1 Thursday, 22 April 2004
2 [Defence Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, good morning. Madam Registrar, could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. Good morning Your Honours.
9 Case Number IT-99-36-T, The Prosecutor versus Radoslav Brdjanin.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Brdjanin, good morning to you. Can you follow
11 the proceedings in a language that you can understand?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. Yes, I
13 can follow the proceedings in a language I understand.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
15 Appearances, Prosecution.
16 MS. GUSTIN: Joanna Korner, Ann Sutherland, Julian Nicholls,
17 assisted by Denise Gustin, case manager.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. And good morning to you all.
19 Appearances for the Defence. Of course, it couldn't be but you,
20 Mr. Vujic.
21 MR. VUJIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't tell me your name, Mr. Bojevic.
23 MR. VUJIC: My name is Aleksandar Vujic, and I'm here together
24 with John Ackerman and David Cunningham.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. And good morning to you all.
1 So the same question, I see that the team behind you increases.
2 That's all my staff, Mr. Ackerman. If you have any objection, I will have
3 them placed -- sit somewhere else.
4 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the afternoon crew that was in this
5 Court after us broke the podium. We have scotch-taped it back together
6 hoping it will hold. But any moment it might just fall in a heap.
7 Claudius has gone off to find another one for us.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I hope this is not a bad omen.
9 Mr. Cunningham, are there any preliminaries before we proceed? I
10 don't think so. Mr. Cunningham, please.
11 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, Your Honours. Last night at dinner,
12 Mr. Ackerman repeatedly admonished me to slow down, so I'm going to try to
13 do that. And I would like to apologise --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: You were somewhere between 16 and 33 yesterday.
15 MR. CUNNINGHAM: The interpreters still think I'm at 78. I'll do
16 my best, and I apologise to them. Mr. Ackerman also reminded me that this
17 Court is quite capable of reading, so what I'm going to do is limit my
18 remarks on implementation. I had talked yesterday that I was going to
19 pick up with the Sanska Unska group. In reality, Mr. Ackerman is going to
20 cover some of that. But I would like to make a few comments on the notion
21 of implementation in Petrovac because that is an area that Ms. Korner
22 discussed, and that is an area that the Witness, Mr. Radojko, testified.
23 When Ms. Korner gave her closing speech, she talked about
24 Mr. Radojko, who had talked about what would happen if the municipality
25 didn't follow a crisis staff decision. And in summary, in his testimony
1 at page 20139 through 40, he, in effect, said that there were two methods,
2 two mechanisms to bring pressure on the crisis staff. One was the
3 populous, the general population; the one -- the other one was the army.
4 Ms. Korner suggested that the municipality certainly wouldn't call
5 the ARK, but they would contact Pale. And when she made that argument, I
6 don't think there is anything in the record that would support that. With
7 respect to the Prosecution's claim made in their brief that if a -- that
8 the presidents of the municipalities felt like they had to implement
9 decisions or they would be replaced, I'd ask the Court to consider this
10 fact: With a nonimplementation rate of 88 per cent, and that's viewed in
11 the light most favourable to the Prosecution, if 88 per cent of these
12 decisions were not being implemented and these presidents were subject to
13 being sacked, one would think there would be a line of deposed presidents
14 all along the road from Banja Luka down to Pale. And the fact is that
15 never happened.
16 I'm going to turn my talk now to the question of the alleged
17 control of the military and the alleged control of the police. With
18 respect to the military, the Prosecution has conceded, their witness
19 conceded, Mr. Brown, that there was not per se subordination. And that's
20 done in paragraph 1.108 of his report, which is Exhibit P2417. The
21 Prosecution argument then devolves to the question, the claim that the
22 crisis staff could cooperate -- cooperated and coordinated with the
23 military. The notion of cooperation with the military structures by a
24 civilian structure is nothing new, and I would cite the Court to two
25 passages. One appearing at page 21535, an exchange between Mr. Ackerman
1 and Mr. Brown. I would also urge the Court to look at a passage from
2 Mr. Zoran Jokic at page 23938 through 9. And finally, note that
3 Colonel Selak said at several locations, including page 12907 and 13273
4 through 74, that this sort of cooperation was logical, expected, and very,
5 very typical.
6 I want to turn now to the allegation of coordination. And one of
7 the arguments made in writing during trial is there was a great deal of
8 coordination between the military and the crisis staff, and one
9 manifestation of that was the presence of Colonel Vujnovic as a
10 representative to the crisis staff. Osman Selak, in his testimony at page
11 13270, dealt directly with this as to whether or not this was usual or
12 unusual. And I'm going to quote his entire passage, again at page 13270.
13 "It was a perfectly normal channel of communication between
14 military and civilian authorities. It was only normal and logical that
15 he" - referring to General Talic - "attended these meetings. He, in
16 person, or any of his assistants, Vukelic, Bogojevic, or the late Gojko
17 Vujnovic who was his assistant for organisation of civil authority in the
18 area of responsibility of the Court."
19 The Prosecutor next contends that there was coordination between
20 the crisis staff and civilian structures with respect to mobilisation and
21 disarmament. Briefly, as we've noted in our brief, the genesis or the
22 origination of the mobilisation order as well as the disarmament order
23 come from structures other than the ARK. P157 was from the Ministry of
24 Defence. That's the general mobilisation. The disarmament, Exhibit P167,
25 came from the regional secretariat for National Defence. The Prosecutor
1 has argued that as part of this disarmament coordination, that there were
2 no efforts ever made, and I take that back. That there were no serious
3 efforts to disarm the Serb paramilitaries. I'm going to ask the Court to
4 review an exchange with Milenko Savic. Milenko Savic, as the Court
5 recalls, was the former police chief in Prnjavor who, to be fair to the
6 Prosecution, left that post in March, April 1992. But he described
7 meetings that he had with Stojan Zupljanin. And at these pages, I've
8 discussed with the Court or given the Court, he discusses that. But there
9 is one passage I would like to read very, very briefly. And this is
10 Mr. Savic's response to the question.
11 "Which paramilitary groups, what ethnicity was the primary focus
12 of these meetings, if you can tell us?"
13 Answer: "We mostly discussed Serb paramilitaries, but we also
14 discussed other paramilitaries composed of other ethnic groups, but which
15 were not within the scope of our municipality. We mostly discussed those
16 that were in our territory, and we discussed what to do with them. That
17 was my biggest problem, my most pronounced problem at the time."
18 With regard to this claim of not doing anything or not doing
19 enough with respect to Serb paramilitaries, again, I'd ask the Court to
20 look at two conclusions: 15 May 1992 conclusion of the crisis staff,
21 which said as follows: "Especially strict measures shall be implemented
22 against any person misusing the uniform and insignia of the TO or the army
23 without authorisation, stopping or checking people's identity or vehicles,
24 searching dwellings or other premises."
25 And there's a conclusion, 18 May 1992, which talks - I'm going to
1 paraphrase - all formations that are not of the VRS or the Banja Luka
2 security service centre must be disarmed. All those not in the armed
3 forces or the police must return their weapons.
4 A final area with respect to the military I'd like to address
5 deals with logistical --
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Reference to the exhibit, please.
7 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Those are both out of 227, Your Honour. I don't
8 have the -- Exhibit P227. I do not have the specific decision numbers,
9 and I can get that for the Court at the break.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
11 MR. CUNNINGHAM: The final area I would like to talk about because
12 it was referenced in the Prosecutor's opening statements back in January
13 2002, they reference the fact that the strategic goals could not have been
14 achieved without the logistical support of the political arm. With
15 respect to this logistical support provided by civilian structures to the
16 Yugoslav People's Army or its successor, this was natural. And this was
17 confirmed by Osman Selak. And I'd like the Court to look at his response
18 which is at page 12907, and it was also confirmed by Mr. Dejanovic from
19 Bosanski Novi who said at page 23246 that the civilian authorities had the
20 obligation to provide logistics support to the military in any situation
21 in which the military was activated.
22 And I gave the Court the wrong page number for Mr. Selak. Can I
23 take that back and give you 13264 to 65.
24 Turning to the question of the police who claim that the police
25 fell under the control of the crisis staff, they argue in part, based on
1 Section 46 of the law of internal affairs, Mr. Ackerman is going to
2 discuss that. With respect to Exhibit P202, I would again point the Court
3 to the testimony of BW-1 as well as Milenko Savic, both of whom testified
4 that P202 worked absolutely no change in the chain of command that had
5 been long established within BiH. And I'd also like to remind the Court
6 that with respect to every witness who had the stature as or position as
7 BT-95, none of those witnesses ever testified that P202 changed the
8 long-standing practice that a civilian structure couldn't order the
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you have the specific references from BW-1 and
11 Milenko Savic's testimony?
12 MR. CUNNINGHAM: I can give it to you at the break, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
14 MR. CUNNINGHAM: The final area that I want to discuss briefly
15 with respect to the police is a claim that is made at paragraph 149 of the
16 Prosecution's brief where the Prosecution argued that Mr. Radojko, again,
17 of Petrovac, gave perhaps the clearest explanation of the reality of the
18 situation; namely, whatever the legal position may or may not have been,
19 the police did carry out certain instructions from the assembly and the
20 crisis staff. What I'd ask the Court to do is to look at the entirety of
21 that testimony, and this is page 20053 through 55. Because to summarise,
22 Mr. Radojko was talking about a unique situation in Petrovac where, after
23 that municipality left the Bihac region and joined the Banja Luka region,
24 there was no regional control from the CSB. So in that situation, he
25 said: "In a certain period" - and this is at page 20054 - "in a certain
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 period, there was a transitional period where the functions were being
2 transferred from one region to another. Our police remained without any
3 real, any kind of real control from a regional centre, and it was
4 effectively without a functional administration."
5 And it's in those situations, in that situation, where the police
6 acted on orders from the municipality.
7 Final area that I want to discuss, Your Honours, is the
8 defendant's actions after the termination of the ARK Crisis Staff because
9 the Prosecution alleges that he was still part of the JCE and contributed
10 to his actions. Briefly, I'd like to remind the Court that in July of
11 1992, his efforts with respect to the Muslim population in Celinac, I'd
12 like to remind the Court again of what his secretary, Drenkja Beric
13 testified as to what his routine was in the two months that she worked for
14 him. That's July through September of 1992. And to summarise her
15 testimony, she testified that during that time period, he attempted to
16 assist people of all three nations, treated all three nations -- people
17 from all three nations the same and did his best to help Muslims in
18 acquiring housing.
19 Mr. Ackerman's going to talk about some of his actions at the
20 Ministry of Housing but I'd like to remind the Court that while there,
21 through the testimony of Boro Mandic, he insisted that the rule of law be
22 applied. And as cited in our brief, he issued documents which attacked,
23 in effect, police officers and VRS officers who were attempting to acquire
24 apartments, either through force or by way of squatting.
25 In the final exhibit with respect to the claim that Mr. Brdjanin
1 is still marching in lockstep with the SDS leadership is Exhibit P2484.
2 This is from the Assembly of the 23rd of November 1992. And I'd like to
3 have the Court look at that exhibit, and I briefly want to summarise some
4 things that are important in this. Mr. Brdjanin begins his speech by
5 saying the following: "Krajisnik has asked to have at least a minimum of
6 respect for dignity, and I agree to that." Mr. Brdjanin continues: "I
7 had a very unpleasant conversation with Mr. Karadzic, and I did not even
8 think of answering him." And during the course of this speech he makes,
9 Mr. Brdjanin suggests that the Serb Democratic Party is the long arm of
10 the communist party. He criticises the party; criticises war profiteers.
11 And I think it's especially instructive for the Court when you look at
12 this exhibit, P2484, is to see how Mr. Krajisnik reacts as the speaker of
13 the assembly. He gives Mr. Brdjanin a chance to back off his statements
14 that are critical of the party, and Mr. Brdjanin does not.
15 That's important because I think it still shows one of the themes
16 that we've seen throughout Mr. Brdjanin's relationship with Pale within --
17 with the upper echelons of the SDS, as that is -- in many, many occasions,
18 on many, many different issues, he was totally at odds with them. That
19 concludes my remarks. I thank the Chamber for the opportunity to address
20 you, and I'll turn the lectern over to Mr. Ackerman.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honours, we have --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: -- come a long way together. Sometimes that
25 journey we have done has been an easy one and most often it has been a
1 hard one. There have been bumps in this road that we have travelled, and
2 there were times when I wondered, and I suppose you wondered, if we would
3 ever make it to this day. But we did. We did make it. And I think we've
4 made it here very well. I think we were careful along the way to try to
5 make sure that this was a fair trial.
6 During this journey, Your Honours, I was mostly struck in a role
7 as observer, I suppose, by how Your Honours invariably followed the
8 evidence so closely and paid such close attention, and how you were so
9 much involved in the evidence in this case. And I say that from having
10 experience in a case where one of the Judges slept through a great deal of
11 the case. And I appreciate that none of you did that. We don't have to
12 raise that issue on appeal.
13 When you questioned witnesses, you asked good questions. And I
14 don't -- I think the Prosecutor would join me. I don't think we could
15 have asked for a more attentive Trial Chamber. And for that, I know all
16 of us are grateful.
17 I want to begin by making it clear, Your Honours, that the
18 argument that I will make to you today is solely for your benefit. I'm
19 not speaking to Banja Luka; I'm not speaking to Belgrade; I'm not speaking
20 to anyone but you. As far as I'm concerned, they could turn off the
21 television that goes out from here because I have no interest in my
22 remarks going beyond this Trial Chamber. You're the people who I want to
23 hear what I have to say today.
