1 Thursday, 30 August 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon to everybody in court today.
7 Mr. Registrar, may you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
9 Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number IT-04-83-T, the
10 Prosecutor versus Rasim Delic.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
12 Could we have the appearances for today.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Good afternoon, Your Honours, counsel and everyone in and around
15 the courtroom. For the Prosecution, Daryl Mundis and Matthias Neuner,
16 assisted by our case manager, Alma Imamovic.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
18 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon Your Honours. Good
19 afternoon to our colleagues from the OTP and to all in the courtroom.
20 Vasvija Vidovic and Nicholas Robson as Defence for General Delic,
21 with the assistance of Lana Deljkic.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Madam Vidovic.
23 May the witness please make the declaration.
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
25 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: ALASTAIR DUNCAN.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, you may be seated.
3 JUDGE HARHOFF: Your apologies. We just have a small technical
4 problem here at the Bench, if the parties will excuse us for just a
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
7 Mr. Mundis.
8 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 Examination by Mr. Mundis:
10 Q. Sir, for the record, can you please state your full name?
11 A. Alastair Duncan.
12 Q. And, Mr. Duncan, can you please give us your date and place of
14 A. 22nd of October, 1952, Toft Monks in England.
15 Q. And, Mr. Duncan, where are you currently employed?
16 A. I'm currently employed as the managing director of the services
17 Sound and Vision Corporation, which deploys television and radio to those
18 British soldiers deployed around the world.
19 Q. And, sir, prior to joining the Sound and Vision Corporation, how
20 were you employed?
21 A. I was 34 years in Her Majesty's Armed Forces, the army.
22 Q. And, sir, at the time you left the British Army, what rank did you
23 hold and in what position were you serving?
24 A. I'd been -- I was a major general, and I'd been running the
25 British Army's Warfare Centre in Warminster with responsibility for the
1 training and deployment of all British soldiers on operations in the last
2 two years.
3 Q. Now, sir, would you prefer to be referred to as "Mr. Duncan or
4 "Major General Duncan"?
5 A. I don't mind.
6 Q. Let me ask you if you could very briefly give the Trial Chamber a
7 run down of your military career from the time you joined Her Majesty's
8 Armed Forces until the time you retired as a major general.
9 A. Thank you.
10 I joined the British Army in 1970 and went to Sandhurst for two
11 years, and then after that went through a number of appointments in the
12 infantry with my own battalion and also in instructional posts outside my
14 I then went to Staff College. I went to the High Command Staff
15 Court and the Royal College of Defence Studies, and after that I did a
16 number of promotional jobs command commanding my battalion in 1993 in
17 Bosnia, later on commanding the Bosnian Zone from Banja Luka, and later
18 beyond that as a brigadier 19 Brigade deployed again on operations. In
19 the meantime, a number of trips to Northern Ireland, and then finally my
20 two year stint, which I thoroughly enjoyed, training the British Army.
21 Thank you, sir.
22 Q. And, sir, when you refer to "my battalion," which battalion were
23 you referring to?
24 A. I refer to the 1st Battalion, the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of
25 Yorkshire, which is a single-battalion regiment composed of about 600
1 people, a body of infantry.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: And is it [indiscernible] for the Prince of Wales?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We haven't really got any
4 association for the Prince of Wales, I'm afraid.
5 MR. MUNDIS:
6 Q. Can you tell us, sir, of the 34 years you spent in Her Majesty's
7 Armed Forces, how long were you a member of the 1st Prince of Wales Own
9 A. For the first four years, and then in Northern Ireland for a
10 further two years, and then was in and out, really, three years on
11 employment with the Staff, and then you come back to your regiment. So
12 you hop in and out of your regiment when you move up through the ranks.
13 Q. And, sir, what was the most senior position you held within the
14 1st Prince of Wales' Own Battalion?
15 A. As the commanding officer for a period of three years from 1990 to
16 1993, an unusually long time for a commanding officer, where commanding
17 officers normally have about two years. I managed to squeeze three, which
18 was quite useful for me, but it also meant that the soldiers who worked
19 for me understood how we thought and what we did, and more particularly
20 how I thought, and what I did. And we had been on operations in Belfast
21 in 1990 as a team, so we were a proven team, as it were, in 1993.
22 Q. Now, sir, just for the sake of -- or perhaps to save my own voice,
23 I will be referring to your battalion as "1PWO." Do you understand that?
24 A. That's fine, yes.
25 Q. And that's actually an acronym that was used within your
2 A. Yes, it is indeed, yes.
3 Q. Sir, did there come a time when 1PWO was deployed to
5 A. Yes. We had a message late in 1992 that we would take over from
6 the 1st Battalion, the Cheshire Regiment, that was already in Herzegovina
7 and Bosnia, and we therefore started training for that task. And I knew
8 that we were going there, so I did two reconnaissances before Christmas to
9 see what was there, because clearly I needed to go on the ground and see
10 what the situation was like in order to be able to adjust the organisation
11 of my battalion best able to do its task in theatre. I did two of those
12 reconnaissances, and finally we deployed on the -- I deployed on the 11th
13 of April, and we took over -- I apologise. We deployed on the 5th of
14 April, and we took over the task on the 11th.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Of 1992?
16 THE WITNESS: 1993.
17 MR. MUNDIS:
18 Q. And, sir, you mentioned relieving the Cheshire regiment. Do you
19 know who was the commanding officer of the Cheshire regiment at the time
20 1PWO relieved that regiment?
21 A. Yes, it was Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Stewart from the Cheshire
23 Q. And for the sake of completeness, how long was 1PWO deployed in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina during this tour?
25 A. It was deployed from the 11th of April to the 21st of November.
1 Q. And which year, sir?
2 A. 1993.
3 Q. Okay. And can you tell the Trial Chamber under what authority or
4 under what type of structure your battalion was deployed to Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina in 1993?
6 A. We were deployed as part of the United Nations force which had
7 been authorised and deployed to provide aid to the stricken people there,
8 directly deployed under the headquarters in Kiseljak, the High Command
9 there, which was a military headquarters, and the political headquarters
10 which was in Zagreb.
11 Q. Sir, did this United Nations force that you're referring to go by
12 any acronym or abbreviation?
13 A. UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force.
14 Q. And the military headquarters in Kiseljak, did that have a
15 particular name or acronym that it was known as?
16 A. It had a number of names which we called it from time to time. I
17 can't particularly remember. It was just known as our high formation
19 Q. Perhaps if I could assist, was it also known as BH Command?
20 A. I'm sorry, yes.
21 Q. Now, can you briefly tell the Trial Chamber, sir, what the mission
22 of UNPROFOR and, more particularly, 1PWO, during the course of its
23 deployment in 1993?
24 A. Certainly. The mission was to provide aid and make sure the aid
25 was delivered to whoever required it, both in my area of interest and
1 those other areas that needed it, so we were to help the United Nations
2 High Commissioner for Refugees deploy aid to those people who required it
3 in that theatre.
4 Q. And, sir, can you tell us, during the time period that your
5 battalion was deployed, to whom you reported?
6 A. I reported to the headquarters at Kiseljak that you just referred
7 to, but I also reported to Robin Searby, who is a brigadier, who is based
8 in Split on the coast of Croatia, who was my British commanding officer,
9 as it were.
10 Q. And for the sake of the record, sir, could you tell us who was in
11 command at BH Command during this time period in 1993, if you recall?
12 A. I can't -- I can't recall, to be honest.
13 Q. Okay. And for the sake, sir, of completeness, when your battalion
14 left Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the end of 1993, were you relieved by
15 any other unit?
16 A. Yes, we were. We were relieved by the 1st Battalion, the
17 Coldstream Guards, which was commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel,
18 Peter Phillips -- Peter Williams, I apologise.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Also from Britain?
20 THE WITNESS: Also from Britain, yes.
21 MR. MUNDIS:
22 Q. Can you tell me, sir, during the time period that your battalion
23 was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, about the structure of your
24 battalion, and how you organised it in order to fulfill its mission?
25 A. Yes. It was very unusual. The ground that was given to me to
1 cover started at Romboci, went north from there to Gornji Vakuf, north
2 from there to Novi Travnik, then east to Vitez, and then north from there
3 right the way up to Zenica, and then on from Zenica to Tuzla in the north,
4 a distance of 180 kilometres, which for a British battalion was a very
5 unusual number of ground to cover.
6 However, I decided that we needed a strong presence in Tuzla, so
7 I kept a company of my troops up there, the majority of my people in
8 Vitez, in the centre, and a fourth company at Gornji Vakuf. I was then
9 able to cover much of that 180 kilometres and to also make sure I could
10 fill my task, which was making sure that guaranteed to get the aid to
11 where it was required.
12 Q. Can you tell us, sir, how your unit was structured in terms of the
13 people who actually went out and were on the ground and covering that area
14 that you've told us about?
15 A. Certainly. One of the most important things about my operation
16 was making sure I knew what was going on in my area of responsibility, and
17 so we had a series of layers of information-gathering. The first layer
18 was those soldiers who were deployed in armoured vehicles or also in Land
19 Rovers, would be going out and talking to the local people and to the
20 local soldiers and gathering information of what was going on in the area.
21 And that was the sort of blanket underneath the first level.
22 The second level was a bunch of seven or eight very experienced
23 captains in my unit, who I'd known very well, and they went out
24 specifically to cover areas of interest within our area so that we could
25 talk to the brigades that were going on, and the battalions that were
1 going and see what they -- so that was a level above.
2 And above that we had company commanders who were in charge of
3 groups of about 100 people, and I sent them out separately to reach out to
4 the brigade commanders.
5 So we had three layers, and on top of that was myself, and I would
6 speak to the corps commanders in particular.
7 The reason for making sure we had those five layers is to make
8 sure that we didn't cross over with the information, and the plan from
9 that was everything was then drawn in every day, and we could then find
10 out what was going on, which routes were open, which routes were closed,
11 where there were problems, where we got information in that things needed
12 to be done, and that is how we worked throughout the time we were in
14 Q. Let me ask you, sir, some follow-up questions based on what you've
15 just told us.
16 First of all, these small groups of soldiers deployed in armoured
17 vehicles, did they go by any particular terms?
18 A. The armoured vehicles were two types. One was a Warrior armoured
19 vehicle, that was the nomenclature, that had a crew in the back of about
20 six people and a cannon on top, which is 30-millimetres, and they would
21 normally go out in pairs. This is -- that is quite a powerful force and
22 we would deploy with care.
23 We also had a vehicle called a 432. That was similar to the
24 Warrior except it didn't have a cannon on top at all, and that could do
25 similar tasks.
1 And then finally we would go to vehicles, which had no armament at
2 all, which were issued to my liaison officers, because we felt they had a
3 much less aggressive role because they were just Land Rovers, and they
4 could get amongst people and talk with ease with them.
5 Q. And these Warriors and the 432 vehicles, were they tracked or
6 wheeled armoured vehicles?
