1 Tuesday, 11 March 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 And could you remind you sir that the affirmation that you made
8 is still applicable. I understand that you may have a correction you
9 wish to make to something you said yesterday.
10 WITNESS: BLAGOJA MARKOVSKI [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you.
13 [Interpretation] Your Honours, I did review -- or I have in mind
14 my statement that I need to speak the truth and nothing but the truth,
15 and this intervention I'm making precisely with regards to that.
16 Yesterday, in the answer to one of the questions asked by the
17 Defence of Mr. Apostolski, when speaking about the dismissal of Mr. Gzim
18 Ostreni discharged from the Kosovo Protection Corps and the post of head
19 of the General Staff, I was interrupted by the learned Prosecutor, and he
20 openly doubted that I was speaking the truth. I made efforts yesterday
21 and during the night to analyse my statement and to find a verification
22 for that.
23 And for my sake and for the sake of truth, I wish to indicate to
24 the Honourable Court that corroboration for that statement can be found
25 in the statement 65 ter 2D712. It is in the footnote when clarifying my
1 paragraphs from the report, numbers 265 and 266.
2 I wish to indicate that what we have here is a document, a
3 research, prepared for presentation at the annual convention of the
4 America Association of Political Scientists in 2001 in San Francisco,
5 California. The title is: Calm before the storm, the impact of the
6 cross-border networks, corruption, and smuggling on to the stability of
7 Macedonia and the security in the region, prepared by professor,
8 Dr. Robert Hislow, Ph.D. in political science within the Union College in
9 New York.
10 On page 34 and 35 in that paragraph in the second sentence, and I
11 quote it says: "In April, Gzim Ostreni, veteran of the NLA -- or KLA
12 from Debar, Macedonia, was suspended from his office in the Kosovo
13 Protection Corps because of the cooperation with the NLA."
14 I made efforts, Your Honours, to arrive at a more precise answer
15 with regard to this position of the esteemed Professor Hislow; and in my
16 electronic archives which I have brought here to The Hague, I found yet
17 another corroboration for this position and this statement that I have
18 made, in the information coming from the state, Macedonia Information
19 Agency, dated the 13th of April, 2001. The title is: The head of the
20 Kosovo Protection Corps dismissed, discharged.
21 It is three sentences only and I will read it: Pristina, 13th of
22 April, MIA, the commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps, Agim Ceku,
23 today discharged the chief of this formation, Gzim Ostreni, because of
24 the suspicions that he participated in the attacks of the Albanian
25 terrorists in Macedonia as related by MIA.
1 "The spokespersons of the corps, Muharem Mahmutaj, announced that
2 Ostreni will be demobilised if the suspicions of his involvement in the
3 events in Macedonia are proven. Mahmutaj stressed that the primary
4 objective of the corps is protection of its own institutions and not
5 certain members of it."
6 Author of this information is the MIA journalist, with the
7 initials are "TT." The information was made available to the public by
8 the person with the initials "SB" at 1704 on the 13th of April, 2001.
9 So, in conclusion, I believe that what I stated with regards to
10 the discharge of Mr. Gzim Ostreni from the post -- from his office in the
11 Kosovo Protection Corps is correct, with a slight correction.
12 I believe that I stated 14th of April, while it was actually the
13 13th of April, and this is why the esteemed Prosecutor, in my opinion,
14 had no right nor duty to interrupt me when I was presenting my position.
15 Thank you, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Could I point out to that
17 the Prosecutor's conduct is under our control, and there would, in our
18 view, be nothing critical that could be said about his appropriate
19 concern expressed yesterday. But we are grateful for your additional
20 references, which I'm sure will be taken into account by counsel as they
21 question you.
22 Now, Mr. Apostolski.
23 Ms. Residovic. We've moved.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
25 Cross-examination by Ms. Residovic: [Continued]
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Markovski. I would kindly, as
2 you, Dr. Markovski, to you look again at this exhibit, 1D81. It is after
3 tab 3.
4 That is page 1D3042, Macedonian, and it was 1D3048 in the English
6 Do you remember, Dr. Markovski, that yesterday, near the end of
7 the day, we discussed the issuance of President Trajkovski's decision to
8 establish a defence of the city and some elements of the command issued
9 by the commander of the city defence, General Sokol Mitrevski?
10 A. Yes, I remember.
11 Q. And the last thing we discussed was the neighbouring zones of
12 responsibility to the one of General Sokol Mitrevski, actually, to the
13 one of command of the city defence. Do you remember that that was the
14 last thing we discussed?
15 A. Yes, it is so.
16 Q. Tell me, considering your answers with regards to what neighbours
17 denotes, was it proper to say that neighbours to the units that were
18 under the command of Commander Sokol Mitrevski were the units in the
19 neighbouring cities, Tetovo and Kumanovo?
20 A. You could say so, unless the task relates to them.
21 Q. And it could also be said that all the other units participating
22 in the defence of the city, as you said, it was not only the army and the
23 police but also civilian defence. They all had the duties to follow the
24 commands of the commander of the city defence. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, it is absolutely correct.
1 Q. Yes, we have this page. And if in item 3, the notion of
2 neighbours has under number 1, command post of the forces, described in
3 item 1, is in the barracks KJP2 in Tetovo, it is means that they are
4 neighbours to the command of the city defence. Is that correct?
5 A. Yes. This is why I told you if the units you have mentioned which
6 are under the command of General Mitrevski are not involved in this
7 action, then they are neighbours. But at the same time, considering the
8 zone of responsibility of the neighbouring unit, in this case, this is
9 the command of the Kuzman Jasifovski Pitu barracks in Tetovo.
10 So, yes, it is exactly as you said.
11 Q. In item 2, we have other forces indicated. The command post of
12 which is in HT Karpos in Kumanovo. Those would be other neighbours to
13 the zone under the command of Sokol Mitrevski. Is that correct?
14 A. So in this case, the western neighbour, the unit -- to the unit
15 that was given the task was the barracks Kuzman Jasifovski Pitu in
16 Tetovo, while the eastern zone with its own responsibility is the command
17 in the barracks Hristijan Todorovski Karpos in Kumanovo.
18 Q. The Petrovac airport is within the zone of command of the city
19 defence. Is one of the main reasons? So the defence of the airport was
20 one of the reasons to establish the city defence. Is that correct?
21 A. Yes, precisely.
22 Q. So further in this item entitled "Neighbours," it is says: "The
23 forces of anti-aircraft defence..." and I don't know what "VV" stands
25 A. It stands for aviation.
1 Q. "... are based at the airport Petrovac from where they conduct air
2 force support to the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia in the
3 fight against the terrorists acting upon call."
4 Could you agree with me that this is an order pertaining to the
5 units under a command, and not the neighbours?
6 A. Yes, yes, precisely. Specifically, it pertains to the units
7 involved and who have tasks within this zone of responsibility.
8 Q. We saw previously that amongst the reason of the establishment
9 For the city defence and its command was the village of Aracinovo. Do
10 you agree, Dr. Markovski, that the village of Aracinovo was under the
11 command of General Sokol Mitrevski?
12 A. Yes. This area was under the command and under the control of the
13 units that General Mitrevski had under his command. It was under his
14 zone of responsibility.
15 Q. The next paragraph from the top of this page reads: "The forces
16 of the MOI, Ministry of Interior, blocked the village of Aracinovo and
17 controlled the access points to the village. With appropriate forces
18 they secure the facilities of vital importance in the central city area."
19 Do you agree with me, Dr. Markovski, that we have here the
20 Ministry of Interior, not as a neighbour, but as a force under the
21 command of General Sokol Mitrevski?
22 A. Yes. They are within the forces under the command of General
24 Q. And this is a direct order that the forces of the Ministry of
25 Interior have the duty to follow. Is that correct?
1 A. An order that is operationalised with precisely provided tasks for
2 the forces of the MOI.
3 Q. I will kindly ask you now to look at the document in tab 4.
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] That is Exhibit 1D82.
5 Q. This is a document bearing the date 14th of June, and it is again
6 signed by Sokol Mitrevski and that is a marching order.
7 And in item 5.1.1, the task pertains to the 1st Guardist Brigade.
8 Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, precisely.
10 Q. With regards to this, I wish to draw your attention to item 1,
11 which reads: "Data on the terrorists, information about the terrorists,"
12 and it says, "according to the defence orders."
13 Do you agree with me, Dr. Markovski, if I were to say that this,
14 1st Guardist Brigade, and it can be seen from the order that it was
15 deployed in the area of Ilinden barracks and the village of Ljubanci,
16 that it had the same tasks with regards to the terrorists as those given
17 in the order for the defence of the city of Skopje that we had seen
19 A. Although we have here two documents, they pertain to one and the
20 same task, to execute the task given to the 1st Guardist Brigade, the
21 commander for the defence of the city of Skopje has decided to issue a
22 marching order as well, so they would occupy their positions and be able
23 to respond to the obligations entailed in the task.
24 So my answer is yes.
25 Q. Thank you. So the task of the 1st Guardist Brigade was as well,
1 to destroy or to detect and destroy the sabotage terrorist groups and to
2 prevent their entry in the city of Skopje. Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, precisely.
4 Q. Thank you very much. Once the president or the commander of the
5 city defence has issued the basic order for the defence, do you agree
6 with me, Dr. Markovski, that then the military superior, regardless of
7 the rank up to the Supreme Commander, was able to directly issue orders
8 to the individual units of the Ministry of Interior?
9 A. Yes, if the task involves them and if they fall under the zone
10 Of responsibility where they perform tasks jointly.
11 Q. I will kindly did you now to look at the document in tab 12.
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] That is Exhibit 1D314. Page is
13 1D4809, and the English page is 1D8176.
14 Q. This is a document from the General Staff of the army of Republic
15 of Macedonia, command of the security forces. And before I ask the
16 question related to this document, tell me, does the title, command of
17 the security forces, indicate clearly that the security forces comprised
18 both army and the police?
19 A. Yes, precisely.
20 Q. So what we have here is a document from the General Staff of the
21 army of the Republic of Macedonia, command of the security forces, date
22 is 21st of June, 2001. Do you agree with me that this is after the new
23 Law on Defence has been passed?
24 A. Yes. 21st of June is after the adoption of the new Law on
1 Q. And this document is addressed to ESZ, a unit for special tasks of
2 the Ministry of Interior. Are you aware that the unit for special tasks
3 is the unit Tiger, the only special unit in the Ministry of Interior at
4 that time? Are you aware of that?
5 A. Yes, I'm aware of that. That is correct.
6 Q. Beneath this, it says that this is a combat order. Tell me
7 whether this document, so the General Staff directly issuing a combat
8 order to a unit of the Ministry of Interior, agrees with your military
9 knowledge but also with the actual situation as existed in 2001?
10 A. Let's be more precise in this case. It is not the General Staff
11 issuing direct order to the unit for special tasks that belongs to the
12 MOI. It is the commander of the command for security forces which is
13 under the direct command of the General Staff of the army of the Republic
14 of Macedonia.
15 Q. I apologise. We did not see who was issuing this order, but it
16 corroborates your position. If the units were placed in a situation that
17 they work jointly with the army under the same command, then it is the
18 army's superiors who can issue a direct order to the units of police.
19 Is that correct?
20 A. Yes, this is obvious from this order. So, yes, it is correct.
21 It is precisely so.
22 Q. Thank you very much. Regardless of the amending of the law, and
23 you clearly stated that the old law with regards to the competencies of
24 the president and the way the army did not really change, could you
25 confirm, Dr. Markovski, that neither pursuant to the old law, nor
1 pursuant to the new law, and not even today, it is the minister of the
2 interior who can order deployment of police forces for any combat
4 A. Yes, correctly. The minister of the interior does not have that
5 right under any law.
6 Q. Thank you. Answering the questions of my learned colleague,
7 Apostolski, you stated that the sabotage terrorist groups had uniforms at
8 times, but there were situations also where they were active wearing
9 civilian clothes and they often used the civilian population to withdraw
10 there after their actions. Do you remember testify to go this effect?
