registrar assist in that regard?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: In order to conclude with the

    8 previous question, in order to be rigorous but

    9 equitable, be assured, Mr. Hayman, that the

    10 examination-in-chief lasted 175 minutes, and at five

    11 after three, you're at 170. Therefore we're going to

    12 ask that you try to be complete by 3.30. Go ahead.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: This is Exhibit D142.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: I will approach with the court's

    15 leave to assist in placing this on Exhibit 172.

    16 Q. Major Bower, I'm going to -- excuse me.

    17 Mr. Whitworth, let's find some coloured pens that don't

    18 duplicate the colours used by the prior witness. I see

    19 there's a green one. Can you approach the

    20 Exhibit D142, which is on top of Exhibit 172, and

    21 indicate the location of the three areas you previously

    22 identified?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Let me simply point out to you

    24 that the quality among Judges is not absolutely ensured

    25 because we can say that Judge Jorda and Judge Riad are

  114. 1 seeing the reflections of the transparency and Judge

    2 Shahabuddeen can hardly see it at all. But I don't

    3 think you can do any better than that. We have Judge

    4 Shahabuddeen who can see now. He will have to have

    5 eyes for us then. Thank you. Now I think nobody can

    6 see. Well, everyone is equal.

    7 MR. HAYMAN:

    8 Q. For the record, let me ask you, sir, if

    9 you've indicated on this map in red --

    10 A. Number 1 is the house where Dobrila was shot

    11 and killed, known as the captain's house where I was

    12 located. 2 is the line of houses on the south side of

    13 the road, which is occupied by the HVO and is occupied

    14 by Croatian population and 3 is the two key houses that

    15 were circled in Grbavica, occupied by the BiH soldiers.

    16 Q. One more question on this subject. During

    17 the exchange of small arms fire that you noted, do you

    18 know from what or which of the houses or locations

    19 along the line that is number 2 specific fire came from

    20 or did the fire come from that general area represented

    21 by number 2 on Exhibit D142?

    22 A. It came from -- it was coming from the area

    23 at the top of the line marked 2, which I have actually

    24 coloured in.

    25 Q. Which you have coloured in now with a

  115. 1 different colour?

    2 A. It was also coming from the BiH positions in

    3 Grbavica.

    4 Q. Thank you. You may be seated.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Are you done with this exhibit?

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Yes.

    7 Q. After the investigative team --

    8 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me. Thank you.

    9 MR. HAYMAN:

    10 Q. After the investigative team, of which you

    11 were a part, carried out its activity over these three

    12 or four days, were there any leads or further

    13 investigation that you felt had not been conducted?

    14 A. Under the circumstances, we had done the best

    15 we could in questioning the people we found in and

    16 around the areas on both sides.

    17 Q. Did you suggest any other investigation or

    18 follow-up investigative activity to Colonel Blaskic or

    19 his representative on the team?

    20 A. No, at the time, I didn't.

    21 Q. Now, let me ask you concerning the death of

    22 Boris, the UNHCR driver.

    23 A. Can I just point out at this stage, Your

    24 Honour, that the investigation I conducted was also

    25 conducted by the British military police at the same

  116. 1 time. All the ballistics evidence, the round's journey

    2 that had gone through the building and subsequently

    3 through Dobrila and behind her, led us conclusively, to

    4 believe, that the round had come from one particular

    5 window in one of the HVO side of the road. That was

    6 almost irrefutable based on the journey that the round

    7 had taken. Despite that, the HVO offered another

    8 conclusion that it was a BiH soldier that had crept

    9 over from the other side, fired the round from HVO

    10 territory and gone back.

    11 Q. Did the BRITBAT military police prepare a

    12 report or other documentation concerning their analysis

    13 of the trajectory of the bullet?

    14 A. Exactly the same conclusions were reached by

    15 the military police officer who came up and based

    16 himself at BRITBAT for that particular location, and I

    17 believe he did produce a report to that effect.

    18 Q. Was that report shared with the HVO?

    19 A. I can't recall, I'm afraid. I gave my

    20 account to Darko Gelic after the HVO investigative team

    21 had given me their account of the events.

    22 Q. I take it at the end of the day, there was no

    23 further investigation, no persons who had not been

    24 interviewed, et cetera, that you or Colonel Duncan

    25 asked Colonel Blaskic to see was done; is that right?

  117. 1 A. In light of the ballistics evidence, it was

    2 quite clear to us that the round had come from one of

    3 the HVO positions, and what we were after was, firstly,

    4 for Colonel Blaskic to acknowledge the possibility that

    5 that was the case, and to do his own investigation to

    6 identify who was responsible and punish them

    7 accordingly. As far as we were aware, that's not what

    8 had taken place. There was a complete denial that the

    9 HVO had had anything to do with it, despite

    10 overwhelming evidence, as far as we were concerned, to

    11 the contrary. And nothing other than the investigative

    12 teams conclusion took place.

    13 Q. Did the investigative team interview HVO

    14 soldiers who were involved on the ground?

    15 A. Not to our knowledge. There was nobody there

    16 at the time, and I remember speaking to the local

    17 battalion commander who dismissed it as of no

    18 importance, as far as he was concerned.

    19 Q. So the local battalion commander was not

    20 cooperative?

    21 A. (Nod).

    22 Q. Was that reported to Colonel Blaskic?

    23 A. I can't remember, to be honest, at the time.

    24 It was -- no, I can't remember. I wouldn't like to

    25 say.

  118. 1 Q. Let's turn, since time is slipping by, let's

    2 move on to the death of the UNHCR driver on the 14th of

    3 August, 1993. I believe you said again, an

    4 investigation was carried out that spanned two days'

    5 time; is that right?

    6 A. That's correct, yes.

    7 Q. Who participated in the investigation?

    8 A. I was the only one that took part in the

    9 investigation, who was able to visit both locations,

    10 the alleged firing point and the impact point where

    11 Boris had been killed.

    12 Q. Nonetheless, did the HVO assign someone to

    13 work with you on the investigation?

    14 A. I believe they did, yes.

    15 Q. How many people was that?

    16 A. I think there was just one on that particular

    17 occasion, but there could have been more.

    18 Q. But that person, I take it, was not allowed

    19 by Commander Djidic to go to the scene of the

    20 destination of the bullet to participate with you in

    21 that aspect of the investigation; correct?

    22 A. Yes. Early on in our tour, Commander Sefkija

    23 had been quite willing to let HVO or Croat

    24 representatives into Stari Vitez in an attempt to

    25 re-establish electricity, telephone cables, but

  119. 1 subsequent to that, in his opinion, what had happened

    2 was they had been spying on the BiH defensive

    3 arrangements within Stari Vitez, and so he stopped. He

    4 refused from that point onwards to allow any

    5 representative, and it happened to affect the outcome

    6 of the inquiry of Boris's death.

    7 Q. What did you find at the suspected firing

    8 point, which, I believe, is indicated by an orange line

    9 from which an arrow emanates on Exhibit 441? What did

    10 you find at the suspected firing point? Did you find

    11 any evidence, forensic evidence of value?

    12 A. None whatsoever, other than knowing that it

    13 was a regularly occupied position from which HVO

    14 soldiers sniped into the area. The only real reason I

    15 have concluded that it came from that point was the

    16 direction of the vehicle and its orientation when the

    17 round had struck.

    18 Q. At the conclusion of this two-day

    19 investigation, did you suggest any leads or additional

    20 investigative activity that you desired the HVO

    21 representative to conduct?

    22 A. I suggested to them that, bearing in mind

    23 what I had found, that there was a strong possibility

    24 that it had come from that particular sanga (phoen)

    25 trench position on the top and asked them to

  120. 1 investigate that and expose who was responsible. I

    2 don't know how far in their investigation went, but

    3 when I asked that, it was met with a blank refusal that

    4 any HVO soldier would have actually done that in the

    5 first place. So from that, I concluded that there

    6 would be no subsequent investigation on their part.

    7 They just weren't prepared to entertain the thought

    8 that that was a possibility.

    9 Q. Was it before or after this point that you

    10 saw the sniper rifle depicted in Exhibits 82-9, 82-10,

    11 and 433-19?

    12 A. I think it was after, after I had -- after

    13 this event that I saw that sniper rifle.

    14 Q. So as of the time of the investigation, you

    15 had not seen any sniper rifle in the theatre; is that

    16 right?

