1 Monday, 12th October 1998
2 (Open session)
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.08 p.m.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,
6 (The accused entered court)
7 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume with the Judges
8 present as we indicated, in full agreement. Let me
9 make sure everybody can hear me first. Mr. Harmon, do
10 you hear me, all though I know you understand French.
11 I would like to say good afternoon to everybody, first
12 the interpreters. I hope that the weekend has been
13 good and let me remind you that we are meeting pursuant
14 to Rule 71, acting as presiding officers in order to
15 allow the hearings to continue in the absence of Judge
16 Riad for exceptional circumstances. Since the Judge is
17 not in the Netherlands at moment. Let me remind you
18 for the transcript that this was done in full
19 agreement. Please be seated
20 (The witness entered court)
21 JUDGE JORDA: With the Defence and the
22 Prosecution. Also let me remind you that we will
23 finish with our hearings on Thursday afternoon, not on
24 Friday, and we will try to sit on Wednesday morning,
25 let me turn to the legal officer. I think there is an
1 initial appearance, but I don't think that will prevent
2 us from doing it afterwards.
3 MR. FOURMY: 1.30.
4 JUDGE JORDA: Can we begin -- can we start
5 the initial hearing at 9.30? I am going to turn to
6 Mr. Dubuisson.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, you can.
8 JUDGE JORDA: All right, then we would start
9 at 9.30. This actually involves another Trial
10 Chamber. Judge Rodriguez would probably have no
11 problems with that either, which would mean that this
12 Blaskic trial would start a bit later.
13 Let me turn to the witness, say good
14 afternoon to him, I hope that he has had a good
15 weekend. And let me remind him that he is still under
16 oath in front of only two Judges. It might be
17 surprising to him but I believe the Defence counsel
18 must have explained to him why we are acting as we are,
19 but changes nothing respect of himself, except that he
20 will not hear Judge Riad asking any questions, but
21 Judge Riad gave to us the questions that he wanted to
22 ask, possibly. And if he has other questions, he can
23 read the transcript and then ask the questions further
24 to that.
25 Mr. Hayman.
1 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Mr. President, thank you.
2 As the Court recalls, it addressed a comment to the
3 witness at the end of the session last week and the
4 witness expressed concern to me whether he could
5 respond, there was something he wanted to say. I told
6 him if the Court would allow, that I could summarise
7 his response perhaps briefly for the Court. And that
8 is to say that he understands that his
9 cross-examination testimony is different in a
10 qualitative sense from his direct examination
11 testimony, and he simply wanted to state that on direct
12 examination he had a chance to review all of the
13 documents in advance. The documents he was shown had
14 been preselected as documents that he recalled, or
15 could authenticate through personal knowledge. On
16 cross-examination, he has not seen documents before in
17 terms of preparing for his testimony, some he has never
18 seen before, and others he has not seen for five
19 years. So, he simply wishes to state to the court
20 through me or directly, that if he appears to be
21 hesitating or taking his time to look at these
22 documents on cross-examination, it is a different
23 procedure from what was used to prepare his direct
25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, I know how talented
1 you are when it comes to defending General Blaskic and
2 I see that you are acting with as much assiduity for
3 the defence of your witness. But he was not being
4 attacked, I want you to understand that, he was not
5 being attacked. I simply wanted to say, and that is my
6 duty to say it, if necessary, and I will then give the
7 witness the floor, in this Tribunal the Judges have an
8 absolute and essential necessity that is to reach the
9 truth which, of course, is also in the interest of the
10 accused first and foremost. Such a long testimony and
11 such a compact and full testimony by necessity can be
12 valued only in respect of its general cohesiveness.
13 And that was the only message that I had allowed
14 myself, personally, in fact what I said only engages
15 myself. But I am profoundly engaged by what I said.
16 If one looks at the Rules and the Statute, one sees
17 that the Judges have a great deal of power allowing
18 them to attempt to reach the truth in a case and one of
19 those powers, in fact, is to order the witnesses who
20 are under oath to be careful that there be a degree of
21 cohesiveness in everything that is being said.
22 Would you like to add something to that,
23 Brigadier? You are absolutely free to add something if
24 you wish to do so, especially in light of what I just
25 said and what Mr. Hayman said. Speak freely, please.
1 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, good day. In
2 relation to what Mr. Hayman has said, and in relation
3 to your suggestion, I have nothing special to add. May
4 I just say that what I shall be saying will be possibly
5 as clear as possible, but when I cannot directly
6 explain things, I shall kindly ask you to bear with me
7 and I'm not going to prejudge anything. I am sure that
8 every question will be responded to adequately, but I
9 shall certainly act on your advice.
10 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, I think I can speak
11 on behalf of Judge Shahabuddeen to thank you for those
12 clarifications. We can now resume our work and,
13 Mr. Kehoe, you have the floor.
14 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President. Good
15 afternoon Mr. President, Judge Shahabuddeen, counsel,
16 good afternoon Brigadier.
17 Q. If we could turn our attention initially --
18 A. Good afternoon.
19 Q. If we could turn our attention initially to
20 the Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/6, Defence Exhibit 405 and
21 then Prosecution Exhibit 456/7.
22 MR. KEHOE: If I may, Mr. Usher, the Defence
23 Exhibit chronologically comes between the two, 456/6
24 and 456/7. I will show you the ones in the series.
25 The 16th goes first, this goes second and
1 chronologically that goes third, great. Thank you.
2 Mr. Dubuisson, while we're talking about
3 these exhibits, with your permission, if you could pull
4 out the photograph 80/7, Prosecutor's 80/7.
5 Q. Brigadier, just going back to the order of
6 Blaskic that we had introduced, talked about on Friday,
7 456/6, is the order of the 16th of January 1993, which
8 orders, among other things, to take shifts off the line
9 against the Chetniks in full readiness for action
10 against the Muslim forces, and on number 5, calls upon
11 the 4th Military Battalion to control traffic,
12 confiscate equipment and weapons from all Muslim
14 Now, shortly after that you talked during
15 your direct examination with Mr. Nobilo about 405,
16 Defence Exhibit 405, which is an order of 21 January
17 1993; do you see that, sir?
18 A. Yes, I have that document.
19 Q. That was written by you, and --
20 A. Yes, I wrote it, and it was signed by Franjo
21 Nakic, Chief of Staff.
22 Q. And this is upon the order of the chief of
23 the main staff in Mostar; correct?
24 A. Yes, that can be seen from the preamble of
25 this document.
1 Q. And without reading the whole thing the order
2 basically notes that the units in the Central Bosnia
3 Operative Zone should establish contact with competent
4 command of the BH army in your zone of responsibility
5 and settle all controversial issues by means of
6 agreement; is that right?
7 A. Yes, that is what it says in this order.
8 Q. And that is signed by Franjo Nakic; correct?
9 A. Yes, as authorised by General Blaskic.
10 Q. Let's turn our attention to the 23rd of
11 January 1993, Exhibit 456/7, and that order is signed
12 by Colonel Blaskic himself, isn't it?
13 A. Yes, this is the signature of General
15 Q. Let's read this. This is the 23rd of January
16 1993, approximately two days after this order of the
17 21st of January, saying "settle controversial issues
18 with the Bosnia government." It says on the 23rd of
19 January 1993, and it is essentially to all of the
20 commands in Central Bosnia, and we will read it. "Due
21 to the need to newly arisen needs and intensified enemy
22 activities of our former allies, who formed in three
23 member groups called Troika, attack our units, crews,
24 manning weapons and individuals, I hereby issue the
25 following order:
1 1. HVO personnel shall raise their alertness
2 and tighten their personal security measures in keeping
3 with their duties in HVO units.
4 2. The command post and HVO personnel in the
5 field or on leave shall be constantly under increased
7 3. This order shall be carried out
8 immediately and commanders of brigades and independent
9 units of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone command
10 shall be responsible to me for its execution."
11 Signed by Colonel Blaskic, 23 January 1993.
12 Now, on the 23rd of January 1993, Blaskic has
13 ordered HVO troops onto a heightened security level,
14 hasn't he?
15 A. No. That is not what it says in this order.
16 Mr. President, Your Honour, with your permission, I
17 would like to go back to the document of January 10th,
18 1993, because on Friday when we had a discussion here,
19 I said that I cannot exactly recall the circumstances
20 under which it was created. Over the weekend I thought
21 about this document and the exact time when this
22 document was made in the main headquarters and when it
23 came to the Operative Zone and on the basis of that
24 document, we gave these orders 456/6. The reason for
25 making such a document is that there was a conflict
1 between the units of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
2 the HVO in Gornji Vakuf. Gornji Vakuf as a
3 municipality is a neighbouring municipality to the
4 municipality of Novi Travnik which was under the
5 command of the Operational Zone, because of that
6 conflict and because of its intensity, the head of the
7 main staff of the HVO issued orders to the commander of
8 the Zone of Central Bosnia to take those measures which
9 the commander did give in his orders.
10 Why traffic control and why observation of
11 traffic communications? Gornji Vakuf was under the
12 zone of command of the 3rd Corps, the 3rd Corps with
13 its command posts in Zenica sent orders to Gornji Vakuf
14 and sent reinforcements to the units that were fighting
15 in that town and also sent materiel and technical
16 support with a view to helping them. It is only
17 natural that in a situation of war the HVO functioned
18 as an entity and the head of the main staff would issue
19 orders for traffic control so that you would monitor
20 all communication lines. That is why this order was
21 created. Not for the reasons that the Prosecutor seems
22 to be indicating in his questions. This can be checked
23 whether at that time there was a conflict in Gornji
24 Vakuf or not, but there are facts and documents
25 supporting this.
1 Q. So, Brigadier, the HVO in various locales,
2 Gornji Vakuf and Vitez did, in fact, operate as an
3 entity, did it not?
