1 Monday, 27 October 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.29 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Registrar. Could you call the case,
8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is case number IT-99-36-T, the Prosecutor versus Radoslav Brdjanin.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, ma'am.
11 Mr. Brdjanin, can you follow the proceedings in a language that
12 you can understand?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Yes, I
15 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, and good morning to you.
16 Appearances for the Prosecution.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Good morning, Your Honours. Julian Nicholls with
18 Denise Gustin, and again with us today is Mr. Dominic Raab, who is a legal
19 advisor to the British Embassy.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Nicholls. Good morning to you,
21 and good morning to you, Mr. Raab.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Appearances for Mr. Brdjanin.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: Good morning, Your Honours. I'm John Ackerman.
24 I'm here with David Cunningham and Aleksandar Vujic.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Ackerman, and good morning. First
1 thing, my apologies and those of the Tribunal for starting with almost a
2 half an hour's delay. The reason is that we had shifted the sitting from
3 the afternoon to the morning. It was done rather late in the day. And
4 apparently something went wrong in the chain of communications, and we had
5 one section of the Trial Chamber and not serviced in time this morning due
6 to this minor fault, which I -- which I can't blame on anyone in
7 particular. So my apologies. My apologies to you too, sir.
8 And perhaps we can start straight away.
9 Usher, could you please hand the solemn declaration to the
10 witness. And proceed. Tough.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.
15 You will be cross-examined today, as you know, and tomorrow, by
16 Mr. Ackerman, who is lead counsel for Mr. Brdjanin. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, before I begin, last week I had
18 submitted two Defence exhibits, DB150 and DB152. Apparently they were not
19 properly tendered, and so I have returned them to the Registrar this
20 morning and asked that they be admitted. I don't think they were used
21 during the testimony, but they will be in future testimony. So before I
22 lose them, I'd submit them.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
24 We'll stay in open session all the time, Mr. Nicholls, no?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, it depends, Your Honour. As -- as you had
1 the order regarding this witness, background information of a certain type
2 will need to be in private session.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. You will keep an open eye on it.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes. And I think Mr. Ackerman as well knows the
5 areas which ought to be in private, and I trust him on that.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you. Let's proceed. Thank you.
7 Cross-examined by Mr. Ackerman:
17 And -- I think you go ahead, Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Nicholls will draw your
18 attention if there is anything --
19 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I really don't want to say something that I
20 shouldn't have said, and I think, I think that the area I got to stay away
21 from --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, more or less -- more or less it was that,
23 yes. More or less it was that.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: All right.
25 Cross-examined by Mr. Ackerman:
1 Q. Good morning.
2 A. Good morning, Mr. Ackerman.
3 Q. I want to begin by discussing a little bit with you the question
4 of -- of how you see your role as a military expert in this case. I -- if
5 one just looks at your report, it seems to me that there are a couple of
6 possibilities. And please feel free to disagree with me if I'm wrong
7 about any of this. It seems to me that one -- one possibility that --
8 that you had as you approached this was to -- to consult all the documents
9 that were selected and present to this Trial Chamber a report which in
10 every way possible would favour the position of the Prosecution as set out
11 in the indictment. Or, on the other hand, what you could have done was
12 looked at the selected documents and tried to provide this Trial Chamber
13 with an honest assessment of what you believe those documents -- the
14 conclusions you believe could be drawn from those documents. Can you tell
15 us which of those, if either, was the way you approached this process,
16 this task.
17 A. The latter, I would argue. I was given the task and to the best
18 of my ability I searched through the documents on the databases of the OTP
19 and attempted where I could to analyse and articulate what I believed
20 these documents to tell me and to say. So I would argue it was the
22 Q. So what you tried to present to this Trial Chamber, what you
23 intended to present to this Trial Chamber, was an honest assessment of --
24 of what could be logically concluded from the contents of these documents.
25 Is that a fair statement?
1 A. Yes, I believe so. Obviously there -- I've articulated certain
2 limitations with -- with the report. I clearly wouldn't have seen and
3 haven't seen every single document in the holding of the OTP. But based
4 on the documents I was able to see and review, I -- I would argue that
5 I've tried to be as -- as honest and -- as I can with the -- with the
6 material available to me.
7 Q. Now, I take it that --
8 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me, I --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated] One moment, Mr. Ackerman.
10 Mr. Nicholls, yes,.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, can we go into private
12 session, please.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's go into private session, for a while.
14 [Private session]
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
11 [Open session]
12 JUDGE AGIUS: What I want to make sure also is, Madam Registrar,
13 when someone asks for transcripts of this session, what is said in private
14 session, does it show up or not?
15 THE REGISTRAR: If it's for the release to the public, it will be
17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.
18 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
19 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. I assume that prior to undertaking this task --
21 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think what I want to do is take us
22 back into private session and just get through all of this preliminary
23 stuff that way, just so I don't run any more risks here.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Anything against, Mr. Nicholls?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: No. I think that's a good idea.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.
2 Let's go into private session again for a while, until we thrash
3 this initial part.
4 [Private session]
13 Page 21486 – redacted – private session
17 [Open session]
18 Mr. ACKERMAN:
19 Q. I want to first begin discussing with you the conceded
20 limitations of the report that you have given to this Trial Chamber. And
21 for that I'd ask you to look at page 4 of your report, under the heading
22 "Introduction." I assume you have your report with you.
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. In paragraph 3, on that page, you -- you tell us this: "This
25 report is based exclusively on an analysis of selected military, police,
1 political, and other related documentary material in the possession of the
2 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
3 former Yugoslavia and is not an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of
4 events in the Bosanska Krajina area between 1991-1992." Correct?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. You used the word "selected," "analysis of selected" documentary
7 material. Who performed the selection?
8 A. I selected the documents.
9 Q. So no one selected them for you. You were given access to the
10 Prosecutor's document database, apparently, and selected what you thought
11 was relevant.
12 A. Yes, that's correct. There may have been one or two instances
13 where, say, colleagues within the team that I work in may have flagged up
14 some documents that they thought I might have been interested in, but the
15 documents were selected by me from the database, as you state.
16 Q. And in order to do that in any kind of a logical way, I take it
17 you had to familiarise yourself with the indictment in this case to be
18 able to do that.
19 A. I was, of course, familiar with the indictment. However, it
20 wasn't in itself a document that I made constant reference to or read. I
21 was aware of it and I was aware of the general content of it, but it
22 wasn't necessarily something that structured the report as it was written.
23 Clearly there was overlaps and there was areas, and I was aware of the
24 general areas of interest from the indictment, but it wasn't sitting on my
25 desk open every day for me to refer to.
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13 English transcripts.
1 Q. But you were certainly aware of the Prosecutor's theory of the
2 case, of this case, and the contentions of the Prosecutor as contained in
3 the indictment, weren't you?
4 A. Yes, in general terms. I'm not a lawyer, so clearly some of the
5 nuances and minutiae I'm not aware of, but I, of course, am aware from the
6 indictment of the case, so yes. But I'm -- as I say, I'm not a lawyer.
7 Q. Please understand I'm not suggesting there's anything wrong with
8 you being familiar with the indictment. I don't know how you would have
9 written a report if you weren't. So please don't take anything I'm saying
10 to you to be any kind of a criticism.
11 Did you assist in any way in drafting the indictment?
12 A. I was asked for comments at certain stages during the indictment
13 process on aspects the lawyers were discussing or were writing, but I
14 wasn't involved per se in the writing of the indictment, but I was asked
15 for comments or whether there was documentation, certainly military
16 documentation, that could assist certain aspects. So yes, I was in that
18 JUDGE AGIUS: When did you join the Tribunal?
19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I joined in 1998, in August 1998.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
21 MR. ACKERMAN:
22 Q. Would you agree with me that in looking at specific documents and
23 considering specific documents that -- that you might have found useful
24 that many of them tend to be ambiguous and capable of more than one
1 A. That -- that is the case in -- in some of them, yes. I would say
2 that -- that certainly if you take some documents in isolation or
3 individually there can be an ambiguity. I'm not sure what you mean by
4 "many," if you mean them all or a significant percentage, but, you know,
5 some documents do have a certain ambiguity, depending on what they are.
6 Q. And I suggest that where there was -- a document is capable of
7 more than one interpretation, that almost invariably you chose the
8 interpretation most favourable to the Prosecutor's position. Didn't you?
9 A. I wouldn't necessarily agree with that, Mr. Ackerman.
10 Q. Did you ever make any inquiry of the Defence team in this case as
11 to whether there were any documents that you should consider in drafting
12 this report for the Trial Chamber?
13 A. No, I didn't.
14 Q. How many times would you say that you sat in on interviews with
15 potential witnesses in this case as part of the team that was interviewing
16 a witness?
17 A. I couldn't -- I couldn't remember how many. I have sat in on a
18 number of interviews, but I cannot put a figure on it. It's -- it isn't
19 that many, actually. Maybe at most a dozen. But I'm a little unclear as
20 to how many exactly it would be.
21 Q. And when you were sitting in on the interviews of potential
22 witnesses in this case, you were there as part of the Prosecutor's
23 investigative team, weren't you?
24 A. Yes, I clearly worked for the Office of the Prosecutor, and the
25 team that I work in is a part of the investigation division of the Office
1 of the Prosecutor. When I was asked to assist in those interviews, it was
2 because I had acquired some expertise certainly in some of the military
3 documentation and they wanted me to assist them in that manner. So it was
4 an assisting role for the benefit of the Office of the Prosecutor and
5 clearly I am -- I work for the Office of the Prosecutor, so ...
6 Q. Well, that kind of takes us back to the very beginning. You told
7 us that your role with regard to this report was to look at the documents
8 and to give the Chamber a completely honest assessment of what you believe
9 these documents show. But other times you found yourself in the role of a
10 member of the Prosecutor's investigating team, basically as a -- as a
11 prosecutorial advocate. And what I'm wondering is how are we to know when
12 you are a prosecutorial advocate and when you are --
13 MR. NICHOLLS: The witness never characterised himself as a
14 "prosecutorial advocate," which is what is being implied here by
15 Mr. Ackerman.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, objection sustained, Mr. Ackerman. Please
17 suggest something else to the witness.
18 MR. ACKERMAN:
19 Q. When you were --
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I would say a member of the prosecutorial team --
21 MR. ACKERMAN:
22 Q. How would we know when you are when you are this impartial,
23 unbiased trying to give an honest assessment of the documents expert and
24 when you are a member of a prosecutorial investigative team trying to
25 further the case of the Prosecution? How can we tell when you're
1 wearing -- which hat you're wearing?
2 A. I don't necessarily subscribe to the view that the two are
3 somehow exclusive. I'm an analysis who works for the Office of the
4 Prosecutor. I've been involved in analytical work all my career. I've
5 always taken the view that -- that it is as my job as an analyst to review
6 material that I see and give an objective view of that material, whether
7 that helps or hinders anybody. This wasn't unusual when I was in the
8 military either. All I can say is that -- that as my role as an analyst
9 within the Office of the Prosecutor to look at material that I see, to
10 review it objectively, and to attempt to place some context and meaning
11 behind it in a -- a common-sense and hopefully a rational manner. And
12 when I was asked in those other tasks that you -- you mentioned, that I
13 would give the same answer as if I was having to write a report on it. So
14 all I can say is that I'm -- I'm an analyst who attempts to look at the
15 material and give an objective view on it, whether it's for whatever
17 Q. Okay. Let's -- let's start looking at some specific instances
18 then. Turn to page 16 of your report, paragraph 1.17, please. Tell me
19 when you're there.
20 A. I'm there.
21 Q. You said this: "Although it is likely that some of the attempts
22 at the local level were genuine in their desire to reduce the ethnic
23 division, the objective of the 5th Corps was again to assist in keeping
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina within Yugoslavia and that the JNA should not be
25 withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina at any price."
1 Now, that's what you wrote. You're telling the Trial Chamber by
2 that sentence that -- that the 5th Corps objective was to keep Bosnia
3 within Yugoslavia and to keep the JNA from being withdrawn. Correct?
4 A. Yes. And I -- I believe the footnote makes a reference to
5 that -- that type of statement, that --
6 Q. Yes. And I now want you to look at the document DB195, please. I
7 believe this is the document that you refer to in the footnote, the
8 translation ERN 01101236, isn't it?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. Please find in there what you believe supports that sentence that
11 we just read.
