1 Wednesday, 12 March 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
7 Your affirmation that you made at the beginning of your evidence
8 continues to apply.
9 Can I mention that if there is a need for a speedy adjournment,
10 the accused should simply make that known quickly and that can be
12 Mr. Saxon.
13 WITNESS: BLAGOJA MARKOVSKI [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
16 Before I forget. Yesterday the last document that we looked at
17 was from 65 ter 2D00-713, from the NATO handbook of 2001. That NATO
18 handbook is actually 536 pages long. I do not propose to burden the
19 Chamber with the entire work. However, I would seek to tender page 1 the
20 title page and pages 42 to 47 which is the chapter that is referred to in
21 the expert report of Dr. Markovski at note 13.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be P00603. Thank you,
24 Your Honours.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]
1 Q. Dr. Markovski, do you have a copy of your report in front of you?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 MR. SAXON: And if Dr. Markovski could also be provided with the
4 first Prosecution binder as well.
5 Q. And, Doctor, if we can turn, please, to paragraph -- I believe
6 it's 51 of your report. Actually, I misspoke, paragraph 52, please.
7 And at the bottom of paragraph 52, Doctor, we see the following
8 sentence: That is why it was no coincidence that the crisis in Macedonia
9 began in Tanusevci that it was immediately subsequent to the signing of
10 the border agreement with Macedonia's northern neighbour and that
11 occurred at the time when the Yugoslav army, with permission from KFOR,
12 entered the buffer zone in southern Serbia and squeezed out the armed
13 extremists of the so-called LAPMB.
14 And then as authority for that comment, you have footnote 25 than
15 is document from the Ministry of Interior than is 65 ter 2D526, and that
16 is at tab 25 of binder number 1, and should be there, both in English and
17 in Macedonian, Doctor.
18 And as you can see, this document is from the Ministry of
19 Interior, security and counter-intelligence administration, dated the
20 11th of March, 2001, and the title is: "Operative intelligence points to
21 a possible deterioration of the security situation in the Republic of
23 Are you with me?
24 A. Yes, yes, I am.
25 Q. And the first paragraph tell us that the UBK's recent operative
1 intelligence points to the possible spread of the activities of the armed
2 terrorist groups in the north-western part of Macedonia and also
3 indicates that they intend to undertake terrorist attacks in Skopje,
4 Tetovo, Kicevo, and Struga.
5 Do you see that?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. And if you move down to the fifth paragraph starting with the
8 name Beqir Sinani, it says -- one moment, please.
9 A. Is it on the same page?
10 Q. No, it's on the next page. If you turn to the next page.
11 Do you see the word -- the name Beqir Sinani?
12 A. Yes, Sinani Beqir, can I see that, yes, from Malino.
13 Q. So we see from that paragraph that Mr. Sinani plays a significant
14 role in supplying the terrorists with weapons and recruiting volunteers
15 for the NLA who operate in the area of Tanusevci, Brest, Malino. And
16 then we're told that Sinani receives his instructions in connection with
17 the procurement of distribution of weapons from Ali Ahmeti, who is
18 referred to as in parenthesis a functionary of the national movement for
19 the liberation of Kosovo, or the NDK.
20 Do you see that?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. And then in the next paragraph, we're told that --
23 A. I apologise, because there is a parenthesis, a high official of
24 the NDK we have to say that he was one of the founders of the NLA and a
25 direct participant of the ...
1 Q. I'm sorry the interpreters did not catch the very last word that
2 you said. Just the last Word?
3 A. I will repeat. You said that he was a high official of the KLA,
4 and we have a parenthesis and it says that he was the founder of the KLA
5 and a direct participant in the liberation army of Presevo and Medvedje;
6 so he was all over the place.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. The next paragraph, we're told that, according
8 to the UBK's intelligence Xhemal Hiseini, (one of the NLA commanders) has
9 been assisted by Murat Jashari (a member of the NDK leadership) and
10 particular members of the LAPMB, originally from the Kumanovo area in
11 intensively collecting financial means and carrying out the transport of
12 weapons and medicines for the needs of the NLA.
13 Did you follow with me?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And then just below that, we see a sentence a large quantity of
16 food and uniforms for the needs of the NLA has allegedly been stockpiled
17 in the school in Tanusevci.
18 Do you see that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Let me ask you this: This intelligence report tell us about
21 commanders collecting money and transporting weapons and medicine for the
22 NLA and it tells -- it talks about the storing or stockpiling of food and
23 uniforms for the NLA.
24 A. I apologise, but I don't see anywhere commanders and
1 Q. Go to the paragraph beginning with: "According to the UBK's
2 intelligence ..."
3 Do you see that paragraph. We read it a minute ago?
4 A. Yes. This is just one of the commanders of the LAPMB. Ali
5 Ahmeti, it doesn't say about Sinan Beqiri, Hiseini.
6 Q. Dr. Markovski, if you just listen to my questions, then I think
7 we could move through this more quickly.
8 A. Very well.
9 Q. The reference to Xhemal Hiseini says in parentheses one of the
10 NLA commanders.
11 So my question is simply this, we have intelligence information
12 here about commanders of the NLA, collecting money and transporting
13 weapons and medicine for the needs of the NLA, food and uniforms being
14 stockpiled in large quantities for the NLA. Doesn't this illustrate a
15 fair amount of organisational capability on the part of the NLA?
16 A. After all, my intervention was quite all right. I was correct
17 when I said this. We don't see this, what you are saying. We see
18 certain names, certain individuals that have been named, and just for one
19 person, it is listed and says one of the NLA commanders, than is why I
20 cannot accept the fact that all these peoples were commanders and they
21 all managed other people, especially bearing in mind the person Ali
22 Ahmeti, because it reads that at the same time he was an official of the
23 NDK, founder of the NLA or KLA, and participant in the LAPMB. You will
24 agree with me also that I cannot be both same time in The Hague and
1 Q. Dr. Markovski, what did you mean by that last comment?
2 A. I wanted to say that these individuals can not sit on two
3 separate chairs at the same time, so they are either people who collect
4 and distribute, or they are commanders.
5 Q. Okay. Well, you see, I didn't say that all of these people were
6 commanders. I was simply reading from the document, and in one
7 paragraph of the document there's a description of Xhemal Hiseini as one
8 of the KLA commanders, that's all. Neither myself nor the document is
9 saying that every individual mentioned is a commander.
10 So one more time. Doesn't the fact that people are collecting
11 money, transporting weapons and medicine, storing feed and uniforms in
12 large quantities for the needs of the NLA, doesn't that suggest a large
13 organisational compatibility?
14 A. No. I don't know on what you base this -- this assertion of
15 yours. This is a group of four to five people who did that, and there is
16 no suggestion that this is an organised institution.
17 Q. Are you suggesting that you read this document to suggest that
18 only the specific individuals mentioned in this document are involved in
19 these activities? Is that how you read this document?
20 A. No. I read the document as it says, and I cannot assume what
21 happened further on, because I don't know how everything was organised.
22 It is obvious that these three to four people did not collect all these
23 items, bearing them on their backs. Probably they had their own
24 collaborators, but this is not explained here and we ask not discuss the
25 precise number; and we cannot say it was an organised group or
1 mercenaries. Maybe we can make even this kind of assumption, people that
2 would do all of this for money.
3 Q. I'm going to move on.
4 If you take a look, please, going back to your report,
5 Dr. Markovski, and if you could take a look at paragraph 57 of your
7 Paragraph 57, the start of the paragraph says this -- actually,
8 Your Honour, before I forget, could I tender that last document that I
9 showed you, please.
10 JUDGE PARKER: You mean the one at tab 25?
11 MR. SAXON: That's correct, Your Honour. It was 65 ter 2D526.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be exhibit number P00604.
14 Thank you, Your Honours.
15 MR. SAXON:
16 Q. Doctor paragraph 57 in the beginning, says that: "The first form
17 of terrorism occurred in 1999," describes an incident there where a
18 soldier Mr. Krstanovski tragically lost his live and then lower down it
19 says: "Other drastic examples of terrorist acts subsequent to this are
20 as follows."
21 And then you list a series of events. But at the word "follows"
22 there is a footnote. It is footnote number 26. And as authority for
23 this paragraph you cite to 65 ter 701?
24 MR. SAXON: And I'm wondering whether we could show that to
25 Dr. Markovski, please.
1 Q. This is at tab 26 of that first binder, doctor. What I see on
2 the screen, I do not believe is 65 ter 701.
3 A. No, it isn't.
4 Q. But do you have it in front of you in the hard copy, Doctor?
5 It's a document dated 25 July 2001 and the title is: "Information on the
6 NLA activities in the territory of Macedonia.
7 Do you have that, okay?
8 A. Yes, I do have it.
9 Q. Okay. And now I see it's coming up on the -- on e-court as well.
10 This is a document from the Ministry of Interior, from the
11 department of security and counter-intelligence. And, first of all, you
12 relied on this document as authority for paragraph 57. So can we take it
13 that you believe that the information in this document is reliable and
15 A. I don't know whether the information is reliable, but it comes
16 from an official body, from the state administration. And I do trust the
17 country of Macedonia.
18 Q. Just so that I understand you, you're not sure whether this
19 document and the information it contains is reliable?
20 A. No, you misunderstood. I'm not a witness of these events in
21 order to trust or not. This is a document from an official body of the
22 Republic of Macedonia and in this regard, I do trust it.
23 Q. All right. Well, -- and by the way, Your Honours, just to
24 correct something. On the list of exhibits in your binders this document
25 is at tab 26. However, the description is incorrect. Just I wanted to
1 clarify that so as not to create confusion for Your Honours and for my
2 colleagues. The ERN is correct but the description of the document is
3 not correct.
4 If we can take a look at the first paragraph in the introduction.
5 You see a sentence a few lines down beginning with: "The armed groups."
6 Do you see that? It's in the middle of paragraph, a sentence
7 beginning with: "The armed groups."
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And this sentence says: "The armed groups of the Albanian
10 extremists who call themselves National Liberation Army, or NLA, by means
11 of organised violence, are trying to effectuate certain political goals
12 in the interests of the Albanians in Macedonia and to impose themselves
13 as the only negotiating factor in the realisation of these goals."
14 Do you see that?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Does the phrase "organised violence" include organised attacks on
17 the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia?
18 A. I don't know, indeed, what the author meant with this thesis.
19 However, organised violence is not limited by territory or force, for
20 that matter, with respect to the numbers. Organised violence can be
21 organised by two or three people on a territory of just a single village,
22 if it was exercised in a planned manner, then one might say that it was
24 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, but you're not answering my question. My
25 question was simple. I'll ask it again.
1 Does the phrase "organised violence" include or would the phrase
2 "organised violence" include organised attacks on the security forces of
3 the Republic of Macedonia? Just yes or no.
4 A. No. It is possible, but the answer is no. I have to make an
5 emphasis here. I am afraid, Mr. Saxon, that we might be looking at the
6 wrong document. Maybe it is just me looking at the wrong document,
7 because the document that you pointed out of the 25th of July, 2005 does
8 not correspond with the assertion in paragraph 57. I think the number
9 listed is different N000-9146, 9179, that is to say, 65 ter 701, because
10 the events that are described here, this is 2001. And in paragraph 57, I
11 am discussing the events in 2000.
