{short description of image}

  1. 1 Wednesday, 23rd September, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 2.08 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated.

    5 Mr. Registrar, you will have the accused brought in,

    6 please?

    7 (The accused entered court)

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Good afternoon to the

    9 interpreters, those who transmit, transfer, translate

    10 our words. We will pick up where we stopped after I

    11 have asked the registrar to be kind enough to bring in

    12 Brigadier Zeko.

    13 Mr. Nobilo, a brigadier, that's a general of

    14 the brigade, isn't it?

    15 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I'm not a

    16 military expert, but this is the rank following the

    17 rank of colonel in the Croatian army. Therefore, in

    18 some armies, it is considered to be brigadier general,

    19 and in other armies, the rank is called brigadier, but

    20 it is the rank above colonel.

    21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you, Mr.

    22 Nobilo, a question. What is a colonel general?

    23 MR. NOBILO: A colonel general is a much

    24 higher rank than the brigadier, because we have major

    25 general, colonel general, and general of the army, a

  2. 1 five-star general.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Mr. Zeko, General

    3 Zeko, Brigadier General Zeko, please be seated. We're

    4 going to resume where we broke off with your

    5 cross-examination. Please be seated.

    6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: We have nothing to hide from

    8 you. I was just asking the correspondence of your rank

    9 of brigadier. You're a General, in fact?

    10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, if we call you

    12 "General," you won't mind. On the contrary, I hope.

    13 THE WITNESS: No. That is my future.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, General. We can now

    15 continue with the re-examination where we stopped.

    16 Mr. Nobilo?

    17 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President.

    18 I won't take long, and I shall try to finish this off

    19 within a short period of time.


    21 Re-examined by Mr. Nobilo:

    22 Q. Brigadier, while you were working in Slovenia

    23 in the JNA, you were working in the same area as

    24 Tihomir Blaskic. Were you privately friends,

    25 acquaintances?

  3. 1 A. No.

    2 Q. Tell me, please, your education. You

    3 completed the academy, but, as far as I know, you also

    4 had speciality training as an intelligence officer

    5 following the academy; is that correct?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Is it also true that you are the only

    8 educated intelligence officer, one with specialist

    9 training in 1993, not only in Central Bosnia, but in

    10 the HVO as a whole?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The Prosecutor has asked you about

    13 reconnoitring, and you used two terms; once you said a

    14 unit, then you said a group. Can you tell us how many

    15 people go to reconnoitre behind enemy territory, enemy

    16 lines?

    17 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, three to five

    18 men go on reconnaissance missions, and during this

    19 reconnoitring, they should use concealed approaches,

    20 those concealed from the enemy, and they usually use

    21 inaccessible terrain where the enemy least expects

    22 anyone to come from, concealed from the enemy. This

    23 infiltration into enemy territory takes a lot of time,

    24 depending on the assignment given.

    25 Q. Do you use various types of camouflage that

  4. 1 we know from films, like branches and twigs and

    2 crawling along the ground?

    3 A. Yes. All types of camouflage are used,

    4 adjusted to the season. If not clothing, then you use

    5 other devices to be found in the terrain.

    6 Q. Is that dangerous? Have there been any

    7 deaths and woundings?

    8 A. Yes. There were people who were wounded.

    9 Q. Let us go on to the questions of the

    10 Prosecutor regarding communications, telephone and fax

    11 use. Your command was in Bila. The Operative Zone had

    12 its command in the Vitez Hotel. Between you in Bila

    13 and the Vitez Hotel, was there an underground telephone

    14 cable?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Did that telephone link go through territory

    17 under the control of the HVO?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. What about the telephone exchange, was it in

    20 Vitez?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Would it be correct to say that, within the

    23 Vitez-Busovaca enclave, there was a reliable telephone

    24 link and a telefax which the enemy could not intercept?

    25 A. Yes.

  5. 1 Q. Therefore, you had no problems with regard to

    2 telephone communications with the command?

    3 A. No.

    4 Q. Tell us, what was the situation like with

    5 regard to Kiseljak? Where did the underground

    6 telephone links go from Vitez-Busovaca to Kiseljak?

    7 A. Those underground cables went via

    8 Busovaca-Kiseljak and between Kacuni and Bilalovac to

    9 Kiseljak.

    10 Q. From January 1993, who controlled the area

    11 between Kacuni and Bilalovac?

    12 A. It was under the control of the BH army.

    13 Q. Would it be right to say that the telephone

    14 lines passed through territory which was under the

    15 control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. In your opinion, what about this telephone

    18 line to Kiseljak, passing through territory under BH

    19 army control, was it safe from interception and the

    20 tapping of faxes?

    21 A. No. It was not safe.

    22 Q. Did you observe that and did that prompt you

    23 to stop using it? If so, when?

    24 A. Yes. We noticed this already in March of

    25 1993, that there were disturbances which prompted us to

  6. 1 believe that our messages were being tapped and

    2 intercepted, those being conveyed along that route.

    3 Q. At the beginning of the war, I think there

    4 were five lines, and all of them were operational.

    5 After that, at least four broke off, and one was being

    6 intercepted. When the war started in April, would any

    7 commander, in your opinion, decide to use that line

    8 going through enemy territory to convey precise

    9 information about the deployment of its units?

    10 A. No.

    11 Q. Why not?

    12 A. Because he would be disclosing the position

    13 of units, the deployment of units, and the activities

    14 being undertaken by those units, which, of course,

    15 would be to the benefit of the enemy.

    16 Q. Is it correct to say that inexperienced HVO

    17 soldiers frequently used hand-held radio transmitters,

    18 speaking over those phones, after which, this would be

    19 followed by the heavy shelling of units?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. You mentioned the technology of a modem and

    22 packet links. Could you explain to the Court, this

    23 computer technology that you used, those software

    24 programmes, were they specialised military programmes

    25 or regular computer programmes that you can buy in any

  7. 1 civilian store selling computers?

    2 A. Those are civilian programmes that were

    3 commercially available, and those are the ones we

    4 used.

    5 Q. What I understood was that modem links and

    6 packet links are more or less the same. I don't know

    7 anything about computers, so please correct me if I'm

    8 wrong. You would write a text, you would store it in a

    9 file, and to open the file, you would determine a

    10 certain number or a group of numbers; is that correct?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. And you didn't encrypt the text?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. Therefore, if anyone wanted to intercept your

    15 telephone conversations or from the air, all he needed

    16 to do was to have the password to enter the file and to

    17 read everything that you were sending?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Isn't that being done nowadays by

    20 14-year-olds who are finding it very simple to discover

    21 those passwords?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. So this is nothing specially designed for

    24 military purposes?