11 A. Yes, yes. I remember having stated this, and I based this not
12 only on my personal knowledge but also on documents developed by the
13 international factor that was present in the Republic of Macedonia during
14 the crisis.
15 Q. The order by the commander of the city defence, that we analysed a
16 moment ago, includes also the order to prevent the disguised sabotage
17 terrorist groups from entering the city. Do you remember -- do you agree
18 with me?
19 A. Yes. That is one of the tasks and obligations of the structures
20 of security forces involved in this task and action.
21 Q. In the Ljuboten case that you analysed in detail in your report,
22 after the end of combat activities in the village itself, one part of the
23 population withdrew towards Skopje. You are familiar with this, aren't
25 A. Yes, and I noted this in my report.
1 Q. Considering your previous experience, as you stated, but also the
2 positions you took into account and which were prepared by the
3 international community, at the list, there was a real threat that part
4 of the sabotage terrorist groups that were inside the village would, as
5 was the usual practice of the NLA, enter the city, together with the
6 civilian population.
7 Do you agree with me?
8 A. Yes. There was a real threat, and it was already confirmed that
9 this is what actually happened.
10 Q. That really threat, or risk, as you stated, and as you stated it,
11 did actually happen, was based on the fact that just a few days before
12 these events, an armed group was detected and eliminated it Skopje. It
13 had infiltrated there in order to execute terrorist activities inside the
14 city. Is that correct?
15 A. Yes. In one of the settlements of the city of Skopje is where it
16 took place.
17 Q. And it was the terrorist group Teli. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes, it was led by Teli.
19 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter kindly asks the counsel and
20 witness to pause between question and answer.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Could you agree with me, Dr. Markovski, if I say that the order
23 for the defence of the city of Skopje, in this specific case as well,
24 when the action to detect the terrorists in the village of Ljuboten was
25 concerned, presupposes also preventing sabotage terrorist groups from
1 penetrating the city of Skopje?
2 A. If you would neglect this, then the task would not be really
3 executed, and it would not really make sense, the action itself.
4 Q. So an order issued to the forces to capture the terrorists
5 presupposes at least the necessary checking up of persons who entered the
6 city of Skopje through the check-points. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes, it is absolutely correct.
8 Q. And if I may conclude, that then the activity of the security
9 forces at the check-points, in order to prevent their entry into the city
10 of Skopje would be part of the combat activities taking place in the
11 Skopje and comprised by the same order that actually ordered the action.
12 Is that correct?
13 A. Yes, that would be a constituent part of the course of the action.
14 Q. Thank you very much.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions, Your
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Ms. Residovic.
18 Mr. Apostolski.
19 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
20 Just for the purpose of the transcript, I would like to say that
21 the Exhibit 1D93 has been uploaded in the e-court under the number
22 "2D731" --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Instead of "1D93,"
24 it should read "2D93."
25 JUDGE PARKER: And what was that exhibit, could you remind me,
1 please, Mr. Apostolski?
2 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] This was the protected witness.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE PARKER: That will be received now as an exhibit in the
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honour. That will be Exhibit
9 number 2D00093. Thank you, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
11 When you're ready, Mr. Saxon.
12 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours. We do have several binders
13 of exhibits that I hope to discuss with the witness, and perhaps we could
14 provide the first binder right now.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Over the next hour or so, is that it, Mr. Saxon?
16 MR. SAXON: That's the hope, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Okay.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Saxon:
20 MR. SAXON:
21 Q. Mr. Markovski, my name it is Dan Saxon, and I represent the
22 Prosecutor in these proceedings. I'm originally from Boston,
23 Massachusetts in the United States, and I have a number of questions that
24 I'd like to ask you.
25 First of all, yesterday, at page 10614 of the transcript, in
1 response to a question from my colleague, you said that you disagreed
2 that the events of 2001 in the Republic of Macedonia should be defined as
3 classic war or classic armed conflict.
4 Do you remember that?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. Doctor, in a -- in a classic armed conflict, one of the things
7 that happens often is that soldiers are mobilised and deployed to areas
8 where fighting is occurring. Is that right?
9 A. Not just in the classical type of war.
10 Q. Okay. But I'm going to ask you some questions right now just
11 focussing on the concept that you mentioned yesterday of the classic
12 armed conflict. All right.
13 But in response to my last question, effectively, your answer
14 would be a yes, right, that in a classic armed conflict, soldiers are
15 mobilised and deployed to areas of fighting? Correct?
16 A. In the classic armed conflict, yes.
17 Q. And in a classic armed conflict, both sides use a variety of
18 weapons against the other side. Correct? Is that right?
19 A. First of all, we have to define when discussing the classic armed
20 conflict. This would mean the use of enemy activities and weaponry
21 between two state entities.
22 Q. Between two state entities. Well, are you familiar with the
23 concept of internal armed conflict? Are you familiar with that concept?
24 A. Yes. I am familiar with the concept of an internal armed
25 Conflict, which is very difficult to be defined, because - and I was
1 discussing this yesterday - it is a transitional stage between the crisis
2 and armed conflict.
3 An internal armed conflict may be caused also by internal
4 structures, and I do agree with that. Maybe one should add that the
5 basic characteristic of any armed conflict, thus internal conflicts as
6 well, are the fights and combat activities that are taking place in a
7 planned manner and in a certain continue unit.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. But just so that I understand your
9 last answer, you say that an internal armed conflict is the transitional
10 stage between a crisis and an armed conflict. Did I hear you correctly?
11 A. The crisis has its own development stage, basically three stages
12 of development --
13 Q. Dr. Markovski, I understand that. You explained that very well
14 yesterday. I completely understand the three stages of the crisis, as
15 you explained them yesterday.
16 But I'm just trying to clarify your last question, Doctor. You
17 said that an internal armed conflict is a transitional stage between the
18 Crisis and armed conflict, and I'm just trying to understand that -- that
20 Is an internal armed conflict, therefore, an armed conflict?
21 A. Under the condition that it has a character of fighting and combat
22 activities that they should be taking place planned and in continuity.
23 This means that there should be organised military structures that issue
24 orders and operations that are being conducted according to previously
25 prepared orders and commands.
1 Q. All right. Going back, I'll use the term you used a minute ago,
2 basic characteristics of an armed conflict, if you will. A basic
3 characteristic of an armed conflict is that both sides use a variety of
4 weapons against the other side, right?
5 A. You are leading me to something again that is something I cannot
6 accept as completely true, because in order for an armed conflict to
7 exist, internal one as well, one should see a couple of sides. This
8 means that both sides, if they are armed forces, they have to be
9 organised according to the standards for organisation and functioning of
10 armed forces. They should have a planned conduction of military
11 activities and combat activities, and they should be taking place in
13 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Perhaps my question wasn't clear. Let me put
14 the question slightly differently.
15 Let's suppose, hypothetically, that an armed conflict exists in
16 country X, all right? One common characteristic of an armed conflict is
17 that the two sides use a variety of weapons against each other, right?
18 A. It is not so, because weapons can be used also by terrorists.
19 Weapons might be used by armed extremists, regardless of whether we are
20 talking about terrorists originating from the country or global
21 Terrorism. That is why I was telling that one of the basic
22 characteristics, in order for a process to be characterised where violent
23 means are being used, you have to have sides; that is to say, it should
24 be done by two armed organisations.
25 Q. And when you have those two armed organisations fighting in an
1 armed conflict, oftentimes, they use a variety of different weapons
2 against each other, correct, when those conditions exist?
3 A. Yes, that's right. When these conditions are met, they would use
4 the weaponry that they dispose of.
5 Q. And when you have two organised armed organisations fighting in an
6 armed conflict, then it's also common that soldiers get killed and
7 wounded, right?
8 A. Are we still talking about the country X?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. Yes, that is correct.
11 Q. And still talking about country X, the armed conflict in
12 country X, classic armed conflict, it is also common that civilians would
13 be displaced, wouldn't it?
14 A. Yes. There is, unfortunately, an accompanying consequence when
15 you have military actions.
16 Q. And it would also be common then, wouldn't it, in such an armed
17 conflict, that one side takes control of some territory that previously
18 belonged to the other side, right?
19 A. Usually, the goal of the armed conflicts is precisely this.
20 Q. And it would also be common that both opposing sides, both armed
21 groups, would fortify their positions with items like sandbags, trenches,
22 things like that? Is that correct?
23 A. Yes. If they conduct active combat activities, then they would be
24 involved in this type of activities; that is to say, in order to protect
25 their own forces.
1 Q. And in such a classic armed conflict, in country X, at least there
2 so-called modern wars or modern armed conflicts, it is also common that
3 international actors become involved, such as the ICRC, such as the
4 United Nations, such as NATO. Would you agree with that?
5 A. Partly. Because the modern wars, in this sense, as you would
6 present them, they do not have these types of characteristics. This is
7 the characteristics of the classical wars in the past. The typical
8 activity of the modern war would be the asymmetrical activities.
9 Q. And when you refer to asymmetrical activities in modern war, are
10 you referring to guerilla warfare, insurgency?
11 A. Not just guerilla warfare. The most typically threat in the
12 present time, regarding security, is the terrorism, especially global
13 terrorism. The guerilla warfare is not a characteristic of the modern
14 democratic states.
15 Q. But it is possible that, in a modern democratic state, a guerilla
16 or insurgent army can development, can't it? Hasn't that happened in
17 modern history?
18 A. I don't know why guerilla warfare would develop in modern
19 democracies if the problems that which occur, and which a normal social
20 process in every country with a difference intensity, could be resolved
21 with normal democratic and political means.
22 Q. But if problems which occur are not resolved with normal
23 democratic and political means, an insurgency can develop, can't it?
24 A. Insurgency is also a characteristic in the past. I fully disagree
25 that the uprising or the insurgency is a characteristic of the modern
2 Q. All right. In a classic armed conflict, again going back to our
3 country X, it's also common, isn't it, that some aspects of normal life
4 are disrupted, such as the ability of adults to go to work, the ability
5 of children to go to school? Do you agree with that?
6 A. Yes, I would agree, absolutely.
7 Q. People tend to spend more time inside where they feel more
8 protected, right?
9 A. I don't understand your question, really. Can you please repeat
10 the question.
11 Q. Well, if there's an armed conflict, and if you live in country X,
12 and there's fighting going on, combat going around either in your town or
13 close to your town and you're a civilian, you would tend to perhaps spend
14 more time in protected areas, wouldn't you, in shelters, in basements,
15 places where bullets won't hit you?
16 A. Yes. If I'm compelled to do so, this is precisely so.
17 Q. And also in a classic armed conflict in country X, it's also
18 common, isn't it, that both opposing forces often communicate to the
19 public about their activities and their objectives. Isn't that right?
20 A. Yes. Bearing in mind the development of technology, this is quite
21 normal and expected.
22 Q. And, in fact, if just focussing for a moment on you and the events
23 in 2001 in Macedonia, in 2001, when you were the army spokesperson, you
24 communicated to the general public about the ongoing events, the
25 activities of the NLA, and the activities of the security forces of the
1 Republic of Macedonia, right?
2 A. Yes, that's right. In 2001, I was the spokesperson of the army,
3 not the army, but the army of the Republic of Macedonia, to be more
5 And I would like to point out that being a spokesperson means to
6 present the official positions of the institution that is being
7 represented by the spokesperson; that is, where he or she is working. In
8 other words, the spokesperson is the conveyor of the news and the
9 positions of the institution where he or she originates from.
10 Q. All right. And in that sense, as the spokesperson in 2001, your
11 work was important so that the public would understand what the security
12 forces were doing and why. Is that fair?
13 A. Yes, you're absolutely right.
14 Q. And that was important, in order to reduce fear among the general
15 public and to avoid panic. Is that fair?
16 A. First, for the public to be informed about everything that is
17 going on and that is current news regarding the security situation at the
18 Particular moment; and, number two, one might say what you have just
20 Q. All right. Going back to our country X, in a classic armed
21 conflict -- in a classic armed conflict, often, unfortunately, abuses
22 against civilians are committed by both sides. Would you agree with
24 A. It is possible, if we discuss a specific country, we might be even
25 more specific in this regard.
