1. 1 Thursday, 10 September 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 10.10 a.m.

    4 (The accused enter court).

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Good morning, interpreters and

    6 also the court reporters. Good morning to you all. I

    7 hope everyone can hear me. Let us now begin then and

    8 turn to Mr. Nobilo.

    9 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. The

    10 next Defence witness is Vice-Admiral of the Croatian

    11 Army Davor Domazet.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: I think there is a transcript

    13 problem, seems that the format has changed. I see the

    14 characters are different now. I think this is a more

    15 modern system. Is that right, Mr. Registrar?

    16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, well for technical

    17 means, there is no reason to have another system.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Has the system been changed?

    19 THE REGISTRAR: No. For technical reasons,

    20 we are required to be connected to a different system,

    21 which gives us this transcript for the time being.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: I see. Well, we'll do with

    23 what we have for the time being.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, the screens on

    25 the video are virtually unreadable in my opinion. On

  2. 1 the video monitor of the transcript. It's so faint you

    2 cannot read it. The laptop screen is quite readable.

    3 We have a laptop we have unplugged. I don't know if

    4 the laptop or more than one laptop can be brought to

    5 the Court. But we would like the Court to be able to

    6 see the transcript of this witness' testimony as it is

    7 given. I think it's an important aid, particularly

    8 given the translation. This witness will be testifying

    9 in BSC.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: But, Mr. Registrar, we don't

    11 have laptops. They have laptops.

    12 MR. NOBILO: We can bring some to you, Your

    13 Honour.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, perhaps it might be wise

    15 to provide us with laptops. I turn to my colleague, do

    16 you think we might go on as we are now into the break?

    17 Now we have nothing at all on the screen. The judges

    18 are ready to go on with the system until the break with

    19 the current transcript, which is even worse now I see.

    20 I am the least handicapped, but that's perhaps not the

    21 issue. Let us now go on with what we have now, but I

    22 am, nonetheless, going to ask that the witness express

    23 himself slowly and then after the break, I hope we'll

    24 have laptops by then. Mr. Registrar.

    25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, perhaps in the next 30

  3. 1 minutes the technical problem may be resolved.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Mr. Nobilo, now we

    3 have nothing on our screens at all. Mr. Nobilo, you

    4 may present your next witness. I wish to remind you,

    5 Mr. Nobilo and Mr. Hayman, that pursuant to the recent

    6 decision on the presentation of a list of witnesses

    7 seven days in advance, that you are to make a summary.

    8 The Chamber is waiting for a written summary, not one

    9 of one or two lines, because that would not be very

    10 useful for us.

    11 Do you understand what I mean Mr. Hayman?

    12 Mr. Nobilo?

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Your Honour, I read the

    14 English version of the decision yesterday for the first

    15 time and we are studying it and we'll file a more

    16 detailed, if you will, statement on that, but we'll

    17 find our way and we'll look to the Court for guidance

    18 in that regard.

    19 THE COURT: Very well.

    20 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, may I just make

    21 one comment on that. We also are handicapped in the

    22 course of preparing our examination of these witnesses

    23 because we also have received a one sentence topical

    24 summary of what these witnesses are going to say and we

    25 have not received a factual summary.

  4. 1 We also have read the decision in English and

    2 in French. It is clear to us that what is required is

    3 a factual summary prepared and presented to the

    4 Prosecutor and to the Trial Chamber several days in

    5 advance. I have notified the Defence that that is your

    6 expectation and interpretation and we are waiting

    7 receipt of those factual summaries.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, the matter is not

    9 as simple as Mr. Harmon suggests. The Court can look

    10 at the testimony of this witness and ask itself, what

    11 should a summary of this witness' testimony be? We

    12 have advised the Prosecutor that this witness is going

    13 to testify concerning what the JNA's actions,

    14 strategies, in the wars in Croatia and

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, principally in the years 1991 and

    16 1992.

    17 Now to go into the facts that he is going to

    18 present, either we describe the subject matter, the

    19 topic, or the Defence is going to be compelled to

    20 create some memorialisation of the witness' specific

    21 testimony, which, by the way, we do not always -- we

    22 have not always heard that seven days in advance. I

    23 heard this witness' presentation the day before

    24 yesterday for the first time. He was asked to prepare

    25 a presentation on a particular topic. I have never

  5. 1 heard that presentation seven days in advance of

    2 today. So the Court is going to have to provide some

    3 flexibility and understanding for the Defence. We

    4 don't have a staff here. If the Court is telling Mr.

    5 Nobilo and I to take time out of the difficult

    6 preparations by the two of us, to prepare this case, to

    7 prepare a deposition transcript or a statement of facts

    8 of an individual witness, that is a serious matter,

    9 given the limited resources that the Defence has. So I

    10 suggest that the Court look at what we're filing,

    11 compare it to the testimony of the witnesses, we will

    12 work with Court. We will look to the Court for

    13 guidance. We will find our way. We wish to comply

    14 with the spirit of the Court's decision, but it is not

    15 a simple matter.

    16 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, it isn't a simple

    17 matter because this summary that is now on the screen

    18 is different than the summary with which we were

    19 provided by the Defence on the 4th of September. I am

    20 sure, Mr. President, that the Court, if comparing this

    21 summary, if it is identical to the one we received,

    22 will notice that this summary is different than that

    23 which we received.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Indeed, I have never seen this

    25 slide presentation when under the Court's decision we

  6. 1 were required to give a summary to the Prosecutor.

    2 That illustrates the problem of setting a calendar

    3 deadline by which we have to provide some kind of a

    4 statement of what a witness is going to say, when we

    5 may not have met with the witness, particularly

    6 experts, and heard the presentations that they have

    7 prepared.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, the Prosecution and

    9 Defence. Here, first of all, one must apply the

    10 decision rendered by this Chamber on the 3rd of

    11 September, 1998. I understand that it may be a little

    12 delicate to try and interpret our decision, but,

    13 nonetheless, we are going to try and do so.

    14 First of all, I would say to the Defence

    15 counsel that I understand that the decision made on the

    16 3rd of September, that the Defence was not able for

    17 this week to carry out exactly what the judges of this

    18 Chamber requested. As a consequence, for this week,

    19 that is to say for today and tomorrow, we will be

    20 content, we, the judges, will be content, and I will

    21 ask that the Prosecution also be satisfied, with what

    22 you have been able to present, given the lateness with

    23 which this decision was rendered on the 3rd September

    24 and the difficulty in which that put the Defence.

    25 Nonetheless, for the following week, that is

  7. 1 to say for Monday, the 21st of September, we expect in

    2 its letter that the decision of the 3rd September will

    3 be respected. What did this decision say? Well, and I

    4 am turning to the Defence counsels now, we did not wish

    5 by this decision to impose all of the provisions within

    6 the 73 ter because these are obligations, which, as you

    7 understand, if you indeed correspond to -- or, the

    8 content, rather, of Rule 73 bis, which was not applied

    9 by the Prosecution.

    10 Nonetheless, since the rule is to be applied

    11 in the case, we, the judges, have requested what we

    12 felt appropriate to carry out these proceedings in good

    13 time. We have requested the names and the identifying

    14 information: name, place of birth, date of birth of

    15 the witnesses. This was requested within the described

    16 time limit. We have also requested a summary of the

    17 facts about which those witnesses will be testifying

    18 and that these be submitted.

    19 This summary in the process have been done

    20 verbally. Why? Because there have not been any text.

    21 But as of now, we feel that it is possible for the

    22 Defence to supply to the Prosecution and to the Chamber

    23 a summary of the facts upon which the witness will

    24 testify.

    25 In addition, we, the judges, we cannot and I

  8. 1 think counsel for the Prosecution, but that is their

    2 own problem, but the judges cannot be satisfied with a

    3 single line summary. We're not going to ask you to

    4 write 15 or 20 lines or 30 lines, we simply wish that

    5 you respect the ledger and the spirit of this

    6 decision.

    7 We would like for a summary. Why? Because

    8 from that summary the judges will be able to ask

    9 questions and possibly interrupt you. All of this

    10 within the spirit of accelerating the process and the

    11 procedure. This is the spirit of the changes made to

    12 the rules of procedure in evidence.

    13 So we are not here to impose any obligations

    14 or have your obligations that we have already imposed

    15 upon the Prosecution. But we believe that having a

    16 summary on the testimony to be given by the witness is

    17 not too heavy a burden to impose upon you.

    18 Now, as for those trials which have not yet

    19 begun, this will be something that will be imposed on a

    20 regular basis. Here is what the ledger and the spirit

    21 of the decision was: Now, of course the decision was

    22 rendered on the 3rd of September; therefore, we will be

    23 satisfied with a verbal summary, which I believe Mr.

    24 Nobilo will present us with now. But, nonetheless, I

    25 think in the future, seven days in advance, we expect a

  9. 1 summary, a factual summary, of what the witness will be

    2 testifying on and I hope that this will be relatively

    3 substantial. I think you understand there is a

    4 difference between one and two lines and a summary of

    5 several pages. I will not speak any further on this

    6 particular issue.

    7 I will now give the floor to Mr. Nobilo, so

    8 that he can present to us the testimony by this

    9 Vice-Admiral.

    10 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. As I

    11 have already said, our witness is Vice-Admiral of the

    12 Croatian Army, Davor Domazet, deputy Chief of staff of

    13 the main headquarters of the armed forces of the

    14 Republic of Croatia.

    15 The title of his expert report is as we see

    16 here, "The Role of the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army

    17 and Serbian forces in the war in Croatian and in Bosnia

    18 and Herzegovina." Within the framework of his expert

    19 report and opinion, Admiral Domazet will discuss the

    20 transformation of the JNA into a Serbian imperial

    21 force. And on the preparations for the war on the soil

    22 of the republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

    23 for the purpose of reaching the invented western border

    24 of Serbia.

    25 Secondly, the use of the defence plan of the

  10. 1 JNA, co-named S-2, this is a defence plan designed

    2 during the era of communist Yugoslavia in the event of

    3 an attack by NATO. This plan from 1986 until 1990 was

    4 developed and it was on the basis of that plan that the

    5 JNA and Serbian forces were used in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    6 and also in Croatia.

    7 Furthermore, Admiral Domazet will present the

    8 strategy of so-called key points in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    9 which are a project of the aggression against

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    11 Fourth, he will describe the first stage of

    12 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the strategic level

    13 and also the control and command structure of the JNA

    14 and the Army of Republic of Srpska in

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    16 Fifth, he will present the command structure

    17 in the Army of Republic of Srpska after the alleged

    18 withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    19 And sixth, describe the second stage of the

    20 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina again from the strategic

    21 standpoint. Therefore, the admiral will be talking

    22 about the framework within which the conflict in

    23 Central Bosnia broke out between the Croats and

    24 Muslims. And this war of the JNA against

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the backdrop had a decisive

  11. 1 effect on the events we are discussing here. That is,

    2 the conflict between the Muslims and Croats in Central

    3 Bosnia.

    4 This expert report will clarify the

    5 disintegration of Yugoslavia and the key role played by

    6 the JNA in that process disintegration. And it will

    7 directly link up with the testimony of Professor

    8 Bilandzic.

    9 This testimony will significantly contribute

    10 to resolving certain dilemmas regarding the nature of

    11 the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it will

    12 explain that Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of

    13 Croatia were treated by the JNA as a single theatre of

    14 war, which is correct from the strategic standpoint.

    15 Therefore, Mr. President, that would be a

    16 brief, oral summary of this testimony.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I see you've taken a very

    18 good summary, Mr. Nobilo. This is the kind of summary

    19 that the Chamber would like to see that you are to

    20 disclose to the Prosecution. I see that your colleague

    21 is also congratulating you, Mr. Nobilo. I would also

    22 like for this type of summary to be given in French

    23 before the hearing begins. So that will be done in

    24 writing and in the future every judge will have a

    25 version in French or in English before him and this is

  12. 1 something that will be presented before the entrance of

    2 the witness.

    3 Therefore, in the future, your

    4 examination-in-chief will be based on those issues

    5 covered in your summary. Therefore, now,

    6 Mr. Registrar, you may have Mr. Admiral Domazet brought

    7 into the courtroom.

    8 (The witness entered court)

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Will the usher please ask the

    10 witness to remain standing. Thank you.

    11 Mr. Registrar, will you please explain to the

    12 usher, once and for all, what type of protocol must

    13 exist in this courtroom. I do not wish to have to

    14 continue to repeat myself on this issue. Please have

    15 this explained to the witness beforehand.

    16 Mr. Admiral, do you hear me? Very well.

    17 Thank you for responding in French. Now, for the time

    18 being, I simply wish that you state your name, your

    19 first name and your rank and then please remain

    20 standing for the reading of the solemn declaration.


    22 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, Your Honours, I

    23 am Vice-Admiral of the armed forces of the Republic of

    24 Croatia. My name is Davor Domazet.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Now the usher will

  13. 1 show to you the solemn declaration, which you will read

    2 and then you may be seated.

    3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    4 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

    5 truth.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Admiral, you may now

    7 be seated.

    8 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Admiral, you hear me well?

    10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, the Tribunal thanks

    12 you for coming. You are here at the request of the

    13 Blaskic Defence, which is here before the International

    14 Criminal Tribunal in the case of Prosecutor versus

    15 Mr. Blaskic. You're now going to be answering

    16 questions put to you by the Defence. Please speak as

    17 freely as possible. Mr. Nobilo, you have the floor.

    18 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    19 Examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    20 Q. Good morning, Admiral.

    21 A. Good morning.

    22 Q. As it is the rule here in Court, we need to

    23 introduce our expert witness to the Court, so will you

    24 please explain to the Court where you were born, which

    25 military schools you attended and your career in the

  14. 1 JNA.

    2 A. I was born on the 1st of May, 1948, in Sinj

    3 in the Republic of Croatia. I graduated from secondary

    4 school of natural sciences in 1967. After that, I

    5 enrolled at the military naval academy, which I

    6 graduated from in 1971.

    7 After that, I sailed on boats very often as

    8 the commander of naval vessels. At the end of this

    9 period of sailing within the scope of the former navy

    10 of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, I was the commander

    11 of the Destroyer Split. In 1986 I was dismissed.

    12 And after that I became an analyst in the

    13 command of the navy, studying the NATO doctrines. In

    14 the meantime, I also completed a school of tactics and

    15 operations. This is a school for command officers.

    16 And in 1990, I attended the highest military

    17 school, the war school, which I abandoned three days

    18 before graduation, when the war broke out in Slovenia,

    19 or rather, when the JNA attacked Slovenia.

    20 Q. When you left this war school three days

    21 before graduation, you joined the guards which became

    22 the precursor of the Croatian Army. What posts have

    23 you held in the Croatian Army to this day?

    24 A. Yes, immediately after leaving the war

    25 college, it is interesting to note that my trip from

  15. 1 Belgrade to Zagreb was not a direct route, but I had to

    2 go through Sarajevo, Ploca Split and then Zagreb. The

    3 national guards, and these were yet the beginnings of

    4 the organisation of the armed forces of the Republic of

    5 Croatia.

    6 As a member of the command, I remained within

    7 the command throughout, but I changed positions. The

    8 first position I held was to organise the command of

    9 the headquarters of the national guards. After that, I

    10 was Chief of Staff in the department for strategic

    11 studies for the use of the Croatian Army. And as of

    12 1992, I performed the duties of Chief of Staff of the

    13 intelligence department of the supreme command.

    14 And finally, as of 1996, I have held the

    15 position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the main command

    16 of the armed forces.

    17 Q. Admiral, you have published dozens of papers

    18 analyses, reviews and articles in various specialised

    19 journals, you became a Counter-Admiral and a

    20 Vice-Admiral in 1998. We see the medals that you have

    21 on your uniform; can you tell us how many decorations

    22 you were awarded in the Republic of Croatia? And maybe

    23 you could mention those you consider to be particularly

    24 important.

    25 A. I have nine orders of merit. First, the

  16. 1 order of Nikola Subic Zrinski for courage shown in war.

    2 Second, of Banja Josip Jelacic for successful command

    3 and control in the armed forces. A Croatian leaf for

    4 my overall contribution to the armed forces, another

    5 Croatian medal for honourable duty in the armed forces.

    6 I also am the bearer of a large number of

    7 medals for significant operations, Bljesak, Jefto,

    8 Oluja and an operation, if it can be called that, for

    9 the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian

    10 Region within the constitutional order of Croatia.

    11 Q. Thank you.

    12 MR. NOBILO: I would now like to ask the

    13 registrar to distribute the exhibits to facilitate

    14 following the testimony. I should also like the

    15 technician to switch on the monitors, the computer

    16 monitors. And perhaps could the lights be dimmed, too,

    17 so that visibility of the screen can be improved?

    18 Can we have the same slide we have on the

    19 screen on our monitors, please?

    20 INTERPRETER: Counsel is addressing the

    21 technicians.

    22 Q. Vice-Admiral, in your own words, without much

    23 interference from me, could you describe to the Court

    24 what was the role of the Yugoslav People's Army and

    25 Serbian forces in the Croatian, and particularly in the

  17. 1 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    2 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, before I present

    3 my expert testimony on the role of the Yugoslav

    4 People's Army, or the JNA, and the Serbian forces in

    5 the war in Croatia and in the war in Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina, it is my duty for the sake of simplicity

    7 to say that the entire presentation will be a

    8 multi-media presentation, as these are complex and

    9 specific military matters viewed from the strategic

    10 standpoint, and the aim is to make understanding

    11 easier.

    12 Secondly, there are three key terms that I

    13 will be using in my presentation. The first is an

    14 asymmetrical war, or a war waged when the technical

    15 factor is substantially different or more explicitly

    16 far beyond all military standards on the one hand, and

    17 very minimal or non-existent on the other.

    18 Second, strategy, because my presentation

    19 will be exclusively focused on a strategic

    20 understanding of the war. That is the approach which

    21 men of wisdom have long since adopted when defining

    22 war. Let me mention some. The well-known French

    23 theoretician Gaulfleur and Jaminee (Phoen); van

    24 Schlieffen; Willenhartdt; the American, and two

    25 unavoidable theoreticians Sonsuvo (Phoen) in ancient

  18. 1 China, and also what is studied at all military

    2 schools, Clausewitz. Therefore, war cannot be

    3 observed, nor is it exclusively a military concept.

    4 A third term that I will be using less is

    5 tactics. That is the lowest level regarding the use of

    6 military force, either units or equipment.

    7 Having made those introductory remarks, I can

    8 proceed with my presentation. The starting point is

    9 1985. We have before us ex-Yugoslavia.

    10 A. How were the armed forces of Yugoslavia

    11 organised at that time? First of all, it consisted of

    12 two components; that is, the Yugoslav People's Army and

    13 the Territorial Defence. So, it is an armed forces

    14 with two components.

    15 The JNA consisted of the military naval

    16 district, or the navy, marked in blue. The entire

    17 inland area of Yugoslavia was divided into armies at

    18 the highest level of command. It is important to note

    19 in this connection that the armies were military and

    20 territorial organisations, and not exclusively military

    21 organisations, which means that both in peace time and

    22 in war time they remain there. This is, in a way, an

    23 anachronism of contemporary military skills. Certain

    24 parts of those armies could be moved to the zones of

    25 responsibility of other armies.

  19. 1 And the third component was the air force.

    2 If we were to look at the military and territorial

    3 division of the army, we will note immediately that the

    4 armies were, to a greater or lesser extent, more or

    5 less entirely covered the borders of the republics of

    6 Yugoslavia. They coincided with the borders.

    7 Therefore, the armed forces, as I said,

    8 consisted of two components, the JNA and the

    9 Territorial Defence. The Territorial Defence was

    10 exclusively under the responsibility of republican

    11 headquarters, which means that it was under the command

    12 of high military officials in the republics, and it was

    13 armed from the budget of those republics.

