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  1. 1 Wednesday, 14 October 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 12.22 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Have the

    5 accused brought in, please. Have the witness brought

    6 in.

    7 (The accused entered court).

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to apologise, the

    9 initial appearance took longer than had been expected.

    10 I'm very sorry. We are just chasing time, so that is

    11 yet one more reason to encourage you both, Prosecution

    12 and Defence, to try to move more quickly.

    13 All right, this is a public hearing, now, the

    14 witness should be brought in.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: We would, request,

    16 Mr. President, for the reasons stated yesterday, that

    17 the cross-examination proceed in closed session. Thank

    18 you.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe.

    20 MR. KEHOE: I'm not quite sure what the

    21 reasons are for that, we are going to talk about

    22 Gomionica. I certainly don't want any harm to befall

    23 the witness, but I'm just telling you what we're going

    24 into at this particular point.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, very well, do you have any

  2. 1 specific reasons, Mr. Hayman? We seem to be constantly

    2 in closed session. Do you feel it's justified,

    3 Mr. Hayman?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: We do, and I can go into greater

    5 detail, if you wish, in a closed session. But I think

    6 I stated the reasons earlier in closed session. Thank

    7 you.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Let me consult with my

    9 colleague.

    10 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. Kehoe, Mr. Hayman is

    11 relying on certain objections which he has already made

    12 or uncertain reasons which he has already advanced. Do

    13 you consider that those reasons pertain to the new

    14 field which you are now proposing to explore?

    15 MR. KEHOE: My answer to that, Judge

    16 Shahabuddeen, depends on a large part on the witness's

    17 answer. If the witness says he does know some things

    18 about what transpired, then I will explore what he

    19 knew, how he knew it, et cetera, you know, who told

    20 him, et cetera, some of the questions that I did

    21 before. But that, in large part, reflects my response

    22 to the witness's statements.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. Hayman.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: Yes, Your Honour.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: We don't have Judge Riad

  3. 1 today who facilitates conversations on the bench. I'm

    2 unilingual, and Judge Jorda has made astonishing

    3 progress, as you have learned, in his command of the

    4 English language. Now, I am still dragging my feet in

    5 French, and that accounts for the peculiar disposition

    6 of the judges this morning, and the way we are sharing

    7 the microphone.

    8 What I wanted to ask you was this: The

    9 primary rule, is, of course, that proceedings in Court

    10 are in public. Very well, you made some objections

    11 yesterday, or you stated certain reasons yesterday in

    12 support of a motion for a closed hearing.

    13 The Prosecutor this morning says he proposes

    14 to explore a certain new area, and you have taken the

    15 position that reasons which you have given are equally

    16 applicable.

    17 May I suggest that the way ahead is this:

    18 That we allow the Prosecutor to begin in open session

    19 in a normal way, and if he comes to a crunch, then you

    20 rise and you repeat or renew your request for a closed

    21 hearing. And at that point the matter should be a lot

    22 clearer than it is now.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: We can, Your Honour.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much, Judge

    25 Shahabuddeen, for your translation. All right, now we

  4. 1 can resume. Thank you very much, Judge Shahabuddeen.

    2 It is very pleasant to work under conditions with

    3 colleagues such as Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Riad,

    4 but we can now continue on the basis of what we just

    5 said.

    6 Have the witness brought in.

    7 (The witness entered court).

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Brigadier, do you hear me?

    9 A. I hear you, Mr. President.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: All right, we're going to work

    11 for about 30 minutes. Mr. Kehoe.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, thank you,

    13 Judge Shahabuddeen, Counsel.

    14 Q. Good afternoon, Brigadier.

    15 A. Good afternoon.

    16 Q. Brigadier, we're going to shift gears. We're

    17 going to remain on the 18th. Yesterday, just to bring

    18 us a little up to date, we talked about what was

    19 happening on the 18th in the Vitez area and Donja

    20 Veceriska, and I would like to shift gears to some of

    21 your testimony about what transpired in the Kiseljak

    22 area on the late night of the 17th of April and on to

    23 the day of the 18th of April and thereafter.

    24 Now, as we begin, I would like to address

    25 your attention back to a Defence document, and if we

  5. 1 can begin with Defence document 258.

    2 Now, Brigadier, you identified Defence

    3 document 258 during the course of your testimony, I

    4 believe, where you identified it as a request for

    5 transportation by the British Battalion. This

    6 particular request for transportation picks Colonel

    7 Blaskic up in Kiseljak and brings him to Busovaca on

    8 the 12th of April 1993.

    9 A. The text is illegible. I can read that on

    10 the 12th of April, 1993, security for the delegation of

    11 the HVO; so this is a request to provide transportation

    12 for an HVO delegation and their escort. There's also

    13 the time of departure, and also a request until 1600

    14 hours, and a telephone number.

    15 So, it is a request for providing

    16 transportation, and it went to the British Battalion.

    17 I'm not sure who signed it. It seems to me it was

    18 Pircic, but I'm not too sure. The seal is from the

    19 command of the Operative Zone.

    20 Q. And from the English translation, if I can

    21 help you along a little bit, Brigadier, this document

    22 reflects that Blaskic is to be picked up at 0900 hours

    23 at the Kiseljak barracks on the 12th of April, 1993, on

    24 a Monday. I think everybody will agree that certainly

    25 that's the translation as is reflected in the French

  6. 1 and the English.

    2 Now, that was a Monday. Let me show you a

    3 document, Brigadier.

    4 THE REGISTRAR: This is 526, 526A for the

    5 English version.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. Brigadier, without reading this whole

    8 document, as you can see, this is a document that is

    9 signed by Colonel Blaskic; is it not?

    10 A. Yes, it was signed by Colonel Blaskic, and

    11 these are my initials here, Slavko Marin.

    12 Q. Now, in this particular document Blaskic is

    13 asked to be picked up on Friday, on the 9th of April,

    14 1993, taken to Kiseljak; isn't that right?

    15 MR. KEHOE: I realise there is no French

    16 copy, Judge, but I'm trying to expedite the questioning

    17 through the document. If Your Honour wants I can read

    18 the whole thing.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: No, that's not necessary.

    20 Generally I say both to the Prosecution and the

    21 Defence, you have to be sure that the day that you make

    22 your final arguments, before the deliberations of the

    23 Trial Chamber, on that day, all documents that have not

    24 been translated into French be so.

    25 Let me tell you that now so you make the

  7. 1 proper arrangements, because you still have several

    2 weeks, and enough time for it to be done. Continue

    3 please, Mr. Kehoe.

    4 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. So, that indicates that Blaskic was taken

    7 down to Kiseljak on the 9th of April, 1993.

    8 A. In this other document, which was offered by

    9 the Prosecutor, 256, it is obvious what it exactly

    10 says. From this document one cannot tell that General

    11 Blaskic will be travelling. So they are requesting two

    12 armoured personnel carriers for the transportation of

    13 the HVO military delegation and their escort on Friday

    14 the 9th of April.

    15 I did write this document, but indeed, I

    16 don't know whether any one of us officers travelled,

    17 either I or General Blaskic, because you cannot see it

    18 from here.

    19 Q. From the Defence document, 258, you stated in

    20 your direct that Blaskic is down in Kiseljak and is to

    21 be picked up on Monday, the 12th. Isn't it true,

    22 Brigadier, from this document you can indicate he got a

    23 lift down there on Friday?

    24 A. Mr. President, if I may, the document that

    25 was offered by the Defence, as far as I can see, it

  8. 1 also doesn't say that Blaskic is being transported.

    2 Again, reference is made to the delegation; and we did

    3 not ascertain, or deny, for that matter, that it was

    4 Blaskic there.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Kehoe. Try to be

    6 as complete as you can.

    7 MR. KEHOE:

    8 Q. Well, was Blaskic taken down to Kiseljak on

    9 Friday afternoon, the 9th of April, 1993, and was he

    10 picked up at Kiseljak barracks on the 12th of April,

    11 1993, Monday morning at 9.00? That's the question.

    12 Was he or wasn't he?

    13 A. Mr. President, I cannot confirm that, whether

    14 General Blaskic was taken exactly on that date. But I

    15 can confirm the following: That one could not go to

    16 Kiseljak, even if one wanted to, I mean the HVO

    17 members, from the January conflict. That is to say,

    18 after the BH army put under its control Kacuni and,

    19 therefore, the road, too. That is to say, without

    20 UNPROFOR participation and documents, it was

    21 impossible.

    22 Q. You do recall telling us in direct

    23 examination that quite often Blaskic went down to visit

    24 his family in the Kiseljak area and was taken down

    25 there by the British Battalion; isn't that right?

  9. 1 A. That is not what I said. I said the

    2 following: That General Blaskic, before the conflict,

    3 that is to say, while one could take this road, while

    4 it was still accessible, he often went to see his

    5 family in Kiseljak. After the conflict, it was

    6 possible to reach Kiseljak only in UNPROFOR

    7 organisation, that is to say in this way; you had to

    8 submit a request and give the date and time and number

    9 of people and submit this request.

    10 Q. Brigadier, the record will speak for itself.

    11 We will move on to the other documents.

    12 Let's turn to Defence document 299 and 300,

    13 both Defence documents.

    14 Before we go to that, Brigadier, you were the

    15 drafter of these, certainly of the order on the 8th of

    16 April; do you recall who was in this HVO military

    17 delegation and their escorts that was taken from

    18 Busovaca down to Kiseljak on the 9th of April? Do you

    19 recall who was in that delegation?

    20 A. I truly cannot recall who was on the

    21 delegation. But I believe that there are archives in

    22 the command of the British Battalion.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Make an effort, General,

    24 please. You are the one who wrote the order. It

    25 involved the delegation, you, yourself, said you were

  10. 1 not sure. But it's a very clear question, apparently

    2 on the 12th of April, Monday, Blaskic was in Kiseljak

    3 to go back to Busovaca, and then you wrote an order for

    4 the transportation of nine people.

    5 So it is a very simple question, was the

    6 accused one of them, yes or no? You are the one who

    7 wrote the order, you are number 2, you are right next

    8 to General Blaskic, you should know.

    9 Please answer, and then the Judges will make

    10 their evaluation. Yes or no, was the accused in that

    11 convoy for which you, yourself, drafted the order? You

    12 just said you drafted the order.

    13 You have a very faithful memory for several

    14 days. After all, he is the number one, he was your

    15 direct superior, you should have known whether or not

    16 he was there. Was he there or was he not there? It's

    17 a simple question. Was he in the convoy or not?

    18 A. Mr. President, I really cannot claim that

    19 General Blaskic was there.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Well, then, let's not be

    21 surprised that this cross-examination is taking so

    22 long. This is going to be Defence time, this is going

    23 to be counted as Defence time. Continue, Mr. Kehoe.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Let us move ahead and turn to Exhibits 299

  11. 1 and 300. Now, we start with 299 first, that is an

    2 order of Blaskic on the 17th of April, 1993 at 9.10 in

    3 the morning.

    4 If I can direct your attention to point 2b,

    5 "The order is given to the Ban Jelacic Brigade to take

    6 control of Gomionica and Svinjarevo after a strong

    7 artillery support by VBR and MB."

    8 My first question for you is: What is VBR

    9 and what is MB?

    10 A. VBR is a multiple rocket launcher, and MB is

    11 a mortar. It doesn't say whether it's 82 or 102

    12 millimetres, but it is a mortar.

    13 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 300, which is the next

    14 exhibit, and we can clarify exactly what type of

    15 artillery we're talking about.

    16 Again, this is an order written by you on the

    17 evening of the 17th of April, 1993, at 2345 hours. On

    18 point 2.2 in this order for combat operations you are

    19 giving instructions, "using all available artillery,

    20 carry out fire preparations for the attack from the

    21 VU," the abbreviation is unknown, "capture Gomionica

    22 and Svinjarevo through systematic targeting, 60, 80 and

    23 120 millimetre mortar launchers."

    24 Is that, that's the type of artillery that

    25 was being used at that juncture; correct?

  12. 1 A. Yes, that is the type of artillery that was

    2 supposed to be used for carrying out the assigned task.

    3 Q. Now, we previously noted that the taking of

    4 positions of artillery takes a high degree of planning,

    5 and I think you noted, and I can read your testimony to

    6 you, Brigadier, that "In order to launch artillery

    7 attacks, either from mortars, I don't know if it was

    8 calibre 80, 82 or 120, or from a rocket launcher, or

    9 from any other artillery piece, you need preparations.

    10 These preparations take a certain amount of time

    11 because the coordinates need to be established. The

    12 hits which were made show clearly," and you're talking

    13 about the hits that were taking place in Vitez.

    14 By the way, this is on page 12.301 of the

    15 Brigadier's direct testimony.

    16 So, the artillery preparations take a

    17 significant amount of time in order to be accurate;

    18 isn't that right?

    19 A. Yes, that is why this preparatory combat

    20 command was issued.

    21 Q. I understand. Let's continue on with what

    22 the events of that day, and let's move to Prosecutor's

    23 Exhibit 456/46. You previously talked about, and we

    24 discussed before, Exhibit 456/46 is an order going to

    25 Stjepan Tuka at 1.40 in the morning written by you with

  13. 1 his combat assignments listed in point 2. That is:

    2 "Regroup the forces of your battalion and carry out

    3 combat operations on the village of Dusina or a

    4 breakthrough in the direction of the Busovaca stables

    5 and link with the forces defending Sebesic."