    25 MR. HARMON: I object, Mr. President. Mr.

  8. 1 Nobilo is testifying, and he is asking only for a "yes"

    2 or a "no" answer. I think it would be more appropriate

    3 to have the witness asked the questions and explain, in

    4 his own words, the answers to these particular

    5 questions.

    6 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, I know you're doing

    8 military training in the area of communications, but

    9 that is not the purpose of this hearing. Please, put

    10 your questions, avoid comments, and then tonight you

    11 can see what was being said regarding military

    12 matters. Please pose your questions directly.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Certainly, Mr. President. I was

    14 only trying to save time, and I learned about this

    15 method of questioning in this courtroom. It is not

    16 permitted in my country.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Please don't do something that

    18 you seem to be doing on purpose. That's what you're

    19 telling me.

    20 MR. NOBILO: It's only for the sake of

    21 expediency, Your Honour.

    22 Q. How many people were there in your

    23 intelligence department for the Operative Zone of

    24 Central Bosnia?

    25 A. Only eight.

  9. 1 Q. You said that, apart from you, there were two

    2 more officers. Were they officers with military

    3 academy training?

    4 A. No. They did not graduate from the military

    5 academy.

    6 Q. Why was your office dislocated to Bila in

    7 relation to the command?

    8 A. Primarily because of space considerations,

    9 because in the Vitez Hotel, there wasn't enough room,

    10 and also for safety reasons. We didn't want to have

    11 the whole command in one place, because shelling was

    12 quite frequent.

    13 Q. The Prosecutor asked you whether you worked

    14 with officers from the Croatian army. You said no. He

    15 asked you whether there were Croatian army troops in

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You said no. My question is:

    17 During the Croat and Muslim war in 1992/1993, which is

    18 the period covered by this indictment, did you see

    19 Croatian army troops or a Croatian soldier in that

    20 period?

    21 A. No.

    22 Q. Did you go outside the Operative Zone of

    23 Central Bosnia in that period?

    24 A. I did not in that period.

    25 Q. When you say that you didn't see any Croatian

  10. 1 soldiers, you mean you didn't see them in Central

    2 Bosnia, because you didn't go anywhere else?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Did anyone wear uniforms with "HV" insignia

    5 in the Busovaca-Vitez enclave?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Who were they?

    8 A. These insignia were worn by soldiers who were

    9 living in Central Bosnia but who, during the war in

    10 Croatia in 1991, went to the battlefront at the

    11 beginning of the war in Bosnia. They returned to their

    12 homes where they joined the struggle, and they didn't

    13 take off those HV insignia, wishing to prove, thereby,

    14 that they were superior to the locals and that they had

    15 some wartime experience, more experience than people

    16 who had not been on the front until then.

    17 Q. But this applied to a limited number of

    18 individuals only?

    19 A. Yes, only individuals.

    20 Q. In a document yesterday, there was mention of

    21 2.300 soldiers from Mehurici, 160 were engaged on the

    22 front against the Serbs. Can you tell the Court,

    23 because that is what the Prosecutor asked you on

    24 several occasions, on a day when the front with the

    25 Serbs was not moving, and it wasn't in 1993, how many

  11. 1 BH army soldiers, in all, were engaged on the front

    2 against the Serbs?

    3 A. At that time, at these frontlines that were

    4 not moving, a total of 1.000 to 1.500 soldiers of the

    5 BH army were engaged on the front.

    6 Q. My next question has to do with the

    7 Prosecutor's question about the shelling of Zenica from

    8 Serb positions. Tell the Court, according to the

    9 sources of the BH army, as well, was there repeated

    10 shelling of Zenica from Serb positions?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. My next question is linked to the order of

    13 Colonel Blaskic of the 17th of April, mentioned by the

    14 Prosecutor and which you had not seen. Linked to that

    15 order, I'm asking you the following: Immediately prior

    16 to the April war between the Croats and Muslims, where

    17 were the most significant forces of the BH army

    18 concentrated in Kiseljak municipality, including their

    19 command, military police, and so on?

    20 A. They were concentrated in the area of

    21 Gomionica, Svinjarevo.

    22 MR. NOBILO: Next, Prosecution Exhibit 472,

    23 can it be shown to the witness, please?

    24 Q. This is a document which the Prosecution

    25 showed you, and it has to do with a report by Franjo

  12. 1 Nakic, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, addressed to

    2 Colonel Blaskic in Kiseljak on the 30th of January,

    3 1993.

    4 When you were shown this report, which you

    5 confirmed the authenticity of and the signature of

    6 Franjo Nakic, can you, indeed, confirm that he was in

    7 Kiseljak?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Can you explain to the Court how come you

    10 didn't know that Blaskic was in Kiseljak and not in

    11 Vitez?

    12 A. At first, when I introduced myself, I said I

    13 was assistant chief of staff for intelligence affairs

    14 and that my superior was the chief of staff.

    15 Q. Do you mean to say that you were in contact

    16 on a daily basis with the chief of staff?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. From this document, document 472, it emanates

    19 that you were at the meeting on the 27th of January '93

    20 with Mr. Flemming, and that Mr. Flemming said, among

    21 other things, and I quote, these are the last four

    22 lines of this text regarding Lasva and Dusina, he

    23 says, "... that it was hard to avoid the feeling that

    24 something terrible had happened." Do you remember

    25 that?

  13. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Could you explain to the Court what is the

    3 terrible thing that happened in Lasva and Dusina, as

    4 far as you remember?

    5 A. The villages of Lasva and Dusina were the

    6 first targets of attack by the BH army carried out by

    7 the Lasva operative group under the command of Nehru

    8 Ganic.

    9 MR. HARMON: I'm going to object to this.

    10 This is beyond the scope of the examination. The fact

    11 that it's mentioned in an exhibit, and there are no

    12 questions about that, Mr. President, does not invite

    13 thorough examination of what happened in Lasva and

    14 Dusina, without the ability of the Prosecutor, in my

    15 view, to come back and ask questions about what is

    16 newly tendered evidence. The document speaks for

    17 itself. The testimony of Brigadier Zeko is new on this

    18 particular subject.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: That is true, that we are going

    20 outside, considerably, the scope of the questions put

    21 during the cross-examination.

    22 Mr. Nobilo, what was the meaning of your

    23 question?