12 I think that there might be some kind of misunderstanding.
13 Q. Well, this is the document that you cited to in -- as authority
14 in paragraph 57. So I am simply reviewing this document with you, all
15 right? This is the document that you cited to, all right?
16 Now --
17 A. Then please help me out, because in front of me I have the
18 document 0171938.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. Footnote 26, I refer to a document N000-9164 and N000-9179. I
21 don't know whether we are discussing the same document at all. But it is
22 obvious that according to the dates it seems that this is not the same
24 Q. Your footnote refers to 65 ter 701 and that is the document in
25 front of you. Your footnote refers to a document from the Ministry of
1 Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, department of security and
2 counter-intelligence. That is the document in front of you. And it
3 refers to a document dated July 25th, 2001, which is this document. And
4 the problem -- I can simplify the problem, Dr. Markovski. Your footnote
5 refers to the English version. Dr. Markovski, look. Look,
6 Dr. Markovski. My version, the English version, has the number that is
7 in the footnote, all right?
8 A. Mr. Saxon, I don't blame you that you gave me the wrong document.
9 I just blame myself that I was not looking at the right document. We are
10 discussing certain events, but this document discusses events from 2001,
11 so maybe it's my bed. I'm just trying to reach the right document
12 discussing the events from 2000, and I'm quite convinced that the basis
13 of my report was maybe another document that described the events that
14 are referred in this paragraph; and you can also conclude that there is a
15 discrepancy between the period that I discussion and the period you are
16 talking to me about in this document.
17 Q. That may be, Dr. Markovski, but there is the document that you
18 referred to in your report as authority in this paragraph. So I simply
19 want to discuss this document with you, all right? Can we agree on that?
20 A. Absolutely we are going to agree. There is no dilemma. I just
21 wanted to say that my paragraph refers to events in 2000.
22 Q. You said that before. You don't have to repeat it again.
23 A minute ago, I asked you whether the phrase "organised violence"
24 could include attacks on the security forces of the Republic of
25 Macedonia. And you responded: No, it is possible, but the answer is no.
1 A. I didn't say the answer is no, but it is possible, but the basic
2 answer was no. So there are possibilities for something like that.
3 Q. All right. And if you go to -- if we turn to the bottom of page
4 4 in the English version, and this will be page 5 in your version, in the
5 Macedonian version, Dr. Markovski. We'll see a subsection entitled: The
6 National Liberation Army, NLA, and then the word "goals."
7 Do you see that? The fifth page of your version.
8 A. Very well. I see it.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. In my printed version, in the folder. Now I see it on the
11 screen, yes.
12 Q. All right. Now, in the very first paragraph of that subsection,
13 in the second sentence it says this:
14 "The aim of this terrorist organisation is to change the
15 constitution of Macedonia and endanger the security in the country by
16 applying organised violence, and by doing so to occupy Macedonian
18 Did you see that?
19 A. I apologise, but I don't see it. Can you point out precisely
20 where you read this from?
21 Q. Do you see the phrase: "The National Liberation Army."
22 Look at the hard copy in front of you.
23 A. Yes, that's correct.
24 Q. Do you see --
25 A. I see this.
1 Q. Do you see the word "goals" beneath it?
2 A. Yes, I do. I tell you, yes, I see the title: Goals.
3 Q. Do you see the -- the second sentence: "The aim of this
4 terrorist organisation ..."
5 Do you see that?
6 A. Unfortunately, no.
7 Q. Dr. Markovski, can you look at your hard copy, please.
8 MR. SAXON: My colleague is on his feet.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
10 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting,
11 but in the Macedonian version, it says: Purposes and maybe that is why
12 the witness was confused and the second sentence does not begin with the
13 word purpose or goals. This is not how the sentence beginning in the
14 Macedonian version. That is maybe why we have this misunderstanding.
15 MR. SAXON:
16 Q. I'm going to read the second sentence to you, Dr. Markovski and
17 hopefully what I read to you will look like what you see in your
18 language, all right.
19 "The aim of this terrorist organisation," aim and purpose can be
20 synonymous in English, "is to change the constitution of Macedonia and
21 endanger the security in the country by applying organised violence and
22 by doing so to occupy Macedonian territories."
23 Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, yes, it is now proper.
25 Q. Dr. Markovski, isn't that what happened in 2001? Isn't that what
1 the NLA eventually accomplished?
2 A. NLA did not manage to achieve anything. The crisis in 2001,
3 unfortunately, and for Macedonian misfortune, turned Macedonia at least
4 ten years backwards in every sense of the word, in both economic and
5 political, and any other aspect and cultural aspect. So all of us in the
6 Republic of Macedonia lost.
7 However, a result of everything that took place and which was the
8 product of the plan of the President Trajkovski to eliminate, the threat
9 to deal with the crisis that is, was strongly supported and aided by the
10 international institutions represented in the Republic of Macedonia, and
11 together with the relevant political entities, the political
12 Ohrid Agreement was adopted which significantly changes the structure and
13 the position of the Republic of Macedonia as a state.
14 On the other hand, I wish to indicate that the attempts to
15 resolve certain issues that became problems in the societal life in the
16 Republic of Macedonia emerged as early as 1992.
17 Q. Dr. Markovski --
18 A. But interrupted in 1995.
19 Q. I'm going to stop you there and I'm ask you from now on to give
20 brief answers to my questions.
21 Well, it's true, isn't it then that what the NLA set out to do in
22 2001 eventually occurred, didn't it? Territory --
23 A. No, no. The answer is an emphatic no.
24 Q. All right. If you go to the next page in the -- in the English
25 version, page 5, and page 6 in the Macedonian version, please, Doctor,
1 there is a subheading there called methods. Do you see it?
2 Can you look at it please on the hard copy that is in front of
4 A. Yes, yes, I see it.
5 Q. And that section says: "The NLA applies terrorist methods. They
6 are trying to fulfil their goals by causing explosions, fire, and other
7 dangerous activities and acts of organised violence in order to create
8 fear and instability among the citizens of Macedonia."
9 Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, I see it.
11 Q. I'd like to show you, please, some video material.
12 A. I apologise, but, again, you had a foresight here because you
13 again placed this quote outside of its natural context. You did not add
14 that the aim of the NLA was to destroy the constitutional order of the
15 Republic of Macedonia and to endanger its security.
16 Q. Dr. Markovski, I'd like to you let me ask the questions and you
17 to just answer them, all right. The Chamber can see what is written in
18 that paragraph, all right?
19 MR. SAXON: If we can show --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
21 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I am able to
22 assist, the English translation of the Macedonian text is wrong so this
23 might what creates the confusion. It should be the constitutional order
24 and not the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.
25 In the Macedonian text, it readings: Constitutional order, not
1 the constitution of the Republic.
2 MR. SAXON: Okay. Thank you very much.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Now, carry on, please, Mr. Saxon.
4 MR. SAXON: Can we please see what will be 65 ter 1120.5. This
5 is a video with ERN VOOO-7474, it's clip 5.
6 Q. This is more material from MRTV, Dr. Markovski. It's from the
7 11th of August, 2001, and it talks about the situation in Radusa.
8 MR. SAXON: If we can start that clip, please.
9 It's the wrong clip.
10 [Videotape played]
11 MR. SAXON: Stop it there. Can we stop it there.
12 Q. So we see by 52 seconds that at the moment in the Radusa region
13 there are terrorist actions with small arms, machine-guns and mortar
14 weapons, but at the same time that the army and police forces in this
15 area, under the unified command are acting forcefully?
16 MR. SAXON: Can we move forward now, please, to about 4 minutes.
17 Right there, if we can start there.
18 [Videotape played]
19 MR. SAXON: Can we stop please. Can we move back to about 3:30.
20 Okay, right there.
21 [Videotape played]
22 MR. SAXON: Stop there. We see at 3:46 we're told that
23 terrorists together with the groups of the Kosovo Protection Corps have
24 been attacking the Macedonian security forces and where there is still
25 heavy fighting and then we see the -- the commentary is turned over to
1 another journalist.
2 Can we start again, please. Can we now go.
3 [Videotape played]
4 MR. SAXON: Stop there. We see homes burning in the village at
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.
7 MR. SAXON: We see homes burning at 4:35, we saw a few seconds
8 before this a combat helicopter. Can we start again, please.
9 [Videotape played]
10 MR. SAXON: Stop there, please. At 4:42 we see the helicopter
11 firing what appear to be rockets.
12 Can we go again, please.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there, please. We've seen enough.
15 Q. Dr. Markovski, what we just saw from the 11th of August, 2001,
16 wouldn't that be an act of organised violence?
17 A. What we have here is the 11th of August, 2001, some information
18 are accurate, some presented here by the journalists are not. I remember
19 this event well, since I was at the -- at the time at the position when
20 it was necessary for me to follow the events. There was a police station
21 there, and the internal --
22 Q. No, Dr. Markovski, a simple yes or no would do. What we just saw
23 on this video from the 11th of August, did we see just an act of
24 organised violence?
25 A. It seems that it will be difficult for the two of us to
1 understand one another, Mr. Saxon, but the picture is never black or
2 white. What you are asking me can't really satisfy the needs of your
3 question. What I can tell you is that this is armed violence, this is
4 violence, but this is not a sufficient answer that would depict the
5 situation here precisely.
6 Q. Okay. Well, armed violence at this level would require a certain
7 degree of organisation, wouldn't it?
8 A. At this level, yes.
9 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender this video-clip,
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be exhibit number P00605.
13 Thank you, Your Honours.
14 MR. SAXON:
15 Q. Yesterday at page 10756 of the transcript, Dr. Markovski, I asked
16 you whether during 2001 the security forces lived and worked in a
17 situation of combat and you replied: "No, no, that would be too harsh an
18 assertion, which is not based in reality."
19 Doctor, doesn't the video that we just saw from Radusa in 2001
20 illustrate a combat situation?
21 A. I don't know. Today it seems that I'm inclined to oppose you all
22 the time. You did not cite to my full answer. I said that they lived in
23 a state of increased combat readiness. I am a bit old man, but I do
24 remember what I have said. So please ask the question now.
25 Q. I know that's what you said, Doctor, and after you said that, I
1 asked you the following: "Didn't the security forces live and work in a
2 situation of combat?"
3 You replied, page 10756 of the transcript: "No, no that is
4 correct would be too harsh an assertion, which is not based in reality."
5 Now, my question was: Doesn't the video that we just saw of
6 Radusa in August 2001 illustrate a combat situation?
7 A. This was a terrorist attack against the police station in Radusa,
8 and the news or their representation was not correct that the police and
9 the army acted jointly. The terrorist attack was carried out against the
10 police station during the time when the police makes the assessment that
11 because of infiltration of armed extremist groups from Kosovo, there was
12 an increased presence of armed persons at Radusa and they had
13 insufficient forces and means to deal with these terrorist attacks, they
14 request assistance from the army. The army was not involved until the
15 moment, or perhaps I won't be precise but it was sometime after 1700
16 hours, when the police forces, in the Radusa region, were given fire
17 support from the aviation.
18 Q. And the aviation falls within the army of the Republic of
19 Macedonia, right?
20 A. The aircrafts were not used.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, you saw a helicopter, didn't you, firing rockets a
22 few minutes ago in the video-clip. So helicopters were used, weren't
24 A. I said fire support from the aviation to the police so that it
25 can deal with the terrorist act carried out by the armed terrorist groups
1 and for the police against whom there was fire from several sides, to be
2 withdrawn, to be taken from the area. I need to mention that the police
3 has left the police station there, which means that it was surrounded by
4 the armed extremist Albanian groups.