    14 Therefore, the overall conclusion regarding

    15 the state of the armed forces of Yugoslavia in 1985 was

    16 that the armies had republican characteristics.

    17 What about the national structure of army

    18 officers? That is the highest level of command of such

    19 armies. We have before us, Mr. President and Your

    20 Honours, the percentage share of officers as

    21 compared -- actually, that is the actual percentage of

    22 posts held by the various ethnic groups; but for the

    23 purposes of analysis, we have to see what it means in

    24 relation to the overall population, or rather the

    25 ethnic structure of individual republics.

  20. 1 For the purpose of analysis, we have the

    2 index of disproportion. This index of disproportion

    3 shows, varies considerably, and it is 51 per cent in

    4 favour of the Serbs. With respect to the Montenegrins

    5 that index is 148; Macedonians 8; and a separate group

    6 that declared themselves to be Yugoslavs, for them the

    7 index was 45.

    8 Therefore, these figures coloured in blue

    9 show the disproportionate representation of certain

    10 groups in relation to others. Albanians 91 per cent,

    11 Hungarians 70, Croats 53, et cetera.

    12 What does this mean? It means that the

    13 disproportional representation was planned so that some

    14 ethnic groups were inadequately represented in the

    15 command structure. Therefore, in 1985 this national

    16 structure will change significantly when the memorandum

    17 of the Serbian Academy of Sciences was adopted in 1986.

    18 And when the new organisation of the armed

    19 forces was approved, and we will be discussing that in

    20 a few moments, then the total percentage of Serbs in

    21 the total number of officers exceeds 70 per cent.

    22 Q. Can we, therefore, from the structure of the

    23 officers cadre prior to the war, conclude that at that

    24 time already the JNA, according to its structure, had

    25 become Serbian?

  21. 1 A. We can conclude that, and we have an overall

    2 view of all the armies' officers. And if we add to

    3 this the fact that the commanding posts were

    4 predominantly held by Serbs, in my introductory address

    5 I said that in 1986 I was the commander of the

    6 Destroyer Split, and without any explanation I ceased

    7 to perform that duty. Thank you. And everything

    8 testified to the fact that I was a successful

    9 commander.

    10 Q. Please continue.

    11 A. Therefore, on this basis, Your Honours, we

    12 will be able to see how the JNA became a Serbian

    13 imperial force. What did they do, in fact?

    14 First, the conclusion was that structurally

    15 speaking there should be more Serbs and less

    16 representatives of other peoples. This, as the basic

    17 principle, and the axiom, therefore, was that the JNA

    18 was an armed force of all the nations and nationalities

    19 in Yugoslavia, as they were called. And if that was

    20 the case, if that was the principle and the axiom, and

    21 a change of this kind set in, then it is very

    22 important, in fact, that that upon which the entire

    23 structure of Yugoslavia was based had now been

    24 disrupted.

    25 Second, the infrastructure had to be adapted

  22. 1 to the deployment of forces following the plan of

    2 reaching the so-called western Serbian border.

    3 Third, in the organisational sense, that is

    4 to say not to have the organisation that prevailed

    5 hitherto, but a new one, and to adapt to the forces for

    6 the pacification of the territory before the Serbian

    7 political goal is made known, so, before that, to

    8 perform this organisational change in the JNA.

    9 Next, when we speak of the operative use of

    10 forces, this should be checked in extraordinary

    11 circumstances, and all this should be masked behind an

    12 alleged general aggression of NATO on Yugoslavia.

    13 Your Honours, here the essential points

    14 exist, and we should not use the armed forces of a

    15 country in this given circumstance. First of all,

    16 extraordinary circumstances; the armed forces will not

    17 be used for the defence of the integrity of that state

    18 by external jeopardy, but will be used for

    19 extraordinary circumstances, therefore, within that

    20 state, and we will agree that that is the task of

    21 somebody else; first of all, the police forces.

    22 And second, the NATO aggression in the 1980s,

    23 as we know full well, was a time of essential, main

    24 events that took place on the world scene. It was the

    25 time when Gorbachev and Reagan were holding

  23. 1 negotiations in Reykjavik. That was the time when the

    2 United States of America were performing their

    3 operations of the El Dorado Canyon in order to punish

    4 terrorist actions in Libya.

    5 So, in this bipolar division of the world,

    6 for NATO to attack Yugoslavia, any strategist would

    7 tell you was unheard of.

    8 Furthermore, in implementing a plan of this

    9 kind in which the forces would be used for

    10 extraordinary circumstances, we must stress the

    11 Yugoslav option, therefore, that the JNA was fighting

    12 for Yugoslavia, and that to wait within for an internal

    13 enemy, this was a syntagma that that enemy should

    14 attack first and then should be destroyed.

    15 These are the words that General Kadijevic

    16 used in his book, "My Vision of the Disintegration" in

    17 1993.

    18 Q. Admiral, let us make something a little more

    19 better known to the Court. Who was General Kadijevic?

    20 A. General Kadijevic, at that time, he was the

    21 highest military officer in Yugoslavia, he was the

    22 Federal Secretary for National Defence, or for easier

    23 understanding, he was Minister of Defence, but he was a

    24 general, so, he had the function of command, supreme

    25 command.

  24. 1 And the next thing that had to be done was to

    2 reshape the JNA into several Serbian armies with an

    3 accent on the defence of the endangered Serb

    4 population, which means that to turn one army into

    5 three armies, Serb armies.

    6 Your Honour, these six points were the

    7 guidelines which the JNA was to use and to become an

    8 important weapon in the strategy of the idea of greater

    9 Serbia, because the borders cannot be changed unless

    10 you have an armed force; or borders are changed, which

    11 history has taught us, exclusively through the use of

    12 armed force.

    13 Before us now we're going to have one of the

    14 key elements which will help us understand the war on

    15 the territory of Yugoslavia, or better said, in Croatia

    16 and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we are dealing with

    17 the year 1985. The idea on a reorganisation of the

    18 armed forces has been made public. How was this

    19 reorganisation put into practice?

    20 In front of us at this moment we have a new

    21 military and political division. Therefore, the army

    22 no longer exists, but what do we have in its stead? We

    23 have the military naval unit, which remains the navy,

    24 in the same, under the same competency as it had

    25 previously.

  25. 1 But the essential changes took place on land,

    2 and in this case, let me repeat once again so that you

    3 can see on your monitors, on your screens, the first

    4 military unit, district, the first army district.

    5 And Mr. President, this can be seen on your

    6 screen, so this new army and naval district in which

    7 the command came from Belgrade incorporated a large

    8 portion of Croatia, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

    9 therefore, in the strategic concept of this division it

    10 can be called a great war field, battle field. And so,

    11 it is on this great battle field that everything that

    12 took place in the war later on happened.

    13 Then we have two other army districts, the

    14 third and the fifth, and you can see that they are much

    15 smaller and disproportionate, so, they have a

    16 peripheral role.

    17 In a structure of this kind in 1985 the

    18 changes lasted two years. So, one, the change was

    19 undertaken already in 1986, the memorandum was

    20 published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences,

    21 and the reorganisation was completed in 1986. But the

    22 Serbian Academy of Science denoted the western Serbian

    23 border Virovitica, Karlovac, Karlobag, that western

    24 line. Therefore, it almost fully coincided with the

    25 great war theatre or the first field.

  26. 1 Q. Admiral, if we were to compare the western

    2 border which was proclaimed by the Serbian

    3 intellectuals in the Serbian Academy Virovitica,

    4 Karlovac, Karlobag; is that the same border which in

    5 the Second World War the Chetniks, Molvice denoted as

    6 the western Serbian border?

    7 A. Yes. Not only Molvice, the border of a

    8 greater Serbia from World War II, but before that, the

    9 border with very slight deviations went along that

    10 line.

    11 The essence of that border is one, and that

    12 is how to take away from Croatia its waters, or how to

    13 take away from Croatia two-thirds of the Adriatic

    14 coast. And in that way, to completely isolate not only

    15 Croatia, but Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well.

    16 Therefore, the essential conclusion to be

    17 drawn here is that the new type of organisation for the

    18 JNA and its territorial division was a complete

    19 anachronism of military science and skills, and,

    20 Mr. President, as can be seen quite clearly, it has

    21 followed the borders on this large theatre of war upon

    22 which the whole situation was to evolve of later on.

    23 If we were to express this with a

    24 pseudo-mathematical formula, this would be none other

    25 than the fact that the first army district, plus the

  27. 1 third army district, plus one-third of the fifth army

    2 district, plus two-thirds of the sea would be equal to

    3 a greater Serbia. And that is the constant element

    4 that will try to be implemented at beginning of 1990.

    5 We also see the relationship between land and

    6 sea, the ratio is five to one. Therefore, the war

    7 events would include the sea for a very small portion,

    8 whereas, the predominance of the war would take place

    9 inland, and the war would be waged for territory.

    10 What was needed for the JNA to become

    11 transformed into a Serbian imperial force? This had to

    12 be legalised in some way, and laws had to be enacted at

    13 the top level, and two laws of that kind were enacted.

    14 The first that you have already had occasion to view,

    15 which was the reorganisation of the armed forces in

    16 1985, 1987, where there were no more armies, divisions

    17 and battalions; and instead of them, military regions

    18 were set up corps and brigades.

    19 I think it would be interesting to hear what

    20 I'm going to say next. The first call in the Yugoslav

    21 People's Army was set up in 1981.

    22 Your Honours, let's look at, it was set up in

    23 Kosovo. Why? Because that was the best organisation

    24 to pacify the region. And that model of the corps, of

    25 its set-up since 1981 exists up until 1985, that is to

  28. 1 say, up until this reorganisation, served the purpose

    2 of an experiment of a laboratory sample.

    3 In Belgrade they concluded that if this

    4 sample was successful, if the experiment succeeded

    5 where 80 per cent of the population was non-Serb and we

    6 found that this was successful, there is no reason for

    7 this experiment not to be successful in the other

    8 regions of Yugoslavia where the (inaudible) for the

    9 Serbs were much better.

    10 When they were convinced this was so, they

    11 started the new reorganisation. However, another

    12 document was found to be necessary which would enable

    13 the armed forces to be used, deployed within

    14 Yugoslavia, or to find a legality for their use, for

    15 the use of the JNA forces in Yugoslavia.

    16 Your Honours, this second document, which on

    17 the 20th of May 1987, was adopted by the presidency was

    18 a strategy for total national defence and social

    19 self-protection. Nowhere in the world does a country

    20 have a strategic document of that kind.

    21 It is interesting to see what these two

    22 documents in fact mean, what they are based on. First,

    23 every republic, up until then, as General Kadijevic

    24 said, had its own army, and the commanders were, for

    25 the most part, from those republics.

  29. 1 Second, the new division neglects the

    2 administrative borders of the republics. Therefore,

    3 Mr. President, here we have the essential word which is

    4 administrative borders, which is once again stressed by

    5 Kadijevic. That means that the top military officer in

    6 Yugoslavia determines what is meant by a border and

    7 what is not. So, as the top officer, he does not

    8 defend the constitution of Yugoslavia but in fact

    9 overthrows it.

    10 Q. When you say, Admiral, administrative

    11 borders, am I right in saying what Kadijevic had in

    12 mind there, the borders of the republics, therefore,

    13 Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, he does not consider them

    14 to be republican borders but merely administrative

    15 borders?

    16 A. Yes, that's quite true. And as Yugoslavia

    17 was a federal state, it implies, and there is no doubt

    18 on that question, that we are dealing with republican

    19 borders. And he does not recognise the federal set up

    20 of Yugoslavia and the constitution of Yugoslavia and

    21 the borders of the republics.

    22 Third, the operational development of the

    23 armed forces, therefore of the JNA, that they should be

    24 used according to extraordinary circumstances, not

    25 towards an external situation, but operatively to set

  30. 1 them up for use in extraordinary circumstances.

    2 Furthermore, officers were brought who were

    3 strongly in favour of the idea of a greater Serbia and

    4 bringing them to the main command posts, regardless of

    5 their rank or of their professional skills for holding

    6 posts of that kind.

    7 Furthermore, the training should be

    8 structured in the, as they should be used following the

    9 new doctrine which the general staff called spatial

    10 conduct, and this was a separate use of the armed

    11 forces and we will talk about that later on.

    12 Once this had been completed and all the

    13 prerequisites were furnished for the JNA into a Serbian

    14 imperial force and what strategy is called a special

    15 strategy, that this army should be used to realise the

    16 ideas of a greater Serbia.

    17 Therefore, we can see that both documents

    18 contained these five provisions and a new force was

    19 created and its legitimacy determined for it to be

    20 used. In the implementation of such an enormous

    21 strategy as Bofar, the great theoretician would say,

    22 this is determined by military strategy and in this

    23 case it becomes dominant; whereas the other separate

    24 special strategies become less important. We can

    25 therefore draw the conclusion that military strategy

  31. 1 and the use of force determined greater Serbia.

    2 Q. Admiral, what we see on our screens, the

    3 outline, that is the idea of a greater Serbia; is it

    4 not?

    5 A. Yes, this is the concept of a greater Serbia

    6 according to the new military territorial division.

    7 And what they aspired to and the like motif was to

    8 remain present at all times.

    9 Military strategy, dominant military

    10 strategy, in this case, military strategy is now in the

    11 dominant, which means that territories can be one.

    12 Territories can be one and the population can be

    13 expelled from these regions. This military strategy

    14 had three basic foundations. We can see them on the

    15 left-hand side, left-bottom-hand corner of our

    16 screens.

    17 The first is the theoretical foundation; the

    18 second, the organisational foundation and the

    19 experimental foundation.

    20 The first theoretical foundation had in the

    21 spatial combat region -- or, a special warfare, had a

    22 distance impact. This doctrinaire organisation would be

    23 explained later on.

    24 Second: Organisational foundation. We have

    25 already seen this. This was the new reorganisation

  32. 1 which was implemented from 1985 to 1986. And this

    2 brings us to the most important factor and that is the

    3 experimental foundation. Before us, Your Honours, we

    4 have the sign S-2. The sign S-2 was a war plan of the

    5 general staff of Yugoslavia, which meant and had the

    6 title of a radical aggression of NATO against

    7 Yugoslavia. Up until 1985, there was a war plan, which

    8 was denoted as War Plan S-1. And it meant a

    9 non-radical, but a partial aggression of the Warsaw

    10 Pact on Yugoslavia.

    11 Up until 1985, each year alternately, one or

    12 other training was in force for one or other plan.

    13 But, in 1986, only one form of training existed, the

    14 training for the S-2 plan and that was the radical

    15 aggression to counter the radical aggression against

    16 Yugoslavia.

    17 What can determine this war plan as being the

    18 strongest document was that each year, and that is

    19 understandable and it's done by every army in the

    20 world, exercises are held and training sessions are

    21 held. And it is indicative to note that on a top

    22 strategic level, there were exercises held according to

    23 the S-2 plan, both in 1986 and 1987 and 1988 and 1989

    24 and 1990. And these exercises were termed Romanija.

    25 Your Honours, let me remind you that the

  33. 1 Mountain of Romania was located next to Sarajevo. It

    2 was the code name between Sarajevo and Pale. And this

    3 was an indicative title given to the exercises, an

    4 indicative code name.

    5 Let us now, for purposes of understanding,

    6 take a look at what is meant by the doors of the great

    7 battlefield, the theatre of war. Let us look at the

    8 first military district. And let us analyse this along

    9 the coastal region for us to be able to determine the

    10 key points. Why is this important? We shall see that

    11 this is also linked up both in the war in Croatia and

    12 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What is important

    13 here? First, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic

    14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina lie, as you can see them, along

    15 the coast. We have before us and I repeat once again,

    16 we have towns. The most populated towns and areas.

    17 And it is in these large urban centres and towns, which

    18 was where there was predominantly a majority population

    19 of Croatian population. In those years we find the

    20 installations of the following JNA institutions: the

    21 commands, the military schools, logistic bases,

    22 military flats, offices, families of Serbian

    23 nationality, a large number of summer houses. And they

    24 were given loans, very favourable loans to build their

    25 summer houses which other people couldn't do. And then

  34. 1 we had the political authorities, the party.

    2 Outside those towns there were two basic

    3 characteristics. And on this slide under A you had the

    4 stretch with a large percentage, a significant

    5 percentage, of Serb population. There was another belt

    6 encompassing the outer islands, outlying islands, where

    7 the JNA had elaborated navy strongholds with an

    8 important, well-organised military infrastructure,

    9 allegedly to defend itself from NATO. Both A and B, in

    10 fact, meant isolation for the main towns and urban

    11 centres along the coast.

    12 And if we look at the sandwich system, then

    13 we can see that it would be very easy to master this

    14 area and gain control of this area in the following

    15 way: To link A and B in points K.

    16 Mr. President, and Your Honours, points K

    17 were a constant, in which, from the aspects of

    18 strategy, you were able to govern not only Croatian

    19 regions, but in depth, the country in depth. These

    20 points K were from the Greek times, Roman times. At

    21 these points K it was the Roman legions which

    22 penetrated the interior of Aleria. By points K, the

    23 crusaders entered the territory towards Jerusalem. It

    24 is through points K that according to the ideas of

    25 planners in Belgrade, where we'll see later on, that

  35. 1 the NATO forces were to enter allegedly for a radical

    2 aggression on Yugoslavia.

    3 Q. Mr. President, I think that we have completed

    4 what we wanted to say at this point. I think we are

    5 going to take a break here.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I agree with you. Let's take a

    7 20 minute recess now then. The Chamber stands

    8 adjourned.

    9 --- Recess taken at 11.20 a.m.

    10 --- Upon resuming at 11.50 a.m.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, you have the floor

    12 until 1.00 p.m., please go on.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    14 Q. We stopped when you were speaking of the

    15 doors to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as you called

    16 them. Could you explain to the Court why you called

    17 this the gate or the door? Could the lights be dimmed,

    18 please? Could the lights be dimmed, please? Thank

    19 you.

    20 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the strategy,

    21 especially geo-strategy, and as I have already noted,

    22 when we go back into history in this area, the main

    23 point is not only the gateway from the Adriatic because

    24 it is the deepest sea in Europe. And it was the silk

    25 route that ended here too, the route that led all the

  36. 1 way to China.

    2 In addition to a gateway, this could be

    3 called a gateway, a part of a gateway to Eurasia.

    4 And it is no coincidence that I have already mentioned

    5 that ever since Greek and Roman times, the crusaders,

    6 all great plans and even plans from the Second World

    7 War envisaged disembarkation of the allied forces

    8 because that would be the speediest way to penetrate

    9 into Europe, but also to go on from there into Asia.

    10 And that is why I call it that. In this particular

    11 case, it is the route leading to Bosnia-Herzegovina or

    12 out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    13 Q. Thank you, please continue.

    14 A. I was speaking about the key points. These

    15 are those two key points: That is, the places where,

    16 if A and B are connected, one has control of the entire

    17 area. You are master of the area. And those two key

    18 points, constants, in simplified terms could be said to

    19 be Maslenica, and Slano or Neum.

    20 Q. Those are two localities in Croatia?

    21 A. Yes. Let me repeat these two constants,

    22 which will be very important for understanding the

    23 relevance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, a

    24 pseudomathematical formula says in order to gain

    25 control of these gateways or two-thirds of the

  37. 1 military, naval area, one just has to have to have A, B

    2 and two Ks under one's control.

    3 Your Honours, you will now see the

    4 fundamental idea behind the war plan S-2 and the

    5 commanding staff war exercises, Romanija, which were

    6 held ever since 1986 and as far as 1990.