    17 A. No.

    18 Q. How much later did you see this sniper rifle

    19 in the possession of a Vitezovi soldier?

    20 A. That sniper rifle was identified on my second

    21 or third visit to Kraljevic, which will be detailed in

    22 the log, so it would be quite easy to look at the

    23 dates, but I would have thought maybe three or four

    24 weeks.

    25 Q. At least a month later; is that accurate?

  121. 1 A. Well, I said three or four weeks.

    2 Q. Three to four weeks after the end of the

    3 investigation you saw this rifle; is that right?

    4 A. At the time of the investigation, after

    5 discussing the range, the accuracy needed, the calibre

    6 of the weapon, myself and the intelligence officer who

    7 was pretty well-educated about weapon capabilities, did

    8 actually suggest that it would be a weapon like that or

    9 something of that nature, responsible for it. Four

    10 weeks later, one appeared in Kraljevic's hands. It

    11 could quite easily have been construed that that weapon

    12 had appeared after the time and was not responsible for

    13 Boris's death, but bearing in mind they are quite a

    14 rare weapon, and that was the only one we ever saw

    15 within the Lasva Valley, we came to what we thought was

    16 a pretty safe conclusion.

    17 Q. Did you or a BRITBAT representative ask that

    18 the investigation be reopened in light of the

    19 identification of this suspect weapon in the possession

    20 of the Vitezovi?

    21 A. No. The investigation had terminated some

    22 time earlier. It was a month later and, again, we were

    23 busy engaged in other activities.

    24 Q. Are all the photographs I identified, are

    25 they all of the same gun?

  122. 1 A. They are, indeed, sir, yes.

    2 Q. During the Convoy of Joy incident, did

    3 BRITBAT have occasion to fire on Croats and kill or

    4 injure Croats in the course of trying to free or

    5 protect the convoy?

    6 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, if I may. I simply

    7 note that this wasn't part of the direct examination.

    8 I have no objection to the question. But it should, of

    9 course, go against -- not taken away from the

    10 Prosecutor's time on a question that was not part of

    11 direct. The substance of it, of course --

    12 JUDGE JORDA: That's correct. If you want to

    13 ask the question, you can, but do it very quickly.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: I'll use my own time for the

    15 balance of this cross-examination, Mr. President, if it

    16 pleases the court. If counsel is making a relevance or

    17 beyond the scope objection, I beg to differ, as there

    18 was testimony about the Convoy of Joy, the behaviour of

    19 crowds, and the fact is, although I'm not suggesting it

    20 was inappropriate, BRITBAT fired upon and killed a

    21 number of HVO and/or Croat civilians in connection with

    22 the Convoy of Joy incident. That is relevant

    23 information vis-à-vis the behaviour of these crowds and

    24 what was going on in the Vitez enclave at the time.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Well --

  123. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment. Mr. Hayman, you

    2 will allow the presiding Judge to have his opinion on

    3 this issue. It is true that the cross-examination must

    4 not move away too far from the direct examination.

    5 It's true that this fact was not included in the direct

    6 examination. I hope that I'm not giving you this as

    7 new information. I'm sure you know this already, but

    8 we're trying to gain some time here. If you tell us

    9 that it's particularly important for you, then ask the

    10 question. I just want to recall to you that it was not

    11 part of the direct examination because the Judges do

    12 listen now and again, you know.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: I won't take that bait, Your

    14 Honour. Of course the court studies the evidence and I

    15 wouldn't suggest or hint otherwise.

    16 Q. Can you answer the question briefly? If not,

    17 I will move on?

    18 A. Can you repeat the question, please?

    19 Q. Did BRITBAT have occasion to fire on Croat

    20 civilians or soldiers in connection with the Convoy of

    21 Joy incident?

    22 A. I bore -- I did not bear witness to that. It

    23 was reported as happening, and there were numerous

    24 instances throughout our tour when both Muslims,

    25 Croats, HVO and BiH were fired upon with restraint by

  124. 1 our soldiers in order to secure U.N. personnel.

    2 Q. Now we come to the last subject of my

    3 cross-examination, and that is the conflict and attack

    4 on the Grbavica feature of the 7th and 8th of

    5 September, 1993.

    6 You've indicated on Defence Exhibit 142, in

    7 red, the BiH army firing point in connection with this

    8 earlier exchange. Was that structure or in that area,

    9 was there, in fact, a BiH army battalion headquarters?

    10 A. Not to my knowledge. If that was the case,

    11 it was a pretty fool hearted place to put one, bearing

    12 in mind, its prominence on the hillside.

    13 Q. Did you ever visit any of the BiH army

    14 facilities and locations in that area, that is, at the

    15 foot along the road of the Grbavica feature?

    16 A. The houses in the Muslim community in

    17 Grbavica didn't seem to have any central military

    18 location, other than those two derelict houses which

    19 were used as lookout positions and usually constantly

    20 occupied by one or two BiH soldiers. But there was not

    21 a headquarters, battalion or otherwise, in the

    22 Grbavica, to the best of my knowledge, other than being

    23 the house where the local militia commander lived.

    24 Q. Am I correct that the house you identified on

    25 Defence Exhibit 142 as being a BiH army location is

  125. 1 within 500 metres of the perimeter of the BRITBAT base?

    2 A. Yes, it's probably about 400, 500 metres from

    3 there.

    4 Q. Was that a subject about which Colonel

    5 Blaskic was continually protesting to UNPROFOR, that

    6 the BiH army was firing on HVO positions from within the

    7 500 metre radius of the base, which UNPROFOR had

    8 proclaimed a fire-free zone?

    9 A. Yes, that's true. Colonel Blaskic did

    10 complain. Likewise, the HVO positions adjacent to the

    11 camp reciprocated and it was my job on numerous

    12 locations to visit the local Grbavica commander and the

    13 commander at 325 Brigade to protest about the

    14 regularity of small arms exchanges within the camp

    15 area.

    16 Q. Prior to the assault on Grbavica on 7 and 8

    17 September, 1993, how many civilian sniper victims were

    18 there from the BiH army snipers on Grbavica during your

    19 tour?

    20 A. I wouldn't like to guess. I would say

    21 probably a dozen or more.

    22 Q. Would you agree that during the attack, the

    23 HVO made no attempt to encircle the rear of the

    24 Grbavica feature so as to ensure an evacuation route

    25 for any civilians, as well as the BiH army on the

  126. 1 feature?

    2 A. Yes, I concur with that, but from a military

    3 point of view, it would have been foolish any way,

    4 because the area marked is BiH territory, and no

    5 military commander worth his salt would send troops in

    6 and try and attack around form the back for fear of

    7 running into other forces deployed over the hill.

    8 Q. In fact, this is the route that was used to

    9 evacuate civilians from Grbavica; correct?

    10 A. That's correct, yes.

    11 Q. After they evacuated on the night of the 7th,

    12 how many BiH army soldiers remained in Grbavica; do you

    13 know or are you not able to tell because they were in

    14 houses, structures, trenches, and fortifications?

    15 A. That's true, yes.

    16 Q. The latter is true?

    17 A. We estimated it may be 10 to a dozen, bearing

    18 in mind the amount of small arms fire taking place.

    19 Q. But the fact is you couldn't tell because

    20 they were hiding themselves?

    21 A. That's correct.

    22 Q. The infantry attack began on the morning of

    23 the 8th; correct?

    24 A. Correct.

    25 Q. Now, the BBC film we watched yesterday,

  127. 1 Exhibit 443, stated that the BiH army withdrawal was at

    2 approximately 13.00 hours or 1.00. Is that correct?

    3 Is that, in fact, when the BiH army forces appeared to

    4 withdraw?

    5 A. I'm not aware of that. That's a BBC detail.

    6 Q. When do you think they withdrew or do you

    7 know?

    8 A. Certainly from what I observed as I drove

    9 along the road, while the fighting was still going on,

    10 I saw very few people as the HVO were clearing through

    11 the position.

    12 Q. On the 8th, how much of the battle did you

    13 observe or to what extent were you doing other things?

    14 A. For the morning of the 8th, I spent in the

    15 offices mess with a fair of binoculars, taking

    16 photographs as the HVO troops went up to point 3 on the

    17 map, which was their launch point for the assault. And

    18 then around lunchtime, I drove through in an armoured

    19 vehicle, observed troops crossing the road, small arms

    20 exchanges taking place. I went down to the Hotel Vitez

    21 to speak to Colonel Blaskic, but spoke to Darko Gelic.