12 A. On page 2, in the paragraph entitled "State of morale," it has
13 the line: "All unanimously believe that withdrawal of the JNA from BH
14 should not be allowed at any price. Telegrams by various associations of
15 citizens are arriving in the corps command, expressing support for the JNA
16 and requesting that it does not withdraw from BH." That -- that is, in
17 terms of the sentence at 1.17, the reference that I hinted there. The
18 other aspects about ethnic tension I believe are from other documents.
19 Q. But that's it? That's what you -- that's what you say supports
20 that sentence?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. First of all, that's a section of the document under the heading
23 "State of morale," isn't it?
24 A. Yes, it is.
25 Q. And it deals with basically what someone is hearing in the
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13 English transcripts.
1 grumbling among officers and troops, isn't it?
2 A. I'm not sure you can draw that conclusion from that section. The
3 state of morale component of the daily combat report was usually a section
4 that would give the political flavour from the JNA's perspective, was
5 usually written by the assistant commander for morale of the corps, and
6 usually, as I say, had -- as a -- had the political message that was being
7 disseminated either up the chain or down to the units on the ground.
8 Q. Well, you've looked at hundreds of these reports, and all of the
9 combat reports or virtually all of them have a section called "morale," or
10 "State of morale," and almost invariably they deal with what the writer of
11 that is hearing from the soldiers on the ground, basically, what are their
12 -- how are they feeling, what are their attitudes, and so forth. Isn't
13 that true?
14 MR. NICHOLLS: This is exactly the same question which he -- the
15 witness has just answered.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Nicholls. Objection sustained. You are
17 asking the same question again, Mr. Ackerman.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Judge, I sure don't think so. But if that's
19 your position, I'll go at it a little differently.
20 Q. When it says there in the second paragraph: "All unanimously
21 believe," what the writer is referring to is conversations with officers
22 and troops, isn't it?
23 A. Yes, you could probably draw that -- that conclusion, that it's
24 from the JNA themselves and based probably on the sentence previously.
25 Q. That -- that is not a section of the report that sets out JNA
1 policy or 5th Corps policy, is it?
2 A. Well, this is a report which is going to the highest level of
3 command or the -- the superior command of the 5th Corps, and it's not the
4 only document that I've seen whereby in that early period, in the first
5 few months of 1992, the JNA were making references that Yugoslavia should
6 be preserved.
7 Q. Please answer my question. This is not a section of the report
8 that sets out 5th Corps or JNA policy. It's just talking about the
9 feelings of the troops, isn't it?
10 A. Well, I -- I can't say whether it's -- it's a document written by
11 General Talic to the corps -- to the 2nd Military District in a section
12 that usually deals with the political context, and he makes no reference
13 in here that he disagrees with this -- this particular view. And my
14 conclusion is that if it's going up there, it's -- it's something that --
15 that is agreed with. You're right. It doesn't specifically say "The JNA
16 5th Corps's policy is X,".
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. But from this and other documents I would argue that the JNA 5th
19 Corps were keen to ensure that Yugoslavia was preserved and that Bosnia
20 was a component of that.
21 Q. You could argue that, but what you say to the Chamber in your
22 conclusion in this report is that this was an objective of the 5th Corps,
23 and I put to you that nowhere in that document can you find that it was an
24 objective of the 5th Corps to do what you say. Now, it may have been
25 somewhere, but it's not in that document. And that's the document you
1 refer the Chamber to. And it's not even an exhibit in the case until
2 today. So the Chamber could have believed that there was a document
3 saying that the 5th Corps's objective was to do this and not have even
4 been able to check it because it wasn't an exhibit. That's my concern.
5 MR. NICHOLLS: That's an argument. It's not a question, and it's
6 totally inappropriate to put that to the witness about which exhibits are
7 in or not.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: No. It's a perfectly legitimate question, which
9 I'm allowing and asking the witness to answer.
10 Q. And don't you think that was a bit reckless to do it that way?
11 It seems to me it's misleading to the Chamber. Isn't it?
12 A. I hope -- it wasn't misleading to the Chamber. Maybe I could
13 have put in three or four other footnote references that would bear out my
14 view that it was an objective for the 5th Corps in line with the JNA
15 policy to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina within Yugoslavia
16 Q. Well, we talked a little earlier about your training and your
17 learning to write reports and footnotes, and one of the things you learned
18 was the footnotes should support your conclusions. And this one doesn't,
19 does it?
20 A. Well, I would argue that it does.
21 Q. Let's move on. I'd like to go to 1.25, on page 20. About
22 halfway through that paragraph you write this sentence: "Additionally,
23 there is evidence that Serb paramilitary units were also given direct
24 authorisation by the 5th Corps to participate in combat operations in
25 Western Slavonia. One of the clearest examples of this is related to a
1 paramilitary group from Prnjavor area, headed by Veljko Milankovic." What
2 other paramilitary units in April of 1992, which is what we're talking
3 about here, during that time, were given direct authorisation by the
4 5th Corps to so participate?
5 A. Cigo's group from Prijedor, which was a component of the
6 43rd Motorised Brigade, Zolja's group, which was also a component of the
7 43rd Motorised Brigade, which operated in Western Slavonia; Zoran
8 Karlica's group, which was an assault detachment 43rd Motorised Brigade,
9 which operated in Western Slavonia.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Which was the first one, the one from Prijedor?
11 MR. ACKERMAN: Cigo's group, I think he said.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right. Your Honour. Sorry.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: How do you spell it?
14 MR. CUNNINGHAM: C-i-g-o.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
16 MR. ACKERMAN:
17 Q. Any others?
18 A. I'm unsure of other ones that spring to mind.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: And we're -- are you restricting your questions
20 only, and is the witness restricting his answers only to the area of
21 Western Slavonia?
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, Your Honour, this paragraph specifically
23 refers to activities in Western Slavonia.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I just wanted to make that clear.
25 MR. ACKERMAN: Let's go now to 1.33, on page 22.
1 Q. Now, in that paragraph, you're talking about a particular
2 meeting, that being apparently the extraordinary session of the Autonomous
3 Region of Krajina, 28 April 1992; is that correct?
4 A. Yes, that is correct.
5 Q. In that paragraph, 1.33, you tell the Chamber this: "The meeting
6 was not attended by members of the corps staff, despite there being calls
7 for them to be present. Although, Veljko Milankovic, the paramilitary
8 leader from Prnjavor, did speak. The assembly also endorsed a call from
9 Nenad Stevandic, the head of the Serbian Sokol Society in Banja Luka, that
10 roads be blocked if JNA units really did decide to withdraw from the
11 Bosanska Krajina." I notice there's no cite to that paragraph. Did you
12 get that information from the article in Glas that you cited in the
13 previous paragraph?
14 A. Yes, I did.
15 Q. All right. 1.34 says this: "The SOS had mounted blockades in
16 Banja Luka in part to halt the withdrawal of JNA units from the area."
17 And I think what you mean to tell us there is that the SOS was part of the
18 effort to keep the JNA from departing and that was part of why the
19 blockades were set up by the SOS in Banja Luka. Is that a fair
20 characterisation of what you're trying to tell the Chamber there?
21 A. Yes. I think maybe as some context I believe that a few days
22 prior to that there had been the declaration of the new FRY constitution,
23 which indicated that only Serbia and Montenegro would be part of the
24 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I believe that that had caused some
25 consternation in the Krajina and Banja Luka that potentially the next
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13 English transcripts.
1 stage would be that the JNA were going to have to withdraw from Bosnia
2 because Bosnia was no longer part of the FRY, and that potentially as a
3 result of that declaration the extraordinary -- amongst other things, the
4 extraordinary session was -- was held and that speakers at that session
5 voiced this view that the JNA must not leave.
6 Furthermore, the blockade at the end of April, highlighted here by
7 the SOS, again may well have been a visible expression that, you know, we
8 must not allow the JNA to depart. There had been an earlier blockade by
9 the SOS in early April, which I believe was for their -- their stated aims
10 were not that the JNA should leave. But I have to check that again. So
11 there was context behind, I think, both that meeting and potentially the
12 actions of the SOS on the second blockade.
13 Q. Well --
14 A. Well, I would argue -- I'm not sure if it had been decided that
15 the JNA were going to physically leave, as opposed to this transition that
16 occurred later on whereby JNA forces were in essence transformed into the
17 VRS. What I think is some context behind this.
18 Q. Well, let me just remind us all exactly what you wrote: "The
19 Serbian defence forces who had in fact mounted blockades in Banja Luka in
20 part to halt the withdrawal of JNA units from the area." And the footnote
21 that you document -- you cite to in the football is Exhibit P1470. I'd
22 like you now to look at that document and just tell the Chamber where in
23 there it says that the Serbian defence forces mounted blockades in part to
24 halt withdrawal of JNA units from the area. Just find that in the
25 document for us.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: If we could have it on the ELMO, please. Thank
3 MR. ACKERMAN:
4 Q. I might be able to help you if you look at paragraph 3,
5 "Situation on the ground." My assumption is that you're basing that on
6 what appears there in that first paragraph.
7 A. Yes, I -- I think that is where I'm referencing that. In the
8 second part of that paragraph, it makes mention of the education centre,
9 which was based in Banja Luka and was a federal -- or a JNA asset, as
10 opposed to a corps asset. And the Kosmos military complex and -- which
11 again was a -- a JNA-wide military complex, as opposed to being a
12 5th Corps asset. So there -- there had been some potential relocation or
13 discussion about potential relocation of those federal-level assets, and
14 it does also make mention of the SOS barricading the exits from Banja
15 Luka, prohibiting departure. So that is where I draw that, from there.
16 Q. Now, you're talking about a -- a few guys with red berets and
17 automatic weapons blocking the JNA with tanks and artillery and
18 machine-guns and -- and very heavy weaponry. How -- how do you propose
19 they were able to do that? How could they stop one of the -- one of the
20 most well-equipped armies in Europe? That doesn't make any sense to us --
21 to me.
22 A. I'm not sure I can necessarily add much that would drift into
23 some element of speculation. I can't say if it was a few guys in red
24 berets. But even if it was a relatively small -- smallish force, in
25 comparison to the 5th Corps, which clearly would have been, I can only
1 speculate that the 5th Corps themselves were not necessarily willing to
2 move out or to -- to take on this particular paramilitary group. Maybe
3 there was a commonality of view between the two.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: And just to be clear, for the record as well, the
5 paragraph itself does not state the assertion that Mr. Ackerman has just
6 put to the witness. The paragraph does not state that a few guys in red
7 berets were able to prevent the entire JNA from leaving. That is not --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: It's true; it doesn't. But I think both you and
9 Mr. Ackerman and us and certainly the witness knew more or less what --
10 what we are talking about. I mean, what I don't agree with is the
11 conclusion that Mr. Ackerman was trying to suggest, because what is
12 obviously is that the act of the SOS brought matters to a head and then
13 decisions were taken.
14 And this is how I understand you to be answering the question;
15 once the matter was brought to a head, it was up to the JNA units to
16 decide what to do. Are you of the opinion that they couldn't have faced
17 the SOS and if they didn't face the SOS, how come they decided not to face
18 the SOS? What's your answer to that? And more or less, we'll cover the
19 territory that Mr. Ackerman was trying to --
20 THE WITNESS: I can only maybe draw your attention to the line in
21 the paragraph that says "Problems were solved in cooperation with the
22 Banja Luka Crisis Staff," in that the JNA had no intention of taking on in
23 a military capacity this particular paramilitary group. Because, to be
24 truthful, I would have thought the 5th Corps would have quite easily
25 managed to take on such a paramilitary group. But the matter was dealt
1 with in -- in some element of cooperation and negotiation. And I can only
2 draw the conclusion that it was not necessarily in the interest of the JNA
3 5th Corps either to withdraw, and hence my comment about some element of
4 commonality of --
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Does that satisfy your question, Mr. Ackerman?
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I have a follow-up.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Go ahead.
8 MR. ACKERMAN:
9 Q. The other possibility, of course, is that the -- the JNA was not
10 excited about engaging in combat activities in the streets of Banja Luka
11 because of the endanger -- the danger that would bring to the innocent
12 civilians living there -- hoped that it could be solved, as you say, in
13 cooperation with the Banja Luka Crisis Staff.
