1 Wednesday, 22 January 2003

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Registrar, let's call the case, please.

6 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Just for the record, since the Registrar's

9 microphone was not activated, the case has been called according to the

10 regulations.

11 Mr. Brdjanin, can you follow me in a language that you can

12 understand?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I can follow in the language

14 that I understand.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Appearances for the Prosecution?

16 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, Joanna Korner briefly today.

17 Nicholas Koumjian assisted by Denise Gustin, case manager good afternoon.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, and good afternoon to you. Appearances

19 for Radoslav Brdjanin?

20 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. My

21 name is Milan Trbojevic and I'm attorney at law. Together with me is the

22 lead counsel, Mr. John Ackerman, and our assistant, Marela Jevtovic, and

23 our colleague Brian Roberts, with your permission.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Good afternoon to you all. So I

25 understand from what I have been told that we are for the time being

1 suspending Colonel Selak's testimony to enable us to deal with the other

2 witness and ensure his return this week.

3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, that's right. Colonel Selak was

4 contacted by VWS and asked if he had any objection, and he did not, so

5 therefore we are going to hear the -- Mr. Mujadzic now, and I would very

6 much hope that he could be concluded this afternoon. Mr. Koumjian, who

7 will be calling him, anticipates between an hour and a hour and a half and

8 in lights of the extensive cross-examination he's already had, we would

9 hope that Mr. Trbojevic, as he indicated, would be no more than an hour

10 and a half.

11 One final matter before I leave if I may because I have other

12 matters to deal with this afternoon. Your Honours may recall at some --

13 about a week or so ago when we just started, Mr. Ackerman raised the

14 question of the timetable and whether there was going to be any break.

15 Your Honours, we have actually discussed the matter. It may be that we've

16 agreed but I don't -- I wouldn't like to speak for Mr. Ackerman, that up

17 until Easter we continue without any breaks as the schedule indicates.

18 Mr. Ackerman, I know, perhaps would like the Easter -- the rest of the

19 Easter week off, if you see what I mean, but we are due back on the

20 Tuesday after Easter at present. Your Honours, my view is very much that

21 I still want to crack on, but I think it's a matter for Your Honours to

22 sort out.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Easter is on the 20th, if I remember well.

24 MS. KORNER: That's right. Good Friday is the 17th.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: What is being suggested is?

1 MS. KORNER: I think Mr. Ackerman -- but I don't know we have only

2 discussed it very briefly this morning, this afternoon, rather. But, Your

3 Honour, the only reason I'm raising it and would ask for a decision sooner

4 rather than later is for witnesses. If there is going to be any breaks

5 between now and Easter we certainly need to know and clearly, because we

6 are being asked by the VWS for witnesses to be notified well in advance

7 now. So we need to know if there are to be any breaks.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Mr. Ackerman.

9 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour there is no kind of an

10 agreement. We have had a discussion and even though major efforts have

11 been made by judges and other high officials in this Tribunal, we still

12 are never given the Court calendar, so we never know exactly what's going

13 on. I have asked this morning to be furnished with a court calendar. I

14 really don't want to make any representations regarding my feelings about

15 breaks until I have a chance to consult that but one of the things I did

16 discuss with Ms. Korner is going through straight to the Easter break and

17 then making it a longer-than-scheduled break, but we will just have to

18 wait until I look at the schedule.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Any way, we will discuss this further.

20 If you want, I can give you my schedule, which is the latest one,

21 updated as on the 17th of January. I can let you have this and you can

22 work on it.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm fairly certain, Your Honour, that I'll have one

24 when I get back to my flat today. I think it will have been e-mailed to

25 me. I think Mr. Wastelain is quite good about that.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: If you do encounter problems, Mr. Ackerman, do let

2 me know, and I will accommodate you. Ms. Korner, if you need to go,

3 please, you're excused.

4 MS. KORNER: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, this witness does not enjoy any protective

6 measures.

7 MS. KORNER: No.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's bring him in. Thank you, Ms. Korner.

9 [The witness entered court]

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon to you, Mr. Mujadzic.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it that you can follow the proceedings in a

13 language that you can understand?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: In other words that you are receiving proper

16 interpretation.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I am receiving interpretation.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Welcome to this Tribunal once more. I know that you

19 have given evidence previously in other trials, and therefore I don't need

20 to brief you on the procedure because I suppose that you know it. The

21 usher who is standing right next to you, to your right, will be handing

22 you the text of a solemn declaration. It is tantamount to an oath.

23 It will be your solemn undertaking with this Tribunal this in the

24 course of your testimony you will be telling us the truth, the whole

25 truth, and nothing but the truth. So please go ahead with making that

1 solemn declaration by reading that text aloud.

2 Thank you.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

5 WITNESS: MIRSAD MUJADZIC

6 [Witness answered through interpreter]

7 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. You may sit down. And you are now

8 going to be examined by Mr. Koumjian, whom you know, I would assume. It's

9 not expected to be a long examination-in-chief because we have the

10 transcripts of your testimony in the other trials.

11 Following the examination-in-chief, you will be cross-examined by

12 Mr. Milan Trbojevic, who is co-counsel with lead counsel, John Ackerman,

13 for the accused in this trial, that is Radoslav Brdjanin.

14 Mr. Koumjian, please.

15 MR. KOUMJIAN: Yes, thank you. The Prosecution would tender

16 Dr. Mujadzic's testimony in the Stakic case. May that transcript be

17 marked as the next exhibit? We would have it as P1601. And the limited

18 redactions have been agreed with the Defence. May I proceed?

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, it is so admitted, P1061.

20 MR. KOUMJIAN: Thank you, Your Honour, Mr. President.

21 Examined by Mr. Koumjian:

22 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, just to remind you I know you understand English

23 well. Please pause for the interpretation and make sure, in fact give a

24 second or two after the interpretation is completed before you begin your

25 response so that there is no overlapping of the interpretation with my

1 question.

2 Doctor, you testified in the Stakic case that were you a medical

3 doctor before the conflict in 1992. During the conflict, once you escaped

4 from the Autonomous Region of Krajina territory to Bihac and later to

5 other parts of Bosnia, and after the conflict, up until the time that you

6 testified in the Stakic case. Do you continue to practise medicine? Is

7 that still your profession?

8 A. I never stopped exercising my profession, that of a medical

9 doctor. I started working as a physician in 1987 when I obtained a degree

10 from a medical school up until present day.

11 Q. You testified that in 1997, were you made the President of the SDA

12 party in Prijedor municipality, at the age of 27. Can you tell the Court

13 what positions first that you held in your party during the conflict from

14 1991 -- let's say from 1990 until the Dayton Accords?

15 A. I apologise but I think that there has been a mistake in the

16 transcript. We read the year 1997. Actually it was in 1996. I don't

17 know whether this is important for this trial. It is just a minor

18 correction. It is true that in 1990, in the month of August, I was

19 elected president of the municipal board of the Prijedor SDA.

20 Q. Within your party, did you hold any positions at the republican

21 level on the main board and did you represent your party in any -- with --

22 in front of foreign conferences or delegations of parties from other

23 countries?

24 A. Yes, I did, from 1990 when I was elected a republican deputy to

25 the council of citizens -- Chamber of citizens in the BH parliament, at

1 the elections, and in November, 1990, I was elected a member of the main

2 board of the party and in that capacity, together with another deputy, I

3 went to Malta in 1996 to attend a conference of the Christian democrats of

4 Europe.

5 Our party was invited by Mr. Kohl to attend this conference

6 because he thought that our programme, the programme of our party, and its

7 activities, were in accordance with the programme of other Christian

8 democrats in Europe. And in my capacity of a parliament deputy, I

9 attended several conferences in Poland, Romania, and Italy, mainly

10 conferences organised which the OSCE and the parliamentary union.

11 Q. With the SDA party, was there ever an organisation on the regional

12 level, in other words the Banja Luka region, covering the Bosnian Krajina

13 region, and if so, did you hold any position at that regional level?

14 A. We had a regional organisation whose main task was coordination,

15 and since the city of Prijedor had a Bosniak majority, our party won the

16 elections and Prijedor was the only town in the Bosnian Krajina where SDA

17 won the election. So it was decided that the Prijedor should act as some

18 sort of coordination centre, and I was elected president of the regional

19 board of Banja Luka.

20 Q. And just so that we are completely accurate, when you say the SDA

21 won the election in the Prijedor municipality, is it correct, as you

22 testified previously, that the SDA had the most seats of any party in that

23 municipality, not necessarily that they had more than half the seats but

24 they were the leading party in the municipality?

25 A. Yes. Your explanation is correct. We did not have the 50 -- over

1 50 per cent majority. We had the most seats in the parliament.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, can you -- you testified that you were elected to

3 the parliament. Can you briefly explain how the parliament of Bosnia was

4 divided, what it consisted of, how many houses and the relationship

5 between those two chambers.

6 A. The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time consisted of two

7 chambers, the Chamber of citizens and the Chamber of municipalities. The

8 Chamber of citizens consisted of 130 deputies and the Chamber of

9 municipalities 110. The sessions depended on the competences of the

10 chambers, of course. They were held separately and in respect of laws

11 which required, and that was the case of more than 75 or 80 per cent of

12 laws, which required both chambers, then the sessions would be held

13 jointly.

14 Q. Thank you. I'd like to now show you a brief video - it's only

15 about one minute long - of a session of the parliament and ask you, please

16 view it and tell us afterwards whether you were present when this

17 occurred.

18 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, this is an excerpt of a previously

19 marked exhibit -- excuse me, it's a new exhibit, in this case. So it

20 should receive a new number, P -- it actually was part of the Stakic

21 transcripts, so may that be marked P1601-S117? And if that could now be

22 played.

23 It will appear on the monitor in front of you, Doctor.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: If I'm reading you well - correct me if I'm wrong -

25 Mr. Koumjian, we are talking of excerpts, "The death of Yugoslavia"?

1 MR. KOUMJIAN: Yes, Your Honour. If the booth is ready, if we

2 could play that video.

3 [Videotape played]

4 MR. KOUMJIAN:

5 Q. Well, that very brief, obviously less than one minute videotape,

6 do you recall that occurring in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

7 Doctor?

8 A. Yes. I was present.

9 Q. Can you describe how you --

10 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me, Your Honour, the video, neither the

11 video nor any translation of it ever showed up on this side of the

12 courtroom.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: What do you mean? Your monitor was not functioning

14 properly?

15 MR. ACKERMAN: We couldn't see any video, and we didn't hear any

16 translation.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Were you -- translation, you didn't need to because

18 there was the English text.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: That's fine. That's fine.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: If you want to see it again --

21 MR. ACKERMAN: Never mind, never mind. You're right.

22 MR. KOUMJIAN: Thank you.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

24 MR. KOUMJIAN:

25 Q. Doctor, can you describe what it felt like to be present when that

1 speech was given?

2 A. Although I heard the speech after this session on several

3 occasions in the media, and also the last time during my testimony in the

4 Stakic case, and I just heard it once again. I always have the same

5 feeling, which is almost identical to the one that I experienced then and

6 there during the session. All members of the parliament, all deputies,

7 including of course myself, after Mr. Karadzic had pronounced this speech,

8 had said those words, we felt fear. We were afraid because the threat

9 seemed to be very serious, and it was expressed with such a tone that we

10 understood it as threatening and we took it very seriously.

11 These words leave me with an even stronger impression nowadays,

12 because his words have almost come true. These things have almost

13 happened. It is true that Bosnia has not disappeared and that Bosniaks,

14 Muslims, have not been exterminated. However, what Mr. Karadzic said was

15 taken seriously and there were serious attempts to implement what he was

16 saying at that time.

