1. 1 Monday, 26th July, 1999

    2 (Open session)

    3 --- Upon commencing at 10.08 a.m.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Please be seated.

    5 Mr. Registrar, please have the accused brought in.

    6 (The accused entered court)

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Good morning to the

    8 interpreters, for their faithful and competent effort

    9 and achievement. I wish to greet the Prosecutor of the

    10 Prosecution, the counsel for the Defence. It seems to

    11 me that we have several persons present, but Mr. Nobilo

    12 and Mr. Hayman will probably explain that to us.

    13 Let me add that we are in the final stage of

    14 the trial before the International Criminal Tribunal

    15 against General Blaskic, the accused here present, and

    16 this week, the last week of the trial, will be devoted

    17 to the final arguments and final statements, closing

    18 statement on the part of the Office of the Prosecution

    19 and the counsel for the Defence.

    20 But first, let me address Mr. Hayman and Mr.

    21 Nobilo for them to introduce any new colleagues which

    22 seem to have joined us at the last moment it seems to

    23 me. Were they behind the scenes working hard and

    24 suddenly you wished to show them to us?

    25 MR. HAYMAN: They refused to leave Southern

  2. 1 California until final argument, Mr. President. Good

    2 morning. Good morning, Your Honours. Joining

    3 Mr. Nobilo and myself are two lawyers from my law

    4 office. I believe Mr. Andrew Paley the Court has met

    5 before during the Defence opening statement. He is to

    6 Mr. Nobilo's immediate left.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: That's right.

    8 MR. HAYMAN: To Mr. Paley's left is Robert

    9 Perrin, also a lawyer in my law firm. They will be

    10 joining us this week as will, from time to time, an

    11 assistant from my office, Mr. Elias Guzman.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. I think there is no

    13 objection on anyone's part, on the part of my

    14 colleagues, the Judges. Of course, also the

    15 Prosecution. The assistants were introduced to the

    16 Office of the Prosecution, I hope.

    17 Mr. Harmon, is everything all right?

    18 MR. HARMON: Good morning, Mr. President.

    19 Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, counsel, and

    20 new counsel, welcome.

    21 We also have, Mr. President, Kirsten Keith

    22 who will be assisting us in the presentation of our

    23 summation. She is also a new face in the courtroom and

    24 I wanted to introduce her before we commenced the

    25 summation.

  3. 1 We're ready to proceed, Mr. President. We

    2 will proceed in a fashion where we will divide the

    3 summation amongst us. Counsel will address different

    4 aspects of the case itself. I would say, as Your

    5 Honours are well aware, this case has been ongoing for

    6 over two years and the volume of evidence in this case

    7 is enormous.

    8 The labour that went into the trial briefs, I

    9 speak for the Prosecutor's office and I assume I speak

    10 as well for the Defence counsel, will more exhaustively

    11 cover the many topics and the evidence in greater

    12 detail than we can conceivably do in the limited amount

    13 of time we have to address Your Honours in respect of

    14 this case.

    15 During the course of our presentation in

    16 summary of this case, we will be required to go into

    17 private session on a number of occasions because we

    18 will be referring to witnesses whose testimony were

    19 heard in closed session, and in order to maintain the

    20 integrity of the protections that were afforded to

    21 them, it's important to go into closed session on

    22 occasion. We will try to limit the number of times we

    23 have to disrupt the proceedings by making that request

    24 but there will be a fair number of those requests.

    25 I would like to invite the Court to make any

  4. 1 inquiries it feels appropriate during the course of our

    2 presentation. We would welcome any inquiries by Your

    3 Honours.

    4 Without further ado, Mr. President and Your

    5 Honours, Mr. Kehoe will begin the presentation for the

    6 Office of the Prosecutor.

    7 JUDGE JORDA: I should simply like to say,

    8 and, thank you, Mr. Prosecutor, for all your

    9 explanation, for the benefit of the public, the hearing

    10 will be public throughout the week except for a few

    11 minutes or longer periods when necessary.

    12 I wanted to ask you, however, you have two

    13 and a half days, I think, Mr. Prosecutor. Do you

    14 intend to use that time?

    15 MR. HARMON: We will use a large amount of

    16 that time. I will be able to give you a better

    17 assessment this evening at the close of business. What

    18 I failed to take into account, Mr. President, in my

    19 calculations earlier was the amount of time it's going

    20 to take to physically manipulate exhibits and put

    21 things on the ELMO, and also to essentially go in and

    22 out of private session. So I think it will take a

    23 little bit longer than I had earlier assessed.

    24 Anyway, Mr. President, without further ado, I

    25 would like to have Mr. Kehoe commence the address.

  5. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman? Before we give the

    2 floor to Mr. Kehoe, Mr. Hayman, will you also be using

    3 your two and a half days or you don't know?

    4 MR. HAYMAN: We will, Mr. President. Mr.

    5 Nobilo and I will. I only wanted to raise the one last

    6 outstanding item of business prior to closing

    7 arguments, and I think that is the matter of the

    8 admission of D197. That had not yet been admitted when

    9 we adjourned two weeks ago. That's the diary. We

    10 would ask that be admitted before arguments begin so

    11 that the matter is settled.

    12 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, is there any

    13 objection? You know it was the diary, produced, I

    14 think, within the framework of another case.

    15 Mr. Fourmy?

    16 MR. FOURMY: Yes, that is true,

    17 Mr. President.

    18 JUDGE JORDA: Was there any objection on your

    19 part or was there any objection on the part of the

    20 other Chamber?

    21 MR. HARMON: I don't know that,

    22 Mr. President. I know we filed the appropriate papers

    23 with the other Chamber and we maintained our objection

    24 that it should be limited to the pages in that document

    25 that were identified by the witness. If the other

  6. 1 Chamber has ruled, we accept the ruling of the other

    2 Chamber.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: As far as I know, it has not

    4 taken a decision. Now we have to take our own

    5 decision.

    6 What do you think, Mr. Fourmy?

    7 A priori, apparently the witness concerned

    8 has given his authorisation that the appropriate

    9 transcript can be disclosed. Do we need to have it

    10 confirmed in the course of the day, Mr. Fourmy?

    11 MR. FOURMY: This information was conveyed to

    12 me, Mr. President, through the intermediary of the

    13 department for the protection of witnesses, Victims and

    14 Witnesses, who contacted the witness who gave his

    15 authorisation for the relevant parts of the transcript

    16 of his testimony made within the framework of another

    17 trial may be used in this case, and the same measures

    18 of confidentiality which should be able to regulate

    19 matters at least regarding the part of the transcript

    20 we are referring to.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I address the parties.

    22 Therefore, there is no objection. Judge Shahabuddeen?

    23 Judge Rodrigues?

    24 Since the witness is the main person

    25 concerned we will take the same protection for

  7. 1 witnesses and the relevant parts are admitted.

    2 Is that all right, Mr. Hayman?

    3 MR. HAYMAN: I think it's all right to admit

    4 the diary, Mr. President. I can't consent in advance

    5 to admission of a transcript that we haven't seen. I

    6 don't know if a transcript can be admitted without

    7 cross-examination and the like, but if the other Court

    8 can confirm that the diary was authenticated by the

    9 witness, both parties have seen the diary so we have an

    10 opportunity to address it in arguments. But if some

    11 transcript of the witness is admitted after arguments,

    12 then we won't have the chance to even comment on it in

    13 argument much less possibly to cross-examine the

    14 witness. So we would ask that the diary be admitted.

    15 Thank you.

    16 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, our position was

    17 and remains that those portions of the diary that were

    18 authenticated by the witness, we have no objection to

    19 their admittance into evidence but he did not

    20 authenticate all portions of the diary.

    21 JUDGE JORDA: I think we have to resolve

    22 this. We are not going to start a procedural debate

    23 over this. We will reserve the same protection

    24 measures. The witness agrees. Therefore, the diary

    25 will be admitted.

  8. 1 What do you think, Mr. Fourmy? I think we

    2 have to overcome this issue. We're in the final stage

    3 and we're not going to have a battle over this exhibit

    4 too long.

    5 MR. FOURMY: I think that there is an

    6 agreement between the parties for the admission only of

    7 the portions of the diary that have been authenticated

    8 by the witness, not the diary as a whole.

    9 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, we will admit the

    10 portions authenticated by the witness. Is that

    11 acceptable? No other remarks? If you have other

    12 remarks, please do so immediately, because we're not

    13 going to come back to this issue again.

    14 MR. HAYMAN: We just need to know, for

    15 purposes of closing argument, what has been admitted

    16 from the diary and what has not or else we won't know

    17 what we can refer to, Mr. President. I'm not quibbling

    18 with the ruling. The Prosecutor knows because he has

    19 access to the sealed transcript. We're the blind man

    20 touching the elephant: We don't know what parts of the

    21 elephant are in evidence.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: That's true.

    23 MR. HARMON: My suggestion, Mr. President, is

    24 Mr. Fourmy can advise the parties as to which of those

    25 pages have been admitted into evidence, and having

  9. 1 reviewed the matter exhaustively, I think we should

    2 then proceed on our summation. I think Mr. Hayman and

    3 the Defence can wait, in the next couple days, to get

    4 that decision, but as we delay now resolving this

    5 issue, where there is an answer, Mr. Fourmy can tell

    6 Mr. Hayman at a later time exactly what pages were not

    7 authenticated.

    8 JUDGE JORDA: In any event, we shall admit

    9 the authenticated pages, and those pages will be

    10 communicated to Mr. Hayman in the immediate future as

    11 Mr. Harmon has been able to study them in the course of

    12 his research. The decision has been made, and we

    13 consider this incident closed.

    14 It is twenty past ten. Mr. Prosecutor, you

    15 wanted to begin. I think you wanted to give the floor

    16 to Mr. Kehoe.

    17 MR. HARMON: Yes. Thank you very much,

    18 Mr. President, Your Honours.

    19 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, Your Honours,

    20 counsel, good morning.

    21 We have come to the end of this case and the

    22 facts of this case, and as we reviewed it over the past

    23 ten days or two weeks, since our final meeting, takes

    24 me back to a line that was presented or a speech that

    25 was given on the floor of the British parliament in the

  10. 1 latter part of the 18th century by a member of

    2 parliament and a political philosopher by the name of

    3 Edmund Burke, and he said in a speech and in a manner

    4 laced with tensions involving religious events, he

    5 noted: "An event has happened upon which it is

    6 difficult to speak and impossible to keep silent."

    7 We have been here some two long years talking

    8 about the facts of this case, talking about those

    9 catastrophic events that took place in Central Bosnia

    10 in 1992 through 1994. But as we sit here some two

    11 years down the line and some six years after the

    12 events, it is difficult to still speak about it because

    13 of what has happened and what has been left in the wake

    14 of this violence.

    15 What we have witnessed is violence, murder,

    16 the destruction of a lifestyle, the destruction of a

    17 portion of an ethnic group within the Central Bosnia

    18 area in pursuit of a political policy, a political

    19 policy that strove for uni-ethnic goals and also trying

    20 to achieve territorial ambitions. The tragedy, of

    21 course, is that in the pursuit of that political

    22 policy, the wake has left hundreds of victims, both

    23 dead and alive. I suppose one takes pause at this

    24 juncture as to who is in a worse situation: Those who

    25 have gone to a better life or those who have been

  11. 1 marked forever by what transpired in Central Bosnia.

    2 Before we walk into and begin to discuss the

    3 development of that political plan which was developed

    4 in the halls of power in Zagreb, Croatia, by President

    5 Franjo Tudjman and his political associates and

    6 subsequently was deployed and employed by the Croatian

    7 Community of Herceg-Bosna political structure as well

    8 as the military machine of the Croatian Community of

    9 Herceg-Bosna, the HVO, before we begin to discuss how

    10 this entire matter developed, let us take a look at the

    11 indictment and exactly some of the matters that the

    12 accused has been charged with.

    13 As I just noted, the facts of this case have

    14 been difficult for all of us, heart-wrenching at times,

    15 still painful. But the indictment and the charges that

    16 are set forth in the indictment, Mr. President and Your

    17 Honours, are basically very simple ones. They focus on

    18 the sanctity of life and they focus on the protection

    19 of civilians and they focus on the protection of

    20 civilians who happen to be belonging to an ethnic

    21 group.

    22 The indictment in this case charges crimes

    23 against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of

    24 war, violations of the Geneva Convention in various

    25 categories, but they all can be discussed in rather

  12. 1 simple terms: What has been charged in this case is a

    2 series of crimes directed by the defendant Blaskic and

    3 his associates, those crimes directed against the

    4 civilian population, the Bosnian Muslim civilian

    5 population in Central Bosnia. They amount to

    6 persecution of the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group within

    7 Central Bosnia. That persecution was not only employed

    8 in Central Bosnia but was part of an overall plan that

    9 was widespread and systematic throughout the Croatian

    10 Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    11 The other crimes more specifically relate to

    12 the killing and murder of Bosnian Muslim civilians, the

    13 destruction of the property belonging to Bosnian Muslim

    14 civilians, as well as the destruction, desecration of

    15 Bosnian Muslim religious sites in an effort to

    16 essentially eradicate or certainly encourage that

    17 ethnic group to either leave the area or be so injured

    18 that they would be compelled to do so.

    19 Suffice it to say this is a series of

    20 attacks, armed, beginning with political policies and

    21 then going to military policies that was directed

    22 against this population, as I noted, killing,

    23 destruction of their homes, destruction of their

    24 religious objects, with an effort to remove them from

    25 the area.

  13. 1 The defendant Blaskic is charged as the

    2 commander, as the commander of the HVO troops who

    3 employed the political policies set out by the Croatian

    4 Community of Herceg-Bosna and the HVO, a political

    5 policy that was developed in Zagreb, that moved down to

    6 Grude and Mostar in the hands of the President of the

    7 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, and

    8 then was deployed politically in Central Bosnia through

    9 individuals such as Dario Kordic, Ignac Kostroman, and

    10 Anto Valenta. Blaskic was the tool, Blaskic was the

    11 individual who worked hand in glove with these

    12 individuals to accomplish the political goals of the

    13 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Those political

    14 goals, as I noted previously, include a uni-ethnic area

    15 of Bosnian Croats, the removal of Bosnian Muslims from

    16 the area that the Bosnian Croats considered to be

    17 theirs and, candidly, the ultimate annexation of the

    18 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna to the Republic of

    19 Croatia.

    20 Blaskic is the commander. Under the Statute

    21 of this Tribunal, he is charged under 7(1) and 7(3) of

    22 that Statute. In 7(1), the Statute charges Blaskic

    23 with planning, instigating, ordering, or otherwise

    24 aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation, or

    25 execution of the crimes in the indictment. This

  14. 1 charges Blaskic with being part of this plan, with

    2 assisting, planning, and instigating the coordinated

    3 effort to remove and persecute the Bosnian Muslim

    4 population from Central Bosnia.

    5 Under 7(3), essentially a charge that charges

    6 Blaskic with failure to punish and failure to prevent

    7 the crimes committed by the troops under his command.

    8 Blaskic knew that the troops under his command had

    9 committed crimes, that they were about to commit crimes

    10 and, ultimately, he knew, after those crimes had

    11 occurred, as the commander, that those crimes had taken

    12 place. He both failed to prevent those crimes before

    13 they took place and also failed to punish the

    14 perpetrators, the individual perpetrators of those

    15 crimes, after those crimes transpired.

    16 Before we move into the historical and

    17 chronological view as to how this all happened, I think

    18 we have to place Blaskic and his command and the areas

    19 in question in some type of context, and with the

    20 assistance of my colleague, Mr. Hooper, I would like to

    21 put the first chart on the board.

    22 Now, Mr. President and Your Honours, this is

    23 a chart, and if I could move closer, I could explain it

    24 in a bit more detail.

    25 This is a map, Mr. President, which I know

  15. 1 Your Honours haven't seen in a while, but it was

    2 admitted during the early portions of this case, some

    3 two years ago, and what it depicts is the three

    4 relevant municipalities that we have been discussing

    5 over the past two years. They include Kiseljak,

    6 Busovaca, and Vitez.

    7 The purpose of this map is to place in

    8 context the area of command over which Blaskic was the

    9 Central Bosnian Operative Zone commander. This

    10 particular portion was only a part of the Central

    11 Bosnian Operative Zone; however, these are the three

    12 relevant municipalities that we have been discussing

    13 throughout most of this case. As the accused has

    14 discussed, there were numerous other locales within his

    15 area of command, such as Zepce, Vares, and areas in

    16 Sarajevo. However, these are the three areas that are

    17 the subject of the indictment.

    18 As Your Honours can see, what we are talking

    19 about contextually in these maps and what we have done

    20 is put the particular municipalities and overlay them

    21 on a map of Holland. What Your Honours can see is the

    22 areas over which Blaskic is charged, or the areas over

    23 which the crimes in the indictment charge, is

    24 approximately a territorial area that goes from The

    25 Hague up north to approximately Haarlem, an area that

  16. 1 is significantly small. It is not large in any sense

    2 at all for a commander of this particular area.

    3 Before we actually go into the crimes on the

    4 ground, Mr. President and Your Honours, I think it is

    5 of use to put what happened in Central Bosnia in

    6 context with not only things that happened throughout

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina but also how this all transpired.

    8 Was this just some spontaneous event that erupted in

    9 Central Bosnia on the 16th of April, 1993, when Ahmici

    10 was attacked or does the history of this entire matter

    11 take us back some years and show us the sequence of

    12 events that, in retrospect, appears to be quite logical

    13 in its development?

    14 I submit to Your Honours that it does, and

    15 the beginning point, certainly the beginning point for

    16 the purposes of this argument, but one of the beginning

    17 points of this goes back to the political aspiration of

    18 the Republic of Croatia as articulated by its president

    19 Franjo Tudjman.

    20 Franjo Tudjman as Your Honours know, is and

    21 continues to be the president of Croatian, and his

    22 desires on portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not arise

    23 in 1993. They didn't arise in 1992 or 1991, nor, for

    24 that matter, in 1990. We can go back to at least 1981,

    25 when through his own writings, Tudjman began to

  17. 1 articulate desires by the Republic of Croatia to absorb

    2 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to object to that

    3 division that had occurred in the past.

    4 I refer first, and I'd like to read this

    5 quite briefly if I may. If I can turn the ELMO on,

    6 please. Thank you very much. If we can pull that down

    7 a bit. That's good.

    8 This is a book written by Tudjman in 1981.

    9 I'm just going to read a portion of it that begins on

    10 page 113 of this document, in the right-hand column,

    11 starting with "But large parts."