7 A. The Warrior and the 432 were both tracked.
8 Q. Let me ask you, sir, about reporting procedures in your battalion
9 during the time you commanded while in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can you
10 tell us about reporting procedures and how you went about reporting
12 A. Yes. Hopefully I've just outlined the five layers that we have of
13 reporting back, but the important thing with that is that every evening at
14 6.00, all that information which had been gathered during the day had been
15 put together by Simon Harrison, who was my intelligence officer, and I say
16 "intelligence officer" because that's what he was doing. He was gathering
17 that information, so we had a complete picture, probably the best picture
18 of -- that anyone had at that time, of the whole of the area.
19 That picture was then given back to everybody at the 6.00 meeting
20 to make sure that it was correct and people could -- who went to that
21 meeting at 6.00 were not only my own soldiers, they were UNHCR people,
22 they were Red Cross people, ECMM people, everybody who was involved in
23 trying to get that aid through to people came to that meeting. And having
24 done the meeting and adjusted, we then produced a thing called a Military
25 Information Sum, which was sent out to everybody in my organisation, also
1 downwards, upwards and sideways, so that everybody knew the situation that
2 was going on, and they could see that and adjust their patrols and conduct
3 the next day. And that was a process that went on all the time.
4 Q. We'll see a few of these military information sums or milinfosums
5 in a few moments, but can you just tell us a little bit about how those
6 documents were structured and what were -- the way those documents were
7 presented, and what was done with those documents once they were finished?
8 JUDGE HARHOFF: Counsel, may I interrupt, because before we go
9 into that, I would like to ask you, General: Who was above and to the
10 sides of the flow of information that you just described?
11 THE WITNESS: To one side we had the Canadian Battalion, who were
12 in Visoko, and we also had a French Battalion, they were in Kakanj up the
13 road. But apart from that, it was very open, indeed, because we had this
14 huge distance to cover.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: And above?
16 THE WITNESS: Above was the headquarters in Kiseljak, the BHC
17 command, and we reported to them every day.
18 JUDGE HARHOFF: Do you know if any of this information was made
19 available somehow to the warring parties in the area?
20 THE WITNESS: It would not be normally made to the warring parties
21 at all, no. That was -- this information we were gathering was so that we
22 had a picture, the armed forces had a picture, the UNHCR had a picture,
23 and all those agencies had a good picture, so we could work together. It
24 was really to make sure that we had unity of effort to what we were trying
25 to achieve.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: Right, but I suppose that just as interesting it
2 was for you to find out what they were doing, it would be equally
3 interesting for them to find out what you knew, and that is why I was
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. They were obviously -- I think, sir, they
6 would obviously keep tabs on what we were doing.
7 MR. MUNDIS:
8 Q. To follow up on a question that Judge Harhoff has just asked, you
9 told us, sir, about your battalion having liaison officers to the parties.
10 Were there any other liaison officers going the other direction?
11 A. It was -- I managed to persuade the warring parties to send
12 liaison officers back to me. This was a fairly risky affair, but it was
13 worth doing because it gained our confidence, particularly with the
14 commanders. Those liaison officers would be expected to talk to
15 brigade-level commanders in the same way that my people were talking to
17 Q. And, General, which parties had liaison officers to 1PWO during
18 this time period you were deployed?
19 A. It was done regionally, so we moved across the various regions,
20 and we moved those deployments as the -- my apologies. We moved those
21 deployments as those deployments changed from time to time. It was about
22 ten officers altogether which moved around.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: What kind of information was exchanged between
24 these liaison officers?
25 THE WITNESS: Between liaison officers, we would tell them what we
1 were doing, we would tell them where the aid convoys were going so that we
2 could hopefully preempt any problems with the aid, particularly. And then
3 we would hopefully find out what they were doing so that they wouldn't be
4 doing anything that stopped us going. So a two-way system, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: And did they tell you what they were doing?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, they did.
7 MR. MUNDIS:
8 Q. Now, General Duncan, let me go back to the milinfosums. Can you
9 tell us a little bit about how those documents were structured and what
10 was done with those documents once they were completed and had been vetted
12 A. The first thing is that all this information which came in to my
13 captain, Captain Harrison, in the headquarters was collated together to
14 make sure it made sense, and we didn't overlap, and we didn't
15 double-report what was going on and things like that. So we made sure we
16 had a, for the 6.00 meeting, a good information. That was then discussed
17 at the 6.00 meeting to make sure that everybody was happy with it, and
18 from there we produced a milinfosum which essentially was the facts with a
19 header on top, and underneath it, normally by locations, what was going on
20 in each location for that particular day, and finishing up at the end
21 sometimes with a conclusion, a suggestion, and things like that, for the
22 next day and -- and I would sign that off every day, either myself
23 personally or my second in command would sign that off to make sure that
24 we had got the right information, and we were doing things correctly for
25 the next day.
1 I should add that one of the major points I made as commanding
2 officer there was for the soldiers on the ground to think if what they did
3 was going to help to get the aid through, that was good and they should do
4 it. But if they felt it was not going to get the aid through, they
5 shouldn't do it, because you can imagine with a force which was deployed
6 over 180 kilometres, I can't micromanage what they're doing, and they need
7 to do have an idea, clearly they needed to know how to get the aid
8 through, but also at the same time, will this help my commanding officer
9 or will this hinder and that was a guideline which was very useful for
10 everybody across.
11 I digressed a little bit, which I apologise, Your Honours, but
12 that's how it was put together every day.
13 That information sum was then passed sideways to everybody
14 downwards to my units and also upwards. So that again, everybody
15 involved, including ECMM, UNHCR knew what was going on. It was a team
16 effort every day.
17 Q. General Duncan, when you indicate in that answer that you would
18 sign off on the document, did you physically sign the documents, did you
19 write your name on the documents, or what do you mean you say you would
20 sign off on it?
21 A. I would then tell the captain, "That's it, put it, send it off
22 now," and it would go off in the form of a fax.
23 Q. Now, sir --
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Without your signature?
25 THE WITNESS: My signature is indecipherable, sir, so it didn't
1 matter. Going off as a fax meant that it had been distributed.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: A signature doesn't have to be deciphered, it just
3 has to be recognised.
4 THE WITNESS: It was scratched, yes.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Recognised as your sign.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes sir.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You did put a signature?
8 THE WITNESS: I did put my signature, yes.
9 MR. MUNDIS:
10 Q. Now, General Duncan, let me ask you, sir, about the situation in
11 Central Bosnia in 1993 at the time your unit arrived there, in terms of
12 the overall strategic situation in Central Bosnia.
13 A. Before I'd arrived there, rather, it was relatively benign on the
14 two reconnaissances that I'd done. But when I got there for my deployment
15 on the 5th, we were then immediately involved in Ahmici and the problem
16 there, which was basically that the Muslims living there had been
17 slaughtered by the HVO or their troops and had knocked people out, and
18 clearly the atmosphere was pretty awful in that stage. A huge atrocity
19 had been done, and within days I found myself in Ahmici finding the bodies
20 and helping to clear up which was a most terrible situation, a situation
21 which was rapidly picked up by the press and transmitted around the world
22 as a terrible atrocity.
23 As a result of that atrocity, the HVO forces, the Croat forces,
24 and the BiH forces, mainly the Muslim forces, fell out with one another
25 completely, and this terrible period of a fight or a war within a war
1 started in Bosnia. So instead of taking their effort to try and prevent
2 the Serb forces coming in, which they had been doing, we now had this
3 internecine battle inside Bosnia which was doing us no good, them no good,
4 and no good at all. And it meant now we had much more difficulties in
5 getting the aid through, as the situation had collapsed very badly.
6 Q. Sir, with respect to the ARBiH and the HVO forces, can you give us
7 a picture of the tactical situation in terms of various advantages and
8 strength and weaknesses of those two parties in the early part of the tour
9 of your battalion?
10 A. In round terms the BiH, ABiH, had an awful lot of soldiers, but
11 not a lot of equipment. And the HVO forces had a lot of equipment but a
12 limited number of people, so you had a dichotomy between the two. It
13 meant that it was quite difficult for people to sustain a battle, and
14 therefore when an advance was taken, it tended to peter out very quickly,
15 and also the lie of the land in that Lasva Valley had a road running all
16 the way through it, like a spine; and therefore, the HVO forces, who had
17 few numbers, could quickly deploy along that spine like a fire brigade to
18 block off any attacks. So we were surrounded, or had begun to be
19 surrounded, in an area which was controlled outside by the BiH forces and
20 inside by HVO.
21 That didn't happen overnight, it's a situation that developed,
22 and it developed because both sides began, if you like, ethnic cleansing,
23 moving forward in areas which they believed, rightly or wrongly, were for
24 themselves, and moving people out, setting fire to their houses, and
25 killing them, and a number of atrocities which again we tried to stop as
1 best we could. It was an unpleasant place to be.
2 Q. General Duncan, you told us earlier that your -- one of your
3 primary tasks was dealing with the senior leaders of the parties. Can you
4 tell us with whom you dealt, starting on the ARBiH side?
5 A. On the ARBiH side, I spoke to Enver Hadzihasanovic and
6 Jamie Merdan, who was his 2 IC, and I spent a lot of time talking to him
7 because he was the commander of the 3rd Corps based in Zenica. So I would
8 drive across perhaps two or three times a week and go and see him, talk
9 through the problems that we had, mutual problems, and to see whether we
10 could do anything about it.
11 In a similar manner, I would go see Tihomir Blaskic, who was
12 commanding the HVO forces in the centre, who was based in Vitez, and I
13 would drive across with him. And I was a bit of a messenger boy at that
14 time, trying to coordinate the two and get them together. And that's what
15 we did. We got them together into a joint mission with the Red Cross and
16 everybody else involved to try and thrash out the problems and to prevent
17 them happening.
18 It worked quite well, but I'm afraid after a bit you get to a
19 stage where it's quite clear that whatever you do, both sides were at each
20 other's throats, and therefore we were unable to get any further.
21 But certainly despite that, I carried on keeping that relationship
22 with the two, if you like, major commanders in the area, one ABiH and one
24 Q. Let me ask you, sir, about Enver Hadzihasanovic. What position
25 did he hold at the time you were meeting with him?
1 A. He was the commander of the 3rd Corps.
2 Q. And do you recall approximately how frequently or how often you
3 would have met with General Hadzihasanovic during this time period of your
5 A. It depended on events, because sometimes we couldn't get through,
6 but two or three times a week, if I could make it. And I would also go
7 and see it clearly. If he sent me a message, "can we talk."
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down and pause
9 between question and answer. Thank you.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You heard that, Mr. Mundis?
11 MR. MUNDIS: Absolutely.
12 Q. What, sir, were some of the topics that you would have discussed
13 with General Hadzihasanovic?
14 A. We discussed the routes through the area, because clearly when
15 sides -- warring sides are at each other's throats, it's difficult to
16 cross those sort of front lines. We discussed that the right amount of
17 food was going to people, and that's one of the tasks of my liaison
18 officers, to make sure that the food had been distributed round the place
19 in the correct manner, and we discussed other matters as they came up,
20 including fishing and other things.
21 Q. Other than fishing and other things, do you recall any of the
22 specific other matters or problems that you addressed with
23 General Hadzihasanovic?
24 A. They tended to be addressed as and when they came. There wasn't
25 any sort of agenda that came in whenever we met. It was normally
1 generated by a problem or something that needed to be resolved or a
2 question from the senior officer.