17 Q. We will come back to the situation that you were in at the time

18 you heard that speech. I want to move on now to talk about Radoslav

19 Brdjanin. Did you know Mr. Brdjanin from the parliament?

20 A. Yes, indeed, both as a deputy and as a colleague, coming from the

21 same region, from the same area that I was from.

22 Q. Were you in the same Chamber as Mr. Brdjanin?

23 A. No, no. I was in the Chamber of citizens and Mr. Brdjanin was in

24 the Chamber of municipalities.

25 Q. I believe a few moments ago you testified about the percentage of

1 times that the two chambers sat together. Do you mean that they

2 physically sat in the same hall?

3 A. Yes, indeed. In the building of the parliament of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, there were several halls, but there was one big one for

5 so-called general assembly meetings, when both chambers sat together, and

6 when Members of Parliament of both chambers would be together.

7 Q. Would there ever come occasions when outside of the hours that the

8 assembly was actually in session, during breaks, there would be social

9 contact or conversation among deputies?

10 A. Yes, of course. During the breaks, during parliament sittings, we

11 would meet in the lobby, converse, and discuss laws or current political

12 affairs. But also very frequently we would have quite unofficial

13 conversations to reduce the tensions in parliament and through personal

14 contacts, to try, through personal social contacts, to create a better

15 atmosphere in parliament, which very frequently was not quite what it

16 should be.

17 Q. You've told us that Mr. Brdjanin was a fellow member of the

18 parliament and that he came from the same region. Can you explain to the

19 Chamber how much contact you had with him as opposed to other deputies,

20 and whether any of those contacts sticks in your memory?

21 A. Actually, I never personally officially met with Mr. Brdjanin, and

22 even unofficially we didn't have contacts frequently. Actually, we did

23 meet -- no, not really meet, but during the breaks, the deputies may form

24 groups of five, six, or ten men, and then one might join one group or

25 another, and various subjects were discussed, various political issues

1 that were of current interest at the time.

2 And on one occasion, I joined a group among whom Mr. Brdjanin was,

3 discussing with the other deputies a very important issue at the time. I

4 think, but I'm not quite sure, I don't remember the exact time but I think

5 it could have been in October or November 1991 when there was a discussion

6 on the possibilities of creating Serbian municipalities within Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina, and Mr. Brdjanin was explaining that it would be best for all

8 round if the number of inhabitants of a particular nation in each area

9 were to be gathered together, concentrated, and that that would be the

10 best solution. For instance, that in the Banja Luka region it would be

11 best the number of non-Serbs to be reduced to 2 to 3 per cent of the total

12 and that the best way to do that would be by humane resettlement, for

13 people simply to move out of those areas.

14 Ideas of this kind, one must say, were not advocated only by

15 Mr. Brdjanin. There were other deputies who advocated similar ideas.

16 These ideas, I must admit, were never officially presented at parliament

17 hearings. But I think in contacts between parties, similar -- such ideas

18 were aired and members of my party, and I think other parliamentary

19 parties never embraced such an idea, the one that I have just tried to

20 explain.

21 Q. Without discussing the substance, did you also have occasions to

22 hear Mr. Brdjanin speak officially in the parliament?

23 A. Yes. Mr. Brdjanin would, with relative frequency, take the floor,

24 and discuss various issues.

25 Q. As a member of parliament, as the SDA leader from Prijedor and

1 having a leadership role in the region of Banja Luka, did you frequently

2 have contact with SDS officials, aside from Mr. Brdjanin, other officials

3 in the parliament and the region?

4 A. Yes. I did have several opportunities to talk with Mr. Kupresanin

5 and with Mr. Grahovac, though Mr. Kupresanin was, for a time, the

6 President of the parliament of the autonomous region, before that

7 appointment I had several contacts with him, and I could say that

8 Kupresanin too was a follower of SDS policies, but it should be emphasised

9 that all the people in the SDS were not the same. I shall try to explain,

10 a substantive difference between, for instance, Mr. Kupresanin and

11 Mr. Brdjanin.

12 Mr. Kupresanin, when conducting a discussion, would treat the

13 Bosniak side on an equal footing and he was a person with whom it was

14 possible to negotiate, and reach agreements, and who would give thought to

15 various modalities of coexistence so that he did leave open the

16 possibility of coexistence between Bosniaks and Serbs so that would be the

17 substance of his official position up to a certain period. Whether later

18 on he changed or not, I don't know, but I do know that I never heard

19 Mr. Kupresanin, as far as I know, having changed substantively or deviated

20 from this position.

21 Unlike him, Mr. Brdjanin never even tried to talk to me or anyone

22 else at the level of the region, because he really didn't want to treat us

23 as partners, and he arrogantly rejected any possibility of a discussion.

24 And on a number of occasions, on the media, he made it quite clear, by

25 characterising his statement quite publicly - and when I say "statement,"

1 I'm referring to what he said in the assembly - to the effect that the

2 autonomous region or later the area of Republika Srpska should have a

3 small percentage of Bosniaks, 2 to 3 per cent only, and he also made some

4 other derogatory comments about Bosniaks, which now I cannot recollect,

5 but I do know that they were derogatory statements.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 MR. KOUMJIAN: If the witness could now be shown P1602 and right

8 after that, P1603. Excuse me, they are not marked yet. These are new.

9 The first has -- bears the ERN number in English of 03066843, and in B/C/S

10 of 01816880. It's a memo from Mr. Halilovic. Could that be marked

11 P1602? Perhaps we could put the English on the ELMO.

12 Q. Doctor, I know you read English. If you need to look at the

13 B/C/S, please indicate that. Doctor, in your testimony in the Stakic

14 case, you indicated that after the attack on Hambarine, you were living in

15 a hole for many days - I don't recall now the exact number of days - and

16 eventually along with a couple of other individuals, you made your way on

17 a long journey through villages to Bihac, crossing the river. One of your

18 colleagues was killed trying to cross that river, and in that way, made

19 your way out of the territory controlled by the authorities of the

20 Autonomous Region of Krajina. The exhibit in front of you, 1602, is it

21 correct that you had not seen this until I showed it to you this weekend?

22 A. Yes. That is correct. I saw it for the first time when you

23 showed it to me here.

24 Q. The memo, which I'm not going to read, it speaks for itself,

25 indicates that there was concern by Mr. Halilovic that you had

1 collaborated with Chetniks. Since your escape from the Autonomous Region

2 of Krajina have you faced allegations from some Bosniaks that you had

3 collaborated or that you had cooperated with the Serbian authorities?

4 A. Yes. Some people were convinced that the area of Prijedor could

5 have been defended. This was believed by some Bosniaks who were not fully

6 informed of the overall situation in political and military terms.

7 Furthermore, there was a meeting with Mr. Arsic prior -- immediately prior

8 to the takeover of power by the army, that is the SDS in Prijedor, and

9 some people used that as a reason to suspect me of cooperating with the

10 Chetniks.

11 Q. Did you also face accusations from some Bosniaks -- excuse me.

12 MR. KOUMJIAN: May the next exhibit be shown? And that would be a

13 report from the security service from Banja Luka, English ERN number in

14 draft is L0036911 to 13, 6911 up to 6913, and the B/C/S ERN number is

15 P0002533 to 2534. May that be marked P1603?

16 Q. Again, Doctor, would it be correct that you had not seen this

17 document until I showed it to you this weekend?

18 A. Yes, that is correct. I hadn't seen the document until you showed

19 it to me.

20 Q. And is it correct that this appears to be a report from the state

21 security department of Banja Luka indicating or accusing you of having

22 been illegally transferred to territory controlled by Muslim authorities,

23 and if we look at -- looking at the last page on the English, page 3, you

24 were described, in addition to describing your grade point average as

25 being 9.7, as an extreme -- as "extreme and wilful in his political and

1 religious convictions." And along with other members of your family in

2 this document, you were described as a type of extremist, an extremist

3 member of the SDA.

4 Did you face similar accusations from Serbian media regarding

5 accusations that you were an extremist who was planning war against the

6 Serbs in Prijedor?

7 A. Yes. There were a number of accusations launched through the Serb

8 media that I, together with a number of other men, had planned to kill a

9 large number of Serbs within the territory of Prijedor municipality and

10 beyond it, and that we had planned various other atrocities against the

11 Serbs, so that in the media, both the printed media and others, there were

12 many articles and broadcasts to this effect, which resulted in a warrant

13 being issued for me and the whole region was looking for me.

14 Mr. Zupljanin personally was committed to arresting me, and so the mass

15 media reported virtually daily as to whether I had been captured or was

16 about to be captured and so on.

17 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour I have a document from the Kozarski

18 Vjesnik newspaper from Prijedor dated the 28th of May, 1993, and I repeat,

19 1993, entitled, "What our sovereign neighbours planned for us." May that

20 be marked next in order which I believe is P1604? And may it be shown to

21 the witness?

22 I'd ask the usher to put the -- if possible, to put the article on

23 the ELMO in a way that the two sets of four photographs can be shown. If

24 we could zoom out, please, a little bit -- move it up a little bit so all

25 the photographs of the eight individuals are shown? Just up another inch

1 would be great. Thank you.

2 Q. Doctor, the article is translated, so I'm not going to go into the

3 details of what it says. But is it correct that the photograph -- that

4 the article and the photographs link eight Bosniaks into two groups, and

5 that four of the individuals, the lower four, to the left, are listed as

6 persons in favour of the war and implementations of instructions from

7 Sarajevo at all costs? Is it correct that that is your photograph on the

8 left of our screens, at the -- in the lower set of photographs, among

9 those individuals in favour of war and the implementation of instructions

10 from Sarajevo?

11 A. Yes. The first picture in the bottom row of photographs is mine,

12 the first on the left.

13 Q. Can you tell us how the individuals in the upper group of four

14 photographs, how they are characterised in the article or the caption?

15 A. The upper group of photographs includes that of Mr. Cehajic,

16 Mr. Crnalic, Nedzad Seric, and Camil Pezo. They were described as a group

17 of intellectuals, Mr. Cehajic was also president of the municipality of

18 Prijedor. Mr. Seric was a Judge, the President of the court. As people

19 who also wanted a sovereign Bosnia, but to be achieved in a more peaceful

20 manner and they were described as the more peace-loving current, but the

21 ultimate objectives being identical to those in the bottom group, that is

22 to have a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the bottom group, of

23 which I was said to be one, was described as an extreme group which wanted

24 to achieve those aims by war.

25 Q. What is the ethnicity of professor Cehajic and the other three

1 individuals, Mr. Seric, Mr. Pezo and the other individual at the top,

2 those listed as being in favour of the peaceful option?

3 A. They are all Bosniaks.

4 Q. Can you tell us if you find a very sad irony in these -- this

5 grouping of eight individuals?

6 A. Yes. The very sad irony of it is that these people who are

7 described as peace makers, people who wanted to achieve their aims by

8 peaceful means, are all dead, and when this article was written, all these

9 people had already been killed in a brutal manner in the Omarska camp.

10 The men described as extremists in the bottom group as people who wanted

11 war were still alive and free in those days, so I think this is a very

12 blatant distinction which is very obvious at first glance. Those who are

13 dead are for peace and those who are alive were for war.

14 Q. So, Doctor, we've learned that you are accused by the Serbian SDS

15 authorities of being a terrorist planning war, and that you were suspected

16 by some of your fellow Bosniaks as being a collaborator. Can you tell the

17 Chamber what the actual situation was and explain your actions at that

18 time. Did you plan a military attack in Prijedor?

