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  1. 1 Wednesday, 9th September 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 (The accused entered court)

    4 --- Upon commencing at 2.10 p.m.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please be seated.

    6 Mr. Registrar, would you please have the accused

    7 brought in? I would like to see if all the interpreters

    8 can hear me. Very good. I hope you've been able to

    9 take advantage of this morning as we all have. The

    10 Office of the Prosecutor hears me. And the accused

    11 hears me, the Defence. I see. Very well.

    12 MR. NOBILO: Good afternoon, Your Honour, I

    13 hear you well.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: I see we're ready to resume.

    15 Before we bring in the witness, I don't want to be

    16 mistaken about his name. I believe his name is Dusan

    17 Bilandzic. Yes.

    18 (The witness entered court)

    19 WITNESS: Dusan Bilandzic.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Professor, do you hear me?

    21 Very well. Please be seated.

    22 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Professor, are you ready to

    24 continue?

    25 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.

  2. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Cross-examination

    2 has not been completed. Therefore, I give, without

    3 further ado, the floor to Mr. Kehoe.

    4 Cross-examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. Thank you. Good afternoon, doctor.

    7 A. Good afternoon.

    8 Q. Doctor, in your testimony yesterday in

    9 response to some questions by my learned colleague,

    10 Mr. Nobilo, you noted that every nation, and I

    11 apologise, I'm dealing from page 11.288, counsel, line

    12 14: "Every nation passes through this phase. It is a

    13 phase of nationalism which turns into chauvinism and

    14 leads to war. Every nation is to apply another

    15 principle in addition to the ethnic principle, at

    16 least one, and that is the principle of historic

    17 right."

    18 "I have the right, as a leader of a nation,

    19 to establish borders along those countries who, at some

    20 time in history, say, a thousand years ago, were within

    21 the composition of my one-time ruler."

    22 Do you recall saying that, sir?

    23 A. Yes; that is correct.

    24 Q. I think, and correct me if I'm wrong at any

    25 point in this series of questions, Doctor, in

  3. 1 conjunction with that you highlighted for the Court the

    2 studies by the, I believe, 19th Century linguist, and

    3 again, if I'm wrong on the "19th Century", please

    4 correct me, but the 19th Century linguist Vuk Karadzic,

    5 who noted that because people in the Balkans or certain

    6 areas of the Balkans, I believe you noted from Salonika

    7 to Constantinople, spoke essentially the same language,

    8 they were one nation, and when asked what nation he

    9 noted that nation was a Serb nation.

    10 I think you testified that that, in

    11 conjunction with some other factors, fuelled the belief

    12 for a Greater Croatia; is that right?

    13 A. That is partially correct, but partly, I

    14 think, you misunderstood, as you misunderstood the

    15 interpretation of the first two principles, that is the

    16 ethnic principle, and the historic right to a national

    17 state, which I think has been quite totally

    18 misinterpreted but I shall explain that.

    19 Q. Certainly. Certainly.

    20 A. The ethnic principle is -- has been more or

    21 less accepted in our civilisation. It was advocated by

    22 the American president, President Wilson, and the

    23 Russian leader Lenin, the right of nations to

    24 self-determination on the basis of their ethnic or

    25 national affiliation.

  4. 1 As for the principle of rights based on

    2 history, the historic right to lands that used to

    3 belong to someone in the past, this was never accepted,

    4 nor did I interpret that principle as being a correct

    5 one, but this was advocated by those who had the idea

    6 of creating greater national states outside the ethnic

    7 right.

    8 So that is not my position, nor has that been

    9 accepted as something generally applicable in modern

    10 civilisation. Which doesn't mean to say that wars are

    11 not waged in the name of that principle. They have

    12 been waged in the past and they are being waged today.

    13 As for the second point, our time is limited

    14 for me to explain this, but these are shades of meaning

    15 in defining the ethnos from the Austrian border to the

    16 Black Sea, Salonika and so on. This was a period when

    17 the ideology of Panslavism was prevalent, as well as

    18 the ideology of Yugoslavism, so that theoreticians

    19 for certain political aims and for certain other

    20 reasons, added to this the following thesis, that these

    21 were still not sufficiently crystallised or

    22 sufficiently developed national consciousness, that

    23 these were peoples who had still not differentiated

    24 among themselves, who are mixed together using the same

    25 or a similar language, but advantage of the Serb

  5. 1 language was that it could become that pillar which

    2 assisted by the political actions of the state, and, of

    3 course, by other means, would speed up the process in

    4 support of this main nucleus, which, according to

    5 Karadzic, and to Tucic (Phoen) was Serbia itself.

    6 So there are various shades of meaning to

    7 that theory, and because of the limitation of time I

    8 had to simplify some of these theoretical premises.

    9 Q. I understand, Doctor, but you do reject the

    10 thesis of Karadzic, that for instance, Croats, living

    11 in the Balkans are all Serbs? You reject that argument

    12 of Vuk Karadzic?

    13 A. Absolutely, yes.

    14 Q. Now, Doctor, during your time as a historian

    15 and as a politician, you are familiar, and again we are

    16 talking on the discussion, the point you brought out

    17 yesterday on a possible interpretation of the break-up

    18 of the former Yugoslavia, and during your time as a

    19 historian and as a politician, you were familiar with

    20 the writings of President Tudjman, and I believe in the

    21 article that we have before you, and if it's not it can

    22 be placed before the witness, Exhibit 464, you noted in

    23 this Nacional article that, "Tudjman never published a

    24 single article without letting me read it first."

    25 So you were intimately familiar with his

  6. 1 ideas; were you not?

    2 A. Mr. President, that is not true.

    3 MR. NOBILO: I have an objection.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: I will give you the floor, but

    5 first I would like to know, is this a Prosecution

    6 exhibit, the document we saw yesterday?

    7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it is an exhibit we saw

    8 yesterday. 464 is the number.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: I see. Mr. Nobilo, you have

    10 the floor.

    11 MR. NOBILO: The Prosecutor is trying to

    12 cross-examine the witness about scholarly and other

    13 works by President Tudjman. However, the subject of

    14 the examination-in-chief was not the life of President

    15 Tudjman but the break-up of Yugoslavia. And President

    16 Tudjman, just before the break up of Yugoslavia, took

    17 over the lead in Croatia, and in that period he had not

    18 written anything. So he was not a relevant factor

    19 until he became the leader of Croatia. He was not

    20 relevant in the life of the former Yugoslavia.

    21 So this is a cross-examination beyond the

    22 scope of the examination-in-chief.

    23 A. Mr. President, this is a very free journalist

    24 interpretation.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: One moment, please. Let's make

  7. 1 sure we maintain some order. I'm not sure if I

    2 understood the question -- first of all I would like to

    3 hear the question put by the Prosecutor on this matter

    4 and then I will turn to my colleagues. It seems that

    5 the witness wishes to respond to the question, but I

    6 have retained the observation you have made,

    7 Mr. Nobilo. Now, very quickly, will you please tell me

    8 the sense of you question and after that I will consult

    9 with my colleagues.

    10 MR. KEHOE: The sense of my question and the

    11 cross-examination is this, Mr. President: The witness

    12 has offered us an explanation for the decline and fall

    13 of the former Yugoslavia, laying the fault, in large

    14 part, on President Milosevic of Serbia.

    15 In part, if you recall the testimony

    16 yesterday, one of the five things or five powerful

    17 items that the witness testified that Milosevic used,

    18 was the nationalistic fervour that Milosevic, for lack

    19 after better word, drummed up in Serbia and elsewhere

    20 for the Greater Serbia movement.

    21 He noted at the outset of his discussions,

    22 Mr. President, that this was one possible

    23 interpretation. I am attempting to cross-examine this

    24 particular witness on a parallel similar, dissecting

    25 cause for the decline and fall of the former

  8. 1 Yugoslavia. Case in point, we talked yesterday about

    2 the meetings in Karadjordjevo where quite clearly this

    3 witness in a newspaper article on the 25th of October

    4 1993...

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Let me now consult with

    6 my colleagues.

    7 Thank you, my colleagues. Your objection is

    8 overruled, Mr. Nobilo. Mr. Kehoe you may continue with

    9 your questioning and the line that you have just

    10 clarified. Please go on.

    11 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    12 Q. Doctor, as a historian and as a politician,

    13 you are familiar with some of President Tudjman's

    14 writings, especially on the national question, are you

    15 not?

    16 A. May I make a remark? Regarding the

    17 interpretations of history. The historical sciences

    18 take the position that it is not possible to give a

    19 definitive interpretation of history. Hundreds of

    20 monographs have been devoted to Napoleon, for instance,

    21 and each author pretends to be correct. I have spoken

    22 to students and saying I wish we had ten different

    23 textbooks, historical textbooks about the history of

    24 the Croatian people or any other people, because it is

    25 never possible to say that only one interpretation is

  9. 1 valid.

    2 A British historian, whose name I cannot

    3 recall, has written a book entitled "The History of the

    4 Habsburg Monarchy." I have read it and I could write

    5 an anti-history.

    6 Therefore, in history as a science, there is

    7 no final definitive truth. History is always open to

    8 various interpretations, and that is my position as a

    9 scholar, and that is why I said that this is one

    10 possible interpretation, and that others will follow.

    11 Q. Doctor, I --

    12 A. I can understand you because you are not a

    13 historian and you need not know that history opens

    14 up --

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Professor, it's a legal

    16 discussion, this is not a historic conference. I

    17 understand you have a great number of things to say,

    18 but we need to cut back to the subject at hand. The

    19 Prosecutor has put a question to you, I'll ask that the

    20 Prosecutor put a question to you and you respond to

    21 that question. I understand what you mean by

    22 historical interpretations, but I would like for

    23 Mr. Kehoe to put his question briefly to you, and that

    24 he do so immediately, and then that he receive a

    25 response from you.

  10. 1 MR. KEHOE:

    2 Q. Doctor, I appreciate that the British

    3 historians that wrote the history of the Habsburgs,

    4 being it Crankshaw, be it McQuiggan or be it

    5 Wheatcroft, which I believe are all British?

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Do not go back to the old

    7 British monarchy issue, please. Ask your question with

    8 regards to the issue at hand, otherwise we will never

    9 be able to get out of the issue about a historical

    10 conference. Please ask your question with regards to

    11 the article Nacional, thank you.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. None of those first historians became the

    14 President of the Republic Croatia, did they?

    15 A. I don't understand the meaning of that

    16 question.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, please ask the

    18 question that you now wish to ask. The British

    19 monarchy is not really our favourite question, but of

    20 course, if you're interested in that subject please go

    21 ahead.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. President Tudjman wrote a book called

    24 "Nationalism in Contemporary Europe". You're familiar

    25 with that book, are you not?

  11. 1 A. I have not held that book in my hands. I did

    2 read the book the war against war, and the book on the

    3 creation of socialist Yugoslavia, and occupation during

    4 the second world war, because it is not correct, I have

    5 to caution you. As a rule, do I not authorise

    6 interviews that I give to the press. I leave that up

    7 to the consciousness of the journalists -- the

    8 conscience of the journalists. And journalists, as you

    9 know, that is their profession, tend sometimes to

    10 exaggerate things, to overemphasise, to leave out other

    11 things, so it is not true that I have read everything

    12 that Tudjman has written, or rather, that he didn't

    13 publish anything before I read it that is a complete

    14 invention. I repeat, I do not authorise my interviews,

    15 and all the journalists in Zagreb know this.

    16 Q. Can we put Exhibit 16 back on the ELMO,

    17 please? For counsel's ease of purposes for the next

    18 line of questions, we'll be talking about Exhibit 19.

    19 Exhibit 19, for Your Honours' clarification,

    20 is Franjo Tudjman's book, "Nationalism in Contemporary

    21 Europe."

    22 Now, Doctor, I will read you a portion of

    23 this, beginning on the top of page 113. And in this

    24 discussion, Doctor, the author, Dr. Franjo Tudjman is

    25 discussing the decision to unite Vojvodina with Serbia,

  12. 1 and he notes, after analysing some factors:

    2 "According to the same yardstick,

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been made part of the

    4 Croatian Federal Unit. Bosnia-Herzegovina were

    5 historically linked with Croatia, and together they

    6 comprise an indivisible geographic and economic

    7 entity. Bosnia-Herzegovina occupy the central part of

    8 this whole separating southern Dalmatian from northern

    9 Panonian Croatia.

    10 The creation after separate

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina makes the territorial and geographic

    12 position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic

    13 sense, and, therefore, in the broadest national

    14 political sense very unfavourable for life and

    15 development."

    16 Now, we turn to the map that's before you.

    17 "These factors largely explain why the 1939

    18 agreement between Belgrade and Zagreb included the

    19 following areas of Bosnia into the banovina of

    20 Croatia. The whole of western Herzegovina and Mostar,

    21 and those of Bosnia districts where the Croats have a

    22 clear majority, Bugojno.

    23 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.

    24 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    25 Q. Bugonjno, Fojnica, Travnik, Derventa,

  13. 1 Karadzic and Brcko.

    2 On the next page and I will not read the

    3 entire page, but starting from the first full

    4 paragraph, counsel.

    5 "An objective examination of the numerical

    6 composition of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    7 cannot ignore that the majority of the Muslims in its

    8 ethnic character and speech" -- excuse me, "the

    9 majority of Muslims is, in its ethnic character and

    10 speech, incontrovertibly of Croatian origin. Despite

    11 religious and cultural distinctions created by history,

    12 the vast majority of the Muslims declared themselves

    13 Croats whenever an opportunity arose."

    14 And we move, counsel, for the sake of

    15 reading, to the bottom of the page, the last two

    16 sentences. I'm sorry.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: If the witness could be provided

    18 with -- counsel is reading from Exhibit 18. But what

    19 has been provided to him is a map of the Vance-Owen

    20 Plan, which is Exhibit. So the witness doesn't have

    21 it?