5 Q. Dr. Markovski, the helicopters that were firing rockets at the
6 NLA member, those helicopters were under the jurisdiction of the army,
8 A. Yes, absolutely.
9 MR. SAXON: I'd like to go back for a moment to this video
10 material, and it is now P00605. If we can go back to this same
11 video-clip, please, the one we just saw, and before we begin, I just want
12 to note what you told us a minute ago. "The aircrafts were not used."
13 If we can start the video, please, and --
14 A. I apologise, I apologise. Before you begin, I said aeroplanes
15 were not uses which means they did not act.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. SAXON: Well, can we scroll to around six minutes please on
18 this video-clip.
19 [Videotape played]
20 MR. SAXON: A bit more, please.
21 Okay, right there is fine.
22 [Videotape played]
23 MR. SAXON: If we can go about 30 seconds more forward, please.
24 [Videotape played]
25 MR. SAXON: Can we stop there, please.
1 Q. That's a fixed wing aircraft, isn't it, Dr. Markovski. That is a
2 fixed wing aircraft that we see coming in here, isn't it.
3 A. You're absolutely right.
4 Q. Okay. So what you said before when you said the aircrafts were
5 not used want quite correct, was it? This is at 7:30 of the video.
6 A. I was absolutely right, and I'm still standing at that statement.
7 The aeroplanes with regards to the events that we're discussing, did not
8 act. Obviously they were flying, but they did not act.
9 Q. Okay, well they were certainly prepared to act, if necessary,
10 weren't they?
11 A. Macedonia is prepared to act today also, if someone attacks it.
12 Q. Okay. I'll take your response as a yes.
13 A. What do you mean, no? I'm emphatic that they did not
15 Q. I said I would take your response as a yes, Dr. Markovski. So we
17 A. I'm telling you that the aviation did not participate.
18 Q. I understand that. The question I asked you was that they were
19 prepared to participate, and you replied: "The forces of Macedonia are
20 always prepared." And I said: "I will take that as a yes."
21 A. Which answer?
22 Q. I'm going to move on?
23 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon, please move on, will you, yes. We are
24 wasting time. The Chamber can well see the effect of what is occurring.
25 MR. SAXON: Very well, Your Honour.
1 Can we please turn to paragraph 267 of your report.
2 Q. Paragraph 267, Dr. Markovski, refers to a letter that you say
3 President Trajkovski sent on the 11th of August, to Kofi Annan,
4 Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to George Robertson,
5 Secretary-General of NATO. And you explain that the letter to Robertson
6 stated that in the course of the day on 11 August 2001, the security
7 forces and the local population in the area of the village Radusa and the
8 village Rogacevo were exposed to continual attack from infantry and
9 artillery fire by the terrorists?
10 And then a few lines later goes on to say: "The security forces
11 of the Republic of Macedonia refrained from responding to these attacks."
12 Do you see that?
13 A. Were refraining.
14 Q. Okay. I think -- I think the meaning is the same.
15 Well, what the president told George Robertson, then, wasn't
16 quite true, was it?
17 A. I can't speak about what the president said to Mr. Robertson and
18 whether that was completely accurate.
19 Q. Well, didn't see from a video-clip that I showed you a minute ago
20 that the security forces quite actively responded to the attacks in
22 A. But that was a reaction, because they were constantly under
23 attack by the infantry from the villages of Radusa and village Rogacevo
24 so that was reaction, a defence.
25 Q. You're right. So where the president said, according to you at
1 paragraph 267, that the security forces refrained from responding to
2 these attacks wasn't quite true, was it?
3 A. It was like this: You could have noticed from the video-clip as
4 well, that, actually, the penetration of the armed extremist gangs from
5 Kosovo started in the evening on the 10th, if I understood it well, and I
6 believe I did because I know the situation well and then the events then
7 took place on the 11th. So up until the moment when the police station
8 was attacked, it was obvious that the police officers present there were
9 restraining; and this is why I don't see that there is anything illogical
10 here, because to restrain and to be restraining, denotes two different
11 tenses in Macedonian and it has two different meanings so they were
12 retraining, up until the moment when their personal safety was at risk.
13 Q. I'm going to move on.
14 MR. SAXON: Can we turn back to what is 65 ter 701, please. This
15 is, again, at -- in binder number 1, tab 26. And, actually, before we go
16 back into this document,.
17 Q. I'd like to go back briefly to your expert report, which is
18 Exhibit 2D00101. If you could turn to paragraph 328, please, Doctor.
19 Can you turn to paragraph 328.
20 A. Yes, paragraph 328.
21 Q. Yes. Paragraph 328 begins: "At the start of the escalation of
22 the crisis, the activities of the terrorists amounted to assassinations
23 and attacks on army and police officials. The attacks were carried out
24 by smaller groups on distinct targets and significant buildings, which
25 had the effect of sowing fear and uncertainty and prevented the officials
1 from completing their tasks. The attacks employed weapons from distance,
2 but the terrorist actions applied the tactic of hit and run, in cases
3 where infantry weapons were used. There were almost no instances of
4 lengthy clashes and casualties among the armed Albanian groups. This
5 created the impression of untouchability and independence, in the
6 undertaking of terrorist acts."
7 Now, if we can move back to 65 ter 701, please, the document that
8 you cited to in your report earlier, the information on the NLA
9 activities in the territory of Macedonia. This document has a chronology
10 section, and the chronology section lists a number of events that
11 occurred during 2001. And if you could turn, please, Doctor, in the
12 Macedonian version to the bottom of page 12 and for those following in
13 the English, this will be page 10 in the English version.
14 We don't seem to have a Macedonian version, but here it comes.
15 Go to the next page in the Macedonian version, please.
16 And starting at the bottom of page 12 in the Macedonian version
17 and in the middle of the English page, which is page 10, we see an entry
18 that says: "On June the 5th, 2001 at 1915 hours ..."
19 Do you see that?
20 A. Yes, I see it.
21 Q. And that entry begins: "Terrorists attacked the Macedonian
22 security forces at the Sipkovica Krivena post in the Tetovo area."
23 MR. SAXON: And can we move one more page in the Macedonian
24 version, please and move up to the top of the screen and focus on the
25 first several paragraphs.
1 Q. We see that it says: "The attack was conducted with grenades and
2 automatic weapons from different directions. In addition, there was a
3 mortar attack coming from the first houses in the village of
4 Sipkovica-Tetovo. During the attack, five members of the army of the
5 Republic of Macedonia were killed," and it gives the names of those
6 soldiers, and then it says that three soldiers were wounded and
7 transferred to the military hospital in Skopje.
8 Have you been following with me?
9 A. Yes, yes, I was following you.
10 Q. Was this a terrorist attack?
11 A. According to all the categories, yes, absolutely.
12 Q. Okay. And which categories are you referring to?
13 A. Categories or characteristics of terrorism or manifestations of
14 terrorist activities.
15 Let me explain. We are discussing the individuals who were
16 killed listed in the report. These are members of the army who were not
17 engaged in the military activities but were taking food to a particular
18 location on Sar Planina, so there were no combat activities and no need
19 to act. So they were carrying food and there was a terrorist ambush and
20 terrorist attack and murder.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, in armed conflict, going back to our country X,
22 isn't it common that members of one side attack and kill members of the
23 other side?
24 A. In combat activity, yes.
25 Q. Well, can't people be attacked while they're eating their dinner?
1 Is there a rule that says that they can't be attacked at dinner time, or
2 breakfast time?
3 A. The Turkish people did not kill people even at that time, but
4 nowadays it is not so.
5 MR. SAXON: Can we move forward, please, to page 12 in the
6 English version, and if we could go to page 12 in the Macedonian version
7 as well, please. And in the Macedonian version, can we go forward one
8 more page, please. Can we go forward one more page in the Macedonian
9 version. And yet again, one more page, please.
10 Q. Dr. Markovski, in your version, towards the top of the page,
11 there's an entry beginning with: "On 21/6/2001 ..."
12 Do you see that?
13 MR. SAXON: No, Mr. Registrar, well, that's fine now.
14 A. It's fine. I can see it.
15 Q. And it's at the bottom of the page in English. And we're told on
16 June 21, 2001, around 1700 hours, from different positions in the lotion
17 called Shipkovecki Bacila and in the village of Sipkovica terrorist
18 groups attacked the Macedonian security forces at Popova Sapka. Seven
19 grenades fell in this location but did not injure any of the policemen.
20 As a response, our forces attacked the terrorist positions with artillery
21 weapons and totally pushed them back."
22 Was this a terrorist attack?
23 A. I was expecting to continue with the story about the previous
24 event. You forgot.
25 Q. Please do not, Dr. Markovski. I want you to answer the question
1 that I'm asking you.
2 A. Very well. Okay. I accept it.
3 So in my opinion, this is not a terrorist group, that is to say,
4 terrorist attack, to be more precise.
5 Q. Okay.
6 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, before I forget, I would seek to tender
7 this document now I believe it was 65 ter 701.
8 Ms. Residovic is on her feet.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this document is
11 already Exhibit 1D342, and there is no need to be admitted again as
13 MR. SAXON: Thank you very much. I stand corrected.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, indeed.
15 MR. SAXON:
16 Q. If we could turn back to your expert report, Dr. Markovski, would
17 you turn to paragraph 74, please. Actually, I think -- no, I will turn
18 to paragraph 74 for a moment.
19 At the beginning of your paragraph 74, you explain that, as a
20 result of the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, the state organs,
21 acting pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, informed the
22 United Nations Security Council and requested from the UN Security
23 Council the undertaking of urgent activities by KFOR to strictly adhere
24 to the regulations relating to the movement of military and paramilitary
25 groups, arms shipment, movement restricts, and the gathering of large
1 groups of individuals in the international zone ..."
2 Do you see that.
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Now, Article 51, I think you know, falls under Chapter 7 of the
5 United Nations Charter, right?
6 A. I am aware what Article 51 of the Charter speaks about, about the
7 right on collective an individual self-defence.
8 Q. Dr. Markovski, we would move along more quickly if you would
9 listen to my question and just respond to my question.
10 My question was simply this Article 51 falls within Chapter 7 of
11 the United Nations Charter, right?
12 A. I don't know whether it falls in chapter number 7. I really
13 don't know.
14 Q. Will you take my word for it for the purposes of this question?
15 A. There is no reason why I shouldn't do so.
16 Q. Okay, thank you. Thank you. Well, chapter 7 of the UN charter
17 addresses actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
18 peace and acts of aggression. And my question for you is this: Didn't
19 the actions of the NLA, in 2001, fall within each of these three
21 A. Simply I don't have an answer. I don't know. Let's analyse them
22 one by one, and then we'll see.
23 Q. Okay. Well, your answer is you don't know.
24 A. Yes. In this particular moment, yes.
25 Q. Well, do you know whether -- well, given the subject matter of
1 Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, action with respect to threats to the peace,
2 breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, do you know whether that
3 was why the government of Macedonia felt that it was appropriate to
4 invoke Article 51 of Chapter 7?
