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  1. 1 Thursday, 29th October, 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 11.45 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated and have the

    5 accused brought in.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to say good

    8 morning to the Defence counsel, to the Prosecution. We

    9 will work for a little while now. Let's have the

    10 witness brought in, please.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: If the ELMO, Mr. President,

    12 could be placed by the witness, I think that needs to

    13 be done.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: No objections.

    15 (The witness entered court)

    16 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume our work.

    17 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, as you know, this morning

    18 there was another case before the Trial Chamber and it

    19 took a bit longer than we thought it would. We can now

    20 resume. Mr. Hayman, the floor is yours, you can work

    21 until 1.00.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you Mr. President. Good

    23 morning and good morning, Your Honours.

    24 Q. Good morning, Mr. Whatley.

    25 A. Good morning.

  2. 1 Q. Let me touch on two subjects before

    2 continuing with the April 8th events of 1993 that we

    3 were discussing. First, you mentioned that you had

    4 meetings with commanders of both warring parties six or

    5 seven days a week during your tour.

    6 At what level or levels of command or units

    7 were these regular contacts?

    8 A. My most usual level of command that I had

    9 contact with was at the brigade level. It wasn't

    10 exclusively a brigade level, I also dealt with the

    11 higher levels, which in the case of the HVO was Colonel

    12 Blaskic, and in the case of the Bosnian army was

    13 General Hadzihasanovic in Zenica, and on occasions with

    14 lower level commanders, below the level of brigade.

    15 Q. You also mentioned yesterday your

    16 introduction, if you will, to the region on your drive

    17 north on the road from Gornji Vakuf to Novi Travnik in

    18 the middle or latter part of October, 1992.

    19 When you first arrived in Vitez during that

    20 same time period, what did you find with respect to the

    21 relationship between the HVO and the BH army in Vitez

    22 itself?

    23 A. On about, I suppose it must have been about

    24 the 20th of April, 1992.

    25 Q. April?

  3. 1 A. Sorry, October, 1992. The Bosnian army and

    2 the HVO in Vitez were undergoing a small war. There

    3 was shooting in the town. There was HVO soldiers in

    4 front of Hotel Vitez when shooting at Bosnian army

    5 positions, and fire was being returned.

    6 Q. Now, I would like to return to the 8th of

    7 April, 1993, where we left our work yesterday. You had

    8 described a meeting with commanders of both sides in

    9 the city of Travnik on that day, and specifically you

    10 described the fact that you had been told, among other

    11 things, that the HVO headquarters in Travnik had moved

    12 out of the town to a location known as Dolac; is that

    13 correct?

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: If a new map, Mr. President,

    16 which we have marked during the recess as Defence

    17 Exhibit 418, if that could perhaps be folded by the

    18 witness so that the portion of the map indicating

    19 Travnik and adjacent areas could be placed on the

    20 ELMO.

    21 A. (Complies)

    22 Q. First of all, the city of Travnik, it is

    23 marked, but for convenience, if you could indicate

    24 Travnik on the map, Defence Exhibit 418?

    25 A. This is the town of Travnik here.

  4. 1 Q. Is Travnik an urban area for the region?

    2 A. Yes, it is. It's the main centre of

    3 population.

    4 Q. Do you know where the area or areas of Dolac,

    5 where you were told, on the 8th of April, the HVO had

    6 moved its headquarters out of the town?

    7 A. Yes, Dolac is to the east of Travnik, this

    8 area here. I must point out this is a very old map,

    9 and the town is quite more built up than it appears

    10 here, but Dolac is this area here.

    11 Q. Indicating to the east, south-east of the city

    12 of Travnik itself?

    13 A. That's correct.

    14 Q. Thank you. We can put that map aside for

    15 now.

    16 I direct your attention to two days later,

    17 the 10th of April, 1993. Did you learn on the 10th of

    18 further incidents between the BH army and the HVO that

    19 had occurred the night before, on the 9th of April,

    20 1993?

    21 A. Yes, I did. I had a meeting on the Saturday

    22 morning, the 10th of April, 1993. I had a meeting with

    23 Baba Salko in Travnik.

    24 Q. Who was Baba Salko?

    25 A. Baba Salko was one of my main Bosnian army

  5. 1 contacts who dealt with -- he ran the exchange

    2 commission in Travnik, which was concerned with

    3 exchanging prisoners of war, dead bodies, and moving

    4 refugees across the front-lines with the Serbs. His

    5 additional duties were to act. He was one of the

    6 people who liaised with me from Travnik.

    7 Q. For the BH army?

    8 A. For the Bosnian army.

    9 Q. Did you learn from him of any incidents in

    10 the town of Travnik on the prior day of the 9th of

    11 April, 1993?

    12 A. Yes, he told me there was a bomb in the

    13 hotel. He is referring there to Hotel Orient, which

    14 was an HVO accommodation hotel, and at a church. He

    15 told me there was a bomb directed against 7 Brigade,

    16 which was the 7th Muslim Brigade.

    17 He told me at 2355 hours, the night before

    18 there had been shooting in the town for about half an

    19 hour, and that a cafe had been destroyed in Dolac, and

    20 that a hand grenade had been thrown in the Bosnian army

    21 barracks, and that later on, that at half past midnight

    22 the previous evening, an 82 millimetre recoilless

    23 weapon had been fired in the town as well.

    24 Q. What was the level of tension or conflict,

    25 then, as of the night of the 9th of April, 1993, in

  6. 1 Travnik, based on those reports which you received?

    2 A. The level of tension in Travnik at this stage

    3 was very, very high.

    4 Q. I'd like to direct your attention to the 12th

    5 of April, 1993, two days later. Did you visit Travnik

    6 again on the 12th of April? Could you tell us what you

    7 learned on that visit with respect to the situation in

    8 the town?

    9 A. On Monday, the 12th of April, 1993, I visited

    10 the Bosnian army in Travnik and spoke to the deputy

    11 commander there. He listed many of the things which

    12 had gone on in the town the previous evening, including

    13 a large explosion that started, well, an explosion that

    14 happened at 10.30 or sometime between 10.30 and 11.00,

    15 and a series of explosions, with the strongest one at

    16 0300 hours on the morning of the 12th.

    17 He also confirmed that on the Saturday night,

    18 referring to the previous part of this, that there had

    19 been an RPG fired south of the road. It's not clear

    20 which road he is talking about.

    21 Q. Did you also meet on the 12th of April, 1993

    22 with Colonel Filipovic, the HVO commander in Travnik?

    23 A. Yes, I did. That was, I think, probably the

    24 next meeting of the day. I went to see Colonel

    25 Filipovic, and among other things he told me that the

  7. 1 7th Muslim Brigade were causing the problems, that the

    2 police in the town were useless, that they had no will,

    3 and the politicians in the town would not talk to each

    4 other because of the flag burning incidents.

    5 Q. Did you have another meeting with the HVO in

    6 their Dolac headquarters later in the day on the 12th

    7 of April?

    8 A. Yes, at 1410 hours I went to Dolac to the HVO

    9 headquarters there, and I spoke to Commander Nakic.

    10 Q. Now, we have heard in this trial of Franjo

    11 Nakic. Are you referring to Franjo Nakic or some other

    12 Nakic?

    13 A. I don't think it is Franjo Nakic, but I don't

    14 know the first name of this chap.

    15 Q. Was this person a local HVO commander in

    16 Travnik?

    17 A. Yes, but he was not somebody with whom I was

    18 very familiar.

    19 Q. Did you learn from him of any incidents that

    20 were ongoing or had recently occurred in the town of

    21 Travnik?

    22 A. Yes, he listed -- I got five points that he

    23 made here, but probably the most important one: He

    24 stated that the HVO had been killed in their flats by

    25 the Mecici.

  8. 1 Q. Did you know who the Mecici were?

    2 A. Mecici in Travnik, and we were becoming aware

    3 of this. The Mecici in Travnik was a criminal group, a

    4 very well armed criminal group that was terrorising the

    5 Croat population in Travnik at the beginning of April

    6 1993.

    7 Q. Were the Mecici a powerful force in Travnik

    8 at the time?

    9 A. Certainly the Bosnian army commanders in

    10 Travnik and the HVO referred to them frequently, and

    11 said they were too powerful for the police to deal with

    12 because they were armed with rifles. They were from

    13 the town and knew the town very well. This is what we

    14 believed at the time.

    15 Q. You mentioned checkpoints. Did you attribute

    16 any significance during your tour of duty to the

    17 appearance or removal of checkpoints in the region and

    18 if so, what?

    19 A. We always considered checkpoints as a

    20 barometer of the level of tension in the area.

    21 Q. Can you explain? You mean barometer in both

    22 directions, up and down?

    23 A. Yes, if tension was rising or had risen as a

    24 result of killings or house burnings or political

    25 statements on the television or whatever, then very

  9. 1 quickly checkpoints would appear all over the place.

    2 They were used by the local communities as a

    3 way of defending their community from outsiders,

    4 because this was a very mixed Croat Muslim area. So, a

    5 Croat village, they would erect a checkpoint on its

    6 part of the road or maybe two, and the Muslims would

    7 and the Croats would, and all of a sudden you would

    8 have 20 or 30 checkpoints in the space of an hour or

    9 two arriving. Then as the tension went down, the

    10 number of checkpoints would reduce back to the, what we

    11 considered to be the standard level of checkpoint.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, you just passed very

    13 quickly on the Mecici. Were they Serbs or Muslims?

    14 Could you just let us know what it was?

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Of course, Your Honours. I

    16 apologise if I'm going too quickly or rushing the

    17 witness.

    18 Q. Could you explain, Mr. Whatley, the Mecici;

    19 what was the composition of that criminal group, to the

    20 extent you received information about them?

    21 A. The Mecici were a criminal group based in

    22 Travnik, and I believe, although I have no first-hand

    23 knowledge, I believe they were majority Muslim.

    24 JUDGE RIAD: What do you mean by majority?

    25 Were there other Muslims or Croats or Serbs, or was it

  10. 1 just a terrorist group, nothing to do with the

    2 conflict?

    3 A. I wouldn't like to describe them as a

    4 terrorist group, but they may have been that. They

    5 were described to me as, if you like, an independent

    6 criminal group that was very well armed from the town,

    7 and it was terrorising the Croat population. That's

    8 what I was told.

    9 I can assume they were probably not Croats

    10 and Serbs, because there were very few Serbs left in

    11 Travnik at the time we're talking about. You could

    12 almost assume they were probably all Muslim; but I was

    13 never told that, so I would be very careful as to say

    14 that, Your Honour.

    15 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

    16 MR. HAYMAN:

    17 Q. Did you hear about this group, the Mecici,

    18 only on the one occasion you identified, or did you

    19 hear about them many times from the parties to the

    20 conflict in Travnik?

    21 A. The name Mecici did come up many times, but I

    22 can't remember how many times. We were well aware by

    23 this time, now, the middle of April, 1993, that they

    24 existed. They were a criminal gang, and looking back,

    25 they had an enormous effect on what was going on in

  11. 1 Travnik.

    2 We were probably not aware of that until too

    3 late. We were still more preoccupied with the military

    4 commanders rather than the criminal gangs and their

    5 relationship to the law and order and the police.

    6 Q. Returning to the 12th of April, 1993, you've

    7 describe two meetings with HVO commanders. Did you

    8 also meet with representatives of the BH army at their

    9 headquarters in Travnik?

    10 A. Yes, I did.

    11 Q. Did you learn anything from them concerning

    12 the situation in the town?

    13 A. Yes, at 1830 hours on the evening of the 12th

    14 of April I had a meeting with the Bosnian army in

    15 Travnik, and amongst other things, and I will read

    16 exactly what my notebook says, it's point five: "About

    17 4.00 p.m. Dolac checkpoint not moved, no power, Bruno,

    18 Knights, Mostar."

    19 Q. That's a quote from your contemporaneous

    20 notes?

    21 A. That's a quote. On the next page there are

    22 more notes on the same meeting referring to the same

    23 thing.

    24 Q. Before we move on to the other notations, let

    25 me ask you, you said three words that may need to be,

  12. 1 well, four, that may need to be dissected a bit.

    2 Dolac, is that the location where the HVO headquarters

    3 had moved to out of Travnik at the time?

    4 A. Yes, that's correct.

    5 Q. If the BH commander was telling you that the

    6 checkpoint at Dolac had not moved, what would you

    7 understand that to be?

    8 A. As I recall, the military commanders, Colonel

    9 Filipovic and Colonel Alagic, in Travnik, of the HVO

    10 and Bosnian army, were constantly trying to reduce the

    11 tension and also reduce the number of checkpoints which

    12 were interfering with the civilian population.

    13 What this refers to, I believe, is that the

    14 Bosnian army were telling me that the HVO in Travnik

    15 did not have the power to remove this checkpoint

    16 because it was not under their command.

    17 Q. Now, let's turn to the last three words of

    18 the passage you have quoted for the Court. "Bruno

    19 Knights, Mostar," when you use the word "Knights," is

    20 the word in your notes, is it "nights" as in day and

    21 night, or is it "Knights" as in Knights of the round

    22 table?

    23 A. This is the word "Knights" spelled with a K.

    24 Q. Very well. Were you aware at the time that

    25 there was a group in Vitez known as the Vitez Knights

  13. 1 or Vitezovi and used the term Knights with a K as their

    2 name?

    3 A. No, I was not.

    4 Q. Were you aware at the time that the Minister

    5 of Defence of Herceg-Bosna in Mostar was Bruno Stojic?

    6 A. No, I was not.

    7 Q. Did you learn later on the 12th, or in that

    8 same conversation, of a later in time checkpoint or

    9 checkpoint problem from the BH command?

    10 A. Yes, this meeting started at 1830, and one of

    11 the points that came up in the meeting was that at 1700

    12 hours, at 5.00 p.m. that day, and I quote "Knights

    13 commander who put the checkpoint at the BH

    14 headquarters." It doesn't say outside, but I've I said

    15 outside, then it says "312 command." If I could

    16 explain that?

    17 I questioned him in this meeting about some

    18 details about what he was talking about with this

    19 checkpoint, because I didn't understand. He said that

    20 at 5.00 p.m. the Knights, which I then began to realise

    21 was a unit of the Croat unit, it was the commander who

    22 put the checkpoint outside the Bosnian headquarters of

    23 312 Brigade in Travnik.

    24 Q. Would that have been a provocative act to put

    25 a Croat checkpoint outside of a BH army Brigade

  14. 1 headquarters?

    2 A. Yes, very provocative.

    3 Q. Was there a BH army brigade in the Travnik

    4 area known as the 312th Brigade of the BH army?

    5 A. Yes, there were three brigades in Travnik and

    6 one of them was 312 Brigade.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: I have a document I would like

    8 to show the witness, Mr. President, if the usher could

    9 assist. It consists of one page, it is an annexe to a

    10 Cheshire Regiment MILINFOSUM that was provided to the

    11 Defence by the Office of the Prosecutor.

    12 THE REGISTRAR: This is D419.

    13 MR. HAYMAN: If there's an extra copy,

    14 perhaps it could be placed on the ELMO.

    15 Q. If you could read this document, please, and

    16 tell us if you recognise the subject matter referred to

    17 in the document.

    18 Do you recognise the subject matter of the

    19 document?

    20 A. Yes, I do.

    21 Q. This is dated, in that it's an annexe to a

    22 MILINFOSUM which was dated the 13th of April, 1993.

    23 At or about this time, or on the prior day,

    24 the 12th of April, 1993, was a joint commission of one

    25 sort or another formed in Travnik between the BH army

  15. 1 and the HVO?

    2 A. Yes, it was.

    3 Q. Does this document memorialise the

    4 conclusions of that joint commission?

    5 A. This is a translation of the conclusions of

    6 the formation of the commission, a translation done by

    7 the British interpreters.

    8 Q. Paragraph 4, and I will read it, states:

    9 "Joint commissions are to ensure that all the agreed

    10 points are implemented. If they are not, the

    11 commission is to intervene. Captain M. Dundas-Whatley

    12 will join the commission as an UNPROFOR

    13 representative. The joint commission's aim is to make

    14 sure all trenches are filled in."

    15 Is that a reference to yourself?

    16 A. Yes, it is.

    17 Q. Did you, subsequent to this event,

    18 participate for some period of time in the work of this

    19 joint commission?

    20 A. Yes, I did.

    21 Q. What was the purpose with respect to filling

    22 in trenches? What was the purpose of the commission's

    23 work?

    24 A. One of the major indications of problems in

    25 Travnik, and indeed one of the main problems in

  16. 1 Travnik, was that on the high ground around the town,

    2 both the Bosnian army and the HVO had been placing

    3 machine gun positions, heavy machine gun positions, and

    4 on occasions these machine guns would then fire into

    5 different parts of the town. The Croat ones firing

    6 into Muslim areas and vice versa.

    7 The purpose of the commission was to get the

    8 guns off the hills, back into the barracks, fill in the

    9 trenches, reduce the tension so that the HVO and the

    10 Bosnian army could continue the war against what they

    11 called the common enemy.

    12 Q. The common enemy being --

    13 A. The Serbs.

    14 Q. This translation indicates that the

    15 signatories to this document were Colonel Filipovic and

    16 Alagic. Were they the brigade commanders of the HVO

    17 and BH army units in Travnik, respectively, or did they

    18 have some other positions?

    19 A. They were the commanders of the HVO and the

    20 BiH, respectively, in Travnik, but certainly in the

    21 case of Colonel Alagic, he was a much more senior level

    22 than brigade commander. He had under his command more

    23 than three brigades.

    24 Q. By this document, how would you characterise

    25 what these two commanders were trying to do at this

  17. 1 critical juncture, the 12th or 13th of April, 1993?