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. That's right.

    24 The last two sentences --

    25 JUDGE JORDA: When and the judges have

  14. 1 nothing at all. Nor do the interpreters, so although

    2 you have read slowly, what is on the ELMO at the

    3 moment?

    4 MR. KEHOE: That is a map of the bonavina.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: I see we have the map before

    6 us. As for the rest of the objection from

    7 Mr. Hayman --

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Counsel meant to put this book

    9 passage before the witness, I think. What was provided

    10 to him is a map of the Vance-Owen Plan, which is

    11 Exhibit 19, so the witness isn't able to follow the

    12 quotations that counsel is reading. I simply ask that

    13 Exhibit 18, which is the book except, be provided to

    14 the witness so that he can have the benefit of being

    15 able to see the printed text, although it is not in his

    16 native language.

    17 MR. KEHOE: What I can do, Mr. President, is

    18 do that, read it slowly as it's being interpreted. The

    19 matter on the ELMO is the bonavina plan, it is not a

    20 map of anything else other than the bonavina plan and

    21 that's what's being discussed in this article by

    22 President Tudjman. So I have two sentences left to

    23 read, Mr. President, and we will move on.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Please go on then, but please

    25 read slowly so that the witness can follow. And the

  15. 1 contents of the passage of President Tudjman. I'm

    2 sorry, one moment.

    3 Professor, would you like for us to have this

    4 passage reread slowly in your language so that you

    5 understand fully the question which will be placed to

    6 you there after? Would you like for us to have this

    7 reread? I'm referring to the passage from

    8 Mr. Tudjman's book.

    9 A. Mr. President, it's not necessary.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you much.

    11 MR. KEHOE: My learned colleague was

    12 correct. This is Exhibit 18, my personal records were

    13 incorrect. I apologise in that regard.

    14 Q. The final sentence I will read to you, and I

    15 will not read any further, and after citing various

    16 facts, Dr. Tudjman writes that on the basis of these

    17 facts, we arrive at the conclusion that a majority of

    18 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Croatian.

    19 Now, Doctor, did President Tudjman ever tell

    20 you that?

    21 A. No. But if you would like to hear my

    22 interpretation of the quotation from President

    23 Tudjman's book, I must tell you, unfortunately, that I

    24 have not read that text, and even if I had read it, it

    25 would require a certain amount of time to prepare for a

  16. 1 scientific analysis of this text which cannot be made

    2 ad hoc, because such text require such an approach.

    3 And secondly, in historiography in

    4 Yugoslavia, both in Serb history and Croatian

    5 history, there is the thesis that the Muslims are a

    6 Slav people who, at a certain point in time, converted

    7 to Islam. According to the Serb version, these were

    8 Serbs who converted to Islam, and a certain section of

    9 Croatian authors, in fact it was the dominant theory in

    10 the 19th Century that they were Croats.

    11 So this is a generally known fact in

    12 history. This is nothing new. But I wouldn't like to

    13 elaborate on this issue, because in that case we would

    14 have to apply the standards of historical science.

    15 Q. Well, Doctor, when you went to Tikves in

    16 April of 1991, you knew that President Tudjman's

    17 position --

    18 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I apologise to my

    19 learned colleague, but we had an objection yesterday,

    20 and the court sustained it, that questions related to

    21 Tikves and Karadjordjevo have been covered repeatedly

    22 and been dealt with. So we're going back to what the

    23 court ruled out yesterday.

    24 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, there are, with

    25 all due respect, there are numerous questions -- not

  17. 1 numerous, but several very important issues concerning

    2 this very important secret meeting in Karadjordjevo

    3 that need to be asked of this witness. Keeping in mind

    4 that this is not a historian who simply wrote or

    5 thought about this issue, this is a historian who was

    6 sent to a meeting by President Tudjman to discuss

    7 secretly with other Serbs issues concerning the

    8 division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    9 THE WITNESS: Mr. President --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: The Chamber has the following

    11 opinion: First of all, the rule with regard to the

    12 cross-examination. That rule has been established to

    13 ensure the proper conduct of these proceedings.

    14 At the same time, you must show some

    15 flexibility at times because this is not a mechanical

    16 rule; rather it is a rule of common sense and left to

    17 the discretion of the judges. That is the second

    18 observation.

    19 The third observation in this same are, Mr.

    20 Nobilio, is that the judges and this Chamber feels that

    21 it is their duty, when it is necessary, to request as

    22 the rules of procedure allows them to do so, that we go

    23 to the very depth of any particular issue, so that we

    24 can exhaust any aspect of any particular question.

    25 This thing the judges feel that the issue of

  18. 1 Karavo Istasin (Phoen), even though you do not see the

    2 importance that should be attached to this.

    3 Nonetheless, on this particular principle alone we

    4 determine that Mr. Kehoe will be permitted to ask

    5 questions about this place of meeting.

    6 It is the judges who solemnly believe that we

    7 must, whenever possible, ascertain the truth and

    8 therefore we will allow the question to be put to the

    9 professor on this issue.

    10 Therefore, Mr. Kehoe, you may proceed with

    11 your question.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    13 Q. Doctor, you knew in 1991 --

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Pardon, on this issue, perhaps

    15 I might conclude by stating and reassuring the Defence

    16 that you do indeed have the right for a rejoinder

    17 following this cross-examination.

    18 Please go on, Mr. Kehoe.

    19 MR. KEHOE:

    20 Q. Doctor, you knew in 1991 that in Croatia,

    21 there was a group of politicians that advocated the

    22 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that part of

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina would be incorporated into the

    24 Republic of Croatia; isn't that correct?

    25 A. That is an assumption which you are taking as

  19. 1 being absolutely correct. Croatian policy, at that

    2 time, held very firmly, adhered firmly to one stand and

    3 that is that the borders of the republics of the former

    4 Yugoslavia according to the constitution are state

    5 borders and Croatia does not accept any change in the

    6 borders. As far as other matters are concerned, as a

    7 confrontation was expected, there could have been some

    8 steps taken about which I have absolutely no proof

    9 either written or oral and what I said I remain

    10 adamant. I think that I elaborated it yesterday and I

    11 really have nothing to add to this subject.

    12 Q. Doctor, you gave an interview to the -- on

    13 the tape that we heard, dispatches where you said the

    14 truth about the Karadjordjevo meeting was never

    15 officially published. They were secret talks, but the

    16 impression was given to the media and that the talks

    17 were only about the disputes between Croatia and

    18 Serbia, nothing else. Did you not say that on the

    19 tape, Doctor?

    20 A. I don't know if they were secret and they

    21 were secret, not only those, but the practice was

    22 introduced after the regime was changed in Yugoslavia

    23 that all, practically all the meetings, I think all

    24 meetings, in fact, were secret meetings. So if they're

    25 secret, then I don't know what they could have

  20. 1 discussed there because I have no documents on the

    2 subject.

    3 Q. Doctor, if you want, I will run the tape back

    4 for you because it's very brief. But did you say in an

    5 interview on camera that we reviewed yesterday that

    6 these were secret talks and that the truth about those

    7 meetings had not been revealed?

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Hold on a minute. If you wish

    9 to have the tape played, then, please, we can have it

    10 played and that will be very short and very simple.

    11 Judge Riad would also like to have this tape replayed.

    12 I don't know about Judge Shahabuddeen, but we can do

    13 so. The judges do wish for this to be done. So let us

    14 play this tape once again and that way the professor

    15 will be able to hear his on words and be able to say

    16 whether or not he stands by them. Mr. Nobilo.

    17 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, there seems to be

    18 a misunderstanding. The professor has confirmed that

    19 they were secret and that he has no information about

    20 that. He keeps repeating that. Despite that fact, my

    21 learned colleague is raising new questions as to what

    22 happened there. What is there on the tape is what he

    23 says to stay there. It was a secret meeting and I have

    24 no information on those talks.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: This is a fundamental

  21. 1 difference this time because this time it is the judges

    2 that are requesting that the tape be replayed.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Gentlemen in the video booth,

    4 it's the first clip.

    5 (Videotape played)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: All right, Mr. Kehoe, please be

    7 very direct, very concise with the very concrete

    8 question you wish to put in the course of your

    9 cross-examination of this witness.

    10 MR. KEHOE:

    11 Q. Doctor, I go back to my initial question.

    12 These were secret talks between the Serbs and the

    13 Croats, weren't they?

    14 A. Every man on the street will tell you that if

    15 the mass media did not publish a communiqué and

    16 documents from some talks, every citizen will tell you

    17 if you ask him what the talks were and what kind of

    18 talks they were. They will say they were secret talks

    19 because they were not publicly disclosed, so they

    20 cannot be classified or qualified in any other way.

    21 You can't qualify a meeting, you have to say that it

    22 was a secret meeting. I see no other logical

    23 explanation. That is quite logical.

    24 Q. Both the Serb government and the Croatian

    25 government misled the media on the purpose of those

  22. 1 meetings in Karadjordjevo, didn't they?

    2 A. As far I remember, neither the Croatian nor

    3 the Serbian government, they didn't explain anything to

    4 the mass media, I don't know where that source comes

    5 from, that they published anything. I don't remember

    6 the source. I have no source in my possession that any

    7 explanation was given of that meeting.

    8 Q. But President Tudjman, Doctor, told you about

    9 the secret, didn't he? He told you that he had made a

    10 deal with Milosevic about the division of Bosnia,

    11 didn't he?

    12 A. Not quite in that way. You asked me whether

    13 those two governments, the Serbian and the Croatian

    14 explained to the public. That was the question about

    15 the meeting. And I said that I don't know, I didn't

    16 know. Tudjman didn't tell me that he had decided on --

    17 but that he wanted to see the relationships between

    18 those two states. And I repeat what I have already

    19 said five times. The expert group had an academic

    20 discussion over the question of whether to recognise

    21 the borders of the existing republics and then left

    22 because the Serbian delegation, they parted then,

    23 because the Serbian delegation considered that these

    24 were not state borders and we considered that they were

    25 state borders and that is all that I have to say about

  23. 1 the meeting.

    2 Q. I turn your attention, again, Doctor, Exhibit

    3 464, the newspaper article that we discussed yesterday,

    4 because I think that I need to clarify some points from

    5 the statement that you just made. Is that article

    6 before the witness? If we can turn again to the second

    7 page in the lower left-hand column, Doctor. Do you need

    8 your glasses, Doctor? We can wait. Please. Just a

    9 moment.

    10 Mr. President, the witness needs his

    11 eyeglasses.

    12 THE WITNESS: I can see well enough. Thank

    13 you.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Are you sure, sir?

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Take your time Professor.

    16 MR. KEHOE: I agree with my colleague, it's

    17 difficult to read. If we want to take a moment to wait

    18 for his glasses, it might be a little more expeditious

    19 all the way around.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: It's one's fundamental rights

    21 to be able to read with one's glasses, Professor. Take

    22 your time. Take your time, Professor.

    23 THE WITNESS: Okay.

    24 MR. KEHOE: I think we're ready to proceed,

    25 Mr. President, the witness has his spectacles.

  24. 1 JUDGE JORDA: You may now ask the witness

    2 whether or not he has taken the time to read. Have you

    3 done so, Professor? Are you ready to respond to the

    4 question? Have you read the document?

    5 THE WITNESS: Yes, but I don't understand the

    6 substance of the question. I can just tell you what I

    7 said yesterday.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I am in the same position

    9 as you, Professor, I would like for the question to be

    10 repeated. Mr. Kehoe, please be very clear in your

    11 question.

    12 THE WITNESS: The questions are quite unclear

    13 to me.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: That's another issue.

    15 Mr. Kehoe, please, from the reading that has

    16 been done by the witness of this excerpt from this

    17 newspaper, would you please specify or clarify for

    18 these judges, which part of the interview you're

    19 targeting because I am not clear on that. What section

    20 are you referring to?

    21 MR. KEHOE: Page 4, I believe. I believe on

    22 your copy, it's the middle of page 3, Your Honour.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: I have the English version here

    24 before me.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Yes, unfortunately, we only have

  25. 1 the English at this point.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: That's not the issue. All

    3 right. Professor, we are on page 3.

    4 Mr. Kehoe, ask your question very clearly.

    5 MR. KEHOE: If I might have one point of

    6 clarification on that. This is at page 3 on the

    7 English translation. However, the doctor has before

    8 him a two-page article in BCS and for him it's on page

    9 2.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Now we understand one another,

    11 please ask you question.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Doctor, you noted in an answer to a question

    14 several moments ago that you did not know what happened

    15 at these secret meetings in Karadjordjevo --

    16 A. That's right.

    17 Q. But you stated in this article in Nacional

    18 what Tudjman told you. And you noted -- you can read

    19 along with me -- at the beginning of 1991, following

    20 his negotiations with Milosevic, it was agreed that two

    21 commissions should meet and discuss a division of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman then told us that he had

    23 made an agreement with Milosevic in principle and that

    24 we would have to work on the maps to work out the

    25 practical details. Did Tudjman tell you that?

  26. 1 A. As far as the Nacional is concerned I said

    2 yesterday that in the next issue of the Nacional that I

    3 denied part of the interpretations which I gave. That

    4 is the first point.

    5 Second, the journalists, some journalists

    6 tend to be very free when they make -- they give their

    7 titles. So, for example, in this Nacional, it states

    8 that I elaborated on a map on the division of Bosnia.

    9 That is of quite -- a very free interpretation,

    10 formulation by the journalist. A free formulation of

    11 the headlines to make the paper attractive to readers.