19 A. To plan a military attack on Prijedor would be something quite

20 illogical and senseless because we didn't have a chance, in view of what

21 we had in our possession. We didn't have a chance of keeping or defending

22 Prijedor. In fact, we never planned any attack. All that we had planned

23 was defence in the case of an attack, which was obvious and quite evident

24 that it would come, judging by the previous situation that we had all seen

25 in Croatia, also judging by the threats made by Mr. Karadzic, the threats

1 made by Mr. Brdjanin, and many other members of the SDS, judging by the

2 testimony of our own recruits who had witnessed with their own eyes on the

3 battle front in Novska in Croatia that a number of soldiers in the

4 Yugoslav People's Army at the time were wearing Chetnik insignia and

5 committing terrible atrocities in Croatia. And it was only logical for us

6 to expect, once the army withdrew from Croatia, that a similar attack -

7 and also bearing in mind political develop developments - that such an

8 attack would be launched against us as well. That is why certain measures

9 were taken in the sense of defence from a possible attack.

10 Also, as far of -- as the doubts expressed by the Bosniaks, or

11 rather the suspicion that is were made by the Bosniaks were done because

12 they were not fully aware of the balance of forces. Both in the

13 municipality and the region as a whole. The Banja Luka Corps --

14 Q. I think you're about to answer my next question. Can you describe

15 the balance of forces and -- you testified that you were a medical doctor

16 rather than a military man, whether your information, or whether you

17 consulted with other persons of military background regarding the

18 possibility of defending Prijedor?

19 A. I do wish to point out that I'm a medical doctor and I never had

20 anything to do with military organisation. I was not a member of the

21 army. I don't have any inclination or talent for military affairs, and I

22 never made any attempts to do so. But of course as a person who was a

23 member of parliament from the area at the time, and a local political

24 leader, I was informed of the situation as it developed. And I also had

25 certain contacts with Mr. Halilovic who came to Prijedor on two occasions,

1 and who actually formed the Patriotic League for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

2 aim of which was to carry out certain defensive preparations which would

3 preserve the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Patriotic League

4 itself was constructed on the basis of the platform of the Presidency of

5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So as an organisation, it wasn't intended only

6 for Bosniaks. Its programme envisaged that it would be open to all those

7 who wanted to defend Bosnia.

8 Q. What did Mr. Halilovic tell you regarding the possibility of

9 defending the Prijedor region and the Banja Luka region from the forces of

10 the former JNA and the SDS party?

11 A. On the basis of their military assessments, it was indicated that

12 unfortunately they stood no chances, that it was impossible to

13 successfully defend the overall area of Banja Luka. I had had some

14 information prior to that. I mean I knew that the Banja Luka Corps was

15 one of the most strongest -- one of the strongest corps in the former JNA,

16 and that it had a large number of armour vehicles, helicopters, artillery

17 pieces, different artillery pieces, and that the area of Prijedor could be

18 easily accessed by tanks, because it was located in a valley, in a plain,

19 and that we could not defend it.

20 The republic board of the Patriotic League said that it was

21 perhaps possible to defend the left bank of the Sana River which excluded

22 some parts of the municipalities of Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc,

23 and the area was actually directly linked thereby to the Bihac area

24 located behind but also on the banks of the Sana. So it was necessary for

25 the Territorial Defence from the Bihac area to provide assistance to the

1 TO units in our area, and that they tried together to defend the left bank

2 of the Sana. That was assessed to be the only reasonable solution, that

3 that was the only plan that could be implemented realistically speaking.

4 Q. And you discussed in your previous testimony that this plan became

5 impossible once -- correct me if I'm wrong -- Bosanska Krupa fell to the

6 SDS forces. Is that correct? I may have the wrong municipality.

7 A. Yes. That is correct. The plan was to establish a corridor

8 towards Bosanska Krupa and unfortunately on the 23rd of April, Bosanska

9 Krupa was attacked in a very swift military attack by JNA. It was taken

10 possession of, and all communications with the area of Bihac were thus

11 severed. Therefore, the area of Banja Luka remained isolated and

12 encircled from all sides. This rendered this last possibility to defend

13 the left bank of the Sana no longer viable.

14 Q. Given this military situation, can you tell us if at any time

15 either before the SDS takeover of the elected government of Professor

16 Cehajic on the 30th of April, or after that, up to the attacks on

17 Hambarine and Kozarac, was there in Prijedor any plans for an offensive

18 against the JNA, against the Serbian party or Serbian citizens in

19 Prijedor? What was your attitude towards conflict?

20 A. As I have already indicated, all our plans were of a defensive

21 nature. We never had a single plan which would have implied an attack by

22 any unit, attack on any Serb settlement or like. As I said, all our plans

23 were defensive plans, plans to defend. We never planned any attack

24 whatsoever.

25 Q. You mentioned today your meeting with Colonel Arsic which you

1 described in your testimony in the Stakic case, and I believe you also in

2 your Stakic testimony, you described a meeting in the police station

3 earlier that day. During that meeting, did a telegram arrive? Or was

4 there some indication that a telegram --

5 A. On the 29th of April, 1992, after several requests of the

6 Autonomous Region of Krajina to have Prijedor annexed to the Autonomous

7 Region of Krajina and to have the Prijedor police station placed under the

8 control of the Banja Luka public security station, we held a meeting with

9 political representatives from both the municipality and other political

10 parties, together with employees of the police. The meeting was held in

11 the police building.

12 We tried to maintain a status quo, and we informed the

13 representatives of the police that it was better to continue having

14 contact with Sarajevo, that it was from there that their salaries were

15 coming and that the region still had no -- its own resources, so that this

16 communication was necessary. And in case of any problems, we thought, we

17 said that we could sit down and try to solve them together, in order to

18 avoid any possible conflict. Almost at the very -- at the end of the

19 meeting, all of a sudden, Milos Jankovic appeared. He's the

20 communications chief with the public security station in Prijedor. He was

21 very hysterical. He waved a document. He held it in his hand, and he

22 said, "You see what they want? You see what Alija Delimustafic and others

23 from Sarajevo want? They want us to attack our JNA. See for yourself.

24 This is what they want. This is what they request for [as interpreted]

25 us. And they want us to be loyal to them."

1 I asked Mr. Jankovic to show us the document, to tell us what this

2 was all about, which is not what he wanted, and he simply said that the

3 document had arrived directly from the minister and that he could not give

4 it to us. However, on the same day, at 5.00 p.m., Colonel Arsic wanted me

5 to come to the barracks as soon as possible, and I asked him for this

6 meeting to be organised at a neutral location because I was already afraid

7 that I could be arrested by the military, because of the situation which

8 was getting increasingly tense, I felt uncomfortable. However, Colonel

9 Arsic insisted and he said, "Please come here as soon as possible. It is

10 very important. Mr. Miskovic is chairing the meeting and we have to get

11 together as soon as possible."

12 So after he insisted, I went to the barracks and Colonel Arsic

13 showed me a document. As soon as I got in, he threw it at me and he said,

14 "Mujadzic, what do you make of this? What do you think about this".

15 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me just a minute.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

17 MR. ACKERMAN: Page 22 line 16 there is a sentence that says,

18 "This is what they request for us," and actually what it should say is --

19 JUDGE AGIUS: From us.

20 MR. ACKERMAN: From us, yes.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

22 MR. KOUMJIAN:

23 Q. Doctor, I know there are many more important details about that

24 meeting but they are contained in your Stakic transcript, so I'm not going

25 to go through all of those now. What I'd now like to do is have that

1 telegram placed on the ELMO, and that's P1167. While it's being prepared,

2 let me just ask you, you mentioned Simo Miskovic, is it correct he was the

3 President of the SDS party in Prijedor at the time?

4 A. Yes, that is correct. He was the president of the SDS.

5 Q. And you talked about Milos Jankovic as the head of the

6 communications department in the police station. Do you know of his

7 ethnicity?

8 A. He was a Serb by ethnicity. I mean he still is. He's alive.

9 Q. And you also mentioned Mr. Delimustafic. Is it correct that he

10 was a Bosniak and was the Minister of the Interior at the time?

11 A. Yes, that is correct. He's a Bosniak and Minister of the

12 Interior.

13 Q. Now, in the meeting with Arsic, did Mr. Arsic finally show you the

14 telegram in question?

15 A. Yes. He showed me the document, and wanted me to provide an

16 explanation of the document, and also to express our attitude towards the

17 document and tell him how it is that we intend to react to the issues

18 raised by the document, what our response would be.

19 Q. If the English could be put on the ELMO and the witness be given

20 the B/C/S. This is obviously a photocopy of the original that you have

21 with some handwriting dated the 11th of May, but the document in type

22 bears the date 29 April, 1992. Is this -- does this appear to be the

23 same -- a copy of the same document that Colonel Arsic showed you?

24 A. Yes. That's a copy of the document shown to me by Mr. Arsic.

25 Q. This document indicates that its pursuant to an order of the

1 Presidency. Can you tell us what was the reaction of the Presidency to

2 this document, the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

3 A. The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Alija Delimustafic, with this

4 document and on the basis -- on an order issued by the Presidency of BH,

5 to issue further orders to all police stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

6 to set up road barricades and lay siege to all military garrisons and try

7 to sever all communications of these garrisons.

8 Q. I stopped you. Thank you for following my hand signal -- because

9 perhaps my question wasn't clear. Did the Presidency react to this

10 document after it became public? Was there an acknowledgment or a denial

11 of the authenticity of this document by the Presidency of Bosnia?

12 A. The Presidency stated their position on the following day

13 regarding this document. They declared that the document was not

14 authentic and that it had never issued any such order or instruction to

15 the Minister of the Interior. In other words, the presidency denied the

16 authenticity of the document.

17 Q. What about the Minister of the Interior, the supposed author,

18 Mr. Delimustafic? Did he admit or deny this document being a genuine

19 document, order that he had sent?

20 A. I think that in the press release, that is what was said on behalf

21 of the Presidency, said that the Presidency had not reached such a

22 decision and that the Ministry of the Interior, of course, could not issue

23 a document of this nature, thereby denying the possibility on the part of

24 the Ministry of the Interior to have sent out a document of this kind,

25 because obviously if the Presidency had not reached a decision to that

1 effect then the Minister of the Interior had no authority to issue a

2 document like this either.

3 Q. Looking at the addressees of this telegram, it indicates to chief,

4 all security services centres, and I believe they would also be known as

5 CSBs. Would it be correct, then, that this document would have been sent

6 according to the addressees to persons such as Mr. Stojan Zupljanin, the

7 head of the CSB in Banja Luka?

8 A. Yes, of course. You can see from the title that the document was

9 supposed to be sent, that it was sent to all chiefs of public security

10 stations, and the MUPs, the public security stations in the city of

11 Sarajevo itself, which means that Mr. Zupljanin must have received this

12 document too.

13 Q. You indicated that in Prijedor, on -- in your Stakic testimony,

14 the police chief was Mr. Talundzic, a Bosniak, and you also told us today

15 that head of the communications department that received the telegram was

16 Mr. Jankovic, a Serb. Just within the Krajina region, if you recall now,

17 how many of the public security stations had Serb chiefs of police?

18 A. At the security services centre in Banja Luka, there were several

19 public security stations, 17, that is, except in Jajce, whose population

20 was Croatian and Bosniak by majority more than 86 per cent. And Jajce was

21 actually part of central Bosnia, not the Prijedor Krajina. Prijedor was

22 the only municipality in which the security services centre, the public

23 security station was headed by a Muslim.

24 Q. Just one question that I mean to ask you before I leave and before

25 I forget it, very simple: How long does it take to drive from the centre

1 of Prijedor to Banja Luka?