    7 Q. Admiral, what we are seeing now, is that the

    8 original war plan of the Yugoslav People's Army?

    9 A. Yes, this is a copy. And in the left-hand

    10 corner, you can see a possible idea for manoeuvres of

    11 the Jadran Operative Group, which is the secret code

    12 name for the NATO, alleged and envisaged NATO, attack

    13 against Yugoslavia. So this is a copy of the

    14 original.

    15 If now we were to analyse this plan by means

    16 of a computer, we would get these two Ks and the belts

    17 A and B. In the right-hand corner, we see the idea

    18 behind the manoeuvres of operative group Jadran of the

    19 NATO forces.

    20 Q. So this original plan, which we see on the

    21 screen in the right-hand corner is being copied

    22 or superimposed over the computer drawing?

    23 A. Yes, for the sake of understanding.

    24 According to this imagined NATO an attack, it would

    25 come from the Adriatic. And the bulk of the forces are

  38. 1 linked to the tactical group Ancona. And then we have

    2 united NATO air forces, mostly of the United States

    3 under the command of the 5th.

    4 Then submarine forces and D minus 1, that is

    5 the day before the envisaged attack, aggression, those

    6 forces would come from the land to the Adriatic. And

    7 we have before us, the four assault naval groups, among

    8 which the UG-1 are Italian forces, UG-2 and 3, forces

    9 of the United States. And Assault Group 4 or UG-4 of

    10 Great Britain. And these forces are allegedly

    11 attacking Yugoslavia. D plus 2 is the day when a part

    12 of the forces are disembarking at point K.

    13 Q. An explanation, D plus 2, what does that

    14 mean?

    15 A. It means the second day of the beginning of

    16 the imagined aggression. This is a standard

    17 terminology used by all armed forces throughout the

    18 world. It is a standard for marking all war plans. So

    19 the forces are entering K at Slano. And then Day D

    20 plus 6, the bulk of the NATO forces are attacking

    21 K No. 2. That is Maslenica, Zadar, Ravni Kotari. And

    22 then on Day D plus 15, those same forces penetrate deep

    23 within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    24 Therefore, the bulk of NATO forces would

    25 enter at points K-1 and K-2, as you can see marked on

  39. 1 the screen now. So those are the key points.

    2 You have before you, Your Honours, a global

    3 plan, according to which the Yugoslav People's Army and

    4 Serbian forces carried out the aggression against

    5 Croatia in 1991.

    6 The operational basis, that is the buck of

    7 the forces for the aggression against Croatia came from

    8 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the

    9 territory from which the JNA would start its aggression

    10 against Croatia. The whole area of Croatia was divided

    11 into four parts. Once again, we see how the plan was

    12 executed regarding the advancement of forces of the

    13 Yugoslav People's Army and Serbian forces. Apart from

    14 the eastern part of Slavonia, where they came from the

    15 territory of Vojvodina or rather Serbia, all the other

    16 forces came from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 In the second stage, these forces, the forces

    18 from Eastern Slavonia, were to have linked up with the

    19 forces in Western Slavonia and thus reach the Western

    20 Serbian border.

    21 If we compare with this idea, the two already

    22 noted constants, point K we will see, and this will be

    23 demonstrated later, the identity between the plan for

    24 the NATO attack and this plan. The idea was to

    25 counter-attack points K, but, essentially, the idea was

  40. 1 to occupy more territory. Such a strategic plan was

    2 applied in two stages. In the first stage, the role of

    3 the JNA was to capture key points. And the key points

    4 were Karlovac, Sisak, Pakrac, Osijek, Zadar, Dubrovnik

    5 and Vukovar. Marked on the slide in yellow.

    6 The JNA's task was to attack the main roads

    7 with combined infantry and tank units with artillery

    8 support and to hold those points and penetrate further

    9 inland. The role of the air force was to attack

    10 civilian objects and to destroy them in order to cause

    11 panic. And the role of the navy was to carry out a

    12 blockade.

    13 In the second stage of the implementation of

    14 this strategy, the plan was to simultaneously occupy a

    15 territory within those key points and to advance in a

    16 divergent manner in order to gain control of a large a

    17 territory as possible and to reach the Western Serbian

    18 border as quickly as possible. And then also at a

    19 lower level because this is a strategic level. At a

    20 lower level, and there were key points at the tactical

    21 level for capturing these areas.

    22 The tactics of the attack, Your Honours,

    23 though we are talking at the strategic level, is

    24 important to see how the area was pacified. First of

    25 all, bases had to be formed and those bases are no

  41. 1 other than barracks in the Territory of Croatia. And

    2 the tactics, the same tactics was applied in

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as far as we know now, also in

    4 Kosovo. Therefore, those bases are the barracks of the

    5 JNA, then villages and localities in which the majority

    6 population is Serbian or exclusively Serbian

    7 settlement, which had been armed by the Serbs. Then

    8 came the attack on Croatian villages, situated within

    9 Serb inhabited villages. The superiority of forces was

    10 2-1.

    11 Q. Admiral, I apologise for interrupting, but I

    12 have a question to you to see whether we are of the

    13 same opinion. You said in Croatia, and I would add in

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, one of the main

    15 characteristics was that the villages were military

    16 bases. And the villages constituted a kind of base for

    17 military units. One village; one military unit. Is my

    18 opinion correct?

    19 A. Yes, quite correct. The bases in addition to

    20 the barracks were the villages. Because they were

    21 armed, they were the bases on which military power

    22 could be based at a certain tactical level. Therefore,

    23 this 2-1 superiority in manpower and equipment, it was

    24 asymmetrical. So this is the term that I mentioned in

    25 my introduction, the asymmetrical war, that is a war

  42. 1 between unequal opponents.

    2 A classical rule of warfare accepted in all

    3 the armies of the world is the balance of forces

    4 between the attacking forces and the forces of Defence

    5 should be 3-1. If one can talk at all about ethical

    6 warfare, then there would be some chances for the

    7 attacker and for the defence. However, in this case,

    8 not only in Croatia, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this

    9 superiority will be even more pronounced. It was not

    10 3-1, but 100-1 or 1.000-1 because it was the armed

    11 forces that attacked unarmed people.

    12 The fourth point. In view of such tactics of

    13 attack, the artillery support, which was exclusively

    14 controlled by the JNA, was 10 kilometres in the rear,

    15 which meant a new kind of warfare, which is the distant

    16 attack, which has a twofold role. First, to provide

    17 fire support in the attack of ground forces, while, at

    18 the same time, cause panic and fire at villages. This

    19 principle, from the military standpoint can be

    20 described as a terrorist method, was also used in

    21 Croatia and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and as

    22 we can see nowadays in Kosovo as well.

    23 The logistics in such a concept of battle at

    24 the tactical level were trucks and helicopters. A

    25 general conclusion regarding such a deployment forces

  43. 1 at the tactical level on the part of the Serbian rebels

    2 was to eradicate, chase out, destroy, the Croatian

    3 population. And this method of one Bosnia-Herzegovina

    4 meant the same to the Muslims and the Croats, resorting

    5 exclusively to terrorism and terrorist use of powerful

    6 military units.

    7 To gain a better understanding of the way in

    8 which tactics was applied from bases, we have a

    9 schematic presentation of an area along the edges of

    10 greater Serbia, where in the centre you have a city and

    11 in order to apply this special doctrine, one had to

    12 have control of the main communications. Then

    13 surrounding that city was smaller villages, and on the

    14 other hand, on the other side, were settlements and

    15 villages predominantly inhabited by Serbs as a base.

    16 And then also, it was necessary to link up with roads

    17 those localities. In this way, the territory can be

    18 covered without any major manoeuvring of forces.

    19 For such a battle in space to be carried out

    20 and to pacify such an area, close to the main city and

    21 at the main junction there used to be a barracks, if it

    22 was lacking it was built in the 80s, and then the

    23 weapons from that barracks was directed towards the

    24 city.

    25 Furthermore, for the entire territory to be

  44. 1 pacified from bases with Serb inhabitants fire power

    2 was also positioned. Such a use of forces shows that

    3 no manoeuvring is required, and it is a kind of

    4 position deployment of forces and weapons, meant that

    5 its exclusive aim was to destroy civilian objects and

    6 facilities and this is particularly characteristic of

    7 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    8 After that a village is destroyed that is

    9 outside that territory, so that space was captured in a

    10 relatively easy manner. This method of warfare was

    11 possible only because of the asymmetry that existed in

    12 equipment.

    13 What was the efficiency of the key points

    14 strategy?

    15 Your Honours, we have now before you a

    16 paradigm of the war which will highlight the

    17 significance of these gateways and perhaps provide an

    18 answer for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The date

    19 indicated is the 28th of September 1991, and the place

    20 is Ravno.

    21 Ravno, as can be seen, is in

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a locality exclusively

    23 inhabited by Croats. The JNA and the Serbs attacked it

    24 on that day and destroyed it on the 28th of September

    25 1991. In their campaign against Dubrovnik, by

  45. 1 destroying this locality, and because of a small depth

    2 of territory, Dubrovnik was cut off.

    3 Q. When you use this operative depth, what does

    4 it mean in military terminology?

    5 A. According to NATO standards, in its rules FM

    6 105 of air and land battle, as part of the Doctrine of

    7 the Land Forces of the United States, it applies to a

    8 brigade as a tactical unit.

    9 It means that the area of responsibility of

    10 the brigade in defence is 35 kilometres, and the zone

    11 of interest for it to be effective is 75 kilometres.

    12 In this case that depth is only 800 metres. And where

    13 it is widest, it is not more than 15 kilometres.

    14 Q. When you say 800 metres, do you mean to say

    15 that the width of Croatian territory from the Adriatic

    16 coastline to the Bosnian border is 800 metres, between

    17 800 metres and 15 kilometres?

    18 A. Correct.

    19 Q. So that the operative depth of a brigade that

    20 would want to defend Dubrovnik could not defend it

    21 unless it enters the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

    22 is that what you want to say?

    23 A. I believe when talking about military

    24 operations one has to react according to circumstances,

    25 but any military expert will tell you that such a

  46. 1 territory cannot be defended with such a small depth

    2 which ranges from 800 metres to a maximum of 15

    3 kilometres, if you have forces that are using the whole

    4 depth of territory.

    5 Why? Because you can very quickly be cut off

    6 and you will lose all your forces. The price in

    7 manpower is vast. So, it is an immense challenge for

    8 any commander, and I would not like any commander of

    9 any national forces to find himself in such a position.

    10 Such a combined attack by the JNA and Serbian

    11 rebels along the main communication lines were

    12 relatively successful only in this area around

    13 Dubrovnik and not in other areas, because the Serbs, or

    14 rather the JNA, did not realise its plan to reach the

    15 western Serbian borders but managed to do so only in

    16 this area.

    17 The question is why. The answer has already

    18 been given; because, not only because Croatia at that

    19 time did not have the adequate weapons with which to

    20 resist, and even if it had, in view of this, its

    21 tactical position, it would be unable to do so from its

    22 own territory. But there is another important point

    23 here.

    24 If the JNA launched its attack on Dubrovnik

    25 on the 28th of September 1991 and attacked and

  47. 1 destroyed a place, and when I say destroyed, I mean it

    2 in the literal sense, this meant that it was actually

    3 attacking Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    4 And I see that this is mentioned often, that

    5 it was then that the president of the presidency of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic declared this was

    7 not his war. I have given the reasons why this was not

    8 successful.

    9 Let us now look to see what this idea meant

    10 globally, so we are coming to the end of the war in

    11 Croatia. The JNA and Serbia did not achieve its

    12 strategic goal, and its strategic goal, as Kadijevic

    13 said, was to defeat the Croatian army and to reach the

    14 Slovenian border, implying in fact, the western Serbian

    15 border. That was the time at the end of 1991, when

    16 Vukovar was destroyed and when actually the waters of

    17 Croatia were seized from it.

    18 Because from the strategic standpoint the war

    19 against Croatia was waged for two goals only, and those

    20 two goals were waters. The Danubian area, and as much

    21 of the Adriatic as possible. That is the crux of the

    22 matter and that is what Kadijevic actually said, that

    23 Croatia had to be moved away from the Danubian

    24 waterway.

    25 Croatia, or rather the main staff, had the

  48. 1 following ideas in mind at the time: To continue the

    2 war in Croatia was unnecessary, it should be avoided.

    3 It was important to gain time, it was important to get,

    4 for the International Community to get involved.

    5 So, for a moment we will leave Croatia for a

    6 while and we will set up a new Serbian army which will

    7 be called the Serbian Army of Krajina, and all forces

    8 will be redirected towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. And if

    9 we manage to pacify Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather

    10 occupy it as quickly as possible, and according to some

    11 estimates, that was to have been done in seven days,

    12 then it will be easy to settle accounts with Croatia.

    13 And at that point in time Bosnia-Herzegovina

    14 becomes part of the game. Kadijevic will then say that

    15 without Yugoslavia there will be no state of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 What this meant was that the war in Croatia,

    18 the first part of the war in Croatia, and the war that

    19 was to follow in Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of one

    20 and the same plan.

    21 If we show this with a circle, we will see,

    22 as this cross shows in the middle, that the centre of

    23 that hole is situated somewhere in the western part of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the standpoint of strategy,

    25 this meant that if this point is captured, then it will

  49. 1 be easy for me to pacify Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    2 As on the 3rd of January a plan was signed on

    3 the entry of international forces, the UNPROFOR --

    4 Q. You mean 3rd of January, 1992?

    5 A. Yes. International forces are deployed in

    6 this area that has been shaded in which the JNA and the

    7 Serbs had occupied. It is visible from this.

    8 Q. Admiral, this territory is the territory

    9 within Croatia known as Krajina, mostly?

    10 A. Not just Krajina. Actually only this part is

    11 known as Krajina. But under the name Krajina they called

    12 this para-state, the Serbian Krajina, the Republic of

    13 the Serbian Krajina, which, according to them, also

    14 included the eastern part, which geographically does

    15 not connect at all. As you see, it is quite separate,

    16 they called it Krajina, as well.

    17 But this occupied territory can be linked

    18 only if Bosnia-Herzegovina is occupied, and that is

    19 part of the plan. That is why in 1992, from January

    20 until March, in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    21 with the coming of international forces, the JNA corps

    22 are deployed.

    23 Mr. President, Your Honours, the manoeuvring

    24 of corps will best be seen on the monitor through

    25 animation. The first corps, the 31st Corps coming from

  50. 1 Slovenia withdraws through Croatia and goes to Serbia,

    2 and passing through occupied territory, they leave most

    3 of the weapons to Serbs who are there.

    4 Then, applying the same methodology, the 14th

    5 Corps goes to Serbia leaving behind the weapons. Then

    6 the 14th Corps is redeployed to Montenegro.

    7 The manoeuvre of the 13th Corps is most

    8 noteworthy, it was situated in the area of Istria and

    9 Rijeka, that is the north-western part of Croatia, and

    10 across the Adriatic it will go to Bare to Montenegro

    11 and from there to eastern Herzegovina.

    12 A very important manoeuvre was that of the

    13 corps going from the occupied part of Croatia to

    14 western Bosnia. And the 9th and last corps, of which

    15 general Mladic was in command, will go to western

    16 Bosnia, which means it will come close to that point,

    17 if I may remind you of it, of the cross that you saw in

    18 the middle of the circle on the previous slide.

    19 At the time, within the territory of Bosnia

    20 and Herzegovina, these three corps were also deployed;

    21 therefore, one does not have to be a great military

    22 expert to come to the conclusion on the basis of this

    23 there were two groupings of forces; three corps in

    24 north-western Bosnia and two corps in south-eastern

    25 Bosnia, plus the corps which were deployed in Serbia

  51. 1 and Montenegro close to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    2 The commanders of those corps, and I don't

    3 want to read them, are the following: Of these names

    4 we will be able to note the commander of the 13th Corps

    5 in the south-eastern, that is to say in eastern

    6 Herzegovina, and at the time it was Major General

    7 Momcilo Perisic, who is a general now and head of

    8 general staff of Yugoslavia, Chief of Staff.

    9 The next we come to the year 1986. We're

    10 going back in time, now, to look at the plan and the

    11 Chief of Staff, the commanding staff of the war

    12 exercise entitled Romanija on the territory of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 Mr. President, we are now coming to the

    15 events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through animation we can

    16 see that is the imagined aggression of NATO in

    17 Yugoslavia which moves via Croatia, with the main force

    18 in key points K, are being extended and are entering

    19 into central Bosnia. How?

    20 First, with the breakthrough from point K,

    21 from Croatian territory, moving via the Neretva Valley

    22 towards Sarajevo. And second, from K 2, via Knin,

    23 Sinj, Livno, from the west towards Sarajevo.

    24 And now, a complete anachronism of war

    25 skills, but one of the key elements which would answer

  52. 1 the question of why Sarajevo was encircled, as it was,

    2 and why Sarajevo experienced the atrocities of war in

    3 the 20th Century that it did, or at the end of the 20th

    4 Century.

    5 That meant that the American 101st Airborne

    6 Division in, according to this imaginative situation,

    7 would descend, Your Honours, on Mount Romanija. The

    8 101st Airborne Division of the United States of

    9 America is a strategic unit within the composition of

    10 the forces of the United States of America.

    11 Therefore, in this absurdity that a complete

    12 division in a bipolar division of Europe, that the

    13 United States could not send this division anywhere

    14 else but to the mountain of Romanija.

    15 On this imagined operation by NATO, the JNA

    16 would have had to respond, and how was it to respond?

    17 Let's take a look.

    18 Your Honours, the JNA responded in the

    19 following manner: In addition to Sarajevo, the NATO

    20 forces were allegedly descended here, then we would

    21 have to have a semicircle in central and western

    22 Bosnia, and forces from Serbia and eastern Bosnia

    23 should move towards Sarajevo so as to break up the

    24 decent and to prevent it previously on this area around

    25 Sarajevo to organise a counter attack, assault. And in

  53. 1 this, with this concept, since 1986 to 1992, the fate

    2 of Sarajevo was sealed.

    3 The second element meant that the forces from

    4 western Bosnia, which was the operative group around

    5 Kupres, should hit the flank with their forces which go

    6 from point K and come to the coast and organise a

    7 defence there.

    8 And third, operative group Mostar, for the

    9 NATO forces along the Neretva River Valley should be

    10 defeated and that the coast should be gained and

    11 defence set up there.

    12 Therefore, strategy at this point tells us

    13 that for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be defended from

    14 anybody in this case, from the JNA and from Serbia and

    15 the Serbs in Bosnia, this meant to defend the region of

    16 western Herzegovina, because land comes out onto the

    17 sea.

    18 Q. Admiral, can we clarify something here? I'm

    19 not clear, and perhaps Their Honours are not quite

    20 clear; you said the JNA thought up the possibility of a

    21 NATO attack, although there were no objective reasons

    22 for this?

    23 A. Yes, that's right.

    24 Q. And in that direction, from 1986 up until

    25 1990 they constantly held exercises, according to the

  54. 1 model that we now have on our screens; is that correct?

    2 A. Yes, it is.

    3 Q. And as there was no realistic reason to

    4 defend the territory from NATO, you wish to suggest

    5 that since 1986 to 1990 the JNA, in fact, prepared an

    6 assault on Bosnia and Herzegovina?

    7 A. Yes, that's right. It preferred this attack,

    8 just as it did for Croatia previously. It was not a

    9 defence against NATO, because NATO in that situation

    10 could never have attacked. It was a model, the NATO

    11 model served for the operational development of the JNA

    12 in order to implement the occupation of Croatia first

    13 of all, and then of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the

    14 training of troops. Yes, every year. And that is why

    15 the Romanija code name for the exercises was given and

    16 took place.