    12 But there is no document on that and I must say that

    13 Tudjman only spoke about the fact that on the basis of

    14 agreements of principle we should look into the

    15 possibilities. And we were to understand that we

    16 should just question the opposite side in the sense of

    17 their political goals for the forthcoming war. So

    18 Tudjman did not tell me that he had decided upon the

    19 division of Bosnia, but that he was looking into --

    20 that he was asking the opposite side about their

    21 political goals. I said that yesterday, I repeat that

    22 here today and I think that state policy was different,

    23 which is borne out by the fact that the policies were

    24 realised, were implemented.

    25 Q. Doctor, is your testimony that Tudjman did

  27. 1 not tell you that he had agreed with Milosevic in

    2 principle on the division of Bosnia; is that your

    3 testimony?

    4 A. That there should be negotiations with the

    5 opposite side as to how to treat Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 But a direct division of Bosnia in the sense that we

    7 have agreed to divide Bosnia along this line, that was

    8 absolutely never present in my talks with Tudjman.

    9 Q. Let's go down two paragraphs in that article,

    10 in the article that's before you, 264. In the article,

    11 the paragraph that begins, "I warned Tudjman"... Do

    12 you see that, Doctor?

    13 A. Yes, I do.

    14 Q. "I warned Tudjman that there were three major

    15 obstacles to the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    16 that only one obstacle was enough for their agreement

    17 to fall through. First of all, the problem of deciding

    18 on Croatian and Serbian areas. Second, the problem of

    19 what the Muslims would say to everything." Tudjman

    20 replied that they would have nothing to say if Croats

    21 and Serbs agreed. I pointed out the third problem,

    22 which was not as serious as the first two, but still

    23 remained a problem. What will the International

    24 Community say to the agreement? Tudjman replied that

    25 the world would accept any agreement coming out of the

  28. 1 region.

    2 Doctor, did you have that discussion with

    3 then President Tudjman?

    4 A. Let me explain it to you. I said yesterday

    5 that I, together with a group of journalists in the

    6 Nacional, drank whiskey and discussed the topic. And

    7 on that occasion I explained these three obstacles as

    8 my own personal explanation, interpretation of that

    9 historical moment. And they gave this as if I had said

    10 it to President Tudjman. I spoke to the journalist as

    11 my vision and it was incorrectly quoted there. So I am

    12 the author of those theses, which I presented to the

    13 journalist as being my own thesis. I did not say that

    14 they were Tudjman's. They were my own; whereas they

    15 interpreted them as if I had told them that this was

    16 something that Tudjman had said -- as I had said to

    17 Tudjman.

    18 Q. You noted that you had filed a retraction on

    19 this article in the first of November 1996 edition of

    20 Nacional; is that right?

    21 A. Two or three issues later, because the

    22 Nacional did not wish to publish my criticism. And

    23 what it did publish it once again left out a large

    24 portion of my answer. So that I had some polemics with

    25 the Nacional. When they received my reply, they

  29. 1 promised to publish it in its entirety, but they failed

    2 to do so.

    3 Therefore, I consider that this discussion

    4 about newspaper articles is something that I, myself,

    5 could not stand behind because very often they are

    6 talks which one has with journalists and sometimes they

    7 have the aim, even for me personally, of placing

    8 something for the public for different reasons. And I

    9 don't like to speak about these things as a scientific

    10 worker myself.

    11 Q. The retraction does not retract the

    12 conversations that you had with Tudjman, does it?

    13 A. I said, before your question, I said that

    14 part of the answer, my answer was not published. Part

    15 of my retraction was not published by the Nacional.

    16 They did not want to publish this and I said that

    17 before you asked your question.

    18 Q. Now, sir, there are several photographs in

    19 that article of you, as well, are there not?

    20 A. I see two photographs of me here, nothing

    21 else.

    22 Q. Were those photographs taken in a barroom?

    23 A. I can't remember. If I were to remember all

    24 these details, if one was to remember all the details

    25 of one's life, I don't know. It's impossible to know.

  30. 1 I don't know where they got the photographs from.

    2 Perhaps they were taken at the editorial office.

    3 Perhaps they took it from one of their files, their

    4 records.

    5 Q. Well, the fact was that a Nacional reporter

    6 came and took those photographs of you for this

    7 article, didn't he?

    8 A. I repeat, I have already answered that

    9 question. I don't know whether they took the

    10 photographs then. It's impossible to recall all these

    11 details in life because had I been able to recall all

    12 these details, I would not be a scientific worker, I

    13 would be something else. Perhaps they took their

    14 documents then, but I don't know.

    15 Q. You do not recall, Doctor, that the Nacional

    16 photographer came and took these photographs of you; is

    17 that your testimony?

    18 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President --

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Wait a moment please. Don't

    20 forget, I also have this. I need to maintain order in

    21 these proceedings.

    22 Mr. Nobilo, you have an objection. Please

    23 make your objection first and then I will say what I

    24 have to say about that matter. Please make your

    25 objection.

  31. 1 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, whether the

    2 photographs were taken then or were taken from the

    3 files, this question has been answered by the witness.

    4 So the Prosecutor is repeating the same question and is

    5 getting the same answer.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, please, I think you're

    7 saying, if I understand correctly, you're saying that

    8 you want us to respond in the place of the witness. If

    9 I understood that's your objection, then that's okay,

    10 that's sustained.

    11 Now, Mr. Kehoe, you've asked questions, the

    12 answer was given to you by the witness. The witness

    13 says he does not remember. That's fine. That's how it

    14 is. We're going to end on the issue of the Nacional

    15 newspaper. I believe he stated that there was a

    16 retraction, if I understand correctly. You stated that

    17 there was a retraction. Then, after that, it did not

    18 go as you wanted it to. The problem is not that issue

    19 there.

    20 But Mr. Kehoe, do you have any further

    21 questions you wish to put to the witness? Then I must

    22 remind the witness that when he responds to questions,

    23 he must respond facing the judges. It is not a

    24 dialogue between you and the prosecution.

    25 So, Mr. Kehoe, have you ended with this

  32. 1 cross-examination dealing with the issue of what

    2 Mr. Tudjman stated and the interview regarding the

    3 Nacional newspaper? Please, go on, tell us how many

    4 more questions you have?

    5 MR. KEHOE: On this particular question, I am

    6 going to ask the witness to read the retraction,

    7 because I think it's important, given the context of

    8 this interview --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, very well.

    10 Mr. Nobilo, the retraction is part of the

    11 cross-examination. Do you have an objection on this

    12 issue?

    13 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Mr. President, because the

    14 witness said that the retraction was published, but

    15 that an important portion of his retraction was left

    16 out by the newspaper and it didn't publish it. So I

    17 consider the question answered.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I understand. But your

    19 objection is not sustained. But the Prosecution I

    20 understand wanted to ask a question regarding the

    21 retraction and indeed that retraction is part of the

    22 interview, so what is your question?

    23 MR. KEHOE: The question is Mr. President,

    24 Your Honours, I would like to show this retraction to

    25 the doctor and ask him to identify it as the copy of

  33. 1 the retraction that appeared in the 6th of November,

    2 1996, edition of Nacional. I just got this this

    3 morning, given yesterday's testimony. I do not have a

    4 copy in either English or in French. I will ask the

    5 witness to read it into the record. I have provided

    6 copies of this retraction to the three respective

    7 booths. I believe everybody has it to assist it in

    8 their interpretation in English and in French.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I believe that it

    10 is not proper for the witness to read the newspaper

    11 here now. It is not something that is customary in

    12 this court.

    13 The Prosecutor's office may read it and then

    14 the witness can confirm what is being read.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but perhaps the witness

    16 may agree to read. So we can go faster. Professor, do

    17 you agree to read this document so that we can

    18 interpret it?

    19 Professor, I'm addressing you directly.

    20 Professor, do you agree to read this retraction in your

    21 language?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Now, each judge has

    24 the Serbo-Croatian version. Do the interpreters also

    25 have their copies of the retraction?

  34. 1 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, yes, yes.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I see that they're saying

    3 yes.

    4 So I see that since the Professor agrees to

    5 read it -- Professor, please go on and read this

    6 article. It's not very long, and deals with your

    7 incomplete, as you have stated, retraction, but it is

    8 the retraction that you submitted and the one that is

    9 being presented to you by the Office of the

    10 Prosecutor. We are listening to you. Go ahead.

    11 A. My interview published in issue number 49 of

    12 the Nacional was not authorised, and in view of the

    13 trust that I have in journalist Mladen Plaset, I did

    14 not expect him to take such freedom in interpreting,

    15 literatise, licentia poetica my words. However, this

    16 has not substantially distorted what I said.

    17 The problem occurred after the interview was

    18 published, when talking over a drink, in addition to

    19 the two of us there were several other journalists with

    20 whom I conversed about various events.

    21 In the course of that conversation, I spoke

    22 about the year 1991, about the dramatic preparations

    23 for a military push, about Bosnia and Herzegovina

    24 within the framework of the overall Yugoslav crisis and

    25 Serbia's attitude towards that republic.

  35. 1 In conversations of this kind, one

    2 spontaneously mixes reminiscences with present-day

    3 views of things, so that an interpretation emerged with

    4 is not authentic and some points in it are not even

    5 truthful. This applies, in particular, to Generals

    6 Trgo and Kukoc. Namely, prior to the military

    7 intervention in Slovenia, I travelled from Zagreb to

    8 Belgrade two or three times and talked to several

    9 people. The Federal Prime Minister Anto Markovic, the

    10 Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar, the previous Prime

    11 Minister of the Federal Government Branko Vikolic, the

    12 Serbian writer Dobrica Cofic, men in the Central

    13 Committee of the Legal Communists of Yugoslavia, as

    14 well as several retired generals, among whom were these

    15 two above named.

    16 From all these conversations, as well as all

    17 the rumours going around Belgrade, one could conclude

    18 that the military would not watch quietly and

    19 indifferently the dramatic debates in the presidency of

    20 the Socialist Federal Republic at the time, but that

    21 they were preparing for a military intervention.

    22 Therefore, Generals Trgo and Kukoc were not

    23 my source of information, but I learnt from the

    24 information from the talks I had with these people.

    25 Unfortunately, in the shortened version of the

  36. 1 interview, the names of several other senior officers

    2 of the JNA were left out, so that only the names of

    3 Trgo and Kucic remained, as if they had announced the

    4 intervention, which is quite incorrect.

    5 The same can be said about the division of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, in that story, there was

    7 an intermingling of information and my subsequent

    8 experiences and present-day views in connection with

    9 those events. I claim categorically that mostly the

    10 Avnoj borders were discussed, the borders between the

    11 former republics of Yugoslavia, where as a result of a

    12 fierce argument broke out in which I defended those

    13 borders while the Serbs attacked them as the work of

    14 two Croats, that is Tito and Subasic, who were Prime

    15 Ministers of two parallel Yugoslavia governments, Tito

    16 of the Partisan Government and Subasic of the Royal

    17 Government.

    18 Of course, the Serbs those added to those

    19 the names the names of Kardelj, and the pre-war

    20 Comintern policy of breaking up of Yugoslavia, all of

    21 which was intended to serve as the basis of their main

    22 thesis that those borders cannot be accepted.

    23 That was how this conversation turned into a

    24 kind of round-table, rather like the round-table

    25 discussions that historians have.

  37. 1 I claim categorically that I did not see maps

    2 on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For me as a

    3 historian, and a chronicler of the time in which we

    4 live, it was a challenge to participate in those

    5 debates which gave me an opportunity to link the

    6 present with history, and that was the main thing. The

    7 time will come when this issue will re-emerge and then

    8 historiographic elaboration of a problem will be made.

    9 This is all.

    10 May I add to this that what is written here

    11 is what I said. First, that we were discussing things

    12 over a drink; secondly, that there was an intermingling

    13 of current reports with my own reflections and

    14 thoughts; so that an interview was produced from which

    15 it is not possible to draw the conclusion that a

    16 division had been ordered or agreed, et cetera, et

    17 cetera.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Professor. You may

    19 now, Mr. Kehoe, ask one question regarding this issue.

    20 MR. KEHOE:

    21 Q. Doctor, this retraction contains no

    22 retraction concerning your discussions with President

    23 Tudjman, does it?

    24 A. Mr. President, I have three or five times

    25 already said that my retraction was not published in

  38. 1 its entirety and I do not understand this.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I've taken note of that,

    3 Professor.

    4 Mr. Kehoe, the witness has stated -- he says

    5 five times, but nonetheless, he said that his

    6 retraction had the not been fully published in its full

    7 version.

    8 MR. KEHOE:

    9 Q. Now, Doctor, after these secret meetings that

    10 you participated in in Tikves, you withdrew from these

    11 discussions concerning the division of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't you, because you did not

    13 approve of them?

    14 A. I withdrew because I had achieved what I had

    15 wanted to achieve as a historian. Of course, I did not

    16 agree during this overall situation at the time

    17 already. I had the feeling that chaos and turmoil

    18 would ensue. And I withdrew for a number of reasons,

    19 not only the one that you are alleging, but I felt that

    20 the whole issue was not clear, it had not been defined,

    21 that I didn't really know what the politicians wanted

    22 on either side, and that myself as a scholar, as a

    23 professional, had no place there because the policies

    24 were contradictory.

    25 On the one hand, there was a firm decision to

  39. 1 defend the republican borders. On the other hand there

    2 was talks going on which I was not familiar with,

    3 state, parastatal talks, I don't know. So there were

    4 several reasons why I gave up my participation in that

    5 undertaking.

    6 Q. But the talks continued, didn't they?

    7 A. I don't know anything about that, because

    8 that group of experts fell apart, or was disbanded,

    9 rather.