    22 Colonel Blaskic was unavailable at the time. I stayed

    23 down there for half an hour and then drove back up in

    24 the afternoon, after lunch sometime. I can't remember

    25 when it was. That's when I took the photographs

  128. 1 showing the extent to which the buildings were burning

    2 as I returned up. That must have been afternoon, early

    3 afternoon, afternoon time.

    4 Q. So you were gone from the BRITBAT base from

    5 roughly when to when, on the 8th of September?

    6 A. I wouldn't like to say. I was maybe gone for

    7 a couple of hours.

    8 Q. I'm sorry. Did you say when you thought the

    9 soldiers withdrew or simply that they had withdrawn by

    10 the time you returned from your trip to Vitez?

    11 A. We assumed that they had withdrawn. As I

    12 drove down to Hotel Vitez, for the first time, I saw

    13 very little activity but could hear small arms

    14 exchanges taking place. From that I assumed that there

    15 were still soldiers left in Grbavica, but on my return

    16 back an hour or two hours later, the HVO soldiers were

    17 walking around, crossing the road and were making moves

    18 to continue up the hill. By the afternoon period on my

    19 return, they had effectively been through the village,

    20 and I assumed whatever BiH were present were now dead,

    21 captured, or had withdrawn.

    22 Q. The BBC broadcast said that the flag was

    23 raised on Grbavica at teatime. In the language of your

    24 nation, when is teatime?

    25 A. That would fit in with the time I've just

  129. 1 given, I would say about 4.00, 5.00.

    2 Q. 1600 or 1700 hours?

    3 A. Something like that.

    4 Q. Is that accurate, in your judgement?

    5 A. It fits in with my recollection of timings of

    6 events on that day.

    7 Q. The BBC tape then says that looting and

    8 burning occurred later on in the night time. Do you

    9 agree with that?

    10 A. Yes, I think as I said yesterday, there were

    11 numerous vehicles and lorries turned up. Once it had

    12 been declared clear, I presume, the word very quickly

    13 went out and people turned up to salvage and loot

    14 whatever they could before the place completely went

    15 up.

    16 Q. The scavengers arrived in buses and trucks;

    17 is that right?

    18 A. No. People turned up with horse-drawn

    19 trailers. Some people turned up in trucks. People

    20 were pushing sofas down the road, or whatever it is

    21 that they could get their hands on, naturally, trying

    22 to salvage anything worthwhile.

    23 Q. How many houses were burning then when you

    24 came back in the afternoon, at mid afternoon?

    25 A. Quite a few. I would have said about half of

  130. 1 them.

    2 Q. Half of the total that you saw burning on the

    3 8th or half of all the houses on Grbavica?

    4 A. Yes, I would have said a good half of the

    5 houses. It certainly presented a great wall of smoke

    6 that looked as if there was a fair number. As I drove

    7 through and took photographs, I would say that half the

    8 houses were on fire.

    9 Q. How many more were burned after the one's

    10 that were burning in the middle of the afternoon on the

    11 8th? On the 8th, that is, say, that night?

    12 A. I would say two or three days later when I

    13 went back in, most of them had been burned, and

    14 everything had been stripped from the place. People

    15 were even coming in and prying the wood out of the

    16 window sills that they could probably then use for

    17 timber wood. I'm not sure. But all the buildings were

    18 stripped of whatever useful things were in them, and

    19 well over half, probably three-quarters of them had

    20 been burned. At that stage, I can't recall the state

    21 of the mosque, but it seemed reasonably intact on the

    22 8th but could quite well have been on fire at that

    23 particular time.

    24 Q. Did you see individuals lighting houses on

    25 fire?

  131. 1 A. No, I didn't, no.

    2 Q. Would you agree that the civilians and the

    3 scavengers who came after the battle was over, were

    4 just as capable of lighting houses on fire as were any

    5 soldiers who may have been lingering in the area?

    6 A. I can't think what their motive would be to

    7 light the fires, considering they were trying to

    8 salvage whatever they could from the buildings.

    9 Q. These were local people, at least, in part,

    10 weren't they, who were descending on the hill, -- who

    11 were coming to the location after the battle was over

    12 and stripping the wood off the windows and so forth?

    13 A. Yes, I presume so.

    14 Q. These were the same people that these sniper

    15 victims had been their families, their friends and so

    16 forth; correct? Weren't these people? Did you see the

    17 people on the BBC tape yesterday?

    18 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Your Honour --

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman. Ask questions,

    20 please. Don't make suggestions and then using your own

    21 suggestions, you come to questions. Go to the question

    22 directly. Don't make suggestions. Don't make any

    23 comments, please. You're pulling the witness into your

    24 own suggestions. Try to ask your questions directly.

    25 MR. HAYMAN:

  132. 1 Q. Did you see whether the locals who descended

    2 on Grbavica, on the 8th, to loot, et cetera, what was

    3 their state or could you tell?

    4 A. They just seemed to be coming down scavenging

    5 and looting for whatever there could be. They were

    6 people from as far up the valley as Nova Bila, Novi

    7 Travnik area.

    8 Q. Did Zuti come with a group of men to loot and

    9 scavenge?

    10 A. I don't recall seeing Zuti.

    11 Q. Zuti was from Nova Bila; correct?

    12 A. Nova Bila, Novi Travnik, yes.

    13 Q. How do you recall that people came from Nova

    14 Bila, specifically, if you didn't see Zuti or some

    15 indication of Zuti's men?

    16 A. There were a lot of people in Nova Bila than

    17 there are Zuti and there were numerous flatbed trucks

    18 and I knew a lot of people in Nova Bila whom I dealt

    19 with when doing the evacuations and could identify

    20 items and trucks that I had seen in the vicinity during

    21 the lotting.

    22 Q. Did you participate in evacuating any persons

    23 from Grbavica on the 7th or 8th?

    24 A. No, sir, I did not.

    25 Q. The man in the black uniform, Exhibit 444, if

  133. 1 that could be shown to the witness?

    2 THE REGISTRAR: Let me remind you to speak a

    3 little bit more slowly so that it can all be properly

    4 recorded in the transcript.

    5 MR. HAYMAN:

    6 Q. Turning to Exhibit 444, the individual on the

    7 far left; is there anything about that individual that

    8 leads you to believe he was a member of the unit the

    9 Jokers, other than the fact his dress is black?

    10 A. No, sir. Yesterday, I said that he was

    11 dressed typically in the fashion I had seen the Jokeri,

    12 but my driver and signaller who worked with me

    13 throughout the tour said they had identified an

    14 insignia on one or two of the gentlemen present near

    15 the Grbavica area. They also recognised the Jokeri

    16 insignia that was shown to demonstrate, as far as I was

    17 concerned, the type of dress that the Jokeri wore. I

    18 didn't say that was a member of the Jokeri, but the

    19 faces and the insignia worn by one or two members

    20 present at Grbavica were identified as being Jokeri.

    21 Q. When you say faces, what do you mean you

    22 identified a face?

    23 A. A couple of faces that I identified were, as

    24 far as I was concerned, people that I had met

    25 previously who sat on the balcony at the Swiss cottage.

  134. 1 Q. If you got close enough to identify their

    2 faces, did you see any insignia or markings on them

    3 that would have identified them as Jokers, had they

    4 been wearing any such insignia?

    5 A. No, sir, I did not. For the most part, there

    6 are very few insignia, actually. Usually the

    7 specialists army units wear with pride their insignia.

    8 None of the soldiers you will see on the film have got

    9 much insignia on. Some of them have "Vojne Policije"

    10 on which intimates that they might be from the military

    11 police. You can't go entirely on what people wear, nor

    12 can you specifically identify units on the whole that

    13 are present. All I said yesterday was that I had

    14 identified Turtko soldiers and chaps wearing Jokeri

    15 dress and we had also identified people with that

    16 insignia at Grbavica during the battle.

    17 Q. You said somebody else had but not you?

    18 A. I identified faces, chaps wearing the black

    19 uniform, and it was confirmed. One of my soldiers, who

    20 was with me in the vehicle, said, "Oh, sir, I have seen

    21 one of the guys with the clowns hat on his arm," to me

    22 indicating that he had also seen evidence that there

    23 were Jokeri present.

