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  1. 1 Wednesday, 28th October 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 4.05 p.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Can we have

    5 the accused brought in, please?

    6 (The accused entered court).

    7 JUDGE JORDA: First of all, I would like to

    8 apologise for this delay. The day has been extremely

    9 busy. We are going to resume with the new witness.

    10 Will it be Mr. Hayman? Let us have the witness brought

    11 in, please.

    12 (The witness entered court).

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Can you hear me, sir?

    14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Would you please give us your

    16 name, your first name, your current status, your

    17 professional status, your domicile, and after that we

    18 will ask you to remain standing for a few moments in

    19 order to take the solemn declaration. First of all,

    20 your name and your first name.

    21 THE WITNESS: My name is Matthew

    22 Dundas-Whatley.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Dundas-Whatley; is that right?

    24 THE WITNESS: That right.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: What is your profession and

  2. 1 current residence, please?

    2 THE WITNESS: I'm currently in business in

    3 Bosnia.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The usher is going

    5 to give you the solemn declaration, that is your oath.

    6 Please read it while you are still standing.

    7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

    8 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

    9 truth.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. Thank you very

    11 much, Mr. Whatley, please be seated. You have been

    12 called to appear, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, by the Defence

    13 for General Blaskic in the trial which is being

    14 conducted by the Prosecution. You are at the

    15 International Criminal Tribunal. Please speak freely,

    16 you are under oath.

    17 First you will answer the questions that the

    18 party which has called you in will ask you, that is the

    19 Defence, and then you will be asked questions by the

    20 Office of the Prosecutor, and finally the Judges will

    21 have questions to ask you.

    22 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, Mr. Hayman, we didn't get

    23 the summary, but we will do it for the next witness;

    24 but since we used a lot of time up we will dispense

    25 with that and ask you to begin. I have the summary

  3. 1 here. Thank you very much.


    3 Examined by Mr. Hayman:

    4 Q. Mr. Whatley, you are a former officer of the

    5 British army; is that correct?

    6 A. That's correct.

    7 Q. Could you briefly describe your military

    8 career of service to the Court?

    9 A. I did approximately eight years with the

    10 British army, and this started in 1985 where I attended

    11 a three-day officer selection course. And when I

    12 passed that, I then went to the Royal Military Academy

    13 at Sandhurst where I trained for nearly a year to

    14 become a British army officer.

    15 At the completion of that course I joined my

    16 regiment, and then for the next six years or so I was

    17 posted in various countries in the world. I rose to

    18 the rank of captain, and my final job in the army was

    19 in Bosnia.

    20 During my nearly eight years in the army I

    21 attended many training courses in the United Kingdom.

    22 Q. When you refer to your regiment, are you

    23 referring to the Cheshire Regiment?

    24 A. That's correct.

    25 Q. What was your position in the regiment at the

  4. 1 time the regiment was ordered to Bosnia?

    2 A. I was selected by my commanding officer, Bob

    3 Stewart, to be a liaison officer.

    4 Q. I will pause slightly after your answers, and

    5 if you could do the same so the translators can

    6 complete their work.

    7 Before you were selected by Colonel Stewart

    8 to be a liaison officer during the regiment's tour of

    9 service in Bosnia, what had your position been in the

    10 regiment?

    11 A. In the two years leading up to deployment to

    12 Bosnia I had been the training officer, the operations

    13 officer, and the second in command of a company.

    14 Q. After your tour of service in Bosnia, did you

    15 leave the British army?

    16 A. Yes, I did.

    17 Q. And under what circumstances did you leave

    18 the army?

    19 A. The army underwent a large scale reduction in

    20 force, and that's when I left.

    21 Q. Did you receive any medals or other

    22 recognition for your service in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    23 A. Yes, I did. I got the United Nations Bosnia

    24 Medal, and I was mentioned in dispatches by the British

    25 government.

  5. 1 Q. Had you received any prior medals for your

    2 service with the British army?

    3 A. Yes, I got the British Northern Ireland

    4 Medal.

    5 Q. After you left the British army in roughly

    6 1993, what was your employment?

    7 A. I went back to the former Yugoslavia as a

    8 humanitarian aid worker, firstly with a British NGO in

    9 Belgrade, an organisation called OXFAM.

    10 Q. When you say NGO, can you tell the Court what

    11 you're referring to?

    12 A. NGO means non-governmental organisation,

    13 charity. I worked in Belgrade about seven months. I

    14 then went back to Bosnia and worked in another British

    15 NGO called "Feed the Children" for about ten months,

    16 and then I did some consulting work with another

    17 British NGO helping old people in Mostar.

    18 After that, towards the middle of 1995, I

    19 then went into business and self-employment.

    20 Q. When you left "Feed the Children" what was

    21 your position with that relief organisation?

    22 A. Within two weeks of arriving with "Feed the

    23 Children" I was promoted to be what was called the

    24 Bosnia coordinator, which meant I was the director for

    25 all their operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  6. 1 Q. Now, let us turn to your tour, or service, of

    2 duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the Cheshire Regiment.

    3 Did the regiment receive any special training prior to

    4 its deployment to Bosnia?

    5 A. Yes, we did. The training for most of the

    6 regiment I think lasted for about two months and took

    7 place in Germany, because that is where it was based at

    8 the time; but for me, I only had about two weeks

    9 training.

    10 Q. Why was that?

    11 A. Because I was part of the advance party. In

    12 fact, I was part of what we call the pre-advance party

    13 into Bosnia on October the 16th, 1992.

    14 Q. There is a large map to your right on the

    15 easel, it is Exhibit -- strike that.

    16 Let's use that map, Exhibit 29, if you would,

    17 there should also be a pointer in front of you, and my

    18 question for you is how the liaison officers for the

    19 Cheshire Regiment, which as we know in this Court was

    20 principally based in Vitez, but also with detachments

    21 in Tuzla and Gornji Vakuf; could you first tell us, and

    22 if it is helpful, show the Court on the map how the

    23 Cheshire Regiment divided the responsibilities of the

    24 various liaison officers for the regiment?

    25 A. Yes. I'm just trying to work out how best to

  7. 1 do this with the map.

    2 Q. There is a microphone that can be moved and

    3 made more convenient, and you may well need to stand in

    4 order to point to the map.

    5 First, perhaps you could tell the Court, and

    6 if it is helpful, point out the locations involved.

    7 A. Your Honours, before I point to the map

    8 probably the best thing to do, to start with, is

    9 explain the concept by which the liaison officers were

    10 created and for what purpose.

    11 Colonel Bob Stewart decided it was very

    12 important, for him to be successful as the commander of

    13 the British forces in Bosnia, that he had to have a

    14 very good understanding and a very good liaison with

    15 the military commanders fighting the war. Because our

    16 main mission, as given to us by the United Nations, was

    17 primarily to be concerned with transporting of food and

    18 escorting convoys into Bosnia.