24 I want to begin just very briefly talking a bit about the
25 challenge to the indictment that was raised in our brief. The Prosecution
1 responded to that challenge basically saying that it wouldn't be fair for
2 us to make that challenge now because we didn't raise the issue earlier.
3 And if we thought the indictment was not sufficient, we should have made
4 that clear at an earlier date. It's not the burden of the Defence, Your
5 Honour, to perfect the indictment. That's the burden of the Prosecution.
6 The Prosecution is correct that we do have a burden to raise the issue.
7 We did that. We raised the issue. We got a favourable ruling that
8 clearly instructed the Prosecutor as to its obligations. Once we raise
9 the issue and get that favourable ruling, I believe we have no obligation
10 to go beyond that. It then becomes the burden of the Prosecution to
11 follow those orders and to abide by that ruling.
12 To understand exactly what I'm talking about, we have to start
13 with the decision of this Trial Chamber on the objections raised by
14 Radoslav Brdjanin to the form of the indictment. The Prosecution was
15 ordered to file a further amended indictment which, (a), complies with the
16 pleading principles discussed in Sections 4 and 5 of the Talic decision;
17 and (b), pleads as material facts the precise role of the accused and the
18 nature of the accused's individual criminal responsibility. That's in
19 paragraph 18 of that order.
20 According to the Oxford English Reference Dictionary, material
21 means "important, essential, or relevant." In other words, the
22 Prosecution must plead the important, essential, and relevant facts of its
23 case. The order of Trial Chamber II is not ambiguous. To understand what
24 that order means when it talks about -- when it refers the Prosecutor to
25 Sections 4 and 5 of the Talic decision of 20 February 2001, we can look at
1 that. With regard to superior responsibility, the Chamber said: "In a
2 case based upon superior responsibility, what is most material is the
3 relationship between the accused and the others who did the acts for which
4 he is alleged to be responsible, and the conduct of the accused by which
5 he may be found to have known or had reason to know that the acts were
6 about to be done or had been done by those others, and to have failed to
7 take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
8 punish the persons who did them."
9 That's paragraph 19. With regard to individual responsibility,
10 the Chamber said: "In a case based upon individual responsibility where
11 it is not alleged that the accused personally did the acts for which he is
12 to be held responsible, where the accused is being placed in greater
13 proximity to the acts of other persons for which he is alleged to be
14 responsible, then he is, for superior responsibility." Again, what is
15 most material is the conduct of the accused by which he may be found to
16 have planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and
17 abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of those acts. But
18 more precision is required in relation to the material facts relating to
19 those acts of other persons than is required for an allegation of superior
21 The Prosecution -- the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber decision then
22 came down following these orders where the Kupreskic Appeals Chamber
23 basically followed the position that had been taken in this case by Trial
24 Chamber II. That case stood for the following: "It is, of course,
25 possible that an indictment may not plead the material facts with the
1 requisite degree of specificity because the necessary information is not
2 in the Prosecution's possession. However, in such a situation, doubt must
3 arise as to whether it is fair to the accused for the trial to proceed.
4 In this connection, the Appeals Chamber emphasises that the Prosecution's
5 expected to know its case before it goes to trial. It is not acceptable
6 for the Prosecution to omit the material aspects of its main allegations
7 in the indictment with the aim of moulding the case against the accused in
8 the course of the trial depending on how the evidence unfolds."
9 Now, Your Honours, that's exactly what the Prosecution has done in
10 this case. In addition to the matters that we cited in the main brief,
11 consider the matter of Mr. Brdjanin's speeches and statements. The
12 Prosecution can't claim regarding those statements and speeches that they
13 were not in their possession at the time of the indictment. That cannot
14 be an excuse for failing to plead the speeches and statements as material
15 facts, but they did fail to plead it. If you look in the indictment,
16 you'll not find one word that the speeches and statements of Mr. Brdjanin
17 were a material fact that they were alleging against him. Not one. And
18 yet, their entire closing brief in this case relies very heavily on them.
19 I will admit that they spoke of them in their opening statement,
20 and I'll admit that they spoke of them in their Pre-Trial Brief. But
21 that's two and a half years, Your Honour, after the indictment -- the
22 initial indictment in this case. Two and a half years passed with
23 numerous amendments to this indictment, and never did the Prosecution
24 allege as a material fact that they were relying on Mr. Brdjanin's
25 speeches, two and a half years in which investigation could have been
1 carried out regarding those allegations and was not. Is this fair? Is
2 this justice? I think not.
3 I now want to talk about some of the things that the Prosecution
4 told you in their final argument. One of the things that has been an
5 issue in this case almost throughout is that meeting of the assembly on
6 May 12th of 1992 where Dragan Kalinic addressed the assembly, and then
7 several speakers later Mr. Brdjanin responds. The Prosecutor wants you to
8 believe and accept that what Mr. Brdjanin was responding to and saying
9 that he agreed with was Mr. Kalinic's words as follows: "Among all the
10 issues this assembly should decide on, the most important one is this:
11 Have we chosen the option of war or the option of negotiation? I say this
12 with a reason, and I must instantly add, knowing who other enemies are,
13 how perfidious they are, how they cannot be trusted until they are
14 physically and militarily destroyed and crushed, which of course implies
15 liquidating and eliminating their key people," and he goes on to say "he
16 doesn't hesitate to choose the first option."
17 Now, if Mr. Brdjanin is agreeing with that statement, then he is
18 agreeing that the option is not negotiation but war. That's clear. But
19 what is it that Mr. Brdjanin says at the very end of his remarks? He
20 says: "That is why in the negotiations, that is why in the negotiations
21 we can ask for this corridor in exchange for some parts that are not
22 important for us. And should it come to the worst, the corridor even if
23 only buswide, will have to be established by military means." And he says
24 "that will be all. Thank you." So he doesn't accept that war is the
25 option; he accepts that negotiation is. And he says in the negotiations
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 here's what we should do. So it's some other part of that Kalinic speech,
2 and there are many parts to it that he must be agreeing with.
3 The Prosecutor discussed the issue of credibility of witnesses.
4 We've really not talked about that in our briefs, and I don't intend to
5 spend very much time on it in my argument today. As I said at the
6 beginning, we've observed that Your Honours have paid very careful
7 attention to the witnesses, to their demeanour, to the way they answered
8 their questions, to the consistency or inconsistency of their testimonies
9 and statements. And all those things you observed, and I'm sure noted at
10 the time, I believe very little would be served by retracing that ground
11 except to the limited extent that I have done so in our brief and may do
12 so on occasion in these remarks.
13 Crisis staff minutes. The Prosecutor has talked at length about
14 crisis staff minutes. First of all, I would suggest that it would be
15 totally inappropriate for Your Honours to draw any conclusions from the
16 fact that they're missing, from the fact that the Prosecution has failed
17 to produce them. You should not draw any conclusion from that at all.
18 It's a non-issue in this case. Mr. Cunningham read you that part from the
19 Sanska Unska document which indicates that maybe minutes weren't really
20 being kept. At least, maybe up until that time. But I can tell you this:
21 You heard us on more than one occasion ask witnesses if they knew where
22 those minutes were, if they could please try to find them. We would
23 really love to have them. And if they exist, we would like to have them
24 here, Your Honour. And the same is true for the minutes of the crisis
25 staff in Celinac, because we suggest to you those minutes would -- well, I
1 will not suggest what they would show. I can only say about that that the
2 Prosecution has not proved that Mr. Brdjanin attended even one meeting of
3 that Celinac Crisis Staff.
4 The Prosecutor spoke at length to you about missing documents and
5 suggested you could draw certain inferences from the fact that documents
6 were missing from various municipalities. I suggest with regard to all
7 the missing documents that no inference can be drawn from the failure of
8 the Prosecution to produce them in aid of their case. The only way you
9 could do that is if you could infer that the documents really did exist,
10 that they really were available, and the Prosecution did not bring them.
11 Then I think the law is that you can then infer that they would have been
12 helpful to the Defence if the Prosecution didn't bring them and they were
13 available. But there's no evidence that they were available, so that
14 would not even be a permissible inference.
15 The Prosecution suggested that one thing you could infer from the
16 fact that these documents were missing was that they would have been able
17 to prove a great, higher level of implementation had they been able to get
18 their hands on these documents. That's also an inference you cannot make.
19 It's pure speculation. As Mr. Cunningham pointed out to you yesterday,
20 the nonimplementation rate by Mr. Treanor's calculations, if you calculate
21 them properly, is 96.4 per cent.
22 The variant A/B document, this is it. It's P25. The Prosecutor
23 spoke about this at length. First of all, the Prosecutor said to you it
24 was issued by the main board of the SDS. I don't know that there's any
25 evidence of that. If you look at the document itself, the issuing
1 authority according to the document on the last page, page 8, is the SDS
2 Crisis Staff, an organisation otherwise unknown to the record in this
3 case. It's noteworthy, I think, we think, that this document is not
4 directed to any regional organisations, but directly to municipalities.
5 We believe it's clear that the provisions of this document, in fact, were
6 implemented in many of the municipalities. It's also clear that this had
7 no connection and nothing to do with the ARK Crisis Staff. There may have
8 been, Your Honour, joint criminal enterprises going on, but we think they
9 may have been multiple, a separate enterprise going on in each
10 municipality. And certainly in no case was the accused part of any of
11 those joint criminal enterprises. There was no such enterprise
12 functioning at the level of ARK.
13 Throughout her remarks, the Prosecutor kept talking to you and
14 suggesting to you that matters were not raised in the final brief of the
15 accused. This has absolutely no legal significance at all. The plea of
16 the accused in this case is not guilty. This places the burden solely
17 upon the Prosecution to prove each and every one of its allegations beyond
18 a reasonable doubt. It's not a relief from that burden that the Defence
19 fails to contest some matter in its final brief. Everything not admitted
20 by the Defence is contested by the Defence, and that's the law.
21 Exhibit P251, Ms. Korner tells you that this document shows that
22 Brdjanin was thinking just like Karadzic regarding annihilation of the
23 Muslims. I suggest to you it's anything but that. He's suggesting that
24 they work together with the Muslims to solve the economic problems of the
25 region by removing the blockade of the corridor to Serbia. All you have
1 to do is look at the document. Now, of course one problem with this
2 document is we have no idea where it came from. It's just a piece of
3 newsprint. We don't know what publication it's from. But setting that
4 aside, Brdjanin talks about power shortages which have brought the overall
5 economy to the verge of collapse. He talks about households that have
6 electricity for only two or three hours a day. It talks about how the
7 citizens of Banja Luka may move relatively safely and without fear of
8 provocations in a radius of about 40 kilometres in all four directions.
9 Brdjanin deems it indispensable to secure a corridor through the northern
10 part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia which would be equally a way to
11 the world for the Serbs and the Muslims from the Cazin and Bihac Krajinas.
12 If we do not manage to resolve the issue of annexing Krajina to Serbia
13 peacefully, we shall literally have to resort to war, says Brdjanin. In
14 that case, the Muslim and Croat people will have to pay the price, because
15 they are precisely on the charted route of the future road. He's talking
16 about the corridor. He's talking about it having been blocked by Croatian
17 and Muslim forces preventing access to Serbia.
18 It goes on to say that Brdjanin think that is the most efficient
19 solution is agreement between the warring parties on lifting the blockade
20 on the road via Tuzla and Bijeljina for, according to him, wars have been
21 waged so far for corridors. And if no agreement is reached, a corridor
22 will be breached toward Belgrade sooner or later. In that context, he
23 believes that Fikret Abdic, a Muslim, could be a major asset in the
24 negotiations as he could bring influence to bear on extremists from the
25 Cazin Krajina and negotiate with the central authorities in Sarajevo.
1 This is nothing like the Karadzic speeches about annihilation.
2 I want to talk briefly about assembly speeches. Ms. Korner was
3 quoting the assembly speeches of numerous persons in her remarks on
4 Monday. They were from Exhibit P20, the 15 October 1991 assembly meeting.
5 One of the things this Chamber must bear in mind, which Ms. Korner
6 overlooks, is that in an assembly such as the one she is talking about, or
7 in any legislature in the world, people rise and speak and make proposals.
8 What they say is not policy. What people say in those sessions is their
9 ideas of what policy should be, what they would like it to be. But what
10 they say is not policy. And when Ms. Korner refers you to these
11 statements, she is suggesting to you that this is policy of the SDS. This
12 is policy of the assembly. And until it is shown that a proposal by a
13 member has been adopted and put into effect by that assembly, it's not
14 policy at all. It's just a speech. And that's all it is. And it has no
15 other significance.
16 Because someone makes a speech does not make it policy. And I
17 will discuss some of Mr. Brdjanin's speeches that were ignored by the
18 assembly, not adopted by the assembly.
19 The Prosecution -- well, Mr. Cunningham has already discussed
20 this, so I don't think I'll spend time doing that.
