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  1. 1 Wednesday, 7th October 1998

    2 --- Upon commencing at 10.15 a.m.

    3 (Open session)

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Have the

    5 accused brought in.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: We're going to resume now. Let

    8 me say good morning to the interpreters, even if I

    9 don't see them very clearly from where I am sitting. I

    10 hope that everybody can hear me, everybody is on the

    11 right channel. I am on Channel 5. I see the

    12 Prosecution is ready, the Defence is ready, everybody

    13 is ready. All right. We can now resume. Mr. Kehoe?

    14 MR. KEHOE: Judge, I was just getting ready

    15 to go.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you can begin. That is,

    17 as soon as the witness comes in.

    18 (The witness entered court)

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, good morning,

    20 Brigadier.

    21 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Mr. President.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Good morning, Mr. President, Your

    23 Honours, counsel. Good morning, Brigadier.

    24 THE INTERPRETER: A bit too loud says the

    25 witness.

  2. 1 THE WITNESS: A bit louder, a bit louder,

    2 please.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: I think you have a little

    4 button that you can use on the right-hand side of the

    5 equipment. Thank you.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Is that okay, Brigadier?

    7 THE WITNESS: Yes.

    8 Examined by Mr. Kehoe:

    9 Q. Good morning, sir.

    10 A. Good morning.

    11 Q. Now, Brigadier, yesterday we finished the day

    12 talking about a series of orders, one of which came

    13 from the accused, Colonel Blaskic, on the 12th of

    14 April, concerning a list of HV officers that were in

    15 units in Central Bosnia. Now, before we move back to

    16 that order, let me ask you a question, as a follow-up

    17 question, from the November order -- excuse me, the

    18 October order, where General Blaskic again asked for

    19 information concerning HV units. And let me ask you,

    20 were there units and HV officers in other areas of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina working with the HVO?

    22 A. The order that you mentioned from the month

    23 of October, could I see it? So as to be able to give

    24 you a precise answer.

    25 Q. Of course, sir. That's Exhibit 406

  3. 1 subdivision 26. While we're at it, 406/31 as well.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: While that's being obtained, Mr.

    3 President, perhaps counsel could be more specific with

    4 respect to the term "other areas."

    5 MR. KEHOE: Sure. We'll just give him a

    6 chance to take a look at the exhibits and then we'll go

    7 back to that question. No problem.

    8 Q. Just by way of review, Brigadier, Exhibit

    9 406/26 is an order signed by the accused or from the

    10 accused, I believe, it's a packet that we talked about

    11 yesterday -- yes, it is, of the 5th of October, 1992,

    12 where he --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: You said, "signed by the

    14 accused," I'm sorry, I didn't quite understand. I have

    15 a document here signed by Mr. Covic; is that the

    16 exhibit you're referring to, Mr. Kehoe?

    17 MR. KEHOE: No, it's not.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Or maybe it's an error in the

    19 interpretation.

    20 MR. KEHOE: I was moving chronologically,

    21 Your Honour.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: I beg your pardon. Fine.

    23 Perhaps the usher should stay next to the witness to

    24 help him with the order of the documents and then we

    25 can proceed more quickly. So you're starting with the

  4. 1 order of the 5th of October; is that right?

    2 MR. KEHOE: Yes, sir.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Fine.

    4 MR. KEHOE: I correct any impression, Mr.

    5 President, that this was a packet communication as the

    6 witness testified yesterday and the original packet in

    7 BSC has no signature.

    8 Q. This particular order on the 5th of October

    9 from the accused, asked for an urgent submission of

    10 data concerning HV officers in the unit. Now, you see

    11 that, sir?

    12 A. Yes. I said yesterday with regard to this

    13 document, if it was at all created in the command of

    14 the Operative Zone because I see no stamp or signature,

    15 it is just an assumption that it was drafted in the

    16 command of the Operative Zone. I can't allege that it

    17 was or was not because at the time I was not in the

    18 command of the Operative Zone. I said in my

    19 introduction that I joined the command of the Operative

    20 Zone on the 1st of November, 1992, so that I am not

    21 familiar with the contents of this order and I cannot

    22 claim that this is an order issued by the Commander of

    23 the Operative Zone. It is possible that it may have

    24 been created as the Prosecutor said, but I cannot

    25 confirm that.

  5. 1 JUDGE JORDA: But this is a question of

    2 principle, Brigadier. It's the absence of the stamp

    3 that leads you to believe that the order was not

    4 issued. I wish to draw your attention to the fact that

    5 this question could be raised for all the other orders

    6 tendered by the Defence. I am just drawing your

    7 attention to the problem. I am closing the brackets

    8 there. We have all been discussing orders that are

    9 photocopies, so let us be very careful. Your answer

    10 has been registered that because you see no stamp,

    11 that, perhaps, this order was not issued and that has

    12 been entered in the record. Please continue.

    13 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, if I may? I

    14 said --

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Be very specific in your

    16 answer, please.

    17 THE WITNESS: When this document was made, I

    18 was not working in the command of the Operative Zone.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: That I understood very well.

    20 That's another answer. You also said that there is no

    21 stamp and as a result you have dealt as to whether that

    22 order is issued. So there are two answers: Either you

    23 say, I was not active at the time and I can say nothing

    24 about this order which is an acceptable order, or you

    25 can say a stamp is missing. So it is possible that

  6. 1 such an order was not issued, so that is quite a

    2 different answer. Thereby, you're opening the way for

    3 challenging all the orders that have been shown in the

    4 case, in this trial, and I am drawing your attention to

    5 that.

    6 THE WITNESS: At the time, I had no duties in

    7 the command of the Operative Zone.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but that is an answer I

    9 understood very well. I am talking about the stamp

    10 now. There is a very big problem regarding all the

    11 orders, those shown by the Prosecution, as well as

    12 those shown by the Defence. The Judges will want to

    13 know at a certain point, the authenticity of those

    14 orders.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Perhaps there is a translation

    16 issue, Mr. President. It's very clear to me what the

    17 witness is saying. He is saying that unlike the other

    18 orders, at least the book of them, that both the

    19 Prosecutor has shown him and the Defence, which he is

    20 able to identify with respect to this document. He

    21 neither recognises a signature, nor the seal of the

    22 Operative Zone, nor a packet communication stamp, nor

    23 does he have personal knowledge of the events because

    24 he wasn't working in the Operative Zone at the time.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. I wish to close the

  7. 1 parenthesis, please continue with your questions,

    2 Mr. Kehoe.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, thank you.

    4 Q. Now, Brigadier, the next document that we

    5 were talking about yesterday at the close of the day

    6 was a document dated 26th November, 1992 and that is

    7 Document 406/31, which was a document that was signed

    8 by Zoran Covic, wherein he said at Point 3:

    9 "HV Croatian army members present in the

    10 region and wearing HV insignia must be warned to take

    11 them off as this creates trouble for the Republic of

    12 Croatia."

    13 Do you see that document, Brigadier?

    14 A. I see it and I see the point that you have

    15 just cited from.

    16 Q. Thank you. My question is: Were HVO

    17 officers -- excuse me, I apologise, HV officers and HV

    18 soldiers working and fighting with the HVO in other

    19 areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as Mostar?

    20 A. I can say with certainty regarding the

    21 command of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia. As

    22 regards official information about the participation of

    23 Croatian army officers in other areas of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I cannot confirm that, but I have

    25 heard from reports from the media during the fighting

  8. 1 around Dubrovnik that the Croatian army participated in

    2 the organisation of the defence, but I cannot confirm

    3 that because I have no official information. I wish

    4 also to add that throughout the war from '92 until '94

    5 until the Washington Agreement, I had no occasion to

    6 leave the area which was surrounded at the time, so I

    7 cannot claim with certainty that that is true or not.

    8 Q. Well, Brigadier, you are now an officer in

    9 the federation army and you have been in continuous

    10 military service for how many years?

    11 A. From the moment I joined the HVO I was never

    12 outside the service, which means since 1992.

    13 Q. Well, sir, since 1992, did you talk to other

    14 members of the HVO about the presence of HV officers

    15 and soldiers in Bosnia fighting and working with the

    16 HVO? Did you have any such conversations?

    17 A. As far as I know, officially and formally,

    18 the participation of the Croatian army in the territory

    19 of Bosnia-Herzegovina following the Washington

    20 Agreement and the Split Agreement, the participation of

    21 the Croatian army in the final operations for the

    22 liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina did exist and I had a

    23 certain duty within that framework and I am aware of

    24 that officially and formally. As for everything else,

    25 what happened in 1992 and 1993, I have no official

  9. 1 information about that. But as I have said on the

    2 basis of information published by the media on the

    3 fighting in the area of Dubrovnik, Ravno, those reports

    4 said that the Croatian army was there, together with

    5 the HVO, fighting against the Chetniks.

    6 Q. Brigadier, maybe my question wasn't clear.

    7 Let me be very precise. Did you have any

    8 conversations, official or unofficial, with any member

    9 of the HVO wherein you, Brigadier, discussed the

    10 presence of HV officers and HV soldiers fighting and

    11 working with the HVO in Bosnia?

    12 A. Could you please tell me exactly what time

    13 frame you're referring to? I told you about the period

    14 that I know about. Are you talking about '92/'93/'94?

    15 Q. I am talking about the time frame 1992 and

    16 1993. That time frame. Until the Washington Accord in

    17 the end of February, beginning of March, 1994. Did you

    18 have any such conversations?

    19 A. I have never spoken about that to anyone,

    20 officially.

    21 Q. How about unofficially, Brigadier?

    22 A. Unofficially, also I cannot remember exactly

    23 when, how, where, because conversations among soldiers

    24 in the war can vary and I really cannot say with

    25 certainty anything that I cannot prove.

  10. 1 Q. Well, Brigadier, did you have any

    2 conversation among your soldier friends in the HVO

    3 about the presence of HV soldiers working and fighting

    4 with HVO soldiers in the Mostar area?

    5 A. I have said very clearly, I know the area,

    6 the hinterland of Dubrovnik, the area of the village of

    7 Ravno, and I know that there were certain joint

    8 activities between HVO units and HV army units. As for

    9 fighting around Mostar and in other places, I really

    10 have no information and I cannot say anything about

    11 that.

    12 Q. Maybe we'll show the witness Exhibit 406/36.

    13 This document dated September, 1992 -- I'm sorry, this

    14 document should be dated 9 December, 1992. Let me read

    15 some portions from this to you, Brigadier. It is from

    16 the Mostar municipal headquarters, 9 December, 1992 and

    17 notes:

    18 "In regards to the strictly confidential

    19 order concerning self-eastern" -- excuse me, "In

    20 regards to the strictly confidential order concerning

    21 self-eastern Herzegovina Operative Zone Number

    22 01286/1514 of 27 November, 1992, regarding various

    23 insignia and symbols on HVO unit uniforms, worn as

    24 opposed to the symbols stipulated by the decree on

    25 Herceg-Bosna armed forces which, as such, compromised

  11. 1 the reputation of HVO and HV members by implying ideas

    2 which the world media may interpret as fascistic, I

    3 hereby order:

    4 1. Commanders of a Croatian community of

    5 Herceg-Bosna HVO to ensure that unit members wear only

    6 HVO insignia and remove all other emblems."

    7 We're going to move down to three,

    8 Brigadier. I would gladly read the rest of it, but

    9 we'll move to three for the purpose to expedite

    10 matters.

    11 3. "Wearing HVO insignia is linked to

    12 accusations against the Republic Croatian community and

    13 the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosna regarding a

    14 direct deployment of HVO units in the territory of the

    15 Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosna, asked HV members

    16 with explanation to wear HV insignia during their

    17 deployment in our area."

    18 You can take a moment or two to read the rest

    19 of it. It goes on to a couple of more paragraphs, some

    20 of which is not legible. It is signed by Ivan

    21 Primorac, who is the 3rd HVO Brigade commander.

    22 Now Primorac's order indicates that HV

    23 members were deployed to the, at least to the Mostar

    24 area, doesn't it?

    25 A. I have not seen this order before. This

  12. 1 order, as can be seen, was drafted in the command of

    2 the Operative Zone of south-eastern Herzegovina. This

    3 command issued the order to its subordinate units,

    4 among which was the 3rd HVO Brigade. I really don't

    5 know anything about that Brigade, so I cannot say why

    6 such a document was drafted, except for what I said

    7 regarding the document we received in the command of

    8 the Operative Zone, which I explained yesterday and

    9 that is that soldiers who had fought in Croatia until

    10 the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who

    11 had lived before the war in the area of

    12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the war started in

    13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they came to Bosnia-Herzegovina

    14 wearing the uniforms and insignia of the Croatian

    15 army.

    16 As the desire of those soldiers was to keep

    17 those insignia, indicating membership, not only in the

    18 Croatian army, but in a particular unit of the Croatian

    19 army, such an order had to be issued to eliminate

    20 this. I don't know the specific figures, but I know

    21 that after the aggression against the Republic of

    22 Croatia, Croats, as well as Muslims and Bosniaks from

    23 the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had been in the JNA

    24 service in Croatia at that moment, joined the Croatian

    25 army. A number of senior officers from

  13. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina were, at the beginning, officers of

    2 the Croatian army.

    3 When the JNA started the war against

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they reported to the authorities of

    5 that republic and joined their forces. That is as much

    6 as I know about this.

    7 Q. Well, Brigadier, in this particular order,

    8 Mr. Primorac does indicate that there are HV members

    9 deployed to the Mostar area, doesn't he?

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, objection to the

    11 form of the question. The witness said he wasn't

    12 there. The document speaks for itself as to what's in

    13 it. The form of the question is inappropriate. He is

    14 cross-examining the witness about something he doesn't

    15 have any knowledge about.

    16 MR. KEHOE: I am simply asking the witness

    17 whether or not he agrees that this particular order

    18 that says HV units are deployed to the Mostar area.

    19 Why, that's a simple question.

    20 MR. HAYMAN: We can all see what it says.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, I think, Mr. Kehoe, that

    22 Mr. Hayman is right. What do you want the witness to

    23 talk about this document? We have the document before

    24 us. It is signed by Mr. Primorac. There is nothing

    25 more to ask him. We're wasting time. I think we

  14. 1 should speed up a little bit. I think that the witness

    2 has answered regarding the whole problem of the

    3 presence of the HV. He said that they were Bosniaks

    4 who went and came back wearing those uniforms, so let

    5 us speed up things a little, please.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. Well, sir, when did you take your position in

    8 Mostar that you currently hold?

    9 A. After the decision was taken on the

    10 organisation of the federation army, signed by a member

    11 of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija

    12 Izetbegovic, and a member of the presidency, Kresimir

    13 Zubac, the decision defined that the army of the

    14 federation should consist of four corps. One of those

    15 corps is called the 1st Guards' Corps and it comprises

    16 all the units of the HVO. The other three corps

    17 comprise all the units of the former structure of the

    18 BH army.

    19 In addition to these corps, this decision

    20 also envisages certain additional units, such as a

    21 rapid deployment brigade, an artillery brigade and some

    22 other minor units which I can't recall just now. After

    23 this decision was taken on the 17th of March, 1996, I

    24 was appointed chief of staff of the 1st Army Corps of

    25 the federation army with a command post in Mostar.

  15. 1 Q. So you went to Mostar to take your position

    2 on the 17th of March, 1996; is that correct?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Did you meet Mr. Primorac?

    5 A. In the area of Mostar, there are several

    6 persons called Primorac, it is a frequent surname, so I

    7 don't know who this gentleman is.

    8 Q. Apparently he was the commander of the 3rd

    9 HVO Brigade in Mostar, and his first name is Ivan

    10 Primorac; did you meet that one?

    11 A. Ivan Primorac, as far as I can recall; but

    12 I'm absolutely not sure, but I do wish to answer your

    13 question, to the best of my recollection. For a time

    14 he was in the command of the military district of

    15 Mostar, but whether that is key, I'm really not sure.

    16 I would be glad to answer your question, but I do wish

    17 to avoid any guesswork.

    18 Q. Since March of 1996, is it your testimony,

    19 since you've been stationed in Mostar in March of 1996,

    20 is it your testimony you have had no conversations,

    21 either official or unofficial, with any HVO members

    22 concerning the deployment of HV troops and officers in

    23 the Mostar area? Is that your testimony, sir?

    24 A. If I may correct you, from the 17th of March

    25 1996 we did not go to Mostar on that very day. I first

  16. 1 went to Posusje to take up my new duties, because we

    2 were based there; and it was only toward the end of

    3 September, I can't exactly remember the date, we moved

    4 to the barracks at the Heliodrom in Mostar.

    5 Q. My question remains the same. Since you were

    6 stationed in the barracks in the Heliodrom in September

    7 of 1996 until today, is it your testimony you haven't

    8 had any conversations, either official or unofficial,

    9 with any HVO people concerning the deployment of HV

    10 officers and soldiers in the Mostar area in '92

    11 and '93? Is that your testimony?

    12 A. Officially, no, but conversations, any

    13 particular conversations about this subject, I didn't

    14 have.

    15 Q. So, your testimony is you had neither

    16 official or unofficial conversations about this

    17 subject; is that right?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Let's turn back to the order that we

    20 discussed yesterday from the accused, where he asks for

    21 a list of HV officers in the units and I'm talking

    22 about Exhibit 406/55, which is also contained in

    23 456/19, and that is the order of the 12th of April

    24 1993.

    25 THE REGISTRAR: This is 406/55 as the

  17. 1 transcript says, or is it 456, 406/55 or 456?

    2 MR. KEHOE: If we can use 406/55, that will

    3 suffice.

    4 INTERPRETER: Microphone.

    5 MR. KEHOE: It's the same document, so if we

    6 can use 406/55, that will be fine. It should be the

    7 order of the 12th of April 1993.

    8 Brigadier, this is the order that we were --

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Counsel.

    10 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    11 Q. Brigadier, this is the order we were talking

    12 about yesterday, and I want to ask you a couple of

    13 follow-up questions here.

    14 Tell me, in number 2 it says, "Include in

    15 this list..." Blaskic asks for the name, the father's

    16 name, last name, number of the order with which he was

    17 sent to the HVO, his rank and the number of the

    18 transfer decree.

    19 What is this transfer decree and who issues

    20 this transfer decree?

    21 A. Are you asking me in principle, in the armed

    22 forces, or are you asking me specifically for the HVO?

    23 Q. I'm asking what this order means, Brigadier,

    24 where it says that they want the number of a transfer

    25 decree.

  18. 1 Is this a transfer decree that is signed by

    2 the HV to the HVO, sending a particular officer to a

    3 particular location in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that what

    4 we are talking about here?