14 A. Well, that is a potential. Clearly it might not necessarily have
15 been in the interests of the 5th Corps to have armed conflict in the
16 streets of Banja Luka. But then I would, as I do in the report, base how
17 this particular situation was dealt with and in weeks -- literally weeks
18 later in other areas in the Krajina, how it was dealt with differently.
19 But you also had allegations and reports of armed groups blockading roads
20 and -- in Prijedor, for example. So -- but I would concede your point,
21 Mr. Ackerman, that it may well not have been in the interest of the 5th
22 Corps to have armed activities in the streets of Banja Luka against a
23 Serbian paramilitary group.
24 Q. Let's go now to a completely different matter, page 25, paragraph
25 1.42. You -- you cite the Court there to a speech given by Karadzic. And
1 in that speech, he says, talking about the strategic goals of the Serbian
2 people: "The first such goal is separation from the other two national
3 communities, separation of states." He's talking there about trying to
4 basically create separate states, which I suggest to you is fully in
5 accord with the directions received from the Serbian people in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina in the plebiscite, where they voted to remain within
7 Yugoslavia and not support an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. Isn't
8 that true? Isn't that just a reflection of what the plebiscite called
10 A. I have not looked at the details of the plebiscite. My report
11 doesn't cut to that. So I think for me to make any comments on whether
12 that -- that is the case would -- would be somewhat -- somewhat difficult.
13 All I can say is what he says in his speech. Clearly he believes that
14 there should be a separation of states in Bosnia. But I don't believe
15 that that statement and others through the 16th Assembly session simply
16 meant that Bosnia was going to be divided into -- into state parts. And
17 as I argued in my direct testimony, including highlighting some of the
18 references from the 16th Assembly session, that internally within the --
19 or a component of that separation was going to involve the resettlement of
21 Q. It wasn't just Karadzic that was talking about that. Various
22 international conferences were talking about that. Cutilheiro was talking
23 about that, Vance Owen were talking about that, the cantonisation of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina was a possible way to settle the issue there that
25 was internationally favoured at some point. Isn't that true?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes, that's true, within the confines of an independent Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina, of course but, you're right, the Cutilheiro plan and
3 these plans were about the cantonisation and some agreement whereby Bosnia
4 could be -- could be governed and managed with an element of -- with the
5 agreement of the national parties within it.
6 Q. And the concept of cantonisation certainly carried with it the --
7 the thought, the possibility that it would involve movements of population
8 from canton to canton, Serbs into Serb areas, Muslims into Muslim areas,
9 Croats into Croat areas, and so forth, didn't it?
10 A. I don't necessarily agree that cantonisation in itself means the
11 movement of populations between -- between places, and I would be
12 surprised that the Cutilheiro Plan was a plan to -- to allow for the
13 movements of persons between cantons. I'm not sure that's the case. I
14 would -- I'm not an expert on the Cutilheiro Plan, and I would have to --
15 to defer to others who may know more, but I would not -- I'd be surprise
16 if the Cutilheiro Plan was an agreement that would allow for all these
17 movements, as you say.
18 Q. Well, it certainly wouldn't be an agreement to prevent people
19 from moving. Freedom of movement is an important humanitarian concept,
20 isn't it?
21 A. Yes, it is. But I'm thinking more along the lines of moving
22 people out to somehow shape cantons or resettlement or whatever. But
23 again, I'm not an expert on the Cutilheiro Plan, so I would defer to
24 someone who is.
25 Q. Is -- and you know that during the war in Croatia and in parts
1 of Bosnia many, many Serbs became refugees, were uprooted from their
2 homes, and went elsewhere, don't you?
3 A. Yes. And a significant number did come to the Krajina area.
4 Q. And after four years of war and some horrendous things that
5 happened during those four years, Bosnia-Herzegovina basically wound up
6 being divided in the way that was in many ways suggest by Karadzic and by
7 some of the international plans in the first place, so we now have a -- a
8 Serb area, the Republika Srpska; the Muslim-Croat area, the Federation,
9 and there have been significant population movements back and forth
10 between the two, haven't there?
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm not -- I think we're kind of straying away
12 from the direct and anything really of relevance to what we should be
13 talking about today.
14 MR. ACKERMAN: Any time the witness feels like he's not capable
15 of answering my questions, I'll move on, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: That's not what my point was, but we're --
18 JUDGE AGIUS: I take note of your objection, Mr. Nicholls, but I
19 will allow the question and I'll see if the witness is prepared to answer
20 it or not. It is relevant to the basic part of his report, in any case.
22 THE WITNESS: Can I just read the question, Your Honour, again?
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, clearly there are some areas that you could
25 draw a similarity between what Karadzic said in 1992 and earlier and after
1 four years of war. War was ended by the Dayton Agreement. The Dayton
2 Agreement established two entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it -- within the
3 borders of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton Accord allowed
4 for the movement back of displaced refugees, people who had been moved
5 from their homes or who'd -- who'd left. So I'm not sure that after four
6 years of war it's exactly as Karadzic planned, but clearly Bosnia as an
7 independent state now has two entities, the Republika Srpska and the
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move to something different, Mr. Ackerman.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm wondering if you want to take a break now,
11 Your Honour.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We can have a break now. Twenty-five
13 minutes. Thank you.
14 Mr. Ackerman, do I take it that in spite of the fact that we lost
15 half an hour this morning this shouldn't make any difference?
16 MR. ACKERMAN: We'll certainly finish within the time allotted,
17 Your Honour.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I thank you, Mr. Ackerman.
19 Twenty-five minutes.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Brown, what we were talking about before we broke was the 16th
25 session of the assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina held
1 on 12 May 1992 and some things that persons appearing there had to say. I
2 want to now direct your attention to paragraph 1.45 of that report where
3 you talk about the speech of General Lieutenant-Colonel Mladic at that
5 You quote him as saying: "People and peoples are not pawns, nor
6 are they keys in one's pocket that can be shifted from here and there. It
7 is something easily said but difficult to achieve. We cannot cleanse, nor
8 can we have a sieve to sift so that the only Serbs would stay, or that the
9 Serbs would fall through and the rest leave. I do not know how
10 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People,
11 that would be genocide. That does not mean that Muslims have to be
12 expelled or drowned."
13 That's language from his speech, isn't it?
14 A. Yes, those are references from the translation speech that we
16 Q. And then if we go on to what -- paragraph 1.46, you say this:
17 "Even these comments should be placed in some context. As one of those
18 expected to implement the goals, he may well simply have been more aware
19 of the practical limitations of what the assembly were proposing, more
20 wary of what conflict would actually entail, and potentially saw it from a
21 soldiers' perspective that it was better to have the Muslims and Croats
22 under control in territory rather than as he himself stated, "in the
23 trenches fighting against us."
24 Now, my understanding of what you're saying there is that the
25 concern was that if Muslims and Croats leave what they were designing as
1 Serb areas, and there was a war, that they would wind up being combatants
2 fighting for the other side. I mean, that was his concern [Realtime
3 transcript read in error "certain], wasn't it?
4 A. That was one of his concerns. Yes, I think he in particular
5 listened to the Muslims, I feel, because he was quite focussed on the
6 Croats as being an enemy. But one of, I think, his concerns was that it
7 may well have been easier to control them if they were in a position of
8 authority and control rather than, as he said, coming back to fight them
9 later. So it was one of his concerns.
10 Q. Do you know that there were efforts -- let's see, what have we got
11 here? Line 29 -- line 7 on page 29, the word "certain" is actually
12 "concern" was the word that was used there.
13 Let me see if I can get back to where I was now. Once the war did
14 break out, the other side of that situation also occurred, that was where
15 Serbs wanting to leave Muslim areas and come into the Serb areas were
16 prohibited from leaving. Are you aware of that?
17 A. I'm not aware of that.
18 Q. We'll come to that later. It's actually in some documents that
19 you've cited in your report. And we'll get to it later on in this cross.
20 We'll find that.
21 If we look at paragraph 1.49, please, you're talking again about
22 separation of communities, being one of the strategic objectives for the
23 Serbs. And then you talk about some of the other goals. You speak of --
24 down near the end much of the discussion related to this involved
25 commentary on the mapping of territory, the acceptance of the stated
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 borders, the designation of land as Serb, and the control of that
2 territory. Included in these discussions were references to seizing land
3 not designated as Serb, but which may have been useful to trade at a later
4 date. This practice was eventually integrated into later military
5 directives. And even caused difficulties within 1st Krajina Corps units
6 when territory was captured with the later indication that it may well
7 have to be handed back as part of political negotiations. And the
8 document that you cite for that proposition, that latter proposition, is
9 Exhibit P1747, which I'd like you to take a look at.
10 Your Honour, I think I can safely direct you to page 2, paragraph
11 5, "state of security and morale," I think that's section you were
12 referring to. Please feel free to look at the entire report if you wish,
13 but I think this is the part you cited us to.
14 MR. NICHOLLS: No objection to counsel pointing the witness to a
15 particular section, but I'd also ask the witness be allowed to review the
16 entire document if he so wishes.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, you're correct, Mr. Nicholls.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I said that.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think it is an issue.
20 THE WITNESS: Sorry, yes, that is, I think, the reference.
21 MR. ACKERMAN:
22 Q. All right.
23 A. Or the section within the reference.
24 Q. Again, this is one of those items that's under the morale part of
25 the report. In this case, it's both security and morale. With regard to
1 morale, it says that the morale in the units has been declining because
2 salaries have not been paid and families were not supplied with food,
3 fuel, and other items. Then it talks about conscripts disapproving of the
4 statement made by the President after the conference in London, that the
5 army will give back 20 per cent of the liberated territories that their
6 comrades have died for, and apparently makes them wonder whether further
7 combat operations in Jajce and Gradacac are justified. I take it that you
8 agree that's the section you were referring to; right?
9 A. Yes, I haven't gone over the whole document, but --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: You're free to go over the whole document for
11 yourself, and if you have any further comments you'd like to make, please
12 go ahead. Take your time, Mr. Brown.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
14 No, I think that's the section, Mr. Ackerman --
15 MR. ACKERMAN:
16 Q. I take it it's highly unlikely that whoever wrote that report
17 actually spoke with every conscript in the VRS, but just kind of drew the
18 conclusion that there were conscripts who were disapproving of the concept
19 of giving back some of the liberated territories in a settlement.
21 A. Well, clearly the author of the document was the staff of the
22 corps headquarters and undoubtedly would not have been able to speak to
23 the thousands of soldiers within the corps. But it was the function of
24 whoever would have compiled that section of the report, either in this
25 case the security officer or the morale officer. That was his job. His
1 job was to be informed of what was happening within the corps and to pass
2 that information up to the higher command. I would also just point out
3 that the actual comment is justifiably disapproved, presuming whoever
4 wrote that section and General Talic as the signator of the document
5 believed this also, was something that they disapproved of. So -- but to
6 answer your question, you're right, it would be unlikely that the author
7 would have spoken to every single conscript. But clearly it was their job
8 to know.
9 Q. So what you have probably there is a consensus that conscripts are
10 disapproving of that and they are wondering whether further operations are
11 justified. You translate that in your conclusion into that having caused
12 difficulties within the corps. I don't see in there anywhere where it
13 says that it caused difficulties within the corps.
14 A. You're right, it doesn't say difficulties. But what you have here
15 is a reference at a time when the 5th Corps were actively involved in
16 operations against Jajce and in other areas, you have a reference here
17 that conscripts and potentially the corps themselves, being the phrase
18 "justifiably disapproved," are unhappy or appear unhappy with the
19 statements of the SRBH president about having to hand back territory that
20 they themselves had fought for. So to be completely accurate, it doesn't
21 say difficulty itself, but the fact that it's talking about a morale
22 problem in this respect and the fact that it's being flagged up to the VRS
23 Main Staff would give me the impression that it was an issue or a
24 difficulty or a problem that the corps wanted to raise to their superior
1 Q. It just seems to me if you were wanting to be honest with the
2 Chamber and report your conclusion honestly to the Chamber, wouldn't it
3 have been honest to say that it even caused grumbling within the
4 conscripts of the 1st Krajina Corps, or maybe putting the word "justified"
5 in there somewhere because that is in the report. But you deliberately
6 chose the words that it caused difficulties, which I think says something
7 different than what the report says, don't you?