21 In Monday's remarks, Ms. Korner is talking about I believe it's
22 the Djeric document. And she says this. This is on -- the time signature
23 is 12:55:31 on Monday. "Your Honour, that is why we say, even though the
24 April instructions themselves specifically don't say "regional crisis
25 staff," it is absolutely clear on the evidence that the SDS intended and
1 did establish a regional crisis staff." It's not absolutely clear on the
2 evidence. In fact, there's no evidence at all that the SDS established a
3 regional crisis staff. It's absolutely not clear on the evidence. In
4 fact, the thing that I think is significant is that the Autonomous Region
5 of Krajina was not the only autonomous region. But it's the only one in
6 which there's any evidence that there was ever a crisis staff. And if
7 there was some SDS policy to set up crisis staffs in all the regions, I
8 think we would have heard about crisis staffs in other regions, but we did
10 Mr. Brdjanin's signatures on documents. The Prosecution wants you
11 to believe that it makes no difference whether Mr. Brdjanin signed
12 documents or not. If his name appears on them, it's good enough, as far
13 as the Prosecution is concerned. And we respectfully disagree with that.
14 We believe that one of two things must happen before a document and its
15 contents can be attributed to Mr. Brdjanin. The Prosecution must either
16 prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his signature appears on the
17 document, or prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he specifically
18 authorised another person to sign it on his behalf. With the exception of
19 about three documents, the Prosecution has proved neither of those things.
20 You'll remember at the beginning of the case, the Prosecutor was
21 distressed that we were denying that the signatures on the documents were
22 Mr. Brdjanin's. And then additionally distressed when we refused to
23 supply handwriting exemplars, and when this Court upheld that refusal. So
24 when it became apparent that they were not going to be able to prove that
25 Mr. Brdjanin signed those documents, they then began to treat it as
1 unimportant. But I suggest to you that it is singularly important.
2 The Prosecutor wants you to accept their assertion that there was
3 a plan to kill the Muslims and Croats of the Krajina. They fail, however,
4 to explain to you why it was that when thousands of Croats and Muslims
5 from the Krajina were put into various detention facilities by people who
6 had lots of guns and lots of bullets, these people were not all killed.
7 If the plan was to kill the Muslims and Croats, that was the opportunity
8 to do it. But the vast majority of those people were released from those
9 camps, exchanged from those camps. There are notable and horrible
10 exceptions where people were killed. But the vast majority were not.
11 Exhibit P185 are conclusions from the ARK Crisis Staff meeting of
12 11 May 1992. And this deals with a couple of issues. The first of those:
13 "The deadline for surrender of the illegally acquired weapons is hereby
14 extended to 2400 hours on 14 May 1992." The Prosecution suggests to you
15 that the whole issue of disarmament was a pretext for attacking the
16 villages in the various municipalities, and that the whole idea of
17 disarmament was it was only directed to Muslims and Croats. Now, why, if
18 what you're doing is setting up a pretext, do you extend the deadline? It
19 makes no sense. It makes no sense that you would do that.
20 The other thing that -- I'll come to it later.
21 Article 46 of the Law on Internal Affairs. This is a giant red
22 herring, Your Honour. I had thought that the Prosecution had abandoned
23 this, but it came up again in argument. Article 46 does not say what the
24 Prosecution has been suggesting it says. Poor Mr. Sadikovic. He was led
25 into agreeing with them about it. I mean, he wanted to help them any way
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 he could. And I don't blame him. The Serbs had treated him badly. And
2 he wouldn't mind getting a bit of revenge if he could. So he was led into
3 a position where he agreed that in emergencies things were different, and
4 Article 46 gave extraordinary powers to civil authorities over the police.
5 It does exactly the opposite. Exactly the opposite. Any lawyer reading
6 it will understand that. Listen. "In the discharge of duties and
7 responsibilities to protect the constitutional order, the lives and
8 personal safety of people, to protect property from destruction, damage,
9 and theft, to maintain law and order and the safety of road traffic, as
10 well as in the event of general danger caused by natural disasters,
11 epidemics, and so forth, the minister" - that's the minister of the
12 interior, MUP - "the minister or his authorised representative or, in
13 emergencies, other authorised officers" - meaning persons authorised by
14 the minister - "may issue special orders to citizens, enterprises, and
15 other legal entities." In other words, what that's saying is that in
16 these kinds of emergencies, the minister of the interior may designate
17 persons, probably police, but may designate persons to issue orders in
18 special circumstances. In other words, the police could order the crisis
19 staff to do things under this. Not the other way around. Absolutely not.
20 All of these calls for disarmament, if you read them, each one of
21 them, every time says "enforce the law." "Enforce the law." Gather up
22 illegally held weapons. Gather up illegally held ammunition. They're
23 asking that the law be enforced. The Prosecution suggests otherwise, but
24 must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The police officer out there
25 enforcing the law, the police officer out there in his car, the police
1 officer out there on his beat receives an order to gather up illegally
2 held weapons and ammunition. Where is the evidence in this case of anyone
3 suggesting to the police officers who were supposed to carry out these
4 orders that they really don't mean what they say? Now, Mr. Police
5 officer, please understand that this order saying all illegally held
6 weapons, but we really don't mean that. There's no evidence of that, of
7 those officers being so instructed. None at all. What they get is an
8 order to gather up illegally held weapons. And I suggest that's what they
9 tried to do.
10 On Tuesday, Ms. Korner showed you some charts. P2650 showed the
11 distribution of killings. P2648 showed the distribution of exhumations.
12 P2649 showed the distribution of camps. P2647 showed the distribution of
13 religious property destruction. I urge you to look at those again because
14 they are striking. One of the striking features is the virtual forest
15 that you will see in the municipalities west of Banja Luka. Every one of
16 them. It looks like a forest of markers in those municipalities that we
17 have called the renegade municipalities. But what is more striking, I
18 suggest, and very telling in terms of this case is the virtual absence of
19 markings in Banja Luka and Celinac, especially Celinac. If there's one
20 municipality in the Krajina where Mr. Brdjanin had influence, it was
21 Celinac. But if you look, there are virtually no killings. The Sugic
22 brothers the exception. No exhumations. No camps. Two religious
23 structures. Now, if Brdjanin was the leader of some genocidal campaign as
24 the Prosecution tries to convince you, wouldn't you expect him to try to
25 set an example in the municipality where he at least had some significant
2 On the contrary. It appears that he was able to prevent as long
3 as he was there, until he went off to the ARK Crisis Staff. He was able
4 to prevent extreme activities in Celinac, and to a lesser extent in Banja
5 Luka. Where he had no significant influence, things were terrible, west
6 of Banja Luka, up there in Kotor Varos.
7 Prosecution Exhibit P2356, this is the Drljaca document
8 establishing Omarska and talking about the secrecy with which that should
9 be treated. The Prosecution says, well, no, it really wasn't all that
10 secret because look at the distribution list. And I want you to look at
11 the distribution list, because the distribution list is really, really
12 important. It went to the Prijedor Crisis Staff. It went to the security
13 services coordinators, Mijic, Jesic, and Lieutenant Colonel Majstorovic.
14 It went to the Security Services Centre in Banja Luka, his immediate
15 superior. He was probably required to send it to them. It went to the
16 police chief, which is him. It went to the security chief who works for
17 him. It went to the general manager of the iron ore mines which is where
18 they were setting up the camp, so they probably needed to know about it.
19 And a copy went to the files.
20 Where was there not a copy sent? To the Autonomous Region of
21 Krajina. To the ARK Crisis Staff. No copy went there. The most powerful
22 civilian organ in the ARK, according to the Prosecution, was not sent a
23 copy of this. That's significant. And I think -- I've not had time to go
24 through and look at everything, but I think if you look at the
25 distribution lists of other documents in this case, nothing went to the
1 ARK Crisis Staff. Nothing.
2 P2356, this was talked about yesterday --
3 JUDGE AGIUS: This is the same document, isn't it? Because the
4 previous one, what you described, the Drljaca document on Omarska, is --
5 you told us was P2356.
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, it's not. That's the wrong number. It's --
7 JUDGE AGIUS: That's why I'm pointing this out. You know, I mean,
8 it's a good thing that Ms. Korner did not stand up and accuse you of
9 trying to mislead the Trial Chamber.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: P1267. I deserve that remark, too. Thank you.
11 P2356 was referred to by Ms. Korner yesterday. And it's a
12 document we don't know the date of issued by -- says it was issued by Miro
13 Mladjenovic, I think. It says "Mradjenovic," but I think it's probably
14 Mladjenovic from the association of Bosanska Krajina Municipalities. And
15 it talks about some statements made by Mr. Brdjanin. And she said this is
16 significant in showing that Mr. Brdjanin agreed with Mr. Karadzic about
17 various matters. If you look at the document, Your Honour, it has nothing
18 to do with the Krajina. This is early. This is when the war is going on
19 in Croatia. And Mr. Brdjanin begins his remarks with this: "Due to the
20 new situation in Okucani, that's Croatia, and Stara Gradiska, that's
21 Croatia, where the army had to retreat under order to its positions and
22 the Serbian people in Okucani have remained in Ustasha encirclement we
23 demand..." And he's demanding a mobilisation, a preparation to defend
24 the border, and assistance to the Serbian people that are surrounded up
25 there. And he says we have no right to leave the Serbian people in
1 Croatia to the mercy of the Ustasha warriors for our grandfathers would
2 curse us and our grandchildren would be ashamed of us. That refers
3 directly back to what had happened during World War II where the Serbian
4 people were left to the mercy of the Ustasha, and we can't let that happen
5 again. Nothing to do with ARK, nothing to do with the Krajina. Only with
6 regard to what was happening across the border in Croatia.
7 Yesterday, Ms. Korner talked about the role that Mr. Brdjanin
8 played in Celinac. The evidence shows that when he became president of
9 the ARK Crisis Staff, he effectively left Celinac and had virtually
10 nothing to do with events there after that. The minutes of the - and I'm
11 sorry, I don't have the exact cite for you - but the minutes of the
12 Celinac Assembly at one point talk about someone taking his place because
13 he doesn't come to meetings any more. The records do indicate that he was
14 made a member of the crisis staff, but as I mentioned there's no
15 indication at all that he ever attended a meeting. Ms. Korner referred to
16 Exhibit P1981 for the proposition that by the end of April, 770 Muslims
17 had left Celinac. And I suggest that that simply cannot be true. It
18 cannot be true that 770 Muslims had left Celinac by the end of April
19 because there were 1.860 Muslims still there in April -- in August, which
20 was basically the entire Muslim community in Celinac.
21 She spoke of a speech that Brdjanin made at the end of August in
22 1992 saying that this tells you about his intent. He says in that speech:
23 "Those who are not loyal are free to go" - speaking of Muslim and Croats.
24 Free to go. Not "must leave." Not "will be expelled." But
25 "free to go." If you believe the Muslim witnesses from Banja Luka,
1 virtually everyone had already left by the end of August in any event. I
2 think Krzic says that most of the Muslims left by May, which I suggest is
3 simply not the case. I think the Muslims left Banja Luka in 1995, and
4 there's evidence of that.
5 I want to finally talk about that 1993 speech that we saw the tape
6 of again yesterday, which the Prosecution concedes is 1993 and couldn't
7 have any effect upon any of the offences alleged in this case. I think
8 that speech is not nearly as clear as to what Mr. Brdjanin means as the
9 Prosecution would like you to believe. If you listen to it carefully,
10 before he makes the remark about non-Christian scum, he talks about the
11 leftists and what the leftists are trying to do. Now, the leftists are
12 communists. That's who the leftists are. And it may very well be when he
13 speaks about non-Christian scum, he's speaking about the communists and
14 what the leftists, the communists, are trying to do. Never does he say
15 anything about Muslims by name. And certainly communists could, in many
16 places, be described as non-Christian because in many places they not only
17 prohibited religion, they destroyed religious buildings.
18 I want to say just one thing about implementation and
19 Mr. Brdjanin's speeches. These tend to be the kind of two big issues that
20 are before you. We get into little traps occasionally where we get so
21 focussed on implementation that we begin to believe that that's the issue.
22 We begin to believe if there was implementation, then the Prosecution has
23 proved the case; and if there was not, they haven't. But I suggest to you
24 that's not the case. If you look at all of the conclusions and decisions
25 of the ARK Crisis Staff, you don't see any conclusions or decisions
1 demanding the commission of an offence. You don't see any decisions or
2 conclusions demanding ethnic cleansing. You don't see any decisions or
3 conclusions suggesting killings, beatings, murders, tortures, or any of
4 those things. If every one of the ARK Crisis Staff conclusions and
5 decisions had been implemented in every one of the municipalities and
6 nothing more, no crimes would have been committed. None. None.
7 The other thing we get into, if the Prosecution can prove that
8 Mr. Brdjanin made some of the speeches and statements that he is alleged
9 to have made, then he must be guilty. If they can't prove it, then he's
10 not. That's another rabbit trail. They have to go way beyond that he
11 made speeches. They have to prove to you that those were heard. They
12 have to prove to you that those had an effect. They have to prove to you
13 that people did things because of those speeches. Look at that forest on
14 those charts west of Banja Luka. They have not proved that anybody out
15 there ever heard Mr. Brdjanin ever say anything. That's where the bad
16 things happened. So those two myths need to be exploded.