    6 Now, this was a two-pronged attack to be

    7 launched on the morning of the 18th with the Ban

    8 Jelacic Brigade taking over the areas of Gomionica and

    9 Svinjarevo while the Fojnica Brigade moved either

    10 towards Dusina or moved towards Sebesic; is that right?

    11 A. Yes, the Ban Jelacic Brigade had as its task

    12 to link up the forces, in preparation and in execution

    13 it had the task of mastering Svinjarevo which is where

    14 the BH army units were located. The Battalion Fojnica

    15 also had the task of executing all operations to link

    16 forces in the places as quoted here.

    17 The reason for this was that the war was

    18 being waged in Busovaca and in Vitez, and that the

    19 forces coming as reinforcements should be linked up in

    20 that area. That is logical and is the military

    21 principle.

    22 Q. Let us turn or attention to Prosecutor's

    23 Exhibit 510, if you could.

    24 Now, Prosecutor's 510 is the order to burn,

    25 number 3, the order of 27 January, 1993, and the last

  14. 1 line on paragraph 3, the Bukovici village must be taken

    2 by nightfall on the condition that we burn anything

    3 standing in the way.

    4 Now, this is an order that is given by Mijo

    5 Bozic, the Ban Jelacic commander, and the person that

    6 was in charge was Mato Lucic, the brigade commander.

    7 That's what the document reflects.

    8 Let us turn our attention to Exhibits 305 and

    9 306, Defence Exhibits 305 and 306.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Can we keep 510 with the

    11 Brigadier? That is the 27th of January, 1993 order,

    12 and I would like to let the Brigadier to look at the 27

    13 January 1993 order in conjunction with Defence Exhibit

    14 305 and 306.

    15 Q. Brigadier, the individual who gives this

    16 order to burn everything that is standing in the way on

    17 the 27th of January is Mijo Bozic, and the person in

    18 charge is Mato Lucic; those are the same two officers

    19 who are conducting operations in Kiseljak on the 18th

    20 of April 1993, aren't they?

    21 And if you want to refresh your recollection

    22 before you answer, I ask you to take a look at Defence

    23 Exhibit 305 and 306.

    24 A. In this document, 306, it was signed, that

    25 is, the name of the commander, Mijo Bozic, is on the

  15. 1 name of the document, the document reached the

    2 Operative Zone command by a link packet, and on

    3 document 305 we have the operative officer in charge,

    4 the officer on duty, Mato Lucic.

    5 Q. So, the answer to my question is yes; is that

    6 right?

    7 MR. NOBILO: Objection, the question was who

    8 launched the operations, and he said Mato Lucic was on

    9 duty at the command, in this way he is being led to

    10 give a false answer.

    11 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, he is not being

    12 led anywhere, and I will start from the beginning.

    13 Q. The brigade commander in January who gave

    14 this order to burn everything in his way was Mijo

    15 Bozic; wasn't it?

    16 A. The commander of the brigade was Mijo Bozic.

    17 And to burn everything in the way, we discussed this, I

    18 cannot say that he was the commander of the brigade who

    19 gave the order to burn, what it stated.

    20 Q. And the brigade commander of the Ban Jelacic

    21 Brigade, on the 18th of April, 1993, who was on the

    22 receiving end of your combat orders, was the same man,

    23 Mijo Bozic; isn't that correct?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Okay, now, let's move to Mato Lucic. On this

  16. 1 order, on the 27th of January, which includes that the

    2 village, that anything should be burned standing in the

    3 way, the person in charge was Mato Lucic; isn't that

    4 right? And that is in number 4.

    5 A. With coordinating this operation which was

    6 ordered in document 510, and it stands that it should

    7 have been Mato Lucic.

    8 Q. Let's move to Exhibit 305. The individual

    9 that is reporting back about the combat operations in

    10 the Gomionica, Gromljak area, is the same man, Mato

    11 Lucic; isn't that correct?

    12 A. Yes, Mr. President, but Mato Lucic, it is

    13 written here, is in the role of the officer on duty.

    14 That means somebody who, on the 18th of April, was on

    15 duty in the brigade.

    16 I don't know whether that was Mato Lucic, but

    17 I see from the document that it is; which means that he

    18 sits in the centre for 24 hours, takes in reports and

    19 assignments from commanders, what should be done from

    20 that position where he is on duty.

    21 Q. Now, fulfilling the orders, let's move to

    22 Defence Exhibit 305, the one that comes from Mato

    23 Lucic, the officer on duty. And let's move to point B,

    24 where it talks about the enemy and MOS, the Muslim

    25 armed forces.

  17. 1 "Our forces, which are fulfilling their task

    2 in the village of Gomionica, are being attacked. They

    3 are mostly using sniper rifles. A great number of

    4 forces has left Gomionica and pulled out towards the

    5 village of Stojkovici.

    6 "2. Our forces. Tasks are being done by

    7 orders. We have reached Mlava. Heavy fighting is

    8 going on. We are using artillery and means of PZO for

    9 support. Jehovac, Gromljak to Mlava and Palez have

    10 been disarmed. We have wounded people, we are going

    11 on with fulfilling our task. We have received zip from

    12 Fojnica bojna. Everything is ready. They're asking

    13 for negotiations. At this moment UNPROFOR came to the

    14 commander."

    15 My question on this is: At this particular

    16 time, on the 18th of April, 1993, at 1000 hours, the

    17 village of Jehovac and Gromljak have been disarmed,

    18 according to this report; isn't that right?

    19 A. The report that you have read out, I have not

    20 had in my hands, I have not had before me.

    21 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry, Mr. Usher, does the

    22 witness have 305.

    23 Q. My question is focused on paragraph 2.

    24 A. I can confirm that what is written here was

    25 done; namely, that they reached Mlava, that there was

  18. 1 strong fighting and that artillery was used, as well as

    2 PZO for support, and that Jehovac, Gromljak up to Mlava

    3 and Palez had been disarmed, the place of Palez.

    4 So, there are wounded people, they are

    5 carrying on with fulfilling their tasks, and we have

    6 received zip, I suppose this is an abbreviation for

    7 telegram, from the Fojnica battalion saying everything

    8 is ready, and they are asking for negotiations, and all

    9 this linked to UNPROFOR.

    10 So, what is written in the report I cannot

    11 deny. It is so.

    12 Q. Let us move to Exhibit 306, the report that

    13 comes from Mijo Bozic, the Ban Jelacic Brigade

    14 commander. Do you have that sir, the report of the

    15 18th of April, 1993 at 1645, which reads: "The

    16 conflict has spread to the villages of Rotilj,

    17 Visnjica, Doci, Hercezi and Brestovsko. We have lost

    18 Zavrtaljka." Pardon my pronunciation.

    19 "We did not manage to handle Gomionica, but

    20 we did take one kilometre on both sides around

    21 Gomionica. Heavy fighting is in progress. We have

    22 three killed and four wounded. The number of missing

    23 is unknown."

    24 My question for you, sir, is: It's pretty

    25 clear from this document that by 1645 on the afternoon

  19. 1 of the 18th of April, 1993, combat operations are still

    2 taking place in the Gomionica, Gromljak area just north

    3 of Kiseljak; would you agree with that?

    4 A. Yes, that can be seen from this report.

    5 Q. And thereafter, combat operations continued;

    6 isn't that correct, sir, through the night?

    7 And let me show you the 19th of April, 1993,

    8 a report from Mato Lucic at 0200 hours, and that would

    9 be Defence Exhibit 323.

    10 Without reading the whole document, again,

    11 this is another document coming from Mato Lucic in the

    12 early morning hours of the 19th of April, 1993.

    13 And on number 2, it says: "Our forces

    14 continue with intense activities in the Gomionica

    15 village since the MOS attempted a counter attack."

    16 Now, my question for you is: Throughout that

    17 whole day was there fighting in the Gomionica, Gromljak

    18 area?

    19 A. I can confirm only that what is written in

    20 the report is exact.

    21 Q. Well, let me ask you a question. Let me show

    22 you Exhibit 293, Prosecution's Exhibit 293.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Did I say 193? I meant 293,

    24 excuse me, 293.

    25 MR. KEHOE:

  20. 1 Q. Brigadier, this is a cease-fire document,

    2 Brigadier, that also came in, in the examination by the

    3 Defence. I'm not positive what the Exhibit number is

    4 on the Defence.

    5 But you testified that this cease-fire order

    6 on the 18th of April, 1993, was also written in BCS.

    7 And my question for you, Brigadier, is: You were in

    8 the headquarters at the time; was this sent to the Ban

    9 Jelacic Brigade during the 18th? Or were they told to

    10 ignore it?

    11 A. This document, 293, was signed by General

    12 Blaskic, the stamp is the Croatian community, but I

    13 can't see whether in Vitez. Have you got a Croatian

    14 version for me to read, so I can understand what is

    15 actually mentioned?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: I thought that we would answer

    17 that question quickly, but it might be better to take a

    18 break. The interpreters have been working since 9.30

    19 this morning, we are not going to begin again before a

    20 quarter to 3.00. Therefore, if you agree,

    21 Mr. Prosecutor, I'm sorry that I have to interrupt you,

    22 but we're going to suspend the hearing and we will

    23 start again at 2.45.

    24 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.04 p.m.


  21. 1

    2 --- On resuming at 2.52 p.m.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: We will resume the hearing now,

    4 have the accused brought in, please, then the witness.

    5 (The accused entered court)

    6 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Dubuisson, while we're

    7 waiting for the witness, could we have Prosecutor's

    8 Exhibit 328, please?

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Prosecution, you said; right?

    10 MR. KEHOE: Prosecution, yes, sir.

    11 Mr. Dubuisson, it should be a map that looks like

    12 this.

    13 (The witness entered court).

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Good afternoon, Brigadier,

    15 we're resuming now.

    16 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, the floor is yours.

    18 MR. KEHOE:

    19 Q. Good afternoon, Brigadier. Brigadier --

    20 A. Good afternoon.

    21 Q. Brigadier, some of the -- if you could move

    22 that down a little bit, we want to focus around, yeah,

    23 if we could just -- that's good.

    24 Brigadier, the attack in Kiseljak, or in the

    25 Gromljak, Gomionica area that we've been talking about

  22. 1 on the 18th focused on the villages that we have on the

    2 ELMO, Prosecutor's Exhibit 328. And Gromljak, which

    3 you said was disarmed, and they were still attempting

    4 some fighting in Gomionica. And I believe in Defence

    5 exhibit 306 the fighting spread to Rotilj, Visnjica,

    6 Doci, Hercezi and Brestovsko; and these are villages,

    7 basically Muslim villages, that are located just north

    8 of the town of Kiseljak, is that right?

    9 A. I don't know the structure of the population

    10 of Gomionica and Hercezi, but I do know that in

    11 Gomionica, according to our information, there was a

    12 stronger concentration of the BH army units, and that

    13 on the days that we mentioned, the 17th and 18th, there

    14 was intensive fighting there, which can be seen from

    15 the report by the operative on duty of the Ban Jelacic

    16 Brigade.

    17 Q. And from the reports that you got from the

    18 Ban Jelacic Brigade, this fighting was taking place

    19 throughout the day on the 18th.

    20 A. The fighting on the 18th, towards the 19th,

    21 that is to say, on the 18th -- perhaps it would be best

    22 if I had the report in front of me, but I'll try and

    23 recall this. It was waged for the reason, because the

    24 BH army units launched a counter-attack on the HVO

    25 units which were located in the immediate vicinity of

  23. 1 Gomionica and the villages that were there.

    2 Q. Take a look at the reports, 305 and 306,

    3 which take us up to 1645 hours on the 18th.

    4 A. In the report of the 18th of April, in point

    5 2, and the report was written by the officer on duty,

    6 Mato Lucic. It states that execution of the assignment

    7 is described and that they had reached Mlava but there

    8 was intensive fighting, and that the guns were being

    9 used and the PZO as reinforcements, and Jehovac,

    10 Gromljak was disarmed, up to the village of Palez. We

    11 have wounded, and we are continuing the execution of

    12 our duties. We have received a zip from Fojnica, a

    13 telegram, and everything is ready, and they are calling

    14 for negotiations. I can go on reading the report where

    15 we see that on the 18th a counter-attack was carried

    16 out, and it was the report by the same officer on duty,

    17 because we're talking about the entirety of the report.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: What report are you asking

    19 for?

    20 MR. KEHOE: Right now I'm talking about the

    21 reports published on the 18th, and those are reports

    22 305 and 306. Those are reports that are, the 18th at

    23 10.00 in the morning, that's 305; and 306 is at 1645 on

    24 the 18th, written by Mijo Bozic.

    25 Q. Now, Brigadier --

  24. 1 A. Can I have the report by Mato Lucic?

    2 Q. Of the 18th?

    3 A. The 18th, 19th, there is another report that

    4 we had before the break for lunch, it was on the table.

    5 MR. KEHOE: There was Defence Exhibit 323 of

    6 the 19th by Mato Lucic.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, it is 323.

    8 A. Yes, that's the report I asked for.

    9 MR. KEHOE:

    10 Q. Brigadier, that is a report of 323 from 2.00

    11 in the morning on the 19th. What time was this

    12 counter-attack that is referred in number 2 on the

    13 19th?

    14 A. The exact time of the counter-attack, I don't

    15 know. If the report was written at 0200 hours, it

    16 would be logical to conclude that the counter-attack

    17 was before the report had been written. And it states

    18 clearly the positions from which the counter-attack was

    19 launched on the MOS, attempted by MOS.