    12 "Large parts of Croatia had been

    13 incorporated into Bosnia by the Turks. Furthermore,

    14 Bosnia and Herzegovina were historically linked with

    15 Croatia and they together comprise an indivisible

    16 geographic and economic entity. Bosnia-Herzegovina

    17 occupy the central part of this whole, separating

    18 Southern Dalmatian and Northern Pannonian Croatia.

    19 "The creation of a separate Bosnia and

    20 Herzegovina makes the territorial and geographic

    21 position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic

    22 sense and, therefore, in the broadest national

    23 political sense very unfavourable for life and

    24 development, and in the narrower administrative sense,

    25 unsuitable and disadvantageous. These factors largely

  18. 1 explain why the 1939 agreement between Belgrade, Prince

    2 Paul and the Spetkovic government, and Zagreb, Macek's

    3 Croatian leadership, included the following areas into

    4 Bosnia, into the banovina of Croatia: The whole of

    5 Western Herzegovina and Mostar and those Bosnian

    6 districts where Croats have a clear majority, Bugojno,

    7 Fojnica, Travnik, Derventa, Gradacac, and Brcko."

    8 As you can notice from these locales,

    9 Travnik, of course, is one of the major cities in the

    10 Central Bosnian Operative Zone, the area under control

    11 of the accused.

    12 I think it is significant at this point, as

    13 Tudjman has referenced it in his writings of 1981, to

    14 place the banovina in context, because the banovina

    15 becomes something that is very important not only to

    16 Tudjman but ultimately becomes something that is

    17 aspired to both by Mate Boban, the president of the

    18 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, and also by Dario

    19 Kordic, the local vice-president of the Croatian

    20 Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    21 So before we begin to talk about some matters

    22 concerning the banovina, I would ask the assistance of

    23 Mr. Hooper to put the map of the banovina on the easel,

    24 and that is Exhibit 16.

    25 I don't know if Your Honours can see all of

  19. 1 this or get a closer view of it but, of course, this is

    2 the map of the 1939 banovina agreement that was the

    3 result of a Cvetkovic/Macek agreement from 1939. This

    4 was the banovina plan that Boban references in his

    5 writing from 1981 as being a suitable territorial

    6 arrangement for the Republic of Croatia.

    7 What is significant about this is, of course,

    8 we can see a larger swath of land that has been

    9 incorporated into Croatia, in the present-day Croatia,

    10 but if Your Honours can focus on the bulge of land in

    11 the latter part of this photograph or map, Your Honours

    12 can notice that, of course, the banovina incorporates

    13 Travnik and leaves the city of Zenica to the outside.

    14 So quite clearly when Franjo Tudjman was

    15 discussing his territorial ambitions that, of course,

    16 we will note stayed with the president long after the

    17 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded, when he began to

    18 talk about his territorial ambitions in

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he forever was interested in

    20 including the area of the Central Bosnian Operative

    21 Zone around Vitez, Travnik, and other locales, moving

    22 south into Fojnica, Prozor, et cetera.

    23 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Mr. Kehoe, a little

    24 earlier you referred to the writings of Mr. Boban in

    25 1981 concerning this subject. Did you perhaps mean

  20. 1 Mr. Franjo Tudjman?

    2 MR. KEHOE: I am, Mr. President. If I

    3 misspoke and I was talking about Mate Boban, I was

    4 referring to Franjo Tudjman. The writings that I am

    5 discussing here refer to the writings of 1981 of

    6 Mr. Tudjman about this area and not Mr. Boban. I

    7 apologise, Your Honour.

    8 This particular idea of Boban's has been

    9 described by some of the witnesses that have been

    10 presented before this Court, in a variety of fashions,

    11 not the least of which is one witness that was brought

    12 before the Court described it as an obsession with

    13 Tudjman, ie. the annexation of portions of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Republic of Croatia.

    15 Not only did Tudjman talk about the

    16 annexation of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the

    17 Republic of Croatia, as events transpired in

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and also throughout the former

    19 Yugoslavia, Franjo Tudjman acted upon it. He acted

    20 upon it in concert and in conjunction with his

    21 presidential counterpart in Serbia, that, of course,

    22 being Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.

    23 In the early part of 1991, shortly before --

    24 certainly after tensions had been raised but shortly

    25 before war erupted in a large part in the Republic of

  21. 1 Croatia, President Tudjman met with President Milosevic

    2 in a town by the name of Karadjordjevo, in the latter

    3 part of March 1991, where they discussed in detail the

    4 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with large parts going

    5 to Croatia, large parts going to Serbia, with the

    6 possible reservation of a small swath of land being

    7 left to Muslims around Sarajevo.

    8 A Defence witness himself, Dusan Bilandzic,

    9 was one of the individuals who testified early on in

    10 the Defence case was, in fact, one of the individuals

    11 who participated in the meetings with the Serbs

    12 concerning the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

    13 where they discussed maps and tried to make some

    14 decisions as to which particular ethnic group would get

    15 which portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    16 I must say that Mr. Bilandzic denied most

    17 that have before this Court. However, this particular

    18 interview published in the Croatian periodical Nacional

    19 described Mr. Bilandzic's actions and comments

    20 concerning a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    21 pursuant to Tudjman's instructions in some detail, and

    22 one of the last exhibits that the Office of the

    23 Prosecutor submitted was, in fact, an editorial from

    24 Nacional saying in substance what Bilandzic told us

    25 concerning his meetings about the division of

  22. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina actually took place, and his

    2 comments that Tudjman said that the Muslims were just

    3 going to have to go along with this arrangement also

    4 took place.

    5 Nevertheless, we need not take

    6 Mr. Bilandzic's comments to this Chamber in isolation.

    7 There were other witnesses that came before this Court

    8 in some detail and some rather high positions who

    9 discussed this matter with Your Honours at some

    10 length.

    11 If I could briefly just go into a private

    12 session, I think I would like to discuss some of those

    13 witnesses, and given the fact that they have been

    14 protected witnesses, I will just like to comment on

    15 them in a private session.

    16 (Private session)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  23. 1












    13 pages 24539-24545 redacted private session













  1. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (Open session)

    13 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President. What

    14 we can see from the testimony of Mr. Ashdown is that as

    15 of mid 1995, Franjo Tudjman had not given up his desire

    16 for the Republic of Croatia to take a portion of Bosnia

    17 and Herzegovina.

    18 This particular conversation that occurred

    19 between Tudjman and Ashdown took place at the Guild

    20 Hall in London on the 6th of May, 1995, and the

    21 celebration, of course, on the 6th of May was Victory

    22 in Europe Day, the 50-year anniversary of victory in

    23 Europe, to which, according to Mr. Ashdown, many

    24 dignitaries were invited.

    25 In an extraordinary conversation, and I use

  2. 1 the words "extraordinary conversation" in quotes

    2 because those are, in fact, Mr. Ashdown's comments, he

    3 had a conversation with Tudjman where clearly Tudjman

    4 projected the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between

    5 the Croats and the Serbs. What transpired factually

    6 was a map that was drawn on a menu by Tudjman and

    7 Ashdown where Tudjman then signed or wrote through the

    8 middle of the particular document, highlighting the

    9 division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating

    10 approximate portions that were going to go to Croatia

    11 and Serbia.

    12 After this took place, Mr. Ashdown asked a

    13 question to Tudjman, and there's a fascinating answer,

    14 and this is on page 7331, line 22 -- of course, this is

    15 Mr. Ashdown speaking:

    16 A. I asked him what about the Muslim area

    17 and he said, "There will be no Muslim

    18 area except as a small element of the

    19 Croat State."

    20 Continuing on page 7332, Ashdown states:

    21 A. We then went on to talk about his

    22 relations with the other two leaders,

    23 that is, Mr. Izetbegovic on the one hand

    24 and President Milosevic on the other.

    25 He was very dismissive of President

  3. 1 Izetbegovic, who he regarded as "a

    2 fundamentalist and an Algerian," were

    3 his words. I have it in my diary, he

    4 used the word "wog" as well but he found

    5 it much easier to do business with

    6 President Milosevic. He said President

    7 Milosevic was, in his words, one of

    8 us whereas President Izetbegovic was

    9 not, and I recall him saying that

    10 the Muslims were, after all, only Serbs

    11 and Croats who could not stand up to the

    12 Turks during the days of the Ottoman

    13 Empire. I found this a truly

    14 extraordinary conversation.

    15 Speaking about exactly what all of this

    16 meant, on cross-examination, Mr. Ashdown, on page 7345,

    17 said, with regard to the land, the land in Bosnia and

    18 Herzegovina:

    19 A. I got it absolutely clearly that it

    20 would be in federation with Croatia. As

    21 far as I was concerned, this was going

    22 to be the -- the impression I got was

    23 this would be Greater Croatia.

    24 He goes on to say that his other impression

    25 was that this was a "done deal" or, in other words, a

  4. 1 deal that had been agreed upon.

    2 So what is very clear from the sequence of

    3 events and the sequence of meetings that we have been

    4 discussing is that not only did Tudjman have a very,

    5 very detailed view of what he wanted from the Republic

    6 of Croatia but he was more than willing to discuss this

    7 matter with international figures and other political

    8 figures. And the question is: While the events were

    9 taking place in Central Bosnia, did Tudjman forget

    10 about this? Was this no longer part of his thinking?

    11 Did he, all of a sudden, dispense with his desires, his

    12 territorial ambitions in the Republic of Croatia, while

    13 he was deploying troops from the Republic of Croatia to

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight the army of Bosnia and

    15 Herzegovina, while he was supplying the HVO and sending

    16 officers down there and advisors down there as well as

    17 the chiefs of staffs? I submit to Your Honours: Of

    18 course he didn't. Tudjman's efforts, that we will see

    19 developing on the ground, were certainly part of a

    20 concerted effort to bring about that aspiration, that

    21 territorial aspiration, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina that

    22 he wanted to achieve.

    23 Now, how did he go about this? Well,

    24 certainly we move from -- we talk a bit just about the

    25 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but prior to that time,

  5. 1 certainly there was a war in Slovenia, a brief war in

    2 Slovenia, and a horrific war in places of the Republic

    3 of Croatia where, quite honestly, towns and areas of

    4 the Republic of Croatia, such as Vukovar, were

    5 devastated by the former army of the Republic of

    6 Yugoslavia.

    7 But as we move into the latter part of 1991

    8 and into 1992, we see a development by Tudjman of his

    9 policies and of his political leaders within Bosnia and

    10 Herzegovina to achieve what he actually wants.

    11 Notwithstanding the difficulties that are taking place

    12 in the Republic of Croatia during 1991, he nevertheless

    13 knows that he will ultimately resolve them and he is,

    14 quite candidly, preparing for the future. And what we

    15 see is the development of an organisation that comes up

    16 in November of 1991 called the Croatian Community of

    17 Herceg-Bosna.

    18 Now, it's important to look at the Croatian

    19 Community of Herceg-Bosna in context in November of

    20 1991 because the context of that organisation changes.

    21 In November of 1991, when the Croatian Community of

    22 Herceg-Bosna comes into existence, it is a entity that

    23 is different than the HDZ party of Bosnia. One of the

    24 political parties that is extant in Bosnia and

    25 Herzegovina at that time is essentially the Bosnian

  6. 1 Croat party called the HDZ. That, of course, is the

    2 same party that was Tudjman's party within the Republic

    3 of Croatia.

    4 At this time, the leader of the HDZ party,

    5 the elected leader of the HDZ party, was a man by the

    6 name of Stjepan Kljujic. Now, who is Stjepan Kljujic?

    7 Interestingly, Stjepan Kljujic is testifying upstairs

    8 as we sit here today. But nevertheless, Stjepan

    9 Kljujic, as Your Honours have heard, was a moderate

    10 man.

    11 What did he believe in? He believed in a

    12 multi-ethnic approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina. His

    13 beliefs concerning a multi-ethnic approach to

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina were, unfortunately, his downfall,

    15 because while he believed in a multi-ethnic

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the real power behind the Croats,

    17 Franjo Tudjman, did not.

    18 So what did Tudjman do? Tudjman began or set

    19 out to remove Stjepan Kljujic from his position as the

    20 political leader of the HDZ party in Bosnia and

    21 Herzegovina. After a period of time, he put an

    22 individual into place by the name of Mate Boban, and

    23 Mate Boban was the anointed representative of Franjo

    24 Tudjman, who was there, by his own words, to fulfil the

    25 policies of Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ party from

  7. 1 Croatia.

    2 If I could briefly just go into private

    3 session for two minutes or so, I would like to

    4 reference the Court to a particular testimony in this

    5 regard.

    6 (Private session)

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    25 (Open session)

  10. 1 MR. KEHOE: Thank you. What we can see here,

    2 Mr. President, is the policy of Franjo Tudjman

    3 filtering down politically into the Croatian Community

    4 of Herceg-Bosna, and the manifestation of that

    5 filtering down of the policy comes through the politics

    6 of Mate Boban and ultimately the subordinate of Mate

    7 Boban, which is locally, in Blaskic's area, which was

    8 Dario Kordic. I think it's interesting at this point,

    9 how very early on in the politics of the Croatian

    10 Community of Herceg-Bosna and the articulation of the

    11 political position of the Croatian Community of

    12 Herceg-Bosna we see the manifestation of a

    13 nationalistic view articulated by Mate Boban and by

    14 Dario Kordic.

    15 If I may go to the next exhibit, which is

    16 4062, which I believe is a chart, and I believe we can

    17 also place that on the ELMO because at this juncture it

    18 may be a bit difficult for Your Honours to read.

    19 Mr. President, this is a document which is

    20 Prosecutor's Exhibit 406. The copy of this document on

    21 the easel is English on the left side as you look at it

    22 and French on the right side, and it is a document

    23 which has been executed by Mate Boban and also by Dario

    24 Kordic, and it is dated the 12th of November of 1991.

    25 The document itself is the conclusions of a

  11. 1 joint committee -- joint meeting of the Herzegovina

    2 regional committee and the Travnik regional committee.

    3 Two committees within the Croatian Community of

    4 Herceg-Bosna, one in Herzegovina and one in Travnik,

    5 had a meeting and they came to conclusions which they

    6 set forth in this document.

    7 I remind Your Honours that this is November

    8 of 1991 where these views are articulated.

    9 The first point of this document is

    10 instructive. It's instructive because, once again, it

    11 points out and corroborates prior testimony concerning

    12 the concert with which the leaders in the Croatian

    13 Community of Herceg-Bosna were operating with Franjo

    14 Tudjman in Croatia.

    15 In this conclusion, on the second sentence

    16 down, it notes as follows:

    17 "On the basis of the conclusions of the

    18 above-mentioned meetings in Zagreb, which were with

    19 Tudjman, as well as the separate conclusions of

    20 15 October, 1991 in Grude, and 22 October, 1991 in

    21 Busovaca, and on this occasion 12 November, 1991, these

    22 two regional communities have unanimously decided that

    23 the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina must

    24 finally embrace a determined and active policy which

    25 will realise our eternal dream - a common Croatian

  12. 1 state."

    2 So in the latter part of 1991, we see,

    3 through Tudjman's subordinates, the articulation, and

    4 I'm not saying this is the first because this is the

    5 only document that we have, but certainly the early

    6 articulation of a desire for annexation to Croatia.

    7 Down on the bottom part of point 2:

    8 "We have to show Europe and the world which

    9 territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina are Croatian

    10 territories and where our future lies. Our people will

    11 not accept, under any conditions, any other solution

    12 except within the borders of a free Croatia."

    13 As we move on in this document, we see

    14 another articulable intention that bears direct

    15 reference to the accused, and it bears on the accused's

    16 selection, by these people, as the military commander

    17 of the Central Bosnian Operative Zone and ultimately

    18 the chief of staff of the HVO.

    19 In point 3 of this document it notes, among

    20 other things:

    21 "In order to implement the conclusions from

    22 the first two items of these conclusions, we must:

    23 "(a) Clearly define the politics of the HDZ

    24 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, strengthen its membership,

    25 and select people who can see these tasks through to

  13. 1 end."

    2 To select individuals who were going to

    3 employ the policies of the Croatian Community of

    4 Herceg-Bosna. That's what they wanted in November of

    5 1991. That's what they wanted throughout, and that, as

    6 we will see, as we move through the chronology, is why

    7 they picked the accused for his job. He was a man, and

    8 we will see it as we go through these facts, as we go

    9 through the chronology, was a man who was selected

    10 because he was perceived by the political leadership

    11 that he would carry out their platform.

    12 Now, Mr. President, I'm about to go into

    13 another -- probably a lengthy portion here. I don't

    14 know if Your Honour would like to take a break now.

    15 I'm certainly willing to go on.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Yes, let's have a break, a

    17 20-minute break.

    18 --- Recess taken at 11.22 a.m.

    19 --- On resuming at 11.52 a.m.

    20 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Have

    21 the accused brought in, please.

    22 (The accused entered court)

    23 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, please

    24 continue.

    25 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President, Your

  14. 1 Honours.

    2 Mr. President and Your Honours, we finished

    3 discussing the exhibit from the 12th of November of

    4 1991 where Boban and Kordic articulate, first, the

    5 desire for annexation to the -- for a common Croat

    6 state and also their articulation of the selection

    7 process for those who would bring about their stated

    8 goals, i.e., persons to be selected who would see those

    9 goals to their conclusion.

    10 The clearest articulation of the

    11 nationalistic motives that we have seen in this case as

    12 articulated by the leaders of Central Bosnia is, of

    13 course, the tape of 16 January, 1992, a tape that was

    14 taken of a speech of both Kordic and another high

    15 political leader within the HVO and the HDZ, Ignac

    16 Kostroman, and the particular celebration is focusing

    17 around the acknowledgment by the International

    18 Community of the Republic of Croatia.

    19 As we look and we see the development of what

    20 has happened on the ground and we see the articulated

    21 views of the politicians in the Central Bosnian

    22 Operative Zone, where the accused not only was the

    23 commander but also where he ultimately thrived, it

    24 becomes easier to understand how the HVO resorted to

    25 military means to accomplish their goals. While I know

  15. 1 that we have seen this tape in the past, we have not

    2 seen it in context with many of the other matters that

    3 we have discussed already this morning and also that we

    4 will discuss.

    5 So, Your Honour, with the Court's permission,

    6 I would like to play the tape of this particular

    7 rally -- this is Exhibit 234. It is a rally that is,

    8 again, dated the 16th of January, 1992. The first

    9 speaker is Dario Kordic; the second speaker is Ignac

    10 Kostroman.

    11 I believe, Mr. President, I did give copies

    12 of those transcripts, which are both in French and

    13 English, to Your Honours through Mr. Fourmy, and if I

    14 could ask that this particular tape be played at this

    15 point?

    16 JUDGE JORDA: I wish to consult with my

    17 colleagues.

    18 (Trial Chamber confers)

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you. Please continue,

    20 Mr. Prosecutor.

    21 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. With your

    22 permission, we will turn to Prosecutor's Exhibit 234,

    23 and I would ask the booth if they could dim the lights

    24 and play this tape?

    25 (Videotape played)

  16. 1 THE INTERPRETER (Voiceover):

    2 "Dario Kordic: To begin with, I will just

    3 say, I wish all of us the best with the independent

    4 State of Croatia.

    5 "Audience: Long live Croatia. Croatia!

    6 Croatia!

    7 "Dario Kordic: This splendid and

    8 magnificent rally was worth shedding litres of blood

    9 and sweat for, to experience this dream finally which,

    10 for nine centuries, was just a dream for the Croatian

    11 people: an independent sovereign state, tens of

    12 thousands ..."