17 And that's what I have to say about the Prosecutor's arguments to
18 you. I now want to tell you the 50 things that the Prosecution wants you
19 to ignore. 50 things they want you to pay no attention to. And for good
20 reason. The first thing the Prosecution wants you to pay no attention to,
21 Your Honours, is Exhibit DB271. It's a significant part of the
22 Prosecution's case that people were dismissed because of their ethnicity.
23 Civil and military. DB271, 16 July 1992, document issued by
24 Colonel General Ratko Mladic addressed to among other places, the 1st
25 Krajina Corps, says this: "All officers of Muslim or Croatian nationality
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 who are judged by the commands of corps and independent units to have
2 proved themselves in combat action and who want to sign the oath and give
3 a written statement that they accept citizenship of the Serbian Republic
4 of Bosnia and Herzegovina may remain in active military service in the
5 Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Not ethnicity,
6 loyalty. There's not an army in the world that would keep someone who is
7 disloyal, who is on the other side of the conflict, who is working as a
8 spy in your midst. But the issue is not what your nationality is; it's
9 what your loyalty is.
10 Now, they want you to ignore that because if you don't, it can
11 raise a reasonable doubt, and you might have to find Mr. Brdjanin not
12 guilty. So you say, well, this was sent to the 1st Krajina Corps, but it
13 didn't have any impact there. DB272, three days later, 19 July, a
14 document signed by General Talic marked "urgent" repeats the language.
15 "All officers of Muslim and Croatian nationality who in the opinion of the
16 brigade commands, independent units and corps command, for headquarters
17 support units have proved themselves in combat action who want to sign the
18 solemn declaration and a written statement that they will take on the
19 nationality of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina may remain in
20 active military service." And we know that some did. I think you'll
21 recall Naum Golic telling you that when he was serving, he was serving
22 under a Croat officer. His commander was a Croat.
23 They want you to ignore DB284. They want you to ignore DB284
24 because it shows that the paramilitaries that they were trying to disarm
25 were Serb paramilitaries. It's a 1st Krajina Corps document dated 30 July
1 1992, refers to disarmament of paramilitary units. It says this:
2 "Paramilitary formations are present in the areas of responsibility of all
3 corps, and they are mostly behind the lines of combat operations in the
4 rear and in populated areas. They rarely enter areas of combat
5 operations, and then most often behind SRBH army units as they liberate
6 territory and settlements with looting as their principal motive."
7 The order after that preamble, it goes on, it says this: "Offer
8 all paramilitary formations and their leaders, if they do honestly intend
9 to serve the rightful struggle for survival of the Serbian people, an
10 opportunity to join the regular SRBH army units and assign them in
11 accordance with their military occupational specialties and military
12 skills." These are clearly Serb paramilitary units. "Do not include in
13 units individuals and groups which have been involved in crimes and
14 looting or have committed other criminal acts. Disarm and arrest them and
15 bring criminal charges against them in SRBH army courts regardless of
16 their citizenship. In cooperation with SRBH MUP, disarm and arrest
17 paramilitary formations, groups, and individuals belonging to them who
18 refuse to come under the unified command of the SRBH Army and bring
19 criminal charges against them corresponding to the criminal acts they
20 committed. I forbid the existence of any paramilitary units, groups, and
21 individuals in the territory of the SRBH. By 15 August 1992 at the
22 latest, disarm all paramilitary formations and submit a detailed report on
24 They want you to ignore that because that could raise a reasonable
25 doubt and might cause you to have to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
1 P1261. P1261 is a conclusion from the Prijedor Crisis Staff
2 signed by its chairman, Dr. Milan Kovacevic. "The Crisis Staff of
3 Prijedor Municipality does not accept and considers invalid all decisions
4 by the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina adopted before 22
5 June 1992." Now, Your Honours, that's all of them with the exception of
6 about two or three. That's the whole body. This shows the municipalities
7 were operating independently. It shows the effect of Article 35 of the
8 ARK statute that municipalities knew that they didn't have to follow ARK
9 Crisis Staff decisions. And most important, it shows that absolutely
10 nothing happened to people who ignored the ARK Crisis Staff, contrary to
11 the Prosecutor's contention that people would be dismissed, which is a
12 bizarre contention. These were people who were elected to their positions
13 by the people. That anyone had the power to dismiss someone who was
14 elected by the people is a stretch for which there's absolutely no
16 The Prosecutor deals with this by causing it -- calling it an odd
17 document. Any document that disagrees with their theory of the case, I
18 guess, is an odd document. They want you to ignore this because it raises
19 a reasonable doubt and might cause you to have to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
20 On 30 January 2002, way back in ancient history when we started
21 this case, Mr. Cayley is examining Dr. Robert Donia. Mr. Cayley says:
22 "Now, you state" - and this is page 1111 [Realtime transcript read in
23 error "111"] of the transcript - "now you state in your report that on the
24 15th of April 1992, TO units in Muslim-led municipalities were placed
25 under a unified command and became the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
1 And then there's a break, and then he asks:
2 "Just referring briefly to the region of the Krajina, from your knowledge,
3 if you can answer this question, how effective was the Bosnian Army in
4 that area?"
5 Donia says: "I don't really think there was a Bosnian Army per se
6 in the Krajina. It was really these local TO units which were poorly
7 armed, and its effectiveness was very low." Mr. Cayley: "But you do
8 state that the Bosnian Army had the advantage in terms of manpower. Is
9 that correct?" Answer: "It appears that at this time, yes, they did.
10 The Prosecution wants you to ignore that because that could raise
11 a reasonable doubt and cause you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
12 Let's look at Dr. Donia again. This time, page 1245, this time
13 during cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman. Question: "One of the -- one
14 of the announced justifications for the formation of ZOBK and then ARK was
15 that there was a contention by persons in the Krajina area that the
16 concentration of economic resources in Sarajevo was causing the area to be
17 economically neglected." Dr. Donia says: "Yes." The Prosecution wants
18 you to ignore that because that could raise a reasonable doubt and cause
19 you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
20 Number 7: Dr. Donia again. Page 1246, question by Mr. Ackerman:
21 "It is not your contention, is it, that this whole concept of
22 regionalisation was something that was invented by and emanated from the
23 main board of the SDS?" Answer: "No, it's not." No. Prosecution wants
24 you to ignore that because that could raise a reasonable doubt in your
25 minds and cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
1 I'll continue, Your Honour, with number 8 after the break.
2 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Your Honour, can I just note a correction for the
3 exhibit dealing with Mr. Drljaca's statement regarding camps. That's
4 Exhibit P1237.
5 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. One small thing that has been pointed out to
7 me. For the record, page 32 of the transcript, line 4, I clearly
8 recollect Mr. Ackerman referring to transcript page 1111. In the
9 transcript, we have three ones, not four. So that stands to be corrected.
10 This is when Mr. Cayley was putting questions to Dr. Donia who was
11 answering them. Thank you.
12 We'll have a break resuming at -- Mr. Ackerman, do you have any
13 problems with concluding today, you think?
14 MR. ACKERMAN: No, no problem, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We'll resume at 5 to 11.00. Thank you.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Number 8, Mr. Ackerman.
19 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, thanks to the usher, I now have
20 the mother of all podiums, and I'll be able to beat on it without fear of
21 breaking it when I get down to the end of my argument.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: You can always blame it on others. So let's go
24 MR. ACKERMAN: Ms. Korner reminded me during the break that I had
25 misquoted the exhibit regarding Muslim leaving Celinac. She says that the
1 exhibit says that "by April, there were only 770 Muslims left in Celinac."
2 By April of 1993, well, then, let's just forget the whole thing. All
3 right. There will be more to say about that, then, as we get down through
4 this list.
5 Let's go to number 8 of the 50 things that the Prosecution wants
6 you to ignore. This is the testimony of Boro Blagojevic at page 21709 on
7 29 October 2003, examined by Mr. Cunningham. Question: "I understand
8 that you're not currently affiliated with a political party, but were you
9 ever affiliated with the SDS?" "No. I have never been a member of the
11 So one of the perhaps two employees of the Autonomous Region of
12 Krajina was not even a member of the SDS. The Prosecution wants you to
13 ignore that because it might raise a reasonable doubt and cause you to
14 find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
15 Mr. Predrag Radic, page 21977, 3 November 2003, examined by
16 Mr. Ackerman. "The crisis staff in relation to the army, did Mr. Brdjanin
17 or the crisis staff itself exercise any control of any kind over the
18 army?" Answer: "Nobody but the presidency or the first figure of the
19 presidency could exert any influence over the army or the police. Nobody
20 had that power. I would like to remind this Honourable Chamber that not
21 before the war, not during the war, not even today civilian organs have
22 had any influence on the army. Not even today when there is a mayor of
23 Banja Luka, that person cannot issue any orders to the police. All he can
24 do is issue a request which is then forwarded to the Ministry of the
25 Interior, and then it's the Ministry of the Interior which issues an
1 implementation order. This question has already been put to me, whether
2 Brdjanin was in the position to issue orders to the police or to the army,
3 and I answered then and I'm answering now that no, he was never in that
4 position. He was never in the position to issue any order to any military
6 Question: "And your answer also includes the police? I think
7 you've included both the police and the military in your answer, that
8 neither Brdjanin nor the ARK Crisis Staff had any control or position to
9 order. Am I correct?" Answer: "I was already asked that, and I answered
10 that he was not in the position to do that. He didn't have any competence
11 of that kind. Nobody would have obeyed any such order coming from him."
12 The Prosecution wants you to ignore that because it raises a
13 reasonable doubt and might cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
14 Again, testimony, Predrag Radic, page 22009, 3 November,
15 questioned by Mr. Ackerman: "Well, did Mr. Brdjanin have authority over
16 the people in Prijedor? Could he order those people to do things and not
17 do things? Did he have that kind of authority?" Answer: "No, he
18 didn't." The Prosecution wants you to ignore that because that could
19 raise a reasonable doubt and cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
20 Again, testimony of Predrag Radic, page 22340, examined by
21 Mr. Ackerman, 7 November 2003: "When was it that most of the non-Serb
22 population that actually decided to leave, when was it that the vast bulk
23 of them left? What year?" And after a little preliminary, Mr. Radic
24 said: "The bulk of the people left in May 1995 during the Operation Flash
25 and Storm." The Prosecution wants you to ignore that because it raises a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 reasonable doubt and might cause you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
2 Exhibit P95, this is an extract from the minutes of the 10th
3 session of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Banja Luka,
4 14 December 1991. The document reveals that on that day, the assembly
5 received a report of the Banja Luka Security Services Centre on the
6 criminal and other illegal activities of Veljko Milankovic and other
7 members of a paramilitary formation from Prnjavor. JNA representatives
8 read a report from the Banja Luka Corps command on the arrest of
9 Milankovic and other persons. In the conclusions reached that day, number
10 2, "the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina neither recognises
11 nor supports the establishment of paramilitary formations, nor will it
12 participate in their funding. It condemns every activity related to
13 carrying out duties that lie within the competence of legal organs and
14 security services. The Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina
15 recognises the JNA and units under its command as the sole armed force and
16 requests that they act forcefully to protect the people and territories
17 that recognise them as their armed force." Interesting limitation there.
18 Number 3: "After a lengthy debate on the activity of the
19 paramilitary formation from Prnjavor, under the command of Veljko
20 Milankovic, the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina fully
21 accepted and supported the measures and activities of the security organs
22 of the JNA 5th Corps and the Banja Luka Security Services Centre." Now,
23 the Prosecution wants you to ignore that because it raises a reasonable
24 doubt and might cause you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
25 Prosecution tells you in the indictment, in its arguments that
1 Mr. Brdjanin was the person designated as chief propagandist, as the
2 person to take control of the press, the television, the radio. In that
3 connection, you should take a look at P107. P107 is an article from Glas
4 of 11 February 1992. I'm not going to read it to you. It is very long.
5 Suffice it to say that it is a document, an article, from that newspaper
6 that is highly critical of Mr. Brdjanin, not the kind of article you would
7 find in a newspaper under his control. In that connection, you should
8 also look at P110, where the Celinac National Defence Council responds and
9 points out how outrageously wrong that article critical of Brdjanin
10 actually was. Now, the Prosecution wants you to ignore that because it's
11 an article of faith with the Prosecution that Mr. Brdjanin was controlling
12 the media. This raises a reasonable doubt about that and might cause you
13 to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
14 Exhibit P80, this is the statute of the Autonomous Region of
15 Krajina. Now, Ms. Korner conceded that the municipal presidents, because
16 of the way the system had operated for so many years, were people who were
17 reluctant to give up authority. And of course they are. Any time anybody
18 achieves a position of authority, they're reluctant to give up any of it.
19 And that reluctance is set out in stark language in Article 35 of the
20 statute of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. This is an association that
21 was created by the presidents of the various municipalities, voluntarily.
22 And one thing they made certain of when they created the statute of that
23 association was that they were not ceding any authority to the Autonomous
24 Region of Krajina. That's why you see in that statute this language:
25 "Decisions and conclusions of the Assembly shall become binding for the
1 member municipalities once they have been approved by the assemblies of
2 municipalities." And not otherwise. They maintained their power. They
3 maintained their authority. They didn't give it to this organisation. And
4 you see clearly that that's the case, that they were asserting Article 35
5 as a basis for ignoring the ARK Crisis Staff because the ARK Crisis Staff
6 tried, and I suggest failed miserably, to solve that problem by purporting
7 to amend Article 35.