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, from Nicholls.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Again, I'm sorry, but I think he's answered this
10 question. I think the witness said that when troops are questioning
11 further combat operations and are dissatisfied, that's a difficulty. So I
12 think he's answered this question of why he wrote that section, and
13 obviously it is a problem.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I think it's a case of res ipsa loquitur here. The
15 contents of the report speak for themselves. I don't think we need to
16 elaborate. Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. Beginning at paragraph 1.50 on page 27, you begin to talk about
19 the corridor, what is sometimes called the Posavina Corridor connecting
20 the Krajina basically to Serbia. This was a road, for instance, a road
21 link that would have connected Banja Luka to Belgrade if it had been open,
22 wasn't it?
23 A. Yes. Amongst other things, I think Karadzic himself articulated
24 why that area was important. It wasn't simply that it was a road link,
25 but he said that the control of that area was important because it enabled
1 Serb areas in Bosnia to be connected. It also enabled those areas to be
2 connected with the Serb areas in Croatia, and it enabled those two areas
3 to be connected with Belgrade. But yes, there was a road link. I
4 actually believe there were two road links, but there was a road through
5 that area.
6 Q. And before the beginning of hostilities, the road was open and
7 normal travel and trade could occur between Belgrade and the Krajina, for
8 instance. Correct?
9 A. Yes, until it was severed or control was taken of some key
10 municipalities by Croat units in, I believe, March 1992.
11 Q. Now, you refer to that actually on page 133 of your report,
12 paragraph 2.197. In April and May 1992, Croat forces took control of
13 Derventa and Modrica severing the corridor road that ran through to
14 Bijeljina and on to Serbia. Do you see that?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Okay. And the Croat forces closed that as a strategic goal, to
17 cut off the supply line between Serbia and the Krajina, not just military
18 supplies but civilian supplies also. It had strategic military
19 importance, not just political importance, didn't it?
20 A. I haven't looked at the Croat operational directives, but clearly
21 it had significant effect of the severance of that line. It did affect
22 civilian supplies and military supplies, so I would agree it was -- it was
23 of significant military importance to the Croats, too.
24 Q. If you look at page 28 of your report, it's paragraph 1.50, you
25 actually quote something General Talic said about this in an order
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 apparently. General Talic said: "Motivate all units and armed structures
2 in opening the road routes towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by
3 stressing the importance of control over the relevant areas in terms of
4 the provision of supplies, the survival of the Serbs in the Bosnian
5 Krajina, and the Serbian Republic of Krajina, the possibility of supplying
6 the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps, and of opening towards the world in
8 So it was certainly recognised by General Talic and Karadzic and
9 all of the persons involved that this was a key issue, not just
10 militarily, but for the survival in terms of civilian supplies and so
11 forth. Right?
12 A. Yes, both General Talic and Karadzic clearly viewed this as a
13 significant area. And hence the reason presumably that Karadzic placed it
14 as strategic goal number 2.
15 Q. And of course with the war going on in Croatia, the previous
16 supply lines between the Bosnian Krajina and, say, Zagreb and Croatia, for
17 instance, also had stopped to function, and so by cutting off that
18 corridor, the -- all trade into Croatia and into Serbia had been severed,
19 hadn't it?
20 A. I wouldn't necessarily say that all trade. There clearly was an
21 air bridge to a certain degree, certain point. Troops were able to be
22 flown in and out of Banja Luka I believe up until the point that an air
23 embargo was imposed. And there are references clearly to black
24 marketeering and smuggling and activities that were going on, if you like
25 unofficially to, to get materials in and out. But you're right, clearly
1 the severance of the corridor was also of some significance in terms of
2 receiving supplies from Serbia.
3 Q. I'd like you to look now at Exhibit P50, P5-0.
4 This is the -- basically the transcript of that May 12th session
5 that we have been talking about, of the 16th session of the Assembly of
6 the Serbian People. And beginning at page 36 is this speech that was
7 given by General Mladic. Unfortunately, I can't find the exact phrase
8 that I wanted to refer you to because the document that I have is not the
9 one I marked. So I'll come back to this later. I'll go on to something
11 Look at P629, please. Now, what I've given you is a regular
12 combat report dated 2 May of 1992. It's still the 5th Corps of the JNA,
13 not the VRS. Correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In paragraph 3, the report is talking about the situation on the
16 ground. It says this: "In the territory of our zone of responsibility,
17 there have been no developments or incidents likely to seriously affect
18 the combat readiness of the units. Caution, fear, and uncertainty are
19 still present among the population of all nationalities. It is
20 particularly prominent in crisis municipalities such as Prijedor, Bosanski
21 Novi, Sanski Most, Bosanska Krupa, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf, and
23 If you go now to paragraph 6, again, we're talking about the
24 morale section of the report. "Troops and officers are dissatisfied and
25 angry with the acting Federal Secretary for National Defence, Colonel
1 General Blagoje Adzic who visited Banja Luka but failed to state what will
2 happen to the JNA in BH or how the issues related to the status of
3 officers and civilian employees who are not from Serbia and Montenegro
4 will be resolved -- whose army will we become and which state will be
5 supporting the families of our fallen comrades and the disabled war
6 veterans, since the official BH authorities have appealed to people not to
7 go to war."
8 Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. In paragraph 1.75 of your report, that would be on page 36, about
11 halfway through that paragraph, you refer to this visit of Colonel General
12 Blagoje Adzic to Banja Luka as being significant. How was it significant?
13 What is it about that visit that you found and reported to be significant?
14 A. Well, it's significant because of who the man is. I mean, he's
15 the most senior JNA officer at the time visiting -- visiting Banja Luka at
16 a time of some uncertainty within the JNA, bearing in mind the issue of
17 the new FRY constitution which had been announced a number of days prior
18 to that. And what happened subsequently, which was the VRS was
19 established a week or so later, Mladic was appointed as the commander of
20 the VRS army. So I think it's significant in terms of who he is and why he
21 comes to Banja Luka at a time of some interest. I think I referenced that
22 visit somewhere else in the report as well, I believe. I have to go and
23 check my footnotes, but I don't think this is the only time I mention it.
24 Q. Well, we're still talking about the JNA at this point. And Adzic
25 was the secretary for National Defence. You think there's something
1 significant when the secretary of National Defence visits a corps-level
2 military structure?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You think that's unusual?
5 A. I think it's significant.
6 Q. Okay. Do you think he visited other corps?
7 A. I don't know if he visited other corps. I would imagine he
8 visited the second military district, or potentially visited the second
9 military district, but I don't know if he visited the other corps.
10 Q. Okay. I want to ask you about what we just read there in
11 paragraph 6 of this document: "... since the official BH authorities have
12 appealed to people not to go to war." Do you know what that refers to?
13 A. I don't. I can only speculate, but I don't know exactly what it
15 Q. All right. I want you to take a look now at another document.
16 It's DB266. And also in connection with that, look at paragraph 1.75,
17 which you should have in front of you.
18 A. Would you like me to put it on the ELMO?
19 Q. Let's find the right place, first. If you look at 1.75, you have
20 a sentence which begins: "An SFRY official instruction on the
21 transformation of the JNA which kept Bosnian members of the army in
22 positions within Bosnia and Herzegovina and sent Bosnians from serving in
23 other republics back to Bosnia and Herzegovina was issued on 5 May 1992
24 and was probably the next official step in the process." Footnote 113.
25 In that footnote, you refer to the document which you now have before you,
1 03028203 which is now Defence Exhibit 266.
2 I don't believe that document says what you report that it says in
3 paragraph 1.75, does it?
4 A. Which bits are you particularly referring to, Mr. Ackerman?
5 Q. You pretty much have to refer to the entire document because the
6 entire documents speaks -- I mean, it's only one paragraph long basically.
7 What you told us was -- well, you can see what you told us there in 1.75
8 that this document says.
9 A. It references a SFRY decision, presidency decision, on the
10 transformation of the JNA. That's the phrase in the document. It's dated
11 the 5th of May, which I've stated in the sentence. And those JNA members
12 who -- or Bosnian -- who were in Bosnia are to remain there. And those
13 who don't have Bosnian citizenship can remain if they want to; or if they
14 express a desire to leave, to go back to the FRY, they should do so by the
15 10th of May.
16 Q. So the document actually gave these people a choice, doesn't it?
17 A. Well, it gives a choice to those who are not BH citizens.
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. That they could either stay if they wanted to, or if they express
20 a desire, they can leave.
21 Q. And what your report says is that it sent all these people from
22 other republics -- maybe I'm reading this wrong.
23 A. I think -- I remember writing this sentence on this document. I
24 had to rewrite it a few times. I think the document also calls for those
25 people who are Bosnian citizens but are not in Bosnia, so Serbia,
1 Montenegro, and others, to go, to be sent to Bosnia. I think that's what
2 I've written in my line here.
3 Q. So -- now, this is, of course, an instruction from the Federal
4 Secretariat of National Defence of the JNA, Socialist Federal Republic of
5 Yugoslavia. That's clear, isn't it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And what's trying to be accomplished here is basically a
8 reorganisation within the JNA inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think probably
9 in connection with a resolution of the United Nations that ordered
10 Milosevic to get the JNA out of Bosnia-Herzegovina basically. Correct?
11 A. Well, I'm not necessarily sure of that. I'd have to go and look
12 at other material. I can only go on the face value of the document.
13 Q. And the other thing we know from the document is that it is issued
14 by an assistant commander for moral guidance and legal affairs, a Colonel
15 Mesud Hasotic who I'm quite certain is a Muslim. Correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Okay. Let's go now to the next page where you talk about
18 mobilisation in your report. Now I want you to look again at the document
19 we were looking at earlier, that P50, the minutes of that assembly. And
20 with any luck, I'll be able to find the section I want to refer to. If
21 you'll check, what's here is a speech by Mr. Brdjanin, I believe. You say
22 in paragraph 1.77: "General mobilisation throughout the SRBiH as had been
23 argued by General Lieutenant-Colonel Mladic, Radoslav Brdjanin and others
24 in the 16th assembly session was announced on the 21st of May 1992 after a
25 decision taken by the Presidency the previous day."
1 The part is actually the second paragraph on that page where
2 Brdjanin says this: "As for the military options, I do not know much
3 about that, but I propose, as Mr. Zupljanin has said, that Serbian BH
4 cannot be defended if it is based on the voluntary principle. If we
5 establish Serbian armed forces today, we will be announcing general
6 mobilisation, and now everyone must be put under the command of the
7 Serbian armed forces and forces for preserving law and order." Do you see
9 A. I don't see it on the ELMO, I think we're looking at a slightly
10 different section.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: I think we're on page 31. Is that right,
12 Mr. Ackerman?
13 MR. ACKERMAN: That's the page I'm on.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: You never said which page you were on, Mr. Ackerman.
15 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm sorry.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Page 31, yes.
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. Did you find what I was referring to?
19 JUDGE AGIUS: The paragraph starts with the words "as for the
20 military options..."
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm sorry.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: And your question, Mr. Ackerman?
23 MR. ACKERMAN:
24 Q. You told us in the -- in your report that general mobilisation was
25 announced on the 21st May. You said: "As had been argued by Mladic,
1 Brdjanin, and others in the 16th assembly, the impression one gets from
2 reading that, I think, is that Brdjanin had called for a mobilisation."
3 If you look at what he says, he just says that: "If we establish a
4 Serbian armed forces today, we will be announcing mobilisation." Is there
5 a difference there or not?
6 A. Maybe if you pick over the word "argued" possibly. If I look at
7 the transcript now of what is said, it would almost indicate that
8 Mr. Brdjanin had an awareness that mobilisation was going to be announced,
9 which it was on the 20th of May, rather than just saying we should
10 mobilise. It almost indicates here that the decision has been taken, and
11 it will be announced at a later date, which of course it was.
12 Q. And look what else he said right after that. He says: "All
13 paramilitary units must truly disappear. Any private armies will only
14 bring us harm and divide us." Right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you know from other documents that that was a position that he
17 maintained throughout the year of 1992, that he was throughout the year
18 concerned about paramilitaries?