    10 Q. Well, you testified, did you not, several

    11 weeks ago in the case of Prosecutor -- versus

    12 Aleksovski?

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Please ask your question,

    14 Mr. Kehoe.

    15 MR. KEHOE: I simply asked the witness

    16 whether or not he testified in that proceeding.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I suppose if you're asking the

    18 question then you must know that he was present. At

    19 least I hope the Office of the Prosecutor knows

    20 already. So please move on.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. Well, in that particular discussion, Doctor,

    23 you noted that, "I resigned from the continuation of

    24 the talks." And then you went on to note, "Q. In no

    25 way do I imply any criticism of you," this is by the

  40. 1 Prosecutor, "I am merely endeavouring to elicit --

    2 eliciting the facts. But the fact of the matter is

    3 that following the meeting between Tudjman and

    4 Milosevic, you were assigned as a member of this

    5 commission to endeavour to reach an agreement with the

    6 Serbs on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

    7 that your concern at that time was the fate of the

    8 Muslims." The answer is, "Yes. As soon as I saw what

    9 was happening, from a kind of historical curiosity I

    10 accepted to take part in the talks."

    11 And later on you say, "I cannot say what

    12 happened afterwards because the contacts probably

    13 continued."

    14 Do you recall saying that, sir?

    15 A. The word "probably" is something I wish to

    16 underline, because interstate contacts between Belgrade

    17 and Zagreb were constant, diplomatic, non-diplomatic of

    18 various kinds. It's quite logical that contacts and

    19 links were not totally interrupted, but I personally do

    20 not know anything about them.

    21 Q. Well, Doctor, is it your belief that after

    22 your departure from those talks that those talks

    23 concerning the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    24 continued?

    25 A. My belief is not important.

  41. 1 MR. NOBILO: Objection.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: I agree with Mr. Nobilo. It

    3 seems that the question has been asked already.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Yes. The witness has quite

    5 clearly said, on several occasions, that he has no

    6 knowledge about what happened later. Therefore, the

    7 grounds for this question do not exist, because the

    8 witness has said that he doesn't know what happened

    9 afterwards.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, perhaps you might rephrase

    11 your question unless -- we're going to be going on to

    12 the break. Do you have another question about these

    13 meetings in Karadjordjevo, if so, please go ahead.

    14 MR. KEHOE: I do not, Mr. President. The

    15 witness has answered the question as far as I'm

    16 concerned.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, very well. Do you have

    18 many more questions in your cross-examination,

    19 Mr. Kehoe?

    20 MR. KEHOE: It's difficult to say, Your

    21 Honour. I would say probably an hour or so.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We're going to take

    23 our first break of ten minutes. We're going to

    24 reconvene at 20 minutes to the hour.

    25 --- Recess taken at 3.30 p.m.

  42. 1 --- On resuming at 3.45 p.m.

    2 (The accused entered court).

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, please go on.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Mr. President, Your

    5 Honours, thank you.

    6 Q. Doctor, you resigned from this commission

    7 because you did the not accept the concepts about the

    8 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you disagreed with

    9 what was happening, so as a Communist of 50 years you

    10 left; isn't that right?

    11 A. I have already answered that question, adding

    12 the fact that the situation was so complicated that I

    13 didn't consider myself competent to continue to be

    14 involved in a dramatic situation, so that I have

    15 already answered that question and explained what I

    16 have just added.

    17 Q. On page 225, at line 20 of your prior

    18 testimony in Aleksovski, you noted, "I publicly came

    19 out against the radicalism, both Serb and Croatian,

    20 because as I know, for 50 years I was a Communist, and

    21 I don't accept the concepts about the division, so

    22 that's why I resigned."

    23 Now, that was your testimony in the

    24 Aleksovski case, is that correct?

    25 A. Yes. I was always in favour of moderate

  43. 1 policies and against radical ones, because I myself

    2 went through the radical policies of the revolution,

    3 socialist revolution, and I had had enough of this

    4 radicalism.

    5 Q. And you did not agree with the policies of

    6 division that President Tudjman advocated, did you, as

    7 it pertained to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    8 A. I didn't claim that, and I claim today that

    9 I'm not sure of that, because it wasn't explicitly

    10 stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided,

    11 but that the overall situation should be examined.

    12 Q. Well, Doctor, in early 1994, President

    13 Tudjman called upon you to go to Belgrade as a

    14 representative of --

    15 MR. NOBILO: I apologise to my learned

    16 colleague, but in our examination-in-chief, we reached

    17 as far as the break-up of Yugoslavia, that is 1990.

    18 About the years that followed and the duties of this

    19 witness in '93, '94, in the independent Republic of

    20 Croatia is something we did not discuss, so this is

    21 quite outside the scope of the examination-in-chief.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I will tell the

    23 Court exactly the question that I'm going to ask.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, please. Finish with your

    25 question first.

  44. 1 MR. KEHOE:

    2 Q. Doctor, you were called upon to go to Serbia

    3 as a representative for the Republic of Croatia as part

    4 of a reconciliation mission with the Serbs; is that

    5 right?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Prior to leaving, you had a discussion with

    8 President Tudjman in early 1994, where he said, "I know

    9 that you do not agree with my policy in Bosnia and

    10 Herzegovina." Did he not say that to you?

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Hold on. Before the witness

    12 responds to that question, I would first like to see

    13 whether or not the Judges would like for this question

    14 to be put under Rule 70. The Rules of Procedure give

    15 the Judges the right to put a question -- rather, under

    16 Rule 90, the Judges do have indeed the right to put a

    17 question to the witness. First let me consult with my

    18 colleagues.

    19 The Trial Chamber -- and this will also

    20 account for the following questions, deems that Rule 90

    21 does indeed -- rather, 98, dealing with additional

    22 evidence presented by the witness, the Trial Chamber

    23 may order either party to produce additional evidence,

    24 and it may, if appropriate, summon witnesses and order

    25 their attendance, but in this case the Judges do have

  45. 1 the right to give the Defence the right to re-examine

    2 on issues which are not covered in

    3 examination-in-chief.

    4 Mr. Kehoe, you may ask your question.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    6 Q. Doctor, in this discussion with President

    7 Tudjman in early 1994, he said to you, "I know that

    8 you, Dr. Bilandzic, do not agree with my policy in

    9 Bosnia and Herzegovina." And that was the policy of a

    10 division in Bosnia-Herzegovina that you didn't agree

    11 with; isn't that so?

    12 A. I really cannot remember that I said that,

    13 and even if I did say that it had been said, I simply

    14 cannot remember that. I did not hear such a statement

    15 from president Tudjman, even if it was published in the

    16 press.

    17 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we should like to

    18 learn the source from which the Prosecutor is quoting.

    19 Secondly, we would like to have a copy, because it

    20 seems to me that the Prosecutor has added his own

    21 interpretation to this quotation. If allegedly

    22 President Tudjman said, "I know that you do not agree

    23 with my policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina," and then the

    24 Prosecutor added, "That was the division of Bosnia,

    25 wasn't it?" So I think this is improper.

  46. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, let's be very

    2 clear. You mentioned quotations. Would you please

    3 give us the source, otherwise, it would seem that

    4 you're giving an interpretation of what the witness had

    5 stated.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. The source

    7 is, again, Exhibit 264, the newspaper article from

    8 Nacional, and on the second to last page, and in the

    9 area, Doctor, if you can look the at Exhibit 264 --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: 464 is it not, Mr. Registrar?

    11 MR. KEHOE: I apologise, Judge, 464.

    12 Q. And do you see, Doctor, in the area on the --

    13 I believe it's your second page, starting with "Free

    14 agent"?

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please underline

    16 where that sentence is, Mr. Kehoe? I don't see it.

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Q. Yes, Your Honour. In the English version

    19 it's on page 6. If I can point to it, Your Honour,

    20 it's right here. On page 6. I realise this is a

    21 rather unscientific method, but --

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Mr. Riad has placed

    23 it before me. Thank you.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Now, Doctor, you said in this article in

  47. 1 Nacional that President Tudjman said to you you do not

    2 agree with my policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina but it

    3 would be good if you went to Belgrade. Do you see that

    4 quote?

    5 A. What it says here is -- I should like to

    6 repeat what I already said. I can't find it here, but

    7 I don't think that is important, Your Honours, because

    8 I do not absolutely recall Tudjman saying that to me,

    9 and we have already spoken about this sufficiently,

    10 that is, that I protested with the Nacional, saying

    11 that it had misinterpreted many of my thoughts, and I

    12 cannot recall President Tudjman saying that to me.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Mr. Kehoe.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Well, place us in time and help us with this,

    16 Doctor.

    17 You were recalled from Belgrade in May of

    18 19595; is that right?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. And you had spent 15 months in Belgrade on

    21 this diplomatic mission?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. So any invitation by President Tudjman for

    24 you to undertake this diplomatic mission would have

    25 taken place in late 1993 or possibly early 1994; is

  48. 1 that right?

    2 A. You're thinking of when the mission was

    3 suspended, the agreement was more or less tête-à-tête

    4 that I would go to Belgrade for only a few months

    5 because I had retired and I had my own obligations with

    6 respect to writing books and I stayed for longer than

    7 originally had been agreed.

    8 Q. But the undertaking per the request of

    9 President Tudjman, was made to you by President Tudjman

    10 in the, say, last half of 1993; is that accurate?

    11 A. No. Your Honours, this was about 15 days

    12 prior to my departure for Belgrade. That was my first

    13 contact when I learned that he would like me to go to

    14 Belgrade, maybe 10 days before I actually left.

    15 Q. So help me out here, Doctor, I am just trying

    16 o tie down the time frame here for the purposes of the

    17 record. If you came back in May of 1995, and you were

    18 there for 15 months, you must have had this discussion

    19 in late December 1993 or early January of 1994, unless

    20 my math is wrong; is that approximately right?

    21 A. I am repeating. Ten days or so prior to

    22 leaving for Belgrade, I was called to go on that

    23 mission, nothing more than that, Your Honours.

    24 Q. And prior to that time, you had expressed

    25 disapproval, publicly you had expressed disapproval of

  49. 1 the policies of the Republic of Croatia as it pertained

    2 to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; did you not?

    3 A. I don't know what source you are referring to

    4 and what kind of non-approval you are referring to,

    5 what you mean as a member of the opposition. Ever

    6 since the first day of the establishment of the

    7 independent state of Croatia, I was a member of the

    8 presidency on behalf of the opposition and to this day

    9 I am a member of the opposition. And as a member of an

    10 opposition party, I often spoke critically about the

    11 regime because that is the logic of a political

    12 opposition.

    13 Q. Well, I guess we'll go into this in a little

    14 more detail, Doctor. You wrote a book that we talked

    15 about yesterday, where you criticised the establishment

    16 of the Kninska Krajina, because it established a state

    17 within a state of the Republic of Croatia and, as such,

    18 presented an intolerable situation for the Republic of

    19 Croatia; do you recall that discussion?

    20 A. Yes, the League of Communists of Croatia of

    21 whose central committee I was a member, from the first

    22 day of the conflict with Milosevic's policies, always

    23 pursued a policy of defence of Croatia and it remains

    24 that that policy remains in force to this day. And

    25 within the framework of that policy, I was naturally

  50. 1 against this so-called Balvan Revolution or Log

    2 Revolution.

    3 Q. And that revolution started as a cultural

    4 grouping and ultimately turned into I believe what you

    5 described yesterday as an entity that had all the

    6 trappings of statehood; is that right?

    7 A. No, that is not right. On the 19th of July,

    8 1990, the people of Knin took up arms. They cut wood.

    9 They put up obstacles to block traffic between Croatia

    10 and its coastline. They blocked the main road and the

    11 conflict started immediately there. Cultural autonomy

    12 was just a way of legitimising the so-called Balvan

    13 Revolution.

    14 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I apologise for

    15 objecting again. Of course the Defence appreciates the

    16 right of the Trial Chamber to call for evidence of its

    17 own, but it appears -- we would just like the time that

    18 is being used for this not to be counted as the Defence

    19 time as this is quite outside the examination-in-chief

    20 and, therefore, it is based on a different grounds than

    21 the regular cross-examination.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: You are not incorrect. But we

    23 would like to see whether the Prosecution has further

    24 questions which is of great interest to the Chamber and

    25 to the judges.

  51. 1 Please understand, Mr. Nobilo, that when you

    2 have a witness who is very close to those in power in a

    3 historical and a political knowledge that also

    4 interests the judges a great deal.

    5 Now I turn to Mr. Kehoe to see whether this

    6 cross-examination which you are carrying out with

    7 questions, which, once again, I repeat, the judges find

    8 of great interest must nonetheless ask the question

    9 about the time. Are you in agreement with that, Mr.

    10 Kehoe?

    11 MR. KEHOE: Absolutely, Judge. I mean, if

    12 the Court wants to suspend the time against the Defence

    13 on that score, the Prosecution has no objection to

    14 that.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Our records indicate that about

    16 30 minutes was within the scope and the rest of the

    17 examination has focused on personal contacts with

    18 President Tudjman and the witness' views about policies

    19 of the Republic of Croatia after the disintegration of

    20 the former Yugoslavia.

    21 MR. KEHOE: The problem, Mr. President, with

    22 that analysis is this --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: No, I propose to be flexible.

    24 We, the judges, have stated that on the Rule of 98 that

    25 these questions can be of interest to the Blaskic

  52. 1 case. However, you do, indeed, have the right to

    2 re-examination. If indeed time has been taken from

    3 you, you will not sacrifice your right to

    4 re-examination. That will be granted to you. But,

    5 nonetheless, please do not abuse this flexibility that

    6 we are showing. This witness is here. He has also

    7 appeared in other cases. He was a very important

    8 political agent in the events that took place in that

    9 area. We understand you have many questions for you.