2 A. From the centre of Prijedor to the centre of Banja Luka, if you

3 drive normally, at an average speed, between 90 and 100 kilometres per

4 hour, I think you need 45 minutes. It's about 58 kilometres, a little

5 more than 30 miles. Prijedor and Banja Luka are very close, as cities,

6 which was damaging for the development of Prijedor, because Banja Luka was

7 the regional centre and it somehow stunt Prijedor in its economical growth

8 because towns such as Bihac, Brcko, and Doboj had this regional character,

9 although they were significantly smaller than Prijedor. I use this

10 example only to illustrate to you the vicinity of Prijedor to Banja Luka.

11 Q. Thank you. Just in the interests of time I want to move on. The

12 fourth paragraph of this document calls on -- indicates, orders, "The

13 planning and launching of combat activities throughout the territory of

14 the Republic of BH is to be accelerated."

15 What effect do you think this order would have upon Serbian police

16 officers and Serbian citizens in places like Prijedor? What effect do you

17 think this would have upon their attitude towards their Muslim and Croat

18 neighbours?

19 A. Excuse me, I didn't fully understand your question. Would you be

20 so kind and repeat it, please?

21 Q. The fourth paragraph of the telegram orders "The planning and

22 launching of combat activities throughout the territory of the Republic of

23 Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be accelerated." Do you think that this

24 document, if taken by Serbs as genuine, would have an effect upon Serbs?

25 A. By all means. If this document were accepted as an authentic

1 document, and I believe that the majority -- well, I'm actually not sure

2 whether anyone knew that this document was not an authentic document sent

3 by the Ministry of the Interior. Most of the people really believed that

4 this document was authentic, and since they believed in its authenticity,

5 they thought that it was necessary to undertake some emergency action as

6 countermeasure, because according to this document, Bosniaks, Muslims,

7 were preparing an attack against the army, which in the view of the

8 majority of the Serbs, constituted an attack on themselves, against

9 themselves. This document served as a justification for the army and the

10 SDS to organise a putsch in Prijedor which took place only a day later,

11 after the arrival of this document, on the 30th of April, 1992.

12 Q. Doctor, you've already commented upon the reality of the military

13 situation, so I won't ask you about how logical paragraph 4 is. But the

14 first three paragraphs of this order concern -- are orders to block the

15 JNA from pulling out of Bosnia. Doctor, which political parties in Bosnia

16 on the 29th of April, 1992, opposed the JNA pulling out its equipment and

17 men from Bosnia and which parties were in favour of the JNA leaving

18 Bosnia?

19 A. All political parties, including the SDA, and with the exception

20 of SDS, were in favour of the JNA pulling out from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 There had already been many such attempts, politically speaking, but the

22 SDS refused this emphatically and they insisted that the JNA should remain

23 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So in addition to the already-stationed units in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the units that had withdrawn from Croatia arrived in

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was in this way turned into a large military

1 warehouse, the territory with the very strong concentration of the former

2 JNA, its personnel.

3 So everybody with the exception of the SDS was in favour of the

4 JNA pulling out from Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, with the insistence

5 of the SDS, the JNA remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this is why

6 this document in itself is not logical. On one hand, that all parties,

7 including the SDS, should request that the JNA leave Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina, and on the other hand, this document requests the JNA to

9 leave Bosnia and Herzegovina. So it is contradictory. It's not logical.

10 Not to speak of the fact that the document of this kind was sent to a

11 place such as Prijedor, whose chief of communications department is a

12 Serb, and so they would have known that the document would have ended in

13 the hands of a Serb. I mean, there is a number of illogical things about

14 this document, which can point to the fact that it is not an authentic

15 document.

16 Q. Thank you. In your Stakic testimony, you go on to describe the

17 overthrow of the elected government the next day in Prijedor. And I want

18 to move on then to just another document.

19 MR. KOUMJIAN: May the witness be shown, the Kozarski Vjesnik of

20 the 28th of June, 1992, and the English translation has the number

21 L0088624. I don't know if Your Honour wants to take the break now before

22 I go into this? It actually might be helpful because I may have another

23 document translated by the time we come back.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That's perfectly okay with us, Mr. Koumjian.

25 This document will be P1605?

1 MR. KOUMJIAN: 5, yes, thank you.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: And just to clarify something.

3 MR. KOUMJIAN: The translation deals with the article in the lower

4 left.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. The previous document, the telegram that we

6 have been discussing, is included in the binder that was handed to us as

7 D6A and B, but I took it that it has already been exhibited in this case

8 as P1617 or something like that, so it's not being tendered again, is it?

9 MR. KOUMJIAN: No, correct. It's P1167.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: 1167, okay.

11 MR. KOUMJIAN: According to Ms. Gustin who is never wrong.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: We will have a 15-minute break and we'll continue

13 after that. Thank you.

14 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 4.04 p.m.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Koumjian. You were about to start dealing

17 with Exhibit P1605, which has just been tendered.

18 MR. KOUMJIAN: Yes. I see on the ELMO we have the English

19 version.

20 Q. Doctor, in your testimony in Stakic, you referred to a friend of

21 yours, a Dr. Zeljko Sikura, who you indicated was of Czech ethnicity. Is

22 that correct?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. Can you tell us what the religion of Dr. Sikura was.

25 A. Dr. Sikura was a Catholic, of Catholic faith, though he never

1 spoke of his religion, nor did he give the impression of being a

2 particularly religious man.

3 Q. Can you tell us, among the most extreme elements of Serbian

4 nationalists, would Dr. Sikura be characterised, together with any other

5 ethnic group, being a Czech Catholic?

6 A. No. He was actually described as an Ustasha, like all other

7 Croats that were considered to be extremists. So Dr. Sikura was described

8 in this way, probably only because he was of Catholic faith, but in the

9 media, he was also referred to as the Monster Doctor.

10 Q. Dr. Sikura is not actually named in this article entitled "Monster

11 Doctor." Can you tell us why you believe it refers to Dr. Sikura?

12 A. Because in Prijedor, it was made public that Dr. Sikura had

13 planned to sterilise Serb children, to carry out abortions without any

14 reason for Serb women, expectant women, though he was newly graduated from

15 medical school and there was no possibility of him being able to do any

16 such thing. But knowing Mr. Sikura's personality, as he was a colleague

17 of mine and he worked with me in the same outpatient's clinic for more

18 than two years, I know that on a number of occasions, or rather very

19 frequently, he went to Serb villages and helped the Serbs, without any

20 remuneration, and actually, he was a person who was beloved, particularly

21 in Tomasica, beloved by Serbs.

22 He was a very popular person among Serbs because he helped them a

23 lot, and that is why this article says a lot. Dr. Sikura was not the only

24 person who paid a high price for being popular among the Serbs and for

25 assisting them. Several other doctors and other intellectuals were

1 victimised for that very reason. Many might wonder how is that possible,

2 that on the one hand, he did so many good things for the Serbs, and on the

3 other side, was described as a monster, somebody who had planned the

4 gravest crimes against the Serbs. The reason is that in the territory of

5 Prijedor municipality, relationships between Bosniaks and Serbs were

6 traditionally good. And Prijedor, as a town, was taken as an example of

7 such good relationships between Bosniaks and Serbs.

8 So the aim of this was to say that if Dr. Sikura who had done so

9 many good deeds, had planned such crimes against you, then you can imagine

10 what others had planned to do to you. So this kind of a propaganda ploy,

11 which climaxed unfortunately with the killing of a number of people, was

12 designed to spread paranoia among citizens of Serb ethnicity to the effect

13 that all Bosniaks and all Croats were planning evil things against Serbs.

14 Q. I believe, correct me if I'm wrong, that this morning going

15 through some issues of Kozarski Vjesnik that I had, you found an article

16 that did in fact refer by name to Dr. Sikura and to another doctor,

17 Dr. Mahmuljin.

18 MR. KOUMJIAN: May that be marked next in order, Your Honour? I

19 have a draft translation only available. That would be P1606. If the

20 original could be put on the ELMO? And I'm not sure if the Defence has

21 got a copy yet?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: No, we don't have a copy as yet.

23 MR. KOUMJIAN: Okay. We have a revised draft, only one copy that

24 just arrived, and we have an earlier draft that we could hand out but

25 we'll have a final later.

1 Q. Doctor, is it correct that this article refers in the -- I believe

2 the first paragraph, to the recent uncovering of Dr. Sikura?

3 A. Yes. That's right. I shall read it out as it is just one

4 sentence. "The recent unmasking of Dr. Sikura, who for years applying

5 monstrous methods worked in a planned manner to reduce the birth rate

6 among the Serb people sheds new light on the professional activities of

7 certain doctors of Prijedor."

8 So it can be seen from this article too that the other article

9 relates to Dr. Sikura, and similar news reports were published in other

10 media so this only confirms what I said a moment ago, that some people

11 paid a high price precisely because they had such -- were on such good

12 terms with the Serbs.

13 Q. This article also discusses alleged mistreatment by Dr. Osman

14 Mahmuljin of the ill Dr. Dukic. Can you tell us the ethnicity of these

15 two doctors?

16 A. Dr. Mahmuljin was a Bosniak and Dr. Dukic was a Serb.

17 Q. As a medical doctor and a resident of Prijedor, do you have any

18 comment having read this article of the alleged mistreatment of Dr. Dukic

19 by Dr. Mahmuljin?

20 A. The article says that allegedly Dr. Mahmuljin administered the

21 wrong therapy to Dr. Dukic and that this could have provoked his death,

22 because Dr. Dukic that day had had an infarction, a heart attack, and that

23 is why Dr. Mahmuljin treated him. Though perhaps that may not be of

24 interest to this Tribunal, I have studied in detail the therapy that was

25 administered to Mr. Dukic, that is what allegedly Dr. Mahmuljin

1 administered to Dr. Dukic, and it is clear that the medicines given, such

2 as Ribokiene [phoen], which is still administered in the United States in

3 the case of a heart attack, Dr. Mahmuljin obviously gave the right

4 therapy, but this article is intended for the public at large, who are

5 untrained and unable to notice the shortcomings and the same was to give

6 another illustration of the fact that all Bosniaks were thinking up evil

7 deeds against Serbs.

8 Q. Did you know a doctor Esad Sadikovic?

9 A. Yes, certainly, I did. I did know Dr. Sadikovic, who was very

10 popular as a physician and as a person in Prijedor municipality. He's

11 also a person who spoke two or three foreign languages, including English,

12 and for many years he was a member of international medical teams all over

13 the world. I think he went to Samoa and some other countries. He was

14 married to a Serb and he personally considered himself to be a

15 cosmopolitan.

16 Q. Do you know what Dr. Sadikovic's attitude was towards the

17 conflict?

18 A. Dr. Sadikovic, who was by ethnicity a Bosniak, but as I just

19 observed, by his own beliefs he was cosmopolitan and he was on very goods

20 terms with all the citizens of Prijedor, including Serbs of course, and he

21 believed that in those hard times, he could be of assistance in avoiding a

22 potential conflict, which he realised too was inevitable, and that is why

23 he invested a great deal of effort to try and calm the situation, and to

24 bring influence to bear on the Serb side so that the conflict be avoided

25 at all cost. Actually, he spoke simultaneously with the Bosniak and the

1 Serb sides and he sincerely endeavoured to preserve peace and have the

2 conflict avoided.

3 However, Dr. Sadikovic, in the media, was subsequently described

4 as a person who had secret plans and hidden malicious intentions against

5 Serbs, and he could also be placed within the same category as Dr. Sikura

6 and Dr. Mahmuljin, who were also on very good terms with citizens of Serb

7 ethnicity. And unfortunately all three doctors, including Dr. Sadikovic,

8 was killed, precisely because of his peace-making efforts. He was killed

9 brutally in the Omarska camp, as were the other two physicians.

