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  1. 1 Friday, 30th October 1998

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 9.54 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated. Have the

    5 accused brought in, please, Mr. Registrar.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: First I would like to say good

    8 morning to the interpreters to be sure that everybody

    9 is ready. Good morning to the Prosecution and to the

    10 Defence and to the accused, and perhaps now we could

    11 have the witness, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, brought in.

    12 (The witness entered court)

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, here he is. Is everything

    14 working right? Did you rest up last night,

    15 Mr. Whatley?

    16 A. I did all right, thank you, Mr. President. I

    17 did all right.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. All right, we can

    19 continue. Mr. Harmon, you have until a quarter after

    20 12 and we will see how that works in with the breaks.

    21 Things are being timed.

    22 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much,

    23 Mr. President. Good morning Mr. President, Your

    24 Honours, good morning Counsel, and good morning

    25 Mr. Dundas-Whatley.

  2. 1 Q. Now, as you've heard, time is somewhat

    2 restricted in here, so my inquiry is going to be fairly

    3 focused, and even though I am going to be going through

    4 a large number of topics with you, still pause after I

    5 ask you a question so we don't make life more difficult

    6 for the translation section.

    7 Let me turn first, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to

    8 your testimony about the 7th Muslim Brigade. The

    9 essence of your testimony was that the 7th Muslim

    10 Brigade had a destabilising effect in areas where there

    11 were Croats living; is that correct?

    12 A. That is correct.

    13 Q. Now, let me ask you, the 7th Muslim Brigade

    14 arrived in Travnik in March of 1993, if I recall your

    15 testimony correctly.

    16 A. I'm not sure exactly when they arrived in

    17 Travnik, it was about then.

    18 Q. There are other factors as well as the 7th

    19 Muslim Brigade that destabilised the situation in

    20 Central Bosnia; isn't that true?

    21 A. That's true.

    22 Q. Did the seizure by the HVO of power, of

    23 complete power in the municipality of Vitez, Kiseljak

    24 and Busovaca have a destabilising effect on the

    25 situation in Central Bosnia?

  3. 1 A. I wasn't aware of that happening.

    2 Q. You weren't aware that the HVO had taken

    3 power in Vitez municipality, had prevented the Muslims

    4 from working in the government and in the police

    5 departments, unless they swore an oath of allegiance to

    6 the HVO?

    7 A. Sorry, rather stupidly, I thought you meant

    8 electric power. I'm very sorry. Yes, I think the

    9 Croats civilian structures, political structures, the

    10 way they behaved was probably quite, could be described

    11 as antagonistic, and it did have, I think, yes, a

    12 destabilising effect, generally.

    13 Q. Now, did the fact that Herceg-Bosna had

    14 created a state within a legitimate state of the

    15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also tend to

    16 destabilise the situation in Central Bosnia?

    17 A. Yes, I think that had the Croats not

    18 separated from the Muslims, then by definition the

    19 situation would have been stable.

    20 Q. Now, the take-over of political and military

    21 power in the Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak

    22 municipalities occurred before the arrival of the 7th

    23 Muslim Brigade; is that correct?

    24 A. The -- to the extent that -- I think, if I

    25 could clarify. I know what you're saying, and I think

  4. 1 you're basically right; but the municipalities that

    2 we're referring to, you've listed three, but of course

    3 we were dealing with about six, some of them were very

    4 much under the control of one side, some were very much

    5 of under the control of the other side, and some were

    6 divided politically or shared power politically.

    7 In the case of Vitez it was divided, the

    8 shared power never existed, certainly after January of

    9 1993. So, there were two separate governments

    10 operating in the same area, two separate local

    11 governments.

    12 But in other areas, for example, Travnik, the

    13 Muslims were very much in control, they were the

    14 government in Travnik. Then in Kiseljak, the Croats

    15 were the government. It was more down to who had the,

    16 which population group had control of the town, and

    17 that was normally down to who was the largest

    18 population there at the time.

    19 Q. Did the 7th Muslim Brigade take a

    20 headquarters in the Vitez municipality?

    21 A. I can't remember if they ever put a flag up

    22 in the town. I can't remember.

    23 Q. Now, we also --

    24 JUDGE JORDA: We have a slight problem here.

    25 If you don't mind, would you answer, please turn to the

  5. 1 Judges and look at them. I know it's not really easy,

    2 but your answers should be directed at the Judges,

    3 please.

    4 A. I apologise, Mr. President.

    5 MR. HARMON:

    6 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, you testified yesterday

    7 briefly about flag raising, both in the context of the

    8 7th Muslim Brigade in Travnik raising its flag with a

    9 crescent and a star and the flag raising of Croat flags

    10 after the visit of Mate Boban on the 8th of April,

    11 1993.

    12 Those kinds of displays tended also to

    13 destabilised the situation at various specific

    14 locations; is that correct?

    15 A. Flags and other nationalist symbols take on a

    16 meaning, a gravity far beyond what we would expect here

    17 in western Europe. So the raising of somebody else's

    18 flag or the wearing of somebody else's badge had a very

    19 inflammatory effect, yes.

    20 Q. Let me focus just briefly, if I can, for a

    21 moment, on the Travnik and Novi Travnik area. You

    22 testified on direct examination about tensions that

    23 existed in the Travnik and the Novi Travnik areas after

    24 the 10th of April, 1993; but there were tensions that

    25 existed in the Travnik and Novi Travnik area between

  6. 1 the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims before the

    2 10th of April, 1993; isn't that correct?

    3 A. That is correct.

    4 Q. So the incidents that you recounted to the

    5 Court only provide to the Court a very partial picture

    6 of the tensions that existed over a fairly long period

    7 of time.

    8 A. Yes, from the day we arrived in October, '92,

    9 Novi Travnik and Vitez and Busovaca, by the end of

    10 October, 1992, all three of those towns had seen Muslim

    11 Croat fighting on the streets and Muslim Croat deaths

    12 on the streets prior the end of October, 1992 when we

    13 arrived.

    14 MR. HARMON: If I could show the witness

    15 Defence Exhibit 419.

    16 Q. 419, while it's on its way to you,

    17 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is a one-page annexe to a

    18 MILINFOSUM that you were shown yesterday, and it is the

    19 conclusions of a joint commission, and you are

    20 mentioned in that particular Defence Exhibit 419 as

    21 going to be a participant in the joint commission.

    22 Do you recognise that particular document?

    23 A. Yes, I do.

    24 Q. This is a document that is the conclusions of

    25 a joint commission, and it has the names of Filip

  7. 1 Filipovic and Mehmed Alagic underneath it. Did you

    2 participate in this joint commission?

    3 A. Yes, I did.

    4 Q. Did this joint commission tend to reduce

    5 tensions, in your opinion, in the Travnik area?

    6 A. Yes, it did for a short period of time.

    7 Q. And on the 16th of April, 1993, when fighting

    8 broke out in Vitez and Busovaca, was there any fighting

    9 between the HVO and the ABiH, or any significant

    10 fighting between the HVO and the army in the Travnik

    11 municipality?

    12 A. Not fighting that could be -- not that was

    13 commanded from a high level. There was street fighting

    14 to some extent between the various factions, but at a

    15 much lower level, a local level, on the streets of

    16 Travnik.

    17 Q. So did it appear to you, then, that the

    18 commission had some ameliorative effect on the

    19 situation, on the 16th of April?

    20 A. What does ameliorative mean?

    21 Q. It remedied, it mitigated the situation, in

    22 terms of the violence.

    23 A. Yes, the two commanders in Travnik were very

    24 concerned to ensure that what was happening elsewhere

    25 did not happen in their town; and so, yes, the

  8. 1 commission was successful for a time.

    2 Q. Let me turn your attention to Novi Travnik.

    3 In that particular municipality, Mr. Dundas-Whatley,

    4 you testified that on the 13th of April the HVO

    5 commander, Zeljko Sabljic informed you that three of

    6 his officers had been kidnapped, do you remember that

    7 testimony?

    8 A. That is correct.

    9 Q. And there after, a joint commission was set

    10 up to investigate the disappearance of those kidnapped

    11 officers, and when I say a joint commission, I'm

    12 talking about a commission between the ABiH, the

    13 Armija, and the HVO; isn't that correct?

    14 A. Yes, and I believe there was also a member of

    15 the ECMM in that commission.

    16 Q. I see. Now, on the 16th of April, when

    17 fighting broke out in Vitez and Busovaca, was there

    18 fighting between the HVO and the Armija in Novi

    19 Travnik?

    20 A. I'm very sorry, I can't remember. If I could

    21 just refer to my notebook, and maybe a MILINFOSUM or

    22 something.

    23 MR. HARMON: In the meantime, Mr. Dubuisson,

    24 if you could get Defence Exhibit 303.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Registrar, once again, I want

  9. 1 to say when a document is put on the ELMO, at least for

    2 a little while, the monitors in the gallery should also

    3 have access to it, because this is a public hearing,

    4 they may be people from universities here and there may

    5 be people from other places that would be interested in

    6 following the hearing as comfortably as possible.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: Of course, Judge.

    8 A. My notebook is not very illuminating about

    9 the situation in Novi Travnik on the 16th. However, I

    10 did have, I did have a meeting in Novi Travnik on the

    11 morning of the 16th. And at the meeting it was a joint

    12 meeting with the Bosnian army and the HVO, and there

    13 was, appears to be a certain amount of tension, but I

    14 don't think there was any shooting at all, certainly

    15 nothing in my notebook. It was more concerned with

    16 prisoners.

    17 Q. All right, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, let me show

    18 you Defence Exhibit 303, you have 303A in front of you,

    19 which is the English version, and this is a Defence

    20 Exhibit that was presented and it is a report from the

    21 brigade Commander, Zeljko Sabljic. It is dated the

    22 18th of April 1993 at 0100 hours. It is sent to the

    23 Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander in Vitez. Let

    24 me just direct your attention to the introductory

    25 paragraph that refers to the further work of the HVO

  10. 1 and the Armija Joint Commission in investigating the

    2 case of the kidnapping of the officers from the Stjepan

    3 Tomasevic Brigade on the 13th of April. This is a

    4 report, as you can see, and if you would take a look at

    5 paragraphs 1 and 3, for just a moment, I'm going to ask

    6 awe couple of questions about it.

    7 Have you had a chance to read paragraphs 1

    8 and 3?

    9 A. Yes, I have.

    10 Q. It appears that this report indicates that

    11 the HVO and the Bosnian army continued its joint work

    12 after the attack that took place in Ahmici, after the

    13 attack that took place in Vitez and Busovaca on the

    14 16th of April; isn't that correct?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. They continued to co-operate and work

    17 together in attempt to solve a crime?

    18 A. Yes, I think this is indicative of the

    19 general mood at the time between the HVO and the

    20 Bosnian army. The general mood was that they did not

    21 want to continue to prosecute this war, they did not

    22 want acts of kidnappings, massacres, burning of

    23 villages and joint command, joint commissions were

    24 being established all over the place in an attempt to

    25 stop what was happening and there was very good

  11. 1 co-operation at low levels.

    2 Q. So, in your opinion, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, was

    3 the ABiH receptive to the idea of investigating crimes

    4 that were committed presumably by one side or the

    5 other?

    6 A. Yes, I think both -- I believe -- it's a long

    7 time ago, but I believe both sides were keen to ensure

    8 that these things didn't continue, and to investigate

    9 the crimes they knew about.

    10 Q. Now, let me just take you one step further in

    11 this, and ask you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, whether the HVO

    12 representatives with whom you met or any HVO

    13 representatives ever approached you or any other third

    14 party, or the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an

    15 effort to set up a joint commission for the

    16 investigation of the crimes at Ahmici?

    17 A. No, I was never approached. I personally was

    18 never approached with a view to establishing a joint

    19 commission to investigate Ahmici.

    20 Q. Did you ever hear of any effort by the HVO to

    21 engage the Armija in a joint investigation of either

    22 the crimes at Ahmici, the truck bomb at Stari Vitez, or

    23 the shelling of Zenica that occurred on the 19th of

    24 April, 1993?

    25 A. In the case of Ahmici, I know that Bob

  12. 1 Stewart spoke to Colonel Blaskic about this, which was

    2 many days after the event when we eventually realised

    3 the gravity and the scale of the crime. I believe, and

    4 I wasn't privy to that meeting, but I believe the

    5 result of it was quite positive in that I believe

    6 Colonel Blaskic, I believe he wanted to investigate it,

    7 as well, and asked for the help of UNPROFOR and of the

    8 British in that investigation.

    9 Q. Did he ask for the help of the Bosnian army

    10 or the Bosnian Muslim authorities in the

    11 investigation? In that investigation or the

    12 investigation of the truck bomb or the investigation of

    13 the shelling of Zenica on the 19th of April?

    14 A. I don't know if he specifically asked for

    15 that, but I know that the HVO and the Bosnian army put

    16 a lot of effort and a lot of support into the joint

    17 commission that existed consisting of Franjo Nakic from

    18 the HVO and Dzemal Merdan from the Bosnian army 3 corps

    19 and I know this commission was very much supported by

    20 Colonel Blaskic and by General Enver Hadzihasanovic.

    21 Q. But my question is more specific,

    22 Mr. Dundas-Whatley. Did the HVO ever ask, to your

    23 knowledge, the Bosnian Muslim authorities, to

    24 participate in a joint investigation with them, the

    25 HVO, of the crimes that took place at Ahmici, at Stari

  13. 1 Vitez, the truck bomb, and the shelling of Zenica on

    2 the 19th of April, if you know?

    3 A. I think that that question is better directed

    4 to Colonel Bob Stewart, who would know.

    5 Q. So you don't know the answer?

    6 A. I don't.

    7 Q. Thank you. Let me turn your attention to the

    8 15th and 16th of April, 1993, in Travnik and in Vitez.

    9 Your testimony yesterday was that you were in Travnik

    10 attending a parade of the first anniversary celebration

    11 of the founding of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    12 when you were informed that Zivko Totic had been

    13 kidnapped and you received that information on the 15th

    14 of April 1993; correct?

    15 A. I don't think I was informed exactly what had

    16 happened that was so important that I went to Zenica.

    17 I think I was informed of that later. Probably, I

    18 think I was informed of that later, probably over the

    19 radio, as I was either travelling to Zenica or once I

    20 had arrived there. I don't think I was informed of

    21 that while I was in Travnik.

    22 Q. Now, before Zivko Totic was kidnapped were

    23 you aware Colonel Blaskic had given a preparatory

    24 combat order at 10.00 in the morning on the 15th of

    25 April, 1993?

  14. 1 A. I had no knowledge or access to combat

    2 orders, as I stated yesterday, of either side, we were

    3 not privy to their plans for fighting the war. That

    4 was of no concern of ours, and it was of -- and they

    5 certainly were not going to tell us what they were

    6 going to do.