    10 However, please do not digress in your

    11 questions, please do not multiply them, backtrack,

    12 otherwise we have great difficulty in understanding

    13 what questions you are asking. Please put your

    14 questions directly and please try to make strong

    15 efforts in this area. We do not want to have any

    16 further incidents as we have seen just now.

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Q. Doctor, going directly to the point.

    19 Yesterday in your testimony, you were strongly opposed

    20 to the establishment of the Republic of Serb Krajina as

    21 it was the establishment of a state within the state of

    22 a Republic of Croatia; isn't that correct?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. You also, sir, were strongly opposed to the

    25 activities that led to the establishment of the

  53. 1 Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosna and the ultimate

    2 creation of the Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, were you

    3 not?

    4 A. Your Honours, the idea about establishing

    5 Herzeg-Bosna itself until the process was completed, I

    6 was not included and cannot testify as to that.

    7 Q. That particular movement, Doctor --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Professor, we have asked you

    9 whether or not you were against it or not. This is a

    10 question which is of interest to the judges. We've

    11 asked you whether you yourself were against it. If you

    12 do not answer the question now, I can tell you that

    13 right now I, myself, will ask you that question. So

    14 please try to respond to that question now or in a

    15 moment. It's a question which id very clear. Yes or

    16 no, were you against the creation of the Herzeg-Bosna

    17 community?

    18 THE WITNESS: When Herzeg-Bosna was created,

    19 then I came to learn that it had been established and

    20 that is why I did not assume a public stand because

    21 about the initiative and the process of creating

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Herzeg-Bosna, I knew nothing.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Please go on, Mr. Kehoe.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Well, you knew, doctor, that the Croatian

  54. 1 community of Herzeg-Bosna, when it was established on

    2 the 18th of November, 1991, had a goal of becoming a

    3 part of the Republic of Croatia; did you not learn

    4 that, sir?

    5 A. Your Honours, I don't know where the source

    6 comes from because I did not have any decided stands on

    7 Herzeg-Bosna and I had retired from political life

    8 already at the time and I did not participate in this.

    9 So I have no stand on Herzeg-Bosna here until it was

    10 already formed. I have already said that.

    11 Q. Well, you do know, doctor, that the goals of

    12 the Croatia community of Herzeg-Bosna were annexation

    13 with the Republic of Croatia; you do know that, don't

    14 you?

    15 A. No, I don't know the source that I knew that

    16 Herzeg-Bosna should be annexed to Croatia. I don't

    17 know where the source comes from. That is, that I knew

    18 about this and that I was against it or anything about

    19 it, in fact.

    20 Q. Well, sir, you perceived that that creation

    21 of the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosna, was an

    22 effort to divide the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    23 didn't you?

    24 A. Your Honours, that was a live process which

    25 began, which lasted in its ultimate goal. What it was

  55. 1 to be, I did not know of it, nor could I have known.

    2 And I always took the view that the constituents of

    3 each nation be respected. And I never said decidedly

    4 anything about Herzeg-Bosna, so I don't know the source

    5 of this.

    6 Q. Let's move ahead, Doctor. You believe and

    7 concluded as a historian that after the establishment

    8 of the Vance-Owen Plan that the authorities in

    9 Herzeg-Bosna had concluded that they could do what they

    10 wanted; didn't you conclude that?

    11 A. Not quite like that. I condemned, that is to

    12 say I have not got the right to condemn, but I stated,

    13 I said that I considered that neither the Republic of

    14 Srpska or Herzeg-Bosna should have the position which

    15 would lead towards a definite division. I said this on

    16 several occasions, but in precise terms, my own policy,

    17 my own positions, I did not declare, but I did say that

    18 I did not consider it to be a good idea.

    19 Q. You concluded that the granting of Bosnian

    20 Croats citizenship in the Republic of Croatia was a

    21 mistake, didn't you?

    22 A. Perhaps I just noted that it had been done,

    23 but I did not qualify this either as a mistake or as a

    24 good thing either.

    25 Q. You also concluded that representation by

  56. 1 Bosnian Croats in the Sabor was also a mistake; didn't

    2 you?

    3 A. I don't know where you have the resource that

    4 it was a mistake. But I was against the fact -- let me

    5 be more precise. I supported, but I do not have a

    6 stand on this, nor did I ever have a stand. I never

    7 said anything about the matter of representation. But,

    8 intimately, I thought that this was not the right

    9 solution. I don't remember saying anything or writing

    10 anything about that.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, when you're going to

    12 be citing something, I hope that you will name the

    13 source if you're going to quote from some document.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    15 Q. But, Doctor, your positions were consistent,

    16 you were against the formation of the Kninska Krajina,

    17 within the Republic of Croatia in the same way that you

    18 were against the establishment of the Croatian

    19 community of Herzeg-Bosna and the Republic of

    20 Herzeg-Bosna because it would lead to the break up of

    21 individual republics; isn't that right?

    22 A. In principle, I assumed that stand, but when

    23 the Prosecutor, Your Honours, say that I expressly

    24 stated, then this is a mistake. I don't recall having

    25 expressly stated this. Because a mistake is that kind

  57. 1 of qualification. It can mean one thing or another.

    2 They're all relative matters. And taking part in

    3 political life, particularly when you're a member of

    4 the opposition, one allows oneself the right to

    5 overdimensionalise in order to make it difficult for

    6 the ruling party.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, this is a question

    8 of methodology. I think you must respect the rigorous

    9 principles of methodology. Either you ask the witness

    10 his opinion and then the witness will give his

    11 opinion. Or, you should list the facts and then ask

    12 him to comment on those. You cannot pile on questions,

    13 approximative questions, you, it seems, did so and so.

    14 And then end that with a question by saying, therefore,

    15 if you're against such and such a thing. Do you follow

    16 me? Do you follow what problem I have? Is it a

    17 question of methodology in your questioning. This is a

    18 procedure that must be followed. Either you ask the

    19 opinion of the witness. That is your absolute right.

    20 But, you should not start off with a question from

    21 which the answer is already there. Then, derive a

    22 certain answer from that. And this is an intellectual

    23 exercise which is not very clear. So please make an

    24 effort in this regard. Thank you.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

  58. 1 Q. Doctor, do you know a reporter by the name of

    2 Jasmina Kuzmanovic?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. Did you give an interview or comment to her

    5 on the 21st of July, or it was published on the 21st of

    6 July, 1993, on a wire service known as "Associative

    7 Press"?

    8 A. That is possible, Your Honours. I had

    9 interviews with hundreds and hundreds of journalists.

    10 Now, whether I gave this particular person an

    11 interview, I don't have records on this in my personal

    12 documents or anywhere, so I don't remember. I don't

    13 know the sense of the question. The question is not a

    14 direct question.

    15 Q. Well, Doctor, let me get more direct on the

    16 question. During the midst of the war between the

    17 Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, did you express

    18 your displeasure of the policies of the Republic of

    19 Croatia in saying if one divides Bosnia, why shouldn't

    20 one divide Croatia? It's a logical consequence. Did

    21 you say that?

    22 A. I don't remember that. It can possibly be

    23 stated, but I don't recall --

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Now here's a question of

    25 methodology once again. You have that article, I

  59. 1 suppose?

    2 MR. KEHOE: I do, I do, Mr. President.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: You don't even know what the

    4 date of the article is. So, please, when you have an

    5 article, please specify which article you are referring

    6 to, otherwise we will lose a great deal of time. I

    7 don't even have the year. So, please, you can say you

    8 gave to such and such a paper on such and such and date

    9 and then we can end with that and the witness can tell

    10 you what he feels, what he thinks about that. Let's

    11 continue on that vein Mr. Kehoe, but not to keep going

    12 around the issue.

    13 MR. KEHOE: With respect, Mr. President, I do

    14 believe I led in before the question that this was an

    15 article that was published approximately on the 21st of

    16 July, 1993 by an Associative Press reporter.

    17 Q. You do not recall giving that particular

    18 interview; is that right?

    19 A. Absolutely not. I have at least 2.000 pages

    20 of interviews and who can remember an interview,

    21 particularly in that dramatic situation.

    22 Q. Well, let me ask you, Doctor, during July of

    23 1993, did you believe that the Croatians were

    24 attempting to divide Bosnia?

    25 A. Your Honours, this is also a strange

  60. 1 question. My stand of principle was always to retain

    2 the results of the partisan war. That is to say, this

    3 republic. And it is from those positions that I always

    4 defended these stands. And then, of course, in one or

    5 another interview, following a policy of that kind, and

    6 as I was a member of the opposition, I could have said

    7 one thing or another. So whether I thought one thing

    8 or another is difficult for me to say. I cannot define

    9 it. I cannot remember precisely what exactly I said in

    10 July 1993, what I thought in July 1993.

    11 Q. Then, maybe we can refresh your recollection,

    12 Doctor, by going to the second clip and I believe

    13 that's 463-B, if I am not mistaken, Mr. Dubuisson. If

    14 we can play that next clip again. Again this is

    15 another excerpt from dispatches.

    16 Excuse me, video room, can you start that

    17 from the beginning with the volume, please. And the

    18 lights, please, if you could dim the lights.

    19 (Videotape played)

    20 Q. Do you recall that interview, Doctor?

    21 A. Well, the question, as a member of the

    22 opposition party, of course I remember. I wanted to

    23 explain and I was close to the view that this was a

    24 state of fact. And from that state of fact to politics

    25 and what should be done is a long road, a large step to

  61. 1 take.

    2 Q. Did you conclude that the Croatian community

    3 of Herzeg-Bosna was attempting to establish a state

    4 within the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    5 A. I only took note of what had been done. I

    6 did not conclude anything. My statement talks about

    7 what they did within their territorial unit. And I

    8 have no stand there, what they were thinking of doing

    9 in the future.

    10 Q. In any event, Doctor, you concluded that the

    11 Croats from Herzegovina thought that the division of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was done and that they could do

    13 whatever they wanted; isn't that right?

    14 A. Well, you used a bit of licentia poetica

    15 there. I did not say that, poetic licence. It was a

    16 dramatic process which was ongoing and it was to end

    17 later on according to the logics of recognition because

    18 Croatia was later to recognise, not later, but it

    19 definitely recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina and an

    20 organisation within Herzeg-Bosna was both military and

    21 political because at that time in the aggressive war

    22 against the JNA and Serbia and so on and so forth,

    23 something had to be done in that direction.

    24 Q. Doctor, let me go back for one moment before

    25 we conclude. In your paper that you wrote, "Croatian

  62. 1 Between War and Independence." A paper that was

    2 published by the University of Zagreb in 1991. And in

    3 your conclusion, you state the following thing:

    4 "Criminal deeds go hand in hand with criminal lies.

    5 This is an old and often proven truth."

    6 Doctor, do you believe that today as much as

    7 you believed that in 1991?

    8 A. Your Honours, criminal deeds go hand in hand

    9 with what? I don't understand the sense of the

    10 sentence. It alludes me. If I wrote it, then the

    11 interpretation is completely unclear and the

    12 Prosecutor's interpretation is unclear. What does it

    13 mean? Criminal deeds are criminal deeds.

    14 Q. I will read it for you one more time. And I

    15 quote as follows on page 90 of your book: "Criminal

    16 deeds go hand in hand with criminal lies. This is an

    17 old and often proved truth." Did you write that?

    18 A. Even if I did write it, I think that it is a

    19 little -- that it has two meanings and it is not

    20 sufficiently clear. A criminal deed, something has to

    21 precede criminal deeds and you lawyers know that. You

    22 have to have intent beforehand or some sort of action,

    23 preparation for some thing. And criminal lies, it

    24 states that criminal lies are also criminal deeds. Is

    25 that the sense of the question? Whether I consider

  63. 1 that lies are criminal deeds? It is not a very clear

    2 sentence and I doubt that I could have written a

    3 sentence which lacked clarity of that kind. Or perhaps

    4 it is a question of translation. I don't understand

    5 the exact sense, either of the sentence or the

    6 question.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: The sentence does not go on too

    8 much further. Otherwise it seems that we are arriving

    9 at a paradoxical situation, where the author of the

    10 sentence would have to receive an explanation from

    11 someone else about that sentence means.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Perhaps if we have it in the

    13 native language in which it was written, the witness

    14 can see it. If we have it in BSC, Your Honour, that

    15 might cut through the problem.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes. We have a possible

    17 difficulty. I understand the witness to be reacting to

    18 a proposition which says that a criminal lie is a

    19 criminal deed. The sentence which was quoted to you

    20 was, however, a little different. That criminal deeds

    21 go hand in hand with criminal lies. From that, there

    22 is no necessary inference, criminal lies are always

    23 criminal deeds.

    24 THE WITNESS: I agree, Your Honours, with

    25 that interpretation made by the judge.

  64. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you Judge Shahabuddeen

    2 having clarified that issue. Mr. Kehoe, do you have

    3 any further questions?

    4 MR. KEHOE: No, Mr. President, I do not. No

    5 further questions.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, Mr. Nobilo. Now,

    7 you realise the re-examination should be within the

    8 scope of the cross-examination.

    9 MR. NOBILO: That's right. But I suppose

    10 with additional questions I could enter into a new

    11 cross-examination outside the examination-in-chief.

    12 Re-examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    13 Q. In any event, Professor please explain to the

    14 Court whether there is a difference in expressing

    15 assertions in a political struggle and presenting

    16 assertions in a scientific work, including professional

    17 expertise given before this Criminal Chamber?