    19 And so, he dedicated five captains, including

    20 myself, with the task of keeping a constant liaison

    21 with those people, the local commanders, and at the

    22 same time, of course, he had to deploy the battalion

    23 around Bosnia.

    24 The way he did that was by putting a company

    25 down in Gornji Vakuf, a company in Vitez, and a company

  8. 1 in Tuzla, and put with each of those some one or two

    2 liaison officers. Two of us liaison officers were

    3 based in Vitez, I was one of them. So, if I could now

    4 just go to the map.

    5 This is the town of Gornji Vakuf, down here,

    6 where we stationed one liaison officer. This is the

    7 town of Vitez, where I was stationed, and one other

    8 captain. And the Tuzla is off the map, up here, where

    9 two more captains were stationed.

    10 Q. Now if Exhibit 183/1 could be placed on the

    11 ELMO, please. I think you may be seated.

    12 If we could zoom in a little more on the

    13 map. Thank you very much to the technical staff.

    14 Using this map, if it's helpful, and you may

    15 point on the ELMO, and then your indications will be

    16 indicated on the video monitors throughout the

    17 courtroom, what your initial area of responsibility was

    18 as a liaison officer.

    19 A. The two liaison officers based here in Vitez,

    20 myself and one other, our area of responsibility did

    21 not extend into the purple, but limited to the green

    22 and yellow.

    23 Of course, my first, my initial area of

    24 responsibility was what we call the Maglaj finger,

    25 because there is the town of Maglaj, right down --

  9. 1 sorry, I moved it -- right down to a sort of shape like

    2 this. The southernmost city was there in my initial

    3 area, which was the city of Zenica.

    4 Q. So, roughly it included the area stretching

    5 from Maglaj to Zenica?

    6 A. I can list the towns, if you like.

    7 Q. Please do.

    8 A. The towns in my initial area of

    9 responsibility were Maglaj, Zepce, Zavidovici, Tesanj

    10 and Zenica.

    11 Q. During your tour of duty, first, did you have

    12 occasion to cover other areas due to the absence from

    13 the theatre of the other liaison officer based in

    14 Vitez?

    15 A. Yes, the arrangement made from the beginning

    16 is the other captain and I would shadow each other's

    17 responsibilities. If he needed support for something I

    18 would come in and cover him, and vice versa, and when

    19 he went on leave I would cover his area. And so, from

    20 the very beginning I developed a very good

    21 understanding of his area, and he of mine.

    22 Q. Did he take any leaves or other absences

    23 during the tour of duty that required you to cover his

    24 area of responsibility on a more full-time basis?

    25 A. Yes, he was away for two weeks in

  10. 1 December, '92, so I covered him during that period; and

    2 then he went back to the United Kingdom in the first

    3 week of March, '93, and so I then moved down

    4 permanently and covered his area from then until May

    5 the 16th when I left.

    6 Q. And what area was it that you took over in

    7 early March, 1993 from this other liaison officer who

    8 departed?

    9 A. I will point it out on the map for you. It

    10 was the towns of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez,

    11 Busovaca, and I also retained responsibility for

    12 Zenica.

    13 Q. You touched on this briefly, but could you

    14 tell the Court anything more concerning the principal

    15 duty or duties of the liaison officers for the Cheshire

    16 Regiment?

    17 A. The primary responsibility of the liaison

    18 officers, as defined by Colonel Bob Stewart, was that

    19 we should maintain a constant link with the military

    20 commanders, that we should be the passage, or we should

    21 be the route through which information would flow to

    22 UNPROFOR from the local factions, and to the warring

    23 factions from UNPROFOR, that we had to develop a very

    24 close relationship with the commanders, and indeed, on

    25 occasions with the civilian leaders, develop a very

  11. 1 close relationship with them. And in our case it was

    2 mainly the Bosnian army and the HVO, but on occasions

    3 with the Serbs.

    4 We also had additional duties, but I must

    5 stress that was our overriding duty. Additional duties

    6 were in the information collection areas, where we were

    7 expected to gather a substantial amount of information

    8 about the activities and structures of the local

    9 warring factions.

    10 Q. You have mentioned several different tasks;

    11 were any of those multiple tasks in conflict?

    12 A. It wasn't a conflict that was difficult to

    13 handle, but it is important to point out, I think, that

    14 maintaining the trust and maintaining the integrity of

    15 ourselves when dealing with the local commanders,

    16 required, quite logically, that we were not seen as

    17 spies.

    18 And so, any information that we were given,

    19 which was on occasions quite substantial, by one side,

    20 we did not pass to the other, but we kept it within the

    21 United Nations information chain. And so, there was a

    22 certain conflict there that we didn't want to be seen

    23 to be spies, and so we didn't ask hundreds and hundreds

    24 of questions about the details of their military

    25 command.

  12. 1 Q. How frequent was your contact with commanders

    2 in the warring parties, the Bosnian army and the HVO,

    3 during your work?

    4 A. From the day I arrived until the day I left

    5 that was my only task, and I was out at least six days

    6 a week, and quite often for 12, 15 hours, dealing only

    7 with local military commanders.

    8 Q. Did the liaison officers for the regiment

    9 have more contact with the commanders of the warring

    10 parties than others in the regiment?

    11 A. Yes, by far. The liaison officers and the

    12 commanding officer were probably the only people that

    13 had any detailed meetings with any of the local

    14 military commanders. It was our full-time job.

    15 Colonel Bob Stewart also took part in very

    16 important meetings with very senior commanders. But

    17 that was, we were out there the whole time and very few

    18 members of the regiment had the contact that we had.

    19 Q. Did the commanding officer of the regiment,

    20 and perhaps other senior officers, obtain information

    21 from the liaison officers about the warring parties?

    22 And if so, how?

    23 A. The way it worked was that we would leave in

    24 the morning on our duties and come back at the end of

    25 the day. If during that time, or in fact at any time,

  13. 1 we discovered information that was considered vital,

    2 that would probably be radioed through straight away;

    3 but more routinely at the end of the day we returned to

    4 our base in Vitez, and if I had information that was

    5 very important but sensitive, I would go to Colonel

    6 Stewart's office and brief him personally. Or

    7 alternatively, and this happened routinely, every day,

    8 I would be debriefed by the military information

    9 office.

    10 In addition, at five o'clock every evening we

    11 had a conference where I was expected to speak about my

    12 activities that day for the general audience.

    13 Q. And who was the audience at that 5.00 p.m.

    14 daily briefing?

    15 A. The senior officers of the regiment and the

    16 heads of department.

    17 Q. You mentioned the MILINFOSUM; what product

    18 did they produce, and to whom was it sent?