    20 Q. Using your logic, Brigadier, on the Exhibit

    21 306, it would also be logical that the counter-attack

    22 took place after Mijo Bozic's report on the 18th of

    23 April, 1993 at 1645; right?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. So, sometime between 1645 on the 18th and

  25. 1 2.00 in the morning on the 19th there was a

    2 counter-attack by the BiH. I would like to show you

    3 Prosecutor's Exhibit 293.

    4 A. The counter-attack, that is, according to the

    5 reports we have, the counter-attack took place in that

    6 time, that is, from the last report at 1645 to the

    7 report written at 0200 hours. That is what we can see

    8 from these two reports.

    9 Q. The Exhibit 293, which is only in English,

    10 although you testified that you saw one in BCS on the

    11 18th of April, 1993.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Prosecution document?

    13 MR. KEHOE: Prosecution Exhibit 293. However

    14 the same exhibit came in as a Defence exhibit, as well,

    15 and I'm just not certain what the Defence number is.

    16 MR. KEHOE:

    17 Q. This is a cease-fire agreement going to all

    18 subordinate HVO units to stop immediate combat

    19 operations. What time of day did this go out?

    20 A. The exact time I cannot remember, but I do

    21 know that the order came from the main staff and that

    22 it was on the basis of the agreement reached by

    23 President Boban and President Izetbegovic, and that a

    24 cease-fire was ordered, and that on the basis of that

    25 order we wrote this order, number 293, that that order

  26. 1 had gone, had been dispatched to the HVO units and also

    2 to the monitoring mission.

    3 This report by Mato Lucic on the 19th of

    4 April at 200 hours, he is informing the commander why,

    5 in addition to this report, fighting was still carried

    6 on, because the MOS forces had launched a

    7 counter-attack.

    8 And so, the cease-fire was not abided by.

    9 And I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that

    10 when I spoke about the 19th, I remember very well, and

    11 I have facts here before me, that on the 19th, that is

    12 to say, in spite of the cease-fire order which was

    13 issued, that on the 19th the most intensive attacks

    14 took place in the Busovaca municipality. The events

    15 that followed, that is to say, when these orders on a

    16 cease-fire were not recognised by the army in the

    17 Kiseljak area, because it felt itself to be strong and

    18 wanted to achieve its goals, on the 20th, General

    19 Petkovic came and General Halilovic and the meeting

    20 Zenica was held as to establish that cease-fire. But

    21 on that, neither on that day, the 20th, was this

    22 recognised, because I remember the event when General

    23 Blaskic went to Zenica and when the BH units in the

    24 Vitez area launched an attack on the line. And so, all

    25 this, these documents can be understood within the

  27. 1 framework of the overall activities that took place at

    2 the time.

    3 Q. Was this order sent to the Ban Jelacic

    4 Brigade in Kiseljak, the cease-fire order? The

    5 Prosecutor's Exhibit 293, which for the record,

    6 Mr. President, is Defence Exhibit 318, it's the same

    7 document. Was the Ban Jelacic Brigade told on the 18th

    8 that a cease-fire order had been signed?

    9 A. I know what General Blaskic did, orders of

    10 this kind, which came from subordinates, would be sent

    11 out to all the commands and that would include the Ban

    12 Jelacic Brigade and that is why in point 2 in the

    13 report, which was written at 2.00 a.m., the officer on

    14 duty states that an attempt was made at a

    15 counter-attack. A counter-attack was attempted.

    16 MR. NOBILO: There has been a

    17 mistranslation. It says that reports that were

    18 received from subordinates were sent by Blaskic to

    19 subordinate units, so this is a mistranslation. The

    20 witness said the orders they received from superiors he

    21 always sent to subordinates, so would you please

    22 correct this.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: No problem. Registrar, did you

    24 take note of that?

    25 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, the fact that Mr. Nobilo

  28. 1 has indicated the error means that it would

    2 automatically be corrected in the transcript.

    3 Q. Were orders given by Blaskic for the Ban

    4 Jelacic Brigade to cease operations upon receipt of

    5 Exhibit 293, which is Defence Exhibit 318, and to

    6 cancel the previous outstanding combat orders?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. So, in addition to this cease-fire order,

    9 there were additional orders written by Blaskic telling

    10 the Ban Jelacic Brigade to cease all offensive

    11 activities; is that right?

    12 A. This order that went to the European

    13 Monitoring Mission and to the 3rd Corps of the BH army

    14 went to our units, too.

    15 Q. Well, Brigadier, based on this order, did the

    16 Ban Jelacic Brigade cease combat activities?

    17 A. From this report and upon receiving this

    18 order, one can see exactly what the Ban Jelacic Brigade

    19 is doing. So, in point one it says that the Chetniks

    20 were not in operations, that Muslim forces were

    21 continuing to engage targets from the region of

    22 Gomionica to the best of our knowledge and they

    23 attempted attacks which they repelled, so the obviously

    24 the counter-attack would not have been repelled if

    25 there had not been fire.

  29. 1 INTERPRETER: The witness is reading too fast

    2 for the interpreters, I'm sorry.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Excuse me, Brigadier, you have to

    4 slow down a bit so the interpreters can keep up with

    5 you. I didn't mean to interrupt you, just slow down

    6 for the interpreters.

    7 A. Mr. President, Your Honours, on the 18th,

    8 1993, 18th of April 1993, the activities of the Ban

    9 Jelacic Brigade, according to this report, were as

    10 follows: They report to us that the Chetniks, that is

    11 to say, the army of Republika Srpska was not operating

    12 because the Ban Jelacic Brigade, at that time, had that

    13 front-line, too, that the Muslim forces continue to

    14 operate from small arms from the region of Gomionica on

    15 the positions of the Ban Jelacic Brigade, against.

    16 Now, further on, they tried to launch a

    17 counter-attack from the village of Gomionica, and it

    18 was repelled. Further on, in the region of Pobrdje,

    19 the Muslim forces, that is to say, the BH army, engaged

    20 targets among our forces, and further on it says that

    21 our units, that is to say, the units of the Ban Jelacic

    22 Brigade, continue their operations against Gomionica

    23 intensely, why? Because the units of the BH army tried

    24 to launch a counter-attack. So, he is informing the

    25 commander that he is involved in war operations. He is

  30. 1 waging war for such and such reasons.

    2 Q. Let me just ask you a couple of questions

    3 about what you just said. And you noted at the outset

    4 that against the Serbs there was no combat activities

    5 in the brigade zone. My question for you is, was the

    6 HVO at Kiseljak cooperating with the Bosnian Serb army

    7 at this time?

    8 A. At that time, I'm not aware of whether the

    9 HVO co-operated with the units of the army of Republika

    10 Srpska, but during 1993, when Kiseljak and the area

    11 around Kiseljak were fully surrounded, according to the

    12 information that I had at that time, that is to say,

    13 for purposes of logistics and supplies, the HVO did

    14 cooperate with the army of Republika Srpska, with

    15 regard to this matter.

    16 Q. We'll come back to that in a bit, sir, but

    17 staying with Exhibit 323, the 19 April 1993 report of

    18 Mato Lucic at 3.00 in the morning, it does note at

    19 point 2, "our forces continue with intense activities

    20 in the village of Gomionica since MOS Muslim armed

    21 forces, attempted a counter-attack." Now, at the same

    22 time on the 19th, you are still expecting the offensive

    23 to be taking place by the Fojnica Brigade against

    24 either Dusina or against Sebesic; isn't that right?

    25 A. If possible, could I get the orders that

  31. 1 Fojnica Brigade got so that I know what we're talking

    2 about.

    3 Q. Absolutely, sir, 456/48. And while we're

    4 there, this is Prosecution Exhibit 456/48, 456/49 and

    5 456/50, and we can move through these quickly.

    6 Looking at 456/48, which is the order that

    7 you wrote to the commander of the Fojnica battalion,

    8 Stjepan Tuka, on the 19th of April 1993 at 1800 hours,

    9 you are telling him to comply with the orders issued by

    10 Mijo Bozic, commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade; isn't

    11 that right?

    12 A. Yes, it says here that will be issued. That

    13 is something that is supposed to happen. In the

    14 Croatian language it says that will be issued, rather,

    15 not that was issued by the Ban Jelacic Brigade,

    16 commander.

    17 Q. I'm sorry, Brigadier, I have a different

    18 translation, and maybe it's a interpretation problem,

    19 but my translation says, "Owing to the difficult

    20 situation and the open aggression of the Muslim forces,

    21 I call to your attention your duty to execute and

    22 comply with the orders issued by the commander of the

    23 Ban Jelacic, Kiseljak Ban Jelacic Brigade." Is that

    24 what it says?

    25 MR. NOBILO: It's a mistranslation. The

  32. 1 right way to put it is "with the orders to be issued by

    2 the commander of the Kiseljak Ban Jelacic Brigade,"

    3 that is to say, that will be issued by the commander,

    4 not those that were already issued. And it is only

    5 logical, because until then Ban Jelacic Brigade, did

    6 not command this battalion. Until then this battalion

    7 was under the command of Nikola Subic-Zrinski, so Ban

    8 Jelacic was not in charge.

    9 MR. KEHOE:

    10 Q. Well, orders were given to the Fojnica

    11 Brigade on 1.40 on the 18th of April 1993, and was

    12 given a specific assignment, and I'm looking at Exhibit

    13 456/46, telling the Fojnica Brigade what to do. If

    14 there is a mistranslation, there is a mistranslation.

    15 I can tell the Court, I think, that I'm faithfully

    16 reading what has been translated. Nevertheless, the

    17 Fojnica Brigade was giving orders at 1.40 in the

    18 morning on the 18th. And, at this point, on the 19th

    19 of April 1993, did you have information that Stjepan

    20 Tuka had refused to comply with your orders?

    21 A. On the 19th, you mean?

    22 Q. Yes, sir.

    23 A. From document 458/48, which I wrote, it is

    24 obvious that the commander is warning commander Tuka,

    25 the commander of the Fojnica unit, that he is

  33. 1 duty-bound to carry out this order.

    2 Q. So, it's logical, is it not, Brigadier, that

    3 the commander and you had information that Tuka was not

    4 complying with what Colonel Blaskic wanted him to do?

    5 A. Yes, yes, he refused to carry out orders that

    6 were given to him. And I think that the Prosecutor

    7 offered this into evidence and we can see exactly what

    8 was ordered and what he refused to do.

    9 Q. My question to you is: Did you get that

    10 information from the Ban Jelacic Brigade?

    11 A. The information that this order was not

    12 carried out, I can't remember who we received it from,

    13 but I know that it was not carried out. I think that

    14 in the Prosecutor's documents it was also offered that,

    15 you know, this could not be carried out.

    16 Q. My question for you, Brigadier, is: Were you

    17 getting other information from the Ban Jelacic Brigade,

    18 other than the three reports that we have introduced

    19 into evidence, and the Defence exhibits that have been

    20 introduced into evidence, and we can clarify that, it

    21 is Exhibit 305, 306 and 323?

    22 A. I cannot remember whether we got other

    23 reports, but the contents of these reports show,

    24 evidently, that they show the most important events

    25 taking place at the time of these operations of the Ban

  34. 1 Jelacic Brigade.

    2 Q. Brigadier, let's be very specific about

    3 this. You are now the deputy commander, because

    4 commander Nakic is not there, and you're also the Chief

    5 of Staff. Is it your testimony that you do not recall

    6 any other information coming from the Ban Jelacic

    7 Brigade other than these three reports that we just

    8 discussed?

    9 A. I truly cannot recall the document as such,

    10 but if I were to see this document, to see its

    11 contents, I would know.

    12 Q. Let me show you one, and this is only one,

    13 and I ask to you take a look at 456/49, and this is an

    14 order of Colonel Blaskic of 19 April 1993 at 1845.

    15 MR. KEHOE: Mr. Dubuisson, excuse me,

    16 Prosecution Exhibit 456/49, I think he has that.

    17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, he has.

    18 MR. KEHOE: I'm sorry.

    19 Q. Do you have that before you?

    20 A. I do, but it's not in its Croatian version.

    21 Q. Well, if we can, I think there should be --

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Can we have it translated,

    23 please.

    24 MR. KEHOE: It has been translated in French

    25 and English, the original.

  35. 1 JUDGE JORDA: But all the 456 documents, I

    2 don't have all of them with me.

    3 MR. KEHOE:

    4 Q. 456 should be an order of Blaskic, 19 April

    5 1993 at 1845. That's it on the ELMO.

    6 A. I'm sorry, the document that was issued at

    7 1845 is called 458, the one I have here. Is that the

    8 document?

    9 MR. KEHOE: Could you check that, Mr. Usher.

    10 THE REGISTRAR: No, it's 456.

    11 A. Mine says 458, the 19th of April 1993 at

    12 1845.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: 456.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. I trust we have clarified any confusion on

    16 456 or 458, the document, trust me, it's 456.

    17 A. Yes, now it says 456.

    18 Q. We're all singing off the same sheet of

    19 music, so to speak.

    20 Now, the beginning of that letter says --

    21 this is something going to, an order going to the Ban

    22 Jelacic Brigade and it says, "reference your letter

    23 22-04-93". So, this order is in response to a

    24 communication that comes from the Ban Jelacic Brigade;

    25 isn't that right?

  36. 1 A. Yes, this is.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: If we want to speed things up,

    3 if it's clear, there's no point to say it, you can say,

    4 it simply says your letter number, such and such.