    13 The rest is inaudible.

    14 "And 50 ..."

    15 The rest is inaudible.

    16 "... state of Croatia! If last night we

    17 feared perhaps that there would be no marking or

    18 celebrating here in Busovaca, many were deceived. The

    19 Croatian spirit lives here, in Busovaca! This, this

    20 evening, is proof that the Croatian people in Busovaca

    21 is also part of the united Croatian nation and how much

    22 the Croats in the Croatian state ..."

    23 The rest is inaudible.

    24 "... borders ..."

    25 The rest is inaudible.

  17. 1 "The Busovaca Croats live just as much with

    2 the Croatian state ..."

    3 The rest of the sentence is inaudible.

    4 "It was announced that people from Kiseljak,

    5 Kresevo, Fojnica, Vitez would be our guests this

    6 evening, and I hope that they will come. If some of

    7 them have arrived in the meantime, I greet them warmly

    8 for coming here to elevate this rally of ours!

    9 "Audience: (Applause)

    10 "Dario Kordic: When I said that the

    11 Croatian people waited for nine centuries, we must

    12 remember the tens of thousands of people who died and

    13 the dear lives ..."

    14 The rest is inaudible.

    15 "... centuries for the Croatian state.

    16 Therefore, for all of those who, throughout the

    17 centuries, sacrificed their lives ..."

    18 The rest is inaudible.

    19 "... their homeland and those couple of

    20 thousand Croats who lost their lives in this dirty war

    21 waged by the aggressor, the Greater Serbian army

    22 against the Croatian nation, I would like us to observe

    23 a minute's silence for the sake of eternal peace for

    24 all those people, Croats who gave their lives for that

    25 which we've experienced today ... Dear Lord, may they

  18. 1 rest in eternal peace.

    2 "Dear Lord, may they rest in eternal peace.

    3 "Now that I have said some words about

    4 Busovaca to begin with, let me say that this Croatian

    5 Community of Herceg-Bosna, which includes Busovaca,

    6 also has the right to celebrate the big day of the

    7 (perhaps) creation of the Croatian state! I would also

    8 like to say that today, we are not becoming part of a

    9 Yugoslavia in which there is still four republics, that

    10 say that the Croatian people will not be part of any

    11 other state. This is Croatian land and that is how it

    12 will be!

    13 "Audience: (Applause)

    14 "Dario Kordic: Don't hold it against me,

    15 but I am very anxious in this (inaudible) and although

    16 I am almost never nervous, I am now. I must stress two

    17 things: We must especially thank the German nation. I

    18 would like to say now, may the German people and state,

    19 who have provided us with much help, live long!

    20 "Audience: (Applause)

    21 "Dario Kordic: I could have ... I should

    22 have mentioned our Holy Father, the Pope, first, but

    23 may the Vatican and the Catholic Church live long as

    24 well!

    25 "Audience: (Applause)

  19. 1 "Dario Kordic: If last night's words of our

    2 honourable friend, the leader of the Croatian people of

    3 Vitez, who said 'Good always comes back to you,' are

    4 true, I would like to paraphrase them: the German

    5 people and the Germany state similarly returned to the

    6 Croatian people that which the Croatian people never

    7 betrayed in history and also (inaudible) to the

    8 Croatian people everything which (inaudible)

    9 Christianity. The Croatian people always remained

    10 (inaudible) to its faith in God!

    11 "Finally, let me say that those who did not

    12 believe that they would ever live to see a day like

    13 this, and in the beginning there were only a few who

    14 believed, we can see today that the dream which was

    15 perhaps impossible has come true and that the Greater

    16 Serbian machinery has been broken by the rock solid

    17 Croatian warriors who showed a superhuman morale and

    18 broke the military power which was among the strongest

    19 in Europe! The Croatian people have proven that they

    20 were and will be strong and that it cannot cease to

    21 exist so long as this (inaudible) and time are here and

    22 so long as there is God's help!

    23 "Audience: (Applause)

    24 "Dario Kordic: If we place our trust in

    25 God, and the Croats do place their trust in God, then

  20. 1 (inaudible) on Croatian soil in Medjugorje just before

    2 the events that followed the war and preceded the

    3 Communist system, which means that God is with the

    4 Croats and, as the old Croatian greeting goes, Bog i

    5 Hrvati, and may the independent state of Croatia live

    6 forever!

    7 "Audience: (Applause)

    8 "Dario Kordic: I would just like to say

    9 that we are not alone. We have our neighbours who have

    10 come to share this with us.

    11 "Audience: (Applause)"

    12 MR. KEHOE: This, of course, is a clip of

    13 Ignac Kostroman.

    14 THE INTERPRETER (Voiceover):

    15 "Ignac Kostroman: Dear citizens of the

    16 State of Croatia.

    17 "It is difficult to (inaudible) words and

    18 penetrate into one's thoughts and heart and say more

    19 than what all of us here feel and say that which has

    20 gathered all of us here.

    21 "Ignac Kostroman: Dear brothers, our

    22 historic dream, which has certainly been a dream for

    23 several centuries now, and no one will ever tear it

    24 away from us.

    25 Audience: Here. Here.

  21. 1 Ignac Kostroman: We will build a state which

    2 will be the state of citizens, and in the first place a

    3 free state where all of us will have the same rights

    4 and a state in which we will be able to say freely that

    5 we are Croats and that this is our Croatian state.

    6 Audience: Here. Here.

    7 Ignac Kostroman: Here it turned out like in

    8 the Bible. After darkness the day must come, and just

    9 like in the Bible, when in a way we had been silent

    10 just when we thought that evil would prevail, we saw

    11 that only good can overcome evil. Our strength was

    12 precisely in our belief, in our unity. With a strong

    13 belief in a future state and in the good Lord who

    14 surely led us, we gained a state right where they built

    15 hatred, discord. It is a state which these days has

    16 been recognised by the whole world. No one would have

    17 known about Croatia had there not been bloodshed, and

    18 at the same time no one would have known about it had

    19 we not won in such a dignified manner. Now the whole

    20 world knows about Croatia. We will make use of that

    21 occasion. We will open the state to every person with

    22 good intentions but, at the same time, as I said a

    23 short while ago, it will be our dear state of Croatia,

    24 where every person will be able to feel at home among

    25 family, regardless of his ethnicity and religion, but

  22. 1 at the same time, to anyone who infringes upon our

    2 rights we will say that they are not welcome and must

    3 look for shelter elsewhere.

    4 I would just like to say a few more things.

    5 Now we ask ourselves where we stand with the territory

    6 of Herceg-Bosna. I believe and maintain that we are an

    7 integral part of the state of Croatia.

    8 Audience: Here, here. Croatia. Croatia.

    9 Ignac Kostroman: We will do everything,

    10 through negotiations, to become an integral part of the

    11 great state of Croatia. Most probably the borders of

    12 our states will be precisely in these areas. We are

    13 the best guarantee and we will be the best guarantee in

    14 securing these borders.

    15 Today (inaudible) all of us are gathered

    16 here. Up to 50 cars set off from Kiseljak, Kresevo,

    17 Fojnica. More than 200, 300 cars arrived here. This

    18 means -- this means that we have gathered here with a

    19 common purpose.

    20 Croatian brothers, we knew that you were

    21 fighting here, deserve to have us as your guests this

    22 evening in our joint celebration.

    23 I would like to ask all citizens of the state

    24 of Croatia to refrain from causing any incidents and

    25 provocation during this interim period. There will

  23. 1 certainly be attacks and provocation, perhaps more than

    2 ever. Let's not provoke the enemy in any way. We will

    3 try, through negotiations, to have the armed forces and

    4 everything else withdrawn from these areas.

    5 Audience: Down with the traitors.

    6 Ignac Kostroman: The Serbian army is the

    7 aggressor, and we said this a long time ago, and we

    8 (inaudible), but we will allow them -- we will allow

    9 them to leave honourably because they do not have to

    10 defend our houses and homes.

    11 Audience: Here, here.

    12 Ignac Kostroman: As for the remaining

    13 population in our areas, the question asked is, "What

    14 about the Muslims? What about the Serbs and everyone

    15 else?" We can say to them let them not worry about

    16 anything. Let them live in our state of Croatia and no

    17 one will miss even a hair on their heads if they accept

    18 us as their brothers and accept the fact that they will

    19 be citizens of the state of Croatia.

    20 Audience: Here, here.

    21 Ignac Kostroman: I will take this

    22 opportunity to greet you on behalf of the president of

    23 Herceg-Bosna, Mr. Mate Boban, who was in Sarajevo today

    24 and who was unable to come here but sends his regards

    25 and congratulations for our celebrations together.

  24. 1 Audience: Mate, Mate. Dario, Dario.

    2 Ignac Kostroman: It is a special honour for

    3 me to greet your leaders, particularly the

    4 vice-president of Herceg-Bosna, Mr. Dario Kordic, who

    5 certainly (the rest is inaudible).

    6 Audience: Long live Dario.

    7 Ignac Kostroman: I greet his closest

    8 associates, particularly Mr. Ante Stipac, who spoke

    9 before me and who has certainly done a lot.

    10 I would like to stress just one more thing.

    11 As we see it, perhaps there will not be any conflict in

    12 our areas if we succeed in reaching agreement as

    13 brothers, if one may say so, to fortify the borders of

    14 Croatia in a peaceful way.

    15 Audience: Here, here.

    16 Ignac Kostroman: If we do not succeed in

    17 this, you understand that the borders of every state

    18 will have to be defended and so will these borders. We

    19 are the best guarantee to defend them.

    20 Audience: Here, here.

    21 Ignac Kostroman: Once again, I greet you

    22 most cordially and I thank you for all your efforts and

    23 activity, particularly the people of Busovaca, who did

    24 much for their neighbouring municipalities as well. I

    25 hope that we will persevere together on this road

  25. 1 leading to complete freedom. We will indeed."

    2 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, folks, in the video

    3 booth.

    4 Mr. President, what we heard here again was

    5 the articulation of a nationalistic platform as set

    6 forth by two of the most powerful leaders in Central

    7 Bosnia and who were connected with the Croatian

    8 Community of Herceg-Bosna, who was located in Grude.

    9 Without going through the speeches at much

    10 length, I believe a couple of comments made by Kordic

    11 and in turn Kostroman merit some discussion.

    12 Kordic himself refers to the area that they

    13 are currently in as the independent state of Croatia.

    14 Now, mind you, they are in Bosnia, in Busovaca,

    15 describing this as the independent state of Croatia.

    16 Now, that is interesting in and of itself, to

    17 articulate the territorial ambitions that he certainly

    18 is interested in, but yet there is another

    19 interpretation to be culled from his use of the term

    20 "independent state of Croatia."

    21 Now, the independent state of Croatia, with

    22 the acronym NDH, was, of course, the independent state

    23 during the Second World War that was the "Ustashe"

    24 regime that was governed by the puppet Ante Pavelic.

    25 That, of course, was a regime that was a puppet regime

  26. 1 of Nazi Germany that engaged in numerous, numerous

    2 persecutions of the population in Bosnia as a whole and

    3 through the rest of the former Yugoslavia.

    4 In addition to calling upon the citizens of

    5 the independent state of Croatia, Kostroman echoes that

    6 same concern, calling upon individuals as the citizens

    7 of the state of Croatia and how the recognition of

    8 Croatia is a fulfilment, and I quote, "of the historic

    9 dream."

    10 Now, this whole idea of an historic dream,

    11 somehow an historic destiny, is a term and a concept

    12 that is laced through many of the documents that Your

    13 Honours have seen. Certainly it's set forth in

    14 Exhibit 4062, the 12 November, 1991 minutes which were

    15 set forth by Boban and Kordic. Naturally, here is

    16 Kostroman talking about this historic dream once again,

    17 which is the realisation of their territorial

    18 ambitions, but Blaskic, interestingly, does the same

    19 thing as well. While he is not present when this

    20 speech takes place on the 16th of January, 1992, he

    21 does, in his future documents, grasp on to this idea of

    22 some historic dream, an historic ideal.

    23 I just reference Your Honours to his order to

    24 attack Kiseljak. I'm talking about the order of the

    25 17th of April, 1993, where at approximately 23.45 on

  27. 1 the 17th he is ordering the attack on Kiseljak to

    2 commence at 05.30 the following morning. He gives two

    3 orders there, if I can just reference -- let Your

    4 Honours recollect the sequence. He gives an order at

    5 approximately 09.00 on the 17th saying attack various

    6 villages in Kiseljak, and at 23.45 or approximately

    7 23.45 that evening, he gives them a time to attack the

    8 next morning, on the morning of the 18th, at 05.30.

    9 What does he say at the bottom of that

    10 document? He urges his troops to remember their

    11 historic responsibility. What does that mean, an

    12 historic responsibility? Historic responsibility is

    13 engrafted in this idea that this is Croatian land and

    14 that, "You, my soldiers, my brigades in Kiseljak that

    15 I'm sending into battle, have to remember that. You

    16 have to remember the historic goals that we have set

    17 forth, and it is your responsibility, it is your

    18 responsibility to take care of those things," that

    19 Kostroman was referring to, i.e., defend our borders

    20 with force if necessary.

    21 Those two ideas are very, very intricately

    22 connected. And it was no mistake, it was not a mistake

    23 that Blaskic used those terms, "Remember your historic

    24 responsibility," as he was sending his troops into

    25 combat.

  28. 1 Just moving quickly through Kostroman's

    2 speech. Again, a man who was a senior political and

    3 governmental leader in Central Bosnia, this area

    4 Busovaca, is an integral part of Croatia he tells us.

    5 He tells us it's going to be a part of Croatia "by hook

    6 or by crook." What does that mean, "by hook or by

    7 crook"? Does that contemplate military action if

    8 necessary? I submit to you it does. And as we go

    9 through the rest of his speech, he acknowledges that.

    10 He notes the borders of Croatia "on this very spot."

    11 In the middle of Bosnia, in the municipality of

    12 Busovaca, Kostroman is saying, "These are going to be

    13 the borders of Croatia." He notes that this is an

    14 interim period.

    15 Then he comments what is the role of the

    16 remaining Serbs and the remaining Muslims going to be

    17 after this becomes, "this" being Bosnia, becomes part

    18 of Croatia? What he says is something very

    19 interesting. "They can stay as long as they accept the

    20 fact that this is Croatia and that they are citizens of

    21 Croatia."

    22 He ends his speech saying that, "We, the

    23 Croats, are, in fact, the best guarantors of our

    24 borders," and they will do what's necessary to defend

    25 them, because he notes that those borders must be

  29. 1 defended.

    2 Now, is this particular speech given in

    3 isolation? I submit to you it's not. If I could go

    4 into private session in one very brief comment before

    5 we go back into public session, we can refer back to

    6 some more testimony and put this particular speech, as

    7 well as the other political platforms of the Croatian

    8 Community of Herceg-Bosna, in context.

    9 (Private session)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  30. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (Open session)

    19 MR. KEHOE: What transpires after this speech

    20 in January of 1992 is a series of cataclysmic events

    21 which ultimately caused the Republic of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina to rip apart through the various

    23 entities, and at this juncture, combat activities with

    24 the army of the Federal Republic -- or the SFRY or the

    25 army, the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army.

  31. 1 As we move from February to March and into

    2 April, combat does, in fact, ensue. In the early part

    3 of April 1992, and this is after the Republic of

    4 Bosnia-Herzegovina has declared their independence in

    5 March, an order is issued by President Izetbegovic, on

    6 the 8th of April, 1992, where he says that, "I am

    7 disbanding the Territorial Defence structure that was

    8 extant under the former Socialist Republic of

    9 Yugoslavia, and the military force that is going to

    10 protect the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the newly

    11 formed Territorial Defence."

    12 What we see on the heels of that is a

    13 sequence of very, very interesting events that set out

    14 the plan as to exactly what the Croatian Community of

    15 Herceg-Bosna is all about.

    16 On the 7th of April, 1992, Franjo Tudjman

    17 recognised the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    18 While also recognising the Republic of Bosnia and

    19 Herzegovina, he gave citizenship to Bosnian Croats in

    20 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a point that

    21 was ultimately had an extremely destabilising influence

    22 on the political framework of the Republic of Bosnia

    23 and Herzegovina.

    24 On the next day, the 8th of April, 1992, the

    25 HVO was set up by the Croatian Community of

  32. 1 Herceg-Bosna. A political/military entity, it engulfed

    2 the entire governmental framework of the Croatian

    3 Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    4 On the 10th of May (sic), we see a sequence

    5 of events that exemplifies the duality of the policies

    6 of the Republic of Croatia.

    7 The first item that takes place on the 10th

    8 of May that I would like to put on the ELMO is an order

    9 that is executed by President Mate Boban, and it is

    10 responding to the order of President Izetbegovic,

    11 establishing the Territorial Defence -- excuse me. I

    12 said the 10th of May. This is the 10th of April. I

    13 apologise.

    14 This order of the 10th of April, 1992,

    15 rejects the decision of President Izetbegovic, and

    16 President Boban notes the following on the 10th of

    17 April:

    18 "The Presidency of the Croatian Community of

    19 Herceg-Bosna has taken a decision that command over

    20 these units belongs solely to the Croatian Defence

    21 Council. This body is the only legal one and only this

    22 name is official. The HVO has a main staff, the HVO

    23 has municipal staffs, and all the municipalities of the

    24 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Starting today,

    25 10 April, 1992, the HVO main staff will communicate

  33. 1 only with the municipal staffs of the HVO."

    2 This last line is the line that demonstrates

    3 exactly why the HVO was set up and what their plans

    4 were for the future. Boban writes:

    5 "All other military formations in the

    6 territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna are

    7 either illegal or hostile. All other names will be

    8 removed from official use."

    9 So this state, this state within a state of

    10 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, has taken it

    11 upon itself to declare the Territorial Defence an

    12 illegal entity as of the 10th of April, 1992; two days

    13 after that entity, the Territorial Defence, was

    14 established by President Izetbegovic and the

    15 presidency.

    16 Now, what else is happening that date? What

    17 else is happening in conjunction with this? And again,

    18 this focuses on the duality of Tudjman's policy and his

    19 efforts to undermine or certainly solidify his position

    20 within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    21 While Boban is outlawing the TO, on the 10th

    22 of May (sic), Tudjman assigns General Bobetko to the

    23 southern front in an order that is dated the 10th of

    24 April of 1992. And what we see -- excuse me. My

    25 colleague is counselling me that I'm using the term

  34. 1 10th of May. It is, in fact, the 10th of April of

    2 1992.

    3 What we see in this order of the 10th of

    4 April, 1992, or on the heels of that order, is the

    5 transfer of numerous HV soldiers or soldiers from the

    6 Republic of Croatia into the ranks of the HVO and into

    7 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    8 Now, the particular involvement of the HV

    9 within the affairs of the HVO and the Croatian

    10 Community of Herceg-Bosna will be discussed at some

    11 length by my colleague, Mr. Cayley, so I don't want to

    12 go into that in much detail at this point as it bears

    13 on the international armed conflict issue under Article

    14 2 of the Statute.