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Excuse me, counsel. I just want

    8 to note counsel has misstated the evidence. Totic was

    9 kidnapped at 8.30 a.m., an hour and a half before the

    10 referenced order.

    11 MR. HARMON: That's fine, if that's the case,

    12 Mr. President, the facts --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, when one of the

    14 parties recalls a witness's own words, I think that

    15 first and foremost the witness should say whether he

    16 agrees or doesn't. Thank you for your diligence and

    17 for your assistance, but I think that is the

    18 responsibility of the witness to say.

    19 MR. HAYMAN: With due respect, Mr. President,

    20 the question was, were you aware that Blaskic issued an

    21 order at 10.00 before Totic was kidnapped? The

    22 evidence in this case is that Totic was kidnapped at

    23 8.30. He consults that the time was 10.00, that's what

    24 I was trying to note.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, if you come in each

  15. 1 time in place of your witness, we're never going to

    2 finish here. Let me turn to Mr. Dundas-Whatley, he is

    3 the one who has to answer, I'm sorry to say. After

    4 all, you will have a moment, you will have a time when

    5 you can ask further questions. Continue, please,

    6 Mr. Harmon.

    7 MR. HARMON:

    8 Q. Have you seen such an order, preparatory

    9 combat order issued by General Blaskic on the 15th of

    10 April at 10.00 in the morning?

    11 A. I have not seen any combat orders.

    12 MR. HARMON: Could I please have Defence

    13 Exhibit 267 and 268, please, and ask that those be

    14 shown to Mr. Dundas-Whatley.

    15 Q. Let me ask you another question,

    16 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, while those exhibits are being

    17 obtained, were you aware that on the 15th of April 1993

    18 that Colonel Blaskic issued an order to take action at

    19 1545 hours to all his brigade commanders? In other

    20 words, an order to increase their combat readiness?

    21 A. I just have to repeat my answer from before.

    22 Q. Let me ask you one additional question and I

    23 expect to get the same answer, but have you seen that

    24 order, the order that he issued on the 15th of April at

    25 1545 hours?

  16. 1 A. Have I seen it since then?

    2 Q. Yes.

    3 A. I have seen some documents in preparation for

    4 this --

    5 JUDGE RIAD: It was 10.45, not 15.

    6 MR. HARMON: There's two, Judge Riad. There

    7 is one at 1000 hours on April 15th and there's one at

    8 1545 hours on April 15th.

    9 Q. Have you seen those orders even in

    10 preparation for this case?

    11 A. During preparation for this case I have seen

    12 various documents, some of which were produced by the

    13 HVO. I can't remember specifically, if I see it, I may

    14 recognise it. I don't know.

    15 Q. All right. Well, these documents are being

    16 prepared now by the registrar and they will be shown to

    17 you in just a moment?

    18 THE REGISTRAR: If you will allow, let me

    19 draw your attention to the fact that 268 has a bis

    20 version, which is confidential. I assume that the

    21 parties are in agreement that we can use the public

    22 version.

    23 MR. HARMON: That's correct.

    24 Q. Let's start, if we can, Mr. Dundas-Whatley,

    25 with 267, and you should have the English version in

  17. 1 front of you. Have you seen that document before

    2 today?

    3 A. I may have, it is similar to some I have

    4 seen. I may have seen it. There are things about it

    5 that I recognise.

    6 Q. Well, let me just very quickly -- we're going

    7 to use this document throughout the morning, but let me

    8 just draw your attention to this. This is an order

    9 from General Blaskic, then Colonel Blaskic, dated April

    10 15th. It is timed at 1000 hours and it is an order for

    11 preparatory combat command and it's been issued to all

    12 the commanders of his brigades, 1 through 12, and the

    13 commanders of the independent units, including the

    14 independent unit the Vitezovi.

    15 Now, let me show you 268, if you would look

    16 at 268, as well. 268 is the order that was issued by

    17 Colonel Blaskic on the 15th of April at 1545 hours and

    18 it is an order to take action and it has been issued to

    19 all his brigade commanders. Is that a document, sir,

    20 that you have seen prior to today?

    21 A. This one is less familiar. I don't think

    22 I've ever seen this one.

    23 Q. Okay. Well, if you just put those aside for

    24 a minute, I would like to carry on with the examination

    25 in respect of the evening of the 15th of April in Vitez

  18. 1 when you visited the town commander Sefkija Dzidic and

    2 you testified that you met with him on, from what I

    3 gather, three occasions 1955 hours, 2100 hours and 2130

    4 hours. At one of those meetings he informed you that

    5 three ABiH military policemen had been arrested at 1715

    6 hours and that the arrestees had been taken to the

    7 elementary school at Dubravica. Do you remember your

    8 testimony about that?

    9 A. Yes, I could.

    10 Q. And you are aware of the fact that's been

    11 established in this case that the Dubravica school is

    12 the headquarters of the Dubravica Knights?

    13 A. I knew the Dubravica school was a HVO

    14 location and it was quite often a check point outside

    15 it as well. But I was not sure -- it was no concern to

    16 me which unit was based there.

    17 Q. Later on in one of your meetings with town

    18 commander Djidic, he said that -- he made a further

    19 complaint to you. He said that some ABiH soldiers had

    20 been disarmed and arrested; isn't that correct?

    21 A. That is correct.

    22 Q. And those people had been disarmed and

    23 arrested by Stara Bila. Now, if you could take a look

    24 at Defence Exhibit 257, which is the order issued on

    25 the 15th of April 1993 at 10.00. Let me direct your

  19. 1 attention, if I can, to paragraph 2.2 which is on the

    2 second page. Now, let me read that.

    3 Paragraph 2.2 reads as follows -- I see there

    4 is an error in the transcript. The transcript says

    5 "Defence Exhibit 257," it should be Defence Exhibit

    6 267. So if that could be corrected. Now,

    7 Mr. Dundas-Whatley let me read 2.2. "The special

    8 purpose battalion Vitezovi will act on special

    9 assignment in the event of a break through in the

    10 Defence lines. Its assignment is to prevent enemy

    11 action in particular from the direction of Stari Vitez

    12 where the ABiH MP, which means Military Police, the

    13 Civilian Muslim Police and the PDV ABiH, are located

    14 with the probable assignment to act against the high

    15 command of the Operative Zone."

    16 I will not read the rest of that paragraph.

    17 Does it now seem to you Mr. Dundas-Whatley

    18 that the arrest of the ABiH military policemen and

    19 their being taken to the Dubravica school was the

    20 result of the order issued to the Vitezovi by Colonel

    21 Blaskic at 10.00 in the morning on the 15th of April?

    22 A. You're asking me to answer a question about a

    23 document that's here in front of me, and so I'm

    24 studying this document now.

    25 Q. Please. I direct your attention primarily to

  20. 1 the sentence in paragraph 2.2 that references the

    2 Military Police and Stari Vitez?

    3 A. If I look at this document across the whole,

    4 and I haven't read every word of it, this document

    5 gives me the impression that the HVO headquarters in

    6 Vitez was scared stiff, was very, very worried that

    7 Colonel Blaskic was worried that he was about to be

    8 attacked. That is the impression the document gives

    9 me, rightly or wrongly, but that's what he says in

    10 paragraph 1. He then goes into paragraph 2.2, and he's

    11 apparently giving an order to a unit and telling them

    12 to prevent enemy action for a particular location,

    13 because there are various units in that location which

    14 he believes are about to attack his headquarters.

    15 Q. Including the Military Police; is that

    16 correct?

    17 A. Yes, he draws attention to the Military

    18 Police and suggests that they are likely to attack his

    19 headquarters.

    20 Q. So my question to you is, does it seem likely

    21 in light of this particular order, given to the

    22 Vitezovi at 10.00 in the morning on the 15th of April,

    23 1993 that the reason those military policemen were

    24 arrested by the Vitezovi and taken to their

    25 headquarters is a result of this order issued by

  21. 1 General Blaskic at 10.00 in the morning on the 15th?

    2 Is that a fair conclusion to draw?

    3 A. There is nothing in here that is issuing

    4 orders to address anyone, to killing anyone, to attack

    5 anyone.

    6 Q. All right. Well --

    7 A. I'm not defending the action of the unit

    8 concerned, but I'm referring directly to this document.

    9 Q. Do you think that the arrest of the Armija

    10 soldiers at Stari Bila -- again, the name Darko

    11 Kraljevic surfaced in that particular incident, and

    12 Darko Kraljevic was the commander of the Vitezovi. Do

    13 you think that in any way relates to this particular

    14 order of General Blaskic --

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, this is the third

    16 time that you're asking the question. You're deducing

    17 from an order that was issued at 10.00, and you were

    18 asking that the witness answer the question three

    19 times. I think it's time to move to another question.

    20 You have a hypothesis you want to have the witness

    21 verify, but nonetheless, I think you must move to

    22 another question.

    23 MR. HARMON:

    24 Q. In fact, Mr. President, let me -- if you keep

    25 those documents near you, we're going to use those

  22. 1 documents again, Mr. Dundas-Whatley.

    2 Let me turn to a different area, and that is

    3 certain conversations that Colonel Blaskic had in

    4 respect of who was responsible for Ahmici.

    5 Were you present when Colonel Blaskic had a

    6 conversation with Brigadier Alistair Duncan about who

    7 was responsible for the commission of the crimes at

    8 Ahmici?

    9 A. No, because Colonel Duncan, as he was then,

    10 arrived one day, I think, one or two days, I think,

    11 before we left. I don't remember that meeting. I may

    12 have been there but I very much doubt it.

    13 Q. Okay. Let me summarise what Brigadier Duncan

    14 related to this court about that conversation. He was

    15 asked a question, and -- about Ahmici, and the

    16 explanation of that, and according to the testimony of

    17 Brigadier Duncan this is what he answered: "From

    18 Blaskic was either it had been done by Muslim

    19 extremists who had somehow come into the Vitez pocket

    20 and committed this event and disappeared in the night

    21 on their own people, or indeed Muslim armed forces from

    22 the BiH, or finally the Muslims dressed up in HVO

    23 uniform."

    24 Those were the three reasons given. I'm

    25 sorry, I should refresh that. The three reasons were,

  23. 1 and these are the people he informed -- these are the

    2 people Blaskic informed Duncan were responsible for the

    3 commission of the crimes at Ahmici. The three reasons

    4 given were Serb extremists, Muslims who had infiltrated

    5 the pocket or Muslims dressed in HVO uniforms.

    6 Now, what is your reaction,

    7 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to the proposition that the Serbs

    8 were responsible for the commission of the crimes at

    9 Ahmici?

    10 A. Almost impossible.

    11 Q. You think that's a truthful answer?

    12 A. It would be almost impossible, Your Honours,

    13 for the Serbs, who were 20 kilometres away to come to

    14 Ahmici to commit that atrocity.

    15 Q. You think that that answer to Brigadier

    16 Duncan was a truthful answer?

    17 A. That Colonel Blaskic was telling the

    18 truth. ?

    19 Q. Yes, sir.

    20 A. I have no -- I don't know what made Colonel

    21 Blaskic think that the Serbs could possibly have done

    22 that.

    23 Q. Let me ask you, in respect of whether the

    24 proposition that Muslims had come into the village of

    25 Ahmici, torched the village, killed over a hundred

  24. 1 people, driven all the Muslims out of the village of

    2 Ahmici, what's your reaction to that?

    3 A. I think it's slightly a bizarre thing to say

    4 and I think it's so unlikely that the Muslims could

    5 possibly have done that to themselves.

    6 Q. We go to the third component of this answer,

    7 and that is that the Muslims disguised themselves as

    8 HVO and went in and did that. What was your reaction

    9 to that, Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

    10 A. I think it's ridiculous to even suggest that.

    11 Q. Now, let me talk to you again about another

    12 statement in respect of the investigation into Ahmici

    13 that was given by Colonel Blaskic, this time in an

    14 Article that appeared in October of 1993.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Beyond the scope,

    16 Mr. President. I've let it go on but this is beyond

    17 the scope.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: It's out of the scope, yes, if

    19 you look at things strictly, but the witness had the

    20 functions of liaison officer. I don't think there's

    21 any problem with asking him questions about the very

    22 core of his mission. He was a liaison officer, he

    23 represents the liaison between various military,

    24 political and other powers. Therefore, there's nothing

    25 wrong with the Prosecution asking what he might think

  25. 1 about opinions that the accused may have offered as

    2 explanations for the massacre at Ahmici. Continue,

    3 please, Mr. Harmon.

    4 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

    5 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley I'm going to read from

    6 Prosecutor's Exhibit 380. There's no reason to put it

    7 in front of you. I'll read a portion verbatim. This

    8 is an interview of Colonel Blaskic that appeared in the

    9 magazine (phoen) Danis in October of 1993. Mr. Blaskic

    10 -- Colonel Blaskic was asked the following question:

    11 "You investigated a crime in Ahmici. What is the

    12 result of the investigation so far?" And Colonel

    13 Blaskic answered as follows: "The investigation is

    14 still in progress. Information is being gathered. In

    15 any case, this is a well-planned scenario in which

    16 Muslim forces wanted, once again, to cast a blemish on

    17 units of the HVO before the world community. After the

    18 crimes that Muslim forces committed in the areas around

    19 the Croatian villages of Lasva, Dusina, Gusti Grab and

    20 other villages in the Busovaca municipality, the case

    21 of Ahmici was staged and skilfully shown to foreign

    22 reporters and the EC observer mission with the

    23 assistance of the commander of the British battalion at

    24 the time, Bob Stewart.

    25 So far we are certain that the crime was

  26. 1 committed by members of the HOS (Croatian defence

    2 force) in Zenica, which was mostly Muslim, and parts of

    3 the Muslim forces of the MOS (Muslim defence force) and

    4 I have already said that this investigation is

    5 continuing.

    6 It is certain that the HVO does not stand

    7 behind the crime that others desire to attribute to

    8 us. However, I want to say that a much greater crime

    9 is being skilfully concealed. Muslim forces shot to

    10 death more than 40 civilians, mostly women and

    11 children, back at the beginning of June in the village

    12 of Mojina (phoen), Travnik municipality. We have not

    13 been allowed to this day, nor has the UNHCR, or the

    14 International Red Cross or the European Observer

    15 Mission to look around that area and perform an

    16 exhumation of the bodies. That was a collective

    17 execution in front of other Croats who had to dig the

    18 grave for those who were killed."