1 Q. All right. I think I'll going to come back to this topic later.
2 But can we agree, then, that in country X, in a classic armed
3 conflict, you often encounter the activities that I've just mentioned to
4 you or some combination of these activities. Would that be fair?
5 A. Yes, it would.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. SAXON: I'm wondering, please, if we can show the witness
8 what is P00467.
9 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, if you take that binder that was given to you,
10 and if you turn to tab 12. Well, you may or may not see the exhibit, but
11 if it's not in the binder, you will see it on the screen.
12 It's simply a map of Macedonia. We'll see it in a minute.
13 And, Dr. Markovski, obviously, this is a map of the Republic of
14 Macedonia. I'm wondering, please, if you can focus, if you go from the
15 city of Skopje to the west, you see there's a road that connects the city
16 of Skopje to Tetovo. Do you see that road or highway?
17 A. Yes, I see it, and I know it very well.
18 MR. SAXON: I'm wondering if our court officer could help us for
19 a moment.
20 Q. Dr. Markovski, if you could assist us, please, and if you take up
21 the magic pen that works on that computer screen. Just to make it
22 easier, if you can highlight please that road. Just draw a thicker line
23 along that road from Skopje to Tetovo, please?
24 A. [Marks]
25 Q. Thank you. Now that -- that road, Doctor, that road is the main
1 communication link between the city of Skopje and the city of Tetovo.
2 Is that right?
3 A. There is it an additional road. This is the highway or the first
4 grade road. There are several axillary roads.
5 Q. And do those axillary roads go close to the highway?
6 A. One of them goes in parallel with the highway, and the other ones
7 turn to the south or to the north.
8 Q. Okay. All right.
9 A. These are called main and rockade roads.
10 Q. All right. And if this main and the rockade roads between Skopje
11 and Tetovo were to be cut or captured, then the northwestern corner of
12 the state becomes virtually isolated from the rest of Macedonia. Is that
14 A. This is a very general assumption. If this happens, we have to
15 consider many of the preconditions. But I would say that I agree with
16 you if the conditions are of this kind and if a force exists capable of
17 doing something like that.
18 Q. All right. Because of then the strategic importance of this road
19 and the auxiliary roads, that was one reason why the NLA deployed some of
20 its forces in the Suva Gora mountains south of Grupcin and Mount Zeden.
21 Is that right?
22 MR. SAXON: And we've just lost the highlighted portion.
23 Q. If you could just answer my question, first.
24 A. I will kindly ask you to repeat the question, because also I was
25 looking at the line that was lost in the mean time.
1 Please repeat the question.
2 Q. Maybe we can just do this in a logical order. If you can take up
3 the pen again and draw your line again along the road, please.
4 A. Now, probably, I'm going to be even more precise.
5 Q. Okay. So going back to my question, one of the reasons why the
6 NLA deployed some of its forces in the Suva Gora mountains south of
7 Grupcin and around Mount Zeden is because of the strategic importance of
8 that road. Isn't that right?
9 A. I think that this is not so. One group of armed extremists were
10 to be seen south of the road in the locality of Bojane, and other group
11 of this type was to the north of this road on the mountain of Zeden.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. In Bojane, there were around 30 to 50 armed extremists, and I'm
14 not quite sure. I don't know previously about Zeden.
15 Q. Could you help us a bit please, then, so that this is clearer.
16 Could you draw a circle to the north of the road, approximately
17 where Mount Zeden is?
18 A. Can we please zoom in on the map. I do apologise, but with my
19 glasses, my eyesight is not that great.
20 Q. It's not a problem, and I'm in the same situation, so you don't
21 need to apologise.
22 MR. SAXON: We have a problem again, because if we zoom in, we're
23 going to loose the line that you draw. What I'm going to do is to ask
24 the court officer to let this image go, please, and zoom in on the upper
25 left side of this map, so that we can get closer to Tetovo.
1 Okay. There we are.
2 Q. If you could take up the pen again, and because you're getting
3 very good at this now, if you can draw the line along the road.
4 A. Yeah, I had a lot of practice.
5 Q. And now if you could please draw a circle approximately where
6 Mount Zeden is.
7 A. [Marks]
8 Q. And could you write the number 1 next to that circle.
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. And could you draw a circle to the south of the road,
11 approximately where Bojane is?
12 A. I'm not quite sure how precise I am about the locate, but this
13 would be location, more or less.
14 Q. Thank you. And could you draw the number 2 next to that lower
15 Circle, please.
16 A. [Marks]
17 Q. Okay. And, of course, for the Macedonian security forces in 2001,
18 the danger in having NLA forces at position 1 and position 2 was that
19 that road could be cut. Is that right?
20 A. No. I would not agree with this conclusion, because we are not
21 discussing forces here but only groups. As I already mentioned, there
22 were 30 to 50 armed extremists in Bojane, and a larger number in the
23 mountain region in the mountain of Zeden. This is not a respectable
24 force that could be able to do this. But bearing in mind they're
25 terrorist methodology of action, they would have been able to cut off the
1 road. They could have caused a terrorist act on the structures of the
2 security forces and civilian that might be moving along the road.
3 Q. All right.
4 A. But I will repeat, this is not a respectable force that would
5 create or mean a serious threat to the security in this region.
6 Q. Well, let's talk briefly, then, about the events of the 8th of
7 August at Karpalak.
8 On that day, I believe ten Macedonian soldiers died when the NLA
9 ambushed an army of the Republic of Macedonia convoy. Is that right?
10 Just say yes or no, that way we'll get through this more quickly.
11 A. I have to say, unfortunately, the answer is yes, and I just added
12 the word "unfortunately."
13 Q. All right. And, for example, when that incident occurred, at
14 least temporarily at that moment, the road effectively was cut, wasn't
16 A. Yes, that is correct. The Ministry of Interior ordered for two or
17 three hours. The road was cut upon order from the Ministry of
19 Q. All right.
20 A. But the other roads, the auxiliary roads, were open.
21 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness -- I'd like to show a couple
22 of video-clips to Dr. Markovski now. And, Your Honours, in your binders,
23 you'll find the transcripts of the videos that we show. Before we leave
24 This image, can this exhibit be admitted, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number P00599.
2 Thank you, Your Honours.
3 MR. SAXON: Now, if we can show the witness what is 65 ter
4 1118.15, and the transcript of this video -- this video-clip is available
5 at tab 11 in binder 1.
6 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, what you're going to see in a minute is a
7 video-clip from Macedonian Radio and Television, from the 27th of May,
8 2001, taken in the region of Vaksince.
9 And we do not seem to be getting any sound.
10 MR. SAXON: I think it just came up, Your Honours.
11 [Videotape played]
12 JUDGE PARKER: [Microphone not activated]
13 MR. SAXON: Okay.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Here we are. Something is happening.
15 MR. SAXON: Can we start at the beginning, please.
16 [Videotape played]
17 MR. SAXON:
18 Q. There we see, Dr. Markovski, what I believe to be is a combat
19 helicopter. I wanted to ask you in what circumstances are combat
20 helicopters used or were they used in 2001?
21 MR. SAXON: Excuse me, this is at 32 seconds of the clip.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So when a state is under threat,
23 under a security threat of any nature, including also terrorist
24 activities, pursuant to the United Nations Covenant, Article 51, the
25 country has the right to defend itself and to undertake measures and
1 activities --
2 Q. Dr. Markovski, I'm very sorry to interrupt. I'm sorry. My
3 question was too general. It wasn't clear enough.
4 What I meant by my question was under what kinds of military
5 Circumstances, what kinds of combat circumstances is a combat helicopter
7 A. A combat helicopter would be employed in several situation:
8 First would be the classic combat activities. Another situation would be
9 in a combat as a support to other security structures when dealing away
10 with the terrorism and terrorist activities in a given territory.
11 Q. And when you say "support to other security structures, more
12 specifically, that would be what may be referred to as "fire support,"
13 firing rocket, firing machine-guns?
14 A. Yes. Combat helicopters actually provide fire support to other
15 structures and to the infantry primarily. Because we don't have a navy,
16 it would be support for the infantry in the Republic of Macedonia.
17 Q. All right.
18 MR. SAXON: Can we continue, please.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. SAXON: Can we stop for a moment.
21 This is at 50 seconds of the clip.
22 Q. Are you able to tell, Dr. Markovski, whether the armoured
23 personnel carrier that we see here behind the gentleman, are you able to
24 whether that is a police vehicle or an army vehicle?
25 A. Yes. This is an armed transporter, but I really can't make a
1 guess whether this is the army or the police.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. But anyhow, it is in the armed transporter, APC, of the security
4 forces of the Republic of Macedonia.
5 Q. All right.
6 MR. SAXON: Maybe we'll just go ahead a second or two. Well,
7 never mind. Just keep going.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. SAXON: Stop, please.
10 Now we're at a minute 32.
11 Q. Obviously, you can see yourself there giving a statement,
12 Dr. Markovski. But I'd like to focus, if we can --
13 A. Yes, yes. I would have been a lot younger than now.
14 Q. And you're not the only one who can say that.
15 You say, here, that the forces are not sent without a reason.
16 Do you recall that? You said that just a minute ago in the clip?
17 A. To be more precise, the forces were not sent offhand.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. So your assertion could be accepted as being correct.
20 Q. And if I understand things, then, the reason that the security
21 forces were sent to the Vaksince area was because NLA units had taken
22 control of Vaksince and other villages to the north-west of Kumanovo, and
23 they to be driven out or killed, is that correct, or captured?
24 A. First of all, the aim of any activity of the security structures
25 is to provide a safe environment. I would not agree with your, I would
1 say, final position, that the aim is killings. The aim is to provide a
2 safe environment. Unfortunately, there could be consequences of such
3 activities, and those consequences could be killings and wounding.
4 Q. All right.
5 MR. SAXON: Can we continue with this clip, please.
6 [Videotape played]
7 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there, please. We're now at two minutes
8 on this video-clip.
9 Q. And, here, we see you again, and you say at this point: "The
10 terrorists are trying to, in a way, redirect the focal point of the
11 combat actions to the area of Otlja, towards Matejce."
12 Did you hear that?
13 A. Yes. But this pertains to the focus of the armed activities of
14 the armed forces; that is to say, the security forces of the Republic of
15 Macedonia. They acted in that way. They were mingling with the
16 population leaving a region or a settlement, leaving one settlement
17 entering another, in order to force the security structures to divert
18 their focus on to another region.
19 Q. Well, that may be, Doctor. But you did say here that "the
20 terrorists are trying to, in a way, redirect the focal point of the
21 Combat actions towards the area of Otlja towards Matejce," right, that
22 was the official version?
23 A. [No interpretation]
24 Q. That's a yes?
25 A. I said, and I will repeat, through their activities --
1 Q. That's all right. If you can just confirm that that's what you
3 A. No, it is not what you are saying. It is what I had said.
4 Q. Thank you. To do something like this, to redirect the focal point
5 of combat areas, to redirect the focal point of combat to different
6 areas, that requires a certain degree of planning, doesn't it?
7 A. Planning is a very complex process, and planning is preceded by an
8 assessment of the situation, then the idea design of the activities,
9 thinking out the activities, analysis of the situation, and only then
10 making the decision on the activities and planning the actual activities,
11 which means that it would be a poor commander who has not made an
12 assessment and who would make new plans from one moment to another, as
13 the situation unfolds in the given country X.
14 So, in that case, he would not be able to implement the action,
15 and he would not be able to control the activities. The only thing that
16 he would be able to do would be planning.
17 There is a saying: To command means to forecast.
18 Q. Mr. Markovski, do we take that response as a yes or as a no?
19 A. My answer is the one I have given you.
20 Q. Well --
21 A. It is very difficult to make a black and white picture. It would
22 be very good if that were possible, but --
23 Q. I'm not asking you to give a black and white picture, but I am
24 asking you to give a brief, clear answer to what was a brief, clear
1 I'm going to ask my question again: To redirect the focal point
2 of combat areas requires a certain degree of planning, yes or no?