5 A. I don't know whether the government decided to invoke Article 51
6 of the UN Charter, but I know that to the Security Council of the United
7 Nations, they asked for immediate activities by KFOR because it was
8 obvious that the Republic of Macedonia was facing problems in providing
9 the security of the national border between Kosovo and the Republic of
10 Macedonia, because, basically, the border was secured only on the
11 Macedonian side and for one or other reasons they would say that the
12 border in depth of two kilometres towards Kosovo is mined by the former
13 Yugoslav army when it was retreated, was retreating from this area and
14 that is why they justified this decision not to provide security of the
16 Q. Help us understanding is, though, Dr. Markovski, why do you say
17 that you don't know whether the government decided to invoke Article 51
18 of the UN Charter, when in paragraph 74 of your report you say that: "As
19 a result of the emerging crisis the state organs acts pursuant to Article
20 51 of the UN Charter, informed the UN Security Council and made certain
22 A. This is my position. I guessed that this is so, but I was not
23 present at the governmental session in order to be sure. So this is why
24 I said it. My assumption is that they refer to the right of collective
25 an individual self-defence. So this paragraph, as can you see there are
1 no quotation marks so this is my personal opinion and position.
2 Q. And so what you say there in paragraph 74 the phrase "acting
3 pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter," that's just your assumption,
5 A. Yes, yes, absolutely, because it is not in quotation marks.
6 Q. Do you think that's a very scientific way to draft your report?
7 A. Why not? This is my conclusion from the result of their
8 reaction. Because immediately afterward we had a reaction by the
9 Security Council which referred to certain resolutions, and they made
10 their position known. On the other hand, the United Nations reacted and
11 they welcome the international efforts, the UNMIK as well, in order to
12 deal with the potential threats and danger in the Republic of Macedonia,
13 and, at the end, the Security Council adopted the resolution 1345 thus
14 condemning the terrorist violence including terrorist activities on
15 certain parts of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. This is --
16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
17 A. Sufficient indication --
18 MR. SAXON: I see the time, Your Honours. Would this be a good
19 time to take the first break?
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Saxon.
21 We will resume at 11.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
25 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Q. Dr. Markovski, could you turn, please, again, back to your expert
2 report, and could we look at paragraph 76, please.
3 Do you have paragraph 76 in front of you?
4 A. Yes, I see it.
5 Q. The last sentence of paragraph 76 says this: "The armed Albanian
6 extremists do not possess any data on the number of wounded extremists,
7 which also serves to demonstrate that they were unorganized and
8 uncontrolled groups of armed thugs."
9 Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, it is like that.
11 Q. How does the first point that you make demonstrate -- excuse me.
12 How does that point that you make about lack of data on number of wounded
13 extremists demonstrate that they were unorganised and uncontrolled groups
14 of armed thugs? How does one point indicate the other?
15 A. I apologise, I don't hear the interpretation into Macedonian.
16 Yes, I hear it now.
17 Q. I will repeat my question. How does the point that -- the
18 comment that you make about lack of data on number of wounded extremists
19 demonstrate that they were unorganised and uncontrolled groups of armed
20 thugs? How does one point illustrate the other point?
21 A. Very simply. One organised military structure has a special
22 respect towards the members of it who have lost their lives or were
23 wounded when working on attaining the goals of that organisation. That
24 would mean when performing the service there.
25 The documents that are available and that I had reviewed, the
1 members of the armed extremists in the Republic of Macedonia have made a
2 table, a document, discussing 52 individuals who were killed on their
3 side. This document, if we ran a more profound analysis we will see that
4 the many data are missing on many persons. For instance, where were they
5 born, when were they born, it is not known where some of them were killed
6 and for some of them is not known where they were buried. A serious
7 military institution would not permit this, since what we have here is
8 their members and what we have here is a tradition that they all need to
9 be buried following all procedures of military tradition.
10 And another aspect is, another data on which I base my conclusion
11 is they really don't have data on how many injured they had. And this is
12 based on the statements available to me, coming from both Mr. Ali Ahmeti
13 and Mr. Gzim Ostreni, who represent themselves as having the highest
14 responsibility within this structure. They both assert that they don't
15 have these data.
16 Q. Were you shown the witness statement of Mr. Nazim Bushi, who
17 talked about the numbers of wounded men that were in his brigade, the
18 114th Brigade?
19 A. That is 114th Brigade, as Mr. Bushi says, I'm speaking about the
20 overall structure that wishes to represent itself as the NLA.
21 Q. Okay. But my question was simply this, so you were not shown the
22 ICTY witness statement of Nazim Bushi, were you?
23 A. I'm not sure, but if it was there among the documents, have I
24 seen it. But I'm not sure whether I have really seen it. I don't think
25 I have analysed it.
1 Q. And how about the ICTY witness statement and I hope I'm
2 pronouncing the name correctly. Rasim Haliti, who talked about the
3 number of wounded persons in his brigade. Were you shown that statement?
4 A. You are directing me only -- in a fragmentary fashion to certain
5 groups, the organisation that wishes to represent itself as the National
6 Liberation Army does not have any such document.
7 Q. I'm just asking, sir, you can just answer yes or no, whether,
8 prior to completing your report you reviewed the ICTY witness statement
9 of Rasim Haliti.
10 A. I have seen Rasim Haliti's, yes.
11 Q. And did you see what he said about the number of wounded men in
12 his brigade?
13 A. But this is not the answer to the question how many wounded and
14 killed were in the NLA.
15 Q. Okay. I'm going to move on.
16 If you take a look at paragraph 77, the very next paragraph,
17 Doctor. In the beginning of the paragraph you say: "The signing of the
18 framework agreement in August 2001 as a political agreement between the
19 relevant political subjects in the Republic of Macedonia and the presence
20 of representatives from the European Union, NATO, and the United States
21 of America, signalled the end of the hostilities ..."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. Yes, it is correct.
24 Q. By "hostilities," do you mean the end of the fighting between the
25 NLA and the Macedonian security forces?
1 A. No. Since, unfortunately, this document, signed by the relevant
2 political structures in the Republic of Macedonia, failed to bring the
3 peace ultimately. It did not relieve the situation of incidents an armed
4 provocations. It continued and continued over the longer period of time.
5 But this document was still a signal and a strong pressure from both the
6 political structure, the relevant ones in the Republic of Macedonia but
7 also from the international factor --
8 Q. I need to stop you there. My question was something else. I'm
9 interested in your use of the word "hostilities." And I want to know
10 whether by the word "hostilities" you mean the end of fighting between
11 the NLA and the security forces of Macedonia.
12 A. Obviously no.
13 Q. Then how were you using the term "hostilities" in that sentence?
14 What does "hostilities" mean?
15 A. In the political sense, since the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a
16 political agreement among the relevant political structures in the
17 Republic of Macedonia, started the processes of further democratisation
18 of the Macedonian society and created inequitable circumstances for
19 absence of any hostilities amongst any political, economic, social,
20 ethnic or other groups in the Republic of Macedonia.
21 Q. Dr. Markovski, wasn't the primary purpose of the Ohrid Agreement
22 to stop the fighting?
23 A. The primary purpose of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was that
24 there were no territorial solutions for any disputes in the Republic of
1 Q. And after that, wasn't the next purpose to stop the fighting?
2 A. Absolutely, yes.
3 Q. Okay. At the end, the last sentence of paragraph 77 you're still
4 talking about the Ohrid Agreement, and at the very end of that sentence
5 you refer to the: "Decentralisation of a large number of the
6 responsibilities on a municipal level?"
7 Do you see that?
8 A. Would you kindly repeat it, please? I apologise for this.
9 Q. Take a look at the last sentence of paragraph 77.
10 A. Yes, yes, please go on.
11 Q. Okay. And one of the things that the Ohrid Agreement did was it
12 also provided for the decentralisation of certain Macedonian government
13 institutions, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Correct?
14 A. Yes, it is correct.
15 Q. And that's because in 2001 the Ministry of Internal Affairs was
16 quite a centralised institution, wasn't it?
17 A. I really can't give you a specific answer to this. With regards
18 to the situation in the Ministry of Interior, I can't really speak about
19 it. I don't know it well. But let's suppose it is like you are saying.
20 Q. All right. Yesterday, you recall from yesterday, I hope, and
21 this is at pages 10735 to 10736 of the transcript, we looked together at
22 the 1992 Law on Defence. Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And I asked you whether we saw that the 1992 law did not define
25 the powers or duties of the General Staff, but you asked to see the 1995
1 law. Do you remember that discussion?
2 A. Yes. Yes, of course.
3 Q. Well, we now have the 1995 law available, and I would like to
4 show it to you, please. I think we even have some hard copies.
5 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, this will be 65 ter 1D01215.2, and
6 there contains some amendments to the Law on Defence which was passed in
7 1995. And if that can be called up on e-court, the English version as
9 Q. And if you take a look at this -- the decree to announce the law
10 on changing the Law on Defence, it is published in the Official Gazette
11 on June 7th, 1995. And you can see here, Dr. Markovski, that there are
12 just five amendments to the Law on Defence, and these -- each amendment
13 addresses amounts of money, and I believe they relate actually to fines
14 that are imposed during disciplinary measures. Do you see that?
15 A. Yes, yes, you're right.
16 Q. So in the 1995 law or amendments to the law, there's -- we see
17 nothing yet about the powers and responsibilities of the General Staff of
18 the army of the Republic of Macedonia, right?
19 A. Yes, that is right, even Gods are silent before the truth.
20 Q. Okay.
21 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, at this time, I would like to tender,
22 first, what was the 1992 law that was discussed yesterday, and that is 65
23 ter 1236. And I would also like to tender this document, the 1995
25 JUDGE PARKER: They will be received as two parts of the one
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be exhibit number P00606.1
3 that's referring to 65 ter 1236. And 65 ter 1D01215.2 shall be P00606.2.
4 Thank you, Your Honours.
5 MR. SAXON:
6 Q. Now do you also recall from our discussion yesterday,
7 Dr. Markovski, that we looked at the 2001 Law on Defence as well.
8 MR. SAXON: And for the parties that is 1D0098.
9 Q. Do you remember when we looked through the 2001 law as well
11 A. Yes, yes, we started reviewing it, but then probably because of
12 what you are showing here, we stopped it. Yes, I agree.
13 Q. Right.
14 A. We are starting to agree a lot. It might not be well.
15 Q. I think it's great, actually.
16 And in the time that we spent on the 2001 law yesterday, we saw
17 these provisions or amendments, if you will, that then specifically
18 defined the roles and responsibilities of the General Staff of the army,
19 right? Do you remember that?
20 A. Yes, yes, it is so.
21 Q. Okay. And you also described yesterday how, during the crisis
22 time in 2001, the General Staff was fully functioning. Do you recall
24 A. Yes, absolutely. All throughout the crisis, even before the
25 crisis and after it.
1 Q. All right. Well, then, so those amendments, first of all, the
2 amendments to the 2001 law that addressed the roles and responsibilities
3 of the General Staff, what those amendments did really was formalise a
4 situation that already existed, right?
5 A. You have very general. But let's analyse it, no problem.
6 Q. But can you answer my question. Since the General Staff was
7 functioning before June of 2001, then what those amendments did was
8 formalise the position an operation of the General Staff, right?
9 A. Which amendments are you referring to? This is why I asked you.
10 It is rather general.
11 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness what is 1D00098, please.