    19 Now, let me ask you your reaction to portions

    20 of this statement attributed to Colonel Blaskic.

    21 A. I'm sorry, would it be possible for me to

    22 have a copy just to make notes on it, because there was

    23 a lot contained in that. I'm afraid I've cleverly

    24 forgotten to bring a pen. If the usher could lend me a

    25 pen, please.

  27. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Let me take advantage of this

    2 break in order to say that in the French version of the

    3 official document from the registry as regards possibly

    4 point -- point of view, is that the English version --

    5 could you go back to the middle of the paragraph and

    6 see -- "I've already declared that the investigation

    7 was ongoing." Do you see that? "I already have

    8 declared," it says in French --

    9 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: And in the next sentence, at

    11 least in the French version, is a bit different. Mine

    12 says, that is from -- the document from the registry,

    13 it is certain, these are the words attributed to

    14 General Blaskic in the interview, "It's certain that

    15 the HVO is not responsible for the crime that some

    16 people would like to ascribe to us." In what you read,

    17 which was interpreted, I didn't get the same version.

    18 It was more ambiguous.

    19 MR. HARMON: Mr. President --

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Could you repeat it, please,

    21 and the interpreters can try to help me. Go ahead,

    22 please.

    23 MR. HARMON: "It is certain that the HVO does

    24 not stand behind the crime that others desire to

    25 attribute to us."

  28. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. It's not the same. Let

    2 me call your attention to the fact that the version I

    3 have here is different. Here it is certain -- the

    4 accused says, according to this, "It is certain that

    5 the HVO is not responsible for the crimes that certain

    6 parties wish to ascribe to it."

    7 I would ask that at the proper time this be

    8 checked and compared with the Serbo-Croatian version

    9 because you have that one in front of you.

    10 MR. HARMON:

    11 Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, your

    12 reaction, first of all, to the second sentence in the

    13 article, "In any case, this is a well-planned scenario

    14 which Muslim forces wanted, once again, to cast a

    15 blemish on the units of the HVO before the world

    16 community." What's your reaction to that? Do you

    17 think the massacre at Ahmici was a well-planned

    18 scenario, that the Muslim forces wanted to use and did

    19 perpetrate in order to cast a blemish on the HVO?

    20 A. I don't think that's what he's saying. Could

    21 I just have a minute to read this, please, this whole

    22 thing?

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Have you read the document,

    24 Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

    25 A. I'm still reading. I'm very sorry.

  29. 1 JUDGE JORDA: After the review of the

    2 document, I suggest that we take a 15 minute break.

    3 A. Yes, I've read the document now.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Since -- go ahead.

    5 MR. HARMON:

    6 Q. Please, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, what is your

    7 reaction to this -- these comments of Colonel Blaskic

    8 in respect of the -- it being a well-planned scenario

    9 in which Muslim forces wanted, once again, to cast a

    10 blemish on the forces of the HVO before the world

    11 community?

    12 A. There are two things that spring to mind

    13 about this, and, firstly, I think that Colonel Blaskic

    14 is using this military publication for normal -- for

    15 military propaganda reasons as every army uses its own

    16 military publications. But secondly, I get the

    17 impression from reading this that probably Colonel

    18 Blaskic actually didn't know who committed the events

    19 in Ahmici.

    20 Q. What does he say?

    21 A. I beg your pardon? In what regard?

    22 Q. Well, let me read this. "So far we are

    23 certain," and I underscore the word "certain" --

    24 JUDGE JORDA: Let's not waste time,

    25 Mr. Dundas-Whatley. Yes, on this point all of the

  30. 1 versions are the same. It says that we're certain that

    2 the crime was committed on that day. On that

    3 particular point all of the versions are in agreement

    4 with one another.

    5 A. Yes. I'm not disputing that, Mr. President.

    6 It's in relation to who he thinks has done it. He's --

    7 on one hand he's blaming people, the HOS from Zenica

    8 and saying they're mostly Muslims, which I have already

    9 said I think is ridiculous and I don't think he would

    10 have believed at the time, and then he's blaming the

    11 MOS, the Muslim defence force, and then he says the

    12 investigation is continuing.

    13 I think he's trying to put on a brave face

    14 about something which he doesn't appear to know much

    15 about, because if he had conducted a proper

    16 investigation in this stage in October or whenever this

    17 is, he would, I think by now he would have stated

    18 exactly who was commanding the attack against Ahmici.

    19 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions in

    20 respect to this document, Mr. President.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I suggest that we take a

    22 15-minute break.

    23 --- Recess taken at 10.43 a.m.

    24 --- On resuming at 11.10 a.m.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: We will now resume the hearing,

  31. 1 have the accused brought in.

    2 (The accused entered court)

    3 MR. HARMON:

    4 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, you were asked yesterday

    5 a number of questions about command and control by

    6 Defence counsel, and the first question you were asked

    7 was essentially a question about the degree of command

    8 and control in the HVO and Central Bosnia while you

    9 were there.

    10 I'm going to try to distil your answer:

    11 Essentially you answered that it was difficult for you

    12 to make that kind of an assessment of the degree of

    13 command and control that Blaskic had over the forces in

    14 Central Bosnia. You didn't have detailed information

    15 about the workings of the HVO headquarters in Vitez,

    16 and you did not have access to combat orders; and,

    17 therefore, you opined that the degree of command and

    18 control in Central Bosnia was poor.

    19 Does that fairly characterise your testimony

    20 in that regard?

    21 A. It does not. My opinion that command and

    22 control was poor was based on a variety --

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Excuse me for a moment,

    24 please. There is a technical problem here in the

    25 public gallery. What's wrong?

  32. 1 THE REGISTRAR: For the time being, for

    2 technical reasons, we can't have retransmission into

    3 the gallery, so the video is going to be interrupted

    4 for a few moments, if you like.

    5 JUDGE JORDA: All right, we will suspend as

    6 long as it takes so that the gallery can follow the

    7 hearing as well. The hearing is suspended.

    8 --- Recess taken at 11.12 a.m.

    9 --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.

    10 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed.

    11 MR. HARMON:

    12 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, as we do in

    14 matches, we're going to count this technical time,

    15 which was needed to make the repairs. I suppose we

    16 will take our break at 12.30.

    17 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President.

    18 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, yesterday when you were

    19 asked questions about the degree of command and control

    20 in Central Bosnia, you said it was difficult for you to

    21 make that kind of assessment because you did not have

    22 detailed information about the workings of the HVO

    23 headquarters in Vitez, you did not have access to

    24 combat orders, some of the indicators to you that

    25 command and control was poor, was based on the poor

  33. 1 quality of officers and soldiers in the HVO, the poor

    2 communications of the HVO, the divided loyalties

    3 between village and between central staff, and you used

    4 examples to illustrate your point, illustrations of an

    5 example at a checkpoint and cease-fire violations. As

    6 a result of that, you opined that command and control

    7 was poor in Central Bosnia.

    8 Let me ask you this question: No system of

    9 command and control functions perfectly in any army,

    10 does it?

    11 A. I think the British system is pretty good.

    12 Q. There is insubordination in the British army,

    13 isn't there?

    14 A. Yes, but not the level we are discussing

    15 here.

    16 Q. I understand, but there is insubordination in

    17 the British army. On occasions some officers refuse to

    18 follow orders; isn't that correct, sir?

    19 A. Over small issues over small periods of time,

    20 there are occasionally differences of opinion which

    21 could be characterised as you have said, but not -- to

    22 describe the British army as having a poor command and

    23 control is very misleading.

    24 Q. What was the level of insubordination in the

    25 former JNA; do you have any idea about that?

  34. 1 A. I have no idea at all.

    2 Q. It's difficult to compare, isn't it, the

    3 British army, which is one of the best armies in the

    4 world, to other armies in the world; is that correct?

    5 A. I served in the British army, I know a lot

    6 about it, and I know certain about the Bosnian army and

    7 the HVO, and that was the extent of my comparison.

    8 Q. All right. Now, let me ask you, you were

    9 read a quote yesterday, as well, and the quote you were

    10 read was as follows: "The attack on Ahmici could not

    11 have occurred without the authority of Colonel Blaskic

    12 due to the number of troops involved and the scale of

    13 the attack."

    14 Your answer to the answer of whether you

    15 agreed or disagreed with that was that you disagreed

    16 and you stated as follows.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, there is an

    18 objection from Mr. Hayman. Does the objection have to

    19 do with what the witness said?

    20 MR. HAYMAN: The question was authority and

    21 order of Colonel Blaskic, the transcript will so

    22 reflect. Thank you.

    23 MR. HARMON:

    24 Q. The answer that you stated was, quote, "I

    25 disagree. The statement assumes that all the attacks

  35. 1 would have been ordered by Blaskic, and the command and

    2 control that existed at the time means it is probably

    3 not the case, almost certainly not the case."

    4 Now, let me draw your attention, first of

    5 all, to the issue of cease-fires. In the period of

    6 time in and around, from April 16th to April - to the

    7 end of April, there were a number of cease-fires, were

    8 there not?

    9 A. Yes, there were a number of cease-fires, and

    10 in the months before that, as well.

    11 Q. I'm focusing -- please just answer my

    12 questions, Mr. Dundas-Whatley. In the month of April,

    13 between the 16th and the end of the month, there were a

    14 number of cease-fires; isn't that correct?

    15 A. Yes, it is correct.

    16 Q. Now, sometimes cease-fires were not followed

    17 because, if you will, there was hot blood between the

    18 combatants and they didn't want to put down their arms;

    19 isn't that correct?

    20 A. That is correct.

    21 Q. Did you ever get the sense,

    22 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, that on other occasions a

    23 cease-fire order would be issued for public

    24 consumption, but privately and behind the scenes there

    25 was another agenda, that is, an agenda to pursue the

  36. 1 combat?

    2 A. That is possible, but I did not get that

    3 impression. But I'm not saying it didn't happen.

    4 Q. And there are other instances, are there not,

    5 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, where the cease-fires were coming

    6 in a relatively quick succession, that it was difficult

    7 to impose immediate and absolute cease-fire before

    8 there was a breach.

    9 A. I'm sorry.

    10 Q. There were successive cease-fires, some were

    11 within two or three days of each other; isn't that

    12 right?

    13 A. And more frequently occasionally, yes.

    14 Q. And more frequently. Okay.

    15 Now, let me ask you, you said that one of

    16 your indicators as to why there was poor command and

    17 control in Central Bosnia was because of poor quality

    18 of officers and the poor quality of soldiers.

    19 Did you ever do an analysis or a survey on

    20 the level of training and the military background of

    21 Blaskic's subordinate commanders?

    22 A. I'm referring to a general impressions that I

    23 gained from talking to these people.

    24 Q. My question is: Did you do an analysis or a

    25 survey of the training and military background of

  37. 1 Blaskic's subordinate commanders?

    2 A. No, I did not.

    3 Q. Let's talk briefly about the JNA. The JNA,

    4 was it not, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, one of the largest

    5 armies in eastern Europe, before the disintegration of

    6 the former Yugoslavia?

    7 A. Yes, it was a very large conscript army.

    8 Q. And it was a very formidable, potentially a

    9 formidable foe even for the British army; isn't that

    10 correct?

    11 A. That's what we believed, yes.

    12 Q. In fact, you said there was conscription,

    13 there was universal conscription for all young men of

    14 the age, I think, of 18, and they had to serve a year

    15 in the JNA, and they had to receive training in the

    16 JNA; isn't that correct?

    17 A. Yes, I believe it is.

    18 Q. And in the former Yugoslavia there were

    19 professional military academies, including the Military

    20 Academy in Belgrade where then Colonel Blaskic

    21 graduated.

    22 A. Yes. I know a little bit about his former

    23 military experience because somebody told me at the

    24 time, and it is true, yes, he did study at the Military

    25 Academy at Belgrade, and I believe he reached the rank

  38. 1 of captain.

    2 Q. Can you tell us about the reserve officer

    3 training program that existed in the former Yugoslavia?

    4 A. I know very little about it, but what I do

    5 know is that people were, the reserve officers were

    6 promoted over a period of time, and the age you may

    7 leave the JNA as a lieutenant or captain, and a few

    8 years later be a major, and a few years later a

    9 lieutenant colonel, but with no command responsibility

    10 and no military training during that period.

    11 Q. Did you start your military career in the

    12 reserves of the British army?

    13 A. Yes, I did.

    14 Q. Let me ask you, the concept of

    15 territoriality, local defence, the JNA had a principle,

    16 did they not, of the Territorial Defence, and those

    17 forces were based in villages; is that correct?

    18 A. I don't know what existed before the collapse

    19 of Yugoslavia. I know there was a Territorial Defence

    20 system in, loosely in place when I arrived in October,

    21 '92. What happened before then I do not know anything

    22 about at all.

    23 Q. Are you aware that one of the central pillars

    24 of the JNA, the total national defence philosophy was

    25 to have Territorial Defence units in local villages?

  39. 1 A. No, I don't know anything about that.

    2 Q. I see. Now, did you ever attend any of the

    3 training or were you familiarised with any of the

    4 training that was available to conscripts in the former

    5 JNA?

    6 A. No, I was not.

    7 Q. So, you're unable to give us, are you, in

    8 your own words, the standards and the degree of

    9 training that was available to JNA conscripts in the

    10 former Yugoslavia?

    11 A. No, I know very little about it, about how

    12 the training was conducted.

    13 Q. Now, one of the fundamental concepts of the

    14 former JNA and one of the fundamental concepts of the

    15 HVO was the concept of unity of command, which is the

    16 concept of subordination; are you aware of that?

    17 A. No, I'm not.

    18 Q. So, when you say, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, that

    19 the level of, the poor quality of soldier that existed

    20 in Central Bosnia, are you ignoring the fact that a

    21 significant number of those people who were soldiers in

    22 the HVO had undergone mandatory military training in

    23 the former JNA?

    24 A. No, I'm not. I'm not ignoring anything. I'm

    25 reiterating my opinion at the time, based on the

  40. 1 information told to me by the Bosnian army commanders

    2 and the HVO commanders about the problems they had with

    3 their soldiers, in particular, most of the soldiers

    4 came from villages and never attended the training in

    5 the JNA before the war, most of them were illiterate,

    6 most of them didn't-- a lot of them didn't know what

    7 they were supposed to be doing, they were not formed

    8 into proper units. I must say it was particularly true

    9 on the side of the Bosnian army because there were huge

    10 numbers of refugees they had to deal with in Travnik.

