1 Wednesday, 27 February 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

7 May I remind you, sir, the affirmation you made still applies.

8 Ms. Issa.

9 WITNESS: ZLATKO KESKOVSKI [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Cross-examination by Ms. Issa: [Continued]

12 MS. ISSA: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honour.

13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Keskovski.

14 A. Good morning.

15 Q. Now, you testified I believe the day before yesterday that on

16 August -- on 11 August, you were in the president's cabinet that morning.

17 Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And it was a quiet day, so you decided to go home and have lunch

20 at around 2.30, right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You indicated that at around 3.00 you received a phone call from

23 the president, and he asked you where you were, you explained to him that

24 you were having lunch, and he said he wanted to join you, right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. He was at your home between 3.00 and 5.00 that day. Is that

2 right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And while you were having your lunch, you received a telephone

5 call from the prime minister's cabinet, right?

6 A. Yes, this is correct.

7 Q. You were informed that there were skirmishes in Radusa and the

8 prime minister asked for assistance from the army, right?

9 A. Yes, this is so.

10 Q. So what happened was the prime minister needed to contact the

11 president for assistance, because the prime minister could only issue

12 orders to the police and only the president could issue orders to the

13 army, right?

14 A. They called from the cabinet of the prime minister to ask for

15 assistance from the army. This is what I know. Why, I don't know. I

16 presume this is because the president can issue orders to the army.

17 Q. You received information?

18 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

20 MR. METTRAUX: Simply before my colleague goes any further I would

21 like to correct the record; she has put a proposition to the witness in

22 relation to the evidence which he gave two days ago, and I believe it was

23 at page 1004 going on 1005, the witness both in his evidence-in-chief and

24 in his OTP statement mentioned that the president arrived, at around 5.00

25 at his home, not as 3.00 as indicated by my colleague.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

2 MS. ISSA: I'm just going to carry on, Your Honour. Yeah.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Please.

4 MS. ISSA:

5 Q. Now, sir, you received information about the position of the

6 soldiers on the ground from the prime minister's office, and you passed

7 this information on to the president, right?

8 A. Yes, this is correct.

9 Q. I should say you received information about the position of the

10 police on the ground. Is that right? Or the security forces.

11 A. Yes, about the security forces.

12 Q. And the prime minister, of course, could get information from the

13 Ministry of Interior, right?

14 A. I can guess yes.

15 Q. And I'd like just to go to P464, which is tab 3 in the Prosecution

16 binder.

17 And for the e-court purposes, it would be N006-3017 to N006-3033

18 at page 8 in the English version; and in the Macedonian, it's pages 106 to

19 107.

20 Now, I draw your attention, Mr. Keskovski, to the -- this is

21 actually a segment from a book called, titled, the war in Macedonia in

22 2001, and I draw your attention to the passage underneath the heading,

23 orders, the use of the police during -- should say state of war to support

24 the army.

25 And it say: "Since a state of war was not declared," than is

1 starting about the third paragraph underneath that passage, "the police

2 was not under Joint Command and acted independently. One can only imagine

3 what the situation is like when two ministers from the same government,

4 the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defence, have two armed

5 components at their disposal, one of which is commanded by the prime

6 minister through the minister of the interior, while the other is under

7 the command of the president of the Republic through the defence

8 minister."

9 "The two ministers from differing political provinces rather than

10 enduring on the course of joint defence of the national and state

11 interests in such a complicated and dangerous situation seem to be

12 fighting for elevated positions in their parties, the government and the

13 Defence. As a result, it could be said that the two armed structures, the

14 police and the army, were each fighting on their own front."

15 You see that?

16 A. Yes, I see it.

17 Q. And no state of war had been declared in 2001, had it?

18 A. Yes, this is so.

19 Q. Now, getting back to the telephone call that came from the prime

20 minister's cabinet, before that telephone call, the president didn't

21 mention anything to you about any skirmishes or battles going on in the

22 region that he was particularly concerned about while you were having

23 lunch with him, did he?

24 A. About the area of Radusa?

25 Q. Or any other area -- or any other battles in the region, did he?

1 A. In continuity the public was informing about sporadic skirmishes

2 of the security forces in the region of Ljuboten and in the region Radusa.

3 On the 10th and on the 11th.

4 Q. Well in the transcript, what you say here is: In continuity the

5 public was informing sporadic skirmishes. Are you talking about the

6 media, Mr. Keskovski?

7 A. Yes, the media, and public reports from the institutions. This

8 was public information.

9 Q. Okay. But at that point, the president didn't discuss this --

10 didn't discuss any concerns he had with you or anything about any -- any

11 plans for an operation going on during the course of your lunch, did he?

12 A. Yes, this is correct.

13 Q. Now, on August -- the 12th of August, 2001, you then went to the

14 cabinet of the president at around 9.00 to 10.00 in the morning, right?

15 A. Yes, this is right.

16 Q. And this was a very important day for the president and his

17 cabinet because the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was scheduled

18 for the next day, right?

19 A. Of course it was an important day, but the cabinet was not in full

20 composition because we had the cabinet had completed all the preliminary

21 preparations. It was an important day because we were receiving the

22 delegations, their advance teams and there was plenty of work for the

23 security.

24 Q. Okay. But there was so much work to do within the cabinet for

25 the -- for -- in preparation for the international delegations that the

1 president did not even go to church that Sunday, did he?

2 A. Yes, this is correct.

3 Q. And the signing of the Ohrid Agreement was the most important

4 issue that day for all members of the president's office, including the

5 president, right?

6 A. Yes. However, the signing was the next day. You didn't

7 understand me that the signing was on the 13th. But this was an important

8 day, yes.

9 Q. I appreciate that, but I'm referring to the preparations of that

10 day.

11 And as you say in paragraph 49 of your statement and you can refer

12 to your statement if you wish. It's at tab 1 of the Prosecution binder.

13 Because of the importance of that day, the preparatory work that

14 was being carried out, nobody in the president's office was paying

15 attention to what was going on in Ljuboten, were they?

16 A. Yes, this is correct.

17 Q. And you testified yesterday, Mr. Keskovski, around -- at 10022 to

18 10023 in the transcript, that the president called you in -- in his office

19 that day and told you that there were activities in Ljuboten and the area

20 of Ljubanci and he wanted you to contact Ljube Boskoski immediately.

21 You recall testify to go that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. If I can please refer you to paragraph 50 of your statement.

24 MS. ISSA: And for the record it's 65 ter 1D1249.

25 Q. What you say in your statement: "The president told me that he

1 had information that something was happening in Radisani village and he

2 could not reach the minister of the interior, Ljube Boskoski. He wanted

3 to talk to him so he tasked me to get in touch with Ljube Boskoski."

4 Isn't that what you said in your statement, Mr. Keskovski?

5 A. Yes.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

7 MR. METTRAUX: To the extent that my colleague is intent on

8 suggesting a contradiction between what was said yesterday and the

9 statement, could we have the correct page of the transcript which she is

10 referring because the statement of yesterday as we have it appears to

11 finish at 1019 and we see no reference on that page to the reference given

12 by our colleague. So if she could refer to that page so it can be

13 verified.

14 MS. ISSA: Well, the transcript from yesterday begins at the very

15 bottom of 10022 over to the top of 10023 which are the pages that I

16 referred to earlier.

17 Q. Now in your statement, Mr. Keskovski, you gave a very specific

18 answer to a very specific question in 2005 when you were asked by the

19 investigators and you told them that the president was concerned about

20 something happening in Radisani, right?

21 A. I said this. This is correct but not when asked a specific

22 question.

23 Q. Well, nevertheless, in your statement, you refer to a concern the

24 president had about the village of Radisani, right?

25 A. In my statement of 2005, but also in my statements of my current

1 testimony, I said that the president knew of ongoing activities in the

2 area of the village of Ljubanci and that, as a consequence, there was

3 movement of civilian population in the area of the village of Radisani.

4 This is in the context of what I have said and in this context, I

5 agree with you.

6 Q. Well, Mr. Keskovski, just so that the record is entirely clear,

7 I'm going to read to you what you said yesterday when you were asked this

8 question by Mr. Mettraux.

9 You were asked at the bottom of page 1022 of the transcript a

10 question: "And what did he tell you, if anything at that point? Mr.

11 Mettraux is referring to the president.

12 And your answer is: "The president called me in told me that in

13 Ljuboten and in the area of Ljubanci there have been some activities and

14 that he wants to establish contact immediately with the minister of the

15 interior, Mr. Ljube Boskoski; on his order, I attempted to find the

16 minister. However, I was unable to establish contact with him. This is a

17 telephone number which I had memorised in my mobile phone.

18 And then you're asked another question. And the following

19 question was: "Did the president tell you who he had got than information

20 from about things happening in Ljuboten and Ljubanci?

21 And you answer: "He did not tell me who he received this

22 information from."

23 Do you see that?

24 A. I don't have the opportunity to see this. I can only hear what

25 you are saying.

1 Q. All right. You have heard out what I read out to you, the

2 questions and the answers that you were asked and the answers that you

3 gave yesterday, right?

4 A. Yes. And I repeated the same today. I believe I have said the

5 same thing today.

6 Q. Well, just so we're clear about this, Mr. Keskovski, what do you

7 mean when you say, I believe that you've said the same thing today?

8 A. I don't say, I believe. Perhaps this is how it was interpreted to

9 you.

10 The same thing which you read out to me now, I also said two

11 minutes ago.

12 Q. But that's not what you said in your statement 2005, right?

13 A. If you read the statement which I gave in 2005 as a whole, you

14 will come to the same information. If you like, I will repeat it again.

15 The president --

16 Q. No --

17 A. -- If you like I can repeat it again, the same statement which I

18 gave then and which I'm giving now in the same context.

19 Q. There's no need for you to repeat it again, Mr. Keskovski.

20 Now, you said, you testified, that the president was concerned

21 about the activities in the region in your statement you said Radisani

22 village; now you're saying Ljuboten. And he summonsed you because on this

23 critical morning, the president could not reach the minister of the

24 interior, right?

25 A. I think you divide two things of the same event, which encompass

1 the same event, the events regarding Ljubanci. I said this in my

2 statement of 2005, that something was happening with the civilian

3 population who had gathered in the area of the village of Radisani. I

4 think this is what I told you yesterday and in 2005.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

6 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, I think the Prosecutor has to -- if

7 there is a suggestion, which apparently is attempted to be made that

8 Mr. Keskovski has changed what he said and that as the Prosecutor said he

9 would have said at the time that he was concerned about the activities in

10 the region of Radisani and that is he now saying that he was concerned

11 about Ljuboten, at paragraph 51 of the witness statement --

12 JUDGE PARKER: The witness has just referred to that.

13 MR. METTRAUX: Yes, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE PARKER: He's made it clear.

15 MR. METTRAUX: But in his statement --

16 JUDGE PARKER: Don't worry. We fully realise 51 is there.

17 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful, Your Honour.

18 MS. ISSA: And I was just getting to that, actually, Your Honour.

19 Q. Now Mr. Keskovski, when the president summonsed you on this

20 critical morning, it was because he could not reach the minister of the

21 interior, Ljube Boskoski, right?

22 A. No. Not because he was unable to get in touch with him. Because

23 this was a Sunday. His cabinet was not working on a regular base. That

24 is to say, his secretaries were not on duty that day, so he called me

25 since I was able to establish contact with all the institutions which he

1 needed to contact, be it from the Republic of Macedonia or abroad. The

2 people who were on duty on Saturday or Sunday -- and Sunday did not have

3 the information how to get in touch. Therefore, these were extraordinary

4 activities so he called me in. This was the usual practice of how things

5 were done, not on only on the 12th. This was the regular procedure.

6 Q. Okay. But the president was so concerned about getting in touch

7 with Ljube Boskoski that he essentially forced you to cancel a meeting

8 that had you planned with your subordinates that day because he wanted you

9 to try to reach the minister, right?

10 A. No, it is not right. I've never said that I've cancelled the

11 meeting.

12 Prior to starting the meeting, the president called me in, and I

13 think this is what I said then and what I'm saying now, today. I did not

14 cancel the meeting, because this was a very important meeting.

15 Q. Okay. You postponed the meeting in order to get in touch with

16 Ljube Boskoski. Is that what you're saying?

17 A. Prior to the starting of the meeting, I did not start it because

18 it had not begun yet. The meeting with the security group of the

19 president. You can interpret it in a way you would like, but this has

20 been my statement.

21 Q. The reason that the president needed you to speak to Minister

22 Boskoski is because he was concerned that the escalation of events and

23 violence in Radisani and Ljubanci might have a negative effect on the

24 signing of the Ohrid Agreement, right?

25 A. The president was concerned; this is correct. He did not ask of

1 me to speak with Mr. Boskoski but to establish contact with him so as he

2 be able to speak with Mr. Boskoski.