12 And, Your Honours, this is at tab 48 and it's binder 2.
13 Q. If binder 2 could be given to the witness, in case you'd like to
14 look at this in hard copy.
15 A. I apologise, but I wish you to understand what I'm asking, when
16 we are discussing the law, I wish to have the law in front of me to see
17 it. Otherwise I don't wish to obstruct you in your work, but this is why
18 I'm asking --
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that's fine, that is
20 perfectly fine. And I just need to find the right chapter.
21 Turn to, please, what is chapter 4 and take a look at Article --
22 excuse me. Yeah, and take a look at Article 28 of the 2001 law.
23 And Article 28 is in a subchapter called command in the armed
24 forces. Do you see that?
25 A. Yes, yes, it is so.
1 Q. And the third paragraph says: "Immediate command with the armed
2 forces is carried out by the chief of the General Staff as well as
3 commanders of the military units ...."
4 You see that?
5 A. Yes. And of the institutions.
6 Q. Okay. One moment, please.
7 Yes. If you take a look at Article 26. Article 26 says: "For
8 the purposes of accomplishing the activities in Article 25, the General
9 Staff of the army forces accomplishes the following ..."
10 And then there's a list of responsibilities of the General Staff.
11 Do you see that?
12 A. Yes, a total of 21.
13 Q. Yes. And then if you turn to Article 27, we see that the chief
14 manages the General Staff of the armed forces who is appointed and
15 discharged by the president.
16 Do you see that?
17 A. It is appointed and dismissed. The competencies for appointments
18 and dismissal discharge of the chief of the General Staff belong to the
19 president, to the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.
20 Q. Thank you for that. But the point is Articles 26 and 27 they are
21 new provisions in the Law on Defence and since the General Staff was
22 already running all during the crisis you explain that General Petrovski
23 was the chief of the General Staff. What we see here is that these
24 Articles in the new law effectively formalise what had was an ongoing
25 situation, right? Defined in law something that was already existing,
1 already operating. Is that fair?
2 A. Your question is very general but probably we will arrive at this
3 conclusion of yours through the next questions. I will not give you a
4 specific answer now because I can't. If you ask me a more specific
5 question then I will really be able to answer it, but I expect next
6 question, so let's see.
7 Q. Well, how about this? Article 26, subparagraph 8 says that: The
8 General Staff of the armed forces will plan and organise and accomplish
9 training activities for the armed forces."
10 Do you see that?
11 A. Which is the document where you see it? In 1995?
12 Q. We were looking at the 2001 Law on Defence, Article 26, what
13 we've been looking at for the last few minutes.
14 A. We're speaking about item 16 of Article 26?
15 Q. Well, no. Let's speak about -- let's speak about item 3. Okay?
16 A. Yes, very well. Yes, no problem.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... supervises taking measures
18 for the readiness of the armed forces and takes measures for their
20 Do you see that? Do you see that? Can you just say yes?
21 A. I see it, but is it what you said or what the interpreter said,
22 the interpretation I receive differs substantial. I will try and read it
23 in Macedonian and let the interpreters interpret it back to you because
24 there is an important thing here. It is about the readiness of the army.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. And I believe that we agree here.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. So it organises and monitors carrying out of measures for
4 readiness of the army and undertakes measures for their execution.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. I believe that you understand, because readiness is something
7 very important.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. But the bottom line is, even before
9 the new law was passed in 2001, the General Staff was fulfilling this
10 role that's described in Article 3, right? It was already doing this.
11 A. Before passing the law of 2001?
12 Q. Yeah. Yeah.
13 A. On the basis of what would it do it.
14 Q. Well, there was a crisis time in --
15 A. [In English] I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
16 [Interpretation] no, no, I meant 1991, I apologise, you're right.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. I apologise.
19 Q. So in 2001 the General Staff was performing some of these
20 responsibilities that are laid out there Article 26, even before the new
21 law was enacted, right? We need a verbal response.
22 A. You're right. Yes, yes.
23 Q. All right. So that means that these provisions or at least to
24 some degree, were simply -- were codifying or formalising a situation
25 that already existed, right?
1 A. I don't understand. I'm really making efforts, but I don't
2 understand the question. Which situation is -- was codified? I don't
3 know what you're asking of me.
4 Q. The fact that the General Staff of the army of Republic of
5 Macedonia, before June of 2001, was involved in organising and taking
6 measures or monitoring of taking measures for the readiness of the armed
8 A. Yes, yes, you're right about this.
9 Q. Okay. And you also describe the yesterday how the General Staff
10 was fully functioning in 2001. And so at least these parts of the 2001
11 Law on Defence, the parts that describe the work of the General Staff,
12 they went into effect immediately, didn't they?
13 A. Yes, there was no reason for any delay.
14 Q. Okay.
15 Can you please turn, if you can -- can you turn, please, to the
16 end of this law. If you go all the way to Article 172?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And Article 172 says: "Regulations issuing of which is foreseen
19 by this law will be issued in a period of one year from the date it is
20 put into effect."
21 Do you see that?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. "Expect for Articles 142, 143, and 144 from chapter 12, which
24 will be passed in a maximum of two years."
25 Do you see that?
1 A. Yes, that is correct. This is what it reads.
2 Q. But Article 172 doesn't specifically define what parts of the law
3 will require regulations and which parts will not, does it?
4 A. Yes, the Article does not specify that.
5 Q. Okay. Could you turn back to your report, please. If we could
6 take a look at paragraph 102 of your report.
7 Paragraph 102 says that: "In view of the fact that the security
8 forces were employed in conditions when a state of war or a state of
9 emergency were not declared, the members of the reservist ranks of the
10 army of Republic of Macedonia could have been called up for exercises or
11 mobilisation exercises."
12 Do you see that?
13 A. Yes, this is what it reads, and this is how it was.
14 Q. Well, but in reality, weren't the army reservists who were called
15 up in 2001 called up for much more than just exercises. They were also
16 called up to fight the members of the NLA, right?
17 A. In the invitations, one could read that they're being called up
18 for an exercise or mobilisation exercise.
19 Q. But during the crisis time in 2001, once these reservists were
20 called up, some of them, at least, found themselves in positions where
21 they were actually fighting the NLA. Isn't that right?
22 A. Yes. Within these 30 days while the exercise lasted.
23 Q. All right. Well, so in 2001, the Law on Defence, if I can use an
24 American expression I hope it will translate all right in your language.
25 The Law on Defence was bent just a little bit to provide the army with
1 the manpower that it needed. Isn't that right?
2 A. No. The law is fine, and the law provides for all other
3 possibilities for mobilisation or use of the army. If you pose this as a
4 problem, as an issue, it should refer to the declaration or
5 non-declaration of state of war so this is what is important for any
6 further legislation and implementation of the provisions of the Defence
8 Q. But would you not include fighting within the definition of an
9 exercise, a military exercise, would you?
10 A. You're right about that.
11 Q. Okay. If we can turn, please, to paragraph 148 in your expert
12 report, the last sentence of paragraph 148 says this:
13 "Nevertheless estimates show that the army had a total of
14 approximately 8.000 personnel at its disposal, of which only
15 approximately 3.000 were directly involved in the protection of the
16 territory under their control, not including the personnel from the
17 border brigade."
18 Do you see that.
19 A. Yes, this is what it says.
20 Q. You use the phrase here "under their control," because during the
21 crisis time part of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia was under
22 the control of the NLA. Isn't that right?
23 A. There is no such thing in my sentence. Let's try it again.
24 Following the same system we applied earlier. It was rather efficient.
25 I will read the sentence and then it will be interpreted into English for
2 Q. Yes, please.
3 A. "However, the estimates speak that the army, on a monthly level,
4 disposed of, in total, around 8.000 personnel, out of which 3.000 were
5 directly engaged for the protection of the territory of their
6 responsibility or under their responsibility, excluding the personnel of
7 the border brigade, which provided security at the border."
8 Q. Okay. Well, the English translation that was provided to us by
9 Defence counsel has the phrase "under their control," so that's why I
10 asked you that question. But thank you for clarifying that.
11 If you could take a look at paragraph 149, just the next
12 paragraph. At the start of paragraph 149, towards the end of the initial
13 paragraph, you're referring to the combat actions of the army, and you
15 "They only undertook active combat actions on five or six
16 occasions ..."
17 Do you see that?
18 A. Yes. This is what happened and this is how it reads.
19 Q. And you list five or six -- you list, I believe, six, actually,
20 examples --
21 A. I list six examples, because five of them were implemented.
22 That's why I say five to six. Out of the six issued orders by the
23 Supreme Corps Commander, five were implemented. One was not implemented
24 by the General Staff, and that is why the Chief of Staff was discharged
25 on the 9th of August, 2001.
1 Q. All right. So just so that I understand your testimony, these
2 six occasions that you're referring to, you're referring to six occasions
3 where the Supreme Commander gave an order to the army, to undertake
4 combat activity. Is that right?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. All right. So, for example, your six examples here would not
7 include the fighting around Radusa that we saw earlier this morning, in
8 the video-clip, from the 11th of August. That wouldn't be included
9 within these six examples, would it?
10 A. That is correct. But one has to bear in mind that I'm discussing
11 here, and I am very specific that in five cases only, active combat
12 activities have been carried out. That is to say, operations that have
13 been organised and planned by the security bodies of the Republic of
14 Macedonia. Radusa is not an action organised and planned by the security
15 structures of the Republic of Macedonia. Radusa was a situation when
16 armed extremists groups attacked the police station and the members of
17 the police, later on, in the afternoon hours, and with the support of
18 army structures, found themselves in a situation where they were
19 defending themselves. So they did not undertake active combat
20 activities. This would mean attack.
21 Q. Okay. So, in other words, you are also not including here the
22 situations or events in 2001 where members of the army, such as in
23 Radusa, had to undertake, shall we say, defensive actions?
24 A. Yes, you're right.
25 Q. Okay. And isn't it also true, though, if we're talking about a
1 crisis that stretched from approximately February to August, so about
2 seven months, that six combat operations is actually quite a bit, isn't
3 it? Six combat planned -- excuse me. Five combat operations carried out
4 by the armed forces in seven months. Isn't that quite a bit?
5 A. Absolutely no. I don't see where you draw this conclusion or
6 where this logic comes from.
7 Q. Well --
8 A. In a period of a single month, if we are discussing dealing with
9 terrorist organisations one might have even 30 different activities.
10 Q. Well, in 2001, as you point out in your report, the security
11 forces were having trouble mobilising sufficient personnel. Isn't that
13 A. Yes, you're right.
14 Q. And so it wasn't always so easy for the security forces to mount
15 an operation, was it, an offensive operation?
16 A. Are you referring to the problems with the personnel?
17 Q. For example, yes.
18 A. Both yes and no.
19 Q. Okay. Well, can you think of -- correct me if I'm wrong,
20 Macedonia became a republic in 1991 or 1992? Which year was it?
21 A. It was 1991.
22 Q. Okay. Can you --
23 A. The first constitution has been passed on the 17th of November,
24 1991, for the independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia.
25 Q. Can you think of any year prior to 2001, when -- can you think of
1 any year between 1991 up through the year 2000 when the army of the
2 Republic of Macedonia was ordered to undertake six combat operations and
3 actually undertook five of them?