    24 Q. When was that, was this after the fight or

    25 during the fight?

  135. 1 A. This was at the end of the battle, at the end

    2 of the day when these soldiers were work walking around

    3 and the battle ceased and the flag had been put up.

    4 Q. At the end of the 8th?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Just a couple more questions. Did you go

    7 back to the Hotel Vitez then or did you only go to the

    8 Hotel Vitez once on the 8th?

    9 A. I can only remember going down when the

    10 battle was taking place, but it's likely that I went

    11 down again. I would sometimes go three or four times a

    12 day, depending on what the circumstances were.

    13 Q. When you went and you saw Darko Gelic and you

    14 said there are houses burning, what's going on at

    15 Grbavica, or words to that effect; what did he say to

    16 you, that there's no military operation going on?

    17 A. His reply was a blank refusal that there was

    18 any military operation going on and when I asked to

    19 speak to Colonel Blaskic or any of the staff officers,

    20 he said none of them are present and available to speak

    21 to you at this moment.

    22 Q. Was this at noon or at six p.m.?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Could you go more slowly,

    24 please? It's not because you have gone for

    25 three-quarters of an hour that you should pretend that

  136. 1 you are going faster by torturing the interpreters.

    2 Please slow down.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: I'm guilty of two sins,

    4 Mr. President. I'm almost done. I appreciate the

    5 court's patience.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Please complete quickly,

    7 please.

    8 MR. HAYMAN:

    9 Q. When did you have this conversation? Was

    10 this at noon or around the lunch hour?

    11 A. This was a conversation I went down to Hotel

    12 Vitez on the lunch time, early afternoon, of the 8th

    13 during which you pointed out I was absent from the

    14 Grbavica area.

    15 Q. And the BiH had not yet withdrawn from

    16 Grbavica as of noontime; correct?

    17 A. No, if you remember, I said that as I was

    18 going through, there were small arms exchange. I

    19 couldn't see any army or soldiers and left down to

    20 Hotel Vitez to return an hour, two hours later, by

    21 which time all the HVO soldiers were walking around on

    22 the road going through the buildings.

    23 Q. Was any other protest or expression of

    24 concern made, other than your, noon on the 8th visit,

    25 to the Hotel Vitez, to your knowledge?

  137. 1 A. There was no point, as far as I was

    2 concerned. The battle was over and done. The HVO had

    3 claimed Grbavica and the Muslim population had

    4 withdrawn.

    5 Q. So the answer is "no"?

    6 A. The answer is no.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you for your patience.

    8 Thank you, Your Honours, and Mr. President for your

    9 patience. I have concluded. I would offer, I think,

    10 444 is already in on behalf of the Prosecution. If

    11 Exhibit --

    12 THE REGISTRAR: Perhaps you are looking for

    13 D155.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: The transparency?

    15 THE REGISTRAR: That's also the transparency

    16 which is D142.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: D142, Your Honour, I believe is

    18 probably already in evidence. To the extent I need to

    19 re-offer it because there are new markings on it, I

    20 would re-offer it. May I inquire of the registrar, D155

    21 is what?

    22 THE REGISTRAR: It's the drawing that the

    23 witness made.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, the paper drawing. I would

    25 offer D155, and I have concluded. Thank you.

  138. 1 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Since this hearing

    2 has been conducted the way it has been conducted, we

    3 will take a 20-minute break, then the Prosecutor will

    4 ask any questions he wishes to ask and then the Judges

    5 will ask theirs.

    6 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.

    7 --- Upon commencing at 4.08 p.m.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the

    9 hearing. Have the accused brought in, please?

    10 (The accused entered court).

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, you now have the

    12 redirect, but stay within the scope of the

    13 cross-examination. I hope it will not be too long, all

    14 right?

    15 MR. KEHOE: Of course, Mr. President.

    16 Re-examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    17 Q. Good afternoon, Captain.

    18 A. Good afternoon.

    19 Q. I'm going to ask you a follow-up on several

    20 questions asked by Defence counsel on cross. Bear with

    21 me if I, again, jump from topic to topic. You said in

    22 response to questions by Defence counsel that Blaskic

    23 was an informed commander?

    24 A. I did, indeed, yes.

    25 Q. I think that Defence counsel raised the

  139. 1 subject of Vares, him being informed of what was

    2 happening in Vares; is that right?

    3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    4 Q. How about Zepce? Did you ever receive

    5 information during your tour about what was happening

    6 up in Zepce. When I say "received information," I mean

    7 received that information from HVO or HVO personnel?

    8 A. I did, indeed, sir. On numerous occasions, I

    9 received updates from Darko Gelic, Colonel Blaskic's

    10 liaison officer, on activity taking place in the Zepce,

    11 Vares and Kiseljak areas.

    12 Q. Captain, you were in the armed forces for

    13 some time, and it's quite normal, is it not, for a

    14 commander, such as then Colonel Blaskic, to be

    15 well-informed about what is happening in the area of

    16 his responsibility; is that right?

    17 A. Absolutely true, sir, yes. It's important to

    18 get communication from wherever to execute strategic

    19 command like that.

    20 Q. In your opinion, based on what information

    21 you got, Blaskic and his personnel were well-informed?

    22 A. Very well-informed, yes, sir.

    23 Q. Now, he also had quite a few number of

    24 soldiers under his command, didn't he?

    25 A. He did. He had several brigades in the Lasva

  140. 1 Valley that we were aware of. From the point of view

    2 of being informed about what was happening everywhere,

    3 we assumed also that he was making policy/strategic

    4 decisions about what was happening in other HVO Croat

    5 pockets like Vares and Zepce.

    6 Q. If I can ask you one more time, when you're

    7 answering the question, just look at the Judges. That

    8 would be a little better. You mentioned this chap

    9 "Zuti" during both direct and cross-examination?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. And you talked about Darko Kraljevic and the

    12 Vitezovi; is that correct?

    13 A. That's correct, sir.

    14 Q. How many Vitezovi were there?

    15 A. We estimated, or I estimated, rather, there

    16 to be 20 or 30 of them. And Zuti was -- I don't know.

    17 I have no reference to figures, but I should imagine

    18 there was a small gang of them that, when they weren't

    19 soldiers or whatever, were part of his entourage.

    20 Q. How about the Jokeri? Approximately how many

    21 of them?

    22 A. As a military police platoon, a normal size

    23 would be about 30 soldiers.

    24 Q. If any of those units were doing anything

    25 outside or contrary to what Blaskic wanted, did Blaskic

  141. 1 have the military manpower to take them out?

    2 A. Yes, sir, he did. He quite easily had

    3 sufficient manpower, weapons, whatever you want,

    4 resources to stop them doing whatever they were doing.

    5 He also appeared to have the necessary command

    6 structure and position himself to be able to execute

    7 and discipline them if that was necessary. "Execute"

    8 was the wrong word, by the way.

    9 Q. Captain, during your tour, starting with the

    10 instance on the 11th of June when Blaskic ordered the

    11 release of the U.N. vehicles, did Kraljevic and the

    12 local HVO obey?

    13 A. All HVO forces obeyed eventually, yes.

    14 Q. When Gelic went out to retrieve the trucks

    15 taken from the Convoy of Joy, when you were with him

    16 and they met the local HVO individuals at various

    17 locations, did those HVO commanders obey Blaskic's

    18 order?

    19 A. They did, indeed, sir, yes.

    20 Q. You mentioned on cross-examination Mario

    21 Cerkez's distaste in complying with the wishes of

    22 Colonel Blaskic. Do you remember those questions on

    23 cross?

    24 A. I do, indeed, sir, yes.

    25 Q. I think you highlighted that when you

  142. 1 attempted to get aid through, there initially was some

    2 resistance from Cerkez; is that correct?

    3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    4 Q. When the final decision came, did Cerkez obey

    5 Blaskic?

    6 A. He did, indeed, yes, sir. Albeit

    7 reluctantly, he did obey, yes.

    8 Q. Let me change subjects with you, if you

    9 will. You mentioned the series of photographs that you

    10 took, one of which was shown both by the Defence and

    11 the Prosecution of Valenta, Blaskic, Kordic, Kostroman,

    12 Santic, Skopljak being taken down to the Kiseljak U.N.

    13 facility. Do you remember those photographs?