    5 MR. KEHOE:

    6 Q. What I'm saying to you is, during this

    7 fighting, in the Gomionica and in the Gromljak area,

    8 this order of Colonel Blaskic verifies that you were

    9 getting additional information from the Ban Jelacic

    10 Brigade; isn't that so?

    11 JUDGE JORDA: That's fine. Thank you, excuse

    12 me.

    13 A. Mr. President, from this document it is

    14 obvious that another letter had arrived, 22/04/93, if I

    15 were to see that, I would remember. But, from this

    16 text, which is a reply to that letter, one may assume

    17 what the original letter had said, especially if we

    18 bear in mind the date, April 19, 1993, when there is

    19 heavy fighting around Busovaca.

    20 Q. Well, this particular document in number 1

    21 says, and we won't read the whole matter, says "you

    22 must go on because the Croatian people has no other

    23 choice," grammatically that's incorrect, "the Croatian

    24 people have no other choice for the time being," and on

    25 five it says, "the future of all Croats of Busovaca,

  37. 1 Travnik, Vitez and Novi Travnik depend on your

    2 success. Whereas in Zenica and any concentration camp,

    3 particularly Gornji Zenica, where our people who have

    4 fled from the centre at Zenica are being slaughtered.

    5 Every day, there is a massacre."

    6 Now, let me refer you to the next exhibit

    7 that has been given to you, which is 456/50, and that

    8 is an order of Blaskic on the 19th of April 1993 at

    9 2140 hours, several hours after the previous exhibit.

    10 Do you see that, Brigadier? Now, it would appear from

    11 that there has been yet another communication coming

    12 from the Ban Jelacic Brigade, because this order

    13 references a report coming from the Ban Jelacic Brigade

    14 and Blaskic's response is, "You must take Gomionica

    15 tonight or in the early morning, because the main

    16 forces of the Muslim armed forces are at Busovaca,

    17 which is being attacked today by the main forces of the

    18 3rd Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although

    19 certainly unsuccessful. They are also attacking Vitez

    20 and destroying it by all means."

    21 So, the order specifically is to take

    22 Gomionica by the early morning, and this is in reply to

    23 a report that was received by the headquarters as to

    24 what was going on; isn't that right?

    25 A. The reply is given on the basis of the

  38. 1 document that had arrived from the Ban Jelacic

    2 Brigade. The objective is to engage forces, to engage

    3 forces. Because under point 1 it says, "You must take

    4 Gomionica tonight or in the early morning because the

    5 main forces of the MOS are at Busovaca," and I already

    6 mentioned that, "which is being attacked today by the

    7 main forces of the 3rd Corps," that is to say after the

    8 order issued by Petkovic and Halilovic on the 19th,

    9 attacks are being launched against Busovaca. But it is

    10 certain that it is unsuccessful, that is to say, that

    11 the General is encouraging his men. Of course, he is

    12 not going to tell his men, "You are going to fall, we

    13 are going to fall." Of course, he wants to encourage

    14 them. However, they are also attacking Vitez and

    15 destroying it by using all means. If you halt the

    16 attack, we will be subjected to strong assaults and

    17 will be destroyed, bit by bit. Now, what does this

    18 say? "If in Kiseljak and in Fojnica the units of the

    19 HVO do not engage, do not go into combat with army

    20 units." We have to understand that this is a distance

    21 of five or ten kilometres, all these forces will be

    22 aimed against Busovaca, Busovaca will fall and after

    23 the fall of Busovaca Kiseljak would fall, too, and then

    24 Vitez would fall, and so on and so forth.

    25 That is the essence of this order, this is

  39. 1 the core of the matter and that is what the order of

    2 the commander of the brigade of Ban Jelacic was aiming

    3 at.

    4 Q. Brigadier, the bottom line is that the

    5 headquarters in Vitez was getting additional

    6 information from the Ban Jelacic Brigade that was

    7 happening and what was going on in the Gomionica area,

    8 other than the reports that we have seen in this

    9 courtroom.

    10 A. Yes, we can see that two letters have arrived

    11 and they state what is happening and how it is

    12 happening and it is quite logical that these two

    13 documents were sent, because the cease-fire order was

    14 given by the commander. However, the results were as

    15 they -- as we know they were.

    16 Q. Brigadier, I highlight this because during

    17 your direct testimony you said these three reports were

    18 the only three reports you got from the Ban Jelacic

    19 Brigade discussing the conflict. And we have at least

    20 two other references to information where Blaskic

    21 received additional information.

    22 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, I should like to

    23 ask that if something is shown to the witness and that

    24 that has been stated, that it be quoted, because as far

    25 as I remember, the witness said that in the contents,

  40. 1 the information that was received, he did not say that

    2 he received only three papers. So, would you read what

    3 he actually said and quote him, if you are quoting him.

    4 MR. KEHOE: At the break I will go get the

    5 transcript about what was actually said about these

    6 transcripts. At this point I will move on about what

    7 this witness said about the information. Suffice it to

    8 say, I think you would agree with me, Brigadier, that

    9 the headquarters was receiving more information than

    10 the three reports that were submitted during the

    11 testimony in Defence.

    12 Now, let's look back at this particular map,

    13 which is Prosecution Exhibit 328.

    14 Q. Now, Brigadier, these orders back and forth

    15 to go on and take Gomionica by the morning time, they

    16 were sent to the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade,

    17 Mijo Bozic, who had discussed that, we discussed

    18 previously in Exhibit 510, as giving that order to burn

    19 everything in his path as they took Bukovci. But look

    20 at Prosecution Exhibit 95. But before we do that, do

    21 you know exactly what happened during these attacks?

    22 A. One moment, please. Mr. President, the order

    23 mentioning the burning was an order dating back to

    24 January and we're now speaking about April. And in

    25 order for me to answer your questions precisely, I

  41. 1 would like to know the exact time and the month we're

    2 talking about.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: I think the witness is right,

    4 this has to be properly identified, otherwise there is

    5 going to be confusion. The order that you're alluding

    6 to --

    7 MR. KEHOE:

    8 Q. Mijo Bozic wrote that order in January

    9 saying, "that in taking Bukovci, Bukovci must be taken

    10 by night fall on the condition that we burn everything

    11 our path." We have established that according to your

    12 testimony, Brigadier. And the same commander was the

    13 commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade when the attack

    14 ensued on April the 18th of 1993. I think we have

    15 concluded that, as well, Brigadier. My question to you

    16 is: What happened to those villages as a result of

    17 that attack that took place on the 18th and 19th of

    18 April of 1993?

    19 A. As far as I remember, Gomionica was not --

    20 that is to say, Gomionica was not placed under the HVO

    21 control, and that the Gomionica area and Svinjarevo

    22 lines were established, which short deviations were

    23 there until the Washington Accords. Mr. President, I

    24 cannot agree with the observation of the Prosecutor

    25 when talking about the January order. In fact, I said

  42. 1 what I know, and I said that those villages were not

    2 taken, and that what was written by Mijo Bozic had not,

    3 in fact, been executed. I can just add that the kind

    4 of language used was not the kind of language usually

    5 used, and I know General Blaskic well enough to know

    6 his style of writing, and I know he would never sign to

    7 any, an order written by any of us written in that way.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: You made the clarification you

    9 wanted to. The document can be interpreted in several

    10 ways. All right, what you said will be taken into

    11 account. Continue, Mr. Kehoe.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President. Let us

    13 look at Prosecutor's Exhibit 95 in evidence.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Are we still on the same

    15 subject, Mr. Kehoe?

    16 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    17 Q. Let us read Prosecutor's Exhibit 95, this is

    18 a daily report that came from the European Commission

    19 Monitoring Mission signed by Alan Lawstone and

    20 Lars Driversen to RC Zenica, Team Z1, "daily

    21 report, 29 April 1993, together with an armed escort

    22 from CANBAT, Canadian battalion, the team visited Polje

    23 Visnjica, Vecesi (phoen), Doci, Visnjica and

    24 Gomionica. Findings: Polje Visnjica, the team was

    25 stopped at the HVO checkpoint, mines were pulled out in

  43. 1 front of the team and the checkpoint behaved

    2 threateningly with RPG 7 in firing position.

    3 Checkpoint demand to see ID, and search the APCs before

    4 we were allowed to pass."

    5 JUDGE JORDA: If it's for me, thank you, but

    6 the registrar lent me his copy.

    7 MR. KEHOE: May I just go down to the

    8 individual conclusions?

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much, Mr. Kehoe,

    10 go ahead.

    11 MR. KEHOE:

    12 Q. "Most of the Muslim houses have been burned

    13 and all the Muslims have left the village. There are

    14 still Croat families in the village.

    15 Hercezi, a few Muslim families had returned

    16 after the fighting had ended. There are good relations

    17 to the Croat neighbourhood, no burned houses, 14 killed

    18 in Hercezi, Polje Visnjica area. Doci, village was

    19 left -- village were left, only a few burned houses.

    20 Visnjica, 40 out of 150 Muslim houses were burned, five

    21 men were killed at the field, approximately 20 Muslim

    22 families have turned to the village. There are still

    23 Croat families in the village. The Muslims are not

    24 confident with the neighbours.

    25 Note, none of the Muslims in the

  44. 1 above-mentioned villages are allowed to pass through

    2 the checkpoint at Polje Visnjica.

    3 Gomionica, today the team could visit the

    4 village without any problems. The village are left and

    5 totally destroyed. HVO soldiers with RPGs and a few

    6 snipers were observed pursuing the team.

    7 Protest, the team want to protest because of

    8 the behaviour at the HVO checkpoint where our

    9 interpreter was threatened, as well as the search for

    10 the APCs, of the APC.

    11 Team conclusion, it is obvious that an ethnic

    12 cleansing had taken place."

    13 So at least in the village of Gomionica and

    14 in addition to these other villages, at least in the

    15 village of Gomionica, the village was totally

    16 destroyed, and this was at the hands of the Ban Jelacic

    17 Brigade. Was that information conveyed to the

    18 headquarters?

    19 A. This report, that is to say its contents, are

    20 not known to me. The village of Gomionica we saw from

    21 reports hitherto that there was very intensive fighting

    22 there and the consequences of that fighting in these

    23 villages I have not had information about. I did not

    24 have information about how many houses were burned of

    25 both sides, how many people remained, where those

  45. 1 people are now, the people who had left, and the

    2 military information, and for me as an operations man,

    3 it was important for me to know where the positions

    4 were, when the fighting was taking place, what the HVO

    5 units were controlling, what the BH army units were

    6 controlling, and what we could expect in the time to

    7 come.

    8 I do not deny all these facts that have been

    9 enumerated here because I truly do not know the

    10 consequences and the results that ensued after the

    11 fighting.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Let me show you a photograph that

    13 is Prosecutor's Exhibit 391, and it is a fold-out

    14 photograph of the remnants of the village of Gomionica

    15 that looks like this. And as the witness is looking at

    16 it, Mr. President, I will gladly hand my copy up to

    17 Your Honours. Mr. Usher, if we could give this to the

    18 Judges, and the other exhibit goes to --

    19 THE REGISTRAR: Document is in the vault at

    20 the moment. Can we take a few moments to go get it?

    21 MR. KEHOE: I think after the Judges get

    22 through, or the witness can use the Defence copy, thank

    23 you, counsel.

    24 Q. Brigadier, that is a photograph that has been

    25 identified as the village of Gomionica, these

  46. 1 photographs are taken in approximately May of 1996.

    2 Are you familiar with this village, Brigadier?

    3 A. I do not know the village of Gomionica,

    4 because it is a village in the Kiseljak municipality

    5 and I cannot, on the basis of this photograph, state

    6 whether it is the village of Gomionica or some other

    7 village.

    8 Q. Well, Brigadier, you said that, with regard

    9 to the report that we had, concerning what happened in

    10 Gomionica in April of 1993, that you have no reason to

    11 doubt the reports of the European Commission Monitoring

    12 Mission. My question for you is: Do you know anybody,

    13 any member of the HVO that was ever punished or

    14 disciplined for what happened in the ethnic cleansing

    15 that took place in this area?

    16 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, once again an

    17 erroneous interpretation. The witness said that he

    18 does not doubt now as to the report of the European

    19 Monitors, and he saw the report for the first time now,

    20 ten minutes ago. He did not get the report in 1993.

    21 The Prosecutor seems to say that he received the report

    22 earlier on and wants to know what Blaskic did in the

    23 way of disciplinary action.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, Mr. Kehoe. I think

    25 that the difficulty that we are running into and have

  47. 1 been ever since the beginning, I've said it several

    2 times, is that the witness has memory problems, and we

    3 have seen that, which is -- and that makes the

    4 cross-examination more difficult. Your task was easier

    5 because the witness was prepared within the context of

    6 your own intentions and objectives, but now it's more

    7 complicated. The difficulty of the cross-examinations

    8 have to be found right at that point. It's true, but I

    9 cannot say that the Prosecutor's comments are not

    10 legitimate. I've often said this witness is in the

    11 number 2 position in charge of operations and we're

    12 talking about operations. Once again, he cannot both

    13 remember everything when he was testifying for you and

    14 then not remember anything when he was testifying for

    15 the Prosecutor. He was the number 2 operational

    16 person. You're the one who called him in. He didn't

    17 see the report, but there was an ECMM report. Perhaps

    18 he didn't see the report, but he cannot contest the

    19 contents; therefore, once he doesn't contest it, it is

    20 not illegitimate to ask whether there were or were not

    21 sanctions. I'm sorry for interrupting, but I've said

    22 it several times, this is the difficulty we that we're

    23 finding in this testimony. We have to be patient.