8 Now, obviously, the Prosecution wants you to ignore that because
9 that basically destroys their whole theory of this case. It certainly
10 raises a reasonable doubt and would require you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
11 Their witness, Mr. Treanor, page 20916. Mr. Treanor, who was one
12 of the best witnesses for the Defence in this case. At 20916, questioned
13 by Mr. Ackerman: "I want to look now at Article 35" - referring to the
14 one we just talked about from the ARK Statute - "and I think if nothing
15 else this highlights the completely voluntary nature of this association.
16 If you look at the second paragraph of Article 35, decisions and
17 conclusions of the assembly shall become binding for the member
18 municipalities once they have been approved by the assemblies of
19 municipalities." Mr. Treanor: "Yes." Question: "In other words, the
20 decisions and conclusions of the ARK Assembly were only binding on
21 municipalities once their assemblies accepted them?" Treanor: "Yes,
22 that's correct."
23 Mr. Treanor again, page 20949, 15 October 2003, questioned by
24 Mr. Ackerman, referring to Article 38 of the ARK Statute, which is the
25 article, Your Honours, which deals with amendment to the statute.
1 Question: "Article 38 talks about the manner in which the statute may be
2 amended, and it says that a proposal to engage in the procedure of
3 amending the statute of the Autonomous Region of Krajina may be submitted
4 by the assembly, the assemblies of the associated municipalities, and the
5 executive council. The proposal referred to in the preceding paragraph
6 shall be communicated to the assemblies of the associated municipalities
7 for their consideration and for the purpose of obtaining their opinions.
8 And then after their opinions have been obtained, or after a given
9 deadline has expired, the assembly shall consider the draft enactment on
10 amendments or additions to the statute and transmit it to the assemblies
11 of the associated municipalities to obtain their approval. And finally,
12 having attained the approval of the associated municipalities, the
13 assembly may then declare the amendments and additions to the statute
14 adopted." Answer: Yes, that's correct." "So that's the procedure that
15 would have to be carried out to amend, for instance, Article 35 of the
16 statute. Correct?" Answer: "Yes."
17 And at the bottom of page 20950, "I'm suggesting to you that the
18 crisis staff had no authority to amend the statute of ARK unless they
19 complied with Article 38." Answer: "Yes, yes. That would certainly be
20 true." Now, Your Honour, they really want you to ignore that because that
21 disagrees with their theories. It raises a reasonable doubt. It might
22 require you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
23 While the Prosecution, this is the 17th thing they want you to
24 ignore. While the Prosecution tells you how important Mr. Brdjanin was in
25 the SDS, what a huge role he played in the SDS, how he was one of the main
1 SDS actors, they want you to ignore the fact that he was never even a
2 member of the SDS main board.
3 Exhibit P157 has been talked about over and over at length. The
4 Prosecution wants you to ignore parts of this documents or to treat them
5 as not really meaning what they say. That's paragraph 4, which says:
6 "The command of the TO and police forces is under the exclusive authority
7 of the professional staff, and therefore any interference regarding the
8 command of the TO or the use of the police forces must be prevented."
9 That should be ignored. They want you to ignore paragraph 8, that the
10 crisis staff has the obligation to provide working and living conditions
11 for the JNA members to ensure a fair attitude toward the JNA officers and
12 soldiers and to prevent them from being humiliated or insulted in any way.
13 Now, the Prosecution would say to you, Gee, this shows close cooperation
14 between military and civilian authorities; in fact, control. Until you
15 look at paragraph 9, which uses the same language, to say that the crisis
16 staff shall provide working conditions for the international peace and
17 relief organisations and ensure the unimpeded transport of relief convoys
18 to their destinations. Surely, the Prosecution would not argue that that
19 shows control by the crisis staff over relief organisations.
20 They want you to ignore that this document was not directed to any
21 regional crisis staff. Although they suggest to you that in paragraph 14
22 when it says: "Submit weekly reports to the regional and state
23 organisations of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" that that
24 must refer to the regional association of the ARK. And that's not a
25 necessary conclusion at all. The legitimate regional organisations that
1 existed way before the war started were the regional police organisation,
2 the CSB, and the regional military organisation, the 5th Krajina Corps,
3 which became the 1st Krajina Corps, the Banja Luka Corps.
4 P626, this is a document from the Sanski Most Crisis Staff dated
5 28 April 1992. This is about a week before there was ever any ARK Crisis
6 Staff. This is about a week -- more than a week before the Sajic
7 disarmament order of the 4th of May. The Sanski Most Crisis Staff says
8 this: "All citizens in the area of Sanski Most Municipality who possess
9 any kind of weapon shall hand it in to the public security station, the
10 closest unit of the Yugoslav People's Army, or the staff of the
11 Territorial Defence of the Serbian Municipality of Sanski Most. Citizens
12 who have private weapons with a license from a competent organ and members
13 of armed Territorial Defence formations, active service and reserve police
14 and the Yugoslav People's Army are exempt from this decision." This shows
15 that disarmament was being ordered in Sanski Most before Colonel Sajic
16 issued his order, before anything came from the crisis staff about that.
17 That substantially detracts from the Prosecution's theory that disarmament
18 was a major goal of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and the ARK Crisis
19 Staff, and that it was a juggernaut set in motion by them. They want you
20 to ignore this because it detracts from that theory, establishes a
21 reasonable doubt, and might cause you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin.
22 P165. P165 is an article from Glas. This was during a time
23 apparently when Glas couldn't even get enough paper to publish on a daily
24 basis because this is an issue dated 30 April, 1 and 2 May. It's a press
25 conference with Mr. Brdjanin dealing with personnel changes in
1 enterprises. Mr. Brdjanin reportedly says: "Only people loyal to the
2 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina can hold managing positions in
3 Banja Luka and the Bosnian Krajina." Loyalty, not ethnicity. Loyalty.
4 "I am especially pleased that among the reports and requests of workers
5 for the replacements of individual managers there are managers of all the
6 nationalities." He's pleased with that. "Which means that people want
7 honourable people to head their organisations." The Prosecution wants you
8 to ignore this because it raises a reasonable doubt as to their theories
9 and might cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
10 Your Honours will recall that the SDS took over power in Prijedor
11 at the end of April, before the creation of the ARK Crisis Staff. The
12 Prosecution would like you to ignore that.
13 Exhibit P1181 and similar documents, there are a number, and
14 Your Honours saw them all. I think I presented them to the witness -- I
15 can't remember his name now. He was a witness from Prijedor. Documents
16 showing that people were being dismissed from their positions in Prijedor
17 substantially before the creation of the ARK Crisis Staff. It's P1181 and
18 documents in that same number range. You could look at one of my
19 favourite documents, DB118. This is the order by Gojko Klickovic to the
20 command of the 1st Krajina Brigade where he orders them to destroy three
21 bridges in Krupa. And then says they don't really have to if they think
22 it's not wise from a military point of view. But this is dated 24 April
23 1992, before there was any ARK Crisis Staff.
24 Ethnic cleansing, according to the Prosecutor, was an enterprise
25 of the ARK Crisis Staff that Mr. Brdjanin was the leader of. You should
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 look at P2077. This is another document from Krupa dated 5 April 1992, a
2 whole month before there was any ARK Crisis Staff, apparently signed by
3 "Crisis Staff commander," Gojko Klickovic, in which he says this: "It is
4 hereby ordered to carry out a partial evacuation of the population from
5 the following neighbourhoods and streets" and then he lists a bunch of
6 neighbourhoods and streets. So here is Klickovic ordering ethnic
7 cleansing in Krupa a month before there was ever any ARK Crisis Staff. Of
8 course, the Prosecution wants you to ignore that document because it could
9 raise a reasonable doubt and cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
10 A couple of interesting documents that speak of the power of the
11 ARK Crisis Staff, P183, P532. On 9 May 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff reaches
12 the following conclusion: Due to abuses in its work, the Atlas Travel
13 Agency is prohibited from further work. Now, you know from the testimony
14 of Mr. Fazlagic, he kept on working. He got special dispensation from
15 the municipality. Totally ignored this document. On 3 June, almost a
16 month later, crisis staff tries again: "At its session held on 3 June
17 1992, the Autonomous Region of Krajina issued a decision to terminate the
18 operation of the Atlas Primaturs Travel Agency." And again, according to
19 Mr. Fazlagic, that one failed. The Prosecution wants you to ignore that
20 because it raises a reasonable doubt regarding the power of the ARK Crisis
21 Staff and might cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
22 At page 28 of our brief, we quote from transcript page 23072 some
23 testimony from Dobrivoje Vidic. He's talking about the ARK and decisions
24 and how they were adopted and so forth. He says: "I know how this was
25 done. It wasn't done in a serious manner. I know how decisions were
1 adopted. Anyone wrote whatever they wished. Mr. Boro Blagojevic would
2 sometimes add things. You'd never know at the next session what he had
3 added. It was a comedy. Mr. Blagojevic, he drafted these documents
4 later. We had quite a few disagreements over that, and I always
5 strenuously protested. And that is why the validity of these documents
6 was always in question, because none of the documents were ever adopted at
7 the next session." Now, if you look at P185, you see a curious example of
8 what he's talking about. P185 is a conclusion, set of conclusions, of the
9 ARK Crisis Staff dated 11 May 1992. The heading: "Autonomous Region of
10 Krajina Crisis Staff, conclusion number 3, we hereby express our support
11 for the work of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina."
12 Now, that's crazy. They're saying "we hereby express our support for our
13 work." It shows you what Mr. Vidic means when he said it was a comedy.
14 It was. "We hereby express our support for the work of the Crisis Staff
15 of the Autonomous Region of Krajina" said by the Autonomous Region of
16 Krajina Crisis Staff. That's comedy, folks. The Prosecution wants you to
17 ignore that because it could raise a reasonable doubt and cause you to
18 find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
19 P192, conclusion of the Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff,
20 13 May 1992. Conclusion number 1, third paragraph: "Persons that are
21 absolutely loyal to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have to
22 occupy managing positions in the companies." Loyalty. Not ethnicity.
23 Prosecution wants you to ignore that. Raises a reasonable doubt. Might
24 cause you to find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
25 I think, Your Honours, that there's probably more than 50, and I'm
1 going to talk about more than 50 because reason number 28 is really two.
2 You should look at Exhibit P194 to start with. This is part of the comedy
3 that Mr. Vidic talked about. On 14 May 1992, the crisis staff made the
4 following conclusion: "The presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina shall immediately define the borders of the Serbian
6 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Now, they are purporting here to
7 instruct the Presidency of SRBiH to do something, which they clearly would
8 not have the competence to do. I think this will help you in deciphering
9 the meaning of these conclusions from the ARK Crisis Staff. From this,
10 you can tell that when they say somebody "shall" immediately do something,
11 what they really mean is "should," "that would be a good idea," "it would
12 be nice if." But it's not a directive. If you look at P227, you see a
13 similar comedy. Paragraph 7: "The government the Serbian Republic of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina is to immediately prescribe punishment for violations
15 of the curfew." Again, they are purporting to instruct the government of
16 SRBiH, which they clearly have no competence to do. But it could help you
17 in deciphering meaning when they say someone is "to do" something; what
18 they mean, "it would be a good idea if," "it would be nice if." And
19 that's what they mean in paragraph 14 of that document where they say "for
20 the time being, the 5th Corps is to" - same language -- "take over the
21 Kosmos Air Force Maintenance and Production Complex until the government
22 of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina comes to a final decision."
23 What they're saying is "that would be a good idea," "it would be nice."
24 The Prosecution wants you to ignore the comedic aspects of this crisis
25 staff because it raises a reasonable doubt and could cause you to find Mr.
1 Brdjanin not guilty.
2 P227, 26 May 1992, this is one in a long of those crisis staff
3 documents where the crisis staff keeps saying "Hey, you out there, we are
4 the highest organ of authority, pay attention to us." And nobody pays
5 attention. So a week later they say "hey, you out there, we are the
6 highest organ of authority. Look at us. Pay attention to us." And
7 nobody does. They don't have to keep saying that if it's true. They just
8 don't. This is an organisation that is suffering from being ignored, and
9 they are crying about it.
10 Look at paragraph 1 of P227. "The work of the crisis staff of the
11 Autonomous Region of Krajina has absolute support since it is now the
12 highest organ of authority in the Autonomous Region of Krajina as the
13 assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina cannot function due to
14 objective and subjective circumstances." 26 May. That's important. 26
15 May. Look at P209, 27 May. P209, 27 May: "Pursuant" -- the next day.
16 "Pursuant to Article 17 of the statute of the Autonomous Region of
17 Krajina, the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina at its session
18 held on 27 May 1992 adopted the following..." And then they adopt the
19 appointment of a negotiating team. So on the 26th, the crisis staff says
20 "we're the highest organ of authority because the assembly can't meet" and
21 the next day the assembly meets. And they say, when the assembly meets
22 that day, it's pursuant to Article 17 of the statute. If you look at
23 Article 17 of P80, it says: "The Assembly of the Autonomous Region of
24 Krajina is the main organ of authority of the Autonomous Region of
1 And then if you look finally at P48, this one's dated 6 June 1992:
2 "On behalf of the Serbian people of the Krajina, the presidency of the
3 Autonomous Region of Krajina hereby renounces the legitimacy of Nenad
4 Kecmanovic and Mirko Pejanovic to represent the Serbian people in any
5 capacity," a document from the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of
6 Krajina signed by its president, Vojo Kupresanin. The Prosecution, of
7 course, wants you to ignore all of those because they fly in the face of
8 their theory, they establish a reasonable doubt, and might cause you to
9 find Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
10 We're up to number 30, Your Honours. P1726, I suggest to you that
11 this document shows why Vujnovic was attending ARK Crisis Staff sessions.