    24 MR. NOBILO: The meaning of the question was

    25 an explanation of these words which appear in the

  14. 1 document that were shown to our witness yesterday, and

    2 that is that Mr. Flemming said that something terrible

    3 had happened in Lasva and Dusina. So my question is a

    4 clarification, what does this word "terrible" mean,

    5 because it is all a relative issue. If the Court feels

    6 that we should go on, we would be glad to do so.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: But now that the question has

    8 been rephrased, will you please briefly answer what the

    9 word "terrible" implies?

    10 A. It means that the BH army captured those

    11 villages and expelled the inhabitants of those

    12 villages.

    13 MR. NOBILO:

    14 Q. Was there any killing of civilians?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Shall we go on to the next question now? You

    17 told the Prosecutor that the BH army was

    18 well-equipped. When you say "well-equipped," could you

    19 clarify this? This is a relative concept. Does it

    20 mean "well" compared to modern armies, such as the NATO

    21 army, or in relation to the Serbs, or in relation to

    22 the Croats? What does a well-equipped BH army in April

    23 '93 mean for you?

    24 A. "Well-equipped" means as compared to the HVO,

    25 and poorly equipped compared to the Bosnian Serb army

  15. 1 and NATO standards.

    2 Q. Was the greatest shortage in the equipment of

    3 the BH army clothing and footwear?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. In 1993, did the HVO, on any occasion,

    6 voluntarily abandon the front against the Serbs?

    7 A. No, it did not, until the BH army carried out

    8 an attack from behind in the region of Travnik and Novi

    9 Travnik against the HVO.

    10 Q. Thank you.

    11 MR. NOBILO: And now can I call for the

    12 usher's assistance with the document, please?

    13 THE REGISTRAR: The document is D197, 197A

    14 the French translation, 197B in the English

    15 translation.

    16 MR. NOBILO: This is the last document and

    17 the last question that we are going to have,

    18 Mr. President. I feel obliged to explain something to

    19 you personally. When the witnesses from Ahmici were

    20 here at some point, you warned me against some

    21 questions which you considered not to be relevant, and

    22 I answered that three months later I will be able to

    23 explain that to you. Unfortunately not three, but nine

    24 months have elapsed since, but I will be able to

    25 explain everything today.

  16. 1 This is a diary found in Ahmici, and it

    2 obviously belongs to somebody from Ahmici. One day we

    3 call a witness who found that diary. Here there is a

    4 plan with all the positions, all the names of the

    5 people.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, Mr. Nobilo.

    7 Just before you continue with your cross-examination, I

    8 suppose that the document that you are distributing is

    9 within the scope of this cross-examination.

    10 You know that during re-examination you can

    11 bring new documents, this is your right; but I just

    12 want to know that this is within the scope of the

    13 cross-examination. I don't know anything of it, but

    14 I'm asking you the question.

    15 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we would request

    16 that we have the opportunity to inspect this document

    17 and also have the opportunity to ask any questions

    18 about it that have been raised in the redirect

    19 examination.

    20 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, you're going to ask

    22 questions -- only we see that this document is outside

    23 of the scope of the cross-examination. In that case,

    24 the Judges will refuse, and that is why I made this

    25 caution to Mr. Nobilo.

  17. 1 He told to us Judges that he was sure of his

    2 position. And now, Mr. Harmon, if this document is

    3 interesting to the Judges, but if it, nevertheless, is

    4 outside of the scope of the cross-examination, we will

    5 give you the right to reply.

    6 But for the time being, we are not there,

    7 yet, and Mr. Nobilo is now using his right to

    8 distribute documents.

    9 According to the good principles, it is

    10 better to be safe than sorry. I thought it was better

    11 to warn you against it beforehand.

    12 MR. NOBILO: Thank you, Mr. President. Yes,

    13 we always should be cautious, that is why I made this

    14 introduction. We are offering as evidence only what

    15 was written on the 11th of April, 1993, and it concerns

    16 a telegram that arrived and that said that the units of

    17 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be put in a

    18 state of readiness, and that was five days before the

    19 beginning of the conflict.

    20 The witness was telling us about the

    21 intentions of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to attack

    22 the Lasva Valley, and putting the units into combat

    23 readiness is the last stage. So, what was written on

    24 the 11th of April, that is the only thing that we want

    25 to tender as evidence from this diary.

  18. 1 Later on, we will come back and use this

    2 diary, as well. As you can see, here it says "Sunday,

    3 the 11th of April, 1993," that was five days before the

    4 war broke out. Thank you.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: For the moment we are not

    6 concerned with the totality of this document,

    7 Mr. Prosecutor, but only with the six or seven lines,

    8 at least, that is the case in the French version. For

    9 those of you who follow the French version, this is on

    10 page 6.

    11 Mr. Nobilo, please, now present this part of

    12 your document.

    13 MR. NOBILO:

    14 Q. Brigadier, let's make this thing clear. You

    15 have never seen this journal, this diary before?

    16 A. No.

    17 Q. I will read the entry for the 11th of April,

    18 1993.

    19 MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President, if

    20 this witness has never seen this document before he is

    21 not the appropriate witness to introduce this

    22 document. Furthermore this document has never been

    23 authenticated.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, Mr. Harmon.

    25 MR. NOBILO: But he knows the contents of it.

  19. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Please, Mr. Harmon, let

    2 Mr. Nobilo finish, and I suppose he will see whether

    3 this witness can or cannot identify this document.

    4 This is a rule that we have adopted here with my

    5 colleagues, Judge Riad and Judge Shahabuddeen. In

    6 general, when one or the other party makes an

    7 objection, we should at least let the other party

    8 present its point of view first.

    9 First, Mr. Nobilo, and after that, Mr.

    10 Harmon. If you want you can still make your objection,

    11 but later on.

    12 Now, Mr. Nobilo, you can talk to your witness

    13 concerning those six lines.

    14 MR. NOBILO:

    15 Q. Let me now read the six lines, and now you

    16 will answer to me whether you know of this event, what

    17 you know of the circumstances which caused that event,

    18 and what you know of that event, or if you don't know.

    19 "The 11th of April, 1993, Sunday, at five

    20 o'clock, a meeting was held at the school Zumara. The

    21 agreement was made where the lines will be formed in

    22 case there will be any shooting. I kept the watch

    23 between 10 and 12, and around 11 o'clock I heard that a

    24 telegram had arrived." And then the quotation about

    25 putting of the units in the first stage of combat

  20. 1 readiness. And the rest is not relevant.