4 A. We did not cooperate with Gornji Vakuf in the
5 sense of us communicating with them directly. I mean,
6 the Operative Zone and them. But we got orders from
7 the head of the main staff and who commanded both
8 Gornji Vakuf and Central Bosnia, so he was in command
9 of the entire HVO. And he gave orders to the commander
10 of the Operative Zone to undertake these measures. It
11 is only according to military logic and any other
12 action --
13 Q. Excuse me, the question and what you said in
14 testimony is, "it is only natural in a situation of war
15 the HVO function was an entity and the head of the main
16 staff would issue orders for traffic control that you
17 would monitor all communication lines." And my
18 question is: Based on what you said, it's true, is it
19 not, that the HVO operated as an entire entity,
21 A. The HVO under the command of the main staff
22 and on the basis of orders of the main staff, they
23 acted in accordance with the orders of the main staff.
24 Q. Now, in these orders, 456/6 and 456/7, the
25 HVO is on heightened security; correct, on both of the
1 orders and documents that Blaskic gives?
2 A. Yes, Mr. President, but it can be seen quite
3 clearly what activities are being taken. There is no
4 move of forces, there are no orders to attack. Only to
5 observe the area, only to observe the communication
6 lines and if the 3rd Corps were to move along
7 communication lines, that is to say if materiel and
8 technical support were to be given to Gornji Vakuf,
9 that that should be stopped and this should be taken
10 away from them. It is only logical in a situation of
11 war, but there is no move of forces there and no orders
12 to attack any unit of the army of Bosnia and
14 MR. KEHOE: Brigadier, let's look at Defence
15 Exhibit 407, and if we could put Prosecution Exhibit
16 8/7, the photograph, on the ELMO, and if the Brigadier
17 could look at this Defence exhibit, as well. 407, Mr.
18 President, is a document from the 27th of January 1993
19 signed by Franjo Nakic, but written by the witness.
20 Q. Now, Brigadier, you note in this document
21 that you wrote, Defence Exhibit 407, that in the
22 afternoon hours of the 24th of January, 1993, Muslim
23 forces erected a barricade at a previously prepared
24 location in Kacuni near Busovaca, and it goes onto say
25 they stopped five UN vehicles.
1 Now, you previously identified an individual
2 in 80/7.
3 MR. KEHOE: Can you put that back on there,
4 please, Mr. Usher?
5 Q. The man you identified as Ignac Kostromann is
6 on the left, is he not? Can you point to him?
7 A. This is Mr. Kostromann.
8 Q. Now, prior to the events that you described
9 in your report, Kostromann was stopped and arrested by
10 Muslim forces in around, between Kacuni and Bijelovats
11 at a checkpoint; isn't that right?
12 A. Yes, that is correct, and we got that in the
13 report from the Nikola Subic-Zrinski Brigade.
14 Q. It's not in your report, that fact is not in
15 your report?
16 A. When it happened, that is to say, when
17 Mr. Kostromann was stopped and taken prisoner and the
18 commander of the Operative Zone sent a report to that
19 effect. If we informed someone else of this too, it is
20 only natural because we received it.
21 Q. Well, nevertheless, Blaskic was supposed to
22 be heading in the same direction as Kostromann at the
23 time that Kostromann was arrested, wasn't he?
24 A. I don't know that day whether Blaskic was
25 supposed to take the same route at the same time as
1 Mr. Kostromann did, but I know that if General Blaskic
2 was supposed to go to Kiseljak, the only way is through
3 Kacuni, or rather, by the place where the checkpoint
4 was, and whether the checkpoint was there or not, and
5 at what time, that is what I cannot tell at this stage
6 without having a document, that is.
7 Q. Well, Brigadier, isn't it true that the
8 arrest of Mr. Kostromann by this checkpoint greatly
9 angered not only Mr. Kostromann but Colonel Blaskic?
10 A. Whether it angered Mr. Kostromann I don't
11 know, because Mr. Kostromann was not a member of the
12 command of the Operative Zone, so it's not that I could
13 have discussed it with him. How angry General Blaskic
14 was, I cannot say for sure either, but it is certain
15 that, as far as I know, it seems to me that Mr.
16 Kostromann was secretary of the HDZ. He was involved
17 in politics. I wasn't involved in politics. It is
18 certain that this was an unfortunate incident,
19 primarily because this is, this was an official of the
20 Croatian people.
21 Q. Well, the Muslims let him go, correct?
22 A. As far as I can remember the report Mr.
23 Kostromann was released, and what happened at that
24 point when he was stopped without a report from the
25 Brigade Nikola Subic-Zrinski, I could not say exactly
1 now. But according to the information I have, he was
2 taken out of his vehicle, he was made to stand there at
3 gun point with a pistol pointed at him, and I know
4 perhaps the Defence could help me with this document,
5 because I know they have this document, the report of
6 the Nikola Subic-Zrinski Brigade, and then I can tell
7 you exactly the way it was.
8 MR. KEHOE: I don't have the document, Judge,
9 maybe the Defence has it and wants to help the Court,
10 the prosecutor, and the witness.
11 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, we don't have
12 anything here now. Whether we have it or not, we do
13 not intend to assist the Prosecutor. It is not
15 MR. KEHOE: Judge, I didn't ask for the
16 assistance, the witness did.
17 JUDGE JORDA: It's the witness who asked it.
18 It was your witness who asked for it. It was the
19 Brigadier who asked for the document. It wasn't
20 Mr. Kehoe.
21 MR. NOBILO: It is D407 so, if possible, this
22 report can be read.
23 JUDGE JORDA: No, no, no, it wasn't that.
24 But we shouldn't continue with this incident. I think
25 it simply is a rectification I wanted to make, and it
1 was your own witness who said there must and document
2 which told about the kidnapping of Mr. Kostromann. If
3 you don't have it, you don't.
4 MR. NOBILO: Well, I do not remember this
5 event. For me personally it was not an important
6 incident, but, at this point, I cannot say whether the
7 Defence has it or not because I cannot recall the
8 incident itself.
9 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, just continue.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. Brigadier, after the release of Kostromann,
12 didn't Blaskic send units from Busovaca down to this
13 checkpoint on the same day to try to break through?
14 A. I do not have such information.
15 Q. Your testimony is you don't know anything
16 about that incident; is that right?
17 A. No, I said what I know about the incident. I
18 know that he was stopped. I know that he was retained
19 at the checkpoint. And what happened after that, I
20 mean, I know that he was released, too, that is a
21 fact. The other details I cannot retell now, because
22 I'm not sure of that.
23 Q. Well, what do you recall, sir? What details
24 do you recall, what happened after Kostromann was
25 released? What response did the HVO have to the arrest
1 of Ignac Kostromann?
2 A. I shall say what I recall, and what was in
3 the report of the Nikola Subic-Zrinski Brigade. A
4 report arrived stating that Mr. Kostromann had been
5 stopped, mistreated at that checkpoint, mistreated, and
6 then released.
7 I would appreciate it if you could tell me
8 the date when this occurred, because I cannot remember
9 the date now when this happened to Kostromann.
10 Q. Well, sir, you were there, your report was of
11 the 27th of January 1993, and it relates to facts that
12 started on the 24th of January 1993. So, you have to
13 tell me and the Court when this happened.
14 A. Mr. President, the report the Prosecutor is
15 drawing my attention to, again, analyses the events of
16 the 24th, the 25th and the 26th.
17 Q. Well, sir, the incident concerning Ignac
18 Kostromann, let me withdraw that question.
19 This particular report deals with the
20 Busovaca area; does it not? The left hand corner it
21 says "Busovaca area situation report," right? Is that
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Nothing in this report discusses the events
25 concerning the arrest of Ignac Kostromann, does it?
1 A. This event, the arrest of Ignac Kostromann is
2 not mentioned specifically because it says here on the
3 date of the 24th, such and such a thing happened and on
4 the 25th such and such a thing happened and on the 26th
5 such and such a thing happened.
6 Q. Well, Brigadier, based on that report, the
7 events that took place, the fighting started on the
8 24th of January 1993, according to the report that you
9 have in your hands; is that correct?
10 A. What it exactly says here is the following:
11 "On the 24th of January 1993 in the afternoon hours,
12 the Muslim forces erected barricades at a previously
13 prepared location in Kacuni near Busovaca. They
14 stopped five UN vehicles, tanks and a regular military
15 police patrol vehicle, fired a hand-held rocket
16 launcher and opened intensive small arms fire which
17 wounded HVO military police deputy commander in
18 Busovaca, Mr. Ivo Perovic. After a brutal torture his
19 throat was cut and his body was delivered to the HVO on
20 the 25th of January 1993 at 1 hours. A taxi driver who
21 was there by chance ran to help the wounded Ivo, but he
22 was hit by a contact rifle grenade at close range."
23 That is what I wrote.
24 Q. The fact of the matter that is, that nothing
25 about Kostromann is in that report; correct? And you
1 said, according to that report, the fighting started on
2 the 24th; correct?
3 A. Mr. President, the paragraph I read out does
4 not speak about the beginning of fighting, but it
5 speaks of an incident that happened at a checkpoint and
6 where a man lost his life.
7 JUDGE JORDA: I would like us to move
8 forward. It's a very simple question. Does the report
9 deal with this arrest of Mr. Kostromann, "yes" or "no"?
10 Mr. Kehoe, be very clear when you ask your questions.
11 The question is clear. You're the one who wrote the
12 report, I imagine, theoretically, as I can see it here,
13 this does not deal with Mr. Kostromann's arrest.
14 Perhaps you were thinking about it, perhaps he is
15 alluding to it indirectly and you're referring to other
16 documents, only you can know. Please answer the
17 Prosecutor's question, the question that he asked.
18 A. Mr. President, this report does not deal with
19 the incident of Mr. Kostromann's arrest, because it can
20 be seen from the text itself.
21 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Brigadier.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Now, after the 24th you told us that Blaskic
24 was down in Kiseljak throughout the entire conflict in
25 late January and early February 1993; isn't that
2 A. General Blaskic, that is correct, was in
3 Kiseljak throughout the conflict. The exact date when
4 he went there, that I cannot tell, but I do know that
5 he went before the conflict broke out.