12 To report on the economic situation in municipalities, and it confirms the
13 testimony that it was a place where municipal authorities gathered to
14 complain. On 17 June 1992 in P1726, Vujnovic submits a report. He says
15 this: "At a meeting of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of
16 Krajina held on 17 June 1992, it was decided that elected deputies should
17 begin forming civilian governments in the Municipalities of Donji Vakuf
18 and Derventa with the help of the units of the 1st Krajina Corps in that
19 area. The economy has totally collapsed in the area of the Autonomous
20 Region of Bosnian Krajina because of the impossibility of obtaining
21 production materials or exporting finished products and a total financial
22 blockade. Throughout the zone of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps,
23 there is a general shortage of electrical power, petrol, money, and some
24 foodstuffs." The Prosecution talks about people being dismissed from
25 their jobs. They fail to distinguish, though, Your Honour, between those
1 who were dismissed for loyalty reasons and those who lost their jobs
2 because of the huge downturn in the economy. Muslims, Serbs, Croats, all
3 were thrown out of work when trade between the Krajina and Croatia, and
4 Serbia and Sarajevo was brought to a halt.
5 Testimony of Boro Mandic, page 21252, 21 October 2003, talking
6 about the composition of the executive board in Celinac while Mr. Brdjanin
7 was in charge, uncontested by the Prosecution. Question: "How was it
8 being a nonmember of the SDS that you were able to secure this position of
9 secretary with the executive board?" Answer: "Let me tell you how this
10 happened. The executive board at its very beginning was composed mostly
11 of members of the Serbian Democratic Party, although I must say before
12 this Trial Chamber that Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin did not agree with that. He
13 insisted on the executive board to consist of experts in their respective
14 fields, regardless of their party affiliation, regardless of their
15 religious affiliation or ethnical background. And very soon after that,
16 probably against a lot of opposition in his party, he managed to succeed
17 in changing the composition of the executive board so that from then on
18 members of the executive board were also people who were not members of
19 the SDS. Other members who participated in the very important work of the
20 executive board were people who were never members of the SDS before that
21 or after that. For example, Nenad Josip was the secretary for economy,
22 and the vice-president for the executive board, and he was appointed on
23 the insistence of Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin. Mr. Vlado Vrhovac was the
24 director of the revenue administration. Then Nemanja Miljanovic who was
25 also a lawyer and who was born in a mixed marriage, he was a misdemeanor
1 judge in that term of office. His position was very important."
2 So in Celinac, in the executive board, where Mr. Brdjanin had
3 authority, he employed people for their skills, not their ethnicity, not
4 their party association, exactly what the Prosecution suggests to you he
5 was against. They want you to ignore this because it raises a reasonable
7 I want to go into private session for a moment, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's go to private session for a while,
10 [Private session]
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
12 [Open session]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session, Mr. Ackerman.
14 MR. ACKERMAN: On 31 July 2003, Your Honours heard from Milorad
15 Dodik. I refer you to page 20516 of his testimony. Cross-examining by
16 Mr. Ackerman: "I'm talking to you about Brdjanin's role in the crisis
17 staff. You said on page 5, line 23 of the English version, `in other
18 words, if Brdjanin wanted to implement anything with the crisis staff, he
19 had to ask for the approval of Radic. Without that, he couldn't have done
20 anything.' Do you stand by that statement today?" Answer: "Well, that
21 was my opinion. I was not present at these meetings. But this is an
22 opinion that corroborates the previously mentioned position; namely, that
23 Mr. Brdjanin was not the most influential member of that staff. And quite
24 simply, that people were there who had far greater power and who were in
25 such offices. I already mentioned the chief of the police, the presidents
1 of the municipalities, the president of the SDS, so they had these
2 positions. They held these offices. They were on the staff ex officio,
3 and the implementation of these decisions depended on them."
4 Question: "Now, just so we can save a little bit of time, when
5 you say to us that it is your impression or you have the opinion, that's
6 based not only upon your observations at the time but on your
7 conversations with people since that time, up until fairly recent times.
8 Am I correct in that? In other words, you're not just guessing. This is
9 based upon something that you observed and have heard." Answer: "Yes,
10 that's correct."
11 Your Honour, we have to go back into private session again now.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's go into private session again.
13 [Private session]
19 [Open session]
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
21 MR. ACKERMAN: Page 22567 of the testimony -- just in passing,
22 Your Honours, I never thought I'd stand in front of a Court and refer to
23 page 22567 of a record. This record is monumental. It's incredible.
24 This is Rajko Kalabic, 12 November 2003. Questioned by
25 Ms. Korner: "Now, we all know that some bad things happened in Kljuc.
1 Could Mr. Brdjanin or the ARK Crisis Staff have prevented those things
2 from happening?"
3 Answer: "Mr. Brdjanin could not have prevented anything that
4 happened in Kljuc itself because after the 27th of May 1992, and those
5 events, of course, he could not influence those. And later developments
6 occurred spontaneously and were often beyond the control of those who made
7 efforts to keep them under control. So his influence there was
9 Same witness, Your Honour, page 24828 -- I'm sorry, this is not
10 the same witness. We have to go back into closed session again.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go back into private session, please.
12 MR. ACKERMAN: Private session, yes.
13 [Private session]
12 Page 25436 redacted, private session
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session, Mr. Ackerman.
8 MR. ACKERMAN: I want to go back now to the witness Boro Mandic.
9 We're at page 21279 of the transcript, where the witness says this, in
10 answer to a rather long question by Judge Agius: "Well, I can say with
11 absolute certainty" -- I'm going to have to read the question because the
12 answer makes no sense without it.
13 Judge Agius: "Sir, I'm going to read from the transcript that I
14 have right here in front of me, and then you've heard what Mr. Ackerman
15 said, and you tell me whether you want -- what you want to have on record.
16 `In most cases, municipalities did not allow this to take place because
17 they probably wanted to give the abandoned flats to the refugees who
18 arrived from Croatia, from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
19 remember very well, and there are a number of decisions.'
20 Judge says: "This is where Mr. Ackerman said to you that there
21 are hundreds of decisions." And then quote: "There are hundreds of
22 decisions in our ministry testifying to that when we started working on
23 the 15th of March 1993 and dealing with those appeals, Mr. Brdjanin..." et
25 Judge: "Did you see there were such decisions or hundreds of such
1 decisions"? "What I can say with absolute certainty that there are
2 hundreds, certainly more than one hundred, and probably hundreds. Not
3 decisions, determinations. The ministry makes determinations."
4 Then Mr. Ackerman: "In the process of making those
5 determinations, did Mr. Brdjanin make any distinction between members of
6 different ethnic groups? Did he treat members of different ethnic groups
8 Answer: "No. On the contrary, every decision that had to do with
9 the swap of apartments or the rationalisation of housing space had two
10 opposing parties involved. One of the parties was always a non-Serb.
11 Mr. Brdjanin insisted that we go by the book; that is, by the law, and the
12 law required us to approve the exchange of apartments or rationalisation
13 of housing space, and we did that. It was always signed by Mr. Brdjanin
14 or one of his deputies, and all of these determinations were confirmed by
15 the Supreme Court."
16 And Your Honours will recall that we then introduced records
17 supporting what he said, DB154 through DB159, and DB166 through DB169,
18 which are all written determinations in favour of Muslims and Croats. So
19 it's not just his word, but the documentary evidence that supports it.
20 The Prosecution wants you to ignore that because it speaks of
21 Mr. Brdjanin's feelings regarding the law and regarding non-Serb persons,
22 raises a reasonable doubt, and might cause you to acquit him.
23 DB189. DB189 is a document dated 22 February 2002. As it's a
24 document that was requested by us from the Ministry of Defence, we wanted
25 to know and we wanted the Court to know about Mr. Brdjanin's working
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 obligation during this time. And it is significant, and I'll show you
2 why. According to the records of the Ministry of Defence, from 6 April
3 1992 until 30 June 1992, Mr. Brdjanin's working obligation was in the
4 Municipality of Celinac on the position of president of the executive
5 board. From 1 July 1992 to 14 December 1992, it was in the Government of
6 Republika Srpska as vice-president of RS and minister for urbanism,
7 housing, and public utility activities and ecology. What is clearly
8 missing from that is the ARK Crisis Staff. And it's missing, I suggest to
9 you, because it was never recognised as a legitimate organ and could not
10 have been a way to satisfy a working obligation.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Incidentally, Mr. Ackerman, regarding while we were
12 in private session, you will recall that there was that altercation
13 between you and Ms. Korner regarding the testimony of the witness you were
14 dealing with and with reference to, transcript page 22567, the question
15 was, indeed, put by you, and Ms. Korner started further down -- further
16 down the same page.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I apologise. I was referring to the
18 notation at the top of the page in the official transcript. And clearly,
19 that was wrong.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
21 MR. ACKERMAN: The next document I want to refer you to is DB317.
25 MS. KORNER: Mr. Ackerman, I'm sorry, but you did realise you put
1 the document in under seal, did you?
2 MR. ACKERMAN: I'm sorry?
3 MS. KORNER: You put the document in under seal.
4 MR. ACKERMAN: No, I didn't realise that. I guess maybe we should
5 go into private session.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: First, we redact what we have. And.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: First we need to redact what we have. And we go
9 into private session afterwards.
10 May I remind the members of the public who are in the gallery that
11 when such a thing happens, they have an obligation to keep what they have
12 heard to themselves and not to share it with anyone else. If you do not
13 abide by this very important rule, you may render yourselves answerable to
14 this Trial Chamber for contempt.
15 Let's go into private session for a while, please.
16 [Private session]
12 Page 25442 redacted, private session
6 [Open session]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session, Mr. Ackerman.
8 MR. ACKERMAN: Next document I want you to look at, Your Honours,
9 one of the 50 that the Prosecution wants you to ignore, is DB379A. This
10 document comes from the Banja Luka public security station. And it talks
11 about registration and deregistration in Banja Luka for the period 1
12 January 1992 to 31 October 1992. Now, you'll recall that there was
13 significant testimony by Bosniak witnesses early in the case about if you
14 were going to leave Banja Luka you had to go through this huge process of
15 deregistration and getting authority from the police and all those kinds
16 of things.
17 Through that period of time, the records of the Banja Luka public
18 security station, from January through October of 1992, in other words,
19 encompassing the entire period of the ARK Crisis Staff, of persons coming
20 to Banja Luka and registering there, 3.440 Serbs, 1.607 Croats, and 1.647
21 Muslims came to Banja Luka and registered in Banja Luka during that period
22 of time.
23 Persons who deregistered to leave Banja Luka: 1.242 Serbs; 2.278
24 Croats; 3.011 Muslims. This totally contradicts the testimony of many of
25 the Bosniak witnesses that people were leaving Banja Luka in droves in
1 early 1992. And it totally supports the testimony of Mr. Radic that the
2 vast majority left in 1995, certainly after October of 1992 and the period
3 of the crisis staff. And of course, the Prosecution wants you to ignore
4 that because it raises a reasonable doubt, might cause you to find
5 Mr. Brdjanin not guilty.
6 Mr. Cunningham talked about this yesterday. I want to just
7 briefly mention it to you again, because I think it is so important. It
8 speaks of the credibility of witnesses and it speaks of this issue about
9 Muslims leaving Banja Luka. It's the testimony of Muharem Krzic, page
10 1788. Question by Mr. Ackerman: "Now, Mr. Krzic, you see what we are
11 looking at here. It's an Article from Newsday written by Roy Gutman
12 September 25 1992. You know Mr. Gutman, do you not?"
13 "Yes." "Did you have meetings with Mr. Gutman"?
14 "Yes." "You've actually had Mr. Gutman as a guest in your home,
15 have you not?"
16 "Not a guest, as a visitor."
17 "As a visitor in your home, you've gotten to respect him, and you
18 believe he is a respectable journalist. Correct?"
20 "Could we look then at page 2 of this document, and look down
21 toward the bottom, the yellow part, down toward the bottom, starting with
22 'until now.' 'Until now, Banja Luka the principal city in northern
23 Bosnia has been largely spared the terror tactics of ethnic cleansing, the
24 process of emptying territory of unwanted ethnic groups.'" That's what
25 Mr. Gutman wrote in September of 1992. Do you agree with him?"
1 Answer: "I don't agree."
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Shall we take the break now, Mr. Ackerman?
3 MR. ACKERMAN: I think we should.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
5 We will resume at 5 to 1.00. Thank you.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.59 p.m.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ackerman.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the next document that I would refer
10 you to is DB344. DB344 is that article from the publication Patriot of 12
11 August 2003 written by Boro Sendic. Your Honours will recall -- no, this
12 wasn't -- this was an open document, I'm sure.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know. Don't expect me to know that. But
14 someone will be checking it, whether it was under seal or not.
15 MR. ACKERMAN: Better check before we go any further, I suppose.
16 It was not, all right.
17 Your Honour will recall that this is the document where Sendic
18 claims the following -- claims that Brdjanin demanded the arrest of he and
19 Grahovac and Mladjenovic for setting up a paramilitary group, the Wolves
20 of Vucak. What he says is this exactly, talking about the Assembly of the
21 Autonomous Region of Krajina: "The assembly was convened on 15 November
22 by its president Vojo Kupresanin. The first speaker was the assembly
23 vice-president Radoslav Brdjanin, and he immediately attacked Grahovac.