3 Q. You tried to reach Minister Boskoski on his phones but you

4 couldn't reach him, right?

5 A. Yes, this is right.

6 Q. So the president instructed you to contact the prime minister's

7 cabinet, to see if they can reach the minister, right?

8 A. Yes. He told me to call the cabinet of the prime minister so that

9 they can give me guidelines how we can establish contact with the

10 minister.

11 Q. And someone from the prime minister's cabinet gave you the number

12 for Ljube Boskoski's driver, and that's how you reached Minister Boskoski,

13 right?

14 A. As I stated, this was Mr. Robert Ljusev from the cabinet of the

15 prime minister, yes.

16 Q. So the prime minister's cabinet knew how to get in touch with

17 Minister Boskoski, right?

18 A. They gave me telephone numbers where I can -- which I can turn and

19 try to and get in touch with him.

20 Q. And that's because the prime minister and Minister Boskoski were

21 actually quite close, weren't they?

22 A. I cannot confirm this.

23 Q. When you reached Minister Boskoski, the president spoke to the

24 minister and asked him about the situation in Radisani and if he knew

25 anything else that was happening there, right?

1 A. Yes, as I stated.

2 Q. The president ordered, as you said, at 10025, page 10025 in the

3 transcript, that the president ordered Mr. Boskoski to go to Radisani and

4 with his authority to calm down the crowds and forbid them from going into

5 the village of Ljubanci, right?

6 A. Yes, this is right.

7 Q. So Minister Boskoski had the authority to calm the situation down,

8 right?

9 A. I think the president believed in this, yes.

10 Q. And going back to paragraph 51 of your statement, Mr. Keskovski,

11 you mention there that the population was angry and you do refer to the

12 villages of Radisani and Ljubanci, right?

13 A. Yes, this is right.

14 Q. You don't, however, refer to the village of Ljuboten, do you?

15 A. If you read well the paragraph, it reads [In English] In the

16 village of Radisani and Ljubanci, [Interpretation] In Ljuboten there is no

17 Macedonian population. You have not read the paragraph fully, so, yes,

18 this is correct. In the region of Radisani and Ljubanci, if you say --

19 you Ljubanci means Ljubanci and Radisani or if you mention Radisani this

20 is also Ljuboten and Ljubanci because these are all villages within a

21 parameter of two kilometres. If you look at the map, this will become

22 clear.

23 Q. Okay. And so if the president was so concerned, Mr. Keskovski,

24 that interethnic clashes might negatively impact on the signing of the

25 framework agreement would you expect the president to add fuel to those

1 interethnic clashes by ordering an operation in the village of Ljuboten?

2 A. The position of the president and of the entire state leadership

3 during that period was in order to sign the framework agreement and

4 because of the pressure of the Macedonian population during that period,

5 the positions of the army of the Republic of Macedonia and of the security

6 forces to be restored back behind the line of 5th of July, 2001, which was

7 endangered by the Albanian terrorist groups, otherwise, there would have

8 been great unrest and the signing of the framework agreement would not be

9 facilitated. I believe that I was not the only one who said that. You

10 read it yourself as well, several times.

11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the counsel to speak

12 closer to the microphone.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operations that you now mention

14 are part of the pushing the structures of the Albanian terrorist groups

15 back behind the lines of 5th of July that the NATO guaranteed.

16 MS. ISSA:

17 Q. Now, you mention, Mr. Keskovski, in paragraph 53 of your statement

18 after the president spoke to Ljube Boskoski and told him to calm the

19 situation down that you received a request from the president to make a

20 inquiry if you had someone that you knew in Ljuboten, right?

21 A. And asked me specifically about Mr. Tarculovski, to make contact

22 with him, I think this is also written in my statement.

23 Q. Yes, I see that. But right now we're dealing with the part of your

24 statement where you said that the president requested from -- for you to

25 make an inquiry if you had someone that you knew in Ljuboten.

1 A. And then continues in my statement and asked me specifically to

2 establish contact with Mr. Tarculovski, because what you are asking me is

3 now outside of the context of the sentence. You can't ask the question in

4 that way.

5 Q. I didn't ask you another -- a question yet, Mr. Keskovski. I

6 simply asked you if you -- I simply referring you to your statement or

7 that portion of your statement.

8 If the president, Mr. Keskovski, was in control of an operation,

9 would he inquire if you knew someone in Ljuboten.

10 A. I want to say that at no moment I stated that the president had

11 the control over the operation, and you are trying to lead me to something

12 completely different, which I had not stated. This means that this is

13 your conclusion. I haven't stated this.

14 Q. Okay. So you're now telling us that the president did not have

15 control over the operation in Ljuboten?

16 A. I'm not saying either of the two. It is you who are saying it.

17 It is you making the statement. I haven't said anything. You made the

18 conclusion and you're asking me whether the conclusion was correct. I

19 told you that such phrasing or such words I have not used in none of my

20 statements that I gave. If you are interpreting it that way, then this is

21 your conclusion. I haven't made any such conclusion.

22 Q. All right. So I'll ask you more directly then.

23 As far as you you're telling us, did the president have control

24 over the operation in Ljuboten?

25 A. I can't answer this question.

1 Q. Why not?

2 A. How could I answer this?

3 Q. Are you saying you don't know?

4 A. Yes, I don't know.

5 Q. Okay. Now, you've also said, as you just mentioned moments ago,

6 or you repeated moments ago, that the president asked you about

7 Johan Tarculovski whose phone was off the whole time. That's what you say

8 in paragraph 53 of your statement.

9 Well, Mr. Keskovski, if Johan Tarculovski was supposed to be

10 reporting on the operation in Ljuboten to the president, why would Johan

11 make himself unavailable to the president?

12 A. Why are you asking this question of me?

13 Q. I'm asking you the question. It's my job. My job is to ask you

14 questions and your job is to answer them.

15 A. I can only conjecture on this question. I can't answer precisely,

16 accurately, since I am not involved in the question that you are asking.

17 Why Johan Tarculovski was unavailable if the president wished -- why

18 was Johan Tarculovski -- the president wanted to have contact with him.

19 Where I am involved in this? Where is my specific knowledge about this

20 question that you are asking me? I don't know.

21 My answer is I don't know.

22 Q. Okay. And on that day, as you say in paragraph 53 of your

23 statement, you weren't aware of anything else happening in regards to

24 Ljuboten, right?

25 A. Yes, that's right.

1 Q. And after 13 August, after the Ohrid Agreement had been signed on

2 that day, Johan Tarculovski, you testified, returned to work a few days

3 later, and you later heard, you've told us, that -- from the media that

4 Johan Tarculovski was involved in the operation in Ljuboten. That's what

5 you've told us in your testimony, right?

6 A. A lot later. This is what I stated.

7 Q. All right.

8 A. Specifically some ten months later.

9 Q. Okay. So ten months later, that was the first time that you heard

10 that Johan Tarculovski was involved in the Ljuboten operation, through

11 media reports. Correct?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. And you said that you asked him about his involvement or his --

14 what was reported in the media about his involvement in the Ljuboten

15 operation, and he denied it. Correct?

16 A. Yes, that's correct.

17 Q. Didn't the president also ask Johan Tarculovski about his

18 involvement in the Ljuboten operation, Mr. Keskovski?

19 A. That happened at the same time and at the same place.

20 Q. Well, just to be -- so that we're absolutely clear about what

21 you're telling us, I'd like you to please turn to paragraph 57 of your

22 statement, please.

23 Do you have it there?

24 A. Yes, I see it, yes.

25 Q. Well, you say in paragraph 57: "Being asked if I asked

1 Johan Tarculovski to comment on the writings on certain newspapers that he

2 was heavily involved in Ljuboten events, he answered briefly that it was

3 rubbish and that he was in Ljubanci all the time."

4 And then you say: "The president asked him also the same question

5 in my presence and Tarculovski gave him the same answer."

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes, that's correct. And I stated this also now.

8 Q. So the president specifically asked about Johan -- asked

9 Johan Tarculovski whether he was involved in the Ljuboten operation,

10 didn't he?

11 A. As I told you, at that happened at the same time, the same place

12 that. Was not a separate meeting that was not a separate occasion and it

13 was not formal. This happened informally while we were walking. We met

14 Johan Tarculovski, we asked him. It was written in the media today that

15 you were involved. Were you involved? And the answer was that these were

16 speculations. That's all. That's all that happened. Everything that I

17 asked and what I saw the president asking. I don't know about any other

18 thing.

19 Q. Okay. I'm going to move to a different topic.

20 Now, in 2001, Mr. Keskovski, you instructed your subordinates in

21 your sector to contact you before trying to get in touch with any other

22 members of the Ministry of Interior, right?

23 A. No. It is not an order issued in 2000. The order is from the

24 beginning of the functioning of the group for security of the president.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. It is a general order. It dates a lot earlier.

2 Q. Okay. So you had a general order to your -- that you had given to

3 your subordinates, perhaps even prior to 2001, that they must contact you

4 before trying to get in touch with any other members of the Ministry of

5 Interior, right?

6 A. Not with other members of the Ministry of Interior. I have given

7 a precise statement. I really elaborated what I meant by this precisely.

8 All needs, individual needs of members of the sector for internal affairs,

9 and members of our group from the Ministries of the Interior and the

10 Ministry of Defence regarding all their personal private needs, they need

11 to speak first to our sector and through our sector address the Ministry

12 of Interior. There is due to security reasons, since it could happen that

13 there would be leakage of information to two ministries that are of

14 different nature, information from the cabinet of the president might leak

15 there. We have had such case in the year 2000 and this is why we have

16 made such decision in coordination with the president.

17 Q. Well, if can I refer you to paragraph 30 of your statement,

18 Mr. Keskovski, you say, the second sentence of paragraph 30:

19 "My personnel had the orders to contact me before trying to get in

20 touch with any other officers in the Ministry of Interior including the

21 minister of the interior personally. All the requests were coming through

22 me. I was the only person responsible and the one who could give answers

23 to the minister of the interior regarding the president's security

24 matters."

25 Do you see that?

1 A. I see it, and I believe that it is very specific. What I said now

2 is identical to what you have read out now. It is exactly the same.

3 Q. So regarding security matters, the -- your members had to get in

4 touch with you before contacting other members of the Ministry of

5 Interior, right?

6 A. Yes, that is correct. But I will tell you again. With regards to

7 their personal needs, if it concerns the regular activities of the sector,

8 then they had regular contacts with other services that would be involved

9 in any operation of ours. That is standard. They couldn't call me to ask

10 that the advance team contacts the traffic police. This is something

11 trivial.

12 Q. So when you say with regards to their personal needs, what do you

13 mean by that?

14 A. Personal needs that every employee of any institution might have.

15 There are various issues that the ministry covers.

16 Q. Can you provide an example?

17 A. If someone has been employed as a person with secondary education

18 and then wishes to have acknowledged the higher education that they have

19 acquired in the meantime, they need to address the ministry. But in order

20 to address the ministry to have this on record, they need to address us

21 first and we, through official channels address the ministry. This is one

22 of the examples.

23 Q. Okay. So if I understand what you're saying then, you're saying

24 that in regards to --

25 A. I will give you another example, a different one.

1 If they wish to be issued with any equipment, they first needed to

2 inform us that they want to go to be issued with equipment, and then they

3 go to the Ministry of Interior to be issued with equipment. This is yet

4 another example.

5 I'm speaking about personal equipment. Maybe a communication

6 station has broken down or something of the sort.

7 Q. So in regards to perhaps employment matters or human resources

8 matters or getting -- issuing personal equipment, they needed to go

9 through you. That's what you're telling us, right?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. And that's because you wanted to ensure that the chain of command

12 was respected. Right?

13 A. I apologise. I stated already, we have had cases in the year 2000

14 when information leaked from the president's office, from this reason --

15 Q. Well, Mr. Keskovski, I heard your answer before. I'm now asking

16 you a different question, and I'd just like you to answer this question,

17 please.

18 A. You asked me now the question that I have ordered this because I

19 wanted the chain of command to function. I told you, why was it that I

20 have made this order? Before this order was made in 2000 the contacts

21 between the members of the sector for security of the president and any

22 other sector, they could have communicated directly with all institutions

23 within the ministry. And I explained why I made that order and why that

24 procedure needed to be followed, and this does not apply only to the

25 Ministry of Interior but the same applied also to the Ministry of Defence.

1 I believe I clarified this already.

2 Q. Okay. Now, when members of your unit or sector were not on duty,

3 they would not necessarily inform you of every activity that they carried

4 out while they were on leave, would they?

5 A. If it is not within the remit of the service, yes. With regards

6 to their private activities, they don't have any need to inform me, of

7 course.

8 Q. So you wouldn't be aware of who they were communicating with, for

9 example, with regards to activities outside the remit of the service?

10 A. No.

11 Q. So if a member of your unit, for example, communicated with a

12 member of the prime minister's security, you may not be aware of that,

13 right?