3 A. I told you, planning is needed, but this is done in advance and
4 not from one moment to another, depending on how the situation unfolds.
5 Q. Would it be fair to say, Doctor, that combat -- combat situations
6 can be very fluid situations?
7 A. Would you be more precise, because I really don't understand what
8 you are trying to ask me.
9 Q. Well --
10 A. Fluid in our language means "empty."
11 Q. Then I better use another word in English.
12 Would it be fair to say that that, during combat activities,
13 circumstances and conditions can change very rapidly? Is that fair?
14 A. Yes, that is correct.
15 Q. And a commander has to be able to adapt to changing circumstances
16 of combat, right?
17 A. He should lead the operations, the actions --
18 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreters did not get the final part
19 Of the answer, so if the witness could repeat it.
20 MR. SAXON:
21 Q. The interpreters did not hear the last part of your response.
22 Can you repeat it again, and just speak up a bit louder?
23 A. Yes. The commander is leading the operations, the combat
24 activities. He is not changing them.
25 Q. Well, what if circumstances change during the combat activities,
1 is the commander supposed to let his men die?
2 A. This is why I told you, with regards to this, to how the situation
3 unfolds, the commander is leading the combat activities. It is again
4 based on the idea on how to carry out the combat activities and the
5 advance planning of the activities where all possible scenarios could be
6 forecasted, what would happen during the execution of the action.
7 It would be a poor commander that changes his plan from one
8 moment to another and who changes the combat activities. But at the end
9 of the line, let me accept your assertion as correct, that a poor
10 commander would change his plans. But he would be a commander for a very
11 brief period only, trust me.
12 Q. Correct me if I'm wrong, Dr. Markovski, you became an officer in
13 the army of the Republic of Macedonia in 1973, right?
14 A. No, no, that is not right.
15 Q. What year was it then?
16 A. In 1973, I enrolled the Military Academy in the then-Yugoslav
17 National Army, and I returned to the Republic of Macedonia after the
18 dissolution of Yugoslavia at the beginning of 1992, when the army was
19 established in April.
20 Q. My apologies. My mistake. You became an army officer in 1973,
21 right, when you joined the Military Academy in Belgrade?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. All right. So you know something about command and commanding,
25 A. We say I have a certificate confirming that I know this, because
1 I have graduated from the command academy in Belgrade in -- actually, I
2 graduated in 1989. I started it in 1988.
3 Q. Well, a moment ago, you told us that it's a poor commander who
4 would change his plans. Well, suppose an army is surrounded and needs to
5 retreat so that it will not be destroyed. If a commander orders such a
6 retreat, why would that commander be a poor commander?
7 A. There is a principle in the commanding, which pertains to what is
8 the realistically achievable goal and through what means and forces.
9 This is the principle of effectiveness in the command. The goal could
10 not be achieved at any cost, at just any cost. The goal should be
11 justified having in mind the means used and the risk, and also the
12 forces, the soldiers used in the achieving of that goal.
13 The commander who makes the assessment that the further achieving
14 of the goal would be ineffective, this is why he is a commander, to then
15 make a decision. But the decision will not be, as you say, a change in
16 his thinking, but it would be an activity planned in advance, which has
17 established that if the goal exceeds the cost of the means used and the
18 casualties, this is what the commander will do.
19 Q. Dr. Markovski, I'm going to stop you there. You haven't answered
20 my question.
21 My question was simple: If an army is surrounded and needs to
22 retreat so that it will not be destroyed, if a commander changes his plan
23 and orders a retreat, that doesn't make him a poor commander, does it?
24 A. No, no, on the contrary. If this is what the commander does
25 within the principle of effectiveness, he would be a good commander.
1 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I see the time. May I ask, may I show
2 a bit more of this clip and ask two or three more questions before the
4 JUDGE PARKER: Please.
5 MR. SAXON: If we can move forward, with my case manager's help,
6 to what is 4 minutes and 16 seconds, please, or just before that. If we
7 go to 4 minutes, please. Okay. Let's start from there.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. SAXON:
10 Q. What we've just seen is that the -- we see that the remaining
11 commanders of the terrorist structures gathered the IDs, the
12 identifications of the other terrorists and destroyed them.
13 Did you hear that?
14 A. I heard that it was allegedly seized, the documents. That was a
15 comment made by the journalist.
16 Q. Okay. And would you agree, then, that the NLA units in the
17 Vaksince area then had commanders?
18 A. The village of Vaksince had no units within it. There was a group
19 more than -- less than 50 armed extremists strong who started their
20 activities with the terrorist act against the --
21 Q. Mr. Markovski --
22 A -- vehicle of the army of the Republic of Macedonia, on the 3rd of
24 Q. I'm just going to stop you there. My question is something
25 different, and I'll use your term. The group, the NLA group that was in
1 Vaksince, can we agree that they had a commander or commanders?
2 A. I really don't know, but let's suppose that it was so.
3 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I would seek to tender what is 65 ter
4 1118.15, the accompanying transcript.
5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit number P00600.
7 Thank you, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Is that then a convenient time, Mr. Saxon?
9 MR. SAXON: Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER. We will adjourn now and resume at five minutes
11 past 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
15 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, could we please show the witness
16 another video-clip. It is 65 ter 1118.17, and it has ERN number
17 VOOO-7472. It will be clip 17.
18 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, what you're going to see in a moment is some
19 more video material produced by MRTV, this time on the 29th of May, 2001.
20 MR. SAXON: So if we could start that clip, please.
21 [Videotape played]
22 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there.
23 If we could, well, keep going, please.
24 [Videotape played]
25 MR. SAXON: We see a helicopter, which appears to be firing
1 rockets. We see the rockets appearing to be exploding on the ground.
2 This is around 25.
3 Please keep going.
4 [Videotape played]
5 MR. SAXON: Stop there, please.
6 Q. What we just heard, Dr. Markovski, was you explaining that the
7 NLA had attacked with all weapons at their disposal from snipers up to
9 I'd simply like to ask you: Doesn't the use of mortars,
10 artillery, require a certain degree of planning and coordination during
11 combat so that you don't shell your own soldiers?
12 Would you agree with that?
13 A. No, I wouldn't agree. It doesn't have to be planned.
14 Q. Well, if it's not planned, don't you run a big risk that you
15 might kill or injure a number of your own soldiers?
16 A. Not with a mortar fire, because if we are talking about
17 120-millimetres mortars, it has a reach up to 12 kilometres. So there is
18 no chance to injure one of your own structures.
19 Q. Well, suppose some of your soldiers are operating 11 kilometres
20 away and ask for some artillery support with mortars. Don't you need to
21 coordinate with them so as to make sure that you don't drop shells on
22 your own soldiers?
23 A. Yes. If it is a military unit which has deployed certain units
24 in a certain region, then this would be done. But, here, it is obvious
25 that armed Albanian extremists are stationed, are positioned on a
1 precisely determined location. Their structures are not located anywhere
2 else, and that is why they can do this.
3 Q. And where do you take that information from the video-clip that
4 you've just seen?
5 A. From your question. I don't see this in the recording.
6 Q. Well, you said, "armed Albanian extremists." You said: "Here,
7 it is obvious that armed Albanian extremists are stationed, are
8 positioned on a precisely determined location. Their structures are not
9 located anywhere else, and that is why they can do this."
10 Where are you getting that information from?
11 A. Because I know at that particular period where the armed
12 extremists have been located, and they were located in the vicinity or
13 right next to the villages where, later on, they would hide. Vaksince,
14 Otlja, Lupate, and Slupcane are the villages.
15 Q. This particular video-clip is talking about Matejce. That's what
16 we just saw.
17 A. Yes. In west -- to the west of Slupcane is the village of
19 Q. All right. And how do you know for a fact that there were no NLA
20 soldiers in the area of Matejce?
21 A. I did not say there was or there wasn't, but the picture did not
22 show here in which direction they fired. If you can remind me, then we
23 can comment on this.
24 Q. I'm just going to move on.
25 MR. SAXON: Can we see the rest of the tape, please.
1 [Videotape played]
2 MR. SAXON: Stop there, please.
3 Q. Dr. Markovski, there is a gentleman here - this is at 1 minute, 7
4 seconds of this video - and to your left we see a gentleman wearing a
5 blue shirt. Can you tell us who that is?
6 A. Yes. At that time, he was the spokesperson of the ministry, and
7 I was the spokesperson of the army. This is a close friend of mine, and
8 today he is a leader of a political party in the Republic of Macedonia.
9 Q. And this is Mr. Gjorgji Trendafilov?
10 A. Yes, that's correct, Gjorgji Trendafilov.
11 Q. And just so the record is clear, when you say that
12 Mr. Trendafilov was the spokesperson of the ministry, that's the Ministry
13 of Defence, right?
14 A. Yes, that's right, the Ministry of Defence.
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. SAXON: Can we continue, please.
17 [Videotape played]
18 MR. SAXON: Can we stop here.
19 Q. Here we see that, according to this news report, the Albanian
20 terrorists are holding persons hostage in Matejce.
21 MR. SAXON: Can we continue, please.
22 [Videotape played]
23 MR. SAXON: Stop there.
24 Q. This comment made by your colleague Mr. Trendafilov, he mentioned
25 disinformation which he feels probably has the objective to discredit the
1 dignity and honour of the army of Macedonia.
2 Is Mr. Trendafilov referring to what is generally called
4 A. If you allow me, I have to clarify.
5 We had several situations when foreign media most of all in their
6 attempt to be as popular as possible, or to be able to sell their
7 material, quite often they would use this type of information or news
8 reports, thus showing photographs and video-clips from different
9 countries and different regions as this was happening in the Republic of
10 Macedonia, especially regarding the tanks 84 which did not exist in
11 Macedonia then and also today.
12 Exodus of civilian people that did not happen in the Republic of
13 Macedonia, but only from Kosovo to Macedonia back in 1999. And both I
14 and Mr. Trendafilov had to face these challenges where we would have to
15 negate this type of reports coming from the media. In this sense, his
16 statement was made; at least, this is my guess.
17 Q. Well, he refers to a special war undertaken against the
18 Macedonian army to discredit its dignity and its honour. I'm just -- I'm
19 trying to clarify whether at least part of this special war involved
20 propaganda coming from the NLA.
21 A. I don't know. I cannot be precise, but part of the special war
22 also is propaganda; and worldwide and within Macedonia, propaganda is
23 considered as something negative.
24 Q. Okay. All right.
25 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender this video,
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P00601. Thank
4 you, Your Honours.
5 MR. SAXON:
6 Q. I'd like to show you, at this time, just one more video-clip,
7 Dr. Markovski.
8 MR. SAXON: If we can show the witness what is 65 ter 1118.11.
9 This has ERN number VOOO-7472, and it's clip 11. The transcript can be
10 found at tab 16 of binder 1, Your Honours.
11 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, this is another video-clip produced by MRTV,
12 this time on the 18th of May, 2001.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there, please. This is at 42 seconds.
15 Q. And there, you mentioned, Dr. Markovski, new fortifications of
16 the terrorists at two positions, to the north of Vaksince and also to the
17 north-west. Do you see that? Did you hear that?
18 A. Yes, I did. This is a little forest to the north of Slupcane on
19 the terrain between Slupcane and Vaksince.
20 Q. Okay.
21 MR. SAXON: And can we continue with it, please.
22 [Videotape played]
23 MR. SAXON: Well, we did not get the last part. The transcript
24 right now is not corresponding, but we got the first part.
25 Q. I just want to ask you: The construction of new fortifications
1 by a group, wouldn't that also demonstrate a certain degree of planning
2 and coordination?
3 A. We are discussing here the activities which, upon order of the
4 Supreme Commander, President Trajkovski, were -- was conducted by the
5 security forces in the region of Vaksince. Pressurised by the activities
6 of the security structures, they retreated to the region of the village
7 of Slupcane; and during this period, when talking about new
8 fortifications, we are basically talking about establishing the positions
9 of mortars, positions that I mentioned earlier.