4 A. Up until 2000, there was no such case.
5 Q. Okay. Can we turn, please, to paragraph 181 of your report,
7 A. Did you say it well, because 181 does not exist in the report.
8 Q. Really? I have it here. I may be reading an older version.
9 A. I submitted certain changes and amendments to the report.
10 Q. I'm going to find it right now. You're probably right.
11 All right. If 181 has been removed, then I'm not going to ask
12 you about it. And it has been.
13 A. Let's -- for the first time, maybe you can agree with me.
14 Q. Oh, it's not the first time.
15 All right. Would you agree with me that during 2001, a division
16 developed, if I can call it that, between President Trajkovski, who, as
17 Supreme Commander, commanded the army, and Prime Minister Georgievski
18 because the prime minister, according to the constitution, could command
19 the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Would that be a fair
21 A. Yes there were certain disagreements between the president and
22 Supreme Commander of the armed forces and the prime minister, and I
23 responded to one of the questions of the Defence. I said that when the
24 issue was whether to accept such an idea for declaration of a state of
25 war, the president was against it and the prime minister was in favour.
1 This is at least according to the information I've got.
2 Q. Okay.
3 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, my colleague is on her feet.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would just like
6 to object to a portion of the question on page 48, line 3, where it says
7 that the prime minister according to the constitution could have had
8 command of the police forces. I think that this is an incorrect
10 JUDGE PARKER: That's noted, Ms. Residovic.
11 MR. SAXON:
12 Q. These disagreements between the president and the prime minister,
13 didn't they also, at times, lead to problems or disagreements during
14 joint operations between the police -- involving the police and the army?
15 A. We are discussing here a different point of view, how to deal
16 with the crisis back in 2001. These are ideas, positions of certain
17 individuals. In this particular case, one of the highest ranking
18 officials and the most responsible ones. However, the army, nor the
19 police depend on the position of the prime minister or the president, but
20 they depend on the constitution and the legal provisions.
21 Q. So did I take your response as a yes or a no?
22 A. They do not depend on the personal opinions of anybody.
23 Q. Well, that's -- that may be true.
24 A. I'm quite sure it is true.
25 Q. Fine. I'll use your words. I'm sure it's true, but it can
1 happen, can't it, that the positions of people in power can have --
2 positions of people in leadership roles can have an influence or effect
3 on their subordinates, can't it? Can we agree on that?
4 A. No, no. These are their political positions which are limited by
5 the constitutions -- constitution and the laws. Outside the law and the
6 constitution, the president cannot act, nor the prime minister.
7 Q. But within the law and the constitution, in 2001, the prime
8 minister, through the minister of the interior, could exert some
9 influence on the activities of the Ministry of Interior and the police,
10 couldn't he?
11 A. In what sense are you referring to? If you're talking in the
12 sense of the engagement of the police, I would be able to provide an
14 Q. Well, I believe you say at several points in your report. In
15 fact, let's take a look at paragraph 216. Hopefully this paragraph still
17 A. Absolutely, yes.
18 Q. All right. Now, for example, the start of paragraph 16 [sic] the
19 government -- at least this is the English translation so if there's a
20 problem with the translation, you correct me, okay? "The government has
21 authority over the structures of the police."
22 A. I apologise, which article or which paragraph are we discussing?
23 Q. Paragraph 216.
24 A. Very well. Again, I was trying to avoid any mistakes.
25 Q. That's fine. It's fine.
1 A. Yes, please continue.
2 Q. Paragraph 216 begins like this: "The government has authority
3 over the structures of the police. The prime minister of the Republic of
4 Macedonia commands the units of the Ministry of Interior and does so
5 through the minister of the interior, i.e., through the director of the
6 security and counter-intelligence office."
7 Do you see that?
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 Q. And later on you quote a particular plan for the use of the
10 security forces, which states that: "The command of the units of the
11 Ministry of Interior falls within the competence of the prime minister of
12 the Republic of Macedonia, through the minister of the interior."
13 Do you see that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Well, wouldn't it be fair, then, to say that during the crisis
16 time in 2001, the prime minister, through the minister of the interior,
17 could exercise, at a minimum could exercise some influence over the units
18 of the Ministry of Interior? You yourself say he could command them.
19 A. The minister, in the sense of using the forces. The prime
20 minister, referring their use. Yes, he could have had a certain
22 Q. Okay. And if that's the case, and since the prime minister and
23 the president disagreed on how to deal with the crisis in 2001, didn't
24 the prime minister's views sometimes affect how joint operations were
25 planned and carried out?
1 A. I will try to answer by using a military term. When certain
2 competencies are given to a major or a general, having in mind their
3 rank, the last say is given by the general. In this particular case, the
4 last say goes to the president and the Supreme Commander of the armed
6 Q. Okay. While we're on paragraph 216, there's something I want to
7 ask you about. We've just seen it a minute ago. At the beginning of
8 paragraph 216, you say that: "The prime minister of the Republic of
9 Macedonia commands the units of the Ministry of Interior and does so
10 through the minister of the interior, i.e., through the director of the
11 security and counter-intelligence office."
12 Do you see this?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And then you say: "Confirmation of this is item 17 of the plan
15 for the use of the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia."
16 All right?
17 A. Yes. One has to continue: "Related to the resolution of the
18 crisis in 2001."
19 Q. Okay.
20 MR. SAXON: Can we show the witness what is 65 ter 700, please.
21 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, this is at tab 52 in the second binder.
22 MR. SAXON: If the usher could help you by making sure you have
23 binder number 2.
24 Q. And in e-court, could we please turn to the very last page in
25 both versions. I'd like you to focus on Article 17, which is what you
1 refer to in paragraph 216 for your report.
2 Now you can certainly tell me whether there's a problem with the
3 English translation in Article 17, Dr. Markovski. But Article 17 in
4 English says this: "The commands over the units of the Ministry of
5 Internal Affairs is under the competence of the president of the
6 government of the Republic of Macedonia, through the minister of internal
8 Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, this is what the document reads.
10 Q. There's no reference to the sector for security and
11 counter-intelligence, is there?
12 A. Here in this Article, it is obviously missing.
13 Q. Well, we're looking at it in English and Macedonian. This is
14 what you cited to in your report, 65 ter 700.
15 A. Yes, it is so.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. But you need to have something in mind, Mr. Saxon.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. That this document, which we are reviewing now, and which bears
20 the title: Plan on use the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia,
21 stems from the plan of the president to deal with the crisis in 2001.
22 That plan was revealed by the president on a special session of the
23 parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, on the 6th -- on the 8th of
24 June, I apologise. 8th of June, the government fully supported it, this
25 plan, and undertook the obligation to make this plan operational, in
1 coordination and conjunction with the president. While the crisis body
2 that was activated at that moment and where members were in addition to
3 certain responsible structures and members of the ministries from the
4 Republic of Macedonia by also representatives of the NATO, KFOR, OSCE,
5 the European Union, et cetera, representatives of several diplomatic
6 bodies in the Republic of Macedonia, it prepared this version and then as
7 a document of the government of the Republic of Macedonia, it was aligned
8 for implementation and was implemented as planned here. I see no
9 possibility for discrepancies in terms of implementation of this plan
10 between the president, as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, and
11 the prime minister.
12 Q. And just for the record, Your Honour, last week I asked my
13 colleagues from the Defence of Mr. Tarculovski for a copy of this plan.
14 Because it is mentioned at least in one point somewhere else in this
15 expert report but to date the Prosecution hasn't received it.
16 I'm going to move on.
17 Your Honour, Ms. Residovic is --
18 JUDGE PARKER: I noticed that.
19 Yes, Ms. Residovic.
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours if I may be of
21 assistance. This document is Exhibit 1D177.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
23 MR. SAXON: I'm grateful for that. I don't think that is
24 mentioned in the expert report, so I didn't know that until just now.
25 And it is not cited to in paragraph 216 either.
1 Can we turn back, please -- can we go back to paragraph 202,
3 Q. And paragraph 202, you describe the new Law on Defence. And you
4 say: The new law was compatible with the strategic aims of the state for
5 the transformation of the defence and was not in any way connected to the
7 When you say "was not in any way connected to the situation," are
8 you saying the passage of the new Law on Defence was not in any way
9 connected to the crisis in 2001?
10 A. Yes. The reason for the adoption of this law or to amend the old
11 law was the transformation, the need of transformation of the Defence
12 according with the NATO standard and in line with the proposal made by
13 representatives of the friendly countries, the ministries of countries
14 friendly to the Republic of Macedonia which suggested that the sector of
15 defence needs to undergo a larger transformation, so this is the sense in
16 which I am speaking that this law stemmed from the need to transform the
17 defence sector particularly the army structure and not because of the
18 situation current at that time. Even if that situation did not exist, a
19 new law would have been adopted.
20 Q. Okay. And in the last sentence of paragraph 202 -- first of all,
21 you talk about in paragraph 202, you talk about the necessity of passing
22 regulations or by-laws and that the old law would be applied until the
23 passing of the by-laws for the new law, right? And then you say in the
24 last sentence: "During the crisis, this was especially characteristic
25 with relation to the competencies of the president of the Republic of
1 Macedonia regarding the command of the army and the issuing of tasks and
2 duties to the police forces."
3 Do you see that?
4 A. Yes, yes.
5 Q. Now, you refer to the president's command over the army and to
6 the president's issuing of tasks and duties to the police forces.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you do that, because under the old law, without a state of
9 war declared, the president could command the army but not the police.
10 Isn't that right?
11 A. No. What I wish to point out here actually through this position
12 that I have presented, is that even without the state of war having been
13 declared, the president, probably due to reasons known to himself only,
14 in certain situations actually acted as if he had commanded the police
15 and the army in circumstances of war. Why did he do that, I don't know.
16 I'm making a conclusion that did he so. In my assessment, it was so.
17 Q. Well, you're a political/military expert here, Dr. Markovski.
18 Isn't it true that the reason the president acted as if he had commanded
19 the police and the army in circumstances of war, even without a
20 declaration of a state of war, it's because, de facto, Macedonia was in a
21 state of war. Isn't that right?
22 A. No, no. That is not right. The Republic of Macedonia was not in
23 a state of war.
24 MR. SAXON: Well, can we turn, please, to what is 65 ter 644.
25 And, Your Honours, this will be at tab 49 in binder 2 of the
1 documents that have you with you.
2 Q. And if you can take a look at this document, please, it's dated
3 the 3rd of May, 2001, and it's a decision by President Trajkovski,
4 entitled the use of the army of the Republic of Macedonia to carry out an
6 Do you see that?
7 A. Yes, precisely.
8 Q. And the president refers to Article 79 of the constitution and
9 Article 15 of the Law on Defence. And then he says -- his decision say
10 this is, and in paragraph 1:
11 "The army of the Republic of Macedonia, in cooperation with the
12 forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to carry out an operation to
13 destroy the terrorist forces in the wider region of the villages Vaksince
14 and Slupcane, and in the other areas within the zones of responsibilities
15 where diversion terrorist groups appear?"
16 Do you see that?
17 A. Yes, I see it.
18 MR. SAXON: Can we scroll down in English please so we can see
19 the bottom of page. And we see it is submitted to the cabinet of the
20 president and to the General Staff of the army.
21 Q. Now, the best that the president could do at that time was to
22 seek the police's cooperation, isn't that true, with the army? He could
23 not order the police to act. Isn't that right?