3 Q. Are you familiar, sir, with an entity that was known as the "Joint
5 A. Yes, I am. The joint command was initially -- there was two joint
6 commands. There was a joint command in Travnik. Are you referring to
7 that one?
8 Q. Let's start with that one.
9 A. Yes. There was a joint command in Travnik, because prior to my
10 arrival, the HVO and the BiH were fighting against the VRS, that's the
11 Serbs, in the west and keeping them out from Travnik. In order to do
12 that, they had agreed to get together, and they had a joint command in
13 Travnik and that was going extremely well.
14 However, after Ahmici and other atrocities, it tended to fall
15 apart. So that joint command was fairly short-lived after the time I'd
16 got there, but unfortunately it didn't work very well.
17 Q. And the other joint command?
18 A. The other joint command was an initiative by myself to get
19 together the senior commanders from BiH and from HVO as often as possible,
20 perhaps once a week, with their teams, so that we could thrash through all
21 the problems and try and stop all these atrocities and animosities and
22 fighting going on because it wasn't helping their effort or us. And
23 therefore I wanted to get them together and discuss such things as
24 prisoner exchange, the exchange of bodies, the routes that we could use
25 through and beyond as it came through, and other things like that. It was
1 to unstick the problems we had in the area.
2 It worked reasonably well until both sides didn't want it to work,
3 and then we had to stop, because there was no trying -- trying to force.
4 You can take the horse to water, but it might not want to drink it and
5 that's the stage we got to, sir.
6 Q. We need to slow down for the benefit of the interpreters, and
7 also, sir, if you can pause between my question and giving an answer so
8 the interpreters can stay with us, please.
9 A. My apologies.
10 Q. You told us, sir, that the -- and I'm referring now to this second
11 joint command, not the Travnik Joint Command. This second joint command,
12 you told us that it was an initiative to get together the senior
13 commanders from BiH and from HVO. Do you recall which senior commanders
14 would attend these meetings?
15 A. Yes. It would be Hadzihasanovic and Tihomir Blaskic.
16 Q. Let me now turn, sir, to a different topic, and I would ask you if
17 you have any information or any knowledge about the system of command and
18 control within the 3rd Corps, based upon what you observed or based upon
19 meetings you held with senior members of the 3rd Corps.
20 A. As a result of my talks to the senior commanders, and also the
21 system we had set up across the area that we had, we had an extremely good
22 plan, if you like, of what was going on for both the HVO and the ABiH.
23 That plan was transformed into a -- on a piece of paper, one piece of
24 paper, which quite simply had the corps headquarters at the top, and which
25 were the subsidiary brigade headquarters under that, and then broken down
1 all the way down to battalion level. So we could plot where those forces
2 were for both sides.
3 So in terms of knowing what was going on, we had a living document
4 that was changed very often at the evening conference to move things
5 around a bit to see where they were, and we had that document which we ran
6 all the way through to enable us to see what was going on.
7 So we knew what was going on right the way across.
8 Q. General Duncan, can you tell us if you were aware of any
9 communication systems that the 3rd Corps Command had?
10 A. The 3rd Corps Command had initially access to telephones through
11 the telephone exchange in Vitez, but after Ahmici that facility was, not
12 surprisingly, unplugged. But besides that, they had satellite telephones,
13 and I knew that because they had given me the phone numbers in case we
14 wanted to call. And on top of that, I knew they had very clear
15 communications back to Sarajevo. That was very useful as well.(redacted)
25 Q. General Duncan, I'd like to ask you a follow-up based on what
1 you've told us. In your answer as reflected on lines 11 and 12, you said:
2 "I knew they had very clear communications back to Sarajevo."
3 And my question to you, sir, is: What is the basis for that
5 A. The basis for that statement is, because when I asked questions
6 about what was going on in Sarajevo or in other areas, I could get a
7 quick, a very -- a quick message back. Or if they wanted me to talk about
8 something, we could do that as well. I just felt that you could get an
9 answer very quickly from 3rd Corps, very quickly.
10 Q. Let me now turn, sir, to the events in June of 1993 or to focus
11 your mind on June 1993. Can you tell us what the situation was like in
12 Central Bosnia in the first few days of June 1993?
13 A. I'm afraid with the passage of time, the dates are quite difficult
14 to know what's going on. If you were to tell me there was some activity
15 happening, but I really can't pick out a date.
16 Q. Let me ask you this, if you recall whether you had any meetings in
17 the first few days of June 1993 with Enver Hadzihasanovic.
18 A. Yes, almost certainly I would have had meetings with him.
19 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness now be shown the
20 document marked PT01163. That's PT01163.
21 Q. Now, General Duncan, since this is the first time we're looking at
22 one of these documents, can you tell the Trial Chamber what is appearing
23 on the screen in front of you?
24 A. Yes, certainly. The top line is referring to what it is, in that
25 case 1PWO, which we've already discussed, is nomenclature of my battalion.
1 The "No info sum" is short of where putting the military information sum,
2 the number"037," merely gives it its sequence, and dated the 15th of June,
3 1993, would be the day that I signed it off.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would it be the 15th or the 5th?
5 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, sir, you're absolutely right, the 5th.
6 MR. MUNDIS:
7 Q. And let me ask you this, sir, in light of what you've just told us
8 in terms about the date that you signed it off. Do you see your signature
9 on this page?
10 A. At the moment, I don't.
11 MR. MUNDIS: Perhaps if we could scroll down to the bottom of this
12 page. Could we go to the bottom of the page, please? Can we go to the
13 second page of the document?
14 Q. Sir, do you see your signature on any of these pages?
15 A. Not at the moment, no.
16 Q. Okay. Let me then ask you, have you had the opportunity to review
17 this document?
18 A. I have, yes.
19 Q. Can you focus your attention, please, on the fifth paragraph of
20 this document, paragraph 5, under the heading "Zenica."
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you tell us, sir, what is being reported in this paragraph of
23 the milinfosum?
24 A. This paragraph 5 refers to my meeting with Enver Hadzihasanovic,
25 the commander of 3 Corps, to discuss the problem of Travnik, and it
1 says -- and this is essentially my recall, both from my mind and from my
2 staff officer that came with me, the detail of our meeting and what we had
3 discussed. And that runs through that document right the way down as far
4 as the word, which is in bold, "Comment." All that above, from "Zenica"
5 down to the word "Comment," will be the actual fact, and the comment
6 itself would be an expression of what we thought was going to happen. So
7 the first bit is fact, the second bit is comment.
8 Q. And, sir, just for the benefit of everyone present, so that we all
9 understand, the first line of paragraph 5, if you will, there's a -- it's
10 indicated "CO 1-PWO." Can you tell us what that refers to?
11 A. That refers directly to me as the commanding officer of the
12 1st Battalion, the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire, i.e., 1PWO.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Your Honour, we would ask that this document be
14 admitted into evidence.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
16 please be given an exhibit number.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 283.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
19 MR. MUNDIS: I would now ask that the witness now be shown
20 PT01171, PT01171.
21 Q. While this document is coming up, General Duncan, let me ask you a
22 little bit more about these comments that appear in some of these
24 Can you tell us a little bit about how the comment came to be
25 created and what the purpose of the comment was or comments are?
1 A. The comments are generally formed by my intelligence officer as a
2 result of what has been happening over a period of time, in terms of
3 incidents, or trends, or ideas of what might happen in the future. He
4 would put those down as guidance for people as to what might then happen
5 in the future. It's merely his thoughts. It is not taken as gospel
6 truth. The bit above will be pretty well 100 per cent correct. It's
7 merely the comment is there to give some guidance to people.
8 Q. Okay. And, sir, what was the -- how would the intelligence
9 officer be in a position to make these type of comments?
10 A. His -- my intelligence officer's entire life was sitting in his
11 office, gathering in the information that was coming in from everybody and
12 pulling that all together and that's what he did every single day, unless
13 his second in command stepped in because he had to go somewhere, but that
14 was pulled together. He therefore lived the organisations. He was, if
15 you like, a living computer in those days, in 1993. He knew what was
16 going on everywhere, it was in his head. He could recall things, and he
17 was my intelligence officer because, I have to say, he was an extremely
18 bright officer in my regiment, and he would put those milinfosums together
19 and put the comments together.
20 Q. Do you recall any occasion where you, as the commanding officer,
21 disagreed with any of those comments?
22 A. Yes, on a number of occasions I did disagree.
23 Q. And what would be the result if you disagreed with a comment, a
24 proposed comment or a comment?
25 A. I would then not sign off straightaway. We'd discuss why his
1 comment -- I wasn't happy with it, and if necessary we would change the
2 comment. But very often, because he in many ways had a much closer idea
3 of what was going on, he could justify his comments. So it was a
4 discussion between myself and him.
5 Q. And the comments that are reflected in the written documents, did
6 you ever have any disagreements with anything that went out in the written
8 A. Again, yes, on many occasions. I say "on many occasions" because
9 this report was produced every day, and therefore we produced a lot of
10 reports. But clearly if I'd come back late and wanted to change something
11 and put it in, it could be fed in at the last minute.
12 Q. Let's now look at the document in front of you, sir, and can you
13 tell us what this document is?
14 A. Certainly, yes. That is again 1PWO, my battle group's milinfosum
15 038, dated the 6th of June, 1993, which reports from Tuzla in this case,
16 where we had a force up there, a company.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Can we now please go in the English version to page 5
18 and in the --
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: Before we leave -- could we just get back to the
20 page we just left, because, General, I'd like you just to explain to us
21 what the references are under Heading D: "BSA Equipment Locations," and
22 then you mention Howitzer and tanks and mortars.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: And then a number of things, are they grid
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, it's horribly hieroglyphical, and I
2 apologise, it's military. In short it refers to the types - you're
3 exactly right, sir - it refers to types of vehicles, in this case, and
4 120-millimetre 155 Howitzers, and those lists - you're absolutely correct,
5 sir - that is a list of the grids where they were seen.
6 JUDGE HARHOFF: So my question is: Did the force that was
7 observed here have one Howitzer that was seen at, one, two, three, four,
8 five, six locations that day, or does it mean that there were six
10 THE WITNESS: It means there were six Howitzers, sir, one at
11 these -- those Howitzers were at those grid points.
12 JUDGE HARHOFF: And if you look down under "Three tanks," did they
13 have that many tanks? Apparently.
14 THE WITNESS: Apparently, yes.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: But I -- sir, can I just remind you that those are
17 Bosnian Serb army tanks and not HVO or ABiH, so these will be observed
18 over the front lines.
19 JUDGE HARHOFF: I'm just surprised because I thought you told us a
20 while ago that the ABiH was under-equipped.
21 THE WITNESS: It is, sir. These are Serbian vehicles.
22 JUDGE HARHOFF: Sorry, sorry.
23 THE WITNESS: I apologise. These are Serbian vehicles, these
24 ones. They're from the BSA, "BSA" being Bosnian Serb Army.