    11 My testimony is not based on anything to do

    12 with the JNA. It's based on what I found talking, as

    13 the person whose responsibility it was to talk to

    14 military commanders in Bosnia about such matters. It

    15 was they that were forwarding this information to me

    16 about the huge problems they had with their command and

    17 control, huge problems they had with their soldiers.

    18 It was them that was telling me, and I'm just

    19 reiterating that to this Court as honestly and as

    20 directly as I can.

    21 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, if the HVO and the ABiH

    22 commanders had such poor quality soldiers and officers,

    23 how did they stop and defend against the Republika

    24 Srpska juggernaut that was better armed, that inherited

    25 all the equipment that was available from the former

  41. 1 JNA? How did they do that?

    2 A. I think the front-lines stopped moving when

    3 the Serbs had taken 70 per cent of the country; and so,

    4 I think that to say that 65 per cent of the population

    5 were now living in 30 per cent of the country, and you

    6 attribute that with some military achievement; it was a

    7 massive disaster.

    8 Q. The question was: How did the HVO, with an

    9 army, as you put it, of illiterate peasants and the

    10 ABiH with an army of illiterate peasants, successfully

    11 defend the lines against the VRS? How did they do

    12 that?

    13 A. I did not go to the front-lines very much.

    14 How they fought on the front-lines, I'm not aware of.

    15 I'm just trying to tell you exactly what I -- exactly

    16 as I can what I knew and what I was told. To suggest

    17 that the HVO and the Bosnian army jointly conducted

    18 some wonderful defence of Bosnia is meaningless, they

    19 lost thousands of men on those front-lines.

    20 Q. Let me change the topic slightly.

    21 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, have you seen any other combat

    22 orders issued by Colonel Blaskic before you testified

    23 here today?

    24 A. I may have, I have reviewed quite a number of

    25 documents.

  42. 1 Q. Do you have Prosecutor's Exhibit 267 and 268

    2 in front of you? Those are the two exhibits we looked

    3 at a little earlier today.

    4 A. Yes, I do.

    5 Q. Let me direct your attention, first of all,

    6 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to Prosecutor's Exhibit 268 -- I'm

    7 sorry, 267, and this is a preparatory order issued at

    8 10.00 on the 15th of April 1993?

    9 MR. HAYMAN: For the record, Counsel, these a

    10 Defence exhibits.

    11 MR. HARMON: Thank you for correcting me.

    12 Q. Let me refer you, please, to paragraph 2.1 of

    13 that order, and I would like to refer you to the

    14 following sentence which is found at the bottom of the

    15 first full paragraph, and it reads as follows: "In the

    16 event of a rather strong attack by the Muslim extremist

    17 forces from the directions of the villages of Nadioci,

    18 Ahmici, Sivrino, Pirici, inform me," which is Colonel

    19 Blaskic who is the author of this order, "and if fire

    20 is opened directly at you, return the fire and

    21 neutralise the attacker."

    22 Now, let me turn your attention to the next

    23 exhibit, Defence Exhibit 268, and this is a combat, I

    24 mean, an order to take action that is dated the 15th of

    25 April at 1545 hours, it is addressed to all the brigade

  43. 1 commanders listed in the right-hand column as

    2 addressees, and let me direct your attention to

    3 paragraph 2.2, which essentially orders that all of the

    4 units, the brigades and the military, 4th Military

    5 Police Battalion increase their combat readiness.

    6 A. 2. what?

    7 Q. 2.1. Let me then turn you to the end of the

    8 document, if I can, paragraph 6, where Colonel Blaskic

    9 orders that "Regular reports are to be sent in by 1800

    10 hours in the evening and 0600 hours in the morning,

    11 special reports as need may be."

    12 Now, this reporting back feature, this

    13 request to get, receive reports back from your

    14 subordinate units is a normal factor found in armies,

    15 isn't it? You want to know what your troops are doing,

    16 you want them to report back to you?

    17 A. Yes, but in the British army we don't give

    18 subordinates orders to report, because it is in their

    19 training and they know they have to report anyway.

    20 MR. HARMON: Could I have Defence Exhibit

    21 269, please, shown to the witness?

    22 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, this is a combat command

    23 issued by Colonel Blaskic on the 16th of April at 0130

    24 hours. It is issued to the commander of the HVO

    25 Brigade Vitez, Mr. M. Cerkez and PN units Tvrtko; have

  44. 1 you seen this document before you testified today?

    2 A. Yes, I think I have.

    3 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph 2, this

    4 particular paragraph orders Mr. Cerkez to assign his

    5 forces to occupy the defence region blockade villages

    6 and prevent all entrances to and exits from the

    7 villages. "In the event of open attack by the Muslims,

    8 neutralise them and prevent their movement with precise

    9 fire from PN." And the time for readiness of this

    10 particular order is 5.30 in the morning on the 16th of

    11 April, 1993.

    12 Do you see that?

    13 A. Yes, I do.

    14 Q. Paragraph 3, Colonel Blaskic advises

    15 commander Cerkez of the positions of various elements

    16 of his forces; do you see that?

    17 A. Yes, I do.

    18 Q. Now, are you aware, sir, that -- well, let me

    19 rephrase the question.

    20 The evidence in this case shows that the HVO

    21 engaged in simultaneous attacks on the villages of

    22 Ahmici, Vitez, Nadioci, Santici, Pirici, Sivrino Selo

    23 and Donji Vecerska on the morning of 16 April at 5.30

    24 in the morning?

    25 A. Are you asking me am I aware?

  45. 1 Q. Are you aware?

    2 A. I knew it was about that time, I thought it

    3 was a little later actually, but about that time of the

    4 morning war did break out in many locations, probably

    5 the ones you just said.

    6 Q. Now, could I have Defence Exhibits 283, 282

    7 and 281 shown to the witness?

    8 Now, let's start, Mr. Dundas-Whatley --

    9 A. Am I going to have to refer back to these?

    10 Q. We're going to keep those up there, yes,

    11 sir.

    12 A. Thank you.

    13 Q. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, if we could start

    14 with Defence Exhibit 282, if the -- the Exhibits I'm

    15 going to show you now are other combat related orders.

    16 This order which, is Defence Exhibit 282, is order an

    17 issued by Colonel Blaskic on the morning of the 6th --

    18 I'm sorry, 16th April, 1993 at 1940 hours, and it is

    19 issued to the commander of the 4th Military Police

    20 battalion in Vitez and to the commander of the Travnika

    21 Brigade for information, and it relates to the

    22 withdrawal of troops of the Travnik Military Police

    23 company to Vitez.

    24 If you -- it's a command, and it is a

    25 command, and you will see in paragraph one it relates

  46. 1 to the unit of the 4th Military Police battalion that's

    2 currently in Travnik, and it is a command to transfer

    3 them to Vitez. Do you see that?

    4 A. Yes, I do.

    5 Q. And do you see in paragraph 2 that the

    6 transfer should be carried out in small groups

    7 depending on the conditions that existed, and bearing

    8 in mind security. Do you see that paragraph?

    9 A. Yes, I do.

    10 Q. And the purpose of this order was to

    11 reinforce the Viteska Brigade. Do you see that in the

    12 introductory paragraph?

    13 A. Yes, do I.

    14 Q. And the Viteska Brigade was engaged in combat

    15 in the Vitez municipality on the 16th of April. You're

    16 aware of that; aren't you?

    17 A. I don't know which brigades were fighting,

    18 but it's pretty obvious that every member of the HVO

    19 would have been fighting by then.

    20 Q. Let me turn your attention to Defence Exhibit

    21 281. 281 is a one-page document in English, and

    22 this -- do you see that in front of you? It is a

    23 combat order dated the 16th of April, 1993 at 1945

    24 hours. It is issued by Colonel Blaskic, and it is

    25 issued to the commander of the Nikola Subic-Zrinski

  47. 1 Brigade in Busovaca and to Mr. Dusko Grubesic. Do you

    2 see that?

    3 A. Yes, I do.

    4 Q. Have you ever seen this document before?

    5 A. I don't think I have, but I -- I don't think

    6 I have.

    7 Q. Have you ever seen the previous document

    8 before?

    9 A. The subjects of it is vaguely familiar, so I

    10 may have read it before.

    11 Q. Now, let's return back to 281, the one

    12 document that is the combat order to Dusko Grubesic for

    13 the Defence of Kuber. And this particular document is

    14 a short document. As you can see, in paragraph 2

    15 Colonel Blaskic identifies the task that he wants Dusko

    16 Grubesic and his brigade to undertake. That is

    17 correct?

    18 A. Yes, it is.

    19 Q. Now I'd like to turn your attention to

    20 Defence Exhibit 283 and ask you to examine 283. 283 is

    21 an order for increased control of the territory to the

    22 commander of the Stjepan Tomasevic Brigade in Novi

    23 Travnik, and it's dated 16 April, 1993 at 2015 hours

    24 and it is signed by Colonel Blaskic. Do you see -- is

    25 that correct?

  48. 1 A. I just need to read it, if you don't mind.

    2 Q. All right.

    3 A. Yes, I do.

    4 Q. And paragraph 4 of that particular document,

    5 do you see that Colonel Blaskic asks that a report on

    6 the execution of the order be received by him by 2400

    7 hours on 16 April, 1993?

    8 A. Yes, I do.

    9 Q. Now, he makes a similar type of request. I

    10 hate to refer you back, but would you look at 281 as

    11 well, which is the combat order to Dusko Grubesic to

    12 defend the positions on Kuber? You see in paragraph 4

    13 that Colonel Blaskic says, "Report back to me in

    14 writing"?

    15 A. Yes, I do.

    16 Q. Let me show you some other combat orders, if

    17 I could. Could I have Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/45 and

    18 456/46?

    19 MR. HAYMAN: Could I have the number again,

    20 please?

    21 MR. HARMON: 456/45, and 46 -- I'm sorry

    22 456/45 and 456/46.

    23 Q. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley these are documents

    24 that -- at least 456/45 is a document I showed you

    25 yesterday. Do you remember this document? This is a

  49. 1 document that is directed by Colonel Blaskic to the Ban

    2 Jelisic Brigade in Kiseljak. It's dated the 17th of

    3 April, 1993 at 2345 hours. You saw this document

    4 yesterday when I showed it to you; didn't you?

    5 A. Yes, briefly. Unfortunately, I don't even

    6 recognise it from yesterday.

    7 Q. Have you seen this document prior to

    8 yesterday?

    9 A. I don't recognise this document at all for

    10 some reason.

    11 Q. Well, this is a document that in paragraph

    12 2.2 -- it is an order for the combat operations, and in

    13 paragraph 2.2 --

    14 A. I'm sorry, to interrupt. This is bit -- this

    15 paragraph I recognise, which you drew my attention to

    16 yesterday.

    17 Q. Let me redirect your attention to that

    18 paragraph. Paragraph 2.2, this order for combat

    19 operations directs the Ban Jelisic Brigade to use

    20 artillery and fire preparations in a particular attack

    21 and to capture Gomionica and Svinjarevo and it

    22 describes how that particular task is to be

    23 accomplished. Do you see that?

    24 A. That paragraph 2.2, yes.

    25 Q. Okay. Now, if you turn to the back -- the

  50. 1 second page of that, it indicates in the document that

    2 combat operations are to begin on April 18th at 5.30 in

    3 the morning; is that correct?

    4 A. Yes, that's correct.

    5 Q. And paragraph 11 indicates that the commander

    6 of the Ban Jelisic Brigade -- or the Ban Jelisic

    7 Brigade command is to report to Colonel Blaskic upon

    8 completing the assigned tasks, correct?

    9 A. That's correct.

    10 Q. Okay. Now, let me -- take a glance at the

    11 whole document for just a minute, because I want to ask

    12 you if you've ever seen this document before. I showed

    13 it to you yesterday?

    14 A. I don't think so. I only recognise the

    15 paragraph that you drew my attention to yesterday.

    16 Q. Fine. Thank you. Now, let me turn your

    17 attention next to another combat order, and this is a

    18 combat order which is the next Exhibit that you were

    19 handed. It should be 456/46. It's a combat order

    20 dated the 18th of April, 1993 at 1.40 -- 0140 hours,

    21 and it's directed to a different part of Colonel

    22 Blaskic's area of operations, that is to Foinijca, and

    23 it is an order that directs that the commander of the

    24 Fojnica HVO battalion engage in certain combat

    25 activities; is that correct?

  51. 1 A. That is correct, yes.

    2 Q. Have you ever seen this document before I

    3 presented it to you today?

    4 A. It is familiar. I may well have been shown

    5 it by the Defence attorney, but I'm not entirely

    6 certain.

    7 Q. So I take it you don't have a clear

    8 recollection of ever having seen this document, it's

    9 possible but you're not entirely sure?

    10 A. That is correct. I'm not entirely certain.

    11 Q. Okay. Turn to paragraph 6 of that particular

    12 exhibit. Again, you can see, can you not, the last

    13 sentence in that, Colonel Blaskic requests that a

    14 report be made to him regularly on all activities, as

    15 well as the implementation of the assignment. Isn't

    16 that correct? He's asking for a report back; isn't he?

    17 A. Yes, he is.

    18 Q. Now, the evidence that has been presented in

    19 this case, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is on the morning of the

    20 18th of April, at 5.30 in the morning, the villages of

    21 Gomionica and Svinjarevo were attacked by the HVO. Are

    22 you aware of that?

    23 A. No, I'm not.

    24 Q. Were you aware that these villages were razed

    25 to the ground and all the Muslims were driven out of

  52. 1 these villages?

    2 A. I'm -- could you tell me the names of the

    3 villages again, and maybe if I look at the map I can

    4 refresh my memory.

    5 MR. HARMON: Svinjarevo and Gomionica.

    6 MR. HAYMAN: The fighting in Gomionica, just

    7 for the record, went on for six weeks, contrary to

    8 counsel's statement, but I don't want to interrupt him

    9 otherwise.

    10 MR. HARMON: May I assist the witness? I can

    11 direct him more quickly, Mr. President. I can show him

    12 where the villages are.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, approach the witness. For

    14 the time being he doesn't seem to be very aware of

    15 that. Mr. Nobilo, Mr. Hayman, if you would like to

    16 approach.

    17 MR. HARMON:

    18 Q. He's indicated, Mr. President, for the

    19 record, and the witness can indicate that I've pointed

    20 out the villages of Svinjarevo and Gomionica to him.

    21 Is that correct?

    22 A. That's correct, Your Honours.

    23 Q. Does that refresh your recollection?

    24 A. Not really, because those villages were in

    25 the Kiseljak municipality, which was well beyond my

  53. 1 scope of interest and responsibility.