    15 Nevertheless, in addition to its legal

    16 implications, the factual implications are enormous

    17 because what we see and what we examine over the course

    18 of time is the nomination and appointment of a series

    19 of chiefs of staff within the HVO that are essentially

    20 soldiers of the Republic of Croatia. We start with

    21 Milivoj Petkovic, we move from Milivoj Petkovic to

    22 Slobodan Praljak, we move from Slobodan Praljak to Ante

    23 Roso, and we go back to General Petkovic for a while.

    24 All - all - of those officers had come from the HV,

    25 come into the HVO, and then ultimately returned to the

  35. 1 HV once their service had been completed.

    2 Those are the three most famous ones, and, of

    3 course, there are others that you have seen during the

    4 course of the evidence that were also deployed to the

    5 area. Interestingly enough, General Bobetko issues

    6 orders all in the same time frame, sometimes on HVO

    7 letterhead and sometimes on the letterhead of the

    8 Republic of Croatia, and there seems to be no

    9 distinction or difference between these two military

    10 entities, leading to the inescapable conclusion that

    11 they are, in fact, the same and are directed from the

    12 same place with the same policies.

    13 Now, through the midst of this, through this

    14 pre-planned strategy by the Republic of Croatia and

    15 Tudjman in conjunction with the Croatian Community of

    16 Herceg-Bosna that takes place in the early part of

    17 April 1993, we see the arrival of the accused. Now,

    18 all of this is taking place in the first week of April

    19 1992. As I noted, the establishment of the HVO is

    20 dated as of the 8th of April of 1992.

    21 Now, who is supposed to show up on the scene

    22 while this pre-planned, coordinated activity is taking

    23 place but the accused?

    24 Blaskic testified to us that he arrived in

    25 Zagreb on the 6th of April, 1992, from Vienna. He

  36. 1 stayed overnight with a plan of then travelling on to

    2 Kiseljak by the next day. So if his plans had gone

    3 according to how they were charted, Blaskic would have

    4 arrived in Kiseljak either the day of or the day before

    5 the HVO was established. Through other circumstances

    6 and because of his prior service with the JNA, he was,

    7 in fact, arrested and incarcerated for a period of time

    8 by the JNA, which caused him to delay his arrival into

    9 Kiseljak until the second week of April of 1992.

    10 I think we have to go back to his testimony

    11 to see exactly what the plan was.

    12 Was it pure happenstance that Blaskic was to

    13 arrive in Kiseljak at the same time that Petkovic was

    14 to arrive in the HVO, at the same time that Bobetko is

    15 setting up or taking over the southern front, at the

    16 same time the HVO is coming into existence? I submit

    17 to you it's not. I submit to you that what is actually

    18 taking place and how the accused shaded the truth in

    19 this regard is that he knew full well what the agenda

    20 was and what it was going to be upon his arrival in

    21 Central Bosnia and in Bosnia as a whole. So when he

    22 told us he was unaware of exactly what was planned and

    23 what was going to be, I submit to you this is just one

    24 of the many misleading untruths that were presented to

    25 this Trial Chamber by the accused under oath.

  37. 1 Nevertheless, his arrival, which comes in the

    2 second week of April 1992, is followed very quickly,

    3 very quickly, by his appointment on the 23rd of April

    4 by the municipal staff as the commander of HVO forces.

    5 The guy is there less than two weeks, a little more

    6 than a week, and all of a sudden, he's in charge.

    7 What we see when Blaskic is in office

    8 commencing on approximately the 23rd of April of 1992

    9 is the manifestation of the political policy of the

    10 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Now, keep in mind

    11 we saw on the 10th of April, 1992, the outlawing of the

    12 TO. And what happens over the next several weeks is

    13 the take-over of, certainly in Kiseljak and certainly

    14 in Vitez and certainly in Busovaca, the take-over of

    15 those municipalities by the HVO.

    16 We see the increased marginalisation of the

    17 Bosnian Croats politically -- excuse me, the Bosnian

    18 Muslims, I'm sorry. We see the increased

    19 marginalisation of the Bosnian Muslims politically,

    20 culturally, economically, and certainly militarily.

    21 Politically with the establishment of the crisis staff,

    22 the Bosnian Muslims were outvoted and the Bosnian

    23 Croats won every vote.

    24 Culturally, we see the introduction of what

    25 they call the Bosnian Croat language, the Croatian

  38. 1 dinar, that prices have to be in the Croatian dinar.

    2 Educationally, we see an education curricula that

    3 emanates from Zagreb that is taught according to the

    4 edicts set forth from Zagreb.

    5 While this is taking place, the person who is

    6 ensuring that the Bosnian Croats are successfully

    7 developing this plan and grafting this new society on

    8 Kiseljak is the accused. He is the military commander

    9 at the time ensuring that is taking place. As we see

    10 the progression of events shortly after he arrives, we

    11 can see how his thinking, or certainly his articulation

    12 of his thinking, is in line with what is taking place

    13 with the political leaders of the Croatian Community of

    14 Herceg-Bosna. Keeping in mind, we will talk at this

    15 juncture just about Kiseljak, but the same events are

    16 transpiring throughout the Croatian Community of

    17 Herceg-Bosna, and this Court has heard a significant

    18 amount of evidence about similar events taking place in

    19 Vitez and Busovaca, Mostar, and elsewhere.

    20 The first sequence of events, of course, that

    21 is in line with this Karadjordjevo agreement that

    22 Tudjman had entered into with Milosevic is a similar

    23 meeting that Mate Boban has with Radovan Karadzic.

    24 Radovan Karadzic at that point, of course, is the

    25 leader of the Bosnian Serbs and ultimately the

  39. 1 president of Republika Srpska. The military arm of

    2 Republika Srpska normally has the acronym of the VRS.

    3 Nevertheless, they reach an agreement on the

    4 6th of May of 1992 where they have resolved all of

    5 their differences, according to the published statement

    6 that we submitted into evidence, the resolution of

    7 those differences, of course, between the Bosnian

    8 Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. That's on the 6th.

    9 The 8th of May, 1992, we see the issuance of

    10 an order coming from the main staff of the Croatian

    11 Community of Herceg-Bosna and signed by General Ante

    12 Roso.

    13 If we could put that on the ELMO? I believe

    14 we have that. It is on the ELMO? Thank you very

    15 much. Could we pan into that a little bit?

    16 Now, this fellow, Ante Roso, before we go

    17 into the elements of this, is a fascinating individual

    18 in the scheme of things. Now, this individual -- and

    19 we will hear much more about him -- at this point is an

    20 officer in the army of the Republic of Croatia. The

    21 evidence, as Your Honours have seen, it is beyond any

    22 doubt that at this juncture, on the 8th of May, 1992,

    23 he is part of the HV.

    24 What does Roso do? Roso issues an order, and

    25 if I may, on the 8th of May, 1992, that states as

  40. 1 follows, and I won't read the whole thing.

    2 "1. The only legal military units in the

    3 territory of the (Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna)

    4 are units of the HVO.

    5 "2. All other military units in the above

    6 territory must join the single defence system and

    7 recognise the HVO Main Staff as their supreme command."

    8 If we can move down to point 5?

    9 "5. This order supersedes all orders of the

    10 Territorial Defence command, which shall be considered

    11 illegal in this territory."

    12 Now, this is an order that comes to the main

    13 staff that Blaskic receives and he implements it. Now,

    14 this is a man who has told us that he, in his spirit of

    15 accommodation with the Bosnian Muslims, has taken all

    16 efforts in order to achieve reconciliation and

    17 coexistence. That's not true because the facts belie

    18 his position.

    19 Let us look at Exhibit 502. Exhibit 502 is

    20 his order of the 11th of May. It is awfully difficult

    21 to see on the ELMO, so I will try to reference through

    22 this.

    23 This particular order is Blaskic's order

    24 following Roso's order. Here is Blaskic in Kiseljak

    25 following the order of a General from the Republic of

  41. 1 Croatia, and he references in the preamble, and you can

    2 see in the preamble, "On the basis of the orders

    3 received from the main staff, 01331/92 --" that is, of

    4 course, the number of Roso's order that we just

    5 observed in Exhibit 584.

    6 And he notes:

    7 "1. The only legal military units in the

    8 area of the Kiseljak municipality are HVO units."

    9 Going down to 5.

    10 "5. By this order, all orders of the

    11 Territorial Defence are rendered invalid and the TO is,

    12 in this area, considered illegal."

    13 Now, Your Honours, I'm sure you can agree

    14 with me that this is hardly a series of orders that one

    15 would issue in the spirit of accommodation and

    16 coexistence. It is more in line with the plan or it is

    17 directly in line with the plan of the Croatian

    18 Community of Herceg-Bosna to take over.

    19 How do we know that?

    20 We know that not only by Blaskic's written

    21 word but also his spoken word. If we can, with the

    22 assistance of Mr. Hooper, put the next chart up on the

    23 easel, which is the Agence France Presse article that

    24 we have discussed previously, Exhibit 545.

    25 These are several excerpts from that article,

  42. 1 that Agence France Presse article, published, of

    2 course, the same day as his order to outlaw the

    3 Territorial Defence, and Blaskic said some fascinating

    4 things that exemplify or clarify his political view of

    5 things at the time.

    6 Among other things, and I note, he says in

    7 this exhibit:

    8 "Tiho Blaskic, who heads the CVO forces in

    9 Kiseljak, explained that the region was peaceful

    10 because the Serbs, who make up only three per cent of

    11 the town's population, 'have no designs on this land.'

    12 "As for the embattled Bosnia-Herzegovina

    13 government in Sarajevo, 'It has no legitimacy here.'

    14 "Kiseljak would henceforth be part of a

    15 Croatian canton or administrative region, and would

    16 look to the west rather than to the east, Tiho Blaskic

    17 said.

    18 "'It's closeness to Sarajevo never

    19 contributed much to our town anyway,' he said."

    20 I will read you a separate portion of the

    21 testimony of another witness, and this is what a

    22 witness said about another person within the HVO

    23 structure.

    24 He said he could not accept the constitution

    25 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its capital Sarajevo.

  43. 1 That sounds like something Blaskic would say. And

    2 Blaskic said that, "The Sarajevo government has no

    3 legitimacy here." He could well have said that he

    4 could not accept the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    5 and its capital Sarajevo.

    6 This latter quote comes from a conversation

    7 between Ed Vulliamy, a newspaper reporter for the

    8 Guardian, and Mate Boban. Mate Boban told Vulliamy

    9 that he could not accept the constitution of Bosnia and

    10 Herzegovina and its capital Sarajevo. Essentially the

    11 same thing as Blaskic was telling the Agence France

    12 Presse reporter on approximately the 11th of May of

    13 1993.

    14 So what does this do that seriously calls

    15 into question yet another shading of the truth?

    16 JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN: Do you say the date of

    17 the Agence France Presse report was the 11th of May,

    18 1993?

    19 MR. KEHOE: 1992, I'm sorry. I apologise.

    20 Sometimes, Judge, as we go through this stuff I

    21 transpose these dates in my dyslexia. So I do

    22 apologise. I get them a little confused.

    23 Both of these statements were in 1992. The

    24 Agence France Presse article is, of course, May of

    25 1992. The comment given to Mr. Vulliamy by Mate Boban

  44. 1 was 13 August of 1992. So I apologise for transposing

    2 some of those numbers, but I get them a little confused

    3 from time to time.

    4 So essentially these two comments are taking

    5 place virtually at the same time and essentially

    6 propose the same idea, that is, on Croatian land the

    7 authority of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is

    8 virtually non-existent.

    9 Now, while this is taking place in Kiseljak,

    10 i.e., the marginalisation of the Muslims, the outlawing

    11 of the TO. Of course Your Honours, as I have noted

    12 previously, have seen evidence that the same thing is

    13 happening in other locales, and not the least of which

    14 is Busovaca.

    15 If we can turn to the next exhibit, which is

    16 Exhibit 208, this is an order by Dario Kordic. I don't

    17 believe that you can see that on the page on the ELMO,

    18 but it is, in fact, on the second page of this

    19 document, but significantly, two days after Roso's

    20 order on the 8th of May, on the 10th of May, 1992

    21 Kordic orders the following on point 3:

    22 "All paramilitary formations, the so-called

    23 TO, individually and others, are given the ultimatum to

    24 hand over all weapons in their possession by Sunday,

    25 12.00 hours, or place themselves under HVO command

  45. 1 which includes wearing the HVO insignia."

    2 So this marginalisation is taking place

    3 throughout the Central Bosnia Operative Zone. Blaskic

    4 is accomplishing his goals in conjunction with the rest

    5 of the HVO in Kiseljak, and the orders are emanating

    6 from Dario Kordic where he is, in fact, doing the

    7 same.

    8 Of course, in view of this order, what fact

    9 transpires? We have seen evidence as set forth in

    10 Exhibit 631, that the order on the outlawing of the

    11 Territorial Defence was attempted to be executed, and

    12 during this same period of time, fighting erupts

    13 between the Territorial Defence and the HVO, to the

    14 surprise of no one, given the fact that the HVO has

    15 taken steps to outlaw the very body that was set up by

    16 President Izetbegovic and the presidency of

    17 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    18 The fighting then ebbs and flows throughout

    19 this period of time, but what we see and what we have

    20 seen from the testimony as we progress through May and

    21 also through June, is essentially the entire take-over

    22 certainly of the Kiseljak municipality while Blaskic is

    23 the commander there. The testimony that we've received

    24 is by no later than the 25th of June of 1992, the

    25 entire political body within Kiseljak is now the HVO

  46. 1 executive board. The HVO executive body is now running

    2 the Kiseljak municipality by approximately the 25th of

    3 June, 1992.

    4 Now, in light of this success, in light of

    5 all of what happened, and what has happened, and the

    6 control with which the HVO is now exerting over

    7 Kiseljak, what happens to the accused? What happens to

    8 Tihomir Blaskic? He's promoted. He's promoted.

    9 On the 27th of June of 1992, Blaskic enters

    10 into a meeting with Boban, Major General Roso, and

    11 Milivoj Petkovic, and it is during this meeting on the

    12 27th of June of 1992 that Blaskic is given the command

    13 of Colonel -- or given the rank of Colonel by

    14 General Roso. Not by President Mate Boban, not by the

    15 so-called chief of staff of the HVO Milivoj Petkovic,

    16 by a Croatian General he is given the rank of Colonel

    17 and Commander of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone.

    18 Now, during this sequence we see yet another

    19 shading of the truth by the accused. The 27th of June,

    20 1992, Blaskic accepts the rank of Colonel and Commander

    21 of the Central Bosnian Operative Zone. We have seen

    22 the order of General Roso dated 8 May, 1992, which

    23 Blaskic implemented, and prior to the 27th of June,

    24 1992, Blaskic told us that he received approximately

    25 ten orders from Ante Roso.

  47. 1 Mr. President, you asked the accused at that

    2 point, "What was the role of Ante Roso within the HVO

    3 structure?" What did he respond? "I don't know."

    4 He implements one of the single most

    5 important orders emanating from the HVO main staff at,

    6 i.e., the dismemberment and the outlawing of the TO,

    7 takes in approximately ten other orders from Ante Roso,

    8 which he executes as a good soldier, yet he's testified

    9 under oath before this Chamber that he didn't know what

    10 Ante Roso's position was within the HVO main staff.

    11 Why did he do that? Why? He didn't do that

    12 because in his level of obfuscation of the truth, he

    13 was unwilling, unwilling to testify truthfully in this

    14 court that a Major General in the army of the Republic

    15 of Croatia was giving him orders and he was following

    16 it. That a Major General in the army of the Republic

    17 of Croatia had given him the rank of Colonel and had

    18 outlined the territory which was going to be the area

    19 of his responsibility.

    20 Blaskic knew full well the ramifications of

    21 testifying truthfully that the HVO was so deeply

    22 ensconced in the day-to-day affairs of the HVO --

    23 excuse me, that the HV was so deeply ensconced in the

    24 day-to-day affairs of the HVO. Consequently, he was

    25 unwilling to tell this Court that an HVO officer was

  48. 1 giving him orders and that he was following them, or an

    2 HV officer was giving him those orders and he was

    3 following them.

    4 I submit to you that his failure to identify

    5 Ante Roso as an officer within the army of the Republic

    6 of Croatia was a lie, was not true.

    7 Now, let us talk just briefly -- and I don't

    8 know -- Mr. President, I'm going to go into a private

    9 session and talk at probably some length about Blaskic

    10 himself being given this position in the -- as the head

    11 of the Central Bosnian Operative Zone. I can go a

    12 little bit over 1.00 or --

    13 JUDGE JORDA: Perhaps we should have the

    14 lunch break now, Mr. Kehoe, don't you think?

    15 MR. KEHOE: Certainly, Mr. President.

    16 JUDGE JORDA: Very well. We will resume work

    17 at 2.30.

    18 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.








  49. 1 --- On resuming at 2.37 p.m.

    2 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Please

    3 be seated. Have the accused brought in, please.

    4 (The accused entered court)

    5 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, I think you

    6 requested a private session for a few minutes?

    7 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President, and just

    8 introducing this particular area ...

    9 (Private session)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

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    18 (redacted)

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  54. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (Open session)

    7 MR. KEHOE: As time progressed, after the

    8 appointment of Blaskic as the Central Bosnian Operative

    9 Zone commander, the continued subjugation of the

    10 Bosnian Muslim population throughout Central Bosnia and

    11 throughout the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

    12 continued. There were conflicts, such as that in

    13 Kiseljak and Duhri, for instance, where Blaskic was

    14 present, and Blaskic, who testified that he was the

    15 accommodator, he was the man that was trying to

    16 constantly achieve coexistence, told us everything that

    17 he tried to do to accomplish that goal. What he didn't

    18 tell us was that when the Territorial Defence commander

    19 from Kiseljak, Sejad Sinanbasic, was arrested and taken

    20 to Busovaca and Blaskic was given the assignment to

    21 secure his release within 24 hours, the commander of

    22 the Territorial Defence, Sejad Sinanbasic, remained in

    23 custody for approximately 25 to 28 days, and what

    24 ultimately happened was that the Territorial Defence

    25 militarily was decapitated and any possible military

  55. 1 confrontation with the Territorial Defence in Kiseljak

    2 after that event was over.

    3 The only nodding attempt to secure the

    4 release of Sejad Sinanbasic was one that Blaskic said

    5 was given to his trusted ally, Mr. Ante Sliskovic.

    6 Ante Sliskovic, the same individual that he entrusted

    7 to conduct the investigation in Ahmici, that is the

    8 individual that Blaskic sent to secure the release of

    9 Sejad Sinanbasic, the same Sejad Sinanbasic who

    10 remained in custody from 25 to 28 days.