14 A. Yes, that's right. That's correct.

15 MS. ISSA: I'd like to please go to P369, and that's at tab 12 of

16 the binder. And perhaps it might be easier to display the Macedonian

17 version on e-court.

18 Q. Now for Madam Registrar, I will be first referring to e-court page

19 22, N000-7433, 022 in the English and Macedonian.

20 Now, Mr. Keskovski, this is a telephone log-book, which is

21 believed to belong to Johan Tarculovski.

22 And if I can -- these are records of the phone calls that are

23 pertaining to Johan Tarculovski. And if I can ask you to turn to page 22

24 in your hard copy, or simply look on your screen. Should be 21 in your

25 hard copy.

1 And if you can look at about the third line from the bottom of

2 that page. Now, this record indicates that Johan Tarculovski made a

3 telephone call to Vlatko Stefanovski on the 19th of August, 2001.

4 Do you see that?

5 A. I see it.

6 MS. ISSA: If we can please go to page 58 in e-court, both in the

7 Macedonian and English version. And page 3 of the outgoing -- or incoming

8 calls, rather, in the hard copy.

9 Q. Now, at about the --

10 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

12 MR. METTRAUX: I apologise for interrupting, Your Honour, but the

13 Defence would simply ask Ms. Issa to identify, if she is able to the basis

14 upon which the Prosecution is able to determine that the phone call was in

15 fact made to Mr. Stefanovski, and if the sole basis for that assertion is

16 in fact the document that the Prosecutor has put in front of the witness.

17 We are aware of a number of matters that perhaps not want to state those

18 in front of the witness, but if she could identify this, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE PARKER: I would think it not appropriate to interrupt the

20 cross-examination for that purpose, Mr. Mettraux. She's proceeding on the

21 basis of this exhibit which has been tendered and used on that basis to

22 date.

23 Please continue, Ms. Issa.

24 MS. ISSA:

25 Q. Mr. Keskovski, if you can please look to about the 11th line from

1 the top on that page on the screen, and you'll see at about that portion

2 of the page, this is a record indicating that there was a telephone call

3 made to the number pertaining to Johan Tarculovski from someone in the

4 security of the prime minister on the 11th of August, 2001.

5 Do you see that?

6 A. Yes, I see it.

7 Q. And if I can just ask for the following page to be displayed.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.

9 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to ask

10 my learned colleague when asking the question to use the term "telephone

11 number which we believe was used by Mr. Johan Tarculovski."

12 Since she did this on previously on page 23.

13 JUDGE PARKER: That will do, Mr. Apostolski. Yes, I think the

14 cross-examination can proceed. Both yourself and Mr. Mettraux are anxious

15 to make points that can be made at other times very effectively but not in

16 the course of cross-examination. Thank you.

17 Carry on, please, Ms. Issa.

18 MS. ISSA:

19 Q. Now, on the following page, Mr. Keskovski, at about the 11th line

20 from the top, once again, we see an incoming call. The record indicates

21 there is an incoming call from the security of the prime minister to the

22 number -- to Johan Tarculovski.

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I see it.

25 Q. Were you aware, Mr. Keskovski, that Johan Tarculovski was in

1 contact with Vlatko Stefanovski and the prime minister's security on those

2 occasions?

3 A. No.

4 MS. ISSA: If I can then please ask for page 44 in e-court to be

5 displayed?

6 Q. Now, at around the middle of that page, Mr. Keskovski, this record

7 indicates that there was a telephone call from Johan Tarculovski to

8 Goran Stojkov on the 4th of August, 2001.

9 Do you see that?

10 A. No, I cannot see it. The screen is split in two, and I can only

11 see the numbers.

12 MS. ISSA: If I might just ask that we show the Macedonian

13 version, please. Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I see it, yes.

15 MS. ISSA:

16 Q. And, finally, Mr. Keskovski --

17 If I can ask Madam Registrar to please go to page 47 in e-court,

18 in the Macedonian version. And it's page 46 in the hard copy English

19 version.

20 Now, at the bottom of that page, Mr. Keskovski, there are several

21 calls, and the record indicates that those calls were made from

22 Johan Tarculovski's phone to Goran Stojkov on the 6th of August, 2001.

23 Do you see that?

24 A. I think I should be looking at a different page. But now I see

25 it, yes.

1 Q. Okay. Were you aware that Johan Tarculovski made or had contact

2 with Goran Stojkov during that period, Mr. Keskovski?

3 A. No, I'm not aware.

4 Q. And during that time, in August 2001, Goran Stojkov was working at

5 the prime minister's security section, wasn't he?

6 A. Yes, this is correct.

7 Q. Now, you've explained, Mr. Keskovski, that Johan Tarculovski's

8 duty was to follow and secure the movement of the first lady, right, in

9 your sector?

10 A. Yes, these were the duties.

11 Q. And he was reporting everything regarding the first lady's

12 security matters directly to you or to your deputies, right?

13 A. He informed Mr. Jarcev, myself or the deputies.

14 Q. And in the branch that he used to work in, the hours of his work

15 were more flexible because the level of security for the first lady was

16 much lower than that of the president, right?

17 A. Yes, this is correct?

18 Q. And the making of the schedule was left up to that branch. You

19 were not involved in the scheduling of his duties or in that branch, were

20 you.

21 A. On a regular basis, no. In certain circumstances when this was

22 requested by the president, yes. But in regular activities, no.

23 Q. And because the schedule was more flexible in that branch,

24 sometimes Johan Tarculovski and others working out of that branch worked

25 two or three days and then had two or three days rest, right?

1 A. Yes, this is correct.

2 Q. You were asked yesterday at page 10034 of the transcript whether

3 it was correct that Johan Tarculovski was in charge of the security for

4 the first lady also during her official and private trips, that was the

5 question that you asked [sic] And you answered yes.

6 Do you recall that?

7 A. Yes, this is exactly so.

8 Q. I'd like to refer you to paragraph 19 of your statement,

9 Mr. Keskovski, please.

10 Now, that says, what you've said to the investigators in your

11 statement:

12 "Regarding Johan Tarculovski's duties as the first lady's

13 security, I would like to say that in the branch he used to work the

14 making of the schedule was left to them, since the level of security was

15 much lower than that of the president. Sometimes they would work two or

16 three days and then have two or three days rest. It was very flexible.

17 Johan Tarculovski's duty was following and securing any movement of the

18 first lady. Johan Tarculovski has never been the direct security

19 inspector of the then president."

20 Now I'd like you to go to paragraph 23. And you say there: "I do

21 not remember where the first lady was during that time." And in the

22 previous paragraph the last sentence refers to August or the month of

23 August.

24 "I just remember that sometime in under/July and the beginning of

25 August 2001, she was in London and then she came back for a short period

1 of time and travelled to Turkey. But I do not remember the exact

2 itinerary, but it is easy to verify her movement within the Ministry of

3 Interior or more specifically at police station in charge of border

4 crossing points in Macedonian. And then you say:

5 "Johan Tarculovski was not with the first lady when she was

6 abroad. I recall that I saw Johan Tarculovski in Ohrid but I do not

7 remember the exact days when he was there. I gave them more rest time

8 since the lady was not in the country that they could relax a bit. But

9 when Johan Tarculovski was in Ohrid with the team, he didn't receive any

10 special order from me."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. Yes, I see it.

13 Q. So just to clarify, then, Mr. Keskovski, Johan Tarculovski was not

14 with the first lady during that period of time when she was abroad, was

15 he?

16 A. Yes, there is what I think in that period during those travels,

17 since they were of a special nature, none of the security of the first

18 lady did not go with her. In Great Britain for sure, because this is a

19 trip organised by MI-6 to provide security of the first lady.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 A. Nobody knew whether she was in Macedonia or not.

22 Q. Thank you. I would just like it go to another topic now.

23 Now, you testified at various points, Mr. Keskovski, that you

24 would go off to Vaksince, or you have been to Vaksince, Tetovo and other

25 places, and you gathered information or intelligence for the president,

1 right?

2 A. I said that on the order of the president, I went to -- I was in

3 several places from Tetovo the Lipkovo region, Lipkovo-Kumanovo region,

4 Aracinovo, and other places with an order to report from the ground and

5 this meant that I communicate, if I may say, officers from the army and

6 from the police, and to inform about the course of the activities on given

7 orders.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I did not say to gather intelligence information, because this

10 could not have happened. This was a crisis situation.

11 Q. Okay. But you're telling us that you were sent by the president

12 specifically to gather information for him and to report back to him, in

13 relation to all of these -- as to what was happening in all of these areas

14 that you've just listed, right?

15 A. Yes, this is so.

16 Q. Now, there was, at the time in 2001, Mr. Keskovski, there was an

17 intelligence branch or service for the government who gather information

18 and intelligence regarding matters that are relevant to the given time,

19 right?

20 A. Yes, this is right.

21 Q. And the army has its own intelligence branch. It's called G-2,

22 right?

23 A. The sector for security, or, rather, sector for intelligence in

24 the army.

25 Q. And the minister of the interior has its own intelligence service,

1 the DBK, right?

2 A. I think when you previously asked me, you were asking about

3 intelligence service. This is a service under the authority of the

4 president, while the next question you're asking me is probably about the

5 DBK, which is within the MOI. This is not for intelligence; rather, for

6 counter-intelligence.

7 Q. Okay. So all of these agencies whose job was to gather

8 information regarding, in part, at the time, the crisis, were out there,

9 and you're saying that the president would task you and people from your

10 sector, like Johan Tarculovski, to gather information for him, right?

11 A. In terms of what you're wanting to ask me, I will answer

12 specifically. All these services which you listed collect information and

13 once a day, or once a week, inform the institutions about the situation on

14 the ground. The president issued me with a task about a concrete

15 operation which I was supposed to inform him about, from the ground. I

16 will repeat, I did not collect intelligence and such information about

17 operations. Again, I'm speaking about operations reporting from

18 operations. I'm not speaking about collecting intelligence on the ground.

19 This is a lengthy activity. I told you, I was sent on the ground to

20 inform him about the operations and the activities specifically for the

21 Aracinovo case. He send me at the onset of the action, on the positions

22 of the army and police in Brnjanci from there I established contact with

23 him. I gave him the commander of the special unit of the police to inform

24 him directly how the situation stands on the ground. These were my tasks.

25 When I returned, I gave him a report that the action in Aracinovo will not

1 be successful as early as Friday, and so forth and so on.

2 I think I'm being very specific in my answer.

3 Q. Well, Mr. Keskovski, doesn't the army report about operations that

4 are ongoing on the ground?

5 A. The president had information that some things which were happening

6 on the ground were not represented to him in a proper fashion and I said

7 this. This was the reason why Pande Petrovski was removed and replaced as

8 chief of General Staff. I think I stated this precisely yesterday. This

9 is why there was a need for a direct contact, and when I say "direct," I

10 mean not with intermediaries but direct. His eyes on the ground.

11 Mr. Keskovski, wasn't there -- doesn't the Ministry of Interior

12 report about operations on the ground?

13 A. I think you do not understand me or do not want to understand me.

14 Q. Mr. Keskovski --

15 A. -- I'm speak being now. If an operation is ongoing now, I have to

16 report now not to write a report about the work or this operation. These

17 are two different things at hand.

18 Q. And if the president wanted a report, a specific report about an

19 operation, couldn't he have, for example called the chief of General Staff

20 and perhaps gotten a report from him about some operation on the ground?

21 A. He surely has done this, but he believed he wanted to hear

22 something directly from people with -- in whom he has maximum trust. As I

23 said previously, his eyes and his ears on the ground. Why did he send me

24 to Aracinovo? In the activity in Aracinovo, so that he can establish

25 contact with the commanders and not only with those leading the operation

1 but also from the other commanders who were on the ground of the

2 operation.

3 Q. Couldn't the -- couldn't the president have contacted

4 Minister Ljube Boskoski to get information from him on the ground?

5 A. Surely he had called Minister Boskoski and the chief of General

6 Staff and the minister of defence. However he also sent me on the ground,

7 where I was almost shot. I spent four hours in ambush in Aracinovo. He

8 would not have sent me in these clashes to die if there was no need to

9 that end. It was not my work duty. It was an order of the president.

10 Q. So the president didn't really trust Ljube Boskoski to get him the

11 direct information, did he? That's why he needed to send you?

12 A. I cannot respond and answer this question. How can I tell you

13 whether the president trusted Mr. Boskoski?

14 Q. Well, you've just told us that the president sent you instead of

15 obtaining his informs from all these other possible organisations, because

16 he needed somebody there that he could trust. Right?

17 A. This is exactly right, and I said he wanted to get in touch or

18 establish contact with commanders who were commanding directly on the

19 ground, not only with the leadership and the leading command. I'm sure he

20 had contacts with all of those, with the MOI and the minister, the

21 Ministry of Defence and the minister and the chief of General Staff.

22 Q. Didn't he trust Minister Boskoski, for example, to give him the

23 complete and accurate information as to what was going on, on the ground.