    2 Q. Now, let me show you the -- some responses

    3 that were made by Blaskic's subordinate commanders. In

    4 fact, one of the indicia of command and control, I'm

    5 sure you will agree with me on this,

    6 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is when a commander gives a

    7 request -- an order to a subordinate to report back,

    8 that the subordinate reports back. That's a favourable

    9 indication --

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Harmon, don't make too many

    11 comments, ask the question, because that's a long way

    12 of going about it. And let me remind you of your

    13 scheduling needs.

    14 MR. HARMON: I'm very conscious of it,

    15 Mr. President.

    16 Q. That a favourable indication that command and

    17 control are functioning properly?

    18 A. One indication, yes, of good command and

    19 control is if you ask for a report from a subordinate

    20 that he gives you that report.

    21 Q. Could I have, please, Prosecutor's Exhibit

    22 521 and Defence Exhibit 280 shown to the witness.

    23 Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, I'm going to show

    24 you a sample of some of the responses made by Blaskic's

    25 subordinate commanders. I'm not going to show them all

  54. 1 to you. And let me ask you -- we'll start --

    2 We can start with 521, Mr. Usher.

    3 Do you have 521 in front you,

    4 Mr. Dundas-Whatley?

    5 A. Yes, I do.

    6 Q. This is a response -- an operative report on

    7 the situation at 6.00 in the morning on the 16th of

    8 April, 1993 from the Jure Francetic Brigade, Branislav

    9 Borzniak (phoen), and it indicates, does it not,

    10 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, and I will read it to you, "The

    11 night was quiet in the zone covered by the brigade.

    12 All units are holding the positions they had seized.

    13 The town is under control, and our units are letting

    14 unarmed civilians who are going to work to pass

    15 through."

    16 So this is an example, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, of

    17 the Zenica Brigade reporting back to Colonel Blaskic at

    18 6.00 in the morning?

    19 A. Yes. I'm slightly confused about this,

    20 because I don't know which town he's referring to.

    21 Q. Well, in any event, whether -- I don't think

    22 that's particularly of interest which town, he's --

    23 this is an indication that the Jure Francetic Brigade

    24 is reporting back to Colonel Blaskic at 6.00 in the

    25 morning on the situation at 6.00 in the morning on the

  55. 1 16th of April; isn't that correct?

    2 A. Yes, it is a report, yes.

    3 Q. Now, let me show you Defence Exhibit 280. Do

    4 you have that in front of you? This is a report dated

    5 the 16th of April from Pasko Ljubicic, who was the

    6 Military Police, 4th Battalion commander. Do you have

    7 that report in front of you?

    8 A. Yes, I do.

    9 Q. And do you see the first paragraph, very

    10 short sentence that says, "Acting in accordance with

    11 your order number," and the number is given, "of 16

    12 April, we hereby report." And you see that that is a

    13 report back by the 4th Military Police to Colonel

    14 Blaskic about the events that took place -- read the

    15 document for a moment if you care to.

    16 A. Yes, this is a report from -- yes. As you

    17 say, yes.

    18 Q. Now, do you know where the Bungalow is that

    19 is -- ever hear of that while you were a liaison

    20 officer?

    21 A. No, I don't ever remember the word

    22 "Bungalow".

    23 Q. Do you know where the -- do you know where

    24 there was an A-frame shaped building located on the

    25 outskirts of the village of Ahmici? Did you ever see

  56. 1 that building?

    2 A. Was that a restaurant that was subsequently

    3 burnt down?

    4 Q. I don't know. It's an A-frame building. It

    5 may be.

    6 A. There was a building next to the road on a

    7 corner which the HVO -- which HVO soldiers used and

    8 were -- I think they were accommodated there. And

    9 following the attack on Ahmici some weeks later or

    10 maybe months later, I don't know, that building

    11 subsequently burnt down. And this building had been a

    12 restaurant, I think, or a large bar. Probably a

    13 restaurant. That could be the building you're

    14 referring to.

    15 Q. Okay. Now, let me -- could I have the next

    16 exhibits, please, and that is the exhibits which would

    17 be 28 -- Defence 287, Defence 312 and Defence 325?

    18 By the way, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, this

    19 particular report, Defence 280, have you ever seen this

    20 report prior to testifying today?

    21 A. I don't know. I don't recognise the report,

    22 but I may well have read it, but I did read quite a lot

    23 of documents over a very short period of time.

    24 Q. Do you have any recollection of reading this

    25 report?

  57. 1 A. I don't recall it, no.

    2 Q. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, the next series of

    3 exhibits I'm going to show you, we can start with

    4 Defence Exhibit 287. 287. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, they

    5 are sample reports back to Colonel Blaskic from the

    6 Viteska Brigade, and you will notice that in the upper

    7 left-hand corner the source of these documents.

    8 The first document, Defence Exhibit 287, is a

    9 report dated the 17th of April at 6.00 in the morning,

    10 and it is a combat report, and the author of this

    11 report is Zvonimir Cilic. Do you see that?

    12 A. Yes, I do.

    13 Q. Have you ever seen this document before

    14 coming in to testify today?

    15 A. This is -- the content of this document is

    16 familiar, but I don't know if I've read it, or if it

    17 was read to me or something similar.

    18 Q. Okay. But this is a document, is it not,

    19 from the Viteska Brigade to Colonel Blaskic indicating

    20 the situation on the ground at 17 April at 6.00 in the

    21 morning?

    22 A. That is correct.

    23 Q. Let me turn to the next -- another document,

    24 this is a day later, from the Viteska Brigade.

    25 A. Which one is it, please?

  58. 1 Q. This is 312. And this is dated the 18th of

    2 April at 1600 hours. It is from the Viteska Brigade

    3 and it is to the Central Bosnia Operation Zone command,

    4 and it's an operations report. It is signed by the

    5 officer on duty, whose signature I can't read on the

    6 original, but let me ask you: In this operations

    7 report, there are a number of paragraphs and very

    8 briefly, let me just go over those paragraphs with

    9 you.

    10 In paragraph number one, it indicates that in

    11 the Kuber region the defenders were holding their

    12 particular positions. In paragraph number two, it

    13 indicates that in Gornji Santici, Mahala hamlet,

    14 there's heavy fighting. Further on reads, in the

    15 villages of Santici and Donja Dubravica there's fire.

    16 From the villages of Sivrino Selo and another village

    17 that I cannot pronounce.

    18 The third paragraph indicates the stretch of

    19 the defence lines, and it indicates they go from

    20 Krizancevo Selo, Krecivine and Jardol and remain

    21 unchanged. Further reports that in the area of

    22 paragraph 4, Divjak and Bila, there's constant firing.

    23 Paragraph 5 indicates that the Kruscica region

    24 continues to be under attack.

    25 So this is a fairly comprehensive report to

  59. 1 Colonel Blaskic from the Viteska Brigade command on the

    2 18th of April, 1993; is that correct?

    3 A. That is correct.

    4 Q. And is this a good quality summary -- a good

    5 quality report back to a commander about the events

    6 that are taking place in that particular region?

    7 A. It's the best one you've shown me so far.

    8 Q. All right. Have you ever seen this document

    9 before you testified?

    10 A. No, I haven't.

    11 Q. Let me show you the last document from the

    12 Viteska Brigade, again a sample. This is a document,

    13 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, that is the following day. Now,

    14 this is the 19th of April, 1993, and this is addressed

    15 to the Central Bosnia operation zone command. It's an

    16 operations report. Again, the operations duty officer

    17 signed it, and this indicates, in the first paragraph,

    18 what the Muslim forces -- what regions they had

    19 shelled, it indicates further, in the second paragraph

    20 that pursuant to Colonel Blaskic's order of 19 April,

    21 the very same day this order was sent back, the report

    22 was sent back to Colonel Blaskic, that the road to Han

    23 Bila and Zepce had been blocked. In other words,

    24 Colonel Blaskic sent an order on the 19th of April 1993

    25 and that order had been complied with. Do you see

  60. 1 that?

    2 A. That's what it says, yes.

    3 Q. Okay. And -- now, this is, again, an order

    4 from the Viteska Brigade informing Colonel Blaskic of

    5 the situation in that particular region; correct?

    6 A. Yes, it is.

    7 Q. Have you ever seen this document before

    8 coming in to testify?

    9 A. I don't think so.

    10 MR. HARMON: Let me now turn to the next

    11 series of documents from Busovaca, and if I could have

    12 D277, D289, D292, D288, D313, D324 shown to the

    13 witness, please.

    14 JUDGE JORDA: Are you still on the same

    15 subject, Mr. Harmon?

    16 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    17 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps it would have been a

    18 bit easier if we could know if the Defence witness more

    19 or less agreed with the idea you're trying to express,

    20 that is, that there was a certain degree of good

    21 quality in the relationship and the chain of command,

    22 which would make things move forward more quickly; but

    23 of course, you are the one conducting the questioning,

    24 not myself.

    25 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. President, for

  61. 1 the suggestion, but given the fact the witness hasn't

    2 seen many of these documents, and I will go as quickly

    3 as I can with these documents, I think it is important

    4 that he at least inspect them. Could we start, Mr.

    5 Usher, with 277A, please?

    6 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, these are a series of

    7 documents coming from the Nikola Subic-Zrinski Brigade

    8 in Busovaca. And let me start out with 277A, an order,

    9 I'm sorry, a report to the Central Bosnia Operation

    10 Zone from that particular brigade in Busovaca, and it

    11 is a report on the situation of the brigade's zone of

    12 responsibility at 1700 hours. And it is signed -- let

    13 me direct your attention, first of all, to the first

    14 paragraph where there is a description of infantry

    15 attacks in particular identified regions, in the region

    16 of Gornji Rovna and Pezici, and further, there were

    17 combat activities in the region of Kuber and Obla

    18 Glava.

    19 Now, this is a report back to the commander

    20 from that particular brigade in Busovaca; correct?

    21 A. That is correct.

    22 Q. Let me turn your attention, then, to 289A.

    23 Again, this is a report back to the commander, and I

    24 say these are samples, this is a report back to the

    25 commander the following day, the 17th of April, 1993,

  62. 1 at 8.30 in the morning, directed to Colonel Blaskic

    2 from the brigade commander, Dusko Grubesic; and it

    3 indicates that the brigade had lost its positions on

    4 Kuber and that Colonel Blaskic would be informed of any

    5 further activities. Do you see that?

    6 A. Yes, I do.

    7 Q. Let me return to 292B -- 292, I'm sorry.

    8 This is a report, again, from the Busovaca Nikola

    9 Subic-Zrinski Brigade on 17 April, and it reports the

    10 situation in the zone of responsibility at 1200 hours.

    11 You can see that it is a report identifying

    12 regions that have been attacked and are engaged in

    13 combat; is that correct?

    14 A. Yes, that's correct.

    15 Q. Now, let me turn you to the next exhibit,

    16 which is 288A, Defence Exhibit 288A. It is an exhibit

    17 dated the 17th of April, 1993 from the Nikola

    18 Subic-Zrinski Brigade to the Central Bosnia Operation

    19 Zone commander.

    20 A. I haven't been given that one.

    21 Q. 288?

    22 A. 288A?

    23 Q. Do you have 288?

    24 A. I have 289, which we have been through.

    25 Q. While Mr. Dubuisson is looking for 288, let

  63. 1 me ask you a question with respect to the documents

    2 I've shown you thus far from the Busovaca Brigade.

    3 Have you seen any of these documents before

    4 you came in to testify, 289, 292 and 277?

    5 A. I don't know. Probably not, but there is a

    6 sort -- the general feeling that's coming from them is

    7 not unfamiliar, but I don't actually know which ones,

    8 if any of these, I've seen.

    9 Q. You don't have any recollection of having

    10 seen these; is that right?

    11 A. No.

    12 Q. Do you have 288A in front of you, sir?

    13 A. Yes, I do.

    14 Q. Now, again, this is from the same brigade in

    15 Busovaca on the 17th of April, and this is an

    16 indication of where combat was taking place in that

    17 particular brigade's area of operation; is that

    18 correct?

    19 A. Yes, that is correct.

    20 Q. So, on the 17th of April, these three

    21 documents which I have shown you, 289, Defence 289,

    22 Defence 292 and Defence 288 are multiple reports coming

    23 to Colonel Blaskic from the same brigade identifying

    24 and informing him of the combat activity that is taking

    25 place in the Busovaca region; correct?

  64. 1 A. That is correct.

    2 Q. Let me show you Defence Exhibit 313, we can

    3 turn our attention to that, because this is now a

    4 report the following day. Do you have 313 in front of

    5 you?

    6 A. I don't.

    7 MR. HARMON: Mr. Dubuisson, just in case, the

    8 next exhibit after 313 would be 324.

    9 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, if you turn your

    10 attention to 313, this is dated, again, the 18th of

    11 April, the day after the three previous documents we

    12 have been talking about, and it is a report on the

    13 situation in the brigade's zone of responsibility at

    14 1800 hours.

    15 In this document you can see that the

    16 operations officer on duty is reporting to Colonel

    17 Blaskic what the situation is in the area of operation

    18 for that particular brigade; is that correct?

    19 A. That is correct.

    20 Q. Now, let me turn your attention to 324, which

    21 is a sample of documents, Defence documents, if we

    22 could. You see that, now, this is a further report on

    23 the 19th of April. Now, this is the day after the

    24 previous report that you have seen, and it is coming

    25 from the Nikola Subic-Zrinski Brigade in Busovaca, and

  65. 1 it is going to the Central Bosnia Operation Zone

    2 command to Colonel Blaskic, and it is signed by the

    3 brigade commander, Dusko Grubesic.

    4 Now, if you take a look at this document,

    5 this is a report in paragraph 1, you can see there are

    6 some asterisks in paragraph 1, and these identify not

    7 only the area where the attacks took place, but

    8 identify the enemy units that are being engaged. Do

    9 you see what I'm referring to?

    10 A. Yes, yes, I do.

    11 Q. Do you see in paragraph 2 the identification

    12 of the HVO forces, both, it identifies the first

    13 brigade with the first asterisk, the second brigade; do

    14 you see that?

    15 A. Yes, this is the standard way that I think

    16 these are going, yes.

    17 Q. And is this a pretty good military report

    18 back to a commander, in your opinion?

    19 A. Certainly compared with the rest of them it's

    20 quite good, yes.

    21 Q. Have you ever seen this document before you

    22 came in to testify?

    23 A. I don't think so.

    24 Q. Let me turn your attention, now, to the

    25 following exhibits, Defence Exhibit 305, 306, and

  66. 1 Defence Exhibit 323.