10 Q. Doctor, I've reached -- I've exceeded the time I wanted to spend

11 so just one additional question: Having been a political leader of the

12 SDA at the time, can you -- looking back now, can you tell us why you

13 believe Prijedor suffered so brutally during 1992 following the takeover

14 of the SDS? Why Prijedor in particular?

15 A. Yes. It is interesting to note that many places in Bosanska

16 Krajina and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which less than 30 per

17 cent of the population were non-Serbs, did not suffer so badly, or rather

18 the citizens of those towns in -- were expelled in a "peaceful manner," in

19 quotation marks, but there were no massacres or many killings, except for

20 individual incidents that did occur within the territories of other

21 municipalities.

22 However, the greater suffering occurred along the Sana River

23 valley where the population percentage-wise were evenly split with the

24 Serbs, and this applies to Sanski Most, to Kljuc, Bosanski Novi, and

25 Prijedor. So that is one of the reasons, however, not -- it is not the

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1 main reason.

2 Prijedor was known in the former Yugoslavia as a town that was an

3 example of brotherhood and unity and an example of Tito's resistance

4 movement and the songs that were sung on the mountains of Kozara

5 surrounding Prijedor were taken as an illustration of brotherhood and

6 unity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. And that was also the reason why

7 Ante Markovic the former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, his campaign for

8 the reformist forces and the unity of the former Yugoslavia, which should

9 have included all the peoples, was launched initially from Prijedor, that

10 is the slopes of Mount Kozara.

11 Dr. Karadzic did not have a great deal of confidence in the SDS

12 leadership in Prijedor, precisely because the SDS had lost the elections,

13 and he believed this to be the reason why what he considered to be poor or

14 bad Serbs lived in Prijedor. And according to Dr. Karadzic, such poor

15 Serbs were all those who accepted coexistence with the Bosniaks. And as

16 Prijedor was known as a town of coexistence, then he wished -- or let me

17 correct myself, the crimes that happened in Prijedor happened precisely

18 because of the design to break or destroy the image of Prijedor as a town

19 of good relationships between Bosniaks and Serbs, as a town that

20 symbolised the brotherhood unity, and that by crimes committed against the

21 Bosniaks, there should be a chasm created between the Serbs and the

22 Muslims, that mutual hatred be instigated which would culminate in the

23 absolute impossibility of joint life by Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina.

25 That is why Prijedor, as a symbol of brotherhood and unity,

1 experienced the greatest suffering and the greatest massacres in that

2 period of time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, it will only be

3 Srebrenica which came later that will surpass this tragic record of the

4 former Yugoslav People's Army.

5 Q. You indicated that Dr. Karadzic classified as the bad Serbs those

6 that would accept coexistence with Bosnians. Based upon your experience

7 in the parliament with Mr. Brdjanin, did Mr. Brdjanin fit Dr. Karadzic's

8 category of bad Serbs or was he of the category that Dr. Karadzic

9 preferred?

10 A. Even though I heard later that Mr. Brdjanin himself was not on

11 good personal terms with Mr. Karadzic, which was probably due to the

12 rivalry, the traditional rivalry between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, and the

13 bulk of the SDS leadership in those days came from Sarajevo rather than

14 Banja Luka, and Mr. Brdjanin appeared on the scene later on as a very

15 powerful regional leader. However, Mr. Brdjanin clearly, by his

16 statements and behaviour and subsequent activities, is within the group of

17 very good Serbs, according to Karadzic's assessment, and this resulted in

18 a very good career that he made in the SDS, and quickly climbed to the

19 position of the President of the Crisis Staff in Banja Luka.

20 So there is no doubt that Mr. Brdjanin, by his statements and

21 behaviour, belongs to the group of the most loyal followers of the SDS,

22 true to the ideas of Dr. Radovan Karadzic and their very substance.

23 MR. KOUMJIAN: Thank you. I have no further questions. Perhaps

24 we could deal later with the admission of the Stakic exhibits or now, as

25 Your Honour prefers.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, certainly that will be more practical,

2 Mr. Koumjian. I thank you.

3 Yes, Doctor, now you're going to be cross-examined by

4 Mr. Trbojevic.

5 Mr. Trbojevic, if you prefer to come forward here rather than

6 stay -- it's up to you. I mean -- because I notice that the microphone is

7 in front of your assistant. Yes, okay. Thank you, ma'am.

8 Now, Mr. Trbojevic and Dr. Mujadzic, you both speak the same

9 language. It has been a common occurrence here that the moment he

10 finishes the question, the witness jumps in straight with the answer, not

11 giving a chance to the interpreters to translate into English. So please,

12 Doctor, when he finishes his question, do allow a very short interval of

13 time you start giving your answer, so that you will give time to the

14 interpreters to finish their translation.

15 At the same time, Mr. Trbojevic, I don't need to repeat there to

16 you because you're quite familiar with the problem and you have been very

17 cooperative in the past, although not always. Thank you.

18 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best, Your Honour.

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Trbojevic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mujadzic, I'm afraid I have to go back a

21 little. I know that you have given extensive testimony and that you have

22 been also extensively cross-examined.

23 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I have the impression somehow that

24 my microphone is being turned off and on.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: It's turned off now. It's turned on now.

1 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I think it will be okay.

2 Q. It is difficult to summarise all your statements and testimonies,

3 there were two such testimonies and two different cross-examinations.

4 However, I should like to begin with the subject of the break-up of

5 Yugoslavia. You addressed the issue for the first time in the Tadic

6 case. I believe you also spoke about it on the 27th of May in the Stakic

7 case, and one could perhaps reach the conclusion that the conflict started

8 with the amendments to the constitution of 1974?

9 A. Would you be so kind and characterise for me the nature of the

10 conflict that you have in mind.

11 Q. Well, I'm not referring to the conflict itself. I think that it

12 is beyond dispute that the SDA and SDS had in their programmes, the

13 preservation of Yugoslavia at the beginning.

14 A. Yes, that is correct. That was part of the SDA programme as well,

15 and part of its policy.

16 Q. However, the constitution of Serbia was amended, autonomous

17 provinces were abolished in this constitution, and from that moment on,

18 the policies of the respective policies of SDS and SDA started to change

19 and become more different. You will remember the adoption of the law on

20 the -- on the tax and the replenishment of the budget for the purposes of

21 the JNA, the federal budget, that is, that that was discussed at one point

22 in time in Bosnia-Herzegovina, also the functioning of the federal

23 institutions. I think you talked about this in the Stakic case,

24 transcript page 3.645.

25 You said that the SDS wanted the continuation of the federal

1 financing of the JNA, that HDZ categorically opposed this, and that SDA

2 found some sort of middle ground by proposing a special fund for this

3 purpose, whose expenses and intention would be determined later on. I

4 think I have more or less correctly paraphrased your words?

5 A. Yes. That's correct. If you have finished your question, I shall

6 take the liberty to be more precise. The change in this constitution took

7 place earlier on. If you remember, these amendments took place at the

8 time prior to the existence of both SDS and SDA. It was during the time

9 of the former League of Communists of Yugoslavia and League of Communists

10 of the Republic of Serbia. So during that period of time, this could not

11 have been a bone of contention between SDS and SDA, since they did not

12 exist at the time. That could not have been the subject of their

13 disagreement.

14 Q. My question would be as follows: Do you agree that at the time

15 that this was all happening, I am referring to the taxes and the financing

16 coming from the federal institutions, that political positions against the

17 financing, federal financing, of the JNA were designed actually to destroy

18 the existing federation? That that was the objective?

19 A. Once again, I have to ask the counsel to be more precise. Whose

20 positions do you have in mind? Whose political positions are you

21 referring to? Which political parties did you have in mind?

22 Q. I quoted your testimony on page 3.645 when you said that the SDS

23 was in favour of the continuation of the federal financing of the JNA?

24 A. Yes, that is correct.

25 Q. That the HDZ was against and the SDA were also --

1 A. Correct.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers be asked to slow down,

3 please? We cannot follow. Microphone, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. You have not been following the advice that I

5 gave you. You're jumping straight one after the other, and not giving the

6 interpreters a chance to do their job, their work, properly.

7 Mr. Trbojevic, please slow down.

8 And Dr. Mujadzic, please allow an interval before you answer,

9 because you're not allowing even Mr. Trbojevic to finish his question.

10 Any way the position -- let me paraphrase it myself. Correctly,

11 Mr. Trbojevic is reminding you that in -- in reference to your previous

12 testimony, he explained or he paraphrased what was the position taken by

13 the various political parties with regard to the financing of the JNA,

14 saying that the SDS wanted to retain the status quo, the Croat -- Croatian

15 party was definitely against, and your party, the SDA, took a middle road

16 and was not exactly against as much as the Croatian party was. And the

17 question that he is putting to you is whether, in your opinion, the fact

18 that your party and the Croatian party took a different view, approach, to

19 that of the SDS was designed specifically to undermine, to destroy, the

20 federation.

21 Did I interpret your question well, Mr. Trbojevic?

22 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Your Honour.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot assess the intentions of

24 HDZ but I know that by trying to reach a middle ground, the intentions of

25 SDA were to preserve and maintain stability and to find a compromise, a

1 transitional solution, so to speak, and not to create instability or

2 undermine the federation as was suggested by Mr. Trbojevic.

3 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. These talks took place at the time when Croatia and Slovenia were

5 asking for independence. However, the issue was not yet being

6 discussed -- this issue was not yet mentioned in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 On the 26th of May, 1996, in your first testimony, you said that the SDA

8 policy was at an equal distance from both, from these two other parties,

9 and that this implied an equal distance or an equal closeness both to

10 Serbia and Croatia, with respect of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what you

11 stated. This is your testimony?

12 JUDGE AGIUS: [Previous translation continues] ... What is your

13 question, Mr. Trbojevic?

14 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I have just paraphrased the testimony of the witness, that is that

16 the SDA believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should not -- neither remain

17 in Yugoslavia nor leave Yugoslavia, but that on the basis of the theory

18 that they termed equidistance, that they realised or implement an equal

19 distance or maintain an equal distance towards Serbia and Croatian.

20 A. I think my original words should be used as a starting point. If

21 you want me to, I can now answer your question or explain what the issue

22 was all about. The term equidistance, that is the equal distance, was

23 based on the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of three peoples,

24 Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, who were two -- who were equal constituent

25 peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that for the stability of Bosnia and

1 Herzegovina, because of this fact, it was necessary for Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, in its entirety, to have equal relations with Serbia and

3 Croatia. Any decision as to the closer relationship with either Bosnia or

4 Herzegovina [as interpreted] because of the nature of its composition,

5 would end-- would result in a break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6 So what you have termed as the theory of equidistance was actually

7 the only possible policy not of the SDA but of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its

8 entirety. Both before and after, and even today, the policy of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina should advocate this position. The objective should be to

10 maintain equally good relationship with Croatia and Serbia, and this is

11 what the term meant.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction page 42 line 13, "The

13 closer relationship with either Serbia or Croatia."

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Trbojevic.

15 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I believe that that was my understanding too. However, SDS --

17 this policy implied the remaining in Yugoslavia, and the SDA, through its

18 leadership, entered into certain agreements or treaties with Croatia, both

19 public and secret.

20 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Your Honour, we are

21 receiving French interpretation.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, we did too for a while. But I think the

23 situation now is --

24 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I believe you heard me. Especially lately some transcripts have

1 been published, transcripts of talks held at Mr. Tudjman's office, that

2 there would be some secret confederations with Croatia and so on and so

3 forth, and it is in this context that I am asking you the following: Was

4 SDA really in favour, for an equal distance with respect of both sides, or

5 was it merely a political game which of course would not be that unusual?