    17 Q. Do I understand correctly, then, that on this

    18 schematic representation we see first that the south

    19 Croatian battle field and the Bosnian battle field was,

    20 in fact, one battle field, and that therefore the key

    21 points for winning over Bosnia-Herzegovina were, in

    22 fact, near the borders of Croatia and

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    24 A. Yes, and that was not a strategic battle

    25 ground, but of a tactical, the lowest possible level,

  55. 1 the south Croatian and the western Bosnian, yes, from

    2 the standpoints of operative skills and war skills.

    3 May I continue?

    4 Q. Yes.

    5 A. The main point of the occupation of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the town of Sarajevo, and with

    7 this access point, how to occupy this as quickly as

    8 possible, it was necessary to occupy these, to capture

    9 these two areas. Why? Because we have the occupied

    10 areas of Croatia, which were under the control of the

    11 Serbian army and Krajina.

    12 So, the question that was raised and a

    13 comparative analysis will be made with slides to see

    14 the congruence between the manoeuvres of the war plan S1

    15 and the operations which in the war were to evolve in

    16 the war in Croatia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 Let us take a look.

    18 You can see, if we look at this picture

    19 better, it sort of associates with the state of affairs

    20 which was to occur in Bosnia. January-April, and the

    21 year is 1992.

    22 Therefore, we have before us, you have before

    23 you, Your Honours, the occupied territory of the

    24 Republic of Croatia. And what we see now is a

    25 regrouping of the JNA in such a way that on occupied

  56. 1 territory of the Republic of Croatia, a new Serbian

    2 army is deployed, the army of the Srpska Krajina

    3 Republic, to retain what was won, and the JNA is

    4 reorganised in the following manner.

    5 You have in front of you four new military

    6 districts. Those military districts had the following

    7 strength: The first was in Belgrade, and its cause,

    8 its organisation, in fact.

    9 The second was positioned in Sarajevo; the

    10 third was from Skopje transferred to Nis; and the

    11 fourth was in Podgorica, Montenegro. That is the new

    12 military and territorial division, the new set-up that

    13 was made after the signing of an agreement on the 3rd

    14 of January 1992, and with the arrival of the

    15 international forces in Croatia for Bosnia-Herzegovina

    16 and the remainder of the former Yugoslavia.

    17 These forces at that time, the JNA forces,

    18 were of the following strength: Before that we can see

    19 the national composition, not only of the command

    20 structure but of the entire armed forces. The command

    21 structure, as I say.

    22 Serbs almost 93 per cent; Montenegrins 7 per

    23 cent; and the others not .4 per cent.

    24 Q. You said 4 per cent, Admiral.

    25 A. Not .4 per cent, yes. Therefore, we may

  57. 1 conclude that at that time the JNA and its complete

    2 commanding cadre was Serbian. At that time it was

    3 located in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was not an armed

    4 force of the other two peoples.

    5 The strength, if we were to analyse strength

    6 in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, it was as follows: 83.000

    7 men, between 460 and 500 tanks, 400 to 420 armoured

    8 vehicles, and about 1.000 guns, artillery pieces.

    9 This new organisation and the system of

    10 command in the first phase of the war in

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was as follows: The commanding

    12 officer of the SNO and general staff, no longer General

    13 Kadijevic, but it was now Lieutenant General Blagoje

    14 Adzic, who at the same time performed the function of

    15 federal secretary. So, at that time he was also the

    16 Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff of the armed

    17 forces of Yugoslavia.

    18 The commander of the second military

    19 district, that is to say in the region of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was Lieutenant General Milutin

    21 Kukanjac. The heads of the 4th Corps of Sarajevo

    22 commanders were General Bojislav Durdevac; of the 5th

    23 Corps of Banja Luka, Major General Vladimir Vukovic;

    24 the 9th Corps of Knin was Sava Kovacevic, and his

    25 Deputy or Chief of Staff of the corps was Major General

  58. 1 Ratko Mladic. The commander of the 10th Corps in Bihac

    2 was Major General Spiro Ninkovic.

    3 From the 1st Army District, from the region

    4 which is Serbian Belgrade and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was

    5 the 17th Corps under the command of the General Sava

    6 Jankovic. And the 4th Army District, therefore, this

    7 was Montenegro, was the 13th Corps under the command of

    8 General Momcilo Perisic.

    9 This structure of command after the

    10 resignation or dismissal of general of the army

    11 (inaudible), that was never determined; his duties were

    12 taken over by General Blagoje Adzic. Apart from that,

    13 here we can see one more factor, and that is that for

    14 the commander of the second army district, General

    15 Kukanjac, that is to say the territory of the whole of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were forces deployed of the

    17 9th, 10th and 13th Corps, which came from the region of

    18 Croatia.

    19 Let us now try, Mr. President and Your

    20 Honours, to have a look. I'm going to try and show why

    21 this kind of military territorial division was

    22 affected. And I am showing you that now.

    23 The second army district, which is located on

    24 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, naturally

    25 continues on from the occupied areas of the Republic of

  59. 1 Croatia. Therefore, and in that region already, the

    2 army of the Republic of Srpska Krajina is already

    3 deployed. On some letters, say Western Serbia border,

    4 which after the war in Croatia was as it stood. And

    5 not only that, in its southern portion, it extends

    6 towards the responsibility zone via the territory of

    7 Croatia to the Adriatic Sea.

    8 The fourth army district and there links with

    9 the first army district, naturally tends towards Split

    10 and outwards towards the sea. Another important factor

    11 is the following: The second army district, which is

    12 located on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina must --

    13 we must add that the first army district crosses the

    14 River Drina and enters Bosnia. And this is a very

    15 significant factor in order to compare forces in the

    16 first phase of the war. And second, that the fourth

    17 army district, which has a small operative debt is

    18 increased by entry into Serbia army.

    19 So this division of forces is achieved in two

    20 ways. First of all, it covers the whole area of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And military power can be

    22 projected towards Croatia, across Croatia. At that

    23 time, if this area is gained one over, then you will

    24 have the capture, then you will have the borders of

    25 greater Serbia. And it is not Vidovica, Karlovac,

  60. 1 Karlobag, but it is not very far from that. It goes

    2 along the line of Maslenica, Nis, Karlovac, up to

    3 Sisak, by the Sava River, to Vukovar which is already

    4 occupied and destroyed, up to Vinkovci and Osijek.

    5 Therefore, at this point in time, if Bosnia was

    6 pacified, one would get a greater Serbia.

    7 What is the key to capturing as fast as

    8 possible and to breaking down any resistance in

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let us recall what the two key

    10 points are: The key points are, therefore, this part

    11 of Herzegovina. That is the constant to two Ks and the

    12 capital, Sarajevo. And the first phase of the war,

    13 with this kind of distribution of forces is based, Your

    14 Honours, begins, Your Honours, in April 1992. That is

    15 the situation in April 1992.

    16 Once again, we have some animation here.

    17 According to the concept and the exercises that have

    18 been ongoing for six years on the western part, the

    19 operative group Kupres and the south eastern part with

    20 an operative group entitled Mostar, in this area, was

    21 to close up the territory. The whole of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, at that point, had the JNA

    23 succeeded in closing the pincer, then the entire region

    24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been isolated. It was

    25 separated. And after that, there was to be the

  61. 1 liquidation of the capital city, because, let me remind

    2 you that at that time, already Sarajevo had already

    3 been encircled. And according to the concept of five

    4 years of exercise and training, and to defend the

    5 descent by the 101st Division.

    6 Q. May we dwell for a moment, please, Admiral,

    7 on this point in time. When you say to close the

    8 pincers, why should this for Bosnia and Herzegovina and

    9 the non-Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is for

    10 the Bosnian Muslims and Croats for the defence from the

    11 JNA, why would it have been a very bad thing had they

    12 lost their inland link with Croatia? What did Croatia

    13 mean for them? Why would this have been fatal? What

    14 did Croatian ports mean for the survival of the armed

    15 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO?

    16 A. Your Honours, if we look at the situation,

    17 then we see that the occupied regions of Croatia have

    18 two basic characteristics: First of all, Croatia was

    19 cut across along its coastal lines, which was very

    20 important and traffic evolved only via one destroyed

    21 bridge. This is the Island of Pag which links the

    22 coast with the mainland. And the JNA in the war in

    23 Croatia in 1991 seriously damaged the bridge, so that

    24 traffic was very risky and overall traffic between the

    25 northern part of Croatia, moving towards the southern

  62. 1 portions of Croatia, which is seen here, went via that

    2 particular bridge.

    3 Q. What about traffic towards Bosnia and

    4 Herzegovina for the non-occupied parts, for the needs

    5 of the Bosnian Croats, the HVO?

    6 A. The overall transport links and supplies for

    7 the population went via this free territory between

    8 Slano and Sinj. And it went from that territory, which

    9 means that it went from Split towards Sarajevo and

    10 Tuzla. That was the only communication line. And the

    11 only communication line which meant the difference

    12 between life and death.

    13 Q. Tell me, please, Admiral, whether the Army of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina could have received a single bullet

    15 without that bullet passing via the Republic of

    16 Croatia, whether through the mainland or through the

    17 sea links?

    18 A. No, that was the only communication. And

    19 that is why the Serbian plans that we saw earlier on

    20 denoted this as being a key point. For that reason, in

    21 the expert report that I am presenting before this

    22 Court, I have emphasised the key points. And strategy

    23 teaches us just one thing and that is they were ideas

    24 of the great theoretician, who was Churchill, in fact,

    25 said this in the eloquent way that he always did. He

  63. 1 said from defeat to victory. And when he said defeat,

    2 he meant tactics. And victory, and when he said

    3 victory, he undermined strategy.

    4 So, in this particular case, from the

    5 strategic standpoint, this communication line which

    6 went down the coast and across the mainland towards Croatia,

    7 meant survival for the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

    8 Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    9 Another thing that I mentioned is the

    10 following, the asymmetry of the war, of the Bosnian

    11 Muslims or Bosnian Croats, they did not have weapons.

    12 They were in a far worse position than was the case in

    13 Croatia. Why? Because Croatia managed to get weapons

    14 by attacking barracks when the aggression started.

    15 This was not the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the

    16 JNA had learned its lesson in Croatia and organised

    17 operations in a different way. And the only

    18 communication line was the line that I described. And

    19 in the case of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this was to

    20 prove correct.

    21 Q. Thank you, Admiral. Please continue.

    22 A. Therefore, at this point in time, the first

    23 phase of the war, Serbia and the JNA, did not succeed

    24 in realising its strategic plan, which was to close the

    25 doors, to close the gateway. Nor was the capital,

  64. 1 Sarajevo, at that time, captured. And it was at this

    2 point --

    3 Q. I am going to interrupt you once again to ask

    4 you why it did not succeed in closing the pincers?

    5 A. Because the defenders succeeded in refuting

    6 the attacks; one from the area of Kupres, via Livno,

    7 towards Split. And the second line was to move towards

    8 the right banks of the River Neretva and join there and

    9 a second direction via Eastern Herzegovina towards the

    10 Neretva River. Which means that the main battle in

    11 which the defenders succeeded in stopping the advance,

    12 both in the Luvansko-Kupreski (Phoen) part and in the

    13 Neretva region, Mostar, Stolavi (Phoen).

    14 Q. When you say Luvansko-Kupreski and Mostar

    15 Stolavi, those, in fact, are geographical concepts from

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    17 A. Yes, geographical concepts in the region of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, exclusively. At that particular

    19 point, Your Honours, there were a lot of polemics as to

    20 whether Croatia could have in 1991, defeated Serbia,

    21 the Army of Yugoslavia. All reports showed that it

    22 just could not have done that. It succeeded in winning

    23 the first phase of the war, exclusively, strategy tell

    24 us, because it stopped these Serbs from realising their

    25 strategic plan. That is, to emerge along the western

  65. 1 borders. And strategy in this area at this particular

    2 time in the first phase of the war in

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that at that time the Serbs

    4 Clausewitz was the strategy key point, the culmination,

    5 the peak, was when one side in the war reaches its

    6 peak. At that time, it failed to close the pincers and

    7 so Serbia and its imperial force, the JNA, had reached

    8 their peak and, at that point, they were to change

    9 their tactics. And so, the war in Bosnia and

    10 Herzegovina was altered and took on different

    11 connotations which I am going to tell you of later on

    12 in my presentation.

    13 Furthermore --

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I have a little problem,

    15 I wonder if you can help me. The admiral points with

    16 his pointer to a certain point on the map. And, quite

    17 naturally, he continues to speak. And while he

    18 continues to speak, the pointer is still pointing to

    19 different places on the map. Now, my mind, which is

    20 rather slow, continues to be attracted by the point on

    21 the map, which no longer has any relevance to what he

    22 is saying. Is there some way that you can resolve the

    23 problem for me?

    24 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Your Honour, you're quite

    25 right. The admiral is a man of temperament and while

  66. 1 he talks, he moves his hands about. So we'll ask the

    2 admiral, if he will, to pinpoint exactly the position

    3 he wishes to illustrate.

    4 THE WITNESS: I have a slight problem here

    5 with my laser beam, my laser pointer. There is

    6 interrupted action.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, of course we're

    8 going to take a pause here. But I have a slight

    9 problem myself, but of course you're the master of your

    10 own schedule, your own time. I do not have the written

    11 summary. Of course I will have it in the future, which

    12 will make this more sufficient. But I want you to

    13 truly focus in on your objective. We are here dealing

    14 with a time in the war, which I am sure for you has

    15 routes in the earlier phases of the conflict. But,

    16 nonetheless, I would like for you to take advantage at

    17 the time at lunch, to find how you can focus us

    18 progressively into what should be the most important

    19 point of the charges against your client. Thank you

    20 very much, Mr. Nobilo.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Yes, I am just getting to that

    22 phase, Your Honour.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, we will all have

    24 lunch and come back for 2.30 p.m.

    25 --- Recess taken at 12.55 p.m.

  67. 1

    2 --- On resuming at 2.38 p.m.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed, please

    4 have the accused brought in.

    5 (The accused entered court)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Let us now resume. Admiral,

    7 can you hear me?

    8 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Have you been able to rest?

    10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Sometimes it is difficult, I

    12 imagine. Let us now continue.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. Let

    14 us resume, and I believe we will be done in about 20

    15 minutes, that is with our direct examination.

    16 Q. Admiral, we stopped with the first phase of

    17 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina when a good basis was

    18 established for the subsequent resistance against the

    19 Serbian aggressor by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    20 the HVO. So please continue.

    21 A. Mr. President, the first characteristic of

    22 the first phase of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

    23 the halting, or rather the prevention of the closing of

    24 the circle or of the pincers, which actually would mean

    25 the total occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is

  68. 1 what I'm referring to. And this was the end of April,

    2 1992.

    3 At that point in time the headquarters, the

    4 supreme command changed the decision and the JNA had to

    5 withdraw from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 Then it took a new decision to reorganise a new Serbian

    7 army which was to continue the occupation of

    8 Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1995, or until the Dayton

    9 Agreement.

    10 We are now talking about the month of May,

    11 1992. At the time there were, in fact, three Serbian

    12 armies which acted in line with the screen play long

    13 since established, that is, some six years previously;

    14 that was the Army of Yugoslavia, the Army of Republika

    15 Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serbian Army of

    16 Krajina in the occupied area of the Republic of

    17 Croatia.

    18 These three armies were under a unified

    19 command of the general staff of the JNA in Belgrade,

    20 and at the strategic level they had two tasks. The

    21 first was to coordinate the production of defence

    22 plans, and the second to protect the external borders

    23 and their integration into the system of Yugoslavia.

    24 Under that term they implied the occupied parts of the

    25 Republic of Croatia and the largest possible part of

  69. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    2 The command structure which they left behind

    3 in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that on the 10th of May

    4 1992, Lieutenant General Blagoje Adzic issued an order

    5 when General Milutin Kukanjac was being held in

    6 captivity in the JNA centre in Sarajevo.

    7 The command read as follows: We can see that

    8 the structure at the highest level of command in the

    9 Army of Republika Srpska was determined, the commander

    10 of which was Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladic. That was

    11 when the JNA was reshaped into the Serbian Army of

    12 Republika Srpska.

    13 The commander became Ratko Mladic, the Chief

    14 of Staff General Manojlo Milovanovic. The previous 5th

    15 Corps of the JNA was transformed into the first Krajina

    16 Corps. The 9th and 10th were transformed into the

    17 second Krajina Corps with their own commanders. The

    18 17th Corps remains the eastern Bosnian Corps with its

    19 commanders. And the 4th Corps is transformed into the

    20 Sarajevo Romanija Corps with its own commanders. And a

    21 new corps actually consisting of the forces that stayed

    22 behind on the left bank of the Drina River that is

    23 within the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina was the

    24 Drina Corps. And finally the 13th Corps, which was

    25 renamed the Herzegovina Corps.

  70. 1 Such a command structure meant that the

    2 withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia was actually just

    3 declarative, whereas the command structure, the

    4 appointment, promotion, payment and planning of forces

    5 remained within the exclusive competence of the general

    6 staff of the army of Yugoslavia.

    7 Your Honours, on this slide, one that I

    8 consider to be very important for this Court, we will

    9 see the distribution of the new Serbian army within the

    10 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is important

    11 because we will see from it what its role was in

    12 1993, '94 and '95.

    13 This is the area held or controlled by the

    14 Army of Republika Srpska at this point in time, and we

    15 see this area which was actually under the control of

    16 the emerging army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO.

    17 At this point in time we can see that virtually 70 per

    18 cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the occupation of

    19 the Serbs.

    20 Q. Admiral, could we now go back to the pincers

    21 you were talking about? Where was the attempt to close

    22 them halted?

    23 A. In the left end, in the area of Livno and

    24 Kupres, that is one of the prongs of the area and the

    25 other is the area of Mostar Stolovi.

  71. 1 So, this is the gateway that will, in the

    2 next phase of the war, enable the survival of this

    3 whole area right up to the north-eastern part of Bosnia.

    4 The disposition of the Army of Republika

    5 Srpska and its cause was as follows, in terms of

    6 strength: The eastern Bosnian Corps covered this area,

    7 in terms of territory. The Drina Corps covered this

    8 area that I'm showing now, marked in pale blue. Then

    9 the Herzegovina Corps occupied this area here. It

    10 covered this area with its forces.

    11 The next and most important for this Trial

    12 Chamber is the Sarajevo Romanija Corps which had

    13 responsibility over the whole City of Sarajevo, as well

    14 as the central part of Bosnia. The area was covered by

    15 these forces. Then, the second Krajina Corps, which

    16 was deployed here from Bihac to Livno and Kupres, and

    17 the last and largest in terms of strength and territory

    18 was the first Krajina Corps which controlled the

    19 northern and central part of Bosnia.

    20 Such a disposition of forces meant that there

    21 were three areas which territory-wise were not within

    22 the responsibility of any of those corps, and those are

    23 the three areas which were preserved either thanks to

    24 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the west or east, or

    25 jointly, at least in the first stage of the war, by the

  72. 1 HVO and the BH army here.