    11 Without going through everything that

    12 happened in these municipalities, I believe we have our

    13 next exhibit to delineate exactly how successful the

    14 HVO and Blaskic was in securing power in the various

    15 areas in the Central Bosnian Operative Zone, and we

    16 would like to turn to the next exhibit, which is just a

    17 front sheet of Exhibit 456/109, which in the transcript

    18 on occasion has been referred to as Exhibit 456/95. It

    19 is both one and the same exhibit. So if I could ask

    20 Mr. Hooper to put that up, that would be helpful.

    21 This is a record of minutes of the meeting of

    22 the HVO and the municipalities of Central Bosnia dated

    23 22 September, 1992. Who was the working presidency in

    24 this? Dario Kordic, Anto Valenta, Tihomir Blaskic, and

    25 Ignac Kostroman. Now, Blaskic has told us he was not a

  56. 1 political person and that he did not sign this

    2 document. But I think it is significant, Your Honours,

    3 to see how these other men reacted to Blaskic.

    4 Kordic, Kostroman, and Valenta were secure

    5 enough in their opinions and assessments of Blaskic to

    6 describe him as part of the working presidency of the

    7 HVO in Central Bosnia.

    8 What were the agenda items, the agenda items

    9 in a meeting that he attended, Blaskic?

    10 The first one that is listed here is

    11 extremely significant:

    12 "The implementation of decisions to

    13 establish HVO authority."

    14 Without going through all these, let's go

    15 through the significant areas or the significant

    16 municipalities.

    17 On page 2 of this document, in Vitez, what is

    18 their assessment?

    19 "Vitez - There is still dual authority.

    20 There is a possibility of confrontation between the

    21 Croats and the Muslims because the HVO is taking

    22 power."

    23 "Busovaca - HVO authority was set up on 9

    24 May, 1992. HVO is the only authority in Busovaca.

    25 "Kiseljak - HVO is in complete control.

  57. 1 Military HVO authority is dominant.

    2 The latter observations of the municipalities

    3 at the end of this document is very telling, and one is

    4 particularly telling. In the latter part of this

    5 document, again we have a comment by the HVO, these

    6 municipalities, was remarkably similar to Blaskic's

    7 comment to the Agence France Presse concerning the

    8 legitimacy of the government from Sarajevo.

    9 "Exiled B and H government and its bodies

    10 with pro-Muslim policies are undesirable on our

    11 territory and their possible activity contrary to the

    12 principles of HDZ bodies shall not be tolerated."

    13 What is the final assessment from this? The

    14 final assessment from this is the HVO is in control,

    15 and those places where it's not in complete control,

    16 they're going to do what they can to seize control.

    17 We then move to October, and October becomes

    18 a somewhat seminal month because of the convergence of

    19 several events that take place. What happens in

    20 October on the political front is a significant event

    21 vis-à-vis Mate Boban, because by October of 1992, Mate

    22 Boban has secured the presidency of not only the

    23 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, but he is now also

    24 the president and leader of the HDZ party, the HDZ

    25 party in Bosnia. He is now the power in the Croatian

  58. 1 Community of Herceg-Bosna.

    2 During this time he makes a very, very -- or

    3 gives a very interesting interview to Ed Vulliamy,

    4 which says, in essence:

    5 "The HVO is the power in the Croatian

    6 Community of Herceg-Bosna, and anybody who does not

    7 agree with our policies must leave or step down in some

    8 other fashion."

    9 What happens in October is a concerted effort

    10 on various locales to force the subordination of the

    11 ABiH or the TO to the HVO.

    12 One, Ed Vulliamy visits Mostar. He meets

    13 with both the HVO Commander Lasic and the ABiH

    14 Commander Arif Pasalic. What has happened is an order

    15 and an ultimatum by the HVO to the ABiH to subordinate

    16 themselves to the HVO and that the HVO is the only

    17 authority in Mostar.

    18 Vulliamy travels to another locale. What is

    19 that locale? It happens to be the locale of Vitez

    20 where Tihomir Blaskic is, and he overhears, during the

    21 course of a press conference, Pero Skopljak, an HVO and

    22 HDZ leader, state almost the exact same thing as Lasic

    23 said in Mostar, and that is that the HVO is the only

    24 power in Vitez.

    25 In conjunction with that, we have an effort

  59. 1 on behalf of the HVO to secure the communication lines

    2 in their territorial areas, and we have the onslaught

    3 in two separate locations. The first, approximately

    4 going on at about the same time, is Prozor. We recall

    5 Ed Vulliamy going through Prozor, and Prozor is the

    6 road going up to Central Bosnia and on to Novi Travnik

    7 and into the Lasva Valley. In the latter part of

    8 October 1992, Prozor is cleansed and approximately

    9 5.000 Muslims are driven out of their homes. Their

    10 homes are burnt, their houses are looted, and they're

    11 sent into the mountains outside of Prozor.

    12 While this is taking place, fighting is

    13 ensuing on behalf of the HVO in Novi Travnik, the

    14 locale not only on the communications road but also the

    15 location of the Bratstvo factory, which is obviously a

    16 factory that is significant and very important to the

    17 HVO in Central Bosnia.

    18 While this is also taking place, of course,

    19 we then have our first conflict coming from Ahmici.

    20 Ahmici, in the morning of the -- on the 20th of

    21 October, 1992, the HVO is sending further troops up to

    22 Novi Travnik to assist in the combat and there is a

    23 roadblock there. Ultimately fighting ensues and the

    24 roadblock is removed.

    25 It is interesting in this sequence, if I

  60. 1 might digress for a second, of Blaskic's testimony

    2 concerning what happened in this Novi Travnik incident,

    3 and suffice it to say there are numerous occasions

    4 where he clearly misled the Court. Some of that

    5 misleading testimony was not only by commission but by

    6 omission. One can lie and mislead by not telling the

    7 Chamber the whole truth. If one tells simply half a

    8 story, certainly that's not the whole story, and the

    9 accused did exactly that.

    10 There are some very easy ones as to how he

    11 didn't tell the truth. Blaskic said the troops that

    12 were going up on the morning of the 20th of October

    13 to -- the morning of the 20th of October, that were

    14 stopped in Ahmici, were on their way to Jajce. Well,

    15 without playing the tape, the Croatian Community of

    16 Herceg-Bosna television reports reflect that, in fact,

    17 those troops were on their way to Novi Travnik, and

    18 that is in Exhibit 646.

    19 The next issue is exactly where he was. He

    20 says that on the morning of the 20th that he was

    21 stopped in Busovaca and was never in Novi Travnik on

    22 the 20th. Interestingly, of course, Colonel Stewart,

    23 not only in his testimony but in the exhibits presented

    24 to the Court, went to the Hotel Vitez on the morning of

    25 the 20th. And what was Stewart told? Stewart was told

  61. 1 by Mario Cerkez that Blaskic was at Novi Travnik, again

    2 where a good commander should be, in Novi Travnik,

    3 where the fighting was going on.

    4 If you examine Blaskic's direct testimony, I

    5 ask Your Honours to ask one question: Why does Blaskic

    6 not tell the Court that he was, in fact, in Novi

    7 Travnik as reflected by one of his own orders that the

    8 Prosecution produced? I am, of course, talking about

    9 Prosecutor Exhibit 647. He never tells the Court

    10 that. He never, in his direct testimony, as we go

    11 through, laboriously, almost daily events does he tell

    12 the Court that he was in Novi Travnik ever.

    13 Well, the fact remains that on the 20th, when

    14 there were meetings in the Hotel Vitez on the 20th with

    15 Colonel Stewart, it was Blaskic, not the individual

    16 acting in the spirit of accommodation but the one who

    17 demanded at those meetings that the ABiH or the TO

    18 subordinate itself to the HVO. It was Blaskic who

    19 wrote in this order on the 21st of October, 1992, and I

    20 quote from Exhibit 647:

    21 "While defence operations are being

    22 conducted, the vice-president of the Croatian Community

    23 of Herceg-Bosna Dario Kordic and I are in Novi Travnik

    24 continuously leading military operations with deep

    25 knowledge of the situation and keeping all the forces

  62. 1 under control."

    2 Now, I ask Your Honours why would testimony

    3 such as that or facts such as that be omitted during

    4 the course of his rather lengthy direct-examination?

    5 There is another very interesting document.

    6 If we could place that document on the ELMO. Do we

    7 have that? 647. That's it right there.

    8 If we look at point 6 of this document, if we

    9 blow it up -- just move it down a little bit -- Blaskic

    10 noted that this was some type of spontaneous eruption

    11 of activities in Novi Travnik. Look at the numerous

    12 locations in point 6, where Blaskic has his troops

    13 deployed. His troops are deployed everywhere

    14 throughout the various lines in the Central Bosnia

    15 Operative Zone, in and around the Novi Travnik area.

    16 In addition to that, I ask Your Honours to

    17 examine the final line and consider this in context

    18 with subsequent statements by Blaskic and view it in

    19 light of Blaskic's statement about his "peasant army."

    20 What does Blaskic say?

    21 "The activities of our forces are organised,

    22 fully coordinated and controlled by the command."

    23 So as early as October the 21st of 1992,

    24 Blaskic is articulating in writing that the command and

    25 control in his area of responsibility works and is

  63. 1 fully coordinated.

    2 There is another point with regard to this

    3 particular event which I think bears some degree or

    4 several points that bear some comment before we move

    5 on, and that, of course, is a series of exhibits that

    6 we have seen that we begin to detect a cooperative

    7 setting between the HVO and the Serbs, especially up

    8 near the Jajce front. We will then see a continuance

    9 of that as we move into the activities in 1993, but

    10 some of the exhibits Your Honours have received in

    11 evidence do discuss, and they are VRS documents, do

    12 discuss levels of cooperation that begin to take place

    13 between the VRS and the HVO.

    14 In addition to that, we might look at Exhibit

    15 347 briefly. Thank you. 347 is an order that was

    16 issued by Blaskic at the behest of Brigadier Merdan

    17 after the cease-fire had ensued.

    18 It is noteworthy, in this particular comment,

    19 that Blaskic commands that:

    20 "All measures shall be taken to prevent

    21 setting fire to houses of eminent citizens of Muslim

    22 nationalities in your zone of responsibility."

    23 So as early as October of 1992, Blaskic is

    24 aware that his troops are burning Bosnian Muslim

    25 houses. Suffice it to say that as a result of this

  64. 1 particular effort, no Bosnian Muslim -- no HVO soldier

    2 was punished for his activities in burning houses in

    3 Novi Travnik. One can only guess what type of

    4 preventative measures would have come about had he, at

    5 that stage, begun to discipline or ensure that troops

    6 who were burning houses were punished for this crime.

    7 Of course, he did not, and what happened thereafter, of

    8 course, is reflected in the facts we have seen depicted

    9 throughout the course of this case.

    10 It is interesting just to refer back to the

    11 troop levels that he had at his command during that

    12 period of time. At that time he had numerous brigades

    13 at his command. The Vitez Brigade was not yet

    14 formulated. That was yet to be formed out of the

    15 Stjepan Tomasevic Brigade in March of 1993, but units

    16 such as the Vitezovi were present in the area. The

    17 military police were certainly present in the area at

    18 that time, while the anti-terrorist unit, the Jokers,

    19 hadn't been formed yet. The foundation of the Jokers

    20 and those particular political policemen were in there,

    21 as was Zuti, who was a military policeman and part of

    22 the Frankopan Brigade, as well as other special purpose

    23 units such as the Tvrtko and the Maturice in Kiseljak.

    24 So at this particular time, even several

    25 months after he has taken power, when he is complaining

  65. 1 there is no command and control possible, he is

    2 articulating that, in fact, command and control does

    3 work with these units that are under his command.

    4 Now, after the events that take place in Novi

    5 Travnik, as we move into November, things do calm

    6 down. Hostilities are not as tense over the course of

    7 November and December of 1992, and there's a reason for

    8 that. The reason for that, in sum and substance, is

    9 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. People are negotiating for

    10 some type of peace settlement, which ultimately becomes

    11 the Vance-Owen Plan. That is going on through this

    12 period of time. What we see during this period of time

    13 is the first articulation of the Vance-Owen Plan which

    14 takes place on the 2nd of January of 1993.

    15 If we can have that particular map,

    16 Mr. Hooper, of the Vance-Owen Plan?

    17 Now, the design of the Vance-Owen Plan was to

    18 break up Bosnia and Herzegovina into cantons or

    19 provinces -- you hear it talked about sometimes as

    20 cantons and sometimes as provinces -- with each

    21 individual ethnic group having, where they had a

    22 majority, having a majority rule in that particular

    23 canton. It did not mean that the minority groups had

    24 no rights. To the contrary. It was trying to be based

    25 on a majority rule. As we will see in a few events,

  66. 1 that intent of the Vance-Owen Plan was, in fact, turned

    2 on its head, if you will, and was not exactly employed

    3 by the HVO and the HVO leadership.

    4 In this particular document, we see the

    5 cantons that fell under the white, being the ones that

    6 fell under the Bosnian Muslim-controlled area, the pink

    7 being the ones falling under the Republika Srpska or

    8 the Bosnian Serbs, and the ones that have been the

    9 subject of discussion throughout are the blue areas,

    10 canton 8, canton 10, and canton 3. Those are the three

    11 cantons that were assigned to the Bosnian Croats as a

    12 result of the first iteration of the Vance-Owen Plan.

    13 There are several other Vance-Owen Plan maps

    14 in evidence and with those it is probably easier to see

    15 exactly what areas are engulfed within the Croat areas,

    16 but suffice it to say, Vitez, Travnik, Busovaca,

    17 Fojnica are in canton 10, whereas Zenica is in canton

    18 9, the Bosnian Muslim side.

    19 What we can see from this is that this is a

    20 large bulge of land that is not exactly but very close

    21 to the territorial desires of the Croats in general and

    22 very close to the territorial or the geographical

    23 demarcations of the Banovina Plan of 1939. If we could

    24 look at that and juxtapose the two? If we could pull

    25 that map out, Mr. Hooper?

  67. 1 If you recall, Mr. President and Your

    2 Honours, I was talking to you about the bulge in the

    3 lower part of the --

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Just a moment. Perhaps your

    5 assistant can hold for us the other map above this one

    6 and that way we can compare the two, and then the

    7 camera can also show us what you are trying to tell

    8 us. Just above. One above the other, please. That's

    9 it. Now you can stand in front.

    10 I think in this way you can present your

    11 thesis. Please continue.

    12 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President.

    13 As you can see, the bulge within the lower

    14 part of the Banovina Plan is remarkably similar to the

    15 incursion of land that would be given to the Bosnian

    16 Croats per the Vance-Owen Plan. It's not exact. There

    17 is some land that's in and some land that's out. For

    18 instance, Jajce is incorporated in 10 and Jajce is

    19 outside of the Banovina Plan. Nevertheless, the two

    20 areas that are to go to the Bosnian Croats or to go to

    21 the Croats in the Banovina Plan and in the Vance-Owen

    22 Plan are remarkably similar.

    23 Suffice it to say, this iteration, which came

    24 out first on 2 January, 1993, was the high watermark,

    25 if I can use that vernacular, the high watermark for

  68. 1 the Bosnian Croats, and they never were given this much

    2 land in any other peace plan again, and that is in

    3 large part why, two days later, the 4th of January,

    4 1993, Boban signed the Vance-Owen Plan and this map.

    5 They immediately accepted this map.

    6 Thank you. If I can just step back?

    7 Blaskic has told us that he is not a

    8 political man and that he was always told that he had

    9 little or nothing to do with politics. I submit to

    10 Your Honours that we will develop through the facts and

    11 the testimony that Blaskic was extremely interested in

    12 the Vance-Owen Plan, as was everybody else on the

    13 Bosnian Croat side, especially as it related to canton

    14 10.

    15 Let us go through a list of things that

    16 transpired.

    17 As I said, this particular map is signed on

    18 the 2nd of January. The 4th of January, Mate Boban

    19 signs it. By the 6th of January, Blaskic and his other

    20 commanders are down in Grude discussing the Vance-Owen

    21 Peace Plan with the Minister of Defence, Bruno Stojic.

    22 That's from his own testimony.

    23 So very early on, within two days of the

    24 signature of Mate Boban on this, the command of the HVO

    25 is discussing the plan. And he didn't stop. Of

  69. 1 course, it always remained of interest to him. It

    2 remained of interest to him even up through May and

    3 through the conflict, and if we can just put Exhibit

    4 112 on the easel -- if we could, Mr. Hooper?

    5 456/112. That's it right there.

    6 These are exhibits that Blaskic talked about

    7 at some length dated the 26th of May, 1993. The

    8 significant part for the purposes of our discussion is

    9 paragraph 2:

    10 "It is well-known by now that high level

    11 representatives of Croat and Muslim people have

    12 militarily and politically agreed on implementing the

    13 Vance-Owen Plan in provinces 8, 9, and 10.

    14 Eight and 10 being, of course, the Croat

    15 provinces, and 9 being the Muslim province within his

    16 area of responsibility.

    17 Now, Blaskic testified that with this

    18 particular copy, the copy that is written in B/C/S, he

    19 didn't sign it. He wasn't a political man. He didn't

    20 authorise this and he would never have authorised this

    21 because he is not a man that's involved in politics.

    22 Well, of course, the actual facts defy that and the

    23 actual facts fly in the face of that testimony because

    24 dated the same day, the HVO had translated this letter

    25 into English, and lo and behold, the accused signed

  70. 1 it.

    2 This is a careful soldier, a very methodical

    3 soldier, a soldier who presumably doesn't put his name

    4 to a document without knowing what's in the document.

    5 He certainly knew what was in this document when he

    6 penned his name to this document, and this document is

    7 an articulation of his concern about the Vance-Owen

    8 Plan. So any debate that he is not involved in

    9 politics or doesn't have political concerns I think we

    10 can put to rest with his signature on this document

    11 alone because his testimony in that regard is not true.

    12 He thought the evidence in possession was

    13 only a document that related to this one document that

    14 was not signed by him, but lo and behold, he had signed

    15 another. He had signed it. And he knew full well what

    16 was in it. There are other documents that we will go

    17 into in a moment that reflect that Blaskic was

    18 sensitive, in fact, to what was going on with the

    19 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and I will turn to those in one

    20 moment.

    21 If I may stay, before we move back to

    22 January -- do we have that? -- if I may put

    23 Prosecutor's Exhibit 456/32 on the ELMO, and in his

    24 requests that he sends to Mate Boban, Bruno Stojic, and

    25 Milivoj Petkovic on the 7th of May, he requests very

  71. 1 clearly, in number 1:

    2 "1. I request instructions in case the

    3 Vance-Owen Plan is applied in line with query ..."

    4 And he gives it a date order of 4 May, 1993.

    5 Another exhibit, moving back to January

    6 itself, and this is a rather interesting document

    7 concerning command and control as rather the

    8 information that was depicted in it. This is a

    9 document that was submitted in evidence towards the

    10 latter part of the Defence case. And if you recall

    11 from Blaskic's testimony, keeping in mind the sequence,

    12 that the Vance-Owen Plan is signed on the 2nd, Boban --

    13 excuse me, the Vance-Owen Plan comes out on the 2nd of

    14 January, Boban signs it on the 4th. By the 6th,

    15 Blaskic is down in Grude talking about the Vance-Owen

    16 Plan with Bruno Stojic, the Defence Minister, and by

    17 the 9th, there are two units that show up in the

    18 Central Bosnian Operative Zone: the Bruno Busic

    19 Brigade that is in Novi Travnik and the Ludvig Pavlovic

    20 Brigade that is garrisoned in Vitez.

    21 From Blaskic's own testimony, he learns that

    22 they show up on the 9th. He testifies he has no

    23 control over them, they are not within his chain of

    24 command, and they had come to the area because the

    25 joint command sent them there. Well ...