    19 A. Every evening the military information office

    20 produced a MILINFOSUM, which is a military information

    21 summary, this was produced every day in the evening by

    22 the office.

    23 Q. And to whom was it sent?

    24 A. The MILINFOSUM was transmitted firstly to

    25 Kiseljak, which was the headquarters of UNPROFOR in

  14. 1 Bosnia. In addition it was sent to Split, which was

    2 the headquarters of the British forces in the former

    3 Yugoslavia. And I believe it was also sent directly to

    4 Britain, as well.

    5 Q. In addition to the meetings and contacts you

    6 had with commanders of the warring factions, did you

    7 also have contact with lower level soldiers in the BH

    8 army and the HVO?

    9 A. On a lower level my contact with the local

    10 warring factions was checkpoints just like every other

    11 member of the battalion who was travelling around.

    12 Q. Did you travel a lot?

    13 A. Oh, yes, I travelled a lot around Bosnia, and

    14 I travelled through a lot of checkpoints.

    15 Q. I take it you were travelling on a daily

    16 basis?

    17 A. All the time, every day.

    18 Q. Now, I would like you to answer the following

    19 question without divulging any information that might

    20 be considered sensitive or confidential.

    21 Did the British Battalion have an

    22 intelligence apparatus in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the

    23 type it would have were it to be at war with an enemy?

    24 A. No, it didn't.

    25 Q. Can you explain?

  15. 1 A. The British army trains for war, and I spent

    2 many years training for war, and when the British army

    3 goes to war, like I believe all NATO armies, it takes

    4 with it a large intelligence gathering network.

    5 To give you some idea how this would work, in

    6 the British situation it would normally be run by the

    7 intelligence corps, which is a department in the army,

    8 and it would have an enormous array of assets for the

    9 purpose of gathering information about the enemy; such

    10 things as satellites, spy planes, equipment for

    11 listening to the enemy's radio networks and decoding

    12 them.

    13 We would conduct reconnaissance into enemy

    14 territory, and we would conduct research into the

    15 background of the personalities commanding the enemy.

    16 We would use radar for spotting artillery and mortars,

    17 and the information from that would all form part of

    18 the intelligence collection which is vital in the

    19 commander's plan for future operations.

    20 In the case of Bosnia, we didn't have

    21 anything like that. In the case of Bosnia we were not

    22 at war. We had a military information office which I

    23 believe had two members of staff, or possibly three.

    24 Q. As a result, was there a difference between

    25 the amount of information the British battalion

  16. 1 received about the BH army and the HVO from what it

    2 would have received had it been at war with either one

    3 of those parties?

    4 A. Yes. I don't think the quantity of the

    5 information is at issue here, it's the type -- it's the

    6 information -- it's the type of information that we

    7 were looking for and that we needed to conduct our

    8 business. So you cannot really compare what we were

    9 doing in Bosnia with what we would do in war, if we

    10 went to war against the HVO or the Bosnian army.

    11 Q. Let me to ask you to think back to your first

    12 arrival in Bosnia in October 1992, and ask you whether

    13 you, to your knowledge, your colleagues in the British

    14 battalion, did you have any preconceptions about the

    15 war and the parties to the conflict when you arrived?

    16 A. We were the first regiment in from the

    17 British army, and so consequently there was no -- there

    18 was not a great deal of information available to us

    19 before we went in, and we relied almost entirely upon

    20 newspaper and television articles. So we built up an

    21 impression in our minds, I think, which became our

    22 established feelings prior to our arrival in Bosnia.

    23 And the feeling we had then, back in October '92, was

    24 that Bosnia-Herzegovina had a government in Sarajevo,

    25 and this government, with its own assets, was at war

  17. 1 against a very large Serb army which had rebelled

    2 against the authority of that government.

    3 Q. When you arrived in country, did you find

    4 that there was also a conflict between the BH army and

    5 the HVO in progress?

    6 A. Yes, there was. We were not aware of this

    7 before we arrived, and it was on October 18th, two days

    8 after I arrived in Split, on October 18th, after I

    9 travelled for the first time into middle Bosnia, and if

    10 I can refer to the map I can explain.

    11 Q. Again, you're referring to Exhibit 29.

    12 Please continue.

    13 A. The route we travelled up to get into middle

    14 Bosnia, this was in a Land Rover convoy of about, I

    15 think, seven or eight Land Rovers, took us over the

    16 mountains along roads which in the main were not made

    17 up, were not covered with tarmac. We went past the

    18 lake here Ramsko Lake, through the town of Prozor here

    19 which was very tense, up over the mountain and down the

    20 hill into Gorini Vakuf here, which was nice and

    21 peaceful and quiet.

    22 We then went up north here, up a valley road,

    23 a very badly made road. And when we got into this high

    24 area here. This is when we began to realise that the

    25 problems in Bosnia were extended beyond just a Serb

  18. 1 problem. We went from checkpoint to checkpoint to

    2 checkpoint. Prior to arriving in Prozor, I think we

    3 had been through one or two checkpoints over the first

    4 hundred miles of the journey. Here the checkpoints

    5 were every mile or every two miles.

    6 Some of the badges had "TO" on them, and some

    7 of the soldiers had no badges and there were the

    8 occasional HVO badges. It was rather difficult to tell

    9 from the way they were dressed exactly what was going

    10 on, but we had an interpreter. At all these

    11 checkpoints we discussed what was going on, and if I

    12 could very quickly explain what was happening.

    13 Most of this area at the time, most of this

    14 area was in the control of the TO, the Territorial

    15 Defence, but some of the villages were Croat villages,

    16 and they didn't consider themselves to be under the

    17 control of the Territorial Defence, but under their own

    18 control, the Croat control. When we got further north

    19 to Novi Travnik, we left this village problem behind

    20 and things changed again.

    21 Q. When you and your colleagues arrived in

    22 country, what then was your initial impression of the

    23 HVO's relationship to this problem as you defined it,

    24 that being a central government and a Serb rebellion.

    25 How did the HVO fit into the initial thinking, at least

  19. 1 on your part, and perhaps if you can tell us, your

    2 colleagues?

    3 A. Certainly in those first few days, first two

    4 days probably, we felt that the HVO was a rebel

    5 organisation, that it was fighting against the

    6 established government in Sarajevo, and it was a

    7 traitor, it was a rebel organisation. That's how we

    8 felt.

    9 Q. As a result of your contacts with the BH army

    10 and the HVO, after a period of weeks or months did you

    11 come to have a different understanding of the problem?

    12 A. Yes. After a few months in the country and

    13 spending all my time talking to military commanders and

    14 civil leaders, we began to see the situation rather

    15 differently. We began to see Bosnia being made up of

    16 three separate people with three separate armies, three

    17 separate military structures and civilian structures,

    18 and all three of them were united in their own national

    19 connection.