    2 Even though the central part of Bosnia where

    3 the 1930 events took place was also under the control

    4 either of the BH army or the HVO, such a disposition of

    5 the Sarajevo Romanija Corps meant only one thing, and

    6 that was that in the next stage of the war they would

    7 try to conquer this central part, as well. And if they

    8 were to manage to capture this central part, it would

    9 mean it was just a matter of days when the north-eastern

    10 part would be captured. After that it would not be too

    11 difficult to deal with the western part and eventually

    12 and finally also deal with the problem of the gateway

    13 to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 Therefore, Your Honours, such a disposition

    15 of operative forces in 1993 meant that the Serbs had at

    16 their disposal 135.000 men, 550 tanks, 430 armoured

    17 vehicles, and more than 1.300 artillery weapons. And

    18 it also meant that in the second phase of the war,

    19 which from the standpoint of strategy is considered to

    20 be the period from 1993 until 1995, until the

    21 operations when the BH army and the Croatian forces

    22 managed to liberate the western part of

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which also made possible the Dayton

    24 Agreement.

    25 In view of the fact, Your Honours, that the

  73. 1 Serbs had lost much of their attack strength, they

    2 applied a new kind of strategy which was designed in

    3 the general staff, and it was first applied in the

    4 occupied areas of Croatia, and then in an even harsher

    5 form in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was known as the

    6 strategy of real threat.

    7 That strategy meant to hold the positions

    8 that you have; but close to those borders, close to

    9 those borders deploy as many artillery pieces and

    10 rocket launchers, and then through constant action

    11 create a psychosis, which occurred as a result of large

    12 scale resettlement from the north-west into central

    13 Bosnia, from the east to central Bosnia, where there

    14 was the highest concentration of either Muslims or

    15 Croats.

    16 This strategy of real threat at this point in

    17 time, that is in 1993, meant waiting for the process of

    18 conflict to occur spontaneously between the Muslims and

    19 the Croats.

    20 May I, to illustrate this, use a very nice

    21 African proverb which says "When elephants fight, then

    22 it is the grass that suffers." In this case one can

    23 make an inversion of this proverb. At this point in

    24 time, the Serbs who have the strength and the

    25 superiority lying in wait, the International Community

  74. 1 is not reacting adequately, and it was the grass in

    2 central Bosnia that suffered. But this meant that

    3 before the eyes of the world, a process was evolving in

    4 which such atrocities as the attack on the Merkale

    5 Market occurred.

    6 Within the framework of this strategy of

    7 waiting for the process to develop of its own accord,

    8 it was applied until 1995. That is, as I already said,

    9 until joint operations were launched and which managed

    10 when more than 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia

    11 was in the hands of Serbs to reduce that percentage to

    12 less than 47 per cent, and this also led up to the

    13 Dayton Agreement.

    14 Q. Admiral, let us stop there for a moment to

    15 check that we understood you well. So, it is your

    16 opinion that the Army of Republika Srpska and the

    17 former JNA moved the non-Serb population from eastern

    18 Bosnia and Bosnia Krajina to central Bosnia, and that

    19 was one of the main detonators of the conflict between

    20 the Muslims and the Croats, and that was part of the

    21 strategic plan of the Army of Republika Srpska; have I

    22 understood you correctly?

    23 A. Yes. From eastern Bosnia, which had been

    24 dealt with by the Serbian army gaining control over it,

    25 a large percentage of the Bosnian Muslims were chased

  75. 1 out to central Bosnia. The same applied to a part of

    2 northern and western Bosnia.

    3 But from this area, from the northern part,

    4 there was a large influx of Muslims or Bosnians, as

    5 well as of Croats, to central Bosnia. So that on this

    6 very limited space there was a large number of people,

    7 and the only situation that can result from this was

    8 chaos. Because, as you can see, it is literally closed

    9 in from all sides, the northern, the eastern and the

    10 southern, and all that remains is this narrow corridor

    11 leading from south-east to the centre of Bosnia.

    12 And if we add in to this new strategy of real

    13 threat artillery to a greater or lesser extent, but

    14 continuously, the negative psychosis would develop and

    15 would eventually lead to what indeed happened.

    16 Q. Do you have any further comments about this

    17 map?

    18 A. I think that no further comments are required

    19 regarding this map, but there is something that I need

    20 to emphasise. There were three key elements of the

    21 attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the joint action

    22 of Muslims and Croats in the first phase of the war

    23 when they prevented this circle to be fully closed in

    24 the fall of Bosnia.

    25 Secondly, from the standpoint of the Croats

  76. 1 and Muslims, that chaotic situation in the central area

    2 occurred.

    3 And third, joint action in strategic

    4 offensive operations to liberate occupied areas of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 Q. Can we say by way of conclusion of the first

    7 part of your testimony that the analysis of the

    8 restructuring and reorganisation of the JNA shows that

    9 the JNA was gradually transformed into a Serbian

    10 imperial force designed to establish the western

    11 borders of greater Serbia far before the democratic

    12 changes in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia; would that be

    13 a correct conclusion?

    14 A. Your Honours, that is an absolutely correct

    15 conclusion. Talking from the level of strategy on the

    16 global level one can make three basic conclusions.

    17 First, that the JNA was restructured into a Serbian

    18 imperial force before the Serbian political goal was

    19 made public, before Milosevic appeared on the political

    20 scene, and far before any new authorities in any

    21 republics were installed. That is my first conclusion.

    22 Second important conclusion is that the

    23 operational base in the southern part of Croatia and

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was such that from the military

    25 standpoint it constituted a unified operative hole. It

  77. 1 is not possible to defend any of these areas unless

    2 they are defended integrally.

    3 And a third fundamental conclusion that may

    4 be drawn is that under such extremely complicated and

    5 unfavourable operational positions that both the BH

    6 army forces and the HVO forces found themselves in, the

    7 only possible logistic support could be obtained

    8 through this naval and land route leading from Croatia

    9 to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    10 That is, those are the strategic conclusions

    11 on the global level.

    12 Q. Before I thank you, may I ask you another

    13 very direct question, theoretical question? If

    14 Croatia had decided to defeat the BH army, could it

    15 have done so very simply by cutting off the route of

    16 supply, and would that have been the end of the army of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    18 A. Absolutely so.

    19 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President, my

    20 direct examination is over.

    21 Mr. President, my colleague, Mr. Hayman, has

    22 reminded me that we would like to tender this set of

    23 maps shown on the monitor into evidence.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Any particular comment,

    25 Mr. Cayley?

  78. 1 MR. CAYLEY: No comment.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Registrar, would you give

    3 it a number?

    4 THE REGISTRAR: This would be 182 for the

    5 entire group.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Registrar,

    7 Mr. Cayley.

    8 Admiral, you will now receive questions from

    9 the office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Cayley.

    10 Cross-examined by Mr. Cayley:

    11 Q. Good afternoon, Admiral. My name is Cayley,

    12 these are my colleagues, Mr. Harmon and Mr. Kehoe. I

    13 have a few questions for you.

    14 Now, I want to make sure that I actually

    15 understand this plan that you were speaking of.

    16 In essence, what I understood you to say was

    17 that in the mid-1980s the JNA general staff transformed

    18 a defensive plan against NATO into one of offence

    19 within Yugoslavia in order to create a Serbian state

    20 within that geographical area; is that correct?

    21 A. Yes, that's correct.

    22 Q. Now, you have come up with your conclusions

    23 by drawing inferences from events which occurred on the

    24 ground in the former Yugoslavia; is that correct?

    25 A. Yes, that's correct.

  79. 1 Q. Have you published this theory in any formal

    2 publication?

    3 A. Yes, in several publications. I think two.

    4 In a professional military journal, Hrvatski Vojnik is

    5 the name of the journal, but not in the integral

    6 manner, but it was published.

    7 Q. What was the second journal in which you

    8 published this theory?

    9 A. It was another publication, but they were two

    10 studies. One described the war in Croatia and

    11 preparations in Croatia, and the second in

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, it was the same publication

    13 and two articles.

    14 Q. At what period in time did you make your

    15 final conclusions about this theory of Serbian

    16 aggression?

    17 A. The conclusions, I came to these conclusions

    18 in time. First of all, because I was in a possibility

    19 to -- I had the opportunity of knowing, conditionally

    20 speaking, the eastern school of thought in military

    21 thinking, the JNA and everything which was a projection

    22 taken over from the Red Army, because it was based on

    23 the heritage of that army.

    24 And secondly, because for five or six years I

    25 studied NATO's doctrine. Also, because I was at the

  80. 1 war college in Belgrade and some of the elements were

    2 used at the war college.

    3 Third, because in the military naval region I

    4 took part, I was in the command which prepared the

    5 exercises for Romanija. So, that was my starting

    6 premise.

    7 Secondly, there was my own participation in

    8 the war from 1991, and I followed that theory and saw

    9 how and to what extent it would evolve. Therefore, the

    10 conclusion is that it was a systematic follow-up on the

    11 basis of knowledge and experience. I wrote my articles

    12 in 1996 relating to this part.

    13 Q. But the article that was published in

    14 Hrvatski Vojnik was published in 1998; is that correct?

    15 A. One for Bosnia and previously for Croatia.

    16 Q. Now, I have copies of that article which you

    17 wrote for Hrvatski Vojnik, and if we can take a moment

    18 to look at it if you can identify it.

    19 MR. CAYLEY: If the usher could assist me,

    20 please.

    21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 466.

    22 MR. CAYLEY: I must apologise to the Court, I

    23 don't have an English or French translation, not an

    24 official English translation. I only anticipate

    25 referring to very limited segments of it, and I think

  81. 1 they are such short segments the Admiral can read them

    2 to the court.

    3 Q. Admiral, is this the article which you wrote

    4 for Hrvatski Vojnik?

    5 A. Yes, that's correct.

    6 Q. Could you turn to page 7 of that article and

    7 the final paragraph on page 7, and could you read that

    8 paragraph to the Court, please? It begins --

    9 A. "Defence of the south-western part of

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina meant at the same time salvation not

    11 only for Bosnia and Herzegovina but for the whole of

    12 southern Croatia as well".

    13 Q. So, I'm correct in concluding from that

    14 comment that the pincers that we referred to earlier

    15 closed, the whole of southern Croatia would have been

    16 lost; is that correct?

    17 A. In the first case this means, and I think

    18 that I have already explained this, that at that time

    19 there would be no more Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that

    20 it would mean the following: So, no more

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the southern part of Croatia was

    22 isolated completely, and then this would be directed

    23 towards Croatia in a subsequent phase of the war. Now,

    24 how Croatia would defend itself, that's another

    25 question.

  82. 1 Q. But in terms of preventing these pincers from

    2 closing, the Republic of Croatia had a strategic

    3 interest of preventing that from happening, as well as

    4 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that's correct,

    5 isn't it?

    6 A. Well, it did have because then, not only the

    7 southern part, but the entire Republic of Croatia would

    8 have been incorporated and lost.

    9 Q. Thank you. Now I would like you to turn to

    10 the next page, which is page 8. And I think it

    11 begins -- I apologise for my pronunciation. Can you

    12 read the first four lines of that paragraph?

    13 A. Yes. As the efforts of the JNA for Bosnia to

    14 be defeated, the selective use of military force did

    15 not give off the results expected. First of all, with

    16 the Croatian people who had organised themselves

    17 militarily and was directed towards the correct

    18 realisation of the pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    19 according to the Croatian model. Which, because part

    20 of the Bosnian Muslim leadership, by waiving had

    21 strengthened the conviction with the JNA that the war

    22 would end very quickly.

    23 Q. I think you referred to that earlier when you

    24 said that, in essence, that Alija Izetbegovic wavered

    25 about taking any action against the JNA?

  83. 1 A. Well, we can say that. And that is a

    2 conclusion with Ravno. That is, during the war in

    3 Croatia on the 28th of September, 1991.

    4 Q. Now, at the beginning of that paragraph, you

    5 state that the JNA's efforts in Bosnia did not yield

    6 results, especially with the Croat nation, which was

    7 militarily organised. Are you referring to the Croats

    8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    9 A. Absolutely.

    10 Q. Thank you.

    11 A. Mainly I am speaking about the Croats.

    12 Q. Yes, I think we've finished with that. Thank

    13 you very much, Admiral, and I apologise for my

    14 pronunciation.

    15 Now, you spoke in your examination-in-chief

    16 that one of the aims of the JNA was to win territory

    17 and expel the population. Now, by that, are you

    18 referring to what commonly became known as ethnic

    19 cleansing?

    20 A. Not in that sense. As an officer, I don't

    21 work as such, but as military operations are under way,

    22 then they're freed and the population leaves, departs.

    23 Officers do not use the term ethnic cleansing, at least

    24 I don't use that term.

    25 Q. If this map could be placed onto the easel,

  84. 1 actually it's not a very big easel, it's a big map, but

    2 we'll do our best.

    3 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, may I get up

    4 closer to the map? It's rather a long way off and I

    5 can't quite see. May I approach the map?

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, of course, go ahead.

    7 MR. CAYLEY:

    8 Q. Now, Admiral, Mr. Nobilo was asking you

    9 earlier and we sort of glided over this subject about

    10 the necessity in narrow areas of land mass for depth of

    11 forces. Do you recall that part of your testimony?

    12 A. Yes. And I stated American Rules FMs 105

    13 that this depth is 35 kilometres for effective and

    14 efficient defence to be set up.

    15 Q. We're talking about the very narrow coastal

    16 strip where Croatia, I think, is no more in some

    17 places, no more than 1.000 metres wide from the coast

    18 to the Bosnian border?

    19 A. Yes, between 800 to 15 kilometres.

    20 Q. Now, during the defensive action against this

    21 pincer movement, you would accept, Admiral, that

    22 elements of HV forces were deployed in the border land

    23 areas of the Republic of Croatia and

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    25 A. As this was at a tactical level, which is not

  85. 1 the subject, was not the subject of my research, but

    2 the subject of my research is strategy, I cannot answer

    3 that question.

    4 Second, for me to answer it, I would have to

    5 have an authorisation by the Minister of Defence of

    6 Croatia. And the authorisation I have is the expert

    7 report on the level of strategy, the one that I

    8 presented to this Trial Chamber.

    9 Q. But, Admiral, you, yourself, fought in Livno,

    10 didn't you, with the HV?

    11 A. No, I did not fight in Livno. Your Honours,

    12 it would be important for us to show you where Livno

    13 lies. Livno is located here. And my native town is

    14 there, which means that, at that time, I was in the

    15 command for strategic research.

    16 Your Honours, I am now going to digress

    17 somewhat in order to answer the question put to me by

    18 the Prosecutor completely. At that particular time,

    19 the Serbs held under occupation, the electric power

    20 plant of Pedajar (Phoen). This is on Croatian

    21 territory. It is located here. They were threatening

    22 to destroy the dam and flood or everybody south of that

    23 line, which would mean almost 100.000.

    24 On the other hand, in this area of Livno

    25 here, another lake is located and another electric

  86. 1 power plant, hydro-electric power plant, which is

    2 called Busko Blato. The characteristics of that power

    3 plant is very interesting. The lake is on the

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina side. That is to say, in another

    5 state. And a tunnel, across the border, through the

    6 Kamesnica Mountain. There is a great tunnel there.

    7 It's 20 kilometres long. And the hydro-electric power

    8 plant is on the Croatian side.

    9 Therefore, if at that time, the power plant

    10 were taken over by the Serb forces, this would mean

    11 that practically the whole of Croatia would have no

    12 electricity, the southern part, and that would be an

    13 end to the situation. But there is another case. This

    14 tunnel, which, as I say, is 20 kilometres long, was

    15 constructed in such a way that the electric power plant

    16 can be stopped and tanks can pass -- and this is

    17 interesting -- through this tunnel and emerge into

    18 Dalmatia.

    19 And then, this dam would be used as an

    20 additional element of terrorist use, use for terrorist

    21 destruction, not only of Dalmatia, but of this region

    22 of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. In strategic

    23 considerations, there is a very legitimate action and

    24 that is preventative defence. It is referred to as

    25 preventative defence, which implies a struggle against

  87. 1 all terrorism, launching cruise rockets, tomahawks, in

    2 the Sudan, for example. And in Afghanistan, meant

    3 preventative defence against terrorism. And, at that

    4 particular time, to an allow the Serbs, I say the

    5 Serbs, and to do that, that would have been a

    6 catastrophe. So it was up to every honourable man to

    7 combat terrorism. He must stand up to terrorism and

    8 that was my role there.

    9 Q. Admiral, it's not a criticism of your role in

    10 the war. And the fact that Livno was defended. So,

    11 I'd be right in understanding that the HV did deploy

    12 into Livno to secure that area to prevent this military

    13 terrorism?

    14 A. No, you asked whether I was there. And I

    15 said why I was there. The reason for being there, not

    16 as distribution of forces, but the importance that that

    17 area had. So you ask me personally and I said the

    18 reasons for which I was there, for the following

    19 reasons, the ones I stated.

    20 Q. For what period of time was the HV deployed

    21 inside the Bosnian border?

    22 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I have an

    23 objection. Admiral Domazet is a member of the Chief of

    24 Staff of the Croatian Army. And in keeping with the

    25 laws on military secrets, every officer, active duty

  88. 1 officer, must gain written authorisation from the

    2 defence minister if he is to disclose these facts and

    3 declassification of these facts and he be allowed to

    4 present them to the public. Admiral Domazet has

    5 received authorisation to present the strategic level,

    6 which is completely different from the tactical level.

    7 So the actual use of units in combat activities. And a

    8 few minutes ago, he stated what his legal

    9 authorisations were and what the obstacles were to

    10 answering this question. So, as we are dealing with a

    11 matter of state security that these questions be

    12 banned. Thank you.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I have a question to ask. Mr.

    14 Nobilo, this witness was presented by you, but he was

    15 not accompanied by any particular request for

    16 protective measures. For example, under Rule 70.

    17 Under these conditions, are you saying that the Chamber

    18 itself may not ask any questions itself on this

    19 matter?

    20 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, there are legal

    21 provisions binding this witness and if he were to

    22 violate them, this would be a criminal act. I am

    23 convinced that this Trial Chamber will not compel the

    24 witness to perform a criminal act.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, very well. But, you know,

  89. 1 in principle, Mr. Nobilo, that the witness must answer

    2 all the questions put to him and especially by the

    3 judges. We have had witnesses who have appeared under

    4 particular protective measures. Please recall that

    5 there are very sensitive issues under Rule 70 in the

    6 rules. And the admiral is here before us now. He is

    7 testifying publicly, freely. He is now being subjected

    8 to a cross-examination, which, perhaps, may not please

    9 you with regards to the lines that he is following now,

    10 but it is quite important and so this is a very

    11 delicate issue. But what kind of response will the

    12 witness give us if the judges were to ask such

    13 questions?

    14 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, you can probably

    15 ask, but it is my view that the national security is

    16 legally binding and with the threat of a criminal act.

    17 And this is a legitimate right to which the witness can

    18 refer. As the witness has already spoken about the

    19 strategic level, a tactical level is quite a different

    20 area of expertise and outside the focus of the

    21 examination-in-chief.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: I think there is a very subtle

    23 difference between the strategic and tactical. In my

    24 own language, I think that the two are quite similar.

    25 I would like nonetheless to consult with my colleagues

  90. 1 because I think this is a very important issue. Please

    2 note the fact that the witness is here before us now.

    3 In your opening statement, Mr. Hayman, and

    4 also in the indictments issued against Mr. Blaskic with

    5 regard to the armed international conflict, it stated

    6 quite explicitly, here I am referring to the

    7 interference, opposing interference or alleged

    8 interference of Croatia in the events. So this bothers

    9 me to some degree. Because it does so, I am going to

    10 consult with my colleagues.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, there are rules

    12 on this question. Just so that the Court, perhaps, has

    13 in mind, rules such as Rule 66 (C) and Rule 70, which

    14 the Court has stated applies to the Defence in this

    15 case. There is precedent and guidance, we think.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that is true. I would

    17 like to consult with my colleagues, but indeed Rule

    18 66 (C) deals with disclosure of evidence by the

    19 Prosecutor.

    20 First of all, the Defence did not request any

    21 protective measures under Rule 70. Secondly, Rule 70

    22 and 66 (C) is not applicable in the present case.

