Case No. IT-99-36-T
IN TRIAL CHAMBER II
Before:
Judge Carmel Agius, Presiding
Judge Ivana Janu
Judge Chikako Taya
Registrar:
Mr. Hans Holthuis
Decision of:
30 October 2002
PROSECUTOR
v.
RADOSLAV BRDJANIN
______________________________________________
DECISION ON “MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM RULE 68 VIOLATIONS BY THE PROSECUTOR
AND FOR SANCTIONS TO BE IMPOSED PURSUANT TO RULE 68BIS AND MOTION
FOR ADJOURNMENT WHILE MATTERS AFFECTING JUSTICE AND A FAIR TRIAL CAN BE
RESOLVED”
______________________________________________
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Ms. Joanna Korner
Mr. Andrew Cayley
Counsel for the Accused:
Mr. John Ackerman
Mr. Milan Trbojevic
TRIAL CHAMBER II (“Trial Chamber”) of the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991 (“Tribunal”) is seised of the “Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations
by the Prosecutor and for Sanctions to Be Imposed Pursuant to Rule 68bis
and Motion for Adjournment while Matters Affecting Justice and a Fair
Trial Can Be Resolved”, filed on behalf of the Accused Radoslav Brdjanin (“Brdjanin”)
on 17 October 2002 (“Motion”).
I. INTRODUCTION
- On 17 October 2002 Defence Counsel for Brdjanin (“Defence”) filed, annexed
to the Motion, a “Motion for Leave to Filed (sic) the Attached Motion
in Excess of the 10-Page Limit”, in which he seeks leave of the Trial Chamber
to file his Motion. During the hearing on 17 October 2002, the Trial Chamber
granted the request.1
- At the hearing of 17 October 2002 and pursuant to a request by the Trial
Chamber , the Prosecution responded orally to the Motion. During the same
hearing, the Defence clarified its submissions and replied orally to the Prosecution’s
oral submissions .
- On 22 October 2002, the Prosecution filed the “Prosecution’s Request for
an Oral Hearing” and attached Annexes (“Request”). In this Request the Prosecution
asked the Trial Chamber to convene an oral hearing on 23 October 2002. The
Request referred to a decision of the Appeals Chamber rendered in the Prosecutor
v. Rutaganda case during an appeals hearing held on 4 July 2002 (“Rutaganda
Decision”).2 The Prosecution annexed the Rutaganda
Decision to the Request. According to the Prosecution, the Rutaganda Decision
could have implications for the application made in Brdjanin’s Motion. The
Trial Chamber did not see the need for such an oral hearing and rejected the
Prosecution’s Request in the “Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Oral Hearing”,
dated 22 October 2002 (“Hearing Decision”). In the Hearing Decision, the Trial
Chamber also ordered the Defence to file its remarks in writing on the relevance
or otherwise of the Rutaganda Decision by not later than 23 October 2002.
- After issuing the Hearing Decision, the Trial Chamber received from the
Registry a copy of the “Opposition to Prosecution’s Request for an Oral Hearing”,
filed on behalf of Brdjanin in the course of 22 October 2002, in which the
Defence opposed the Prosecution’s Request and made submissions on the relevance
of the Rutaganda Decision (“Opposition”). The Trial Chamber was not aware
of the existence and the content of Brdjanin’s Opposition at the time it rendered
its Hearing Decision. On 23 October 2002, the Defence filed its “Memorandum
in Response to Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Oral Hearing”, requesting
the Trial Chamber to treat the Opposition as Brdjanin’s response to the Hearing
Decision.
II. SUBMISSIONS
A. Rule 68 disclosure
- In its Motion, the Defence argued that the Prosecution has not fulfilled
its disclosure obligations pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence . The Defence pointed out that on 15 October 2002, it was advised
by the Prosecution of the existence of Rule 68 material in the form of a taped
interview of Vinko Kondic conducted by representatives of the Prosecution,
without being furnished a transcript in redacted or unredacted form. Indicating
that the interview took place on 30 August and 1 October 2002, the Defence
requested an explanation as to why the interview was not disclosed until 15
October 2002. The Defence alleged that the Prosecution deliberately took their
time to disclose the exculpatory material, waiting for certain witnesses to
complete their testimony.