    24 What else can we do?

    25 Go ahead, Mr. Kehoe, it's legitimate.

  48. 1 MR. KEHOE:

    2 Q. Brigadier, based on the ethnic cleansing in

    3 the Gromljak and Gomionica area in April of 1993, was

    4 any HVO soldier, either prosecuted in the military

    5 courts or disciplined in the discipline courts as a

    6 result of his actions in that area?

    7 A. Mr. President, I cannot agree with the

    8 observation of ethnic cleansing. We have seen up to

    9 now that wherever there was fighting, with all the

    10 consequences, the burning of houses, a large number of

    11 dead, that if the place was taken control of by the HVO

    12 units, that from that place, locality, with the BH

    13 units, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina left, and

    14 if the settlement was taken over by the

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina army units, the Croatian population

    16 would withdraw from those areas and would follow the

    17 HVO. Why? Because they felt themselves to be

    18 insecure, and we saw the amount of problems that

    19 existed and what the people had to live through if they

    20 stayed on in the settlements where their army was not

    21 in control. For that reason, I cannot, within this

    22 context, give an answer and say "yes", or "no", in the

    23 context of observing that ethnic cleansing had been

    24 conducted.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Ask your question again,

  49. 1 Mr. Kehoe.

    2 MR. KEHOE:

    3 Q. Brigadier, do you know of any HVO soldier

    4 that was prosecuted, either in the disciplinary courts

    5 or in the military courts of justice as a result of his

    6 actions in the Gromljak and the Gomionica area in April

    7 of 1993? Do you know of anybody?

    8 A. Mr. President, I do not know, but I would

    9 like to take advantage of this question to tell the

    10 Judges, as far as I'm able, of the situation and

    11 circumstances in which these terrible actions took

    12 place, which I denounce, absolutely. Mr. President, in

    13 Bosnia, where the war was being waged, everything that

    14 was committed, that -- everything that was committed in

    15 the sense of house burning, or some other inhumane acts

    16 was -- it was very difficult to arrive at a name, and

    17 we have not arrived at a name to this day. Now, why is

    18 that so? I'm telling you my opinions and my vision of

    19 the situation, because I was there, I spent some time

    20 there, and I would like to explain why that is so. We

    21 said how the units were set up, what the family

    22 relationships were, the neighbourly relations were.

    23 Nobody wanted to disclose any names. I am now asking

    24 myself the question, what would I have done had I been

    25 commander of the Operative Zone in a situation of this

  50. 1 kind when you cannot get any name or surname of any

    2 individual committing acts of this kind? I remember

    3 one particular example, and that is that on one

    4 occasion a judge, whether it was the judge of a

    5 military court or not, but somebody in the Lasva River

    6 Valley, that he was shot at in the legs. They shot at

    7 his legs. And after an incident and a row that had

    8 broken out in the settling of accounts between

    9 individuals. That is to say, after weapons had been

    10 used. And when one of these was wounded, and ten days

    11 later that individual who had wounded that particular

    12 man was himself killed. Mr. President, it is because

    13 of the gravity of the war in Central Bosnia, in the war

    14 between the BH army units and the HVO that it is very

    15 difficult to arrive at any names, and we have not been

    16 able to come by the names today. Nobody wants to state

    17 those names.

    18 As far as the burning of houses is concerned

    19 and all other acts, they did not -- were not done

    20 following orders. These were not acts that were done

    21 in an organised fashion, but they were done so that

    22 there was no information and no knowledge of the acts

    23 committed and of the perpetrators.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Well, Brigadier, based on what you just said,

  51. 1 did General Blaskic and the others in the headquarters

    2 know that this type of burning of civilian houses was

    3 taking place?

    4 A. Did General Blaskic know that on the day when

    5 it happened, that I do not know. But I believe that as

    6 time went by he, afterwards, did receive information on

    7 what had happened.

    8 Q. Well, when he received that information, did

    9 you see any orders that Blaskic gave to investigate

    10 what happened in those villages in April of 1993?

    11 A. Mr. President, my answer has been understood

    12 wrongly. It's not that I said that we received written

    13 information, I simply believed that after sometime,

    14 after a day, two days, three days, five days, 20 days,

    15 and I believe this was also mentioned during the peace

    16 talks, I imagine that when the consequences of this war

    17 were mentioned and when the senselessness of this war

    18 was expounded on, that this was mentioned, too. I did

    19 not receive any written information from the Ban

    20 Jelacic Brigade on the consequences of this war or

    21 rather the consequences of these combat operations on

    22 the territory of Gomionica and that is why I'm saying

    23 that this is the first time, at this point in time,

    24 when I read this report of international organisations

    25 that I come across this information for the very first

  52. 1 time. And that is equally true for all places where

    2 there was combat.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Brigadier, I think

    4 that everything you have said has been noted down. The

    5 Tribunal will note with interest what you said. As

    6 regards your conception of ethnic cleansing, the judges

    7 will make their evaluation when it comes to knowing

    8 exactly what ethnic cleansing is. As for the rest, one

    9 can say that for your morning briefings you did not

    10 speak about the most recent developments, what was

    11 happening on the ground in that period when there was a

    12 briefing in the morning. I suppose there must have

    13 been -- did what was happening a few kilometres from

    14 there, was it spoken about? Was there nobody who said

    15 they were burning houses? I'm not asking whether it

    16 was Croatian or Muslim, nobody said they were burning

    17 houses? You are the number 2 operative person, but

    18 nobody said, "Well, you know, Colonel, in Gomionica

    19 there were houses that were burned?" I'm not setting a

    20 trap for you. You just said there was no conferences,

    21 no meetings in the headquarters in this time of war

    22 saying that in Gomionica there were houses that were

    23 burning, but we had to wait for several years until

    24 that information was given. We will note what you said

    25 and we will ask Mr. Kehoe to continue. We can't do

  53. 1 anything more than note what you yourself have said.

    2 Mr. Kehoe, please continue.

    3 A. Mr. President, just a few more sentences

    4 about this, please.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Go ahead.

    6 A. I did not say that after a few years, General

    7 Blaskic found out about this. I did not say that he

    8 found out after five days. The consequences of the war

    9 in many localities were such or similar. Perhaps in

    10 Gomionica things were a bit harsher, but in many

    11 villages it was similar to this, or like this, wherever

    12 there was fighting between the HVO and the army. Truth

    13 to tell, during the fighting, if a village was burned

    14 down, and if there were 50 houses, perhaps ten houses

    15 might have been burned during the fighting, however,

    16 during 1993, that is to say, all the events that took

    17 place, all the battles that took place, all the

    18 consequences of these battles, led to the fact that

    19 five or ten houses would be burned down during the

    20 night. How would this happen? I shall give you an

    21 example of something I saw with my very own eyes. For

    22 example, Bucegori (phoen), that is village where Croats

    23 lived and it is a village on top of a hill, and you

    24 can -- it's Bosniaks who live there and then there is

    25 no fighting, but they torch one Croat house. Then

  54. 1 somebody sees this, and somebody else who assumes whose

    2 house this is, perhaps torches five other Muslim

    3 houses. Or, for example, a man gets killed, for

    4 example, my brother gets killed or one of your nearest

    5 and dearest, and since you're so nervous and

    6 everything, this happens again.

    7 Everything that we see in this picture today,

    8 Mr. President, does not have to be a fact, although I'm

    9 not saying that it is not a fact. It does not have to

    10 be due to a conflict itself. Torching houses is a

    11 problem that we used to encounter and that we could not

    12 overcome throughout 1993, even though settlements that

    13 remained under HVO control. But it was likewise in

    14 those places that were under the control of the units

    15 of the BH army. And when you put all these figures

    16 together about the total number of houses burned down,

    17 which is the greatest tragedy and the greatest harm of

    18 all, all of this speaks of the fact that what I'm

    19 saying is right.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Brigadier. The

    21 clarification has been taken into account and the

    22 Judges will evaluate them at proper time.

    23 Mr. Kehoe, please continue.

    24 MR. KEHOE:

    25 Q. Brigadier, Mijo Bozic was the commander of

  55. 1 the Ban Jelacic Brigade during this time, and during

    2 this same time, or maybe in early May, did information

    3 come to the Hotel Vitez that Mijo Bozic was signing

    4 eviction notices that were given to Bosnian Muslims for

    5 them to be evicted from their premises in the Kiseljak

    6 municipality?

    7 A. I do not have such information. But,

    8 Mr. President, we often mention Mijo Bozic here.

    9 Mr. President, the name of Mijo Bozic we often mention

    10 here, and I want to tell you more about the person whom

    11 I know. That is a man who certain disobedient people

    12 kicked out of the brigade in May, and after that,

    13 another person came to lead the brigade, and what am I

    14 trying to say? That man did not have the kind of

    15 authority that the commander of a brigade was supposed

    16 to have. It's not for want of expertise, but simply

    17 that was the situation at that time. I would have been

    18 the happiest of all if this were not the situation.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: I would like to add a footnote,

    20 Mr. President. We heard the testimony about these

    21 supposed notices many months ago and they pertained to

    22 state-owned apartments, that was omitted from

    23 Mr. Kehoe's question.

    24 MR. KEHOE: I can check the record. There is

    25 a document under seal if counsel wants to check it

  56. 1 right now. It's Exhibit 461 and the page is 13.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: I remember the testimony,

    3 Mr. President, from the witness, in the transcript,

    4 state-owned apartments.

    5 MR. KEHOE: I would invite the Court to look

    6 at the transcript and I invite the Court to look at the

    7 exhibit and I cite the place in the exhibit, again.

    8 It's document under seal Exhibit 461, page 13.

    9 Q. Brigadier, Mijo Bozic, the man you just

    10 talked about, was the man you talked at the outset of

    11 your testimony as one of the three individuals with

    12 military training as a graduate of the Military

    13 Academy, as was the defendant, Blaskic; isn't that

    14 right?

    15 A. Yes, that is correct. I didn't deny it, but

    16 I just wanted to say what his true authority was, and

    17 how much he could actually give orders. They kicked

    18 him out of the command, literally.

    19 Q. And this is the man that was given the

    20 command in the Ban Jelacic Brigade, and who also was

    21 the Chief of Operations before you were the Chief of

    22 Operations.

    23 A. All of that is correct. No one contested

    24 Bozic's expertise and I never said it. But being Mijo

    25 Bozic with an academy degree is one thing, that is to

  57. 1 say with formal training and a formal post and

    2 position, that is one thing, but another thing is to

    3 rule in a situation as it was then.

    4 MR. KEHOE: And when was Mijo Bozic --

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Let's go on. We're getting

    6 lost here. Let's go on.

    7 MR. KEHOE:

    8 Q. When was Mijo Bozic replaced?

    9 A. Mijo Bozic was expelled on the 10th of May

    10 1993 from the command, literally. And that is what I

    11 found out after the war, and people made fun of it.

    12 Q. And he was replaced by Ivica Rajic, again?

    13 A. Ivica Rajic came to replace Mijo Bozic, that

    14 is to say that Mijo Bozic was replaced without anyone

    15 having asked General Blaskic whether Mijo Bozic could

    16 be replaced or not. And nobody even asked him, so

    17 General Blaskic could only nod his head at that.

    18 MR. KEHOE: Well, Brigadier, let's talk about

    19 the 19th and we can move ahead to another subject,

    20 Mr. President. We will go from the 19th and move into

    21 the Vitez area, and during the course of the 19th, you

    22 didn't discuss in your direct testimony the fact that

    23 the town of Zenica was shelled on the 19th of April.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Now, just a moment, we have

    25 been here since a quarter to three, since we're moving

  58. 1 from the 18th of April, I suggest that we take a

    2 break.

    3 --- Recess taken at 3.58 p.m.

    4 --- On resuming at 4.28 p.m.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,

    6 please.

    7 (The accused entered court)

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe.

    9 MR. KEHOE: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

    10 Q. Brigadier, as I noted before the break, we

    11 are going to move back to the Vitez, Zenica area for

    12 the 19th of April, 1993. The first question --

    13 THE REGISTRAR: If you excuse me for a

    14 moment, I don't see anything on the transcript here.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to suspend the

    16 hearing for a few moments.

    17 (Technical interruption)

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President.

    20 Q. Brigadier, we're going back, as I said, we

    21 are going back to the Vitez, Zenica area for the 19th

    22 of April, 1993, and that was the day that Zenica was

    23 shelled at approximately noontime; was it not?

    24 A. I'm not getting the interpretation.

    25 Q. Can you hear?

  59. 1 A. Yes, thank you. I heard Zenica was shelled,

    2 I don't know whether on the 19th or the 20th.

    3 Q. What type of artillery pieces did the Central

    4 Bosnian Operative Zone have on the 19th, what calibre?

    5 A. As far as I recall, we had a Howitzer 122

    6 millimetres and a Howitzer 152 millimetres.

    7 Q. And where were these two Howitzers

    8 positioned?

    9 A. They were positioned in the area of the

    10 village of Puticevo and in the area of the Mali Mosulj

    11 village, or more exactly, the facility, the coming

    12 along facility. And the local population called this

    13 the Pleseba (Phoen), the stone quarry.

    14 Q. Were they mobile? In other words, did they

    15 have wheels on them that could be carried around?