6 Q. Let me show you a document, sir.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 509A, A for the
8 English version.
9 MR. KEHOE:
10 Q. Brigadier, document 509 emanates from the
11 command of the Ban Jelacic Brigade in Kiseljak on 20
12 January 1993 signed by Mijo Bozic; isn't that right?
13 A. As far as I remember, this is Mijo's
15 Q. Do you want to compare it to one of the
16 Defence documents that you previously identified as
17 Mijo Bozic? Because if you want to do that, we can
18 look at Defence Exhibit 200, which you identified as
19 Mijo Bozic's signature.
20 A. There is no need for that. I do remember,
21 it's a bit illegible here, but I remember the way Mijo
22 used to sign his name.
23 Q. That is, in fact, Mijo Bozic's signature;
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, so as of the 20th of January 1993, would
2 you agree with me that Mijo Bozic is now the brigade
3 commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade in Kiseljak?
4 A. At this point I cannot remember when Mijo
5 became commander, whether it was --
6 Q. Let's read the order and see if the context
7 of this particular order clarifies things for you. And
8 it's an order from the command of the Ban Jelacic
9 Brigade in Kiseljak, number 01117 January 1993, the
10 date is 20 January 1993. "For the purpose of the
11 complete engagement of the brigades military
12 intelligence service and the establishment and
13 organisation of these services in the battalions, I
14 hereby issue the following order: For all Voss
15 officers in the battalions to submit comprehensive
16 biographies and the evaluations of the battalion
17 commanders and the SIS, Information and Security
18 Service, officers concerning the proposed personnel.
19 2. The biographies and evaluations shall be
20 submit to the brigade's Voss organ, at the latest, by
21 1700 hours on 22 January 1993.
22 3. The battalion commanders and the SIS
23 officials of the battalions are responsible to me for
24 the execution of this order.
25 CC commanders of the battalions 1 through 3", the
1 balance of that is illegible and it is signed
2 "commander" with the signature of Mijo Bozic; is that
3 right, sir? It would appear that as of the 20th of
4 January 1993, Mijo Bozic, who was in Blaskic's
5 headquarters in Vitez, had been transferred to the Ban
6 Jelacic Brigade in Kiseljak; is that right?
7 A. Mr. President, when we're talking about this
8 transfer I know this happened in January, but I don't
9 know the exact date, and that Mijo was appointed to
10 that duty.
11 Q. Well, in any event, at that particular time,
12 or excuse me, after the 24th, 25th of January 1993,
13 Blaskic himself is down in Kiseljak, and he was located
14 in Kiseljak in the Kiseljak barracks, which is where
15 the Ban Jelacic Brigade was; isn't that right?
16 A. General Blaskic, at the time of the conflict
17 in Busovaca in January was in Kiseljak, and he was
18 located, that is communications with us were done
19 through the command of the brigade in Kiseljak, and he
20 therefore used the links and communications that that
21 brigade had at its disposal.
22 Q. And the brigade was garrisoned and stationed
23 at the Kiseljak barracks; correct?
24 A. As far as I know, it was, yes. Its command
25 was in one of the facilities of the barracks in
2 Q. Let me show you another document, sir.
3 Mr. President, I have a rough translation of this in
4 English. It is in BCS. I'll gladly read the rough
5 translation and should anybody feel that that
6 translation is incorrect, certainly I'm sure we will
7 all discuss it.
8 THE REGISTRAR: This is 510, it's only in
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. Brigadier, take a look at this document, 510,
12 is that Mijo Bozic's signature at the bottom?
13 A. Yes, that is Mijo Bozic's signature.
14 Q. Okay, sir. Let me read this from the rough
15 translation and you correct me if there is anything
16 wrong here. "27 January 1993, order on offensive
17 military action..."
18 JUDGE JORDA: Don't read too fast, Mr. Kehoe,
20 MR. KEHOE:
21 Q. "27 January, 1993, order on offensive
22 military action, to the commander of the 1st
23 Battalion. Due to the negative developments in the
24 theatre of operations and the impossibility to take the
25 villages of Bukovci due to strong lateral fire and the
1 probable participation of the villages of Radeljevici,
2 Pobrdje, Markovici and Maslinovici in a defensive
3 effort I hereby order:
4 1. That the first company of the 1st
5 Battalion be mobilised immediately and reinforced with
6 anti-commando platoons and transported by armoured
7 personnel carrier to the village of Datici, Datici
8 formed up and that upon making preparations for opening
9 fire, disarm the villages of Radeljevici, Pobrdje,
10 Markovici and Maslinovici.
11 Readiness at point of departure, 1600 hours.
12 Readiness for opening mortar fire," time is illegible,
13 but it looks in the original to be 1300 or 1800, I'm
14 not sure.
15 "Preparations for opening fire to be carried
16 out from 1600 to 1630, with ten shells each for 82
17 millimetre and 122 millimetre mortar and targets in
18 villages selected.
19 Upon completing preparations, demand that the
20 local population unconditionally surrender all their
21 armaments as otherwise the village will be burned to
22 the ground.
23 In case of refusal to surrender weapons, open
24 strong and concentrated fire from all targets from
25 anti-aircraft guns, anti-aircraft machine guns and
1 mortars and proceed with mopping up operations.
2 3. After taking the villages, pursue the
3 enemy towards the village of Bukovci with a view
4 towards destroying that village and breaking up the
5 enemy forces in it. We will have to be able to take
6 the village of Bukovci by night fall on the condition
7 that we torch everything we find in our path.
8 I appoint Mato Lucic brigade commander,
9 co-ordinator of this action and Marinko Tuka his
10 deputy. Inform me regularly every two hours of all
11 important events and extraordinary ones." The rest is
13 "6. That operations start at" illegible
14 "signal" and the CC is "the 1st Battalion commander
15 and the 2nd Artillery commander" and signed by
16 commander Mijo Bozic: Do you see that, sir?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. Now, let me show you a map, sir, if I may.
19 THE REGISTRAR: This is 511.
20 MR. KEHOE: For reference purposes, Mr.
21 President, this is a smaller version of Exhibit 29,
22 which is the large one.
23 MR. KEHOE:
24 Q. Brigadier, I show you this map, which has
25 been identified as Exhibit 511, and you can see the
1 villages in and around the Kiseljak area that are
2 mentioned in this order. Do you see them highlighted
3 in yellow?
4 A. Yes, I can see them highlighted in that
6 Q. And you can see that the initial meeting
7 point and the goal being going towards Bukovci, which
8 is in between Bijelovats and Kacuni; do you see that?
9 A. Yes, but Bukovci is nearest to the village of
11 Q. I understand. Now, Brigadier, those are
12 predominantly Muslim villages, aren't they?
13 A. I don't know whether they are Muslim
14 villages, because I never lived in the Kiseljak
15 municipality area. But I would like to say something
16 with regard to the order as a soldier and the
17 conditions governing that order, although I didn't see
18 the order and I'm not familiar with the text of the
20 JUDGE JORDA: I'm sure -- I promise you can
21 say what you want to say, but try to answer the
22 questions and afterwards make some comments. You can
23 make your comments, but first answer the question
25 MR. KEHOE:
1 Q. Brigadier, based on paragraph two, completing
2 preparations, "Demand the local population
3 unconditional surrender, all their armaments, as
4 otherwise the villages will be burned to the ground."
5 This is an order given by a HVO brigade commander. Do
6 you conclude as a military officer and a military man
7 that those villages were Muslim villages?
8 JUDGE JORDA: Now answer the Prosecutor's
9 questions and then you can make any additional comments
10 you like about the order.
11 A. (No translation)
12 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, judge, I'm not getting
14 INTERPRETER: Repeat, please.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Please repeat, Brigadier.
17 A. I cannot say that the order was given as it
18 stands, and because they were Muslim villages, because
19 I don't know whether the villages were exclusively
20 populated by the Muslims. As I said, the national
21 structure of these villages is not known to me. The
22 document that we're talking about, that we're
23 discussing, that is to say this order which was issued
24 in the Ban Jelacic Brigade, came into being under
25 conditions when the war in the area of the Busovaca
1 municipality and the Kiseljak municipality, that is to
2 say they were intensified operations, and when the
3 whole area of Kacuni, Bijelovats and the other
4 settlements between Kiseljak and Busovaca were placed
5 under the control of the BH army. This kind of order,
6 if it was given at this particular place, had as its
7 goal to stop those attacks, that is to say to stop the
8 attacks and to prevent a further escalation of the
9 control of the corridor between Kacuni and Kiseljak in
10 the area where these conflicts took place.
11 Now, as far as those events and this
12 document, I don't know the circumstances in which they
13 came into being. That is what I can say as a soldier
14 and officer in the Croatian army.
15 Q. Well, Brigadier, you would agree with me that
16 this order in both paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 gives
17 orders to a battalion that was commanded by Mato Lucic
18 to burn villages to the ground if they are not
19 disarmed, and then after, on paragraph 3, after taking
20 the villages and pursuing the enemy to Bukovci, with a
21 view to destroying that village and breaking up the
22 enemy forces, then it says: "By night fall, take
23 Bukovci by night fall on the condition we torch
24 everything we find in our path."
25 Now, this particular order, sir, is an order
1 by a brigade commander, Mijo Bozic, to burn houses,
2 isn't it.
3 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, my learned
4 colleague said that the translation is not an
5 authorised one, and therefore, I can conclude from the
6 question that the finesses of the translation are not
7 quite clear. And in point 2, as far as I understand
8 it, and it is my mother tongue, it is stated that the
9 population be threatened, that their village will be
10 burned down if they do not give their arms. It is not
11 an order to burn the villages. It is an order to
12 threaten the population, that unless they lay down
13 their arms their village will be burned. That is to
14 say, if the population do not surrender their arms, and
15 then the second sentence states what is going to be
16 done, and it does not say to burn the village in
17 sentence to point 2, should they fail to surrender
18 their arms, a strong fire should be opened, et cetera,
19 et cetera.