10 We were discussing the forest to the north of Slupcane; and in
11 the report I gave at that time in my statement, I'm talking about the
12 part to the north-west of Slupcane, so a new fortification or a new
13 position for the mortar.
14 Q. Well, if you have to decide on a new position for your artillery,
15 doesn't that require a certain amount of planning and coordination? You
16 don't just put your artillery anywhere, do you?
17 A. You really appreciate these extremists armed groups. There are
18 no structures like that who would plan and who would organise, et cetera.
19 Q. All right. I'm just -- just so that your testimony is clear, so
20 what you're saying is, then, that the members of the NLA would simply
21 have placed their mortars, other artillery, wherever they felt like it.
22 Is that your evidence?
23 A. Where they considered these should be placed, not where they
24 wanted. This would be something different.
25 Q. Okay. Where, who considered that the mortars should be placed?
1 A. Probably, there were experts amongst them who were taught how to
2 operate mortar.
3 Q. All right. And probably, then, to use your term, the experts who
4 knew about how to operate mortars would probably also discuss with
5 commanders where the mortars should be positioned. Isn't that right?
6 Isn't that just logical?
7 A. No. I cannot confirm this.
8 Q. Why can't you confirm it?
9 A. Because I don't know whether they had a commander at all. If you
10 indicate who the person is, then maybe we can discuss it.
11 Q. Well, let's suppose that we don't know whether there's a
12 commander or not, but let's suppose there's an expert who knows about
13 artillery. That expert in the NLA has to plan where he's going to put
14 the mortars, right?
15 A. If he is in a situation and possibility to plan. This was a
16 particular, specific situation where they would leave the village of
17 Vaksince and retreat to the village of Slupcane.
18 Q. And retreat -- the term "retreat," in the military sense, what
19 does that mean?
20 A. Retreat means when you're not able to fight the enemy, and it is
21 not longer effective nor economic to continue the combat or fighting at
22 that particular location.
23 Q. All right. And, usually, the decision to retreat is made by a
24 commander, isn't it?
25 A. Usually, in normal armed forces, this would be so, yes.
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. But we should not forget that also terrorist groups also have
3 their own leaders.
4 Q. All right. And these "leaders," as you call them, if we refer to
5 the leaders of terrorist groups, since they're leaders, logically they
6 would tell members of the group what to do, right? That's what makes
7 them a leader?
8 A. Yes. One can assume so, under the condition that they have
9 organised manner of carrying out their activities.
10 Q. And logically, then, if you have leadership who tells people what
11 to do, the members of the group are supposed to carry out the wishes of
12 the leader, right?
13 A. Are we discussing a terrorist group or armed forces?
14 Q. Terrorist group.
15 A. I don't know. I have never been a member.
16 Q. I see. Isn't it true, Dr. Markovski, that, in the military
17 sense, the term "fortifications" normally refers to an activity that
18 could be offensive or defensive to help a particular armed group?
19 A. In the general sense, yes. But, here, we are discussing a
20 specific situation that I already explained. I remember it well. And
21 that is why there is no need for special fortification because protection
22 is provided by the forest to the north-west of Slupcane, and they used
23 this opportunity to place the mortar and fire on the security forces.
24 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, before I forget, I would seek to tender
25 what is 65 ter 1118.11.
1 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P00602. Thank
3 you, Your Honours.
4 MR. SAXON:
5 Q. Earlier today, when we were talking about the classic armed
6 conflict in country X, one of the things that we agreed upon was that,
7 unfortunately, oftentimes, there are abuses committed by both sides
8 against civilians. I'd like to explore that with you, and if you could
9 turn to what is --
10 MR. SAXON: I think what we need to do now, Your Honours, if we
11 can, please, is distribute the remaining binders, binders 2, 3, and 4.
12 Then, perhaps, if the third binder could be given to the witness,
13 please, for him to review.
14 I'm very grateful to the court officers for their assistance.
15 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, perhaps if you could turn to what is tab 75
16 in that binder.
17 MR. SAXON: If we could show what is Exhibit P00326. Thank you.
18 Q. Dr. Markovski, this is a photograph taken in May of 2001, and it
19 reportedly depicts injuries received by an ethnic Albanian man when he
20 was held at the Kumanovo police station during that month.
21 I wanted to ask you, in your report, you talk about crimes
22 committed by the members of the NLA, and I wanted to ask you whether
23 you've also been aware of crimes that were committed by members of the
24 security forces during the crisis time in 2001.
25 A. No.
1 Q. Never heard of such a thing?
2 A. No. I never found any such document.
3 Q. Well, apart from finding a document, did you ever hear such
4 allegations on the news?
5 A. Could you please remind me and then we could comment, because I
6 really can't remember.
7 Q. During 2001, did you ever see any news reports alleging that
8 members of the Macedonian security forces had committed crimes or abuses
9 against ethnic Albanian civilians.
10 A. It is possible. But let's discuss specific problems, then we
11 could comment. I might have read, I might have seen something.
12 Q. Okay. I guess my question is: Going back to what we talked
13 about earlier, if both sides in the events of 2001 committed some crimes
14 against civilians, that would, unfortunately, be another -- that would be
15 one of the characteristics of the classic armed conflict that we talked
16 about, right?
17 A. Look here, the state organs such as the security structures in
18 the Republic of Macedonia act pursuant to laws. Pursuant to that same
19 law, they are disciplinary and criminally libel if they overstep their
20 powers. The terrorist organisations do not adhere to any laws, and I
21 don't see a possibility to have a parallel or comparison between the one
22 and the other.
23 Q. That's interesting, but that's not what I asked you. I need you
24 to answer the question that I ask you.
25 Going back to what we talked about earlier, if both sides in the
1 events of 2001 committed some crimes against civilians, that would,
2 unfortunately, be one of the characteristics found in a classic armed
3 conflict, wouldn't it?
4 A. You are speaking again about some sides to the conflict. What
5 I'm telling you is that if this the security forces of the Republic of
6 Macedonia would commit something contrary to the law, they would be
7 liable. I have not read anything of the sort.
8 Q. I'd like an answer to my question, Dr. Markovski. Do you want me
9 it repeat it one more time?
10 A. You're speaking about sides. I do not agree that there have
11 been, in this conflict, as you call it, or in the crisis in the Republic
12 of Macedonia, sides to the conflict.
13 Q. Well, let me see if I can rephrase my question a little bit then.
14 If both the members of the NLA and the members of the security
15 forces of the Republic of Macedonia committed some crimes against
16 civilians during 2001, that would, unfortunately, be one of the
17 characteristics found in a classic armed conflict, wouldn't it?
18 A. Well, we can't discuss a typical armed conflict when what we have
19 here is state and legal entities, and we have armed extremist gangs, the
20 activities of which followed the methodology of terrorism. I really
21 can't permit, neither from a scientific nor from a practical aspect, to
22 correlate the two and to run a parallel between them.
23 Q. Well, I'll use your language. Suppose, in 2001, we have some
24 armed extremist gangs, "terrorists," to use your term, and we have the
25 Macedonian --
1 A. I said "armed extremists," the methodology of which is terrorism.
2 Q. All right. Well, suppose we have some armed extremists, in 2001,
3 who commit abuses against civilians, and we have some members of the
4 security forces of the Republic of Macedonia who commit abuses against
5 civilians, wouldn't that be very similar to one of the common
6 characteristics of an armed conflict that we talked about earlier?
7 A. I really do not understand how you insist to ran a parallel
8 between the two structures. Ask me separately about the one and the
9 other, and I will answer properly.
10 Q. I'm going to move on to another topic, Dr. Markovski. I'd like
11 to talk to you a little bit about the Ministry of Defence and how it
12 works and how the army of the Republic of Macedonia works.
13 It's my understanding that the Ministry of Defence in Macedonia
14 traditionally deals with all aspects of defence affairs and preparations
15 at the republic level. Is that right?
16 A. At the state level, yes.
17 Q. And, so, that would include activities like civil defence
18 preparations, maintaining lists of reservists, scientific research,
19 publishing documents, et cetera, wouldn't it?
20 A. It is correct. But I would kindly ask you to indicate where that
21 is in my report, so that I'm able to follow you.
22 Q. Well, I'm actually not referring to any part of your report right
23 now. I'm just asking you to confirm -- to confirm this.
24 The Ministry of Defence --
25 A. Very well. Then we will speak from a theoretical viewpoint, no
2 Q. Okay. And from a factual viewpoint. And in Macedonia, usually,
3 the minister of defence has been a civilian, right?
4 A. Yes. Pursuant to Article 97 of the constitution, it is
5 obligatory that the minister is a civilian.
6 Q. And, in 2001, the minister was a civilian named Vlado Buckovski,
8 A. Actually, in 2001, from the creation of the broad coalition
9 government, or coalition, Mr. Buckovski was appointed a minister. There
10 was another minister before him.
11 Q. All right. And also, within the Ministry of Defence - correct me
12 if I'm wrong - but I believe there was another part or institution called
13 the General Staff of the army of the Republic of Macedonia, right?
14 A. Pursuant to the Law on Defence, the General Staff is an expert
15 body within the Ministry of Defence.
16 Q. All right. And you're referring, of course, to the new Law on
17 Defence that was enacted in the summer of 2001, right?
18 A. I'm referring to both the new law, but I'm indicating that there
19 were no substantial or essential amendments with regards to the old one.
20 I'm also referring to the final provisions of the law which indicate that
21 until the adoption of certain secondary legislation items that would
22 support the new articles of the new Law on Defence, the old law will
24 Q. All right. We're going to come back, but let me ask you some
25 more questions. I think we'll come back to this point in a minute.
1 The General Staff of the army was composed of professional
2 military officers, wasn't it, in 2001?
3 A. Senior officers, that would mean --
4 Q. I'm sorry the interpreters did not hear the last part of your
5 response. Perhaps you could repeat --
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters will continue the
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that would mean commissioned and
9 non-commissioned officers. I wish to be more precise than your
11 Professional soldiers can be ordinary soldiers as well, but the
12 General Staff is composed of commissioned and non-commissioned officers
13 and certain number of civilians serving in the army --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: "Employed" in the
15 army, rather than "serving" in the army.
16 MR. SAXON:
17 Q. All right. And the normal job of the General Staff of an army is
18 to run the army and military operations, right?
19 A. To plan, lead, and analyse the activities undertaken.
20 Q. Okay. After the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke apart
21 during the early 1990s and Macedonia became an independent republic,
22 there was a policy to reduce the level of militarisation of the country.
23 Isn't that right?
24 A. It is possible. We might come to this conclusion further in our
25 discussions, so please go on.
1 Q. I'm not quite sure what you mean, but I will go on.
2 A. It is too broad a question, and I can't give you a specific
4 Q. Well, the role of the army, during the mid- to late 1990s in
5 Macedonia, was reduced, wasn't it, from the time-period when the JNA
6 existed? Would that be correct to say?
7 A. When the JNA existed, the army of the Republic of Macedonia did
8 not exist. I really do not understand you. If you are referring to the
9 number of military officers in the Republic of Macedonia who belonged to
10 the army of the Republic of Macedonia was smaller than the number of the
11 officers that the JNA had in Macedonia while Yugoslavia still existed,
12 then the answer is yes.
13 Q. Okay. And it would be fair to say, then, a number of officers,
14 even generals, were retired during that time. Is that right?
15 A. Yes. They retired during 1998.
16 Q. And, consequently, the role of the General Staff of the army of
17 the Republic of Macedonia was also diminished, wasn't it, at that time,
18 in the 1990s?
19 A. No, no, no. This has nothing to do with the reduction or the
20 retirement of certain number of generals. This can't be compared in this
21 way. But the army was reduced according to a plan. In a planned
22 fashion, according to the NATO standards, the transformation of the army
23 commenced to have it more mobile; and because of the specific features of
24 the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, the army was trained and is
25 still trained in a planned fashion.