    2 A. They were doing what many, in many areas of

    3 Bosnia, the HVO and Bosnian army were trying to do, was

    4 to stop a war starting between the HVO and the Bosnian

    5 army.

    6 Q. Paragraph 1 of the conclusions of the joint

    7 commission states: "HVO, BiH commanders and civil

    8 police commanders have agreed that they are to

    9 establish full control over their soldiers in the aim

    10 of peacekeeping in the area."

    11 Were you receiving information at or about

    12 this time that on both sides of the conflict there were

    13 units of soldiers, or other armed persons, who were

    14 outside the control of the military structures on the

    15 HVO and/or BiH side?

    16 A. Yes, we were. I was constantly being

    17 approached by the military commanders on both sides

    18 during the meetings, and them complaining to me, or

    19 using me as someone to explain the problems they were

    20 having controlling criminal organisations in the area.

    21 By criminal organisations, I mean highly armed quasi

    22 military criminal gangs.

    23 Q. We can put this document aside for the

    24 moment. Thank you.

    25 Let me direct your attention to the next day,

  18. 1 the 13th of April, 1993. On the 13th of April did you

    2 learn of the kidnapping of certain HVO officers from or

    3 in the region of Novi Travnik?

    4 A. Yes, I did.

    5 Q. Can you tell us whom you met with and what

    6 you learned concerning the kidnapping of these three

    7 officers and a driver, or four officers, as the case

    8 may be?

    9 A. In the afternoon of the 13th of April, 1993,

    10 I went to Novi Travnik. Would you like me to indicate

    11 that?

    12 Q. Please.

    13 A. I can probably do it sitting down so you can

    14 hear me. This is the town of Travnik, and this is the

    15 town of Novi Travnik.

    16 Q. Could you indicate Vitez so we have a

    17 reference point, please?

    18 A. (Indicating)

    19 Q. Thank you.

    20 A. I went to the town of Novi Travnik probably

    21 in the afternoon, although I have haven't written the

    22 time of the meeting, and I spoke to the HVO commander

    23 in Novi Travnik. His name was Zeljko Sabljic. He told

    24 me that, "Three people plus the driver, Bugojno Road,

    25 1400 hours, sentry ports, car."

  19. 1 Q. You're telling us what the notations in your

    2 notebook are on this matter; is that correct?

    3 A. Yes, I'm reading it exactly. If I can

    4 explain what that means? He was telling me that three

    5 members of the HVO plus their driver, who were

    6 travelling on the Bugojno Road -- perhaps you want me

    7 to point that road out.

    8 Q. Perhaps, if you can, if that has a clear and

    9 determinant meaning.

    10 A. I'll point out the road of Novi Travnik and

    11 then which road is the Bugojno Road from the town.

    12 Q. Indicating to south/south-west from Travnik?

    13 A. Yes. It's not a very well-made road but it

    14 heads to the town of Bugojno. At 1400 hours this

    15 incident had happened from their car.

    16 Q. Did the HVO commander know where these four

    17 abductees were?

    18 A. According to my notes, he believed that it

    19 was perpetrated by the 7th Muslim Brigade but there's a

    20 question mark there. He went on to say that he had

    21 already phoned Mevludin, and Mevludin was the Bosnia

    22 army commander in the town of Novi Travnik. He'd

    23 already phoned him to ask him to phone the 7th Muslim

    24 Brigade, and that had already been done. He then told

    25 me that the people in the incident that had

  20. 1 disappeared, two members were HVO soldiers, and then

    2 the two others, one was the deputy commander of the 1st

    3 battalion of an HVO brigade, but I don't know --

    4 presumably his brigade but it doesn't say that here,

    5 and it gives me the name of that deputy commander as

    6 Ivica Kamdic.

    7 Q. How would you characterise the effect of this

    8 apparent kidnapping, on the 13th of April, 1993, on the

    9 level of tension in the region?

    10 A. In the town of Novi Travnik this had a major

    11 effect. Checkpoints sprung up everywhere and the

    12 tension level went very high.

    13 Q. Later on, on the 13th of April, 1993, did you

    14 meet with Sefkija Djidic in Stari Vitez?

    15 A. Yes, I did.

    16 Q. Who was Sefkija Djidic?

    17 A. Sefkija Djidic was the Bosnian army officer

    18 in the old part of Vitez known as Stari Vitez. He was

    19 not a brigade commander. He was a lower level

    20 commander. We used to call him the town commander.

    21 Q. Did you learn from Mr. Djidic, on the 13th of

    22 April, 1993, of another incident that had occurred?

    23 A. Yes. He told me that -- and it's probably

    24 best I just read it from the notebook and explain it

    25 afterwards. He told me, "Forest, opened fire, damaged

  21. 1 vehicle, Darko Kraljevic, commander HOS." What he was

    2 telling me about there is an attempt at murdering

    3 Mr. Darko Kraljevic by people opening fire from

    4 woodland. They damaged the vehicle but they did not

    5 kill Mr. Darko Kraljevic, whom Sefkija Djidic believed

    6 was the commander of the HOS, a Croat -- an HVO unit.

    7 Q. Now I'd like to leave the 13th of April, 1993

    8 and move forward to the 15th of April, 1993.

    9 First, on the morning of the 15th of April,

    10 did you have a meeting with the HVO command in Novi

    11 Travnik?

    12 A. Yes, I did, at 0935 hours.

    13 Q. What, if anything, did you learn from them

    14 concerning further incidents in the region?

    15 A. I spoke to the HVO deputy commander, who,

    16 amongst other things, told me that the 7th Muslim

    17 Brigade had put a checkpoint outside the hotel.

    18 Q. The reference to the hotel would be what?

    19 A. The HVO -- sorry, the hotel that he's

    20 referring to was the headquarters of the HVO.

    21 Q. In what location?

    22 A. It was his headquarters, the HVO

    23 headquarters.

    24 Q. In Novi Travnik?

    25 A. That's correct.

  22. 1 Q. Was there a celebration on the part of the BH

    2 army on the 15th of April?

    3 A. Yes, the 15th of April, 1993 was the first

    4 anniversary of the Bosnian army.

    5 Q. Did you attend any celebrations of this event

    6 on the 15th of April?

    7 A. Yes. Following these meetings in Novi

    8 Travnik, I went to Travnik. I'd been invited to do

    9 this a few days before. I went to the main Bosnian

    10 army headquarters in Travnik where I was a guest of

    11 Colonel Filipovic at the celebration parade for the

    12 first anniversary of the Bosnian army.

    13 Q. You said Colonel Filipovic.

    14 A. Sorry, Alagic.

    15 Q. Was Colonel Filipovic present at the parade?

    16 A. No, he was not.

    17 MR. HAYMAN: If the usher could assist, we

    18 have a small photograph that I'd like to place on the

    19 ELMO and question the witness about. I would ask that

    20 if it's possible, that a copy be made so the witness

    21 can retain a copy at the end of the trial or what have

    22 you. If we could mark it and put it on the ELMO,

    23 please, as the next exhibit in order.

    24 THE REGISTRAR: Do you agree that we will

    25 keep the original then?

  23. 1 MR. HAYMAN: I agree. I think the witness

    2 has a sentimental attachment to the photograph. He's

    3 in the photograph, but if a professional copy could be

    4 made of the photograph, I think that that will meet the

    5 witness's needs.

    6 JUDGE JORDA: Let me turn to the witness.

    7 Mr. Whatley, it's your photograph, it's your document,

    8 and I understand you appear in that picture.

    9 A. Yes, I do.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Well, it would appear normal

    11 that the photograph be given back to you if a visible

    12 copy can be made so that it could be tendered into

    13 evidence. That way you could go home with your

    14 photograph.

    15 THE REGISTRAR: This photograph is D420, and

    16 the document that the registrar will have will be a

    17 copy of the one which is being shown now on the ELMO.

    18 A. If we could go just very slightly left.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    20 Q. Do you recognise this photograph?

    21 A. Yes, I do.

    22 Q. What does it depict?

    23 A. In the middle of the picture, this is me here

    24 in uniform, and on the left here is my interpreter.

    25 This photograph was taken in Travnik on the morning of

  24. 1 the 15th of April, 1993, and, in fact, you can see the

    2 date written here.

    3 Q. The 15th.

    4 A. The 15th of April, 1993. These were -- many

    5 of the senior Bosnian army and Bosnian government

    6 figures in Travnik on the morning of that parade.

    7 We're all standing on what in Britain we would call a

    8 saluting dais. Taking the salute at the front here,

    9 the senior officer present is Colonel Alagic.

    10 Q. Indicating at the far right-hand side or end

    11 of the photograph?

    12 A. That's Colonel Alagic, who was the senior

    13 Bosnian army commander for Travnik. Over here with --

    14 appears to be smoking, with his hand in front of his

    15 mouth, is Commander Kulenovic, who was one of our main

    16 contacts as well, and he was the town commander for

    17 Travnik for the Bosnian army.

    18 Q. He's the individual second from the left; is

    19 that correct?

    20 A. That is correct. In uniform between the two

    21 civilians.

    22 Q. Could you describe the festivities? Was

    23 there a parade, and if so, was it a large parade or how

    24 would you describe it?

    25 A. Yes, there was very large parade that

  25. 1 morning, the largest collection of locals in uniform

    2 that we had seen in one place. Certainly in excess of

    3 a thousand soldiers, but I don't know how many. I

    4 think the parade probably went on for a couple of

    5 hours.

    6 Q. In the course of the ceremony, did you

    7 receive word that you were needed elsewhere?

    8 A. Yes, I was. I was asked to go to Zenica. My

    9 Land Rover, which is parked slightly to right of this

    10 picture, off and behind, you can't see it. My radio

    11 operator came to me and told me he'd received a message

    12 telling me that I should proceed immediately to the

    13 city of Zenica.

    14 Q. Were you able to extract yourself from the

    15 ceremony or did that make you uncomfortable?

    16 A. It was slightly awkward, but I saluted

    17 Colonel Alagic and I then left the parade.

    18 Q. If Exhibit D416, which is a map we marked

    19 yesterday, could be provided to the witness and put on

    20 the ELMO it would be helpful. It is one of the JNA map

    21 series, Zenica 4, D416.

    22 We can proceed with exhibit -- if we have it,

    23 that would be fine. If we could provide it to the

    24 witness, and perhaps the witness can fold the map so

    25 that the road from Vitez to Zenica, the so-called

  26. 1 mountain road, will be visible on the ELMO.

    2 Could you indicate for the Court on what

    3 route you proceeded to Zenica on the -- what was by now

    4 what, the late morning or midday of the 15th of April?

    5 A. Yes. I think the time was probably about

    6 midday. Could you just pull -- I'm sorry to try and

    7 control what's going on in the court here, but --

    8 that's better. Thank you.

    9 Q. Can you indicate how you travelled to

    10 Zenica?

    11 A. This road here goes to Travnik, up this way

    12 to -- and I drove down this road from Travnik, past the

    13 British base, which was about here, along this main

    14 road here, which is not marked because the map's too

    15 old, and up this mountain road here to Zenica. Zenica

    16 is here. I carried on up the mountain road here, and

    17 then we started to go down here, and this is the

    18 village of Cajdras here.

    19 Q. Was that a Croat village?

    20 A. At this stage, yes, it was.

    21 Q. What did you find when you reached Cajdras?

    22 A. In Cajdras I encountered a reinforced HVO

    23 checkpoint.

    24 Q. Did you proceed on to Zenica?

    25 A. Yes. The HVO checkpoint had put mines in the

  27. 1 road, which was a severe indication of the tension

    2 level, but I told my driver just to ignore the mines

    3 and to drive straight into Zenica, and we did not stop

    4 at that checkpoint.

    5 Q. What did you find in Zenica at midday on the

    6 15th of April, 1993?

    7 A. Zenica is a large city and I went there

    8 frequently, but on this day it was completely different

    9 to how it normally looked. Normally the city would be

    10 bustling with shoppers. On this occasion the streets

    11 were deserted. There were military policemen and

    12 soldiers, armed soldiers, standing on the corners of

    13 the streets, and there were a couple of buses blocking

    14 some -- a couple of the streets as well.

    15 Q. Did you proceed and did you meet, during your

    16 visit to Zenica, with the representative of the HVO at

    17 the HVO headquarters in Zenica?

    18 A. Yes, I did.

    19 Q. Do you know the name or first name of that

    20 individual?

    21 A. Yes. I spoke to what I believed to be the

    22 deputy commander of the HVO in Zenica, whose name I

    23 wrote down as Vinko.

    24 Q. Had you learned by this time that the HVO

    25 brigade commander had been kidnapped?

  28. 1 A. I knew that there had been a kidnapping in

    2 the city but I didn't know the details at this stage.

    3 Q. Did you visit the scene of the kidnapping?

    4 A. Yes, I did. I went with -- excuse me. I

    5 went with commander Vinko to the scene in my Land

    6 Rover.

    7 Q. In very short summary, what did you see

    8 there?

    9 A. I found a car, a silver Audi 80, the number

    10 plate I have here, which had been abandoned. It was

    11 full of bullet holes and full of blood. There were no

    12 people left in the vehicle.

    13 Q. At or about that time, or after perhaps

    14 returning to the HVO headquarters, did you have a

    15 conversation with Vinko, the deputy commander, and if

    16 so, what did he say to you?

    17 A. Yes. He, having shown me the results of this

    18 incident, and it was rather horrific, then I went back

    19 to his office in the hotel and he briefed me, and if I

    20 could read directly from my notebook.

    21 Point one, "More killed by Muslims than

    22 Chetniks." What he's referring to there is he believes

    23 that more Croats were being killed by the Muslims than

    24 by the Serbs.

    25 Point two, "Who is enemy?"

  29. 1 Q. By that did you understand him to mean who is

    2 the enemy of the Croats in the region?

    3 A. Yes, who is his enemy. He felt that he was

    4 fighting against the Serbs, the people referred to as

    5 Chetniks, but on his own doorstep his commander is

    6 kidnapped by Muslims.

    7 Q. Did he give any more information concerning

    8 the kidnapping to you?

    9 A. Yes. He said, three, "Corps did nothing."

    10 That is a reference to the corps headquarters of the

    11 Bosnian army based in Zenica.

    12 Fourth point, "7th Muslim Brigade not wanted

    13 here by other brigades." This was a repeated complaint

    14 by both the Bosnian army and the HVO, that the presence

    15 of the 7th Muslim Brigade was not wanted by the HVO or

    16 the normal Bosnian army brigades in the various towns.

    17 He then said that there were 1.300 extremists

    18 in 7th Muslim brigade, and then he told me about an

    19 ultimatum he received.

    20 Q. Did he tell you how he received that

    21 ultimatum?

    22 A. Yes. The ultimatum came in by telephone that

    23 day. He said if -- I quote, "If they don't release

    24 Mujahedeen in Busovaca in 48 hours, we'll kill Zivko

    25 Totic." It then says, "Commander, 2nd Brigade, HVO."

  30. 1 Would you like me to explain that?

    2 Q. Please.

    3 A. Near Busovaca, which I -- would you like to

    4 point Busovaca out on the map?

    5 Q. Please do.

    6 A. I'll point Zenica first. On this one, not

    7 the other one. That's Zenica, the big city where I was

    8 at the time, and this is the town of Busovaca. In or

    9 near the town of Busovaca, we knew that the HVO had a

    10 prison, and we knew that in the prison were many

    11 foreign people from the Middle East who had been

    12 arrested. I think we were aware of 12 by name at this

    13 stage, maybe more. This ultimatum is saying, "You let

    14 the Arabs go and you can have your commander Totic

    15 back."

    16 Q. Well, it was a little more explicit than

    17 that, that if they weren't released in 48 hours Totic

    18 would be killed; correct?

    19 A. Correct.

    20 Q. Staying with the 15th of April, 1993, later

    21 on that day did you visit the BH army commands in the

    22 Vitez area?

    23 A. Yes, I did.

    24 Q. Did you learn of a new incident on the 15th

    25 of April, 1993 from the BH army representative you met

  31. 1 with?

    2 A. Yes. At 1955 hours that evening in Vitez, at

    3 the Bosnian army headquarters in the town, I was told

    4 that three members of the Bosnian army had been

    5 arrested by the HVO in Vitez, and that it had happened

    6 at 0515, and that they were members of the Bosnian army

    7 Military Police.

    8 Q. Did you learn any more about that incident an

    9 hour or so later?

    10 A. Yes, I did. At 2100 hours that evening, I

    11 went back to speak to commander Sefkija, and he gave me

    12 a little bit more detail. He said that it had happened

    13 at 1715, and that he gave me the names of the two

    14 Bosnian army military policemen who had been kidnapped,

    15 and their names were Spahic Fahrudin and Hurem Semko.

    16 He gave me a third name in addition, but subsequently

    17 the third person was recovered.

    18 Q. Did he tell you that that third person had

    19 already been recovered?

    20 A. I'm not entirely sure. Sometime afterwards,

    21 I had crossed it out and put a tick next to it to say

    22 that it was no longer an issue.

    23 Q. Did Sefkija Djidic tell you, on the evening

    24 of the 15th, where he believed two of the three missing

    25 BH army military policemen had been taken?

  32. 1 A. He said, and I'll read it. He said, "Taken

    2 from house by HVO to elementary school, Dubravica,

    3 (HVO)."

    4 Q. Were you aware at the time that the Dubravica

    5 school, near Vitez, was the headquarters of the Vitezovi

    6 or Vitez Knights?

    7 A. No. I was aware that the school in Dubravica

    8 was an HVO location, but I did not know which unit was

    9 based there.

    10 Q. Did you learn, in this meeting with Sefkija

    11 Djidic, any other provocations, from his perspective,

    12 that had occurred on the night of the 15th.