    2 Now, you'll recall, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, that

    3 I showed you an earlier exhibit, and this was an

    4 exhibit that is Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/45. I

    5 referred you to the second paragraph that talked about,

    6 it was a combat order from Colonel Blaskic, and it

    7 indicated that the combat instructions were to capture

    8 Gomionica and Svinjarevo, and the combat operations

    9 were to start on the 18th of April at 5.30 in the

    10 morning. Do you remember what document I'm talking

    11 about?

    12 A. I have quite a large pile of these now.

    13 Could you give me the number, again?

    14 Q. Yes, 456/45, and it is an order for combat

    15 operations on the 17th of April, 1993 at 2345 hours to

    16 the Ban Jelacic Brigade command, and it is an order to

    17 commence combat operations the following morning at

    18 5.30 on the villages of Gomionica and Svinjarevo. Turn

    19 to paragraph 2.2.

    20 A. Yes, I have that.

    21 Q. Turn to paragraph 2.2, just to refresh your

    22 recollection, and paragraph 10, which is the time the

    23 command is, the operation is supposed to start against

    24 those particular villages.

    25 Now we can turn our attention,

  67. 1 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to these three next exhibits, which

    2 represent samples of the Kiseljak Brigade's responding

    3 to Colonel Blaskic. Turn your attention first to

    4 Defence Exhibit 305. Do you have that in front of you?

    5 A. Yes, I do.

    6 Q. Now, this is a report from the officer on

    7 duty of the Ban Jelacic Brigade headquarters, a

    8 gentleman by the name of Mato Lucic, and this is a

    9 report on the situation in Kiseljak at 10.00 in the

    10 morning.

    11 If you turn your attention to paragraph 1b,

    12 it reads that, "Our forces which are fulfilling their

    13 tasks in the village of Gomionica are being attacked.

    14 They are mostly using snipers, a large number of forces

    15 has left Gomionica and pulled out toward the village of

    16 Stojkovici." And in the second paragraph it indicates

    17 that "Tasks are being done by orders." It goes on to

    18 state that the villages of Jelovac, Gromljak, Malva and

    19 Palez have been disarmed."

    20 So, this is a report from the Kiseljak

    21 commander, officer on duty, I should say, to Colonel

    22 Blaskic about the situation in respect of his order

    23 that he gave the night before about attacks Gomionica;

    24 is that correct?

    25 A. That is correct.

  68. 1 Q. Let me turn your attention to the next

    2 exhibit, which is the same day, 18 April, 1993, and

    3 this is a brief report from the brigade commander, Mijo

    4 Bozic, dated the 18th of April, 1993, at 1645 hours, in

    5 other words, later in the day, and it is a description

    6 of further conflicts in the area; do you see that?

    7 A. Yes, I do.

    8 Q. Lastly, let me turn your attention to these

    9 Kiseljak documents, and turn your attention to 323.

    10 323 is, again, from the Ban Jelacic Brigade, and it is

    11 a combat report for the 19th of April, 1993 at 2.00 in

    12 the morning, and it describes the Muslim armed forces

    13 in paragraph 1, and it describes the attempted

    14 counter-attack on Gomionica, and it describes a

    15 situation of the HVO forces; is that correct?

    16 A. Yes, it is.

    17 Q. So, in respect of these three documents I

    18 have shown you about Kiseljak, have you ever seen these

    19 three documents before you came in here to testify?

    20 A. I don't think I have.

    21 Q. And it appears that there's reporting back to

    22 Colonel Blaskic about the military attack that he

    23 ordered on Svinjarevo and Gomionica; do they not?

    24 A. Yes, they do.

    25 Q. Let me turn your attention, lastly, to

  69. 1 Defence Exhibit 322. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, this is an

    2 exhibit, Defence Exhibit dated the 19th of April, 1993,

    3 and it is from the 111th XP Brigade located in Zepce,

    4 and one of the addressees is Colonel Blaskic. This is

    5 a report -- and by the way, Zepce is a distance from

    6 Vitez; isn't it?

    7 A. Yes, it's one-and-a-half hours drive,

    8 probably.

    9 Q. This report is a report on the situation of

    10 the Zepce 111th Brigade; is that correct?

    11 A. Yes, it is.

    12 Q. Now, have you ever seen this document before?

    13 A. No, I have not.

    14 Q. Now, I've shown you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, a

    15 sample of documents which represent reports back to

    16 Colonel Blaskic from the Zenica municipality, the

    17 military, 4th Military Police, the Viteska Brigade, the

    18 Busovaca Brigade, the Kiseljak Brigade and the Zepce

    19 Brigade; and does it appear to you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley,

    20 from these exhibits that I've shown you that there was

    21 good reporting back to Colonel Blaskic in respect of

    22 the combat situation that was occurring in his area of

    23 operations?

    24 A. From the examples you've given me two things

    25 spring to mind; firstly, that I think to have an

  70. 1 accurate assessment, an accurate assessment of whether

    2 reporting was good, you would need to study one order,

    3 there is an early one here that went out to about a

    4 dozen different units, and confirm that all dozen of

    5 them were responding to that order as requested.

    6 The other thing that springs to mind, and we

    7 are certainly not getting that, there is a general

    8 pattern here that we're getting reports from three

    9 brigades all the time.

    10 The other thing that springs to mind is all

    11 these reports, including the one on the -- which was

    12 very strange to me -- including the one on the morning

    13 of the 16th of April, the report from the military

    14 police.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: Defence 280.

    16 A. According to that one -- but most of the

    17 ones, particularly the first two days of this, they all

    18 refer to attacks on their positions by the Muslims.

    19 That springs to mind immediately from reading these,

    20 which was a trend I was not aware of at the time.

    21 MR. HARMON:

    22 Q. Let me ask you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, is this

    23 how the British military operates in a combat

    24 situation, orders go out and reports come back?

    25 A. Yes, but we don't operate in this paper trail

  71. 1 system, normally.

    2 Q. I understand. But, nevertheless, there is a

    3 function of command orders going out and reports coming

    4 back to the commander; isn't that right?

    5 A. Yes, there is. And if I could elaborate

    6 slightly. We have reports, there are routine reports

    7 which are sent either every 12 or 24 hours, depending

    8 on the situation. In the case of Bosnia, we sent

    9 24-hourly reports, as I remember. And then there are

    10 combat reports which are sent immediately during the

    11 battle so the commander knows what is going on where.

    12 And those are two different types of reports.

    13 The latter type would normally be sent over

    14 the radio immediately. And at battalion level, the

    15 other ones would also be sent over the radio. This

    16 written type of report is, I think, it's not something

    17 I'm very familiar with in the British army, because I

    18 think is more concerned with much higher level command.

    19 Q. All right, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, now I would

    20 like to show you Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/32.

    21 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, this is a report authored

    22 by Colonel Blaskic, it is a Defence military secret, it

    23 is strictly confidential, it is dated the 7th of May

    24 1993 at 1230 hours, and it is addressed to the Supreme

    25 Commander of the armed forces of the Croatian community

  72. 1 of Herceg-Bosna, the head of the Defence department of

    2 the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna, and the chief

    3 of the main headquarters of the HVO, Mostar, and it is

    4 a report on the special situation in Central Bosnia

    5 Operation Zone and the Croatian community of

    6 Herceg-Bosna.

    7 Have you seen this document before?

    8 A. No, I have not.

    9 Q. Let me turn your attention, if I can,

    10 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to the third to the last page, and

    11 you will see in Colonel Blaskic's own words.

    12 A. Page number?

    13 Q. I don't have a page number, but if you look

    14 at the top there is a series of numbers, and it should

    15 be 00564015, do you have that page in front of you?

    16 A. Yes, I do.

    17 Q. Do you see the mid-page conclusion? Do you

    18 see that?

    19 A. Yes, I can.

    20 Q. Let me read, in Colonel Blaskic's own words,

    21 his assessment in a confidential military secret to his

    22 superior officers about the level of command and

    23 control in Central Bosnia. I quote paragraph.

    24 "1. Command and control function properly,

    25 and all missions proceed in a planned fashion,

  73. 1 according to orders, with detailed knowledge of the

    2 situation, full coordination and control."

    3 Have you ever seen this document?

    4 A. No, I have not.

    5 Q. This is Colonel Blaskic's assessment of how

    6 command and control --

    7 MR. HAYMAN: Is that a question, Mr.

    8 President, or is counsel lecturing or posturing,

    9 perhaps?

    10 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment, please. We

    11 don't have a great deal of time. What document are you

    12 talking about? I'm having difficulty following you,

    13 456/32?

    14 MR. HARMON: Yes, that's correct.

    15 JUDGE JORDA: Since it isn't paginated, what

    16 -- it starts with "composition". So, this, the last

    17 word is -- the one I have says "demand" at the end.

    18 There is some page number, 00621.

    19 MR. HARMON: On the English version.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, please.

    21 MR. HARMON:

    22 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, this is the assessment of

    23 Colonel Blaskic to his superior officers of how command

    24 and control functioned in the Operation Zone, and this

    25 assessment of Colonel Blaskic differs from your

  74. 1 assessment; does it not?

    2 A. Yes, it does.

    3 Q. Now, who do you think had more reliable and

    4 more complete information, you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, or

    5 Colonel Blaskic?

    6 A. I did not have detailed knowledge of the

    7 workings of the HVO headquarters so I can only assume

    8 Colonel Blaskic's knowledge of his command control

    9 system would be better than mine.

    10 Q. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, does it seem

    11 probable or possible to you that in a top secret

    12 military document sent to the Supreme Commander of the

    13 armed forces, who happened to be Mate Boban, the head

    14 of the defence department of the Croatian community of

    15 Herceg-Bosna, who happened to be Bozo Rajic, and the

    16 chief of the main headquarters of the HVO Defence

    17 counsel in Mostar, who was General Petkovic, that

    18 Colonel Blaskic would be deceiving his superior

    19 officers about the level and the degree of command and

    20 control that he had over his forces in Central Bosnia?

    21 A. Are you asking me is he likely to deceive

    22 them?

    23 Q. Yes.

    24 A. I have no idea.

    25 Q. Let me turn your attention, lastly,

  75. 1 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, to --

    2 JUDGE JORDA: How much more time do you

    3 have? How much more time do you need, Mr. Harmon? I

    4 was thinking about the break for the interpreters.

    5 We're working until 1.30. What do you have, another

    6 ten minutes, about?

    7 MR. HARMON: Yes.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: Do you want to take a short

    9 break now and then we could start up afterwards?

    10 MR. HARMON: I would prefer to continue for

    11 the next few minutes, Mr. President, with the line of

    12 questioning I have.

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Let me consult with my

    14 colleagues.

    15 We will suspend and the hearing and resume in

    16 15 minutes.

    17 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.

    18 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Have the accused brought in,

    20 please.

    21 (The accused entered court)

    22 JUDGE JORDA: We are going to resume for the

    23 last hearing of the week. You have about ten minutes

    24 or about 15 minutes. Go ahead. You will finish by

    25 1.00 at the latest and then there is the

  76. 1 re-examination -- the time for re-examination.

    2 MR. HARMON:

    3 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, earlier in your

    4 examination, when you opined that the command and

    5 control of Colonel Blaskic in Central Bosnia was weak,

    6 you testified that you had not seen combat orders. I

    7 have shown you a number of combat orders that you have

    8 testified you have not seen before testifying today,

    9 and I have shown you combat orders that were issued by

    10 Colonel Blaskic in the Vitez municipalities and the

    11 Busovaca municipalities on the 15th and the 16th of

    12 April, 1993.

    13 I have shown you the Defence Exhibit 267,

    14 which is an order -- preparatory combat order dated the

    15 15th of April, 1993 at 10.00, in which Colonel Blaskic

    16 says, "In the event of a rather strong attack by Muslim

    17 extremist forces from the direction of the villages of

    18 Nadioci, Ahmici, Svinjarevo Pirici inform me, and if

    19 fire is opened directed on you, return fire and

    20 neutralise the attacker."

    21 Evidence has been presented in this case that

    22 attacks in the Lasva Valley occurred simultaneously in

    23 Vitez, Nadioci, Santici, Pirici, Sivirno Selo, Donja

    24 Veceriska at 5:30 in the morning on the 16th of April,

    25 1993.

  77. 1 I have shown you orders issued by Colonel

    2 Blaskic on the 17th of April, 1993, ordering the attack

    3 on Gomionica and Svinjarevo at 5.30 in the morning on

    4 the following day, and evidence has been presented in

    5 this Tribunal that on the following day, at that time,

    6 the HVO attacked those villages.

    7 I have shown you a number of combat reports

    8 sent to Colonel Blaskic by his brigade commanders, and

    9 a sample of those reports, incomplete reports, sent to

    10 Colonel Blaskic from Zenica municipality, Vitez

    11 municipality -- Viteska Brigade I should say, the

    12 Busovaca Brigade, the Kiseljak HVO Brigade, the Zepce

    13 Brigade and the 4th Military Police, reports that were

    14 requested by Colonel Blaskic.

    15 Finally, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, you have seen

    16 what Colonel Blaskic said to the supreme commander of

    17 the armed forces of the Croatian Community of

    18 Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, what he said to the Defence

    19 Minister Bruno Stojic, what he said to his commanding

    20 officer General Petkovic on the 7th of May, that,

    21 "Command and control function properly and all

    22 missions proceed in a planned fashion according to

    23 orders, with detailed knowledge of the situation, full

    24 coordination and control."

    25 Do you still maintain your answer that

  78. 1 Blaskic's command and control was poor?

    2 A. Yes, I do, but that is a very long -- a very

    3 long question, and based on a lot of assumptions. And

    4 having had time to think about this in more detail, I

    5 would like to just draw your attention to some of the

    6 documents which I've been given in the build-up to this

    7 very long question to reinforce my opinion.

    8 Firstly, if we could deal with the situation

    9 with regards to the orders issued by Colonel Blaskic on

    10 the 15th of April. He asked that the orders -- that in

    11 the case of the 4th Military Police Battalion, that

    12 they were expecting an attack, and they should -- if

    13 fire is opened, they should return fire and then

    14 neutralise the attacker. Then he later says they

    15 should send a report.

    16 Then the report is here, it's about ten lines

    17 long, and the report says that -- and this is the 4th

    18 Military Police Battalion referring to the village of

    19 Ahmici, that the 4th Military Police Battalion was

    20 attacked by the Muslims, and so contrary to the orders

    21 that they were given, they went ahead and -- somebody

    22 went ahead, and I can only assume it was this unit,

    23 because they appear, from these documents, to be based

    24 next to Ahmici, went ahead and destroyed that village.