    14 A. I do so, yes.

    15 Q. I think you also said that was sometime in

    16 June.

    17 MR. KEHOE: If we could put that back on the

    18 ELMO. I'm not sure, for the record, again,

    19 Mr. Dubuisson, which 80 that is. I think that's 80/8?

    20 THE REGISTRAR: That's right. It's 80/8.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. You - and by "you," I'm talking about

    23 UNPROFOR - took quite an entourage of people down

    24 there, did you not?

    25 A. We did, indeed, sir, yes.

  143. 1 Q. I think you mentioned in passing on cross

    2 that there were two warrior companies to load all these

    3 individuals up; is that right?

    4 A. Yes, I think there were eight or ten

    5 warriors, each of which will hold a section of eight

    6 men. But in this particular case, it was holding three

    7 or four representatives from the HVO/Croat hierarchy.

    8 Q. You mentioned that you took all of them down

    9 to the U.N. facility in Kiseljak, and several days

    10 later you brought them back; is that right?

    11 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    12 Q. You said in cross-examination you didn't

    13 bring all of them back?

    14 A. That's correct, sir.

    15 Q. You also said on cross-examination that,

    16 shortly thereafter, those people, who you had taken to

    17 Kiseljak, made it back into the Vitez area; is that

    18 right?

    19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    20 Q. How did they get back?

    21 A. I will reiterate what I said earlier, that we

    22 had strong suspicions that the helicopter flights

    23 coming in and out with considerable regularity were

    24 bringing people in and out, senior military and

    25 political figures like Dario Kordic, Colonel Blaskic,

  144. 1 and the like, but that was supposition on our part.

    2 Bearing in mind that we did see them again, it was the

    3 only explanation we could offer at the time.

    4 Q. The fact of the matter, Captain, was that

    5 these high HVO officials got back to Vitez without the

    6 assistance of UNPROFOR; isn't that right?

    7 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

    8 Q. Based on that fact, do you believe that it

    9 would have been just as easy for Colonel Blaskic to

    10 make that trip as well?

    11 A. In either direction, yes, sir, that's

    12 correct. That's one of the ways we assumed he was

    13 executing command in other areas outside the Lasva

    14 pocket.

    15 Q. If I can turn from that exhibit to

    16 Exhibit 435, if I may?

    17 MR. KEHOE: It's a map, Mr. Dubuisson.

    18 Q. Now, Captain, you noted in your direct and in

    19 cross that the green circled area was the general area

    20 where these individuals were held, but right close to

    21 the front line; is that right?

    22 A. It was a couple hundred metres from the

    23 front-line, sir, that's correct.

    24 Q. I believe there were how many displaced

    25 Bosnian Muslims in there?

  145. 1 A. I counted five or six families. There was

    2 about 20 to 30 people all told, about ten to a dozen of

    3 which were children.

    4 Q. You found out about these people, did you

    5 not?

    6 A. I did, indeed, sir, yes.

    7 Q. How far were these people being held from the

    8 Hotel Vitez?

    9 A. A kilometre, 1.400 metres.

    10 Q. They were being held by Blaskic's men, were

    11 they not?

    12 A. They were being held, sir, yes, by -- they

    13 were stopped from leaving.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Vague as to the term "Blaskic's

    15 men." Could we be more specific, please?

    16 MR. KEHOE: They were all his men.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: Well, on cross-examination,

    18 Mr. President, we had a specific discussion of who they

    19 were, militia, military police. It doesn't clarify the

    20 matter for counsel to use vague and, let's be frank,

    21 derogatory terms of the type he's using. We should

    22 have a clear, specific record in this case.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: All right. The objection is

    24 sustained. The cross-examination was conducted for

    25 clarifications about each of the troops and the

  146. 1 militias and the different formations. Try to be a bit

    2 more specific, Mr. Kehoe. Thank you.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. Captain Whitworth, these were HVO Vitez

    5 brigade soldiers, were they not?

    6 A. They were, indeed, sir, yes.

    7 Q. HVO Vitez brigade soldiers knew about the

    8 presence of those people a kilometre away from the

    9 Hotel Vitez, didn't they?

    10 A. As did the elements of the military police as

    11 well who stopped us living at that time.

    12 Q. The two units, two separate units, in the HVO

    13 knew about the presence of these individuals; isn't

    14 that right?

    15 A. They did, indeed, sir.

    16 Q. Initially, Darko Gelic even informed you that

    17 they could not leave; is that not right?

    18 A. That's right.

    19 Q. Based on that, do you have any opinion

    20 whether or not Blaskic knew that those displaced people

    21 were being held on the front-line area?

    22 A. I assumed that Darko Gelic, who was acting in

    23 the same light as I act on behalf of the Colonel, i.e.,

    24 with his authority and blessing, and that Colonel

    25 Blaskic was aware of the fact that those troops were

  147. 1 actually -- those civilians, rather, were detained in

    2 that area.

    3 Q. Now, let me speak on a couple of subjects,

    4 and again we're going to shift subjects. We're going

    5 to the Dobrila Kolaba murder. With the assistance of

    6 the usher, if we can flip back to that Defence Exhibit,

    7 and if I may approach the witness briefly? Let me just

    8 flip that plastic. I'm going to use that as well.

    9 Can you see this, Captain?

    10 A. Yes, sir.

    11 Q. Captain, from the questions by Defence

    12 counsel, did you receive some suggestion that Defence

    13 counsel tried to indicate a firing point from the BiH

    14 position on the top of the Grbavica feature?

    15 A. They did try to indicate that, yes, sir.

    16 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, I asked the

    17 question -- I think the question and the answer is

    18 vague. I asked questions. If there is a comment that

    19 the witness doesn't like -- if the witness feels I

    20 asked an inappropriate question -- what was the

    21 question? Let's hear it. Let's have it on the

    22 record. This conversation occurring between counsel

    23 and the witness is too elliptical, I think, for the

    24 record in this case. If there is some suggestion that

    25 I have done something improper, let's have it in the

  148. 1 record so we're precise --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: We have got to be clear here,

    3 because the interpreter also has to have time to

    4 distinguish the question from the answer. It's not

    5 that easy for me either. Reformulate your question,

    6 please.

    7 MR. KEHOE:

    8 Q. Captain, from the questions presented to you

    9 by Defence counsel, did you infer some indication by

    10 those questions that he suggested that the firing point

    11 for the killing of Dobrila was the feature in Grbavica

    12 overlooking the BRITBAT base?

    13 JUDGE JORDA: No comments, Mr. Kehoe,

    14 please. Here I can't agree with you. You haven't

    15 asked the witness if he thought that he was asked to

    16 suggest that. We have to be fair to all parties here.

    17 Keep things a little lighter, please.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, very well.

    20 MR. KEHOE:

    21 Q. You were asked questions on cross about the

    22 BiH position on the top of the Grbavica feature, were

    23 you not?

    24 A. I was, indeed, sir, yes.

    25 Q. You mentioned during both direct and cross

  149. 1 that the HVO conducted an investigation of the Dobrila

    2 killing; is that right?

    3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    4 Q. Did they not conclude that the firing point

    5 was, in fact, from an HVO trench and that it was never

    6 up on a BiH position?

    7 A. When I pointed out the trajectory of the

    8 round that actually struck Dobrila, they reluctantly

    9 conceded that it must have originated from the HVO side

    10 of the road.

    11 Q. From the HVO's investigation, they concluded

    12 that it was not from the BiH position on top of the

    13 Grbavica feet; isn't that right?

    14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    15 Q. Now, the firing point that you took them to,

    16 as you just mentioned, was an HVO trenching area; is

    17 that right?

    18 A. It was one of the houses occupied by the HVO,

    19 yes, sir.

    20 Q. Their conclusion was that an ABiH soldier

    21 crawled into that trench?

    22 A. It was not a trench. It was actually the top

    23 floor of one of the buildings that were occupied by the

    24 HVO soldiers.

    25 Q. I'm sorry. It was a house that was in

  150. 1 control of the HVO, but that an ABiH soldier somehow

    2 surreptitiously got into that house and killed Dobrila

    3 from that point?

    4 A. That's correct, sir, went around the back,

    5 got up the stairs into the room, shot from the window,

    6 and then left the building via the same way, crossed

    7 the open road and then re-entered the ABiH territory

    8 during the small arms exchange that was taking place.