    23 Thirdly, it is true that Rule 70 (F) does indeed allow

    24 a witness to refuse to testify on the grounds that he

    25 might be incriminating himself. But the judges deem

  91. 1 this is incrimination before the Trial Chamber, which

    2 has jurisdiction in that matter. Fourth, the Trial

    3 Chamber authorises the Prosecutor to put one at a time,

    4 the questions he wishes to put to the witness. Fifth,

    5 the witness may respond as he wishes. He may not

    6 respond if he chooses to do so, but the Prosecutor

    7 shall evaluate the value of that response, the weight

    8 of that response. The Tribunal shall weigh the value

    9 of that response. The Trial Chamber, rather, shall

    10 weigh the value of that response.

    11 MR. CAYLEY:

    12 Q. Admiral, what I would like you to do on the

    13 map next to you is to draw a line indicating to the

    14 judges in the time period of the beginning of 1992 to

    15 the end of 1993, the outer limit of deployment of HV

    16 forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    17 A. As this is a tactical matter, it is not the

    18 subject of my research. A tactical deployment of

    19 forces is separate from strategy. As an officer, I

    20 repeat, I do not have permission to speak about

    21 something that is not within the field of my research.

    22 Therefore, I have no permission by the Defence Minister

    23 of the Republic of Croatia for this.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley.

    25 MR. CAYLEY:

  92. 1 Q. Admiral, were the units of the HV deployed

    2 into Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1994?

    3 A. As I was performing the duty of Chief of

    4 Staff of the Intelligence Administration, Intelligence

    5 Department of the main command, that was not within the

    6 field of my activities. I repeat again that I do not

    7 have the authorisation of the defence minister to make

    8 any such statements. And that is the duty of any

    9 officer to respect that position.

    10 Q. So you're stating that whilst Chief of

    11 Military Intelligence, you had no knowledge about the

    12 deployment of Croatian armed forces in

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina; that's what you're saying to the

    14 judges?

    15 A. I wish to say that the Chief of Intelligence,

    16 his responsibility is to monitor the forces of the

    17 enemy, of the opponent and not to monitor its own

    18 forces. That does not apply to any armed forces in the

    19 world and therefore not in the Croatian armed forces

    20 either.

    21 Q. I am not going to get into an argument with

    22 you, Admiral, (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  93. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 MR. HAYMAN: Is Mr. Cayley going to subject

    4 himself to cross-examination, Your Honour? He is

    5 testifying. It wasn't a question. I ask that his

    6 comments be stricken.

    7 May I have a ruling, Mr. President? Could I

    8 have a ruling on my request to strike his comments?

    9 JUDGE JORDA: The objection is sustained,

    10 you're not to make any comments, Mr. Cayley. Just

    11 simply put questions.

    12 MR. CAYLEY:

    13 Q. It is your position of Chief of Military

    14 Intelligence in the Croatian armed forces you had no

    15 knowledge of the deployment of Croatian armed forces?

    16 A. My task was to monitor, exclusively to

    17 monitor the forces of the enemy, their deployment,

    18 their intentions. That was my task. My task was not

    19 to monitor the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia

    20 and least of all the deployment of those forces.

    21 Q. Admiral, simply answer my question "yes" or

    22 "no". Is it your testimony that as Chief of Military

    23 Intelligence for the Croatian armed forces, you had no

    24 knowledge of the deployment of those forces between

    25 1992 and 1994? Yes or no?

  94. 1 A. I had knowledge about the deployment of enemy

    2 forces.

    3 Q. Admiral, you're being evasive and I would

    4 like an answer to the question.

    5 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, please, I would ask

    6 that Mr. Cayley be reprimanded for his comments. He

    7 can put a question. He can ask the Court to direct the

    8 witness to answer --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: I have asked Mr. Cayley not to

    10 make any comments. However, I cannot reprimand a

    11 counsel for the Prosecution once the answer from the

    12 witness is evasive. I have asked Mr. Cayley not to

    13 make any comments. However, do not go so far as to

    14 request a reprimand. We are before an impasse. I call

    15 this an impasse.

    16 Mr. Cayley, please avoid making any comment

    17 and put questions. The responses then will be

    18 recorded.

    19 MR. CAYLEY: Could I ask you, Mr. President,

    20 to simply ask the witness to answer "yes" or "no" to my

    21 next question, which I think is a fairly

    22 straightforward matter.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: That, Mr. President, not if it

    24 contradicts the ruling of the Court. The Court told

    25 the witness how he should respond to this line. And it

  95. 1 may not be possible within the framework that the Court

    2 has established to answer yes or no. I would have that

    3 comment.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: The witness shall answer as he

    5 wishes, as I say, and it's up to the judges to then

    6 evaluate his response.

    7 MR. CAYLEY:

    8 Q. Admiral, I will ask you the question once

    9 again. And I would like you to answer me "yes" or

    10 "no". As Chief of Military Intelligence, within the

    11 Croatian armed forces, are you stating to this Court

    12 that you had no knowledge of the deployment of Croatian

    13 armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    14 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the witness has

    15 at least three times answered the same question. This,

    16 to me, looks like cross-examination in poor crime

    17 films.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, you asked for

    19 comments not to be made, I don't want you to make

    20 comments either. The witness has voluntarily come to

    21 this format of questions and response. I have asked

    22 Mr. Cayley to ask some questions one at a time. The

    23 witness has the right to answer the questions as he

    24 sees fit.

    25 Please go on, Mr. Cayley.

  96. 1 MR. CAYLEY:

    2 Q. I am not going to keep repeating myself,

    3 Admiral. You heard the question, can you give an

    4 answer to that?

    5 A. I have answered that question. As Chief of

    6 Intelligence, my task was to monitor, to evaluate the

    7 enemy forces and not the armed forces of the Republic

    8 of Croatia.

    9 Q. Admiral, while you were in Livno, were you a

    10 member of the HV or the HVO?

    11 A. My stay in Livno was merely to indicate the

    12 importance of defence and what could happen, nothing

    13 more than that.

    14 Q. Admiral, you didn't answer my question. I

    15 asked you, when you were in Livno, were you a member of

    16 the HV or the HVO?

    17 A. I was there simply to draw attention to the

    18 importance of defending the area.

    19 Q. I ask, Mr. President, the Court draws the

    20 necessary inference from the fact that the witness is

    21 simply not answering any of my questions at all.

    22 Am I right in saying, Admiral, at the end of

    23 May, 1994, you were promoted by President Tudjman to

    24 Rear-Admiral?

    25 A. The rank of Admiral in May 1994.

  97. 1 Q. I think I am right in saying that at the same

    2 time, Slobodan Praljak was promoted to Reserve Colonel

    3 General in the HV and Ante Gotovina to a Major General

    4 in the HV. Do you recall that?

    5 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, this question --

    6 Mr. President, this question about Praljak and Gotovina

    7 is absolutely outside the focus of

    8 examination-in-chief, quite outside.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: I'm sorry, Mr. Nobilo, but they

    10 were questions which were indeed in the scope of the

    11 examination-in-chief. I don't know exactly where we

    12 are going, but when he answers questions within the

    13 framework of the cross-examination, but when he tells

    14 us, for example, that he cannot answer questions

    15 because he does not have authorisation from the Defence

    16 Minister, then that does indeed limit the scope of the

    17 examination.

    18 But, please, let us reflect again on the

    19 text. Their right to refuse to respond. These are

    20 rights which are included in the Rules of Procedure and

    21 Evidence. So I don't know what you think of this, Mr.

    22 Nobilo, but they are indeed included in these Rules.

    23 But it is stated here that it is quite possible that we

    24 may use Rule 98, in which case we may then proceed with

    25 a further examination of this witness by an official

  98. 1 from Croatia in order to obtain any additional

    2 information. There is this rule, do not forget.

    3 Very well, under these conditions, Mr.

    4 Cayley, please continue.

    5 MR. CAYLEY:

    6 Q. I am right in saying --

    7 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I believe that

    8 the transcript in English has given, if I may say so, a

    9 different version of what you have just stated. In

    10 particular, with regards to the possible hearing of

    11 this Chamber by the Minister of Defence. I am not a

    12 specialist, but I think, perhaps, you might restate

    13 what you have just stated.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. What I have been

    15 satisfied myself with saying is that it is very

    16 difficult, Mr. Nobilo, to continue with the

    17 cross-examination when the witness is invoking that he

    18 does not have authorisation to respond to such and such

    19 a question. I would like to remind you once again that

    20 the witness is not under the protection of Rule 70 as

    21 you have said for other witnesses. It is not something

    22 that is in my hands. You have chosen your own

    23 strategy.

    24 Secondly, Rule 90 (F) states the conditions

    25 under which the witness under solemn declaration may

  99. 1 testify.

    2 Thirdly, Rule 98 states that should the case

    3 be -- Rule 98 -- let me look back again to the text to

    4 be sure. Rule 98 does indeed state that, if necessary,

    5 the Trial Chamber may, in order to get a feel for the

    6 weight of the evidence presented by the witness, it may

    7 call upon the person under whom he is sheltering his

    8 responses as saying that he can only give strategic and

    9 not tactical responses. So he may then call upon his

    10 superior in order to obtain additional information. So

    11 here I am calling upon Rule 98. This may be something

    12 you may refer to. This is all that I was stating. I

    13 hope the transcript now reflects what I am saying. Is

    14 it not being reflected in the transcript Mr. Fourmy?

    15 No? I see. Well, I am doing what I can. I hope the

    16 interpreters will be very attentive to what I am

    17 stating. I cannot repeat myself a third time. Mr.

    18 Fourmy please ensure that this is indeed what the

    19 transcripts shall reflect. I hope that all the persons

    20 listening to me understood what I am saying.

    21 MR. FOURMY: Mr. President, I have a brief

    22 remark to say. I am sorry to intervene. But the first

    23 thing is that it was stated in the transcript that Mr.

    24 Nobilio, who was stating what I heard you say, perhaps

    25 that should be corrected first of all.

  100. 1 The second thing, Mr. President, that you

    2 have mentioned the differences between strategy and

    3 tactics and not -- this does not appear in the

    4 transcript, which, as I said, you can either give a

    5 tactic or strategy.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that has nothing to do at

    7 all with what I said. Please have this stricken. For

    8 the rest, it is fine. Very well.

    9 Mr. Nobilo, you may now, if you wish to

    10 speak, please go ahead. After that, then we're going

    11 to take a recess.

    12 MR. NOBILO: I agree, Mr. President. I

    13 understood what you said. But my objection was that

    14 this question is outside the focus of the direct

    15 examination. That was the substance of my objection.

    16 I know that it is up to the Trial Chamber to rule, but

    17 then let the Trial Chamber decide on the matter.

    18 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, may I speak?

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley.

    20 MR. CAYLEY: I would refer, both my learned

    21 friend and the Court to Rule 90 (H), which is the

    22 foundation for Mr. Nobilo's position.

    23 Cross-examination shall be limited to the subject

    24 matter of direct examination and matters affecting the

    25 credibility of the witness. 89 (H) -- sorry, 90 (H) is

  101. 1 a permissive subsection in that the rule, so it states,

    2 that the Trial Chamber may, in the exercise of its

    3 discretion permit, inquire into additional matters as

    4 if on direct examination.

    5 My position is simply this: I believe that

    6 these questions are within the scope of the

    7 examination-in-chief. The good admiral spoke about his

    8 career in the Croatian Army. These are related to

    9 that. And even if the Court considers that they are

    10 not, the Court has the discretion to allow me to ask

    11 questions as if it were a direct examination. If the

    12 witness particularly, bearing in mind that this witness

    13 is being evasive for whatever reason.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Just briefly, Mr. President. My

    16 learned colleague reads the Rule well. But, of course,

    17 this Rule did not exist and did not apply during the

    18 Prosecution case. This is one of the amendments, Rule

    19 90 (H). How many times in the Prosecution case was the

    20 Defence quieted on the grounds that we were outside the

    21 scope and told you can try and bring the witness back

    22 and put on that evidence in your case. We submit the

    23 matter of scope to the Court, but I think there is

    24 another issue other than what is the wording of

    25 Rule 90 (H).

  102. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I have heard what you have

    2 said, Mr. Hayman. And generally speaking I would like

    3 to remind you of two things. First of all, the

    4 amendments made to the Rules of Procedure, are

    5 applicable immediately except, of course, if they're

    6 prejudicial for the accused, as you know. For example,

    7 and Rule 73 ter was not applied immediately because we

    8 did not apply it to the prosecution in the case of 73

    9 bis. I also remind you that, according to the Rules,

    10 that the cross-examination shall be limited to the

    11 subject matter of the direct examination, but of

    12 course, this is not a strict matter. Don't forget

    13 there is also an overall governing rule. Is that the

    14 judges, in order to render their final judgement, must

    15 have a clear understanding of the subject matter and,

    16 therefore, they can bring back the witness on several

    17 occasions.

    18 If there is a witness who has a superior

    19 above him, from whom he does not have the authorisation

    20 to give such a testimony, then, in particular, that is

    21 of importance. This, indeed, was the issue that was

    22 raised by Mr. Nobilo in the very beginning. It does

    23 allow for cross-examination on two principles, one

    24 principle is that it is true that the judges do not

    25 have all of the answers from the Admiral for the

  103. 1 reasons that he himself as given. In that case, he

    2 would not necessarily be required to come back, but

    3 that issue may be raised.

    4 Yes, Mr. Hayman, you wish to take the floor.

    5 But this is only from the goodwill of the Presiding

    6 Judge who does not want to cut the Defence short.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I would just note, Mr.

    8 President, perhaps to provide some context to this

    9 drama, if one may call it that, that the Defence does

    10 not contest that HV troops went into south-west -- south

    11 western Bosnia in this time period to help keep the

    12 route open and defeat the JNA. We agree with that. In

    13 fact, the need for that, at the strategic level, was a

    14 large part of this witness' testimony. I think what's

    15 going on here is the Prosecutor is, in essence, asking

    16 questions designed to provoke the witness to have to

    17 invoke national security. These questions are like,

    18 when is the last time you had a secret meeting and

    19 something was discussed that you can't disclose? That

    20 is what is going on here.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, very well. I think we

    22 shall interrupt the proceedings on this note and to

    23 take a recess and then return. I believe we require a

    24 20 to 25 minutes break. The Chamber stands adjourned.

    25 --- Recess taken at 3.58 p.m.

  104. 1 --- On resuming at 4.23 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Cayley, please continue.

    3 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

    4 Q. Admiral, you stated earlier that your

    5 function as Chief of Military Intelligence was to

    6 monitor those armed forces which were regarded as the

    7 enemy of the Republic of Croatia; is that correct?

    8 A. That's correct.

    9 Q. In 1993, did that include monitoring the

    10 armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    11 A. The armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

    12 1993 didn't really exist. In 1993, in the territory of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina there were the forces that called

    14 themselves the Army of Republika Srpska, the BH army

    15 and the HV.

    16 Q. Let's return now to what we were speaking

    17 about before the break. You confirmed in May of 1994

    18 that you were promoted to rear Admiral by President

    19 Tudjman; that's correct, isn't it?

    20 A. Yes, correct.

    21 Q. At the same time it's correct, isn't it, that

    22 Slobodan Praljak was promoted to a Reserve Colonel in

    23 the HV?

    24 A. Colonel General, Reserve Colonel General,

    25 yes, General Praljak was promoted, yes.

  105. 1 Q. And that was in the HV?

    2 A. The promotion was in Zagreb. In Zagreb he

    3 was promoted, but the General was promoted as a Reserve

    4 General.

    5 Q. I understand, Admiral, and I'm right in

    6 saying that Slobodan Praljak had formerly served as a

    7 general in the HVO, that's correct; isn't it?

    8 A. Yes, he was in the Croatian Defence Council,

    9 a general, yes.

    10 Q. For what period was he a general in the

    11 Croatian Defence Council?

    12 A. Your Honours, I really cannot recall for how

    13 long, but I know that he first left the Croatian army

    14 and then he went to Bosnia-Herzegovina and was a

    15 general of the Croatian Defence Council. I don't know

    16 the exact date, but probably for about a year, that is

    17 my assumption.

    18 Q. And then after his service in the HVO he

    19 returned to the HV?

    20 A. Yes. And he was promoted to the rank of

    21 retired general.

    22 Q. During your service in Livno, Ante Gotovina

    23 was your commanding officer; is that correct?

    24 A. My service in Livno, or rather, I was in

    25 Livno to investigate, because we knew from our

  106. 1 assessments that that is where the main strike would

    2 come, and that is why I was in Livno, to investigate.

    3 But classically General Gotovina was not my superior,

    4 there was no superiority between us.

    5 Q. Was Ante Gotovina in Livno in April of 1992?

    6 A. Yes, he was.

    7 Q. And at that time was he in the HVO or the HV?

    8 A. General Gotovina, as he was an experienced

    9 officer, at the time was an officer of the Croatian

    10 army, because things needed to be organised, because

    11 the forces of the Serbs, that is of the JNA, were about

    12 to strike.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, the transcript

    14 refers to General Kadijevic, I think we're discussing a

    15 different person now, just to aid the transcribers.

    16 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, it's General Gotovina.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I'd like to ask everyone here

    18 present to speak more slowly. I believe it is very

    19 difficult for the interpreters to follow such a complex

    20 trial; and so, let us all make an effort.

    21 In addition, it is true that an error like

    22 this one is an important one, even on a phonetic basis

    23 it seems to be not at all the same thing; so, let us

    24 also try to be more attentive. Please go on,

    25 Mr. Cayley, continue. Thank you, Mr. Hayman.

  107. 1 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you Mr. President.

    2 Q. Now, I'm right in saying, Admiral, in May

    3 1998 you were promoted by President Tudjman from the

    4 rank of Rear-Admiral to Vice-Admiral; is that correct?

    5 A. Correct.

    6 Q. And I think at the same time Major General

    7 Petkovic was promoted to a Colonel in the HV; do you

    8 recall that?

    9 A. Correct.

    10 Q. And I'm right in saying that Colonel General

    11 Milvoj Petkovic was formerly the Chief of Staff of the

    12 HVO; is that correct, when he was a brigadier?

    13 A. Yes, correct.

    14 Q. What year was that?

    15 A. When he was Chief of Staff?

    16 Q. Of the HVO.

    17 A. In '93, for sure. I think in '94, as well.

    18 And I think it was from 1992 he was there.

    19 Q. Thank you, Admiral. And prior to his service

    20 as the Chief of Staff of the HVO, he had been an

    21 officer in the HV; hadn't he?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Now, am I right in saying that in April of

    24 1992 General Bobetko of the Croatian army was the

    25 commander of the southern front?

  108. 1 A. Yes, correct.

    2 Q. And that command included tactical command of

    3 HVO units in Bosnia-Herzegovina; didn't it, Admiral?

    4 A. That command had the role of organising

    5 defence in that area, to organise the defence so as to

    6 be able to effectively defend that territory because of

    7 the closing of the pincers, that was his

    8 responsibility.

    9 Q. I understand that, and we have almost

    10 finished, but I would like a direct answer to my

    11 question. General Bobetko, a Croatian general in the

    12 HV, had tactical command of HVO units in

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina during that time as part of his

    14 command; didn't he?

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Could we have the time frame in

    16 the question?

    17 Q. From at least April of 1992.

    18 MR. HAYMAN: If counsel could close the time

    19 frame. Does he mean until 1996, or from a particular

    20 month to a particular month? Otherwise, it's vague as

    21 to time, that's my objection.

    22 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be allowed

    23 to answer the question.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: If it could be specified so it

    25 is no longer vague, Mr. President.

  109. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Cayley, please

    2 specify.