    25 So I don't consider the -- although that is

  79. 1 not in the report. The report does not say that the

    2 village was destroyed. The report does not say that

    3 anyone burnt Ahmici or killed a hundred civilians. I

    4 think this report by the 4th Military Police Battalion

    5 is -- could be described as completely inaccurate and

    6 misleading, and if I was Colonel Blaskic sitting in the

    7 Hotel Vitez and I received that report, I would believe

    8 that things were going very well in that sector of my

    9 command. This report is designed to mislead Colonel

    10 Blaskic, I believe.

    11 It -- also, the events on the ground

    12 demonstrate a complete disobeying of his order. His

    13 order did not say, "Go and kill 100 civilians."

    14 The second issue was the village of

    15 Gomionica, which is in the Kiseljak area. It is not a

    16 village which I'm familiar with, but according to

    17 your -- according to your question earlier, you said

    18 that Gomionica was attacked and razed, I believe you

    19 said, and all the Muslims were cleansed, or words to

    20 that effect, from the village.

    21 The report on the village -- and I think we

    22 did have the order of what the Kiseljak Brigade was

    23 supposed to do in Gomionica, but it certainly was not

    24 as you have described they did do. The report does not

    25 say that they must cleanse the village, burn it to the

  80. 1 ground, which is apparently, according to what counsel

    2 has just said, happened, but the report received back

    3 on the 18th definitely does not say that's what's

    4 happened either. I don't know what day that happened.

    5 It may have been after the 18th. But certainly the

    6 report after the 18th makes no reference to the ethnic

    7 cleansing of that village.

    8 Going back to this very large document that

    9 you have just quoted, where Colonel Blaskic concludes

    10 that the -- to his commander that the command control

    11 is functioning properly. If you had taken the time to

    12 read the previous page of this document which I have

    13 just read, paragraph 6 --

    14 MR. HAYMAN: Could we, for the record -- I'd

    15 just like to note the witness first was referring to

    16 Exhibit D280 which is the military report regarding

    17 Ahmici, and now he's referring to Prosecutor's Exhibit

    18 56/32, page 014.

    19 A. It's 456/32. About the second paragraph of

    20 six he's referring to the Fojnica Battalion. Now, we

    21 have an order which you asked me read just now, which

    22 was 456/46B, where the Fojnica -- sorry, the Fojnica

    23 Battalion is given orders of what it is required to do

    24 under its military chain of command. Then in the

    25 report that Colonel Blaskic then sends to his commander

  81. 1 up the chain, he says, and I quote, "All units to carry

    2 out their tasks except the battalion in Fojnica, which

    3 with engaged in personnel reshuffling and taking a

    4 neutral position vis-à-vis the Muslims. So that the

    5 Muslim forces are attacking on Busovaca unimpeded from

    6 the area of Fojnica."

    7 He is actually telling his commander in

    8 Mostar, in a roundabout way, that his orders to the

    9 Fojnica Battalion have been ignored, disregarded or

    10 disobeyed. So that's the third example from the

    11 question which springs to mind, without going through a

    12 great deal more.

    13 I would also refer you to another paragraph

    14 on the same page of this very long report that Colonel

    15 Blaskic wrote, and it's at the bottom of that same

    16 page, number one.

    17 The problem is his communication routes have

    18 been cut off, and then he explains how he is now

    19 completely cut off from Herzegovina. On the next page,

    20 he is completely cut off -- Kiseljak is completely cut

    21 off from him, and that Zepce and Usora, which is much

    22 further north, are completely cut off from him as

    23 well.

    24 So I think that in summary, these documents

    25 actually do not support your -- the counsel's assertion

  82. 1 that command and control was going well, but the

    2 reports were misleading, incomplete, and his own report

    3 illustrates that to us and to his commander, if his

    4 commander wanted to read it.

    5 MR. HARMON:

    6 Q. You also testified that you disagreed with

    7 the a statement, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, "The attack on

    8 Ahmici could not have occurred without the authority of

    9 Colonel Blaskic, due to the number of troops involved

    10 and the scale of the attack," and your answer was, "I

    11 disagree. The statement assumes that all of the

    12 attacks would have been ordered by Blaskic, and the

    13 command and control that existed at the time means that

    14 it is probably not the case, almost certainly not the

    15 case."

    16 Do you maintain your answer in that respect?

    17 A. Yes, do I.

    18 Q. Now, let me ask you some additional

    19 questions, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, and that is about your

    20 military career in the British army.

    21 You testified, did you not, before this

    22 Tribunal that the -- under what circumstances did you

    23 leave the army, and your testimony was, "The army went

    24 under a large-scale reduction in force and that's when

    25 I left."

  83. 1 Now, let me explore that with you for just a

    2 moment. At the end of the Cold War, the British army

    3 decided to reduce its land forces from 155,000 to

    4 100,000 soldiers, isn't that true?

    5 A. That is correct, yes.

    6 Q. And they asked to reduce their soldiers

    7 through a programme of what was known as redundancy.

    8 There was voluntary redundancy, in other words,

    9 soldiers could opt out of the service, get a large

    10 capital payment, preserve their retirement benefits and

    11 leave the service; isn't that correct?

    12 A. That is correct.

    13 Q. And a large number of British officers and

    14 soldiers left the British army through a voluntary

    15 redundancy procedure, isn't that correct?

    16 A. That is correct.

    17 Q. And you testified, and I'm going to quote,

    18 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, from your testimony on

    19 direct-examination, "In the British army, officers and

    20 soldiers, senior NCO, belong to a meritocracy, where

    21 they are promoted as a result of being good at their

    22 jobs, getting good reports." Do you remember that

    23 testimony?

    24 A. Yes, I remember.

    25 Q. Now, the second way the British army reduced

  84. 1 its land forces was by compulsory redundancy; isn't

    2 that correct?

    3 A. That's correct.

    4 Q. And compulsory redundancy or forced early

    5 retirement was a situation where the Ministry of

    6 Defence reviewed the personnel file of NCOs and

    7 officers in the British military, and desired -- made

    8 a decision on the desirability whether those NCOs and

    9 officers should remain in the British army, is that

    10 true?

    11 A. That is correct.

    12 Q. They retained their best personnel and

    13 released their weakest personnel; is that correct?

    14 A. Arguably.

    15 Q. And you left the army in 1993 through the

    16 programme of compulsory redundancy, isn't that true?

    17 A. That is correct.

    18 Q. Now, you were made redundant in 1993 while

    19 you were serving in Bosnia, is that true?

    20 A. That is correct.

    21 Q. Were you the only officer of the Cheshire

    22 Regiment serving in Bosnia at the time asked to leave?

    23 A. I can't remember.

    24 Q. Did you make an appeal from this compulsory

    25 redundancy?

  85. 1 A. Appeal was made by my commanding officer Bob

    2 Stewart, by his commanding officer Brigadier Andrew

    3 Cumming, based on the last two years of work in the

    4 army both in three tours of Northern Ireland and in my

    5 time in Bosnia. Based on my recent two or three years

    6 of exceptional, or to use their word, "excellent"

    7 reports for those last three years. My commanding

    8 officer, my regiment and indeed the brigadier in

    9 command of all British forces in Bosnia said the that

    10 army was making mistake and so they appealed.

    11 Q. What was the result of that appeal?

    12 A. The appeal was turned down.

    13 Q. So the Ministry of Defence didn't agree with

    14 their assessment, did they?

    15 A. I have no idea.

    16 Q. Okay. Now, let me ask you about --

    17 A. And I have been subsequently been asked to go

    18 back to Bosnia with the British army. I have been

    19 asked on two occasions by the Ministry of Defence to

    20 rejoin on a special type commission, and to serve back

    21 in Bosnia doing presumably similar work to what I was

    22 doing before, and on both occasions I refused.

    23 Q. Let me ask you about an interview that you

    24 had with representatives of the Office of the

    25 Prosecutor on July 22, 1998 in Split, Croatia, where

  86. 1 you were residing at the time. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, did

    2 you have a meeting with Howard Tucker at that time?

    3 A. Yes, I did.

    4 Q. And Howard Tucker is a British police officer

    5 employed with the Office of the Prosecutor, is he not?

    6 A. Yes, he is.

    7 Q. Did you have a meeting with Jean-Pierre

    8 Kapelle a French retired Lieutenant-Colonel?

    9 A. Yes, I did.

    10 Q. And did you have a meeting also with Patrick

    11 Lopez-Terres, a lawyer who is employed by the Office of

    12 the Prosecutor?

    13 A. Yes, did I.

    14 Q. Did they ask you about the events that

    15 occurred it Central Bosnia?

    16 A. Yes, they did.

    17 Q. Did you inform them that your memory was not

    18 very good about the events because you were usually

    19 drunk by lunch time?

    20 A. In the early part of my tour that is true,

    21 although from about the beginning of April, 1993, I

    22 almost completely stopped drinking as a liaison

    23 officer, which was considered very unusual that liaison

    24 officers would not drink, but I stopped drinking

    25 because I was going to so many meetings every day that

  87. 1 if I continued to drink, I would be an alcoholic. So I

    2 stopped probably about the beginning of April.

    3 Q. Did you tell them as well,

    4 Mr. Dundas-Whatley, when they asked you questions about

    5 matters about which you've testified, that "I was quite

    6 drunk most of the time." Therefore, you couldn't

    7 remember?

    8 A. Yes.

    9 Q. Okay.

    10 A. I think I probably did.

    11 Q. Now, --

    12 A. And I think I if you asked any liaison

    13 officer and my commanding officer about dealing with

    14 the locals, they would all say the same thing.

    15 Q. Now, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, at that same meeting

    16 with Mr. Patrick Lopez-Terres, Mr. Howard Tucker and

    17 Mr. J.P. Kapelle, did you deceive them?

    18 A. In what sense?

    19 Q. Did you tell them that you were not intending

    20 to testify for either the Defence or the Prosecution?

    21 A. They were --

    22 JUDGE JORDA: We may have an objection.

    23 MR. HAYMAN: I think Mr. Harmon's time has

    24 expired. We have been -- limits have been imposed on

    25 us, and we voluntarily abided by them. My colleague's

  88. 1 redirect examination after a two and a half week of

    2 cross-examination was limited to under two and a half

    3 hours and we abided by those restrictions. I think

    4 counsel for the Prosecution should do the same, and if

    5 he declines, then the Court should enforce --

    6 JUDGE JORDA: I understand that this reminder

    7 of an equal amount of time for both parties is coming

    8 at the right time, but these questions and answers do

    9 throw the Judges into an abyss of perplexity. The

    10 rather idyllic state of the people working in the army

    11 at the time is of interest.

    12 I'm very sorry, Mr. Hayman, but I think

    13 Mr. Harmon has to continue, and the witness is under

    14 oath, and is in good physical shape today, and is,

    15 therefore, in a position to answer. Mr. Harmon,

    16 continue, please.

    17 MR. HARMON:

    18 Q. Mr. Dundas-Whatley, my question was: Did you

    19 deceive the three gentlemen I talked about by informing

    20 them that you did not intend to testify for the Defence

    21 or the Prosecution?

    22 A. We were not talking about this case. All the

    23 questions and all the answer were is in relation to

    24 another case, which at that stage had not even started.

    25 Q. Did you subsequently have a conversation with

  89. 1 Mr. Tucker on the 23rd of October, 1998, in which you

    2 apologised to Mr. Tucker because you had deceived him

    3 because you had already reached an agreement to testify

    4 for the Defence prior to the conversation that you had

    5 with Mr. Tucker in Split on the 22nd of July?

    6 A. No. I will explain. I'll explain. I can

    7 understand why you may think there's some deception

    8 here.

    9 From the very beginning, when I first got

    10 involved with the War Crimes Tribunal, which was in

    11 May, 1993 when I escorted Mr. Payam Akhavan, I think,

    12 around middle Bosnia, from that moment I realised the

    13 gravity of the situation. I realised the appalling

    14 atrocities that had gone on and how important it was

    15 that this should be dealt with on an international

    16 level by a neutral party, the International War Crimes

    17 Tribunal, which was subsequently put in place. From

    18 then on, over a period of four or five years, I have

    19 frequently and on many occasions helped the Prosecutors

    20 to piece together a lot about what happened.

    21 During the course of that, piecing this

    22 together and discussing with the Prosecutors, I started

    23 to have doubts about some of the -- some of the ways in

    24 which not evidence was being gathered, but the ways in

    25 which people were being indicted and the reasons behind

  90. 1 it.

    2 I'm being totally frank and honest with you,

    3 but I think you need a full answer to that question.

    4 I was repeatedly approached, repeatedly

    5 approached, throughout last year and this year by the

    6 Defence team in the name of Colonel Blaskic, and I told

    7 them exactly what I told the Prosecutors, and that is

    8 that I would have -- I had no intention of making a

    9 statement, and no intention of taking part in a trial,

    10 but I would provide all my photographs and documents

    11 and as much information to all sides.

    12 Those meetings with the Prosecutors

    13 continued, and with the Defence team continued until

    14 the beginning of this year, probably about May or June,

    15 when I then decided that I was going to, in light of

    16 what I remembered and what I knew existed in my

    17 notebook, although I still, at that stage, had not

    18 recovered all these notebooks, and this has happened in

    19 the last three months, two months, that I would -- that

    20 I would probably -- I told the Defence team that I

    21 would probably be happy to speak in the Defence of

    22 Colonel Blaskic because what I remembered about command

    23 and control and some of the other major issues.

    24 I then was approached again by the Office of

    25 the Prosecutors who wanted to talk to me about Dario

  91. 1 Kordic and Mario Cerkez, and, of course, there was a

    2 major overlap between all these Croat people in middle

    3 Bosnia. They asked me again to testify. I said I

    4 would not. They then asked me would I testify -- if I

    5 was approached by the Defence, would I testify for the

    6 Defence, and I said, "No." At that stage I was

    7 referring entirely to the case they were talking

    8 about. I didn't think it was prudent, at that stage,

    9 to tell the Office of the Prosecutor that I intended to

    10 defend in the case of Colonel Blaskic, and I didn't

    11 think it necessary, particularly as the people I was

    12 talking to were investigating Cerkez and Kordic.

    13 Subsequently, I then went to England, I found

    14 all my notebooks which are all here, and my maps, and I

    15 brought them here. I have also, yesterday, and

    16 frequently this week and last week, I have been in an

    17 ongoing dialogue with the Office of the Prosecutor

    18 about submitting notebooks or not for other cases, and

    19 submitting my photographs for other cases, and it is my

    20 intention, next week, to have a meeting in England with

    21 Office of the Prosecutor to hand over about 120 films

    22 of photographs that were taken during my tour in the

    23 British army in Bosnia.

    24 I have never at any stage attempted to

    25 interrupt the work of the Tribunal. All I want to do

  92. 1 is see that everyone gets a fair trial and I'm

    2 assisting both sides in that.