    18 A. Yes, there is a difference, absolutely.

    19 Because statements, Your Honours, in a political

    20 struggle, are something that is aimed at having your

    21 political adversary disqualified. And when we're

    22 talking about science, then the approach must be quite

    23 different. The methods might be quite different and

    24 the statements different. And I assume that this holds

    25 true in a court of law as well.

  65. 1 Q. Have I understood you correctly in saying

    2 that the weight and precision and quality of one, that

    3 is statements said in the heat of political argument,

    4 and a different weight is placed on something that you,

    5 as a scientist, write or state or something which you,

    6 as a scientist, state before a court of law?

    7 A. The ethics of science has its own ethics and

    8 political struggles have their own ethics which are

    9 different according to my view.

    10 Q. You are a member of the strongest opposition

    11 party in the Republic of Croatia and whether it is --

    12 is it the aim of your opposition party to overthrow

    13 president Tudjman's power and party, of course, in a

    14 parliamentary manner?

    15 A. I think I can confirm this because the whole

    16 meaning of having an opposition party is to come into

    17 power one day. And, of course, in Croatia this means

    18 by parliamentary methods today.

    19 Q. You -- we heard mention of the Nacional a lot

    20 of times, is this a pro-government newspaper or

    21 anti-government newspaper?

    22 A. It's expressly opposition anti-government and

    23 expressly critical. And I always follow the Nacional

    24 and I must say, unfortunately, that I don't very often

    25 agree with them because at times they overstep the code

  66. 1 of conduct and morals -- well, not morals, that's a

    2 little heavy, but they overstep the frameworks of Buto

    3 in order to inflict a blow to the regime and the ruling

    4 party. And I have the impression I could also supply

    5 you with documents because I myself am convinced of

    6 that.

    7 Q. In a young democracy, such as Croatia, is

    8 that the characteristic of the majority of newspapers?

    9 A. Also in this case I think, Your Honours, this

    10 is a broad question. But I must say one thing and that

    11 is that the mentality that reigns the Mediterranean

    12 mountainous mentality in polemics does not always take

    13 care of content and style, but very often they react

    14 very sharply and heatedly. In Croatia we have several

    15 newspapers who are in the forefront of this kind of

    16 behaviour.

    17 Q. Would the Nacional, do you assess that the

    18 Nacional is also politically oriented like your own

    19 party as an opposition in the direction of overthrowing

    20 the existing powers that are in Croatia?

    21 A. Yes, it's far more critical than my own

    22 party.

    23 Q. In Croatia, in our political discussions

    24 there, when we speak of division, the division of

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, does this encompass a division

  67. 1 within the state, that is who is going to be dominant

    2 in power within? And the same term, is it used in the

    3 division of the same state into two, three or more

    4 parts? Am I right in saying the same term, "division",

    5 is used for breaking up Bosnia-Herzegovina and also

    6 when we mean division in the local division of

    7 government within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Am I right

    8 there?

    9 A. Well, I think that politics and the processes

    10 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the first day to the

    11 present, are such that the term "division" is really

    12 used both for a policy of Bosnia as an entirety, that

    13 is that the division must ensure constituency of the

    14 three basic elements. Those who wish to have the

    15 division of Bosnia also use the same term "division".

    16 So this is rather a confusing term, a

    17 confusion of terms, terms which are not quite clear,

    18 and daily politics uses, intentionally, these confusing

    19 terms, both the ruling party and the opposition parties

    20 use this term.

    21 Q. In concrete terms, is Bosnia divided into two

    22 ethnicities today -- entities in keeping with the

    23 Dayton Accords?

    24 A. Well, the Dayton Accords, in fact, divided

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the opposition overemphasises

  68. 1 this assessment, that the International Community

    2 divided Bosnia and that it now keeps it divided. This

    3 is particularly widespread, the accepted widespread

    4 view in the opposition parties.

    5 Q. Well, from -- we discussed Karadjordjevo a

    6 great deal, so I won't dwell on that, but you said that

    7 you did not see any document from a meeting in

    8 Karadjordjevo, and that President Tudjman did not tell

    9 you the contents of the talks there.

    10 A. Absolutely.

    11 Q. And now I'm asking you whether anybody -- any

    12 other member of the Croatian delegation who was present

    13 in Karadjordjevo told you about the contents of the

    14 talks in Karadjordjevo between the representatives of

    15 Croatia and Serbia?

    16 A. Absolutely not. Neither the Minister, nor

    17 the Prime Minister, nobody told me this.

    18 Q. So just with one sentence, can we definitely

    19 conclude and discard all doubt that you have no

    20 knowledge on the talks in Karadjordjevo and what was

    21 discussed in Karadjordjevo?

    22 A. Absolutely not.

    23 Q. Tikves. You said that the meeting in Tikves

    24 boiled down to a discussion on whether the boarders

    25 from the Second World War can or cannot be changed.

  69. 1 Can you tell me in precise terms whether this related

    2 to the external borders of Yugoslavia or the republican

    3 borders?

    4 A. Your question -- even in my interview in the

    5 Nacional, says that -- and that is the frequently

    6 quoted Nacional is an important source here, that

    7 practically the entire talks were -- evolved in a

    8 polemics as to which borders were meant. The talks

    9 gave me the impression, a strong impression, that both

    10 sides, in discussing borders, understood that they were

    11 dealing exclusively with internal borders, because none

    12 of the sides brought into question external borders.

    13 Q. Professor, could you please make it clear to

    14 the court; in our political terminology, when we say

    15 "internal borders," do we have in mind the borders of

    16 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and

    17 so on and so forth?

    18 A. Absolutely, completely. There is no dilemma

    19 there. We have in mind exclusively the republican

    20 borders, which according to the 1974 constitution, were

    21 defined as the boarders of the states of the

    22 republics. So state borders are borders -- internal

    23 borders between the republics.

    24 Q. Having said that, may we conclude, in view of

    25 your previous statement, that you, together with the

  70. 1 other representatives from Croatia, advocated no change

    2 for the boarders of Croatia and Bosnia?

    3 A. While I took part in those talks the answer

    4 is yes, and after me and before me I don't know.

    5 Q. To objectvise the situation, at that time --

    6 in that time span, that is the armed insurrection of

    7 the Serbs in Krajina, which brought into question

    8 Croatian state borders, Croatia could allow itself the

    9 political luxury of bringing into question its internal

    10 borders within Yugoslavia.

    11 A. The political-military-international

    12 situation in the early spring of 1991 was such that it

    13 reached a climax. That is to say, it was the time when

    14 preparations for a military coup were being prepared,

    15 and when the Minister of the army went to the Soviet

    16 Union, to Marshal Jasov (Phoen), and Croatia found

    17 itself in a situation which was a difficult one, so

    18 difficult that any serious policy, anybody serious at

    19 the time would not have opened a front of that kind.

    20 Q. We have heard you were an expert working with

    21 the peaks of Croatian power and authority during the

    22 disintegration period of Yugoslavia. Now, I ask you

    23 the following: At that time, or afterwards, and we're

    24 now entering into the region, right up to the present

    25 day, whether you ever saw one official document of the

  71. 1 Republic of Croatia which would demand, request, the

    2 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    3 A. As far as I know, a document of that kind

    4 does not exist. I had occasion to look at the

    5 documents of our Sabor, or parliament, of the

    6 government, of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, as far as

    7 I was able through the mass media, and as far as I know

    8 I don't know of any document of that kind.

    9 Q. I have asked you officially. Did you see a

    10 secret document of the organs of Croatia seeking for

    11 this division?

    12 A. No, absolutely not.

    13 Q. Would you please tell the Court what state in

    14 the world first recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 A. I think that it was Croatia.

    16 Q. In the diplomatic world, when a state is

    17 recognised, what does that mean in view of its

    18 territory and borders?

    19 A. It means that the side recognises the

    20 integrity of the country recognised.

    21 Q. What does that mean?

    22 A. It means that in the case of Yugoslavia and

    23 recognition of mutual -- whether Serbia, Slovenia,

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina Montenegro, whatever, that the

    25 signing and the international recognition meant

  72. 1 recognition of its existing borders. That is political

    2 practice. And that holds true for Slovenia, with which

    3 we do have diplomatic relations. It holds true for

    4 Macedonia and also for Serbia, although -- that is to

    5 say Yugoslavia. Although with Yugoslavia, we have the

    6 problem of the Prehlika (Phoen) area, that although

    7 that is a specific issue. However, Yugoslavia and

    8 Croatia recognised existing borders, and existing

    9 borders are always recognised.

    10 Q. Without side-stepping, did Croatia recognise

    11 Bosnian borders?

    12 A. Yes, yes, of course it did.

    13 Q. Is recognition by the Republic of Croatia of

    14 Bosnia, was that before or after Karadjordjevo or can

    15 you remember?

    16 A. Karadjordjevo was while Yugoslavia existed as

    17 an internationally recognised state. Therefore, we

    18 could not have spoken at that time. It was, let's say,

    19 one year before the international recognition of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and nine months or eight months

    21 prior to the international recognition of Croatia,

    22 Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and four months prior to

    23 the beginning of the war.

    24 So we're dealing here with Yugoslavia, which

    25 was still an internationally recognised state.

  73. 1 Q. Therefore, Professor, the recognition of

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croatia came after

    3 Karadjordjevo. That's what you wanted to say?

    4 A. Yes, one year later.

    5 Q. Now tell me, in relation to Karadjordjevo,

    6 how much time elapsed before the Great War broke out

    7 between Serbia, the JNA and Croatia? How long after

    8 Karadjordjevo?

    9 A. I didn't understand the question.

    10 Q. From the moment of the meeting in

    11 Karadjordjevo?

    12 A. Yes, I understand.

    13 Q. Yes. From Karadjordjevo to the outbreak of

    14 war between Serbia and Croatia, how much time elapsed?

    15 A. About four months. Yes, about four months

    16 later. The real war began in the summer of 1991, and

    17 up until then, there were outbreaks in Krajina, Knin.

    18 Clashes existed in Pakrac, Dalj and so on and so

    19 forth. These were clashes that broke out. But a

    20 frontal attack by the JNA began on Croatia from Serbia

    21 in the summer of 1991.

    22 Q. Professor. You have a great deal of

    23 scientific, political and every other kind of

    24 experience, so could you tell the Court, as a

    25 historian, as a politician, what do you conclude from

  74. 1 the fact that the war broke out after Karadjordjevo, a

    2 war in which the large town of Croatia was destroyed,

    3 Vukovar, the holy place of Croatia at Dubrovnik and so

    4 on? What do you conclude from that fact, that the war

    5 broke out four months after the meeting in

    6 Karadjordjevo? What is your conclusions regarding what

    7 happened or did not happen in Karadjordjevo?

    8 A. Your Honours, this is a very interesting

    9 question to which history will certainly be able to

    10 provide an answer, but it is self-explanatory, without

    11 going into a thorough analysis, that a bloody war

    12 between two parties should not have occurred if those

    13 opposing parties had reached some kind of a mutual

    14 agreement. Because if there was an agreement, then

    15 there's no way to explain why the war broke out,

    16 because as is known, the war was indeed bloody. The

    17 JNA had about 15.000 killed soldiers and 40.000

    18 wounded.

    19 Q. On whose side?

    20 A. On the side of Croatia. And about ten towns

    21 were destroyed. So it is quite incomprehensible that

    22 such a brutal and bloody war could have occurred after

    23 any kind of agreement.

    24 Q. Therefore, 15.000 dead, 30- to 40.000 wounded

    25 and about ten destroyed towns after Tudjman and

  75. 1 Milosevic had agreed on everything, according to you

    2 that is absurd?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President, that

    5 is all.

    6 A. Your Honours, may I make a request?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Doctor. We are going to

    8 have a break now before the Judges will be asking you

    9 questions. Would you like to add something?

    10 A. I just wanted to say that my wife is very

    11 sick, and I have plane tickets for tomorrow morning.

    12 If perhaps you could devote a little more time to me

    13 today, I have to go back urgently, because I've been

    14 told today that my wife has to go into hospital for

    15 treatment.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. You are right to point

    17 that out, Professor, but I believe that after the break

    18 we will finish with the questions from the Judges. So

    19 you will be free to go as of this evening.

    20 We'll stand in recess for 20 minutes.

    21 --- Recess taken at 4.50 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 5.15 p.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Please have the accused brought

    24 in.

    25 (The accused entered court)

  76. 1 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I believe I

    2 neglected to offer the exhibits that I discussed during

    3 my cross-examination into evidence and with the Court's

    4 permission, I would like to do that at this time.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: No objections?

    6 MR. NOBILO: We would like to ask the

    7 Prosecutor to specify which exhibits and documents he

    8 is referring to because he used a variety of

    9 documents.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: The video, I presume, Mr.

    11 Kehoe?

    12 MR. KEHOE: The video is broken down into 463

    13 A and 463 B. The article, the Nacional article of the

    14 25th of October, 1996, is 464 and 464 A and the

    15 retraction of which there is only a BCS version is

    16 465. Those are the exhibits.

    17 MR. NOBILO: We have no objection, Your

    18 Honour.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. They have been

    20 admitted as numbered. Is that right, registrar?

    21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, that is correct, Your

    22 Honour.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Professor, we are now coming

    24 close to our conclusion, but now the judges have

    25 questions for you. I will now give the floor to Judge

  77. 1 Riad.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon, Professor. Can

    3 you hear me?

    4 A. Good afternoon, Your Honour, yes, I can.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Indeed, I listen with great

    6 interest to your testimony which is of great historical

    7 dimension and I wish I could listen much more and read

    8 you more, I hope.

    9 Just a few things I need clarification in my

    10 mind in what you said. One of them interests me in

    11 particular, not only with regard to your testimony, it

    12 is the rights which you mentioned, the rights of a

    13 nation could be based on ethnic principle or could be

    14 based on national ethribution or based on history. And

    15 you seem to identify the ethnic principle with the

    16 principle of national ethribution and you said

    17 ethribution is tantamount to self-determination.