25 JUDGE HARHOFF: Oh, sorry, yes, I misheard that. Thanks.
1 MR. MUNDIS:
2 Q. Let me ask you, General Duncan, because we'll also see this
3 abbreviation commonly in a number of the milinfosums, can you tell us what
4 the abbreviation "C\S" is?
5 A. Yes, "C\S" is an abbreviation for call sign. It will appear quite
6 often on milinfosums; although, it may not be on this milinfosum.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you excuse my slowness on the uptake, was
8 "C\S" --
9 MR. MUNDIS: "C\S" does not appear on this page. I'm simply asking
10 him because, we will see that on a number of --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: I would like to ask about what I see on this
12 document. Now, will you excuse me, I know absolutely nothing about the
13 military, so I see Judge Harhoff here knows that"CQ" means a grid. What
14 about grid? What's a grid?
15 THE WITNESS: A grid is a location, merely, sir.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Some specified area?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. It's -- on our maps, we have a grid on the
18 map, and within that you get 100 spaces, as it were, and you can therefore
19 give it a nomenclature. So by running 305179, it gives you -- to walk
20 across and down, it gives you a spot which is exactly accurate as to what
21 that is.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what is "Sqn," "Squadron"?
23 THE WITNESS: That's squadron, yes.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what is "B" before "Squadron"?
25 THE WITNESS: "BSA" are you talking to?
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, no, no. Just under the heading "Tuzla,"
2 number 1, "B Squadron"?
3 THE WITNESS: B Squadron, yes, yes. Those were the -- that's the
4 name of the squadron that was deployed up in Tuzla, the grouping, sir.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
6 THE WITNESS: I apologise for the British Army's numenclature.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: No problem. You didn't write this with a view to
8 coming to testify. It was for your information.
9 MR. MUNDIS:
10 Q. Let's return, General Duncan, to the "C\S." You told us that that
11 referred to -- can you please tell us again?
12 A. It refers directly to a call sign. The call sign will be normally
13 the radio sign of that vehicle, so it will be known by a call sign. It
14 will probably have it painted on the back door and the sides as well, so
15 you could see that is call sign so-and-so, what type of vehicle it was,
16 and you know what it is because you've heard it speak over the air. It
17 enables us to track what's going on. It's merely call sign X or Y will
18 come in and put their reports in it, it just gets for our milinfosum, it
19 tells us who said it, basically.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: And this is a sign on one of your vehicles or one
21 of the army vehicles that are listed here?
22 THE WITNESS: These are Bosnian Serb Army equipment, so they will
23 not be on our -- yes. If I just turn to -- if I may for a moment, sir, to
24 point C on that, it says: "50 times Bosnian Serb Army tanks," so that's
25 why we've got the numbers there, which are quite large. They're not Croat
1 or ABiH at all.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Mundis.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Could we please go to page 5 in the English version
4 and page 6 in the B/C/S version, please.
5 Q. Sir, can you look at paragraph 10 as a starting point. Can you
6 tell us what paragraph 10 is referring to, what it's relating to?
7 A. Paragraph 10 relates to two meetings, first chaired by
8 Ambassador Thebault, who was with the European Commission Monitoring
9 Force, and the second by myself, in an attempt to effect a ceasefire. And
10 we pulled together those list of commanders, senior commanders, from both
11 HVO and ABiH. Those got together for that meeting, and I chaired it with
12 Thebault, and it was an attempt to get people together as a joint command.
13 Q. Now, can we look now at paragraph 11, and simply for the benefit
14 of the Chamber, if you look at paragraph 11, sir, and in the middle of
15 that paragraph you see a comment?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And to tie up to a question I asked a few moments ago, can you
18 tell us what that comment means?
19 A. The Comment in that case means that the following information or
20 the following sentences, until comment ends, is the perception of my
21 intelligence officer, and it says that call signs have reported large
22 numbers of Croats ready to leave the town, and are claiming they wished to
23 move to Novi Bila. Now, that is his comment of what's happening. It's not
24 particularly fact, but it's what might happen.
25 Q. And I would turn your attention, sir, to paragraph 12, and if you
1 could take a quick look at that to perhaps refresh your recollection.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you recall --
4 A. I do recall that. We were due to reconvene at 1800 hours that
5 evening, but without the planned attendance of either Blaskic, the senior
6 HVO, and Hadzihasanovic, it really didn't get very far.
7 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that this document be admitted into
8 evidence, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
10 please be given an exhibit number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 284.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
13 MR. MUNDIS:
14 Q. General Duncan, I'd now like to turn to or focus your attention
15 on, again, the first half of June 1993. Did there come a time, sir, where
16 active fighting erupted in Central Bosnia?
17 A. Fighting erupted in Central Bosnia, particularly around the area
18 of the Lasva Valley, in a sporadic way. It was -- it is difficult to
19 point out individual activities, although sometimes we could, from our
20 milinfosums, discover what was likely to happen and put that down. It
21 is -- was an attempt much of the time for the ABiH to try to cut that
22 spinal road through, which was an essential thing for them to do and that
23 is really -- that dominates the area at that time, their attempts to do
25 Q. And can you tell us, if you recall, when this fighting erupted,
1 the date?
2 A. I'm sorry, I can't. I haven't got the dates at my fingertip after
3 these years.
4 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask if the witness could be shown the
5 document marked PT01189. That's PT01189.
6 Q. Sir, again for the record, can you tell us what this document is?
7 A. Again, it's a milinfosum generated by my battalion, number 40,
8 dated the 8th of June, 1993. It starts with "Vitez," where clearly there
9 were some rounds -- single rounds fired from rifles, I suspect, but not
10 really significant. Of more significant is the second paragraph there,
11 where it says "General," and it explains or, rather, describes that the
12 expected BiH offensive in the area has begun, and then it recounts the
13 detail of the advance forward by reference to various villages which had
14 been captured.
15 Q. And does this milinfosum relate to the combat operations you were
16 just describing a moment ago?
17 A. Very much so, yes. Absolutely. This describes in some detail
18 what has happened, and again it is a result of gathering of information
19 over a period of time, and perhaps on a short period of time when
20 everything erupted.
21 Q. And again, sir, I would just ask -- I'm going to show you another
22 document, but I would ask you if you could again take a look at the number
23 of this milinfosum and the date of it, and keep that in mind as we look at
24 the next document.
25 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness now be shown PT01209.
1 That's PT --
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you want to do with this one?
3 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that this be admitted, Your Honour, thank
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: That document is admitted into evidence. May it
6 please be given an exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 289.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
9 MR. MUNDIS: Again, PT01209.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Registrar, did you say Exhibit 285?
11 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour, 285.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I see the transcript says "289". May the record
13 show it's 285 and not 289.
14 Thank you very much.
15 MR. MUNDIS:
16 Q. Now, General Duncan, do you see the document that's on the screen
17 in front of you?
18 A. Yes, I do, yes.
19 Q. Can you tell us what this document is?
20 A. Again, it is a milinfosum dated 41, so it's a slightly later one,
21 on the 9th of May, 1993, and it summarises recent events in the Travnik
22 and western Lasva Valley area, which at this stage was really where most
23 of the activity between HV and ABiH forces was going on.
24 Q. Can you look, sir, at the note on this document, that is, the
25 first sentence under the summary?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And there's a reference to a date?
3 A. It says you should read this milinfosum in conjunction with the
4 milinfosums from the 1st of June onwards, which contain the detail of
6 Q. Okay. I'm asking you now, General Duncan, if you can comment on
7 the fact that this document appears to be dated 9 May 1993, it's an Annex
8 to milinfosum number 41 dated 9 May 1993. Can you comment upon that?
9 A. It must be wrongly labelled. It can't be May. I think it's June.
10 Q. And again, what would be the purpose of an Annex such as this one
11 to a milinfosum?
12 A. The purpose of this Annex would enable those people who read it to
13 get a much better idea of what's going on, rather than just taking the
14 snapshots they get every evening from the milinfosum. So what my
15 intelligence officer has put together is a summary of all those recent
16 events so that people who are not aware of what's going on or need to get
17 up to date can read this, and they can then understand what is happening
18 over the period. It gives an idea of what has happened in the past, and a
19 possibility of what might happen in the future.
20 JUDGE HARHOFF: Was that done on a weekly basis?
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it was done as required. There was no
22 particular trigger by weeks. It was merely done when we felt there was a
23 need to make sure people knew what was going on.
24 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, we ask that this document be admitted
25 into evidence.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
2 please be given an exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number 286.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
5 And, Mr. Mundis, did the previous document, Exhibit 285, PT01189,
6 referred to an Annex A to it, and I'm particularly interested to see that
7 Annex A to that document.
8 MR. MUNDIS: Let me make some inquiries about that, Your Honour. I
9 had noticed that yesterday and made some preliminary inquiries. I'm not
10 sure if that document is in the OTP's possession, and I don't believe that
11 it's on the exhibit list, but I will certainly make some inquiries and
12 will provide that information.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would it have to stand alone in the exhibit list as
14 an item or is it part of Annex -- is it part of PT01189?
15 MR. MUNDIS: Well, it could very well be a part, obviously, since
16 it's referred to, but it did not come up in our system as being attached
17 to this. It might have a sequential ERN number, but we'll make some
18 inquiries on that at the next break and see if we can inform the Trial
19 Chamber at that point in time.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, at which point, sir, I might
21 as well remind you that you're left with three minutes.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Let me now ask the witness, sir, if you've ever heard of a place
24 called Guca Gora.
25 A. Yes, I have, yes.
1 Q. Can you tell us what happened in Guca Gora?
2 A. In Guca Gora had a large church, and in that church were
3 sheltering a number of Croats who had been surrounded by BiH, and my call
4 signs, which were out on the ground, detected that there was going to be a
5 problem here because these people could well be massacred, as a result of
6 which I deployed a very large force to Guca Gora, to the church, and we
7 managed to eventually, over two days, rescue 187 people who were stuck
8 there, who were put in the back of my armoured vehicles and brought back
9 into the Lasva Valley.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you able to remember on what date this was when
11 they were in this church?
12 THE WITNESS: Sir, I haven't got the date. I can -- the number --
13 the number "187" is printed on me, but not the date, I'm afraid.
14 MR. MUNDIS:
15 Q. And, General Duncan, what steps, if any, were taken with respect
16 to these 187 people who were in that church?
17 A. They were conveyed in the back of my armoured vehicles to the
18 refugee centre in the Lasva Valley, where they were able to meet up with
19 their friends and relatives.
20 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness be shown PT01240.
22 Q. General Duncan, I would like you to focus your attention on
23 paragraph B of this document, and please tell the Trial Chamber if you
24 know anything about what's described in paragraph B.
25 A. Paragraph B describes the situation prior to the evacuation, where
1 we had surrounded -- or were surrounded by Mujahedin elements in some
2 strengths, the group containing Arabic speakers, and were quite hostile.