24 A. No, no. You are not understanding this correctly.
25 What I mean is I don't wish to offend you, but this is not what
1 it reads here, what is the substance of this decision. Here we can find
2 two key points. The first one is what I'm asserting as well, that in the
3 Republic of Macedonia in 2001 there was no state of war. This decision
4 is a result of the emergence of the need to carry out an operation to
5 destroy the terrorist forces. We are not speaking about armed forces.
6 We are speaking about terrorist forces.
7 And the second one present here and this is how the first time
8 item starts, the army of the Republic of Macedonia, in conjunction with
9 the MOI forces should carry out this operation. This mean, at the same
10 time, a task for both the army and the Ministry of Interior, where such
11 joint activities are carried out of the security forces, which would mean
12 of the army and of the police forces from the Ministry of the Interior
13 command belongs to a military officer. This is why the president
14 forwards this decision to the General Staff of the army of the Republic
15 of Macedonia, which should make this decision operational, and detail the
16 obligations, the duties for both the army and the police forces that will
17 carry out there operation.
18 Q. And he couldn't forward this to the prime minister because he
19 could not -- the president could not forward such a decision to the prime
20 minister because the prime minister controlled the forces of the Ministry
21 of Interior. Isn't that right?
22 A. He had no obligation to forward it there. It was sufficient to
23 sent it to the General Staff of the army, and the General Staff of the
24 army will make the task operational and issue all tasks to all
25 participants in this task.
1 Q. Can I ask the interpreter, please to read the first line of
2 paragraph 1, please, to read it in English.
3 THE INTERPRETER: The army of the Republic of Macedonia, in
4 cooperation with the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to carry
5 out an operation to destroy the territory forces in the wider region of
6 the villages of Vaksince and Slupcane and in the other areas within the
7 zone of responsibility where diversion terrorist groups appear.
8 The interpreter is not sure what the request was. I'm reading
9 the first paragraph in the English translation of the document.
10 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Ms. Interpreter, that's fine, and I simply
11 wanted to see whether our CLSS interpreters interpretation would match
12 the written translation and it does.
13 JUDGE PARKER: I believe the interpreter said she was reading
14 from the English version.
15 MR. SAXON: Then -- then I was not clear. I was asking the
16 interpreter to -- I meant -- the interpreter to read from -- to interpret
17 the Macedonian version.
18 JUDGE PARKER: And were you wanting just a sentence or a
20 MR. SAXON: The first line of the Macedonian version, please if
21 that could be interpreted.
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter just needs a moment to read the
23 sentence before interpreting it.
24 "The army of the Republic of Macedonia in conjunction with the
25 MOI forces to carry out an operation to destroy the terrorist forces in
1 the boarder regions of villages Vaksince and Slupcane --"
2 MR. SAXON: That's fine. Okay, well then we stand corrected.
3 There's a problem with the translation. That's fine.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Ms. Residovic.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours because the
6 interpreter already interpreted it, we believe that it would be
7 co-action, but yes conjunction works fine. This is the first things we
8 wish to react about, and second thing is the 65 ter 644 that my learned
9 colleague cites to is it Exhibit 1D50.
10 MR. SAXON: I'm grateful for that. It is referred to 65 ter 644
11 in Dr. Markovski's report, and I'm simply using the authorities cited in
12 Dr. Markovski's report.
13 Q. If you can turn, please, to paragraph 206 of your report,
14 Dr. Markovski. And in paragraph 206, you talk about the system of
15 command within the army of the Republic of Macedonia.
16 A. Yes, it is so, yes.
17 Q. And then you -- in paragraph 207 you refer to Article 12 of the
18 Law on Army Service. And then in paragraph --
19 A. I apologise, Mr. Saxon, I entered corrections here and amendments
20 that it was not Article 12 of the Law on Service in the army but Article
21 28 on the Law on Defence.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 A. And the same will apply to 28 in the final sentence.
24 So 208 in the final sentence. It is again Article 28 of Law on
1 Q. And focussing now for a moment on paragraph 208 you say: "The
2 regulation of the Law on Defence connected to the subject of this report
3 was practically applied when the president gave a direct order by way of
4 telephone to Major Despodov on the completion of tasks related to
6 Then you say: "Major Despodov --" [Microphone not activated]
7 JUDGE PARKER: Could I make it clear there is a button on my desk
8 which is very awkwardly placed, and if it is lent on by the weight of a
9 pad, it will often switch off the microphones.
10 MR. SAXON: That's all right, Your Honour, I have many awkward
11 things in my life too. So I understand.
12 Q. The last and then -- in the end of paragraph 208, you say:
13 "Major Despodov, pursuant to his own duties specified in the Law on
14 Defence -- Article 28, was obligated to execute it," referring to the
15 direct order of the president.
16 Do you see that?
17 A. Yes, yes it is so.
18 Q. And then you cite para 2 in footnote 118, you cite to a report by
19 -- by Captain Ljupco Kostadinov on the 12th of August, 2001, which is
20 Exhibit P303. Now, when you cited to this report, were you also citing
21 to it as authority for your statement that the president gave a direct
22 order by telephone to Major Despodov?
23 A. I can't remember, but probably it was so, because my point is
24 that the president has such right and has directly issued an order to
25 Major Despodov.
1 Q. Okay. Can we show the witness what is Exhibit P103, please.
2 MR. SAXON: And, Your Honour, this is in your -- this is in your
3 fourth -- I was about to misspeak.
4 Your Honours, this is in binder 2, tab number 53.
5 Q. And could the witness be assisted so that he has the hard copy in
6 front of him, please, because that might speed this up.
7 MR. SAXON: It should be Exhibit P303. I apologise. And this
8 should be at tab number 53 in your binder.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, now it's fine.
10 MR. SAXON:
11 Q. Okay. Dr. Markovski, where in this report do you find the
12 president of Macedonia issuing a direct order to Major Despodov?
13 A. Unfortunately, the English version is not here in the binder, so
14 allow me to read this document from the e-court.
15 Q. Well, I'll give you my copy. I'll give you my copy in
17 MR. SAXON: Could the usher assist.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So it is in the first paragraph of
19 page 2.
20 MR. SAXON: Okay. Can we turn to page 2, please.
21 Q. And can you read the sentence where it indicates for you that
22 Major Despodov received a direct order from the president.
23 A. "Around 1800 to 1900 hours first a person Johan talked to the
24 president of the state and then Major Despodov personally talked with the
25 president. The president asked him whether he was under the command of
1 General Sokol. Major Despodov answered yes. The president told him,
2 good I will talk to General Sokol, and I will call you again." Which
3 means this conversation took place on the basis of the fact that
4 Major Despodov had prior opportunity to talk to the president, to receive
5 an order from him and probably to ask that this is done to request that
6 this order is also notified of Mr. -- of General Sokol Mitrevski.
7 Q. Dr. Markovski, there's nothing in what you've just read that
8 indicates that the president gave a direct order to Major Despodov, is
10 A. Yes. But there are other documents which corroborate the notion
11 that the president has, indeed, given an order. Primarily the report of
12 the Despodov's superior, the commander of the 1st Guardist Brigade.
13 Q. You see, Dr. Markovski, the difficulty is that the only thing you
14 cited to in footnote 118 is this particular document, Exhibit P303. You
15 didn't cite to other documents.
16 A. Yes, you're right. I probably considered that this was a
17 sufficient corroboration or support for my statement, but I'm saying now
18 that there are other documents and that report also of the command of the
19 1st Guardist Brigade is available. Have you it. But I really can't give
20 you anymore specific help at the time moment. I don't know what the
21 specific number of it is.
22 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I see the time. Would this be the right
23 time for the second break?
24 JUDGE PARKER: Indeed, it is. We will resume at 1.00.
25 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
3 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honours.
4 If we can show the witness what is Exhibit P91, the constitution
5 of the Republic of Macedonia, please. This is tab -- at tab 51 in the
6 second Prosecution binder.
7 And, first of all, if we can turn to what is Article 79 for a
8 moment, please, which in the English version is at ERN N001-8982.
9 Q. And, Dr. Markovski, Article 79 has three provisions of it.
10 Paragraph 1 says -- I'm sorry, are you with me? Do you have Article 79?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. Paragraph 1 says: "The president of the Republic of
13 Macedonia represents the Republic."
14 Paragraph 2 says: "The president of the Republic is
15 Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Macedonia."
16 Paragraph 3 says: "The president of the Republic exercises his
17 or her rights and duties on the basis and within the framework of the
18 constitution and laws."
19 You followed with me?
20 A. Yes. Yes, this is correct.
21 Q. All right.
22 MR. SAXON: Can we turn now to Article 124, please.
23 Q. And we've seen this before, of course. Article 124 describes a
24 state of war. It says: "A state of war exists within direct danger of
25 military attack on the Republic is impending or when the Republic is
1 attacked or war is declared on it."
2 And then paragraphs 2 and 3 describe how a state of war may be
3 declared and under what circumstances.
4 I'm just trying to understand. Yesterday, I believe it was in
5 response to some questions from my colleague Ms. Residovic. You
6 explained that in issuing orders to the army and the police or to the
7 army and then through the army to the police, the president relied on
8 Article 79 of the constitution for doing that. And we even saw the
9 references to Article 79 in several of the orders or decisions issued by
10 the president.
11 Do you recall that?
12 A. Yes. And more precisely, Article 79, paragraph 2.
13 Q. Okay. And Article 79, paragraph 2, says that the president of
14 the Republic is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Macedonia,
16 A. Yes, that's right.
17 Q. But without the declaration of a state of war, how would Article
18 79, subparagraph 2, give powers to the president over the police?
19 A. I explained that in certain situations, the president behaved as
20 if it was state of war and why did he do so and where he draw his powers
21 from, I cannot really comment on. I was just explaining the facts of the
22 situation, and it is obvious from these orders, and one of those we saw
23 it a bit earlier and we discussed it and we could see that the army is
24 going to perform these duties in co-action with the police; it was a
25 joint activity by both armed forces and why the president behaved in this
1 manner, I'm not capable of explaining this.
2 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. Just so that I understand then, your
3 testimony and the circumstances of 2001, although a state of war was not
4 declared, the president behaved as if a state of war had been declared.
5 Is that right?
6 A. In certain circumstances, yes. I would add, in certain
7 circumstances, yes.
8 Q. Okay. And although a state of war had not been declared, the
9 president asserted certain powers as if a state of war had been declared.
10 Is that -- in certain circumstances. Is that right?
11 A. Yes. I could accept this kind of assertion.
12 Q. All right. But wouldn't it be fair to say, that because a state
13 of war had not been declared and in certain circumstances the president
14 acted as if a state of war had been declared, that, in a sense, the
15 president was acting, if you will forgive the expression, sort of inside
16 a legal vacuum?
17 A. Maybe you're completely right here, because in 2001 the Republic
18 of Macedonia, as a young democracy did not have developed all the
19 procedures with respect to situation of crisis. Mainly I refer to the
20 fact that Macedonia, only in 2005, adopted the Law on Crisis Management
21 or the Law on Management of Crisis and in this period if such a law would
22 have existed probably the president and everyone else involved, in
23 accordance with this law, they would conduct their activities pursuant to
24 the provisions of this law. At that time, crisis management law did not
25 exist and the crisis management body, the precise title was coordinative
1 body for crisis management established by the government, I could not
2 find corroboration on which basis it has been organised. Probably the
3 situation was such that such a body was required, but I could not find a
4 special regulation that would point out to the establishment and activity
5 an organisation of this body. So this cannot be found in any of the
6 regulations of that time.