- The Defence also indicated that the issue of lateness of disclosure has
been raised previously before this Trial Chamber. The Defence noted that,
during the status conference of 6 September 2001, Pre-Trial Judge Hunt directed
the Prosecution to supply the Defence with Rule 68 material with respect to
persons interviewed by the Prosecution in Banja Luka, including the transcripts
of the interviews (“ Interviews”). The Defence asserted that it had only been
provided with summaries of the Rule 68 material included in the interviews,
which in its view did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 68. In support
of its submission that the actual transcripts should be supplied, the Defence
referred to an Appeals Chamber Decision in the Prosecutor v. Blaskic (“Blaskic
Decision”).3
- Furthermore, the Defence contended that the Prosecution has conducted a
substantial number of other interviews without ever supplying the Defence
with Rule 68 material .
- For that reason, the Defence requested the Trial Chamber to:
- order the Prosecution to advise the Trial Chamber in writing how and
to what extent it has complied with the Orders of Judge Hunt and Judge
Agius as Pre-Trial Judges regarding Rule 68 arising from the Interviews;
- decide, pursuant to Rule 68bis, on sanctions to be imposed on
the Prosecution for failing to perform disclosure obligations under Rule
68, suggesting that the Trial Chamber order the Prosecution to provide
the Defence with a list of all persons interviewed by the Prosecution
in connection with the Brdjanin case, that the Prosecution file the full
transcripts of all such recorded interviews with the Registry and that
the Defence be given redacted transcripts of exculpatory material contained
in the interviews;
- provide time to the Defence to review the transcripts and to inform
the Trial Chamber which witnesses need to be recalled for additional cross-examination
upon proper justification for such recall;
- stay the trial and the presentation of evidence until all the issues
raised in the Motion have been resolved.
- In addition, the Defence submitted that the Trial Chamber should order
the Prosecution to submit a signed, sworn affidavit to certify that it is
aware of its continuing obligations under Rule 66 (A) (ii) and Rule 68 and
has produced to the Defence all material required by the Rules. In the course
of the hearing on 17 October 2002, the Defence withdrew this request.4
- In its oral response, the Prosecution argued in essence that Rule 68 compels
the Prosecution to disclose not only the existence of the exculpatory material,
but also the nature of the exculpatory material. The Prosecution asserted
that it has satisfied Rule 68 by disclosing a summary of the nature of the
material, which falls within the purview of Rule 68. The Prosecution strongly
believed that Rule 68 does not require it to actually provide the Defence
with redacted transcripts of the exculpatory material. It pointed out that
the Blaskic Decision does not require the Prosecution to disclose verbatim
transcripts and stated that, in accordance with the Blaskic Decision, it has
never disclosed portions of verbatim transcript of any interviews that are
the subject of Brdjanin’s Motion.
- However, the Prosecution acknowledged late disclosure of the exculpatory
material contained in the interview of Vinko Kondic.5
The Prosecution explained that, as it has accumulated large quantities of
interviews in relation to the Prijedor municipality, it decided to conduct
a thorough search to determine if the interviews of persons who were not called
as witnesses contained any material fact that contradicted the statements
of witnesses whom it intended to call. The Prosecution admitted that the interview
of Vinko Kondic came up during that search, but refuted the allegation that
the delayed disclosure of the exculpatory material contained in this interview
was deliberate. The Prosecution confirmed that in principle it would not object
to witnesses being recalled as a remedy for delayed disclosure of exculpatory
material.
- The Prosecution also fundamentally disagreed with the Defence’s assertion
that it has not fulfilled its Rule 68 disclosure obligations, stating that
it has disclosed all known exculpatory material. The Prosecution assured the
Trial Chamber that all the exculpatory material contained in the Interviews
had been disclosed in the form of summaries, together with all other Rule
68 material in its possession, with two possible exceptions. First, the Prosecution
had not yet disclosed exculpatory material contained in interviews with persons
interviewed in conditions of confidentiality . In addition the Prosecution
had not yet provided the Defence with Rule 68 material of interviews conducted
in relation to the Stakic case.
- The Prosecution undertook to continue to honour its obligation under Rule
68 . Moreover, the Prosecution assured the Trial Chamber and the Defence that
it would check – once again - all interviews for exculpatory material and
to disclose this pursuant to Rule 68.