    13 A. Yes. He said at 2130 hours that a few

    14 soldiers had been disarmed near Stari Bila, which

    15 was -- I think probably best point that out on the

    16 ELMO.

    17 Q. If we could zoom in, and perhaps you can move

    18 the map to the left. If we could zoom in on Exhibit --

    19 A. That's it. Thank you.

    20 Q. -- 416, and could you point out Stari Bila,

    21 where you were told some BH army soldiers had been

    22 disarmed on the evening of the 15th of April, 1993?

    23 A. Yes. I received the information here in

    24 Vitez, talking to commander Sefkija, but the place he

    25 was referring to was one and a half kilometres away

  33. 1 here in Stari Bila, which was also the British base.

    2 Q. Stari Bila is indicated in blue on Exhibit

    3 D416; is that correct?

    4 A. It's been highlighted in blue here.

    5 Q. Can you tell us exactly what you recall or

    6 what your notes reflect concerning this incident of the

    7 disarming of some number of BH army soldiers near Stari

    8 Bila?

    9 When was it and who was responsible?

    10 A. This was on the evening of the 15th of April,

    11 1993, and I recall very little, but I can read to you

    12 from my notebook. It says, "2130 hours, few soldiers

    13 disarmed near Stari Bila. Darko Kraljevic, guy shot

    14 at. Bruno Stojic, Mostar Knights."

    15 Q. This was something that was told to you by

    16 Sefkija Djidic; is that right?

    17 A. I believe so, yes.

    18 Q. What did you understand the connection to be

    19 during this incident, the disarming of soldiers, and

    20 Darko Kraljevic, the guy shot at. What was the

    21 connection, as you understand your notes?

    22 A. This Darko Kraljevic, somebody who I didn't

    23 know but whose name appears in my notebook, he is the

    24 Croat who had been, the day before, two days before, or

    25 maybe even three days before, there had been an attempt

  34. 1 on his life in the town or near Vitez somewhere, and

    2 that's what "guy shot at" means. It's a reference in

    3 my notebook, so I knew we were talking about the same

    4 guy.

    5 Q. What was the level of tension at this point

    6 on the evening of the 15th? You were learning of these

    7 cumulative incidents. How would you characterise the

    8 level of tension in Vitez?

    9 A. The evening of the 15th of April, 1993 was

    10 when the level of tension had reached its highest level

    11 in the time that -- in the six months, at that stage,

    12 that I had been in Bosnia.

    13 Q. On that evening, the night of the 15th of

    14 April, 1993, do you recall whether any BH army

    15 commanders made any threats to you concerning possible

    16 BH army attacks on the HVO?

    17 A. Yes, I do. There's a certain amount of

    18 confusion in my mind as to exactly where this threat

    19 was given to me, whether it was by Sefkija in Stari

    20 Vitez or by the commander in Kruscica.

    21 Q. By "the commander in Kruscica" you mean the

    22 BH commander?

    23 A. Yes. The Bosnian army had a headquarters in

    24 Kruscica and elsewhere, of course.

    25 Yes, I do remember a threat being given to

  35. 1 me, and the threat was, "If the two Bosnian army

    2 military policemen that had been kidnapped are not

    3 released, I, as the commander, cannot be responsible

    4 for the actions of my soldiers."

    5 Q. Was it the British battalion's assessment at

    6 the time that this meant that imminent retaliation by

    7 the BH army was likely, that is against -- by the BH

    8 army against the HVO was likely unless the two missing

    9 BH army personnel were recovered?

    10 A. That was my assessment and the assessment of

    11 the MILINFO officer as well.

    12 Q. That was on the night of the 15th of April,

    13 1993 that that threat or threats were made; is that

    14 correct?

    15 A. That is correct.

    16 Q. On the night of the 15th of April, 1993, did

    17 you report to the command of the British battalion that

    18 Vitez was in imminent danger of exploding into

    19 conflict?

    20 A. Yes, I did. I reported it to the second in

    21 command, Major Brian Watters, and I reported it to the

    22 MILINFOSUM, and I think also to the operations officer.

    23 Q. Did you make a recommendation concerning how

    24 the British battalion might attempt to calm the

    25 situation in Vitez?

  36. 1 A. Yes, I did. I wanted to continue -- two

    2 things. I wanted to, firstly, continue my efforts to

    3 track down and have those two policemen released to an

    4 avoid further conflict. That was my first

    5 recommendation. Secondly, I suggested that the British

    6 send Warrior armoured fighting vehicles into the town,

    7 because that had been very successful in the past at

    8 helping to diffuse tension.

    9 Q. To your knowledge, were those recommendations

    10 followed?

    11 A. To my knowledge, no. Certainly, I was told

    12 not to continue my efforts personally, because it was

    13 considered too dangerous for me to be in the town, and

    14 secondly, I believe no Warriors were sent into the town

    15 that evening.

    16 Q. You've previously mentioned a lot of

    17 incidents in Travnik, and here on the 15th of April,

    18 1993, we're speaking more of Vitez.

    19 Had the focus, in your eyes and in the eyes

    20 of the British Battalion, of the danger of eminent

    21 conflict, had it shifted by the night of the 15th of

    22 April from Travnik to Vitez?

    23 A. Yes, it had.

    24 Q. During your tour of duty, your six or seven

    25 months in Central Bosnia, did anyone on either the BH

  37. 1 army or the HVO side express any concern or even

    2 interest to you concerning any ultimatum issued by the

    3 HVO in Herzegovina concerning the formation of a joint

    4 command between the BH army and the HVO on or before

    5 the 15th of April, 1993?

    6 A. To me?

    7 Q. Did you hear anyone, either on the BH army or

    8 the HVO side, express any interest or even knowledge of

    9 such an ultimatum?

    10 A. There was. The whole issue was to do with

    11 the Vance-Owen Plan, which was a peace plan put forward

    12 by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen.

    13 As a result of that plan, parts of Bosnia

    14 were to be controlled by different entities. The

    15 region we're talking about now was to become, I think

    16 it was going to be called Canton 10, I can't remember,

    17 and it was going to be a Croat canton.

    18 So the Croat authorities in Mostar considered

    19 that they should take control of this area, which

    20 included the town of Travnik. But, of course, Travnik

    21 was overwhelmingly Muslim, particularly in light of the

    22 tens of thousands of Muslim refugees from the Serb

    23 side, and the Muslims in Travnik were not about to

    24 become subordinate to the Croats.

    25 I do remember there was a conflict about

  38. 1 this. I don't mean shooting, but there was constant

    2 talking about this, and various commanders saying "I

    3 will never become subordinate to that side" or one side

    4 saying "actually we should be in control of this."

    5 There was -- yes, there was, but I don't

    6 actually remember an ultimatum about it.

    7 Q. Did you ever hear anyone express any

    8 knowledge of any specific demand or ultimatum that had

    9 to do with a joint command or that had to do with the

    10 15th of April, 1993, specifically?

    11 A. Other than the ultimatum I've just given to

    12 you?

    13 Q. Other than what you just described in general

    14 terms.

    15 A. I can't think of anything at the moment.

    16 Q. The next morning, the 16th of April, 1993, of

    17 course there was fighting in the region. To your

    18 knowledge, was any element of the British Battalion on

    19 patrol on the early morning of the 16th of April, 1993,

    20 at the time this fighting began?

    21 A. Not to my knowledge, but I was not involved

    22 in the operational side, operation deployment of the

    23 Warriors.

    24 Q. Let me direct your attention, then, to the

    25 16th of April, 1993. On the 16th of April, did you

  39. 1 meet with an HVO representative in Vitez?

    2 A. Yes, I did at 1845 hours on the evening of

    3 the 16th of April.

    4 Q. Were you given an appraisal of the situation

    5 at that time by the HVO representative you met with?

    6 A. Yes. Yes, I was. What the HVO officer said

    7 was, "Muslims continuing their attack, new forces from

    8 Zenica."

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Now, if we could put up another

    10 exhibit, Mr. President, it's Prosecutor's Exhibit 45,

    11 and I think we will need to put it on the ELMO. It's

    12 an aerial photograph.

    13 Q. While that's being done, on the 17th of

    14 April, 1993, could you tell the Court whether you were

    15 asked to escort two HVO negotiators back from a

    16 cease-fire meeting, in which the United Nations was

    17 involved, back to the Hotel Vitez?

    18 A. Yes, I was.

    19 Q. Now, I think we should wait for the map so

    20 you can illustrate these events with the aid of a map.

    21 If you could take a moment to orient yourself

    22 on this aerial photograph. I believe there is a legend

    23 in the upper left-hand corner, if that's of

    24 assistance. Have you oriented yourself?

    25 A. Yes, I have. Thank you.

  40. 1 Q. First of all, perhaps it would be helpful if

    2 you point out the Hotel Vitez on Prosecutor's Exhibit

    3 45.

    4 A. This is the Hotel Vitez, here.

    5 Q. Marked as A on this exhibit? Hotel Vitez is

    6 marked as A on the exhibit?

    7 A. Yes. I can mention the letters if you like.

    8 Q. That would be helpful. First of all, how did

    9 you transport these two negotiators, HVO negotiators,

    10 back to the Hotel Vitez on the 17th of April, 1993?

    11 A. The two negotiators were put into the back of

    12 a Warrior, a British armoured fighting vehicle, at our

    13 headquarters, which is not on this photograph, over

    14 here. I got into the back with them, and with my

    15 interpreter.

    16 We drove the direct route to the, I think, I

    17 seem to remember driving the direct route through the

    18 old part of Vitez, here, up the main road, here. We're

    19 actually heading south-east, though it is upwards on

    20 this photograph. We stopped about here.

    21 Now, what you probably are not aware of is

    22 actually where I'm pointing to at the moment is a fuel

    23 station. At this time the fuel station wasn't

    24 functioning, but it is right in front of the hotel,

    25 here. The fuel station area and the hotel were

  41. 1 completely surrounded in barbed wire in a defensive

    2 style.

    3 Q. Let me ask you: Why was an armoured vehicle

    4 used to transport these two negotiators back to the

    5 Hotel Vitez on the 17th of April, 1993?

    6 A. There was a major war going on in Vitez at

    7 the time, a lot of shooting, a lot of fighting was

    8 happening in Vitez at the time, and it was considered

    9 too dangerous for us to travel around, for me to travel

    10 around in my Land Rover, which is how I normally

    11 travelled, and because we considered it our duty to take

    12 every precaution to protect the lives of the HVO

    13 negotiators.

    14 So we put them into an armoured fighting

    15 vehicle, a Warrior, which was the most secure mode of

    16 transport available to us.

    17 Q. How far were you able to go in the Warrior

    18 towards the Hotel Vitez?

    19 A. We stopped here, by the fuel station. We

    20 were probably, I should say about 50 yards from the,

    21 maybe slightly less, from the entrance of Hotel Vitez.

    22 Q. What happened?

    23 A. I told the driver of the vehicle to open the

    24 back door. It was an electrically controlled back

    25 door, and then I climbed out of the vehicle with my

  42. 1 interpreter, and then the two HVO officers climbed out

    2 with me.

    3 The back door closed. The vehicle stayed

    4 where it was, and I walked with the HVO officers to the

    5 front door of Hotel Vitez.

    6 Q. Can you indicate on the exhibit, Prosecutor's

    7 Exhibit 45, how you walked? In other words, where were

    8 you and in what direction or directions were you

    9 walking, the four of you, as you described?

    10 A. You would like me to point it out?

    11 Q. Yes, could you point it out, and the

    12 direction in which were you walking, if it can be seen?

    13 A. Okay. I think you will be able to see better

    14 here.

    15 This is the fuel station, and this is the

    16 front door of the hotel, here. The Warrior stopped

    17 about here, where in fact there's a vehicle already on

    18 this photograph. We stopped there, and we walked this

    19 way, south -- not south, down on the photograph, along

    20 to the right, here, following the line of the barbed

    21 wire, and up here, along this long straight, probably

    22 20 yards straight here to the entrance of the hotel,

    23 here.

    24 Q. How were you and your interpreter and the two

    25 HVO negotiators walking? Who was next to whom?

  43. 1 A. I was, if you can imagine, I'm on the right,

    2 here, I have an HVO officer immediately to my left,

    3 another HVO officer to his left, and my interpreter, a

    4 girl, to the left of that. We were walking, what we

    5 would call four abreast, 1, 2, 3, 4, in a straight

    6 line, walking this way towards the hotel.

    7 Q. Was that on purpose, to, if you will,

    8 sandwich the two negotiators in between the two

    9 UNPROFOR personnel?

    10 A. Not necessarily. I was concerned to stay as

    11 close to the HVO officers as I could, but it was just

    12 the most natural way to walk.

    13 Q. What happened?

    14 A. At this point here, we were now moving

    15 upwards, if you like, at this point here, two yards

    16 before we turned to go into the door of the hotel, two

    17 shots rang out from behind us.

    18 Q. Was anyone hit?

    19 A. Yes, both HVO officers were hit. One was hit

    20 in the hand and the other one was hit in the backside.

    21 Q. Were you able to tell the direction from

    22 which these two shots were fired and if so, can you

    23 indicate on the map?

    24 A. On the photograph here, the shot came from

    25 directly behind us, the two shots, in very quick

  44. 1 succession, came from directly behind us in this

    2 direction down here.

    3 Q. Can you point with the chopstick you're

    4 holding, the direction, perhaps with your hand at the

    5 origin of the fire and the end of the chopstick in the

    6 direction that these two rounds headed?

    7 A. If I point like that, where my fingers, my

    8 fingers indicate where we were, and the stick is

    9 pointing to the direction that the rounds came from.

    10 Q. What is that at the lower end of the

    11 chopstick, where you're indicating below the Hotel

    12 Vitez? What area is that and under whose control was

    13 it at the time?

    14 A. Well, I wasn't entirely certain as to which

    15 buildings had been captured by which side, but

    16 subsequently, I learned this area was controlled by the

    17 Bosnian army.

    18 Q. From that area, was there a field of vision

    19 to the location where the two negotiators were shot?

    20 A. Yes, there was.

    21 Q. Were you able to tell whether two shots were

    22 fired from the same weapon or two different weapons?

    23 A. No, I couldn't say for certain, but the

    24 impression I had at the time was it was probably two

    25 separate weapons, because of the very quick succession

  45. 1 between the rounds.

    2 Of course it could have been fired from one

    3 weapon, an automatic, but I think it is unlikely, but I

    4 can never be certain, because of the accuracy with

    5 which they fired.

    6 The person firing or the people firing took a

    7 great risk at that range not to hit me, as a member of

    8 the United Nations, or my interpreter, who was also

    9 dressed as United Nations, she had a blue barrier on as

    10 well. We were so close, I believe it was probably two

    11 separate snipers.

    12 Q. From a sniper rifle is it possible to fire

    13 two shots in as close a succession as these two shots

    14 were?

    15 A. I'm not sure. I believe that most sniper

    16 rifles have to be loaded, each round has to be loaded

    17 separately. Of course, there could be automatically

    18 loading sniper rifles that I'm not aware of.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: This would be a convenient

    20 breaking point, Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: All right, this will be the

    22 time for the break, I suggest we resume at 3.00 and we

    23 will meet from 3.00 to 6.00. We will resume at 3.00.

    24 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.02 p.m.


  46. 1 --- On resuming at 3.07 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing will now resume.

    3 Have the accused brought in, please.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Then have the witness brought

    6 in.

    7 (The witness entered court)

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman?

    9 MR. HAYMAN: Thank you, Mr. President.

    10 Q. Good afternoon. I would like to move now to

    11 the 18th of April, 1993. On or after that date did you

    12 have occasion to visit the site of a large explosion in

    13 Stari Vitez?

    14 A. Yes, I did.

    15 Q. Do you recall how long after the explosion it

    16 was that you visited?

    17 A. No, I don't remember the date, but I would

    18 say it was probably about a week or so after the

    19 event.

    20 Q. On the occasion of your visit to the scene,

    21 did you witness the recovery of any bodies from the

    22 wreckage of a building?

    23 A. Yes, I did.

    24 Q. Was the international press present?

    25 A. Yes, there was the largest collection of

  47. 1 international media and television cameras that I ever

    2 saw in Bosnia.

    3 Q. Can you describe what you saw on this

    4 occasion?

    5 A. Yes. The very large truck bomb which had

    6 exploded in Stari Vitez had destroyed or taken the

    7 roofs off something in the order of 40 houses, and many

    8 of the houses were very badly damaged. The object of

    9 this particular day was for us to provide -- us as

    10 UNPROFOR, to provide security, in other words, using

    11 our Warriors to protect the local workers in the town

    12 who were going to work on one house which they believed

    13 had people trapped inside it.

    14 Q. Was a recovery operation undertaken?

    15 A. Yes. The British Royal Engineers assisted

    16 the local soldiers to slowly, piece by piece, remove

    17 the stones from the collapsed building so they could

    18 get to the people inside that had been crushed when the

    19 building fell over.

    20 Q. Was anyone found?

    21 A. Yes, there were. We had been told there were

    22 some civilians caught inside the building. The

    23 reality, of course, when we dismantled the building and

    24 got to the bodies inside, there were actually three

    25 armed and uniformed soldiers who had been killed in the

  48. 1 explosion, and as the house collapsed, were crushed

    2 under the rubble.

    3 Q. What happened when these bodies were found

    4 and recovered?

    5 A. The locals who were doing most of the work

    6 were very anxious that the media that were filming all

    7 this, and all the media were on one side of the house,

    8 behind some white tape which we had erected. They were

    9 anxious that the media did not see the weapons coming

    10 out of the house. So as the bodies were lifted out of

    11 the house, the weapons were hidden in coats and carried

    12 off to the back, out of view of the media.

    13 Q. Did you see what kind of weapons they were?

    14 A. They were just the standard issue

    15 Kalashnikov.

    16 Q. Automatic rifles?

    17 A. Automatic rifles.

    18 Q. Did you attribute any significance to the

    19 concealment of these weapons from the press present at

    20 the scene?