    5 A. I did not have an opportunity to see these

    6 documents on transfers, because I did not work in

    7 personnel; however, in any army, if it is properly

    8 organised, in order to transfer any officer to any

    9 post, he has to have an order of transfer by the

    10 authorised officers. His authority is defined by the

    11 rules of these armed forces.

    12 Again, let me repeat to you, as I did not

    13 work on personnel issues, I never handled any such

    14 document.

    15 Q. Well, sir, would such a transfer decree be

    16 issued by the HV, transferring this soldier or this

    17 officer to the HVO?

    18 A. I really don't know whether such an order

    19 could be, or could have been issued.

    20 Q. Well, this particular transfer decree

    21 obviously must have some type of number to it, some

    22 type of number, just as many of the documents you've

    23 discussed; because in the front-line it asks for a

    24 listing of the number of the order which he was sent to

    25 the HVO, in addition to the number of the transfer

  19. 1 decree; is that right?

    2 A. I can only guess in that respect. I said

    3 that I did not see such orders. I do not know their

    4 contents and I don't know under what circumstances,

    5 that is, if such orders had been issued. I'm not aware

    6 with which type of documents such a person would arrive

    7 at a new post.

    8 Q. You would agree with me, would you not,

    9 Brigadier, that this is pretty organised. They were

    10 asking for actually two particular documents, a number

    11 of an order to which he was sent to the HVO, and a

    12 number of the actual transfer decree. So, there are

    13 two documents concerning these particular officers

    14 which are discussed in this number 2; isn't that right?

    15 A. My apologies, you're mentioning two

    16 officers?

    17 Q. Two documents, I apologise if I misspoke.

    18 Number 2 is talking about two particular documents, an

    19 order, from which he was sent to the HVO, and a

    20 transfer decree.

    21 A. Mr. President, when we spoke about this

    22 document yesterday I said that as far as I recall this

    23 document was drafted on the basis of an order of the

    24 Chief of Staff of the main headquarters. Probably the

    25 person who wrote this, Ljubomir Jurcic, and

  20. 1 Mrs. Stefica was the typist, I believe that he has no

    2 military training, and so he did not refer to the

    3 document on the basis of which this document was

    4 drafted, and he just copied down whatever the main

    5 headquarters of the HVO asked him to do.

    6 I don't know why the main headquarters of the

    7 HVO was looking for these particular names. I don't

    8 know the reasons for it.

    9 Q. Well, sir, you noted to us yesterday that as

    10 far as you knew there were no HV officers in Central

    11 Bosnia; is that correct?

    12 A. Yes, I said that, and I say that now.

    13 Q. Were HVO officers sent to Central Bosnia to

    14 consult with then, Colonel Blaskic, and other members

    15 of the HVO?

    16 A. I do not know of that. I did not meet such

    17 officers.

    18 Q. Whether or not you met them, did you ever

    19 discuss the fact that they were there with Blaskic and

    20 other members of the Central Bosnian Operative Zone

    21 staff?

    22 JUDGE RIAD: There are some mistakes in the

    23 transcript. You said, "were HVO officers sent to

    24 Central Bosnia to consult with Colonel Blaskic."

    25 MR. KEHOE: It should be HV.

  21. 1 JUDGE RIAD: We have to be clear. Before

    2 they refer to the HV as HJ officers. The transcript

    3 has to be correct.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Judge.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. Let me ask again that question, given the

    7 correction in the transcript.

    8 Were HV officers sent to Central Bosnia to

    9 consult with Colonel Blaskic and other members of the

    10 HVO?

    11 A. I said that I did not know this. I

    12 personally did not meet the HV officers in the

    13 territory of Central Bosnia.

    14 Q. Well, Brigadier, whether or not you met them,

    15 if they were there, given your position in the

    16 headquarters, would you know about it?

    17 A. I need not know any single case, because

    18 there are different areas that are covered, logistics,

    19 operations, and so on and so forth. So, if they had

    20 been there on some task regarding operations, then I

    21 would have known.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, perhaps we shouldn't

    23 go too much round and round here. I think that the

    24 witness has told you everything that he knows about the

    25 question. Although he was at a high level, next to the

  22. 1 accused, he was not aware of the presence of the

    2 Croatian army officers. The Judges will evaluate in

    3 respect of the documents you have presented and about

    4 which the witness has made his comments. I don't think

    5 we can go any further than that.

    6 MR. KEHOE: I understand, Mr. President. I'm

    7 just going to move on, at this point, to the next

    8 document, which is Exhibit 406/56.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: The Judges will evaluate

    10 things, as they always do. I think you also have to

    11 get used to a procedure where the Judges can appreciate

    12 or evaluate the relevance or irrelevance or the

    13 evasiveness of the witness, which I'm saying for the

    14 witness, not just this witness in this courtroom. You

    15 show your evidence, the witness answers as he wishes to

    16 answer, and the Judges make their evaluation.

    17 INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    18 MR. KEHOE:

    19 Q. I ask you to take a look at this document

    20 that's in evidence, which is a letter from the

    21 president of the Travnik HVO, Zeljko Pervan, to

    22 President Tudjman, President Franjo Tudjman.

    23 If you could look at the second to last page,

    24 the paragraph beginning, "It would be very helpful"; do

    25 you see that? At the bottom of the page, Brigadier.

  23. 1 Let me read it to you, you can probably catch

    2 it. The document reads: "It would be very helpful,"

    3 directing this to President Tudjman of Croatia, "If you

    4 could once again instruct your assistants to send

    5 senior officers of the Croatian army headed by General

    6 Praljak to consolidate our units in the Lasva Valley."

    7 The date of this document is the 12th of

    8 April 1993, the same date as the order wherein Colonel

    9 Blaskic asks for a list of HV officers; do you see

    10 that, sir?

    11 A. Excuse me, I couldn't find the proper

    12 excerpt. You said page 2?

    13 Q. The second to last page, sir, of the letter.

    14 The letter is a three-page letter, it's the second

    15 page, I believe.

    16 A. Okay.

    17 Q. I think it's the bottom paragraph, the bottom

    18 paragraph on the second page. I'll read it to you

    19 again. "It would be very helpful" --

    20 A. I'm sorry, can he please mark it for me?

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Our problem is that we don't

    22 have it in Serbo-Croat. We have it on the ELMO, but

    23 you have the whole page, except for the line which is

    24 the important line.

    25 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, with your

  24. 1 permission, it would be good that the Croatian text be

    2 given to the witness so that he could see the date,

    3 signature, the institution.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, the witness has to

    5 have the Croatian text. I don't have to have the

    6 French version, but at least give me the English one.

    7 MR. KEHOE: It's on the last page of the

    8 English.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: I think that's not the

    10 sentence. We are almost there. Yes, there it is.

    11 MR. KEHOE: It's up a page, down, the other

    12 way, the other way. Down more. The other way.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: It's the other way.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Mr. Usher, it's the

    15 other way, the top of the page, not the bottom of the

    16 page.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: There we go. Very well.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, there is a French

    19 translation of this in the file.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: All right, Mr. Kehoe. Ask your

    21 question, please.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. Do you see that line, Brigadier?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Mr. Pervan is saying that, once again, he is

  25. 1 asking President Tudjman to once again send senior

    2 officers from the Croatian army to the Lasva Valley

    3 area; isn't he?

    4 A. I would just like to comment on the document

    5 itself before I specifically answer your question.

    6 This document, as far as I can see, was

    7 drafted in the Travnik HVO, which is by the civilian

    8 authorities, and Zeljko Pervan, as far as I know, was

    9 president of the Travnik HVO, which means it was the

    10 civilian authority.

    11 This document which I'm holding in my hand I

    12 never saw in the Operative Zone command. It can also

    13 be seen that it was not delivered to him where you have

    14 all the addressees, the three addressees.

    15 The sentence which you were referring to

    16 would need to be taken in the entirety of the issue

    17 relating to the situation in the Travnik municipality;

    18 and if we pull it out of the context, and if we just

    19 gave answers to these excerpts, we would not get a real

    20 picture.

    21 So, on the basis of all of this, I can just

    22 say and confirm that when the civilian authorities

    23 analysed the situation with all the problems that were

    24 present in the territory, which was similar to the

    25 other municipalities, it came to a conclusion that we

  26. 1 did not have enough trained military officers. So,

    2 they are setting out this initiative and asking for

    3 assistance.

    4 However, I know that if this is the time when

    5 this document was drafted, at that time there were no

    6 officers of the Croatian army in the Operative Zone

    7 command, regardless of what the representative of the

    8 civilian authorities was requesting.

    9 So, this should be taken in the context of

    10 the entire situation, in the context of the entire

    11 military personnel that was available in the area, and

    12 the civilian authorities have concluded there are no

    13 officers who could carry out the task for the

    14 organisation and system that was established in the

    15 territory of Central Bosnia.

    16 Q. Let me shift gears here, the document speaks

    17 for itself, and we will move away from that document at

    18 this point, Brigadier.

    19 I would like to change the subject just a bit

    20 and talk to you a little bit about the headquarters

    21 that was run by then Colonel Blaskic.

    22 Tell us a little bit about the headquarters,

    23 Brigadier. Can you explain the format, and where

    24 people were located, and where the communications

    25 centre was, and where the fax machine was, et cetera?

  27. 1 A. The organisation of the Operative Zone

    2 command, when I arrived there on 1 November 1992, at

    3 that time the command was just being accommodated at

    4 the Hotel Vitez, and it did not have all the right

    5 conditions in terms of the premises we had there. Then

    6 the actual structure, the way it was constructed, and

    7 everything else that a command headquarters would need

    8 to have in war time.

    9 Under such circumstances this is how we

    10 organised ourselves. The intelligence unit worked in

    11 Nova Bila. The packet system was working in the post

    12 office building in a basement that was about 100 metres

    13 from the hotel, and the rest of us were in the actual

    14 hotel building.

    15 In one of the larger rooms there, there was

    16 the operation centre with a duty desk, and this is

    17 where all the personnel from the operations department

    18 were, and all the officers, relating to combat

    19 activities.

    20 Somewhere upstairs there was the logistics

    21 department, there was a hallway there which separated

    22 the room where the operations centre was, and the room

    23 where General Blaskic worked and stayed and where he

    24 slept.

    25 He didn't have an apartment or house in

  28. 1 Vitez; and so, when he would be there, this is where he

    2 would spend the night, and this is where he worked

    3 during the day, and this is where he would hold

    4 briefings, and that's where he would meet the UNPROFOR

    5 representatives and any other visitors who arrived who

    6 would come to this hotel.

    7 So, we worked in improvised circumstances

    8 with respect to accommodation and quality of work

    9 conditions. So, those were our conditions of work.

    10 Q. Tell me, Brigadier, was there a map room in

    11 there, in the headquarters, where lines of

    12 confrontation were written and where troops were

    13 deployed, et cetera?

    14 A. Yes, and this map was in the Operative Zone,

    15 in the operations room of the Operative Zone. This was

    16 actually part of my duty, too, to work on that.

    17 Q. So, that was my next question: Who was

    18 responsible to keep that up to date? I mean, you noted

    19 that you were; who else in the headquarters was

    20 responsible to keep that map up to date?

    21 A. All officers were in charge of that. There

    22 was another officer who was with me in the operations

    23 and training department, and then all the department

    24 heads had their own obligations in that regard, so that

    25 when the commander came to the room, he would have the

  29. 1 most accurate and up-to-date picture. We entered any

    2 changes. As we received information from the

    3 subordinate units, we would enter them.

    4 Q. Who was this other person that was

    5 responsible, who was in operations, that was

    6 responsible to keep this map up to date with you?

    7 What's his name?

    8 A. It was Mr. Ivica Cosic who worked with me,

    9 and for a while it was Mario Rajic, and then he

    10 transferred to the Vitez Brigade.

    11 Q. With regard to the actual operation within

    12 the headquarters, tell me about a general day. Was

    13 there something akin to an orders group meeting every

    14 morning that was held by the colonel?

    15 A. Colonel Blaskic, or General Blaskic today,

    16 had a method of work that every day, whenever he could,

    17 he held morning briefings, and very precisely would

    18 give out assignments and would debrief every single

    19 officer present as to what tasks had to be carried out.

    20 If Mr. Blaskic was not around, his Chief of Staff,

    21 Mr. Nakic, would hold the briefings. In his absence,

    22 it would be myself who held them.

    23 Q. This is, of course, a traditional or a normal

    24 functioning aspect of a headquarters, to have a morning

    25 briefing with the commander, or if the commander isn't

  30. 1 there, the second in command, or you as chief of

    2 operations; that's a normal procedure, is it not, in

    3 most headquarters?

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, I would like us to

    5 speed things up a bit. I don't know if anyone is

    6 challenging the fact that Mr. Blaskic was the chief of

    7 the Operational Zone, that he was acting as any Chief

    8 of Staff.

    9 Let's try to go a bit faster. We're not

    10 going to spend weeks and weeks over the question about

    11 what Mr. Blaskic did getting up in the morning, going

    12 to the office, having his coffee and doing this and

    13 that. This is Defence time that is running here.

    14 Otherwise, go right to your question.

    15 If all of these questions are aimed at trying

    16 to get to authenticating something by the witness,

    17 please understand that the Judges are intelligent

    18 enough to understand what you're doing. I cannot agree

    19 to our spending such a long time to know whether he had

    20 coffee before going into the map room in Stari Vitez

    21 and Vitez. That's what I have to say. Go right to

    22 your question, please.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    24 Q. These morning briefings, information

    25 concerning the situation on the ground was passed back

  31. 1 and forth; wasn't it?

    2 A. Yes, it was passed back and forth, and this

    3 information was based on the reports which we received.

    4 So, every morning those units were able to deliver

    5 reports, and these reports would end up on the

    6 commander's desk, and all that eventually ended up with

    7 me.

    8 Q. During these reporting meetings did the

    9 aspects that took place at the Busovaca joint

    10 commission, were they discussed during these morning

    11 meetings?

    12 A. Regarding the work of the commission, we saw,

    13 and I'm talking about the facts regarding the war in

    14 the Lasva Valley, on the basis of the joint order of

    15 the commander of the Third Corps and the Operative Zone

    16 command, on the basis of that, as far as I know, the

    17 commander was regularly briefed by the head of this

    18 commission, which at that time was Mr. Nakic as Chief

    19 of Staff.

    20 Q. Well, if Mr. Nakic was told about Muslims

    21 being forced to dig trenches by the Busovaca

    22 commission, was that subject discussed in these morning

    23 briefings by Colonel Blaskic?

    24 A. Mr. Franjo Nakic, when he was a member of the

    25 commission in Busovaca, did not come to the morning

  32. 1 briefings, because he was tied up in Busovaca. As far

    2 as I know, he would come whenever he could, be it in

    3 the afternoon or the morning, and personally reported

    4 to the commander on the commission's work.

    5 Q. Well, was the subject, after the Busovaca

    6 joint commission was set up in early February of 1993,

    7 and prior to the conflict in April of 1993, was the

    8 subject of Muslims being forced to dig trenches

    9 discussed at these morning meetings?

    10 A. I do not recall any such discussions, and I'm

    11 not aware of that fact, that anyone was forced to dig

    12 trenches.

    13 Q. Now, in addition to the staff meetings with

    14 the people in the headquarters, did Blaskic have

    15 regular meetings with his brigade commanders?

    16 A. Meetings with brigade commanders, in

    17 practice, depending on the situation on the ground,

    18 were most frequently held once a month, and, I believe,

    19 because that is what every commander does, that

    20 Commander General Blaskic, during his daily work, as

    21 far as communications allowed, he did communicate with

    22 the brigade commanders regularly.

    23 If the situation were to deteriorate, then

    24 the commander would decide when those meetings would be

    25 held, and they were held on the basis of a decision and

  33. 1 an order of the commander of the Operative Zone.

    2 Q. Did you attend those meetings?

    3 A. Most frequently, yes. Unless I had any other

    4 assignment given to me by the commander, because we

    5 must realise that this was war and that some officers

    6 had other tasks to carry out.

    7 Q. In any of the meetings that you attended,

    8 when Blaskic met with his brigade commanders, did the

    9 subject of Muslims being forced to dig trenches, was

    10 that subject ever discussed?

    11 A. I cannot say with certainty whether this ever

    12 happened. I personally do not recall, but I know that

    13 Commander Blaskic, though I don't know on the basis of

    14 which information, that he did give an order

    15 prohibiting any such action. I think that we reviewed

    16 such an order when presenting the evidence as to what

    17 the Operative Zone commander was doing during the war

    18 of 1993.

    19 Q. Prior to the issuance of that order, and that

    20 order was issued on the 19th of June, 1993, after a

    21 joint commission meeting, prior to the issuance of that

    22 order, had you been in any discussions with headquarters

    23 staff or brigade staff where the subject of Muslims

    24 being forced to dig trenches came up?

    25 A. I did not attend. All I know about that is

  34. 1 that the Commander of the Operative Zone issued an

    2 order expressly prohibiting such action.

    3 Q. Now, in your conversations during your direct

    4 examination, you noted various aspects that were

    5 essential for a Commander. Excuse me one moment.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, do you want me to

    7 go to 11.30 or would you break now?

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I think we started rather

    9 late. Do you have many questions about these trenches

    10 dug by Muslims?

    11 MR. KEHOE: Actually, I am finished that

    12 subject at this point. I have a few more questions

    13 about the command structures here, we can finish that

    14 and take a break.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. You have several

    16 questions on the command structures, let's continue

    17 with those questions for another few minutes, please.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    19 Q. Now, Brigadier, you noted during your direct

    20 examination concerning the command structure that what

    21 was essential -- and I am reading, counsel, for your

    22 purposes, page 12.209 -- what was essential for the

    23 operation was five components, actually, six

    24 components, planning, organisation, command,

    25 coordination, supervision and control. Then a couple

  35. 1 of pages later, you noted that, if you had set up an

    2 organisation and you had issued commands and orders,

    3 the next part of the activity is to ensure that

    4 everything was carried out. So you needed to monitor

    5 and supervise and these are key factors in a command

    6 organisation. Again for clarity in the record, that's

    7 page 12.212 of the English transcript.

    8 Do you recall that, Brigadier, where you

    9 noted that the monitoring of a structure is essential?

    10 A. Certainly, that control of the execution of

    11 orders issued is very important. It is also very

    12 important that the conditions are in place to enable

    13 that supervision to be carried out.

    14 Q. Does that monitoring include going out in the

    15 field and inspecting the troops and the positions of

    16 those troops to ensure that the orders that are being

    17 given are being carried out?