3 Q. Now, what, sir, if anything, can you tell us about these Mujahedin
5 A. The Mujahedin elements in Central Bosnia consisted of a number of
6 what I call local Mujahid who were part of the BiH, who had decided to put
7 on clothing and equipment more aligned with Mujahed type people rather
8 than normal soldiers, and that was one element. It was what I call "the
9 locals." There were also a number of elements who came from outside, and I
10 say they came from outside -- they came from outside of the country and
11 into the country and joined almost as mercenaries, and joined up with the
13 It is my belief that the reason they did that is because at this
14 stage and later on an awful lot of money was being put into the BiH from
15 outside resources, and the bill for that, I believe, was a requirement to
16 take in to the BiH a number of Mujahedins, both local and imported. They
17 were very hostile at most of times. They formed later on into formed
18 units, and they were used with great effect by the ABiH.
19 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'd ask that this document be admitted
20 into evidence.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
22 please be given an exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 287.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I am cognizant of the time, as well as
1 our Rule 65 ter estimate on this witness. I would ask the Trial Chamber's
2 leave for a little bit more time. I have four more documents, all of
3 which relate to the subject of the Mujahedin, that I would like to cover
4 with this witness, if that's acceptable.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: That is acceptable.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone --
7 MR. MUNDIS: We'll deal with one document now, sir, and move on to
8 the remaining three after the recess -- or after the break. I do thank
9 the Trial Chamber.
10 Could we please now see the document PT01116, PT01116.
11 Q. And while that's coming up, General Duncan, can you tell us what
12 you mean when you say, referring to the Mujahedin, "They formed later into
13 formed units and they were used to great effect by the ABiH"? Can you
14 tell us what you meant by that?
15 A. Yes. The Mujahedin became the basis of 7 Muslim Brigade, which
16 was a manoeuvre unit, and because of its -- its makeup, they were very
17 efficient and good soldiers. I say "good" in the effective term. They
18 were very effective soldiers. I wouldn't ever actually put the tag of
19 "good" along side them.
20 However, they were often used, and as part of a plan, if you
21 wished to move forward, and I've stated before or tried to state before,
22 that the ABiH have lots of soldiers but little equipment, and therefore
23 having a unit which has quite good equipment and pretty nasty people, in
24 terms of being able to fight extremely well, would often be used and
25 advertised before an assault went on. So they would say, "7 Muslims" or
1 "The Mujahedin are coming," and people would be very, very frightened, and
2 therefore in terms of shock tactics, they were a very special unit, able
3 to put people's minds at worry about what was going to happen, and then
4 they would follow on with an attack, perhaps, and go through. That enabled
5 a very quick and clean and well-organised force to move the ABiH's forces
6 front line forward and win some more ground, which they did very
7 successfully using these forces.
8 Q. General Duncan, if you could now look at the document on the
9 screen in front of you and tell us what this document is.
10 A. Once again, it is a milinfosum from my battle group, dated the
11 27th of May.
12 Q. Let's then turn, please, to page 3 in English and page 4 in the
13 Bosnian language. And I would ask, General Duncan, if you could please
14 look, when this page comes up, if you could please look at paragraph 10.
15 A. Yes. This refers directly to a visit to Zenica by one of my
16 liaison officers, who was able to visit and see the Mujahedin manoeuvre
17 unit in a street there, the commander of which was absent, but the unit
18 spokesman, who comes from Istanbul and therefore was somebody from outside
19 the country who had been brought in, stated those five points there. He
20 stated the strength of his unit, the fact that it is directly subordinate
21 to 3 BiH, but currently there are only 15 soldiers there, that they train
22 themselves, that they are members of -- they are Bosnian Muslims who are
23 members of the unit to encourage to grow beards; and therefore, become
24 more Mujahedin-like than they would normally.
25 They don't believe any intervention by the Western powers will
1 assist them in their plight, the Bosnian plight. And there are a number of
2 nationalities fighting with the Mujahedin, including Australians,
3 Canadians, French, and British.
4 Q. And General Duncan, my last question before we take a short
5 recess. In paragraph 10(a)(1), where it says: "... directly subordinate
6 to HQ 3 BiH Corps," do you have a comment or can you comment upon that
7 part of this report?
8 A. My comment would be is when you have a specialised unit, such as
9 that organisation of Mujahedins, they have to be used with skill and very
10 carefully; and therefore, they must be controlled at the highest level.
11 In a similar way, whether you have special forces in other armies,
12 those special forces come under high command. It would be very unusual
13 for any force like this of Mujahedins or, if you like, shock troops, to be
14 given just anywhere and which array. You would want to keep them
15 especially for operations where you can get the maximum effort out of
16 them, and that's very important.
17 And because they can do so much so quickly, you would keep them
18 under the very highest command, and I can understand here they would
19 certainly be under command of the 3rd Corps in Zenica and, I would think,
20 even higher command, because you can't afford to waste that product. It's
21 very important. They are shock troops.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, General Duncan.
23 We would ask that this document be admitted into evidence, Your
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before we do that, do I understand you to say
1 that they would not be under the control of lesser officials in the ranks
2 of the BiH Army?
3 THE WITNESS: Sir, you are absolutely right.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
5 The document is admitted into evidence. May it please be given an
6 exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 288.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
9 Would that be a convenient time, Mr. Mundis?
10 MR. MUNDIS: It would indeed. Thank you, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. We'll take a break and come
12 back at 4.00.
13 Court adjourned.
14 --- Recess taken at 3.32 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Mundis.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 I would ask that the witness now be shown PT01312, PT01312.
19 Q. General Duncan, can you identify the document that's currently on
20 the screen in front of you?
21 A. Yes. It's a milinfosum 55 dated the 23rd of June, 1993.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Can we please go, in this document, to page 3 in both
23 the English and B/C/S versions of the document.
24 Q. And I would draw your attention, sir, to paragraph 8 in the
25 English version of this document, and I would ask you if you could please
1 take a look at that.
2 MR. MUNDIS: And while the witness is doing that, Your Honour, I
3 note for the record that the Bosnian version of this document, the
4 translation has two paragraph 3s, and as a result it's paragraph 7 in the
5 Bosnian version, for the benefit of General Delic and the Defence. The
6 translation is mis-numbered, so we're looking at paragraph 8 in English
7 and paragraph 7 in Bosnian.
8 Q. General Duncan, have you had a chance to review paragraph 8 of
9 this document?
10 A. Yes, thank you.
11 Q. And can you comment upon what's written in paragraph 8 of this
12 document, please?
13 A. Yes. It's a very significant document, in that the first part,
14 where it begins with paragraph 8, is a report from the European Community
15 Monitoring Mission where a woman has been attacked by -- wearing
16 inappropriate clothes, and that's obviously an incident that's happened,
17 perpetrated, I assume, by somebody in the Mujahedin, but I think more
18 important is the comment which I think was put together very succinctly by
19 my intelligence officer. It is very significant:
20 "Whether they are under the effective control of 3 Corps or not
21 has been a topic of some debate. This cell believes they are under
22 effective control. They are invariably found at the point of 3 Corps main
23 effort," which I talked about with main efforts earlier on:
24 "That the Mujahedin are clearly capable of extreme acts as
25 demonstrated by the attacks in Zenica and the Guca Gora desecration of the
1 church," which I didn't mention before, and it says:
2 "The labelling of them as uncontrollable is a convenient means of
3 deflecting criticism ..."
4 And I entirely agree with that comment. I think it's a very
5 significant comment of my intelligence officer.
6 Q. And, General Duncan, why do you say that? Why do you think that's
7 a significant comment?
8 A. I say it's a significant comment because Simon would have put all
9 this -- Simon Harrison would have put all this together, and from that he
10 has deduced those comments which he has made, which I think are very good.
11 You know, it is easy to take criticism away from -- you know, it's
12 so easy to push something on the side and put it away, but actually he
13 says there, you know, this is a very cunning way of doing business, very
14 good way of doing -- and classic use of special forces.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I would ask this document be admitted
16 into evidence, but I see there's a question from the Bench.
17 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] I have a question for you,
18 Witness, regarding a statement you made before the break, just before we
19 took the break.
20 You stated, and I'm translating from English, you stated: "I
21 understand that they were under the command -- they were placed under the
22 command of the 3rd Corps in Zenica." I would think that they would even
23 be under a higher command." And now you're telling us that your own
24 intelligence officer wrote this comment on the same topic.
25 Therefore, what I would like to know is whether this is an opinion
1 or a fact that are you conveying to us. Is it a fact or an opinion from
2 you and from your intelligence officer?
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, yes, it is a -- it is a comment from my
4 intelligence officer, but I think it's a very subtle comment, in that it
5 explains that the labelling of them as being uncontrollable is a very
6 convenient excuse, very convenient excuse. So I agree with his comment.
7 And I really can't add any more to that.
8 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] Just one more thing.
9 Therefore, you believe, you think, that it is the reality, but
10 that's your opinion; that's what you think?
11 THE WITNESS: I think -- I think it's reality.
12 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.
13 JUDGE HARHOFF: Just to be clear, General, an excuse for what?
14 THE WITNESS: It's -- it's not a -- it's not a clear-cut business,
15 this at all. You can use your special forces in various ways. You can
16 use them as shock troops. You can use them to terrify people. You can
17 use them to just -- to be there in some cases. And I just think that you
18 will use them in the best possible way that you can and hold them at the
19 highest level for things, and that is why this is being done. If it's
20 being put out as propaganda, it's very good propaganda. If it's being put
21 out that it's convenient, it's very -- it's very -- it works a number of
22 ways, and you can -- and you can use those thoughts to change what you
23 want to do with your shock troops.
24 I'm sorry to be unclear. It's not a clear-cut business, this.
25 It's a very subtle business of why are they doing this, why are they
1 putting a display on somewhere. Perhaps that's something else. Do they
2 want us to look at that? It's very, very subtle, a subtle use of shock
3 troops, again, and you keep that at the highest level.
4 They may have fooled us here completely, but I don't know.
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: I understand, and I agree that things are
6 certainly not clear, at least not at this stage of this trial, but what
7 would be, in your view, the interests that the 3rd Corps might have in
8 denouncing control over the Mujahedins?
9 THE WITNESS: I think the 3rd Corps would like to use the
10 Mujahedins as part of their corps business, but I suspect that they're not
11 allowed to because they're kept for other things or -- and that's what I
12 think with 3rd Corps doing.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Going back to the question raised by Judge
14 Lattanzi, you said that the labelling of them as uncontrollable becomes a
15 convenient means of deflecting criticism away from the 3rd Corps. And then
16 you go on -- your intelligence chap goes on to say, "... While still using
17 their proven tactical worth."
18 As you sit there, and let me, by way of preface, acknowledge that
19 in that comment two incidents are mentioned, the Guca Gora attack and the
20 knifing of women. As you sit there, are you able to remember any other
21 incidents in which they were used, subsequent to this date, used by the
22 3rd Corps?
23 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure if they had been used by the 3rd Corps,
24 but certainly I can recall a number of events, of a similar type of event,
25 when Mujahedins have said, "Do not wear those clothes," and, "You mustn't
1 do that," wanting to put down what I call a harder line of Muslim than I
2 believe the ABiH -- I mean, the ABiH as an organisation, and I discussed
3 it with senior commanders, I'm supposed to be a Christian, I go to church,
4 deaths, marriages and various other bits and pieces and that's about it.