    2 Now, I'm asking you: Do you know about

    3 telegrams of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina which,

    4 on that day, were forwarded to the units telling them

    5 to prepare for the first stage of combat readiness?

    6 Were you aware of that in April of 1993?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Can you explain that?

    9 A. Yes, I can explain that. On the 10th of

    10 April we received a telegram of the corps command about

    11 an organisational command for all units, and this is a

    12 telegram sent to one of the units.

    13 Q. So, what you want to say, is that you used

    14 technical measures like tapping?

    15 A. Yes, we received a telegram through -- it is

    16 an organisational command that was sent to all units,

    17 and we decrypted it, and then we followed the situation

    18 on the ground with the units that observed and followed

    19 and monitored the movements of the army of

    20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    21 Q. Well, this is all that I had to ask about

    22 this particular document, and this has been my last

    23 question to the witness.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, would you like to

    25 make an objection?

  21. 1 MR. HARMON: I would make an objection to the

    2 admissibility of this document, Mr. President. It has

    3 not been authenticated.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, can you give us

    5 some elements that could help this witness to identify

    6 this document? Because it is true that this document

    7 -- well, the Prosecutor is going to have

    8 inconveniences if he is later going to reply. We

    9 cannot know where these pages come from.

    10 Can you say that or you cannot say that for

    11 the moment, and in that case we can postpone its

    12 admissibility for the moment. What would you prefer?

    13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, another witness

    14 will authenticate this document. At this moment we

    15 wanted just to authenticate the six lines written on

    16 the 11th of April.

    17 At this stage we are not asking to

    18 authenticate this Serb document through this witness.

    19 We can postpone it to the moment when the witness will

    20 come here, the witness who had actually found this

    21 diary.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: As the Defence does not, in

    23 particular, wish this document to be admitted, this

    24 document has not been admitted into evidence for the

    25 moment, so, we will not give it a number. But it will

  22. 1 probably be authenticated through another witness.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. President, this document

    3 has already been marked for identification, but it has

    4 not been admitted.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I agree with you, I

    6 believe everybody is agreeable on that. So, I think

    7 that we have finished now with all the questions by the

    8 Defence, by the Prosecution, and by the Defence, and

    9 now I'm turning to my colleagues.

    10 Judge Riad, do you have any questions you

    11 would like to ask? Please do.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Good afternoon, Brigadier Zeko.

    13 A. Good afternoon.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to clarify some

    15 general points, and I hope that the knowledge that you

    16 have and you've given us, proof up to now, you will be

    17 able to clarify these points.

    18 What interests me is whether the army of

    19 Territorial Defence, the army that had existed before

    20 the HVO was formed, were the members of that army, were

    21 the members both Croatian and Muslim?

    22 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, before the

    23 conflict between the Muslims and the Croats, there was

    24 an army that was a joint army. There was the

    25 Territorial Defence and the HVO. And at the beginning

  23. 1 the TO had both Croatian and Muslim members.

    2 I, myself, was one of the members of that army.

    3 JUDGE RIAD: And later, they split up. You

    4 said that the BH army had something between 80.000 to

    5 82.000 soldiers and the HVO had 8.000 soldiers. How

    6 can you explain this difference? Was it that the

    7 soldiers that were in the initial army were mostly

    8 Muslim? If they both belonged to the same army, they

    9 should have been more or less in the same proportions

    10 and not such a huge number of Muslims and such a small

    11 number of Croats.

    12 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, we spoke about

    13 the territory of Central Bosnia, and what I was

    14 speaking of is that apart from the existing population

    15 of the Central Bosnia. The greatest part of the

    16 refugees that came from the Krajina region and from

    17 other regions with Muslim majority, they were coming to

    18 Central Bosnia. And that is why the proportions have

    19 such a big difference; whereas the Croats that had been

    20 expelled by the Bosnian Serb army, they mostly left for

    21 Croatia.

    22 For example, from the Krajina region, all of

    23 them, they went to Croatia.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: Yes, but even the soldiers had

    25 gone? Were there only 8.000 soldiers left? All the

  24. 1 others, the soldiers had gone to Croatia. How come

    2 there was only 8.000 Croatian soldiers? The only

    3 explanation that you gave was that Central Bosnia had a

    4 Muslim majority. Is that the explanation?

    5 A. Not only that, but, as I've said, from those

    6 areas under the control of Bosnian Serbs, the refugees

    7 from those areas were coming to Central Bosnia.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: And they belonged to the army?

    9 A. Not all of them were in the army. The

    10 displaced persons were also civilians and children.

    11 But apart from the Bosnian Krajina and all the eastern

    12 part, Eastern from Doboj, everything, there was a great

    13 flow of refugees into the Central Bosnian region, which

    14 was not under the control of Bosnian Serbs.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: In that Bosnian army were there

    16 Mujehadeen? You told us the Mujehadeen came from

    17 Afghanistan and Iran.

    18 A. Yes.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: And how come? What caused the

    20 Mujehadeen to come there? Why were they made to come

    21 to Bosnia?

    22 A. The real reason I could not explain to you

    23 now, but they used as an excuse to provide help to the

    24 Muslim brothers. That was the slogan of those people.

    25 JUDGE RIAD: Who made them come? Was it the

  25. 1 state, or did they just come to the country, or did the

    2 government call them so that they would help with the

    3 defence?

    4 A. Had the government asked them to help, I

    5 don't know. I cannot give you an exact answer. But

    6 they did not come all at the same time. They used to

    7 come gradually through various humanitarian

    8 organisations that, at the time, were arriving in the

    9 Central Bosnian region.

    10 JUDGE RIAD: You call these humanitarian

    11 organisations. What do you mean by that? Did the

    12 humanitarian organisations bring combatants?

    13 A. No, they did not organise the combatants'

    14 arrivals, but that is the way, that is how they would

    15 mostly be arriving. That is what my colleagues were

    16 telling me, that they would go across Croatia and then

    17 come to Bosnia. Those Mujehadeen, those that called

    18 themselves Mujehadeen.

    19 JUDGE RIAD: According to the report by

    20 Colonel Blaskic, and I even notice here the

    21 translation, the Bosnian army was poorly equipped.

    22 What you said was that, on the contrary, that army was

    23 well-equipped. How come that army was so well-equipped

    24 when their sanctions, there was an arms embargo on the

    25 whole of Yugoslavia; so how come that army would be so

  26. 1 well-equipped? One that interests me, first of all, is

    2 the Bosnian army, BH army.