    21 A. No, this was perfectly normal. I didn't

    22 speak to the press about this. We considered ourselves

    23 to be beyond telling the press this type of, if you

    24 like, secret, but it was perfectly normal. All sides

    25 probably, but certainly both sides, were very skilful

  49. 1 in their manipulation of the media.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: If I could have the usher's

    3 assistance in handing out a document, please.

    4 The document, Mr. President, consists of two

    5 pages. It is in English.

    6 THE REGISTRAR: This is D421.

    7 MR. HAYMAN:

    8 Q. When you get this document, if you could look

    9 at it and tell us whether you recognise it.

    10 A. Yes, I recognise this document.

    11 Q. What is it?

    12 A. This is a translation of a document produced

    13 in Travnik by Colonel Filipovic and Colonel Alagic,

    14 relating to a meeting which had taken place, an

    15 agreement which had been reached between

    16 Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban on the 18th of April.

    17 Q. The 18th of April, 1993?

    18 A. That's correct.

    19 Q. Did you obtain this document on or about the

    20 19th of April, 1993, which is the date in the first

    21 line?

    22 A. Yes. Probably the 19th, but it may have

    23 been -- this translation may have been given to me the

    24 following day.

    25 Q. Do you know who made the translation?

  50. 1 A. It was made in the interpreter's office of

    2 the British base, so it would have been one of our --

    3 judging by the writing, I think probably one of our

    4 local interpreters.

    5 Q. Did you provide this document to me prior to

    6 your testimony?

    7 A. Yes, I did.

    8 Q. Were you able to locate a copy of the B/S/C

    9 original of this document?

    10 A. No. That would be held in the British

    11 archive.

    12 Q. Mr. President, I won't read the whole

    13 document, but I'd like to read, perhaps, the

    14 introduction and the first paragraph or two. It is

    15 titled "Notice," and begins, "On the day of 19 April,

    16 1993, a meeting was held in Travnik between the

    17 commands of the HVO and the BiH army regarding the

    18 practical realisation of the documents signed and

    19 agreed on by Mr. A. Izetbegovic and Mr. M. Boban on 18

    20 April, 1993.

    21 Following the order of this document and

    22 facing the danger of the common enemy, the two commands

    23 have decided to inform the complete Travnik public

    24 about the following: One, the HVO and BiH army

    25 commands will undertake all measures and means at their

  51. 1 disposal, and those include force, to protect Croat and

    2 Muslim people against any possible clashes and attacks

    3 by extreme forces and orientations.

    4 Two, in this context, all forces erecting

    5 non-negotiated or self-decided barricades or checkpoints,

    6 and those mistreating the population will be prevented

    7 from doing that.

    8 The initiators and realisers of such

    9 activities will be forced to go to the front-line

    10 against the common enemy. This also stands for those

    11 who prowl the town with rifles without executing their

    12 professional duty. This matter will be regulated by a

    13 separate order."

    14 I'll read one more paragraph: "Three, the

    15 two commands resolutely demand that the civil

    16 government immediately put its authority and functions

    17 into the service of peacekeeping and protection of all

    18 population, public order and peace, and that they do

    19 not contribute in any way towards negative development

    20 of this situation."

    21 It continues, Mr. President, in paragraph

    22 four to talk about public information and the

    23 regulation of unconfirmed information being released to

    24 the public. The remaining paragraphs discuss other

    25 matters along this same vein.

  52. 1 My question is: In your view, did this joint

    2 statement or notice by Commander Filipovic and

    3 Commander Alagic, did it reflect the sincere desires of

    4 both commanders of the HVO and BH army in Travnik to

    5 implement and support the agreement of 18 April, 1993

    6 between Messrs. Izetbegovic and Boban?

    7 A. Yes. Yes, it did.

    8 Q. Based on your first-hand involvement and

    9 knowledge of the conflict in Central Bosnia from

    10 October 1992 until May of 1993, can you tell the Court,

    11 in your opinion, what was the degree of command and

    12 control that existed within the HVO in Central Bosnia?

    13 A. It was very difficult for us to make an

    14 assessment of the command and control that Colonel

    15 Blaskic exercised over the HVO in middle Bosnia. We

    16 did not have the detailed information about the

    17 workings of the HVO headquarters in Vitez, but we did

    18 learn of many incidents from which it appeared that the

    19 chain of command was flimsy, and overall we felt

    20 that -- well, I feel now, and I probably felt then,

    21 that the chain of command was poor.

    22 Q. When you say, "We did not have the detailed

    23 information about the workings of the headquarters,"

    24 what are you referring to?

    25 A. We did not know about and did not ask about

  53. 1 the structure of the headquarters, and we did not -- of

    2 the staff, of the equipment that was in the

    3 headquarters, and we did not have access, for very

    4 obvious reasons, to combat orders, orders issued by the

    5 various headquarters. But we did have access to and

    6 were frequently involved with orders for cease-fires.

    7 Q. Before you get to that, you say that

    8 generally you believe command and control in the HVO,

    9 in the Central Bosnia Operative Zone during your tour

    10 of duty was poor; is that correct?

    11 A. That's correct.

    12 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Can he just use

    13 another word but "flimsy"? Can you describe it

    14 better?

    15 A. "Weak," Your Honour.

    16 JUDGE RIAD: He couldn't reach his

    17 subordinates?

    18 A. The word "flimsy," by that I mean weak, that

    19 it was not a strong chain of command.

    20 MR. HAYMAN:

    21 Q. Can you tell us why that was the case if you

    22 know specifically, or why you believe that to be the

    23 case if you don't have direct information concerning

    24 the internal workings of the HVO in Central Bosnia at

    25 the time?

  54. 1 A. The indicators that tended for us to believe

    2 that this was the case were the poor quality of the

    3 officers who were commanding that we came across, and

    4 indeed the poor quality of the soldiers. We didn't

    5 know a great deal about the communications, but what we

    6 knew was that it was of poor quality, but possibly

    7 the strongest indicator was that we knew that the small

    8 units we came across on the ground were -- their

    9 loyalties were quite often different from what we would

    10 expect within a military structure. Their loyalties

    11 were -- I mentioned this yesterday, but their loyalties

    12 were with respect to local politicians and figures.

    13 There was a great deal of criminal activity and

    14 profiteering conducted by armed uniformed gangs.

    15 Q. You said that poor quality of officers

    16 contributed to poor command and control by General

    17 Blaskic, then Colonel Blaskic. Which officers are you

    18 referring to, officers in general or which officers?

    19 A. My particular knowledge, my expert knowledge,

    20 is in relation to the brigade level of command. They

    21 were the officers that I dealt with the most.

    22 Generally, across the board, the brigade

    23 level of command was -- the people who held those

    24 positions, those ranks, were of poor quality certainly

    25 when compared with a standard British army officer.

  55. 1 Q. If Exhibit D418 could be provided to the

    2 witness, and folded so that the Travnik/Novi Travnik

    3 area is visible on the ELMO, please. It's a JNA map.

    4 We used it yesterday. It's the Zenica 3 series map.

    5 There were two of them.

    6 If we could place that on the ELMO so the

    7 circled location is visible, please. Zoom back just a

    8 touch, please, if the technical booth could. Very

    9 good. Thank you.

    10 What I would ask now, Mr. Whatley, is you've

    11 told us that you believe the command and control that

    12 Colonel Blaskic was able to exercise was poor. Can you

    13 think of a particular example that might illustrate

    14 this for the Court, and please use the map if it's

    15 helpful.

    16 A. I was talking a moment ago about the brigade

    17 level of command, but a much more easily understood

    18 example of where the chain of command was not

    19 functioning properly was in relation to checkpoints,

    20 and I'm now going to, with your permission, go into

    21 some detail about an incident that took place at one

    22 particular checkpoint.

    23 The date of this incident I cannot remember,

    24 but I believe it was either March or April '93. If I

    25 could ask you to look at the map here. This is the

  56. 1 town of Travnik, and the road that comes out of Travnik

    2 this way goes down here towards Vitez and the British

    3 base, and this road junction here, which was a critical

    4 road junction, goes south through Novi Travnik and then

    5 down eventually to Gornji Vakuf and Croatia.

    6 Q. You are referring to the road junction that

    7 is circled with a black circle?

    8 A. That's correct, this road junction here.

    9 From the day we arrived to the day we left

    10 and for a long time after, this road junction was the

    11 scene of an HVO roadblock, and the size of the

    12 roadblock would -- in other words, the number of

    13 weapons and people at this roadblock would go up or

    14 down depending on the tension and the situation in the

    15 local area and in middle Bosnia generally. This was a

    16 critical roadblock to the HVO.

    17 All our resupply and all our convoys coming

    18 up from Croatia went through that roadblock, and all

    19 aid agencies and UNHCR agencies coming to middle

    20 Bosnia, almost all, came through that junction and that

    21 roadblock as well.

    22 Quite often we would provide a Warrior escort

    23 to aid agencies. This was part of our mandate, and

    24 nearly all convoys, and aid agencies and UNHCR convoys

    25 were escorted by our soldiers in Warrior fighting

  57. 1 vehicles.

    2 On one particular occasion, I was not at the

    3 checkpoint, I was in my Land Rover somewhere else, and

    4 I received a radio message to go to this checkpoint

    5 because there was a problem. The details of the

    6 problem were not given to me over the radio, but when I

    7 arrived at the checkpoint it became obvious what had

    8 happened.

    9 A British platoon, that is four Warrior

    10 vehicles commanded by an officer was escorting a large

    11 UNHCR aid convoy. The convoy, which was an UNHCR, in

    12 other words, United Nations sponsored convoy with an

    13 UNPROFOR escort, had been stopped by the HVO Military

    14 Police at this junction.

    15 I made an assessment of what the situation

    16 was. I spoke to the British commander of the convoy

    17 first. I then asked the UNHCR representative to show

    18 me some paperwork to confirm, in my mind, that this was

    19 the correct convoy, that it was an United Nations High

    20 Commissioner for Refugees convoy, and then I went to

    21 speak to the HVO commander at the checkpoint, the

    22 Military Police in charge.

    23 Q. Let me interrupt. How could you tell that

    24 the Military Police of the HVO were manning this

    25 checkpoint?

  58. 1 A. We knew very well in advance who was manning

    2 which checkpoint, but they were dressed in HVO uniforms

    3 with HVO badges on their arms, HVO cap badges on their

    4 caps. They were Military Police which could be told by

    5 them wearing white belts and white cross-straps,

    6 vertical straps.

    7 The checkpoint was very well reinforced with

    8 sandbags and RPG, which is a rocket propelled grenade,

    9 which would take out -- if it hit the vehicle in the

    10 right place would take out a Warrior.

    11 I spoke to the military policeman in charge

    12 of the checkpoint, and I was with my interpreter, of

    13 course, and I said, "Why have you stopped this

    14 convoy?" He said, "There are Muslims in the convoy,

    15 and we don't want the convoy to come down this road."

    16 Now, it is true that some of the drivers of some of the

    17 trucks were locals. He said that he did not want the

    18 convoy to come down this road, and I said to him that

    19 whether he wanted it to come down this road or not,

    20 this was an U.N. Convoy with a British escort, and the

    21 convoy was going to come through this checkpoint and it

    22 was going to Zenica, to the UNHCR main warehouse for

    23 middle Bosnia. He said, "No way at all."

    24 I went outside and I spoke to the platoon

    25 commander and I told him, the British platoon

  59. 1 commander, and I told him to reposition his Warriors,

    2 take them off the road, put them on the ground around,

    3 point all the barrels of the main weapons at the

    4 checkpoint and be prepared to destroy the checkpoint on

    5 my orders.

    6 I then went back into the checkpoint and

    7 spoke to the checkpoint commander again, the Croat. I

    8 said to him, "Have you got a telephone here?" He said,

    9 "Yes." So we called -- I had my notebook full of

    10 telephone numbers, which I have here, and I called

    11 directly to Colonel Blaskic's office, and he knew my

    12 voice. I identified myself over the telephone to him,

    13 although I couldn't speak Serbo-Croat, and of course,

    14 he couldn't speak English. I then gave the telephone

    15 receiver to my interpreter, and through her I explained

    16 where I was and that this HVO checkpoint had illegally

    17 stopped a British and United Nations convoy. He told

    18 me that the checkpoint was acting contrary to orders,

    19 and that he would tell the checkpoint commander that

    20 himself. The interpreter then gave the hand-set of the

    21 telephone to the checkpoint commander, and the

    22 interpreter then translated the half of the

    23 conversation that she could hear.

    24 I can't remember the details, but basically

    25 the checkpoint commander ended up swearing at Colonel

  60. 1 Blaskic and telling him that, I won't use the words,

    2 but they weren't polite, and he ended up slamming the

    3 phone down on him, and the checkpoint commander was

    4 very angry. I could only deduce that the checkpoint

    5 commander had been ordered to let the convoy through.

    6 Q. In return, he had done what?

    7 A. He had apparently sworn at his commander and

    8 slammed the phone down on him. I don't know if he

    9 refused to let the convoy through.

    10 Q. What did he do after the phone call was

    11 completed and he hung up on Colonel Blaskic?

    12 A. I then said to him that if he did not let the

    13 convoy through as he had been ordered to, and as he

    14 knew he should, that I would ensure that his checkpoint

    15 was destroyed and could never interfere with us again.

    16 He knew I was serious. He knew me because I had been

    17 to that checkpoint many times.

    18 I then got into my Land Rover and drove 200

    19 or 300 metres down the road. I then gave an order to

    20 the British commander of the Warrior, an order which is

    21 well documented in the battalion radio operator's log,

    22 that when I give the instruction for the convoy to

    23 move, if anyone from the HVO interrupts that convoy, he

    24 is to destroy the checkpoint.

    25 Luckily that wasn't required and the convoy

  61. 1 was not interrupted from that point.

    2 Q. After the phone call between the checkpoint

    3 commander and Colonel Blaskic was concluded, did the

    4 checkpoint commander allow the convoy to pass at that

    5 point?

    6 A. Not straight away. I continued to argue for

    7 a minute or two, and then I explained to him that these

    8 Warriors outside were going to kill him if he did not

    9 let the convoy through.

    10 Q. You've described the level of command and

    11 control that Colonel Blaskic had in your view,

    12 generally, over the HVO and Central Bosnia as poor, and

    13 you've given an example concerning convoys and this

    14 very important checkpoint at the Novi Travnik

    15 T-junction.

    16 Can we perhaps go to another level of detail

    17 or specificity, and I would ask you in that regard, can

    18 you give the Court your assessment of the degree of

    19 command and control that Colonel Blaskic had over HVO

    20 forces in the Central Bosnia Operative Zone,

    21 specifically, with respect to combat activity, not with

    22 respect to checkpoints or shining boots or something

    23 else, but combat activity.

    24 The use of weapons or the failure to use in

    25 combat, what was his level of command and control with

  62. 1 respect to such activity?

    2 A. We never knew. We had no access to combat

    3 orders. We had no access to knowledge about the

    4 intentions of the HVO or the Bosnian army, what they

    5 were going to attack.

    6 Where we drew most of our conclusions on this

    7 matter, from the point of view of written orders and

    8 failing to obey orders, was in the realms of

    9 cease-fires.

    10 We were frequently involved with the

    11 cease-fire agreements. Many of these cease-fire

    12 agreements were signed by Colonel Blaskic, himself.

    13 These were local and regional cease-fires, and because

    14 we were BRITBAT, because we were the United Nations and

    15 because of our close liaison with the warring factions,

    16 this is after April the 16th, we were frequently

    17 involved with attempting to monitor the cease-fires, to

    18 supervise the cease-fires, to confirm neutrally that

    19 both sides had implemented their part of the bargain,

    20 their part of the agreement, whether it was forces

    21 withdrawing some distance from a given line, or whether

    22 it was -- many examples I can't think of at the

    23 moment.

    24 We were constantly involved in monitoring and

    25 supervising cease-fires, which were written orders

  63. 1 issued from the respective headquarters on both sides.

    2 What we found, generally, was that on both

    3 sides, cease-fires were very badly implemented, if at

    4 all. Quite often an order to cease-fire at a

    5 particular time, and one of our call signs, one of our

    6 Warriors would go along to that particular area at the

    7 time and there would be no reduction in shooting.

    8 Forces were meant to withdraw to certain lines and

    9 there would be no withdrawing of forces and no filling

    10 in of trenches. There was outright refusal on

    11 occasions to respond to any of these orders.

    12 Q. How then, overall, would you characterise,

    13 based on the information that you did have, the level

    14 of, the degree of command and control over combat

    15 activity or the failure to initiate or engage in combat

    16 activity that Colonel Blaskic had in the Central

    17 Bosnian region at the time you were there?

    18 A. The level of command and control would have

    19 to be described as poor, when compared with what I

    20 would be used to.

    21 Q. Specifically, with respect to combat type

    22 activity?

    23 A. I've already explained about combat activity,

    24 but military activity, checkpoint, cease-fires, failing

    25 to respond to written and verbal orders.

  64. 1 Q. The opinions you have given concerning the

    2 poor level of command and control within the HVO from

    3 the Operative Zone headquarters in Central Bosnia

    4 during your tour of service, was this opinion shared by

    5 others in the British Battalion at the time?

    6 A. It was certainly shared by Bob Stewart, the

    7 commanding officer, and it was certainly shared by the

    8 other liaison officers. Generally I didn't discuss

    9 such matters with other people in the battalion, so I

    10 cannot speak for them.

    11 MR. HAYMAN: If we could bring Exhibit 29

    12 back around in front of the easel, with the usher's

    13 assistance. We're going to play a short videotape in a

    14 moment, Mr. President, but I would like to identify

    15 what I believe is the location of the events on the

    16 videotape before we play the tape.