- The Prosecution further submitted that the Defence is not entitled to a
list of the names of all the persons interviewed by the Prosecution in relation
to the issues in the Brdjanin case.
- During the hearing on 17 October 2002, the Prosecution firmly contended
that the presentation of evidence should not cease pending the resolution
of all issues raised in Brdjanin’s Motion.
B. Preparation Problem
- In its Motion, the Defence argued that the Trial Chamber’s decision to
sever the trials of Brdjanin and General Momir Talic has created severe difficulties
with respect to its preparation.6 The Defence
submitted that it would need more time in order to review the military documents
and to prepare properly for the military aspect of the trial, formerly the
task of Counsel for Talic. In addition, the Defence argued that it would need
more time to prepare for the Prijedor phase of this trial, since the workload
now falls on one person, i.e. Brdjanin’s lead counsel, as a result of the
Severance Decision. Therefore, the Defence requested the Trial Chamber to:
- provide time and direct that the Defence determine the amount of material
that needs to be read and processed in order to become familiar with the
military aspect of the case;
- provide time and direct that the Defence determine the amount of material
that needs to be read and processed in order to become familiar with the
Prijedor phase of the trial.
- In addition and linked to these requests, the Defence asked the Trial Chamber
to order the Registry to suspend hour restrictions on the Defence and its
necessary staff. During the hearing on 17 October 2002, the Trial Chamber
took note of this request without further allowing a debate on its merits.7
The Trial referred to its oral decision of 8 October 2002, in which it directed
Mr. Christian Rodhe to enter a memo on the Decision of the Registry to curtail
on the hours that can be recognised for remuneration.8
- During the hearing of 17 October 2002, the Prosecution contended that the
decision taken by the Defence not to read the military documents which have
been disclosed in this case, was negligent. According to the Prosecution,
it is the duty of the Defence to read the documents supplied. The Prosecution
further argued in respect of the workload of the case that the Defence is
in that position because of the way it has decided to conduct its case. As
a result, the Prosecution opposed Brdjanin’s requests, as set out in paragraphs
16 and 17 above.
C. Rule 66 (B) disclosure
- In the Prosecution’s Request, the Prosecution stated that the Rutaganda
Decision could “well alter the application made by the SDCefence on 17 October
2002”, arguing that the Rutaganda Decision would appear to apply when the
provisions of Rule 66 (B) are brought into effect. No further submissions
were made by the Prosecution in respect of either the applicability of Rule
66 (B) or the meaning of the Rutaganda Decision.
- In its Opposition, the Defence disagreed with the Prosecution’s submission
that the Rutaganda Decision might have an effect on the requests contained
in Brdjanin’s Motion. The Defence contended that the Rutaganda Decision deals
solely with the Prosecution’s disclosure obligations pursuant to Rule 66 (B),
while the Defence alleged a failure of the Prosecution to comply with Rule
68, not Rule 66 (B). The Defence stressed once again that it requested disclosure
of exculpatory material enclosed in interviews in the form of redacted transcripts
pursuant to Rule 68.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 68 disclosure
- Rule 68 provides:
Disclosure of Exculpatory Material
The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence
the existence of material known to the Prosecutor which in any way tends
to suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused or may affect
the credibility of prosecution evidence.
- The rationale behind Rule 68 was discussed in the case of Prosecutor
v. Blaskic in the Decision on the Production of Discovery Materials rendered
on 27 January 1997:
There is no doubt that the obligation to disclose evidence which might
exculpate the accused is the responsibility of the Prosecutor alone, if
for no other reason than the fact that she is the one in possession of
the materials.9
- The disclosure to the Defence of evidence which in any way tends to suggest
the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused is one of the most onerous
responsibilities of the Prosecution. The Prosecution alone is responsible
for identifying which evidence might be exculpatory and for disclosing Rule
68 material, under the control of the Trial Chamber which will duly respond
to an established failure to comply, particularly at trial, and provide the
necessary remedies.10 Pursuant to the jurisprudence
of the Tribunal, if the Defence believes that the Prosecution has not complied
with Rule 68, the Defence must first establish that the requested information
is indeed in the possession of the Prosecution, and must second “present a
prima facie case which would make probable the exculpatory nature of
the materials sought.”11 This is the test to
be applied for discovery under Rule 68. If the Defence satisfies the Trial
Chamber that there has been a failure by the Prosecution to comply with Rule
68, the Trial Chamber in addressing the aspect of appropriate remedies will
examine whether or not the Defence has been prejudiced by non-compliance and
will provide accordingly pursuant to Rule 68bis; in this context the
“sanction approach” is not the primary option:
the possible violations of Rule 68 are governed less by a system of
‘sanctions’ than by the Judges’ definitive evaluation of the evidence
presented by either of the parties, and the possibility which the opposing
party will have to contest it .12
- The Trial Chamber is of the opinion that the meaning of Rule 68 must also
be placed in the broader context of securing the fair trial rights of the
accused as enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
The fair trial concept demands not only that the Prosecution, pursuant to
the plain language of the Rule , disclose to the Defence in sufficient time
“the existence of evidence”, but also , as the Prosecution has rightly pointed
out, that it actually provide the Defence with all of the exculpatory evidence
in question “as soon as practicable”. The question arises, however, whether
the Prosecution satisfactorily complies with the meaning and scope of Rule
68 when it discloses to the Defence exculpatory evidence in a summarised form.