    16 A. That possibility did exist, but they were

    17 more massive artillery pieces, and for that kind of

    18 activity, a certain amount of time would be needed. I

    19 can't tell you how much time, because I'm not an expert

    20 gunner, but it is massive artillery, and massive

    21 weapons.

    22 Q. You mentioned Puticevo; are you talking about

    23 Novi Travnik, in the Novi Travnik area, where one of

    24 those weapons was positioned?

    25 A. No, no, the area of Puticevo, this is an area

  60. 1 along the road towards Travnik. The closest bigger

    2 place is Dolac, the closest towards Travnik, and the

    3 other neighbouring place is, and the ratio is 1 to

    4 50.000, on the map is upper and lower Puticevo. I can

    5 show you on the map, if you have a map available. I'm

    6 quite ready to point out the position of Puticevo.

    7 But the exact position, give or take 50

    8 metres or so, and the artillery pieces, I could not

    9 tell you that exactly now.

    10 Q. These artillery pieces were under the direct

    11 command of Colonel Blaskic; weren't they?

    12 A. I did not say that they were not under his

    13 command, these artillery pieces. They were under the

    14 artillery division, and that division had a commander,

    15 and the commander was directly under the command of

    16 General Blaskic.

    17 Q. Now, which piece that you were talking about,

    18 either the 122, and I think you said it was a 155 or a

    19 152, which piece was at Puticevo?

    20 A. As far as I remember, at Puticevo it was the

    21 122 piece.

    22 Q. Sir, you recall that day that the actual

    23 shelling of Zenica took place, where civilians were

    24 killed in Zenica, and you recall that the Central

    25 Bosnian Operative Zone and the HVO were blamed for that

  61. 1 shelling; isn't that right?

    2 A. The information that I have about that, and

    3 as far as I know, and as far as I knew in those days, I

    4 don't know the exact day. That is what I know today.

    5 I heard this via the Bosnian radio station,

    6 that Zenica was shelled. And that shelling was

    7 explained in such a way, that is to say, information

    8 and propaganda wise, and in the announcement that I

    9 heard over Zenica radio, the speaker making the

    10 announcement maintained, and let me try and remember

    11 the term he used, that the Ustashe had shelled Zenica.

    12 That is what he said, more or less, to that effect.

    13 Because in the war that we had with the BH

    14 army, that is to say, in communications, and certain

    15 information services of the BH called the HVO the

    16 Ustashe. And this term was used in the radio

    17 announcement over radio Zenica.

    18 Q. Was this issue discussed in the morning

    19 meetings with Colonel Blaskic?

    20 A. As far as I recall, after the information via

    21 the public media which I had, I don't know exactly how

    22 General Blaskic came by this information that we were

    23 being blamed for something of that kind, that he

    24 contacted the commander of the division and asked him

    25 whether he had done this on his own, independently,

  62. 1 because he could not have done so without orders from

    2 the commander.

    3 My information is that the commander of the

    4 division said that he had not done this, and as far as

    5 I know, we from the command of the Operative Zone never

    6 issued an order of that kind.

    7 Q. Well, did Blaskic take his commander's word

    8 for it, or did he do any type of investigation to

    9 determine whether or not the, either the 122 or the 155

    10 had fired onto Zenica?

    11 A. An investigation in that case, when you are

    12 not, when you cannot be on the spot to perform a

    13 ballistic expertise to see what direction, what calibre

    14 was used, and so on; in the sense that you ask, it was

    15 not possible to undertake an investigation of that

    16 kind. And in conditions of that kind, if the commander

    17 asks his subordinate whether he did that or not, the

    18 commander must believe his subordinate if he tells him

    19 he did not.

    20 Q. Well, --

    21 A. To add a few words. In addition to this, did

    22 General Blaskic go into further contact with the

    23 commander? I'm not aware of that. I'm not aware of

    24 further such activity. Because I said how and in which

    25 way I received certain pieces of information.

  63. 1 Q. Well, did Blaskic contact the 3rd Corps and

    2 request to do a joint investigation with the army of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina to determine who fired these shells

    4 into Zenica?

    5 A. As far as I know, General Blaskic had some

    6 contacts with the representatives of UNPROFOR, whether

    7 with Mr. Stewart or one of his associates linked to the

    8 implementation of that activity. What Stewart or some

    9 of his associates told him with regard to that issue, I

    10 do not know.

    11 I know that General Blaskic, as far as I

    12 recall, went to a meeting in Zenica on the 20th.

    13 Q. Well, my question is, did he contact, to your

    14 knowledge, as chief of operations, and during this time

    15 as the deputy Chief of Staff, did Blaskic contact 3rd

    16 Corps, or anyone in 3rd Corps to attempt to do a joint

    17 investigation to determine if this had been fired by an

    18 HVO artillery piece?

    19 A. I do not know that, and I cannot either

    20 confirm or say no to it.

    21 Q. Well, sir, at this time there were joint

    22 investigations going on between the HVO and the army of

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct? And I refer you to

    24 Defence Exhibit 303, if I may show that to the

    25 witness.

  64. 1 This is a document that you discussed during

    2 your direct examination from the Stjepan Tomasevic

    3 Brigade in Novi Travnik that takes place on the 18th of

    4 April, 1993. It's a report from the Stjepan Tomasevic

    5 Brigade to the headquarters, and it talks in the

    6 opening paragraph about a joint investigation on the

    7 kidnapping of the officers from the Stjepan Tomasevic

    8 Brigade.

    9 So, during this period of time, joint

    10 investigations between the HVO and the ABiH were taking

    11 place. The opening line says "Further to the work of

    12 the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina army joint

    13 commission on investigating the kidnapping of officers

    14 from the Stjepan Tomasevic Brigade on 13 April, 1993."

    15 And then it discusses how the two entities are working

    16 together to attempt to solve this, and travelling to

    17 places to attempt to solve it.

    18 And my question for you, Brigadier, was:

    19 You, as the Chief of Staff, the deputy Chief of Staff

    20 at time, and the chief of operations; do you know of

    21 any requests that went from the headquarters to 3rd

    22 Corps to attempt to do a joint investigation like was

    23 taking place in Novi Travnik with the Stjepan Tomasevic

    24 Brigade?

    25 A. The activities with regard to investigation

  65. 1 and joint investigation of the shelling in Zenica at

    2 this time and on this date, I do not know about. But

    3 the document that you have proffered as an explanation

    4 testifies to an act and a commission which was set up

    5 to deal with that particular case, and that is what is

    6 written in the preamble.

    7 And it says, with regard to the joint work of

    8 the joint commission of the HVO and the army of

    9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, to throw more light on the case of

    10 the kidnapping of the officers. So, this commission

    11 dealt with that particular case and those problems.

    12 Q. My question to you, Brigadier, is: Was there

    13 any attempt by Blaskic, during this time frame, when he

    14 attempted to do a joint investigation with the army of

    15 Bosnia-Herzegovina to discover who shelled Zenica?

    16 And my reference point for you is this

    17 particular document where we have established that

    18 joint investigations were taking place.

    19 I'm just asking you, did that request take

    20 place by Blaskic?

    21 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the witness has

    22 already answered. The Prosecutor asked him earlier on

    23 whether he knows that Blaskic moved any form of

    24 investigation with the 3rd Corps and the witness said

    25 he did not know, he cannot either confirm or deny it,

  66. 1 so this is just a repetition of the same question.

    2 MR. KEHOE: I'll move on.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, that's right, Mr. Nobilo

    4 is right, the question was answered, was asked, you got

    5 your answer, apparently he does not know very much.

    6 MR. KEHOE:

    7 Q. During this period of time, Brigadier, the

    8 HVO had the capability, through electronic surveillance

    9 data, to determine where a particular weapon was fired

    10 from and who fired on an area; isn't that right?

    11 A. I truly do not know of this, but I'm trying

    12 to think as a commander would think about this case in

    13 its entirety. And if you know that General Blaskic

    14 knew that this was shelling, and then there is no need

    15 to make any great initiative for this to be confirmed.

    16 I'm thinking about what I would have done had

    17 I been the commander. If I knew that I did not do

    18 something, and the International Community and through

    19 its mediation or the representative of the 3rd Corps

    20 are not offering an initiative along those lines in

    21 that direction, I don't know why, then, I, myself,

    22 alone should confirm this. This is what I'm saying on

    23 my own personal thoughts in the matter, had I been

    24 commander at that time.

    25 Q. Well, did the HVO, or do you not know whether

  67. 1 or not they had the capability through electronic

    2 surveillance to determine the place where shells had

    3 been fired from?

    4 A. I don't know that we had this kind of

    5 technical possibility.

    6 Q. Let me show you a document, sir.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: But you were aware of the

    8 technical capability of the HVO. I'm getting

    9 concerned. You say you didn't know anything about,

    10 occasionally you said you didn't know anything about

    11 the technical capabilities, several times you said

    12 you're not aware of this or that capability; but you

    13 did have a role which would seem to indicate that you

    14 were aware of certain technical capabilities. Isn't

    15 that right?

    16 Really, you're beginning to worry me. You

    17 were never in the right briefing, you don't know if

    18 there were briefings or if there was strategic

    19 material. The question was very specific. Were you

    20 aware of the technical material? Was there any or was

    21 there not any?

    22 So, you continue to say that you were not

    23 aware? That's what I'm asking you.

    24 A. Mr. President, I really don't know of that

    25 kind of equipment, because in the affairs we had, we

  68. 1 had a commander for the gunnery section.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: I'm noting that, but with a

    3 great deal of interest. Very frequently you are not

    4 aware of anything. It's been noted down. You really

    5 have got blanks in your memory, but not -- it's

    6 somewhat worrisome, that is what I wanted to say to

    7 you. It's my right as a Judge to be able to say this

    8 All right, let's go on.

    9 MR. HAYMAN: I don't know if there is a

    10 linguistic issue here. I think the witness, to a

    11 number of questions, is saying "not that I know of,"

    12 which is different from "I don't know". But when the

    13 witness says "not that I'm aware of," that doesn't mean

    14 he is having a lapse of memory, unless the question,

    15 the fact being asserted in the question is true.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: No, he says he is not aware.

    17 My comment was that I was surprised that the number two

    18 to chief of operations is not aware of the technical

    19 capabilities of the military equipment. It was

    20 surprise that I was expressing, and I was saying I had

    21 the right to be surprised, that's all.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: I understand, Mr. President,

    23 there are two different possible answers. "I don't

    24 know" or "not that I'm aware of." The witness could

    25 also say "no." Those are three different answers, but

  69. 1 "not that I'm aware of" is different than "I don't

    2 know," and let's look at -- I would propose, let's look

    3 at the document. We don't know, I don't know if the

    4 HVO had this capability. I think the witness is

    5 saying, "if we did, I wasn't aware of it."

    6 That may be shocking, but it's only shocking

    7 if in fact they had this capability, whatever it is,

    8 that is being loosely referred to as electronic

    9 surveillance. That was my comment.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Thank you for your

    11 comment. Perhaps we will allow the Brigadier, who is

    12 your witness, to make even a greater effort to jog his

    13 memory about the technical capabilities of the

    14 operational units of which he was the number two in the

    15 accused's staff.

    16 Continue, please, Mr. Kehoe.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, if we could

    18 show this document.

    19 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, may I? It was

    20 interpreted as electronic monitoring. That's what it

    21 said in English, electronic monitoring. This last word

    22 "monitoring" was not translated into Croatian. It was

    23 only electronic that was translated into Croatian, and

    24 the other word was retained as monitoring is Croatian.

    25 So it sounds like science fiction, when you say it in

  70. 1 Croatian "monitoring"; so perhaps he wasn't aware of

    2 what it was like. Perhaps if you show him this device

    3 he would know what it is all about. This sounds like

    4 from outer space.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo, I really say that

    6 you know how to say things at the right time. All

    7 right. That's enough of that. I want to tell the

    8 witness that I'm paying particular attention to the way

    9 he answers, and I'm also speaking for my colleague.

    10 And if we were to count the number of times when the

    11 witness says he does not remember, he doesn't have a

    12 good memory, doesn't have the technical capabilities,

    13 he was not at the briefing, it is a bit worrisome.

    14 That is what I want to say.

    15 This is 12 days, now, we have been on this

    16 issue, and my responsibility is to move the trial

    17 forward.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: Document 527, 527A for the

    19 English version.

    20 MR. KEHOE:

    21 Q. Brigadier, this is a retraction of a verbal

    22 protest dated the 22nd of April 1993 that was signed by

    23 Colonel Blaskic; was it not?

    24 A. Yes, this is the signature of General

    25 Blaskic.

  71. 1 Q. And a copy of this went to the operations and

    2 training body of, over which you were the commander;

    3 correct?

    4 A. I'm sorry, it was translated to me saying

    5 that I was the commander of a unit; is that right?

    6 Q. I'm sorry, sir. It may have been my

    7 improper, or inaccurate question.

    8 In the lower left-hand corner it says a copy

    9 of this goes to ONO; that's you, isn't it? I mean you

    10 told us during your direct examination when you wrote

    11 ONO on there --

    12 A. Yes, yes.

    13 Q. Now, let's go through this. It says, "On

    14 April 22nd, 1993 at 2030 hours we protested verbally

    15 because you fired three shells in the town of Vitez.