20 So, point 2, which is the crucial point in
21 sentence one, it is stated the type of threat that
22 should be made, regardless of the fact that you can
23 condemn a threat of that kind. And point 2, second
24 sentence says what should be done if they fail to
25 surrender their weapons.
1 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Nobilo, it was
2 very helpful. Of course, it is your native language,
3 but it is important enough that in agreement with Judge
4 Shahabuddeen we would ask the interpreters to reread
5 the entire paragraph 2 and 3 and read them slowly. I
6 think that would be the best thing to do. I will ask
7 the interpreters, or am asking the interpreters to read
8 us paragraphs 2 and 3.
9 Mr. Dubuisson suggests that the witness
10 should read paragraphs 2 and 3, slowly, and the
11 interpreters, who work for the Tribunal have taken
12 oaths of their own, will make a very faithful
13 translations of those paragraphs. And I thank you
14 Mr. Nobilo having raised this very significant
15 question, it is important in respect of your accused,
16 but it is also important for the Prosecution.
17 Therefore, Brigadier, if you agree to go back to
18 paragraphs 2 and 3, read them slowly and the
19 interpreters will do the translation.
20 A. Mr. President, point 2, paragraph 2: "Upon
21 completion of the preparations, to demand of the local
22 population unconditionally to surrender all weapons.
23 If they fail do so, the village will be burned
24 completely. Should they not surrender, reject
25 surrendering their arms, fire will be opened and
1 concentric fire on all goals from PAT and PAM
2 anti-aircraft guns and mortars and a mopping up of the
3 terrain will be undertaken.
4 3. Upon taking control of these villages, to
5 undertake the, driving out the enemy so that the
6 village of Bukovci could be broken up and destroyed and
7 the enemy forces therein. The village of Bukovci must
8 be taken control of by night fall on condition that we
9 burn everything that is in our path, that stands in our
11 MR. KEHOE:
12 Q. Well, Brigadier, based on what you just said,
13 on paragraph 2, this is an order that if the villages
14 do not turn over their arms, that their village is
15 going to be burned to the ground; isn't that right?
16 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, in my
17 consultation with Mr. Hayman I maintain that the
18 interpretation is not the correct one, because from
19 one, there is one sentence has been turned into two
20 sentences and I'm talking about the first sentence in
21 point 2, and when you have two sentences, the senses
22 change. We're dealing with one sentence where it
23 states that they be asked to surrender their arms. And
24 that should they fail to do so, the village will be
25 destroyed. So, it is one sentence and not two.
1 JUDGE JORDA: I think we will not have the
2 passages reread. We simply ask the Prosecutor to have
3 the document officially translated by the translation
4 service into English and into French. And if, in light
5 of those translations the Defence has something else to
6 add, it can provide its own translation. Sometimes
7 there are differences in translations, that can
8 happen. The translation must be prepared by tomorrow,
9 and if necessary, the Defence can make its own
10 translation. But this is a very important point,
11 everybody realises this. Yes or no was an order given
12 to burn or was it ordered conditionally, or was it
13 simply a threat? I think this is an important point.
14 Mr. Kehoe, please continue.
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Brigadier, turning your attention to number
17 3, it is clear, is it not, that Mijo Bozic is telling
18 Mato Lucic and his battalion that they must take
19 Bukovci by night fall on the condition that we torch
20 everything that is in our path or in our way? Isn't
21 that right?
22 JUDGE JORDA: If you agree with that, you
23 have no comment about paragraph 3. I myself heard the
24 translators or the interpreters say under conditions of
25 -- how was it? Under the condition...
1 MR. KEHOE: I think the translator first
2 said, "on the condition that we torch everything that
3 we find in our path," and then there was a translation
4 "on the condition that we find anything in our way."
5 JUDGE JORDA: Brigadier, there is no problem
6 with the translation here in paragraph 2, you have no
7 problem with that, do you, Mr. Nobilo?
8 MR. NOBILO: No, Mr. President. It has been
9 translated literally, what it says here. But I don't
10 know whether in the English language it has the same
11 meaning. In the Croatian language, that which is found
12 in one's path is an obstacle, it is something that
13 impedes --
14 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Nobilo's speech, let the
15 translators translate this.
16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, if this continues
17 we are going to recruit you as a translator for the
18 International Criminal Tribunal. Let's state that
19 point for the time being.
20 MR. HAYMAN: I object to counsel interrupting
21 my learned colleague, but I would like to say, and I
22 think Judge Shahabuddeen, who speaks my language, is in
23 a good position to see that the translation in English
24 doesn't make sense. "We must take Bukovci by night
25 fall on the condition that we torch everything that is
1 in our path." It doesn't make sense in the English
2 language. There has to be some meaning full
3 translation of the phrase, and I think had we will get
4 there, and by what process I'm not sure, but I don't
5 know, Mr. President, if you're getting the same strange
6 translation that us English speakers are getting.
7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, Mr. Hayman, I will admit
8 that in French when one says under the condition that
9 especially under the condition can be interpreted in
10 various ways. We will ask the chief of the translation
11 service to give us a translation of this text in
12 English and in French.
13 MR. KEHOE:
14 Q. Now, Brigadier, the goal of this particular
15 battalion was to take Bukovci; wasn't it?
16 A. Mr. President --
17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, you didn't ask a
18 question. This is a very simple question that the
19 witness was asked. You don't have to intervene unless
20 you want to talk about the translation. But we're now
21 talking about paragraph 3 where it says that there was
22 an order to take Bukovci. That is the question that
23 the witness is being asked. You are not being asked
24 that question.
25 MR. NOBILO: Yes, I agree with you, Mr.
1 President, but we have ascertained that as far as two
2 essential points are concerned, we cannot use this
3 document, and the document is an organic hole, so I
4 suggest that questions in relation to this document be
5 put once a complete translation is provided, otherwise
6 a mistake can be made. That the only thing I wish to
8 JUDGE JORDA: Agree with Mr. Nobilo, I would
9 like this document to be translated by this evening
10 into French and English and tomorrow we will take up
11 this conversation again, that is, the discussion about
12 document 510.
13 All right, Mr. Kehoe, please move to another
15 MR. KEHOE:
16 Q. Turning our attention, Brigadier, to the
17 actual map, 511, and the individual villages that are
18 highlighted on it, were those villages burned?
19 A. I don't know whether those villages were
20 burned or not.
21 Q. Now, Brigadier, without going into the
22 content of this document, Judge, I'm not going to go in
23 there, talking about those paragraphs, but you will
24 agree with me, Brigadier, that this Mijo Bozic order
25 was dated the 27th of January and they were due to
1 begin to execute this at 1600 hours; is that right?
2 A. I don't see the document now.
3 Q. I'm sorry, give that document back to him,
4 document 510.
5 JUDGE JORDA: Was the attack ordered for the
6 27th of January? For the date I think there is no
7 translation problem, don't you agree, Mr. Nobilo?
8 A. In this document, I don't see the exact
9 date. I see a signal and I can't read it, that
10 operation should be started on signal, and I don't see
11 anything after that.
12 Q. Brigadier, up in the upper left-hand corner
13 the date is 27 January 1993; is that correct?
14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, we already said we
15 would talk about this document tomorrow. I don't want
16 you to ask many more questions, but if you have a
17 question about the date and the time, he can say that,
18 he can answer or not answer. He can answer this
19 question immediately and then we will move to another
21 All right, was the order of the attack,
22 according to this that you read in your own language,
23 that it was the 27th of January 1993, that's the only
24 part in Serbo-Croat that I myself can translate, but I
25 don't know whether it was 4:00 in the afternoon or
1 not. If you don't want to answer, then we will go back
2 to this question tomorrow.
3 A. In the second half of paragraph 1 it says
4 readiness, that's the start position at 1600 hours.
5 1600 hours is what is stated in the document.
6 MR. KEHOE:
7 Q. Thank you, sir. Turn your attention to
8 Defence Exhibit 348.
9 Now, Brigadier, the particular document we
10 just looked at, the order, had an execution date of
11 1600 hours. Now, before you is Defence Exhibit 348,
12 which is a cease-fire agreement signed by Colonel
13 Blaskic at 1740 hours; do you see that? Upper
14 left-hand corner?
15 A. Where do you see that?
16 JUDGE JORDA: On top of the document at the
17 top of the document.
18 You're used to reading orders, I'm sure you
19 can find the time. At the top, it says 1745. Go
21 MR. KEHOE:
22 Q. Now, this is dated this, particular order,
23 this Defence Exhibit 348 is dated the same day as the
24 Mijo Bozic attack order; isn't it?
25 A. Yes, the order of Mijo Bozic was written on
1 the 27th and this document was also written on the
3 Q. And this, sir, was written approximately an
4 hour and 40 minutes after the attack was supposed to
5 begin; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, turn to paragraph 1, paragraph one
8 states that this goes into effect at midnight on the
9 28th of January 1993; isn't that correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the previous document noted that Bozic
12 ordered Lujic to take those villages, or take Bukovci
13 by night fall; didn't he?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Did Blaskic issue an order to stop the
16 attacks on this village?
17 A. I don't know whether an order was issued, but
18 this order which I have before me was given on the
19 basis of an agreement, the time when the agreement came
20 into force, that is, it is the 28th of January 1993 at
21 1.00. And that was probably an agreement reached, and
22 this order on the cessation of hostilities is the
23 result of that agreement.
24 Q. Well, Brigadier, on the 27th of January,
25 based on your direct testimony, Blaskic is in Kiseljak,
1 isn't he?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And he signs this --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And he sign this is cease-fire agreement at
6 1740 on the 27th to take effect at midnight on the
7 28th; correct?
8 A. When the agreement was signed, actually
9 signed, I don't know. But I do know that it comes into
10 force on the 28th of January 1993, which can be seen
11 from the document.
12 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 511, the map we just
13 talked about, right over to your left. Did Blaskic
14 stop the shelling of these villages on the 27th, or did
15 he go ahead with it and allow them to go ahead?
16 A. Mr. President, I do not know whether the
17 shelling was stopped. And I don't know whether the
18 shelling actually took place or not.