1 Q. All right. Well, prior to the crisis time of 2001, one of the
2 generals who was returned was Pande Petrovski, wasn't he?
3 A. Yes, you're completely right. It is like that.
4 Q. And then, during the crisis time, in 2001, General Petrovski was
5 brought back from retirement to lead the General Staff of the army of the
6 Republic of Macedonia during the crisis. Isn't that what also what
8 A. Yes. That is true. This is exactly how it happened. However,
9 the decision on the retirement of generals and their activation or
10 reactivation was made or issued by the president, by the Supreme
11 Commander of the armed forces. That was his political decision on the
12 basis of the constitution and the Law on Defence.
13 Q. All right. Now, when the crisis began in the early part of 2001,
14 the old Law on Defence was the governing law, right, because the new law
15 had not been enacted yet. Can we agree on that?
16 A. Until the 6th of July, 2001, the Law on Defence of 1995 was in
17 force or the amended version of the law which was passed in 1992.
18 Q. All right. Well, the old Law on Defence -- in the old Law on
19 Defence, the roles and responsibility of the General Staff were not
20 clearly defined or described, were they?
21 A. It depends on the views or interpretations. My opinion was
22 completely different, that it was completely, precisely, and properly
23 defined, the role of the army.
24 Q. Well, no, I'm not asking about the role of the army. My question
25 was specifically directed to the role of the General Staff. My question
1 was that in the old law, the particular duties and powers and
2 responsibilities of the General Staff were not specifically defined.
3 Isn't that right?
4 A. In both the old and the new Law on Defence, General Staff is an
5 expert body, expert and operational body of the Ministry of Defence. I
6 don't see where you find your point.
7 Q. All right. Well, maybe you can help me clarify this.
8 MR. SAXON: If we can show the witness -- first of all, I need to
9 explain something to Your Honours.
10 A small portion of the old Law on Defence has already been
11 admitted into evidence, and it is Exhibit 1D97. But that exhibit only
12 contains, I believe, two, perhaps three, of the Articles of the old law.
13 So I'm going to ask that the witness be shown 65 ter 1236, which
14 is a more complete version. To my knowledge, it is a complete version of
15 the old Law on Defence, because I would like to ask the witness to look
16 at it.
17 This can be found in binder 4, tab 127.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 MR. SAXON:
20 Q. If it would help you, Dr. Markovski -- Dr. Markovski, if you take
21 a look at binder 4 and go to tab 127, then you could look at a hard copy
22 of the full version, and it might be quicker, actually.
23 A. Which tab did you say, please?
24 Q. 127.
25 MR. SAXON: There's an English version --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
2 MR. SAXON: There's an English version which has not translated
3 every Article but has translate add number of Articles.
4 Q. And if you can just follow with me, Dr. Markovski, the chapter
5 headings, we see the basic provision.
6 I'm sorry. I'll wait for you.
7 We see the first chapter is titled basic provision; the second
8 chapter is titled citizen rights and duties in the defence. And, again,
9 this is the decree on the declaration of the Law on Defence published in
10 the Official Gazette, 14 February 1992.
11 And we see a number of Articles about military service in chapter
12 2; we see the responsibilities or duties of citizens; Article 12, we see
13 an Article regarding the needs of the army during a state of war. In
14 chapter 3, we see the competencies of the organs of the state government,
15 and that's divided into the Assembly of the Republic, which is
16 Article 14; the president of the Republic, which is Article 15; and the
17 government of the Republic, which is Article 16.
18 Then, if you get to Article 17, we see the Ministry of Defence,
19 and we see the different roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of
20 Defence in Article 17. Then, if you turn to what is chapter 4, which is
21 the chapter on the army of the Republic, we see a number of Articles that
22 talk about the army.
23 MR. SAXON: And this is on page 9 of the English version.
24 Q. The army is an armed force of all citizens in the Republic,
25 that's Article 19; Article 20, the army prepares and gets qualified or
1 trained for waging armed war and combat and other actions in a state of
2 war; Article 21, the army organises and prepares in a state of peace in
3 order to realise its constitutional function for defence of the Republic,
4 et cetera.
5 Do you see that? Are you following me, Doctor?
6 A. I'm following you, but there is a serious criticism to be made
7 here. You probably wish to indicate that this law is substantially
8 different from the law of 2001; but I wish to indicate, on the contrary,
9 that this law, passed on the 14th of February, 1992, was amended in 1995.
10 Actually, before the crisis, and until the adoption of the new
11 law, the Law on Defence of 1995 was in force. At this moment, I don't
12 know; or if we have it here, maybe we could compare the amendments. I
13 can't comment on this from the top of my head.
14 What you are trying to, escape from the law or deviate from this
15 law of 2001, is making me avoid this law of 1992, because what was in
16 force was the law of 1992 but with the amendments passed in 1995.
17 Q. Just for the record, Dr. Markovski, I'm not trying to escape from
18 anything. I'm trying to clarify what the situation was in Macedonia, all
20 Now --
21 A. I beg your pardon. It was not the sense in which I meant. It is
22 not how you understood it. I spoke metaphorically because I also said
23 that I tried to escape something as well.
24 Q. Very well. I do not have the 1995 amendments with me, but I need
25 to ask you something about the 1992 law, if I may.
1 There's nothing in the 1992 law that describes the powers and
2 functions of the General Staff of the army of the Republic of Macedonia,
3 is there?
4 A. Well, this is where the problem this. This is what I wish to
5 indicate. I'm not sure at this moment that this is what is missing in
6 1995 as well.
7 Q. Dr. Markovski, I asked you a simple question. All you need to do
8 is say "yes" or "no."
9 Is there anything in the 1992 law that describes or defines the
10 powers and responsibility of the General Staff of the army of Macedonia?
11 A. But how could I answer this when this law was not in force in
12 2001. In 2001, at the beginning of the crisis, what was in force was the
13 law of 1995.
14 Q. Did the law of 1995 contain a description of the powers and
15 responsibility of the General Staff of the army?
16 A. The problem is that I never learn the Articles of any law by
17 heart. If we have it here, we could comment on this. This is what I
18 wish to indicate.
19 Q. So your answer is you're not sure. You're just not sure.
20 A. No. I'm absolutely not sure, because I don't have the law here
21 to see it.
22 Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that during the crisis time, when the
23 crisis began in the early part of 2001, there were disputes within the
24 Ministry of Defence as to which person the minister or the chief of the
25 General Staff should be the person in command of the army units. Would
1 you agree with that?
2 A. I'm not aware of this. I don't know.
3 Q. All right.
4 A. And if you allow me, I don't see a possibility for something like
5 this happening, because the competencies of the chief of the General
6 Staff is one thing, and the minister is a political person elected by the
8 If you have something more specific, we might discuss it. I
9 really don't know what you're referring to.
10 Q. Okay. Well, if the roles were clearly described, if the role --
11 if the powers and responsibilities of the General Staff were clearly
12 defined in the 1995 Law on Defence, then there would be no need to define
13 them in the new Law on Defence that was enacted in 2001, right?
14 A. This is an assumption. I really cannot respond.
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness what is Exhibit 1D00098,
17 which is in binder 2, and it's tab 48.
18 If the witness could be assisted so that he could find binder 2,
19 and if you could go to tab 48, please.
20 Q. You'll see, Dr. Markovski, that this is the so-called new Law on
21 Defence that was enacted in 2001.
22 A. Why so-called? This is a real law.
23 Q. Dr. Markovski, the reason I used the term "so-called" is because
24 that's the term that the parties here during this trial have used in
25 court, just to distinguish between the earlier law and the subsequent
1 law, all right? We get through this more quickly if you could just
2 answer the questions that I ask you, okay?
3 A. I apologise. But in the Macedonian language, the wording
4 "so-called" bears a negative connotation. I apologise.
5 Q. And if we can, please, if you could turn, please, Dr. Markovski,
6 to chapter 4 of the old -- excuse me, of the law that's in front of you.
7 MR. SAXON: It is has ERN number N002-2795.
8 Q. Do you have chapter 4 in front of you?
9 A. Yes, yes, I can see it.
10 MR. SAXON: For those following in English, we see a chapter here
11 called: General Staff. Subsection two of this chapter is entitled
12 General Staff, and it begins with Article 25.
13 Q. It says that: "Operational and expert activities for organizing,
14 preparing, and commanding the armed forces in the Ministry of Defence are
15 accomplished by the General Staff being the highest expert body within
16 the Ministry of Defence on issues related to the armed forces."
17 Are you following me?
18 A. Yes, I am. I repeated this on several occasions, and I basically
19 provided the definition that this is so.
20 Q. And in Article 26, we see the duties and responsibilities of the
21 General Staff. Do you see that?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. And we see at least 21 separate duties and responsibilities,
25 A. Yes, that is correct.
1 Q. Okay. Now, to your knowledge, was Article 26 implemented -- was
2 Article 26 a new Article in 2001 or did it exist already in the old law?
3 A. I should really take a look at this law in order to be able to
4 say more, but let's discuss it further and see what you're after. It is
5 very difficult for a person to know a law by heart.
6 Q. Okay. How about Article 27? It refers to the chief of the --
7 the chief manages the General Staff of the armed forces, who is appointed
8 and discharged by the president of the Republic."
9 "The chief of the General Staff reports to the president of the
10 Republic and to the minister ..."
11 Are you following me?
12 A. Yes. I remember this was as it is, in the past and now.
13 Q. And in 2001, then, the chief of the General Staff of the -- yeah,
14 the chief of the General Staff was -- was managing the General Staff,
15 right, as it says in Article 27?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And the General Staff, in 2001, were carrying out the activities
18 as described in Article 26, right, throughout the crisis time?
19 A. Yes. This is how it is supposed to be, according to the law.
20 Q. All right. Now, during the crisis time in 2001, General Pande
21 Petrovski was the chief of the General Staff until the 10th of August,
23 A. Until the 9th of August.
24 Q. Okay. Thank you for correcting me.
25 And the deputy chief of the General Staff was General Metodija
1 Stamboliski, right?
2 A. Yes, that is correct, at that particular time?
3 Q. And during the crisis time, while these two officers held their
4 positions, a big part of their job was to plan the responses of the armed
5 forces of Macedonia to the armed actions of the NLA, right?
6 A. No, I cannot agree with this position. The chief of the General
7 Staff and his deputy are the highest officers and the most responsible
8 officers in the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
9 The planning, carrying out, and the analysis are being made by
10 their assistants and commanders of the units.
11 Q. All right. Let me then step back a bit.
12 So the General, if I can -- if I can say this clearly, the
13 General Staff is composed of general officers like Pande Petrovski and
14 Metodija Stamboliski, as well as a group of people who work for the chief
15 and the deputy chief, yeah, and carry out work for them. Is that right?
16 A. Yes. Amongst them, Blagoja Markovski, as a colonel, was also
18 Q. So amongst the staff of the General Staff would be people who
19 would plan operations and present those plans to General Petrovski and
20 General Stamboliski for their approval. Is that a fair statement?
21 A. Within the General Staff, in 2001, considering that it was
22 organised or structured according to the NATO standards, there was the
23 so-called G3, and this G3 service is the service for planning of
24 operations. But this department or service did not present its plans to
25 the chief and the deputy chief only, but at the collegium of the General
1 Staff. The General Staff is a collective body managing the army.
2 Q. Okay. And at the collegium, when these plans were presented,
3 people like General Petrovski and General Stamboliski would have the
4 responsibility of approving the plans or not, right?
5 A. Yes. The plan is approved by the chief of the General Staff; and
6 if he is absent, this will be done by his deputy.
7 Q. All right. And, so, the G3 service, for example, during 2001,
8 would have planned some operations, such as the operation around
9 Vaksince, operations at Tetovo, operations at Aracinovo, et cetera, and
10 discussed these plans with -- at the collegium. Is that fair?
11 A. For every single operation planned within G3, the collegium will
12 discuss it; and, as I already mentioned, following the discussion at the
13 collegium, the action is approved or the order is signed by the chief of
14 the General Staff.