    3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, when I said

    4 "well-equipped," what I had in mind was well-equipped

    5 from the point of view of weapons, and compared to the

    6 HVO.

    7 When it comes to comparison with the army of

    8 Bosnian Serbs, that army was poorly equipped; but BH

    9 army did not pay great attention to the clothing of the

    10 soldiers. So, they paid more attention to armaments

    11 and ammunition.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Where did those weapons come

    13 from?

    14 A. I cannot give you a precise answer as to

    15 where the weapons came from.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: Through Croatia or through

    17 Serbia, or through where?

    18 MR. HAYMAN: I apologise, Your Honour, it's a

    19 rare day that the Defence will interrupt any of your

    20 question, but we need the witness's passport. His visa

    21 expires today and I believe he has his passport with

    22 him. We need to extend it through tomorrow so he will

    23 be able to go home and return to his duties. May I ask

    24 the witness if he has his passport to give it to me?

    25 JUDGE RIAD: When I have finished he can.

  27. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge. Obviously we

    2 are not going to try and keep Brigadier as hostage at

    3 this Tribunal. So, please, can you assist Mr. Hayman?

    4 THE REGISTRAR: We need your passport,

    5 Mr. Zeko.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Your Honour, and

    7 again, I apologise.

    8 JUDGE RIAD: I would like to -- I thought for

    9 a moment that the witness had to go. I would like to

    10 continue with my questions.

    11 You are a member of the intelligence service,

    12 and I suppose that you knew what was going on. How

    13 come the BH army, for which you claim it was

    14 well-equipped, where did they get the weapons from?

    15 And later on I will ask you the same

    16 question for the HVO. I will not ask for the Serb army

    17 because you're not a specialist on that.

    18 A. The supply of arms during the war depended on

    19 how one could manage. Partly it was taking the

    20 armaments and equipment from the former JNA that was on

    21 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that

    22 armament had remained there. There were other channels

    23 and I think the only way was through Croatia.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: And Croatia provided equipment

    25 for the BH army?

  28. 1 A. I don't know whether Croatia armed them, but

    2 I know that they both, the Muslims and the Croats,

    3 could receive any armament via Croatia. But I cannot

    4 say that it was Croatia who supplied that armament and

    5 that equipment.

    6 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Shahabuddeen is going to

    8 ask some questions.


    10 A. Brigadier, I am one of those slow speakers.

    11 I hope that does not trouble you too much. Let me ask

    12 you the first question like this.

    13 You were talking about October, 1992. You

    14 were mentioning a roadblock, which I thought you said

    15 the BiH put up to stop HVO forces from going to Jajce

    16 to fight the Serbs. You were saying that the HVO was

    17 going to Jajce to fight the Serbs, but I understood you

    18 to say that the BiH put up a roadblock to stop them.

    19 Is my recollection correct?

    20 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the first

    21 incident that happened and that you mentioned was the

    22 putting up of roadblocks by the then Territorial

    23 Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that time the

    24 army had not been formed as yet. There were the HVO

    25 units that were going for a tour of duty in Jajce where

  29. 1 the frontlines were of the Bosnian Serbs.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do I understand you to

    3 mean that the territorial units were the predecessors

    4 of the BiH?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So, there were Muslim

    7 forces?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, tell me this; why

    10 would Muslim forces stop the HVO from going ahead to

    11 fight the Serbs?

    12 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, the reason why I

    13 cannot explain, but I know that at that time we still

    14 worked together, and that after that incident an

    15 agreement was reached. There was a meeting, and then

    16 two or three days later those soldiers managed to get

    17 through to Jajce. But why it happened at that time, I

    18 don't know.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Tell me about the

    20 Mujehadeen. Were they present during the period when

    21 the relations between the HVO and the Muslim forces

    22 were good or did they arrive afterwards? That is to

    23 say, did they arrive after relations had soured?

    24 A. The arrival of the Mujehadeen in the region

    25 of Central Bosnia happened in mid 1992, but at that

  30. 1 time, they were still working illegally in a

    2 clandestine way, and they would mostly go to villages.

    3 The first destination in Central Bosnia was the village

    4 of Mehurici, which means that when it came to the

    5 escalation or, we can say, when the conflict broke out

    6 between the HVO and the BiH army, at that moment, quite

    7 openly, the Mujehadeen units started to participate.

    8 There were units such as Abdul Latif and El Mujahed.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What do you say about

    10 this: Did the HVO receive any reinforcements by way of

    11 personnel from any of the former republics of

    12 Yugoslavia?

    13 A. As far as I know, and in the time period when

    14 I was there in that region, that is, the Operative Zone

    15 of Central Bosnia, I have no knowledge of it. I do not

    16 know that any units arrived from other republics.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you be so kind as

    18 to answer the same question in relation to the BiH?

    19 Did they receive reinforcements in the form of

    20 personnel from any of the former republics of

    21 Yugoslavia?

    22 A. Not that I know of.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, can you describe

    24 the relations between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian

    25 Croats in this sense: Was there any period during

  31. 1 which the Serb military forces were in a state of

    2 cooperation with the Croat military forces?

    3 A. In that period, whether there was any

    4 cooperation, I know, personally, nothing of, because in

    5 the Lasva River Valley where I was, in that enclave of

    6 the Lasva Valley, there was certainly no cooperation.

    7 As for other enclaves that were separate from ours, I

    8 cannot claim anything, because I was not there at that

    9 time.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, as my colleague,

    11 Judge Riad, has had occasion to observe, you drew a

    12 comparison between the size of HVO military forces and

    13 the size of BiH military forces, and I think the ratio

    14 you gave was roughly 10:1 as against the HVO; is that

    15 correct?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Can you also describe

    18 matters in such a way as to present the picture of the

    19 HVO being contained in two relatively small

    20 geographical pockets and surrounded on all the sides by

    21 BiH forces. Was that the picture you presented?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, tell me about

    24 this: You were an intelligence officer, and you were

    25 concerned with evaluating the strength and the

  32. 1 positions of the opposing forces; is that correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, Brigadier, could

    4 you meaningfully evaluate the strength of the opposing

    5 forces without, at every stage, making comparisons with

    6 the strength of the forces on your side?

    7 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, it is quite

    8 obvious that a comparison cannot be made if we do not

    9 know how many forces, what was the personnel strength

    10 on the other side. Otherwise, you can't establish a

    11 proportion.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Did you make a schematic

    13 of the HVO forces and of their distribution?