In short, the following question needs to be clarified: is the Prosecution
obliged under Rule 68 to disclose exculpatory material in its original form
or may the Prosecution disclose exculpatory material in a summarised form?
- In resolving this question, the Trial Chamber recalls the Blaskic Decision
of 26 September 2000, which was raised by the parties during the discussion
on Brdjanin’s Motion and in which the Appeals Chamber held that:
it does not make sense that the Prosecution can stop short of providing
exculpatory evidence in its possession, having pointed out to the Defence
that it possesses such evidence. If the evidence is in the sole possession
of the Prosecution, it is obvious that if the fourth reason were upheld,
the Defence would be hindered from discovering it, thus frustrating the
principle of a fair trial.13
- The Trial Chamber strongly believes that if a rule is created and intended
to have some value, especially if it creates a right, than the remedy must
be an effective one. The principle of a fair trial has the following implications
with respect to the meaning of Rule 68. First, the principle of a fair
trial requires that disclosure of exculpatory material be made in sufficient
time. Thus, if the Prosecution has the statement of a person which contains
exculpatory evidence and does not intend itself to call that person as a witness,
disclosure as soon as practicably possible is a must to ensure that the Defence
has an opportunity to subpoena that witness or to use that exculpatory material
during the cross-examination of witnesses whom the Prosecution intends to
call. It stands to reason that where disclosure is not made within sufficient
time, the Defence should be in the position to recall witnesses who have already
testified, if it establishes to the satisfaction of the Trial Chamber that
the lateness of the disclosure prejudiced the preparation or presentation
of his defence. Second, within the context of a fair trial the obligation
to disclose exculpatory material implies the disclosure of the exculpatory
material in its original form, and not in the form of a summary. The
raison d’être behind the disclosure rules is undoubtedly to permit the accused
to make effective use of that material. The Trial Chamber is of the view that
if the exculpatory material is enclosed in a statement, it is the statement
that needs to be disclosed . The Defence rightly pointed out in its Motion
that “[t]he ‘material’ contemplated by Rule 68 in this instance are the words
of the witnesses as recorded in the statements not the Prosecutor’s impressions
of those statements.”14 Indeed, in order to make
real use of the material, the Defence is entitled to be provided with the
exculpatory material in its original form, minus redactions the Prosecution
deem appropriate. The redacted versions of exculpatory material that will
be disclosed should however be “sufficiently cohesive, understandable and
usable ”.15 The Trial Chamber underlines once
again that only the sections that contain the exculpatory material should
be provided to the Defence, not the whole document.
- The Trial Chamber stresses that the system suggested and adopted by the
Prosecution , i.e. to give the Defence a summary of the nature of the
exculpatory material in its possession, apart from being laborious in itself,
essentially deprives the Defence from being in a position to assess the real
value of the exculpatory material for itself. The Trial Chamber is of the
opinion that disclosing exculpatory material in summarised form is not in
compliance with Rule 68. Therefore, the Trial Chamber , using its powers of
supervision over disclosure and pursuant to Rule 68bis , instructs
the Prosecution to verify the exculpatory material previously disclosed to
the Defence in the form of summaries and to disclose to the Defence the redacted
transcripts which fall within the purview of Rule 68. The Trial Chamber will
set a time limit of two weeks within which the Prosecution must comply with
this order .