19 A. I don't know. But I know that that type of comment was -- wasn't
20 just Mr. Brdjanin making that comment. There were others, too.
21 Q. And we got more to talk about with regard to that as we go on,
22 too, so we'll get there.
23 It's clear that what he says there about paramilitary formations,
24 he's talking about Serb paramilitary formations, isn't he?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. All right. Let's go now to paragraph 1.86 of your report. In
2 that connection, I'd also like you to look at Defence Exhibit DB267. If
3 you look at page 3 of that document, it speaks of military activity and
4 what has been called the -- talk about the corridor that we have been
5 talking about. Correct?
6 A. Yes, some of those areas are in the corridor.
7 Q. And it's that corridor that we talked about just a few moments ago
8 linking the Krajina area of Bosnia with Serbia. Correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And it says -- that report indicates that the corridor once opened
11 had been closed as a result of military activity and the withdrawal of the
12 Tuzla Corps. And then it mentioned the SRJ. Do you know what the SRJ is?
13 A. I think it's referring to the FRY, the Federal Republic of
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me, Your Honours, just for the record, this
17 document is also P2514.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
19 267, page 3. Yes, what's your next question, Mr. Ackerman?
20 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm working on it, Your Honour. I'm sorry.
21 Q. I'm going to move on to another matter. I think I've asked all I
22 want to ask about that. 1.103. We're under a heading called
23 "cooperation with civilian bodies" on page 44. And in paragraph 1.103 you
24 speak of Serb Crisis Staffs being established by the SDS from late 1991 in
25 various municipalities. In your last sentence, you say this:
1 "This coordination function" -- I better go back a little earlier. "It is
2 evident that the Crisis Staffs were become an important form of
3 organisation in ensuring that the resources of the municipality or the
4 region were coordinated and unified in achieving the overall political and
5 military objectives. To do this, they brought together the relevant
6 civilians, military, and police bodies in a formalised grouping. This
7 coordination function was the primary role of these bodies." Correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If we look then at the next paragraph, you speak of a speech that
10 was made by Karadzic on 27 March 1992. And in relation to the military,
11 Karadzic said this: "You must try to organise the people so that they can
12 defend themselves. Find a number of reserve officers for those staffs and
13 have them register everyone who owns a weapon as well as units. They
14 should organise Territorial Defence, and if the JNA is there, they must be
15 placed under its command." So he's talking about taking these TO units
16 and putting them under the command of the JNA, isn't he?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And this is a significant period of time prior to the creation of
19 the VRS, isn't it?
20 A. I don't think it's a significant period of time. The VRS was
21 created on the 12th of May, and this instruction -- this speech, I think
22 was in late March. So I don't think that's a --
23 Q. Okay. I'll withdraw the significant part. It was before the
24 creation of the VRS.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And it smacks of an effort to achieve and continue some kind of a
2 unified command to avoid competing commands, doesn't it?
3 A. Yes, I think Karadzic seems to be saying that in those areas where
4 they need to defend themselves, they need to have this unified military
5 command clearly indicating that the Territorial Defence and the JNA seem
6 to have some shared, shared view. But you're right, it would seem to say
7 this was would avoid any difficulties in that respect.
8 Q. Within any kind of military organisation a unified command is
9 pretty important to being able to efficiently carry out whatever mission
10 it is that the command is trying to carry out, isn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Let's go now to the next paragraph: In that paragraph, you refer
13 to Document P157, and I think it would be helpful for you to have that
14 exhibit in front of you as we speak about it. Now, this is a document
15 dated April 26th of 1992, I believe, signed by Prime Minister Branko
16 Dzeric of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina government. Correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you quote rather large parts of that in your report,
19 presumably because you find this document particularly significant.
21 A. Yes, I think it's an important document.
22 Q. The first thing that I think is important about this document is
23 that it makes it clear in paragraph 4 that Crisis Staffs are not to
24 interfere with the operations of the TO or the police. Correct?
25 A. Yes, that's what it says.
1 Q. You then quote the section in paragraph 8 that provides that the
2 Crisis Staff has the obligation to provide working and living conditions
3 for JNA members. Right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, that paragraph certainly doesn't imply any kind of control by
6 the Crisis Staffs over the JNA, does it?
7 A. No, it doesn't.
8 Q. It simply details to a limited extent that cooperation between
9 civilian and military authorities that you referred to earlier in your
11 A. Yes, it's another example of that.
12 Q. And that paragraph talks about providing working and living
13 conditions for JNA. If you look at the next paragraph, it uses almost the
14 same language: "Shall provide working conditions for international peace
15 and relief organisations. Doesn't it?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And again that certainly wouldn't imply that the Crisis Staff was
18 to have authority over international peace and relief organisations, does
20 A. No.
21 Q. All right. Now, keep that document, and look also at P1265.
22 P1265 is a decision on the organisation and operation of the
23 Crisis Staff of the Prijedor Municipality. And I think you've pointed out
24 in your report, and you'll see it in this document, that it's pretty clear
25 that this document was created in response to the Dzeric document on
1 instructions for the work of municipal Crisis Staffs because it contains
2 the same language in many places, doesn't it?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So at least we can conclude that with regard to Prijedor
5 Municipality, the instructions of Dzeric were implemented and had some
6 significant as far as they were concerned?
7 A. Yes, it would appear so.
8 Q. In Article 2 of that document, 1265, it talks about creating
9 conditions for the Executive Board to exercise executive authority. Do
10 you see that?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 Q. That seems to be an indication that while the Crisis Staff
13 replaces the assembly of the municipality, the executive authority remains
14 with the Executive Board, and the Crisis Staff has to create conditions so
15 that they can exercise that executive authority. Correct?
16 A. I'll just read your question, Mr. Ackerman, on the...
17 Well, it would seem -- I can only go by what is written on the
18 instruction, that the Crisis Staff is to create conditions for the
19 Executive Committee to exercise legitimate executive power. What it says
20 on the document.
21 Q. All right. Let's move forward. I'm finished with that, now.
22 1.109 on page 47, you tell us this. You're talking about 5th
23 Corps deployment to Western Slavonia, and the time when some of those
24 units were returning. You say: "As these units were redeployed into
25 municipalities, they were ordered to establish links with the local
1 authorities. And it is that they were being redeployed back from Western
2 Slavonia, from the fighting in Croatia, weren't they?
3 A. Yes, certain units. I think the reference here was one was -- had
4 been deployed in Western Slavonia and was being redeployed back to Bosnia.
5 Q. Just so that we fully understand this situation, what had happened
6 was when the war broke out in Croatia, units that were stationed in
7 various localities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were mobilised and went into
8 Croatia to join in the fighting there. And then when that was winding
9 down, they came back to those areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina where they
10 had been deployed from. Right?
11 A. Yes, there were some units that were redeployed to other areas in
12 the corps, not necessarily their home area. But most units went back to
13 the areas that they had been deployed -- had come from.
14 Q. And you say that they were ordered to establish links with local
15 authorities upon their redeployment. There's nothing militarily unusual
16 about this, is there? It's important, isn't it, for military units to try
17 to maintain good relations with civilian authorities in the places where
18 they're stationed?
19 A. Yes, and it was also contained in the regulations of the JNA. So
20 no, it wasn't necessarily something that was unusual.
21 Q. Just for an example, let's look at P608.
22 And this is a document you referred us to, I think, in paragraph
23 1.109 to. And I think you're referring -- in fact, it's clear that you're
24 referring to -- under paragraph 1 where it says "order," it's about the
25 third paragraph down, where it says: "Establish full cooperation with the
1 organs of government in Sanski Most Municipality and collaboration with TO
2 and police units." Do you see that?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Now, would you agree with me that if this had just been normal
5 peacetime conditions, let's say we're in 1985, and the JNA had decided to
6 establish a military base in the Sanski Most area and had sent a military
7 unit there, would you agree with me that there would have been an order
8 saying "establish full cooperation with the organs of government in the
9 Sanski Most Municipality and collaboration with TO and police units"? In
10 other words, what I'm suggesting is that is common language any time a
11 unit moves into a new civilian area. Peacetime, wartime, any time.
12 A. I can't really tell you what would be expected and the type of
13 regulations that would be passed out in 1985 or in a period of peacetime.
14 I can tell you this was more emphatic because it was a period of some
15 tension and crisis. That unit had been involved in combat operations
16 since late 1991 and it was moving back into an area that -- or moving back
17 into the Krajina, which clearly had tensions. So I can only go by what
18 this particular instruction says. I don't know if in 1985 it would have
19 been less emphatic or it would have been covered in some standard
20 operating procedure that would have had been written. So I'm not clear.
21 I'm not sure I can really answer the question fully.
22 Q. I think in your experience, you certainly have become aware that
23 military orders tend to be written in the same language over and over and
24 over to cover the same situation. So I take it it wouldn't surprise you
25 to find an order from 1985 where a unit was moving into a community where
1 it had not been to find this language in that order. It wouldn't surprise
2 you, would it?
3 A. In this case, this is not a unit that is necessarily moving back
4 into an area that it has never been before. It is moving back into an
5 area that it had been based in. So I'm not sure if it would surprise me
6 or not to be honest. If you said to me here's an instruction from 1985
7 that has very little reference to establishing coordination with the
8 police and civilian authorities and made reference to some generic
9 standing operation procedure, would that surprise me? No. Would it
10 surprise me in 1985 if there was an instruction which was more emphatic
11 and echoed some of this language? Maybe not. So I'm not sure I can
12 really answer the question.
13 Q. And I'm having difficulty asking it in a way that probably makes
14 sense to you. From my own military experience, I know that the presence
15 of a military base, a military unit in a community has significant impact
16 on that community. And that cooperation between the military and the
17 civilian authorities is awfully important in dealing with all of the
18 impacts that come from that. I think you can probably agree with that.
19 A. Yes, clearly a military unit in a community, you know, has its own
20 issues to deal with and cooperation between civilian bodies and the police
21 and other structures is a feature of that relationship. So -- and that's
22 not unusual.
23 Q. This is 1 April 1992, the date of this document we're looking at.
24 Do you know what the nature of the Sanski Most organs of government was at
25 that time?
1 A. No, I'm unclear on the nature.
2 Q. Are you aware that this was well before the Serb takeover of the
3 Sanski Most organs of government and that it was a multiethnic government
4 at that point?
5 A. Well, I believe that the takeover was in late May, so I'm not sure
6 it was well before the takeover. A matter of weeks. I know it was a
7 multiethnic municipality, but I'm unclear on the details of the structure
8 of government and how they operated in that period.
9 Q. Well, does the significance of that paragraph that you've referred
10 us to, about establishing full cooperation, change if it's establishing
11 full cooperation with a multiparty government made up of primarily Serbs
12 and Muslims, or if it's establishing cooperation with a purely Serb
13 municipality? Do you think the significance is different as to which one
14 it's dealing with?
15 A. Yes, it could very well change that. But I'm a little bit unclear
16 on the exact details or necessarily what that particular brigade actually
17 did in reality in terms of its cooperation and who it cooperated with.
18 Q. It's a matter of record in this case that the Serbian Municipality
19 of Sanski Most was not formed until 20 April. Okay? So clearly this is
20 referring to a pre-Serbian Municipality of Sanski Most government, isn't
22 A. Yes, it would appear to be so.
23 Q. In addition, let me see if I can find it, maybe you know where it
24 is, this order indicates that the mission of the brigade to prevent
25 interethnic conflict, among other things.
1 A. Yes, I think it's the paragraph above. That's what is stated in
2 this instruction.
3 Q. Mm-hmm.
4 Okay, I think I'm finished with that. We'll go now in your report
5 to paragraph 1.112. In this paragraph of your report, you say this: In a
6 similar manner to the municipal level, cooperative links were also
7 established. And again, we're still in that section dealing with
8 cooperation between military, civilian bodies. "Cooperative links were
9 also established with the regional government bodies including the
10 Autonomous Region of Krajina, ARK, Crisis Staff; the Autonomous Region of
11 Krajina Assembly; and other regional governmental bodies. On 14 April
12 1992, a reference in a corps report noted that the 5th corps command
13 focussed its work on informing subordinate units, organising a meeting
14 between the SAO of Krajina commander and commanders of subordinate staffs
15 in monitoring the situation in the area of responsibility."