19 Q. Well, we will move on to another subject, and
20 we will come back after a full translation. Mr.
21 President, with the Court's permission I would like to
22 ask a few more questions concerning Exhibit 510, the
23 order that we had.
24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, all right. Let me call
25 your attention to the fact that the deadline for
1 execution was the 28th of January, 1:00.
2 MR. KEHOE: That's right, midnight.
3 JUDGE JORDA: 28 January at 1.00.
4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: I wanted to ask this
5 question: The implication in your questions is that
6 this order of the 27th of January 1993 should have
7 operated to inhibit the execution of the order in
8 Prosecutor's Exhibit 510.
9 MR. KEHOE: That's correct, Judge.
10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: But if you exclude the
11 manner of implementing the order in Exhibit 510, was
12 there anything in the new order which prohibited the
13 implementation from the previous order?
14 MR. KEHOE: No, Judge, except, of course,
15 that the previous order, we can discuss this with the
16 translation, if it calls upon the burning of houses, is
17 an illegal order. But as far as the actual attack
18 goes, no, but it goes, I believe, Judge, to the spirit
19 of an actual cease-fire agreement which is trying to be
20 implemented. And we have an order to take these
21 villages by midnight, and then a cease-fire agreement
22 that comes in effect at 12.01.
23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Your questions are
24 directed to the spirit of the thing?
25 MR. KEHOE: Yes.
1 JUDGE JORDA: I want to thank Judge
2 Shahabuddeen, which again gives me the occasion to ask
3 you, Mr. Kehoe, to get to your comments and
4 observations more directly. Let's not keep turning
5 around and around all kinds of questions in order to
6 get to what you're going at. You're trying to get
7 something, go there directly and we will make our
8 evaluation thereof.
9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
10 Q. Let me turn your attention to another subject
11 concerning the conflict in January and February and I
12 want you to look at Defence Exhibit 409 of the 29th of
13 January 1993.
14 Now, Brigadier, this is a document that was
15 signed by Franjo Nakic on the 29th of January 1993 at
16 2020 hours. I just want to go to the first paragraph
17 here that starts "In the course..." "In the course of
18 today the lines of defence have remained unchanged. A
19 45 kilometre long front has been established. Our
20 defence is positioned and well entrenched, further
21 entrenchments are being completed, a fire system has
22 been organised and the situation is under control."
23 Do you see that, Brigadier?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. The sentence that starts: "Our defence is
1 positioned and well entrenched, further entrenchments
2 are being completed." We are talking there about the
3 digging of trenches in this particular document, are we
5 A. In this document, or rather in this
6 paragraph, mention is made of the situation at the
7 front-line, not about digging trenches, so the situation
8 has not been changed during the course of that day.
9 That is to say, that a cease-fire had entered into
10 force, operations had stopped; however, the troops
11 remained in trenches, because it is only these further
12 measures that should be taken that are going to
13 separate the two armies. However, nothing was done,
14 and the two armies remained at that front-line until the
15 Washington Accords were signed. So, now they are
16 talking about the situation as it is on the ground. On
17 one hand is the army of the BH and on the other side is
18 the HVO and that is what this report refers to.
19 Q. It's a simple question, Brigadier. When
20 Nakic says "further entrenchments are being completed,"
21 he is talking about trenches being dug at the
22 front-line, isn't he?
23 A. What is important to note here, Mr.
24 President, is that further entrenchments are being
25 completed, not simply entrenchments. So, that is to
1 say that if a soldier started digging a dug out on one
2 day, and then for several days after that he --
3 Q. What we're talking about is the continued
4 digging of trenches, correct?
5 MR. HAYMAN: Your Honour, counsel should not
6 interrupt the witness. If the court perceives a
7 problem, the Court can interrupt the witness. That is
8 not a power within counsel's proper authorities.
9 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, it is a very
10 simple question as to whether further entrenchments
11 means to continue the digging of trenches.
12 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, but Mr. Hayman pointed out
13 that you interrupted the witness. Try to let the
14 witness speak. The day that Mr. Hayman will interrupt
15 the witness, I will point that out to him, as well, but
16 for the time you're the one who interrupted the
17 witness. Let the witness make his explanations, but I
18 ask him to be specific in his answers to go as quickly
19 as he can to the point that he is trying to get at. Go
20 ahead, Brigadier.
21 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, further
22 entrenchments, as far as I understand military
23 terminology, and as far as I remember the situation on
24 the ground, meant in this situation to repair that
25 which has already been done. Because the army, the
1 troops, had to be there on the front-line, and not that
2 level of agreement had been reached which would
3 completely separate the two armies, so the people were
4 there and they continued to be there.
5 Q. Well, Brigadier, did you go to the front-line
6 to observe the digging of trenches at the front-line?
7 A. At that time I did not go to the front-line to
8 watch trench digging because I had things to do at the
9 command of the Operative Zone. And during the fighting
10 I never had an opportunity to go to the front-line,
11 because as the head of operations, I had to collect
12 information and work at the operational centre. Mr.
13 President, with your permission, we shall move on to
14 the next sentence and we are going to understand it.
15 "During the day the enemy violated the signed
16 cease-fire several times," et cetera.
17 JUDGE JORDA: I would like things to be very
18 clear. The questions must be asked clearly and then
19 answered. Brigadier, have you to answer the question
20 and then we move on to another one. Otherwise we are
21 not going to find a way out of this. Was your question
22 answered, Mr. Kehoe? And if so, please ask another
24 MR. KEHOE: I will move on to the next
25 question, Mr. President.
1 Q. Brigadier, let me direct your attention to 1
2 February 1993. Was then Colonel Blaskic in the Lasva
3 Valley area?
4 A. On the 1st of February 1992, to the best of
5 my knowledge, General Blaskic was not there. Unless
6 some negotiations or meetings were organised.
7 Q. Excuse me, I'm talking about on 1 February
8 1993 and you answered February 1992, I don't know if
9 that was a slip of the tongue, but my question was, was
10 he in the Vitez area on 1 February 1993?
11 A. 1st of February 1993, to the best of my
12 knowledge, no.
13 Q. Well, you told us during direct examination
14 that he was in the Kiseljak area throughout the entire
15 time of the conflict; is that right? Or is there --
16 are you somewhat doubtful of that?
17 A. I have no doubts concerning that. I only
18 could not give a direct answer because perhaps UNPROFOR
19 had organised a meeting on how the cease-fire would be
20 conducted. But in his capacity of commander of the
21 Operational Zone, that he was staying at the Lasva
22 Valley at that particular point in time, no.
23 Q. Well, sir, if he came to Vitez or the Vitez
24 area on the 1st of February 1993, he certainly would
25 come to his headquarters, wouldn't he?
1 A. General Blaskic did not stop by the command
2 on the mentioned day, the 1st of February 1993. So, I
3 said that I do not know that he was in the area of the
4 Lasva River Valley. So, I stick to the statement I
5 made, that at that time he was in Kiseljak.
6 Q. Well, do you know General Morillon?
7 A. I have heard of General Morillon, but I have
8 not met him, so I don't know him personally, but I have
9 heard of him, because of the post he held.
10 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, we can take a
11 break now, because we're about to move into another
12 subject here.
13 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, we have a long afternoon,
14 we're going to take a 15-minute break.
15 --- Recess taken at 3.26 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 3.50 p.m.
17 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume, have the
18 accused brought in, please.
19 (The accused entered court).
20 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, ask the appropriate
21 service to be sure that we don't freeze to death in
22 this room.
23 THE REGISTRAR: I will take care of it
24 immediately, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE JORDA: These are long trials, but if
1 the Judges or the counsel get sick on top of it, it
2 really isn't a good thing. All right, we will now
3 resume, Mr. Kehoe.
4 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I'm going to read
5 a document which is in English, I hand it out to all
6 parties so everybody can read along. Mr. President,
7 this is a military information summary from the British
8 Battalion, the Cheshire regimen, of 1 February 1993.
9 THE REGISTRAR: This is 512.
10 MR. KEHOE:
11 Q. Brigadier, I realise this is in English, but
12 I would like to read to you, and if we could put it on
13 the ELMO, the second paragraph on the first page.
14 MR. KEHOE: Again, Mr. President, we are not
15 going to read the entire document, I put the document
16 in its entirety so nothing would be --
17 JUDGE JORDA: Please read slowly so the
18 interpreters can interpret it. They don't have the
19 document, they have to look at the screen.
20 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
21 Q. 1 February, 1993, 1 Cheshire, no info sum
22 number 93, dated 1 February 1993.
23 1. Vitez. We will skip the first paragraph
24 and move to the second paragraph, the one beginning
25 "General Morillon." That's good.
1 "General Morillon hosted talks between 3rd
2 Corps BiH commander, Enver Hadzihasanovic, Colonel
3 Tihomir Blaskic, HVO Central Bosnia, Commander Jusic
4 Kadir, BiH Visoko and EC monitors at Bila school.
5 "Agreement was reached on the withdrawal of
6 external forces from the Busovaca/Kacuni area. All
7 external forces are to be withdrawn from the area by
8 1300 hours on 2 February 1993.
9 "Discussions also included measures to open
10 all routes, Vitez/Zenica, Kiseljak/Visoko. Work will
11 commence on the main barricade blocking the Vitez to
12 Zenica route at 1400 hours on 2 February, 1993."
13 Now, Brigadier, do you remember this meeting
14 when General Morillon came to the Bila school where the
15 British battalion was garrisoned? Do you remember this
16 meeting, sir?
17 A. I know that a meeting of this kind was held
18 on -- I don't recall the day and time of the meeting, I
19 was not present at the meeting. Everything happened
20 under UNPROFOR organisation, and it was UNPROFOR in
21 charge of all the, the entire organisation, the coming
22 and the going of the participating parties, that was
23 all under UNPROFOR organisation.
24 Q. At this time General Morillon was the
25 Commander in Chief of all UNPROFOR forces; isn't that
2 A. As far as I recall, it is. But I cannot say
3 that with any certainty.