    20 Q. You mentioned these checkpoints on the road

    21 between Gornji Vakuf and Novi Travnik. Was there a

    22 pattern to the checkpoints, or was there a purpose that

    23 you could discern to the checkpoints?

    24 A. That was our first encounter with

    25 checkpoints. The situation there was not unique at

  20. 1 all. The situation there had arisen as a result of

    2 enormous mistrust between the Muslim villages and the

    3 Croat villages.

    4 Q. During your initial tour of duty did you keep

    5 a diary?

    6 A. Yes. Yes, I did.

    7 Q. I'd ask you the following question, and if

    8 you need to refer to your diary, with the Court's

    9 permission you may, whether in the latter part of

    10 October did you make a determination under whose

    11 control the road south from Novi Travnik towards Gornji

    12 Vakuf was, that is who controlled that road?

    13 A. Yes. I've just described to you the

    14 situation as we found it on the 18th of October. If I

    15 could now refer to my diary of Saturday the 24th of

    16 October.

    17 Q. 1992?

    18 A. 1992. And if I could read it to you. "My

    19 vehicle, followed by as Ander's Toyota, then Olie

    20 Halstead's, very few roadblocks compared with

    21 last time," I'm referring to the days before, "The Novi

    22 Travnik road is indisputably in TO hands."

    23 Q. Thank you. Based on your almost daily

    24 contacts with HVO commanders and HVO commands during

    25 late 1992 and in early 1993, can you tell the Court

  21. 1 what type of army was the HVO as you saw it, and

    2 understood it and came to understand it?

    3 A. The HVO and the Bosnian army, in my opinion,

    4 were both peasant armies. They were made up of

    5 villagers, most of whom had probably had experience in

    6 the Yugoslav army as conscripts, but they were

    7 ill-disciplined, they were drinking on the streets.

    8 And they were organised on a territorial

    9 village-by-village basis.

    10 Q. Can you tell the court what the consequences

    11 of that were, being organised on a territorial basis as

    12 you put it, village-by-village basis?

    13 A. The result of being organised in that way was

    14 the loyalties of the soldiers were to the village, to

    15 the local leaders and the local politicians, that

    16 the -- that they were primarily concerned with the

    17 defence of the village. And dealing with small units

    18 of this nature whose raison d’être was defence of the

    19 village, it was almost impossible and very difficult at

    20 least to organise them into what we would call a

    21 military command structure.

    22 Q. Why would the presence of these predominantly

    23 local loyalties, as you put it, undermine the creation

    24 of a military chain of command?

    25 A. There was a conflict of interests between

  22. 1 defending the village you're living in and operating in

    2 a greater or a grander military scheme, which may

    3 require you to have to leave your village under the

    4 command of somebody you've never met and go and fight

    5 somewhere else.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: You've mentioned the chain of

    7 command, and I'd like to take a short detour from the

    8 events of your tour of duty, and I would ask for

    9 assistance in placing an exhibit on the ELMO and

    10 distributing it, please.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: This is D414.

    12 MR. HAYMAN:

    13 Q. You have before you on the ELMO Exhibit D414,

    14 and my question for you is: You've mentioned chain of

    15 command. Can you tell us, in the British army system,

    16 what is the chain of command from the level of brigade

    17 commander down?

    18 A. When we talk about the chain of command in

    19 the British army, we're talking about from one

    20 headquarters to a subordinate one. In the case of this

    21 chart here, we have a brigade headquarters here

    22 commanded by a Brigadier. Under need him we have four

    23 or five battalions, each of which will be commanded, in

    24 the British system, by a Lieutenant-Colonel.

    25 Q. Could the technical booth zoom in on the

  23. 1 picture slightly, please? Thank you. Please continue?

    2 A. And under each one of those battalions, under

    3 each one you could expect another four or five

    4 companies, each commanded by a Major. So the chain of

    5 command would go from the Brigadier, to the

    6 Lieutenant-Colonel to the Major.

    7 Q. Within that structure, who are the

    8 commanders? Who would be known as a commander?

    9 A. Commanders are the -- at the brigade level

    10 with the Brigadier. In American it would be known as a

    11 one-star General. At the battalion level it is the

    12 Lieutenant-Colonel and at the company level it is the

    13 Major.

    14 Q. On this chart -- by the way, did you design

    15 this chart?

    16 A. Yes. I thought it might help explain the

    17 confusion here.

    18 Q. There's a box to the right of the brigade

    19 labelled "Brigade Staff Officers". Who are, and are

    20 Brigade Staff Officers commanders?

    21 A. Brigade Staff Officers are not commanders.

    22 The Brigade Staff Officers work for the Brigadier.

    23 They are obviously junior to him in rank, Colonels,

    24 Majors, Captains, and they are his specialists in

    25 various fields and they advise him.

  24. 1 Q. What types of duties or areas would a Brigade

    2 Staff Officer have responsibility over?

    3 A. Generally -- of course, every brigade is

    4 different with different purposes, but generally there

    5 will be a chief of staff who at brigade level in the

    6 British system would probably be a Major. And then

    7 there will be probably maybe another Major dealing with

    8 the administration side of life or re-supply. There

    9 will be a Captain -- or probably a Captain dealing with

    10 intelligence and another Captain dealing with the

    11 operations. There will probably be, depending on the

    12 side of the brigade and its purpose, you'll have

    13 communications officers and transport officers.

    14 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to return to your

    15 tour of duty and your observations of the HVO. Could

    16 you tell the court how the HVO differed from the

    17 British army?

    18 A. It's very difficult to compare the HVO with

    19 the British army. The British army has a highly

    20 organised structure developed over many years, and

    21 within that structure the commanders and the units have

    22 a well-defined relationship based on training and

    23 respect, and it's well understood throughout the whole

    24 system.

    25 In the case of the HVO, that isn't exist.

  25. 1 The HVO was formed during the war, out of chaos, and

    2 the structures were developed from the village

    3 upwards.

    4 Q. Were there any other differences that you

    5 noted as a result of your observations?

    6 A. Another probably important factor is to

    7 compare the command structure and the rank structure of

    8 the British army with the HVO. In the British army,

    9 officers and soldiers, senior NCOs, belong to a

    10 meritocracy where they are promoted as a result of

    11 being good at their job, getting good reports.

    12 In the case of the HVO, people were given

    13 appointments overnight, and people, who before the war

    14 had almost no responsibility at all, found themselves

    15 as brigade commanders. A very good example of this

    16 would be commander Mario Cerkez, who commanded the

    17 Vitez Brigade in the time I was there, in the HVO.

    18 Before the war, I believe he had been a security guard

    19 in the local ammunition factory and here he was, with

    20 very little military experience and very little

    21 education, commanding the Vitez Brigade of the HVO.