    14 A. No. The total amount is given by the command

    15 or by the operatives. They are the ones who give the

    16 full personnel strength.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, with this huge

    18 advantage of forces, how do you explain the fact, I

    19 believe it is a fact, that the BiH did not succeed in

    20 overwhelming the HVO and in taking over these two

    21 relatively small pockets?

    22 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, apart from those

    23 two pockets existed another three pockets, because

    24 there were five enclaves under the command of the

    25 Operational Zone of Central Bosnia. We were speaking

  33. 1 of the Lasva River Valley, where you've noticed there

    2 were two pockets which are relevant for this particular

    3 case.

    4 How can we say that the army of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not take control? It did in

    6 quite a great deal, because this enclave was split up

    7 into five parts. And could the army of Bosnia and

    8 Herzegovina, it probably could have taken control over

    9 the whole region, had a peace agreement not been

    10 reached. So we cannot claim that the BH army was not

    11 able to win control over it, but I think what is

    12 crucial is to know the time period.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: We're talking about

    14 April 1993, more or less. What proportion of the BiH

    15 strength, would you say, was directed to the Serbs and

    16 to the other HVO pockets to which you have referred?

    17 A. Talking about the balance of forces in the

    18 time period that we are referring to, it was not

    19 possible to establish precisely the balance of forces,

    20 because there were people on a daily basis. For

    21 example, an entire brigade would come from Jajce to the

    22 Central Bosnia area, which immediately changes the

    23 balance.

    24 At the time of the conflict between the HVO

    25 and the BiH army, the ratio of forces was the one that

  34. 1 I presented in my estimate. Sometimes it may have been

    2 lower, and, according to some estimates, their number

    3 went up to 97.000, occasionally. But while the

    4 conflicts were ongoing between the HVO and the BiH

    5 army, the frontlines towards the Serbs were not moving,

    6 and so I already gave you this ratio of forces.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: If the frontlines

    8 towards the Serbs were not moving, would I be right in

    9 supposing that the frontlines were not moving because

    10 they were opposed by the BiH?

    11 A. Are you referring to the front-line between

    12 the Bosnian Serb army and the BiH army?


    14 A. Yes, because on those frontlines in that time

    15 period, the front-line did not move between the Bosnian

    16 Serb army and the lines held by the BiH army.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I know, Brigadier. I

    18 know that you have said that the frontlines did not

    19 move. I'm asking you this question: Is it the case

    20 that the frontlines did not move because the BiH was

    21 opposing the Serbs?

    22 A. I would say that, in this period, that was

    23 not so, because the BH army had established contact

    24 with the Bosnian Serb army in the area of Meokrnje and

    25 in the area of Turbe, and I'm referring to the enclave

  35. 1 of the Lasva Valley.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: If the BiH had not

    3 established contact with the Serbs, as you said, would

    4 the Serbs have been in a position to advance even

    5 further?

    6 A. This is a question that I don't know how to

    7 answer. I don't know whether the Serbs would have

    8 started an offensive. In my personal opinion, the

    9 Serbs, in this time period, did not, themselves, want

    10 to join in, probably waiting for the outcome of the

    11 conflict between these two belligerents, the HVO and

    12 the BiH army.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me put my last

    14 question on this phase to you: Was any part of the

    15 total BiH forces, amounting to some 82.000 people,

    16 directed to the Serbs?

    17 A. Yes, yes.

    18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you like to say,

    19 since you have been dealing with estimates, what

    20 portion of the 82.000 men, Muslim BiH men, would have

    21 been concentrating on the Serbs?

    22 A. On the defence lines, I have already said

    23 there were between 1.000 and 1.500 men.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I see. What part of the

    25 82.000 men would have been concentrating on the other

  36. 1 HVO pockets to which you have referred?

    2 A. In military terminology, this is a ratio of

    3 1:10, as we have already said. However, these 84.000

    4 were not all, at the same time, waging war. These are

    5 units that the BiH army had at its disposal within the

    6 territory of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia.

    7 They were the units of the 3rd Corps, the entire 3rd

    8 Corps, parts of the 1st Corps, parts of the 2nd Corps,

    9 and parts of the 4th Corps.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let's turn to the

    11 business of resupply. Is my impression correct that

    12 you have said that the BiH got their resupplies through

    13 territory held by the HVO? If I'm wrong, do correct

    14 me.

    15 A. Yes.

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would that mean, then,

    17 that the HVO was in a position to control the extent of

    18 military supplies reaching the BiH?

    19 A. I wouldn't say that. I don't know. Whatever

    20 I were to give could not be authentic, because I was

    21 not in a position to be able to see whether it could

    22 control it or not. But the fact is that the supplies

    23 went through territories under the control, among

    24 others, of the HVO.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me put the question

  37. 1 a little hypothetically to you. If the HVO was in a

    2 position to control the extent of military resupplies

    3 to the BiH, was it, in your judgement, likely that the

    4 HVO would permit the BiH to be better equipped than the

    5 HVO itself?

    6 A. Logic tells us that no one would allow it,

    7 but I'm talking about the period of the conflict, not

    8 while we're operating together.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, you made certain

    10 estimates and assessments for the HVO, and I take it

    11 that your assessments and estimates were made on an

    12 objective basis; would that be correct?

    13 A. My estimates were made on the basis of

    14 information gathered in the ways I have presented and

    15 on the basis of the situation on the ground during this

    16 war.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What I mean is, the

    18 estimates you presented to the HVO authorities would

    19 enable the HVO to decide, on the basis of those

    20 estimates, whether they wanted to attack or to defend?

    21 A. The estimates made were certainly used to

    22 take steps in relation to the situation on the ground.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I'll put it slightly

    24 differently. Your estimates would not vary, depending

    25 on whether the objective of the HVO authorities was

  38. 1 offensive or defensive. Estimates would remain the

    2 same. Somebody else would decide whether, on the basis

    3 of your estimates, they wanted to take offensive action

    4 or defensive action?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, I'm a little

    7 unclear. Your evidence was quite extensive. I have a

    8 problem with pronunciation, and this could mislead

    9 you. I remember some talk about Gomionica, does that

    10 ring a bell for you, and of an attack being ordered by

    11 General Blaskic on the 17th of April, 1993. Do you

    12 recall that area of testimony? I think you said you

    13 didn't remember it yourself.

    14 A. At that time, I did not because I said that I

    15 did not have information from Kiseljak at that time.

    16 But according to information I had before, units of the

    17 BiH army were situated in the area between Gomionica

    18 and Svinjarevo, with their command post in Gomionica.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What about Stara Bila,

    20 was there an HVO attack there in September 1993?