4 Q. And this particular report indicates that
5 Blaskic was at the Bila school in Stari Bila on 1
6 February 1993; is that right?
7 A. From this report it can be seen, and I said
8 that the meeting was organised by UNPROFOR, that the
9 participating parties were brought there under the
10 UNPROFOR organisation, and they were returned to their
11 positions, and the places from which they had come to
12 the meeting was also organised by UNPROFOR. That is
13 all I know on the case.
14 Q. Brigadier, how far is the Bila school from
15 the Hotel Vitez?
16 A. The Bila school from the Hotel Vitez is about
17 4 kilometres away, it shouldn't be more than that.
18 Q. And we are talking about an area that is
19 under control of the HVO; isn't that right?
20 A. The area and the venue of the meeting was the
21 UNPROFOR base, and along with the UNPROFOR base on the
22 one hand side were the units of the BiH army and on the
23 other side the HVO units. UNPROFOR was at the Grbavica
25 Q. Now, sir, during this period of time Blaskic
1 had ordered meetings to take place to assess what the
2 situation was in his area of control, and this period
3 of time I'm talking about, the first week in February;
4 did he not?
5 A. I would like to see a document so that I
6 could know in precise terms what we're talking about
7 and what time we're talking about.
8 Q. Certainly, sir.
9 MR. KEHOE: I think there are six copies
10 there, Mr. Usher.
11 THE REGISTRAR: This is 513.
12 MR. KEHOE: Unfortunately, Mr. President,
13 there is no French copy of this, so I will have to read
14 the entire page-and-a-half or page-and-three-quarters
15 of this document.
16 MR. KEHOE:
17 Q. This is an order of the 4th of February 1993,
18 from the Vitez forward command post, and overcoming the
19 current crisis, order; and it's the attention of
20 commanders of brigades and independent units of the
21 Central Bosnia Operative Zone.
22 "On the basis of your reports, the overall
23 situation in units, and in order to overcome the
24 crisis, I hereby order:
25 1. The assistant commander of SIS shall
1 submit a list of and report on soldiers who have
2 wilfully deserted the line of defence and the reasons
3 for this extraordinary shall be analysed at the command
4 meeting. Officers in charge, brigade commander,
5 assistant for SIS of the Travnik Brigade, dateline 10
6 February, 1993.
7 2. The military police commander shall
8 reinforce patrols and guards and shall tighten the
9 security on roads in the area of responsibility of the
10 Travnik Brigade and shall be responsible directly to me
11 for the situation and the measures taken the prisoners
12 under arrest. Officers in charge, assistant for SIS,
13 the commander of the military police, Travnik Brigade,
14 deadline 10 February 1993.
15 3. Hold meetings, identify persons who have
16 shown negligent and irresponsible conduct or have
17 failed to carry out their tasks, and present evaluation
18 reports for each member of the brigade. Officers in
19 charge commander, deputy commander, dateline 10
20 February 1993.
21 4. Carry out the unification of brigades
22 logistics base by unifying the material and
23 redistributing it in sections on two or more
24 locations. Officer in charge, brigade commander,
25 dateline 10 February 1993.
1 5. Assistant to the commander for SIS shall
2 analyse the security situation and the brigade's area
3 of responsibility with regard to possible sources of
4 the threat to its security, criminals. Officer in
5 charge, assistant to the commander for SIS, deadline 7
6 February 1993.
7 6. Immediately have the soldier who sold a
8 rifle to Muslim members of the military police, JF
9 Zenica Brigade, arrested and inform me thereof in
10 writing. Officer in charge, Zenica JF Brigade,
11 military police. Deadline 7 February 1993.
12 7. Chief of Staff, Franjo Nakic shall
13 supervise the implementation of this order according to
14 deadlines indicated above."
15 And it goes to various units and it's signed
16 someone on behalf of Colonel Blaskic.
17 Whose signature is that on behalf of Colonel
19 A. This is the signature of the chief of the
20 main staff, Franjo Nakic, and in the left-hand corner
21 is my own handwriting.
22 Q. Now, sir, on number 3, it says that, if you
23 can return to the front page, or you just have a
24 one-page document, but the front page of the English.
25 It says there is an order to hold meetings
1 and identify persons who have known negligent and
2 irresponsible conduct or have failed to carry out their
3 tasks and present evaluation reports for each member of
4 the brigade. The two people he puts, Blaskic puts in
5 charge, is himself and Franjo Nakic; is that right?
6 A. Would you repeat what you said, please?
7 Q. On number 3, the order to hold meetings; does
8 he order himself and Franjo Nakic to conduct those
10 A. Yes, we are talking about holding meetings
12 Q. Yes. Now, he gives the responsibility of
13 that to himself and to Franjo Nakic; is that right?
14 A. Holding meetings, these are meetings in the
15 brigade headquarters. And let me clarify the document,
16 if possible, why it was written, how it came about; and
17 that it is not linked to the events we discussed before
18 the break. Because the Travnik Brigade has its defence
19 line towards the army of the Republika Srpska and the
20 problems occurred in that section.
21 Q. Well, my question is: Did he hold meetings
22 with the various brigades pursuant to the order that he
23 issued, specifically number 3 in this order?
24 A. The meetings were not ordered in the way you
25 describe, but they were ordered, that is to say that
1 the meetings were to be held -- I understand from the
2 text that it was ordered to hold meetings in the
3 brigades themselves.
4 Q. The person responsible for completing this
5 was either Blaskic or Nakic; isn't that right?
6 A. No, the responsible individual, that the
7 meetings be held, was the commander of the brigade.
8 The commander of the brigade was to organise the
9 meetings, and he was responsible for them.
10 Q. With all due respect, Brigadier, look at
11 number 1 and number 4, the people in charge of those
12 two, and when it is given to the brigade commander, it
13 is listed brigade commander; isn't it?
14 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. Kehoe, may I invite
15 you to look at the last eight or ten words in paragraph
16 three, "and present evaluation reports for each member
17 of the brigade"; is it your suggestion that General
18 Blaskic should have done this?
19 MR. KEHOE: No, sir, no, sir. I'm merely
20 inquiring, Judge Shahabuddeen, as to whether or not
21 these meetings were conducted by the commander and the
22 deputy commander. I think what it says is present
23 evaluation reports; so, I don't think that he would
24 actually conduct. It says "present evaluation reports
25 for each member of the brigade," so I think the actual
1 evaluation reports that are being presented are either
2 to the commander or the deputy commander.
3 Q. All I'm trying to explore is if there was a
4 plan to have meetings with the brigades to sort out
5 these problems and whether or not Blaskic and Nakic
6 were responsible for being involved in these meetings
7 and completing this task by 10 February 1993.
8 A. No.
9 Q. Okay, sir. Who was responsible for this?
10 A. The commanders of the brigades, and all the
11 activities in point 7, from points 1 to point 6, states
12 what should be done, and the control of the
13 implementation will be informed, that they would inform
14 the commander of the main staff. The copy I have is
15 rather illegible, and that is why I find it difficult
16 to follow.
17 Q. Okay, sir. You would agree with me the
18 person in charge of matters in number 4 is the brigade
19 commander; isn't that right?
20 A. Just one moment, please. The brigade
21 commander, yes.
22 JUDGE JORDA: Careful, Brigadier. When you
23 have a document right in front of you, I'm sure that
24 you recognise this one, you have to try to be logical.
25 When one says commander and deputy commander, what is
1 meant by that.
2 It is in the document the brigade commander.
3 But when Colonel Blaskic means the brigade commander,
4 he says brigade commander; and when he says assistant
5 to the commander, he says it in 5.
6 I want there to be a certain logic in the way
7 you're answering. Do you agree with my comment,
9 A. Mr. President --
10 JUDGE JORDA: Who was responsible in 3, under
11 3 who was responsible?
12 A. Under 3 it is the commander who is supposed
13 to be responsible. How this word was additionally
14 typewritten, deputy commander, that I really have no
15 idea. I mean, for that large number of brigades, I
16 really have no idea. So, it should be the commander of
17 the brigade.
18 JUDGE JORDA: The commander is the officer in
19 charge; isn't that right? All right, I have no, I'm
20 not taking sides one or the other, but you are saying
21 it's the brigade commander. All right.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Brigadier, was Blaskic receiving information
24 from these brigades as to what was happening within
25 their brigades?
1 A. General Blaskic did receive certain
2 information from the brigades. What kind of
3 information was this? When I talked about the system
4 of command, I said that with the brigades we had
5 regular daily communications through daily operative
6 reports that they submitted to us; that is to say, on
7 the situation, the units, the front-lines and other
8 facts that were relevant to each and every brigade.
9 So, that was the most frequent way of
10 informing the commander of the Operational Zone. That
11 is to say, if the commander of the Operational Zone did
12 not give special orders concerning certain events and
13 asking for a special report on certain events.
14 So, regular information was through operative
15 reports, and we had the opportunity of seeing a great
16 many of them.
17 Q. Well, Brigadier, Blaskic was receiving
18 information about what was happening with prisoners at
19 the Kaonik camp; wasn't he?
20 A. As far as the military prison at Kaonik is
21 concerned, that is what we called it. We did not call
22 it a camp. If you are referring to the prison, the
23 military prison in Kaonik; if you mean a camp in
24 Kaonik, I don't know a camp there.
25 Q. I'm talking about the military prison in
1 Kaonik. Blaskic was getting reports about what was
2 happening in the military prison in Kaonik; wasn't he?
3 A. I cannot confirm that, whether he received
4 them, or whether he received them regularly, or not;
5 but I shall try to remember all the activities
6 concerned and draw a conclusion.
7 The military prison in Kaonik was not in the
8 organisation structure of the command of the
9 Operational Zone. The warden of the military prison in
10 Kaonik was not under the command of General Blaskic,
11 commander of the Operational Zone.
12 Reports, reports on the situation and the way
13 -- and on how people were treated, people who were in
14 the military prison, regardless of whether they were
15 HVO or the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not come
16 regularly. That is to say that the military prison did
17 not send the commander reports every day, what the
18 situation was like, how many prisoners he had, et
20 If there was some kind of problem where the
21 military was involved, where soldiers were involved, it
22 was to be expected that the warden of the military camp
23 did inform General Blaskic.