    17 We don't need to actually put it up.

    18 Perhaps, I can even come over and hold it up.

    19 Q. On this large map, Exhibit 29, are you able

    20 to point out the location of Kasagici on this map? I

    21 would direct your attention to the Kiseljak

    22 municipality.

    23 A. Here.

    24 Q. If you could step back. First, could you

    25 indicate perhaps Busovaca and Kiseljak by way of

  65. 1 orientation? Where is Busovaca?

    2 A. This is Busovaca, here, and this is the town

    3 of Kiseljak, down here. The village in question,

    4 Kasagici, is here, on the north side of the road.

    5 Q. Thank you. Was Kasagici within the Central

    6 Bosnian Operative Zone of the HVO?

    7 A. Yes, I believe it was.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: We have a short tape from the

    9 British Broadcasting Corporation, Mr. President, and I

    10 would ask that the lights be dimmed and that it be

    11 played at this time. It's approximately three minutes

    12 in length.

    13 (Videotape played)

    14 MR. HAYMAN: May we pause the tape? The

    15 date, Mr. President, it's a little difficult to see,

    16 but it's toward the top, 28 April, 1993. Perhaps if

    17 you could rewind the tape for just three or four

    18 seconds, and then continue it.

    19 (Videotape played)

    20 JUDGE JORDA: I more or less understand, but

    21 I would have preferred to have interpretation.

    22 MR. HAYMAN: Can we have a French

    23 interpretation?

    24 JUDGE JORDA: I always show indulgence toward

    25 the interpreters. I have a general understanding, but

  66. 1 I would like to try to get more of the details,

    2 please.

    3 MR. HAYMAN: I can say, Mr. President, there

    4 will be a brief interview with Colonel Robert Stewart,

    5 and that would be the most critical portion to be

    6 translated, if it could be. Perhaps, if it's

    7 difficult, I don't remember how quickly he is speaking,

    8 we can play that very short segment more than once.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you very much,

    10 Mr. Hayman, but I'm sure the interpreters will do their

    11 best, and then my learned colleagues will help me, too,

    12 if I miss one of the nuances in the cassette. Go

    13 ahead.

    14 (Videotape played)

    15 MR. HAYMAN: We can stop the tape there,

    16 please. That's the segment we wish to play,

    17 Mr. President. We can turn the lights back on.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: I would like to thank the

    19 interpreters.

    20 MR. HAYMAN:

    21 Q. Mr. Whatley, the situation described by your

    22 commanding officer in Bosnia, Colonel Stewart, of local

    23 forces acting wholly independent of a cease-fire order

    24 by their headquarters, is that a situation that you

    25 learned of repeatedly during your tour of duty?

  67. 1 A. Yes, it was.

    2 Q. Was the HVO in Central Bosnia characterised

    3 by a comprehensive chain of command?

    4 A. That's not a military way of describing a

    5 chain of command, but the chain of command did not

    6 function well, and I think I've given you some examples

    7 as to why we believed that.

    8 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic have a firm grip on HVO

    9 troops in the Lasva Valley and full control of all

    10 local commanders?

    11 A. As I understood it, as we believed at the

    12 time, command and control was poor.

    13 Q. To your knowledge, was the British Battalion

    14 aware whether Colonel Blaskic undertook or initiated

    15 any investigation of the events in Ahmici in the middle

    16 of April, 1993?

    17 A. I'm unaware of that.

    18 Q. You're unaware of what?

    19 A. Whether he did or not, it was not something

    20 that I knew about.

    21 Q. Do you agree or disagree with the statement,

    22 the following statement: "The attack on Ahmici could

    23 not have occurred without the authority and order of

    24 Colonel Blaskic, due to the number of troops involved

    25 and the scale of the attack."

  68. 1 A. I disagree. That statement assumes that all

    2 attacks would have to be ordered by Blaskic, and I

    3 think that the command and control that existed at the

    4 time means it is probably not the case, almost

    5 certainly not the case.

    6 Q. In the days following the 16th of April,

    7 1993, what were your duties? Were your duties changed?

    8 A. Yes, the situation in my area of

    9 responsibility, an area which I described to you

    10 yesterday, became quite intensive, and so, another

    11 captain was brought down, another liaison officer was

    12 transferred from Tuzla back to Vitez to support me, and

    13 I was, and he took on the responsibility for the town

    14 of Vitez, and I was tasked to spend all my time in

    15 Travnik and Novi Travnik in an attempt to ensure that a

    16 Muslim Croat war did not start in either of those two

    17 towns.

    18 The exact date that this happened, I cannot

    19 remember, but it was sometime after the 16th of April,

    20 1993.

    21 Q. During your service and your tour of duty in

    22 Central Bosnia, were you aware whether Colonel Blaskic

    23 had access to a helicopter to use to move around?

    24 A. I'm not aware during my tour that any

    25 helicopters flew into Vitez.

  69. 1 Q. During your tour of duty did the British

    2 Battalion track the movement of HVO artillery pieces?

    3 A. I know we were not in the habit of tracking

    4 the movement of any artillery pieces or tanks. We did

    5 know the whereabouts of one, you could say permanently

    6 stationed large artillery piece, and that was, I could

    7 indicate it on the map, if you like.

    8 Q. If you can describe the location, that will

    9 be adequate.

    10 A. It was within about half a kilometre of our

    11 base. It was in a quarry near Mali Mosulj, and we

    12 never saw this artillery piece, but we knew it was.

    13 There, it was guarded, and I did make one attempt to

    14 visit it to confirm what type of piece it was, but we

    15 were denied access.

    16 Colonel Bob Stewart did not want to

    17 antagonise the situation by forcing our way into their

    18 military positions, which was not our policy.

    19 They told us it was a 203 millimetre gun.

    20 That was never confirmed. We knew that one was there,

    21 and to the best of my knowledge that one did not move

    22 from that location.

    23 Throughout the rest of our area of

    24 responsibility, if we saw artillery moving or firing,

    25 or we saw tanks, then that would be reported. But, no,

  70. 1 we did not track them and we did not follow them.

    2 Q. Was it obvious to British Battalion artillery

    3 experts that Serb artillery on the Vlasic feature was

    4 not in range of Zenica?

    5 A. I don't know what you mean by British army

    6 artillery experts in Vitez. We had no members of the

    7 Royal Artillery, to the best of my knowledge, to answer

    8 that first half of the question.

    9 The second half of the question relates to

    10 the Serb artillery being in range of Zenica.

    11 Throughout my tour, towards the ends of '92 and the

    12 beginning of '93, the Serbs, the VRS, did drop

    13 artillery shells onto Zenica, and onto many other

    14 towns, as well, including Travnik and Zepce.

    15 Q. Did you see any units or officers of the army

    16 of the Republic of Croatia or the HV in the Lasva or

    17 Kiseljak valleys during your tour of duty?

    18 A. No, I did not. We were constantly hearing

    19 rumours of the presence of the Croatian army, the army

    20 of the Republic of Croatia, or the HV, were in Bosnia

    21 and Herzegovina. We were always hearing these

    22 rumours. But I never saw them. No one else that I can

    23 remember ever saw them in the Lasva Valley or in

    24 Kiseljak.

    25 The only occasion I ever saw an HV badge was

  71. 1 in -- I visited a bar with an HVO commander on one

    2 occasion, and one of his bodyguards had an HVO badge on

    3 one arm, and on the other arm had an HV badge which had

    4 been held on with a safety pin. That's the only

    5 occasion I ever saw an HV badge in my area of

    6 responsibility.

    7 Q. Do you recall a specific rumour at one point

    8 in your tour of duty that there was an HV unit in Novi

    9 Travnik?

    10 A. This was spoken about. We did a little bit

    11 of investigating, and the only outsiders we found in

    12 Novi Travnik was an outside unit that had come from

    13 Mostar, I believe.

    14 Q. An outside unit of what army, what force?

    15 A. It was an HVO unit that had come from Mostar

    16 that I was aware of in Novi Travnik.

    17 Q. When you met with the BH army commanders in

    18 Vitez and/or Kruscica on the night of the 15th of

    19 April, 1993, did they suggest in any way, or did

    20 anything they did suggest to you that they were

    21 distracted or preoccupied with events in Srebrenica to

    22 the east?

    23 A. No, Srebrenica never became a topic of

    24 conversation at all, on that day.

    25 MR. HAYMAN: Mr. President, I would like to

  72. 1 offer certain exhibits to be admitted into evidence. I

    2 believe they are D414, 415, 415A, 416, 417, 417A, 418,

    3 419, 420, 421, and a portion of the tape we played,

    4 which I believe will be marked as Defence Exhibit 422.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Have you concluded your

    6 examination-in-chief, Mr. Hayman?

    7 MR. HAYMAN: If there is no objection to the

    8 exhibits and they are admitted.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: There is no objection.

    10 MR. HAYMAN: Then I have concluded my direct

    11 examination. Thank you.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Hayman. I want

    13 to compliment you at the same time for having made

    14 efforts to be as concise as you can in the questions

    15 that you asked.

    16 Now, let me turn to the Prosecutor. Will it

    17 be Mr. Harmon?

    18 MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President, it will be.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Mr. Whatley, you

    20 are now going to be asked questions by the Office of

    21 the Prosecutor as part of the cross-examination, and

    22 following that the Judges will ask you questions which

    23 they wish to ask. Mr. Harmon, the floor is yours.

    24 Examined by Mr. Harmon:

    25 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

  73. 1 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, good afternoon.

    2 A. Good afternoon.

    3 Q. Sir, who was your commanding officer while

    4 you were in the Cheshire Regiment?

    5 A. Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart.

    6 Q. The second in command of the Cheshire

    7 Regiment was whom?

    8 A. For the first four-and-a-half or five months

    9 it was Major Tim Park, and then from, for about three

    10 months it was Major Brian Watters.

    11 Q. Do you know Lieutenant Colonel Martin Thomas?

    12 A. Yes, he was a major at the time, and he

    13 commanded a company that moved, but spent quite a lot

    14 of time in Vitez.

    15 Q. Those three officers, Colonel Stewart,

    16 Lieutenant Colonel Brian Watters and Lieutenant Colonel

    17 Martin Thomas are officers who had far more experience

    18 than you in the British army; is that correct?

    19 A. That is correct.

    20 Q. Those three officers, correct me if I'm

    21 wrong, but those three officers have all had posts at

    22 battalion levels and commanded battalion level

    23 operations; is that correct?

    24 A. At what stage?

    25 Q. At any stage in their career, sir.

  74. 1 A. Well, subsequently, yes, but at the time in

    2 question, Colonel Bob Stewart was the only one of those

    3 officers to have had any experience in commanding a

    4 battalion.

    5 Q. Brian Watters has subsequently taken command

    6 of the Cheshire Regiment; am I correct?

    7 A. Of the first battalion.

    8 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Martin Thomas has also

    9 taken battalion level command in respect of the

    10 Cheshire Regiment?

    11 A. That is correct.

    12 Q. Now you arrived in Bosnia on the 18th of

    13 October.

    14 A. 1992.

    15 Q. 1992. You subsequently drove through the

    16 town of Prozor, as you described in your direct

    17 examination.

    18 A. Yes, I did.

    19 Q. How many times did you travel through Prozor?

    20 A. In the whole of my tour?

    21 Q. That's correct?

    22 A. Certainly, probably five or six times.

    23 Q. The first time you drove through was

    24 approximately the 18th of October, 1992?

    25 A. That is correct.

  75. 1 Q. Your testimony on direct examination, was, as

    2 I recall, that the situation in Prozor was quite

    3 tense.

    4 A. Yes, that's correct.

    5 Q. Now, are you aware that approximately a week

    6 later the HVO attacked the city of Prozor and the

    7 Muslims were driven from that location?

    8 A. Yes, I am.

    9 Q. In fact, sir, the Muslims were ethnically

    10 cleansed from Prozor; am I correct on that?

    11 A. That is correct.

    12 Q. Now, did that --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Try to speak a little bit more

    14 slowly. You're both speaking the same language, and it

    15 is not always easy to distinguish between the question

    16 and the answer. Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.

    17 MR. HARMON:

    18 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, we both speak the same

    19 language, if you would pause briefly after I ask the

    20 question to allow the interpreters time to interpret

    21 for the Judges and the gallery, everyone would be

    22 appreciative.

    23 Now, did the ethnic cleansing of Prozor that

    24 occurred in October 1992 cause an increase in tensions

    25 in Central Bosnia?

  76. 1 A. Yes, it did.

    2 Q. Please tell the Judges how and why.

    3 A. The problem with what happened in Prozor was

    4 that it resulted in the collapse of the defence of the

    5 town of Jajce. Jajce is, unfortunately, not on this

    6 map here. Jajce is well to the west of this map.

    7 At about the time we're talking, the town of

    8 Jajce was jointly defended by the HVO and the Bosnian

    9 army. But the problems in Prozor that we're talking

    10 about, which were not unique in Prozor, there were a

    11 lot of problems in other towns, as well, at the time,

    12 resulted in a loss of confidence in the defence of

    13 Jajce, because the HVO and the Bosnian army that were

    14 defending Jajce together knew their families back in

    15 the other towns like Prozor were involved in a war

    16 against the families of the soldiers they were jointly

    17 defending Jajce with.

    18 Consequently, there was a loss of morale and

    19 a loss of confidence in Jajce, and the Serbs took Jajce

    20 very quickly. The result was a huge convoy, an almost

    21 endless convoy, and it was one of the saddest things,

    22 of refugees leaving the town with whatever they could

    23 get their hands on and heading east towards the town of

    24 Travnik.

    25 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, let me focus exclusively

  77. 1 on the effect of the ethnic cleansing of Mostar on the

    2 Muslim community in Central Bosnia.

    3 Did the ethnic cleansing of Prozor cause

    4 alarm in Travnik, in Novi Travnik, in Vitez, in

    5 Busovaca, in Kiseljak and in Zepce?

    6 A. Are you talking about Prozor? I thought you

    7 said Mostar. You're talking about Mostar.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: You said Mostar.

    9 MR. HARMON:

    10 Q. We will come to Mostar in a few minutes.

    11 Let's stay with Prozor for a minute. Tell us, please,

    12 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the effect on the Muslim community

    13 in the municipalities which I just identified, the

    14 effect of the ethnic cleansing of Prozor.

    15 A. The effects of the ethnic cleansing in Prozor

    16 was the collapse of Jajce. The effect of the collapse

    17 of Jajce, if I may continue, was that the towns of

    18 Travnik and Vitez and Novi Travnik and other towns in

    19 Central Bosnia became even more full of refugees.

    20 The ethnic balances were further displaced. That was

    21 the most obvious affect to us.

    22 Q. Let me ask you then a less obvious effect to

    23 you, sir. Did the Muslims in the communities which

    24 I've identified become fearful and distrustful of the

    25 HVO as a result of the HVO ethnically cleansing Muslims

  78. 1 from Prozor?

    2 A. Yes. I think it was probably more difficult

    3 to maintain the alliance, yes.

    4 Q. Now, in Prozor, you had been through there a

    5 number of times --

    6 A. I must say I'm not trying to be evasive here,

    7 but what the Prosecutor is asking me is that was not

    8 how we saw it at the time. I'm trying to be as honest

    9 as I can here. What we saw at the time was a huge

    10 refugee problem, and a general decrease in the

    11 confidence between the two sides. We did not see alarm

    12 and panic because the overwhelming day-to-day functions

    13 of the HVO and the Bosnian army, at this time, were in

    14 the fight against the Serbs.

    15 Q. Your principle job, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, was

    16 to mingle, if you will, the communities where you were

    17 a liaison officer. You mingled with civilians, with

    18 representatives of the Bosnians, Muslims, the Bosnian

    19 Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. My question very

    20 directly to you --

    21 MR. HAYMAN: That's two questions,

    22 Mr. President. He's just stated a proposition and now

    23 he's asking a question. Let the witness answer whether

    24 the first statement is correct or not.

    25 MR. HARMON: Please, if I could ask the

  79. 1 question. If the witness is confused in some way, it's

    2 up to the witness --

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Let me remind everybody of the

    4 difficulty the interpreters have when they have to work

    5 under those circumstances. For me it's difficult as

    6 well. I'm not speaking for my colleagues but it's very

    7 difficult for me as well. I haven't heard the end of

    8 the question when the answer begins. Mr. Hayman is

    9 correct. Make your comment, but try to get to your

    10 first question directly and then ask your second one,

    11 and then in ten minutes we'll take our break. I would

    12 like to say that for the interpreters' sake.

    13 MR. HARMON:

    14 Q. Did I accurately state what your

    15 responsibilities were in part, to mingle with, and to

    16 understand, and to have your ear to the ground in

    17 respect of the military and civil leaders of the

    18 various ethnic groups in the area where you were a

    19 liaison officer?

    20 A. Yes, that is one way of describing my

    21 responsibilities. I didn't use the word "mingle," but

    22 yes, I had to deal primarily with the military

    23 commanders, and, secondly, the civilian leaders in my

    24 areas of responsibility.

    25 Q. Were the Muslim civilians, the civilian

  80. 1 leaders, and the military leaders more distrustful of

    2 the HVO as a result of the burning of houses in Prozor,

    3 as a result of the driving out of the Muslim civilian

    4 population, as a result of the ethnic cleansing that

    5 occurred in Prozor?

    6 A. Yes, I think that's quite an accurate way of

    7 describing it, yes.

    8 Q. Now, let me turn, if I can, very briefly to

    9 your responsibilities here as a liaison officer.

    10 Initially, when you arrived in Central Bosnia, you told

    11 us that your area of responsibility was from Maglaj to

    12 Zenica. Am I correct?

    13 A. That is correct, yes.

    14 Q. How long did you have those particular

    15 responsibilities in that area of operation? From what

    16 date to what date?