6 A. Never before the war, and before the conflict, did any talks take

7 place between the leadership of the SDA and Croatian Democratic Union or

8 President Tudjman for that matter, with respect of the creation of some

9 Croatian-Muslim coalition or Bosnian-Croatian federation. Nor were there

10 any talks ever, any talks that would be targeted against the citizens of

11 Serb ethnicity.

12 Q. The fact remains, however, that the activities with the purpose of

13 secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia were taken on the basis of

14 this attitude, the attitudes that were contrary to the wishes of the Serb

15 people?

16 A. When you say "contrary to the wishes of the Serb people," I don't

17 know exactly what you mean. Could you be more precise, please?

18 Q. The fact is that the Serbian deputies in the parliament clearly

19 declared themselves as opposed to the secession. The fact is also that

20 there was a referendum, a plebiscite actually. How many people turned out

21 is perhaps not very important here; however, it expressed their wish to

22 remain in Yugoslavia.

23 A. There is no doubt that the SDS deputies were explicitly in favour

24 of remaining in Yugoslavia. However, the SDS deputies were not

25 representatives of the Serbian people in general, as the deputies of the

1 SDA were not representatives of the Croatian people. They never had an

2 exclusive right to represent one single people. In other words, a single

3 political party cannot act as a representative of a single people except

4 in fascism, because such things happened in those societies. I don't

5 think that this is something that you would characterise in this manner.

6 So I don't think that the SDS represented the Serb people, nor can we say

7 that the HDZ and SDA represented Croatian or Muslim people respectively so

8 this is not something that you can identify with the wishes of the

9 Serbian people in general.

10 Q. I wasn't trying to suggest that. But today, from this time

11 distance of more than ten years, I think that we have to agree that there

12 was no doubt that the Serbian people wanted to stay in Yugoslavia?

13 A. I've already mentioned in several of my testimonies, that there is

14 no doubt, and that there was no doubt, that the Bosniak people wanted to

15 preserve Yugoslavia and wanted to stay in Yugoslavia. But President

16 Izetbegovic at negotiations that you remember very well - I'm sure, on a

17 number of occasions, through initiatives with the President of Macedonia,

18 Mr. Gligoroff - demonstrated this and endeavoured in every possible way to

19 preserve Yugoslavia in any form. And in doing so, he actually

20 demonstrated that he, or rather we Bosniaks, were most eager to preserve

21 Yugoslavia at all cost, and that is the bare truth. However, it was

22 precisely Mr. Milosevic who did not agree to any of those proposals, but

23 one must say that the Slovene and Croatian presidents didn't either so

24 that it is the Bosniaks who least wanted the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: May I remind both of you, please, that this is not

1 the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where you may have exchanged

2 political blows in the past but a Trial Chamber trying Mr. Brdjanin. So

3 please may I call you to order and restrict yourself to what is strictly

4 relevant to the case. The Tribunal is not very much interested in whether

5 it was the -- on who had the primacy between the SDS and the SDA for the

6 preservation of the former state of Yugoslavia. It disintegrated in any

7 case. So let's go ahead.

8 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] May I ask just one more in this

9 area, please? Just one more?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Trbojevic.

11 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. You will remember that before the war operation started, in the

13 assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, political activity started for the

14 constitutional guarantees and procedures to be established so that the

15 vital interests of all the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be secured

16 in a certain sense. Those activities had started, hadn't they?

17 A. Yes, they had, but the disintegration took place before we managed

18 to assert them.

19 Q. I'm sorry, I didn't hear your sentence.

20 A. Yes, the disintegration occurred before those guarantees were

21 embodied in the constitution. That's right.

22 Q. So now we come to the war operations in Croatia. Would you agree

23 with me that both the constitutional and legal role of the JNA was to

24 preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of SFRY according to

25 the constitution and laws that were still in force at the time?

1 A. Yes, I would agree with you, and if possible, could I have the

2 text of the translation on my screen? Because in that way, I can tell

3 when the translation has been completed and when I can start speaking so

4 there is no overlapping. Thank you.

5 Q. So the political position of the SDA, which gave instructions not

6 to take part in the war operations in Croatia at the time, was not in

7 conformity with the constitution, was it?

8 A. I would only partially agree with you in that respect. And I've

9 already confirmed this in my previous answer, and that is that the

10 Yugoslav People's Army was one of the mechanisms whereby the Federal

11 Republic of Yugoslavia was to have been preserved. However, in the

12 constitution of the former Yugoslavia, it was -- the implication was it

13 was an enemy and an aggression, I don't think the constitution of any

14 country envisages that the army of that country should attack its own

15 people, because the Yugoslav People's Army, by its definition, was an army

16 of all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Therefore, of the Slovenes and Croats

17 as well, as in those days.

18 Unfortunately, the Yugoslav People's Army was directly attacking

19 civilians and civilian property as well, and destroying civilian

20 facilities in Croatia, that is something that we didn't want to take part

21 in, and I think that that was quite justified and in harmony with the

22 constitution.

23 Q. Would you say that the military response of Croatia after it was

24 internationally recognised, and after the JNA did not wish to leave that

25 territory, was justified?

1 A. That is a complex issue that I could not give a simple answer to.

2 Q. In any event, no one expects us to resolve all political disputes

3 here.

4 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour, for

5 this remark.

6 Q. You said, on the 27th of May this year, that constitutional

7 activity after the first multi-party election started with the dispute

8 over the oaths, and you elaborated on this with the request of the SDS

9 that remaining in Yugoslavia should be given a first place in that text.

10 Could you recollect any other detail in this context? If I tell

11 you that the administrative service distributed to the deputies the text

12 which was any way a constitutional provision, which was already part of

13 the constitution, and then somebody observed that the text was not

14 identical, and then there was a break during which the Presidents of the

15 deputy clubs got together, Mr. Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and other party

16 leaders who were not deputies, and then a new text of the oath was agreed

17 among the parties, was that how it went?

18 A. To the best of my recollection, the text of the oath that was

19 distributed to us first was the authentic text which the deputies spoke

20 out when taking their oath for years. So to the best of my recollection,

21 we received the same wording used by all Members of Parliament before. It

22 wasn't changed. But as the order of the words in the oath was that the

23 first one should take an oath of allegiance to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then

24 to Yugoslavia, the SDS complained, and that is when the problem arose.

25 They wanted a change in the oath of allegiance before the deputies had

1 taken the oath. And this was impossible. It couldn't be done before the

2 deputies took their oath because, before that, they weren't really Members

3 of Parliament.

4 Q. But it was agreed and changed, because the sociopolitical

5 situation had changed and words -- socialism, was left out?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Trbojevic, what's the relevance of this event?

7 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we are talking about

8 the confrontation of different policies. Mr. Mujadzic has expressed that

9 from the very outset, in the assembly, there was a confrontation, because

10 of the request that he described. I'm trying to -- we have finished.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: [Previous translation continues] ... Let's proceed,

12 move forward, because we are not going to waste time on the debate that

13 took place in the assembly on the formulation of the oath, on how it

14 should have been drafted or whether it should have included this and what

15 should have come first. Please.

16 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. We'll move on to the events in Prijedor.

18 In the LiveNote, in the Stakic case, page 3.649, and in other

19 places too, you spoke about the Territorial Defence not having weapons so

20 that the assessment was that Prijedor could not be defended. And at one

21 point, you said that the Muslim people wouldn't have anything to defend

22 themselves with if it were to be attacked by the JNA or the SDS.

23 Did you mean that the SDS could have, on its own, carried out that

24 attack?

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Let him answer the question and then I will hear

1 your objection, please.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just a moment please

3 for me to think this over.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. While you think, when I stopped you,

5 Mr. Koumjian, provided that what has been suggested by Mr. Trbojevic to

6 the witness is not correct, in other words, that he did not mention a

7 possible attack from the SDS? If the suggestion is correct, then wait

8 until we hear the answer.

9 MR. KOUMJIAN: The question included an unintentional

10 oversimplification of the witness's testimony. He never said the

11 Territorial Defence had no weapons. He described the paucity, the

12 poorness of the weapons of the Territorial Defence but the question

13 implies that he I think unintentionally that he said that he had no

14 weapons.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Dr. Mujadzic, please do take that in

16 consideration.

17 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I didn't mean it in absolute

18 terms.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Trbojevic, as well.

20 Yes, Mr. Mujadzic, please. Do you require more time to answer the

21 question?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I can answer it.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Please proceed.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The observation that the Territorial

25 Defence didn't have any weapons, you have already heard from

1 Mr. Koumjian. The Territorial Defence did have some weapons, after all,

2 and that was light infantry weapons, and these were mostly hunting rifles

3 or personal weapons that people had lawfully. There were about 1.000

4 barrels that Colonel Arsic distributed legally to mobilise the Territorial

5 Defence, and some weapons were procured by people on their own, on the

6 black market, and in fact, those weapons were mostly purchased from Serbs.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Wait. I'm going to stop you, because the substance

8 of Mr. Trbojevic's question wasn't actually what extent of ammunition

9 or -- and weapons did the Territorial Defence have, but whether, in

10 including or in referring to a possible attack on -- the possibility of

11 defending themselves against possible attacks, you had also included a

12 possible attack from the SDS, whether you sincerely believe that the SDS

13 was in a position to attack the Muslims in your region. Not the JNA, not

14 the JNA, because he said JNA and SDS. Forget the JNA for the time being.

15 Was there the perception that the SDS could launch an attack on its own?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the question put by

17 Mr. Trbojevic was put in such a way that I am asked to say whether the SDS

18 could have attacked Bosniaks without the JNA, and the gist of it all is

19 that many months before there was any possibility of an attack, what was

20 happening within the JNA itself, which underwent dynamic changes in its

21 composition and its officer structure, identified itself fully with the

22 policies of Mr. Milosevic and the SDS. Therefore, the question of the JNA

23 is inseparable from the SDS. The JNA was transformed into the military

24 wing of the SDS. So the -- Milosevic's policies served as the political

25 background for the JNA.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Trbojevic?

2 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You've explained about the part of the weapons given to the

4 Territorial Defence, the reserve police, private hunting weapons, and if

5 we remember the telegram from Mr. Halilovic that we looked at today, I

6 think there is no need to show it to the witness again.

7 What weapons is Mr. Halilovic referring to when he says -- when he

8 makes his allegations about you? Which weapons was he referring to?

9 A. Mr. Halilovic had information about the arming of the Territorial

10 Defence, and the overall weaponry in the possession of Bosniaks, and that

11 is what he was referring to probably.

12 Q. Let us remind ourselves of the other telegram of the 29th of

13 April, 1992, that was shown to you in the police and in the barracks -- by

14 the police and in the barracks, signed by Mr. Delimustafic, and which

15 includes an order to build a road barrier, not to allow equipment and

16 materiel to be taken out of the barracks, et cetera, et cetera. You said

17 that that must be a non-authentic document, and you highlighted certain

18 things that were illogical in that text.

19 Would you agree with me that the scenario of blocking barracks and

20 not allowing the troops to leave, to come out, and take out the weapons

21 and materiel, was a scenario that had already been seen in Croatia?

22 A. Yes, yes. Such things did indeed happen in Slovenia and Croatia,

23 but there was an enormous difference between the situation in Slovenia,

24 that of Croatia, and the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If you remember,

25 Slovenia kept all the weapons of the Territorial Defence, because it did

1 not allow the TO weapons to be taken away so that it even had heavy

2 artillery weapons, anti-armour weapons, and thereby was in a position to

3 resist and oppose the JNA.