    9 Q. You disagreed with that conclusion?

    10 A. Yes, I did, sir.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: I think that you can move on,

    12 Mr. Kehoe.

    13 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: This has already been dealt

    15 with from every side possible. The Trial Chamber is in

    16 a position to reach a decision. Move on, please.

    17 MR. KEHOE: I'll move on from that.

    18 Q. Likewise, there were denials on the killing

    19 of Boris, the UNHCR driver, in Stari Vitez; is that

    20 right?

    21 A. There was, indeed, sir, yes.

    22 Q. Those denials on HVO involvement came from

    23 Darko Gelic; is that right?

    24 A. They did, yes.

    25 Q. He was the same individual you mentioned on

  151. 1 cross-examination that said that no military operation

    2 was transpiring in Grbavica that you were witnessing on

    3 the 7th and the 8th?

    4 A. That's true, sir, yes.

    5 Q. After you found this weapon and after you had

    6 done your investigation, you disagreed with the HVO's

    7 position on that as well?

    8 A. I did, indeed, sir, and felt that they could

    9 have made considerably more effort to investigate it

    10 themselves.

    11 Q. Those are the two murders that you disagreed

    12 with and for which no HVO soldier was punished, to your

    13 knowledge; is that right?

    14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    15 Q. Did it surprise you during your tour and

    16 after those experiences that no HVO soldier was

    17 punished for the massacre in Ahmici?

    18 A. No, it doesn't, sir. It follows the pattern

    19 that we saw of the lack of will and commitment towards

    20 the pursuance of seeing the right thing done under

    21 these circumstances.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope. I ask to be

    23 able to cross-examine this witness about Ahmici,

    24 subsequent investigations into Ahmici, orders by our

    25 client to investigate Ahmici, because this witness

  152. 1 should tell the court, has he been given that

    2 information, or is he being misled into giving false

    3 and inappropriate testimony to this court by counsel.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: The objection is sustained.

    5 Move to another question, please.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. Let's talk about Stari Vitez. You noted

    8 during cross-examination that people were using

    9 improvised weapons; is that right?

    10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    11 Q. You noted that women sometimes were defending

    12 their houses; is that right?

    13 A. On occasion, sir, yes.

    14 Q. You noted that Sefkija Djidic told you that

    15 there was a cache of ammunition in that location; is

    16 that right?

    17 A. He did, indeed, sir, yes.

    18 Q. Was ICRC and UNHCR routinely supplying the

    19 Muslims in Stari Vitez?

    20 A. With medical supplies and food, yes.

    21 Q. How about ammunition?

    22 A. They, like ourselves, went to great lengths

    23 to prevent and eliminate that possibility.

    24 Q. How do you know that?

    25 A. We had our own liaison officer based with the

  153. 1 UNHCR who oversaw activities like loading and

    2 unloading; likewise, we had a liaison officer working

    3 with the ICRC whose conduct was impeccable as far as

    4 making sure that any casualties and delivery of medical

    5 supplies were always aboveboard and as agreed.

    6 Q. How do you know that UNHCR was not routinely

    7 taking trucks of supplies loaded with weapons into

    8 Stari Vitez?

    9 A. If I was supervising and organising an aid

    10 delivery, one of the measures I would take to try and

    11 imbue the HVO and the Croats with confidence would be

    12 to allow them to choose, out of a convoy of however

    13 many vehicles, which particular vehicles that they

    14 wanted to take for themselves and which they would

    15 allow into Kruscica, so that if weapons would get

    16 into -- basically who was packing the vehicles could

    17 not guarantee that those weapons would not end up in

    18 the hands of the HVO.

    19 Q. Would it be fair to say that the selection of

    20 trucks going to Stari Vitez from the HVO warehouse was

    21 random?

    22 A. To the best effect, yes, it was as random as

    23 it could be. At this point --

    24 Q. I'm sorry. I had mentioned the HVO warehouse

    25 in my question. I stand corrected; I did say that.

  154. 1 The UNHCR warehouse.

    2 A. I would also like to point out that all these

    3 supplies originated from Split in Croatian territory

    4 and came up through an extensive HVO and Croat area.

    5 We experienced no such problems when all those vehicles

    6 were transiting through Muslim and BiH territory south

    7 of the Lasva Valley. It was treated as unacceptable to

    8 stop the UNHCR convoys. Everybody, as far as we were

    9 concerned, was aware that all efforts were made to

    10 minimise and avoid those types of --

    11 THE INTERPRETER: Will you please ask the

    12 witness to slow down?

    13 MR. HAYMAN: We would like to cross-examine

    14 this witness about, apparently, his knowledge of the

    15 standard operating procedures at the UNHCR warehouse in

    16 Zenica, in light of this new testimony beyond the

    17 scope.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this is clearly

    19 not beyond the scope, given the fact that Defence

    20 counsel went into it at some length, this issue.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Listen, let's try to put some

    22 order to this. That's my role. First of all, there

    23 will not be a cross-cross-examination. We have never

    24 operated that way. With my colleagues, we have all

    25 agreed that the cross-examination must be adapted to

  155. 1 the direct examination, and the redirect to the

    2 cross-examination. This is not a mathematical rule.

    3 I've already said this on several occasions. We apply

    4 it with some degree of flexibility.

    5 Second of all, I would ask the witness to

    6 limit himself to answers to the questions and not to

    7 make comments; otherwise, it is going to degenerate. I

    8 understand that the Defence at that point becomes

    9 concerned and wants to bring information to the

    10 Judges.

    11 Last of all, I would like to say - I should

    12 have said this first - the interpreters can no longer

    13 work under these conditions.

    14 Mr. Kehoe, ask a further question --

    15 MR. KEHOE: Yes, I'm almost done.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: -- but remain within the scope

    17 of the cross-examination; otherwise, I am going to set

    18 a time limit, beyond which we are going to stop, as we

    19 did yesterday afternoon.

    20 MR. KEHOE: I'm almost completed,

    21 Mr. President.

    22 Q. Stari Vitez, who was doing the attacking, the

    23 HVO or the ABiH?

    24 A. It was my impression, sir, that the HVO

    25 initiated the majority of the exchanges that took

  156. 1 place. The circumstances in Stari Vitez were very

    2 difficult. They were making every effort to conserve

    3 ammunition and would, therefore, resist any temptation

    4 to spend unnecessary ammunition. With the Croat/HVO

    5 positions, they were in no position to try to make

    6 offensive against whatsoever, and that was only to the

    7 advantage of the HVO to do that.

    8 Q. You were asked on cross-examination whether

    9 or not Blaskic allowed civilians to leave Stari Vitez,

    10 and you mentioned that you passed that message on on

    11 several occasions. I believe that was your response to

    12 counsel's questions; is that right?

    13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    14 Q. Initially, nobody left; is that right?

    15 A. Nobody wanted to leave, sir, that's correct.

    16 Q. Ultimately, did some people in Stari Vitez

    17 leave?

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Slowly, please.

    19 MR. KEHOE:

    20 Q. Ultimately, Captain, did some people in Stari

    21 Vitez leave?

    22 A. Yes, we were eventually allowed to remove

    23 maybe a dozen or so people who were old or injured or

    24 required regular medical attention that they couldn't

    25 get within the limited confines of Stari Vitez.

  157. 1 Q. After that, did civilians continue to remain

    2 in Stari Vitez?

    3 A. They did, sir, yes.

    4 Q. After these people had left?

    5 A. They did, indeed.

    6 Q. These people in Stari Vitez, can you see the

    7 burning of the village of Kruscica from there? Excuse

    8 me, the burning of Grbavica?

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope, absolutely

    10 beyond the scope. As one can see, in Grbavica or

    11 Zenica -- I know what counsel is trying to do. It is

    12 very clear. I can tell the court if it wants more.

    13 Absolutely beyond the scope.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, may I respond?

    15 The response is this: Counsel has suggested to this

    16 court that these people were free to walk out of

    17 there. And what these people concluded, based on what

    18 they saw around them, is that if they left, their

    19 village would have been destroyed, burnt, and looted,

    20 just like every other village in the Lasva Valley

    21 area.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that's a valid answer.

    23 Continue, please.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Could you see Grbavica from Stari Vitez?

  158. 1 A. You could, indeed, sir.