    22 Q. On the exhibit which I think is still on the

    23 ELMO, D414, we see a Brigadier who would command a

    24 brigade in the British army. What type of experience,

    25 or training or selection process would entitle someone

  26. 1 in the British army system to command a brigade?

    2 A. A British brigade commander would typically

    3 have about 25 years of professional, full-time military

    4 training with many, many courses probably in that time,

    5 with three or four years spent away on courses.

    6 Q. You said 25 years of training. Did you mean

    7 25 years of experience with the training courses you've

    8 mentioned?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Were there any other differences you noted

    11 between the British army and the HVO?

    12 A. Yes. I think we should look -- it's

    13 important to look at the equipment which the HVO had.

    14 When the British army trains and when the British army

    15 goes to war, it is equipped with all the military

    16 equipment required to fight that war. Communications

    17 equipment, logistical equipment, re-supply equipment,

    18 military hardware, artillery regiments, tank regiments,

    19 aeroplanes, helicopters and this type of thing, radar

    20 systems. The HVO had none of this.

    21 Q. Was the HVO properly equipped to fight a

    22 modern war or fight war in the modern style?

    23 A. In middle Bosnia where I dealt with the HVO,

    24 and I can only speak for middle Bosnia, there were very

    25 few tanks, very little artillery in the HVO. It was

  27. 1 fighting a war in the late 20th Century in the style

    2 which we were fighting a hundred years ago.

    3 Q. And I take it you would say something similar

    4 with respect to the BH army?

    5 A. Oh, yes. It was exactly the same with the

    6 Bosnian army as well. There is one other area where I

    7 think I could -- I think it makes it so difficult to

    8 compare the HVO with the Bosnian army, and I've alluded

    9 to it already, but I think I should go into a little

    10 bit more detail.

    11 Q. You said HVO and Bosnian army.

    12 A. Sorry, HVO and the British army. And this

    13 was in the area of how people were selected and trained

    14 for their positions. I've already mentioned one

    15 example, but across the board, in the British army,

    16 soldiers are selected, trained and promoted over a

    17 period of time within a structure for the purposes of

    18 conducting -- of carrying out a job, and over the

    19 period of their careers, whether they're in the army

    20 for three years or 30 years, that is an ongoing

    21 process. In the case of the HVO, the men were

    22 mobilised from the villages, from the streets, given a

    23 rifle and told to get on with it.

    24 For those reasons, I don't think you can

    25 really compare the HVO or the Bosnian army with the

  28. 1 British army or any other NATO army.

    2 Q. You mentioned the role of training in

    3 building a professional army. Did you, during your

    4 six-month or so tour of duty, did you ever see HVO

    5 troops engaged in training?

    6 A. No.

    7 Q. On any occasions?

    8 A. No, I didn't. And in the time I was in -- in

    9 the time that I was in Bosnia, I never heard anyone

    10 else talk about the training of either the HVO or the

    11 Bosnian army.

    12 Q. Was the HVO a disciplined, organised military

    13 force or was it something else?

    14 A. No, it was not a -- in my experience in

    15 middle Bosnia, the HVO and the Bosnian army were not

    16 disciplined and well-organised military forces. This

    17 information was -- came to us as a result of their own

    18 commanders telling us of the problems that they had

    19 controlling the rogue gangs that they had as soldiers

    20 and units underneath them.

    21 Q. Did the HVO have a large headquarters well

    22 equipped with staff? And I'm referring to the Hotel

    23 Vitez.

    24 A. We did not know -- or I did not know how many

    25 trained staff officers they had in their headquarters.

  29. 1 In order to evaluate the ability of their headquarters,

    2 we would need to -- we would need to know that, but

    3 I've already given you some idea of how many trained

    4 staff officers we would have in a British brigade

    5 headquarters.

    6 Q. Would a British brigade headquarters have any

    7 type of communications unit?

    8 A. Depending on its role, but it could expect to

    9 have probably a signals squadron working within the

    10 brigade. And it should be stressed also that I've been

    11 talking about a brigade headquarters. In the case of

    12 Hotel Vitez, there were many brigades under the command

    13 of that headquarters. It was more of -- by the British

    14 standard you could say a divisional command or even

    15 higher.

    16 Q. So I take it your testimony is you're not

    17 able to answer the question whether the HVO

    18 headquarters in Central Bosnia was -- functioned well

    19 or functioned professionally because you do not know

    20 how many professionally trained officers they had in

    21 their headquarters?

    22 A. That is correct.

    23 Q. Did the HVO headquarters in the Central

    24 Bosnia Operative Zone have access to secure fax or

    25 other secure communications?

  30. 1 A. Not that I'm aware of, and our dealings with

    2 them were over the telephone.

    3 Q. Is it dangerous to use unsecured

    4 communications in a military headquarters?

    5 A. Yes, it would be very dangerous to try to

    6 prosecute a war at that level without access and

    7 without the use of secure communications. And the

    8 reasons for this are that any radio transmissions or

    9 telephone transmissions which are not coded can, of

    10 course, be -- would probably be picked up by the enemy,

    11 your enemy. In that situation, if you are giving

    12 instructions to your subordinate units, your

    13 subordinate brigades, orders of what they are required

    14 to do, if the enemy heard those orders, the enemy would

    15 have a very good understanding of your intentions.

    16 And in the same way, if the subordinate units

    17 were then reporting to you and telling them how they're

    18 getting on, have they taken any land, have they taken

    19 any casualties, have they lost any land, that

    20 information, if that information went into enemy hands

    21 they would have a very good understanding of where your

    22 strengths and weaknesses were. So to operate without

    23 secure communications, on that level, is very

    24 dangerous.

    25 Q. Did UNPROFOR use any secure communications?

  31. 1 A. I don't believe we did, but we were not --

    2 certainly at the level I operated no, we did not, and,

    3 in fact, we made no secret of our radio frequencies,

    4 but we were not fighting a war.

    5 Q. So I take it it was by design that UNPROFOR

    6 did not attempt to shield their communications?

    7 A. I don't know the reasons why we weren't given

    8 secure communications, but it was not important for

    9 what we were doing, because we were not fighting a

    10 war.

    11 Q. Let me direct your attention forward in time

    12 to April or perhaps March of 1993. At this time, I

    13 take it, you were the sole liaison officer responsible

    14 for the areas of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca

    15 and Zenica; is that correct?

    16 A. Yes. In March and up to about the middle of

    17 April I was the sole liaison officer for that area.

    18 Q. Prior to April of 1993, did an entity known

    19 as the 7th Muslim Brigade come to your attention, and

    20 if so, in what regard?

    21 A. The organisation which became known as the

    22 7th Muslim Brigade came to our attention -- came to my

    23 attention in about January 1993. It had rather a

    24 destabilising effect from the moment we were aware of

    25 it, and it is because of how destabilising it was that

  32. 1 it was brought to our attention that it existed.