    16 During the conversations we received a protest that we

    17 had fired six shells on the town of Zenica. Since we

    18 know for certain that our units did not shell the town,

    19 we requested that our military intelligence service

    20 provide the correct information regarding the place

    21 where the shells had been fired, based on electronic

    22 surveillance data." It just says, "On the basis of the

    23 data obtained, it was established that the Chetniks had

    24 fired three shells on the town of Vitez, and another

    25 three shells on the town of Travnik from their

  72. 1 positions in Travica, they also shelled the town of

    2 Zenica from the positions in Kraljevo Guvno. In the

    3 view of the above-mentioned, we regret the confusion

    4 that ensued, and we would hereby like to retract our

    5 verbal protest and offer our apology."

    6 My question for you is: According to this

    7 letter, Colonel Blaskic has confirmed that he concluded

    8 where the shells were fired from, based on electronic

    9 surveillance data. Now, you were in the headquarters;

    10 what is this electronic surveillance data that Colonel

    11 Blaskic is talking about?

    12 A. Mr. President, I was in the staff. This

    13 equipment, this equipment, together with the

    14 intelligence department, was apart from the staff.

    15 This was a department led by Ivica Zeljko, and

    16 physically they were three or four kilometres away from

    17 us, and I really don't know what kind of equipment they

    18 had available. Perhaps it is a shame for me to say so

    19 as a trained officer, but I really didn't know what

    20 kind of devices we had available. You should bear in

    21 mind that I came on the 1st of November, so I had been

    22 there only four months in the command, and I'm going to

    23 admit what is true.

    24 After the war, I mean until the present day,

    25 I do not know where this equipment is and what its

  73. 1 possibilities are. Perhaps this is due to my modest

    2 technical education, but that's the way things are.

    3 Q. Brigadier, turning to the shelling on the

    4 19th, of Zenica, 1993, did any electronic surveillance

    5 data come to the headquarters in the Hotel Vitez, that

    6 indicated where those shells were fired from?

    7 And if so, what was that electronic

    8 surveillance data?

    9 A. The data that are mentioned in this letter by

    10 General Blaskic were received by him personally, not by

    11 myself. And he wrote what he had received. I would

    12 really be happy if I could speak about this equipment

    13 now and say what it was all about.

    14 Q. Well, Brigadier, you got a copy of this

    15 letter, and my last question on this vein is: Was the

    16 issue of the shelling of Zenica on the 19th of April

    17 discussed by General Blaskic with you and the other

    18 officers in the Hotel Vitez?

    19 A. As far as I know, General Blaskic did talk to

    20 the commander of the division in order to check. And

    21 what information did I have? I had the information

    22 that we had not done this. And to tell you the truth,

    23 quite frankly, I wasn't interested in it any longer.

    24 And these data that are in this report, these

    25 possibilities did exist, and the shelling of Zenica and

  74. 1 the shelling of Vitez, from the positions where the

    2 artillery of the army of Republika Srpska was.

    3 Q. Who was the commander that Blaskic talked to

    4 when he asked if these shells had been fired? What's

    5 that commander's name?

    6 A. Mr. Mirko Bartinic.

    7 Q. To your knowledge, sir, did Blaskic gather

    8 any electronic surveillance data from the shelling on

    9 the 19th and provide it to the 3rd Corps in order to

    10 prove that they had, HVO had not actually fired this

    11 weapon?

    12 A. From this report, which is written to the

    13 Monitoring Mission, it is obvious that Mr. Blaskic did

    14 ask his assistant for intelligence affairs, and what he

    15 ascertained is written in this letter.

    16 Q. With all due respect, Brigadier, this is a

    17 different shelling. I'm talking about the shelling on

    18 the 19th, not the shelling after that. I'm talking

    19 about the shelling of Zenica on the 19th.

    20 I'm asking you, did, to your knowledge,

    21 Blaskic gather electronic surveillance data to prove

    22 that the HVO did not shell Zenica on that day?

    23 A. At that time I was not aware of the General

    24 having collected this information. That is what it

    25 says in this report.

  75. 1 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, in this report

    2 that we are discussing now, where electronic

    3 surveillance is mentioned, and obviously we can't

    4 define what it is, we are talking about six shells on

    5 Zenica. Zenica was shelled on the 19th with six

    6 shells. So I believe that it is not two shellings of

    7 Zenica that we're talking about, but one single

    8 shelling of Zenica that is mentioned here, the shelling

    9 of Zenica with six shells on the 19th of April.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, I don't have the

    11 documentation to clarify the point now, but I will

    12 provide the documentation. It's simply a different

    13 shelling, it's not the shelling that took place on the

    14 19th, and it is an issue that we can discuss based on

    15 the documentation thereafter, but it's a different one.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: I think it would be better to

    17 have the documents, in order to clarify the

    18 discussion. Continue, please.

    19 MR. KEHOE:

    20 Q. Brigadier, are you aware that the HVO and

    21 Colonel Blaskic blamed this shelling on the Bosnian

    22 Serbs?

    23 A. Since I know that the shelling was not

    24 carried out by the HVO, and there were three armies in

    25 that area, there was no one else to do the shelling but

  76. 1 the army of Republika Srpska. We didn't think that the

    2 army would shell itself.

    3 Q. Well, Brigadier, the Bosnian Serb army

    4 objected to that; didn't they?

    5 A. I am not aware of what the army of the

    6 Bosnian Serbs did, as regards the shelling of Zenica on

    7 that day.

    8 Q. Let me show you a letter, sir, if I could

    9 move to the next document.

    10 THE REGISTRAR: 528, 528A for the English

    11 version.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, this is an order

    13 that came from the Commander Lieutenant Colonel Bozo

    14 Pulic (Phoen) of the 27th Motorised Brigade of the

    15 Bosnian Serb army, the VRS, the army of Republika

    16 Srpska, and it's dated, I believe the original is the

    17 27th; however, the translation has a question mark next

    18 to the 7.

    19 Q. 27 April, excuse me, 27 May, 1993. Let me

    20 just read a bit of this letter, Brigadier. It

    21 says, "Negotiations with the Ustashe. Order: We

    22 received the strictly confidential order number 0/2-448

    23 from the GS main staff of the VRS Republic of Srpska

    24 army which regulates the following. It has been

    25 noticed that the Ustashe have been turning to units and

  77. 1 commands of the VRS requesting support in the forms of

    2 weapons, ammunition, fire support, care for the wounded

    3 and use of our territory to evacuate forces and people

    4 in the regions where they are threatened by Muslims.

    5 "We have noted incidents of contacts being

    6 made with the Ustashe in the form of some kind of

    7 cooperation on lower levels which causes us more harm

    8 than good. And as a result, Ustashes are moving around

    9 our territory without the knowledge or approval of the

    10 Corps command.

    11 "On the other hand, Ustashe officials at the

    12 highest political, military and religious levels are

    13 blaming Serbs for the crimes of the HVO against the

    14 Muslims, and statements given to the mass media and

    15 approaches to international institutions.

    16 "They have announced that our forces targeted

    17 Zenica in order to blame the Serbs for the conflict

    18 with the Muslims. They have officially blamed the

    19 Serbs for the massacre of 500 Muslims in the Vitez

    20 area, even though UNPROFOR statements clearly confirm

    21 that the Croats are responsible."

    22 And you can gladly read the balance of this

    23 Brigadier. Were you made aware at any time directly --

    24 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, Mr. President, I

    25 apologise. I would suggest that first and foremost we

  78. 1 leave the witness enough time to read the entire

    2 document. And I think it would also be interesting for

    3 the Court to familiarise itself with the entire

    4 document, because that is where it exactly says where

    5 there was cooperation with the Serbs; and that was not

    6 Vitez, mind you.

    7 MR. KEHOE: We can turn to where the

    8 cooperation was. I was trying to short circuit and

    9 talk about Zenica.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Continue reading, please.

    11 MR. KEHOE:

    12 Q. Next paragraph. "The Croatian Christian

    13 union organised a so-called scientific convention in

    14 Zagreb where the highest political, state and religious

    15 representatives of the Republic of Croatia, the

    16 so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Austria --

    17 MR. NOBILO: Just a minute, please. I'm

    18 sorry, once again. I'm sorry, I apologise for saying

    19 something all the time, but the translation said the

    20 Croatian Christian units. There is the Croatian

    21 Christian union, which is a political organisation, and

    22 the interpretation it sounded like a military

    23 organisation.

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, you're right, I, myself,

    25 have seen the words union, yes, the Croatian Christian

  79. 1 union. That's what it says in the transcript. All

    2 right. Continue, please.

    3 Q. "The Croatian Christian union organised a

    4 so-called scientific convention in Zagreb with the

    5 highest political, state and religious representatives

    6 of the Republic Croatia and so-called

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Austria, prominent persons

    8 and leaders of extremist anti-Serbian parties of

    9 Kosovo, Visanjak (phoen), Macedonia, Bulgaria, Germany,

    10 et cetera, were present.

    11 "The purpose of the convention was to study

    12 and coordinate measures to join all these countries in

    13 a unified front in the battle against Serbs and

    14 Serbian.

    15 "The objective of Croatian politicians is to

    16 recreate the NDH, independent state of Croatia, within

    17 its historic borders, the Drina River, where Serbs

    18 would not have a place even as a minority.

    19 "To this end, and under the umbrella of the

    20 highest political bodies of the Republic of Croatia and

    21 Herceg-Bosna, the so-called Muslim Democratic Party has

    22 been formed. Its head is Arman Pohar (phoen), who is

    23 committed to a common existence with Croats and a joint

    24 struggle against the Serbs.

    25 "We stress that Ustashes tend to ask for help

  80. 1 and cooperation in areas where they are threatened by

    2 Muslims, Usora, Konjic, Vares, Kiseljak, Tuzla. At the

    3 same time they are forcibly trying to realise their

    4 aims, Orasje, eastern Herzegovina, et cetera, and other

    5 parts of the front. Simultaneously they are also

    6 negotiating with the Serbs in areas -- I'm sorry,

    7 negotiating with the Muslims, I'm

    8 sorry. "Simultaneously negotiating with the Muslims in

    9 areas in which they might be threatened.

    10 "This indicates that they are negotiating

    11 with us to save themselves if the relations with the

    12 Muslims take an inconvenient turn. Keeping in mind the

    13 above mentioned objectives and actions, I order the

    14 following: Should Ustashes contact you for help and

    15 cooperation, stress that the fundamental obstacle in

    16 cooperation is the behaviour of their officials at the

    17 highest level. The crimes they committed against the

    18 Serbian people and their attributing to the Serbs all

    19 the crimes that Croats committed in the conflict with

    20 the Muslims.

    21 "2. Bear in mind that a joint struggle

    22 against the Serbs is the basic platform of Croats and

    23 Muslims in their endeavours to overcome conflicts

    24 between them.

    25 "3. Instruct them to forward their requests

  81. 1 for help and cooperation through their highest military

    2 and political representatives and inform them that

    3 agreements on any future cooperation must be made at

    4 the highest military and state level.

    5 "4. Report any announced contact with the

    6 Ustashes, requests submitted by them, et cetera, to the

    7 VRS general staff.

    8 "5. In your contacts you must strive to

    9 acquire exhaustive intelligence data on Croatian and

    10 Muslim forces; size, structure, condition, weaponry,

    11 intentions, bearing in mind the interests of the VRS

    12 and the Republic of Srpska. In your contacts with

    13 Ustashes, prevent any classified military information

    14 being leaked. The delegation for possible negotiations

    15 will be named by corps commanders. The delegation must

    16 include a member of the intelligence and security

    17 body.

    18 "7. Any contact with the enemy or attempts

    19 to make such contact must be reported in detail to the

    20 corps command, the organ for intelligence and security

    21 affairs, for their information, accompanied by your

    22 opinion and proposal for measures.

    23 "8. Individual and unplanned contacts with

    24 the Ustashes are forbidden, as are agreements at lower

    25 levels. Such occurrences must, therefore, be prevented

  82. 1 vigorously by the command and appropriate measures must

    2 be taken against those responsible.

    3 "9. Battalion commanders and the commanding

    4 officers of independent companies are responsible to me

    5 for carrying out this order." Signed by Lieutenant

    6 Colonel Bozo Pulic.

    7 On this particular document, Brigadier, did

    8 it come to the attention of the headquarters that the

    9 Bosnian Serbs did object to being blamed for the

    10 shelling of Zenica, as well as being blamed for any of

    11 the crimes that took place in Central Bosnia?

    12 A. I did not know that.

    13 Q. Were you aware, sir, that in a conversation

    14 with a British officer that Colonel Blaskic blamed what

    15 happened in Ahmici on the Serbs?

    16 A. I'm not aware of that, either.

    17 Q. Let's turn our attention to Defence Exhibit

    18 321, which is the map, and if we could put this on the

    19 easel?

    20 Brigadier, taking a look at Exhibit 321, and

    21 again, I realise we're that only talking about the

    22 major areas of conflict and the major areas of

    23 artillery fire, there would appear to be significant

    24 artillery fire in the Vitez municipality on the 19th;

    25 is that right?

  83. 1 A. No, not artillery fire. The army shelled all

    2 these places that are marked on this map.

    3 Q. Maybe I'm talking -- we're not understanding

    4 each other. The arrows reflect artillery fire by the

    5 army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that right?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. And the circles represent major areas of

    8 conflict.

    9 A. Those are areas where, during the day, there

    10 was larger-scale shelling.