    18 A. Supervision can be done as you have

    19 suggested, but it can also be carried out by requesting

    20 reports and a feedback report. So there are various

    21 possibilities, depending on the one chosen by the

    22 Commander, depending on the time available, the kind of

    23 activity he wishes to monitor and how important that

    24 activity is for the current situation, the war

    25 conditions under which we were working and operating.

  36. 1 Q. Brigadier, in direct examination, you noted

    2 that the reporting that was coming from the Brigades

    3 was not very accurate because of the lack of skilled

    4 personnel. Did that cause Colonel Blaskic to monitor

    5 activities in the field? By that, did he leave the

    6 headquarters frequently to monitor what was happening

    7 in the field?

    8 A. It is true that I said that reports due to

    9 lack of skill on the part of the officers were

    10 incomplete and also because of the concealment of

    11 information because they didn't wish some information

    12 to reach the Operative Zone Commander. The Commander,

    13 General Blaskic, did go to the Brigade commands. I

    14 cannot say exactly what he did there, but we as

    15 officers too, would occasionally, upon orders of the

    16 Commander, go to the Brigade command with the documents

    17 we had issued to check whether some thing had been

    18 carried out or not. That is whether what had been

    19 ordered had been done and how.

    20 Q. When did Colonel Blaskic and other members of

    21 the Operative Zone staff discover that the Brigades

    22 were concealing information from the headquarters?

    23 A. I would be so bold as to say that this was a

    24 constant phenomenon. There would be a case of us

    25 losing a position on the front-line. The Commander did

  37. 1 not wish to report that to the Commander because he

    2 hoped he would regain that position and he didn't want

    3 to create a negative impression of his ability with the

    4 Commander. So he wanted to deal with as many problems

    5 as he could by himself within his own zone of

    6 responsibility. So that I remember when certain

    7 positions fell around the village of Brdo, that we

    8 didn't get a report from that Brigade until six or

    9 seven hours later. I can't exactly remember how we

    10 learned about it and only when we called up did we

    11 learn about it and did we have to engage additional

    12 forces and try to regain those positions, though they

    13 never were regained, they remained the same until the

    14 Washington Accords.

    15 So that even in such serious instances, that

    16 was how the commanders behaved. But that was our

    17 reality. I could explain the reasons, an untrained

    18 officer, a person who is not qualified for the position

    19 he is holding, he is virtually not aware of his

    20 responsibilities.

    21 Q. So, what you're saying, Brigadier, is that

    22 the lack of accurate information coming to the

    23 headquarters was constant and began in 1992 and went

    24 through 1993; is that right?

    25 A. Yes, and as far as we were able in the

  38. 1 command of the Operative Zone, we did everything we

    2 could to prevent this, to reduce such tendencies. We

    3 would send officers to the commands as assistants in

    4 those commands, to set those commands up and to improve

    5 them in military terms and improve their organisation

    6 to correspond to the aims which we had set ourselves at

    7 the end of '92 and the beginning of '93 when we defined

    8 our goal of establishing brigades. But this is a

    9 painstaking endeavour and I told you what the outcome

    10 was at the end of the war.

    11 When the MPRI arrived, they noted that a key

    12 problem was the control and command, accommodation and

    13 funding. Even today, I have a very high position, and

    14 those officers, they are retired officers of the

    15 American army, they are training us and army officers,

    16 as to the way an officer should behave, a NATO officer,

    17 a professional officer, what he needs to know, what

    18 prior qualities he needs to have and so on. This is

    19 for six years. Now we still have similar problems, I

    20 can't say they're identical, because we now have peace,

    21 but they're similar to what we had in 1993.

    22 Q. Brigadier, did this lack of information,

    23 cause Blaskic to go to the front-lines and to send his

    24 headquarters officers to the front-lines to monitor and

    25 inspect?

  39. 1 A. I said yes.

    2 Q. Did he do that frequently?

    3 A. I don't know what you mean when you say

    4 "frequently." Do you mean on a daily basis? Every

    5 other day? Every five days? Because it is a very

    6 imprecise term, frequently.

    7 Q. Was it part of his routine in organising the

    8 command and the control of the Operative Zone to

    9 routinely visit front-lines throughout his area of

    10 command?

    11 A. General Blaskic, as far as I know, would go

    12 to the commands whenever he, himself, thought it was

    13 necessary. I cannot tell you exactly when he felt it

    14 was necessary. He was the Commander. We went to carry

    15 out supervision when we were ordered to do so by the

    16 Commander of the Operative Zone.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, Mr. Kehoe, I think

    18 we shall have a break now for about twenty minutes,

    19 just after quarter to twelve, we will resume work. So

    20 the hearing is adjourned.

    21 --- Recess taken at 11.28 a.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 11.54 a.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed, please

    24 have the accused brought in.

    25 (The accused entered court)

  40. 1 MR. KEHOE: May I proceed, Mr. President?

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, please.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. Brigadier, just before the break, I asked you

    5 a question and I can just read it to you. When I said

    6 there was a part of Colonel Blaskic's routine to

    7 organise the command and control of the Operative Zone

    8 to routinely visit front-lines throughout his area of

    9 command and you answered that as far as I know, he

    10 would go to the commands whenever he thought it was

    11 necessary. My question is dealing with front-line

    12 positions and I ask that question again: Did Colonel

    13 Blaskic routinely go to front-line positions? As

    14 distinguished from Brigade command headquarters, did he

    15 routinely go to front-line positions as part of his goal

    16 to monitor what was happening in his area of

    17 responsibility?

    18 A. General Blaskic went to monitor and control

    19 whenever he thought it was necessary. So I can't say

    20 that he did so routinely, just when it occurred to

    21 him. But as a commander and monitoring developments,

    22 he would decide when he would go to the Brigade

    23 commands and when to the front-lines. As the

    24 intervention of General Blaskic was to develop an

    25 organisation, as far as I can remember, he wouldn't go

  41. 1 to the front-line within the zone of responsibility of a

    2 particular Brigade without going to the Brigade command

    3 first and going with them to the front-line in order to

    4 point to any shortcomings or deficiencies that he may

    5 notice.

    6 If General Blaskic were to go to the front

    7 without the knowledge of the Brigade commander, that

    8 would undermine the unity of command and he would

    9 thereby be belittling the Brigade commander, who,

    10 anyway, didn't enjoy a great deal of authority among

    11 their soldiers, among their troops.

    12 Q. Okay, sir. Just a couple of subjects I would

    13 like to clear up before we move to an entirely

    14 different subject. I would just like to show you an

    15 exhibit that has been received in evidence,

    16 Prosecutor's Exhibit 292, and there was a Defence

    17 exhibit that was the exact same thing, I am just

    18 unfamiliar with the number. So if we could just talk

    19 about Prosecutor's Exhibit 292.

    20 Now I realise this document is in English,

    21 Brigadier, however, this is the way it was sent to ECMM

    22 and I want to direct your attention, if I could, to the

    23 top line. Now, is that the fax number for the Central

    24 Bosnian Operative Zone at the top of that?

    25 A. I cannot recall exactly whether that is the

  42. 1 number. After all, it was five years ago, so I am not

    2 sure.

    3 Q. Well, does it say, that is the HVO Central

    4 Bosnian Operative Zone with the number after that of

    5 3872711300?

    6 A. Yes, that is what it says on this document.

    7 Q. Now, where was the fax machine in the

    8 headquarters?

    9 A. The fax machine in the headquarters was in

    10 the communication centre. As far as I remember, in the

    11 course of 1993, we had one installed with the officer

    12 on duty.

    13 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic have his own fax

    14 machine?

    15 A. As far as I can remember, he did not.

    16 Q. Did he share this fax machine with others; is

    17 that right?

    18 A. Not shared it. Everything that was done in

    19 the headquarters depended on the Commander. So we all

    20 worked to carry out his decisions in the field.

    21 Everything depended on the Commander.

    22 Q. I mean, for instance, during the course of a

    23 day, would using this fax machine, for instance, would

    24 the Commander Colonel Blaskic make a determination what

    25 press releases were going to leave the headquarters?

  43. 1 A. I know that there was a press service which

    2 was there to inform the public about events in the area

    3 of Central Bosnia. The way in which the officers in

    4 the press service communicated with the Commander, I

    5 cannot say. I don't know exactly how they reached

    6 agreement, but the press service in our organisation

    7 was not really part of the actual organisational

    8 structure because their responsibilities were different

    9 from those of the officers and Chiefs of Staff in the

    10 command.

    11 Q. Let me turn to another subject and I just

    12 want to clarify something for myself. I can show you

    13 Defence Exhibit 200.

    14 Now, if you just take a look at the BSC

    15 section, you said in your examination that this was a

    16 signature of Mijo Bozic; is that right?

    17 A. Yes, this is Mijo Bozic's signature.

    18 Q. I think you described Mijo Bozic as a

    19 professional soldier and he knows how the structure and

    20 control and command functions and that the superior has

    21 to be informed about what is happening. For the record

    22 that is on page 12.226 of the transcript.

    23 Now, my question, Brigadier, is with regard

    24 to executing an order such as this. This would be done

    25 with the approval of Colonel Blaskic and he would be

  44. 1 informed by Mijo Bozic that he had, in fact, signed

    2 such an order; is that the procedure?

    3 A. The procedure was as follows: I said that at

    4 the morning briefings we would be given assignments as

    5 to what each of the members of the command had to do.

    6 We would undertake to carry out those assignments. If

    7 the assignment was to issue an order of these contents,

    8 as we see here, then General Blaskic would provide the

    9 guidelines, the frameworks, as to what should be

    10 written and for what purpose. That would be 85 to 90

    11 per cent would be his contribution to the order. It

    12 was our duty as officers to draft this, to type it, and

    13 to submit it to him for signature.

    14 In all occasions, if Blaskic was away, so as

    15 not to waste any time, he would give these precise

    16 assignments in the morning and say, "Sign on my

    17 behalf." When we returned to the headquarters, those

    18 orders had to be there waiting for him on his table so

    19 that he could see what had been signed in his absence.

    20 That was the practice in our headquarters and even

    21 today, as the Chief of Staff of the 1st Guards Corps in

    22 the army of the federation, I signed the document in

    23 the absence of the Commander, but when he comes back, I

    24 show him what has actually been written. That is how

    25 this document was created too.

  45. 1 Q. Brigadier, suffice it to say that Colonel

    2 Blaskic trusted Mijo Bozic to sign this document on his

    3 behalf; did he not?

    4 A. Yes, my impression was that General Blaskic

    5 trusted his associates; and had Mijo Bozic written

    6 something with which General Blaskic did not agree,

    7 when he returned and saw the document, Mijo Bozic would

    8 have been criticised or whatever, depending on the

    9 seriousness of his mistake. The commander would decide

    10 what to do. I don't know what he would decide.

    11 Q. Mijo Bozic was given, shortly after this

    12 order in October of 1992, Mijo Bozic was given command

    13 over the Ban Jelacic Brigade in Kiseljak; was he not?

    14 A. Not after this order. When I reached the

    15 Operative Zone command he was already there, and I said

    16 that I joined on the 1st of November. As far as I

    17 remember, Mijo Bozic was appointed to commander in

    18 1993. Please don't hold me to the day of the date, but

    19 I think it was in February 1993.

    20 Q. Was there a close relationship between Mijo

    21 Bozic and Blaskic that caused them to trust him and

    22 give him this honour as a brigade commander? Or did he

    23 just have faith in Mijo Bozic as a commander?

    24 A. I will say what I know with regard to Mijo

    25 Bozic and General Blaskic, as persons in their

  46. 1 relationship. As far as I know, they did not know each

    2 other before the war, though I'm not quite sure;

    3 because Mijo Bozic, before the war, was serving in the

    4 district staff of Territorial Defence in Zenica. As

    5 far as I know, General Blaskic was serving in Slovenia.

    6 Whether they may have come across one another as

    7 officers of the former army, I don't know.

    8 As far as I know, Mijo Bozic was born in

    9 Kresevo and General Blaskic was born in Brestovsko,

    10 Kiseljak municipality; so again, I cannot connect them.

    11 Further, Mijo Bozic is quite a bit older than

    12 General Blaskic, in age. I think he was born in 1950

    13 and General Blaskic in 1960, or '61. So,

    14 generation-wise they couldn't have gone to school

    15 together.

    16 However, Mijo Bozic, whom I found in the

    17 command when I joined, he was in the operations

    18 department, he was head of that department. When he

    19 left I took his place; and if a person holds such a

    20 position, that is as head of operations department, the

    21 commander has to trust you, because if he doesn't, then

    22 he would probably look for somebody else whom he

    23 trusted more to assign to that position.

    24 From the facts that I have presented, I think

    25 that General Blaskic did trust Mijo Bozic.

  47. 1 Q. Now, just a couple of other questions,

    2 Brigadier, just on the flow of paper that I just want

    3 to clarify. If we could show these in unison, and we

    4 don't have to spend much time on this, Brigadier,

    5 Defence Exhibit 338, Defence Exhibit 402, and Defence

    6 Exhibit 406, and I just want to focus on the BCS

    7 version.

    8 338, 402 and 406. Actually, we can look at

    9 all of them in unison, we can look at all of them

    10 together, because I just want to ask you some questions

    11 about some writing on them.

    12 Do you have those three documents before you,

    13 Brigadier?

    14 A. Yes, I do, I have the three documents.

    15 Q. Could you clarify something for me? Is the

    16 writing in those three documents in the right-hand

    17 corner, is that all your writing?

    18 A. In the right-hand corner the words "Urgent

    19 for Kiseljak and Busovaca," that is my handwriting and

    20 my signature.

    21 Q. Whose writing is next to yours?

    22 A. Next to mine, as far as I recall, this could

    23 be the handwriting of Franjo Sliskovic, who was

    24 assistant for logistics. Because you see I have

    25 written "urgent for Kiseljak," I'm sending it to

  48. 1 Kiseljak where the commander was; but I'm also sending

    2 it to Busovaca where Franjo Sliskovic lived, so that

    3 the matter should be dealt with as quickly as possible,

    4 because I was cognisant of the seriousness of the

    5 request by Rasim Delic, because I received the document

    6 from the command.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Could it be clear that this is

    8 D402, the record didn't reflect which document he was

    9 looking at.

    10 MR. KEHOE: I was waiting for the Brigadier

    11 to finish and follow-up. That is D402, counsel is a

    12 hundred per cent correct.

    13 Q. The other two documents, 338 and 406, the

    14 initials ONO; are those initials yours, as well?

    15 A. Which document are we referring to, 406?

    16 Q. Either 406 -- 406, just for clarification's

    17 sake, is dated the 22nd of April. It's not the 22nd of

    18 April?

    19 MR. HAYMAN: It's the 26th of January, 1992,

    20 I believe, D406.

    21 MR. KEHOE: You're absolutely right, counsel,

    22 thank you.

    23 Q. D406 is the 26th of January, 1992; is that

    24 your initials there, too?

    25 A. The word "done" or "executed" and the

  49. 1 initials are mine, and ONO is mine, because I did

    2 everything that I was supposed to do, which was my

    3 competence. Yes, all that is in my handwriting.

    4 Q. Is that kind of a routine thing to do when it

    5 comes to your attention, to put your initials on it in

    6 some capacity?

    7 A. There were no regulations, so, you couldn't

    8 say that it was a routine thing, because there are also

    9 some documents where I did not put this.

    10 Q. And 338, the next document, does that ONO

    11 belong to you? I think that's the document, unless I'm

    12 incorrect here, the 22nd of April; correct?

    13 A. Yes, here it is stated in this document, the

    14 letters ONO were hand-written by me.

    15 Q. Let me show you a document, Brigadier, and

    16 I'll ask if you can recognise this handwriting, if I

    17 can, with the next exhibit.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: This is document 478.

    19 MR. KEHOE:

    20 Q. Take a look at that writing, Brigadier; do

    21 you recognise that writing? Is that yours?

    22 A. I do not recognise this handwriting, and it

    23 is not my handwriting.

    24 Q. How about the writing on the bottom, is that

    25 handwriting yours?

  50. 1 A. No, this is not my handwriting, either.

    2 Q. You don't recognise who wrote this? You

    3 don't recognise the handwriting?

    4 A. No, I do not recognise it.

    5 Q. Okay, sir. Let's move to another subject.

    6 The subject we're going to move to is the actual army

    7 itself.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: May I have the number, please?

    9 THE REGISTRAR: This is 478.

    10 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, apologies, this

    11 document is only in Croatian version, and nobody in

    12 this room, with the exception of Mr. Marin and myself

    13 and maybe another person or two, would know what this

    14 means; because as it stands now it looks like a

    15 mysterious document.

    16 MR. KEHOE: I invite the Brigadier to read it

    17 into the record. I apologise.

    18 Q. Brigadier, even though it is not your

    19 handwriting, could you read it into the record?

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I thought you were right, Mr.

    21 Nobilo; but I thought that the Prosecutor's question

    22 was simply to know whether this was the person who

    23 wrote the document. In fact, this might be of interest

    24 to know what the contents are.

    25 Perhaps you might read it to us and then the

  51. 1 interpreters will interpret it for us, unless you do

    2 not want to ask that question, Mr. Kehoe, the decision

    3 is yours.

    4 MR. KEHOE: I don't want any mystery about

    5 what this document says.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Since it's only

    7 three-and-a-half lines, we can read it. Read it,

    8 please, and the interpreters will interpret it. Please

    9 read it.

    10 A. Mr. President, this document states as

    11 follows: "All military conscripts shall report to

    12 their military command," and the rest of the word is

    13 missing, and then "the HVO units." At the bottom it

    14 says, "For the press, the Travnik HVO and Novi

    15 Travnik".

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    17 MR. KEHOE:

    18 Q. Brigadier, let's move to another subject, and

    19 I would like to address testimony you talked about

    20 during your direct, and you were answering some

    21 questions by Mr. Nobilo and counsel, I'm talking about

    22 page 12.051, and you were talking about some of the

    23 problems that you had in the HVO as a whole.

    24 I could just read a portion of your

    25 testimony. You said, "First of all, the entire

  52. 1 organisation was based on voluntariness, which made

    2 difficult, the functioning of the chain of command."

    3 Down on line 13, "Voluntariness, in simple terms,

    4 implies that a soldier or conscript applies on a

    5 voluntary basis to join. Similarly, he is free to

    6 leave a certain organisation because you have no

    7 instrument when he is a volunteer to fit him within the

    8 structure, because of the overall situation in which

    9 you are working and living."

    10 You again reiterated that problem, sir, on

    11 page 12.092, when you talked about one of the major

    12 problems being the voluntary principle.

    13 Now, sir, let me direct your attention to

    14 Prosecutor's Exhibit 36/1, if I could.

    15 THE REGISTRAR: We would need a few minutes

    16 to find it in the vault of the Registry since we don't

    17 have it with us here.