24 Q. Let's turn your attention to Defence Exhibit
25 354. Do you recognise that document, Brigadier?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. That is a document that you identified during
3 the course of your direct testimony, and it is a
4 document that was executed by Blaskic concerning the
5 breaking in to the prison, the Busovaca military
6 prison, by use of arms and the taking of prisoners from
7 their cells. Do you see that, sir?
8 A. I see it. I remember this document. I
9 remember having identified it when I was answering the
10 questions of the Defence. I do remember this document.
11 Q. Up in the right-hand corner, up in the upper
12 right-hand corner, what are the two names that are
13 written on there, or the two items that are written in
14 the right-hand corner?
15 A. In the upper right-hand corner it says in
16 handwriting, Dusko, and it also says prison.
17 Q. And who is Dusko?
18 A. The word prison.
19 Q. Dusko is Dusko Grubicic; correct?
20 A. I cannot confirm it on the basis of what it
21 says here; however, guided by logic, when it says to
22 the commander of the HVO Brigade Nikola Subic-Zrinski,
23 one may conclude that he is the person that this is
24 addressed to, but only on the basis of this, where it
25 says Dusko we cannot say for sure that that is the
1 person concerned, Dusko Grubicic.
2 Q. Who was running the military prison?
3 A. The warden of the military prison was in
4 charge of the military prison. I know that it was
5 Zlatko Aleksovski who was there.
6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, may I go to
7 private session one moment on this particular
9 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, private session. All
10 right, then, a closed session.
11 (Closed session)
13 Page 13258 redacted - in closed session
13 Page 13259 redacted - in closed session
13 Page 13260 redacted - in closed session
10 (Open session)
11 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Just going back to this document, Brigadier,
13 354, it is true that Blaskic was getting information
14 about what was happening inside the Busovaca Military
15 Prison; isn't that correct?
16 A. I said how he could have obtained it, and I
17 cannot confirm that he always received such
18 information. This can best be seen from the top of
19 this document. It probably says on the basis of the
20 report of the responsible persons, et cetera. That is
21 to say, that the warden of the prison was not duty
22 bound to send regular reports to the commander of the
23 operation zone on what was happening in the prison.
24 Q. Well, Brigadier, is it true that 400 or more
25 Bosnian Muslim prisoners were being held in the
1 Busovaca Military Prison until approximately the 8th of
2 February 1993?
3 A. I cannot confirm the number of prisoners that
4 were there, and I don't know the date until which they
5 were held, but I do know that there were prisoners
7 Q. Were those prisoners taken out to dig
8 trenches on front-lines and elsewhere?
9 A. I cannot confirm that, although the
10 information that I have personally received, as I
11 worked with my colleagues, said that there were such
12 things, but this was never ordered by the commander of
13 the Operational Zone.
14 JUDGE JORDA: Brigadier, try to answer as
15 clearly as possible. I do understand that you are
16 trying to be cautious in your answers, but if you read
17 the answer that I see in front of me here, "I cannot
18 confirm that, although the indications from my
19 colleagues said that I might be able to and that it
20 wouldn't be the commander. I would like," -- this is a
21 Tribunal and I am asking that you understand that.
22 Reread the sentence, logically it is not very good. I
23 don't speak English that well, but when I look at this,
24 if you look -- just read it in English. And I would
25 like it to be reinterpreted into French, that it be
1 reinterpreted. I would like that sentence to be
2 reinterpreted, the answer.
3 All right, continue, Mr. Kehoe.
4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
5 Q. Brigadier, who in the HVO took prisoners out
6 to dig trenches?
7 A. I do not know that, who it was exactly, by
8 name and post, who did that.
9 Q. Where did you hear it from?
10 MR. HAYMAN: We would ask for a private or
11 closed session, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE JORDA: All right, closed session.
13 (Closed session)
13 Pages 13264 to 13289 redacted - in closed session
5 (Open session)
6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, if we could just
7 have this particular video marked as an exhibit, and if
8 we could dim the lights and play it?
9 THE REGISTRAR: This will be 515.
10 MR. KEHOE: If I could ask the translator to
11 translate as we go through?
12 THE INTERPRETER: There are subtitles on the
13 film and it is hard to hear it here.
14 (Videotape played)
15 MR. KEHOE: That's it. Thank you.
16 Q. Now, Brigadier, the fall of Srbrenica on the
17 16th of April was the culmination of a series of
18 Bosnian Serb offensives that had started in April of
19 1993; isn't that correct?
20 A. I cannot claim that. I was not in contact
21 with the command of the army of Republika Srpska.
22 Srbrenica is quite far away from us. It is a 300- or
23 200-kilometre distance, so I cannot say anything about
24 Srbrenica except for what the video we have all seen
25 here says for itself.
1 Q. Well, let me show you a map, sir.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Document 516.
3 MR. KEHOE:
4 Q. Now, Brigadier, the source of the information
5 that's on this map are UNPROFOR situation maps as well
6 as the United Nations Commission of Experts report.
7 Let's go through this map. Beginning in the
8 early part of February, the dates designated don't
9 necessarily say that it's the end of the battle, but
10 the purple arrows reflect the direction of Bosnian Serb
12 It's true, is it not, that an offensive began
13 in Brcko on the 3rd of February, 1993, where the
14 VRS attacked ABiH positions or Armija positions in
15 Brcko; isn't that right?
16 A. I really cannot claim that. When the army of
17 the Republika Srpska, in this area of Tuzla, in the
18 Sarajevo area and other areas further off from Central
19 Bosnia, when that was attacked, if this is a document,
20 an international document, by international
21 organisations, and they claim that it is so, I have no
22 reason to say that it isn't.
23 Q. Well, the Central Bosnian Operative Zone had
24 brigades in Sarajevo, didn't they? I think we talked
25 about that last week.
1 A. Yes. We had an HVO brigade in Sarajevo which
2 was active within the composition of the 1st Corps of
3 the BH army.
4 Q. And on approximately the 17th or thereabouts,
5 the 17th of February of 1993, the shelling of Sarajevo
6 by the Bosnian Serbs commenced in earnest, not only
7 Sarajevo but the area around Mostar and Kojnic?
8 A. I cannot claim this because I don't recall,
9 but when we come to the HVO brigade in Sarajevo, we did
10 not obtain from that brigade any operational reports as
11 to what was going on in the zone under its control on
12 the defence line towards the Republika Srpska, so that
13 brigade belonged to the command of the Operative Zone
14 organisationally speaking but it was under the command
15 of the command of the 1st Corps of the army of
17 Q. In and around the 3rd of March, is it not
18 true that the shelling of Sarajevo commenced again by
19 the Bosnian Serbs and also the beginning of the
20 provinces, the enclaves, in eastern Bosnia, that is
21 Cerska -- Cerska, Srbrenica and Zepa, the attacks on
22 those enclaves began.
23 A. I cannot say whether any of these facts are
24 correct because I don't know when the army attacked the
25 units of the Bosnia and Herzegovina army around
1 Sarajevo, in Srbrenica, and the other places mentioned
2 by you. According to my knowledge, my personal
3 knowledge, on the attacks of the BH army in the area of
4 Sarajevo and the area around Tuzla and Srbrenica with
5 the units of the Republika Srpska army, usually we
6 learnt about this from the media, the public media.
7 Q. Sir, turn down to the next, in Sarajevo where
8 the shelling began in earnest of Sarajevo on the 17th
9 of March 1993, and let's go a couple of days to the
10 21st of March.
11 Did you not learn from your brigades down
12 there that on the 20th and 21st of March that the
13 Bosnian Serb army fired approximately 3.000 shells on
14 both of those days into Sarajevo? Did you learn that
15 from your brigades?
16 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the witness, on
17 three, four or five accounts, said that he did not have
18 any knowledge on what happened outside the Central
19 Bosnia Operative Zone. The Prosecutor is taking him
20 through this document and he has answered on each count
21 he does not know what happened. I don't see the
22 purpose of this.
23 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, would you define
24 your objective more clearly, please?
25 MR. KEHOE: The objective is simple, Mr.
1 President. This witness testified that this attack on
2 the 16th of April was a surprise attack by the Bosnian
3 Muslims. In a relatively close area to Central Bosnia,
4 various offensives, various significant offensives were
5 taking place by the army of, by the Bosnian Serb army
6 against the Bosnian Muslims, beginning with the 3rd of
7 February in Brcko. It continued on the 17th of
8 February in Sarajevo and Mostar and Konjic.
9 After a brief lull it began again in Sarajevo
10 and the invasion into Srpska took place. Later on in
11 March, Your Honour, the shelling of Sarajevo began in
12 earnest, focusing on the days I just discussed, the
13 20th and 21st of March, very well-known days, very
14 well-known days in the conflict in the former
15 Yugoslavia, in excess of 3.000 shells fell on
17 Now, while this is going on, the enclaves are
18 being invaded, and we heard General Morillon testifying
19 as to what was happening in Srebrenica, as well as the
20 enclaves at Srpska and Zepce were under siege.
21 What was happening in all these fronts, all
22 the fronts that are on this map, was that the army of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina was under serious, serious attack.
24 And given the fact they were under attack and losing
25 these battles, it defies any logic they would open up a
1 second front against the Bosnian Croats when they were
2 getting annihilated and destroyed in these other
3 locales. It would, in essence, to use a simple term,
4 be cutting their own throat.
5 JUDGE JORDA: The Prosecutor has to find what
6 he is looking for. You said that it defied all logic.
7 You had an official, an important position. It's true
8 that very often you do seem to know nothing.
9 Since the Prosecutor has explained his
10 question, do you still give us the same answer?
11 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, if I wanted at
12 this point to claim that it was so, I would have to
13 recall all the dates and say it was so, and this would
14 not be the objective or realistic for me; so for these
15 dates and concrete activities I'm afraid I don't know.