16 That's what you tell us. Right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And the documents you refer to in 173 I have now marked as DB268,
19 and I'll ask you to take a look at that.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Nicholls, does this document that Mr. Ackerman
21 is tendering now already have a number, according to your records? Has it
22 been tendered by the Prosecution or is it a new?
23 MR. NICHOLLS: I'd have to check that, Your Honour. Ms. Gustin
24 tells me that it is not.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Gustin. Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: While I'm up, I wonder if we could have a very
2 short break, about 5 minutes, and let the witness read the --
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you object to that, Mr. Ackerman? You were in
4 the middle of a question.
5 MR. ACKERMAN: We were going to have a break in 15 minutes, but if
6 somebody needs a break for some reason, I have no objection at all., we'll
7 do it now.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly. Let's break now.
9 We'll have a break of 25 minutes straight away. I think we can
10 have the break now and continue afterwards.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: That's fine.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Is it fine with you, Mr. Ackerman? Thank you.
13 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
16 MR. ACKERMAN:
17 Q. Mr. Brown, we were just getting ready to look at the Document
18 DB268. And as I understand, this was not previously an exhibit in the
19 case. First thing I'll draw to your attention is it's dated 14 April
20 1992. Correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. If we just start reading it, looking at that first paragraph, it's
23 talking about a fierce attack launched by the Ustashas from Pakrac, Lipik,
24 Prekopakra, Klisa, and Matkovac areas. That's all in Croatia, isn't it?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. If you go on down to the second paragraph, again talking about
2 Croatia, Medarski, Vinograd, Nova Gradiska, Bilici village, all those
3 villages are Croatian?
4 A. Yes, I think they are. Yes.
5 Q. If you go down to paragraph 2, the area and villages discussed
6 there and the reference to Ustashas all have to do with the battle that
7 was going on in Croatia, doesn't it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And this report, of course, was issued during a time when the -- I
10 believe the 5th Corps command was located in Croatia?
11 A. Yes, just over the river.
12 Q. The paragraph that you refer to in your paragraph 1.112, it's
13 there close to the bottom: "The 5th Corps command focussed its work on
14 informing subordinate units organising a meeting between the SAO Serbian
15 Autonomous District of Krajina commander and commanders of subordinate
16 staffs and monitoring the situation in the area of responsibility."
17 Again, that's talking about the SAO Krajina, isn't it?
18 A. Yes, I believe it is, and I think the reference that I'm making
19 more generally is made in this paragraph, that the corps was used to or
20 had done in Western Slavonia, had contacts with regional government
22 Q. Well, what you told the Chamber, referring to a document that was
23 not an exhibit, so they couldn't check it, in a similar manner to the
24 municipal level, cooperative links were also established with the
25 regional government bodies --
1 MR. NICHOLLS: I just want to say for the record obviously
2 Mr. Brown has no control over what becomes an exhibit and what doesn't,
3 and I don't like the suggestion that that was somehow -- that there was
4 some intent to put in something without putting in the exhibit on
5 Mr. Brown's part.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Definitely not, Mr. Nicholls. But sooner or later,
7 I think, and probably much sooner than later, rather than later, you will
8 have to face this problem because you have got several reports referring
9 to several documents that are not in the record as exhibits. What's the
10 solution for that? It's not my business. It's your business. So you
11 have a clear indication from Mr. Ackerman today that that is something
12 that he attaches importance to. And if we found or we came across the
13 word "justifiably" before, I think I can also use the word justifiably now
14 because it's a problem. I mean, what's not in the record will remain
15 outside the record. I mean, I'm not going to refer to those documents
16 that are not tendered an exhibit even if I have them. You have filed
17 binders with hundreds if not thousands of documents that have ultimately
18 not been tendered in evidence. Perfectly legitimate. I agree that that
19 could be done, but I think you need to address this problem and find a
20 solution, or at least a solution that you are satisfied with.
21 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
22 MR. ACKERMAN:
23 Q. Mr. Brown, what you told the Chamber in paragraph 1.112 was this:
24 "In a similar manner to the municipal level, cooperative links were also
25 established -- were also established -- with the regional government
1 bodies, including the Autonomous Region of Krajina, ARK, Crisis Staff; the
2 Autonomous Region of Krajina Assembly; and other regional government
3 bodies. On 14 April 1992, a reference in a corps report noted that." You
4 are citing that as support for what you just said about these cooperative
5 links being established with -- and the major one there is the ARK Crisis
7 A. It's not the only one there, Mr. Ackerman.
8 Q. That's just not correct, is it? That's totally misleading, isn't
9 it? You're referring to a document from Croatia dealing with the
10 SAO Krajina in Croatia as support for the proposition that cooperative
11 links were established with the ARK Crisis Staff. I find that
12 unacceptable, don't you?
13 A. Well, I think maybe if you read on to the next paragraph,
14 Mr. Ackerman, you'll see that there are enough references there talking
15 about more regional ARK Crisis Staffs, Autonomous Region of Krajina
16 Assembly documents. My point in this whole paragraph, this whole section
17 in relation to cooperation with civilian authorities, was that the corps
18 established cooperative links with government bodies wherever it went.
19 The SAO in Krajina, in Western Slavonia, was a regional body that they
20 established some contact with as can be seen from this document, amongst
21 others, I hasten to say, because I think I talk about that in Western
22 Slavonia paragraph. This chapter is about cooperation with civilian
24 Now, in paragraph 1.113, I list and footnote other references that
25 talk about more specifically the Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis
2 Q. We're going there, but I'm talking about 1.112 right now. You're
3 talking about April of 1992. There wasn't even an ARK Crisis Staff at
4 that point, was there?
5 A. No, I don't believe there was. But I'm not making there was a
6 claim there was an ARK Crisis Staff in that reference. In paragraph 1.112
7 I make reference that, as well as at municipal level, there were
8 established links with other regional government bodies. This was one of
9 them, the one in Croatia. There were also ones in the Krajina of which I
10 come on to in 1.113.
11 Q. Well, let's go to point 1.113. In 1.113, you tell us this, and
12 I'll leave out a little bit just to provide context: "General Major Talic
13 assisted ARK personnel in the execution of their tasks." Do you see that?
14 Do you see that language in your report, 1.113?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, the conclusion that would be logically drawn from that, I
17 think, is that several ARK personnel were assisted by General Talic in the
18 execution of several tasks because it's all plural "personnel and tasks."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, I'd like you to look at the Document DB269. This is the
22 document you refer the Chamber to to support that proposition.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: And again, Your Honours, I don't think this was a
24 document that was previously admitted.
25 Q. Do you see the document?
1 A. I do, yes, Mr. Ackerman.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you tendering it yourself, Mr. Ackerman?
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, Your Honour, I am. I'm tendering as DB269.
4 Q. It's a permit, isn't it?
5 A. Yes, yes, it is.
6 Q. And it's a permit issued to -- just, it's easy to just read the
7 whole thing: "This document is to certify that permission has been
8 granted for a delegation to travel along the Doboj/Prnjavor route. The
9 delegation from the Serbian Republic of BH and Banja Luka is headed by
10 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin. The delegation has another nine people with four
11 motor vehicles. This permit cannot be used for other purposes." Now, you
12 say this proves that ARK personnel were assisted. What other personnel
13 are there in there other than Mr. Brdjanin that are ARK personnel?
14 A. Well, Mr. Brdjanin clearly is a member of the Autonomous Region of
15 Krajina Crisis Staff. It doesn't make mention that they were --
16 specifically who exactly the other nine personnel.
17 Q. But you used the word "personnel" that's plural. Who else in that
18 report is ARK personnel?
19 A. In that particular one, there's not.
20 Q. But that's the one you cited?
21 A. But there are other references in that paragraph that talk
22 about --
23 Q. There's only one other reference to that phrase, "assisted ARK
24 personnel in the execution of their tasks." You cite -- you cite footnote
25 178 and this is the document.
1 A. I could also have cited document footnote number 187, which is the
2 visit to Manjaca camp, which is in an assistance issue --
3 Q. We're going to get to that. We're going to talk about that. Let
4 me focus you on the question?
5 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Ackerman, before you proceed, may I
6 ask you, please, to have a look at your DB269A and your DB269B. I hope
7 you're not suggesting that DB269A is a faithful translation of DB269B.
8 Because although it should be, there's no way it could be.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: I hope it is, Your Honour.
10 It's possible that got confused.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: It's definitely -- there's a confusion here.
12 Everyone makes mistakes, Mr. Ackerman.
13 MR. ACKERMAN: Well I'm looking at it, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: It's probably -- but we need to know because if
15 you're going to make use of the English translation of what we have as
16 269B, you need to dig that up. And we don't really need us, the three
17 Judges at least, the translation into B/C/S of what is purported to be
18 269A. Because I don't think we need it. But perhaps you could help us
20 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, there's clearly a problem, Your Honour. The
21 one here on my computer is the correct one. The one has been given to you
22 is not. It's some other document completely
23 JUDGE AGIUS: The one that has been given to us has the ERN
24 number 00861601.
25 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, that's clearly the wrong document.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I'm just drawing your attention to this,
2 and then you see to it later. I don't want to take up -- of your
3 cross-examination time, Mr. Ackerman.
4 MR. ACKERMAN: I'll definitely substitute the proper document. I
5 have it right here. Thank you, Judge.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
7 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Judge.
8 Q. All right, we're back to this document, this permit. Is there
9 anything in that that indicates what was going on here was a task of ARK?
10 A. Well, all I can say is that Mr. Brdjanin was not a member who is
11 been given assistance in being able to travel in this area on the 26th of
12 June 1992, two days after operation corridor was launched by the 1st
13 Krajina Corps.
14 Q. I really want to insist that you answer my question. Is there
15 anything in this document that indicates that was going on here was a task
16 of ARK? That's the question I asked you.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Wait.
18 THE WITNESS: Directly stated in this document, it doesn't say
19 this was a task of the ARK. What it does say is that Mr. Brdjanin is
20 heading a delegation into this area, and he is request -- or he has been
21 granted permission by General Talic for him and other people to go into
22 this area which at that time was a combat zone, and also you remember my
23 direct testimony in the video reference Mr. Brdjanin makes about visiting
24 the corridor area. It does not say specifically this was a task of the
1 JUDGE AGIUS: It's a conclusion that you came to having read or
2 perused other material.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: But Mr. Ackerman is also correct in his suggestion
5 that that does not follow from the document itself, from the face of the
7 THE WITNESS: It doesn't state that specifically, that it was an
8 ARK task, but you have a very influential --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, we are there.
10 Yes, Mr. Nicholls.
11 MR. NICHOLLS: My only point, Your Honour, was that I believe the
12 witness was trying to answer the question. As he did, Mr. Ackerman keeps
13 cutting him off midsentence, and I object to that.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right, yes, Mr. Ackerman. Please don't cut the
15 witness mid -- okay, let's proceed.
16 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, if I ask about an orange and he
17 starts talking about an apple, can I ask him to focus on the orange.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but please be patient. Let's proceed.
19 THE WITNESS: I would just like to add as well that the reference
20 actually says,"assisted ARK personnel in the execution of their tasks."
21 It doesn't actually say the execution of ARK tasks. But my reference is
22 that --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: But we are now, you know, getting lost in useless
24 meanders. Let's proceed. Mr. Ackerman, next question.
25 MR. ACKERMAN:
1 Q. You have no idea what this delegation was about, do you? You'd
2 have no idea what they were doing.
3 A. On the basis of this document, no.
4 Q. Mr. Brown, this is the concern: You told the Chamber that General
5 Talic assisted ARK personnel in the execution of their tasks. Now, the
6 Chamber would have been entitled to believe that that's exactly the case,
7 that General Talic assisted ARK personnel, multiple people, in the
8 execution of their tasks, multiple tasks, and you cite a document that's
9 not an exhibit in the case.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop telling him that because I agree with the
11 submission of Mr. Nicholls --
12 MR. ACKERMAN: So do I.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: -- That's not a fault that could be attributed to
15 MR. ACKERMAN: Please, I'm not attributing it to him. What I'm
16 trying to suggest that it is unacceptable.
17 MR. NICHOLLS: That's argument, not a question.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: You are correct. Just put a question, Mr. Ackerman.