    2 Q. Could you see the village of Donji Vecerska

    3 and Gacice?

    4 A. They were close enough to be able to see what

    5 went on there in terms of when buildings were burned,

    6 yes.

    7 Q. Did the people in Stari Vitez know what had

    8 happened in villages like Ahmici?

    9 A. They knew, sir, yes.

    10 Q. Why didn't these civilians leave?

    11 A. It was their opinion that if they left, it

    12 would be literally handing over their homes and the

    13 rest of the Lasva Valley to the Croats and that there

    14 would be no future for their families. As far as they

    15 were concerned, they were quite prepared to stand and

    16 defend their homes, regardless of what it took. It was

    17 that simple and clear-cut, as far as they were

    18 concerned.

    19 MR. KEHOE: If I might have a moment,

    20 Mr. President. I have nothing further, Mr. President,

    21 Your Honours.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Riad?

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Captain Whitworth, good

    24 afternoon.

    25 A. Good afternoon, Your Honour.

  159. 1 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to ask you for some

    2 clarifications, and if you are in a position to give

    3 them to me without entering into too many details, we

    4 have heard enough details. I will go quickly through

    5 parts of your testimony.

    6 You mentioned that Colonel Blaskic was

    7 well-informed in the area and had a good understanding

    8 of the situation. These are almost your words.

    9 A. That's correct, sir.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Of course, you are a military

    11 man. Of course, you know better than me - I'm not a

    12 military man - what a commander should be aware of.

    13 Did you build this assessment on your military

    14 knowledge or also on concrete indications that he was

    15 well-informed and, as you said, had a good

    16 understanding of the whole area? You had concrete

    17 indications?

    18 A. Sir, that conclusion was really -- we came to

    19 that at the end of our tour, after all of us, the

    20 Colonel and the liaison officers, had made observations

    21 throughout the tour. I personally witnesses and bore

    22 messages from Hotel Vitez to Colonel Alastair detailing

    23 the situation in other parts of the area. I had

    24 witnessed different types of communication equipment,

    25 which we weren't aware that they had.

  160. 1 Our overall impression was that he was an

    2 effective commander at a strategic level because he was

    3 well-informed about the areas which were supposedly

    4 under his command in Third OP zone. This was an

    5 opinion we came to at the end. It wasn't one we jumped

    6 to, and there was information from several sources that

    7 led us to that final conclusion.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: On the ground, not academic.

    9 A. Yes, sir.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Now, you also mentioned, as you

    11 have repeated now, that he had an effective command and

    12 control over his soldiers on the ground, including

    13 military police. Those were your words. You ruled out

    14 some kind of conversation which apparently happened

    15 with Colonel Duncan where he was considered as a puppet

    16 commander ignored by the locals.

    17 A. That's correct, sir.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: So he was not a puppet

    19 commander?

    20 A. As far as we were concerned, that wasn't the

    21 case. If we wanted something done, then it would be

    22 Colonel Blaskic we petitioned to achieve that.

    23 Ultimately, although it might take time to disseminate

    24 the information and his orders, eventually it would

    25 happen in one form or another.

  161. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Being an effective commander and

    2 having control over his soldiers on the ground, would

    3 you rule out the fact that certain major incidents,

    4 like the burning of villages and so on, could happen in

    5 spite of his orders or without his knowledge?

    6 A. I would say, sir, that circumstances are very

    7 difficult - command and control is always very

    8 difficult in battle - and that I could anticipate

    9 circumstances arising where soldiers would be in a high

    10 state of adrenaline or excitement, that things like

    11 that could happen. Certainly, to me, it appeared that

    12 it was systematic, bearing in mind the number of houses

    13 that were actually burned during this type of attack.

    14 If it was a smaller number, then I would have

    15 been prepared to accept that, but the fact that we're

    16 talking virtually all the buildings in a place like

    17 Grbavica are levelled to the ground because they were

    18 Muslim-occupied and not Croat-occupied, it suggests

    19 strongly to me that it's a policy, rather than

    20 something taking place at the spur of the moment.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: You just mentioned Grbavica.

    22 You showed us a video, I think, where houses have been

    23 burning, and a soldier was walking around with a

    24 butcher's hatchet in his hand.

    25 A. That's correct.

  162. 1 JUDGE RIAD: You mentioned that you found

    2 somebody with his head chopped off.

    3 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: Is the carrying of a hatchet a

    5 weapon used in the army now at the end of the 20th

    6 century?

    7 A. I wouldn't like to make the connection. It

    8 is not a weapon, sir. My conclusion from that was not

    9 that that particular weapon had been responsible for

    10 the decapitation, but it looked to me, when I took the

    11 photograph, that it was simply a trophy that had been

    12 acquired from one of the Muslim homes during the

    13 looting.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: Was there any investigation

    15 undertaken?

    16 A. No, there wasn't, sir.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: Not at all?

    18 A. Not to my knowledge.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Neither about the destruction

    20 nor the killing?

    21 A. The bodies that were found were identified as

    22 wearing Armija uniforms and so were soldiers. I

    23 personally did not witness it. I was told that the

    24 head of the decapitated soldier appeared in a bag down

    25 in Busovaca but that was hearsay. I don't know who

  163. 1 that came from.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: You also mentioned that Colonel

    3 Blaskic was always up and down the Lasva Valley, and he

    4 had an active role. How much could he travel without

    5 the UNPROFOR assistance?

    6 A. The assumption that he was active came from

    7 the fact that it was very difficult to identify his

    8 whereabouts at times and it was repeatedly told to me

    9 that he was not in the Hotel Vitez. On occasion, I did

    10 bump into him once or twice in the Nova Bila area, so

    11 he obviously was taking an active role in that way. He

    12 spent, if what Darko Gelic's liaison officer tells me

    13 is correct, he spent a considerable amount of time out

    14 of the Hotel Vitez itself. His movements within the

    15 Lasva Valley were limited because of the movement of

    16 the BiH territory, obviously, which was as far as

    17 Travnik area, Novi Travnik, and Busovaca.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: His travelling up and down,

    19 would it be possible to places like Ahmici or Stari

    20 Vitez?

    21 A. Yes, very easily, sir, they are on the main

    22 road. They are literally a mile, a few kilometres away

    23 from the Hotel Vitez and they are all on the edge of

    24 the HVO territory.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: You spoke of the trenches, you

  164. 1 said they were well situated to prevent the Armija and

    2 they were done to the knowledge of Colonel Blaskic?

    3 A. No, sir, I said they were obviously well

    4 planned by a professional officer. There were several

    5 members of the JNA, ex-members of the JNA, in the HVO

    6 based in the hotel. And the fact that these trenches

    7 were well-positioned and cited was what limited the

    8 Armija's ability to penetrate and gain ground in the

    9 Lasva Valley area, so far as we were concerned, the

    10 defence was laid out and well planned, not by some

    11 local militia commander but by, obviously, by a

    12 professional soldier.

    13 JUDGE RIAD: The fact how these trenches are

    14 being built and by whom, by prisoner civilians, would

    15 that also be the domain of these JNA or would it be the

    16 commander's --

    17 A. The actual digging of the trenches would be

    18 the local militia on the ground. I saw no evidence of

    19 civilians or prisoners digging trenches. The trenches

    20 were -- well, let's say usually established during the

    21 night. There was digging -- trenches would appear the

    22 following day or changes to them would appear. So

    23 there weren't prisoners involved in digging them.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: You spoke of Anto Valenta as a

    25 senior political figure and the policy maker in the

  165. 1 Lasva Valley, and Colonel Blaskic as the key military

    2 figure?

    3 A. Yes, sir.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: We know what the policy maker is

    5 supposed to do and what the military, let's say,

    6 commander is doing. But would you consider the

    7 military commander as executing the policy?

    8 A. The executor of the policy.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: The executor of the policy?

    10 A. That's how we interpreted it.

    11 JUDGE RIAD: While executing this policy,

    12 could it be done in a way avoiding destruction or the

    13 destruction that happened, the burning and all this

    14 that we've listened to?

    15 A. Yes, it could, sir, yes. There's no reason

    16 whatsoever for the systematic clearance and destruction

    17 like that, once the area has been cleared of troops.

    18 JUDGE RIAD: You mentioned that in Stari

    19 Vitez, I think there was a decision of the HVO, that in

    20 case of invasion by the BiH, they would explode the

    21 ammunition?