24 A. He trusted Minister Boskoski because, as I previously said, he had

25 sent him on previous other places. He also placed Minister Buckovski

1 because he was in daily contact with him and gave him information. I

2 presume he also trusted Mr. Pande Petrovski, because they were in daily

3 contact but all these three together are in no correlation with the tasks

4 which I received. I think I explained this clearly. Direct information

5 does not mean commanders on the ground through the heads of the services

6 where they are assigned to, to the president. He wanted to be in direct

7 contact to see if they were encountering problems during the action and

8 not with the police only but the army as well. When-- if you were to ask

9 me if President Trajkovski trusted Mr. Boskoski, then you will have to ask

10 me whether he also trusted Mr. Buckovski, the chief of General Staff and

11 all the others.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Now Mr. Mettraux.

13 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, I believe that obviously my colleague

14 did not do that on purpose but that to the extent that she wishes to put

15 to the witness a proposition that she should suggest he has made, she

16 should do that fairly and correctly; and in the question when there was a

17 suggestion that the president sent you, that would be Mr. Keskovski,

18 instead of obtaining his information from other source this is a serious

19 distortion of what he said. It there was no suggestion that it was an

20 either or situation. It was repeatedly stated that it was and, that both

21 information had come from certain places and that in addition he sent

22 Mr. Keskovski. I think it has to be fair to the witness and not seek to

23 distort the evidence that has been given.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Mettraux. May I make it clear once

25 again that where a witness is likely to be misled by a question, you can

1 expect the Chamber to interfere. When a question is put that the witness

2 is very capable of dealing with, as you have just heard, we will not

3 interfere. It's just an unnecessary delaying of the process.

4 But a witness the capacity to deal with things and make his

5 position clear, as this witness is, we will leave that matter alone and

6 let the witness show what he really means, as he is capable of doing and

7 the end result is more satisfactory for non-interference.

8 MR. METTRAUX: I'm grateful, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Is this a convenient time now, Ms. Issa?

10 MS. ISSA: It is, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now and resume at 11.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

13 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Issa.

15 MS. ISSA: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. Before we move on to another topic, Mr. Keskovski, you mentioned

17 in the last session, before the recess, that when the president sent you

18 on the ground, you were almost shot and you spent hours in ambush and that

19 was it was not your work duty. And that was at page 32 of today's

20 transcript, lines 6 to 12.

21 Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes. I recall the event as well.

23 Q. So sometimes, because of the complexity of the security situation

24 in 2001, people such as yourself worked, carried out duties, or carried

25 out tasks that were outside of their normal duties, right?

1 A. Yes, this is what I stated. The regular duties were on the one

2 hand, but upon the president's order, those, again, became regular duties,

3 because the president had ordered those.

4 Q. Now, I'd like just to move to another topic.

5 You explained in your examination-in-chief that on 11 August 2001

6 Johan Tarculovski called you from Ljubanci and said that there was an

7 action being planned in Ljuboten, and that this was shortly after 5.00,

8 right?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. And as you say in paragraph 39 of your statement, you asked him

11 what it means, and he replied that in Ljuboten there are fortifications of

12 terrorists.

13 Now, you asked him that question, because at this point, did you

14 not know what Johan was talking about, did you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Johan told you that the police and army units were involved in

17 preparing the action, right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You asked him what the problem was, and he explained to you that

20 there was a lack of cooperation from an army major who did not want to

21 undertake the action without orders, right?

22 A. Yes, this is how it was.

23 Q. And that was the first time that you'd heard of this action, when

24 Johan called you and told you about it.

25 A. Yes, that's right.

1 Q. Now, apart from the issues with the army major, Johan never

2 mentioned any problems with anyone else, did he?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. He never said anything about any problems with the police, did he?

5 A. Yes, that is right.

6 Q. And the nature of the problem, with the army major, was that the

7 major did not want to undertake any activities until the major received an

8 order from his army superiors, right?

9 A. Yes, precisely.

10 Q. So you asked the major what was his rank and who was his immediate

11 superior, and he -- the major told you that his superior was army

12 General Sokol Mitrevski, who was the president's agitant, right?

13 A. Yes, precisely.

14 Q. You also asked the army major if the major would obey an order

15 from the president, right?

16 A. Yes, that is right.

17 Q. And the major replied that he would, right?

18 A. Yes, that's right.

19 Q. And you say in paragraph 40 - and you testified, I believe - in

20 your statement that you were still holding on to the phone and you

21 explained to the president the situation, right?

22 A. Yes, precisely.

23 Q. And, incidentally, you testified that the president spoke to

24 Johan Tarculovski before he spoke to the army major. Do you recall that?

25 A. Yes. Yes, precisely.

1 Q. But if we look in your statement, particularly at paragraph 40,

2 there's nothing in there that says that the president spoke directly to

3 Johan Tarculovski at this point, is there?

4 A. What they asked me, I answered. I am standing behind my

5 statement.

6 Q. Now, when the president spoke to Major Despodov, he asked the

7 major about his rank and who his superior was, right?

8 A. Yes, precisely.

9 Q. And you heard the president tell the major that he would call

10 Sokol Mitrevski, who was the superior of Major Despodov, right?

11 A. He told the major the following: Undertake all actions within

12 your competence so that the operation, the action there, is successful,

13 and I will phone General Sokol Mitrevski.

14 Q. Okay. So the president wanted to make sure that any orders he

15 issued would be issued down the proper chain of command. That's why he

16 said he would phone Sokol Mitrevski. Correct?

17 A. The president had already issued an order at a lower level, and he

18 said he would inform General Sokol Mitrevski of the order.

19 Q. And why was it then necessary for the president to inform

20 Sokol Mitrevski of the order?

21 A. Since he was the supreme commander of the armed forces of the

22 Republic of Macedonia.

23 Q. So, in other words, the president wanted to make sure that the

24 hierarchy or the higher levels of the chain of command within the army

25 were aware of what was going on, that there was an order issued, right?

1 A. Yes, precisely.

2 Q. Now, Major Despodov was a major in the army, and his superiors, as

3 you just mentioned, was Sokol Mitrevski and also General Stamboliski. Is

4 that correct?

5 A. Yes. If you follow the line of hierarchy, yes.

6 Q. Well, when you spoke to Johan Tarculovski, didn't you ask him why

7 Major Despodov's superiors didn't order Despodov to undertake the action?

8 A. There was -- I -- there was no need of me to interfere when the

9 president has issued the orders, to Johan, also to go and inform him. On

10 had a basis would I ask Johan all these questions that you are now putting

11 to me? If I had been the one sending Johan to the grounds then maybe I

12 would ask him, but I had no authority to send him to the ground to perform

13 tasks that are outside of the scope of his working tasks set forth in the

14 law.

15 Q. If there was an action organised by the president, which involved

16 the president's army, why wouldn't General Stamboliski have contacted the

17 president instead of Johan Tarculovski contacting the president?

18 A. Once again, I don't understand your question. Since we have here

19 two different things. You're asking me about the General Stamboliski and

20 about Johan Tarculovski. I can't understand you. Would be kind to ask

21 your question again, or to ask it more precisely?

22 Q. If there was an action organised by the president which involved

23 the president's army, why didn't the Chief of Staff, or perhaps Major

24 Despodov's superiors, or General Stamboliski -- members of the army have

25 contacted the president about the major refusing to undertake an action

1 instead of Johan Tarculovski contacting the president?

2 A. I believe that you need to ask this question of Major Despodov or

3 what was his name? You said it. I don't know his name. Whether he was

4 able to establish contact with his superiors in the highest ranks so then

5 for this communication to continue. I can't answer the question whether

6 and how was the major able to establish contact so that this chain of

7 command would be followed further across the hierarchy.

8 Q. Now that day, there were no other contacts from Johan Tarculovski

9 or anyone else relating to this matter, was there?

10 A. Yes, precisely.

11 Q. And as far as you were aware, the president did not contact

12 Sokol Mitrevski, did he?

13 A. While he was with me? No.

14 Q. Now, in 2001, Mr. Keskovski, when an action is being prepared by

15 the security forces, that fact is not generally made known to the public,

16 is it?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. And that's because in 2001 the security forces issued confidential

19 orders and plans for operations because if such orders and plans became

20 publicly known they might alert the enemy to the security forces's

21 preparation, right?

22 A. Due to security reasons. This is what should be written.

23 Q. Okay. So the security forces are very careful about information

24 that may be divulged, right?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. You've testified that when Johan Tarculovski called you and told

2 you there was a problem with an army major that, as far as you were aware,

3 Johan Tarculovski did not tell you that he, Johan, was involved in the

4 operation. Correct?

5 A. Yes, precisely.

6 Q. In fact, as far as you knew, Johan was in Ljubanci, right?

7 A. Yes, precisely.

8 Q. And after 13 August, when Johan returned to work, some ten months

9 later, and you asked him about news of his involvement in the Ljuboten

10 action, he denied it, right?

11 A. Yes. Yes, precisely.

12 Q. Now, if Johan Tarculovski was not involved in this operation, how

13 do you explain the fact that Johan Tarculovski knew there was a problem

14 with Major Despodov?

15 A. From my own experience I can give you an example, if you accept

16 that.

17 Q. Well, I'm not asking you to give me an example. I'm asking you

18 how you explain the fact that Johan Tarculovski knew there was a problem

19 within the army chain of command or with the army major, Despodov?

20 A. When I was sent by the president of the state to Aracinovo during

21 the action to seize Aracinovo village in the region of Brnjanci, I was

22 sent to a task similar to the one given to Mr. Tarculovski with regards to

23 Ljubanci region. From what I heard, this is what I gather, that they were

24 similar.

25 When I got there, the general, the commander of the special unit

1 of the police, communicated to us that they had a problem with -- because

2 they didn't have a tank there in the region where they were active. So I

3 phoned the president directly, personally and informed him about the

4 problems that were identified in order to have him directly aware of the

5 problems that the commanders were having in the field.

6 In this context, Mr. Tarculovski could have known about certain

7 problems that had emerged on the ground with regards to coordination

8 between the security forces.

9 Q. But in this case, unlike the case you just described to us,

10 Mr. Keskovski, you explained earlier in your testimony, and as it states

11 at paragraph 34 of your statement, that the president had asked

12 Johan Tarculovski to inform him about the situation in the village and

13 that the president was concerned about unrest in the village. Right?

14 A. Not regarding the unrest in the village. I believe that I hadn't

15 given such statement, if we're speaking about the 10th of August, 2001. I

16 said that Mr. Boris Trajkovski, the president, had ordered

17 Mr. Tarculovski, when going to the village of Ljubanci, because he had a

18 personal issue there, he requested to be -- to go there and then to -- the

19 president requested that he be informed about the situation on the ground

20 by Mr. Tarculovski, since the situation was well known that -- the public

21 was aware of it also. That after the action of the Albanian terrorists

22 and the killing of the eight soldiers, there was still sporadic fighting

23 between the Macedonian security forces and the Albanian terrorists in the

24 area of village of Ljuboten.

25 The concern of the president was that maybe there was the

1 intention for this conflict to escalate to an even higher level because

2 threats were made that the city of Skopje would be shelled and that would

3 have placed the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement under risk.

4 I believe I explained it better now.

5 Q. Well, if you look at paragraph 34 of your statement,

6 Mr. Keskovski, what is say there is that you "heard the president asking

7 Johan Tarculovski to call the next day and inform the president about the

8 situation in the village. The president was concerned that if there was

9 unrest at the village, it could postpone the signing of the Ohrid

10 Agreement, which was scheduled for Monday, 13 August 2001."

11 Right?

12 A. If you're referring to unrest such as protests, no. Several of

13 the soldiers who were killed on the 10th of August and who were killed by

14 the Albanian terrorists at Ljubotenski Bacila locality, were from the

15 village of Ljuboten. I believe that you can imagine what was the

16 situation if several people are killed, several people from one village

17 are killed, and why was the concern there. I didn't say that there were

18 any unrest there is, but precisely what I explained here is what I meant.

19 Ljuboten village and Ljubanci village are at a distance of two

20 kilometres.

21 Q. Mr. Keskovski, there's nothing in what you've told us or in your

22 statement that says that Johan Tarculovski was sent by the president to

23 obtain information from the forces on the ground directly, is there?

24 A. The president had sent Mr. Tarculovski and ordered him to inform

25 him from the ground itself. That is a broad order.

1 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Keskovski, that Mr. Tarculovski was informed

2 about the operation but that Mr. Tarculovski wasn't involved in the action

3 at all. Is that what you're saying?

4 A. I said what I stated in the statement, and I stand behind it. It

5 is like that. The order of the president was specific: Go, since you

6 will already be there, inform me about the situation on the ground where

7 you are, the area of Ljubanci village.