    3 Q. Did you tell Mr. Howard Tucker, on the 22nd

    4 of July, 1998, that Mr. Hayman had insisted strongly in

    5 involving you as a witness for the Defence in the

    6 Blaskic case but that you had refused?

    7 A. No, I did not use the name of anyone. I ask

    8 not use any names. I said that I had been approached

    9 by a Defence team, I said it was an American. He asked

    10 me if it was a name -- I think he probably said was it

    11 Hayman and I probably shrugged my shoulders. I was

    12 being evasive but for the reasons I've explained to

    13 you.

    14 Q. In your desire to assist the Prosecutor's

    15 Office, Mr. Dundas-Whatley, did you refuse to give a

    16 signed statement to the Prosecutor?

    17 A. I was never asked to be a witness in this

    18 case by the prosecutors.

    19 Q. Were you asked to sign a statement?

    20 A. The Office of the Prosecutor tried to pull a

    21 trick on me by writing a statement themselves and

    22 having me sign it, and I said that I had no intention

    23 of signing a statement, "Especially not one that you've

    24 written yourself."

    25 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions,

  93. 1 Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. Dundas-Whatley.

    2 JUDGE RIAD: What kind of statement are you

    3 referring to?

    4 A. I think this was -- Your Honour, I think this

    5 was probably about a year ago, maybe more. I can't

    6 remember when.

    7 I was living in Sarajevo and a statement was

    8 roughly written out on a piece of paper. One of

    9 Prosecutors visited and I gave him as much help as I

    10 could, but I said I wasn't going to sign it, I didn't

    11 write it, and it wasn't even typed at this stage. It

    12 was basically what he wanted me to say. And I think

    13 that if I'm going to have to say anything, then I'm

    14 going to have to review all my notebooks, which I have

    15 done, and I will attend court if I'm going to take

    16 part.

    17 MR. HARMON: Let me ask one additional

    18 question with the court's indulgence, please. Who was

    19 that investigator, sir?

    20 A. I can't remember. I have met a lot of

    21 investigators over the last five years.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: Judge Riad, have you completed

    23 your question?

    24 Mr. Hayman, you have your right to

    25 examination now, but do it with a -- it will be done

  94. 1 with a degree of flexibility.

    2 MR. HAYMAN: I estimate -- because of all the

    3 documents the witness has been shown and a need to go

    4 over some of those documents, I estimate one hour. I

    5 estimate I need one hour, and the witness can return on

    6 Monday to complete that and the court's examination.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Then we'll come back on

    8 Monday. There is no problem with that, Mr. Hayman.

    9 Re-examined by Mr. Hayman:

    10 Q. How times were you interviewed by Prosecutors

    11 and investigators from the Office of the Tribunal

    12 Prosecutor, can you estimate?

    13 A. If you add all the phone calls and the visits

    14 and contacts with the Tribunal, it's certainly in

    15 excess of 10. I mean, there's been three this week.

    16 Q. Roughly how many days did you spend with the

    17 Office of the Tribunal Prosecutor, prosecutors and

    18 investigators, helping them review events that occurred

    19 during your tour of duty? Can you estimate that, how

    20 much time you gave them?

    21 A. Well, if you measure it in terms of days,

    22 it's probably three or four. I don't know. Maybe

    23 less.

    24 Q. Were you personally interviewed by any of the

    25 Prosecutors in this case, to your recollection?

  95. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. And could you just point to which of the

    3 three gentlemen, if it was one or more than one? The

    4 gentleman on the far left? Mr. Kehoe, our friend and

    5 colleague?

    6 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    7 MR. HAYMAN:

    8 Q. Let me ask you, after those ten or more

    9 contacts, those four days of interviews, that personal

    10 interview by Mr. Kehoe, did they ever ask you to come

    11 and testify in this case before this court?

    12 A. No, they did not.

    13 Q. Would you have come if they'd asked, in the

    14 end?

    15 A. Once -- once I'd reviewed all my notebooks.

    16 In this case it would probably be quite difficult for

    17 me to testify for the Prosecution, but because --

    18 because I don't think they'd want to hear a lot of what

    19 I would have said.

    20 Q. Fair enough.

    21 A. But I was never asked. What may be of

    22 interest also, is I don't think any of the key officers

    23 from my regiment who had dealings with the locals have

    24 been asked. None of the liaison officers have

    25 attended. The military information officer, the

  96. 1 operations officer and the commanding officer, none of

    2 them who had dealings with the locals have attended as

    3 witnesses for the Prosecution.

    4 Q. There were a number of documents put before

    5 you, and I'll try and organise that for after the

    6 recess, the weekend recess, so that we can do it

    7 quickly and efficiently, but while the -- some of these

    8 are fresh in your mind and in the court's mind, if

    9 Exhibit 490A could be retrieved.

    10 You were shown an order from Colonel Blaskic

    11 to the HVO brigade in Fojnica, to the battalion in

    12 Fojnica, to engage in military activity. You may even

    13 still have it before you. I've lost track of the

    14 number.

    15 A. The 18th of April.

    16 Q. I believe that's so. Do you have it in front

    17 you?

    18 A. Yes, I do.

    19 Q. Does it order the HVO battalion in Fojnica to

    20 engage in military activity?

    21 A. Yes, it does, Your Honours.

    22 Q. While the registrar is looking for the

    23 document, let me draw your attention to Exhibit 490A,

    24 which I have placed on the ELMO to your left. Can you

    25 turn and see it, or do you see it on the screen?

  97. 1 This is a document, English translation of a

    2 document which has a number of authoring or signatory

    3 parties, including the 3rd Fojnica Battalion Command,

    4 Fojnica HVO, Croatian Democratic Community, Franciscan

    5 Monastery and some other apparently cultural

    6 organisations writing to the Operative Zone command in

    7 Vitez and the command of the Kiseljak HVO Brigade.

    8 Then it references an order, which I can

    9 represent to you was an order -- the 20th of April

    10 order referenced was an order dismissing the commander

    11 of the battalion. If I'm in error and it was another

    12 order to engage in the military activity ordered on the

    13 18th of April, and I'm sorry I can't be absolutely

    14 specific, I don't have that exhibit or number in front

    15 of me; but it references that order, which I represent

    16 to you was an order from Colonel Blaskic.

    17 The document states, "The command of the

    18 battalion has reached the following decision," in all

    19 caps. "Your order of 20 April is being completely

    20 rejected, due to the work accomplished so far and the

    21 complexity of the current situation in the zone of

    22 responsibility of the 3rd Fojnica Battalion. The

    23 Croatian people of Fojnica support this unanimous

    24 decision."

    25 What does this document tell you about the

  98. 1 chain of command within the HVO, particularly with

    2 respect to the battalion in Fojnica?

    3 A. I haven't got access to the order this is

    4 referring to, but this suggests to me that probably

    5 Colonel Blaskic wasn't aware of the complex situation

    6 in Fojnica, whatever that complex situation is; but far

    7 more importantly, it is a refusal to carry out the

    8 order. And what makes it so strange, when compared

    9 with military orders I'm used to in the British army,

    10 is the number of people who have signed this, this not

    11 order, this report or this decision, the number of

    12 people who are involved in making a decision that the

    13 HVO battalion should not carry out its orders.

    14 Q. Is it normal for a military commander to be

    15 corresponding with a monastery and with a cultural

    16 organisation, if you will, over whether the commander's

    17 military orders are going to be followed?

    18 A. Absolutely not, not in the British army.

    19 Q. What kind of chain of command is that? Is it

    20 a chain of command, if you issue an order and the local

    21 monastery writes back, we reject your decision?

    22 A. It reinforces my opinion that the chain of

    23 command was, at best, poor, ill-defined.

    24 Q. Would you agree with respect to the Fojnica

    25 battalion the chain of command was non-existent?

  99. 1 A. It was non-existent -- it existed in the sense

    2 that they did at least receive the order. This type of

    3 refusal would suggest that things were not going very

    4 well.

    5 Q. If Exhibits D267, 268 and 269 could be

    6 retrieved, those are three orders of Colonel Blaskic.

    7 I don't know if they are still in front of the witness,

    8 if the usher could help pull them out of the large

    9 stack. While those are being sorted out for you, let

    10 me ask some preparatory questions.

    11 Counsel, on cross-examination, has reviewed

    12 certain events with you in the days prior to the 15th

    13 and 16th of April, namely the kidnapping of HVO

    14 officers in Novi Travnik, the abduction of a brigade

    15 commander, Zivko Totic, that is commander of the HVO

    16 Brigade in the town of Zenica, the murder of four in

    17 his entourage at the time, and an attempted killing of

    18 the commander of the Vitezovi independent unit, Darko

    19 Kraljevic.

    20 Can you tell us, if within the scope of 72

    21 hours those types of attacks occurred on the commanders

    22 of a British unit in the field, in combat situations,

    23 or in a hostile situation, in confrontation with a

    24 potentially hostile enemy force; what would the effect

    25 be on that British unit or units, if those types of

  100. 1 actions, abductions, murders had been carried out

    2 within a 72-hour period?

    3 A. It's difficult to imagine the effect that the

    4 kidnapping of a British Brigadier would have on things,

    5 and if that was coupled with the attempted murder of

    6 another unit commander, the murder of his staff

    7 officers and bodyguards, the kidnapping of other

    8 commanders, I think the affect on the British army in

    9 the zone of operation would be devastating.

    10 Q. How would the British army react, say in

    11 Northern Ireland, if those events occurred in 72 hours,

    12 if you can answer the question without divulging

    13 sensitive information? What would the army do? Would

    14 it respond to events of that sort?

    15 A. I won't talk at all about Northern Ireland,

    16 but hypothetically, of course, -- sorry, in another

    17 situation, in another part of the world, if these type

    18 of events were happening over a period of two or three

    19 days, as was happening to the HVO in Bosnia, yes, we

    20 would immediately, I'm sure, start conducting

    21 investigations, we would erect road blocks and increase

    22 the security situation and issue orders to the units to

    23 prepare for further attacks of that nature, I should

    24 imagine. But I must add, I was a captain in the

    25 British army and not a general.

  101. 1 Q. Would, in your view, forces be placed on a

    2 higher state of readiness or alert and to be on guard

    3 against possible further attacks or abductions?

    4 A. I'm almost certain that's exactly what would

    5 happen.

    6 Q. Now, you have seen, and you hopefully by now

    7 have before you exhibits D267, 268 and 269; do you have

    8 those orders?

    9 A. I haven't got 267, yet, I don't think, unless

    10 it is in here somewhere. I will go through it again.

    11 Q. If you could check and tell me which ones you

    12 have. We have about five more minutes today in today's

    13 session. Do you have it?

    14 A. I have got 269 and 268.

    15 MR. HAYMAN: We need 267B, the English

    16 translation.

    17 Q. Well, let's start with --

    18 A. We have got it.

    19 Q. Do you have it? This is the order from 15th

    20 of April, 10.00 in the morning with a lead-in

    21 descriptive paragraph, paragraph 1. And on the second

    22 page, assignment is given to the military police

    23 battalion, paragraph 2.1, with respect to, and I don't

    24 know if this is on the ELMO so others can read it, if

    25 there is a copy that would be helpful, if not, I will

  102. 1 put my copy on.

    2 This portion of paragraph 2.1 includes the

    3 direction, "In the event of a rather strong attack by

    4 the Muslim extremist forces," et cetera, "inform me,

    5 and if the fire is opened directly at you, return the

    6 fire and neutralise the attacker."

    7 Is that an order for defensive action or

    8 offensive action?

    9 A. That is, it is a defence style order.

    10 Q. And what about the next paragraph, paragraph

    11 2.2, I direct your attention to the last sentence: "The

    12 essential assignment is carry out the blockade of the

    13 above-sighted forces and to prevent the same from

    14 attacking the high command," that is the headquarters;

    15 is that an offensive assignment or a defensive

    16 assignment?

    17 A. That's even, that's more obviously a better

    18 word, defence assignment.

    19 Q. In your opinion, this response, as exhibited

    20 in Exhibit D267, to the events of the prior 72 hours,

    21 is it a measured and proportionate response, or was it

    22 a disproportionate response to the threats ongoing

    23 against the HVO and the HVO command?

    24 A. I think to answer that question I would have

    25 to try and put myself in Colonel Blaskic's position at

  103. 1 the time, because this is five-and-a-half years ago,

    2 and of course, everyone in this room knows a lot more

    3 about what really happened.

    4 But bearing in mind the information he had

    5 available to him and the recent events, probably his

    6 headquarters was verging on a state of paranoia and

    7 possibly even panic, I think this could be described as

    8 a measured response, when put into that perspective.

    9 Q. Would you agree, then, that in Exhibit 268B,

    10 paragraph 2.1, when Colonel Blaskic ordered units to

    11 increase combat readiness, that was also a measured and

    12 not a disproportionate response to the events of the

    13 prior 72 hours?

    14 A. Well, I haven't read the rest of the

    15 document, but yes, that paragraph -- yes, it is a

    16 logical and responsible thing to do.

    17 Q. You, yourself, I'm directing your attention

    18 now to Exhibit D269B, you, yourself, as a result of

    19 your tour of duty, became familiar with the presence of

    20 BH army forces and units in the locations of Kruscica

    21 and Vranjska; is that correct? Kruscica being --

    22 A. I know where Kruscica is and I know where

    23 Vranjska is, I just want to refresh myself on the map.

    24 Yes.

    25 Q. Would you agree, as set forth in paragraph 2

  104. 1 of that exhibit, an assignment to block those villages

    2 and to prevent ingress and egress or entrances to and

    3 exits from those villages, and to respond to any attack

    4 with precise fire; would that also, in your view, be a

    5 measured and not a disproportionate response to the

    6 threat that existed as manifested by the events of the

    7 prior 72 hours?

    8 A. Yes, I think it is a measured response. I

    9 think this is, from reading this, I get the impression

    10 that Colonel Blaskic was very worried that his

    11 headquarters was about to be attacked as a result of

    12 the paranoia, or whatever I was describing earlier.

    13 So, I think it is probably a measured response, in

    14 light of how he probably felt at the time.

    15 Q. Thank you.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, if you've finished

    17 with the review of those three documents, we will

    18 suspend the hearing, and we will resume at 2.00 on

    19 Monday, and ask the witness to return.

    20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

    21 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,

    22 the 2nd day of November, 1998 at

    23 2.00 p.m.