4 The Croatia didn't succeed in doing so but it had wide open

5 borders with Italy and Hungary and it also had a chance of arming itself

6 and resisting the army in that way. Bosnia and Herzegovina had no

7 possibility of arming itself, and it didn't have such weapons, and these

8 activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina could simply have not been carried

9 out.

10 Q. Supposing that this could have been a forgery and that it was

11 provocative in nature and called for a response, that is what you're

12 saying?

13 A. Is that your question?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Yes, that was the case.

16 Q. In this context, the event which took place on the 30th of April

17 and the 1st of May, could it be a reaction, a response, to this dispatch?

18 A. I'm sorry, do you mean -- was it possible for the Bosniak side to

19 react to this dispatch?

20 Q. No, the Serb side.

21 A. I see. If Serbs believed that it was true and authentic, would

22 their reaction -- I'm sorry, I don't fully understand your question. It's

23 not precise enough.

24 Q. You said that it could have been expected that this -- this

25 dispatch could have been expected to be unauthentic, untrue, designed to

1 provoke a reaction. Is that what you had in mind?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In connection with the events of the 30th of April, you said that

4 there were soldiers around the town, that certain citizens recognise

5 members of both Prijedor brigades, that there were special police units

6 from other towns as well, and that this indicated that the action had been

7 planned at the regional level. Can you explain what exactly you had in

8 mind?

9 A. Since citizens of Prijedor who had lived together for years know

10 each other very well, Bosniak and Croat citizens were able to recognise

11 amongst the soldiers who, after the event, appeared in Prijedor, there

12 were a lot of those who were not originally from the area of Prijedor.

13 Some people even recognised individuals coming from the area of Sanski

14 Most, for instance, and other locations. So it was obvious that not only

15 Prijedor units took part in this action but also units from some other

16 towns, which is what I based my testimony on.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We'll have a break now. 15 minutes.

18 How much longer do you reckon you have, Mr. Trbojevic?

19 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] 15 minutes or so, 20 perhaps.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: If you have 15 minutes, just feel free to tell me

21 yes or no, may I suggest to the interpreters and the technicians that we

22 go ahead and then we can finish and all go home?

23 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes? I can't see much behind the -- okay. So let's

25 go -- let's go ahead. And if the technicians need a stop, an interval to

1 change the tape, please let us know. Thank you.

2 Yes, Mr. Trbojevic, thank you.

3 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

4 Q. You continue, then, to say that some later information pointed to

5 an even higher level of planning of this action. You said a much higher

6 level. What did you have in mind?

7 A. Immediately after this event, there appeared a number of blue

8 posters all over Prijedor town with the following words: Citizens of

9 Prijedor, Muslims, there is no need to worry. The security situation in

10 Prijedor is now stable. I'm paraphrasing the text. I'm not using the

11 authentic words. However, the essence of the text on those posters was

12 the following: We merely wish to remove the representatives of the party

13 for democratic action who had destroyed the economy of Prijedor, who had

14 plundered Prijedor, and who had -- who are responsible for the chaotic

15 situation in Prijedor. In this way, we are trying to save you from them,

16 and after six months, you will have -- you will enjoy the full right to

17 elect, at a new election, your new genuine representatives, and not these

18 thieves, these criminals, who have brought this down into such a difficult

19 situation.

20 This political text, which I have now simplified and paraphrased,

21 was much more eloquent and precise. It had been composed in very precise

22 and eloquent terms, and obviously it had been prepared long time ago,

23 because these posters appeared around the town the very next morning. So

24 it was necessary to compose the text, to have it printed, and this is --

25 this could not have been done within one hour or one night. This just

1 tells you that the whole thing had been planned a long time ago.

2 Then the media continued, or rather started with their propaganda,

3 using very similar texts, and Bosniaks were then asked to return their

4 weapons and the whole problem focused for a while on the SDA, that is the

5 extremist wing of the SDA. Knowing what the positions were of the local

6 leadership, and also knowing who they were, knowing the local SDS leaders,

7 how skillful politically they were, this perfectly coordinated military

8 and political action could not have come from the local level, the

9 municipal level, of the SDS leadership, but only from a higher level.

10 At the very least, there were certain instructions. I'm not

11 saying that the whole plan, the whole action, was masterminded at the high

12 level, but I'm sure that certain instructions and guidelines were given

13 from the highest level. For instance, when it comes to the wording of

14 this text and some other details.

15 Q. Thank you very much. In a previous testimony, in the Stakic case,

16 page 3.677, when speaking of the Prijedor municipal Crisis Staff, you

17 stated that this was an institution that was above all other

18 institutions. Do you want me to show you the decision on the

19 establishment of the Prijedor municipal Crisis Staff?

20 A. Are you referring to the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality

21 of Prijedor?

22 Q. I am referring to the Crisis Staff in the Prijedor municipality

23 which functioned after the 30th of April.

24 A. Please, just emphasise that you are referring to the Crisis Staff

25 the Serbian Municipality of Prijedor, because I understood you to mean

1 that you were referring to a -- to this body, specific body in general.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: We have a technical problem. I think we are having

3 a -- we are hearing simultaneously with the translation, the original,

4 over a loudspeaker inside the courtroom. Okay. Can we go ahead?

5 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] That's not the case with my

6 earphones, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: It was in my case, any way. Okay. Go ahead.

8 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

9 P1265? It was exhibited in the Stakic case under number 110, if I'm not

10 mistaken.

11 Q. The date in question is the 20th of May, in Article 2 we see that

12 the Crisis Staff of Prijedor is established in order to coordinate

13 government and so on and so forth. What interests me in this case is

14 Article 3. I should like to draw your attention to the following: "The

15 Crisis Staff shall decide on issues within the competence of the municipal

16 assembly. If the assembly is unable to convene." The next sentence

17 reads: "The Crisis Staff shall submit all decisions on issues within the

18 competence of the municipal assembly to the municipal assembly as soon as

19 the assembly is able to convene."

20 My question with regard to this is the following: Does this make

21 clear the fact that Crisis Staff hereby avails itself of the competences

22 of the municipal assembly?

23 A. These competences were already provided for in a relevant law.

24 The Crisis Staff cannot avail itself of these competences. These were

25 already regulated by law, except that in the relevant law, they are

1 referred to -- this is referred to as the National Defence Council. The

2 body in question is the National Defence Council and not the Crisis Staff

3 and that is the main difference.

4 Q. I would just like to hear you with respect of this. There are no

5 other competences that this Crisis Staff availed itself of, except from

6 the competence that already apply to the municipal assembly in this area?

7 A. I have to emphasise that the role of the National Defence Council,

8 whose competences were taken over by the Crisis Staff, are different --

9 differ depending on peacetime and wartime. A different situation applies

10 in wartime. Second, the competences of the National Defence Council, and

11 in this case the Crisis Staff, are different from the competences of the

12 assembly. So these two things are not completely identical.

13 Q. This decision makes no mention of the National Defence Council.

14 A. I agree.

15 Q. Can we agree that the National Defence Council was also a body of

16 the assembly, at the level of the municipality?

17 A. National Defence Council, because of its composition, could not be

18 referred to as a body of the municipal assembly, because when you say a

19 body, or an organ, you usually refer to a body which is directly

20 subordinated to the municipal assembly. National Defence Council is much

21 more complex than that, in terms of its competences. If you want me to, I

22 can provide you a brief explanation of these differences.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, gentlemen, stop, both of you, because I think

24 we are beating around the bush. There is no way Article 3 can be read on

25 its own, without reference to Article 2 that precedes it, which spells out

1 actually in broad terms the terms of reference, the various terms of

2 reference, of the Prijedor municipal Crisis Staff.

3 Article 3 refers only to the function of the Prijedor municipal

4 Crisis Staff, should the municipal assembly be unable to sit in session.

5 But the real terms of reference and powers and functions of the municipal

6 Crisis Staff of Prijedor are in Article 2 and not in Article 3 and there,

7 inter alia you also have the function of coordinating the Defence of the

8 municipal territory. And no one would have expected the municipal Crisis

9 Staff to incorporate either in Article 2 or in any other article, the

10 coordination of the defence of the national territory. So let's move

11 forward to some other relevant question.

12 Yes, Mr. Koumjian?

13 MR. KOUMJIAN: If I can make a quick comment. I happen to know

14 there is a further translation somewhere in the OTP. This stops at

15 Article 4 and does not include, for example, Article 6 which deals with

16 defence matters. But we'll bring that down and have that to the court

17 today.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: It's Exhibit -- what was Exhibit S110 in Stakic has

19 from Article 1 right through Article 15, which seems to be the last

20 article, and which is signed then eventually or -- by Dr. Milomir Stakic.

21 So we have the entire document here. Thank you.

22 Yes, Mr. Trbojevic?

23 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I just wanted to ask the witness

24 for his opinion regarding the text of this decision, from which we can see

25 what it says, what is written there.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: He has confirmed to you that basically it was the

2 entity that counted in the circumstances.

3 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Microphone not activated]

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Microphone.

6 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Are you familiar with the relationship between the municipal

8 Crisis Staff and the Regional Crisis Staff? Specifically, I'm talking

9 about Prijedor and the ARK in Banja Luka.

10 A. I did have occasion to see certain documents in the previous case,

11 in the Stakic case, in which the competences of the Crisis Staff of the

12 region are more specifically defined in relation to municipal leaderships,

13 and I think they were defined in one of the documents. I think it was the

14 founding document of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Bosanska

15 Krajina.

16 Q. I would like to know whether you know what the relationship was

17 between the Crisis Staff of Prijedor municipality and the Regional Crisis

18 Staff. Let me tell you straight away, I don't have it here to show it to

19 you, but Their Honours have already seen it. On the 22nd of June, the

20 Prijedor Crisis Staff took a decision in which it stated that it did not

21 recognise the decisions of the Crisis Staff of the region made prior to

22 the 22nd of June, 1992.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Koumjian?

24 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, the testimony of this witness in

25 Stakic - it's part of the transcript - is that at that time, he was either

1 trying to reach Bihac or had reached Bihac. There is no information that

2 he would have had access to those documents and would just call for

3 speculation on his part to guess as to what the relationship was between

4 those two bodies.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: In any case, it's being put to him. He may have

6 obtained information subsequent to his departure to Bihac. But I think

7 the -- I will allow the question.

8 Sir, it's being suggested to you that on or around the 22nd of

9 June, the Prijedor Crisis Staff took a decision tantamount to declaring

10 that they will not recognise any decision reached by the ARK Crisis Staff

11 prior to that date. Are you aware of this?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I'm not aware of this. I hear

13 of that decision and of that document for the first time now.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: And if I confirm to you that this is so, that such

15 decision was taken indeed on the 22nd of June by the Prijedor Crisis

16 Staff, what would that mean to you with reference or in relation to the

17 relationship that existed between the ARK Crisis Staff and the Regional

18 Crisis Staff -- and the municipal Crisis Staff, and the Prijedor Crisis

19 Staff?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To be able to give a specific

21 answer, Your Honours, and Mr. President, if possible, could I see that

22 document?

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Gustin? We can show it to the witness if it can

24 be --

25 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] This same Official Gazette, the

1 same Official Gazette.

2 MR. KOUMJIAN: If counsel has an exhibit number -- we can't find

3 it right now.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Any way, let's not lose time. I am --

5 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I'm told it's 1265.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: 1265? See if you can find 1265.

7 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

8 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, it is the Official

9 Gazette that hasn't been translated in its entirety.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but we have had an English translation of that

11 part of the gazette too. What you have just said is correct,

12 Mr. Trbojevic, when it was first mentioned it had not yet been translated

13 but we had it translated there and then and it was made availability. So

14 the English translation is available.