    18 MR. KEHOE: We can continue and I will read

    19 it into the record, and we can go back on it, if need

    20 be.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. Brigadier, what I'm reading to you is Article

    23 3 from the Narodni List, published on the 3rd of July,

    24 1992.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Which came from where? Narodni

  53. 1 List, I see it.

    2 MR. KEHOE: It's called the National Gazette,

    3 they call it the Narodni Lists.

    4 Q. Article 3: "Every citizen of the Croatian

    5 community of Herceg-Bosna shall have the duty to

    6 protect and defend the independence and territorial

    7 integrity of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna;

    8 and therefore, the obligation to: One, serve in the

    9 army; two, perform compulsory work service; three,

    10 participate in Civil Defence; four, participate in

    11 monitoring and reporting services; five, be subject to

    12 requisition."

    13 Are you familiar with that aspect of the law,

    14 Brigadier?

    15 A. I remember that there was a regulation. I

    16 think that it was called something, a decree on the

    17 armed forces of Herceg-Bosna. However, this document

    18 was compiled as a foundation for the organisation and

    19 structure of the army which we wanted to establish and

    20 build.

    21 In accordance, on the basis of this document,

    22 you saw that a number of other documents were drafted

    23 both by Mr. Blaskic and others in order to accomplish

    24 this goal. But the situation on the ground was indeed

    25 as I presented it, and I think that you will find the

  54. 1 documents drafted by Colonel Blaskic, which I believe

    2 have already been tendered here, where he refers to the

    3 voluntariness should be abolished, that these decrees

    4 should be implemented and so on and so forth.

    5 However, in order to implement such a law,

    6 this law is a foundation, but you needed instruments,

    7 instrument of a state. We did not have this state.

    8 So this was a process of establishing an army

    9 in wartime conditions. You had a war against the army

    10 of Republika Srpska, in comparison to which we were

    11 poorly armed, and then, despite this law, people would

    12 show up and wanted to join. They showed up at the

    13 local headquarters.

    14 So, this initial principle of voluntariness

    15 was gradually diminishing. People realised that it is

    16 not just a simple thing to go to war, because people

    17 were dying in the war.

    18 Another aspect which contributed to this

    19 situation is that we also mentioned that there were

    20 instances of crime that, for instance, we had a

    21 situation that somebody went to the front-line at Jajce,

    22 and criminals would then operate and they would simply

    23 take some property or things like that.

    24 So, what you're referring to, this was a

    25 framework for establishment of a military which we

  55. 1 wanted to have, which we desired to have; but I said

    2 that, I mentioned the reasons why we did not have this.

    3 I also mentioned that one of the principles

    4 of the organisation of the HVO was this voluntariness,

    5 and we had this situation that, let's say a soldier

    6 spent ten days at the front-line, and because of the

    7 needs, three days later he would need to go again. But

    8 he refused, he says let's send someone else.

    9 So this is a real situation which is hard to

    10 comprehend unless a person was really there in the

    11 theatre, to see how things were.

    12 Q. Based on this article, and based on this law,

    13 on the 3rd of July, 1992, compulsory military service

    14 was introduced into Herceg-Bosna; was it not?

    15 A. If this is what is written in this document,

    16 then that is the case, but I do not have the document

    17 in front of me.

    18 Q. Well, we have it now in this BCS Article 3.

    19 THE REGISTRAR: The document here that is 36A

    20 of the Prosecutor, if that's the one you want to show.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, it is.

    22 We can move ahead, Mr. President, and come

    23 back to that particular point on that.

    24 INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Here it is, okay.

  56. 1 Q. Now, Brigadier, based on that article, my

    2 question is: Was compulsory military service

    3 introduced?

    4 A. On the basis of this article, yes, the

    5 conscription is mandatory. As I wanted to point out,

    6 we could not have established the HVO on no basis, but

    7 everything that is mentioned here, all the provisions,

    8 were envisaged as a basic document for the

    9 establishment of an organisation that would be as good

    10 as possible under the circumstances in a given time.

    11 Q. Blaskic implemented conscription right away;

    12 didn't he?

    13 A. No.

    14 Q. Let me show you --

    15 A. Apologies, when we talk about conscription,

    16 we have to be very specific, because conscription has

    17 two meanings. So, could you please specify which

    18 aspect of conscription you have in mind?

    19 Q. Well, did he, based on this principle,

    20 immediately implement the compulsory military service

    21 component and abolish the voluntary principle?

    22 A. General Blaskic or Colonel Blaskic was not

    23 authorised for this work. This was a kind of

    24 competence of the territorial staff of the defence

    25 department at municipal levels. I was working in such

  57. 1 an office at one time, so I am familiar with this. If

    2 these instruments existed, then such a person can

    3 conscript of a particular individual and if this

    4 individual does not respond to it, he could be

    5 prosecuted.

    6 If on the second notice, this individual does

    7 not appear, then the case may be sent from the defence

    8 office down to the civilian police and they would then

    9 issue a warrant for arrest. But when a person is

    10 finally in the uniform, then he is under the authority

    11 of a Commander and as soon as he takes off his uniform,

    12 he is a civilian again. I know this very well because

    13 I worked in such an office of defence for five years.

    14 I was running such an office.

    15 Q. Let's take a look at Defence Exhibit 199,

    16 which is dated the 10th of May, 1992, some two months

    17 prior, or almost two months prior, to the actual decree

    18 coming down. This is the 10th of May, 1992, order,

    19 introduced by the Defence, signed by the Colonel,

    20 Blaskic.

    21 Now, Brigadier, you, when you were being

    22 questioned on direct examination, you focused namely on

    23 No. 1, but I would like you to read No. 7. Now, I

    24 remind you that this is the 10th of May, 1992, and the

    25 actual decree in acting come compulsory military

  58. 1 service was the 3rd of July; nevertheless, on the 10th

    2 of May, 1992, at Point 7, Blaskic says as follows:

    3 "I forbid all persons, subject to military

    4 conscription, in the Kiseljak municipality, as well as

    5 other civilians who may be needed by the armed forces

    6 of the HVO or armed formations of the HVO, to leave the

    7 borders of the municipality without permission of the

    8 HVO. Commanders of the military police units are

    9 personally responsible for the execution of this

    10 task."

    11 Do you see that, sir?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Let's turn to another document. If I may,

    14 this is not a document that has been received in

    15 evidence yet. This is a document where, apparently,

    16 the translation section or I couldn't actually read the

    17 actual date because it has a stamp on there, but it is

    18 in May 1992, signed by Colonel Blaskic.

    19 THE REGISTRAR: This is 479, 479A for the

    20 French version; B for the English version.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. Now, Brigadier, on the order itself -- I'm

    23 sorry, just move the next one to the ELMO. That's it.

    24 Do you recognise that stamp or that

    25 signature?

  59. 1 A. As far as I can see, this is a stamp from

    2 Kiseljak, which I am not familiar with and a signature

    3 I am not familiar with either. Somebody signed this on

    4 behalf of the person whose name is typed there. I

    5 don't recognise the signature though.

    6 Q. Well, the person's name who is typed there is

    7 Tihomir Blaskic, is it not? Or Tiho Blaskic?

    8 A. It is not clearly legible, but from the four

    9 letters that I can make out, you could infer that it is

    10 Tihomir Blaskic.

    11 Q. Let's read it, sir. "Due to the fact that

    12 the barracks in Kiseljak need to be put in order, in a

    13 quicker and more efficient way and taking into

    14 consideration the possibility of engaging persons

    15 eligible for military service who have not yet been

    16 called up, I am issuing the following order:

    17 1. A certain number of persons eligible for

    18 military service is to be engaged in labour units.

    19 2. Labour units will carry out their

    20 activities in a planned and organised manner from 09.00

    21 to 17.00 according to the plan of engagement.

    22 3. Women can be engaged in labour units on a

    23 voluntary basis."

    24 Then it talks about units, the composition

    25 and the transportation and who was going to organise

  60. 1 it.

    2 Do you see that, sir?

    3 A. Yes, I do see it.

    4 Q. Now, we noted before in the article that's

    5 before you, that the actual order for compulsory

    6 military service was issued on the 3rd of July, 1992.

    7 I ask you to take a look at Exhibit 456/94.

    8 Now, Brigadier, this is a document of Colonel

    9 Blaskic. It says, "Regional staff Central Bosnia with

    10 Gornij Vakuf, Strictly confidential, No. 93/92, 4 July

    11 1992.

    12 On the basis of the announcements and reports

    13 of the Operative Zone commanders of 3 July, 1992, and

    14 in order to improve the combat readiness of the Central

    15 Bosnia HVO units, I hereby issue the following order:

    16 And go down to number 3, sir.

    17 "According to the needs of the HVO armed

    18 forces, municipal staff, the principle of compulsory

    19 service is introduced and the voluntary principle is

    20 abolished."

    21 That should be number 2, I apologise.

    22 "According to the needs of the armed force

    23 municipal staff, the principle of compulsory military

    24 service is introduced and the voluntary principle is

    25 abolished for all those aged between 18 and 55 who are

  61. 1 liable for military service."

    2 Do you see that, sir?

    3 A. Yes, I do see it.

    4 Q. By the way, sir, staying with that order, if

    5 you could turn to No. 6. No. 6 states that it's an

    6 order to intensify propaganda activities in order to

    7 boost morale and create a sense of insecurity in the

    8 enemy.

    9 Is that a normal thing for a commander to do,

    10 order that propaganda activities should be boosted?

    11 A. In a situation when you are facing a much

    12 more powerful enemy and in considering the time when

    13 this document was drafted and this was the army of

    14 Republika Srpska and it is well established what their

    15 strength was in comparison to both the BH army and the

    16 HVO. When you have the battles at Kupres, Livno and

    17 Ravno, then you could do anything to lift the morale

    18 and this task makes sense in that context.

    19 Q. Blaskic put himself in charge of the

    20 propaganda activities, didn't he?

    21 A. No. Within the Operative Zone command there

    22 was information, a propaganda department. That means

    23 that people who were tasked with informing the soldiers

    24 through their representatives of the events, what was

    25 going on, what steps were taken, whether it was going

  62. 1 to be harder the next day or easier. In military

    2 terms, this was done precisely in the way that General

    3 Blaskic did here.

    4 Q. Well, nevertheless, going back to Point 2 in

    5 this order, clearly Blaskic orders compulsory military

    6 service and abolishes the voluntary principle.

    7 Now, let me show you yet another order of

    8 Colonel Blaskic. This is dated the 19th of September,

    9 1992. Mr. Usher?

    10 THE REGISTRAR: This is Document 480; 480A

    11 for the English version.

    12 MR. KEHOE:

    13 Q. Now this is an order, is it not, Brigadier,

    14 the 19th of September, 1992, by Colonel Blaskic, coming

    15 from the Central Bosnia Operative Zone, does he sign

    16 that, sir?

    17 A. Yes, this is General Blaskic's signature.

    18 Q. In No. 6, we'll read the preparatory

    19 paragraph and then move to No. 6. You're welcome to

    20 read the entire document, naturally. But on the basis

    21 of reports, a proposal by members of the headquarters,

    22 a personal review of the situation on the field and

    23 following an evaluation with the purpose of rectifying

    24 mistakes I order:

    25 This goes to the municipal headquarters

  63. 1 Commander.

    2 "Submit a list of people eligible for the

    3 military who left the municipality on their own

    4 initiative."

    5 Do you see that, sir? Do you see that

    6 Brigadier?

    7 A. Yes, yes.

    8 Q. To implementing the compulsory service in

    9 July, you would agree with me that Blaskic is trying to

    10 go after potential conscripts who have left the area;

    11 isn't he?

    12 A. I cannot agree with you that General Blaskic

    13 could introduce the obligatory military service. This

    14 is something prescribed by the state. The documents

    15 that we have reviewed just now and which were issued

    16 before the decree on the armed forces of Herceg-Bosna

    17 and the decree on the armed forces of Herceg-Bosna came

    18 into being as a document that were not based on

    19 anything before that. Because, before the

    20 establishment of Herceg-Bosna, there was a military

    21 service obligation. The obligation to provide material

    22 resources and all the other obligations. So, actually,

    23 the law that was in effect until then was taken over.

    24 On those grounds, all the documents were drafted, which

    25 the Commander of the Operative Zone or the Commander in

  64. 1 Kiseljak issued before the publication of the decree on

    2 the armed forces of the Croatian community of

    3 Herceg-Bosna.

    4 But in the preamble of each of these

    5 documents, reference is made to what preceded it.

    6 Because we must realise that we couldn't wait for the

    7 decree on the armed forces to stop the army of

    8 Republika Srpska at Livno, Kupres, Jajce and Ravno and

    9 so on. Before any such document was issued, the army

    10 of Republika Srpska attacked Ravno, Sarajevo and all

    11 those other places, so no commander could wait. He had

    12 to do what he could in view of the difficult

    13 circumstances. So that commanders with experience and

    14 being aware of the legal regulations in force in the

    15 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued such orders.

    16 Because the defence departments that existed in the

    17 municipalities were functioning and operating on the

    18 basis of the legal regulations of the Republic of

    19 Bosnia and Herzegovina until the regulations of the

    20 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna were passed.

    21 Q. What date is this order that is before you,

    22 Brigadier? What date is it?

    23 A. The 19th of September.

    24 Q. That's over two months after the decree was

    25 passed ordering compulsory service, isn't it?

  65. 1 A. I tried to be precise in my answer. All the

    2 orders that were issued before the decree was passed,

    3 the decree of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna

    4 emanated from the existing regulations of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, if a decree was issued before

    6 this document that I have before me, then this document

    7 was based on that decree. I am ready to answer any

    8 specific question regarding this order in front of me.

    9 But could those questions be clear? Because I am very

    10 familiar with these matters and I may be of use.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me, Brigadier, but the

    12 question was a very precise one. This decree, this

    13 document, came two months after the decree. So I am

    14 here to regulate the overall hearings. The question

    15 was very precise. You can't always say that the

    16 question was not precise. The question was very

    17 precise. This order is dated 19th of September, '92,

    18 two months after the decree. The question was very

    19 precise. You can just say that you don't know.

    20 MR. KEHOE:

    21 Q. Let's turn to the next document, Brigadier,

    22 Exhibit 456/81 dated 7th of October, 1992.

    23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    24 MR. KEHOE: If I could ask for 456/3, I think

    25 we can move through these documents more quickly, Mr.

  66. 1 President. We're looking at, the first one is 456/81

    2 and the next one is 456/3.

    3 Q. Now, Brigadier, the document that's in your

    4 hands, again another document that is sent by packet by

    5 Colonel Blaskic is dated the 7th of October, 1992,

    6 three months after the compulsory service was enacted.

    7 I turn your attention -- and again you're welcome to

    8 read the entire document -- I turn your attention to

    9 Point 3 where Blaskic orders:

    10 "Commanders of the municipal headquarters of

    11 Kakanj and Kresevo must bring along as well, a copy of

    12 the order, call up order, regarding conscripts and

    13 their departure to the front-line."

    14 He references the Narodni List, No. 1, page

    15 60, regarding failure and refusal to carry out orders.

    16 Now, he is ordering commanders in Kakanj and Kresevo to

    17 bring a list of conscripts, isn't he?

    18 A. Yes, he is ordering that because we were

    19 already having a problem with the response to the call

    20 up and going to the front-line. He is referring to the

    21 regulation on the basis of which certain measures can

    22 be taken by competent defence departments and that the

    23 Brigade should show them those regulations.

    24 Q. Let's talk about that. Let's turn to the

    25 next document, which is 456/3, which is dated 11

  67. 1 November, 1992. Again, a packet communication, and I

    2 direct your attention to 21 and 23. Now, is this a

    3 packet communication, sir?

    4 A. It doesn't say packet communications, but

    5 judging by the appearance of the document, it probably

    6 arrived through packet communications.

    7 Q. Okay. Let's just read this, sir. Beginning

    8 with the preparatory language and then we'll move

    9 directly to paragraph 21 and 23 respectively:

    10 "In view of the current military situation

    11 in Central Bosnia Operative Zone, which was considered

    12 in detail at a meeting held 6th November of 1992. A

    13 subsequent discussion of the gentleman present with the

    14 aim of strengthening defence and consolidating forces,

    15 I hereby order:

    16 21. The conscripts who refuse to be sent to

    17 the front are to be disarmed and brought to the

    18 appropriate command under the jurisdiction of the

    19 regional military police.

    20 23. A list of conscripts who work abroad is

    21 to be made in the HVO government decision on donations

    22 where defence is to be implemented."

    23 Now, Blaskic, in the order that we saw on the

    24 4th of July, implements the compulsory conscription.

    25 He asks his commanders for lists of conscripts. In

  68. 1 this order, he wants a list of conscripts who are

    2 outside the country, doesn't he?

    3 A. Yes. He is asking his commanders and those

    4 commanders will address themselves to the defence

    5 departments because those departments were aware of the

    6 movement of military conscripts because they kept

    7 records of all military conscripts within the territory

    8 of a municipality.

    9 Q. Now, this mobilisation continued throughout

    10 1992 and throughout 1993 and throughout the entire time

    11 Blaskic was in as the commander of the Central Bosnia

    12 Operative Zone, didn't it?

    13 A. Yes. We never managed fully to engage all

    14 potential military conscripts who were listed in the

    15 records of the municipalities, and we didn't for

    16 reasons visible from these documents. Some people were

    17 abroad before the war, never came back. Some people

    18 afraid of the war fled. We have such people in the

    19 west living as refugees. General Blaskic, whose duty

    20 was to set up an organisation and to have insight into

    21 the potential effectives he had at his disposal, so he

    22 searched for information of this kind in this way.

    23 However, from the first part of this

    24 document, it can be seen that a decision to issue it

    25 was made at a meeting, but we can't see whether

  69. 1 representatives of the civilian authorities, the

    2 political authorities, were present. But I assume that

    3 all the tasks assigned in this order were agreed upon

    4 at that meeting, so that all the responsible

    5 institutions who were operational at the time would

    6 recognise their responsibilities. Then this order went

    7 to the commanders so that they would know what

    8 decisions had been taken at the meeting and also to be

    9 able to refer to this document when contacting the

    10 defence departments with which they cooperated.

    11 Q. Well, Brigadier, the bottom line is that

    12 service in the HVO was compulsory; correct?

    13 A. Yes. That was stated in the decree. I said

    14 that and I am not denying it, nor can it be denied.

    15 This was stated in the decree. But the situation

    16 underground was such as you can see within two or three

    17 months you had to issue five orders in order to try to

    18 implement that. We didn't manage to implement it even

    19 when the Washington Accords were signed because the

    20 situation as it was.