    17 A. I don't know exactly what date I was first

    18 sent up there or should I say when it was first decided

    19 I would have that responsibility. It would have

    20 been -- that decision was probably made in the first

    21 week of November 1992, and then I eventually

    22 relinquished or handed over that area in the first week

    23 of March 1993.

    24 Q. In between the 1st of November of 1992 and

    25 the first week of March of 1993, you took some leave

  81. 1 time, did you not?

    2 A. No -- yes, I did, sorry. I took two weeks'

    3 leave in January.

    4 Q. Did you also take a week's leave in late

    5 February or early March?

    6 A. No, I don't think I did. I don't remember

    7 it.

    8 Q. All right. Let me ask you -- now, in respect

    9 of the other areas where other liaison officers

    10 operated, Captain Martin Foregrave was responsible

    11 during that time frame for Travnik, Novi Travnik and

    12 Busovaca; is that correct?

    13 A. Yes, with me as his shadow.

    14 Q. Tell me what you mean by "shadow"? I didn't

    15 understand that term yesterday in your

    16 direct-examination. What do you mean by that?

    17 A. It meant that if for any reason he could not

    18 be there, for example, two weeks' leave in December,

    19 then I would take responsibility. At any other time,

    20 if for some reason, and I can explain some of the

    21 reasons, but if for some reason I didn't go to my area,

    22 I would probably spend all day with him in his area.

    23 Q. Now, between the first of November, first

    24 week in November of 1992 and first week in March 1993,

    25 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, how much time did you spend in his

  82. 1 area of operations?

    2 A. I spent the two weeks that he was away on

    3 leave -- I spent most of the week before he went on

    4 leave with him refreshing my knowledge, and I probably

    5 spent one or two days a week every week before that,

    6 something of that order.

    7 Q. Was he in charge also of the Vitez

    8 municipality?

    9 A. Yes, he was.

    10 Q. Now, in addition to Captain Foregrave,

    11 Captain Mark Cooper was involved with Tuzla as the

    12 liaison officer; is that correct?

    13 A. Sorry, could you say that again?

    14 Q. Was Captain Mark Cooper the liaison officer

    15 in Tuzla?

    16 A. He was one of the two liaison officers in

    17 Tuzla, yes.

    18 Q. The other was Captain Bob Ryan?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. In the municipality of Vares, was Captain

    21 John Ellis the liaison officer?

    22 A. Yes. He became the liaison officer very late

    23 in the tour. I don't know when. I think probably

    24 January or February. Maybe before, but I can't

    25 remember.

  83. 1 Q. Who preceded him, sir?

    2 A. I don't think there was a liaison officer

    3 before him down there.

    4 Q. In the municipality of Gornji Vakuf, was

    5 Captain Mike Hughes the liaison officer?

    6 A. Yes, that is correct.

    7 Q. Now, you've described primarily your liaison

    8 responsibilities in respect of the Bosnian Croats and

    9 the Bosnian Muslims, but to give a fuller and more

    10 robust picture, you also had liaison responsibilities

    11 with the Bosnian Serbs, did you not?

    12 A. Yes, I did.

    13 Q. Your responsibilities with the Bosnian Serbs

    14 included both the area where you were initially

    15 assigned, that is Maglaj and Zenica, and then where you

    16 were subsequently assigned, which was the Busovaca,

    17 Novi Travnik, Vitez and Travnik municipalities; am I

    18 correct?

    19 A. No, you're not.

    20 Q. Okay. Please correct me then.

    21 A. When I was in my first area I did not deal

    22 with the Serbs in the northern area at all. However,

    23 while I was in the northern area, responsible still for

    24 the northern area, I dealt with the Serbs west of

    25 Travnik. I never had any dealings with the Serbs in

  84. 1 the northern area.

    2 Q. Now, you remained, as I believe you

    3 testified, you remained as the liaison officer in the

    4 Vitez, Travnik, Busovaca and Zenica area until sometime

    5 after April the 16th, 1993?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Thereafter, it was, I believe, Bob Ryan who

    8 became the liaison officer in the Vitez municipality;

    9 is that correct?

    10 A. Yes, it is. I don't know exactly when that

    11 happened, but yes.

    12 Q. Could you check your notebook to see when

    13 that happened, sir?

    14 A. No, it's not in my notebook. I've attempted

    15 to decipher this but it doesn't actually say that.

    16 This is only a record of the meetings I held. It's not

    17 a diary.

    18 Q. You have an approximate recollection of when

    19 that was, sometime after April 16th, but you don't have

    20 a precise recollection?

    21 A. No, I don't.

    22 Q. Now, in the course of your working as a

    23 liaison officer, you testified yesterday that it was

    24 very, very important to develop a very close

    25 relationship with the commanders and the civil leaders

  85. 1 of all of the ethnic groups with whom you were

    2 performing liaison functions?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Do you remember that testimony?

    5 A. I do, and I should emphasise it was

    6 particularly important to develop a relationship with

    7 the military commanders.

    8 Q. I see. Well, first of all, I would be very

    9 interested in your identifying for us, please, the

    10 military leaders and political leaders with whom you

    11 developed a close relationship who were on the Bosnian

    12 Serb side. Could you please tell us that?

    13 A. No, I did not develop relationships with the

    14 Bosnian Serbs.

    15 Q. Did you have any contacts with the Bosnian

    16 Serbs?

    17 A. Yes, I did.

    18 Q. Can you remember any of the commanders in

    19 your area of operation who were Bosnian Serbs?

    20 A. No, and if you want me to explain this, I

    21 will. I'm surprised that you're asking this question.

    22 Q. Well, please, you can answer it anyway you'd

    23 like, but my question is: Can you identify any of the

    24 Bosnian Serb political leaders or military leaders with

    25 whom you had liaison relations?

  86. 1 A. No, I cannot. I can remember a couple of

    2 names. The name Grujicic comes to mind, and Poletan

    3 and a few other names. The reason for this, if I can

    4 explain, Mr. President? We lived in Vitez, and Vitez

    5 was part of Muslim Croat territory, which only -- at my

    6 time, only was 30 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

    7 other 70 per cent was in the hands of the Serbs.

    8 Between us and the Serbs was a major front-line, a very

    9 well-defended, well-established front-line. We, the

    10 British, had no basis in the Republika Srpska, in the

    11 Serb Bosnia. When we went across there it was arranged

    12 from Travnik. It was arranged by me over the radio

    13 from the radio operations room in Travnik of the

    14 Bosnian army through Baba Salko, a very brave man, and

    15 he would cross the front-lines with us. We would stay

    16 there for two or three hours for meetings or picking up

    17 prisoners of war, or shall I say refugees, and

    18 escorting them back, or we'd had long meetings

    19 discussing local cease-fires in that area to allow us to

    20 do that type thing. We would then travel back to our

    21 base in Vitez.

    22 I did this 17 times. I was the first British

    23 officer to cross the Serb front-line, but no, I did not

    24 develop the type of relationships which counsel is

    25 talking about.

  87. 1 Q. Now, did you have any opportunity at all to

    2 meet the paramount military and political leaders from

    3 the Republika Srpska?

    4 A. No, I did not.

    5 Q. Who were they?

    6 A. I beg your pardon?

    7 Q. Who was the paramount military of the

    8 Republika Srpska?

    9 A. I believe it was Mladic.

    10 Q. Who was the paramount military leader at the

    11 time?

    12 A. That would be Karadzic.

    13 Q. You had no occasion to meet them in your tour

    14 of duty?

    15 A. No, I did not.

    16 MR. HARMON: All right. Mr. President, I see

    17 it's time we should have a break, and I'm prepared to

    18 stop at this time.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: All right. We'll take a

    20 20-minute break.

    21 --- Recess taken at 4.20 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 4.55 p.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,

    24 please. We will resume the hearing now.

    25 (The accused entered court)

  88. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon.

    2 MR. HARMON: Mr. Dundas-Whatley, I have been

    3 informed that we are going too fast in our questions

    4 and answers, so I am going to make a considerable

    5 effort to slow my pace, and if you would also hesitate

    6 after I ask you a question, it would slow your pace,

    7 and everyone in the courtroom who assists would

    8 appreciate it.

    9 A. Of course, Your Honours.

    10 Q. Now, we left when discussing the leaders with

    11 whom you had had contact on the Serb side, and now I'd

    12 like to focus your attention, during the time period

    13 when you were a liaison officer, from the first week of

    14 March until the end of your tour as a liaison officer.

    15 Could you please identify for the Court and for me the

    16 military and the political leaders on the Bosnian

    17 Muslim side with whom you had liaison relations.

    18 A. Yes. I may have to refer to a bit of paper

    19 here.

    20 Q. If you could that, please,

    21 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, in each of the communities. If you

    22 could break it down into Busovaca, Vitez, Travnik, Novi

    23 Travnik and Zenica.

    24 It would be sufficient, rather than writing

    25 them down, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, if you could just tell

  89. 1 us.

    2 A. Okay. Well, if we could start with Zenica

    3 then. My main point of contact in Zenica was the

    4 headquarters of the 3rd Corps of the Bosnian army, and

    5 I had occasion there to occasionally pass messages and

    6 meet the corps commander whose name was Enver

    7 Hadzihasanovic. More usually I would probably meet one

    8 of his deputies, Dzemal Merdan, who -- and also Esad

    9 Dzenanovic. They were the principle deputies that I

    10 spoke to there. Up until the 15th of April, 1993, I

    11 had no connection with the HVO in Zenica.

    12 If we could then go now to Travnik. My main

    13 point of contact on the Bosnian government side in

    14 Travnik was Baba Salko, but I also had constant contact

    15 with Commander Kulenovic and Colonel Alagic. These are

    16 military commanders. I'm going through the military

    17 people at the moment.

    18 On the HVO side, the Croat side of Travnik,

    19 my main contact was Filipovic, and then he was replaced

    20 by Commander Leotar.

    21 In Novi Travnik, on the -- the microphone has

    22 gone dead here.

    23 Q. You're fine. It's still on.

    24 A. In Novi Travnik -- I'm getting the French

    25 here. Have I pressed a button? It's come back now.

  90. 1 No, it's gone again. It's coming and going. I've got

    2 French on -- okay. Sorry. I hit the wrong one.

    3 In Novi Travnik the HVO commander for the

    4 period you asked me, who I had constant dealings with

    5 was Zeljko Sabljic, and the Bosnian army military

    6 commanders that I dealt with were Mevludin Zarajpe

    7 (phoen) and Berberovic Mevludin. The pronunciation is

    8 very difficult for me.

    9 In Busovaca, I didn't go often to Busovaca

    10 but when I did go there I occasionally met the -- the

    11 name is not in my book here. It will come to me in a

    12 moment, the HVO commander there. Very occasionally I

    13 went to Kacuni, which was in the Busovaca opstina but

    14 it was the Bosnian army headquarters and I occasionally

    15 met the commander down there. I'm afraid I don't

    16 remember their names. There is a list of other people

    17 I did meet in Busovaca here, but these were not the

    18 principle people. I very seldom went there.

    19 In Vitez, still continuing on the military

    20 side, the principle military commander I met in Vitez

    21 with was Mario Cerkez, and the Bosnian army commanders

    22 I met in Vitez -- in the town of Vitez was Sefkija

    23 Dzidic, but also I would meet the commanders down at

    24 Kruscica and Preocica, which were also battalion

    25 commanders outside of the town, but I'm afraid I don't

  91. 1 remember their names and I don't really know if they're

    2 in this book. Their meetings were towards the end --

    3 after the 16th of April, when things became a little

    4 bit more chaotic, and so their names do not appear in

    5 this book because this book was written before then.

    6 With regards to the civilian leaders that I

    7 would meet, in Vitez I met, on occasions, Santic and

    8 Skopljak, one of which, and I can never remember which

    9 one. One was the mayor and one was the President of

    10 the HDZ on the Croat side. I did not meet any civilian

    11 leaders routinely on the Muslim side in Vitez, on the

    12 Bosnian government side.

    13 In Zenica I very seldom met civilians. I met

    14 the President of the rugby club and various people but

    15 not routinely.

    16 In Busovaca I don't believe I met any

    17 civilians on a routine basis.

    18 In Novi Travnik probably not.

    19 In Travnik I occasionally met the mayor, and

    20 some HDZ representatives occasionally who were hanging

    21 around the HVO headquarters, but I'm afraid I can't

    22 remember the names of them either.

    23 All these names are in one of these books

    24 somewhere, but it is a long time ago.

    25 Q. Suffice it to say, based on your

  92. 1 recollections, in respect of the civil leaders of both

    2 the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, it seems or

    3 sounds to me like you had minimum or virtually no

    4 contact with them as a liaison officer.

    5 A. I did meet civilians frequently, but what I'm

    6 trying to say is I don't remember their names and it

    7 was -- I would not always meet the same one. It was

    8 quite often I would just bump into civilians, because

    9 my main efforts, you may understand, was towards the

    10 military commanders, but that's not to say the

    11 civilians leaders didn't know who I was. I remember

    12 attending a couple of very large meetings in Travnik

    13 chaired by the mayor, one of which had two or three

    14 hundred people in a hall, and I was rather surprised

    15 that, as I entered the hall, I was cheered by the

    16 assembled people. Apparently, they knew who I was even

    17 if I didn't know who they were.

    18 Q. Was that a meeting with the Bosnian Croat

    19 civil leaders did you say?

    20 A. No. That one in Travnik would have been the

    21 Muslims, I believe.

    22 Q. Muslims. All right.

    23 Now, let me ask you, you didn't mention

    24 Colonel Blaskic. Did you liaise with Colonel Blaskic?

    25 A. Yes, on a lesser extent. I think I explained

  93. 1 that earlier. My primary role was to maintain a

    2 constant relationship with the brigade levels, but I

    3 did frequently attend his hotel, his office, his

    4 headquarters.

    5 Q. How many times did you meet with Colonel

    6 Blaskic while you were a liaison officer in Central

    7 Bosnia?

    8 A. It's very difficult to remember how many

    9 times I met him. It's very difficult to remember. The

    10 number of times I went to his headquarters with a view

    11 to either meeting him or passing a message to him was

    12 probably 20. The numbers of times I actually met him,

    13 I can only actually, specifically remember two times

    14 that I actually sat and talked to him, and I would

    15 normally meet him as I was acting as aid to Colonel Bob

    16 Stewart.

    17 Q. Now, when were those two times that you sat

    18 and talked to Colonel Blaskic?

    19 A. One was in October '92 and one was in May '93

    20 that I can specifically remember.

    21 Q. Was the meeting in October of 1992 when you

    22 were introduced as a liaison officer?

    23 A. Yes, it was.

    24 Q. Was your meeting with him in May of 1993 when

    25 you were leaving the theatre?

  94. 1 A. That's correct.

    2 Q. Okay. Other than those two occasions, the

    3 only other occasions you met with Colonel Blaskic as a

    4 liaison officer was as an aid or an assistant with

    5 Colonel Stewart, your commanding officer; is that

    6 correct?

    7 A. Or I would -- primarily, but I -- there were

    8 other occasions. I'm sure I met him, but I say I can't

    9 specifically remember any occasions. But there were

    10 the other occasions where I would go to Hotel Vitez

    11 with the view of passing a message to him, or asking

    12 him for a meeting, or asking him for a document, this

    13 type of thing.

    14 Q. I understand.

    15 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the two occasions that

    16 you do recall, meeting Colonel Blaskic, October, 1992

    17 and May of 1993, those were meetings where matters of

    18 substance were not discussed; is that correct?

    19 A. Yes, I think that would be the case.

    20 Q. All right. Now, let me ask you a little bit

    21 about the Hotel Vitez, because you say you went there

    22 what, approximately 20 times?

    23 A. It may be rather more. It is a long time ago

    24 to remember but it may be more than that.

    25 Q. You're familiar with the Hotel Vitez, suffice

  95. 1 it to say?

    2 A. Oh, yes. I am.

    3 Q. Okay. Now, where would you normally meet the

    4 liaison officers that you dealt with in the Hotel

    5 Vitez? First of all, did you meet with liaison

    6 officers normally in the Hotel Vitez?

    7 A. No, the local military commands, both Bosnian

    8 army and HVO, didn't institute a system of liaison

    9 officers until the regiment that came after my

    10 regiment. During my time, we dealt with commanders,

    11 and if they weren't available then their staff

    12 officers.

    13 Q. Now, could you describe the Hotel Vitez?

    14 When you walked in, first of all, did you have to pass

    15 a checkpoint or a guard to gain access into the

    16 interior of the Hotel Vitez?

    17 A. Not normally, no, I didn't. Although there

    18 was a lot of security on the hotel, I would not

    19 normally be expected to go through any checks because

    20 the staff there knew me.

    21 Q. I see. But if they didn't know you, would

    22 you normally be stopped by a security person or a

    23 security post?

    24 A. Towards the end, when everyone was getting

    25 very twitchy in April or May, normally I would not walk

  96. 1 straight in past the security, round and round again

    2 into Colonel Blaskic's office. Normally we would stop

    3 en route and be intercepted by a staff officer, and he

    4 would then want to know the nature of the visit, and

    5 would either take me in to deal with Colonel Blaskic

    6 myself, personally, to hand over a document, pass a

    7 message or whatever, arrange a meeting, or he would ask

    8 if he could handle it himself because Colonel Blaskic

    9 was too busy.

    10 Q. One of the things you mentioned yesterday

    11 when you were discussing your role as a liaison officer

    12 was that your job required you not to make probing

    13 inquiries into matters that may be sensitive to any of

    14 the parties. Does that fairly characterise your

    15 testimony yesterday?