    18 I would like more clarification because I

    19 thought the ethnic principle is more linked with race.

    20 Is that what you meant that ethnic principle can be the

    21 basis of a nation or has it a wider scope? Is my

    22 question clear? Concerning the ethnic principle, what

    23 did you mean by it?

    24 A. Your Honour, in European theory of a nation

    25 is a social community comprising several elements. It

  78. 1 should have several elements: Language, culture,

    2 history, and, in particular and most importantly, an

    3 individual feeling of a certain person, the conviction

    4 of that person that he belongs to a certain nation.

    5 I distinguish nation from race because I

    6 don't like the term race. But if we were to accept it

    7 in the conventional and popular sense, then within a

    8 race, there may be several nations. For instance,

    9 though this is not my strong point. For instance,

    10 among Arabs, there may be 10 nations. Among the Slavs

    11 who are not a race, but a large social grouping, there

    12 are about 10 states. So nation is something narrower.

    13 And nation according to European criteria can no longer

    14 be subdivided. It remains a whole.

    15 As for the principle of self-determination,

    16 this is a political category, which may or may not be

    17 allowed to a nation to resort to, that is to

    18 self-determine itself.

    19 According to Stalin's policy, for instance,

    20 this right to self-determination was not recognised

    21 until the Soviet Union was disintegrated. As for these

    22 two terms: Ethnic is national; ethnos, that is

    23 belonging to a particular situation, an ethnos becomes

    24 a nation when it becomes conscious of definite

    25 political goals. The ethnic principle is the principle

  79. 1 for the formation of nations, but the historical

    2 principle is one that I do not recognise. In other

    3 words, I do not recognise the right of, for instance,

    4 former empires because they used to govern certain

    5 peoples, have the right to gain control of those

    6 peoples again. Though any right may be abused,

    7 including the right to self-determination, as well as

    8 the right to historical borders.

    9 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both of

    10 the two larger nations ought, or to be more precise,

    11 both Croatia and Serbia over a period of 150 years

    12 equally claimed the right over Bosnia-Herzegovina in

    13 the name of the ethnic and in the name of the

    14 historical right. I don't know whether I have been of

    15 any assistance. Therefore, in Europe, you have nations

    16 such as the German nation, the French nation, the

    17 Russian nation, the Italian nation, the Croatian

    18 nation, the Hungarian nation. Those are nations.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: Just to go to your last

    20 affirmation. When you said Croatia and Serbia are

    21 claiming rights over Bosnia based on ethnic principle

    22 and on historical ground, what is the historical

    23 ground? And what is the ethnic principle in this

    24 instance?

    25 A. That tendency is 150 years old. It emerged

  80. 1 in the middle of the 19th century as an idea and a

    2 tendency, as a plan, as a project. The starting point

    3 was that both parties believed that the Muslims were

    4 actually Slavs, but they were Serbs or, in the other

    5 case, Croats. Both parties proceeded from the belief

    6 that they are of a certain faith. Because, when the

    7 Muslims came into being, there were no nations in

    8 Europe at the time in the sense in which that concept

    9 was established with the French Revolution.

    10 When Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1500 something was

    11 captured by the Turks, all was that they found there

    12 were Slavs of Catholic faith and Orthodox faith. And

    13 then later on, national ideologues said that the

    14 Muslims who converted to Islam were exclusively

    15 Catholics. That would be one theory in Croatia.

    16 In Serbia, Karadzic and other theoreticians

    17 claim that they were all Orthodox who converted to

    18 Islam. Therefore, they remained Serbs, but they only

    19 changed their religion, which scientifically cannot be

    20 proven quite precisely because the social consciousness

    21 in the middle ages differed substantially from social

    22 consciousness today.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: At least the fact remains, the

    24 bottom line is that they were Slavs? The Bosnians were

    25 Slavs?

  81. 1 A. That is correct.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: They are sometimes called Turks,

    3 is that a right description?

    4 A. That is true too. But they changed

    5 ethnically, although I do not know their history very

    6 well. But during the Osmanly Rule, Turks did settle in

    7 Bosnia and in time they came to recognise themselves as

    8 Turks, as Bosniaks, as something rather vague, so that

    9 the research done so far into this issue are quite

    10 lacking, even though all three parties have their own

    11 interpretations, today's Bosniaks, former Muslims and

    12 the Serbs and the Croats each have their own versions

    13 about the situation as it was in the middle ages.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: What is the version of the

    15 Bosniaks themselves?

    16 A. The version of the Bosniaks, I will be

    17 referring to contemporary views. The Bosnian Muslims

    18 always considered themselves a separate people. And

    19 when nations were being formed, the nations of the

    20 Croatian and the Serbian nation, they took the position

    21 that, or they aspired towards becoming an autochthonous

    22 factor and that tendency was weak because some of them

    23 really did consider themselves Serbs and other Croats,

    24 but as of the end of the 19th century, and especially

    25 with the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and

  82. 1 Tito's socialist Yugoslavia, they tended increasingly

    2 to see themselves as a separate national unit. And the

    3 Constitution of Yugoslavia recognised this for the

    4 first time this figured in the population census of

    5 Yugoslavia in 1971. Therefore, today, they have

    6 definitely become a formed national community which has

    7 this national consciousness of being a separate

    8 nation.

    9 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you so much for your

    10 information. Just another question which comes to my

    11 mind and you are not obliged to answer it. When you

    12 spoke of the negotiations in Kresovo between President

    13 Tudjman and President Milosevic, you just said that it

    14 was on how to treat Bosnia-Herzegovina. What did you

    15 mean by "How to treat Bosnia"? What does the meaning

    16 of "How to treat?" Did you have a definition or rather

    17 an explanation of it?

    18 A. As I did not get completely clear and precise

    19 instructions or information that indeed it had to do

    20 with a division, something I didn't believe in, but let

    21 me say in passing, I saw that assignment as a

    22 political drive conducted before the war. The aim of

    23 which was to test the enemy, which from whom one

    24 expected the war to start, to see the views regarding

    25 that problem. And, secondly, to gain time.

  83. 1 However, as intimately I favoured an integral

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you know when one personally

    3 believes in something, he is not prone to accept such

    4 directives. But I can claim with emphasis that I

    5 received no document about the Karadjordjevo meeting,

    6 nor was I orally told that, except to the effect that

    7 we should test what the views of Serbia were regarding

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and to see the possibility of coming

    9 to some kind of an agreement.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Professor.

    11 A. Thank you too.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Judge

    13 Shahabuddeen.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor Bilandzic, as

    15 the president has told you, the Tribunal is not a

    16 college of historians and we are grateful to you for

    17 coming forward to help us. I shall be sufficiently

    18 prudent, I hope, not to enter into areas which are

    19 really beyond my reach.

    20 So I will ask you just one or two questions

    21 and let me begin with Mr. Djilas. Were you referring

    22 to the prominent Yugoslav writer?

    23 A. Yes, who was also a politician.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: He had more than one

    25 dimension to his character. He was both politician and

  84. 1 writer. I didn't know that.

    2 A. That's right.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now as you can

    4 appreciate, the Bench has an interest in the

    5 Karadjordjevo meeting. I understand, perfectly I hope,

    6 the position which you have expressed. You heard of

    7 it, but you never saw anything and you're not in a

    8 position to say authoritatively what may or may not

    9 have happened at Karadjordjevo; am I right?

    10 A. Right.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, would I be right,

    12 however, in supposing, Professor, that you would have

    13 heard stories circulating that the meeting at

    14 Karadjordjevo was about dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 A. Yes, there were such rumours.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, would you,

    17 Professor, as a scientific person, have thought that

    18 that was an important question?

    19 A. Yes, I agree.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you, sir, have

    21 felt that your scientific pursuits would at least have

    22 encouraged you, if not required you, to probe the

    23 nature of the alleged agreement?

    24 A. If I live for another five or six years, I am

    25 75-years-old, I hope that in five or six years' time, I

  85. 1 will learn not only about that, but a whole series of

    2 events. It is well-known that some events from the

    3 Roman times are being discovered today. Or, for

    4 instance, some discoveries are being made about the

    5 political and social life in the former Soviet Union

    6 and the former Yugoslavia, so that a time distance is

    7 required to be able to clearly, fairly and

    8 scientifically to analyse the past.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand you then to

    10 mean that, yes, you recognised that this was a matter

    11 of importance which could properly engage the mind of a

    12 scientific historian, but you considered that a time

    13 factor in the material factor required a deferment of

    14 close examination in order to arrive at an objective

    15 appreciation of whatever may have happened?

    16 A. Exactly so.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you see,

    18 Professor -- well, I know you saw it. Would you like

    19 to recall the clip which you saw yesterday and today,

    20 television clip. I think you prepared on it. After

    21 you prepared and spoke, Mr. Letica also appeared on the

    22 television clip? Another person? Yes. Am I right in

    23 my recollection, I did not take down his words, but I

    24 recall him speaking about maps and dividing

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall him speaking about

  86. 1 those matters?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you know him?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you ever see that

    6 clip before today?

    7 A. I think it was shown in the programme, the

    8 break up of Yugoslavia, the BBC movie. And I did watch

    9 that BBC film. And I remember that he appeared in that

    10 film. And I can tell you, quite frankly, that any maps

    11 about a division, I never saw. Whether he knows

    12 anything about that, I never discussed that with him.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand that

    14 perfectly. You, yourself, have never had any knowledge

    15 of maps. But, looking at the television programme at

    16 the time, did you have any reason to think that he was

    17 not telling the truth?

    18 A. The TV programme was done quite fairly and

    19 honestly and I omitted to mention throughout my

    20 testimony here that I joined political life in 1939. I

    21 joined the communist movement. The communist movement

    22 very emphatically, but very emphatically, accused the

    23 Serbian and Croatian bourgeois of dividing Bosnia. And

    24 ever since 1939 for some 50, 60 years, and even before

    25 that actually, the communists had an entirely different

  87. 1 concept. In the war of 1941, they decided that Bosnia

    2 had to be an equal state, one of the federal units.

    3 And for us communists --

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor, perhaps I

    5 should explain. I am not asking about your own

    6 position. I am only asking whether at the time you

    7 thought that Mr. Letica was not telling the truth.

    8 A. I can't give you a very clear answer.

    9 Because Letica too is not very clear. He said there

    10 were maps, but he did not say I saw those maps. And I

    11 never asked him, so I don't know. I just wanted to end

    12 by saying that we communists were very rigid and this

    13 entered our blood stream, the belief that Bosnia had to

    14 prevail, that it had to exist.

    15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand your

    16 position perfectly, Professor.

    17 May I ask you a supplementary question on

    18 this point. At the time when you saw this clip, did

    19 anyone in authority in Croatia come forward to assert

    20 that Mr. Letica was not telling the truth?

    21 A. In Zagreb, there was no public debate in

    22 political and scientific circles about this programme,

    23 so that I didn't have the opportunity to hear what

    24 individuals or the public thought about this TV

    25 programme or specifically about Letica.

  88. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, Professor, we know

    2 that from what you have said that you have objected for

    3 the reasons which you have given, was a division of

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is your position. Would I be

    5 right in understanding you to mean that the fact that

    6 you objected to the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    7 implied that you knew it was a plan to divide

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina? That is what you objected to?

    9 A. In political life in the mass media and in

    10 the public in general, the topic of Bosnia was

    11 constantly on the agenda. And I often reacted to this

    12 story about Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that we have to

    13 abide by the 1974 constitution. But in concrete terms,

    14 I cannot say anything more than I have already said. I

    15 am a little tired too.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand. And I

    17 wouldn't weary you too much. I am about to conclude in

    18 one or two more modest questions, if I may. The

    19 president may have his little quota to add -- I

    20 shouldn't say little, but he will have his quota to

    21 add, but I am sure he will take note of your desire to

    22 escape, shall we say.

    23 Now, you were, Professor, a member of the

    24 commission, the commission was established formerly by

    25 law, by proclamation, by edict, how was it set up?

  89. 1 A. The term used was not a commission, but an

    2 expert group, which was to question the other side as

    3 to its intentions regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    4 generally to get an idea of the strategy. In those

    5 dramatic circumstances, which were extremely dramatic,

    6 and the war was impending, and we needed to know what

    7 the other protagonists in the drama were thinking, and

    8 in that context this was this talk about

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Were there any terms of

    11 reference of the expert group?

    12 A. No. Absolutely none.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, the commission

    14 encountered some difficulties which you have

    15 explained. Were those difficulties related to the

    16 principle of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina, or did they

    17 relate to difficulties arising from implementation of

    18 the principle of dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    19 A. The question is a very good one and most

    20 inspiring, even for my future reflections.

    21 Psychologically, mentally, whichever way you

    22 want me to put it, we were obsessed with the problem of

    23 the totality of the political conflict on the soil of

    24 the former Yugoslavia, and our attention focused -- we

    25 were simply -- I can't find the right word. We were so

  90. 1 preoccupied with the problem of whether we would emerge

    2 from an impossible situation, or would blood flow in

    3 streams. And for this reason the expert group focused

    4 on the problems of Yugoslavia as a whole.

    5 First we needed to resolve the question of

    6 Yugoslavia as a whole, and we will solve it if we stick

    7 to the rule that the republics are states and thereby

    8 we will avoid war. That is how the whole debate --

    9 rather than being dedicated to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 59

    10 per cent of it was orientated towards Yugoslavia as a

    11 whole.