    21 Q. Mr. President, it's about two minutes to one

    22 and I am about to shift into another subject area.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, we'll resume with

    24 that new subject at 2.30.

    25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.

  70. 1 --- On resuming at 2.38 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed, please

    3 have the accused brought in, and the witness.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 (The witness entered court)

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, Mr. Kehoe.

    7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, thank you, Your Honours,

    8 very much.

    9 Q. Brigadier, good afternoon.

    10 A. Good afternoon.

    11 Q. Now, Brigadier, just a couple more questions

    12 on this voluntariness issue that you discussed during

    13 your direct examination with Mr. Nobilo. You noted

    14 that that voluntariness issue also permeated the

    15 military police, because there were no standards for

    16 the military police; do you recall that testimony?

    17 A. Regarding the military police, I said that

    18 they joined voluntarily, which meant that young men who

    19 wanted to join the military police would report to

    20 military police commanders in their place of residence,

    21 and they would join the military police.

    22 There was no special selection or any

    23 standards that would impose certain requirements that

    24 you had to fulfil to become a member of the military

    25 police.

  71. 1 Q. What you said was that the member of the

    2 military police came on a voluntary basis and there

    3 were no criteria established for someone to become a

    4 member of the military police.

    5 I'm reading page 12.080, and I ask you to

    6 take a look at the next exhibit, sir. With the

    7 assistance of the usher, it's right here. One of those

    8 rare occasions.

    9 THE REGISTRAR: Document 481, 481A for the

    10 English version.

    11 MR. KEHOE: Again, I apologise there is no

    12 French, Mr. President, but that's in translation, as

    13 well, or will be.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Brigadier, do you know Zvonko Vukovic?

    16 A. I do know Zvonko Vukovic.

    17 Q. Who was Zvonko Vukovic, as it relates to the

    18 military police, for the 4th Military Police Battalion?

    19 A. Zvonko Vukovic was a military police

    20 commander. I cannot tell you exactly from when until

    21 when.

    22 Q. Well, Zvonko Vukovic was ultimately replaced

    23 by Pasko Ljubicic; isn't that right?

    24 A. As far as I recall, yes.

    25 Q. Let's turn the page -- well, actually, you're

  72. 1 looking at it, you see the stamp in the lower

    2 right-hand corner?

    3 A. This is the incoming stamp. As far as I can

    4 remember, this is not the incoming stamp of the

    5 Operative Zone command; but as the police had its own

    6 communications system, this was probably the incoming

    7 stamp of the police, or the HVO in Travnik. So, I'm

    8 not quite sure whose incoming stamp this is.

    9 Q. This is also another communication that

    10 appears to be sent by the packet communication system;

    11 isn't that correct?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Well, let's read this document, Brigadier.

    14 It's dated 11th of January, 1993, and it's addressed to

    15 HVO military police stations in the municipalities of

    16 Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Zenica, Busovaca,

    17 Kresevo, Kiseljak, Fojnica, Vares, and Kakanj. It

    18 reads as follows:

    19 "As part of the reorganisation project of

    20 the military police in the Croatian community of

    21 Herceg-Bosna, we are about to form special purpose

    22 units of the military police. In order for all the

    23 regions of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna to be

    24 equally represented in these units, you are hereby

    25 requested to propose five of your members for this

  73. 1 purpose, before 15 January, 1993.

    2 The members are to become full-time employees

    3 of the military police and will carry out their duties

    4 throughout the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna.

    5 Temporary headquarters of these will be in Capljina.

    6 Requirements for admission: Secondary school

    7 education; maximum age 30; membership in the HVO prior

    8 to the announcement of general mobilisation for June

    9 1992; completion of the military police or regular

    10 police training; prior service as a military policeman

    11 in the former JNA or a member of its special units.

    12 The following data should be submitted for

    13 each candidate who meets the above requirements: Name,

    14 father's name, and surname, date of birth, place and

    15 municipality of birth, residence address, education and

    16 speciality, rank and military record in the JNA,

    17 information on all training completed so far, date of

    18 joining the Croatian army, HV or the HVO, name of all

    19 the units in which the candidate has served since

    20 joining the HV or the HVO, commanders opinion on

    21 performance up until now. Please observe the

    22 deadline."

    23 Now, sir, this is the setting up of the unit

    24 known within the military police, known as the Jokeri,

    25 or the Jokers; isn't that right?

  74. 1 A. One could not confirm that on the basis of

    2 this document, because that is not stated in this

    3 document, that it has to do with the Jokers; but it

    4 does refer to the organisation of a professional

    5 military police, as is stated here.

    6 When I was making my testimony and said that

    7 people joined the military police on a voluntary basis,

    8 this applied to the police at the level of the

    9 municipality. But you see here that the commander is

    10 addressing the police at the level of municipal police

    11 bodies, asking for candidates; so, we're talking about

    12 professional military policemen.

    13 Q. Would you agree with me, Brigadier, that for

    14 the special purpose units formed within the military

    15 police in January of 1993, significant criteria were

    16 required for the candidates to be admitted into this

    17 special purpose unit? Isn't that so?

    18 A. I don't know which unit was formed on the

    19 11th of January, 1993, because the internal

    20 organisation of the military police is something I'm

    21 not very familiar with; but all I can say is what I can

    22 see from this text, and it says that it is full-time

    23 employment, which means military policemen will be

    24 professionals, and that they will be operating

    25 throughout the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna.

  75. 1 There is no specific mention of the Central Bosnia

    2 Operative Zone.

    3 Q. Well, let me ask you about the Central Bosnia

    4 Operative Zone, Brigadier. There was a special purpose

    5 unit within the 4th Military Police Battalion in

    6 Central Bosnia; wasn't there? Specifically in the

    7 Central Bosnian Operative Zone.

    8 A. As far as I can remember, and I said that I

    9 couldn't discuss the internal structure and

    10 organisation of the military police because I was not

    11 familiar with it. It was not a problem addressed by

    12 the Central Bosnia Operative Zone. I think that it had

    13 about 15 policemen.

    14 How it was formed, what it was transformed

    15 into later on, I cannot tell you exactly, because, I

    16 wish to repeat, the internal structure of the military

    17 police was not within the terms of reference of the

    18 Central Bosnia Operative Zone. As an officer in that

    19 Operative Zone, I did not supervise the military

    20 police, because we had no such authority in relation to

    21 the military police.

    22 But this document says that, refers to the

    23 formation of a professional military police for the

    24 whole area of Herceg-Bosna.

    25 Q. Brigadier, was the Jokeri a special purpose

  76. 1 unit?

    2 A. As far as I know, that is how they were

    3 called. As far as I can remember, there were about 15

    4 military policemen in that unit, but I'm not sure about

    5 these figures, as I have said.

    6 Q. The Jokeri was stationed at the Bungalow on

    7 the road right outside of Ahmici; wasn't it?

    8 A. I know that there was a unit, or a part of

    9 the 4th Battalion in the Bungalow, exactly which unit,

    10 I cannot tell, but I do know that it was a military

    11 police unit. Whether it was the Jokers or something

    12 else, I think there was also a general police and

    13 traffic police; so, I cannot, with certainty, talk

    14 about the structure of the 4th Military Police

    15 Battalion because I am not familiar with it.

    16 This is a structure that was not determined

    17 by the commander of the Operative Zone, but rather the

    18 military police administration attached to the Ministry

    19 of Defence.

    20 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, one moment, I just

    21 want to consult with my colleague.

    22 Q. Brigadier, we would like to move on.

    23 INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    24 MR. KEHOE: I apologise.

    25 Q. We can move on to a separate subject, and

  77. 1 again, I want to just chat with you for a couple of

    2 moments, Brigadier, about your testimony with

    3 Mr. Nobilo last week.

    4 One of the things that you mentioned was that

    5 you noted, and this is on page 12.074, that one of the

    6 problems you had with the troops was that there was no

    7 real facilities. You said on line 7 on 12.074 that,

    8 "it was very difficult because of the lack of proper

    9 facilities, to build proper military discipline."

    10 Then you went on to say on -- excuse me,

    11 before that, on page 12.067, that "the difficulty with

    12 combat ready forces means personnel in one place in a

    13 barracks which have their duties and are undergoing

    14 training and which are adequately equipped." Do you

    15 remember those statements you said about the lack of

    16 proper facilities, having some difficulty in training

    17 your people and keeping control over the troops? Do

    18 you remember that?

    19 A. Yes, I remember that, and today the HVO has

    20 certain problems with facilities and accommodation.

    21 Q. Let me show you a document, sir.

    22 THE REGISTRAR: This is 482, 482A for the

    23 English version.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Brigadier, this is a decree signed by the

  78. 1 president of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna on

    2 the 3rd of July, 1992, where the Croatian community of

    3 Herceg-Bosna took over all the JNA facilities. Let's

    4 read this: "Pursuant to Article 7 of the decision on

    5 establishing the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna of

    6 18 November, 1991, the presidency of the Croatian

    7 community of Herceg-Bosna at its session --"

    8 A. Excuse me, I do not have that document in

    9 front of me.

    10 MR. NOBILO: We also have a different

    11 document.

    12 A. I have the document numbered 482.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: I think there is a problem

    14 here. We have to look at the date in the

    15 Serbo-Croatian version, and the date on the third line.

    16 MR. KEHOE: Your Honour, it's part of the

    17 Narodni Lists that are in evidence in Exhibits 36, 37

    18 and 38, and I can read the English and withdraw that

    19 exhibit, and I can point to the place in the Narodni

    20 List where it exists already.

    21 MR. KEHOE:

    22 Q. Let me read this to you, Brigadier.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Just a second, Mr. Kehoe. I

    24 think what Mr. Nobilo is saying is that the text in BCS

    25 and the English text that I have don't seem to match.

  79. 1 MR. NOBILO: If the Narodni List is going to

    2 be read from, could the witness please be shown the

    3 entire document from which it is going to be read?

    4 MR. KEHOE: We will find it at the break,

    5 Brigadier. Let me ask you a question just about the

    6 JNA facilities.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: If you allow me, for the

    8 transcript, it would be better to clarify the situation

    9 so we know what number we're going to use for which

    10 document, because there are two documents that don't

    11 match.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, your intention,

    13 apparently, was to confront the witness with a decree

    14 which was signed by Mate Boban the 3rd of July, 1992;

    15 is that what you intended to do?

    16 MR. KEHOE: That's correct, Mr. President.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: If that is your intention, then

    18 you have to find the Serbo-Croatian text for this

    19 document which has the number 482.

    20 MR. KEHOE: I will do that, Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. Let me ask you a question about the JNA

    24 facilities. Did the HVO take over the JNA facilities

    25 in Central Bosnia?

  80. 1 A. The situation regarding facilities of the

    2 former JNA in the area of Central Bosnia was as

    3 follows: The Travnik barracks, which was held by the

    4 former JNA, was liberated jointly by the HVO and the BH

    5 army units.

    6 After the control was taken of this barracks,

    7 I cannot say who it was initially, but after the fall

    8 of Kotor Varos in Jajce, I know the refugees were

    9 accommodated there, and units of both the BH army and

    10 the HVO from Kotor Varos.

    11 Due to the proximity of the lines with the

    12 army of the Republika Srpska and the potential danger

    13 of being shelled, we did not use these barracks. After

    14 the attack against HVO by the BH army, this barracks

    15 came under control of the BH army.

    16 The facility of the former JNA in Kaonik, and

    17 another one in the Busovaca municipality, were depots

    18 and Kaonik, even to date, these facilities are not

    19 properly outfitted for accommodating the army.

    20 Then the third facility of the former JNA was

    21 in Kiseljak municipality. I know that this was not a

    22 large facility, and I know that these barracks, during

    23 the war, the units, or the special purposes unit of

    24 Kiseljak were accommodated there.

    25 Further, there was barracks in Zenica which

  81. 1 also were liberated, jointly, by the BH army and the

    2 HVO units, and then later on it was completely taken

    3 over by the BH army. Then there was another depot at

    4 Slimena, and it was a facility which was used

    5 exclusively as a weapons and equipment depots.

    6 All these facilities were liberated jointly

    7 by the HVO and the BH army. Some of these facilities

    8 were destroyed at the pull out and some of them were

    9 mined, and the HVO did not make any use of that. These

    10 facilities were all in the zone of responsibility of

    11 the Central Bosnia Operative Zone, and I believe that I

    12 have not omitted any of them.

    13 In these circumstances we did not have a

    14 potential to keep troops there to train them, and due

    15 to this lack of such facilities, we were using school

    16 buildings and similar facilities, we improvised and we

    17 could not accommodate significant forces there.

    18 In these conditions a number of these

    19 facilities were, therefore, not in use; but the

    20 military organisation continued to keep their troops in

    21 the villages from where people were recruited to go to

    22 the defence lines. This was one of the problems,

    23 because people did not like to go to the barracks.

    24 Even if we had them, it would have been difficult to

    25 keep people in them.

  82. 1 Had we had them where we could have brought

    2 people and trained them there, we would have done so,

    3 but you have to keep one thing in mind: The shelling

    4 was always possible, both by the air force and by the

    5 artillery, which was in possession of the army of the

    6 Republika Srpska, and this was at all times.

    7 Q. Brigadier, who took the Kaonik camp, the JNA

    8 facility at Kaonik on the Busovaca T junction? Who

    9 took that? HVO?

    10 A. The Kaonik facility, which is at that T

    11 junction, was taken over by the Busovaca HVO, and this

    12 was another facility which was a depot which did not

    13 have a potential for accommodating larger armed force.

    14 Because the former JNA had also not used it for

    15 training of soldiers who were serving in the former

    16 JNA.

    17 Q. Who took the Draga barracks; the HVO?

    18 A. I said that the Draga barracks were taken

    19 over by the HVO, but the facility is such that it is

    20 exclusively a depot. Even to date, it is used by the

    21 HVO. But even to date, we cannot accommodate the

    22 troops, the parts of the 3rd Guard Corps, because these

    23 are specifically warehouse facilities.

    24 Q. There was a facility that you didn't talk

    25 about that's near your hometown of Novi Travnik and

  83. 1 that's the JNA facility at Stojkovici, the HVO took

    2 that as well, didn't they?

    3 A. Yes, I forget that. It is a facility -- it

    4 is a logistics base and this facility was designated by

    5 the former JNA for storage of larger quantities of

    6 fuel. So this again is a special use facility where, I

    7 think, that not even 100 people can be accommodated, so

    8 this is again a depot.

    9 Q. The HVO used the JNA facility at Stojkovici

    10 as a communication centre, didn't they?

    11 A. I do not know that, so I cannot speak to

    12 that. I do not know. Maybe because there are some

    13 underground facilities, it was used as a protection

    14 from potential shelling or air attacks from the army

    15 of Republika Srpska.

    16 Q. Now Kiseljak, as we move down to the road,

    17 Kiseljak, the largest former JNA facility was in the

    18 Kiseljak barracks; isn't that right?

    19 A. I'm sorry, the largest in relation to what?

    20 For instance, the barracks in Sarajevo are the

    21 largest. So, if you can tell me what to compare it to.

    22 Q. Well, the Kiseljak barracks, the former JNA

    23 facility at the Kiseljak barracks, the HVO took that

    24 facility as well; isn't that right?

    25 A. The HVO took over this facility and I said

  84. 1 that as far as I know, as early as wartime, this was

    2 used by Maturice or whatever this special purpose unit

    3 was called in Kiseljak.

    4 Q. Well, it was used by Blaskic too, wasn't it?

    5 A. In this barracks, in one of the buildings

    6 there, and I don't know, I didn't go there at that

    7 time. It could have been the Brigade command. I did

    8 not go to Kiseljak when the commander at Kiseljak was

    9 General Blaskic. I was in Novi Travnik at that time

    10 and I was not in the Operative Zone command at that

    11 time, so I cannot speak to that.

    12 Q. Well, Brigadier, you told us during fighting

    13 in and around Busovaca in January and February that

    14 Blaskic was in Kiseljak and that you were communicating

    15 with him in the Kiseljak barracks; isn't that right?

    16 A. Yes, he was in Kiseljak at that time in

    17 1993. That was that Kiseljak already had a Brigade and

    18 it had its command post there in Kiseljak. But I told

    19 you first that I did not know where the municipal

    20 headquarters in Kiseljak was and we saw from certain

    21 documents that this was when General Blaskic was

    22 commander there.

    23 Q. The bottom line, Brigadier, is that in

    24 addition to the units you were talking about, Colonel

    25 Blaskic used the Kiseljak barracks too, didn't he?

  85. 1 MR. HAYMAN: Has this been asked and

    2 answered, Mr. President?

    3 JUDGE JORDA: No, Mr. Hayman. I'm sorry to

    4 have to tell you that we're not getting an answer. I

    5 don't accept your intervention, Mr. Hayman. The

    6 witness is contradicting himself, you know that.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Well, Mr. President --

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Please don't continue going

    9 down that line of comments. I do understand that

    10 Mr. Kehoe is going back to that issue, I understand.

    11 We don't know whether the relationship with what was

    12 before, we don't know what that was. We know he was in

    13 Kiseljak, but not at that time, maybe not that

    14 barracks. We can understand that these are questions

    15 that the Prosecutor want to know from someone who was

    16 in such an important position. Ask your question

    17 again, Mr. Kehoe, the Judges need to know. I would ask

    18 the witness to make special efforts to jog his memory.

    19 Work on this please, General. You're bound

    20 to do so by the text of the Tribunal. You cannot

    21 remember all kinds of things when you're the defence

    22 witness and no, for every question that's asked you,

    23 say, you don't know or not aware of it. I really very

    24 firmly have to commit you to answering completely the

    25 questions that are asked, otherwise the Judges are

  86. 1 going to have to ask you the questions.

    2 Ask your question again, Mr. Kehoe.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. Brigadier, Colonel Blaskic used the Kiseljak

    5 barracks during his work, didn't he?

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Can we have a time, Mr.

    7 President? That's why there is confusion here.

    8 General Blaskic was in Kiseljak in the summer of '92.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, the question was

    10 not asked of you, the question was asked of the

    11 witness.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: The time, Your Honours.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Let the witness answer instead

    14 of you, Mr. Hayman.

    15 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, Your Honours, in

    16 1992, at the time when General Blaskic was Commander of

    17 the Kiseljak municipal headquarters, and I do not know

    18 the exact time frame, I do not know whether during that

    19 period his command post was in the Kiseljak barracks.