  72. 1 Let's turn to a Defence Exhibit to show that

    2 that is simply not true, and I turn your attention to

    3 Defence 565.

    4 Defence Exhibit 565 is an order that is given

    5 by Blaskic at 2405 hours on the 9th to the 10th of

    6 January of 1993, the day these guys show up. He,

    7 Blaskic, is giving an order to the Bruno Busic Brigade

    8 in Novi Travnik. On the front sheet of this document,

    9 it is designated as the BB Brigade and the commander is

    10 Anton Luburic.

    11 What is the first individual item on that?

    12 It has to do with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

    13 "1. Localise the clash and strive to calm

    14 the situation for the negotiations in Geneva to be

    15 conducted without obstruction."

    16 As a separate note, if we turn to page 2,

    17 this unit that Blaskic says he's got no command over,

    18 point 6 of this document, again a Defence document:

    19 "6. The brigade commander and the

    20 BB Unit --"

    21 Which is Bruno Busic.

    22 "-- commander are responsible to me for the

    23 execution of this order."

    24 Blaskic is asking this Court to believe that

    25 he is giving an order to a unit, the Bruno Busic

  73. 1 Brigade, holding the commander liable to him for the

    2 execution of this order while also asking you to

    3 believe that he has no authority over this unit and

    4 that he had no idea, given this chain of chronological

    5 circumstances regarding the Vance-Owen Plan, why they

    6 were deployed in his locale so shortly after his

    7 meeting with Bruno Stojic.

    8 Suffice it to say, Mr. President and Your

    9 Honours, they were deployed through that area for a

    10 particular reason, and that is, they have every desire

    11 in the world to implement the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,

    12 and we need only look at what was happening in Central

    13 Bosnia in conjunction with what was happening in Gornji

    14 Vakuf to exemplify that point.

    15 On the 15th of January, 1996, Blaskic

    16 received two orders from Milivoj Petkovic: one was a

    17 combat order to put his troops on a combat setting; the

    18 other was an order that came down from Perlic, the

    19 President of the HVO, to Bruno Stojic, the Minister of

    20 Defence of the HVO, down to Milivoj Petkovic. In that

    21 order, it called for the subordination of the ABiH

    22 units in cantons 3, 8, and 10, subordination to the

    23 HVO.

    24 If we could turn to the first document, which

    25 is Exhibit 659 -- do we have that on there? Thank you.

  74. 1 This, Mr. President and Your Honours, is the

    2 final order in the trio of orders that we have

    3 submitted into evidence. This is an order coming from

    4 Milivoj Petkovic ordering that the ABiH troops in

    5 cantons 3, 8, and 10 subordinate themselves to the

    6 HVO. The deadline for this? The deadline for this is

    7 the 20th of January, 1993.

    8 What does Blaskic do in response to these two

    9 orders? If I can move to the next document, which is

    10 Exhibit 456/6, Blaskic puts his troops on a combat

    11 readiness alert. As we can see from this document, he

    12 has received an order from Mostar, which is 01/16/93,

    13 and based on that order, he has put his troops on

    14 combat readiness. So during this location, we have

    15 movement of the Bruno Busic Brigade and the Ludvig

    16 Pavlovic Brigade into his area, we have an order for

    17 the subordination of the units of the army of

    18 Bosnia-Herzegovina; Blaskic, the next day, putting his

    19 troops on a combat readiness level -- and by the way,

    20 the combat readiness includes all formations within the

    21 Central Bosnian Operative Zone, including Bruno Busic,

    22 Ludvig Pavlovic, the Vitezovi, the Travnik police, and

    23 the 4th Military Police Battalion. It's interesting to

    24 note in this document was Blaskic does say.

    25 In point 2, about three down, he notes that:

  75. 1 "All HVO formations to be in maximum state

    2 of readiness; all Muslims in the HVO formations who

    3 disobey our orders are to be disarmed and isolated."

    4 On the next page, point 5:

    5 "IV Military Police Battalion is to control

    6 the traffic and confiscate equipment and weapons from

    7 all Muslim transports and put them at the disposal of

    8 the HVO forces."

    9 I submit to Your Honours, this is not

    10 precisely an order that one would issue in a spirit of

    11 accommodation and coexistence.

    12 What they're getting ready for at this

    13 particular point is a defiant ABiH refusing to come

    14 under the command of the HVO in this canton, and it all

    15 comes back to this misinterpretation by the political

    16 leadership in the HVO that the cantonisation of a

    17 particular area meant that it was supposed to amount to

    18 uni-ethnic power as opposed to a majority/minority

    19 split.

    20 So they're unilaterally calling for the

    21 subordination. Blaskic puts them -- unilaterally

    22 calling the subordination of ABiH troops on the 15th

    23 with a deadline to do it on the 20th. The 16th,

    24 Blaskic puts his troops in a combat readiness mode.

    25 And what happens after that? If we could turn to 666,

  76. 1 which is the chart right there?

    2 Now, this is the order of the 19th of January

    3 where Milivoj Petkovic subordinates the Vitezovi to

    4 Blaskic and the Central Bosnian Operative Zone for all

    5 purposes. On the 19th. What also happens on the 19th,

    6 the same day this order is issued, and we know this

    7 fact from Defence Exhibit 250, the same day, the

    8 Vitezovi, in conjunction with the Ludvig Pavlovic

    9 Brigade, are out conducting a reconnaissance mission to

    10 examine the deployment of ABiH troops. Of course,

    11 Blaskic doesn't know anything about this. I mean, he

    12 doesn't know anything about how and why, on the 19th,

    13 the Vitezovi, who are subordinated to him, and the

    14 Ludvig Pavlovic Brigade, are out doing reconnaissance

    15 on the ABiH.

    16 We can't take what's going on in Blaskic's

    17 back yard in isolation because the same thing is

    18 happening in Gornji Vakuf on a little bit of a quicker

    19 timetable. As we know, the order comes from Milivoj

    20 Petkovic on the 15th to have the ABiH subordinate

    21 themselves.

    22 The commander in Gornji Vakuf is moving a

    23 little quicker. He wants a subordination by the 17th.

    24 He's not waiting till the 20th. He wants a

    25 subordination and a disarmament by the ABiH by the

  77. 1 17th.

    2 Of course, the ABiH don't and what happens?

    3 They refuse this unilateral subordination and, of

    4 course, in their time-honoured tradition which has

    5 become the modus operandi of the HVO, they attack

    6 Muslim civilian property, they burn the houses, and

    7 they drive the Muslims out of the villages in and

    8 around Gornji Vakuf on the main communications line.

    9 The testimony we just heard recently from then Captain

    10 Short reflects that.

    11 While this ensues, there is fear even among

    12 the Bosnian Croat population in Central Bosnia that the

    13 violence that erupted in Gornji Vakuf on the 17th is

    14 likewise going to erupt in Central Bosnia in the

    15 Busovaca area. In fact, we heard a tape from Zvonko

    16 Rajic, one of the individuals that was tragically

    17 killed in the Dusina-Lasva killings, and in that tape

    18 Zvonko Rajic notes:

    19 "We have one fact, the conflict from Gornji

    20 Vakuf spread all the way to these territories of Middle

    21 Bosnia and the municipality of Travnik."

    22 So there was an awareness that the conflict,

    23 the conflict that is brought about by the HVO is going

    24 to spread to the Central Bosnia region.

    25 And by the way, Mr. President, we have heard

  78. 1 facts concerning the tragic death of Zvonko Rajic and

    2 the other individuals, Bosnian Croats, who were killed

    3 in those villages.

    4 War crimes -- if half of what was testified

    5 to was the truth, crimes were committed and people were

    6 prosecuted. At no point, at no juncture during the

    7 course of this case is the Prosecutor here to defend

    8 that type of criminal conduct. That type of criminal

    9 conduct must be prosecuted and hopefully will be

    10 prosecuted. But nevertheless, what happened to

    11 Mr. Rajic and the other individuals in Dusina and Lasva

    12 on the 24th of January fell after there was an eruption

    13 of hostilities at the behest of the HVO, that commenced

    14 on the evening of the 20th and 21st of January. As I

    15 noted to you that the ethnic cleansing and the

    16 attacking that took place on the 17th in Gornji Vakuf

    17 then erupted in Busovaca on the 20th of January.

    18 Of course, the ABiH did not go along with the

    19 deadline set out by the HVO command, i.e. the

    20 subordination. The deadline in the Stojic order, I

    21 believe, gave a subordination deadline of 19.00 on the

    22 20th. By 20.00 on the 20th, with no subordination to

    23 the HVO, checkpoints were placed in the town of

    24 Busovaca, and according to the British Battalion

    25 milinfosum that was received in evidence, and I'm

  79. 1 referring to, there it is, Exhibit 669, Your Honours

    2 can read exactly what transpired.

    3 There was attacks on Muslim homes, attacks on

    4 Muslim businesses, and if we look at the comment on the

    5 bottom of that page:

    6 "Comment: The action of 20-21 January, 1993

    7 appears to be a pre-planned coordinated attack on the

    8 Muslim population."

    9 That particular attack led to further

    10 fighting. Excuse me, Your Honour.

    11 That particular attack led to further

    12 fighting, and the cutting off of the road between

    13 Kacuni and Bilalovac, and an onslaught of additional

    14 fighting in that area. It also led to significant

    15 heinous crimes committed by troops under Blaskic's

    16 command.

    17 What we heard from testimony by witnesses

    18 before this Court was that hundreds of Bosnian Muslim

    19 civilians were arrested and incarcerated in the Kaonik

    20 military prison and taken to dig trenches, hundreds.

    21 There is an exhibit in evidence at this

    22 point, and it's Exhibit 678, that reflects that within

    23 Busovaca municipality alone, 112 structures, this is an

    24 HVO-controlled area, 112 structures are destroyed and

    25 58 burnt to the ground in HVO-controlled areas.

  80. 1 The time-honoured modus operandi of the HVO

    2 continues. Barring some testimony of Blaskic of two

    3 individuals being prosecuted for killing Muslims who

    4 were out digging trenches, nobody else, nobody else is

    5 punished, dismissed, disciplined for the trench digging

    6 that goes on. One witness testified that the trench

    7 digs was so pervasive that every man, woman, and child

    8 in Busovaca knew it was taking place.

    9 From the 23rd or 24th of January on, yes,

    10 Blaskic was in Kiseljak. With the communications that

    11 will be discussed and the evidence that is in the

    12 record right now of his communications with his

    13 command, clearly he knew exactly what his HVO soldiers

    14 were doing in the Busovaca area in January and early

    15 February, and if he didn't, he certainly found out when

    16 he got back in the early part of March of 1993.

    17 But the burning that took place in Busovaca

    18 should come as no surprise to Blaskic, because troops

    19 under his direct command, when he was in Kiseljak,

    20 ordered the same thing.

    21 If we could turn to Exhibit 510, Mr. Hooper.

    22 This is a document, Mr. President, Your

    23 Honours, that is written by the brigade commander for

    24 the Ban Jelacic Brigade. The man's name is Mijo

    25 Bozic. He was a man that was, at the beginning of the

  81. 1 conflict, in Blaskic's headquarters in Vitez. In

    2 approximately early January of 1993, he was appointed

    3 by Blaskic as the brigade commander of the Ban Jelacic

    4 Brigade.

    5 When in discussions in cross-examination with

    6 Brigadier Marin concerning Blaskic's relationship with

    7 Bozic, I asked whether or not there was a trusted

    8 relationship between Blaskic and Bozic, and Marin

    9 said:

    10 "Given his position, first as the chief of

    11 operations and then as a brigade commander, I believe

    12 that Blaskic trusted Mijo Bozic."

    13 Mijo Bozic gives an order which calls for

    14 criminal activity, without question. It notes, in this

    15 attack order, that the HVO forces are going to take a

    16 certain amount of ground. To do so, they are ready to

    17 burn everything in their way.

    18 Now, this particular order, this threat to

    19 burn civilian villages in their way, in the HVO's way,

    20 was issued while Blaskic was in the Kiseljak barracks.

    21 By his own testimony, he is in Kiseljak during this

    22 period of time and his direct subordinate issues this

    23 order.

    24 Why is this order so telling? Given the

    25 proximity between Blaskic and Bozic and the issuance of

  82. 1 this order, it's quite clear, Mr. President and Your

    2 Honours, that Mijo Bozic was very comfortable in his

    3 belief that he would never be punished for issuing such

    4 an order, never. And he wasn't. And lo and behold,

    5 what a big surprise that we'll see later on during the

    6 course of facts, that this same unit, the Ban Jelacic

    7 Brigade, and the same commander, Mijo Bozic, and the

    8 same deputy commander, Mato Lucic, when the events in

    9 Kiseljak took off and the attacks took place on the

    10 18th of April, lo and behold, this same unit burnt all

    11 these villages, burnt Gomionica, Svinjarevo, Behrici,

    12 Visnjica, Polje Visnjica, the same ones.

    13 Again, what would have been the net effect

    14 and the preventative measures had Blaskic punished

    15 somebody as a result of this order? Maybe saved a few

    16 lives. Maybe some people would be living today.

    17 Certainly people would have houses to live in. But he

    18 didn't do it. He didn't do it because that's what he

    19 wanted them to do and that's how he wanted them to

    20 operate.

    21 There was a series of cease-fires after the

    22 fighting in January and February, and a series of

    23 cease-fire agreements that take place and are signed by

    24 General Hadzihasanovic who was then 3rd Corps commander

    25 and Blaskic as the Central Bosnia Operative Zone

  83. 1 commander. Those documents were signed on the 13th of

    2 February of 1993.

    3 During this same period of time, there is

    4 continued negotiation about the Vance-Owen Plan. As we

    5 move from February through March, while the Bosnian

    6 Croats through Boban have immediately signed the

    7 Vance-Owen Plan, neither the Serbs nor President

    8 Izetbegovic have signed the plan.

    9 And there is discussion. There is discussion

    10 in the halls of Zagreb of exactly what the plan was

    11 going to be in light of this fact. In light of the

    12 fact that it hasn't been signed, what are the Croats

    13 going to do?

    14 I think the comments, at this point, of some

    15 private-session witnesses about what the plan was of

    16 the Bosnian Croats and also the plan within the halls

    17 of Zagreb and President Tudjman is very telling. So if

    18 I could take a very brief period of time to go into

    19 private session, I would appreciate it.

    20 (Private session)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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  88. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (Open session)

    21 As I noted, Mr. President and Your Honours,

    22 the Bosnian Serb assembly voted on the Vance-Owen Plan

    23 on the 2nd of April of 1993. They rejected the plan.

    24 On the 3rd of April, the HVO issued a document calling

    25 Alija Izetbegovic and the Bosnian Muslims to sign that

  89. 1 document.

    2 In that document, the HVO and Mate Boban

    3 asked the ABiH to implement the Vance-Owen Plan and to

    4 have ABiH troops subordinate themselves once again to

    5 the HVO in cantons 3, 8, and 10, and respectively have

    6 the ABiH forces subordinate themselves to the HVO in

    7 the Muslim cantons.

    8 What was also included in that document, and

    9 this was a document that was issued by a man by the

    10 name of Veso Vegar. Now, Veso Vegar, if you'll recall

    11 from the testimony of Ed Vulliamy, Veso Vegar was the

    12 essential public information officer for the HVO. He

    13 was not a reporter like Mr. Vulliamy and others that we

    14 have had contact with in our lives. This was a

    15 spokesperson for the HVO.

    16 As a spokesperson for the HVO, the HVO

    17 included a threat, issued a threat, an ultimatum in

    18 conjunction with this request to sign on to the

    19 Vance-Owen Plan.

    20 The HVO noted that the joint command has to

    21 be set up by the 15th of April, 1993, and the

    22 subordination also has to take place, and if, if the

    23 Bosnian government does not go along with the edicts of

    24 the Vance-Owen Plan, the HVO has decided to

    25 unilaterally implement that plan. Unilaterally.

  90. 1 Now, do they say in that document that the

    2 fighting is going to take place if it is not on the

    3 16th? No, they don't. They don't say that. What they

    4 do say is and the one date that they give for the

    5 setting up of the joint command is the 15th of April,

    6 1993, and if it doesn't happen, then they're going to

    7 unilaterally implement this plan. Of course, there was

    8 no subordination and, of course, we saw from the

    9 subsequent facts there was an attempt at the unilateral

    10 implementation of that plan.

    11 Before we go into that implementation that

    12 commenced on the 16th, let us digress for one moment

    13 and talk about a series of events that took place.

    14 Between the issuance of this ultimatum on the

    15 3rd, that was then published in the newspaper on the

    16 4th of April, and the actual deadline of the 15th,

    17 several events take place. There were forces,

    18 individuals of Muslim religion, who had kidnapped some

    19 soldiers, some officers from Novi Travnik. They

    20 kidnapped those officers because they were trying to

    21 secure the release of their colleagues from the Kaonik

    22 camp, which Blaskic ultimately did, by the way.

    23 In addition to that, there was a terrible

    24 homicide that took place outside of Zenica involving

    25 Commander Totic, who was the Jure Francetic Brigade

  91. 1 commander in Zenica, who had many of his bodyguards

    2 killed in a shoot-out in the early morning hours of the

    3 15th of April, 1993.

    4 Those particular events emanated not from a

    5 conflict with the ABiH but from, as Mr. Remi Landry

    6 testified, an effort by these Muslim groups to secure

    7 the release of their colleagues who were in the Kaonik

    8 camp. Prior to that time, these individuals had been

    9 attempting on numerous occasions -- several occasions

    10 at least -- to secure the release of their colleagues.

    11 They were unsuccessful. They then engage in this

    12 activity. But there is no evidence to suggest, first

    13 and foremost, that the ABiH was behind this. As I

    14 noted just previously, the person who ultimately

    15 negotiated the release of these prisoners as well as

    16 Commander Totic, Colonel Remi Landry from the Canadian

    17 forces, who is an ECMM monitor, said that one had

    18 nothing to do with the other. It was a totally

    19 separate event.

    20 So what took place on the morning of the 16th

    21 was unrelated to the kidnapping and the deaths that we

    22 saw on the 15th and the 14th of April. That's not to

    23 say that those particular events didn't elevate

    24 hostilities, didn't elevate emotions. They did. I'm

    25 sure they did. And I know that the HVO and Kordic

  92. 1 spoke about it at length on television as a reason for

    2 the combat to ensue or to begin. Nevertheless, all of

    3 those events post-dated the ultimatum issued by the HVO

    4 which came out on the 3rd of April, 1993, which is an

    5 important ingredient as it goes to the question, the

    6 question posed by the Defence, as to who started this

    7 conflict.