- The Trial Chamber now turns to consider the specific allegations made by
the Defence in relation to delayed disclosure. First, the Defence contended
that the Prosecution deliberately waited to disclose the interview of Vinko
Kondic until certain witnesses had completed their testimony and returned
to their place of residence . The Prosecution acknowledged the delayed disclosure
and provided the Trial Chamber with an explanation for it. The Trial Chamber
is convinced that the delayed disclosure was not malicious or deliberate as
suggested by the Defence.
- Furthermore, the Defence alleged that additional interviews have been conducted
with respect to which no exculpatory material in any form has been supplied.
Although the Prosecution firmly refutes this allegation insofar as it concerns
exculpatory material, it admitted that it has yet to disclose exculpatory
material contained in interviews either with persons interviewed in conditions
of confidentiality (“ Confidential Interviews”) or conducted in relation to
the Stakic case (“Stakic Interviews ”). There would appear to be two reasons
for this delayed disclosure: heavy workload and confidentiality. While the
Trial Chamber recognises the workload of the Prosecution in this case, it
believes that this is not a justification for any further delay . With respect
to confidentiality as a justification for delayed disclosure, the Trial Chamber
notes that the issue of disclosure of confidential material has arisen previously.
In this respect, the Trial Chamber stated in a previous decision that “Rule
70, which is entitled ‘matters not subject to disclosure’, […] does not relieve
the Prosecution from disclosing material that it would otherwise be required
to disclose pursuant to Rule 68”.16 Therefore
, the Trial Chamber instructs the Prosecution pursuant to Rule 68bis to
disclose , as soon as practicably possible, the exculpatory material contained
in the Confidential Interviews and the Stakic Interviews. The Trial Chamber
will set a time-limit of one week within which the Prosecution has to disclose
the Rule 68 material as described in this paragraph along the lines indicated
above.
- The Trial Chamber emphasises that there is nothing to substantiate the
general allegation of the Defence that numerous additional interviews have
been conducted or that the existence of any exculpatory material has not been
provided. With the exception of the two disclosures still to be made as described
in the previous paragraph , the Trial Chamber has not found any indication
that the Prosecution violated its Rule 68 disclosure obligation as such. In
the absence of prima facie evidence from the accused, the Trial Chamber
must assume that the Prosecution acts in good faith with respect to its Rule
68 obligation. The Trial Chamber points out - once again - that the issue
of what evidence might be exculpatory evidence is primarily a facts-based
judgement made by and under the responsibility of the Prosecution. As a result,
the Trial Chamber sees no reason to order the Prosecution to provide the Defence
with a list of all persons interviewed by the Prosecution in connection with
the Brdjanin case or to file the full transcripts of all such recorded interviews
with the Registry. However, pursuant to what has been decided in the previous
paragraphs of this decision and in accordance with Rule 68bis, the
Trial Chamber instructs the Prosecution to provide the Defence with the original
portions of exculpatory material, which the Prosecution previously has disclosed
in summarised form, and to disclose the original portions of exculpatory material
contained in the Confidential Interviews and the Stakic Interviews.
- The Trial Chamber stresses that the decision to instruct the Prosecution
to disclose Rule 68 material in its original form is being taken without prejudice
to the rights of the Defence to recall witnesses for additional cross-examination
, if it establishes to the satisfaction of this Trial Chamber that the lateness
of the disclosure of the said documents prejudiced the preparation or presentation
of his defence. The Trial Chamber recalls that the Prosecution has in principle
no objection to this.
B. Preparation Problem
- The Trial Chamber has carefully considered the Defence request to be allotted
additional time in order to adequately prepare its case. In relation to the
military aspect of the case, the Trial Chamber believes that the request to
be given appropriate time to become familiarised with the military aspect
of the case is completely unfounded and cannot be entertained. The decision
to divide responsibilities with respect to conducting this case was a decision
that the Defence took freely and is therefore in no position to escape from
the inevitable consequences of this decision. The Trial Chamber is of the
opinion that it would be abusing the process if it would entertain requests
for delays based on such grounds.
- The Defence also argues that it needs more time to prepare the Prijedor
stage of the trial.17 The Trial Chamber agrees
with the Defence that “expediency must not replace justice”18.