    20 When we established a Brigade, which was the end of

    21 1992, I know that the command of the Ban Jelacic

    22 Brigade was in the Kiseljak barracks.

    23 In 1993, that is after the January conflict,

    24 between the BH army and the HVO in the territory of the

    25 Busovaca and Kiseljak municipality, the then Commander

  87. 1 of the Operative Zone, Tihomir Blaskic, was in the

    2 Kiseljak barracks at the post of the Operative Zone

    3 Commander. Now, which forces were there at that time,

    4 I am unable to tell you.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. Well, in January, Brigadier, when you were

    7 sending fax communications to Colonel Blaskic, where

    8 did you send them in Kiseljak?

    9 A. We were -- that is when we send them through

    10 the packet system and by fax, while General Blaskic was

    11 in Kiseljak, we sent it to the command post of the Ban

    12 Jelacic Brigade.

    13 Q. Now, you noted previously that one of the

    14 reasons that you didn't do training in the barracks was

    15 because you were afraid of Bosnian Serb shelling; is

    16 that right?

    17 A. That was the reason that I refer to only the

    18 Travnik barracks, which we were using jointly with the

    19 BH army. After the fall of Jajce, after the fall of

    20 Kotor Varos, after the BH and the HVO units from

    21 Kotor Varos, along with the refugees, arrived, we were

    22 unable to use this facility because these people, these

    23 people and these soldiers who arrived from those areas

    24 were accommodated there from the territory which was

    25 taken by the units of the Bosnian Serb army.

  88. 1 Q. But during the conflict in January, the

    2 Kiseljak barracks was safe enough for the Commander of

    3 the Central Bosnia Operative Zone to work from; wasn't

    4 it?

    5 A. Yes. The Commander probably did work at that

    6 command post. I do not know all his movements over a

    7 24 hour period while he was staying in Kiseljak.

    8 Q. Before we move to the next subject, Mr.

    9 President, consistent with the Court's request, we do

    10 have the Mate Boban order in French and English. We

    11 haven't quite collated it, however, here is the BCS

    12 version and here is the French version.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: This is Document 482 in BSC

    14 version, B is the French version and 482A is the

    15 English version as was assigned a short while back.

    16 MR. KEHOE:

    17 Q. Looking at 482, Brigadier --

    18 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel, microphone,

    19 please.

    20 MR. KEHOE:

    21 Q. Looking at 482, Brigadier, that is, in fact,

    22 the decree of the 3rd of July, 1992, signed by

    23 Mr. Boban on the taking over of the JNA and federal

    24 secretariat of peoples defence material on the

    25 territory of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna and

  89. 1 transforming it into the property of the Croatian

    2 community of Herceg-Bosna.

    3 "Article 1: All social assets on the

    4 territory of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna

    5 that has been as federation assets, administered and

    6 managed by the former JNA and the former SSNO, shall be

    7 taken over and shall become the property of the

    8 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna and social assets

    9 comprise property, money and rights.

    10 Article 2: The Croatian community of

    11 Herceg-Bosna, presidency or an authority authorised by

    12 it, shall allocate assets mentioned in Article 1 of the

    13 present decree.

    14 Article 3: The heads of the defence, legal

    15 and administration departments, shall be authorised to

    16 issue regulations and comment and documents for the

    17 implementation of this decree.

    18 Article 4: The decree shall come into the

    19 effect on the day that it is issued. Signed Mate

    20 Boban, the Presidency of the Croatian community of

    21 Herceg-Bosna. Mostar 3 July, 1992."

    22 Are you aware of that decree, Brigadier?

    23 A. I am not familiar with this decree or this

    24 document. I have, personally, not seen before.

    25 Q. Do you recognise either the stamp or the

  90. 1 signature of Mate Boban?

    2 A. I have heard of President Boban. I have

    3 never met him and I do not know his signature.

    4 However, if I may, I would like to say something

    5 regarding this document. From the position at which I

    6 occupied at the time, this document was drafted, but we

    7 had a situation such as I have described it and along

    8 with the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is the way

    9 things are now. The situation in the entire territory

    10 of the Croatian community was such that it could not

    11 have been implemented everywhere. We, in Central

    12 Bosnia, were unable to implement it fully.

    13 With respect with some facilities of the

    14 former JNA, we had to do in a way which I have just

    15 described a moment ago.

    16 Q. Now, you noted during the course of your

    17 testimony with Mr. Nobilo that you had a difficult time

    18 training your soldiers; is that right?

    19 A. Yes, we did have such difficulties because we

    20 don't have teams of instructors, we did not have the

    21 compounds where we could train.

    22 Q. Well, isn't it true, Brigadier, that by

    23 mid-1992, into the fall of 1992, a rather elaborate

    24 training structure had been set up by the HVO

    25 throughout Bosnia?

  91. 1 A. I do not know this. That was not the case in

    2 Central Bosnia. If I may, all training that was done

    3 was conducted with small arms. We had different types

    4 of small arms, which was used by the infantry. If a

    5 soldier had not handled such a weapon during his

    6 regular military service, we would conduct special

    7 training and we would, typically, do it a day or two

    8 before he would go out to the front-lines so that he

    9 would be able to actually use it at the line of

    10 defence. We would prevent incidents so that he would

    11 not mishandle this weapon. But at the level of platoon

    12 company and battalions, this would be the tactical type

    13 of training we did not have time for and we did not

    14 have conditions for such training.

    15 Q. Let's explore that a little, Brigadier. Let

    16 me first show you a film that was filmed, Mr.

    17 President, by ITN, in October of 1992, in the

    18 Tomislavgrad area. If we could just dim the lights and

    19 put this particular film on. It's about five minutes

    20 long, Mr. President.

    21 (Videotape played)

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Dim the lights, please.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Could you dim the lights,

    24 please.

    25 (Videotape played).

  92. 1 MR. KEHOE:

    2 Q. Brigadier, are you familiar with any HVO

    3 training facility such as that?

    4 A. You said at the beginning that what we have

    5 just seen was shot in the territory of Tomislavgrad;

    6 this was a municipality within the zone of

    7 responsibility of the Operative Zone of north-western

    8 Herzegovina, and I was not familiar with what was

    9 happening in that Operative Zone.

    10 But, from what we have seen on this clip, it

    11 is visible that it is a reconnaissance sabotage unit,

    12 two platoons in strength; because I did serve in

    13 Tomislavgrad after the Washington Accords, the people

    14 in Tomislavgrad told me they had such a unit which was

    15 within the scope of the Tomislavgrad Brigade in

    16 Tomislavgrad.

    17 This kind of training, and this level of

    18 equipment of troops and units is something that we did

    19 not have in the command of the Operative Zone of

    20 Central Bosnia. The best equipped and best trained

    21 unit in the command of Central Bosnia during the war

    22 was a special purpose unit, the Vitezovi. It was

    23 structured and organised as such. Its organisation and

    24 the equipment of its members was not within the

    25 competence of the Operative Zone command.

  93. 1 The brigades for which we were responsible

    2 and were under our command did not have this kind of

    3 training shown on this clip.

    4 Q. Well, Brigadier, the HVO, in addition to

    5 training in Central Bosnia, sent people to train

    6 elsewhere; didn't they?

    7 A. As far as I can remember, we sent groups, or

    8 perhaps certain servicemen, for training with air

    9 defence devices. Because of the special purpose

    10 industry in Central Bosnia, the air force of the

    11 Bosnian Serbs was constantly shelling this area, so we

    12 would send people to train in Herzegovina, people who

    13 would man the rocket launchers, Maljutkas, and also

    14 some people for reconnaissance training, I think in

    15 Grude.

    16 That's as much as I know about the organised

    17 training undertaken for members of brigades within the

    18 Central Bosnia Operative Zone.

    19 Q. You sent some people to train in Herzegovina

    20 and some reconnaissance people to train in Grude. How

    21 about people to the Republic of Croatia; did the HVO

    22 and Central Bosnia send people to train in the Republic

    23 of Croatia?

    24 A. At the very beginning of 1992, I don't know,

    25 because I said when I joined the command of the

  94. 1 Operative Zone. After the enclave was completely cut

    2 off, we had no chance of going anywhere after that, and

    3 still less to send people to train outside the

    4 territory of the Lasva Valley or Bosnia, because we

    5 needed every man in the trenches.

    6 Q. Well, sir, prior to the outbreak of

    7 activities in Central Bosnia in January of 1993, did

    8 the HVO, to your knowledge, send troops to Croatia to

    9 train?

    10 A. We never sent troops, we sent a group of men,

    11 three, four or five men. I cannot confirm exactly what

    12 kind of training it was. I think it was military

    13 police training, but I'm not quite sure of that.

    14 Q. How many times did Blaskic send groups of men

    15 to train in the Republic of Croatia?

    16 A. From the time I joined the command of the

    17 Operative Zone, and that is the 1st of November, 1992,

    18 I do not remember that we ever sent people for training

    19 to the Republic of Croatia. I do not remember. If

    20 there was such a case, by any chance, it may have been

    21 an individual or a group of three or four people, up to

    22 ten.

    23 Q. Well, when did Blaskic send these individuals

    24 to some type of police training in the Republic of

    25 Croatia? When was that?

  95. 1 A. I cannot claim that General Blaskic sent

    2 these people, because the training of individuals or

    3 groups in military police matters was not conducted

    4 while General Blaskic was commander of the Operative

    5 Zone. If there was any such training, it was through

    6 the military police organisation, so that we, as the

    7 command of the Operative Zone, could not send military

    8 policemen for that kind of training.

    9 Q. Let's take a look at Exhibit 406/23.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Dubuisson, do we have a

    11 number for the film?

    12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, for the video, the

    13 number is 483.

    14 MR. KEHOE: Thank you.

    15 Q. Now, this document, 406, again, a packet

    16 communication from Colonel Tihomir Blaskic, 24 July,

    17 1992, "On the basis of a clear need to create and train

    18 reconnaissance units, I hereby order:

    19 Deploy one squad of men for reconnaissance

    20 operations in every operation zone, i.e., all municipal

    21 headquarters engaged in war operations. Training will

    22 take place in the Republic of Croatia, because specific

    23 tasks are to be carried out. The training will last

    24 ten days.

    25 Each of the following municipal headquarters

  96. 1 shall appoint seven soldiers to the squad; Gornji

    2 Vakuf, Bugojno, Konjic, Jajce, Novi Travnik, Travnik,

    3 Zepce, Zavidovici, Maglaj. Deliver the list of men for

    4 training through a radio packet communications or by

    5 courier by 27 July, 1992 at 1400 hours.

    6 The personnel on the list, i.e. the men

    7 selected for the training, must report in Grude on 30

    8 July 1992 by 1400 hours. The men must present

    9 themselves in the above-mentioned place and time in

    10 full combat gear."

    11 The document in the original BSC has a list

    12 of seven men written down by someone.

    13 Now, are you familiar with this procedure of

    14 sending at least reconnaissance units for training in

    15 the Republic of Croatia?

    16 A. From the heading one can see that the

    17 document was dated the 24th of May, 1992, when I was

    18 not in the Operative Zone, and in my statement before

    19 your question I said that as far as I remember I knew

    20 that groups did go for training.

    21 I know there was mention of Grude, and that

    22 groups of men went there from each of the municipal

    23 headquarters, but I do not know whether people, other

    24 groups, were sent in this way.

    25 We can just see from this that training was

  97. 1 for ten days, and you can judge for yourself whether

    2 ten days is enough to become an expert in

    3 reconnaissance.

    4 MR. NOBILO: Correction, the transcript says

    5 May 1992, but the witness said in July 1992. So, could

    6 the transcript please be corrected?

    7 MR. KEHOE: The witness actually said May,

    8 but the document says July. The witness said May, he

    9 probably just misspoke. I won't quibble about that.

    10 Q. The document says July; doesn't it Brigadier?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The fact of the matter is, the bottom line is

    13 some people, some soldiers from the Central Bosnia

    14 Operative Zone were being sent to Croatia to train.

    15 A. From this document it is clear that these

    16 were individuals and groups who went for such training,

    17 as is stated in this document.

    18 Q. Now, let's then turn to the actual training

    19 of recruits. Now, the individuals that were taken into

    20 the HVO, many of those men had already done national

    21 service in the JNA; isn't that right?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Then there were those that were brought into

    24 the HVO who had not served in the JNA; isn't that

    25 right?

  98. 1 A. Yes, these young men volunteered, as did the

    2 others. They voluntarily joined the HVO units.

    3 Q. I think we established this morning,

    4 Brigadier, that they were all drafted. I mean, there

    5 was conscription and everybody was drafted as a result

    6 of the 3 July, 1992 edict that Blaskic put in effect

    7 the next day; correct?

    8 MR. NOBILO: Objection, that is what the

    9 Prosecutor said, the witness never said that. The

    10 witness said there was a legal basis, he said that

    11 Blaskic gave the order, but that the situation on the

    12 ground differed, so that voluntariness remained the

    13 basic principle. Now the Prosecutor is putting into

    14 the witness's mouth what he believes.

    15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, the record can

    16 speak for itself, we'll just move on.

    17 Q. Let us turn our attention to Exhibit 456/79.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: On what subject,

    19 Mr. Prosecutor, still the same subject?

    20 MR. KEHOE: The same subject, Mr. President,

    21 still on the training of recruits issue.

    22 It should be an order of 20 September, 1992,

    23 Mr. Dubuisson. That's not it. This is it. I'm sorry,

    24 it should be Exhibit 456/79.

    25 Q. Now let us take a look --

  99. 1 INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    2 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    3 Q. Again, take a look at Exhibit 456/79. It,

    4 again, is an order that is signed by the accused, dated

    5 20 September, 1992. Brigadier, I'll read the

    6 preparatory paragraph and then move down to paragraph

    7 number 3.

    8 "Tasks of the Central Bosnia HVO command

    9 headquarters. On the basis of a clear need for a more

    10 expeditious work of an improved quality in September

    11 1992, the following essential tasks are to be carried

    12 out by the appointed time and the person responsible

    13 for the task.

    14 3. The training of new recruits who have not

    15 served in the Yugoslav army is to be basic and

    16 specific; recruit all able-bodied men over 18." The

    17 person responsible for this task was head of operations

    18 and training.

    19 Brigadier, you did not come to the

    20 headquarters until the 1st, or approximately the 1st of

    21 November, 1992, and I take it that your predecessor was

    22 responsible for that. But are you familiar with this

    23 document, sir, and the order to train new recruits who

    24 have not served in the JNA?

    25 A. The document was signed by General Blaskic.

  100. 1 I recognise his signature. The document was issued

    2 before I joined the command of the Operative Zone, but

    3 as far as I know this activity that is ordered under

    4 point three was not carried out in that time.

    5 Q. Well, Brigadier, an entire plan for the

    6 training of recruits was set out by General Petkovic of

    7 the HVO in September of 1992; wasn't it?

    8 A. I remember that plan and programme of

    9 training. I don't know exactly when it was issued.

    10 But I was speaking about the conditions under which we

    11 were working and living in the Operative Zone.

    12 As far as I can recall, this task in the area

    13 of the Lasva Valley, that is the Vitez, Busovaca, Novi

    14 Travnik enclave and a part of the Travnik area, I shall

    15 try and be precise. We partly carried it out in

    16 September 1993, a part of this order, because we were

    17 short of men on the front.

    18 At that time we did carry out what is

    19 referred to in point three under improvised conditions,

    20 where we put up recruits in the elementary school in

    21 Nova Bila. I only recall those activities in that

    22 period of time in 1993.

    23 Q. Brigadier, let me show you, again, Exhibit

    24 456/107, another document that comes from Colonel

    25 Blaskic.

  101. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Would you prefer us to have a

    2 break now, because I see that there is some difficulty

    3 in finding the document? Mr. Dubuisson, have you found

    4 it? Very well, we will have a break immediately after

    5 we examine this document.

    6 MR. KEHOE: That's fine, Judge, thank you.

    7 MR. KEHOE:

    8 Q. Brigadier, you said in the prior exhibit, in

    9 the order of 20 September, 1992, that the training of

    10 recruits was not completed; and we have before us an

    11 Exhibit 456/107, a packet communication from General

    12 Blaskic as of the 19th of November, 1992. It has a

    13 rather elaborate timed training schedule that runs from

    14 0600, getting up in the morning, to callisthenics,

    15 personal hygiene, inspection, one training period, two

    16 training periods, three training periods, four training

    17 periods, five training periods, break for lunch, again,

    18 we train again, in the afternoon after lunch, and then

    19 the seventh training period and recess before taps.

    20 Read the bottom part, and keep in mind your

    21 comment about training in barracks. "This daily

    22 schedule to apply to all barracks, buildings where

    23 members of the armed forces are accommodated in the

    24 Central Bosnia Operative Zone, and barrack commanders

    25 shall adhere to the above schedule."

  102. 1 Now, would you agree with me, Brigadier, that

    2 for a place where no training is going on, this is a

    3 pretty elaborate schedule?

    4 A. Yes, it is an elaborate schedule. As far as

    5 I recall, this was copied from the regulations booklet

    6 of the former Yugoslav People's Army, and this kind of

    7 a timetable exists in any organised army. That was

    8 what we sought to achieve, and we addressed such a

    9 document to our subordinates, so that if they should

    10 find themselves in such a situation they would know how

    11 to behave.

    12 Q. I mean the bottom line, Brigadier, is that

    13 Blaskic ordered that training be done, and training was

    14 being done; isn't that a fact, sir?

    15 A. Training was not done as ordered. I said

    16 when, under what conditions and in what time period

    17 such training was done with recruits in the Lasva

    18 Valley, or rather the Central Bosnia Operative Zone.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, thank you. If

    20 it's convenient for the Court to take a break at this

    21 time, if it's convenient?

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Very well, we will resume work

    23 at a quarter past 4.

    24 --- Recess taken at 3.54

    25 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.

  103. 1 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Have

    2 the accused brought in, please.

    3 (The accused entered court)

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, thank you.

    6 We move to another exhibit. If I could hand this to

    7 the usher. Again, Mr. President, there is no French

    8 translation yet on this document, but we will provide

    9 it. It is a multi-page document, Mr. President, so it

    10 might be difficult to put on the ELMO. Maybe we could

    11 just put the cover sheet.

    12 THE REGISTRAR: 484, 484A for the English

    13 version.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Brigadier, are you familiar with this

    16 training manual that was signed on the cover by General

    17 Milivoj Petkovic?

    18 A. I have seen this kind of plan and programme

    19 in the command of the Operative Zone.

    20 Q. Now, if we just go through it, and we need

    21 not read this whole matter, this is a rather extensive

    22 22-day period, rather extensive programme for a 22-day

    23 period for recruits in the Croatian community of

    24 Herceg-Bosna, isn't it?

    25 A. Yes, that can be seen from this document.

  104. 1 Q. Is that the type of training that was being

    2 contemplated by Colonel Blaskic in the previous exhibit

    3 where we had this training schedule running from 6.00

    4 in the morning until 21.00 hours in the evening?