8 Q. Mr. Keskovski, I'd like you to turn to tab 7 of the Prosecution

9 binder.

10 MS. ISSA: And for e-court purposes, I will be going to P303,

11 please.

12 Q. Now, this is a military report on the actions and situation of the

13 area -- in the area of the 3rd Guard Brigade in the village of Ljuboten

14 which was submitted on the 12th of August, 2001, which I believe you've

15 seen before.

16 A. If you're asking me, I haven't seen it.

17 Q. Okay. Perhaps it was the other report that was referred to.

18 That's fine.

19 A. Could I just be shown the Macedonian version as well on the

20 display?

21 Q. Yes. Thank you.

22 MS. ISSA: If I can just ask Madam Registrar to please move the

23 page down so that the witness can see the first paragraph. Thank you.

24 Q. Now, if I can just draw your attention to this first paragraph of

25 this report, Mr. Keskovski, it says on the 10th of August, 2001, at 9.30

1 or 2330 hours a group of around 40 persons came to the school in the

2 village of Ljubanci. The group was headed by the person Johan Tarculovski

3 who comes and says - head of the agency Kometa - who comes from the

4 village Ljubanci. After some time, more persons arrived whereby the

5 number increased to around 60 to 70 persons. A Ministry of Interior truck

6 arrived from which weapons, ammunition, bombs and bazooka were distributed

7 to them. The persons were wearing Ministry of Interior uniforms. These

8 persons asked Major Mitre Despodov, who is the commander of the 3rd

9 Guardist Brigade to provide them with a place to sleep in the mountain

10 lodge Ljubanci. And then it continues. It says that Major Despodov asked

11 them on whose orders they had come and they said this is known to the

12 president and no one else should know about their stay. Major Despodov

13 asked them what their role is here and they answered that they had the

14 task to enter into the village of Ljuboten and to conduct a cleaning of

15 the terrain.

16 So if Johan Tarculovski was not involved in this operation,

17 Mr. Keskovski, how is it that he arrived there at 9.30 in the evening on

18 the 10th of August with others from the Ministry of Interior and a truck

19 full of weapons from the Ministry of Interior?

20 A. How can I answer this question when this is not my Official Note

21 and I can't answer this question.

22 Q. So --

23 A. I said that I didn't know that Johan Tarculovski was involved in

24 the Ljuboten events. You are asking me now, you are presenting evidence

25 to me, this is an Official Note of the army. I can't confirm anything.

1 Q. So when you say that you didn't know that Johan was involved in

2 the action, you're basically -- you're just basing that on what -- and

3 Johan told you basically, right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, I'd like you, please, to go to the second page.

6 MS. ISSA: If we can please have that displayed on e-court.

7 Q. And if you can please look at the paragraph that starts with: "On

8 Saturday, 11 August, 2001."

9 Do you see that there?

10 A. Yes, I see it.

11 Q. Now that says: "On Saturday, 11 August 2001, the above listed

12 persons headed by Johan Tarculovski conducted a reconnaissance in the

13 village of Ljuboten and in that village they shot at dogs and barked at

14 them."

15 And then it says: "Around 1700 to 1730 hours the person

16 Johan Tarculovski asked Major Mitre Despodov to shoot at the target in the

17 village of Ljuboten which they previously had determined precisely

18 together with Major Mitre Despodov. Major Despodov did not want to open

19 fire upon the above mentioned targets without orders, requested approval

20 from the superiors."

21 Do you see that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then it says: "Around 1800 to 1900 hours, first, the person

24 Johan talked with the president of the state and then Major Despodov

25 talked with the president. The president asked him whether he is under

1 the command of General Sokol. Major Despodov answered yes. The president

2 told him, Good. I will talk to the General Sokol, and I will call you

3 again."

4 Do you see that?

5 A. Yes, I see it.

6 Q. And then if you look at the following paragraph: After 2200 hours

7 on 11 August 2001."

8 Do you see that, that paragraph?

9 A. Yes, I see it.

10 Q. It says: "That the above listed persons of the Ministry of

11 Interior came again and demanded orders to start the action and they

12 disassociated themselves from the same while Johan Tarculovski said

13 tomorrow at 4.30 hours I will start the action."

14 THE INTERPRETER: Would you mind reading more slowly.

15 MS. ISSA: Certainly.

16 Q. "Major Mitre Despodov also asked for approval an orders for

17 supporting the action of Johan Tarculovski, even though it had been agreed

18 earlier. Johan Tarculovski told Major Despodov there will be orders from

19 the president or from the persons around him."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I see it.

22 Q. Now, this is -- took place -- this conversation took place at 2200

23 hours on the 11th of August, 2001. And according to this report, there

24 was still no order from Sokol Mitrevski, right?

25 A. It is right.

1 Q. Then the report continue and it says that: "On Sunday, 12 August

2 2001, at 4.30 hours the person Johan Tarculovski with other persons,

3 Ministry of Interior reservists, started the action. Immediately after

4 the start of the action Captain Grozdanovski called up Major Despodov an

5 informed him about the start of the action.

6 And then it continues and it says that they called Major Despodov

7 and requested support for shooting at the mentioned buildings and

8 Major Despodov agreed.

9 Do you see that?

10 A. Yes, I see it.

11 Q. And then if you look at the very last paragraph of this report,

12 Mr. Keskovski, it says that around 8.00 --

13 A. If I could have the text raised on the screen, please.

14 Q. Certainly. Do you see it now? All right.

15 A. Yes, yes. It's fine now.

16 Q. Now at the very bottom it says: "Around 0800 hours,

17 Major Despodov called the commander and asked him whether he had received

18 any orders from General Sokol Mitrevski for an action against the village

19 of Ljuboten."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I see it.

22 Q. And then it says that the commander answered that for the present

23 he had not received any orders and after this he called personally

24 General Sokol Mitrevski who said that he had not issued any orders.

25 Do you see that?

1 A. Yes, I see it.

2 Q. And then if we can please turn to the following page. Just if you

3 look at the very first sentence.

4 MS. ISSA: Perhaps in the Macedonian it might be at the very

5 bottom of the page. No, I'm sorry, Madam Registrar it might be at the

6 bottom of the previous page. I'm looking for the passage that begins with

7 the passage: "Around 8.30 hours."

8 All right. I think it's there. Thank you.

9 Q. Now, if we look at the paragraph that begins with around 8.30

10 hours. It says around 8.30 hours Major Despodov again called the

11 commander and asked him whether the superiors know about the action that

12 is being organised and carried out by the Ministry of Interior in the

13 village of Ljuboten. And the commander answered that General Sokol

14 Mitrevski is not informed about the mentioned action and that he will come

15 personally to positions to resolve the situation. And after that, when

16 the commander saw how -- how the operation was being carried out by the

17 Ministry of Interior, he ordered that actions -- to stop.

18 Do you see that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. So by 8.30 in the morning on the 12th of August, Major Despodov is

21 still asking about whether an order had been issued by his superiors,

22 right?

23 A. What you are read to go me now is not a statement of Major

24 Despodov. It is a narration of a certain person who is recounting what

25 had happened there while he was not on the ground. Whether Major Despodov

1 received or not this order, it's a question that should be asked of him.

2 All the rest is conjecture which pertains to this report and it's mainly

3 hearsay, something which a person has heard happen. Therefore, I cannot

4 answer your question.

5 Major Despodov received an order from the president to undertake

6 activities within his competency.

7 Q. We see here --

8 A. This is what I heard.

9 As for the undersigned, what the undersigned person on this report

10 heard, I don't know. This is a different matter.

11 Q. Well, I appreciate that you don't know, Mr. Keskovski. But this

12 is a report from the assistant to the commander for security in that area

13 in the army, right? And --

14 A. Yes. But he is recounting something he had heard about while not

15 being present there. This is not the same thing. If I'm telling you

16 about something which I had heard about, then this can be understood in

17 different ways as speculation or tendency to prove something. As far as

18 I'm able to note, he also told him and then he answered. Again, the

19 drafter of this report spoke with persons and on the basis on that

20 conversation he drafted the report.

21 Q. Well, we also see here, Mr. Keskovski, that commander Kapoce [sic]

22 stopped any measures or any action, or any -- of measures of support when

23 he realised that an order from the army superiors had not been issued,

24 correct?

25 A. This is what is written here, whether this is it accurate or not,

1 I wouldn't be able to tell you. I was not present there.

2 Q. Now, I'd like you to please turn to tab 8 in your binder. And I

3 will be referring to P304.

4 If you can turn to the second page, please, the very first

5 paragraph. This is the report that was referred to earlier in your

6 examination-in-chief that was written by the commander Kopacev.

7 And perhaps for e-court purposes, I will be referring to the

8 second page, please. Thank you.

9 Now, if I can draw your attention, Mr. Keskovski, to the very

10 first paragraph on that page. It says: "After 2200 hours on the same

11 day," and that's referring to 11 August 2001 as we have just seen in the

12 previous report.

13 A. I apologise, but I don't see this on the screen. It says on the

14 12th of August at 430. This is what I'm looking at. Perhaps it's on the

15 previous page.

16 Q. I believe it's on page N001-4677 in the Macedonian version.

17 MS. ISSA: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

18 Q. You see it now?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Says that: "After 2200 hours on the same day, the above mentioned

21 persons from the Ministry of Interior led by Johan Tarculovski came from

22 the second time to Mitre Despodov regarding the action. Johan Tarculovski

23 told all of them that the action starts at 430 in the morning --"

24 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for reading slowly.

25 MS. ISSA: Certainly, I apologise.

1 Q. -- "regardless whether or not there would be army support."

2 Do you see that?

3 A. Yes, I see it.

4 Q. Then it says that Major Despodov told that he has no authority to

5 support the action.

6 Do you see that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But despite that, Major Despodov undertook all measures in order

9 to implement the action successfully in case it was approved by our side.

10 Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, I see it.

12 Q. Now, I'd like to go to tab 42, which is 65 ter 1D00936, please.

13 And I will perhaps be referring to specific pages. And I would ask if

14 Madam Registrar can pull up the Macedonian on the screen and the English.

15 The first page I will be referring to, Madam Registrar, is page 17

16 in the English and it is 1D00-7925. 17 in the hard copy, I should say.

17 Now, this is an interview carried out by investigators of the

18 Office of the Prosecutor of Sokol Mitrevski. And if we look at page 17,

19 Sokol -- if we look at the previous pages, actually, Sokol Mitrevski is

20 asked about this action in the village of Ljuboten. And if I can perhaps

21 just ask for context, if we can refer to page 15, which is 1D00-7923. And

22 Sokol Mitrevski says:

23 "At the beginning I would like to say" - this is about line 6 of

24 the transcript - "That I have no connection whatsoever with the events of

25 Ljuboten. And I was informed after the events by the commander of the

1 Guardist Brigade. I was informed by Colonel Kopacev who was commander of

2 the Guardist Brigade that had the position above the village of Ljuboten

3 at the time. I requested from the commander personally to submit a report

4 with all information that was ..." and it continues.

5 Then if you look at page 17, Sokol Mitrevski explains at the very

6 top of that page, at line 2: "There was a commanding system in an army.

7 You know, once an army where only one person makes decisions." And there

8 is an indiscernible word there. And then he goes on to say:

9 "Command is planning; the units are performing. And every

10 performance should be preceded by an order. So once again I would like to

11 resume that the army nor the army officials were involved in any way.

12 That was an action by the Ministry of Interior. And he continues.

13 Then he says: "Who said that nobody was supposed to know about

14 this action." This at about line 13 "apart from himself and some people

15 from the ministry. I don't want to justify or find justification for the

16 major because he violated the basic commanding chain; he was punished and

17 he was revoked from his position. Do you see that, Mr. Keskovski?

18 A. I see it, but only in the English version and I am able to hear

19 what you are saying.

20 Q. I appreciate that. Do you suppose, Mr. Keskovski, that

21 Major Despodov would have been disciplined for his actions for violating

22 the chain of command, if he had received a direct order from the

23 president?

24 A. I'm not competent to provide an answer to this question.

25 Q. Okay. Well, let's continue.

1 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Mettraux.

3 MR. METTRAUX: Before we continue and perhaps again I'm mindful of

4 Your Honour's instructions of the previous session, but the question was a

5 loaded one if I may say so because it assumed that Major Despodov had

6 indeed been disciplined or punished in any way. The evidence as we have

7 it on the transcript from the major is that he wasn't.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Mettraux.

9 The problem is referring only to an unexhibited interview. The

10 content which of is no weight, unless adopted by the witness, and he

11 cannot.

12 Carry on.

13 MS. ISSA: May I continue -- thank you.

14 Q. Now, Mr. Keskovski, Sokol Mitrevski continues and he says: "But

15 as a human being, not as a general, but as a commander of a brigade I

16 assume that he was impressed from the phone call with the president. He

17 thought he was a big shot, you know, speaking with the president. Maybe

18 it was a set-up conversation, I don't know." And he goes on.