    3 MR. CAYLEY:

    4 Q. Admiral, in April of 1992 did General Bobetko

    5 have command of HVO units in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    6 A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is how it was

    7 called, there was an advanced command post. And that

    8 post is not a classical command post, and its role was,

    9 as far as I can remember, the organisation of the

    10 defence and the forces to close those pincers. So, it

    11 was not a classical command function.

    12 Q. Did General Bobetko have HVO forces under his

    13 command?

    14 A. He coordinated and guided those forces in the

    15 command to organise themselves. Through this command

    16 post he channelled the forces for defence, for defence

    17 from this advance command post. In that sense he had a

    18 command function, not in the classical sense of command

    19 over units below him, but just to distribute those

    20 forces and improve their organisation. That was his

    21 role.

    22 Q. Did he issue orders to these forces, Admiral,

    23 written orders?

    24 A. Some, probably he did. Some form of written

    25 orders, I assume he had to issue. I think he did have

  110. 1 to issue such orders.

    2 Q. Could you tell the Court, Admiral, where

    3 those written orders are maintained or kept, the

    4 archive?

    5 A. Written orders, every commander keeps them in

    6 the archive of the command.

    7 Q. And where is that archive located, Admiral?

    8 A. The archive, if you are referring to the

    9 command of General Bobetko, the archive was in Ploca,

    10 which is a place in Croatia.

    11 Q. And those orders are still maintained there

    12 now?

    13 A. Those orders are kept in the place where the

    14 command for that area was based.

    15 Q. So, those orders are still in Ploca?

    16 A. That I don't know, I don't know where those

    17 orders are. I really do not know, but they should be

    18 in a command post there in the south. At present the

    19 command of the southern Croatian forces is not in Ploca

    20 but in Ston, or that is Dubrovnik.

    21 MR. CAYLEY: I have no further questions,

    22 Mr. President, if I could ask for admission into

    23 evidence for exhibit, if the registrar will give me a

    24 number.

    25 THE REGISTRAR: 466.

  111. 1 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you very much, Admiral.

    2 MR. NOBILO: With the Court's permission.

    3 Before I ask our witness some questions, my proposal

    4 would be that all this time be deducted from the

    5 Defence time, because it was totally outside the focus

    6 of the direct examination which had to do exclusively

    7 with strategy. Archives, promotions, these are all

    8 additional information that were not covered by the

    9 direct examination.

    10 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Let me consult with my

    12 colleagues.

    13 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, can I speak?

    14 This Tribunal, you judges have a truth finding mission,

    15 and the Admiral has information and evidence which is

    16 relevant to this case. There is discretion within the

    17 rules that I have already mentioned which allows me to

    18 ask questions. The reason that this cross-examination

    19 has taken perhaps longer than it should have done is

    20 because the witness has not answered my questions.

    21 This time should be deducted from the Defence, they

    22 called the witness.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Let me consult with my

    24 colleagues.

    25 The Chamber and the judges have taken the

  112. 1 following decision. It calls upon various principles

    2 of different types. What has guided the Prosecution is

    3 the first principle, is the consequences of the silence

    4 of the witness; therefore, it was necessary for the

    5 Prosecution to ask indirect questions to try to obtain

    6 some of the reality that the Prosecution is pursuing in

    7 its objective.

    8 Secondly, it is no less true that in the

    9 absolute value, the questions that have been put for

    10 about half an hour by the Prosecution are outside of

    11 the scope of the examination-in-chief.

    12 Thirdly, the Trial Chamber has not

    13 interrupted the Prosecution, nor will it do so, because

    14 the Chamber finds that in its sovereign power, which is

    15 its own, to determine what is the truth in the matter

    16 referred to it, we will go to the very depth of the

    17 question put to the witness by the Prosecution.

    18 For that reason it would not be altogether

    19 fair for the Defence to suffer the prejudices of the

    20 questions put by the Prosecution; therefore, for that

    21 reason, 30 minutes in addition will be allotted to the

    22 Defence.

    23 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    24 Q. Admiral, let's try and demystify some things,

    25 if by some strange fact we could call your Defence

  113. 1 Minister and ask him to send a fax complying, to tell

    2 the Chamber what troops, where and when were deployed

    3 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for how long; could you now,

    4 according to your recollections, tell that to the

    5 Court?

    6 A. Your Honours, if a decision of that kind were

    7 to be made I would quite simply not be in a position to

    8 say which troops or elements were deployed in the area

    9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina at this point in time.

    10 This would require additional research,

    11 because at the time, quite honestly, I was performing a

    12 function which, whose competency was not the deployment

    13 of Croatian troops. What was under my authorisation

    14 was strategic research as to how that process would

    15 develop and evolve, so I could not give an answer of

    16 that kind.

    17 Q. Tell us, Admiral, while you performed the

    18 duty of head of the Intelligence Department of the

    19 Croatian army, did you treat the army of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an enemy?

    21 Did you act, you as an intelligence

    22 commander, towards the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or

    23 as an intelligence officer of the Croatian army, did

    24 you look at the insurgent Krajina regions in the

    25 Yugoslav People's Army as a realistic threat? What did

  114. 1 you do in your job in 1992 and 1993?

    2 A. As in the strategy of the defence of the

    3 Republic of Croatia, in which I participated myself,

    4 there are three basic principles; and one is that

    5 Croatia is not considered the enemy of anybody and is

    6 not hostile to anyone. That means that my field of

    7 activity as the head of the intelligence service was

    8 exclusively geared towards the Serbs who were at that

    9 time the threat.

    10 Q. How?

    11 A. The BH army, in no event, was an enemy of any

    12 kind, it was not a threat to Croatia. Therefore, it

    13 did not come under the duties of my duties and the army

    14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, it was only geared towards

    15 the Serbs.

    16 Q. Let us throw some more light on the southern

    17 front of General Bobetko. I will try and go further

    18 from the Prosecutor, and if I enter the realms of state

    19 secrets, please do your duty. Therefore, let's

    20 proceed.

    21 Could General Bobetko liberate and defend the

    22 southern part of Croatia without entering the territory

    23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the military sense?

    24 A. Your Honours, because of the small operative

    25 depth, General Bobetko could not defend the southern

  115. 1 regions of Croatia, that is without doubt.

    2 Q. With his separate command in

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, his advance command, yes, exactly.

    4 And where was the Croatian army active? Which region?

    5 Can you show us on the map, using the map, please? How

    6 deep did it penetrate into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what

    7 was the military reason for this?

    8 A. In view of this fact, I can assess the depth

    9 to which certain elements of the Croatian army could

    10 penetrate on the basis of the plan and disposition of

    11 the Serb onslaught. And, Your Honours, I would show

    12 this now.

    13 Therefore, in my assessment as a military

    14 analyst, elements of the Croatian army could have

    15 entered to a maximum depth the borders of the Republic

    16 of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the northern part

    17 of the town of Livno. Ultimately up to Tomislavgrad,

    18 that is the end point, this line here, because the area

    19 of the main onslaught of Serb forces was the valley of

    20 Livensko Polje (Phoen) in order to take over the hydro

    21 power plant and to move towards Split and by the

    22 Neretva River Valley.

    23 And second, on the southern side, which

    24 stretches from the borders of the Republic of Croatia

    25 and borders Bosnia-Herzegovina up to a depth of

  116. 1 Stolovic, located here where the laser pen is pointing.

    2 So, in my evaluation, it is this depth, and

    3 this depth enabled this defence and to prevent the

    4 closing of the pincers and defending the southern part

    5 of Croatia.

    6 Q. Tell us, tell the Court, please, Admiral,

    7 whether you know, are there any legal bases, political

    8 bases for the entry of the Croatian army into the

    9 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    10 A. As far as I know, I think that in 1992 there

    11 was an agreement reached between the president of the

    12 presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija

    13 Izetbegovic, and the president of the Republic of

    14 Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman.

    15 On a joint defence from aggression, the Serb

    16 aggression, I think that a document of that kind does

    17 exist, and it was probably on the basis of that

    18 document that the events took place and General Bobetko

    19 was designated to come to command the southern front.

    20 Q. General Bobetko was positioned with his

    21 command in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the

    22 spring of 1992 when the fateful battle to save

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Croatia took place.

    24 Can you tell us at that time whether, apart

    25 from the formal organisation, whether any organisation

  117. 1 and preparation at a high level the forces of local

    2 Croats from Herzegovina and local Muslims were being

    3 prepared for themselves to be able to close the

    4 pincers?

    5 Did General Bobetko in this fighting command

    6 both the Croats and the Muslims in defence of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    8 A. As there are several questions there, let me

    9 answer in the following manner.

    10 It is quite certainly true that the

    11 organisation of Croats in Bosnia was better than the

    12 organisation of the Bosnian Muslims in that area of

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    14 However, as we are dealing with an

    15 asymmetrical war where the technical factor is greater

    16 on the Serbian side, these forces were absolutely no

    17 guarantee, although the Croats were better organised.

    18 But, it is also a fact that in addition to the Croats

    19 in the units which were commanded by General Bobetko,

    20 there were also units of Bosnian Muslims, and this was

    21 simultaneous, they existed at the same time, and I am

    22 certain that I stressed this in my presentation.

    23 Q. Tell me, General Praljak, is he a native of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    25 A. Yes, as far as I know, he is.

  118. 1 Q. Is it true that Petkovic was from

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well?

    3 A. As far as I know, General Petkovic, his

    4 origins are from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he lived in

    5 Sibenik, as far as I know.

    6 Q. Is it true that at beginning of the war in

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina a group of officers and soldiers

    8 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, who originated from BH and who

    9 took part in the Croatian army during the Serbo-Croat

    10 War, asked to step down from the Croatian army so as to

    11 be able to go home and defend their own home in

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that true?

    13 A. As far as I remember, there were instances of

    14 this kind, some Croats who were in the Croatian army

    15 after January, 1992, not quite then, but somewhere in

    16 the second half of March and the beginning of April

    17 asked to go to Herzegovina, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    18 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President, we

    19 have concluded.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Nobilo. Your

    21 Honour, as I have explained to you, you will now have

    22 questions put to you by the judges for the completion

    23 of your testimony here before this Tribunal. I now

    24 turn to Judge Riad.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. President.

  119. 1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, to the

    2 President. Microphone to the Judge Riad, please.

    3 Microphone to Judge Riad.

    4 JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry, I have listened very

    5 attentively to your testimony and your presentation on

    6 military strategy. It seems that you are a great

    7 expert on this subject. However, I cannot say that I

    8 was able to assimilate everything at once. I must look

    9 at the transcript once again to learn more. But I

    10 concluded from that that the fundamental responsibility

    11 for all that occurred of all those events, that the

    12 responsibility was attributed to the Serbs.

    13 I would just like to ask you questions

    14 dealing more, more relative, whether it deals more

    15 directly with our trial, but I am going to tempt myself

    16 with general questions, dealing again with your

    17 testimony.

    18 If I understood correctly, do you consider

    19 that the Serbs are responsible for the confrontation,

    20 which took place between the Croats and the Muslims in

    21 Bosnia? Do you believe that they are the cause or,

    22 rather, who was the cause for this confrontation?

    23 Because the two had a common enemy. If you will

    24 respond to that question, you will help me or help us

    25 to follow and to understand the situation.

  120. 1 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, if I have

    2 understood your question correctly, it is whether the

    3 Serbs were the cause of the confrontation between the

    4 Bosnia Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Have

    5 I understood your question correctly?

    6 JUDGE RIAD: In other words, what was the

    7 cause?

    8 A. According to my research, which I have spoken

    9 about from the elements of strategy, I came to the

    10 conclusion, and this can be seen from the map, the

    11 situation is as such: It is 1993, the year 1993. The

    12 main objective cause in strategy, this is called the

    13 external circle. The external circle is much more

    14 decisive and influential for events within the circle

    15 itself than what is actually taking place in the

    16 epicentre.

    17 This means in practical terms the following:

    18 That on a strategic level, on the aggression in

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this phenomenon stepped into play.

    20 That is to say, the Serbs pushed at the same time both

    21 the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, into that circle. And

    22 by applying the strategy of real threat, realistic

    23 threat, they created a psychosis. This psychosis, the

    24 longer it lasted, objectively gave birth to the

    25 confrontation between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

  121. 1 Therefore, my conclusion, Your Honours, and I

    2 think that this is what my research has shown, that it

    3 was a basic cause for that confrontation.

    4 This also bears out one other thing. Because

    5 the Serbs had already used up a portion of their

    6 forces, they could no longer effect a global

    7 offensive. And by applying this strategy, they quite

    8 simply waited, lay in waiting. We can compare this to

    9 the strategy of a spider with his web waiting for his

    10 prey to be caught. And this, at the same time, is

    11 meant by the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. And that,

    12 Your Honours, is the external circle in the area of

    13 strategy of how you can liquidate your enemy. And I

    14 think that that in this case is the principal cause.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: You gave a very interesting

    16 example when you compared that to the battle between

    17 elephants. Is there any particular reason, the

    18 specific reason that the Bosnia Croats fought against

    19 the Muslims? You stated that the Croats were better

    20 organised than the Muslims, the Bosnian Muslims. And

    21 that the Bosnian Muslims never posed any real threat to

    22 the Croats. So what is the reason then for the Croats

    23 to want to get rid of the Muslims? And there was also

    24 ascensions, that you said and I read this from the

    25 transcripts, so I am going to read it for you in

  122. 1 English. By wavering has strengthened the conviction

    2 by the JNA that the war would end quickly.

    3 A. Your Honours, that sentence, I think was

    4 contained in the article.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: All right. Let me continue

    6 now. I would like to repeat because I don't think it

    7 was translated correctly from French.

    8 Mr. President, perhaps you have understood

    9 the translation. I must admit I don't follow the

    10 French translation very well. I followed the

    11 translation into French, so I will repeat the

    12 question. It seems one part of the Bosnian Muslim

    13 leaders, they're wavering and this to enforce the

    14 convictions among the JNA that this battle could be won

    15 quickly. Do you feel that this would also encourage

    16 the Croatian Army, this give them -- do you think that

    17 there was some sort of agreement that agreed between

    18 the two sides, the Muslims and the Serbs, because

    19 that's why the -- because you said at one point that

    20 they had begun to abdicate their forces.

    21 A. Your Honours, I will be happy to try and

    22 explain the situation. I think there is a nuance of

    23 interpretation here because strategy has its nuances as

    24 well. Let's see what we're talking about. As the plan

    25 that you have seen is a very complex plan, a very

  123. 1 sophisticated plan by which they wish to achieve a

    2 greater Serbia, many people, even in the Republic of

    3 Croatia, were certain that a war of this kind would

    4 actually break out. At the same time, some people in

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina were not certain that war was

    6 imminent. It is possible, Your Honours, that a portion

    7 of the Bosnian Muslim leadership thought only at the

    8 beginning, at the very beginnings of the war, that is

    9 to say the beginning of 1992, that they would avoid an

    10 aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina in that way. And in

    11 view of the defensive strategic interests, this cannot

    12 be considered to have been a bad thing. And this meant

    13 that if as the Serbs had the enormous advantage, and

    14 where we were talking about time here, it was a

    15 question of time, Your Honours, one month, perhaps, 15

    16 days, were in question because it was April 1992 and

    17 any hesitation in decision, any lack of a fast

    18 reaction, could have brought what you saw happen here.

    19 So we cannot explicitly state that the

    20 Bosnian Muslims and their leadership did not wish to do

    21 so. At that moment they did not, perhaps, have a full

    22 understanding of the situation. But subsequent events

    23 were to show that after the pincers were stopped,

    24 prevented in closing, they came to realise in the

    25 political leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to

  124. 1 say the Bosnian Muslim leadership, that aggression was

    2 there and they then began to organise themselves, the

    3 armed forces and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina began

    4 to organise itself. And, in that sense, that is the

    5 right observation.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: Yes, very well. That is not the

    7 reason for the conflict, I understand. You also talked

    8 about the agents of the Croatian forces in order to

    9 secure the Croatian territories. You said that during

    10 the examination by the Defence.

    11 Now, these Croatian forces who entered, did

    12 they come into contact or into the battles with the

    13 Bosnian forces? Were there any battles between the

    14 Bosnian forces and the Muslim forces?

    15 A. Your Honours, we are talking about 1992. The

    16 first phase of the war in closing the pincers and that

    17 is the key point. At that time, there were no

    18 conflicts between the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    19 existed and the Bosnian Muslims. On the contrary, at

    20 that time, and I am talking about Bosnia Muslims as

    21 opposed to the other regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    22 they became included and they joined forces to the best

    23 of their ability, to prevent the pincers. So, at that

    24 time, there were no conflicts between the Croats and

    25 the Bosnian Muslims.

  125. 1 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. One more question to

    2 wind up and over which I have some difficulty

    3 understanding. You said that there was a total lack of

    4 equality of balance between the Serbian forces, the

    5 Croatian forces and the Bosnian forces. You said

    6 regarding the Croats it was 1-10. And in the case of

    7 the Bosniaks, it was 1-1.000 because these were armed

    8 forces against non-armed forces, non-armed people. The

    9 United Nations, as far as I remembered, prohibited

    10 delivery of weapons, so how come the Serbs were so

    11 strong in spite of the ban on arm supply? Why was

    12 there this ban when there was such a large

    13 disproportion? You're a military expert, could you

    14 comment on that?

    15 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, as a man and a

    16 general, the question that I have just heard is a

    17 question above all questions when we're talking about

    18 the events in the former Yugoslavia. It is a question

    19 upon which many in the future will have to find an

    20 answer to and will have to dwell on. But on the basis

    21 of my research, I can say the following, and that is

    22 why I said in my introductory testimony, I use the term

    23 asymmetrical war. Here, that is to say, on the

    24 territory of the former Yugoslavia, an asymmetric war

    25 was waged. An asymmetrical war could have been waged

  126. 1 only on one condition and that is the embargo.

    2 As in 1985 and 6 and 7, a Serbian imperial

    3 force was organised which wanted to emerge on the

    4 western borders and take away portions of Croatia and

    5 the entire region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This

    6 asymmetric war led to the fact that in those regions,

    7 as so many victims fell and a complete chaos reigned.

    8 And I would like before Your Honours, to say that this

    9 strategic game and to call it a determined chaos.

    10 But, at the same time, before Your Honours,

    11 as an officer and an admiral, I have great satisfaction

    12 in seeing that we succeeded in maintaining Bosnia and

    13 Herzegovina as an independent state. And in the first

    14 phase of the war, in setting up a joint defence, as

    15 well as in the second phase of the war, to have a joint

    16 attack. And that the international forces ensured the

    17 entirety of Bosnia. This also means that we have a

    18 whole Croatia. Why and for what reason an asymmetric

    19 war was allowed to take place and the City of Sarajevo

    20 to be destroyed for three years before the eyes of the

    21 world, Your Honours, that is something that will have

    22 to be studied in the future.

    23 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Admiral.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Riad. I turn

    25 to Judge Shahabuddeen.

  127. 1 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Admiral, I also have

    2 listened to your testimony with much interest. Let me

    3 start off with a little question about the Serbian

    4 Academy of Sciences. You mentioned the Academy. I am

    5 a little unclear in my mind about the precise status of

    6 the Academy. Was the Academy regarded as a spokesman

    7 of the Government of Serbia on the matters to which you

    8 refer?

    9 A. I have understood your question, Your

    10 Honour. I did not deal with this in the sense of the

    11 structure of the Serbian Academy of Science. But, I

    12 shall tell you what I personally know from my general

    13 education.