15 Q. All right. And Generals Petrovski and Stamboliski, they were
16 experienced and competent military professional, weren't they?
17 A. It would be incorrect by me to give assessments or evaluation
18 about my superiors. Since your comment was a positive one, I can agree
19 with it.
20 Q. All right. Well, then, I will take your answer as a yes.
21 I'd like to turn to another topic, if I may.
22 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, I'm wondering whether we could take the
23 second break now; otherwise, I will have to stop sort of in mid-topic.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Very well, Mr. Saxon. We can have the break now,
25 and we will resume at five minutes to 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.55 p.m.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon.
4 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. Dr. Markovski, yesterday, at page 10627 of the transcript, you
6 said that: "In order to declare a state of war, three conditions have to
7 be met," and this was in reference to Article 124 of the constitution.
8 And the first condition that you mentioned was where you said
9 there must be imminent danger posed to the Republic of Macedonia, and
10 "this would mean attack coming from any of the neighbouring countries."
11 MR. SAXON: If we can, please, I would like to show the witness
12 Exhibit P91, and that will be in binder 2, tab 51. I don't know what
13 binder the witness has next to him. If he could be given binder 2,
14 please, that would help, if that would assist him.
15 For those looking on in e-court, Article 124 is at page 21 in the
16 English version of e-court and page 25 in the Macedonian version of
18 No, that is not the right document. We're looking for what
19 should be P00091, which should be the constitution of Macedonia.
20 There we are. And if we could go to page 21 in the English
21 version and page 25 in the Macedonian version.
22 Q. And if you could turn, Dr. Markovski, to Article 124.
23 Do you have that Article in front of you?
24 MR. SAXON: If we could go back one page in the English version,
25 please, and if we could focus on Article 124.
1 Q. The first of the three conditions that you mentioned yesterday,
2 Dr. Markovski, you said there must be imminent danger posed to the
3 Republic of Macedonia, and "this would mean attack coming from any of
4 the -- this would mean attack coming from any of the neighbouring
6 Where do you see a requirement that the attack come from
7 neighbouring countries within Article 124?
8 A. I don't know what other possibility there might be for a war
9 threat. This means a danger or a threat of an organised military
10 structure to the Republic of Macedonia. Military organisations or
11 military structures are one of the basic attributes of every single
12 country, and this is where I draw my conclusion from. There cannot be a
13 military organisation without a country, nor a country without a military
14 organisation as its own basic attribute, and I'm talking about democratic
16 Q. Well, suppose there's an insurgent force that develops in a
17 country. Can't an insurgent force be a military organisation or a
18 military structure?
19 A. You're referring me back to something that I already explained.
20 In a democratic country, it is not logical that one might face such a
21 situation. The problems in a democratic country are resolved through a
22 political dialogue and through the institutions of the system.
23 The Republic of Macedonia, regardless of the fact that it was at
24 the very beginning of its democraticisation of its society, from the very
25 beginning, it has established and built upon its democratic institutions.
1 Q. Dr. Markovski, take a look at that first provision, number 1 of
2 Article 124. It reads like this: "A state of war exists when direct
3 danger of military attack on the Republic is impending, or when the
4 Republic is attacked, or war is declared on it."
5 So that provision is written in the disjunctive construction,
6 isn't it? It provides three different scenarios for a war, right?
7 A. In fact, three conditions in order to declare a state of war.
8 Q. If you say it imposes three conditions, how do you explain the
9 use of the words "or" in that first sentence?
10 A. So there is one condition when there is an imminent danger. The
11 second condition is, "or when the Republic is under attack." The third
12 condition is when war has been declared on it. And this means, since we
13 have this word "or" in between the three conditions, this means not
14 every -- not all three conditions have to be met in order to declare
15 state of war, but at least one and any of these three conditions in order
16 to be able to declare a state of war.
17 Q. All right. Let's talk about maybe just the first condition for
18 right now, when there is an imminent danger.
19 A. Military. Imminent military or war danger.
20 Q. Fine. Okay. Imminent danger of military attack or when the
21 Republic is attacked. Let's talk about the first two conditions, if we
23 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness what is Exhibit 1D0099, and
24 this is at tab 9 of binder number 1.
25 Q. Dr. Markovski, this document is dated the 11th of June, 2001.
1 It's a decision from President Trajkovski to establish the defence
2 command of the city of Skopje.
3 Do you see that?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. And it says that the 12th Infantry Brigade, the 16th Infantry
6 Brigade, the 1st Guardist Brigade, and the 8th Infantry Brigade will be
7 subordinate --
8 A. I apologise. It seems that I have another document then on the
9 screen in front of me.
10 Oh, very well. I apologise. Yes, in the second item, 12th,
11 16th, and so on. I apologise for this.
12 Q. And in item 3, it says that: "The chief of the General Staff of
13 the army of the Republic of Macedonia will issue orders for engaging the
14 units for the defence of the city of Skopje."
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes, this is what it says.
17 Q. Doesn't this order, this decision, indicate that the Republic of
18 Macedonia was in imminent military danger and was being attacked?
19 A. No, I don't see this anywhere.
20 Q. Well, what other conclusions would you draw from this?
21 A. In this decision, it is not listed what is going on in the
22 Republic of Macedonia or what the country is faced with. It just says
23 that the training defence is supposed to establish a defence command for
24 the city of Skopje, comprising these four-mentioned units and the Chief
25 of Staff to make or adopt an order for the deployment of the units for
1 the Defence of the city of Skopje, but it doesn't say from whom the city
2 is supposed to defend and whether the city is facing this kind of threat.
3 In accordance with the provisions of charter of the United
4 Nations, Article 51, everything single country, that is including the
5 Republic of Macedonia, will undertake appropriate measures in order to
6 protect its territory from terrorists or asymmetrical activities, but
7 also in cases as it is stipulated in the Article of the constitution that
8 you have mentioned earlier.
9 Q. Dr. Markovski, isn't it logical that this order, this decision,
10 was issued by the president due to the ongoing activities of the NLA
11 inside the Republic of Macedonia?
12 A. Yes. This order, this decision by the president has been made
13 because of the disturbance of the security situation in the Republic of
14 Macedonia as a result of the presence of armed extremist groups of ethnic
15 Albanian composition in the Republic of Macedonia.
16 Q. And it`s true, isn't it, that a country can be attacked from
17 within, can't it?
18 A. The comparison that we are trying to make between the
19 constitutional provisions and this decision is an inappropriate one. It
20 says when there is an immediate danger, imminent danger of a military
21 attack, and this can only happen from a military structure or
23 If we want to be specific, then the constitution should have read
24 also asymmetrical threats for the security of the Republic of Macedonia,
25 or, even more specific, possible terrorist activities inside the Republic
1 of Macedonia.
2 Q. Are you suggesting, Dr. Markovski, that when President Trajkovski
3 issued this order on the 11th of June, that the city of Skopje was not in
4 imminent danger of a military attack? Are you suggesting that?
5 A. I am trying to say that we could have had cases of infiltration
6 of different terrorist groups, part of the armed extremist groups in the
7 Republic of Macedonia, and this order was an order to prevent their
8 infiltration in the city of Skopje.
9 Q. Well, you see, that order doesn't say anything about preventing
10 infiltration. But let me ask you this: Yesterday, at page 10679, you
11 agreed with the proposition of my colleague, Ms. Residovic, that the
12 defence of the capital city of the Republic of Macedonia is the most
13 significant defence task of the armed forces and of the citizens of
15 Do you recall that testimony from yesterday?
16 A. These are not the precise words I used; but, more or less, this
17 is it.
18 Q. All right. Well, then, if the armed forces of Macedonia needed
19 to be mobilised in June 2001 to defend the capital city against the NLA,
20 doesn't that sound like the Republic of Macedonia was in imminent danger?
21 A. First of all, this decision talks about prevention of
22 infiltration and not about defence. The main task of the army is to
23 prevent the infiltration or advancements of organised or non-organised
24 groups or individuals with weaponry in the city where they would conduct
25 and carry out their terrorist activities.
1 Q. First of all, Dr. Markovski, the word "infiltration" does not
2 appear here in this document.
3 Second of all, you haven't answered my question. My question was
4 simple. I'll ask it again.
5 If the armed forces needed to be mobilised in June 2001 to defend
6 the capital city against the NLA, doesn't that sound like the Republic of
7 Macedonia was in imminent danger?
8 A. But one cannot read in this decision that Skopje is under a
9 military threat or military attack either.
10 Q. So the anticipate to my question is no, then.
11 A. No. I cannot accept this kind of an answer. This was a decision
12 made in the sense of prevention. Because I am familiar with the
13 situation, I know what were the preconditions. So it was a decision in
14 order to prevent the penetration of armed extremists groups and
15 individuals in the city where they would carry out certain terrorist
17 Q. Dr. Markovski, at page 10621 of the transcript, yesterday, you
18 told the Trial Chamber that the NLA, in 2001, was trying to create a
19 situation "where they would be able to control one portion of the
20 territory of the Republic of Macedonia and, with additional attempts, to
21 establish their own political power on this territory."
22 And my question for is this: If units or groups of the NLA were
23 pushing close to the city of Skopje by June of 2001, doesn't had a sound
24 like the NLA was close to reaching its goal by that time, the goal that
25 you described to us yesterday?
1 A. The infiltration of armed extremists in Skopje and their
2 intention to carry out terrorist activities doesn't mean this. At the
3 end of the day, the best example would be Teli's group where the Ministry
4 of Interior, that is to say, the structures within the MOI, dealt with
5 this problem and resolved this issue with the terrorist group in a very
6 quick manner.
7 So by entering of these structures into the city, it doesn't mean
8 that it is under a military threat, but the city can find itself in a
9 situation where terrorist activities would be carried out inside the
11 Q. Dr. Markovski, by June of 2001, the NLA was in control of the
12 village or the suburb of Aracinovo. Isn't that right?
13 A. Yes, for several days.
14 Q. Well, doesn't that sound like that and doesn't that indicate
15 that, by coming so close to Skopje by June of 2001 and controlling
16 territories so close to Skopje, that the NLA was quite close to
17 accomplishing the goal, or the goals, that you described yesterday?
18 A. Absolutely not, at least for Skopje. The entry of the armed
19 extremist group in Aracinovo, and the period until the moment when they
20 were forced out of the village, was ten to 12 days. If Macedonia, that
21 is to say, the security forces of the Republic, if they wanted to resolve
22 this problem at the very first day and information was available, they
23 could have done so, but we would have had plenty of victims and
24 destruction. So it would have not been effective, so the principle of
25 effectiveness would not have been satisfied.
1 And the Republic of Macedonia did not opt for destruction and
2 killing, but, most of all, to use political means to resolve the
3 situation. And, of course, whenever we had serious problems, the
4 president would make the decision to apply and deploy the security
5 forces. This has been done only on six occasions through decisions of
6 the president, and only five of them have been implemented.
7 Q. Just to clarify your response, you said that if the Macedonian
8 security forces had resolved the problem in Aracinovo on its own, on the
9 very first day, they could have done so, but there would have been plenty
10 victims and destruction.
11 It's fair to say, isn't it, that, by June 2001, it was pretty
12 predictable that military operations in populated areas - for example,
13 like Aracinovo - would result in lots of victims and lots of destruction?
14 Is that fair?
15 A. I think that one cannot generalise the situation. There were 260
16 armed extremists in Aracinovo, and this was a fact known to the police
17 and the army. This is not a force that one should fear from, the police
18 or the army for that matter. So the resource effectiveness is what
19 matters because the Republic of Macedonia was always following the notion
20 that we have to continue living together, and this applies for -- to all
21 the citizens in the Republic of Macedonia.
22 Q. All right. You said, a moment ago, that the security forces, if
23 they had want to the resolve this problem, they could have done so, the
24 problem in Aracinovo. Why was the occupation of Aracinovo by the NLA a
25 problem for the state?
1 A. Any square metre, if the situation there is not safe and secure,
2 is a problem for the state.