7 MR. SAXON: If we can show the witness what is now Exhibit
8 P606.1, please. That is the more complete version of the old Law on
9 Defence that was admitted this morning. And we need to look at Article
10 15, please. So if we could turn to the next page in the Macedonian
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the counsel to
13 adjust the microphone. Thank you.
14 MR. SAXON: Sorry about that. Thank you.
15 And if we could go to Article 15 in the English version as well,
17 Q. We see that in the old Law on Defence, the president of the
18 Republic, under Article 15, subparagraph 12: "Commands the use of the
19 police for execution of combat tasks in a state of war."
20 Do you see that?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. Okay. Now, of course, as we know --
23 MR. SAXON: Now, if we could turn, please, to Article 23.
24 Probably the next page in Macedonian and one or two more pages in
25 English, please.
1 Q. And in Article 23 of the old Law on Defence, we see that in a
2 state of war, the police may be used in order to perform combat tasks as
3 an integral part of the army. You see that?
4 A. Yes, this is what it reads.
5 Q. Now, of course, we know that during the crisis time in 2001, no
6 state of war was ever declared, right?
7 A. Absolutely correct.
8 JUDGE PARKER: It appears there is a technical problem with the
9 transcript. We will wait a little while and it may be able to be
11 [Technical difficulty]
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Saxon, it appears that the technical problem
13 is resolved. You may continue.
14 MR. SAXON: We've just looked at Article 23 of the old Law on
15 Defence. And we've just reminded ourselves that in 2001 a state of war
16 was not declared.
17 If we could turn to what is Exhibit 1D0098, please, which is the
18 new Law on Defence that was enacted in 2001. It's at tab 48 of the
19 second binder. And first if we could look at what is Article 24, please.
20 That has ERN number N002-2795 in the English version.
21 Q. And this chapter, chapter 4 of the 2001 law, Dr. Markovski,
22 refers to the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia, and in Article
23 24 it begins: "The armed forces structure elements are: Unit, commands,
24 staffs, and institutions."
25 And then a couple of lines below that in the English version, it
1 says: "The armed forces consists of services, branches and technical
3 Do you see that?
4 A. I can accept it as correct, but the mistake is not of an
5 essential importance.
6 MR. SAXON: Thank you.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
8 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there is, again, a
9 mistake in the translation. In the Macedonian text it reads army and in
10 the English version we have armed forces. We are discussing Article 24
11 that was cited by my learned colleague right now.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
13 MR. SAXON: Well then I need to seek some clarification from
14 Dr. Markovski.
15 Q. This chapter on the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia,
16 Article 22, refers to the "armed forces are the armed force of all
17 citizens of the Republic. There are active forces and reserve forces."
18 Do you see that?
19 A. Article 24, exclusively refers to the army and not to the armed
21 Q. I know that, Dr. Markovski. But I just asked you a question
22 about Article 22. Article 22 refers to the armed forces. Is that right?
23 Or do we have another translation problem?
24 A. I don't see Article 22 on the screen.
25 Q. All right.
1 A. Can we see the previous page, please.
2 Q. Can we please go back a page.
3 A. Please continue with your question.
4 Q. Does Article 22 refer just to the army or does it refer to the
5 armed forces?
6 A. Here the army is a synonym of the armed forces as it is
7 represented in Article 22 as an armed force of all the citizens of the
8 Republic. And it is composed of the regular and reserve forces. Article
9 24 exclusively mentioned the army, but this is not an essential problem
10 whether we have to understand the army as an armed force or just as an
12 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. As you -- as you mention, Article 24
13 refers expressly to the army.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Residovic.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we are not always
16 able to follow the translation of this document but the whole chapter,
17 chapter number 4 the title is army of the Republic of Macedonia, and the
18 translated document reads armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia and
19 this is not the same.
20 MR. SAXON: Well, with that correction that will probably shorten
21 some of my questions, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber, though, would ask you to have the
23 translation checked with the translation service of chapter 4 and the
24 references whether it to be army or armed forces, because if it is simply
25 referring to army, there are some grammatical problems in the translation
1 of particular articles.
2 Thank you.
3 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour, I will do that.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I can intervene,
5 maybe I can help out.
6 JUDGE PARKER: No, I think we leave it to Mr. Saxon and the
7 appropriate translators. Thank you.
8 MR. SAXON: Can we turn, please, to Article 172, one of the last
9 Articles of this law.
10 Q. And -- I'm sorry, if we could focus on Article 174. It's on the
11 same page. And it says: "This Law --" I don't know what is going on in
12 the Macedonian version. We just need to stop right there?
13 A. [In English] It's okay.
14 Q. "This Law comes into effect from the eighth day from its
15 publication in the official register in the Republic of Macedonia."
16 Do you see that, Dr. Markovski?
17 A. [Interpretation] Yes, I see it. This is what it reads and this
18 is so.
19 Q. And this law was published in the Official Gazette on the 8th
20 [sic] of June, 2001, so its effective date then would have been the 9th
21 of June, 2001. Is that fair?
22 A. I cannot be precise about this. I have never thought about this
23 problem. In my opinion - just a moment, please - yes, this is how it
24 should be, as you interpreted it. This is how I understand it as well.
25 Q. Okay. Now hypothetically speaking if a few days after the 9th of
1 June 2001 the president of the Republic of Macedonia had issued an order
2 which was based --
3 A. I'm sorry, I did not receive interruption.
4 Q. Can you hear me now? Okay.
5 If hypothetically the president of the Republic of Macedonia had
6 issued an order a few days after the 9th of June, which was based on this
7 law, that would be an indication that this law had come into effect,
8 wouldn't it?
9 A. Yes, this is how it should be.
10 MR. SAXON: For the record, Your Honour, I would refer you to
11 what is Exhibit 1D00060.
12 JUDGE PARKER: And before we loose it on the screen, lines 15,
13 16, 17 of page 3, are you saying that the Gazettel was on the 8th of
14 June or the 1st of June?
15 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, it's my understanding it was on the 1st
16 of June. We can certainly go back to the first page and check it in the
17 Macedonian version.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It just appears in line 15 as the 8th.
19 MR. SAXON: That I believe is an error, probably my error.
20 JUDGE PARKER: So the line 16 would then be correct if the 1st of
21 June was the correct date.
22 MR. SAXON: That's correct, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
24 MR. SAXON:
25 Q. Moving to another topic, can you turn, please, to your expert
1 report, Dr. Markovski, paragraph 239. And in paragraph 239, you talk
2 about units of movements of organised resistance --
3 THE REGISTRAR: Can counsel please turn on his mic. Thank you.
4 MR. SAXON:
5 Q. In the end of paragraph 239, you explain that units of movements
6 of organised resistance that belong to a warring faction are also
7 considered to be part of the armed forces, regardless of whether they are
8 at war on domestic, foreign, occupied, or unoccupied territory on the
9 following conditions. And then you list four conditions there.
10 You see that?
11 A. Yes, it is so.
12 Q. And the first condition is that their members are organised
13 militarily (have a leader that is responsible for his subordinates).
14 Do you see that?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. SAXON: Can we show Dr. Markovski what is Exhibit P321,
17 please. And this is a document known as the NATO briefing pack.
18 And Your Honours can find it at tab 36 of the first binder. And
19 it might be easier if Dr. Markovski could be given the first binder so he
20 could look at the hard copy as well.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please repeat, which tab?
22 MR. SAXON:
23 Q. Tab 36 of the first binder. And you should have a copy there in
24 English and in Macedonian.
25 A. Yes, I have it here.
1 Q. Okay. Before we discuss the document, you refer -- you rely on
2 this document in your report in a number of footnotes. You cite to this
3 document at footnote 18, 39, 42 through 44, and footnote 65.
4 Since you rely on this document to that degree, do you accept
5 that the information in it is correct?
6 A. I don't know, I find them correct but considering that this is an
7 international factor, they're respectable information I appreciate those.
8 I can't say whether they are accurate or not, but I appreciate them.
9 Q. All right.
10 MR. SAXON: Can we turn please to the page that has ERN number
12 Q. And, for example, this page describes the NLA military structure.
13 Do you see that, Dr. Markovski?
14 A. Yes. The diagram of the so-called NLA.
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. SAXON: Can we go two pages further on. It has ERN number
17 R037-6860, please?
18 Q. And on this page we see the NLA military command. Are you
19 following me?
20 A. Yes, I'm following you. It says political speaker of the NLA,
21 Ali Ahmeti, Abazi.
22 Q. And below Ali Ahmeti we see Gzim Ostreni, right?
23 A. Yes. As Chief of Staff.
24 Q. All right. And if we can just move one page further along to ERN
25 number R037-6861. Here we see a description of the NLA military command
1 and the brigades. Do you see that, Dr. Markovski?
2 A. Yes, I see it.
3 Q. So at least in the viewpoint of NATO, the NLA had an organised
4 military structure, didn't it?
5 A. I believe that it is insufficient to look at these diagrams only.
6 We should read the narrative part as well.
7 Q. I'm asking to you look at these diagrams and tell me whether, in
8 the viewpoint of NATO, the NLA had an organised military structure?
9 A. I can't say anything until we corroborate this by narrative part
10 as well.
11 Q. Dr. Markovski, if we could turn then to what is ERN R037-6866,
13 Dr. Markovski, this is the only narrative text that talks about
14 some of the NLA personalities. You see Gzim, Plaku, Ostreni, at the top,
15 and if you follow the asterisk, there is some description of his
16 particulars in the middle of the page.
17 Do you see that?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now this is the only narrative text that this document contains
20 regarding NLA personalities. But would this help you to agree that in
21 NATO's view, the NLA had a military structure?
22 A. What we have here is depictions in the first place of Ali Ahmeti
23 as the political spokesperson, not the Supreme Commander or any other
24 office. Gzim, Plaku, Ostreni is shown here as Chief of Staff of Ona, not
25 chief of General Staff of Ona -- of NLA. And no numbers are given with
1 regards to these squares that are indicated as brigades.
2 So from this aspect, we should approach with doubt the
3 qualification whether this is some armed group within a given region, or
4 whether it is really a brigade, particularly since there is no document
5 related to any of these brigades anywhere here, a document which would
6 really corroborate the notion that those are brigades.
7 Q. So the answer to your question [sic] -- excuse me, the answer to
8 my question would be no, right?
9 A. Yes. I said at the beginning, these documents I find respectable
10 but it does not give me right to assert that the NLA was an organised
11 armed structure.
12 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Apostolski.
14 MR. APOSTOLSKI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting,
15 but could my learned colleague from the Prosecutor's office tell the
16 expert what was the NATO source for this information, so maybe the expert
17 would be able to answer the question.
18 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I find that irrelevant.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Well, I think, Mr. Apostolski, we can leave
20 Mr. Saxon to develop his questions. If you think it, in the end, is
21 going to be material, your re-examination can deal with that.
22 And we have come our allotted time, I'm afraid, Mr. Saxon. So we
23 must adjourn for the day, to resume tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 13th day of
1 March, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.