    21 A. In Stara Bila, an active defence was carried

    22 out, and this was at the feature known as Grbavica, to

    23 prevent the breakthrough of the BiH army towards the

    24 explosives factory.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: You are not aware of any

  39. 1 attacks mounted by the HVO; is that correct?

    2 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, to carry out an

    3 attack, there must be a certain depth, which means

    4 moving the defence by about 800 metres. In military

    5 terms, this is described as an active defence, because

    6 there wasn't any operation in strategic or operative

    7 terms. This was strategic movement of units.

    8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: What is the standard

    9 military wisdom about the proportionalities involved in

    10 mounting an attack? The attackers must have a certain

    11 ratio of advantage. What is that, 3:1, 2:1?

    12 A. In the army I was serving, it was 2:1.

    13 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So if a party mounted an

    14 attack, we could suppose that that party had a 2:1

    15 advantage or thought it had a 2:1 advantage?

    16 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, in this case, in

    17 this war, the principles that we referred to were not

    18 respected. I'm talking about the principles that were

    19 started at the academy at which I studied. In this

    20 case, the ratio could have been much higher or much

    21 lower.

    22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Things were unorthodox?

    23 A. Yes, yes.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you a little

    25 about some documentation. I begin with Exhibit 195.

  40. 1 It is dated, let me see, it begins during the day, the

    2 Mujehadeen. I wonder whether you have seen it. I

    3 would ask the registrar to show it to you, in case you

    4 haven't seen it recently. It speaks of the

    5 Mujehadeen. Did you receive a copy of this document at

    6 the time?

    7 A. Yes, yes.

    8 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: When did you go into the

    9 area?

    10 A. At the time it was issued, yes.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: When did you go into the

    12 area? When did you assume command of your particular

    13 post?

    14 A. This is a document that refers to a period

    15 much earlier, but I had it in my files. It was in the

    16 archives of the command.

    17 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: The document is dated

    18 the 22nd of April, 1992; is that right?

    19 A. This is a mistake. I think it should be

    20 '93.

    21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Does "1992" appear in

    22 the original?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: And the month is April,

    25 the 22nd of April?

  41. 1 A. Yes.

    2 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Let me ask you a

    3 question like this: Have you experienced a certain

    4 risk that early in the year, say, January, you tend to

    5 carry over the previous year and write that year in,

    6 instead of writing in the new year? If you pass from

    7 1991 to 1992, in January, you still tend to write, now

    8 and then, the previous year. Have you experienced

    9 that?

    10 A. No.

    11 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: No? Do you think that

    12 well into the year, in April of a given year, you would

    13 write in the previous year for the current year?

    14 A. Let us understand one another. This is not a

    15 document drafted by me or my department. It was sent

    16 to me by the assistant for intelligence from the

    17 Viteska Brigade. This text, the contents, refers to

    18 1993. It may have been an error, a typewriting error.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I understand. I retract

    20 any suggestion that you, yourself, might have written

    21 it. I was only speaking rhetorically. I understand

    22 very fully that your testimony is that you didn't write

    23 this, you only received this.

    24 Let me rephrase the question by asking: Does

    25 your experience suggest to you that the writer of a

  42. 1 memorandum who is writing in April of a year would

    2 write in the previous year for the current year, he

    3 might do that in January and maybe early February, and

    4 do you think he would do that in April?

    5 A. Whether he may have done it, according to

    6 what I see, the mistake was made. Whether it could

    7 have been done, I -- the year has been typed

    8 erroneously. Instead of "1992," we have "1993."

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Brigadier, if we could

    10 turn to 194, it's a document dated the 16th of April.

    11 The Prosecutor read out some parts of paragraph 1 to

    12 you. Roughly, in paragraph 1, the BiH was saying that

    13 the HVO were committing brutal aggression. Was that

    14 correct or not correct?

    15 A. As far as I know, and judging by the

    16 activities I engaged in, for me, this is not correct,

    17 that the HVO was carrying out a brutal aggression.

    18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: So, you recognise that,

    19 according to your assessment of the document, there

    20 could be a problem of determining what parts are

    21 correct and what parts are not correct?

    22 A. In this document, and the sentence that you

    23 quoted, I just expressed my personal opinion regarding

    24 this document.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you turn to

  43. 1 paragraph 4 and help me? Not being a military man, I

    2 cannot interpret all the formulations correctly. I see

    3 that this paragraph speaks of an attack; does any

    4 particular part of it speak directly or indirectly of a

    5 BiH attack on Ahmici?

    6 A. No mention is made of the attack on Ahmici.

    7 The only thing mentioned is communications between

    8 Busovaca and Vitez.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, let us turn to

    10 Defence Exhibit 193, that is the one with the

    11 controverted date, 14 March or 14 April.

    12 Now, if you look at the third full paragraph,

    13 there's a reference there to an attack on Ahmici, the

    14 precise words being that "The BH army may attempt to

    15 launch an attack on Ahmici." Do you see what I'm

    16 talking about?

    17 A. Yes, I see what you are asking me to look at.

    18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, at that date, the

    19 14th of March, or even the 14th of April, would you say

    20 that Ahmici was a BiH controlled area?

    21 A. On the 14th of April 1993, yes.

    22 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Well, would you say

    23 there's a difficulty in the idea of the BiH attacking a

    24 BiH held area?

    25 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, this document

  44. 1 speaks about the intentions of the army. It is an

    2 assessment by the assistant for military intelligence

    3 from the Busovaca Brigade. So, he is assessing along

    4 which axis the BiH army may be acting.

    5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: As a military man, would

    6 you say that it is more usual to speak of one military

    7 force attacking an area held by another military force?

    8 A. Is it more customary for an army controlling

    9 a particular territory to attack another territory

    10 under the control of another army, or one of the

    11 armies? That is logical.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, would you say that

    13 the effect of this warning that the BH army was likely

    14 to launch an attack on Ahmici should have put the HVO

    15 on guard as to possible developments in Ahmici, that

    16 because of this warning which the HVO received, the HVO

    17 should have been taking a particular interest in

    18 Ahmici?

    19 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, in assessments

    20 which are made, this is the assessment of one brigade.

    21 So, similar such assessments probably came in from

    22 other brigades. So, then, all the assessments are

    23 given to the commander, or rather the Chief of Staff

    24 who forwards them on.