3 Q. And when you say the situation - for example, in Aracinovo - was
4 not safe and secure, it was not safe and secure because the NLA, at that
5 moment, controlled Aracinovo, right?
6 A. It was not the NLA, it was a group composed of around 260 armed
7 extremists. Sometimes, the reason should be prevail over the violence.
8 Q. Can we agree, Dr. Markovski, that the groups of armed extremists
9 that were carrying out armed violence in 2001 went by the name or the
10 acronym the NLA? Can we agree on that?
11 A. Yes, I agree.
12 Q. Why, then, do you say that the group composed of around 260 armed
13 extremists who took control of Aracinovo was not the NLA?
14 A. Since I don't think that the NLA existed at all under this
15 acronym, something is being represented as an armed structure while it
16 did not exist at all. There were several armed extremists groups that
17 neither had a joint plan of action nor they implemented any coordinated
18 activity. Each of these armed extremist groups carried out their actions
19 according to their own plans and views.
20 Q. Well, we're going to come back to this then.
21 Yesterday, at page 10628 of the transcript, you told us that the
22 president can declare a state of war in a situation where the parliament
23 cannot meet or convene.
24 Do you remember that?
25 A. Yes. In such a case, the president has one additional competence
1 within the competencies vested in him by the constitution.
2 Q. And you also explained yesterday that, during the crisis, the
3 parliament was in permanent session, right?
4 A. Yes, that's right, and this is how it was.
5 MR. SAXON: Can we go back to what is exhibit P00091, please, the
6 constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and if we can go back to
7 Article 124, please. Again, this is at tab 51 in the second binder.
8 And Article 124 on e-court should be at page 20 or 21 in the
9 English version and page 25 in the Macedonian version, and if we can
10 focus on article 124, please.
11 Q. You'll see, Doctor, that paragraph 2 of Article 124 says that:
12 "A state of war is declared by the Assembly," by the parliament, "by a
13 two-thirds majority vote of the total number of representatives of the
14 Assembly, on the proposal of the president of the Republic, the
15 government, or at least 30 representatives."
16 Do you see that?
17 A. "In peace," it is specifically stated, and this is properly
19 Q. So what that means is, during 2001, either the president, the
20 government, or at least 30 representatives of parliament could have
21 proposed that a state of war be declared, right?
22 A. Yes, that is correct. Yes.
23 Q. And, for example, there were times during the crisis period when
24 the prime minister, Ljubco Georgievski, argued that a state of war should
25 be declared. Correct?
1 A. Yes, I read that information as well.
2 Q. Dr. Markovski, wasn't the real reason that a state of war was
3 never declared, back in 2001, was that the result would have been a
4 full-scale civil war between the ethnic Macedonian and the ethnic
5 Albanian communities in Macedonia?
6 A. I apologise, but I really did not understand the question. Could
7 you simply it, please.
8 Q. I will do my best.
9 A. [In English] I'm sorry.
10 Q. No, it's probably my fault. It's okay.
11 The result of the declaration of a state of war, or the
12 consequence of the declaration of a state of war in 2001, would have been
13 a full-scale civil war between the ethnic Macedonian and the ethnic
14 Albanian communities in Macedonia, and so isn't that the real reason why
15 a state of war was formally never declared?
16 A. [Interpretation] You could make such assertion but that would be
17 conjecture only, and I have a correction to enter. As you said, it would
18 be a war between the ethnic Albanian population and all the others,
19 because all the others did not join the armed extremist groups of the
20 Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. When I'm speaking about all the
21 others, I'm referring to the fact that in the Republic of Macedonia, in
22 addition to the Macedonians and Albanians, there are also ethnic Serbs,
23 Bosniak, Turks, Roma, Vlachs, and Serbs, and I hope the other ethnicities
24 that I have not mentioned will not mind.
25 Q. All right. You say that my proposition could be made but that it
1 would only be conjecture, but I'm asking you really for your expert
2 opinion. You're here testifying as an expert, as a political/military
4 So I'd like, really, a clearer answer to my question. Isn't the
5 really reason why with a state of war was never formally declared was
6 because the consequence would have been a full-scale civil war?
7 A. You are really trying to make me oppose you, because the science
8 is not based on conjecture. The science is based on events and
9 documents. So from the scientific aspect, I really wouldn't like to
10 enter any conjectures. I apologise, but, really, such conjecture is not
11 something that I can accept at face value. I need to have arguments, I
12 need to have scientific knowledge and researches to then arrive at any
14 Q. Dr. Markovski, you were, in light of the position that you held
15 in the Ministry of Defence in 2001, you were a witness to those events;
16 you were, at times, a participant in those events; you've spent many
17 years now studying those events, teaching about them.
18 So I'm asking to you give your expert opinion, please.
19 A. First of all, I was not a participant; I was a witness to those.
20 And I remain at my position, that it is very difficult to guess
21 what would happen if something else would happen; but probably, and let
22 me satisfy your need for the answer, probably, having learned from the
23 experiences from the immediate neighbourhood and particularly the events
24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina but also Croatia, probably, there would have been a
25 large bloodshed. But still, still, I'm just giving you this answer to
1 provide an answer to the question; and, otherwise, I do not fully stand
2 from a scientific aspect behind this answer and this conjecture.
3 Q. All right. It's true, isn't it, that in 2001 the security forces
4 of Macedonia were operating in an undeclared state of war, weren't they?
5 A. During a certain period, during the crisis in 2001, they lived
6 and worked in a situation of increased battle readiness. It has been
7 precisely defined, and this is how they acted.
8 Q. And the security forces also lived and worked in a situation of
9 combat, didn't they?
10 A. No, no. That would be too harsh an assertion, which is not based
11 in the reality.
12 Q. All right. Well, we'll come back to that in a minute.
13 I'd like to move to a different topic now.
14 Dr. Markovski, do you have a binder there with your report in it?
15 Do you have a copy of your report with you? Because if not, we can give
16 you one.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Yes, I have my report here.
20 Q. All right. All right. If you go to paragraph 21, please, of
21 your report -- actually, I'm going to direct you to a different
23 I'm sorry. Dr. Markovski, could you turn to paragraph 24,
25 In paragraph 24, you provide some definitions of the word
2 First, you say: "Crisis is the disruption of certain rules and
3 norms that function in the specific system. Crisis is a national or
4 international situation which presents a threat to the vital interests of
5 the country."
6 Then, later on, you cite it a document in footnote 11 -- excuse
7 me, footnote 12. Actually, you cite to your own work, to your own book?
8 Then, in the middle of the paragraph, there's a sentence
9 beginning with: "The NATO handbook defines ..."
10 Do you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It says: "The NATO handbook defines crisis as a network of
13 rapidly evolving events that significantly increase the influence of the
14 destabilizing factors in the broader international system, or, one of its
15 subsystems, above the normal level, an increase the probability of the
16 onset of violence; 2, the continuation of consequences of actions between
17 the governments of two or more sore republican states and specific
18 convicts, a short and real war which can escalate into a large dangerous
19 war; 3, a change in the status that is characterised by an increase in
20 the likelihood of destructive actions between two or more opponents with
21 a high probability of military action."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 Q. And as authority for that definition, you cite in footnote 13 to
25 the NATO handbook, chapter on the strategic concept of the alliance that
1 starts at page 42.
2 A. The strategic concept.
3 Q. Okay.
4 MR. SAXON: If we can turn please to what is 65 ter number
5 2D00-713, please. This is the NATO handbook, or a portion of it, from
6 2001. It's in binder 3, tab 67.
7 And, perhaps, if the witness could be given binder 3 and directed
8 to this tab, it might make things easier for him.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
10 MR. SAXON: We only have this in English, and if we could turn to
11 page 42, please, of the NATO handbook.
12 Q. Dr. Markovski, you'll see at the bottom?
13 MR. SAXON: No, can we scroll counsel to the bottom of the page.
14 There we go.
15 Q. You'll see, here, we have this chapter that you've cited here for
16 the definition of a crisis. The chapter is called: The strategic
17 concept of the alliance. It's about five or six pages long.
18 Can you tell us please where we will finds the definition of
19 crisis that you mention here in the middle of paragraph 24, which page?
20 A. So if we wish to be really proper about what is mentioned in
21 paragraph 21 and everything that is mentioned here, it reads --
22 Q. Paragraph 24, you mean.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 24.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In paragraph 24 of my report, it
25 reads that: "In the NATO handbook, the definition of crisis is what has
1 been indicated," and then number 1, number 2, number 3.
2 Nothing of this is placed under quotation marks. It is allowed -
3 I don't know how it is in the law - but in the science, it is permissible
4 when running analysis to be able to draw conclusions and then present
5 those conclusions as one's own, but they are not then placed under
6 quotation marks.
7 So, what has been indicated here in the strategic concept of the
8 NATO alliance, in pages 42 to 47, as my view, I have made these three
9 conclusions and I am presenting them here without quotation marks.
10 So these were my conclusions from the materials that I have
11 studied, analysed, and, therefore, reached those conclusions.
12 Q. All right. Look, we've got some time. It is only five or six
13 pages. I understand that you haven't quoted this chapter precisely, but
14 where in these pages do you see a discussion of what a crisis is? Where
15 do you see that?
16 A. I have here just the English version. I don't know whether the
17 Macedonian version is available as well.
18 Q. Sorry. We only have the English version. I do believe you read
19 the English language, and you cited to this in your report.
20 A. Yes. I am able to use the English language; but to be able to
21 make a professional analysis, I still need the Macedonian version.
22 Q. Well, since you can use the English language, can you turn -- can
23 you just look at these pages and see if the word "crisis" is there.
24 A. You are really making me, again, to analyse something from the
25 top of my head. I did permit myself to answer your question using
1 conjecture, but I really wouldn't like to run an analysis based on a
2 language that I do not fully understand.
3 Q. The truth is, there's no discussion of what a crisis is in this
4 chapter of the handbook, is there?
5 A. If this is the conclusion you make, then so be it. I can't make
6 an analysis from a language that I don't understand.
7 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I see the time. Should we end for the
8 day now?
9 JUDGE PARKER: We will consider that.
10 Now we must ask you, sir, to return again tomorrow to continue.
11 We resume again at 9.00 in the morning.
12 The court officer will show you out now.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 [The witness stands down]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon, I thought, in the absence of the
16 witness, we might inquire how you saw your timing. We are not holding to
17 you minutes. Days would be a start.
18 MR. SAXON: And I was afraid of that.
19 My objective, Your Honour, is to finish my cross-examination by
20 the end of the day on Thursday. That is my objective. I see Judge Van
21 den Wyngaert is not happy with that, but this witness covers a huge
22 amount of material.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Well, I think we might encourage to you finish
24 earlier than that, Mr. Saxon, at least by the end of the second session
25 on Thursday, with a view to Mr. Apostolski having the complete last
1 session on Thursday, because of commitments that would make it hard for
2 two of the Judges now to be present on Friday. And if that isn't the
3 case, it would disrupt the flow of things. But if you look at the time
4 fully available tomorrow and for two of the three sessions on Thursday,
5 it ought to give you plenty of scope to deal adequately, I would think,
6 with this witness.
7 MR. SAXON: Very well, Your Honour. Thank you.
8 JUDGE PARKER: We would be grateful if you could attempt that.
9 The Chamber would also mention that, for another or for a related
10 issue that affects me, I'm having to be engaged in other matters both on
11 Friday and on Monday of next week; and for that reason, we would propose
12 for the last or the one remaining witness of Mr. Apostolski to deal with
13 that witness on Tuesday, rather than simply have two Judges sit and hear
14 that witness. And given the fact that it is a 92 bis witness and there
15 is essentially only cross-examination, we should be able to finish that
16 witness on Tuesday and deal with any procedural matters that are then to
17 be dealt with, with a view to concluding your evidentiary sittings on
18 Tuesday of next week.
19 Strength to your planning and preparation for the next day and
20 two-thirds, Mr. Saxon.
21 We will adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
24 March, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.