24 What did he think he was doing setting up some paramilitary unit without
25 consulting the assembly, spending money on it, buying uniforms and so
1 forth, with Sendic and Mladjenovic?"
2 And near the bottom, "Grahovac behaved in a slightly distant
3 manner, as though he was disgusted by the whole thing. He briefly wanted
4 to help the Slavonian people because they had asked him to. He was
5 pleased that Mladjenovic and Sendic had formed a unit of volunteers who
6 proved their worth in these few clashes. The assembly did not decide on
7 anything. Brdjanin's proposal that the three of us be charged for harmful
8 and inappropriate behaviour was not accepted."
9 Now, that's interesting in itself, but what confirms in many ways
10 what is said in this article is that reunion at Mount Kozara of the people
11 who were responsible and involved in the taking down of the transmitter
12 tower there. And who was at that reunion in Grahovac, Mladjenovic,
13 Milankovic was dead or I'm sure he would have been there. The same group,
14 the same group that Sendic talks about here. Not Mr. Brdjanin. He wasn't
16 The Witness Mehmed Talic, page 24146. Bosniak from Celinac. He
17 talks about encountering Brdjanin at the municipal building with a
18 problem. Brdjanin says to him: Go to the office. I'll be up there in a
19 minute. And he says: "And I came to the office, and we sat down
20 together, and we talked about all the problems, about everything. And he
21 asked me, Talic, what is bothering you? And I told him what it was. And
22 he said, yes, Mr. Brdjanin will help you.
23 "At 12.00, maybe 11.30 or 12.00, I'm not sure, the meeting was
24 supposed to be held at the Celinac municipal office. So we went out at
25 11.30 from his office. At that time, Mile Maksimovic came out. I don't
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 know what he was, chief of the ministry or something. And he said from
2 the door, Mr. Maksimovic, make me a special permit and secure me a driver
3 and a car so that Meho can be taken. When you make this permit, bring it
4 to my office. I'm bringing a stamp, and I will stamp it so that Meho can
5 go and bring his daughter back. And he said very well. Ilija came back,
6 and he made the certificate for the driver and the vehicle, and he took it
7 to the office. And Rajko Orasanin was the driver of the car. He took me
8 to Kotor Varos, and I went and I brought my daughter back. And I
9 returned. Everything went well. I found my daughter in Kotor Varos, and
10 I managed to bring her back. So this is what Mr. Brdjanin did for me."
11 Now, contrary to what the Prosecutor told you, this was not a
12 permit signed by Mr. Brdjanin. This doesn't show Mr. Brdjanin had power
13 in Kotor Varos. It's a permit signed by what Mr. Talic believed was chief
14 of the ministry, Mr. Maksimovic.
15 The next page, 24145, "go ahead and tell the Chamber about the
16 encounter between you and Brdjanin at the municipal building."
17 Actually, that's the beginning of the part that I have already
18 read to you. I think we don't need to go into that. It's actually the
19 preceding page.
20 Again, Your Honour, from Mehmed Talic, page 24152: Question:
21 "All right. I have a lot of questions to ask you about some of the things
22 that you said. You talked at one point of being in front of the municipal
23 building, and Mr. Brdjanin had arrived and gone inside. And you said you
24 could hear his voice from inside the building. Do you have any
25 recollection as to what it was you heard him saying?" Answer: "I
1 couldn't hear exactly what he was saying, but I could just hear him
2 shouting, raising his voice up there to those officials. I heard that
3 personally, that he was shouting at them. This was the second or the
4 third floor, the windows were closed, of course. So it wasn't possible to
5 hear everything that he was saying. But I know very well that he ordered
6 that we should be put in the elementary school, and that there should be a
7 guard for us. We were not detained. We could go out freely. They were
8 really protecting us." And he talks about the 1.860 of them.
9 I asked him then: "Who do you believe is responsible for the 1860
10 persons in Celinac being protected and placed in the school and being
11 protected? Who do you think is responsible for that? Mr. Brdjanin?"
12 Answer: "Mr. Brdjanin and three other Serbs who reported to the military
13 police." And when he says reported to the military police, that was the
14 report that if the buses left town, they would be ambushed.
15 Question, and now this is a different subject, Your Honour, but
16 goes to what the Prosecution told you yesterday about Muslims leaving
17 Celinac. This is 24154. "You told the Chamber that in 1992, several of
18 the young people, and the words you used were `they left to seek their
19 fortunes elsewhere.' My question is, were these young people forced to
20 leave, or did they leave of their own free will?"
21 Answer: "They left of their own free will."
22 Question: "When you left, were you forced to leave or did you
23 leave of your own free will?"
24 Answer: "Of my own free will. No one forced me to. No one. We
25 were merely protected."
1 Now, Your Honour, there were 1.860 Muslims in Celinac on that day
2 who this witness says had their lives saved by Mr. Brdjanin. Presumably,
3 the Prosecution had access to a large number of those 1.860 people. And
4 if this were not the case, I suggest they would have brought you a witness
5 in rebuttal to say it was not the case.
6 I want you to look again at P229. This is that Sanska Unska
7 group, the first document we know of that was issued by them. 7 June of
8 1992, representatives from Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac, Srpska Krupa, Sanski
9 Most, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc sent -- these conclusions they
10 adopted were sent to the crisis staff of the Autonomous Region of Banja
11 Luka. And they made certain demands. "It is necessary to declare a state
12 of war in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the next
13 three days." That was not done.
14 Number two: "Within the next three days, we request a clear
15 position from the highest authorities of the Serbian Republic of BH on the
16 question of forging a land corridor to the Federal Republic of
17 Yugoslavia." The ARK Crisis Staff would have had no competence to deal
18 with that one, but it was not done.
19 Number 4: "We demand that the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka,
20 and particularly General Momir Talic of the 1st Krajina Corps, purge the
21 1st Krajina Corps of Muslims and Croats. We believe that they cannot
22 fight against their own people and that they are now involved in
23 intelligence and other activities in the 1st Krajina Corps that are of
24 interest to Ustasha forces and members of the so-called Alija's
25 Territorial Defence. Deadline for completion, seven days." We know from
1 the first documents I referred you to today that people who were loyal,
2 whether they were Muslim or Croat, to the Serbian Republic were able to
3 remain in the military, and some did.
4 "We absolutely demand that within the next three days, the
5 leadership of the Autonomous Region of Krajina clearly define the borders
6 of the Autonomous Region of Krajina." That was not done.
7 Number 6: "All seven municipalities in our subregion agree that
8 Muslims and Croats should move out of our municipalities until a level is
9 reached where Serbian authority can be maintained and implemented on its
10 own territory in each of these municipalities. In this respect, we
11 request that the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina provide
12 a corridor for the resettlement of Muslims and Croats to Central Bosnia
13 and Alija's independent state of BH because they voted for it. If the
14 leadership of the Autonomous Region of Krajina in Banja Luka fails to
15 solve this issue, our seven municipalities will take all Muslims and
16 Croats under military escort from our municipalities to the centre of
17 Banja Luka." Now, this is exactly the opposite of what the Prosecution is
18 suggesting to you. This is this subregional group saying "we want the ARK
19 to assist us in the ethnic cleansing of our municipalities." It's not the
20 ARK ordering them to do it. It's them ordering the ARK to help them, or
21 else they will do something drastic. And again, this corridor was not
22 provided by the ARK Crisis Staff. It was ignored.
23 So what are the consequences of the ARK Crisis Staff ignoring this
24 group of municipalities? What then did they do? Well, they met again
25 about a week later. On the 14th of June, P247. They said: "We think the
1 work of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina under wartime
2 circumstances should be much more serious and that it's politicians and
3 experts should pay more attention to the problems in all constituent
4 municipalities of the Autonomous Region of Krajina." Now, this time,
5 Your Honours, meeting at Korcanica were representatives from Srpska Krupa,
6 Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Prijedor, Sanski Most.
7 So after saying that the crisis staff should be more serious, they say
8 "accordingly, we propose that Vojo Kupresanin be appointed president of
9 the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, given the position
10 he currently occupies, president of the Assembly of the Autonomous Region
11 of Krajina, and belongs to -" something that's unclear.
12 So they are saying there, get rid of Brdjanin and put Kupresanin
13 in his place. And a little further down, they tell you why.
14 "Accordingly, personnel changes should be made in the Crisis Staff of the
15 Autonomous Region of Krajina and with a view to urgently breaking with
16 individuals who have decided to obstruct the work of the Serbian
17 Democratic Party in the Autonomous Region of Krajina and to question the
18 lofty goals which have galvanised the Serbian people." They are saying in
19 no uncertain terms that Mr. Brdjanin has decided to obstruct the work of
20 the Serbian Democratic Party and the ARK, and to question the lofty goals
21 which have galvanised the Serbian people. They are saying that this
22 project, this enterprise that we're trying to carry out is being thwarted
23 by Mr. Brdjanin. He is standing in the way. He is an obstacle. You must
24 replace him and put Kupresanin there who will carry out these tasks.
25 Now, it's one thing for me to say that Mr. Brdjanin was not part
1 of a joint criminal enterprise. It's one thing for me to argue that. But
2 when his peers argue that on the 14th of June 1992, when his peers take
3 the position that he is not participating in this process, that is a
4 powerful, powerful, powerful thing. The Prosecution really wants you to
5 ignore this because this establishes a reasonable doubt, beyond a
6 reasonable doubt, and with this, with this kind of criticism at that time,
7 from those people, he's not part of any joint criminal enterprise.
8 Your Honour, that concludes the -- 50 of the reasons why you
9 should acquit Mr. Brdjanin, the 50 things the Prosecution want you to
11 A long time ago, and I don't know when, the Prosecution set out to
12 deal with matters that had occurred in the Krajina. And they reasoned
13 that it would make sense to look for, indict, and prosecute the person who
14 headed the military organisation in the Krajina at the time. They found
15 out that was the 5th and then the 1st Krajina Corps, and that it was
16 headed by General Talic, and he was indicted. The reason that it would
17 make sense to look for, indict the person who led the police in the
18 Autonomous Region of Krajina during the time involved, they determined
19 that was Stojan Zupljanin. He was indicted. Not yet arrested. And they
20 determined that it would make sense to look for and prosecute the civilian
21 leader of that region during that period of time. And so they looked for
22 some regional authority and found the Autonomous Region of Krajina. They
23 looked for who was in charge of that and decided, well, it must be the
24 crisis staff and Mr. Brdjanin. Now, that was not a bad way to look at how
25 to prosecute what had happened in the Krajina. That was a reasonable
2 The problem was this: There had long been a regional organisation
3 of the military. The Banja Luka Corps had been there for years. And it
4 became the 1st Krajina Corps later on. There had long been a regional
5 organisation of the police, the CSB in Banja Luka. But there wasn't any
6 regional civilian authority. It simply did not exist. The best they
7 could find was this Autonomous Region of Krajina. And by the time it
8 became clear that their quest regarding a civilian authority was one that
9 held no water, it was too late. Mr. Brdjanin was indicted. He was at
10 this Tribunal, and they had to go forward with the case. But I suggest to
11 you it became clear to them even that they were on the wrong track.
12 There's a book that's well known in Texas where I come from that
13 tells a story about a man who goes out, stays out virtually all night
14 drinking heavily. Comes home about 5.30, 6.00 in the morning and goes in
15 the backyard and hops into the hammock where his wife finds him that
16 morning. And she starts giving him a hard time, alleging that he was out
17 all night and partying and carrying on. And he says, no, no, no. He said
18 I came home about 11.30, and I didn't want to wake you and so I just came
19 out here and got in the hammock. She said, that's a complete lie. I
20 looked at midnight, I looked at 3.00, and you weren't there. So that's
21 just a total lie. And he said Well, that's my story and I'm sticking to
22 it. And that's the Prosecution's story in this case. And they are
23 sticking to it.
24 There's a lot of evidence in this case that's very ambiguous, to
25 say the least. From that ambiguous, I suggest the Chamber must always
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 draw the inference most favourable to the accused, if it's a reasonable
2 inference. When you look at the charges in the indictment and ask if they
3 were proved, if you say maybe not, you're stating a reasonable doubt. If
4 you look carefully at the Prosecutor's final brief, look carefully at the
5 arguments they have made to you, you find that what they have created is a
6 house of cards. It's just a house of cards. And the problem with that
7 house of cards is it's full of jokers. And if you remove a joker, the
8 house falls. And their case falls. When you look at this evidence the
9 Prosecutor wants you to ignore, I suggest you're left with only one
10 choice: This case has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
11 Mr. Brdjanin must be acquitted on all counts.
12 I'm about to sit down now, which I must tell you is hard. I have
13 carried the burden of Mr. Brdjanin's case since July of 1999. It has been
14 my task to rise to his defence whenever I could and to try to find the
15 words to say that would be the right words to help him. In just a moment,
16 I will have said the last word that I'll be able to say on Mr. Brdjanin's
17 behalf, and I ask myself, have I said everything I should have said? Have
18 I done everything I should have done? Have I made every argument that I
19 should have made? Have I gone too far at times and erred in that way? I
20 hope not. I think not. I think my job is to do everything I can
21 ethically to help my client.