    16 A. Yes, but if I could explain, that that was

    17 how we, as liaison officers, sat down. You mentioned

    18 Martin Foregrave earlier on. He and I worked closely

    19 for the whole of the time we were there, and we

    20 discussed our best strategy and that was it. This

    21 wasn't ordained from on high, this was the way we

    22 decided to operate.

    23 Q. All right. But your personal modus operandi

    24 was not to make inquiries into sensitive matters unless

    25 it was a matter of conflict and matter that had been

  97. 1 tabled, and it was a matter of dispute by the parties?

    2 A. Yes, that's correct. I would refrain from

    3 asking what I considered to be sensitive questions.

    4 Q. Let me give you an example.

    5 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, you were aware of what occurred in

    6 Ahmici, were you not?

    7 A. At some point, yes, I was.

    8 Q. Well, did you attend the meeting with Colonel

    9 Stewart where Colonel Stewart confronted Colonel

    10 Blaskic about what occurred in Ahmici?

    11 A. When was that?

    12 Q. I'm asking you. Did you attend such a

    13 meeting?

    14 A. I'm sorry. I do have a recollection of that,

    15 but it may help if I refer to my notebook briefly. I

    16 may find the meeting in there.

    17 Q. Do you recall such a meeting, sir?

    18 A. I don't mean to be evasive, but I think

    19 probably, yes, that meeting took place.

    20 Q. Now, normally it was for Colonel Stewart to

    21 raise matters that were sensitive with Colonel Blaskic?

    22 A. That is correct.

    23 Q. Okay. So I take it in your meetings with

    24 either Colonel Blaskic or with other HVO officers with

    25 whom you had contact, generally, the subordinates of

  98. 1 Colonel Blaskic, you didn't raise the issue of Ahmici

    2 with them, did you, for fear that that might endanger

    3 your relationship with them?

    4 A. At Colonel Blaskic's level of command I

    5 certainly would not have asked questions of that

    6 nature.

    7 Q. Did you raise questions of that nature with

    8 Colonel Blaskic's subordinates?

    9 A. Absolutely not.

    10 Q. What you're telling this Court, at no time

    11 did you, as a British liaison officer, make any inquiry

    12 into the responsibilities and the events at Ahmici; is

    13 that correct?

    14 A. It is correct. I'll explain it, because I

    15 don't want the Court to be misled on this issue.

    16 The Cheshire Regiment, my regiment, we did

    17 not become aware of the events in Ahmici until some

    18 days after the event.

    19 Prior to us becoming aware of the horrific

    20 events in Ahmici, I, or at about the same time, another

    21 liaison officer came and took over the area of Vitez

    22 and Ahmici from me, and he went ahead and supervised

    23 the burial of the 96 bodies. He was, from that point

    24 on, the primary liaison officer for Vitez, as I

    25 concentrated on the west of Travnik and Novi Travnik.

  99. 1 Q. In your dealings with your military

    2 counterparts in the HVO in Travnik and Novi Travnik, I

    3 take it you did not inquire into the well-known events

    4 at Ahmici.

    5 A. No, the information we received was from the

    6 Bosnian army representatives.

    7 Q. Well, the information you received, as well,

    8 about what occurred in Ahmici was from your own forces

    9 at BRITBAT; isn't that correct?

    10 A. That's correct, yes.

    11 Q. So, you were fully aware of the extent of the

    12 destruction and the killing at Ahmici; were you not?

    13 A. Yes, there was a point in time when we did

    14 become fully aware, yes.

    15 Q. That time was in April of 1993; was it not?

    16 A. Yes, it was.

    17 Q. It was approximately April 22nd or April 23rd

    18 of 1993; is that correct?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, in terms of

    21 other inquiries that you had the ability to make, such

    22 as who was responsible for the truck bomb explosion

    23 that occurred in Stari Vitez, did you raise issues of

    24 responsibility for that crime with any HVO

    25 representative?

  100. 1 A. Not that I recall, no.

    2 Q. Did you consider what occurred at Stari Vitez

    3 with the truck bomb to be a war crime, sir?

    4 A. It was a crime of the most horrific order.

    5 Q. It was a war crime which, if you were a

    6 commander of an operation, you would conduct an

    7 investigation; would you not?

    8 A. I don't understand.

    9 Q. Would you conduct an investigation if that

    10 war crime occurred on your watch?

    11 A. Do you mean if a subordinate of mine planted

    12 a truck bomb in a town?

    13 Q. Obviously the Muslims didn't plant the truck

    14 bomb; did they?

    15 A. The truck bomb was almost certainly planted

    16 by the Croats.

    17 Q. If you were a Croat commander, if you were

    18 Colonel Blaskic, would you initiate an inquiry into

    19 responsibilities relating to that truck bomb?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope,

    21 Mr. President. It seems we're going to go for another

    22 three weeks on cross-examination if this is the scope

    23 of cross-examination of this witness, and I would ask

    24 the Court to give some guidance. How long is

    25 cross-examination going to be allowed? I think the

  101. 1 direct was three hours or three hours and twenty

    2 minutes, something like that.

    3 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, this line of

    4 inquiry --

    5 JUDGE JORDA: The direct examination lasted

    6 how long? I'm not sure. Was it about three hours,

    7 Mr. Hayman? Yes, I think we have to try to maintain a

    8 certain balance. I would not like the previous example

    9 of testimony to reappear. I did compliment the Defence

    10 for its conciseness.

    11 It is true, Mr. Harmon, that perhaps you have

    12 asked questions, what would you have done under this or

    13 that circumstance. I think that the former officer is

    14 here to answer your questions in respect of what he was

    15 able to observe while he was exercising his functions.

    16 Therefore, perhaps you shouldn't ask the same

    17 question several times. Please continue. In fact,

    18 we're going to start timing the cross-examination, but

    19 we haven't got to that point, yet.

    20 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I will conclude

    21 within the time frame allotted to me. But this witness

    22 has made numerous comparisons between the British army

    23 and the HVO, and my question to him, I believe, is

    24 relevant, because it asks this witness as a

    25 professional military, former professional military

  102. 1 officer what he would have done under similar

    2 circumstances, which I believe would be relevant to

    3 this Court's determination.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: That is your evaluation. Let

    5 me remind you of what the registrar just told me.

    6 There was three hours and 45 minutes in the direct

    7 examination, three hours and 45 minutes, the

    8 registrar's just told me that. Thank you

    9 Mr. Dubuisson. Continue Mr. Harmon.

    10 MR. HARMON:

    11 Q. Can you answer that question, please,

    12 Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

    13 A. If I had been a British military commander in

    14 a war and one of my subordinates, or a unit operating

    15 under my command and in my area of responsibility

    16 committed such a horrific war crime, yes, using the

    17 British military justice system and all legal powers

    18 available to me, and the duty as a military commander,

    19 yes, I would have conducted an investigation.

    20 Q. All right. Now, let me ask you about some

    21 additional testimony that you gave yesterday, and that

    22 dealt with the issue of a large troop movement that

    23 occurred on the 8th of April in Travnik.

    24 Do you remember testifying to that on that

    25 occasion you were informed by, I believe it was Colonel

  103. 1 Filipovic, that there was a movement of approximately

    2 500 Bosnian army soldiers on the 8th of April, and that

    3 you considered that to be a large troop movement?

    4 A. Yes, I remember that. I do remember saying

    5 that Colonel Filipovic considered it to be a large

    6 troop movement, and that is why it was brought to my

    7 attention.

    8 Q. Did you consider that to be a large troop

    9 movement?

    10 A. Yes, I think at the time and in the location

    11 it probably was, otherwise Colonel Filipovic would not

    12 have brought it to my attention.

    13 Q. That fact having been brought to your

    14 attention, did you go and talk to Colonel Alagic and

    15 inquire of Colonel Alagic about that particular large

    16 troop movement?

    17 A. Do you mind if I just consult my notebook?

    18 Q. Please.

    19 A. That evening I had, I think I had two further

    20 meetings in Travnik, one was at the police station with

    21 the civilian police commander, to follow-up the point

    22 about police not doing enough. Then I went to the

    23 Bosnian army headquarters in Travnik where I was told

    24 that two members of 312 Brigade, Bosnian army brigade,

    25 had been killed and that the Bosnian army commander, I

  104. 1 don't know whether it was Alagic or Cuskic (phoen) on

    2 this occasion, asked that I should send the Warriors

    3 back into town.

    4 That is all my notebook says. I do not know

    5 whether I discussed that issue with the Bosnian army.

    6 Q. Now, did you consider that information that

    7 you had received to be vital information at the time

    8 you received it?

    9 A. I don't know. I passed all information that

    10 I received. I passed to the MILINFO cell. If I, at

    11 the time, considered it to be vital I would have gone

    12 and found Bob Stewart and told him, as well.

    13 Q. Do you have any recollection,

    14 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, of having either radioed that

    15 information to BRITBAT, having told Colonel Stewart, or

    16 told the MILINFO cell about it?

    17 A. I have no recollection, but I almost

    18 certainly total the MILINFO cell, because I told them

    19 everything in my notebook and an awful lot more.

    20 Q. I'd like to show you an exhibit--

    21 MR. HARMON: If I could have this

    22 distributed, with the assistance of the usher.

    23 Q. Let me ask you, before this document arrives

    24 and is distributed to everybody in the courtroom: Did

    25 you have occasion, after you gave information to the

  105. 1 military information cell, to check the military

    2 information summaries to see if they had properly

    3 recorded and reported the information which you

    4 provided to them?

    5 A. No, I did not.

    6 Q. I see.

    7 A. The reason for that was, at the end of each

    8 day the last thing I would do each day would be go to

    9 the MILINFO cell and be debriefed, a process which may

    10 take as much as an hour. Everything I said would be

    11 written down, and that was the end of it.

    12 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be 539.

    13 MR. HARMON:

    14 Q. In addition to receiving information about

    15 the 500 Muslim soldiers who had arrived in Travnik, you

    16 told us that Colonel Filipovic was going to be moving

    17 the HVO headquarters from Travnik to Dolac; is that

    18 correct?

    19 A. That's correct.

    20 Q. Now, do you have the exhibit, 539, in front

    21 of you, sir?

    22 A. Yes, I do.

    23 Q. Does that appear to be a Cheshire military

    24 information summary dated the 8th of April 1993?

    25 A. Yes, it is.

  106. 1 Q. I would like to direct your attention,

    2 please, to the last page of that document, page 4, and

    3 it says at the top of that "6" and then it says

    4 "Travnik."

    5 Will you kindly read that to yourself? When

    6 you are finished let me know. Actually, I will read

    7 it, because we don't have a French translation.

    8 It reads as follows: "An LO team visited

    9 Travnik this evening and spoke to a BiH officer who

    10 claimed that tensions had risen between Croats and

    11 Muslims in the town today. The BiH officer claimed

    12 that there had been sporadic gunfire for the last 40

    13 minutes at 2000 hours. The LO reported that he had

    14 heard two small arms rounds followed by a sustained

    15 burst of fire. The BiH officer claimed that Mate Boban

    16 had visited Travnik today and subsequently complained

    17 about the lack of Croat flags. The BiH officer claimed

    18 that a Muslim fired on some HVO soldiers erecting a

    19 Croat flag, and from there the situation had

    20 deteriorated. At 2100 hours the LO reported that there

    21 were groups of armed soldiers moving around the town

    22 and tensions appeared to be high. At 2105 hours two

    23 RECCE C/S deployed to Travnik and remained there until

    24 2230 hours. At 2230 hours, the LO, meaning liaison

    25 officer, reported the situation calmed down somewhat

  107. 1 and the RECCE CS were recalled."

    2 Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the military

    3 information summary that I have just read to you makes

    4 no reference at all to the arrival of 500 Muslim

    5 soldiers in the town of Travnik; does it?

    6 A. No, it doesn't.

    7 Q. Nor does it make any mention of the movement

    8 of the HVO headquarters from Travnik to Dolac; is that

    9 correct?

    10 A. That's correct.

    11 Q. Now, what did you believe to be the purpose

    12 of the arrival of those 500 soldiers in Travnik on

    13 April the 8th?

    14 A. I have no idea.

    15 Q. Now, were you aware, sir, that the Bosnian

    16 army was engaged in conflicts in Visoko with the Serbs?

    17 A. Yes, I was.

    18 Q. This bus, or buses with, according to Colonel

    19 Filipovic, 500 Muslim soldiers, arrived from Visoko;

    20 did it not?

    21 A. That's what he said.

    22 Q. Do you know whether or not those 500 soldiers

    23 that arrived in Travnik were soldiers who were

    24 returning from the front-lines at Visoko on a rotation?

    25 A. No, I have no idea about this. I read what

  108. 1 my notebook said, which was a result of a conversation

    2 I had with a concerned HVO commander in Travnik, an HVO

    3 commander for whom I have the greatest respect.

    4 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the information was

    5 unconfirmed, as far as other parties verifying that

    6 information; was it not?

    7 A. I was the liaison officer. No one verified

    8 what I said. There was no verification procedure. We

    9 did not go into barracks and count soldiers. I

    10 reported what the commanders told me.

    11 Q. Approximately a week later, you personally

    12 attended a military parade of the ABiH at barracks in

    13 Travnik; did you not?

    14 A. That's correct.

    15 Q. You testified earlier, and indeed you showed

    16 us a photograph of you in attendance at that parade

    17 where over 1000 ABiH soldiers were on parade

    18 celebrating the first anniversary of the founding of

    19 the Armija; is that correct?

    20 A. Yes, that is correct.

    21 Q. Let me turn to your testimony in respect of

    22 training. You were asked the question yesterday, as

    23 follows: "Did you, during your six month or so tour,

    24 ever see the HVO troops engaged in training?"

    25 Your answer was: "No."

  109. 1 The next question that was asked to you was:

    2 "On any occasions?"

    3 Your answer was, "No, I didn't and in the

    4 time I was in, in the time I was in Bosnia, I never

    5 heard anyone else talk about the training of either the

    6 HVO or the Bosnian army."

    7 Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, did the HVO have an

    8 operations and training officer at the Hotel Vitez at

    9 one of Colonel Blaskic's staff?

    10 A. I don't know.

    11 Q. Do you know a gentleman by the name of Slavko

    12 Marin?

    13 A. I met Slavko Marin by some coincidence at the

    14 airport in Amsterdam about six days ago as he was

    15 coming to be, or coming to be a witness here. I didn't

    16 recognise him. I don't think he recognised me, I don't

    17 know, but that's the gentleman of whom you're referring

    18 to, and I subsequently found out he had been a staff

    19 officer under Colonel Blaskic's headquarters. I did

    20 not recognise his face. I may have known him, and I

    21 may have known what he did, but he is not in any of my

    22 books, and I don't remember it.

    23 Q. Did you have any conversation with Slavko

    24 Marin?

    25 A. On Saturday?

  110. 1 Q. At any time since.

    2 A. He doesn't speak English.

    3 Q. Did you ever ask any HVO liaison officers

    4 with whom you had contact in your tour of duty in

    5 Bosnia whether the HVO was engaged in training

    6 activities for its troops?

    7 A. No, I must reiterate, the HVO did not have

    8 liaison officers when I was dealing with them. I dealt

    9 with commanders, that's the first part of the

    10 question.

    11 Secondly, I didn't ask them questions of that

    12 nature. I did not ask them, didn't ask anyone

    13 questions that may make me look like a spy.

    14 Q. Now, let me ask you this question: In your

    15 tour of Central Bosnia, do you know where the local HVO

    16 military bases were located?

    17 A. Quite a few of them, I think, yes.

    18 Q. Where were they, sir?

    19 A. They had, to the best of my knowledge, I

    20 believe, a large base in Busovaca. They had many bases

    21 in and around Vitez that I would drive past and see

    22 large numbers of soldiers congregated in.

    23 In Travnik I knew they had a bit of a base in

    24 the Hotel Orient, and there were lots of small

    25 locations, houses and shops, ex-shops and ex-houses

  111. 1 where you could see a large number of HVO soldiers on

    2 occasions.

    3 But if you ask me about their barracks, no,

    4 I'm not aware of where the barracks were, exactly.

    5 MR. HARMON: Could I have, please,

    6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 484 shown to the witness, please?

    7 A. I would, if it's all right, like to clarify

    8 something about this MILINFOSUM.

    9 Q. Please.

    10 A. I think the reason why nothing is in my

    11 notebook, appears in the MILINFOSUM on this day, and it

    12 is quite unusual for my notebook not to appear in the

    13 MILINFOSUM. I think the reason for it was I don't

    14 think I left Travnik until about 11.00 or midnight in

    15 the evening. Because from reading this, and from

    16 reading my notebook, I think, I stayed in Travnik until

    17 the last possible minute, until very late at night,

    18 because I wanted to keep a personal eye on what was

    19 happening there. I was probably going from

    20 headquarters to headquarters just checking that the

    21 commanders felt they were in control.

    22 Before I suggested that the British armoured

    23 vehicles be removed from Travnik, I would have got,

    24 well, not permission, but I would have asked the advice

    25 of the Bosnian army commander and the HVO commander. I

  112. 1 would have gone to them, as, indeed, I'm sure I did,

    2 according to this, and said to them, is the situation

    3 calm enough now for the British to go home and have

    4 dinner, and they would have both at some point have

    5 said yes, and the armoured vehicles would have left and

    6 I would have left.

    7 I think by the time I would have got back to

    8 the British base it would have probably been too late,

    9 or whatever, I don't know, but I think that's probably

    10 why nothing appeared in this MILINFOSUM.

    11 Q. Nor did you radio this information. Had you

    12 radioed this information in, then it would have

    13 appeared in the MILINFOSUM; isn't that correct?

    14 A. I think, from looking at this, that probably

    15 I did radio some in, because it says here "At 2100 the

    16 LO reported there were groups of armed soldiers moving

    17 around the town and tensions appeared to be high."