    2 The 7th Muslim Brigade was formed, I believe,

    3 and it was what I believed at the time and I have no

    4 reason not to believe it now, in a village called

    5 Nemila, which I shall point out on the map.

    6 Q. You're pointing above the map Exhibit 29; is

    7 that right?

    8 A. Yes. Unfortunately, your map is not big

    9 enough for the purpose of this.

    10 Q. Is it some place north of Zenica?

    11 A. Yes. I believe about 15 kilometres north,

    12 and it was known to us as the Nemila Brigade

    13 originally.

    14 Q. Can you describe the characteristics that

    15 were reported to the British battalion concerning this

    16 brigade?

    17 A. The 7th Muslim Brigade represented a new

    18 dimension in the way the war -- the military situation

    19 was going in middle Bosnia. They were paid as soldiers

    20 and they were paid quite well. This was unusual,

    21 because most of the normal Bosnian army, which

    22 attracted most of the Muslims, were not paid or were

    23 paid an absolute pittance.

    24 In addition to being well paid, they were

    25 well equipped. Instead of having to share rifles they

  33. 1 had one each, and they were given proper uniforms. In

    2 addition to all this, they were also expected to stop

    3 drinking and to attend the mosque, and most Bosnian

    4 Muslims do not.

    5 Q. You said that they were paid more, that is

    6 the members of the 7th Muslim Brigade received higher

    7 pay or salary than other BH army officers. Was it

    8 known where these funds were coming from to pay members

    9 of the 7th Muslim Brigade?

    10 A. Of course, we never knew anything about them

    11 for definite, but what we did -- what we were told is

    12 that the money came from the Middle East, and the

    13 effect of paying these soldiers was that it attracted

    14 soldiers away from the normal Bosnian army units.

    15 Q. Are you saying that soldiers actually left

    16 the existing BH army units and joined 7th Muslim

    17 Brigade as sort of as a competitor of the BH army?

    18 A. That's what we believed at the time, yes.

    19 Q. You said the 7th Muslim Brigade had a

    20 destabilising effect on the military situation in

    21 Central Bosnia. Why and how did it have a

    22 destabilising effect?

    23 A. To answer that question I'd like to use

    24 Travnik as an example. I'll just point it out.

    25 Prior to the war, Travnik -- the populations

  34. 1 of Muslims and Croats in the town of Travnik were

    2 roughly equal, and the relationship in the town was

    3 very good. And then as a result of the war there was a

    4 huge influx of Muslim refugees from Serb territory.

    5 This upset the balance of population in the town

    6 enormously, and at the time we believed that the Croats

    7 were probably out numbered by between three to one and

    8 six to one in the town.

    9 But the commanders of the Bosnian army in the

    10 town, and the HVO in the town, maintained the alliance,

    11 Colonel Alagic and Colonel Filipovic; Alagic from the

    12 Bosnian army, and Filipovic from the HVO. And they did

    13 everything they could to maintain the alliance and not

    14 let the destabilising effects of a huge influx of

    15 refugees detract from their ability to prosecute the

    16 war against the Serbs.

    17 But then, probably in about March 1993, and I

    18 don't remember the date, the 7th Muslim Brigade opened

    19 an office in the town and started attracting soldiers

    20 to join them, you could hear, you could see them in

    21 their slightly different uniforms.

    22 This introduced a different type of

    23 nationalism and different type of religious

    24 fundamentalism which had not existed in Travnik in the

    25 thousand year history of the town. The Croats in the

  35. 1 town were very frightened, as were the normal moderate

    2 Muslims. This is not what they expected.

    3 But when I questioned the Bosnian army

    4 commanders about this, they told me the 7th Muslim

    5 Brigade was not under their control. Its very presence

    6 had a worrying effect on the Bosnian army commanders,

    7 as well.

    8 Q. Did the presence of the 7th Muslim Brigade,

    9 for example, in Travnik, did it become an issue among

    10 politicians in the town?

    11 A. In the sense that -- yes, it did, in the

    12 sense that the Croat politicians used the presence of

    13 these extreme Muslims, dressing slightly differently,

    14 to raise the, to raise the nationalist feelings of the

    15 Croats in the town.

    16 Q. When you say that, are you thinking of a

    17 particular politician in Travnik?

    18 A. During -- yes, there is a very good example,

    19 the details of which I do not remember properly, but I

    20 do remember a visit to the town by Mate Boban, who was

    21 the president of, I believe the president of

    22 Herceg-Bosna at the time.

    23 As a result of his visit the tension between

    24 the -- or shall I say not necessarily as a result of

    25 his visit, but after his visit, the tension in the town

  36. 1 and the relationship between the Muslims and the Croats

    2 in the town deteriorated rapidly; and there were

    3 incidents of flag burning in the town, burning of Croat

    4 flags and of Bosnian flags.

    5 Q. Was the 7th Muslim Brigade present in any

    6 other locations in Central Bosnia other than Travnik?

    7 A. Yes, before they moved to Travnik, I have

    8 already pointed out the village of Nemila, where we

    9 believe they started; but they were in other towns, as

    10 well. And if you like I can point them out on the map.

    11 Q. If you can tell us or point out on the map

    12 where else they established units.

    13 A. Yes. Further north, this is the city of

    14 Zenica here, further north I've already pointed out

    15 the, approximately here, the village of Nemila, where

    16 we first heard of this brigade.

    17 Further north to that, there were the towns

    18 of Zepce and Zavidovici, which unfortunately, again,

    19 are not on this map. It was in Zepce that I first

    20 became aware of the 7th Muslim Brigade. So, we had

    21 Nemila, Zepce, Zavidovici, and later on we had Travnik,

    22 Novi Travnik, down here approximately here, there is a

    23 place called Ravno Rostovo, which is not even a

    24 village, it's a collection of houses on this mountain

    25 here. And over here the town of Kakanj. Those were

  37. 1 the locations that I was aware that the 7th Muslim

    2 Brigade had offices and units.

    3 Q. Was this in the first three or four months of

    4 1993 that this unit or these units seemed to be

    5 springing up in the region?

    6 A. Yes, I think it probably all started at about

    7 Christmas time, and by the end of March, the situation

    8 was as I described just then.

    9 Q. Do you recall any more specific information

    10 concerning the presence of the 7th Muslim Brigade in

    11 the town of Zepce?

    12 A. Yes, Zepce was the town much further north on

    13 the map, which in January 1993 that I first came

    14 face-to-face with the 7th Muslim Brigade.

    15 As a liaison officer for the town I always

    16 visited both the Bosnian headquarters and the

    17 headquarters of the HVO in the town. And on one

    18 occasion, and I do not remember the date, both

    19 commanders told me exactly the same thing; and they

    20 told me that we are very worried, there is a new unit

    21 in this town.