    5 A. If we link the document we saw a moment ago

    6 to this one, I would not be able to say that they are

    7 directly linked. But if we were to compare the

    8 schedules then we would see here in items one and two,

    9 it says eight hours daily, two hours in the morning,

    10 two hours in the afternoon. So these match and they

    11 could be linked together.

    12 Q. Sir, now this basic training that was

    13 employed by Blaskic, and that was set out by General

    14 Petkovic -- take a look through this, it has a variety

    15 of aspects of training for new recruits, doesn't it?

    16 Some in firearms, some in mortars, tactical training,

    17 infantry weapons, medical care, engineering, physical

    18 exercise, et cetera. It's a rather broad range of

    19 subjects, isn't it?

    20 A. Yes, Mr. President, I should like to spend a

    21 little time on this document and try to explain the

    22 previous document. In the HVO, this programme did

    23 exist. Also, there were orders. We saw the number of

    24 orders issued by the Commander of the Operative Zone

    25 regarding organisation, the prevention of arbitrary

  105. 1 behaviour. As many orders were issued by the Commander

    2 of the Operative Zone in connection with the

    3 implementation of this programme. Therefore, the

    4 documents existed both at the level of the main

    5 headquarters and the command of the Operative Zone.

    6 We wanted to organise the army and to do

    7 everything in the best possible way but the situation

    8 on the ground was different. For that reason we have

    9 quite a number of orders by General Blaskic, within a

    10 short period of time, ordering the execution of certain

    11 actions. We saw those orders with regard to

    12 organisation. We are now seeing them in relation to

    13 training. Then there were other documents concerning

    14 crime and other such occurrences.

    15 General Blaskic, as a professional military

    16 man, knew what an army meant and how an army is

    17 established. He wanted to implement the regulations

    18 that we had but the situation on the ground was a

    19 different matter and it was not possible to put into

    20 effect the things in the way we wanted or in the way

    21 ordered by the Commander of the Operative Zone.

    22 Q. Well, you said, Brigadier --

    23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. You said, Brigadier, that you were familiar

  106. 1 with this document and that you'd seen it in the

    2 Operative Zone headquarters; is that right?

    3 A. Yes, I am familiar with this document and I

    4 saw it in the command of the Operative Zone.

    5 Q. You saw it during the time that you were in

    6 charge of training; isn't that right?

    7 A. Yes. When I joined the Operative Zone

    8 headquarters, I cannot remember exactly when this

    9 programme reached us, the programme which we were

    10 assigned to carry out.

    11 Q. Well, look through this document, Brigadier.

    12 Is there any notation or comment in this document that

    13 calls for the training of recruits in the Laws and

    14 Customs of War in the Geneva Conventions? There isn't,

    15 is there?

    16 A. Yes, in this document, in this pile of pages

    17 that I have, I see no mention of that subject.

    18 Q. Now, in addition to this training manual, as

    19 the head of training in the headquarters, you were also

    20 familiar with the armed forces instruction manual

    21 issued by the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna, the

    22 HVO defence department, aren't you?

    23 A. There were several handbooks. Could I please

    24 see the handbook and the date? A handbook that came

    25 from the main headquarters in '93 and '94, there were

  107. 1 several such handbooks, so I don't know exactly which

    2 one you're referring to. If I could see it, I would be

    3 able to answer your question.

    4 Q. Absolutely, Brigade.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this is a handbook

    6 dated Mostar, 1992. It is a rather extensive armed

    7 forces manual. We have simply translated the index and

    8 we're unable to give a translation for all of the BCS

    9 going into French and English. It's just too

    10 extensive, given the work going in the translation

    11 section at this point.

    12 THE REGISTRAR: This is document 485, 485A

    13 for the translation of the index.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Now, Brigadier, you mentioned that there --

    16 MR. HAYMAN: Could we have one, please?

    17 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, is there not another

    18 one? Here's another one. Here, you can put this on

    19 the ELMO.

    20 Q. Now, Brigadier, you mentioned that there were

    21 several manuals that were issued by the HVO?

    22 A. Yes, since the time of the establishment of

    23 the HVO, which is, well, April '92 until its

    24 transformation along with the BH army into the

    25 federation army, there were several manuals which we

  108. 1 were supposed to use and which we did use in training

    2 of our units. When you said that you had this

    3 handbook, this is what I wanted to have in order to be

    4 able to specifically answer your questions in that

    5 regard.

    6 Q. Now you just noted that this was a handbook

    7 that was used in the training of your personnel, isn't

    8 that right?

    9 A. This handbook, in this volume, there are

    10 contained several parts, one would be the training

    11 manual of the armed forces. Let me see if there are

    12 other enclosures here.

    13 Mr. President, Your Honours, this is just one

    14 portion of the entire handbook which was entitled, "The

    15 General Rules of the Armed Forces." One would be the

    16 rules, the training handbook. This would have been the

    17 entire volume and this is just one portion of it.

    18 Q. You would know better than I, Brigadier, how

    19 many other volumes are there in addition to this

    20 volume?

    21 A. The entire handbook would be a three part

    22 thing. One is the Rules of Service. One would be the

    23 Training and then one would be the Rules and one would

    24 be the Discipline Rules. So this portion that has been

    25 enclosed here is the training manual. This would be

  109. 1 the drill, but not the tactical. In other words, this

    2 would be how to address your superior, how to salute.

    3 This is what was regulated in the portion of the

    4 handbook that we have in front of us.

    5 Q. The actual armed forces instruction manual,

    6 of which this is a part, is somewhat extensive?

    7 A. It is entitled, "The General Rules of Service

    8 in the Armed Forces." It actually has four parts: One

    9 would be the General Rules of Service; one would be the

    10 Training Manual; one would be the Ritual and one would

    11 be the Discipline.

    12 Q. This is just simply one of four volumes is

    13 all I am trying to get at. There are three other

    14 volumes in addition to this?

    15 A. Yes, yes, yes.

    16 Q. By the way, was this training manual adopted

    17 from the Republic of Croatia? Take a look at the first

    18 paragraph after the index. Paragraph 1.

    19 A. I cannot say whether it was taken over or

    20 not. The author of this would know the best. That is

    21 the author of this instruction manual. But a large

    22 part of its contents has been taken over from the JNA.

    23 It was linguistically adjusted to the Croatian way of

    24 speaking. We have to realise that this was done during

    25 the war and you did not have expert teams which would

  110. 1 have changed things around at that time.

    2 Q. Read that first sentence in paragraph 1,

    3 Brigadier. If we could put it on the ELMO in the BCS.

    4 This paragraph here. No, right here. That's it. So

    5 the folks in the translation booth can read it. Do you

    6 see that okay? Can you read that, Brigadier, that

    7 first sentence?

    8 A. Chapter 1, General Provisions:

    9 1. "This training manual regulates instructions

    10 and actions of individuals and the following units:

    11 squads, platoons, companies and battalions on land

    12 which should be unified for the entire Croatian army.

    13 The units of different branches and arms and services

    14 which are not covered by this instruction manual shall

    15 act according to the provisions of this instruction

    16 manual with respect to the real conditions, equipment

    17 and weapons available."

    18 Q. Thank you. Now, Brigadier, in addition to

    19 the training recruits, and in addition to this manual,

    20 Blaskic issued order for specialised training even to

    21 special purpose units, didn't he?

    22 A. I would like to see such a document.

    23 Q. Exhibit 456/2. We'll focus on paragraph 3 of

    24 that document.

    25 Now, Brigadier, this is a document dated the

  111. 1 26th of September, 1992, 12.00 hours from the Central

    2 Bosnia Operative Zone. It was signed by Colonel

    3 Blaskic, was it not?

    4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    5 MR. KEHOE: I'll repeat myself. This is a

    6 document of the 26th of September, 1992, at 12.00 hours

    7 from the Central Bosnia Operative Zone and it was, in

    8 fact, signed by Colonel Blaskic with his seal. Is that

    9 right, Brigadier?

    10 A. Yes, this is General Blaskic's signature.

    11 Q. Well, let's just read it briefly.

    12 It's an order to form units for assault

    13 operations. "Further to Order No. 012173/92, dated 21

    14 September, 1992, of the general staff and in order to

    15 ensure the full and timely execution of tasks and form

    16 special units for combat operations, as well as,

    17 intervention in areas under threat, I hereby issue the

    18 following order:"

    19 He gives orders to the municipal staff on the

    20 structure. But look at No. 3, because that deals with

    21 the subject we've been discussing on training.

    22 "Initiate, immediately, drills and training for the

    23 special purpose units, PPN, for assault operations and

    24 train the PPN to platoon level while concentrating on

    25 anti-tank groups, sniper groups, groups for destroying

  112. 1 firing points, bomb points, groups for liquidation

    2 using cold steel" -- and I believe steel is spelled

    3 incorrectly in the English -- "Groups for clearing

    4 trenches and communication trenches" --

    5 THE INTERPRETER: We're not getting the

    6 translation into French. It would be best if the

    7 document could be placed correctly on the ELMO.

    8 MR. KEHOE: Just dealing with that No. 3.

    9 I'll read it again:

    10 "Initiate, immediately, drills and training

    11 for the special purposes unit, PPN, for assault

    12 operations. Train the PPN to platoon levels while

    13 concentrating on anti-tank groups, sniper groups,

    14 groups for destroying firing points, bombing groups,

    15 groups for liquidation using cold steel, groups for

    16 clearing trenches and communications trenches,

    17 reconnaissance of enemy deployment."

    18 Now that's very specific training, is it not,

    19 Brigadier, being set out on the 26th of September,

    20 1992, by Colonel Blaskic?

    21 A. The training programme was not elaborated

    22 here. This is just to point out what these people

    23 should be trained in.

    24 Mr. President, I would like to point out the

    25 date when this document was drafted and the situation

  113. 1 which we had in Central Bosnia. This was 26 September,

    2 1992. In the area of Zepce, Jajce, Novi Travnik,

    3 Kiseljak, Travnik, Bugojno municipalities, there were

    4 very strong attacks being carried out by the Bosnian

    5 Serb army. As I said, we did not have organised forces

    6 at that time and we had a need. We had people at the

    7 line of defence and we did not have solutions as to

    8 what to do if those lines would fall, how we would

    9 prevent a further advance of the Bosnian Serb army.

    10 These are the reasons why the commander who

    11 was in charge of the defence of a particular line had

    12 an idea and this is as early as 1992, how to most

    13 efficiently counter that pressure. This is why he

    14 issued such an order. I know that because of the

    15 situation and conditions on the ground which were

    16 similar to what I have said with respect to

    17 organisation and training, was not implemented. So the

    18 forces which have been ordered here, we never had in

    19 the Central Bosnia Operative Zone.

    20 Q. Well, Brigadier, suffice to say, based on

    21 what we've seen this afternoon, you'll agree with me

    22 that on the 20th of September, Colonel Blaskic issued

    23 orders on training of new recruits that we saw in

    24 Exhibit 456/79 and on the 26th of September, he issued

    25 an order to train special purpose units and I might add

  114. 1 that in Point 2, he required experienced and discipline

    2 soldiers. We discussed Exhibit 456/107, 19th November,

    3 1992, the rather extensive training schedule in

    4 barracks of recruits.

    5 Now would you agree with me that that is a

    6 somewhat extensive training schedule and you were the

    7 chief training?

    8 A. I can agree with you on only the following:

    9 That these documents were drafted and signed by the

    10 commander of the Operative Zone at the time which is

    11 indicated. I cannot agree with you about the practice

    12 of implementing them.

    13 You saw how many orders General Blaskic

    14 issued with respect to training. Within a month or so

    15 we have as many as three; but we could not implement

    16 them on the ground, due to the circumstances which I

    17 explained.

    18 Also, as far as the kind of work that we were

    19 able to carry out, these were only with the soldiers

    20 which we had with the BH army in Travnik and in the

    21 barracks in Kiseljak.

    22 Q. Well, Brigadier, after November the 1st, or

    23 the 1st of November, 1992, when you took over the

    24 operations and training section, did you begin to train

    25 HVO soldiers?

  115. 1 A. Under conditions which I inherited when I

    2 started, the situation changed. Jajce had fallen, and

    3 we fought alongside the BH army troops in order to

    4 prevent the breakthrough of the Bosnian Serb army in

    5 the Travnik municipality. We had a similar situation

    6 in the Zepce municipality.

    7 When I arrived in the Operative Zone command,

    8 the war was spreading and the conditions which were

    9 prevailing in July and August, and even April, were

    10 completely obsolete and we did not take any, we did not

    11 consider them anymore, because the situation had

    12 changed. I'm talking about the situation on the

    13 ground, and the document speaks about what the

    14 commander wanted to do and what his intention was with

    15 respect to the organisation of the units.

    16 Q. Maybe you didn't understand my question,

    17 Brigadier. When you took over on 1 November, 1993, did

    18 you supervise or were you involved in training of HVO

    19 soldiers? You?

    20 A. When I took over as department head, I was

    21 mostly involved in the lines of defence and the

    22 situation there. I did not have the time or

    23 opportunity to conduct or implement training

    24 programmes.

    25 Q. Just to clarify, you took over in 1 November,

  116. 1 1992, I think, I misspoke and said 1993.

    2 Let me show you a document, Brigadier.

    3 THE REGISTRAR: This is 486, 486A for the

    4 English version.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. Now, take a look at this document, Brigadier.

    7 Is that your signature on this document? Is it?

    8 A. This is not my signature. This was signed by

    9 someone else on my behalf.

    10 Q. It was signed on your behalf. Who signed it

    11 on your behalf?

    12 A. If you will allow me, let me just review the

    13 contents and I may be able to draw a conclusion.

    14 This was signed by the operations duty

    15 officer, so, it could have been my assistant. I don't

    16 know who it was on the 23rd of November, 1992.

    17 However, if you want an answer as to whether

    18 there was training on the artillery crews, yes, the

    19 crews trained on the firing positions and this training

    20 was conducted by the artillery chief.

    21 Q. Let's read this, Brigadier. 23rd of November

    22 1992, it goes to the assistant for logistics, Central

    23 Bosnia Operative Zone, I believe it's a gentleman you

    24 discussed previously, Franjo Sliskovic. Subject is

    25 securing devices for Zis gun, Z-I-S.

  117. 1 "It is necessary to urgently secure sighting

    2 devices for a Zis gun, as well as binoculars. Check

    3 with Novi Travnik logistics if Bratstvo has them," in

    4 handwriting, "sighting devices from another is also

    5 possible. The above-mentioned sighting devices are

    6 needed for the training of newly formed crews."

    7 So, crews were, in fact, being trained during

    8 this period of time; isn't that right, Brigadier?

    9 A. Mr. President, regarding this specific Zis

    10 gun, we only had two Zis guns in the entire Lasva

    11 Valley.

    12 Q. Brigadier, you were doing training, weren't

    13 you?

    14 A. Yes, I did work on training. These two Zis

    15 guns were a part of the artillery battery, and the

    16 training for these artillery pieces and command were

    17 all -- the commander of the artillery was in charge of

    18 this training.

    19 Q. Brigadier, when you told us several minutes

    20 ago that you were not involved in training during this

    21 time period, what you told this Court was not accurate;

    22 was it?

    23 A. No, I do not agree with what you said. I

    24 said that the focus of my work, when I arrived at the

    25 Operative Zone command, was the lines of defence

  118. 1 because those were the needs of the situation. In this

    2 time period, I mostly worked on that, obviously with

    3 all other work at the Operative Zone command.

    4 There was no major training, such as would

    5 have been needed had we had conditions. That I did not

    6 do, no.

    7 Q. Brigadier, did the training in the Central

    8 Bosnian Operative Zone continue even until the outbreak

    9 of hostilities with the Bosnian Muslims?

    10 A. The basic training which was conducted in the

    11 units in the Central Bosnia Operative Zone was the

    12 handling of small arms. If you were in infantry, you

    13 had to learn how to use the infantry weapons. If you

    14 had to be trained to use an artillery piece, then other

    15 members of the crew would train this new soldier while

    16 they were in a firing position.

    17 Other portions of the training, such as was

    18 defined here in this instruction manual, according to

    19 the plans that existed, we did not carry out such

    20 training, with respect to all the hours and all the

    21 elements and everything else which is spelled out in

    22 this programme.

    23 Q. Brigadier, after the conflict between the

    24 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO in early January

    25 -- excuse me, late January and early February of 1992,

  119. 1 there was a cease-fire that was signed on the 13th of

    2 February, 1993. I think there was a series of

    3 documents presented by the Defence on that subject; is

    4 that right?

    5 A. Excuse me, you're asking me about the date of

    6 the signing of a cease-fire?

    7 Q. I think we will agree those documents were in

    8 fact signed on the 13th of February of 1993 between

    9 Enver Hadzihasanovic and Colonel Blaskic.

    10 After the conflict between the army of

    11 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO was completed in

    12 February, did Blaskic order additional training for HVO

    13 troops?

    14 A. He did not order additional training, but in

    15 1993 the only organised training which we conducted was

    16 with a group of new recruits in the Nova Bila

    17 elementary school. These would be the new recruits,

    18 and this is under conditions which we had and with

    19 equipment which we had. This training mostly consisted

    20 in handling small arms.

    21 Q. Let's take a look at Exhibit 456/15.

    22 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Kehoe, in the transcript

    23 apparently you said "after the conflict between the

    24 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO was completed in

    25 February."

  120. 1 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: What is meant by "a conflict

    3 being completed"?

    4 MR. KEHOE: Judge Riad, documents that were

    5 submitted both by the Defence, through Brigadier Marin,

    6 and also with Colonel Remi Landry, who was then with

    7 ECMM, Canadian armed forces, the conflict in the

    8 Busovaca area between the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    9 and the HVO took place late January early February. A

    10 series of documents ordering a cease-fire and various

    11 measures to be taken was signed on the 13th of

    12 February, 1993, by the accused, as well as General

    13 Hadzihasanovic.

    14 JUDGE RIAD: What is the meaning of

    15 "completed"?

    16 MR. KEHOE: It may be inaccurate, Judge.

    17 JUDGE RIAD: I wanted to know when the

    18 conflict is completed.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Maybe it was just a slow boil.

    20 In any event, those documents are signed on the 13th.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    22 MR. KEHOE:

    23 Q. Brigadier, take a look at this document, it

    24 is a two-page document dated the 13th of February,

    25 1993, same day these agreements are signed. I believe

  121. 1 this is, again, a packet communication system; is it

    2 not?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Take a look at the lower left-hand corner;

    5 who wrote this document? Whose initials are down in

    6 the lower left-hand corner? SM?