    12 What Serbia's project was regarding the whole

    13 of Yugoslavia and what Croatia's project was regarding

    14 the whole of Yugoslavia, we were simply intoxicated by

    15 this problem and this topic, and a way out of the

    16 situation.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: One remaining little

    18 area of interest. In your -- in speaking of your

    19 correction, your published partial correction of the

    20 Nacional article, it was said there, and I recorded the

    21 terms: "This has not substantially distorted what I

    22 said."

    23 In other words, in your correction you were

    24 pointing out certain errors, but you were saying,

    25 "Those errors have not substantially distorted what I

  91. 1 said." Do you remember that part? And you wrote that

    2 correction with your own hand or typewriter.

    3 Would that statement also apply to the

    4 unpublished part of your correction? Would you be

    5 prepared to say, in relation to the unpublished part of

    6 your correction --

    7 A. In this retraction, I also said that the

    8 interpretation regarding the future obstacles to the

    9 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not given by

    10 President Tudjman, but that I was the one who told them

    11 that. But they left that out. They probably had a

    12 particular design in mind.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: We all know what

    14 difficulties reporters can be.

    15 So let me ask one last question. If

    16 President Tudjman and President Milosevic had an

    17 agreement to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina, would you

    18 regard that as a matter of substance? Would I then be

    19 right in supposing --

    20 A. If you wish to hear my personal opinion then,

    21 not today -- not just today but then at the time, I

    22 thought that those two leaders wanted to manoeuvre each

    23 other and to outwit each other by various proposals and

    24 ploys. On one hand to delay the war as far as Croatia

    25 was concerned, and as far as Serbia is concerned, to

  92. 1 attract Croatia to involve it in a game that would not

    2 have been to the benefit of Croatia. That is why I

    3 said that our mission of the expert group had mostly to

    4 do with Yugoslavia as a whole.

    5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Politicians, every so

    6 often, engage in playing poker games with one another.

    7 We know that. You know the expression, "poker game"?

    8 Yes.

    9 Now, if your first published statement in

    10 Nacional referred to an agreement made at Karadjordjevo

    11 between the two presidents, then would I be right in

    12 supposing that the retraction which you later made was

    13 not intended to apply to that matter?

    14 A. In the part that I was referring to the three

    15 obstacles, that did apply, that is that it was not true

    16 that I said that to President Tudjman, but I said it to

    17 them. Otherwise, I'm afraid I didn't get the gist of

    18 your question.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Oh, let me put it back

    20 this way then: In your retraction, you said that the

    21 errors of which you complained did not distort the

    22 substance of the first publication. And my second

    23 question was this: If the first publication quoted you

    24 or referred to you as referring to Karadjordjevo as

    25 establishing an agreement to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina,

  93. 1 would you regard that as a matter of substance?

    2 A. In my response, a part of which was left out,

    3 I said, first of all, that it was to them that I spoke

    4 about those three obstacles; and secondly, I said that

    5 I never saw any maps, and for some strange reasons,

    6 they left that out of my retraction.

    7 I tried to write a third retraction, but you

    8 see, sometimes the newspaper editors have rather unfair

    9 treatment of the author, and they wish to give the

    10 impression that they will not change their own

    11 positions or their own policies.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Professor, you encourage

    13 me to ask further questions, but it's five minutes to

    14 6.00. You're not so well, and Madam herself is not so

    15 well, so I will turn the matter back to the President.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Yes, indeed. The

    17 witness had requested that we be able to finish this

    18 evening, so if Judge Riad or Judge Shahabuddeen, if you

    19 have any more questions to ask, you may do so.

    20 I see. Very well. I understood you to say

    21 that you are tired. It has been a very long

    22 examination-in-chief and a long cross-examination, but

    23 I have a need for some clarification.

    24 How long have you been in opposition to

    25 Tudjman?

  94. 1 A. Yes, I am. As a member of the Central

    2 Committee of the Communist party of Croatia, I took

    3 part in the continuity of that party which changed its

    4 name and became the Social Democratic Party, and which,

    5 of course, performed radical changes of its ideology

    6 and politics, rejecting the essential traits of

    7 Communism. One a uniparty system, second a

    8 single-party system, Marxist ideology, the economy, and

    9 accepted a multi-party system quite truthfully, adopted

    10 market mechanisms and so on and so forth.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Now I'm going to get to my

    12 question. I'm sorry for interrupting you. My question

    13 is very simple. You are in opposition. How long have

    14 you been in opposition to Mr. Tudjman? That's a very

    15 clear, simple question. '88, '89, '90?

    16 A. We have been the opposition since the time of

    17 the formation. That is when we lost power. We lost

    18 power, the Communists, the former Communists, we lost

    19 power in May, in the first parliamentary elections of

    20 May 1990. And we were forced at the time to join the

    21 opposition, and to the present day we have been the

    22 opposition, hoping that perhaps at the next elections

    23 we will once again take part in the formation of a new

    24 ruling power.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: All right. I understand that

  95. 1 is the objective of every opposition is to try to form

    2 a new government.

    3 If I understand correctly, Mr. Tudjman would

    4 call upon you as an advisor. And what kind of

    5 functions would you carry out? Are they secrete, are

    6 they official or unofficial? He would perhaps ask of

    7 you to go on a mission, perhaps to Serbia. What type

    8 of role did you play? And I imagine it must not have

    9 been a very comfortable one. Do you understand my

    10 question?

    11 Were you a confidante of President Tudjman,

    12 or did he call on for other purposes? I don't quite

    13 understand your role.

    14 A. Thank you. Since 1939, we were the members

    15 of the Communist movement. Both of us were Communists,

    16 therefore, both of us were partisan for four years.

    17 Both of us --

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I understood all of that,

    19 but if you want us to let you go very early or very

    20 quickly, please try to respond directly to the

    21 question.

    22 A. Then we continued privately from the former

    23 regime. We considered to have contacts from time to

    24 time. And when we had to go to Belgrade, he started

    25 out from the fact that I lived in Belgrade for 20

  96. 1 years, and that I knew many people there, particularly

    2 the Belgrade intelligencia, and it was quite normal for

    3 him to come to the conclusion that a man of my format,

    4 who knows the politicians of Serbia and the

    5 intellectuals of Serbia, would be useful to establish

    6 contacts.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: That's a very clear answer.

    8 Now, the following question I'd like to ask is about

    9 your party. I understand that you are an imminent

    10 member of your party.

    11 Now, in its own platform, during all these

    12 events, did that include a very clear opposition to the

    13 issue of Bosnia? Was that one of the central matters

    14 in opposition to Tudjman, or did you have other

    15 opposition platforms dealing with culture, dealing with

    16 the economy, et cetera, or was that a very important

    17 platform?

    18 And when you met with Mr. Tudjman, because as

    19 we've said, you were friends, you said, "My party will

    20 not accept that position with regards to that issue."

    21 The central point, the pivotal point of the

    22 divergence of views between the party and myself lay in

    23 the fact that we had a different project with respect

    24 to the manner of privatisation of the former socially

    25 owned property, with regard to relationships towards

  97. 1 the mass media, with respect to the relationship

    2 towards state -- legally governed state, based on the

    3 very rule of law. And we, who for 50 years tried to

    4 realise an ideology, encountered a debacle. We

    5 failed. And we considered that we would have to enter

    6 a bourgeois society much more decisively, and to

    7 develop institutions -- all civil institutions on the

    8 multi-party type. And it is the practice of the side

    9 that triumphs that once it comes into power, by its

    10 very nature, regardless of who the individuals are, it

    11 does have the tendency towards authoritarianism.

    12 We, however, feel that we have been healed of

    13 that disease. I think so. Perhaps we'll be bad too

    14 once we come into power, and that is the central

    15 question.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I understand. We are not

    17 here in a political Tribunal, but let me continue with

    18 my line of reasoning.

    19 So I understand your party was a classical

    20 opposition party which had differences with the party

    21 in power on various issues. But during the crucial

    22 years in 1988 to 1990, given the tragedy that was

    23 preparing, in your annual meetings of your party, did

    24 it ever issue any strong oppositions, as I have

    25 understood, of the maintenance of the internal

  98. 1 borders? Is that the case, or did you not deal with

    2 that issue?

    3 A. Communist Party of Croatia was well-known

    4 that it was too -- overly-Titoist, and that it was

    5 rigid in standing behind the principles of the

    6 inviolability of inter-republic borders. And not only

    7 that, but we did not, up until the beginning of the

    8 downfall of Yugoslavia, we never and even in our

    9 imaginations and let alone in reality, did we think

    10 that we would agree to a change of borders. We never

    11 did that. For us, that was a cannon for the

    12 Communists. A dogma, their creed.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I see. So the question I would

    14 like to ask now is that during this entire development

    15 of a propaganda both in Central Bosnia and perhaps also

    16 in Zagreb, and in respect of this possibility for some

    17 sort of annex, whether on a cultural basis or

    18 historical basis in which this part of Bosnia should

    19 become part of Greater Croatia, my question is the

    20 following: Did your party do anything? Did it not

    21 only state its position but did it also carry out any

    22 action? Did it publish any articles? Did it denounce

    23 this type of propaganda? Did it state that

    24 International Humanitarian Law would be put at risk and

    25 all other republics would end up losing...

  99. 1 Did your party do anything? And I assume you

    2 also heard this propaganda. What is your feeling on

    3 that issue? How did your party define itself in

    4 relation to that?

    5 A. Let me first put right something I said a

    6 moment ago. When I said that we were in the opposition

    7 from the very first days, I forgot to mention that in

    8 the summer of 1991, at the moment of an all-embracing

    9 war with the JNA and Serbia, that the so-called

    10 government of democratic unity was set up in which the

    11 vice-president of my party was the vice-premier of that

    12 government of the new regime, and he was there in that

    13 post for about one year or a little less, and then in

    14 real terms it definitely became what it did.

    15 The party never, because we didn't know, at

    16 least the public did not know and we did not know, the

    17 party never decidedly, at the time when the news came

    18 that the meeting was held in Karadjordjevo, it did not

    19 decisively say anything, but it always repeated that it

    20 stands -- it assumes the positions of the inviolability

    21 of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not only that

    22 particular party, but this was the stand assumed by the

    23 Croatian Popular Party, the Croatia Peasants Party.

    24 All of them took that position, all the three or four

    25 major parties. The others are not important. They all

  100. 1 came out for an unified Bosnia.

    2 But you know, when a nation finds itself in

    3 war, then the opposition has to retract its horns

    4 somewhat. And in order to -- for the purposes of

    5 defence, I must state a fact that perhaps you don't

    6 know. Never in the history of Croatia did an event

    7 occur which occurred in 1990 and 1991, in the war, and

    8 that is that three men could not be found who would

    9 move towards the side of the aggressor. This fact

    10 happened for the first time in the history of Croatia.

    11 Croatia, in the Second World War, was tragically

    12 divided into two armies which fought for four years,

    13 but in this war this did not happen.

    14 So as I say, the war and the aggression

    15 unified the people to such an extent that the

    16 opposition, under such circumstances, did not wish, nor

    17 could it sharply criticise the ruling party, because

    18 the public would see this as an attack on the newly

    19 created state of Croatia, and, therefore, the

    20 opposition refrained from doing so.

    21 Now it has no such considerations, no such

    22 difficulties.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I understand that

    24 when there are tragic events like this one, the

    25 opposition party is obliged to try to nuance its

  101. 1 opposition.

    2 My following question is the following:

    3 Given the traditional basis of your party and the

    4 revolutionary history of Communism, during the war

    5 against -- when the war against Serbia ended, if it had

    6 been proven before you that your country, here we are

    7 no longer in the tragic situation of national unity, if

    8 it had been proven in one way or another that your

    9 country had participated in one way or in another in a

    10 plan to infiltrate, or military actions or propaganda

    11 into Bosnia, if that had been the case, would you have

    12 condemned such an act?

    13 A. If it had the power of doing so, it would not

    14 have done that, and that emanates from its political

    15 strategy, its political doctrine.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much. You have

    17 fully answered all of the questions. I understand you

    18 must be very tired, Professor. I hope that you will be

    19 able to catch your plane, and that above all, when you

    20 return you will have better news about your wife.

    21 Would you like to add something, perhaps?

    22 No? Otherwise, it is ended.

    23 A. Yes, I do. Your Honours, I am fully

    24 conscious of the vast responsibility that you have

    25 taken upon yourselves, because although right and law

  102. 1 focuses on man and the individual, you yourselves not

    2 only have a man before you, an individual, but you have

    3 several nations before you, nations which have gone

    4 through this terrible catastrophe.

    5 I know full well that you have your

    6 consciences and you are aware of the lofty burden that

    7 you are bearing, but I have a very happy experience,

    8 that is that the Trial Chamber has demonstrated here

    9 legal ethics, a Code of Conduct, a legal Code of

    10 Conduct which I have found very pleasant, and I must

    11 say that I find that your correct attitude is to be

    12 commended.

    13 If I have helped you in clarifying the

    14 situation to you, I am very happy. And as I say, you

    15 have a very difficult task you, and as they say, may

    16 God help you in your deliberations.

    17 Thank you once again. I am happy to have had

    18 the opportunity of helping you.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Professor, I can tell you

    20 already now that you have aided us a great deal, and I

    21 can speak on behalf of my colleagues when I say you

    22 have our gratitude for having spent two very long days,

    23 and we wish you a very serene and agreeable return to

    24 your family.

    25 Do not leave, do not move as yet. Tomorrow,

  103. 1 I believe, Registrar, we are meeting at 10.00 in the

    2 morning.

    3 THE REGISTRAR: That is correct, Your

    4 Honour.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, we all stand

    6 adjourned.

    7 --- Whereupon hearing adjourned at 6.15

    8 to be reconvened on the 10th day of

    9 September, 1998 at 10.00 a.m.