    22 Now, I should point out that the commander of

    23 the Bosnian army was a Muslim and a commander of the

    24 HVO was a Croat, but they were both very concerned

    25 about this new unit. And I went to have a look, and

  38. 1 the 7th Muslim Brigade had taken over a building

    2 opposite the command headquarters of the HVO, and they

    3 had erected a flagpole, and on the top of the flagpole

    4 was a green flag with the crescent moon and the star,

    5 which is associated with Islam.

    6 The Croats, the HVO considered this to be

    7 very antagonistic in the middle of the town, in a town

    8 which boasted of having a mosque, a Catholic church and

    9 an Orthodox church all together in a straight line.

    10 And they considered this to be antagonistic.

    11 But also, the Bosnian army commander told me

    12 it was antagonistic. He also told me he could not

    13 command them, they were not under his command, and he

    14 also told me he was losing some of his soldiers who

    15 were going to join them.

    16 Q. Was there later fighting in Zepce?

    17 A. Yes, after, I think in about May there was

    18 very bad fighting in the town of Zepce, and the result

    19 was it became a Croat enclave and all the Muslims were

    20 kicked out of the town.

    21 Q. After the fighting in Central Bosnia in the

    22 January 1993 time period, and perhaps it was early

    23 February, was there a cease-fire of some sort ordered?

    24 A. Yes, I think, yes, there was, I know what

    25 you're referring to, there was a cease-fire, I think at

  39. 1 the end of January. I can't remember, it may have been

    2 in the 3rd or 4th week of January.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: If I could have the assistance

    4 of the usher in distributing a document,

    5 Mr. President. There is an original and BCS and a

    6 hand-written English translation. We have no French

    7 translation at this time, Mr. President, my apologies.

    8 THE REGISTRAR: Document D415, 415A for the

    9 English version.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: If you could examine that

    11 document, and while we're doing that I would ask that a

    12 map be marked and placed on the ELMO. It's a standard

    13 Zenica 4 JNA map, and there are certain portions

    14 highlighted which I think will fit on the ELMO so they

    15 can be visibly seen. But first it needs to be marked

    16 as an exhibit, please.

    17 Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit D415A, do

    18 you recognise this document?

    19 A. Yes, I do.

    20 Q. And approximately when did you first see it?

    21 A. Probably on the day it was written, certainly

    22 it would either have been that day or the day after.

    23 Q. Did you receive both D415 and 415A in March

    24 of 1993 in the course of your duties with UNPROFOR in

    25 Central Bosnia?

  40. 1 A. Yes, I did.

    2 Q. And did you provide these documents to me

    3 prior to your testimony?

    4 A. Yes, I did.

    5 Q. And are these two exhibits authentic copies

    6 of the documents you received at the time during the

    7 war?

    8 A. Yes, they are.

    9 Q. The hand-written English translation, do you

    10 know how it was created, that is, what organisation or

    11 entity created it?

    12 A. Yes, it was created by the interpreter cell

    13 in my battalion headquarters.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: This document, Mr. President,

    15 for the record, it is a protest signed by Dusko

    16 Grubesic, and I would like to read portions and ask the

    17 witness to help us all identify some of the locations

    18 referred to in the document. If the map, which has a

    19 number, I'm sure, by now --

    20 THE REGISTRAR: This is D416 on the map.

    21 MR. HAYMAN: If we could move it up slightly

    22 and zoom in so we have a closer picture, that would be

    23 very helpful.

    24 MR. HAYMAN:

    25 Q. The protest is dated 13 March, 1993.

  41. 1 "Protest because of breaking the cease-fire. We are

    2 protesting to ECMM and UNPROFOR because Muslim armed

    3 forces, instead of all agreements, still breaking the

    4 cease-fire. On 12 March, 1993, at 2040 hours they were

    5 shooting from machine gun, M-48, on our positions in

    6 village Kula."

    7 Could you please indicate the area known as

    8 Kula? And are you indicating an area immediately to

    9 the east, north-east of Busovaca?

    10 A. Yes, that's Busovaca, there.

    11 Q. And Kula, if you could indicate it, once

    12 again? Thank you.

    13 Second bullet point: "From regions Pezici

    14 and Gornji Rovna, they provoced our units all night

    15 from personal weapons on our positions in villages

    16 Donja Rovna, Bare, and Roske Stijene. Muslim forces

    17 were shooting from anti-aircraft machine gun about

    18 05 --"

    19 MR. HAYMAN: And here, Mr. President, it says

    20 0503 hours in the translation, but I see in the

    21 original it is 0530 hours.

    22 Q. "On this same locations."

    23 First, could you indicate the locations

    24 identified as sources of fire on the 12th of March,

    25 1993, namely Pezici and Gornji Rovna?

  42. 1 A. Pezici and Gornji Rovna are here on very high

    2 ground, Pezici and Gornji Rovna.

    3 Q. And could you indicate Donji Rovna and Bare

    4 on this exhibit, Exhibit D416?

    5 A. Donji Rovna is here and Bare is here.

    6 Q. Third bullet point: "At 2230 hours they

    7 opened the fire from direction of Merdani on our

    8 locations in village Gavrne Kuce. They were using fire

    9 munitions and burned two Muslim houses in this

    10 location. Send this protest to ECMM, UN and BH army,

    11 commander of brigade, Dusko Grubesic."

    12 Could you indicate the village of Merdani?

    13 A. Merdani is here.

    14 Q. Thank you. There is a reference in this

    15 document to use of an anti-aircraft machine gun for

    16 ground assault. What is an anti-aircraft machine gun;

    17 or is itself explanatory? Can you describe the type of

    18 gun?

    19 A. There are many different types, but in Bosnia

    20 they generally used a 12.7 millimetre, which is about

    21 half an inch, machine gun, which is designed for

    22 shooting down aircraft. It has a very high rate of

    23 fire, and obviously quite large calibre. And it has a

    24 very long barrel which allows it to project these the

    25 projectiles very high into the sky, they hit aircraft.

  43. 1 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist,

    2 Mr. President, I have another document to distribute.

    3 It is a similar document, another protest, there is a

    4 BSC original and a hand-written English translation.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Document D417, D417A for the

    6 hand-written English version.

    7 MR. HAYMAN:

    8 Q. Could you examine these documents, please?

    9 Do you recognise them?

    10 A. Yes, I do.

    11 Q. And are they also documents that you received

    12 during your service in UNPROFOR in Bosnia during the

    13 war?

    14 A. Yes, they are.

    15 Q. And are they true copies or authentic copies

    16 of those documents which you provided to me prior to

    17 your testimony?