19 Isn't General Mitrevski saying here that Major Despodov made

20 certain decisions on his own?

21 A. I cannot answer this question. I don't know.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Issa could the Chamber intervene to point out

23 that you are basing this upon a statement which is not in evidence. There

24 is no oral evidence of these matters, and the cross-examination is

25 therefore of no value to the Chamber at all unless the witness is able to

1 say of his own knowledge that these events are correct. And this

2 witness's position is that he cannot speak about these events of his own

3 knowledge.

4 MS. ISSA: All right, Your Honour. I will move on.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

6 MS. ISSA:

7 Q. Now, I'd like you, Mr. Keskovski, to please turn to tab 19.

8 MS. ISSA: And I will be referring to P379.04. If we can perhaps

9 bring that up in the e-court system.

10 Now, this was information obtained in 2003 by a commission that

11 was set up by the minister, Hari Kostov, to investigate the events in the

12 village of Ljuboten. This is a report that was dated 25 November 2003.

13 And if I can draw your attention to about the fourth paragraph at the --

14 on the first page of this report, Johan Tarculovski was interviewed by

15 members of the commission and it says:

16 "In this direction, Tarculovski was asked who gave him orders to

17 go to the village Ljuboten and who gave the orders to fire and which

18 persons were present with him in the village of Ljuboten."

19 "In his reply to these question, Tarculovski first explained that

20 at the previous meeting he was summoned as an employee of the ministry,

21 while now he is a civilian because he has resigned from the ministry. He

22 also said that he left for Ljuboten on his own will, and that he did not

23 get orders from anyone to go to the village of Ljuboten."

24 Do you see that.

25 A. Yes, I see it.

1 Q. Then he goes on, very bottom of the paragraph -- of the page.

2 Says: "With regard to the question about the manner about entrustment

3 much weapon, Tarculovski replied that he was called by the minister of

4 internal affairs at that time who told him to determine a reserve force of

5 people who will provide the security of vital state facilities." And it

6 continues.

7 Do you see that?

8 A. Yes. Yes, I see it.

9 Q. So even when Johan Tarculovski was asked about this by the

10 commission, he did not say that the president ordered him to go to

11 Ljuboten and undertake an action or provide the president with

12 information, did he?

13 A. Do you want me to answer this?

14 Q. Certainly.

15 A. Find me one place in this statement, in a previous statement, or

16 the statement before that, my statements, where I said that the president

17 ordered Mr. Johan Tarculovski to go to Ljuboten. In all my statements, I

18 indicated the village of Ljubanci and what has Mr. Tarculovski stated, I

19 can't comment on that. This is not my right.

20 Q. Okay. And in here it says that Mr. Tarculovski -- Mr. Tarculovski

21 says, at least to the commission, that he was in fact in Ljuboten, doesn't

22 it?

23 A. You are reading this. This is what Tarculovski has stated. This

24 is a statement that I see for the first time.

25 Q. Thank you. I will move on.

1 Now, you've testified, Mr. Keskovski, that Ljube Boskoski is an

2 honest man, right?

3 A. In my opinion, yes.

4 Q. That he wouldn't hide from the truth, would he?

5 A. I can't give you an answer for this -- to this question. In my

6 opinion, he is an honest person, and I don't believe that he would hide

7 from the truth.

8 Q. He wouldn't misrepresent deliberately what happened in 2001, would

9 he?

10 A. I can't give you answers to questions that you should ask of

11 Mr. Ljube Boskoski and not myself. Ask me, I might give you my opinion.

12 I can't tell what you Mr. Ljube Boskoski is thinking.

13 Q. Well, I'd like you to please go to tab 2 of the Prosecution

14 binder.

15 MS. ISSA: And I will be referring to P402, for the record.

16 Q. I will be referring, firstly, to page 32 in the English hard copy,

17 page 66 in your copy, Mr. Keskovski, and in e-court page 35 in the

18 Macedonian.

19 A. Page 35?

20 Q. No, I'm referring to page 66 in the Macedonian hard copy.

21 Now, first of all, this is a --

22 A. Yes, I see it.

23 Q. This is a book, Mr. Keskovski, that was written by Ljube Boskoski,

24 titled My Battle for Macedonia, regarding the events of 2001.

25 Are you familiar with it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Have you read the book?

3 A. I skimmed through it.

4 Q. Okay. Now, if I can draw to your attention to about the bottom of

5 the page in your copy, where it says, paragraph that begins: "However the

6 tension in Aracinovo was ever more disturbing."

7 Have you found that?

8 A. Yes, I see it, yes.

9 Q. Well, in this paragraph, Mr. Boskoski is talking about the events

10 in Aracinovo in 2001. And he says this:

11 "This village was entered by some 30 armed and uniformed people.

12 And the information from the village confirmed that newcomers had

13 immediately disposed in several locations."

14 And then he continues. And towards the end of the paragraph,

15 about five lines from the bottom he says:

16 "As a result the police in cooperation with the army of the

17 Republic of Macedonia strengthened its security and defence activities.

18 We reinforced the police presence at the entrances and exits of Aracinovo

19 as well as on the vital positions around the village. Our objective was

20 to make use of the operation and technical measures of the security forces

21 to prevent this militant group from leaving Aracinovo," and he continues.

22 Now first of all, isn't he saying in this passage that the police

23 forces were working in cooperation with the army?

24 A. Of course, they would cooperate. This is something normal.

25 Q. So the police forces were not subordinated to the army, right?

1 A. If you're speaking about this specific action, the police forces

2 were subordinated to the army.

3 Q. Isn't what Ljube Boskoski saying -- isn't what Ljube Boskoski

4 saying here is that they were working jointly with the army?

5 A. I believe that your question is not proper, because to cooperate

6 means the same. Cooperation is cooperation, so it means that they

7 undertook activities together, and they're not one and the same

8 institution, so that they could be considered as one. They are two

9 institutions but they cooperate and they undertake measures jointly.

10 Q. Now, if I can move on --

11 A. If you would like to -- like me it give you a specific answer,

12 Mr. Boskoski is writing precisely that this was done cooperation with the

13 army. I don't see anything here saying who is in command of whom.

14 Q. Let's continue, Mr. Keskovski, and I would ask to you please look

15 at page 67 in the Macedonian version in your hard copy. We're still at

16 page 35 in e-court. And now it's page 33 in the English hard copy.

17 And if I can just draw your attention to the paragraph that begins

18 with: "Everything was ready to undertake the Macedonian security forces."

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He says: "Everything was ready to undertake the Macedonian

22 security forces decisive actions against the terrorists in Aracinovo. The

23 only thing we were waiting for was the order from the state highest

24 officials and the crisis management coordination body. I did not agree

25 with the indecisive views of this body which were pushing Macedonia into

1 negotiations with the terrorists, something that the great Albanian

2 national chauvinist centres truly wanted. I made up my mind. I resigned

3 my membership,".

4 And he continues.

5 Do you see that?

6 A. Yes, I see it.

7 Q. Then if you go to page -- I think it's the same page in your

8 version, but in the e-court version it should be page 36 and in English

9 it's at the very bottom. And Mr. Boskoski is here talking about

10 continuing to talk about the action in Aracinovo. And he say: "The

11 action of the Macedonian security forces in Aracinovo confirmed that

12 Macedonia was able to cope alone with enemies of whatever sort."

13 And he continues.

14 Did you find that paragraph? It should be on your screen. It's

15 under the subheading: The people's response.

16 A. I don't see that paragraph. I have here a paragraph starting with

17 everything was ready to start, a decision was awaited, what you had read

18 previously.

19 Q. I would ask you, then, to please look at the paragraph below that,

20 immediately after that lengthy paragraph that we just looked at.

21 A. Yes, that is in your paragraph, yes. Very well. A new topic.

22 Q. Yes. And he continue -- Minister Boskoski continues and says: "I

23 saw this myself when I gave the flag to the crew and I told them to plant

24 it in the centre of Aracinovo."

25 So he's talking about being there.

1 Now, nowhere in these passages, Mr. Keskovski, does it say

2 anything about the president, does it?

3 A. What you have read, yes, but I'm not the author of the book.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You need to talk to the author of the book, regarding his views

6 and positions, or at least I think so. I'm not a critic so that I can

7 answer about what Mr. Boskoski has written.

8 Q. Okay. Well, if I can ask you to please turn to -- it would be

9 page 35 in the English; Macedonian page 38 to 39 in the e-court..

10 MS. ISSA: If I can ask Madam Registrar to pull that up, please.

11 Q. And it starts at the very bottom of your screen, Mr. Keskovski, of

12 page 38. And he says at the very last paragraph: "I assure you there

13 will be no peace with terrorists. We will continue our action and

14 President Trajkovski will negotiate as a president of a state which wants

15 to become a member of the EU."

16 Do you see that?

17 A. Yes, I see it on the screen.

18 Q. So Ljube Boskoski didn't agree very much with the president, did

19 he?

20 A. I can't answer this question. I am not Ljube Boskoski, I'm not

21 the president.

22 I will tell you again, this is a book written by Mr. Boskoski, so

23 I can't comment on that.

24 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Keskovski, did you know Minister Boskoski, or

25 Ljube Boskoski, to be a man who was a peace maker?

1 A. How could I answer this question? I can't answer this question.

2 Q. Well --

3 A. The question is not clear to me.

4 Q. Was he a forgiving person.

5 A. It is Christian to forgive.

6 Q. Well, I don't think you answered my question, Mr. Keskovski. Was

7 Ljube Boskoski a forgiving person?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I'd like to turn to 65 ter 1117.6, please, which is a short

10 video-clip.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

12 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour perhaps we move on and before Your

13 Honour decide they wish or don't wish to watch this video I will simply

14 indicate what this is. This is again another political speech of

15 Mr. Boskoski. I think one of the month of July 2002. In the course of

16 Sunday of the past weekend, our colleagues from the Prosecution sent us a

17 list of material which indicated they intended to use with Mr. Keskovski.

18 We sent an e-mail to the Prosecution in relation to this particular video

19 as well as another video and a third document asking them to specify the

20 purported relevance of that material to this case and in particular to the

21 evidence of Mr. Keskovski.

22 The Prosecution refused to do so, indicating to us that they had

23 no obligation to do so. In a previous e-mail relating to a previous

24 witness they had indicated that this would reveal their strategy, Your

25 Honour.

1 We believe that this particular video has nothing to do with these

2 proceedings, and it has even less to do, Your Honour, in our submission

3 with the evidence of this particular witness. What the Prosecution is

4 attempt to do is to show you a video of Mr. Boskoski making political

5 statement that have nothing to do with these proceedings.

6 We believe that the Prosecution should be asked to state the

7 alleged relevance of that material to the extent that they can satisfy the

8 Chamber of the prima facie relevance of this matter it could be shown, and

9 Your Honour obviously could decide later what to do with it.

10 The last time such a video was shown, Your Honour had expressed

11 some reservations about the relevance of this material, particularly in

12 relation to the time-frame. The reasons for Your Honours acceptance of

13 the material was of subsequent indication by the Prosecution to the effect

14 that the prime minister, I believe and another state official, I cannot

15 remember at this stage, had been present at the time during this

16 particular political meeting, having seen the video there seems to be no

17 such presence at this particular meeting; and we would wish to hear from

18 the Prosecution what the alleged relevance of that material is.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

20 Mr. Saxon.

21 The witness is being taken by Ms. Issa it is to her that I

22 should--

23 MS. ISSA: All right. Your Honour with this particular witness,

24 clearly, the Defence has put Mr. Boskoski's character into issue. They

25 asked him questions about Mr. Boskoski's character in their

1 examination-in-chief, and in light of that we are entitled to raise or to

2 provide evidence that relate to character.

3 JUDGE PARKER: The video that you're to put to the witness? What

4 is its nature and character?

5 MS. ISSA: Your Honour, it's a speech given by Minister Boskoski

6 regarding -- in Tetovo on the 29th of July, 2002, and in it he refers to

7 the crisis in 2001. He talks about the Macedonians have the strength to

8 handle any type of crisis. There's no forgiving. Those who killed

9 Macedonia's sons and he continues.

10 So it's a speech that reflects his perception and his views about

11 the crisis in 2001 and reflects and has an impact on his character.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber is not minded to hear this video or to

15 have questions put in respect of it, Ms. Issa. Thank you.

16 MS. ISSA:

17 Q. Mr. Keskovski, are you aware of Minister Boskoski's reaction to

18 the incident in Karpalak?

19 A. Let me just correct you. My name is Keskovski.

20 Q. Okay. Thank you for correcting my pronunciation of your name.

21 I'll ask the question again.

22 Are you aware of then-Minister Boskoski's reaction to the incident

23 in Karpalak in 2001?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Well, I'd like to turn to tab 2, P402, within the same ERN range

1 that we were dealing with earlier, page 46, and the Macedonian is page 51.