    7 A. SM, those are my initials.

    8 Q. Those are yours, okay. You were the drafter

    9 of this document; is that correct?

    10 A. On the basis of an assignment given to me by

    11 the commander of the Operative Zone, I drafted this

    12 document.

    13 Q. Naturally, I wouldn't infer anything else,

    14 Brigadier. I just want to read you some subjects in

    15 this document, and it goes to a variety of units, and

    16 it says:

    17 "Organisational order for further action.

    18 Due to the very extreme activities by the enemy, and

    19 shortcomings in the command and the control of the HVO

    20 units, and in order to raise the level of combat

    21 readiness, I hereby," let's turn our attention to

    22 number 4 in a list of 12 paragraphs: It says, "Carry

    23 out additional training and live firing practice for

    24 sniper groups from all units of the Central Bosnian

    25 Operative Zone.

  122. 1 Person responsible for the task, assistant

    2 for ONP in the unit. Monitoring and supervision will

    3 be carried out by the ONP assistant, Central Bosnian

    4 Operative Zone, deadline 20 February, 1993."

    5 Now, Brigadier, I asked you several minutes

    6 ago whether or not Blaskic ordered additional training

    7 after the conflict was over in mid-February, between

    8 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO, and you

    9 said no. Do you want to change that answer?

    10 A. Mr. President, I should like to give my

    11 answer to this document and to clarify something. The

    12 document was drafted on the 13th of February, 1993.

    13 True, at the time, there was a cessation of hostilities

    14 between the HVO and the BH army.

    15 When I made my presentation and answered

    16 questions by Mr. Nobilo, I kept underlining the fact

    17 that we, or that is the HVO, from April 1992, had a

    18 defence line facing the army of Republika Srpska,

    19 constantly, until June 1993 when units of the BH army,

    20 in the area of Travnik and Novi Travnik, attacked HVO

    21 units from behind units that were facing the Bosnian

    22 Serbs.

    23 After the cease-fire was signed, which is

    24 linked to the conflict in Busovaca, the activities of

    25 the Republika Srpska armies along the defence lines

  123. 1 held by the HVO were intensified, and according to our

    2 estimates there was a danger of the Bosnian Serb army

    3 taking advantage of the conflicts and misunderstandings

    4 between the BH army and the HVO to attack our defence

    5 lines.

    6 This order went to all HVO units which held

    7 defence lines towards the Bosnian Serbs. So, this

    8 order was linked exclusively to the organisation of a

    9 quality defence against the Bosnian Serbs. That is the

    10 only answer I can give.

    11 Q. Brigadier, did Blaskic, or did he not, order

    12 additional sniper training in this order on the 13th of

    13 February, that you drafted?

    14 JUDGE JORDA: The question was already asked,

    15 Mr. Kehoe.

    16 MR. KEHOE:

    17 Q. My next question; did the additional sniper

    18 training take place pursuant to Blaskic's order on the

    19 13th of February?

    20 A. Regarding the training of snipers, I know

    21 that instructors for sniper fire did not exist in the

    22 Operative Zone of Central Bosnia, so that we couldn't

    23 implement sniper training in the full sense of the

    24 word.

    25 As an officer specialising in training, you

  124. 1 need special instructors to provide quality training

    2 and special devices and conditions in order to train

    3 people for the use of such devices.

    4 Q. Well, do you know a man by the name of Vlado

    5 Ilic, also known as Golden Eye, and was he a trained

    6 sniper who was in the Vitez area under Blaskic's

    7 command, and was he awarded, or given an award by

    8 President Boban for killing 72 people? Are you

    9 familiar with this man?

    10 A. I do not know Mr. Vlado Ilic. You said that

    11 he was from Vitez; didn't you?

    12 Q. He was a sniper in the Viteska Brigade.

    13 A. I cannot confirm that.

    14 Q. Do you know a man who had the nickname of

    15 Golden Eye, in the Vitez area, who was a sniper for the

    16 HVO?

    17 A. I do not know any such man.

    18 Q. Do you know any instance when a sniper for

    19 the HVO, in the Vitez area, was given an award by Mate

    20 Boban for killing 72 people?

    21 A. I'm not aware of any such award, nor of any

    22 such person. Could you perhaps tell me when this award

    23 was given because after the Washington Accords, I was

    24 transferred to the command in Tomislavgrad, and I spent

    25 two years there.

  125. 1 Q. It could very well be, Brigadier, that that

    2 award was given after the Washington Accords.

    3 On the sniper fire, did the HVO have snipers?

    4 A. The HVO did not have organised snipers. I

    5 should like to try and explain what snipers are in the

    6 war that was waged in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both on the

    7 side of the BH army units and the HVO.

    8 The HVO, as far as I know, the soldiers on

    9 the front-lines used, as snipers, hunting carbines with

    10 optical sights, and they also used improvised M48

    11 rifles with sights. This is an improvisation. I do

    12 not know, at least, I'm not familiar with whether

    13 anyone had an original real military sniper rifle.

    14 These kind of snipers that I have referred to

    15 were used on the defence lines.

    16 Q. May I see the series of exhibits beginning in

    17 80, and I believe in Exhibit 80 we have a weapon in

    18 that regard. Can I see that? Prosecutor's Exhibit 80.

    19 I take that back, Mr. Dubuisson, it's

    20 Exhibit 82.

    21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, 82/10 and 82/9.

    22 MR. KEHOE: Yes, can I just see those? Would

    23 you show these two photographs to the Brigadier and put

    24 them on the ELMO?

    25 For the record, Mr. Usher, what is the record

  126. 1 of the photograph we have on the ELMO.

    2 THE USHER: 82/10.

    3 MR. KEHOE: If we could put 82/10 on the ELMO

    4 first and move the photograph up just a bit to put the

    5 rifle --

    6 Q. Do you see that rifle, Brigadier?

    7 A. Yes, I see that rifle.

    8 Q. What type of rifle is that?

    9 A. It is a sniper rifle, 12.7 millimetres, which

    10 is used to neutralise enemy fortifications, because of

    11 its calibre size at larger distances. I can't tell you

    12 what the range is exactly, but I think it is greater

    13 than that of regular sniper rifles.

    14 Talking about snipers, I have just recalled a

    15 statement made by General Blaskic to UNPROFOR. I was

    16 reminded by these photographs, in which HVO soldiers

    17 are simply showing off what kind of weapons they have.

    18 They know that an UNPROFOR officer came to

    19 see General Blaskic and reproach him about this, and he

    20 literally said, "Any soldier that you see carrying a

    21 sniper rifle in the street, feel free to seize it from

    22 him." I remember that very well, because this was

    23 recounted in our command.

    24 Q. Brigadier, we will just put the other

    25 photograph on the ELMO so we have an idea what we're

  127. 1 talking about, and the number on that photograph?

    2 THE USHER: 82/9.

    3 Q. Brigadier, that is the same photograph of the

    4 sniper rifle; is that right?

    5 A. Yes, it is the same rifle.

    6 Q. Now, before we move away from --

    7 JUDGE RIAD: I just want to know who would

    8 feel free to seize him? It says if you find somebody

    9 carrying a sniper, feel free to seize him. The

    10 UNPROFOR officer would seize the sniper?

    11 A. General Blaskic, in response to complaints by

    12 UNPROFOR, that along the roads being used by UNPROFOR

    13 and HVO members, that they had seen HVO members showing

    14 off with these weapons, because this is a weapon with

    15 strong fire power. General Blaskic prohibited it. I

    16 think there is an order to that effect and to prove to

    17 UNPROFOR that he doesn't support the use of such

    18 weapons, he said, "Seize those weapons from them and

    19 tell me who had them." It was in that context that

    20 this statement was recounted.

    21 JUDGE RIAD: Yes, but was it within the

    22 authority of UNPROFOR to seize arms of HVO? Did they

    23 have this authority?

    24 A. I'm not familiar with the details regarding

    25 the mission and authority of UNPROFOR in Central

  128. 1 Bosnia, whether they had the authority to seize such

    2 weapons and under which conditions. Maybe if they

    3 were, personally, in jeopardy, but I can't say that

    4 with any precision.

    5 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. Just finishing up on this particular document

    8 that you wrote, Brigadier, on the 13th of February,

    9 there were, in fact, sniper groups in all of the units

    10 within the Central Bosnian Operative Zone; isn't that

    11 correct?

    12 A. I cannot confirm that. Organised sniper

    13 groups did not exist, because there was no one to train

    14 them, to act as organised sniper groups. I know a

    15 little from literature about sniper training, the

    16 training in pairs, in combination and so on. If in a

    17 unit you had two men with sniper rifles that I have

    18 mentioned, the improvised kind that I described, then

    19 this cannot be described as a sniper group.

    20 A sniper group must be a well-trained group

    21 who are familiar with the tactics, the technical

    22 characteristics, the use of such weapons in all weather

    23 conditions.

    24 Q. Well, the fact is, of course, Brigadier, that

    25 General Blaskic himself said to carry out additional

  129. 1 training for sniper groups from all units in the

    2 Central Bosnian Operative Zone.

    3 Now, the training of these recruits and the

    4 training of personnel continued throughout the war in

    5 Central Bosnia; didn't it, up until the Washington

    6 Accords?

    7 A. Talking about the training of recruits, I

    8 know that in the Lasva Valley, we trained recruits. I

    9 think it was the end of August '93 or September '93 in

    10 the facility, that is the school at Bila, which we used

    11 as a barracks. Because we were surrounded and isolated

    12 from Kiseljak and Zepce, I do not know whether they

    13 engaged in any training under the conditions in which

    14 they were living. We carried out this training because

    15 in the war of '93, we had very high casualties. We

    16 were lacking men on the front-lines and we had to train

    17 young men over 18 as quickly as possible. I can't tell

    18 you how many of them there were to assist and reinforce

    19 the front-lines.

    20 Let me give you an example of the shortage of

    21 men. When I went to the Viteska Brigade in December

    22 1993, after an attack by BiH army units in Busancavo

    23 Selo (phoen), when we had 70 dead in one night, we were

    24 lacking men. As a member of that command, I had to

    25 spend three hours, during the night, in the trenches

  130. 1 and then go on with my regular duties the next day

    2 because we were lacking men.

    3 Therefore, even though we didn't have the

    4 necessary conditions for quality training of recruits,

    5 we decided, at least, to train these young men how to

    6 hold a rifle, how to use it, so that they could be used

    7 on less dangerous positions that were less exposed to

    8 attacks by BH army forces, so that they would be able

    9 to participate in the defence. Those were the

    10 conditions under which, in the Lasva Valley in '93, we

    11 trained recruits.

    12 Q. Excuse me one moment, Mr. President. If I

    13 could show you and put on the ELMO, Prosecutor's

    14 Exhibit 433/8. By way of refreshing the Court, Mr.

    15 President, Your Honours, this was a photograph that was

    16 taken by then, Captain Lee Whitworth of the Prince of

    17 Wales Regiment of Yorkshire, and I believe late summer,

    18 early fall of 1993, but it was certainly during the

    19 Prince of Wales own tour. That's it.

    20 Brigadier, this is a photograph taken by a

    21 British battalion officer in late summer, early fall of

    22 1993 of what he testified are HVO recruits training in

    23 the streets in and around Vitez. Is this photograph

    24 accurate to portray the type of training these recruits

    25 were doing in and around the streets of Vitez?

  131. 1 A. Recruits were not trained in Vitez, they were

    2 trained in Nova Bila. But this is quite close. The

    3 distance is not great between Nova Bila and Vitez. I

    4 cannot recognise whether these are recruits. But from

    5 what can be seen on this photograph, we see that the

    6 recruits are being trained too much in a military

    7 fashion. We had this kind of training in the exercise

    8 manual of the armed forces and this is not the training

    9 for combat. The fundamental focus of training was to

    10 teach recruits to use infantry weapons.

    11 Q. The fundamental training for recruits is the

    12 use of infantry weapons, working together, drilling

    13 together and marching together and that's what's going

    14 on in this photograph, isn't it?

    15 A. In peacetime conditions, the fundamental

    16 training of recruits in an organised army is far more

    17 complex. I said under what conditions we were training

    18 recruits in Nova Bila. The conditions were such that

    19 in September, the HVO in Vitez had more than 400 dead

    20 in Travnik, more than 300 in Busovaca, about 250 and so

    21 on. So the conditions were such that we didn't have

    22 the manpower to hold defence lines and we were lacking

    23 men. That is why out of necessity we opted to take

    24 this step. This training was incomplete and these

    25 young men were certainly not trained for adequate use

  132. 1 in combat operations. May I draw your attention to

    2 this relief, this model?

    3 Mr. President, you see the green flags on

    4 this model. You see that we were surrounded and it was

    5 under such conditions of siege that we were carrying

    6 out this training. When any person who is capable of

    7 carrying a weapon had to be used for defence.

    8 Q. If we could just move that back from the

    9 Brigadier.

    10 Before we leave this area, though, Brigadier,

    11 the bottom line is you were doing training, isn't that

    12 so?

    13 A. It cannot be said that there was no

    14 training. It was reduced to a minimum and exclusively

    15 to meet fundamental, elementary needs for the soldier

    16 to be able to correctly behave while holding defence

    17 lines. A proper organisation of training, such as you

    18 would have under peacetime, did not exist.

    19 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: He has not asked you

    20 this question. He has asked you whether the bottom

    21 line is that you were doing training. Now, that is not

    22 answered by a statement to the effect that such

    23 training as was being done was minimal. Could you

    24 please answer the Prosecutor's question.

    25 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, Your Honours, we

  133. 1 carried out the minimal and most essential training.

    2 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I am about to go

    3 into a somewhat lengthy area. I am glad to begin.

    4 I am glad to go on. I would just like to know for the

    5 Court's purposes, if the Court would like me to do

    6 that?

    7 JUDGE JORDA: We could stop now, although we

    8 have a few minutes left. What subject did you want to

    9 take up?

    10 MR. KEHOE: We're going to discuss the

    11 testimony that was -- or the subject raised by

    12 Judge Riad, specifically, on the power to appoint and

    13 dismiss commanders and I believe several days ago,

    14 Judge Riad asked a specific question in that regard.

    15 We have somewhat lengthy questions on that subject.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, did you want to say

    17 something? What did you want to speak about?

    18 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, just to say, Mr. President,

    19 it would be helpful if we could have some idea of when

    20 to have the next witness on hand. Right now we have no

    21 idea if a witness may be needed on Friday, Monday,

    22 Tuesday, Wednesday of next week. If there could be

    23 some information in that regard, it would help us use

    24 the Court time efficiently.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Good question, but I think it

  134. 1 depends. First of all, it depends on the Prosecutor

    2 when he finishes, then it depends on you because you

    3 have a re-examination; right? Then there are the

    4 questions that the Judges want to ask. So I really

    5 can't answer you. Perhaps the Prosecutor, who, for the

    6 time being, is holding the key to his own

    7 cross-examination could tell us when he will finish, or

    8 is it difficult to say? The time has to remain a bit

    9 fluid. Mr. Kehoe?

    10 MR. KEHOE: I think at this point, Mr.

    11 President, it has to remain somewhat fluid. I want to

    12 move through this as expeditiously, but these are very

    13 significant areas that were brought out by the defence

    14 in numerous documents that need to be addressed. I do

    15 not want to prolong this any more than I have to, but

    16 the trial team has tried to cut this down as much as

    17 possible and I will move as quickly as possible. I

    18 simply, at this point, can't give a specific time. I

    19 would venture to say that given the questions that

    20 remain for the Brigadier and that remain for re-direct

    21 examination and for the questions by the Judges, I

    22 don't think we will have another witness this week.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to speak with my

    24 colleagues because the Judges have, in my opinion, the

    25 responsibility to set limits, both for the

  135. 1 examination-in-chief and for the cross-examination and

    2 not allow for time to remain just completely vague.

    3 This refers to the Defence in this case, but I would

    4 like to consult with my colleagues about this.

    5 The Judges are very concerned about the time

    6 being taken for this testimony, but at the same time

    7 they are aware of the importance of the testimony.

    8 They have decided that the Prosecution should not take

    9 more time than was taken by the Defence for the

    10 presentation of its evidence. That would be the

    11 limit. As I said, the Prosecution should not exceed

    12 the total time that the Defence used for the

    13 examination-in-chief, for the cross-examination.

    14 Secondly, that's the maximum amount of time.

    15 The Judges recommend that the Prosecutor try as best he

    16 can to remain on, short of the line. That is, to try

    17 to finish before that deadline. How many half days

    18 were used by the Defence? I turn to the Registrar, he

    19 can tell us.

    20 THE REGISTRAR: Calendar days, it was six and

    21 a half days and hearing days from five -- there were

    22 four and a half.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Therefore, the Judges are

    24 requesting that the cross-examination not exceed -- how

    25 did you say?

  136. 1 THE REGISTRAR: Four and a half days of

    2 hearing time. That is 320 minutes.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: 320 minutes. As much as

    4 possible, Mr. Prosecutor, the Judges would like for you

    5 to finish sooner. This is a recommendation that they

    6 are making. Then, we will ask the Defence, in view of

    7 what the substance of this cross-examination will have

    8 been, to set the amount of time that it plans to take.

    9 Last point, if for exceptional reasons, you

    10 were to exceed the amount of time given to you, the

    11 time, of course, would not be counted as the general

    12 Defence time. That's what we can say insofar as

    13 setting the day for the probable return of the witness

    14 to his home. Mr. Kehoe?

    15 MR. KEHOE: I understand, Mr. President. I

    16 understand the parameters.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, you heard that?

    18 MR. HAYMAN: I did, Mr. President. If there

    19 is some way to fashion some incentive for, quite

    20 frankly, either party not to exceed time spent by the

    21 participant that conducted the direct examination, in

    22 other words, if perhaps time spent over that time

    23 period came out of the amount of time allotted to the

    24 rebuttal case, some incentive, because otherwise I am a

    25 little concerned there is no incentive to end.

  137. 1 Although it wouldn't be counted against the Defence,

    2 the Prosecutor might choose to go on for eight days,

    3 because it's not coming out of his time. I just

    4 mention that as something, food for thought, as we say

    5 in my language. Thank you.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: We are all aware of the fact

    7 that there is a problem, but for the time being we

    8 cannot settle it in any other way from the way that we

    9 did. Of course, I call to the Prosecutor's attention

    10 for the time being, he is using Defence time.

    11 Therefore, we're recommending, and I am doing it, as

    12 well as I am asking you as much as you can, to simplify

    13 your questions. This is an important witness and I

    14 think for the time being we cannot say anything

    15 further. We will resume the hearing tomorrow morning

    16 at 10.00.

    17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    18 5.28 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    19 the 8th day of October, 1998, at

    20 10.00 a.m.