15 Yes, Mr. Ackerman?

16 MR. ACKERMAN: I think it maybe was introduced as a DB document

17 and not a P document.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: It could be.

19 MR. ACKERMAN: I think I did it on cross-examination with a

20 translation that we did ourselves.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes --

22 MR. ACKERMAN: I think. That's my recollection.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you're correct, you are right,

24 Mr. Ackerman.

25 Any way, the position is this: That at a certain time on the 22nd

1 of June, or there about, the Prijedor municipal council declared openly

2 that it will not recognise the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff taken

3 before or up to that date. What would this mean that there was good blood

4 or bad blood in the relationship existing between the ARK Crisis Staff and

5 the Prijedor -- it's Crisis Staff, the Crisis Staff of Prijedor, and the

6 ARK Crisis Staff? Were the relations, according to you, good or bad? Or

7 could this decision be explained by reference to some other important

8 matter? That you may be aware of.

9 If you're not aware of it, or if you're not in a position to

10 answer the question, please say so, and we move to the next question.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honour, you

12 asked me about the substantial relationships between the municipal staff

13 and the Regional Crisis Staff. Judging by a number of documents that I

14 saw in the Stakic case, and also judging by what I heard after I left

15 Prijedor, those relationships were mostly good. What I'm saying is there

16 was a certain hierarchical superiority of the regional staff and that --

17 and it functioned.

18 Now, whether there were any misunderstandings and what the nature

19 of those misunderstandings were, which could be gleaned from the document

20 you are mentioning, but without seeing the document itself, you will

21 realise it's difficult for me to make any kind of judgement.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Next. We stop for one minute or two,

23 until they change the tape and we continue.

24 [Proceedings suspended]

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Trbojevic, you may proceed.

1 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation].

2 Q. In view of the answer, I must ask you, which documents you saw,

3 what kind of documents? What was the content of those documents or the

4 gist of those documents, please, regarding this hierarchy between the

5 municipality and the ARK?

6 A. All those documents are to be found in the evidence in the Stakic

7 case, but I will now present the substance from some of those documents.

8 For instance --

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Do we need to go through all this if they are in the

10 Stakic records -- if they are exhibits in the Stakic records, which we all

11 have here?

12 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that this

13 particular point cannot be found in those documents.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: So that's your point of view, and he differs from

15 that. I mean, but the documents that he will obviously be referring to

16 are the same documents which, according to you, would not lead to the same

17 conclusion. So let's leave it at that.

18 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: You're not going to change your positions in any

20 case. The documents are what they are. They are not going to change

21 either. So...

22 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I have to ask you, but a moment ago, speaking about Mr. Brdjanin,

24 you said that he advocated the position that citizens should be humanely

25 resettled. I'm paraphrasing and simplifying, of course. Because in your

1 most recent statement, you said that you had heard him say in the assembly

2 that it would be a good idea if there would be only a few percent of

3 non-Serbs in Serbian municipalities, et cetera, et cetera.

4 I should now like to ask the witness to be shown Defence Exhibit

5 80, DB80. It's a short text and we'll go through it quickly.

6 This is again a photocopy of an Official Gazette. I think the

7 conclusions are at the bottom of the page under number 23. Can you see

8 it? It's rather a poor copy. These are conclusions of the ARK dated the

9 29th of May.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Trbojevic, is it DB80 or DB0126? Because what

11 we are seeing on the monitor now is what you handed down to us today as

12 DB0126.

13 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we did have it

14 marked today as 0126, but I was informed a moment ago that it had already

15 been admitted into evidence as DB80.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So it's not being admitted into evidence

17 today. It has already been admitted into evidence. Okay. Thank you.

18 Yes.

19 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Have you been able to read this text?

21 A. Yes. Part of the text in Cyrillic script are difficult to read,

22 but thanks to the English translation, I have managed to read the whole

23 text. Actually, this conclusion that you referred to -- you mean, right

24 up until the end, the President of the Crisis Staff, Radoslav Brdjanin?

25 Q. Yes. Can it be seen from this document that the Crisis Staff of

1 the ARK, of the region, is here concluding, it is not ordering or

2 determining or prescribing, but it allows for the need to have exchanges,

3 family for family, at the request of those interested in such an exchange,

4 on the basis of reciprocity. And in paragraph 3, the leaderships of the

5 SDA and the HDZ are called upon to join in this process of humane

6 resettlement. Is that right?

7 A. If you wish to hear my comments regarding this conclusion, or do

8 you need to confirm that what you have read is right? Yes, that is what

9 it says.

10 Q. Well, of course you may comment on it if you wish.

11 A. What is your question? I will answer your question.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: This is not a forum where comments are invited. You

13 either put a question or you don't. And your question was whether it says

14 what you read, and he said yes, it says exactly what you read. The

15 suggestion was very clear that Mr. Brdjanin was advocating a peaceful

16 resettlement of the population and not a radical one.

17 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. My question is whether this is significantly different from what

19 you described as Brdjanin's political view regarding resettlement.

20 A. What I said was that Mr. Brdjanin advocated resettlements, which

21 can be clearly seen from this document. However, in this document, no

22 mention is made of the highest percentage in these resettlements.

23 Q. Tell us, please, you told us that according to Mr. Karadzic's

24 criteria, Mr. Brdjanin was a good Serb, and you justified this with his

25 relatively fast progress in terms of career. If I tell you that this

1 Crisis Staff led by him lasted less than three months and that after that

2 he was removed from the assembly as a deputy, would you still agree that

3 a -- he had had a fast-moving career?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. What's your objection, Mr. Koumjian?

5 MR. KOUMJIAN: Well, I think the time he was removed from the

6 assembly is very important. It's far beyond the indictment period.

7 During the indictment period, he was moved to a minister position.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: That's correct. Yes.

9 Doctor, please, your answer to Mr. Trbojevic's question, keeping

10 in mind that the removal of Mr. Brdjanin from the assembly was not

11 immediately -- did not immediately follow the cessation of the existence

12 of the ARK Crisis Staff.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the removal of

14 Mr. Brdjanin from the assembly does not necessarily constitute a removal.

15 His appointment to the position of the minister, according to the laws of

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which to a significant extent also applied to the

17 government of the then Republika Srpska, could not include at the same

18 time, simultaneous offices of a member of parliament and minister. One

19 single individual could not at the same time be a member of the executive

20 and the legislative power, and that is why I think that Mr. Brdjanin was

21 simply relieved of list duty as a member of parliament which was perfectly

22 normal procedure and appointed to the position of the minister. In

23 application of this principle that there should be no overlapping of the

24 executive and the legislative power. So this mere fact cannot serve as a

25 basis for the conclusion that Mr. Brdjanin, because of the fact that he

1 had been relieved of his duty as a member of parliament, was demoted. I

2 think if someone is appointed minister, it's actually a promotion, and it

3 was a step higher up in his career.

4 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. You spoke about the information that could not be practically --

6 that is not correct. We cannot go into a debate about that at this

7 point. I should like to focus on the events that took place in Hambarine

8 on the 22nd of May. I think that you have provided four descriptions of

9 the said event?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: It was 35 minutes ago you told me you only --

11 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] I have two more questions, Your

12 Honour.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Because we have to be fair to the interpreters and

14 the technicians. If we said 15 to 20 minutes, we keep it to 15 and 20

15 minutes.

16 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. In the transcript, on page 3.827, line 5, in the Stakic case, you

18 said that the vehicle was shot at by a passer-by by the name of Habibovic

19 who happened to have grabbed somebody else's rifle, opened fire, and who

20 later perished in the Omarska camp. However, in the Tadic case, on page

21 55, line 84, you stated that it was a member of the TO that had opened

22 fire on this vehicle, and that he shot with a burst of gunfire and

23 targeted the vehicle and so on and so forth. So can you tell us now which

24 version is accurate or more accurate?

25 A. Both versions are accurate. Not only one but several members of

1 the -- actually, not the Territorial Defence, because the checkpoint was

2 manned by the police. But if you're specifically referring to the person

3 who actually shot at these -- at this vehicle, at these members, then it

4 was Mr. Habibovic who fired.

5 Q. You said that it was clear that the vehicle was carrying the

6 extremist forces of SDS and that you could conclude that by the insignia,

7 the signs, on the vehicle. What kind of insignia were those? Line 87 of

8 the Tadic transcript.

9 A. I don't think I referred to the markings on the vehicle. I think

10 I referred to the insignia on the uniforms of the soldiers who were in the

11 vehicle.

12 Q. Can you tell us what kind of insignia those soldiers had on their

13 uniforms? And how was it that they were visible when you said that they

14 never left the car?

15 A. Well, they were eventually visible because a member of the

16 checkpoint came close to the vehicle, approached the vehicle. He was

17 probably 30 or 50 centimetres away from the vehicle. So surely he was

18 able from that distance to see the insignia on the shoulders of these

19 soldiers who were inside.

20 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much.

21 This concludes my examination, Your Honour. Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

23 MR. KOUMJIAN: Very quickly, two questions, I hope.

24 Re-examined by Mr. Koumjian:

25 Q. Sir, you mentioned in you are why earlier testimony a traditional

1 rivalry between the Sarajevo SDS leadership and Banja Luka, that that was

2 a traditional rivalry. Was there a similar traditional rivalry in the

3 Krajina region between Prijedor and Banja Luka?

4 A. Yes. I guess you could call it that way. There was a similar

5 rivalry between Prijedor and Banja Luka. I think I mentioned it in the

6 first portion of my testimony.

7 Q. Thank you. Secondly, you indicated -- you were shown a document

8 in which the Crisis Staff is asking for resettlement of population. Given

9 what you know about the Bosniak and Croat populations in the Krajina

10 region in 1992, do you think it was possible to peacefully remove the

11 great majority of those people from the homes that they were born in and

12 lived in all their lives?

13 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours?

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Trbojevic?

15 MR. TRBOJEVIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend is saying that

16 the conclusions of the Crisis Staff of the region were asking for a

17 resettlement. This was not the wording of the document. Conclusions

18 imply that it is the wish or request of the people living there to

19 exchange their places of residence.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Any way, in any case, the witness's opinion isn't

21 going to change anything, Mr. Koumjian. That decision will be taken -- or

22 that consideration will be made by this Trial Chamber in its deliberations

23 later on.

24 MR. KOUMJIAN: I have no further questions.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Sir, that brings us to an end. We have managed to

1 finish your testimony today. And that enables you return to your place of

2 residence, country of residence, as early as possible.

3 I thank you for having accepted again, once more, to come to this

4 Tribunal to give evidence in another trial. And you will be attended to

5 by the officers of this Tribunal to assist you in your return. And I wish

6 you a safe journey back home. Thank you.

7 Tomorrow we continue with Colonel Selak.

8 The exhibits?

9 MR. KOUMJIAN: Does Your Honour want me to go through them or

10 perhaps --

11 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you can sort it out with the Registrar

12 and -- provided you keep Mr. Ackerman or Mr. Trbojevic informed, it can be

13 done. If there is a difficulty, then you will refer to us and we will

14 decide accordingly.

15 MR. KOUMJIAN: We are moving all of the exhibits from the Stakic

16 testimony into evidence. Many of them, most of them are already in

17 evidence but I don't know if there is any objection.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: If there is a problem, obviously when in doubt,

19 don't refer it to us and we will decide. I thank you all and my apologies

20 to the interpreters and the rest of the staff. I assure you it was all

21 non-intentional and I'm sure we have your forgiveness and understanding.

22 Thank you.

23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

24 6.03 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday,

25 the 23rd day of January, 2003, at 2.15 p.m.