2 Page 46 in English.

3 If you can just find the paragraph that starts with: "However, 8

4 August, 2001."

5 A. I look at page 51, as you said for the Macedonian version, and I

6 don't see any such paragraph.

7 Q. Well, at the very bottom, it should be at the very bottom of the

8 screen. And Madam Registrar right now moving the page down. So if you

9 look at your screen you will see it. And in the English version it at the

10 very bottom of page 46 in the hard copy.

11 And it says: "However 8 August 2001 was the day when we faced the

12 great Albanian impudent obscured and insulting hypocritical arsenal or

13 anti-Macedonian dishonour."

14 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.

15 MS. ISSA:

16 Q. And then he continues: "It was the day that I was devastated by

17 the death of ten soldiers from Prilep. I immediately ordered additional

18 restrict the movement in Aracinovo which was extended for one hour from

19 2100 hours to 0500 hours. We expected that the committers of the

20 unforgivable crime at the place called Karpalak, having blood-stained

21 their arms to the shoulders will shelter in this village where they were

22 going to plan their further bloody actions. The same addition for

23 restrict movement applied to Tetovo."

24 Do you see that?

25 A. Yes, I see it.

1 Q. Mr. Keskovski, are you aware of Minister Boskoski's views

2 regarding the international community's efforts, and the efforts of the

3 Macedonian government to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis?

4 A. I can't answer this question. I'm not competent to answer it.

5 Q. Are you saying you're not aware?

6 A. I don't know. I can't answer it. This what is what it means.

7 You're asking me about Mr. Boskoski, what was the reaction of

8 Mr. Boskoski. During the period of time you're talking about, I was head

9 of the security for the president of the Republic of Macedonia.

10 Q. Well, Mr. Keskovski you also told us that you know Minister

11 Boskoski personally and that he was your best man at your wedding and you

12 were close to him, right?

13 A. Mr. Boskoski was the best man at my wedding, a witness at my

14 wedding, on the 18th of May, 2002.

15 Q. Are you suggesting you didn't know him before the 18th of May,

16 2002?

17 A. I knew him. He was the minister of the interior. And his

18 political positions do not correspond to his presence as the witness, as

19 the best man at my wedding. I don't need to know what was the political

20 position of Mr. Boskoski and how was his attitude towards the

21 international community. I believe your question is irrelevant. I am not

22 able to know what was the thinking of Mr. Ljube Boskoski on the 8th of

23 August, 2001. On the 8th of August, 2001 --

24 Q. Mr. Keskovski --

25 A. -- I was head of security for the president, and it was near the

1 completion of the Framework Agreement in Ohrid.

2 Q. Well, Mr. Keskovski, I would ask you to please turn to page 41 to

3 42 in the Macedonian version perhaps it might be simpler if we can just

4 pull that page up on the screen. And it's page 38 in the English hard

5 copy. And it is under the subheading titled: "Provocations continue."

6 There's a paragraph that begins with: "After the reconciling

7 tones and moves of the highest officials of the Macedonian state ..."

8 Do you see it?

9 A. Yes, I see it.

10 Q. It says: "After the reconciling tones and moves by the highest

11 officials of the Macedonian state for resolving the crisis, the situation

12 did not only fail to calm down but the Albanian terrorists and extremists

13 continued the provocations."

14 And then he continues.

15 Then if you look at the last paragraph that begins with: "Strange

16 things were taking place."

17 It would be at page 42 in the Macedonian version.

18 He says this: "While the activities of Albanian terrorists was

19 escalating, the international community representative were demanding that

20 the Macedonian security forces restrain from armed actions. These

21 ingenious proposals came from the EU and the USA political representatives

22 in the state, Leotard and Pardew when they paid me a visit in my Ministry

23 of Interior cabinet. They openly requested that the Macedonian security

24 forces refrain from opposing the provocations by the Albanian terrorists.

25 The terminology by the two already changed into insurgence. They

1 explained their attitude by claiming that negotiations must continue in

2 order to find a final solution.

3 And he then says: "I responded fiercely pointing to the fact that

4 we had not been sending to the field sacrificial goats into the jaws of

5 the beasts but rather defenders of the territorial integrity and state

6 sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia," and he continues.

7 And finally if I can just ask you to turn to page 46 of the

8 Macedonian version. If we can just pull that up on the screen, page 41 in

9 the English. And I will be referring to the paragraph that begins with:

10 "I also pointed out that one side truce which was signed with NATO

11 would be observed."

12 Do you see that on your screen, Mr. Keskovski? Yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In the middle of the paragraph he says: "I was pleasantly

15 surprised by the interest of the reporters in the meeting that I had with

16 the special envoys Leotard and Pardew what did you talk about, one

17 reporter asked. They tried to soften my strict attitudes regarding the

18 Macedonian national interests. I felt that the journalists were pleased

19 with me statement."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. Yes, I see it.

22 Q. Now, Mr. Keskovski, I'm going to put a few propositions to you,

23 and I would ask you to simply answer yes or no, okay?

24 A. If I can answer this by yes or no, then the answer is yes.

25 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Keskovski, that there was no order to attack

1 the village of Ljuboten of president because, had there been one,

2 Major Despodov would not have kept asking about the order until the 12th

3 of August. Do you agree with that?

4 A. These are your words. You drew them from this. I can't answer

5 this question. How could I answer it?

6 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Keskovski --

7 A. Just a moment. Was there any order by the president to attack

8 Ljuboten to Major Despodov? Yes.

9 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Keskovski, that the president's primary

10 certain was to facilitate the Ohrid Agreement in the face of a very

11 difficult crisis in 2001 and that he would have done nothing to jeopardise

12 that agreement in the days leading up to the signing of the agreement. Do

13 you agree with that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Keskovski, that Johan Tarculovski was

16 involved in the action in Ljuboten that day. Do you agree with that?

17 A. I can't answer these questions by yes or no. This is your

18 assertion. You are saying that you are asserting this and I can't confirm

19 what you are thinking.

20 Q. Okay. I put it to you --

21 A. Because the questions are very general.

22 Q. I put it to you Mr. Keskovski that you have demonstrated bias in

23 favour of Ljube Boskoski who is friend of yours and who was your best man

24 at your wedding and that in your evidence you're merely attempting to give

25 evidence in his favour and that's why you have changed your statement on

1 material points. Do you agree with that?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MS. ISSA: I have no further questions.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Issa.

6 We will have the break now and resume. It will be tight,

7 Mr. Mettraux, but we would hope --

8 MR. METTRAUX: Should be able to do it --

9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.

10 We resume at ten minutes past.

11 --- Recess taken at 12.38 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 1.12 p.m.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

14 Re-examination by Mr. Mettraux:

15 MR. METTRAUX: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Keskovski.

17 A. Good afternoon.

18 Q. Do you recall being asked questions by my colleague of the

19 Prosecution about the statement that you have given to the Office of the

20 Prosecutor, and you have been asked to comment about a number of

21 paragraphs in that statement. Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I recall.

23 Q. And do you recall being asked by my colleague whether when doing

24 so, you attempted to be as accurate and truthful as you could, and you

25 answered that you did. Do you recall that?

1 A. Yes, I recall.

2 Q. Now tell me this, if you can recall. How long approximately did

3 the interview with the OTP investigator last?

4 A. The interview lasted from 9.30 in the morning to 1930 in the

5 evening.

6 Q. So that would be about ten hours. Correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And during the course of the interview, was a transcript a

9 verbatim transcript taken of what you and the investigator were saying to

10 each other, or was it the investigator that was writing things down as you

11 went?

12 A. The investigator was taking notes while I was speak.

13 Q. And is it the case that at the end of those ten hours he provided

14 you with what effectively is a summary of the discussion you had with

15 them. Is this correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And would it be fair to say that the statement that was presented

18 to you was only a portion or a summary of the entire conversation you had

19 with him? Would it be fair?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And tell me this as well. Who was asking the questions during the

22 interview? Was it yourself or the investigator?

23 A. I was answering the questions of the investigator.

24 Q. And did he ever give you a list of written questions or was he

25 asking them orally to you, as you went?

1 A. He asked me one by one.

2 Q. And you did not receive the written list of his questions. Is

3 that correct?

4 A. This is correct.

5 Q. And who was writing down what was said between you and the

6 investigator? Was it you or was it the investigator?

7 A. The investigator was doing this.

8 Q. And who decided what should be included in the statement and why

9 shouldn't? Was it you or the investigator?

10 A. The investigator.

11 Q. And at the end of the interview, this ten-hour interview you had

12 with the investigator, did he gave you a copy of your statement that you

13 were able to take home with you?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And did they ever come back to you and ask you whether you would

16 be able to give further information or further clarification or additional

17 information about the information you had already given, and when I

18 say "they," I mean the Office of the Prosecutor. Did they ever come back

19 to you to ask for additional information?

20 A. After giving the statement, I was informed that if there was need,

21 I would be contacted again. I agreement to this. In February 2007, the

22 OTP called and they said they wanted to speak with me at the end of

23 February. However, they made no further calls or did not contact me

24 further in March or in April 2007 I received the summons to testify on

25 behalf of the Defence which was signed by Ms. Carla Del Ponte. These are

1 all the contacts which I have had.

2 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65

3 ter 1D1249. And I would kindly ask the usher, if you could give

4 Mr. Keskovski his Defence binder once again.

5 Q. Mr. Keskovski that would be under tab 1 of your binder, and this

6 is the statement that you have given to the OTP. And I would ask the

7 registry to turn to page 8 of the statement that would be 1D00-9966 and

8 ask you to focus on paragraph 34, please. Mr. Keskovski, I will ask you

9 to locate if you can, paragraph 34 of your statement. Do you have that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And do you recall being asked a number of questions by my

12 colleague of the Prosecutor in relation to that paragraph?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I'd like to read it back to you if I may, the first sentence say

15 this is: "In the afternoon, 10th of August, 2001, the president approved

16 the request and asked me to call Johan Tarculovski.

17 Let me ask you this: Was that statement true and accurate?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And you stand by it to this day?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now let's look at the next sentence it says this: "As I called

22 Johan Tarculovski, the president wanted to speak to him, so that I gave

23 him mobile phone.

24 Again, was that statement true and accurate?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And do you stand by it to this day?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Let's look at the next sentence. It says this: "I was present

4 during the conversation and I heard the president asking Johan Tarculovski

5 to call the next day and inform the president about the situation in the

6 village." Was that statement true and accurate?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And do you stand by it to this day?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And when you told the investigator of the Office of the Prosecutor

11 that you were present during the conversation when you heard the president

12 asking Johan Tarculovski to call the next day, which conversation were you

13 referring to?

14 A. I was referring to the conversation between the president and

15 Tarculovski, about his going to Ljubanci and report being what was going

16 on, on the ground.

17 Q. And was that the conversation that took place on the phone or was

18 that the conversation that took place in the office of the president?

19 A. In the office of the president. Twice the conversation took

20 place, once over the phone and once in the office.

21 Q. And was that the meaning that you intended to communicate to the

22 investigator of Prosecution?

23 MS. ISSA: Your Honour.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on Mr. Mettraux.

25 MR. METTRAUX:

1 Q. Was that the meaning that you intended to communicate to the

2 investigator of the Prosecution?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And just looking at this paragraph, the paragraph in question,

5 does it seem from that paragraph that the investigator had any wish or

6 need to determine where that particular conversation took place? Does it

7 seem that -- from the statement, that he asked you to specify that?

8 MS. ISSA: Well --

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the course of the interview, I

10 was asked very general questions. For example what do you know by the

11 10th of August, what do you know about the 11th, 12th of August without

12 any specification or request for specification for any concrete

13 situation. I was not asked about any specific events of this nature which

14 you and the Prosecutor were asking me about.

15 MR. METTRAUX:

16 Q. And would it be correct that when there was a need for

17 specification the Prosecutor would ask you a subsequent question, is that

18 the way it worked?

19 A. I think he should have asked me concretely about some things which

20 should have been of interest to him. Which might have been of interest to

21 him.

22 JUDGE PARKER: Now Mr. Mettraux I must interrupt. Ms. Issa has a

23 concern.

24 MS. ISSA: Yes, Your Honour I believe in my submission I believe

25 that during the critical questions regarding the reliability of the

1 statement Mr. Mettraux should not be permitted to lead to ask leading

2 questions of this nature.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. They have tended to be leading and

4 their probative weight is affected by that. Ms. Issa, you will realise

5 that I have not allowed you to interrupt at a critical point just as I had

6 not allowed Mr. Mettraux to interrupt your cross-examination at those

7 points.