19 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm finished with the question, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So we'll move to the next.
21 MR. ACKERMAN:
22 Q. In the same paragraph, you talk about the ARK Crisis Staff and its
23 relation to or impact on military matters. 2 t reads like this:
24 Conversely, decisions or discussion at the ARK Crisis Staff meetings and
25 other regional level bodies impacted on or were related to military
1 activity. These included, for example," and then you go through a list of
2 things. And one of those is: "And issues in relation to camps." Do you
3 see that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, would it be -- would it be appropriate for someone reading
6 that to draw the conclusion that issues in relation to camps were
7 discussed at ARK Crisis Staff meetings, that that's what you're telling
9 A. Not -- no. I'm saying that the issue of camps were discussed at
10 certain meetings, and I reference one of them which is a report which made
11 mention of the autonomous region Crisis Staff, or the autonomous region
12 war presidency meeting discussing the issue of camps as footnote 184. And
13 there's other references in the paragraph talking about visits to camps by
14 delegates. So no, I'm not implying that it's ARK Crisis Staff meetings
15 that necessarily -- that -- in your question that they were discussing
16 camps all the time, but there are references that I've seen which discuss
17 the issue of camps.
18 Q. Maybe you misunderstood my question, and it's probably my fault.
19 If you read the whole thing, starting with "conversely" down to the word
20 "camps," would it be inappropriate for someone to conclude that you're
21 suggesting that the ARK Crisis Staff in a meeting discussed issues in
22 relation to camps? Would that be a mistake if someone were to conclude
24 A. I'm a little unclear on the question. Maybe it's me.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: No, it's not you. It's actually the first of this
1 series of -- sequence of sentences in your report because basically you
2 have the interchanging -- interchangeable use of decisions or discussions.
3 Then ARK Crisis Staff meetings and other regional level bodies. And then
4 whether they impacted on or were merely related to military activity. And
5 then a series of topics, and it's not quite clear whether it's decisions
6 and discussions or decisions, or mere discussions, or just the issue. I
7 mean, if you read it, these included, for example, decisions and
8 discussions on mobilisation, deadlines concerning the surrender of
9 weapons, the removal of non-Serbs from the military, decisions relating to
10 the establishment of civilian authorities and issues in relation to camp.
11 What are we talking about now, decisions on issues in relation to camps or
12 just discussions on issues relating to camps? I mean, I fully understand
13 the legitimacy of Mr. Ackerman's question and his concern, too, because I
14 mean things need to be clear. What is one to understand in reading
15 through this part of the paragraph with regard to camps, only? Forget the
16 rest, because the question does not address the others, the other topics.
17 THE WITNESS: With regard to camps, in the footnote I cited, it
18 was a discussion I believe to do with the International Red Cross and
19 whether the Red Cross were being fair, I think, in relation to their --
20 JUDGE AGIUS: But that's one issue.
21 THE WITNESS: That is one issue.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Here you say "issues."
23 THE WITNESS: Maybe I have made an error in putting it like that.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: That's okay. No one is blaming you for that. We
25 just want a clear-cut answer as to what am I supposed to understand when
1 I'm reading this. Because here, I have a reference to a document which
2 irrespective of whether it's in the records or not, that's not your
3 problem, that's the Prosecution's problem. But even reading this, what
4 conclusion am I supposed to come to?
5 THE WITNESS: I think in this particular reference, that the issue
6 of camps was known about. It was reported as a result of a war presidency
7 meeting that the assistant commander for civilian affairs of the 1st
8 Krajina Corps had visited, and he was passing on that comment and
9 discussion about the issue of camps at that time. My point, and maybe I
10 should have articulated the paragraph in a better way, was that there were
11 discussions. This was not a report about the functioning and the inner
12 workings of these government bodies. What I wanted to articulate was that
13 there were discussions and decisions, and maybe I should have made it more
14 clear in relation to which was a decision and which was a discussion.
15 About military or Defence-related issues at this level that this was not a
16 body or these bodies including the ARK Crisis Staff were not bodies that
17 were divorced completely from discussing and taking decisions related to
18 military issues. Some of those of some significance, like weapon
19 deadlines, like the removal of non-Serbs from the military, and others
20 were more discussions about awareness of certain issues -- involved, for
21 example, the issue of camps. Apologise if I've made the paragraph
22 unclear. This was not a paragraph or a part of the report that was going
23 into all the workings and all the decisions of this -- these regional and
24 other government bodies. That is not within the remit of the report.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: It's -- okay, I thank you for that. But you also
1 need to understand that this is something that is fundamentally important,
2 at least for part of this trial, because there is an allegation on the
3 part of the Prosecution that what was happening in the camps was known,
4 was known to all -- to everyone, and still the ARK Crisis Staff, for
5 example, deliberately chose to not to discuss this matter or try to avoid
6 discussing this matter. So you can understand why Mr. Ackerman is
7 concerned about this matter, which should also be of concern to the
9 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
10 MR. ACKERMAN:
11 Q. What you say in the paragraph was that -- you used the words
12 "impacted on or related to military activity." And then go on to cite
13 issues in relation to the camps. And the document you cite there is
14 DB270, and I'd like you to look at that now, please. And please feel free
15 to look at the entire document, but specifically I think you were
16 referring to page 2, paragraph 3: "humanitarian organisations are
17 operating in these areas. We still have certain complaints about the work
18 of the NCK, International Red Cross Committee, because they keeps their
19 methods of work and information about the conditions found in the camps to
20 themselves and probably for their superiors. At one of the AR war
21 presidency meetings, they were warned, but their response was that they
22 were not obliged to inform anyone of the conditions they find in camps
23 except their authorised institutions." Now is that the paragraph you were
24 referring to when you suggested that the ARK Crisis Staff had, in their
25 meetings, taken decisions or had discussions that impacted on or related
1 to military activity?
2 A. Yes, in relation to the camps.
3 Q. Now, first of all, isn't it a bit of a stretch to say that what's
4 in that paragraph has anything to do with military activity?
5 A. Well, not particularly, because many of those who went to those
6 detention camps were there as a result of military activity.
7 Q. And isn't it also fair to say that what appears to be going on
8 based on the language of that paragraph is that at a war presidency
9 meeting, some representative of the Red Cross was apparently present,
10 asked for information about what they were finding in the camps, refused
11 to give it, and received some kind of warning? In other words, it appears
12 that the autonomous region war presidency was trying to get information
13 from the Red Cross about what was going on in the camps. So if necessary,
14 they might be able to take some action regarding it. And the Red Cross
15 refused to give them any information. Isn't that what that says?
16 A. I don't think it says that in entirety. It says that -- as it
17 says in the document, that there were complaints about the work of the
18 ICRC, and because they kept their methods and information about conditions
19 to themselves, and they were warned. It doesn't necessarily say that, as
20 you've put in the question, that the ARK Crisis Staff were trying to find
21 out about necessarily all the conditions. I do know that contextually
22 around this time, there were complaints certainly in the military
23 documentation about the work of the ICRC who they viewed not as being
24 impartial, and that they were not portraying accurately the condition in
25 other camps, and that the International Red Cross was coming on ulterior
1 motives of intelligence gathering and the likes. So it's not clear from
2 this necessarily what they were complaining about. But they could have
3 been complaining, for example, about the fact that they viewed the ICRC as
4 not being impartial and were being disingenuous and spreading rumours that
5 conditions in the camps were very bad, but it's not exactly clear.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Doesn't all this also show up in what is essentially
7 a military document?
8 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, it's a military document. It's a military
9 secret confidential coded deliver immediately document. 18 July 1992.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: So if it is, what's the problem?
11 MR. ACKERMAN: I think I've outlined the problem as clearly as I
12 can, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Move ahead.
14 MR. ACKERMAN:
15 Q. We're not going to go to the one that you wanted to talk about
16 regarding the ARK Crisis Staff and camps. At the bottom of that
17 paragraph, you talk about "on 23 August during the visit to Manjaca camp
18 by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former
19 Yugoslavia, members of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanied the visit."
20 That's what you told the Chamber. Right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. What members of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanied Mr. Mazowiecki's
23 visit on the 23rd of August?
24 A. May I have a look at the document.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.
1 MR. ACKERMAN: Let me find it for you. It would be DB286.
2 MR. NICHOLLS: That's P1777, Your Honour.
3 THE WITNESS: Maybe if I take you to the last paragraph, it says:
4 "Regardless of the consequences of the cancellation of Mr. Mazowiecki's
5 visit to the prisoner of war camp, we declare with full responsibility
6 that the purpose of his visit was inspecting of the state of human rights,
7 but on the contrary, intelligence, reconnaissance, which can be confirmed
8 by those representatives of the government of the Autonomous Region of
9 Krajina who were present and who spoke to him."
10 MR. ACKERMAN:
11 Q. Well, that doesn't say ARK Crisis Staff members, does it?
12 A. No, but Mr. Radic was present, and I believe he was a member of
13 the ARK Crisis Staff.
14 Q. And you think he was present as a member of the ARK Crisis Staff
15 rather than as mayor of Banja Luka?
16 A. I don't know in what capacity he attended the meeting.
17 Q. But why did you tell the Chamber he attended in capacity of ARK
18 Crisis Staff if you don't know?
19 A. I didn't say he was attending as part of the Crisis Staff.
20 Q. You just told me that. You just said that. Just now.
21 MR. NICHOLLS: We're getting way off field. He started on
22 cross-examination --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Let him finish. It's important. Because it's
24 reading documents and referring to documents, needs to be hundred per cent
25 correct if we are to give weight, hundred per cent weight, to the reports
1 that we receive. I mean, it's being put to the witness that his
2 conclusion that members of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanied the visit does
3 not follow or does not flow from the document to which the expert refers.
4 Namely, this document 270 that we have just been reading. It says not a
5 member of the ARK Crisis Staff, it says "members of the Crisis Staff
6 accompanied the visit." So the question is perfectly legitimate. Did Mr.
7 Brown have a basis on which to conclude that members of the ARK Crisis
8 Staff accompanied the visit, having referred to that document, or didn't
9 he? And if he did, is it a mistake or is it because he has other
10 information which perhaps justified his conclusion but which we don't have
11 a reference to in this particular paragraph of the report?
12 MR. NICHOLLS: I agree, Your Honour, that those are within the
13 limitation of the questions. I believe it's the way he's trying to
14 characterise the question in the footnote.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but Mr. Nicholls, we are not members of a panel
16 of jurors here, we are three professional Judges and we are perfectly
17 capable of taking stock of what is happening. So we are not going to be
18 impressed by Mr. Ackerman becoming suddenly aggressive or raising his
19 voice or whatever. I mean, it doesn't -- these things... I have been
20 doing this work for the past 27 years. So take it from me, nothing
21 impresses me.
22 Yes, Mr. Brown.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I cannot remember if there was other
24 material which I didn't footnote that may have indicated who else was on
25 this visit. That aside, I should have stated in that sentence "a member
1 of the ARK Crisis Staff visited" or "a member" and, to quote the document
2 "representatives of the government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina
3 were present during this visit."
4 MR. ACKERMAN:
5 Q. Well, that may have been true if there was an ARK Crisis Staff on
6 23 August 1992, but there wasn't, was there?
7 A. I don't know if there was a Crisis Staff or war presidency during
8 that date.
9 Q. Don't you think before you made that representation to the Trial
10 Chamber you should have found out?
11 A. Mr. Radic had been a member of the ARK Crisis Staff.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I know, but the quotation is that on the 23rd of
13 August 1992, what was the ARK Crisis Staff had already come to an end and
14 there was no longer an ARK Crisis Staff. There is a question, an argument
15 of whether for a part of August it still existed. Formally or informally,
16 I don't know. That is a submission that has been made and which still
17 remains to be seen. But for all intents and purposes it has been put to
18 you that you should have been aware that the ARK Crisis Staff had come to
19 an end, end of July beginning of August, and that therefore on the 23rd of
20 July-- of August you couldn't have safely stated that there were members
21 of the ARK Crisis Staff accompanying Mr. Mazowiecki on this visit. And all
22 the more so, since the document 270, Exhibit DB270, actually never refers
23 to any members of the ARK Crisis Staff, but just members of the government
24 of Krajina.