    18 A. Yes, they are.

    19 Q. On the BSC original there's a hand-written

    20 notation in the upper right-hand corner; do you see

    21 where it reads "This fax for the attention captain M. J.

    22 Dundas-Whatley"?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 MR. HAYMAN: This is a shorter document,

    25 Mr. President, and I will read it.

  44. 1 Q. It's again titled -- first of all, it is

    2 dated 14 March 1993, a protest against the breach of

    3 the cease-fire agreement.

    4 "We protest to the ECMM and the UN because

    5 the Bosnian army forces, despite everyday meetings

    6 concerning the realisation of what has been agreed, are

    7 breaking the truce. On 14 March, 1993 the BH army

    8 forces were engaged in provocative fire from small arms

    9 from the direction of Pezici and" --

    10 MR. HAYMAN: And Mr. President, from the

    11 original, I think it is reasonably clear, the second

    12 location is Vranjska, V-R-A-N-J-S-K-A, although it is

    13 very difficult to read, but I do believe it is

    14 Vranjska.

    15 Q. "Towards the positions at Roske Stijene and

    16 Kovacevac and Donji Rovna. From 1213 hours to 1300

    17 hours they were firing from an anti-aircraft machine

    18 gun. We are informing about this the gentlemen from

    19 the ECMM, UN and the BH army." Signed brigade

    20 commander, Dusko Grubesic.

    21 I believe there is only one location

    22 Mr. Whatley mentioned in this document which hasn't

    23 already been identified for the Court -- well, actually

    24 there are two. First of all, there's indication that

    25 fire came from Pezici, which you; could you identify

  45. 1 that one more time? Thank you. And Vranjska, where is

    2 Vranjska?

    3 A. (Indicating).

    4 Q. Where is Vitez in relation to Vranjska? Can

    5 you move the map slightly down? There we go. So Vitez

    6 is where you're indicating now, and Vranjska is to the

    7 south-east.

    8 The fire was towards the positions, among

    9 others, of Donji Rovna, and Kovacevac. Do you see

    10 Kovacevac, between Pezici and Bare? It is not

    11 highlighted. Thank you.

    12 Did you keep up your diary after you had been

    13 in the country in Bosnia for a period of time, or was

    14 there no longer time to keep a narrative diary?

    15 A. I kept a diary from the day I arrived until

    16 the beginning of January 1993.

    17 Q. After January, 1993, did you keep any

    18 abbreviated notes?

    19 A. Yes, when I came back from leave at the -- I

    20 was away for two weeks in January, and when I came back

    21 towards the end of January I didn't keep a diary, so

    22 all I maintained was my army notebooks.

    23 Q. I would like to direct your attention to

    24 specific events now in April of 1993. And if you need

    25 to refer to your contemporaneous notes, with the

  46. 1 Court's leave, you may do so; but please indicate when

    2 you are, so it is clear in the record.

    3 First I would like to direct your attention

    4 to the 7th of April, 1993. Did you meet with the BH

    5 army commander in Kruscica on that day?

    6 A. Yes, I did.

    7 Q. Was the Vance-Owen Peace Plan mentioned by

    8 him?

    9 A. Yes, it was.

    10 Q. Is there a reference in your notebook to this

    11 discussion?

    12 A. Yes, there are three things in my notebook

    13 which relate to the Vance -- relate to this. The first

    14 one, the commander, the Bosnian army commander in

    15 Kruscica is asking me to provide him with a written

    16 version of the Vance-Owen Plan, because he hadn't had

    17 it. He then went onto say "Never under command HVO,"

    18 and then he said, "Muslim provinces full."

    19 Q. Did you have a lot of meetings on a daily

    20 basis with different people, different headquarters and

    21 so forth?

    22 A. Yes, I did.

    23 Q. Without your notebook, would you be able to

    24 tell us that those things were said in this meeting on

    25 the 7th of April, 1993?

  47. 1 A. Absolutely not. Without this notebook I can

    2 remember very little of the details.

    3 Q. From five years ago.

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Five-and-a-half.

    6 A. Five-and-a-half, yes.

    7 Q. Let me direct your attention to the next day,

    8 the 8th of April, 1993. Did you visit the town of

    9 Travnik on April 8th?

    10 A. Yes, I did. And I attended, this was my

    11 third meeting that day, and I attended a joint meeting

    12 of the Bosnian army and the HVO in Travnik.

    13 Q. Did you learn of a troop movement on the 8th

    14 of April, 1993?

    15 A. Yes, I did.

    16 Q. Wait one moment.

    17 What did you learn in this meeting on the 8th

    18 of April, 1993, concerning a troop movement?

    19 A. Colonel Filipovic, the HVO commander in

    20 Travnik, told me "five hundred soldiers from Visoko to

    21 barracks in Travnik." He then went on to say "2100

    22 hours," referring to the previous evening, "Flag

    23 burned," in brackets, "Croat". He then told me that

    24 the HVO command was now going to be in Dolac.

    25 Q. Going back to the first thing you recounted

  48. 1 from your notebook, that 500 troops had moved from

    2 Visoko to Travnik; were there any HVO troops in Visoko

    3 that you knew of, at the time?

    4 A. They --

    5 Q. Or did you have an understanding as to whose

    6 troops these were that would have moved from Visoko to

    7 Travnik barracks?

    8 A. There may well have been HVO troops in

    9 Visoko, but this is not a reference to HVO soldiers.

    10 Q. How can you determine that?

    11 A. Because Filipovic told me about it, because

    12 he was concerned about it. And in addition, because

    13 they went to the barracks in Travnik, which was not a

    14 HVO barracks, it was a Bosnian army barracks.

    15 Q. Was a movement of 500 Bosnian army soldiers

    16 to Travnik on the 8th of April, would that be

    17 considered a large troop movement in the Lasva Valley?

    18 A. Yes, it would. That would be quite a convoy

    19 of buses.

    20 Q. You mentioned that you learned at this

    21 meeting that the HVO had moved its headquarters out of

    22 the town of Travnik; is that right?

    23 A. That's correct. I think they moved that

    24 evening.

    25 Q. I would ask that another map be marked,

  49. 1 unless --

    2 MR. HAYMAN: I don't know, Mr. President,

    3 what our hours will be for the balance of the day, but

    4 if we're going to proceed I would be moving on to

    5 another map.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: We're going to stop at 5.30,

    7 because the interpreters began working at 9.30 this

    8 morning. We must stop at 5.30 if you want to begin

    9 another subject, otherwise we can stop right now. As

    10 you like.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: We would probably consume a

    12 couple of minutes getting this map situated on the ELMO

    13 properly; so I suggest we break, and when we begin

    14 tomorrow we will have it in place and save the time.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. The Court stands

    16 adjourned.

    17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    18 5.27 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

    19 the 29th day of October, 1998.