    11 Q. Okay. Now, you would agree with me, would

    12 you not, Brigadier, that in the Vitez area, according

    13 to your map, there appears to be artillery fire taking

    14 place in at least one, two, three, four, five, six

    15 different areas, and that includes downtown Vitez;

    16 would you agree with that? If you want to get up and

    17 count the arrows, I mean, you're welcome to go up and

    18 count the arrows.

    19 A. There is no need for me to do that.

    20 Intensive shelling, intensive shelling, the strongest

    21 shelling that day in Vitez was in Kruscica, in the town

    22 of Vitez, and along the defence lines held by the HVO

    23 units. The arrows from this little circle that says

    24 Vitez, there are one, two, three of them, they show the

    25 shelling along the defence lines. Because the

  84. 1 positions that are marked here, that is where the

    2 defence line of the HVO is vis-à-vis the army of Bosnia

    3 and Herzegovina.

    4 Q. Well, sir, you also have the town of Vitez

    5 being shelled; isn't that right?

    6 A. I don't have interpretation.

    7 Q. Maybe I can ask the question again. You also

    8 have the town of Vitez being shelled; isn't that right?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. And what was shelled in Vitez?

    11 A. I cannot say now what particular facility was

    12 shelled that day, but shells were falling on the town

    13 of Vitez. During the war, that is to say, from the

    14 16th until the 19th, the greatest effects of the

    15 shelling were seen on the hotel, the post office, the

    16 municipality building and -- I can't remember the name

    17 of the building where the health centre was. Those

    18 were the effects of the shelling.

    19 Q. Well, did the shelling on Vitez continue on

    20 the 20th and the 21st and the 22nd and the 23rd,

    21 et cetera?

    22 A. According to data or, rather, according to

    23 the things I remember, because I did not prepare myself

    24 in terms of Vitez Brigade, the 20th and the 21st and

    25 the 22nd, those were the days when the cease-fire was

  85. 1 to start, and on those days, the shelling had

    2 practically, I think, subsided, or if there was

    3 shelling, then it was only on an individual basis.

    4 Q. Okay, sir. Let's talk about the area on the

    5 19th, the area that is being shelled on the 19th. This

    6 is quite a significant amount of shelling taking place

    7 in Vitez on the 19th, and again, I want to turn your

    8 attention to Defence Exhibit 345.

    9 Again, as we did yesterday, Brigadier, I

    10 would ask you to take a look at chart for the 19th and

    11 I would ask you to tell this Court how many people were

    12 killed on the 19th.

    13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, the Defence

    14 proposes, whichever number the Prosecution puts

    15 forward, we accept. Whatever number the Prosecution

    16 states, the witness can say "Yes."

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Unfortunately, you counted the

    18 number of victims. How many did you count?

    19 MR. KEHOE: One.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Do you agree, General, or do

    21 you want to count them again? In principle, the

    22 Defence agrees with you, but you are not the one who is

    23 accused, but do you agree with the figure one? Do you

    24 have faith in the Prosecutor's number?

    25 A. Mr. President, this is data which is on the

  86. 1 list, and I'm not in a position to give any other

    2 number because this would just -- a lot of time would

    3 go by. It would be guesswork.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: It has been noted that you can

    5 count up to one.

    6 MR. KEHOE: All right.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We will take as the

    8 figure one since -- it is a very low number of

    9 casualties, which is a very good thing.

    10 It is now twenty after five. What is the

    11 question that you want to ask in respect of the

    12 shelling?

    13 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I'm just

    14 about through that particular area. I will just put on

    15 the record, so that my counting is not inaccurate, the

    16 only individual on this record that I find killed on

    17 the 19th of April is number 196 in Exhibit 345, Pero

    18 Miskovic. That's the only one that I find.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Kehoe. Please

    20 continue.

    21 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Pero Miskovic. I see

    22 the place indicated is Santici?

    23 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    24 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Well, are there not

    25 others who are indicated on this document as having

  87. 1 died on that date but in other places?

    2 MR. KEHOE: I don't think so, Judge. On the

    3 19th of April?

    4 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Oh, I see, 19th of

    5 April.

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    7 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Yes, you may be right.

    8 I have some other months. Nineteenth, but some other

    9 months.

    10 MR. KEHOE: Yes, yes, yes.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: All right. You were very

    12 successful in your evaluations, Mr. Kehoe. You can

    13 continue now.

    14 MR. KEHOE:

    15 Q. Let me turn your attention, Brigadier, back

    16 to Exhibit 456/50. I'm sorry we didn't keep this out

    17 before.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: 456/50.

    19 MR. KEHOE: The 19th April, 1993, order of

    20 Colonel Blaskic at 2140 hours.

    21 Judge Shahabuddeen, I stand to be corrected

    22 if my counting is wrong on that but --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Don't worry. He will correct

    24 you.

    25 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: ... that your counting

  88. 1 is wrong.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Judge Shahabuddeen.

    3 Let's go on for another six minutes.

    4 MR. KEHOE:

    5 Q. Brigadier, before we talk about this, where

    6 were you and where was Colonel Blaskic during this

    7 entire time? And I'm talking about the 16th, the 17th,

    8 the 18th, the 19th, the 20th. Where were you? Were

    9 you in the Hotel Vitez the entire time?

    10 A. The entire time I was in the operative centre

    11 in the Hotel Vitez, and I worked there as far as time

    12 allowed, I slept there and had my meals there, because

    13 I said that on the 16th of April, there were only seven

    14 of us in the command headquarters, so that I had none

    15 of my associates there and I had to do everything

    16 myself, within the region of the things I was in charge

    17 with, and General Blaskic was in the hotel at the same

    18 time. He sat -- that is to say, he had his table at

    19 the operative headquarters in the same -- and he had an

    20 office in the same building. And it was his personal

    21 assessment when he would come to the headquarters.

    22 When he did not consider that this was necessary, he

    23 would go to his office.

    24 Q. Well, Colonel Blaskic went to Zenica for the

    25 meeting on the 21st of -- or, actually, he went to

  89. 1 BRITBAT and also Zenica on the 21st to cease-fire

    2 meetings, didn't he? The 21st of April.

    3 A. If we wish to be precise, as far as I recall,

    4 the meeting in Zenica was on the 20th, and in Nova

    5 Bila, it was on the 21st, as a continuation of the

    6 previous meeting.

    7 Q. I think we can agree that the document that

    8 we talked about previously was on the 21st of April,

    9 based on the Defence document.

    10 Up until going to that meeting in Bila and

    11 Zenica, were Blaskic and you both in the Hotel Vitez?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. Now, let us turn back --

    14 A. Let me be more precise. Until he left for

    15 the meeting, General Blaskic was constantly in the

    16 hotel, and after the meeting, I, myself, as I began in

    17 the morning on the 16th until the cease-fire had

    18 actually taken into effect, I was and remained in the

    19 hotel.

    20 Q. Now, let's talk about the evening of the

    21 19th, and let me direct your attention back to Exhibit

    22 456/50.

    23 A. Just one moment, please. If we wish to

    24 ascertain when the meeting was, I think the meeting was

    25 on the 20th, and if we're going to speak of the night

  90. 1 when General Blaskic was at the meeting in Zenica, then

    2 we should have in mind the time term 20th and not the

    3 19th. If there is document that states that it was the

    4 19th, there is no problem. I remember the events, what

    5 happened at the time when he went to Zenica; that is

    6 what I remember.

    7 Q. Brigadier, we will get to that in a little

    8 bit when I think we will agree, after we show and

    9 refresh your recollection with some documentation, that

    10 the meeting in Zenica was the 21st.

    11 But nevertheless, let's turn our attention

    12 back to Exhibit 456/50 before we conclude for today,

    13 and I would ask you to take a look at paragraph one.

    14 We're not going to focus on Gomionica here but on the

    15 second part of the sentence. It says:

    16 "You must take Gomionica tonight or in the

    17 early morning because the main forces of the Muslim

    18 armed forces are at Busovaca which is being attacked

    19 today by the main forces of the 3rd Corps of the army

    20 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although certainly

    21 unsuccessfully."

    22 So Blaskic is telling the 3rd Corps that the

    23 main force of 3rd Corps of the army of

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina is attacking on the evening of the

    25 19th of April.

  91. 1 A. That is not so. Let us read the whole text

    2 once again.

    3 "You must take Gomionica tonight or in the

    4 early morning because the main forces of the MOS are at

    5 Busovaca."

    6 That means on the day, the 19th, the General

    7 is writing on 21. He is saying what went before in the

    8 course of the day. So if you write a report at 2100

    9 hours, then you say what happened until that time, 9.00

    10 p.m. You cannot write something that you suppose

    11 happened. If you write something that you suppose

    12 happened, then you say so.

    13 But it is obvious from the map and the data

    14 that I have at what places the BH army attacked on that

    15 particular day in Busovaca, and they are the following

    16 places: Doboj, Putis, Gradina, Solokovici, Milavice,

    17 Kapak, Polonj, Ocehnic, Prosija. Those are the places

    18 where there was fighting in the course of the 19th of

    19 April. And in Vitez there was fighting, infantry

    20 fighting, in Sivrino Selo. That is a village. It is

    21 some 200 metres away from the Busovaca-Vitez main road,

    22 and that is where the lines remained as they were

    23 established on the 17th. But there was fighting over

    24 those positions.

    25 Q. Brigadier, I apologise if my question was

  92. 1 inaccurate. All I'm asking you is, by 2140 hours, the

    2 main force of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3rd

    3 Corps, is attacking the Busovaca forces; isn't that

    4 what Colonel Blaskic is saying here?

    5 A. Yes, that is what it says, what is written,

    6 and that is our assessment because the forces of those

    7 attacks were such that we assessed that they were the

    8 main force. If we knew exactly who was attacking us

    9 and where they would attack us, we would be more

    10 successful in defending ourselves, so that is an

    11 observation on the basis of what was happening on the

    12 terrain.

    13 Q. Thank you, Brigadier. I think the prior

    14 confusion was as a result of my question more than

    15 anything else.

    16 I'm just about to go into another subject,

    17 Mr. President.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: I think that the interpreters

    19 have been working for a long time.

    20 I would like you to recall that tomorrow is

    21 our last day. How do you see the continuation of what

    22 we're doing? About an equivalent amount of time has

    23 been divided between the direct and the

    24 cross-examination, or the Prosecutor has taken a little

    25 bit more time. All right. You are now going beyond

  93. 1 the time that was spent in direct examination, and you

    2 are to continue with your cross-examination.

    3 Can you give us an assessment of how much

    4 time you are going to need to complete your

    5 cross-examination?

    6 MR. KEHOE: I'm going to try to do my best to

    7 finish this tomorrow, Mr. President, but I must say

    8 candidly, it's difficult to know. And I think that,

    9 without rehashing what's happened previously, I think,

    10 Mr. President, you've noted some of the difficulties

    11 that have taken place during cross. But I will

    12 endeavour to try to finish. I certainly would like to

    13 do so, as do my colleagues, and that is what we're

    14 hoping to do, but if we get to that point or not, I

    15 just don't know at this juncture, but that certainly is

    16 the plan.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: I spoke with my colleague. At

    18 least what I can say, and we all agree, that the 26th

    19 of October, Monday, the General will have to come

    20 back. I think things have to be clear. Unless the

    21 Defence does not want to conduct a rebuttal, but I

    22 don't think that's the case.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: I know that the scheduling of

    24 the Court is very difficult. Our request would be to

    25 try and finish the witness this week, even if we have

  94. 1 to extend hours, because to send him back to the

    2 federal army to serve in the middle of his testimony we

    3 think is, as we said at beginning of the testimony, is

    4 a very difficult situation to put the witness in. I

    5 understand we all have obligations, there is

    6 limitations on staff, spacing, and so forth, but that's

    7 our position, Mr. President.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: I would like you to answer my

    9 question, also, Mr. Hayman. I wanted to know whether

    10 you're going to conduct a rebuttal. Mr. Nobilo?

    11 MR. NOBILO: Yes, Mr. President, but very

    12 directly and very efficiently, so we're not going to

    13 take up a lot of your time.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Oh, I'm sure that you will get

    15 very specific and direct answers from your witness. I

    16 have no doubt about that.

    17 Nonetheless, it is true - now I turn to my

    18 colleague - that one simply cannot think about

    19 finishing tomorrow. The Judges have many questions

    20 that they want to ask; and therefore, I think that

    21 hypothetically we can say that the General must make

    22 arrangements to be here on Monday, the 26th. The 26th,

    23 Monday. Or else the witness will remain in The Hague

    24 for the week.

    25 Mr. Nobilo?

  95. 1 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President, Mr. President,

    2 there would be certain difficulties for the witness to

    3 remain in The Hague, perhaps, but we suggest that this

    4 Trial Chamber, and you as its President, give an

    5 express order to the witness to appear on a given date

    6 in the Court, and so, if he has this order, then he

    7 will be able to take it to his superiors and be allowed

    8 to come here and remain here. I think that would be

    9 useful.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: I think there would be no

    11 objection to that. All right. The order will be

    12 issued based on Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and

    13 Evidence.

    14 I think we're now going to suspend the

    15 hearing. Those things are clear.

    16 Tomorrow you will continue the

    17 cross-examination, Mr. Kehoe, and try to finish it, if

    18 you can.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. I

    20 understand.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: All right. Thank you very

    22 much. And I wish everybody a good evening. Tomorrow

    23 we will resume at 10.00.

    24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    25 5.35 p.m. to be reconvened on Thursday,

  96. 1 the 15th day of October, 1998 at

    2 10.00 a.m.