    18 At that time I was either in meetings or

    19 between meetings, I think. It's slightly confusing to

    20 see in my notebook. Probably I left one meeting, got

    21 in my Land Rover and radioed to Vitez that bit of

    22 information and gone through to another meeting.

    23 It would be during that meeting that I would

    24 have probably asked, in fact obviously here, because at

    25 2100 hours I radioed that message in, and at 2105 hours

  113. 1 the vehicles, the armoured vehicles were sent to

    2 Travnik, so, obviously as a result of my radio

    3 message.

    4 What I considered to be vital information was

    5 passed over the radio, and the battalion, as usual,

    6 responded accordingly.

    7 Q. Would you have passed, then, that information

    8 on the following day?

    9 A. I don't know. I would like to see the

    10 MILINFOSUM, but it's quite possible by the next morning

    11 events had overtaken this.

    12 MR. HARMON: Mr. Dubuisson, could I also have

    13 at the same time Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/104 through

    14 108? In the meantime I will ask Mr. Dundas-Whatley

    15 about the exhibit in front of him.

    16 Q. Would you take a look at the Prosecutor's

    17 Exhibit 484? This, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is a training

    18 plan and programme for recruits of the HZ-HB armed

    19 forces, and it was issued in Mostar on the 1st of

    20 September, 1992 by Brigadier General Milvoj Petkovic.

    21 Do you know who Milvoj Petkovic is?

    22 A. I believe he was the commander of the HVO in

    23 the whole of Bosnia.

    24 Q. You can take a look at this, please. Browse

    25 through it for a moment.

  114. 1 Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley have you had a

    2 chance, briefly at least, to look at that particular

    3 training programme?

    4 A. Yes, I have.

    5 Q. This is a training programme. If you turn to

    6 page 3 of the document, it is referring to paragraph

    7 1.2. This is a training programme that lasts 22 days.

    8 If you turn the page, to page 4, under paragraph 1.3,

    9 you can see the curriculum is summarised in that

    10 particular page.

    11 Now, this is a training programme that was

    12 for recruits of the HZ-HB. I would next like to direct

    13 your attention to the following exhibits.

    14 MR. HARMON: If I could have Prosecutor's

    15 Exhibit 456/104 shown to the witness.

    16 Q. Do you have that, Mr. Dundas-Whatley? It

    17 hasn't been given to you yet.

    18 Number 104, which you have before you,

    19 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is an order issued by Colonel

    20 Blaskic on the 23rd of July, 1992, and it is an order

    21 which orders a number of soldiers to be trained in the

    22 use of a Strella 2-M rocket.

    23 Those soldiers were to assemble in front of

    24 the Hotel Vitez at 8.00 in the morning on the 25th of

    25 July, 1992. If you turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 105,

  115. 1 this also is an order of Colonel Blaskic, it is dated

    2 the 24th of July, 1992 --

    3 A. Mine says the 25th. Right, it's the next

    4 one.

    5 Q. It should be. Perhaps the usher can make

    6 sure they are given to Mr. Dundas-Whatley in the proper

    7 order. I'm talking about Prosecutor's Exhibit 105.

    8 A. Sorry, I do apologise, it is dated the 24th.

    9 Q. This is an order by Colonel Blaskic to create

    10 and train reconnaissance units, and those units were to

    11 be trained in Grude, and they were -- obviously the

    12 order speaks for itself.

    13 If we turn now to Prosecutor's Exhibit 106,

    14 this is a document that is three pages long. You

    15 should have it in front of you, and it is, if you turn

    16 to paragraph 3 of that particular document, an order

    17 issued by Colonel Blaskic on the 20th of September,

    18 1992. You will see that paragraph 3 relates to the

    19 training of new recruits who have not served in the

    20 Yugoslav army. It is to be basic and specific, and the

    21 person who is responsible for that task is the

    22 operations and training body of the central

    23 headquarters, and the deadline for that training was

    24 the 15th to the 30th of September, 1992.

    25 Now, let me turn, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to the

  116. 1 next Prosecutor's exhibit, which is 456/107.

    2 MR. HARMON: For the record,

    3 Mr. President --

    4 A. I have 106.

    5 Q. 456/107, it is a document that looks like

    6 this?

    7 MR. HARMON: Mr. Usher, a document that looks

    8 like this.

    9 Q. This is an order also issued by Colonel

    10 Blaskic dated the 19th of November, 1992. Take a look

    11 at that for a minute, if you will, and you will see

    12 that it is essentially a training regimen. It

    13 describes a training schedule that should apply to all

    14 barracks in the territory of Central Bosnia and all

    15 barracks commanders shall adhere to this particular

    16 schedule. You will see, then, quite a schedule.

    17 The last document I would like to show you,

    18 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is a document that is an order

    19 issued by Colonel Blaskic. It is Prosecutor's Exhibit

    20 456/108. It is an order dated the 12th of March --

    21 A. I'm sorry, we're just looking for this one.

    22 Q. It's a one-page document, and it is ordered

    23 by Colonel Blaskic that additional training be required

    24 for crews of light portable S2MAAD launching systems,

    25 and in paragraph number 3, one day refresher courses

  117. 1 shall be organised once a month.

    2 Now, the sum of these orders, which are

    3 merely representational, indicate that from the 23rd of

    4 July, 1992, through the 12th of March, 1993, the HVO

    5 was engaged in the training of its soldiers.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: Objection, Mr. President.

    7 Mr. Harmon is trying to testify. These are orders for

    8 training. They don't indicate whether there was

    9 training or not. The witness testified orders

    10 frequently weren't followed. In any event, he said he

    11 didn't see any training, so I think the purpose of this

    12 line of inquiry is very hard to discern.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Each of you will use the

    14 witness as he likes and according to his objectives

    15 whether the Defence or the Prosecution strategy. For

    16 the time being I think the Prosecution is simply trying

    17 to ascertain from the witness whether he was aware of

    18 the training. That's not excessive. Of course, don't

    19 spend three hours doing so.

    20 MR. HARMON:

    21 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, it would not be unusual,

    22 would it, sir, that the HVO would not take you to its

    23 training facilities?

    24 A. I'm sorry?

    25 Q. Would it be unusual for the HVO, or would it

  118. 1 be normal for the HVO to take third parties to its

    2 training facilities?

    3 A. Yes, it would be very unusual. These

    4 documents are marked secret.

    5 Q. So, it doesn't surprise you, does it,

    6 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, that the HVO was engaged in the

    7 training of its recruits; does it?

    8 MR. HAYMAN: Assumes a fact not in evidence.

    9 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we have shown a

    10 film. I don't want to delay, taking the time to reshow

    11 the film of the HVO engaged in training.

    12 MR. HAYMAN: Where, Your Honour, was that

    13 film shot? It was not shot in the Central Bosnian

    14 Operative Zone. The Counsel's question assumes a fact

    15 not in evidence, and he shouldn't be allowed to ask the

    16 witness "would it surprise you that," making an

    17 assertion of fact when it's a fact not in evidence.

    18 MR. HARMON:

    19 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, let me rephrase the

    20 question.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, as regards to the

    22 form of the questions, I think both you and Mr. Harmon

    23 are very subtle specialists to know how to ask a

    24 question in the direct and cross-examinations.

    25 As regards the training, it is undeniable

  119. 1 that the liaison officer, through his duties, had

    2 access to certain kinds of information that would be

    3 useful for our discussions here, which you did bring up

    4 in the direct examination. That is the question of

    5 training.

    6 I once again would like to ask Mr. Harmon not

    7 to dwell too long on that question. I think that the

    8 question was asked and that the liaison officer

    9 answered the question.

    10 MR. HARMON:

    11 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, does it surprise you to

    12 see these orders and this training programme?

    13 A. No, I'm not surprised to see it.

    14 Q. All right. Let me move on to a different

    15 subject, then, sir.

    16 You were asked a question yesterday as

    17 follows: "Did the HVO headquarters in the Central

    18 Bosnia Operational Zone have access to secure fax or

    19 other secure communications?"

    20 Your answer was, "Not that I'm aware of."

    21 Do you remember that answer, sir?

    22 A. Yes, I do.

    23 Q. When you went to the Hotel Vitez, did you

    24 have unlimited access to the Hotel Vitez?

    25 A. No, I did not.

  120. 1 Q. Were you ever permitted into the HVO

    2 communications centre in the Hotel Vitez?

    3 A. On one occasion I did go into the HVO

    4 communications centre, which actually was not in Hotel

    5 Vitez. It was in the post office in the centre of the

    6 town. That was my understanding, anyway. But only on

    7 one occasion that I can remember.

    8 Q. When was that, sir?

    9 A. It was about April, 1993. It was during the

    10 very heavy period of conflict in April 1993, I believe.

    11 Q. Tell the Court what kind of communications

    12 you saw, what kind of communications equipment you saw

    13 in that particular location at that particular day.

    14 A. That particular location and that particular

    15 day, I saw a number, probably half a dozen of soldiers

    16 in uniform sitting at desks which were manned with --

    17 there were maps on the wall, and they were manning

    18 telephones, and there may have been radios, hand-held

    19 radios, there, as well. I can't remember.

    20 Q. Did you ever go into any communications

    21 centre of the HVO when you were in Busovaca, Travnik,

    22 Novi Travnik or Zenica? I'm talking about

    23 communications centres of the HVO?

    24 A. No, I did not.

    25 Q. Now, did you ever talk to any HVO officers

  121. 1 about their communications capabilities?

    2 A. It may be useful if I told you what I spoke

    3 to the Bosnian army about their communications

    4 abilities.

    5 Q. Let me stay for a moment -- you talked to the

    6 HVO about their communications capabilities. Did you

    7 ever talk to them about their communications

    8 capabilities?

    9 A. No, I did not.

    10 Q. Did you ever ask the HVO representatives with

    11 whom you were dealing, the officers that you have

    12 identified, whether or not they had encryption

    13 capabilities?

    14 A. No, I did not.

    15 Q. Now, do you know who the head of intelligence

    16 was for the HVO headquarters at the Hotel Vitez?

    17 A. No, I did not.

    18 Q. Would it surprise you to learn that he

    19 testified in this court that the HVO had encryption

    20 capability?

    21 A. No, it would not.

    22 Q. Why not?

    23 A. Because the internal workings of the command

    24 structure of the HVO were not a major concern of mine.

    25 How they conducted their military campaign was not my

  122. 1 overriding business.

    2 Q. So it's not your testimony, is it, that the

    3 HVO did not have secure communications?

    4 A. No. My testimony, and I'm sure it's written

    5 down somewhere, I said yesterday that I am not aware.

    6 Q. Now, in part, you said yesterday that it

    7 would be very important to have, essentially -- or be

    8 very dangerous -- let me rephrase it.

    9 It would be very dangerous to have combat

    10 orders sent that were not encrypted?

    11 A. That's correct.

    12 Q. The reason being if they were intercepted,

    13 then it would be almost fatal or suicidal to the

    14 attacking forces to -- it would be intercepted; isn't

    15 that correct?

    16 A. That's correct.

    17 Q. Now, let me show you, if I could,

    18 Prosecutor's exhibit -- I'm sorry, Defence Exhibit 300,

    19 and Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/46. Mr. Dubuisson, I will

    20 actually make it easier for you. It will be 456/45 and

    21 456/46.

    22 Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, I would just like to

    23 ask your opinion on something, and perhaps you would be

    24 so kind as to review these orders with me first. I

    25 would like to refer you to 456/45, which is an order

  123. 1 for combat operations issued by Colonel Blaskic on the

    2 17th of April, 1993. It's in English. It is a

    3 two-page document, and the time of the issue is 2345

    4 hours.

    5 Now, let me just direct your attention to

    6 paragraph 2.2 of that particular combat order, and in

    7 that it gives direction. It says, "Use all available

    8 artillery, carry out fire preparations for the attack

    9 from the VU, capture Gornji Zenica and Svinjarevo

    10 through systematic targeting (6082 and 120 millimetre

    11 MB), afterwards regroup forces and carry out artillery

    12 preparations for launching an attack on" --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, please read more

    14 slowly. The interpreters don't have the documents in

    15 front of them. The register has given me the version

    16 in French. For once I'm the one at an advantage.

    17 MR. HARMON: Let me repeat the last

    18 sentence. "Afterwards, regroup forces and carry out

    19 artillery preparations for launching an attack on and

    20 the capture of Bilalovac."

    21 If you turn to paragraph 10 on the second

    22 page it says, "Begin the operation on the 18th of

    23 April, 1993 at 0530 hours." So, at the time when this

    24 order was issued and the time when it was to be

    25 executed is approximately 5 hours and 45 minutes

  124. 1 difference.

    2 My question to you is: This order was issued

    3 from Vitez, and it was issued to the Ban Jelicic

    4 Brigade, the command in Kiseljak, and as you know,

    5 there was an area of occupied territory by the Muslims

    6 between Kacuni and Bilalovac, and this order had to

    7 pass through or over that territory in order to be

    8 received in Kiseljak; isn't that correct?

    9 A. That is correct.

    10 Q. Now, using your judgement and looking at this

    11 document and looking at the time frame that is required

    12 from the time the order is issued to the time when it

    13 needs to be executed, would it be prudent to send this

    14 particular document with either unencrypted or insecure

    15 communications?

    16 A. It would be very dangerous.

    17 Q. Do you believe, or can you deduce from just

    18 the four corners of this document that this document

    19 would have been sent by secure communications if you're

    20 able to give us your opinion?

    21 MR. HAYMAN: Objection to the form,

    22 Mr. President. It calls for speculation. That's a

    23 ludicrous question if I may say so.

    24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Judge,

    25 please.

  125. 1 JUDGE JORDA: What I was interested in -- I'm

    2 going to put the microphone on. One should not use

    3 that kind of language to talk about the questions that

    4 your colleagues ask. We have only five minutes left.

    5 Try to remain calm. With all the respect I owe you, I

    6 don't find the question ridiculous, and I would be very

    7 interested in hearing the answer.

    8 Continue, Mr. Harmon.

    9 MR. HARMON: Do you remember the question or

    10 do you want me to repeat it, Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

    11 A. No, I think I understand. The issue here, as

    12 I understand --

    13 MR. NOBILO: Mr. President --

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Nobilo?

    15 MR. NOBILO: With your permission, our client

    16 is actively participating in our work, and he says the

    17 following: That probably, by omission, the transcript

    18 says that the artillery attack was supposed to be

    19 carried out against Gornji Zenica, at the very

    20 beginning of this text, so please let's have this

    21 corrected.

    22 MR. HARMON: That clearly is an error, and

    23 the document speaks for itself, Mr. President.

    24 Q. Could you answer the question,

    25 Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

  126. 1 A. I'm not sure. Are we still talking about

    2 using artillery against the area of Kiseljak or some

    3 other area now?

    4 Q. We're talking about this particular order,

    5 and my question to you is: Using the four corners of

    6 this document, considering that it is an order for

    7 combat, it was an order issued on the 17th of April at

    8 2345 hours, with an operation to begin at 5.30 the

    9 following day. This is an order that had to pass

    10 through or over hostile territory. Can you deduce that

    11 this is a document -- are you able to give us an

    12 opinion as to whether this document was sent by secure

    13 means?

    14 A. Yes, I understand. So, if it went over enemy

    15 territory, so to speak, by radio or any other means,

    16 was it sent securely or not? If it could not be taken

    17 by hand and it was transmitted over the airwaves, which

    18 I think is what you're suggesting, then it would be

    19 very stupid not to send it in some coded fashion.

    20 Q. Now, let me show you, because we only have a

    21 minute or two remaining. Let me show you Prosecutor's

    22 Exhibit 456/46, which is another combat order issued by

    23 Colonel Blaskic on the 18th of April, 1993, and let me

    24 refer you to paragraph 2 that discusses the assignment

    25 of the addressee who was the commander of the Fojnica

  127. 1 HVO battalion. In other words, this was going to a

    2 different part of Colonel Blaskic's command.

    3 Paragraph 2, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, discusses

    4 combat operations on the village of Dusina, or

    5 discussing a breakthrough in the direction of the

    6 Busovaca stables and a linkup with the forces defending

    7 Sebisic (phoen), and it discusses preventing the enemy

    8 from bringing fresh forces for combat operations to

    9 the Lasva Valley, engage some forces to control the

    10 area and reduce no-man's land.

    11 Again, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the same question

    12 I asked you before. This is a combat order that went

    13 to a different part of the command of Colonel Blaskic.

    14 Again, it went from the Hotel Vitez. It had to go

    15 through or over enemy territory, which was the

    16 territory that was between Kiseljak municipality and

    17 the Vitez Busovaca municipality. I ask you the same

    18 question; in your opinion, would this be the order that

    19 would have been sent by secure communications?

    20 A. The information contained in this order would

    21 be very dangerous if it fell into the enemy hands, and

    22 if it had to be transmitted using the radio, and if it

    23 was not sent in code, that would be very dangerous.

    24 MR. HARMON: Thank you. Mr. President, I

    25 have no additional questions this evening.

  128. 1 JUDGE JORDA: As regards the amount of time,

    2 the Defence used 3 hours and 25 minutes and you used 1

    3 hour and 25 minutes. Therefore, tomorrow, if we begin

    4 at 9.45, and taking into account a 20-minute break, you

    5 should finish by 5 minutes after 12.00. Of course, we

    6 can have a certain degree of flexibility, and that

    7 should allow you to focus all of your questions on the

    8 objectives which you consider to be essential, and not

    9 to subject yourself to the angry comments of Mr. Hayman

    10 about the quality of your questions.

    11 Having said this, I can give you back the

    12 figures and say we will now suspend the hearing and we

    13 will resume tomorrow morning at 9.45.

    14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    15 6.02 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

    16 the 30th day of October, 1998, at

    17 9.45 a.m.