5 And I think it's the same with the BiH. They are what I call a much, much
6 softer religion, and -- but the import of these harder people changed the
7 dramatics quite effectively, and they hadn't -- before that, you wouldn't
8 get incidents like this at all.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're saying you're not sure if they had been used
10 by the 3rd Corps. The reason I asked about their use by the 3rd Corps is
11 because this comment leaves the impression with the reader that, in fact,
12 it is the 3rd Corps that is using them, but the 3rd Corps deflects
13 attention from itself --
14 THE WITNESS: Yes.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- by describing them as uncontrollable, while
16 still using them. So I'm rather intrigued by your retraction, that you
17 are not saying necessarily they are used by the 3rd Corps.
18 THE WITNESS: Sir, they may have been used for a specific purpose
19 by the 3rd Corps and then drawn away again. That would be quite normal.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right.
21 THE WITNESS: A small amount of time, high risk, high impact, and
22 then taken away again.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right. Hence my question: Can you remember an
24 incident, subsequent to this, where they were used in a similar fashion by
25 the 3rd Corps?
1 THE WITNESS: I can't at the moment, sir, no.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can't at the moment?
3 THE WITNESS: I can't, no.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you remember any other incident, apart from
5 those that have been mentioned so far, whether it's subsequent or previous
6 to this one.
7 A. To be honest, sir, I can't. It's --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, thank you very much.
9 THE WITNESS: I feel -- I can only apologise. I just cannot -- I
10 just can't recall, sir.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You don't need to. These computers do go down at
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 Thank you very much, General.
15 Yes, Mr. Mundis.
16 MR. MUNDIS: Your Honours, we would ask that PT01312 be admitted
17 into evidence, please.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. PT01312 is admitted into
19 evidence. May it please be given an exhibit number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 289.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
22 MR. MUNDIS: I would now ask the witness be shown PT01351. That's
24 Q. General Duncan, do you recognise the document that's on the screen
25 in front of you?
1 A. Yes. Again it is a milinfosum. This case dated -- 59, 27th of
2 June, 1993.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Can we please go to the second page in both the
4 English and Bosnian languages, please, and focusing on the bottom part of
5 the page.
6 Q. Sir, do you see paragraph 10 that begins: "ORBATS"?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. First of all, can you tell us what "ORBATS" refers to?
9 A. "ORBATS" is a shortening form of "Order of Battle," and therefore
10 if you're laying out the enemy that you think you've got, you find out
11 their order of battle, and "ORBAT" merely is a shortening of that, so it
12 describes what's going on in terms of various units.
13 Q. Can you then look, sir, at paragraph 10, where there's a reference
14 to Franjo Nakic, deputy commander, OZ Central Bosnia? Do you know who
15 Mr. Nakic was, and can you tell us what position he held?
16 A. He was the deputy commander of Central Bosnia, and I had a number
17 of conversations with Nakic during -- during my time in Bosnia.
18 Q. Let me ask you this, sir: What does "OZ" refer to?
19 A. "Op. Zone."
20 Q. And when you say "Op. Zone Central Bosnia," what military force
21 are we talking about?
22 A. We're talking about the Lasva Valley.
23 Q. And which of the parties to the conflict in the Lasva Valley, if
24 you remember?
25 A. The ops. -- well, the ops. zones were ABiH units, as far as I'm
1 aware, but I mean --
2 Q. Well, let me ask you this, if you remember: Was Mr. Nakic with
3 the ABiH or with the HVO?
4 A. He was with the HVO. I'm sorry, I didn't get -- he was with the
5 HVO, very firmly.
6 Q. Okay. Can you please take a look at paragraph 10, and I
7 unfortunately, it carries over onto the next page, so we'll have to switch
8 the page, and I'd ask you to look at that, and we'll ask you to comment
9 upon what's contained in paragraph 10.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you go to the next page.
11 MR. MUNDIS:
12 Q. General Duncan, have you had an opportunity to read this
14 A. Yes, I have.
15 Q. Can you comment on what's contained in this paragraph, sir?
16 A. The first part, the comment from Nakic describes that he believes
17 there were three subordinate battalions under the brigade headquarters and
18 that they had been infiltrated by a number of, what I call externals, who
19 had come in and joined the 7 Muslim Brigade, and that stands as his own --
20 as his comment as an HVO officer.
21 For the second part, is initially somewhat confusing for everybody
22 here, I suspect. It is the ORBAT -- the Order of Battle of 7 Muslim
23 Brigade as described down there, and that is an assessment of the cell.
24 It is not fact, it's an assessment of the cell. And what they're saying
25 is below the paragraph where it starts "7," and this is a Muslim
1 headquarters based in Zenica with a commander, a deputy, and a security
2 man, and I assume the deputy is not filled at the moment. That's the
3 second one down. They then have 1st Battalion 7th, which is in Travnik,
4 with a Commander of Asim Korcic. And then "UI" is "Unidentified," so it's
5 an unidentified company in Travnik, an unidentified company in Mehurici,
6 an unidentified company in Ravno Rostovo, and that completes the 1st
7 Battalion. And then the 2nd Battalion has a commander and only one
8 unidentified element which is down there in cell Sedzeno Polici [phoen];
9 and then the Battalion similarly with just a commander.
10 So that is given the order of battle, as it were, that's laid out,
11 and this is a comment assessing that the Mujahedin are subsumed within
12 7MMB, and the remark about Nakic seems to confirm this. But, again, I
13 remember this is a comment from my intelligence officer, but I think
14 that's a pretty straightforward comment.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, General Duncan.
16 We'd ask, Your Honours, that this document be admitted into
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
19 please be given an exhibit number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, exhibit number 290.
21 MR. MUNDIS: And I would now ask that the witness be shown P01451,
22 P01451, page 1 of both the English and Bosnian versions.
23 Q. General Duncan, can you recognise the document that's visible on
24 the screen in front of you?
25 A. Yes. Once again, it is a PWO milinfosum number 100, dated the
1 7th of August, 1993.
2 Q. And I would ask you, sir, to focus your attention on paragraph 3
3 of this document. And if you could please take a look at that, and then I
4 will ask you to comment upon that paragraph.
5 Sir, have you had an opportunity to read this paragraph?
6 A. Yes, thank you.
7 Q. Do you have any comment upon what's contained in paragraph 3?
8 A. I'm not sure entirely, but I think Sipic is a part of the
9 3rd Corps. I think he was a deputy commander. He may not have been.
10 Q. Perhaps if you were to look at the first sentence of paragraph 2,
11 that might refresh your recollection as to Mr. Sipic.
12 A. Yes, I am right on that, then. He's 306 Brigade. Thank you.
13 Q. And with respect to paragraph 3, sir, do you have any comment to
14 add about what's contained in this milinfosum?
15 A. It is interesting, because clearly Sipic is concerned that there
16 would be a problem if members of my unit went to visit without an escort,
17 because they would be guaranteed a hostile response, which is not a
18 terribly good thing to do.
19 And, secondly, the comment there is that -- that the group is
20 clearly hostile and that they are very much under command. They're a part
21 of the ORBAT that we talked about earlier.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, General Duncan.
23 I would ask that this document be admitted into evidence, please.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
25 please be given an exhibit number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, exhibit number 291.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
3 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, Your Honours, we, during the course of
4 the last break, were able to identify and locate Annex A to milinfosum
5 number 40 of 8 June 1993. I provided a copy to the Defence at the break
6 and discussed this with Mr. Robson. He would have no objection to that
7 document going in with a caveat, with the caveat, that you will recall
8 Exhibit 286, which was Annex B to milinfosum number 41. Mr. Robson
9 indicated that if we were to also bring in Annex A to milinfosum number
10 41, and I again was able to, with the assistance of Mr. Neuner, obtain
11 copies of that Annex, which I -- I've got both of those here in the
12 courtroom. And Mr. Robson will correct me if what I've just said is
13 wrong, but my understanding was as long as both of those annexes were
14 presented to the witness, the Defence would not object to those documents
15 coming in, although they weren't technically on the Prosecution's exhibit
16 list, although as Your Honour, the Presiding Judge indicated, obviously
17 Annex A to the exhibit might very well be considered part of that exhibit,
18 in any case.
19 But with that lengthy explanation, perhaps if these remaining two
20 documents could be shown to the witness.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Robson, do you confirm?
22 MR. ROBSON: I concur with that, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 They may be shown.
25 MR. MUNDIS: What we have, unfortunately, only is hard copies of
1 these documents. I do have multiple copies of them, and if the usher
2 could assist in distributing these. Perhaps -- I don't have many
3 questions, but I do note, at least, Annex A has, again, a number of
4 military acronyms, and it might be helpful simply to have the witness tell
5 us what those are for the benefit of everyone so that we all can
6 understand what's contained in Annex A to milinfosum number 41 of
7 9 June 1993.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Mundis.
9 MR. MUNDIS: Actually, I misspoke, Annex A to milinfosum number 40
10 dated 8 June 1993.
11 And perhaps if the usher could assist.
12 Q. General Duncan, I'm going to ask you to put the document Annex A
13 to milinfosum number 40, dated 8 June 1993 on the machine, the ELMO
14 machine to your right, so that we all can ensure that we're looking at the
15 same document.
16 Now, sir, I apologise for not having shown you this document
17 earlier, and if there's any information I'm asking you about that you
18 don't remember or don't recall, just simply indicate that.
19 But let's start, sir, with whether or not you recognise this
20 document that's been placed in front of you.
21 A. I certainly recognise it as a milinfosum from my unit, yes.
22 Q. Now, can you tell us, under the heading "Time," there -- under
23 each of the entries are six-digit numbers. Do you know, sir, what those
24 six-digit numbers refer to?
25 A. They normally refer to a date/time group, but I'm not sure which
1 date/time group we're on at the moment.
2 Q. Perhaps if it would assist you, again we're looking at a document
3 dated 8 June 1993. I don't know if that assists you in any way.
4 A. It doesn't, I'm afraid. And that's -- ah, I'm with you now.
5 I think -- I think it is obviously a timeline down the right-hand
6 side, and therefore the detail is of an engagement going on, and somebody
7 has recorded the dates all the way down, which is pretty straightforward.
8 Q. And so the "08" would refer to what?
9 A. Well, "0803" I think refers to the time of the event happening.
10 Q. And then the last two digits?
11 A. The last two digits are -- I'm not sure what they would be. It
12 may be shorthand for some other stuff, but I don't know what it is.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Your Honour, if I could perhaps lead the witness. I
14 believe we could clarify this matter. Again, in light of the fact that he
15 hasn't seen this document recently.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may proceed.
17 MR. MUNDIS:
18 Q. General Duncan, I would suggest to you, and if I'm completely out
19 of line, sir, simply tell me, I would suggest that the "08" refers
20 to "8 June" and the four digits afterwards would refer to the time.
21 A. Yeah, I'd probably concur with that. In fact, I would concur with
22 that, so it's back to front.
23 Yeah, so the "08" running all the way down is the 8th of June, and
24 the four next digits are the timelines.