    8 Given the facts that took place in the

    9 testimony and given the context of this ultimatum, who

    10 started this conflict? Blaskic, Zeko, and Marin

    11 testified that it was the ABiH. Let's look at that. I

    12 submit to you, Your Honours, that testimony is simply

    13 not true. And let's look at a series of items in

    14 context to demonstrate what the HVO did to get ready

    15 for this conflict.

    16 Mr. President, I see you're looking at the

    17 clock. Do you want to take a break now or should I

    18 continue on or ...

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. Quite so. A 20-minute

    20 break.

    21 --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

    23 JUDGE JORDA: The hearing is resumed. Can we

    24 have the accused brought in?

    25 (The accused entered court)

  93. 1 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, you have the

    2 floor.

    3 MR. KEHOE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.

    4 At the break, Mr. President, Your Honours, we

    5 were beginning to discuss the issue that was raised by

    6 Blaskic and Marin and Zeko as to who started this

    7 conflict on the morning of the 16th of April, 1993.

    8 Well, we know from the evidence that has come

    9 in that there was an ultimatum issued by the HVO due to

    10 expire shortly after the 15th of April, 1993. But

    11 let's look at other factors, other factors,

    12 ingredients, that go into this planning.

    13 We have an order issued by Anto Valenta

    14 closing schools and businesses on the 14th of April,

    15 1993, until the following Monday, which I believe is

    16 the 19th of April, 1993. There were field hospitals

    17 set up, as we heard from Witness F. What were the

    18 logistics needed to conduct this combat activity?

    19 Logistics, ammunition, troops, supplies,

    20 transportation, reinforcements. All those things that,

    21 for Ahmici alone, Colonel Stewart said would take at

    22 least half a day to plan.

    23 The evacuation of Croats from the Ahmici

    24 area, Santici, Nadioci, et cetera, on the 15th of

    25 April, 1993, and the existence of detention locations

  94. 1 that had to be preordained prior to the attacks of the

    2 16th of April, 1993, or else how would HVO soldiers

    3 know where to take all these people that they took into

    4 custody? They had to know. It wasn't self-evident,

    5 I'm sure, that a prison was going to be in the

    6 Dubravica school and that there was going to be a

    7 prison at the cinema building next to the Viteska

    8 Brigade headquarters nor in the veterinary station nor

    9 in the STK building. Nevertheless, these were the

    10 areas that the witnesses testified that they were

    11 brought to seriatum commencing on the morning of the

    12 16th of April, 1993.

    13 Interestingly, while all these preparations

    14 are taking place by the HVO, there are no similar

    15 preparations by the Muslims. There was no setting up

    16 of a field hospital by the Bosnian Muslims in that

    17 area, no evacuation of the Bosnian Muslim property from

    18 that particular area. Nothing of that score.

    19 Let's turn to the victim testimony.

    20 The victim testimony unilaterally, across the

    21 board, every victim/witness that Your Honours have

    22 heard has testified to one thing: That commencing on

    23 the 16th of April, 1993, the HVO attacked. Not the

    24 ABiH. The ABiH didn't attack their own people and

    25 murder and burn their own people on the morning of the

  95. 1 16th of April, 1993. Every victim attests to the fact

    2 that it was the HVO.

    3 Third party witnesses, independent witnesses,

    4 the consensus of all of these witnesses is the same,

    5 and in that group I'm including the British Battalion

    6 witnesses such as Colonel Stewart, such as Colonel

    7 Thomas, such as Captain Ellis, such as Colonel Watters,

    8 then Major Watters, Colonel Landry, then Major

    9 Baggesen, all of these independent observers came to

    10 the conclusion at the time that the HVO launched their

    11 attacks on the 16th of April, 1993, and on considered

    12 reflection by the ECMM, they likewise came to the same

    13 conclusion.

    14 And if we could, with the assistance of

    15 Mr. Hooper, I'd like to turn to the next two charts?

    16 This is, of course, the front cover of a

    17 report that was developed by ECMM. The reporter that

    18 put this document together, this individual in the

    19 upper left-hand corner, a military officer whose name

    20 is Charles McLeod. The report is a Report on

    21 Inter-ethnic Violence in Vitez, Busovaca, and Zenica,

    22 April 1993.

    23 I might note that he comes to a similar

    24 conclusion, and if we could just go to the next page,

    25 and for the record, this is Exhibit 242.

  96. 1 I know, Your Honours, this is difficult to

    2 see, albeit in both French and English, but if I may

    3 take the liberty of reading the pertinent portion as to

    4 who started this attack.

    5 Second paragraph -- it's on page 1,

    6 counsel --

    7 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Hayman, if you wish,

    8 approach the easel, of course, you may do so.

    9 MR. KEHOE: The second paragraph:

    10 "The Croats in Vitez launched a coordinated

    11 attack on 16 April against the Muslim villages around

    12 Vitez and on Old Vitez, the predominantly Muslim part

    13 of the town."

    14 The assessment of an ECMM representative was

    15 that after reviewing the individuals, the appropriate

    16 players, if you will, in the Lasva Valley area, they

    17 put together a series of facts, and I will note that

    18 one of the individuals that he spoke to was the

    19 accused, and he came up with the conclusion that it

    20 was, in fact, the HVO that launched those attacks.

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  97. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 MR. KEHOE: I apologise, Counsel. You are

    16 absolutely right. That was the last document that --

    17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

    18 MR. KEHOE: ... with all due respect.

    19 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Kehoe, will you switch on

    20 your microphone, please?

    21 MR. KEHOE: Yes.

    22 JUDGE JORDA: The document is under seal?

    23 MR. KEHOE: The Defence document I referred

    24 to, counsel, is 100 per cent correct, it is under seal.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Thank you, Mr. Hayman. Then we

  98. 1 need to redact the transcript accordingly.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Mr. President. It will

    3 be done.

    4 JUDGE JORDA: Continue, please, Mr. Kehoe.

    5 MR. KEHOE: Let us continue on the issue as

    6 to who started it.

    7 There has been a production to this Chamber

    8 of the reports, the pertinent reports of General

    9 Hadzihasanovic, the 3rd Corps commander, concerning the

    10 events of the 15th and 16th of April, 1993, and there

    11 is no reflection in those reports of any preparation

    12 for combat to ensue on the morning of the 16th of

    13 April. There is no discussion about anything to put

    14 the ABiH on a combat footing against the HVO. To the

    15 contrary, General Hadzihasanovic said: Why would I do

    16 that to myself? Why would I open up a second front at

    17 the same time? If one looks at it as a military

    18 strategist, it is not a wise thing for an individual to

    19 open up a second front taking into account the huge

    20 front that he was currently manning against the VRS.

    21 Well, the document of General Hadzihasanovic

    22 that is evidence reflects no such preparations. This

    23 request has been made on several occasions, on numerous

    24 occasions, for the documentation and the notebooks for

    25 General Blaskic that he read seriatum throughout his

  99. 1 direct testimony. Those documents and that information

    2 has not been forthcoming from any source. There is no

    3 documentation to reflect what Blaskic is saying, no

    4 documentation coming from the HVO or any other source.

    5 Let's just look at what actually happened on

    6 the ground. Are we to believe that the ABiH attacked

    7 the HVO when we look at the documentation produced by

    8 the Defence, and I am referring to Exhibit 345?

    9 From the Defence document itself, this

    10 surprise attack led to one death, and now maybe some

    11 documentation submitted by the Defence makes it two

    12 deaths, whereas in Ahmici alone, approximately a

    13 hundred individuals were killed.

    14 So when the surprise attack by the ABiH

    15 resulted in a 100-to-1 ratio deaths of the Bosnian

    16 Muslims as to deaths of the Bosnian Croats, not even

    17 including - not even including - the countless houses

    18 belonging to the Bosnian Muslim population that were

    19 burnt, when we assess all of those facts, when we put

    20 all of those facts together in the sober light of day,

    21 there is just no credibility to the testimony by the

    22 accused and his chief of operations, Marin, and his

    23 intelligence officer, military intelligence officer,

    24 Zeko, that the ABiH started this attack. That's simply

    25 not true. There is simply no independent witness that

  100. 1 we -- any leaders that have corroborated that.

    2 Now, let us look at what exactly transpired.

    3 What has the Defence produced, what has the Defence

    4 produced concerning the attack? They have produced

    5 Exhibits 267, 268, and 269, and what do we know about

    6 those orders? Let's assume for a second, without going

    7 into a discussion about some of the things that weren't

    8 on those orders and the sequence of those orders, let

    9 us assume for the sake of argument that those are

    10 legitimate orders, which the Office of the Prosecutor

    11 does not agree with for a second, but let's assume they

    12 were.

    13 What do we know about those orders? We know

    14 from the facts on the ground that those were not the

    15 only orders issued by Blaskic, contrary to both his

    16 evidence and Marin's. We need only look at

    17 Exhibit 269. What does 269 say? 269 deploys the

    18 Viteska Brigade at 05.30. Now, mind you, 269 is the

    19 written order that is written at 01.30 in the early

    20 morning hours of the 16th deploying the Viteska Brigade

    21 at 05.30.

    22 What does Blaskic tell the Viteska Brigade?

    23 He tells the Viteska Brigade, "When you take a

    24 particular position blocking Vranjska and Kruscica, the

    25 civilian police will be to your left, the Nikola

  101. 1 Subic-Zrinjski Brigade from Busovaca will be on your

    2 right, and the military police will be in front of

    3 you."

    4 What do we know about that? There is no

    5 order deploying the civilian police at 05.30 in the

    6 morning, none. He's got his troops on a combat footing

    7 and there is no order to the military police -- excuse

    8 me, to the civilian police.

    9 Likewise, there is no order ordering the

    10 Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade, the troops that are on

    11 the Viteska Brigade's right flank, to likewise mobilise

    12 at 05.30, and we do know there are other orders.

    13 Let us turn to, if we may, to 521. If we

    14 could put that exhibit up.

    15 521, Mr. President and Your Honours, is a

    16 report that comes from the Jure Francetic Brigade in

    17 Zenica, a report back to the Central Bosnia Operative

    18 Zone that Brigadier Marin said was received. I asked

    19 him, "How long does it take for troops to -- ordered

    20 and mobilised?" He said, "At least two or three hours

    21 prior to mobilisation."

    22 This particular report that is timed at 06.00

    23 on the 16th reflects that the Jure Francetic Brigade in

    24 Zenica had deployed sometime well prior to 06.00 on the

    25 morning of the 16th. It notes:

  102. 1 "Operative report on the situation at

    2 06.00. The night was quiet in the zone covered by the

    3 brigade. All units are holding the positions they had

    4 seized. The town is under control and our units are

    5 letting unarmed civilians who are going to work pass

    6 through."

    7 Where is the order issued by Blaskic telling

    8 the Jure Francetic Brigade to seize positions in and

    9 around Zenica? Where is it? This is a report back

    10 from the field saying those positions had been seized.

    11 Where is the order that Blaskic issued for them to

    12 seize those positions? It doesn't exist. But more

    13 importantly -- one fact, it does exist, but more

    14 importantly, Blaskic and Marin said no other orders

    15 went out.

    16 Well, the question that the Chamber must

    17 answer if that testimony were to be true is: How did

    18 the Zenica brigade know what to seize? How did they

    19 know when to deploy? How did they know what positions

    20 to take? They knew what positions to take, they knew

    21 when they were supposed to deploy, they knew when they

    22 were supposed to report back because Blaskic issued

    23 other orders that day that we haven't seen.

    24 How do we know he issued other orders?

    25 Because what he did militarily virtually defies logic

  103. 1 in light of the rest of his testimony.

    2 What did he tell us? He told us at 11.30 on

    3 the 15th of April, 1993 that many combat activities

    4 ensued on Kuber Mountain and that there was fighting

    5 and that he had wounded and that it was a serious

    6 conflict.

    7 Now, given his belief that the ABiH was going

    8 to begin their offensive at that time, what would a

    9 commander do? Would a commander immediately deploy his

    10 troops up to that area, or if he was interested in

    11 truly securing the road between Vitez and Busovaca,

    12 would he tell his troops to immediately take the high

    13 ground above Ahmici, because Blaskic himself, he said,

    14 that one cannot protect a road or a communication line

    15 by being on the road, one has to take the high ground

    16 above the road, which is perfectly logical. But when

    17 this attack ensues at 11.30 p.m., we're talking about

    18 23.30 on the evening of the 15th, Blaskic neither

    19 deploys troops to Kuber, neither deploys his troops

    20 above the high ground in Ahmici to secure the

    21 communication, nor does he tell the Viteska Brigade

    22 about this attack. He does none of the above.

    23 Why? Why? He didn't do it, Your Honours,

    24 because he had another plan for those troops. He had

    25 another plan for the Viteska Brigade, he had another

  104. 1 plan for the military police, and he had another plan

    2 for members of the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade and

    3 for the Vitezovi, and that plan was focused on Ahmici.

    4 What other explanation could there be for Blaskic not

    5 securing that high ground at the crucial point when he

    6 believed his troops were under attack?

    7 He didn't send them to the high ground. He

    8 kept them there to commence the operation that he

    9 wanted to commence at 05.30. He ordered these troops

    10 in there at 05.30 to cleanse that operation, to ensure

    11 that the departure of the Bosnian Muslim population

    12 from the Lasva Valley was going to commence and it was

    13 going to commence with a horrific event to drive people

    14 out and others would follow.

    15 What happened in Ahmici was a matter that was

    16 commenced not by renegade troops but troops following

    17 orders. Orders by the most powerful individual in the

    18 Lasva River area. That most powerful individual is the

    19 accused. They were following orders.

    20 How do we know that? Let us turn to some of

    21 the evidence in this regard. Abdulah Ahmic. I don't

    22 know if Your Honours can recall Abdulah Ahmic. Abdulah

    23 Ahmic was an individual, a young man who was taken out

    24 from his house with his father and, I believe, his

    25 brother, and they were shot at point-blank range.

  105. 1 Abdulah Ahmic lived because the bullet happened to

    2 graze his cheek and come out the other cheek and he

    3 survived, but his testimony on the issue of ordering is

    4 instructive. This is on page 3731:

    5 A. When this man came out of the house he

    6 ordered the younger one, he said,

    7 "Follow the orders." And the younger

    8 one says, "I will not do it." He

    9 repeated this two more times, and then

    10 to both these orders he answered, "I

    11 cannot do it." Then the big one says,

    12 "Okay. I'm going to carry out the

    13 order, but you'll remember this," and he

    14 said it in a threatening voice. Then he

    15 ordered me and my father to pass around

    16 the southern side of the side and he

    17 ordered that the younger one to guard my

    18 mother and my sister.

    19 My colleague Mr. Cayley asks Mr. Ahmic

    20 further on page 3835:

    21 Q. Mr. Ahmic, when your father and brother

    22 were murdered outside your house, do you

    23 believe that the soldiers who did that

    24 act were acting according to orders, or

    25 do you believe that they simply decided

  106. 1 of their own will to kill your father

    2 and your brother?

    3 A. In my statement, in all my statements,

    4 they did it exclusively according to

    5 military orders because that is what

    6 they said, "Do as you are ordered." He

    7 refused and then he said "Take care, I

    8 will carry out the orders." And then he

    9 did what he did. So this is clearly a

    10 strict military order received from

    11 somebody.

    12 That order, of course, was an order to kill,

    13 and his father and his brother were, in fact, killed.

    14 Witness F, on page 3688 notes as follows:

    15 A. Then my husband addressed Ilija once

    16 again and said, "Ilija please do not

    17 kill women and children. Let them go

    18 and do what you will with us." He said,

    19 "My wife is pregnant like yours, and I

    20 am sorry, but we have been given orders

    21 to kill all the Muslims and the Muslims

    22 will never live here again.

    23 Later on, in a separate locale the next day,

    24 Witness F testifies about those orders to kill again.

    25 This is on page 3671:

  107. 1 A. In the meantime, another neighbour of

    2 ours came. Approached my brother. This

    3 is about two years after Ivica left. He

    4 was looking at my brothers, my husband,

    5 myself, all of us, because we were all

    6 together. He offered them cigarettes.

    7 I approached to see what was going on,

    8 what he was going to tell me, and he

    9 said, "I am really sorry, but I was

    10 ordered to bring you out. I was ordered

    11 by them." He stood there and they

    12 smoked a cigarette, all of them. He was

    13 still standing there.

    14 Q. When you say "he was ordered by them,"

    15 what did he say he was ordered to do?

    16 A. They ordered him to bring out the three

    17 of them. He said, "I have to bring the

    18 three of you out so that you would be

    19 killed."

    20 Fatima Ahmic, 3955:

    21 A. I started weeping. "Dear Drago, why did

    22 you not save my Fahrudin?" He tells

    23 me -- he approached me to give me

    24 condolences. I said, "Why do I need

    25 your condolences when you did not save

  108. 1 my Fahrudin? Do you know who killed my

    2 Fahrudin?" He answered, "I do not know

    3 who killed him. I did not kill him."

    4 "Do you know who killed him?" "It was

    5 the force majeure who ordered it. The

    6 orders came from above."

    7 In the last particular series of testimony on

    8 this particular score, I would ask to go briefly into

    9 private session.

    10 (Private session)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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  113. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (Open session)

    21 JUDGE JORDA: Let us continue in open session

    22 now. Please continue, Mr. Kehoe.

    23 MR. KEHOE: Mr. President, what we have

    24 before you is a composite of a series of photographs of

    25 victims and some family members of those victims,

  114. 1 unfortunately at happier times, which, of course, is

    2 not the reason that we are here but, unfortunately, was

    3 the end result that was wrought on the Bosnian Muslim

    4 population in the Vitez municipality in Ahmici,

    5 Santici, Nadioci, Pirici, and in other villages.

    6 We will note, yes, there are young men of

    7 military age in that collage, but it also includes

    8 women, elderly men, young girls and young boys, people

    9 that had nothing but their lives to look forward to.

    10 Yet that was taken away, that was removed on the

    11 morning of the 16th of April, 1993, in pursuit of this

    12 policy of uni-ethnic dominance. That is the end result

    13 of this powerplay by the HVO in their attempts to

    14 unilaterally implement the Vance-Owen Plan. The only

    15 thing they wrought on that area was pain, misery and,

    16 ultimately, a tragedy.

    17 What happened to those that survived? What

    18 were they left with? Were they left with anything?

    19 They certainly weren't left with their homes.

    20 Let's go through a series of these.

    21 The village of Ahmici, the village of

    22 Gacice -- excuse me, in the village of Ahmici, I would

    23 also like to show the upper mosque in Ahmici. We just

    24 saw the lower mosque and now we will go to the

    25 upper mosque. The village of Gacice, the village of

  115. 1 Pirici, the village of Nadioci, the village of Donja

    2 Veceriska, and, Mr. President and Your Honours, there

    3 are others. These were not the only villages that were

    4 decimated by HVO troops under Blaskic's command

    5 commencing on the 16th of April. There are other

    6 villages and heaven knows there are countless other

    7 houses purposely targeted and destroyed by the HVO

    8 troops. And why? Why? One only need to examine the

    9 testimony of various third party witnesses who noted

    10 for Your Honours the one reason. These people were

    11 killed or driven out and their houses destroyed to

    12 ensure one thing and one thing alone: That they would

    13 never come back.