16 JUDGE JORDA: How many kilometres is Sarajevo
17 from Vitez and Travnik?
18 A. Sarajevo is 80 kilometres away from Vitez and
20 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Continue,
21 Mr. Kehoe.
22 MR. KEHOE:
23 Q. Would you agree, Brigadier, that the army of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army, was being attacked on
25 numerous fronts by the Bosnian Serb army between
1 February and April of 1993, and they were losing; isn't
2 that so?
3 A. I cannot bear this out. If these facts are
4 exact, then it is obvious that the army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina on those dates was attacked by the
6 army of, the Serbian army.
7 Q. And at the same time, Brigadier, that you say
8 that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina engaged in a
9 surprise attack on the 16th of April, 1993, Srebrenica
10 was falling, as we just heard on the tape; isn't that
12 A. According to what I saw on the tape, it is
13 exact that Srebrenica was falling. But, Mr. President,
14 in my testimony about the 16th, the attack on the 16th,
15 I did not say I was attacked by the forces of the 1st
16 Corps or the 2nd Corps forces; but we were attacked by
17 the forces of the 3rd Corps from the Zenica area, from
18 the Zenica area. We were with them, in conflict with
19 them, and we were fighting a war against them, not in
20 Vitez with the forces of the 2nd Corps.
21 Q. Well, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just
22 like the HVO, was a unitary command; wasn't it?
23 A. As far as I know, that is so. But let me add
24 that in those particular days, in our operative
25 reports, the reports that we received, the Serbs, the
1 army of the Republika Srpska, attacked the HVO area in
3 So the activities of the army of the
4 Republika Srpska probably had some of their own plans,
5 and I cannot say what the army of the Republika Srpska
6 had at its objective.
7 Q. And as General Petkovic was running the HVO,
8 General Halilovic, the person we saw surrendering to
9 the Bosnian Serbs on the tape, he was the general of
10 the entire army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; wasn't he?
11 A. I apologise, but General Halilovic was the
12 commander of the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army.
13 Q. That's what I said, we agree.
14 MR. KEHOE: If I could give another document
15 to Your Honours, and this is a UN Security Council
16 resolution in French and in English.
17 Mr. President, I don't intend to read this
18 entire document, it is in French and English, it is a
19 UN security resolution of the 16th of April, 1993,
20 declaring the Srebrenica enclave a safe area. But I do
21 think that several lines in this item does bear some
22 reference during this discourse.
23 THE REGISTRAR: 517, 517A for the French
25 MR. KEHOE:
1 Q. Just with regard to the first page, this is
2 resolution 819 of 16 April, 1993, "The Security
3 Council, after reaffirming various resolutions, takes
4 note that the International Court of Justice, in its
5 order of 8 April, 1993, in the case concerning the
6 application of the convention on the prevention and
7 punishment of the crime of genocide, Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 versus Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro unanimously
9 indicated as to the provisional measure that the
10 government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
11 Serbia and Montenegro should immediately, in pursuance
12 of its undertaking in the convention of the prevention
13 and punishment of the crime of genocide of 9 December,
14 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the
15 commission of the crime of genocide."
16 We will skip three paragraphs. The paragraph
17 starting with "Concerned by the pattern of hostilities
18 by Bosnian Serb power military units against towns and
19 villages in Eastern Bosnia in this region, reaffirming
20 that any taking or acquisition of territory by threat
21 or use of force, including through the practice of
22 ethnic cleansing, is unlawful and unacceptable. Deeply
23 alarmed at the information provided by the
24 Secretary-General to the Security Council on 16 April,
25 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the situation in
1 Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of
2 the continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of
3 the innocent civilian population by Bosnian Serb
4 paramilitary units."
5 We will skip two paragraphs. "Aware that a
6 tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in
7 Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct
8 consequence of the brutal actions of the Bosnian Serb
9 paramilitary units forcing the large scale displacement
10 of civilians, in particular women, children and the
12 Go to the demands, "Demands that all parties
13 and others concerned treat Srebrenica and surrounding
14 areas as a safe area which should be free from any
15 armed attack or other hostile act.
16 2. Demands also to the effect, the immediate
17 cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary
18 units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal
19 of the areas around Srebrenica."
20 Down to the bottom of the page, 6, "Condemns
21 and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb
22 party to force the evacuation of the civilian
23 population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas,
24 as well as from other parts of the Republic of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the overall abhorrent
1 campaign of ethnic cleansing.
2 9. Urges the Secretary-General and the
3 United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees to use all
4 resources at their disposal in the scope of the
5 relevant resolutions of the council to reinforce the
6 existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular Srebrenica and its
9 And the last one we will read is 11.
10 "Further request the Secretary-General, in
11 consultation with UNHCR and UNPROFOR, to arrange or the
12 safe transport of wounded and ill civilians from
13 Srebrenica and surrounding areas and urgently report
14 thereon to the council."
15 That, of course, Mr. President is an official
16 document of the UN filed on the 16th of April 1993.
17 JUDGE JORDA: Ask your question, Mr. Kehoe.
18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.
19 MR. KEHOE:
20 Q. So, would it be fair to say, Brigadier, based
21 on what you heard and what you have seen today,
22 Srebrenica was a humanitarian and military disaster for
23 the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that correct?
24 A. From what we saw on the film, we saw that the
25 population had suffered greatly and that it was truly
1 an act which was very difficult for the people living
2 in Srebrenica.
3 Q. And, well, we won't get into -- based on what
4 you've seen and based on what you heard, you still
5 maintain, sir, that it was the Bosnian Muslims or the
6 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina who attacked the HVO on the
7 morning of the 16th of April 1993? Is that still your
9 A. That is part of my testimony, on the basis of
10 what I experienced on the 16th of April, 1993.
11 Q. Let's turn to just another document, if you
13 MR. KEHOE: Do we have an easel here? Can we
14 bring in an easel? I don't know what time, Mr.
15 President, you're going to break. I have a document
16 that I would like to --
17 JUDGE JORDA: On the same subject?
18 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, on the same
20 JUDGE JORDA: If my colleague agrees. All
21 right, distribute the document.
22 MR. KEHOE: It's a map, Mr. President, but we
23 can distribute, Defence Exhibit 401, 402 and 403.
24 Defence Exhibit 401, 402 and 403, while we're setting
25 up the map. I think in a very brief period of time,
1 Mr. President, I think I can complete this area of
3 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead. The interpreters
4 will work a few more minutes, I'm sure. Thank you.
5 Mr. Dubuisson, if we can also have this map
6 marked and put on the ELMO, marked as an exhibit.
7 THE REGISTRAR: The map is 518.
8 MR. KEHOE:
9 Q. Now, Brigadier, while the usher is putting
10 the map up on the board, previously during your direct
11 testimony you gave us some orders from, or some
12 requests from the 8th of January, 5th of February of
13 1993, and the 1st of July of 1992. And I'm referring
14 to, in series, Exhibits 401, 402 and 403.
15 These are requests to be able to transit HVO
16 areas by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to travel with
17 ammunition, et cetera; isn't that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, Brigadier, the resupply of the Bosnian
20 Herzegovinins, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had to
21 come through either Croatia or an area controlled by
22 the HVO; isn't that so?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Look at the map that is before us, that is,
25 the map 518, and I took the liberty of writing in red
1 on that map the supply lines coming from the Dalmatian
3 My question for you, Brigadier, is: Do you
4 agree that those are the major supply lines that would
5 go from the Dalmatian coasts up into Central Bosnia?
6 MR. KEHOE: And, Counsel, I advise you to
7 come over and take a look at the map. I apologise for
8 asking the question without giving that courtesy.
9 A. May I approach the map, as well, please?
10 Q. Certainly.
11 A. I think that they are, yes.
12 Q. And all those areas, those particular supply
13 routes, all transit through Croatia and through HVO
14 controlled area, one obviously going through Prozor and
15 the other going, for instance, through Jablanica;
17 A. No, that's not correct. This route passes by
18 the following places; Tomislavgrad, where the HVO was
19 present; through Prozor, where the army and the HVO
20 were there, the HVO was dominant; it passes through
21 Gornji Vakuf, where we have the army and the HVO, from
22 Gornji Vakuf along the length of 40 kilometres, it
23 passes through an area controlled by the army of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina; and further on from there, Novi
25 Travnik. It moves across the territory of Vitez
1 municipality, where we have units of the HVO and the BH
3 So, if we go from Vitez towards Zenica,
4 towards Zenica, from Kaonik onwards, from Lasva, that
5 is to the say, this territory was controlled by the BH
6 army units.
7 As far as the supply line passing through
8 Central Bosnia from Split, for example, to Zenica, it
9 passed through a territory which was controlled both by
10 the units of the HVO and the Bosnian BH army. And for
11 that reason, this type of communication was
12 established, so that when we would take supplies, we
13 would ask the army to ensure safe passage through these
14 areas mentioned a moment ago where the army had its
16 Q. You would agree with me, Brigadier, these are
17 the life lines for Central Bosnia; isn't that so?
18 These are the routes that basically are used to
19 resupply Central Bosnia; isn't that right?
20 A. Yes, they were routes for supplying Central
21 Bosnia and the HVO, under its own organisation with its
22 own resources, participated in building and preparing
23 the roads for the forthcoming winter period, so that
24 the supplies of the needs of the army and food should
25 be effective and efficient as possible. Because part
1 of the roads pass through mountainous ground, which is
2 very difficult under winter conditions.
3 Q. And if the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 attacked the HVO, the first response of the HVO and the
5 HV would be to cut those supply lines to the army of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that correct?
7 A. That can be stated in that way and thought to
8 be like that, but the attack was because of the supply
9 routes. The BH army attacked in order to gain control
10 of the supply lines, fully gain control of the supply
12 Q. Thank you, Brigadier.
13 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I've concluded
14 this area and we will move into another area tomorrow.
15 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Tomorrow morning we
16 will resume at 10.00. Court is adjourned.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
18 6.08 p.m. to be reconvened on the 13th
19 day of October, 1998 at 10.00 a.m.