25 Q. Okay. Now, sir, again, I'm only going to be asking you about some
1 of the abbreviations on the document so that it's of assistance to the
2 Trial Chamber.
3 The first line under "080350", can you tell us what "ARTY" refers
5 A. It refers to "Artillery."
6 Q. And the abbreviation "SAF"?
7 A. Is "Small Arms Fire," so that would be rifle fire.
8 Q. In the next line, "080540" we again see "C/S"?
9 A. That would be a call sign. So a call sign which is deployed out
10 of camp is reporting in that there's fighting going on.
11 Q. The entry "080630," at the end of that line, again we see
12 again "ARTY/MBRL." Can you tell us what that would refer to?
13 A. I'm sorry, which line again?
14 Q. "080630. The guard reports ..." At the end of that line.
15 A. Artillery and multi-barrel rocket-launcher rounds. Artillery and
16 multi-barrel rocket-launcher.
17 Q. Then if we could go down to the entry "080810: "Outgoing rounds
18 reported ...," the second line of that entry: "Approximately 1 times RD
19 every minute."
20 A. It's one round, it's a shell every minute.
21 Q. And in the entry "080830," we see a reference to you reporting
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And it says: "200 times CAS."
25 A. That's "Casualties."
1 MR. MUNDIS: If we could then go -- if we could have the document
2 moved down so that we can see the bottom half of the document, please.
3 Q. And if you could look at the entry "081115: Approximately 50 -
4 60SA rounds." What would that "SA" refer to.
5 A. Again, that's "Small Arm," "Small Arms."
6 Q. The entry "081215." It says: "1ZU-23-2AAMG." Can you tell us, if
7 you know, sir, what that refers to?
8 A. It is a designation used for an anti-aircraft machine-gun but used
9 in a ground role. So what you're doing is using a cannon, an
10 anti-aircraft cannon, to use on a ground role as opposed to its normal
11 role, which would be to shoot down aircraft.
12 Q. And do you know, sir, what the "ZU-23-two" refers to?
13 A. It's a former Soviet weapons system.
14 MR. MUNDIS: If we could then go, sir, to the second page of this
16 Q. The entry under "081815" towards the very bottom.
17 MR. MUNDIS: So if we could have the bottom half of the document,
18 please, 081815.
19 Q. It says:
20 "A call sign reports that the Dolac CP ..."
21 Can you tell us what "CP" refers to?
22 A. It refers to check-point. Dolac was a check-point, and the armed
23 mine, yes, was discarded or disarmed.
24 Q. And the entry, sir, under "082145," the second line:
25 "30 times 7.62-mm Coax ...," can you tell us what that refers to,
2 A. That would refer to a firing of one of my units from the chain gun
3 which is fitted to the Warrior armoured vehicle, and it would be 30 rounds
4 of 7.65-millimetre, coax returned.
5 The machine-gun is aligned on the same line as the main element,
6 so it will hit the same target. But that's fired 30 rounds from its
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated].
9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]. I beg your pardon.
11 What do you say "Coax" stands for? After "7.62-millimetre"?
12 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry, "coaxial." I'm sorry, sir.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Coaxial. Thank you.
14 THE WITNESS: My apologies, sir.
15 MR. MUNDIS: I believe that's all the abbreviations on the
17 We would ask, Your Honours, that this be admitted into evidence.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
19 please be given an exhibit number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 292.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
22 MR. MUNDIS: And perhaps if the final document, which is marked or
23 labelled "Annex A to 1 PWO milinfosum number 41" dated the 9th of June
24 could be placed on the ELMO, please.
25 Q. General Duncan, do you recognise this document?
1 A. Yes, that's again a milinfosum, in this case 41, dated the 9th of
2 June, 1993.
3 Q. And, again, I note just a few abbreviations in this document.
4 We'll try to explain those, if that's possible.
5 Could you please look at the entry 9 June at 0725 hours. That
6 would be "090725." Can you look at the very last line, where it says:
7 "The Dutch TPT BN," and tell us what, if you know, that refers
9 A. It refers to the Dutch Transport Battalion.
10 Q. And then, sir, in the next line, "090742," at the end of the first
11 line, "FP." Do you know, sir, what that refers to?
12 A. It stands for "Firing Point."
13 Q. In the next line: "090805, Sporadic SA/HMG ..."?
14 A. That is: "Sporadic small arms and heavy machine-gun ..."
15 Q. The entry under "090930", in the fourth line, we
16 see: "Approximately 12 times TPS equipped with RPG-7."
17 Do you know, General Duncan, what that refers to?
18 A. "TPS" is referring to the number of troops, so there were 12
19 soldiers, and "RPG-7" is a shoulder-launched anti-armour weapon.
20 Q. And what does "RPG" stand for?
21 A. "Rocket-Propelled Grenade-7," which is numenclature.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, sir. I think that covers all of the
23 abbreviations in this document. We would ask that this be admitted into
24 evidence, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
1 please be given an exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 293.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
4 MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution has no further questions, sir. Thank
5 you very much, and thank you to the Trial Chamber for the extra time.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Mundis.
7 Yes, Mr. Robson. I see you standing up.
8 MR. ROBSON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. I'm just waiting for
9 my lectern. Here it is.
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Robson:
11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Duncan. My name is Nicholas Robson, and I'll
12 be questioning you on behalf of General Rasim Delic this afternoon.
13 If I could begin with some preliminary questions.
14 Could you just confirm for the Trial Chamber that you have
15 testified before this Tribunal on three prior occasions, in the Blaskic
16 case in 1998, in the Kordic case in 1999, and the Hadzihasanovic case in
18 A. Yes, that's true, yes.
19 Q. Now, at the beginning of your evidence, you made a reference to
20 the BiH forces, meaning Muslim forces. Mr. Duncan, were you aware that
21 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a multi-ethnic army?
22 A. Yes, I am aware that they're a multi-ethnic army.
23 Q. So you knew that its ranks were comprised of Bosnian Muslims,
24 Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs?
25 A. Yes, but I would add the derider that the majority of them are, to
1 my knowledge, are Muslims.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Duncan, it's right that when you left Bosnia in 1994, you
3 wrote an article called "Operating in Bosnia"; is that so?
4 A. Yes. I can't remember it, though, but yes.
5 Q. And in that article, it's right to say that you defined the
6 mission for your battalion, the Prince of Wales' Own as: "To create
7 conditions whereby aid could be delivered into and through our area of
8 responsibility." Is that right?
9 A. That is right, yes.
10 Q. Now, as part of that mission statement, you considered that it was
11 important for the regiment to gather information so that Brit-Bat could
12 create those conditions for aid to be delivered; is that right?
13 A. Yes. That was essential.
14 Q. Now, if you're not able to help us with this, please say so, but
15 when you arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April of 1994, it's right
16 that the blockade of the Travnik region by the HVO had been in place for a
17 considerable period of time? Did you know that?
18 A. Before I arrived, there was no blockade, as I was aware of it, and
19 it was a much more benign environment, and there didn't seem to be any
20 animosity between the two armed forces at that stage.
21 Q. Well, again, if you can't help us, please say so, but isn't it the
22 case that there had been a number -- there had been conflict between the
23 HVO and the BiH prior to your arrival in Bosnia in April 1993, and
24 consequently this has had the effect of restricting the movement of the
25 Bosnian Army and depriving Bosnian Muslims in certain places of food?
1 A. I'm not aware of that. I mean, the only conflict I knew that had
2 gone on was that -- was Ahmici.
3 MR. MUNDIS: I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honours, but before it
4 disappears, I believe on line 5 of page 60, that should be April of 1993,
5 not April of 1994.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Line 5 of page 60. Sorry, can you say that line
8 MR. MUNDIS: Line 5 of page 60, there's a reference to the
9 General's arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April of 1994, and I
10 believe that should be 1993.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
12 MR. ROBSON: Perhaps we can quickly clarify.
13 Q. You arrived in April 1993, didn't you?
14 A. Yes, I did, yes, on the 5th.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
16 MR. ROBSON: If I could -- if the witness could please be shown
17 Exhibit 283. There's no Bosnian translation of this document.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Duncan, we can see here a milinfosum dated the 5th of
19 June, 1993. I would just like to refer your attention down to point 3.
20 Obviously, this is in the section headed "Travnik." And if I can just
21 read out the beginning of this paragraph, it says:
22 "At 051000, the Travnik LO attended a meeting in the Travnik PT
23 building, the location of the joint HQ ..."
24 And then later, if we move down about halfway down this paragraph,
25 it then goes on to say:
1 "Merdan claimed that 18 Muslims had been massacred in the village
2 of Bukovica, GR 1402, and that something similar had occurred in
3 Radojcici, GR 1801."
4 First of all, do you recall this report, about the HVO -- it
5 mentions the HVO attack on Bukovica?
6 A. I don't recall it, no. I don't believe I was -- I was not at that
7 meeting, and I don't recall that particular comment.
8 Q. And again if you can't recall, please say so, but do you remember
9 did Brit-Bat react at all, when that information was passed, that Muslims
10 had been massacred in Bukovica village?
11 A. In terms of taking that report back to my headquarters, which is
12 what would have been done because it's now appeared on this form, and
13 there is a comment after it which says there's no collateral for it, as a
14 comment, not a fact, so we registered that something had been reported but
15 there didn't appear to be any collateral for it.
16 Q. And by "collateral," what do you mean by that?
17 A. More confirmation of what had happened rather than just a bold
18 statement which Merdan had claimed.
19 Q. It's right, isn't it, Mr. Duncan, and if you can't say, obviously
20 please tell us that, that it was this HVO attack on Bukovica on the 5th of
21 June, resulting in the death of those Muslims and the capture of the
22 village's inhabitants, that was the trigger for the ABiH's counter-attack
23 along the Bila Valley on the 8th of June, 1993?
24 A. I can't physically confirm the dates, but, you know, there are --
25 what actually sparked it off, I don't know.
1 Q. Right. Certainly, it's right, isn't it, that the attack on the
2 8th of June was limited to the Bila Valley and not the Lasva Valley, as
3 you mentioned in your examination-in-chief? Would you agree with that?
4 A. I would agree that the -- that the conflict started at the western
5 end of the Lasva Valley. I think that's correct.
6 Q. And would you agree that that is the Bila Valley region?
7 A. Yes, yeah.
8 Q. Mr. Duncan, it's simply wrong to say, as you suggested in your
9 examination-in-chief, that both sides were involved in ethnic cleansing,
10 running people out of their homes and killing them, isn't that so?
11 A. I -- I saw ethnic cleansing on both sides during my time in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is very difficult to establish sometimes who's
13 done what and where, but it was a -- a prevalent activity, and it was done
14 occasionally --
15 Q. Mr. Duncan --
16 A. -- to next door neighbours, strangely enough.
17 Q. I'm not asking what you tell us, but we are talking about the 8th
18 of June, the events at that time, at this stage.
19 Now, I'd like to turn to a different topic, and that is
20 cooperation between Croat and Serb forces.
21 MR. ROBSON: If the witness could please be shown document D220. I
22 beg your pardon, it's D260.