The Trial Chamber recalls, however, that this matter has been previously discussed
and debated, and sufficient time off was allocated and even extended. No new
justification has been advanced by the Defence which would merit further delay.
The Trial Chamber fails to see why it should extend the number of days it
has allotted to the Defence to be adequately prepared for Prijedor and notes
that the date on which the Prijedor stage of the trial would start was set
in close consultation and with the agreement of the Defence.19
Therefore, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that there is no unfairness
to the Defence in rejecting Brdjanin’s request. Rather it believes that more
than sufficient time has been available to the Defence to be prepared for
the Prijedor municipality stage of the trial.
C. Rule 66 (B) disclosure
- The Trial Chamber recalls that the Defence has invoked Rule 68 in its Motion
, alleging a failure of the Prosecution to comply with this provision. As
a result the Defence has requested the Prosecution to disclose all exculpatory
material in its possession in its original form but redacted. The Prosecution
has submitted that the scope of the Defence demand in fact amounts to a Rule
66 (B) request resulting in the applicability of the Rutaganda Decision.
- The Trial Chamber considers that its decision should be restricted to the
Motion at hand and the requests contained in it. As the Defence rightly points
out in its Opposition, Brdjanin’s Motion is restricted to the application
of Rule 68. Therefore , the Trial Chamber does not deem it necessary or relevant
to address issues outside the scope of Rule 68, when they are obviously inapplicable.
IV. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons,
PURSUANT to Rule 54, Rule 68 and Rule 68bis,
TRIAL CHAMBER II HEREBY
INSTRUCTS the Prosecution to disclose the original versions, redacted
as necessary, of any exculpatory material previously disclosed in summarised
form by not later than Wednesday, 13 November 2002;
INSTRUCTS the Prosecution to disclose the original versions, redacted
as necessary, of any exculpatory material contained in the Confidential
Interviews and the Stakic Interviews, by not later than Wednesday, 6 November
2002;
STATES that this decision is being taken without prejudice to the
rights of the Defence to recall witnesses for additional cross-examination;
STATES that Brdjanin’s requests are not requests within the meaning
of Rule 66 (B);
RECALLS the oral decision rendered by this Trial Chamber on 17
October 2002 , in which the Trial Chamber decided not to stay the presentation
of evidence pending the resolution of issues raised in Brdjanin’s Motion;
20
REJECTS all other aspects of the requests contained in Brdjanin’s
Motion.
Done in French and English, the English version being authoritative.
Dated this 30th day of October 2002,
At The Hague
The Netherlands
_______________
Carmel Agius
Presiding Judge
[Seal of the Tribunal]
1 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 17 October
2002, T. 10889.
2 - Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-03-A, Oral
Decision, 4 July 2002, Unofficial Transcript of Appeals Hearing on 4 July 2002,
T. 18.
3 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Decision
on the Appellant’s Motions for the Production of Material, Suspension or Extension
of the Briefing Schedule, and Additional Filings, 26 September 2000.
4 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 17 October 2002, T.
10947.
5 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 17 October 2002, T.
10894-10895 and T. 10897.
6 - Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T,
Decision on Prosecution’s Oral Request for the Separation of Trials, 20 September
2002 (“Severance Decision”).
7 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 17 October 2002, T.
10947-10948.
8 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 8 October 2002, T. 10330.
9 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Decision
on the Production of Discovery Materials, 27 January 1997, para. 47.
10 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, supra
note 9 at para. 50
11 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, supra
note 9 at para. 50.
12 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision
on Defence Motion for Sanctions for Prosecutor’s Continuing Violation of Rule
68, 28 September 1998, page 3.
13 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, supra
note 3 at para. 41.
14 - Brdjanin’s Motion, para. 24.
15 - Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision
on the Defence Motion for “Sanctions for Prosecutor’s Repeated Violations of Rule
68 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, 29 April 1998, para. 19.
16 - Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T,
Public Version of the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule
70 of 6 May 2002, 23 May 2002, para. 20.
17 - See Unofficial Transcripts of Hearings on 17 September
2002, 7 October 2002 and 10 October 2002.
18 - Brdjanin’s Motion, para. 41.
19 - Unofficial Transcripts of Hearing on 10 October 2002,
T.10506, T. 10513 and T. 10589.
20 - Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on 17 October 2002, T.
10948.