    22 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: How much would this endanger the

    24 civilians?

    25 A. The ammunition factory was a kilometre

  166. 1 outside of the Vitez town centre, but our own

    2 assessment of the damage that would be created, which

    3 was done by our explosives and engineer experts said

    4 that there would be a lot of damage from shrapnel and

    5 bits of buildings and the like. It would create quite

    6 a hole, but most of the damage would be done by the

    7 debris that would fly away from the area.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Captain.

    9 A. Thank you, sir.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen? Thank you,

    11 Judge Riad.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Captain, I apologise in

    13 advance if I should appear to be raising matters which

    14 you have already covered. The fault, in that case,

    15 would be mine in that I would not have been paying as

    16 much attention as I should have been doing. I want to

    17 talk about the hospital at Nova Bila. There was a

    18 hospital there?

    19 A. There was, indeed, sir, yes.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, the patients in

    21 that hospital, were they exclusively Croats or

    22 exclusively Muslims or a bit of one and a bit of the

    23 other?

    24 A. Can I first explain, sir, that it wasn't

    25 actually a hospital, it was a catholic church that had

  167. 1 been converted into a hospital, and that was the only

    2 real medical facility that the HVO and the Croat people

    3 had in the Lasva pocket. So circumstances were very

    4 difficult for them in that respect. As far as I

    5 witnessed, the only people that were in there were

    6 Croats, although on one occasion, there were some

    7 Muslim gypsies residing in Vitez town centre who were

    8 injured during shell fall, and they were hospitalised

    9 in that hospital.

    10 So that was the only occasion I saw Muslims

    11 in there. They were just local gypsies that drifted

    12 around the area.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Colonel Blaskic gave

    14 certain instructions about evacuation?

    15 A. In what respect, sir?

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Of the patients in the

    17 hospital?

    18 A. He expressed a wish on several occasions that

    19 people should be evacuated from the hospital because

    20 the hospital was stretched in terms of the numbers it

    21 was expected to deal with and the facilities that it

    22 could offer. For example, during the fall of Travnik,

    23 there was a large influx of casualties, most of which

    24 were suffering from shrapnel or gunshot wounds, and so

    25 there were requests at that time from the hospital

  168. 1 staff for us to organise an evacuation.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Am I correct in

    3 understanding you to mean that his instructions

    4 presented no distinction between Muslims and Croats?

    5 A. There was no such distinction, sir, no, but

    6 the people in the hospital were Croats.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, tell me about

    8 Mr. Anto Valenta and Mayor Santic. I gathered from

    9 what you said that Mr. Valenta favoured separation, a

    10 policy of separation, whereas, Mayor Santic was

    11 prepared to accept a certain degree of integration. Do

    12 I understand you correctly?

    13 A. That was the impression I was given by both

    14 those gentlemen, yes, sir.

    15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: From what you saw

    16 happening on the ground, whose policies would you say

    17 were, in fact, being implemented?

    18 A. Those were the ones of Anto Valenta, sir.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would that have been

    20 apparent to any objective onlooker?

    21 A. I think at the end of our six-month tour,

    22 when you study each of the incidents that took place,

    23 that would be quite clear.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say from all

    25 the information you had that that would or would not

  169. 1 have been clear to General Blaskic?

    2 A. He's a professional soldier with, as I always

    3 interpreted it, a good understanding of what is

    4 happening in his area of responsibility, so I can't see

    5 why he would not see that as happening around him.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I want to talk to you a

    7 little about Vitez and Stari Vitez. The impression I

    8 have from what you said was the balance of military

    9 assault favoured Vitez against Stari Vitez. Most of

    10 the shooting was coming from Vitez and directed to

    11 Stari Vitez?

    12 A. That's correct, sir, whilst I can't say I

    13 stood in no-man's land and counted off who started

    14 first.

    15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand that. Now,

    16 was it your impression that the prospect of killing

    17 civilians in Stari Vitez at any time operated to

    18 restrain the use of military force from Vitez directed

    19 against Stari Vitez? That's a difficult question,

    20 Captain?

    21 A. I'm just reflecting and thinking about the

    22 circumstances.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you this:

    24 Were civilians killed in Stari Vitez?

    25 A. If I was to be honest, sir, I would say that

  170. 1 my overall impression that no consideration was given

    2 to the civilians within Stari Vitez, and that the

    3 number of casualties taken was -- they were all

    4 civilians in there, as far as I was concerned. And

    5 there were equal number of women and children hurt in

    6 the use -- with the use of babies, et cetera.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: It was a relatively

    8 small area, was it?

    9 A. It was, indeed, sir, yes.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us talk about

    11 the ammunition factory to which you referred. The

    12 impression I have from your testimony is that Colonel

    13 Blaskic undertook to give notice in the event of his

    14 side deciding to blow up that factory; do you remember

    15 that part of your evidence?

    16 A. Yes, sir. He did give us warning of that,

    17 sir. He assured us he would give us two hours'

    18 notice.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: He said he would. If

    20 the factory blew up, would the establishment of BRITBAT

    21 be in jeopardy?

    22 A. I don't doubt, sir, we would have suffered

    23 damage to a considerable degree.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Right. Now, are you in

    25 a position to tell us whether a similar undertaking to

  171. 1 give notice was ever given on the HVO side in respect

    2 of any other explosions which they might have

    3 occasioned in the area within which you were located?

    4 A. No, they weren't, sir, and that includes the

    5 assault on Grbavica where rounds initially fell within

    6 the camp area before the mortars had zeroed in on their

    7 target. So no notice was given for that which was the

    8 closest, I suppose.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: One last area of

    10 questioning has to do with this: HVO military

    11 personnel were located in groups in various places

    12 within Central Bosnia; am I right?

    13 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: From what you saw as a

    15 military man, would you be able to tell this Trial

    16 Chamber whether it was your impression that these

    17 various groups of eight HVO military personnel were

    18 acting in coordination one with another or they were

    19 acting completely on their own?

    20 A. Our impression was that, as with all military

    21 units, they are given specific missions and tasks to

    22 undertake, but that is driven and directed by, for want

    23 of a better word, the policy makers. And that seemed

    24 to fit the picture in this case, as it does in most

    25 fields -- areas of conflict like this. There always

  172. 1 seems to be a general policy operating behind it.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say then that

    3 these various pockets of HVO military personnel were in

    4 communication, one with another, by some method or the

    5 other?

    6 A. Yes, they were, sir.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I have only one question to ask

    9 you, Captain, before we finish with this long

    10 testimony. It's one of the questions that my

    11 colleagues didn't ask but thought about this. Anto

    12 Valenta's politics or policy was very pre-eminent in

    13 respect of separation or the implementation of the

    14 Vance-Owen Plan was to an advantage. My question is

    15 the following: When this policy, at the time that this

    16 type of policy is implemented, you who are a military

    17 man, when the military leader of the operative zone is

    18 chosen, is that person chosen as a result -- in respect

    19 of his own policies or the choices that he makes of

    20 that policy? Do you understand what I'm getting at?

    21 A. I do, indeed, sir, yes. And basing your

    22 question around the circumstances that I'm familiar

    23 with, we would say it's courses for courses. You would

    24 choose the person to undertake the task who you felt

    25 best equipped to do it.

  173. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Very well, the

    2 Tribunal thanks you very sincerely. You have shown

    3 great patience. You have tried to answer honestly and

    4 in good faith, and objectively as it should be. For

    5 every witness, even if it is a witness for one of the

    6 two parties. We are grateful to you for that. You may

    7 now go back to your civilian activities, if I

    8 understood you correctly, and the registrar will have

    9 the witness escorted out of the courtroom. Thank you

    10 very much.

    11 (The witness withdrew)

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, what are you

    13 suggesting now? I have the feeling that you don't have

    14 any other witnesses; is that correct?

    15 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, we do not

    16 have any further witnesses for today.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Well, that will be advantageous

    18 to the interpreters and we are very thankful for their

    19 say because it hasn't been that easy for them. We are,

    20 therefore, glad we are ending early. Tomorrow we will

    21 resume at 10.00. Court stands adjourned.

    22 --- Whereupon hearing adjourned at

    23 5.00 p.m. to be reconvened on Wednesday,

    24 the 15th day of July, 1998 at 10.00 a.m.