8 MS. ISSA: Yes, I understand.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux please carry on.

10 MR. METTRAUX:

11 Q. Mr. Keskovski, can I ask you now to look at paragraph 32 of your

12 statement, it's just above. Can you see that?

13 A. Yes, I see it.

14 Q. And do you recall being asked a number of questions about this

15 paragraph by my colleague of the Prosecutor?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And I would like to read out to you this paragraph or at least the

18 relevant part of it, it says this: "On 10th August 2001 we came back from

19 Ohrid sometimes in the morning and the chief of General Staff of the ARM

20 General Metodija Stamboliski called me by phone and informed me about

21 Ljubotenski Bacila mine incident.

22 Was that statement true and accurate, to the best of your

23 knowledge?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And do you stand by it to this day?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The next sentence reads as follows: "Later on I have passed the

3 information to the president."

4 Same question: Was that statement true and accurate to the best of

5 your knowledge, at that time?

6 A. Yes, this is correct.

7 Q. And then it goes on to say: "I understood that in mine incident

8 some soldiers of the army got killed and they were from Ljubanci village."

9 Was that statement true and accurate, to the best of your

10 knowledge?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And do you stand by it to this day?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, were you asked by the investigator of the Prosecution whether

15 the president had given an order to General Stamboliski, as far as can you

16 recall?

17 A. I was not asked this question.

18 Q. And just looking at that paragraph, in particular the section that

19 I have read out to you, does it appear that the investigator had any

20 interest in obtaining any detail from you about what was said between the

21 president, Mr. Stambolski, and yourself, other than the information

22 contained therein?

23 A. As I said, I wasn't asked additional questions.

24 Q. And, again, the point has been made, I think, but it was the

25 investigator that decided what questions should be asked. Is that

1 correct?

2 A. Of course.

3 Q. And you will recall that my colleague and myself, in

4 examination-in-chief, had asked you about an order that the president in

5 fact gave to Mr. Stamboliski regarding the elimination of NLA. Do you

6 recall those questions?

7 A. Yes, I recall.

8 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown what is Exhibit

9 1D249, please.

10 Q. Mr. Keskovski, this would be under tab 10 of your binder.

11 And, Mr. Keskovski, this is going to be a document that I have

12 already shown to you in examination-in-chief. It's a press report, we

13 understand, based on the press release taken by the Security Council in

14 relation to the events at Ljubotenski Bacila. I will ask to you look at

15 the last paragraph in that document and it reads as follows:

16 "At last night's meeting the council concluding that the firm

17 action should resume to eliminate any threat to the security forces and to

18 the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia."

19 Is this statement, Mr. Keskovski, made by the Security Council of

20 the Republic of Macedonia consistent with the order that you heard the

21 president give to Mr. -- or General Stamboliski?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And as far as you know, do you know who is the president of the

24 Security Council of the Republic of Macedonia?

25 A. The president of the Republic of Macedonia.

1 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour this is Article 86, 1 of the

2 constitutional of the republic; it is exhibit P91.

3 Q. Mr. Keskovski, do you recall being asked a number of questions by

4 my colleague about the forthcoming signing of the Ohrid Framework

5 Agreement. Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And do you recall my colleague suggesting to you that the

8 president was concerned, and I think you agreed, that the agreement should

9 in fact be signed on Monday, the 13th. Do you recall that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And do you remember also the Prosecution putting to you or

12 suggesting to you that the -- the president would be concerned on the 10th

13 of August that further retaliatory action, I think that was the expression

14 used, might jeopardise the signing of the agreement. Do you recall that?

15 A. Yes, I recall.

16 Q. Would the president also have been concerned that there should be

17 no further NLA attack prior to the signing of the agreement on Monday?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And would that concern be based on his wish, which, I think you

20 have indicated, that the signing should take place on Monday, the 13th?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you know who Mr. Vlado Buckovski is?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And perhaps could you indicate what the position of Mr. Buckovski

25 was in the month of August of 2001?

1 A. Mr. Buckovski was the minister of defence in the government of the

2 Republic of Macedonia.

3 MR. METTRAUX: Could the witness please be shown what is Rule 65

4 ter 1D856.

5 Q. And, Mr. Keskovski, I think it would be under tab 12 bis of your

6 statement.

7 You will see, Mr. Keskovski, this is an OTP statement taken from

8 Minister -- in August 2001, ministry of defence, later Prime Minister

9 Buckovski, and it's dated 11 June 2004?

10 MR. METTRAUX: And I will ask the registry to turn to page

11 1D00-7491.

12 Q. And I will ask you, Mr. Keskovski, to locate what is paragraph 21

13 of that statement.

14 A. Yes, I see it? And I would just like to read two sentences from

15 that statement. It says this: --

16 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Issa.

17 MS. ISSA: Yes, Your Honour. I don't see how this arises from my

18 cross-examination, referring to the statement and also I point out that

19 this is a statement that is not in evidence.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mettraux.

21 MR. METTRAUX: There was extensive lengthy hourly

22 cross-examination in relation to the reaction both of the president and of

23 Mr. Boskoski in relation to the Karpalak incident, and the impact, if any,

24 that this might have on the chain of events and in particular the issue of

25 whether the Ohrid Agreement should go ahead. We believe we should be

1 permitted to put that matter to the witness.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Well, that you can put, but what is the use of the

3 statement?

4 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, we would like to test the content of

5 the statement with the witness and whether he is able to give any

6 indication as to the consistency of the material contained in the

7 statement and whether he can comment upon it.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Why does it arise in re-examination and why was it

9 not used in examination-in-chief, if you see some force or relevance in

10 it.

11 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour the understanding of the Defence was

12 that this matter was not an issue with which the Prosecution would

13 disagree. That's the first time that they've taken issue as far as we can

14 say with this. There had been prior occasion when we examined on this

15 matter with other witnesses where no issue was taken with the witnesses

16 about the chain of events and what might have led to what. This was the

17 first time we, we understand, that this was challenged by the Prosecutor.

18 JUDGE PARKER: I don't think challenge is the right word. But in

19 any event, now Mr. Apostolski has a point.

20 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there was no

21 translation in the Macedonian language coming to the accused, but a minute

22 later this was resolved. This is why I stood up a minute ago.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. I thought you were raising on the ...

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE PARKER: I think you better move on, Mr. Mettraux.

1 MR. METTRAUX: Very well, Your Honour.

2 Q. Mr. Keskovski do you recall being asked by my colleague about a

3 number of occasions when you had been sent by the president to the terrain

4 to provide information to him and I think you mentioned Tetovo, the

5 Lipkovo region, and Kumanovo, and Aracinovo. Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, I recall.

7 Q. And in relation to any of these particular occasion, were you the

8 witness of the president giving orders or instructions to any of the

9 troops that were involved in these operations?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And would that include orders to the army?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And would that also include, on occasions, orders to the police?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you recall, Mr. Keskovski, on a different topic, that my

16 colleague asked you about the process of selection of your deputies within

17 the sector of security, and I think she used the expression whether you

18 had the last word in this matter.

19 Do you recall that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And I think you explained and please correct me if I misstated

22 your evidence that you took the final decision but that you would do so

23 after consultation with the president. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes. With the suggestion of the president.

25 Q. Let me ask you this then. Did you ever appoint or choose anyone

1 to be taken in your sector of which the president disapproved of?

2 A. There is no such person of the security team.

3 Q. And were there occasions where the president asked to you remove

4 from your sector individuals that he disapproved of?

5 A. Yes, on several occasions.

6 Q. And just, again, moving on to a different topic, in August of

7 2001, do you know what telephone number Mr. Stefanovski used at the time?

8 Are you aware of that?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Do you recall also being asked quite a number of questions by my

11 colleague about the orders that the president gave to Mitre Despodov, and

12 at the end of your cross-examination she put it to that you there had been

13 no such order. Do you recall that?

14 A. Yes, I recall.

15 MR. METTRAUX: Can the witness please be shown what is Rule 65 ter

16 1D332, please.

17 Q. Mr. Keskovski, I'll have to ask to you look at the version on your

18 screen. It is not in the binder. It's a statement that is taken by a

19 person whose name both my colleague and myself have mentioned to you.

20 It's Mr. Blazo Kopacev and this is record of the statement that he gave to

21 the Office of the Prosecutor.

22 And I will ask the registry to please turn to page 8 of the

23 statement and that's 1D00-3061, please. And I will ask the registry,

24 please, to scroll down to paragraph 38. Thank you.

25 Q. Mr. Keskovski, if I can ask you to focus on the last paragraph on

1 that page and I will read it out to you so that you get a good

2 translation.

3 It says this: "Regarding the meeting between Despodov and

4 Tarculovski on Friday, 10 August, Tarculovski asked Despodov to support

5 his group. Despodov was reluctant. He did not want to get engaged

6 without an order. I do not know who else from the army was present at

7 this meeting.

8 And then there's the passage I'm interested in, Mr. Keskovski. It

9 says this: "I emphasise that the only source of my knowledge about the

10 president's alleged orders to Major Despodov for action, which he

11 allegedly received by phone from the president directly, is Major Despodov

12 himself."

13 Would you agree, and again, Mr. Keskovski, accepting for the sake

14 of the argument that this is a correct -- that the information contained

15 in it is correct, that according do the statement of Mr. Kopacev,

16 Major Despodov in fact confirmed to him personally that he had received a

17 direct order for action from the president on the phone.

18 Do you agree with that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And would that be consistent with the evidence that you gave

21 before this Chamber?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR. METTRAUX: Your Honour, I have no further questions.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Mettraux.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Keskovski, you will be believed to know that

2 concludes the questions that will be asked of you. The Chamber would

3 thank you for your attendance in The Hague and the assistance you have

4 been able to give. And you are now able to return to your normal

5 activities. And the court officer will show you out.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you allow me, since

7 in these past several days the President Trajkovski was frequently

8 mentioned, and yesterday was the fourth year anniversary of his death, I

9 wish to express my condolences to his family.

10 Thank you.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

12 [The witness withdrew]

13 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Issa, there was some matter.

14 MS. ISSA: Yes, Your Honour.

15 I indicated to my colleague that I would be seeking to tender two

16 documents that I neglected to tender during the course of evidence and I

17 agreed to wait so that Mr. Mettraux could complete his re-examination of

18 the witness.

19 I wonder if I might, I know we're getting very close to the time,

20 if I might just address, Your Honours on that matter now.

21 JUDGE PARKER: These are each opposes are they.

22 MS. ISSA: Sorry?

23 JUDGE PARKER: Are these --

24 MS. ISSA: Yes, they are opposed.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Okay. The first of them.

1 MS. ISSA: The first one is the personnel record that was

2 identified by the witness as belonging to him which was 65 ter 1139 and

3 that I -- which I referred to several documents within that record during

4 the course of my cross-examination, and I would be seeking to tender that.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Why do we need the full record?

6 MS. ISSA: I believe that I referred to most of the documents in

7 that record, Your Honour. In some instances, Your Honour may have noted

8 that some of the documents are repetitive. There's more than one document

9 relating to the same matter but in order to provide perhaps the context of

10 the record and the chronology of events a full record might be of

11 assistance to the Chamber.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE PARKER: We will not receive the full record, Ms. Issa.

14 The second one.

15 MS. ISSA: The second document, Your Honour, is Rule 65 ter 314.1.

16 And that is the Article on the Ohrid framework agreement which I put to

17 the witness regarding the events that took place, in particular in the

18 last month leading up to the initialling of the Ohrid Agreement and then

19 its subsequent signing. The witness had indicated that he was familiar

20 with some of the events that I put to him, and I would submit that on that

21 basis, that it should be received, and I'm seeking to tender it on that

22 basis.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE PARKER: The claim doesn't see a sufficient relevance in

25 this document either, Ms. Issa. So we will not receive it.

1 MS. ISSA: Thank you.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Now, the hope which we expressed tentatively the

3 other day is that it will be possible to conclude the next two witnesses

4 in the course of the shortened session tomorrow morning. Each of them,

5 their evidence in chief would appear to be the subject of a written

6 statement that is received in evidence, so our hope is that the

7 cross-examination and any re-examination in each case can be concluded in

8 an hour. That is, an hour for each witness.

9 Is that, Mr. Saxon, too high an ambition?

10 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, it might be too high of an ambition, but

11 the Prosecution will endeavour to frame its cross-examinations as close to

12 one hour as it possibly can.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Well, we have effectively just a minute or two over

14 an hour for each witness, because given one break, we must conclude by

15 11.45.

16 MR. SAXON: Would it be acceptable to the Chamber if, for one

17 witness the Prosecution takes a bit more than an hour and then for the

18 second witness, of course, the Prosecution might take a bit less as long

19 as we finish tomorrow.

20 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber will give you full flexibility within

21 the scope of finishing by 11.45, allowing for the prospect of

22 re-examination.

23 MR. SAXON: Thank you.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We therefore adjourn until 9.00

25 tomorrow morning.

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of

3 February, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.

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