    14 As far as I know, the Serbian Academy of

    15 Science, like any other academy of science, should

    16 promote scientific work in certain fields. Among

    17 others, social phenomenon, international relations and

    18 so on and so forth, the natural sciences, technology

    19 and so forth. However, the Serbian Academy of Science

    20 was not an instrument of the Government of Serbia. It

    21 was not an instrument of the Presidency of Serbia.

    22 Like any other academy of science, it was an

    23 independent institution.

    24 However, in the Serbian Academy of Science,

    25 according to the structure of the academicians members

  128. 1 of the academy within it, they were exclusively from

    2 the social humanitarian sciences. And they had

    3 authority and the power to determine in the sense of

    4 scientific research, what is good and what is bad for

    5 the Serbs as a whole, as an entity, both through their

    6 scientific authority as scientists, men of science.

    7 The results of their endeavours resulted in a

    8 memorandum in 1986. That authority, scientific

    9 authority for the Serbs was binding. And, for them, it

    10 meant absolute truth. That absolute truth was put

    11 forward by the names of academicians and the loftiest

    12 academic institutions. So 1986 was the year when the

    13 armed forces, that is to say, the JNA, had started its

    14 reorganisation and had become a Serbian, imperial

    15 force. That component, along with the component of the

    16 memorandum as an ideological platform, offered the

    17 political structure, as a legitimacy too as a guiding

    18 light and to exert pressure on to federal aggression.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: That the conclusions

    20 reached by the Serbian academy of sciences were

    21 regarded as corresponding to the positions of the

    22 Government of Serbia?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let me ask you a

    25 very little question about Lieutenant General Gavric.

  129. 1 I may not be pronouncing the name correctly and I hope

    2 to be forgiven. I thought you said that he was in

    3 captivity in Sarajevo. Is my recollection correct?

    4 A. Your Honour, it was General Kukanjac, he was

    5 in captivity. That is to say, at that particular time,

    6 and we're talking about the 10th of May, 1992, when the

    7 attack on Sarajevo started, when the whole city was

    8 exposed to fire, the only thing that was important was

    9 to reach the main commander, to prevent this

    10 destruction.

    11 At that time, this meant salvation for

    12 Sarajevo as a city. But an answer to this operation by

    13 the Serbs was to appoint General Mladic as commander.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So why was the General

    15 in captivity? To prevent what?

    16 A. The destruction of Sarajevo. It was a Serb

    17 general. He was the commander. And the Bosniaks, the

    18 inhabitants of Sarajevo succeeded in circling him and

    19 captured him.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I see. Now I understand

    21 a little more clearly.

    22 Now, you would have heard learned counsel,

    23 Mr. Hayman, say something like this and if I have got

    24 him wrong, he would correct me immediately, I know.

    25 That the Defence in this case is not contesting that HV

  130. 1 forces were in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Defence rests

    2 on other positions. Do you confirm his statement, that

    3 HV forces were in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    4 A. Your Honour, yes, according to my evaluation,

    5 I don't know which units, because I did not go into

    6 that, I truly don't know. But that some elements of

    7 the armed forces, of the Croatian Army were, according

    8 to my assessment as an analyst, I said the depth to

    9 which this could have been the depth in my assessment

    10 from the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the Town of

    11 Tomislavgrad. That is a depth of about 15 to 20

    12 kilometres and the same thing in the south, which means

    13 yes.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let me, in this

    15 connection, recall that part of your testimony in which

    16 you referred to an agreement between President Tudjman

    17 and President Izetbegovic for HV forces to serve in

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you recall that part of your

    19 evidence?

    20 A. Yes, as far as I know, an agreement did exist

    21 between the president of the presidency,

    22 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and the President of Croatia,

    23 Mr. Franjo Tudjman on a joint defence of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, it existed, as far as I know.

    25 Its exact contact I don't know. But I do know that an

  131. 1 agreement of that existed.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I accept what you say

    3 that you haven't got a ready recollection or grasp of

    4 its exact contents. But would you know, generally,

    5 whether that agreement between the two presidents

    6 authorised HV officers to serve in the HVO?

    7 A. There was no competence in that sense to

    8 serve in the HVO, not in that sense. It wasn't binding

    9 in that sense as far as I know. But, exclusively, that

    10 is the fact that Croats left the Croatian Army in that

    11 first phase of the war, this was on a voluntary basis,

    12 so they left voluntarily.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now let's talk about HV

    14 officers who left on a voluntary basis to serve in

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were HV officers in Croatia,

    16 would they have had to get official approval to leave

    17 the HV in Croatia to go over into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    18 A. Yes, they would need official permission.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What would be the status

    20 of their service in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Would they be

    21 regarded by the Croatian authorities as serving on

    22 secondment in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    23 A. Yes, they were temporarily assigned there to

    24 prevent a disaster. One could put it that way.


  132. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, what would happen with their pay

    2 from Croatia?

    3 A. I think that they must have received their

    4 pay from Croatia because there was no one to pay them

    5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Then would I be right,

    7 Admiral, in supposing that at the end of their service

    8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would have had an automatic

    9 right of reversion to the Croatian armed forces?

    10 A. Those of them who wanted to return, could.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let's talk about

    12 the directive of the defence minister, which authorised

    13 you to testify only on certain matters. Would I be

    14 right in thinking that what you were saying was that if

    15 you testified on those matters, not only would you be

    16 violating his directive, but that the violation would

    17 constitute a criminal offence under the law of

    18 Croatia?

    19 A. It would constitute a criminal offence.

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us talk about

    21 standard military practices. You remember that during

    22 one phase of your evidence, you referred to a certain

    23 practice -- I don't rightly recall exactly what it

    24 was -- being a standard military practice in the armed

    25 forces of all countries in the world. Do you remember

  133. 1 saying something like that? That you were talking

    2 about a standard military practice?

    3 A. Yes, yes, I remember.

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you, Admiral, say

    5 that it is a standard military practice world-wide for

    6 the Chief of Military Intelligence over an army to know

    7 of the global deployment of the main elements of that

    8 army?

    9 A. The global deployment at the highest level,

    10 one might know. Because the global level is the area

    11 of strategy, but the Chief of Intelligence, I don't

    12 know expressly because this, after all, is the top

    13 secret of any armed force in the world for him to deal

    14 with the tactical level.

    15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now we are making

    16 progress very rapidly, I see.

    17 Let's talk about the position of Serbia in

    18 all of these matters. I gather you concur with Judge

    19 Riad's summary, which I share, that your evidence was

    20 to the effect that the conflict between Croatia and the

    21 Muslims was due to the Serbs?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, a military officer

    24 would, I take it, and this is just while theorising on

    25 my part, because I am not a military man, have been

  134. 1 trained in some kind of capacity to empathise, to see

    2 the thing from a point of view of the other man, so as

    3 to acquire objectivity. Suppose we had before us

    4 today, a Serbian admiral, do you think he would accept

    5 your proposition that the conflict between the

    6 Croatians and the Muslims was entirely attributable to

    7 the Serbs?

    8 A. Probably, Your Honour, that would depend on

    9 the admiral in question.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Of course it would.

    11 A. When I say that, I am referring to the depth

    12 of his studies. Would he view this problem from the

    13 strategic level or at a lower level? My assumption is,

    14 that depends on the individual, his education, his

    15 background, his understanding for strategy. But in the

    16 scientific way --

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Suppose he was a

    18 cultivated and learned gentleman like yourself, would

    19 you think that he would accept your version?

    20 A. Your Honours, thank you for the compliment.

    21 But if he were indeed such, and if he were to apply

    22 scientific criteria of warfare, then I think he would

    23 come to the same conclusion.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let us turn to this

    25 distinction between the strategic and the tactical.

  135. 1 Would I be right, Admiral, in supposing that there is a

    2 grey area within which the two concepts tended to

    3 merge?

    4 A. In military circles even, there is confusion

    5 often between the tactical and the strategic. And I

    6 will tell you what the NATO standard is. Tactics is

    7 exclusively, and I stress exclusively, devoted to the

    8 way in which a certain piece of equipment or a unit

    9 should be used in a particular battle. So this is

    10 purely military operations; whereas at the level of

    11 strategy, that does not, especially not in war, refer

    12 to the use of military effectiveness. Because in addition

    13 to the military resources, there are others. In

    14 theory, which is generally accepted by Beaufour, the

    15 French military theoretician, who said that a war is

    16 waged at the level of general strategy. And general

    17 strategy comprises military strategy, political

    18 strategy, diplomatic strategy, cultural strategy. And,

    19 Your Honours, most recently because we are living in

    20 the post-modern era, information strategy too. And by

    21 combining those strategy a war is waged.

    22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Admiral, I am grateful

    23 and I see I have entered into an area in which I needed

    24 to be educated. Thank you very much.

    25 Now let us talk a little bit about it this

  136. 1 way. Supposing there was an agreement between

    2 President Tudjman and President Milosevic for the

    3 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, supposing, would you

    4 regard that as pertaining to strategy or to tactics?

    5 A. Exclusively strategy.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, would I be right in

    7 thinking that the strategy of a nation could itself

    8 evolve over time, it could change its components?

    9 A. As opposed to tactics, which can change very

    10 easily. Strategy, at least it should not change so

    11 often. But even if any changes do occur, those changes

    12 have to be minor, of a corrective nature, in the sense

    13 of a correction rather than a global change.

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: But you have already

    15 said that if there was a presidential agreement to

    16 divide Bosnia-Herzegovina that would pertain the

    17 strategy.

    18 A. Yes, that is what I said.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What do you think of

    20 this proposition, suppose, according to you, it was

    21 said that the strategy of the Serbs was to absorb the

    22 whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and suppose you added to

    23 that a subsequent agreement of the kind I mentioned;

    24 would it follow that the original strategy had become

    25 modified, that a strategy of total absorption had

  137. 1 become modified by a strategy of partition?

    2 A. Your Honour, I don't think you could make

    3 such a conclusion. It would be possible, but under one

    4 hypothetical condition, and that is if there had not

    5 been the war in Croatia. And since there had been a

    6 bloody, destructive war, then this hypothesis does not

    7 stand.

    8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Admiral, did there ever

    9 come a time when the Serbs were prepared to accept less

    10 than the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and give the

    11 balance to Croatia?

    12 A. To understand the question better, what

    13 exactly do you mean by balancing the situation?

    14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: No, there must be a

    15 translation problem. I didn't speak about balancing

    16 the situation. What I asked was: Did there ever come

    17 a time when the Serbs were prepared to accept less than

    18 the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to give the

    19 remainder to Croatia?

    20 A. I think that such a situation did not occur,

    21 and that it was not present on the Serb side. Why is

    22 it that I can claim this, even though this would

    23 require additional research? For the reason that the

    24 occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia were retained

    25 and the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the

  138. 1 Serbs covered 70 per cent. So, I assume that is the

    2 situation you're referring to.

    3 But even then, that is not the map that we

    4 see here from 1993. The Serbs always thought that some

    5 kind of favourable environment, political environment

    6 would set in for them to take as much of Bosnia as they

    7 could, preferably the whole.

    8 A rapid analysis that comes to my mind is

    9 that the strategy of constant threat meant that even

    10 Dubrovnik was exposed to artillery fire up to '95.

    11 This was an indicator that they had not given up their

    12 ideas.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you a

    14 slightly different question. Did there ever come a

    15 time when the Serbs were cooperating with the Croatians

    16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    17 A. With the Croats? You mean the citizens of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina? That is the Bosnian Croats or the

    19 Croatian?

    20 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: The Croatian Croatians.

    21 A. You mean civilians?

    22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Military forces.

    23 A. There was never any such cooperation in the

    24 military sense.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let us go finally to

  139. 1 this article, I didn't retain the numbering of it. I

    2 wonder if colleagues could help.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: 466, Your Honour.

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: 466; do you remember,

    5 Admiral, this Exhibit 466?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: And page 8 you were

    8 reading something, and I didn't take a note at the

    9 time, at the top left-hand column. Would you like to

    10 read those words again? Could you read them and the

    11 translator would translate them for me?

    12 A. "Since the efforts of the JNA for Bosnia to

    13 fall quickly, the threat and selective use of force did

    14 not produce results, primarily among the Croatian

    15 people who had organised themselves militarily. So, it

    16 focused on the concrete implementation of the

    17 pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina, modelled on the

    18 Croatian example. Because the Bosnian Muslim section

    19 of the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by its

    20 hesitation, had increased the conviction of the JNA

    21 that the war would end quickly".

    22 Q. Could I invite you, Admiral, to focus on the

    23 word pacification? Now, is the use of that word in

    24 your discipline more proximate to the idea of more

    25 conquering or protecting?

  140. 1 A. The way I use it, it is closer to occupation,

    2 capture.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Admiral, you have been a

    4 great help to me. Thank you.

    5 A. It was an honour.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Admiral, I'm not going to take

    7 too long and extend the debate any further, which is

    8 already long, I shall just follow on to what Judge

    9 Shahabuddeen just said, you answered very well many of

    10 the questions that I myself was asking myself and which

    11 were asked by Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Riad. Let

    12 us go on with a few clarifications. I see there's an

    13 apparent change of attitude which I find most

    14 acceptable because, thanks to you, I have better

    15 understood the difference between the word strategy and

    16 tactics. I was able to understand that when you

    17 refused to answer this was more of a strategy, and when

    18 you agreed to answer, this could be described as

    19 tactics. So, thank you for the second concept winning

    20 over.

    21 I just need one or two points to be

    22 clarified, Admiral. And then we will adjourn.

    23 In the agreement that Judge Shahabuddeen has

    24 just referred to, this agreement on joint defence

    25 between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in your

  141. 1 opinion, in view of the position you held, in your

    2 mind, Mr. Izetbegovic and the high political and

    3 military leaders, were they in agreement to apply just

    4 then, the period we're interested in, to implement that

    5 agreement?

    6 Was this relayed by the media? Do you

    7 understand my question? Or on the contrary, when the

    8 Croatian forces pledged themselves at the disposal of

    9 the HVO one just said, "We are entitled to do this

    10 because there was an agreement"? There is a slight

    11 shade of meaning, different meaning between the two.

    12 What is your position?

    13 A. I have to go back to strategy once again.

    14 Since in the overall strategy of warfare, in view of

    15 the level of development of civilisation in the third

    16 revolution, that is the era of information, that

    17 information is important and at times decisive. I must

    18 note that in those days it was not sufficiently

    19 developed on either the Croatian or the Bosnian side

    20 for such a special strategy to be applied. As far as I

    21 can recall, it was not fully utilised and it was not

    22 sufficiently presented to the public, unfortunately.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: You haven't quite understood my

    24 questions. I don't know whether that is strategy or

    25 tactics. But what I wanted to know, simply, was

  142. 1 whether in this kind of partial occupation of, on the

    2 part of Croatia in Bosnia, central Bosnia, whether at

    3 any given moment in the course of developments you had

    4 the impression that Izetbegovic and the Muslim forces

    5 said let us implement this agreement so that we should

    6 become militarily stronger.

    7 That is all I'm asking you. Because there

    8 was an agreement, I'm asking whether in the course of

    9 developments itself it was invoked not just by one side

    10 of Croatia, but by both, because if there was an

    11 agreement, you will agree it must be between two

    12 sides. That was my question. Perhaps you can't answer

    13 it.

    14 A. I'm trying to, I do apologise, Mr. President,

    15 if I did not understand your question completely. But

    16 I shall do my best to try and answer it.

    17 Have I understood you well, since there was

    18 this agreement, your question is, Mr. President,

    19 whether it was implemented, and to what extent by the

    20 Bosnian leadership? Did it take advantage of that

    21 agreement, did it place emphasis on it? Have I

    22 understood you properly?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, because I understood that

    24 the Croatian leaders did rely on it. That is my

    25 question.

  143. 1 A. In my opinion they didn't use it

    2 sufficiently, in my opinion. I'm trying to recall,

    3 maybe they could have done better, and it may have been

    4 more useful.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Admiral. I have a

    6 last question to put to you. The accused is here,

    7 Colonel Blaskic, at the time, I didn't quite understand

    8 the chain of superior command. In other words, who was

    9 in command over Colonel Blaskic? And was this command

    10 linked to the Croatian forces? Was it General Bobetko,

    11 was it someone else?

    12 A. As far as I know, General Blaskic was not

    13 within the chain of command linked to General Bobetko.

    14 General Blaskic was the commander of an operative zone,

    15 the operative zone of central Bosnia. And according to

    16 the vertical chain of command, he came under the

    17 command of the main command of the HVO. That is the

    18 line of command, the line of subordination in the army.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: And according to you it was at

    20 that level that he communicated with the Republic of

    21 Croatia.

    22 A. At what level do you mean? At the level of

    23 the operative zone or at the level of the main

    24 command?

    25 JUDGE JORDA: The operative zone depended on

  144. 1 a headquarters, you have just said that. And I'm

    2 asking whether at the level of the headquarters there

    3 was a military tactical strategic link with the

    4 Croatian forces, or at least with the Republic of

    5 Croatia?

    6 A. Since this was an area that is the gateway

    7 which was of key significance for defence, it is quite

    8 possible that there may have been cooperation in the

    9 sense of coordination rather than command. The

    10 expression coordination means the coordination of the

    11 activities of each in his own area, so as to ensure the

    12 best possible defence, so the form of coordination.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: But these relations did exist,

    14 then, those relations existed, these relations of

    15 coordination?

    16 A. Yes, in the shape of coordination, but not

    17 command.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: But in times of war you will

    19 agree with me, coordination is extremely important.

    20 A. It is important. Coordination means that the

    21 forces in this area should carry out their assignments,

    22 and that the forces in this area should carry out their

    23 assignments. Because there was a constant threat of

    24 the renewed operations of the enemy and the closing of

    25 these pincers, there is a fundamental difference

  145. 1 between coordination and command in the military sense.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Well, Admiral, all that remains

    3 for me to do is to thank you, but I noted a question

    4 from the Prosecutor when you were able to answer where

    5 certain archives were, and I think the Prosecutor can

    6 get that information from another source; but I would

    7 like to thank you by calling on countries, yours and

    8 all others through your example, for total loyal and

    9 wholehearted cooperation with this Tribunal.

    10 This Tribunal is not composed of judges who

    11 pretend to be judges, they have been mandated by the

    12 Security Council within the framework of a statute and

    13 in mind with very lofty international standards. The

    14 Tribunal has the tools to firmly require of all states

    15 concerned better cooperation, and that is in the first

    16 place in the interest of the person here, the accused,

    17 and it is the duty of all of us.

    18 Admiral, thank you for coming here, this was

    19 lengthy, but I think it was useful. Now, the

    20 registrar, unless Mr. Nobilo has a question, is to

    21 tender exhibits, I assume. You have a question to put,

    22 Mr. Nobilo?

    23 MR. NOBILO: No, Mr. President. A very minor

    24 detail. As the accused is a party to this trial, he

    25 sent me a message that there was an error in the

  146. 1 transcript. When the Admiral was listing the armies

    2 who constituted the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    3 the Admiral mentioned the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    4 the Army of Republika Srpska and the HVO, and what

    5 appears in the transcript is HV. So could this fact be

    6 noted? Thank you.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, I think

    8 Mr. Registrar, we have to pay the greatest attention to

    9 this transcript, we have a lot of problems, far be it

    10 for me to criticise our interpreters who have an

    11 extremely difficult task; but the transcript is very

    12 important because we have to use it and rely on it 100

    13 per cent.

    14 Let me remind everyone that we are meeting

    15 tomorrow at 9.45 with two breaks. It is a quarter to

    16 6.00, I thank the interpreters and we meet again

    17 tomorrow at 9.45. This hearing is adjourned.

    18 --- Whereupon proceedings adjourned at

    19 5.53 p.m., to be reconvened on the 11th

    20 day of September, 1998, at 9.45 a.m.