22 It's hard to sit down and know that I'll not be able to speak on
23 his behalf again in this case. But then trust has to begin somewhere.
24 And we place our trust in you to consider this case carefully,
25 responsibly, to do justice, as it's your job to do. I can ask no more. I
1 want to close with the words of Justice Robert Jackson, as he opened the
2 trial of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. He said:
3 "We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task
4 that this trial will commend itself to posterity, as fulfilling humanity's
5 aspirations to do justice." Thank you, Your Honours, for your attention.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Korner.
7 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, under Rule 86(A), I have the -- sorry,
8 we have the right to present a rebuttal argument. Your Honour, I can deal
9 with what I want to say, and it really -- it would have been otherwise
10 raised as objections to a couple of the things that were said. So if,
11 Your Honour, if I may deal with that now, because I know we're not sitting
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, how long is it going to take you?
14 MS. KORNER: 10 minutes.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead.
16 MS. KORNER: Thank you.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Try to restrict yourself to the 10 minutes because
18 we need another 5 minutes or so. Thank you.
19 [Prosecution Rebuttal Argument]
20 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I gave a warning, if I can put it that
21 way to those who I met from the following case to say that we might be --
22 have to run over a little bit.
23 Your Honour, can I deal first of all with the question of the
24 indictment that Mr. Ackerman raised again this morning. Most of our
25 arguments, all of our arguments, have been expressed in the written
1 response. But I do want to say this because this has been raised again as
2 part of the speech.
3 First of all, Your Honours, if you look at the indictment on which
4 this case proceeded in January of 2002, this was the fourth amended
5 indictment. There are two things which should be said. First, there was
6 an unambiguous order, not only from Your Honour, but from Judge Hunt that
7 if there were any objections still remaining to the amount of detail given
8 in this indictment, and it was known in this Tribunal as the most detailed
9 indictment ever, ever to be drafted by a Prosecution, then those
10 objections had to be raised by Judge Hunt's order within 30 days and by
11 Your Honour's order by the beginning of the trial.
12 Your Honour, the Defence simply cannot under any jurisprudence
13 whether of this Tribunal or national jurisprudence decline to comply with
14 an order, and then say at the end of the day, this was a defective
15 indictment. That's the first thing.
16 Second, Your Honour, the main complaint is that it did not make it
17 clear what the Prosecution's case against Mr. Brdjanin was. If
18 Your Honour looks -- if Your Honours, look, please, at paragraphs 10 of
19 the original indictment, it is stated that "the president of the ARK
20 Crisis Staff was Radoslav Brdjanin." At the bottom of that paragraph,
21 "amongst its other actions, the crisis staff took control of the media,
22 continued the campaign of propaganda against the non-Serbs as a key
23 instrument in the implementation of the aforementioned plan."
24 At paragraph 16, "Radoslav Brdjanin was a prominent member of the
25 SDS" and I will skip the next words. "As such, from the early stages, he
1 played a leading role in the takeover of power by the SDS, in particular
2 with respect to the propaganda campaign." And I should read on actually.
3 "Which was an essential component of the SDS plan to create a Serbian
5 Your Honour, that deals, as I say -- the remainder of our
6 arguments are set out carefully in the brief.
7 Your Honour, the second matter that I want to deal with is
8 briefly, one of the last things that Mr. Cunningham said, and I think he
9 must have misunderstood what I said. He said that Ms. Korner suggested
10 that the municipality - he's dealing with Bosanski Petrovac and
11 Mr. Radojko - certainly wouldn't call the ARK, but they would contact
12 Pale. Your Honour, what I actually said was in relation to the removal
13 of -- Mr. Radojko's assertion of the removal -- I've now got so many bits
14 of paper in this -- but what I was actually saying is that the ARK Crisis
15 Staff couldn't remove the heads of municipalities, but that Pale could,
16 and it was clear that the people thought that the complaint would be made
17 to Pale. That's what I said, not that they weren't going to Pale. So I
18 think that was a misunderstanding.
19 Your Honour, more importantly and more seriously, the question of
20 the Celinac assertions now made by Mr. Ackerman. He has already corrected
21 what he said that I had said; namely, that 770 people had left by April
22 1992. I was referring to the document that shows that 770 were left in
23 April of 1993.
24 But, Your Honour, he then went on to say this. Your Honour, this
25 is -- he's referring to me. "She spoke of a speech that Brdjanin made at
1 the end of August in 1992, saying this tells you about his intent. He
2 says in that speech `those who are not loyal are free to go, speaking of
3 Muslims and Croats, free to go, not must leave."
4 Now, Your Honour, I need to go into private session for a moment
5 because I'm going to have to quote the exact words of the witness who gave
6 evidence in private session.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go into private session for a while, please.
8 What's the problem, Madam Registrar?
9 [Private session]
2 [Open session]
3 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, not a very long time ago, Mr. Brdjanin
4 referred to my saying that Mr. Talic had a permit signed by Mr. Brdjanin.
5 First of all -- Mr. Ackerman. Did I say Mr. Brdjanin? I did.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: That's what you said. You said Mr. Brdjanin.
7 MS. KORNER: Mr. Ackerman referred to me saying... Right.
8 Can I -- could I have the part of my speech back from yesterday.
9 Right. I've found that.
10 Your Honour, what I actually said was, and this is at page 12 of
11 yesterday's transcript: "Your Honours may remember that Mr. Brdjanin,
12 according to Mr. Talic, was able to provide Mr. Talic not only with a car
13 but Your Honours this is at page 24186 of the transcript, a driver, but
14 also a special permission permit which enabled me to bring my daughter
16 At no stage did I ever allege that Mr. Brdjanin had signed the
17 permit. But the actual evidence which was given by Mr. Talic is this:
18 "Mr. Brdjanin called me to come to Celinac" - this is page 24145 - "I met
19 him on the staircase, and I said, Mr. Brdjanin, I would like to speak to
20 you. And he said yes, very well." This was in chief to Mr. Ackerman.
21 "Go to the office. I'll be up there in a minute. And I came to
22 the office, and we sat down together, and we talked about all the
23 problems, about everything. And he asked me, Talic, what is bothering
24 you? And I told him what it was. And he said, yes, Mr. Brdjanin will
25 help you." He was obviously using the third person.
1 "We went out at 11.30 from his office." I've missed out two
2 lines. "At that time, Mile Maksimovic came out. I don't know what he
3 was, chief of the ministry or something. And he said from the door" -
4 that's he, being Mr. Brdjanin - "Mr. Maksimovic, make me a special permit
5 and secure me a driver and car so that Meho can be taken. When you make
6 this permit, bring it to my office. I'm bringing a stamp, and I will
7 stamp it so that Meho can go and bring his daughter back. And he said
8 very well." And Your Honour, I'm not going to go into the part of the --
9 about coming to the checkpoints because I've already reminded
10 Your Honours.
11 Your Honours, again, we would simply invite Your Honours as we did
12 with Mr. Radojko to read through the whole of that evidence.
13 And finally, Your Honour, and I must say this because we've had
14 this mantra being repeated just in case Your Honours didn't understand the
15 point almost at the end of each point that Mr. Ackerman was making "the
16 Prosecution wants you to ignore" this particular document "because it
17 raises a reasonable doubt and might cause you to acquit Mr. Brdjanin."
18 There are two points I want to make. The first is, the majority
19 of the documents that Mr. Ackerman referred to were entered into evidence
20 by us on behalf of the Prosecution because we took the view that all
21 documents that we were in possession of which were relevant to the issues
22 should be before Your Honour.
23 The second matter is this: At no stage have we ever suggested
24 that Your Honours should ignore any evidence in this case.
25 My very last words to Your Honours yesterday were this:
1 "Your Honours, we say finally, if Your Honours consider all the evidence
2 in this case dispassionately and objectively as we know that you will,"
3 and then we asked you to return the opposite verdict from Mr. Ackerman.
4 Thank you, Your Honours. That's all I wanted to say.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Ms. Korner. Mr. Ackerman, is there a
6 rejoinder? Thank you.
7 But it's not over yet. And I'll try to be as concise as possible.
8 Ms. Korner, Mr. Ackerman, when I was very young, I was taught not to look
9 behind when the journey lies ahead. A very useful advice indeed, based on
10 the wisdom accumulated by our ancestors, especially when the past does not
11 auger well for the future.
12 When I became a judge in Malta several years ago, it suddenly
13 dawned on me that whoever coined that wise adage could not have had court
14 proceedings in mind. How could I, as a judge in any particular case, not
15 look behind as the journey in that case lay ahead? As a judge, I soon
16 learned that the journey ahead at any given moment very much depended on
17 what lay behind. In a few minutes, we shall adjourn this case for
18 judgement. A long and laborious, certainly complex and difficult journey
19 lies ahead. And day in, day out, Judge Janu, Judge Taya, and myself,
20 together with our precious staff will be constantly looking behind to the
21 proceedings in this case, looking back at all the testimony heard, at all
22 the documents tendered, of course at the arguments and submissions, at our
23 notes. We shall consider everything. And at the end, when we would have
24 put all the evidence and our deliberations on the scales of justice, we
25 shall come to a decision sometime towards the end of August.
1 When we concluded the evidence stage, I made a short speech on
2 behalf of the Trial Chamber thanking everyone. We are going to thank you
3 all again. Counsel and those who work outside the courtroom behind the
4 scenes, so to say, to assist you in your difficult work; the clerical
5 staff; the various deputy Registrars who have worked with us; the
6 stenographers and those who complete the transcripts; the technicians, the
7 interpreters with the difficult job to whom I also extend an apology for
8 the many times we made your work more difficult; and of course, to our
9 ushers and the security officers who have helped us indeed.
10 I also wish to thank all the witnesses that came over to give
11 evidence in this case, helping us in our search for the truth. Witnesses
12 that came from afar, witnesses for the Prosecution, and for the Defence.
13 I also thank the Victims and Witnesses Unit for its assistance,
14 both to the witnesses and to Chambers.
15 Last, but not least, I wish to thank our staff who have worked and
16 worked, including weekends, to help us keep abreast with these
17 proceedings. As I said already, please God, we shall all meet again
18 towards the end of August. I mean, August of this year, of course, when
19 we shall pronounce our final judgement in this case. I said all, but it
20 will not be all. And if this is a misstatement, it's not a misstatement
21 to mislead you, Mr. Ackerman, or you, Ms. Korner. It's because as you
22 know, Ms. Korner will be leaving this Tribunal after the end of this
23 month. And so, please, allow me to say a few words to you, Ms. Korner.
24 Ms. Korner, like me, like Judge Janu and Judge Taya, and like your
25 colleague, Mr. Ackerman, but both of you before us were ahead of us. You
1 were trusted with one of the most difficult cases this Tribunal has had to
2 deal with. You have completed your task admirably, Ms. Korner. You have
3 lived to the traditions of advocacy that you have been so well-trained in.
4 You have been loyal to this Trial Chamber. You have been honest. But
5 above all, you have acted professionally throughout and with the utmost
6 propriety towards the staff, the witnesses, counsel for the Defence, and
7 also the Trial Chamber.
8 Ms. Korner, you have done honour to the legal profession of your
9 country and to the Office of this Tribunal's Prosecutor. For all this I
10 congratulate you, and I thank you.
11 The journey lies ahead for you, too. This time, outside this
12 Tribunal, in your own country, back to the English bar, where you have
13 excelled so well in the past. So as you move to pastures new, but also
14 old, I will not tell you not to look behind because you have a new journey
15 on which you are embarking. Do look behind to your work in this Tribunal,
16 particularly in this case, because your performance here has been
17 inspiring, especially to other officers doing prosecutorial work in this
18 Tribunal. On behalf of the Trial Chamber, Ms. Korner, I wish you all the
19 best on this new journey and venture on which you are about to embark.
20 And please, do look behind while you proceed forward in your career.
21 When we meet again towards the end of August, we will also miss
22 the presence amongst us of Dr. Inga Onsea my ALO who as from June 1st will
23 be joining the Office of the Prosecutor of the Rwanda Tribunal. She, too,
24 is embarking on a new journey. And on behalf of Chambers, I wish to thank
25 her publicly for her excellent work and dedication throughout these two
1 and a half years she worked for us. To her to the adage "don't look
2 behind when the journey lies ahead" does not apply. You should look
3 behind to your work here, to the experience gained here as you move to
4 your new journey to Arusha. I bid you farewell and thank you. The Rwanda
5 Tribunal's gain will be our loss.
6 Missing at the end of August when we pronounce judgement will also
7 be all the interns that have helped us throughout these two and a half
8 years. Many of them are already gone. I wish to them, too, the very best
9 in their -- and every success in their respective careers.
10 We leave this with this while we embark on our long and difficult
11 journey, and we promise you that we will go through the entire journey to
12 the best of our abilities, confident that at the end we will each embark
13 on another journey very happy to look back to this one with pride and
14 satisfaction. What we do with what lies behind us will determine our
15 journey. We leave you with this, and we thank you all.
16 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I don't know whether Anneka has rights
17 of audience and, if not, can I say perhaps on behalf of both of us how
18 very grateful we are for Your Honour's very, very kind words.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Ackerman. You always want to
20 have the last word, Mr. Ackerman.
21 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, I do. I just want to join in all of your
22 remarks, your thanks to all of the people who have been involved in this.
23 And farewell to Dr. Inga Onsea, too.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We stand adjourned to a date which will
25 be communicated to you later.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.