    14 Now, all this happened - all this

    15 happened - in a relatively small geographical area.

    16 If we can, Mr. Hooper, if we can put Exhibit

    17 29C up?

    18 Let's look at this exhibit, an exhibit that

    19 I'm sure Your Honours at this point -- an exhibit that

    20 is well-known, Vitez being at the centre of the ring.

    21 If we can ... Santici, 3 kilometres away;

    22 Ahmici, approximately 5 kilometres, or it was timed in

    23 an exhibit that you will see as Exhibit 79, 4700

    24 metres; Loncari, 7 kilometres away; Gacice, 2

    25 kilometres away; Donja Veceriska, 3 kilometres away.

  116. 1 These villages that were decimated and destroyed by HVO

    2 troops, Blaskic could stand out in front of the Hotel

    3 Vitez and see. That's how close they were. And yet he

    4 testifies that when these attacks ensued that he was

    5 unaware certainly that this was going on in his locale

    6 and, in fact, blames it on the army of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    8 Given the locale, given the presence, and

    9 given the level of this tremendous destruction, he's

    10 got no other choice than to try to blame it on somebody

    11 else because if he says it was his own troops that did

    12 all this, it would defy logic that he wasn't

    13 responsible. The fact of the matter is and the fact

    14 that we see set forth here compels one to conclude that

    15 he knew exactly what was going on, exactly what was

    16 afoot, and consequently, which we will talk about

    17 later, he never did anything to stop it and never

    18 punished anybody for doing it.

    19 The tragedy once again, the tragedy that we

    20 see so often throughout Central Bosnia by troops under

    21 Blaskic's command and he never punished anybody as a

    22 result of the crimes on the 16th and, lo and behold,

    23 those crimes continued, and we will continue to talk

    24 about those crimes in a moment.

    25 JUDGE JORDA: Mr. Prosecutor, there is a

  117. 1 small problem with the numbering of the exhibits. The

    2 table that you had where you grouped the testimony of

    3 all the victims and the compilation of the photographs

    4 I assume is all an exhibit, is it not?

    5 MR. KEHOE: Yes, Mr. President. Those

    6 particular photographs are a series of exhibits that

    7 have been received in evidence, and the only thing that

    8 the Office of the Prosecutor did, as opposed to going

    9 through each individual photograph, was to mount a

    10 series of them as a collage.

    11 JUDGE JORDA: In that case, there is no need

    12 to give them any number. Anyway, this is not the time

    13 to give exhibits a number. So this is just one way of

    14 presenting your closing arguments. Are we in agreement

    15 then? No objection?

    16 Very well. Then let's continue.

    17 MR. KEHOE: Thank you, Mr. President. The

    18 last exhibit to put the geographical framework in

    19 perspective, Mr. President, is the particular exhibit

    20 that we have, Prosecutor's Exhibit 31, in evidence.

    21 We have noted various locales and the

    22 kilometre readings away from the centre, and this is an

    23 overlay of distances on The Hague, a town which, after

    24 some period of time, we've all become somewhat

    25 familiar.

  118. 1 "A" is designated as Central Station. For

    2 here, we have the Hotel Vitez, if the Hotel Vitez, and

    3 we're marking the distance it would be from the Hotel

    4 Vitez at Central Station. "B" is Ahmici, which is at

    5 the pier on the beach. So if we stand in front of

    6 Central Station, the distance between Blaskic's

    7 headquarters and Ahmici is the distance between Central

    8 Station and the beach. That is a 5-kilometre range.

    9 Of course, the other distances are even shorter.

    10 Santici, being "C," is less than 5 kilometres; Gacice,

    11 smaller still, approximately 2 kilometres, et cetera.

    12 So what we're talking about between Blaskic

    13 not knowing the full import of what was happening in

    14 Ahmici until his testimony on the 22nd of April, 1993,

    15 we're talking about a very, very small distance between

    16 these two locales to plead ignorance to those events

    17 for approximately a week's time.

    18 Now, where was Blaskic on the morning of the

    19 16th? Blaskic would have you believe, and certainly

    20 Marin would have you believe, that both Blaskic and

    21 Marin, while this surprise attack was under way, that

    22 both Blaskic and Marin were buried away in the basement

    23 of the Hotel Vitez, totally unaware of what was

    24 happening a short 5-kilometres away from their

    25 headquarters and in the other villages that were

  119. 1 significantly closer.

    2 But what do we know about that and what do we

    3 know about Blaskic? We know that Blaskic is a man who

    4 is out in the field. Certainly we know in October,

    5 both from his own document, the order 647, P647, and

    6 through meetings that he was supposed to have with

    7 Colonel Stewart, that he was out on the ground, on the

    8 front line in Novi Travnik, while combat was taking

    9 place. How many times did he tell us during the course

    10 of his direct examination that he went to the front

    11 line, such as Jajce, during the course of the events

    12 that unfolded in Jajce during the fall of 1992?

    13 In the attack on Kiseljak in January of 1993;

    14 he commented that he was out on the ground during the

    15 attacks that took place either the 28th or the 29th of

    16 January with Mato Lucic conducting the attack.

    17 When we move ahead to September of 1993 in

    18 Grbavica, once again we have Blaskic, the military

    19 commander, out on the ground nearby watching the

    20 unfolding of events.

    21 The only singular time when Blaskic

    22 maintained he was not on the ground when combat was

    23 under way was when the events on the 16th of April were

    24 taking place. The only time. The facts reflect that,

    25 in fact, he was out on the ground.

  120. 1 How do we know that? How do we know that?

    2 Independent third party witnesses. Ten o'clock in the

    3 morning. The one person that Blaskic, if he had been

    4 attacked, would have wanted to see would have been

    5 Colonel Stewart. The one person that could have

    6 assisted him on a cease-fire right away, if, in fact,

    7 that's what he wanted, was Colonel Stewart. Colonel

    8 Stewart showed up, came to the Hotel Vitez at

    9 approximately 10.00 on the 16th. Blaskic was not

    10 there.

    11 Now, he's not the only one. And, by the way,

    12 before we go on to the next witness, Colonel Stewart

    13 did note that it was perfectly understandable to

    14 Colonel Stewart as a military officer that a man such

    15 as Blaskic would be out on the ground while combat

    16 activities were under way and while his troops were

    17 being deployed. So it was no surprise to Colonel

    18 Stewart that Blaskic wasn't there.

    19 The next witness, Major Baggesen. Major

    20 Baggesen was an ECMM monitor who also tried to go see

    21 Blaskic on the morning of the 16th of April, 1993,

    22 totally independent of Colonel Stewart, and he notes on

    23 page 1919:

    24 Q. Did you try and --

    25 He's talking about the 16th, the morning of

  121. 1 the 16th:

    2 Q. Did you try and contact Colonel Blaskic?

    3 A. We tried several times, but we were told

    4 that Colonel Blaskic was not in his

    5 headquarters.

    6 Q. You were with a fellow army officer at

    7 that time, I think a lieutenant-colonel,

    8 am I right, from the Canadian army?

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. Did you discuss this lack of presence of

    11 Colonel Blaskic?

    12 A. Yes, we did, and we found out that maybe

    13 we were not that surprised that we were

    14 not able to get in contact with Colonel

    15 Blaskic because it is normal during a

    16 military operation that the commander is

    17 at the forward headquarters so he can be

    18 closer to the front and command his

    19 soldiers.

    20 Q. It is normal for a commander to be at

    21 his forward headquarters to command his

    22 operation on the ground, and you were

    23 calling the Hotel Vitez, which was a

    24 rear or central headquarters; is that

    25 correct?

  122. 1 A. That's correct.

    2 So it was no surprise that Blaskic wasn't

    3 there. Blaskic wasn't there because he was on the

    4 ground doing what military commanders do, which is

    5 direct military operations. This testimony by Blaskic

    6 and Zeko that they just sat down in the basement of the

    7 Hotel Vitez for three days without poking their head

    8 out of the front door is simply not true. It defies

    9 logic and it certainly defies the testimony of

    10 independent third-party witnesses, witnesses that

    11 Blaskic, given his testimony, would have wanted to see,

    12 and when they arrived at the Hotel Vitez or called the

    13 Hotel Vitez, he wasn't there.

    14 After the 16th, the combat activities ensued

    15 in other locales, in other locales where Blaskic knew

    16 HVO troops were present. The same modus operandi, same

    17 methodology employed by the HVO.

    18 The 17th of April, 1993, in Loncari,

    19 approximately seven kilometres away from Blaskic's

    20 residence, no combat activities. Women and children

    21 rounded up, put into a mekteb, their houses burnt, the

    22 civilians driven out of the village, all by HVO

    23 troops. Blaskic, in his testimony, conceded HVO troops

    24 in Loncari.

    25 Later on in that week, on the 19th, Ocehnici,

  123. 1 again another village, this time burnt by the military

    2 police, which is no question, on the 19th of April,

    3 were under the command and control of Tihomir Blaskic.

    4 This was not the only forum where such

    5 activities transpired, and we need only turn to the

    6 other prong of the attacking force. That other prong

    7 of the attacking force focused its energies on

    8 Kiseljak. Kiseljak, which was under the domain of the

    9 Ban Jelacic Brigade, and Mijo Bozic, who is the author

    10 of the burn order of the 27th of January.

    11 If we could turn to Exhibit D299 and Exhibit

    12 300. If we could turn to 299.

    13 This is the first order of the early morning

    14 hours of the 17th -- or not early, at 09.10 of the

    15 17th of April, 1993, and this is an interesting order

    16 for a couple of reasons.

    17 Number one, we heard that earlier that day,

    18 Blaskic was concerned of the death of civilians,

    19 because one of his subordinates had observed civilians

    20 as they were riding back from the Viteska Brigade on

    21 the 16th. I think Your Honours will note, in looking

    22 at this exhibit now and looking at this exhibit while

    23 your deliberations are underway, Blaskic has no caveat

    24 to protect civilians while he sets the Ban Jelacic

    25 Brigade up to attack various villages, Bosnian Muslim

  124. 1 villages in the Kiseljak municipality.

    2 This particular order is issued to Blaskic,

    3 and we were told by Blaskic that this order has to be

    4 read in conjunction with Exhibit 300. He testified

    5 that this order tells the troops what to do, and

    6 Exhibit 300 tells them when to do it. In this order he

    7 orders a very simple thing:

    8 "Take control of Gomionica and Svinjarevo

    9 after a strong support. The attack of the main force

    10 to be made from Sikulje and Hadrovici."

    11 In Exhibit 300, he reiterates that and notes

    12 in paragraph 2.2, and that is on the ELMO, he orders

    13 his troops that their assignment is to capture

    14 Gomionica and Svinjarevo. This is the order, of

    15 course, that in the latter part, as you can see on the

    16 bottom, he tells his troops to maintain a sense of

    17 historic responsibility.

    18 Blaskic testified to Your Honours that he did

    19 not order his troops to take the village of Gomionica.

    20 A review of these orders reflects that's exactly what

    21 he told them to do. He told them to take the village

    22 of Gomionica while also securing other villages that

    23 might support the ABiH in Gomionica, and that's exactly

    24 what they did.

    25 He sent the same troops in who authored this

  125. 1 burn order to attack Gomionica on the morning of the

    2 18th of April, 1993. Not only that, while he was

    3 ordering this attack and while he was ordering the

    4 further attack of these locales, a cease-fire order came

    5 into play.

    6 If you recall, Your Honours, there was a

    7 cease-fire order signed supposedly for the 18th of

    8 April, 1993. Nevertheless, as we move into the 19th of

    9 April, 1993, Blaskic is urging his troops to continue

    10 to take Gomionica and to continue their attack.

    11 If I might go into private session one moment

    12 to discuss some closed session testimony on this score,

    13 I will be almost finished this area.

    14 (Private session)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  126. 1 (redacted)

    2 (redacted)

    3 (redacted)

    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (Open session)

    13 MR. KEHOE: As we noted, after we discussed

    14 the burn order by Mijo Bozic that was issued on the

    15 27th of January, 1993, in light of the absolutely no

    16 sanctions imposed by the accused Tihomir Blaskic, it

    17 was no surprise that similar events of burnings,

    18 expulsions, killings, and evictions took place when the

    19 Ban Jelacic Brigade commenced their attacks on

    20 Svinjarevo, Gomionica, Behrici, and the other villages

    21 in the Kiseljak municipality that commenced on the 18th

    22 of April, 1993. A short view of some of these villages

    23 reflects exactly what transpired.

    24 The village of Visnjica. We can go to the

    25 next one. The village of Behrici. The village of

  127. 1 Gromiljak. The village of Hercezi.

    2 I think this photograph best depicts, and if

    3 I can ask Mr. Hooper and I show this particular

    4 exhibit, which is Exhibit 391, which is a panned view

    5 of the village of Gomionica. This, Mr. President, is a

    6 series of photographs put together, panning the

    7 landscape of the village of Gomionica. I'm sorry.

    8 Mr. President and Your Honours, this is a

    9 series of photographs panning the landscape of the

    10 village of Gomionica, showing the destruction,

    11 expulsions and other damage on the Bosnian Muslim

    12 structures in that village that commenced in April of

    13 1993.

    14 If I might turn to the next particular

    15 document, which is Exhibit P395. Excuse me, P95.

    16 This is a report, an ECMM report, again a

    17 third-party document. If I may approach this document,

    18 Mr. President.

    19 This is a listing of the various villages

    20 that were visited by Alan Lausten and one of the

    21 witnesses that was before this Court, Lars Baggesen.

    22 Very visited, the villages of Hercezi, Polje Visnjica,

    23 Visnjica, Gomionica, and they go on to list the various

    24 acts of destruction, but their conclusion is most

    25 revealing as to what Blaskic's troops actually did.

  128. 1 Number 4, the team's conclusion:

    2 "It is obvious that an ethnic cleansing had

    3 taken place in the area."

    4 Something that is no surprise given what we

    5 know about troops under Blaskic's command. So while

    6 troops under Blaskic's command are burning, looting,

    7 and cleansing villages in and around the Lasva Valley

    8 commencing on the 16th, on the 18th the same thing is

    9 happening in the Kiseljak municipality. This is no

    10 surprise. This is not a surprise. This is the modus

    11 operandi that Blaskic has employed his troops to

    12 undertake, and unfortunately, unfortunately, this

    13 result published on the 29th of April, 1993,

    14 approximately 10 days after these events reflects the

    15 devastation and destruction on these villages.

    16 Now, chronologically, Mr. President and Your

    17 Honours, if we could move back to the Lasva Valley

    18 area, what happens towards the 18th of April, 1993, is

    19 that the Bosnian Muslim army, after being taken by

    20 surprise on the 16th, begins to fight back. They begin

    21 a counter-offensive and they begin to muster forces to

    22 fight the HVO off. The response by the HVO is a series

    23 of events to try to curtail the offensive being

    24 conducted by the ABiH. The first such act is the truck

    25 bomb on the 18th of April, 1993.

  129. 1 As you can see from these photographs, and

    2 this is just a series or a sampling of a series of

    3 photographs of the truck bomb.

    4 What happened about 5.00 in the morning --

    5 excuse me, 5.00 in the afternoon, about 17.00 on the

    6 18th, was that a cistern, a truck full of explosives

    7 was sent into Stari Vitez, and it exploded causing any

    8 amounts of devastation, a portion of which you see in

    9 these photographs, and causing obviously death in what

    10 was described by the British Battalion as "a terrorist

    11 act."

    12 Now, this was done by the Vitezovi, and what

    13 they used was huge amounts of explosives, explosives

    14 which unquestionably were under the command and control

    15 of Blaskic.

    16 What's interesting about Blaskic's testimony

    17 is that prior to this particular event taking place, he

    18 didn't know anything about it. Well, let's look at

    19 that testimony, this knowledge that once again he was

    20 unaware that this terrorist act was taking place. Let

    21 us look, if we can, at P707.

    22 Let's look at this exhibit, Mr. President,

    23 and look at all the people that testified just before

    24 this Trial Chamber that -- I'm sorry. Let us look at

    25 all the individuals that testified just before this

  130. 1 Trial Chamber, both Prosecution and Defence witnesses

    2 that knew that this explosion was going to take place

    3 prior to it actually taking place.

    4 Dr. Fuad Zeco. Where is he? He's in

    5 captivity at the veterinary station. You heard

    6 testimony that some individuals were kept in the

    7 veterinary station as prisoners and taken out to dig

    8 trenches. HVO soldiers informed him that there was

    9 going to be an explosion.

    10 The next one, Dr. Mujezinovic. Where is he?

    11 He is in his house. He is told by other HVO soldiers

    12 and his neighbours that an explosion is going to take

    13 place.

    14 Sefik Pezer? Where is Mr. Pezer? Mr. Pezer

    15 is held captive in the cinema. He, along with several

    16 hundred individuals, are being held captive in the

    17 cinema, both in the cinema and in the basement, near

    18 the Viteska Brigade headquarters. While he was there,

    19 he was told by an HVO soldier to go downstairs into the

    20 basement and stay away from the glass because there's

    21 going to be an explosion.

    22 Witness E is a woman who informed that she

    23 found out about this explosion, that it was going to

    24 take place, from one of her neighbours, and that she

    25 should ensure that the windows are open so that the

  131. 1 glass doesn't explode inward.

    2 Lastly a Defence witness, Mr. Marijan

    3 Strukar, who lived just south of Stari Vitez, who was

    4 told by one of his neighbours to take cover, that

    5 there's going to be an explosion.

    6 Individuals completely out of the chain of

    7 command, completely out of the know within the HVO, all

    8 of which know that this explosion is going to take

    9 place and the only person who's testified in this court

    10 that he didn't know is Blaskic.

    11 And why? Why? Why did he say that he can't

    12 know? Because he cannot face the consequences of a

    13 terrorist act of this magnitude. A particular act that

    14 is so outside the rules, and laws, and customs of war

    15 that it has to mandate -- has to bring with it criminal

    16 sanctions. So to defend himself and protect himself

    17 and his continuous pattern of concealment, he tells

    18 Your Honours that he doesn't know anything about it.

    19 Given the proximity of this particular

    20 explosion, an explosion that took some 400 metres away

    21 from his headquarters, and given the fact that

    22 everybody else knew what was going on, his testimony

    23 defies logic and is simply not true.

    24 Mr. President, I'm about to embark into

    25 another area at this point. It's almost 5.30. This

  132. 1 might be the appropriate time to break before I go into

    2 that area.

    3 JUDGE JORDA: Yes. We're going to adjourn,

    4 and we will be resuming the hearing tomorrow morning at

    5 10.00.

    6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

    7 at 5.30 p.m., to be reconvened on

    8 Tuesday, the 27th day of July, 1999,

    9 at 10.00 a.m.