25 THE WITNESS: I concede, Your Honour, that I maybe should have
1 been more careful in that respect.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Next question, Mr. Ackerman.
3 MR. ACKERMAN:
4 Q. Finally, again back to your original language, "on 23 August
5 during the visit to Manjaca camp by Tadeusz Mazowiecki..." Now the
6 impression I think anyone would get from that is Tadeusz Mazowiecki
7 visited Manjaca camp on 23 August. And in fact, that visit never
8 occurred, did it?
9 A. The attempted visit.
10 Q. Well you didn't say attempted visit. You left the impression that
11 he went there with members of the ARK Crisis Staff, and he didn't even go
12 there, did he?
13 A. He wasn't allowed in.
14 Q. Why did you leave that out? You knew it, didn't you?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. Don't you think that shows a pretty high degree of
17 irresponsibility on your part to misinform the Chamber that way?
18 A. I had no intention of misinforming anybody, Mr. Ackerman, and this
19 is a large report, and I can only say I should have been more careful in
20 that section. Not much else I can say on that matter.
21 Q. And that may apply to several other sections of your report, also
22 correct? You should have been more careful?
23 A. Maybe if you point those out, we can discuss them.
24 Q. If it weren't for cross-examination --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: On the other hand -- one moment, Mr. Ackerman,
1 because we also have to be... If you look at footnote 187, it reads as
2 follows: 1st Krajina Corps report dated 23rd of August. And please note
3 the date. On the visit Manjaca camp by Tadeusz Mazowiecki which was
4 denied. So there is a statement to the effect based on the Krajina
5 report, on the 1st Krajina Corps report, that the visit to Manjaca was
6 actually denied.
7 But in any case, I mean, the point is made by both of you, both by
8 you, Mr. Ackerman, and Mr. Brown. And I fully degree if you read the last
9 part of the last sentence of the paragraph 1.113 for the record, it is in
10 itself misleading in a sense that it tends to suggest that there was a
11 visit on the 23rd of August by Tadeusz Mazowiecki at which he was
12 accompanied by members of the ARK Crisis Staff. And as such, this is not
13 correct. I'm not imputing at all that this was intentionally inserted in
14 the report to mislead the Trial Chamber. We're not taking it as that also
15 because of the footnote that I referred to.
16 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Let's go to paragraph 1.114.
18 Q. You tell the Chamber there that "ARK Crisis Staff
19 members - plural - also toured the areas of combat activity and were
20 briefed by military personnel in order to gain an understanding of the
21 situation." And then the only reference that you give the Chamber with
22 regard to that contention, that members toured the areas, is one visit by
23 Mr. Brdjanin to Kotor Varos and another by Brdjanin to Operation Corridor
24 in 1992. What other members of the ARK Crisis Staff toured areas of
25 combat activity that you can tell the Chamber about?
1 A. There's a reference in the previous paragraph about delegation
2 going to Prijedor and the Kozarski Vjesnik article characterised that as
3 areas of combat operations had taken place and collection centres.
4 Q. Well --
5 A. And I believe Kozarski Vjesnik article makes reference to
6 Mr. Radic and Mr. Brdjanin and others. There's the Vojo Kupresanin visit
7 to Manjaca camp. So there are one or two articles there.
8 Q. So the Chamber should treat that phrase "ARK Crisis Staff members
9 also toured areas of combat activity and were briefed by military
10 personnel in order to gain a better understanding of the situation" to
11 mean areas of previous combat activity or previous combat activity or
12 places where there had never been any combat activity? I mean, that's the
13 way it should be read according to you now.
14 A. I can just give you the three or four examples that I've just
15 cited, that certain members did tour the area. And Mr. Brdjanin's own
16 words in the video, that the idea was to gain an understanding of the
17 situation on the ground. He makes mention that he had been into the
18 corridor, and he's clearly in Kotor Varos at the time.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, Mr. Ackerman is fully justified in drawing
20 your attention to this because the paragraph starts with "ARK Crisis Staff
21 members," but then the reference is only to two instances, both of which
22 seemingly at least on the face of it, because I don't have the documents
23 here in front of me, refer to Radoslav Brdjanin, to Radoslav Brdjanin
24 only. It may well be that there were other instances which you may have
25 had in your mind and which you rightly referred to in drawing your own
1 conclusions. But the point is that they are not indicated here as
2 footnotes. So this is the problem.
3 And the other problem is that again, you state that ARK Crisis
4 Staff members also toured the areas of combat activity and were briefed by
5 military personnel in order to gain an understanding of the situation.
6 Were they briefed by military personnel in order to gain an understanding
7 of the situation when they toured the areas of combat activity, or were
8 the two activities separate? In other words, one could have taken place
9 independently of the other. Because it could well be for example that
10 reports were made regularly or irregularly during meetings of the
11 ARK Crisis Staff by members of the armed forces, by members of the
12 1st Krajina Corps. I don't know. I mean, it's -- what did you base your
13 conclusions upon?
14 THE WITNESS: I have used the other references in the previous
15 paragraph, so the reference to the visit to Prijedor I used in the
16 previous paragraph, the Kozarski Vjesnik article, which does reference.
17 Radic and Brdjanin and others I believe being briefed by Mr. Adzic and
18 others. I could have refootnoted it and included it there --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but we need to keep distinct and apart the
20 ARK Crisis Staff members and the representatives of the ARK government and
21 Banja Luka Municipality because that's the reference you make when you're
22 mentioning the visit to Prijedor. The visit to Prijedor took place -- "by
23 the representatives of the ARK government and Banja Luka Municipality."
24 When you refer to Vojo Kupresanin as visiting Manjaca, which I do not
25 equate with a visit to an area of combat activity, you refer to him as
1 president of ARK assembly and also ARK Crisis Staff member. So it's this
2 confusion of, you know, representatives from here, representatives from
3 there all being put seemingly in the same basket to make a point. And the
4 point simply gets confused because -- do we have proof of ARK Crisis Staff
5 members touring the areas of combat activity apart from Mr. Brdjanin?
6 THE WITNESS: In the capacity of the ARK Crisis Staff are you
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, because then you state "ARK Crisis Staff
9 members," and then you refer only to Radoslav Brdjanin. There were other
10 members. I've lost count of how many members there were. But are you
11 aware of any other ARK Crisis Staff member touring the areas of combat
12 activity, and then also any other ARK Crisis Staff member apart from
13 Radoslav Brdjanin who was briefed by military personnel in order, et
14 cetera? Either during one of these visits or before or after or having
15 nothing to do with any of these visits?
16 THE WITNESS: I can only reference the Prijedor one where they are
17 referenced as being briefed by Colonel Arsic and military commanders in
18 Prijedor. I believe that document reference makes mention that they
19 were -- I would have to reread the document actually because I don't
20 remember what -- if they say "ARK Crisis Staff members were briefed" or
21 members of the regional government.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Maybe at the time you drafted these paragraphs, that
23 was not important. But you realise now how important it is.
24 THE WITNESS: I do. And I can only go back to my answer, that
25 this document, I was not set the task by the legal staff here to finesse
1 and nuance every ARK Crisis Staff or government decision in relation to
2 who briefed what. And I put this -- these paragraphs, and I again I
3 apologise if they are unclear. I put these paragraphs in the wider
4 section relating to civilian cooperation to articulate that civilian
5 cooperation was a feature in operations or the activities in 1992. That's
6 what I put in. I wasn't asked to put it in to finesse and nuance and
7 explain every relationship between the members of the ARK Crisis Staff. I
8 wasn't given that task. I wanted to get over in these paragraphs, unclear
9 as they may be, that civilian cooperation was a feature, and an important
10 feature. And there is some evidence that it was a feature in this
11 regional-level government, both from the military perspective, and some
12 limited documentation that I have seen, I may not have seen it all, from
13 the governments at the various assembly or the Crisis Staff.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: But for the accused, that is very important because
15 the accused was president of or it being alleged that he was president of
16 the ARK Crisis Staff. And it is being alleged that the ARK Crisis Staff
17 itself had no teeth, and not even a legal basis for its authority, if
18 authority it had. That's what is being submitted. So actually, if there
19 was delegation that went to Prijedor which Mr. Radic, for example, formed
20 part or even headed, I don't know, then it's being alleged that you
21 cannot, unless you have the appropriate basis for it, appropriate
22 documents to rely upon, you cannot in your report tell us that Mr. Radic
23 went there as a member of the ARK Crisis Staff because that, for the
24 Defence, is very important. If he went there as a member of the ARK
25 Crisis Staff, obviously it has its importance. If Mr. Brdjanin went there
1 as president of the ARK Crisis Staff, of course that has its importance.
2 But if you're saying that there were other members of the
3 ARK Crisis Staff that visited these combat zones, areas of combat activity
4 as you put it, when in actual fact there was no evidence to show that, the
5 suggestion by the Defence is, dear Judges, please ignore his expert report
6 because it is based on assumptions and not on facts. This is what is
7 being put to you and to us.
8 THE WITNESS: I appreciate that, Your Honour, and I can only
9 articulate that that type of argument was not necessarily -- was not the
10 agreement on the basis my report was written on. And what I wanted to do
11 in this section was to look at the issue of civil/military cooperation and
12 try and portray the fact that from the documents I have seen, and limited
13 they may have been, that civilian/military cooperation existed. It
14 existed at municipal level, there's evidence that there was this regional
15 level cooperation as well, and finally, another example from Western
16 Slavonia that the JNA and VRS at --
17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right, Mr. Ackerman, you've made your second
18 point. I invite you to move to the next question, if you have finished
19 with this part.
20 MR. NICHOLLS: If I may, Your Honour, I just want to say in
21 connection with this issue which we have been talking about, on the direct
22 examination, in fairness to the accused, we went through the transcript
23 where he said that he toured all the areas of combat activity in the
24 corridor in his capacity as president of the ARK Crisis Staff. So that
25 main point has made clearly, and as well as in the report.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but the whole thing is the suggestion that
2 this is not an accurate report, and even if it may say so in so many words
3 with regard to some aspects, you should look at it with circumspection,
4 keeping in mind these points that are being referred to, it is not only
5 precise but it is based on assumptions and not on facts. This is the
6 suggestion. I don't think that Mr. Ackerman is as such contesting that
7 there is a footage in which Radoslav Brdjanin himself supposedly states
8 that he was - I don't know where - or that there is an official notebook
9 that mentions Brdjanin as visiting, et cetera. He may contest that this
10 visit ever took place. But that's not the point.
11 The point is that in paragraph 1.114 supposes or suggests that --
12 not just Radoslav Brdjanin, but ARK Crisis Staff members. And there is a
13 reference to documents, and that statement is not borne out by those
15 Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
16 MR. ACKERMAN:
17 Q. Sir, you indicated when you were responding Judge Agius that all
18 you were trying to accomplish here was to show military/civil cooperation
19 between the military and civilian authorities. So I take it from that
20 that you have no indication from what you're telling us here, and you do
21 not contend, that any of this documentation shows Crisis Staff control,
22 ARK Crisis Staff control, over military units, does it?
23 A. I do not see the ARK Crisis Staff necessarily controlling military
24 units per se in a strict subordination manner. I do see in some areas,
25 for example, the issue of weapon deadlines, decisions taken at the ARK
1 Crisis Staff which clearly led to some military activity on the ground
2 which were involved in attacks on municipalities in the Krajina area. And
3 there are other areas such as, say, the removal of Muslims from the
4 military which clearly a decision at the ARK Crisis Staff led to activity
5 in the military. But as to the ARK Crisis Staff controlling military
6 units in a subordinated way, I do not see that. And in that respect,
7 you're right, Mr. Ackerman.
8 Q. Your answer just opened about 30 minutes of questions which I will
9 have to do tomorrow.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
11 MR. ACKERMAN: And thank you.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Brown. I thank you, Mr. Ackerman,
13 Mr. Nicholls. We stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00. In
14 which courtroom, Madam Registrar? Is it this one again? I think it's the
15 whole week. No?
16 If it is possible to shift to another courtroom, please, let's try
17 and do that. I don't know if it is at all possible.
18 Yes, your client has discovered a horrendous mistake somewhere in
19 the transcript, Mr. Ackerman.
20 MR. ACKERMAN: We'll find it and take care of it, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
23 To be reconvened on Tuesday, the 28th day of
24 October, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.