    25 What the commander would do upon receipt of

  45. 1 that assessment is up to him to decide, whether he will

    2 use the units against which target, and along which

    3 axis. We were not those to judge about that, where the

    4 HVO units would be used.

    5 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Last document, 475E, I

    6 think. I think the Prosecution produced this. Am I

    7 right, Mr. Prosecutor, the Prosecution produced this?

    8 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes, the Prosecution

    10 produced this. Brigadier, do you see the document?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do you recognise the

    13 document?

    14 A. Yes, the one, I recognise it from yesterday.

    15 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Now, look at paragraph

    16 one. This is a BiH document, is it?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: On the 7th line of

    19 paragraph numbered one we see that the commander of the

    20 303rd Brigade is being ordered to provide assistance to

    21 our forces in the village of Putis, Jelinak, Loncari

    22 Nadioci and Ahmici, he is being ordered to provide

    23 assistance. Do you see those words?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Would you say those

  46. 1 words are different from words which direct the making

    2 of an attack on Ahmici?

    3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, this order, as

    4 far as I can understand it, this commander order is

    5 issued once the units are already undertaking combat

    6 activities in those villages. And now this is simply

    7 stated as the assistance that has to be provided to

    8 them, as to which unit.

    9 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Thank you very much. I

    10 return the matter to the Presiding Judge.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: I would just like to organise

    12 ourselves, first of all. I know that the interpreters

    13 have been working since 2 o'clock. I haven't got many

    14 questions to ask you, because many of the questions I

    15 wanted to ask were asked by my colleagues. I have two

    16 or three questions I would like to ask you, but before

    17 that, even though it's going to be short, I wonder

    18 whether the interpreters will agree with me.

    19 First of all, maybe we could finish with this

    20 witness and then maybe have a half an hour break,

    21 because this has been a very strenuous session, and

    22 then we will have the Status Conference.

    23 Do the interpreters agree with me? Yes? All

    24 do accept. In that case, you must be tired, Brigadier,

    25 but I have got a few questions to ask you.

  47. 1 My first question is the one to which I

    2 authorise you not to answer; or even if you want to,

    3 you can confer with counsel for Mr. Blaskic, in case

    4 you don't want to answer.

    5 The documents, all the documents that you

    6 have brought to this Tribunal, is it the result of your

    7 personal sources only, or did the Ministry of Defence

    8 of Croatia give them to you?

    9 Please think over my question well. The

    10 reason why I would like to know is that I wondered

    11 maybe that you can consult the Defence counsel. I

    12 remind you, you are under oath, but maybe if you don't

    13 want to answer it, don't answer. In any case, the

    14 Judges will draw conclusions, whatever your answer is.

    15 My question, I repeat, is: Were these only

    16 your own notes, or did Croatia open its military

    17 archives to you? So, this is a very clear and personal

    18 answer, you can either not answer or consult with the

    19 Defence counsel; but in any case, I would like an

    20 answer.

    21 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, Defence counsel

    22 would like the witness to give an answer according to

    23 his personal conscience.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much, Defence

    25 counsel. I understand.

  48. 1 You can answer, but you are under oath, I

    2 remind you.

    3 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, all the

    4 documents which were at my disposal and which were

    5 presented here I have personally, with my notes and

    6 according to my recollections, that is the form in

    7 which I gave it to this Tribunal, that is, to the

    8 Defence.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much.

    10 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I apologise, the

    11 English answer is, the translation into English was,

    12 does not make too much sense. Maybe he can say how,

    13 who gave him the documents, and what were his personal

    14 notes. It was not clear in English.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: What I understood was that all

    16 the documents that were brought by the witness was the

    17 result of his personal notes and his personal

    18 recollections. That is what I understood, and I did

    19 not want to ask any other questions of him about that

    20 particular matter.

    21 MR. NOBILO: When we speak about documents,

    22 these are the orders. This is just one source, and his

    23 notes and his recollections represent another source.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. I did not mean the orders

    25 here. These are the documents of the Defence, I have

  49. 1 not, I cannot interfere with. But what I meant were

    2 the maps and the schematics and so on. For all the

    3 rest is confidential between the witness and the

    4 Defence.

    5 My following question, which might probably

    6 be the last one, or the one before the last. When you

    7 worked with the intelligence service, did you have any

    8 political activities in the sense that you would give

    9 to your hierarchical superiors information about the

    10 atmosphere in the population, the general feeling, the

    11 context? Or else, you only satisfied yourself with

    12 military information?

    13 A. Only the information, intelligence of

    14 military type.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. And when in the

    16 military hierarchy there were various, when various

    17 officers had some political positions that they

    18 expressed, were you aware of that, or not?

    19 A. During my work, and even today, I can say

    20 that I never engaged in any political activities, and I

    21 have been solely concentrating on my profession and on

    22 the job that I have been doing. I never had any impact

    23 or influence on the political activities. The tasks

    24 that I receive, I receive from my commander, and that

    25 concerns the military.

  50. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Maybe I can rephrase my

    2 question. During the weeks and the months before the

    3 attack on the 16th of April, did you have the feeling

    4 that in the HVO, which is a military organisation, so,

    5 it is something that you are familiar with, that the

    6 HVO could have a propaganda activity?

    7 Now we speak about your field of competence.

    8 Did you have the feeling that, in the months and weeks

    9 preceding the attack that is mentioned in this

    10 indictment, the HVO actively participated in a

    11 propaganda campaign against the Muslims?

    12 A. I don't know that it took part in that.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Taking into account your

    14 position, your job, your high responsibility and

    15 intelligence activities, you had no knowledge of some

    16 form of propaganda that could have been in the HVO,

    17 that the HVO could be distributing?

    18 A. I cannot claim that it did not exist, that

    19 propaganda did not exist; but as a military man, I did

    20 not deal with such propaganda. My job was to gather

    21 information about the BH army in that time period, and

    22 also I had to make certain estimates.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. And now I will ask

    24 you the last question: From what you've said, I can

    25 draw a conclusion that in fact you wanted to tell us

  51. 1 that there was some kind of a civil war between

    2 military forces, very organised military forces on both

    3 sides.

    4 A. Yes.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Brigadier, you have

    6 been very patient. You have been for quite a while

    7 with us, and thank you very much for your coming here

    8 to give us evidence. I would like to thank the

    9 interpreters, and now we are going to have a longer

    10 break, for half an hour, after that a Status Conference

    11 which will be in closed session, and that is why we are

    12 going to meet now at 16.30. And after that we will

    13 have a Status Conference which will be in closed

    14 session

    15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    16 3.54 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    17 the 24th day of September, 1998 at

    18 10.00 a.m.








Page 11961