23 Perhaps just to explain the document whilst it's way -- whilst
24 we're waiting for it, it's a milinfosum, number 39, dated the 7th of June,
25 1993. We can see halfway down of page 1, it comments upon events in
1 Travnik. Now, what I'm interested in is over at page 2 at point number 5.
2 Q. Now, I'll just read out some extracts from this paragraph. It
3 starts off saying:
4 "A normally reliable BiH source offered the following explanation
5 of certain events in Travnik. He claimed that an order was issued by the
6 Travnik HVO at 061900 ordering the evacuation of Croats to Ovcarevo from
7 surrounding villages."
8 Moving down a little, it then goes on to say:
9 "At 070130 the people, including HVO soldiers who had discarded
10 their uniforms, moved out of Ovcarevo and reputedly crossed the Serb lines
11 to Babanovac. The source claims that this was part of a well-organised
12 agreement by which the HVO would surrender their positions in the defence
13 of Travnik and Turbe to the BSA."
14 Now, just to again clarify, Mr. Duncan, the BSA is the Bosnian
15 Serb Army, isn't it?
16 A. Yes, yes it is. Yes.
17 Q. Would you agree that the explanation from that BH source was
18 indeed correct and in fact cooperation had taken place between the HVO and
19 BiH Serb forces?
20 A. There were two results about people moving out. One was that
21 people would have gone across to the BSA, and the other that people were
22 hiding in the woods and hadn't actually disappeared at all, and had just
23 been forced out of their houses. Those are the only two points I know
24 from that.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sir --
1 THE WITNESS: It actually refers to that later on down in the
2 document. People weren't moving out of Travnik.
3 MR. ROBSON: Sorry, Judge, please go ahead.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry to do this to you. I just want to find
5 out. You're talking of, Mr. Robson, of the HVO cooperating with the BSA.
6 MR. ROBSON: Yes.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document talks of surrender. Are those two
8 words used synonymously?
9 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I can't answer that, but perhaps if I
10 could put the question to the witness and explore it.
11 Q. First of all, if I can begin -- go back a little, have you seen
12 this document before, this milinfosum dated the 7th of June?
13 A. I have seen this document before, yes.
14 Q. And what I've asked you is: Were you aware that cooperation was
15 taking place between the HVO and Serb forces?
16 A. I was only aware that if there was going to be a movement of
17 people out, they would either go out across the Bosnian Serb Army lines or
18 into the woods. That's all I knew. But it would be logical to assume
19 that there was some sort of liaison between the Bosnian Serb Army to let
20 people across their front lines.
21 Q. Isn't it the case, Mr. Duncan, that around that time large numbers
22 of Bosnian Croat civilians crossed Serb lines in the Croat region; do you
23 remember that?
24 A. I would -- I would not be able to put a finger on the -- on the
25 numbers, and although the --
1 Q. I'm not --
2 A. -- the milinfosum puts it here as about 3.000. That's quite a
4 Q. So you wouldn't be able to put your finger on the figures, but you
5 are aware that an officer of your regiment has reported that 3.000 Croats
6 have crossed Serb borders. Could that sort of movement take place without
7 cooperation between the HVO and the Bosnian Serb forces?
8 A. I think it's quite impossible.
9 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that around this time when this
10 cooperation took place, the HVO simply deserted large sections of the
11 front line that they'd been holding against the Bosnian-Serb forces? Do
12 you remember that?
13 A. I do remember that, yes.
14 Q. And when the HVO deserted those front line sections, it's correct,
15 isn't it, that a vacuum was created which the Bosnian Army suddenly had to
16 fill to prevent the Bosnian-Serb forces moving in and claiming that
17 territory; is that so?
18 A. Yes, I believe so.
19 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I'd like to tender this document for
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
22 please be given an exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 294.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
25 MR. ROBSON: My colleagues are telling me to slow down, so I'm
1 going to heed their advice.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: I can see he'd been trying to do that for a long
3 time, and I'm pleased he's finally getting through.
4 MR. ROBSON: I'd like to move on to the topic of the 3rd Corps.
5 Q. It's right, isn't it, Mr. Duncan, that it was the 3rd Corps of the
6 Bosnian Army and its subordinate units that Brit-Bat mostly dealt with?
7 A. I tried to be -- keep it in balance between dealing with HVO and
8 3rd Corps.
9 Q. Sorry, perhaps that was me being unclear, but what I was trying to
10 get at was this: Within the Bosnian Army, it was almost exclusively the
11 3rd Corps that you had your dealings with?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And no other?
14 A. No, because you will recall in my previous statement I had a plan
15 for gathering information, which meant that I personally would be dealing
16 with the corps commanders.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure whether there's communication
18 between the two, but I suppose what Mr. Robson is trying to suggest is
19 that you didn't, for instance, deal with the 2nd Corps of the Bosnian
20 Army, and you didn't deal with the 1st Corps; you were mainly dealing with
21 the 3rd Corps within the larger Bosnian Army?
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's absolutely right. Yes.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's what you're trying to say, Mr. Robson, isn't
25 MR. ROBSON: That's absolutely right, Your Honour.
1 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that Brit-Bat's area of operations
2 broadly corresponded to the 3rd Corps' area of responsibility?
3 A. Technically, my area of responsibility went from Romboci to Tuzla,
4 and the aid group through there, and we were therefore very focused on the
5 aid route. And if I could remind you, the aid route went from Novi
6 Bila -- sorry, Guca Gora and then got to Novi Travnik, and then went
7 through the Lasva Valley up to Zenica. So that part of activity that was
8 going on in Travnik was not threatening the aid route, which was our
9 primary aim and task.
10 Q. Okay, so parts of your area of operations were outside of the 3rd
11 Corps. You told us that you met with Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic.
12 Were you aware that it was only in November of 1992 that he was appointed
13 as the commander of the 3rd Corps and, in fact, the 3rd Corps only began
14 functioning sometime thereafter?
15 A. I wasn't aware of that because it was before my time in
17 Q. Would you agree with me that at the time that the 3rd Corps was
18 formed, there were extremely difficult conditions in place with the
19 Bosnian Army defending itself from Serb and, indeed, HVO aggression?
20 A. Yes. They were in -- it was a difficult -- very difficult time
21 for them, yes, and it's something I discussed with Enver.
22 Q. And from what you saw, the soldiers of the Bosnian Army were very
23 poorly equipped, weren't they, and lacked decent weapons and uniforms?
24 A. That's correct, yes.
25 Q. A little earlier during examination-in-chief, we referred to a
1 milinfosum dated the 6th of June, 1993, and we looked at how the
2 Bosnian-Serb Army was equipped with Howitzers, 50 tanks, and so on. It's
3 right, isn't it, that the Army of both Bosnia and Herzegovina didn't have
4 any sort of equipment like that?
5 A. Yes, it's correct, yeah.
6 Q. Would you agree that the 3rd Corps had to defend a front line
7 against the Serbs extending to around 300 kilometres?
8 A. Yes. I would assume that you're talking about the western front
9 line on that.
10 Q. Absolutely.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And would you accept that that is, in reality, a huge front line
13 to defend?
14 A. Yes, it is a huge front line to defend, in a similar manner that
15 my battalion was asked to do 180 kilometres.
16 Q. Absolutely. And it's right, isn't it, that the ARBiH's task was
17 to become significantly harder when the HVO commenced its cooperation with
18 the Serb forces and abandoned its sections of the front line?
19 A. Yes, yes, I would agree with that as well.
20 Q. It's also right to say, isn't it, that at the time that the
21 Bosnian Army was trying to establish itself, there was a UN arms embargo
22 in place which severely constrained the possibility of the Bosnian Army
23 obtaining weapons from outside?
24 A. Yes, and I discussed that with Enver at detail, and I seem to
25 remember at some stage during that detail I promised to give him some
1 books and pamphlets on how to organise an army, which he found quite
3 Q. Sir, would you agree with me when I say that the task to form the
4 3rd Corps, comprising around 30.000 men, must have been a virtually
5 impossible assignment for Commander Hadzihasanovic?
6 A. It would be a significant challenge.
7 Q. Now, despite all of those difficulties, it's right to say that the
8 3rd Corps did take some steps to ensure that international humanitarian
9 law was respected within the corps. Do you recall that?
10 A. Yes, I did, and indeed one of the pamphlets we gave them discussed
12 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you two documents that touch upon this
13 issue. The first is Defence document D280.
14 And while we're waiting for this to come on screen, perhaps I can
15 just explain that this is an order from Commander Enver Hadzihasanovic,
16 dated 3rd of February, 1993, and it's to all brigade groups and municipal
17 defence staffs. It's a long document so I'm not going to read all of it,
18 but perhaps if I could just read a couple of extracts.
19 Q. What this document from February states is:
20 "There have been occurrences of looting and burning of objects, as
21 well as imprisonment of civilians in the course of combat activities so
22 far. These actions were perpetrated by individuals who do not respect
23 orders and instructions issued by their superiors. We do not want to
24 build an army using the same methods and ways as the aggressor. We want to
25 build an army with a humane conception of warfare that will respect and
1 adhere to all the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter."
2 And perhaps if I can just read briefly from point number 1 by way
3 of example. We can see that Commander Hadzihasanovic says:
4 "Strictly prohibit all units of RBH Army in the 3rd Corps zone of
5 responsibility from imprisoning unarmed civilians, looting property, and
6 burning down infrastructural facilities."
7 My question to you, Mr. Duncan, is: Is this the sort of
8 instructions that you would expect a responsible commander to issue to his
10 A. Entirely. I would expect nothing else, if you wish to give me an
11 army that's going to be effective. Sadly, I don't think that both HVO and
12 ARBiH held to those tenets throughout this conflict.
13 Q. Well, Mr. Duncan, that wasn't my question. I'd be very grateful
14 if you could please restrict your answer to the question I'm putting to
15 you, and perhaps restrain from putting your comments to the Court.
16 A. In that case, yes, it would be a good thing to do.
17 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, please, could I tender this document for
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
20 please be given an exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 295.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 MR. ROBSON: Next, please, could we refer to document D264. D264.
24 Whilst we're waiting for it appear on the screen, I can perhaps
25 just explain. It's a milinfosum number 127, dated the 6th of March, 1993,
1 and it's the top part of this document I'm interested in.
2 Q. Before we look at this document, Mr. Duncan, can you just confirm
3 that this document was produced by the Cheshire Regiment, the battalion
4 that preceded yours?
5 A. I would assume so, yes, because it's got its flick on as being a
6 Cheshire milinfosum, yes.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. Mr. Robson, don't we have a B/C/S copy?
8 I think Mr. Delic would like to see what's being talked about.
9 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I'm afraid that we don't have a B/C/S
10 version here.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You don't. Okay. If we don't, we don't. Is it
12 possible to generate one at some stage?
13 MR. ROBSON: It may be, Your Honour, it may be. What you'll
14 notice from this document is that the majority of it is in B/C/S. It's
15 just the introductory part that I'm interested in, so ...
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: As long as Mr. Delic doesn't feel disadvantaged,
17 that's fine.
18 MR. ROBSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Your Honour, perhaps just before I move to the document,
20 Mrs. Vidovic, by way of explanation, tells me that we did request this,
21 but we've been unable to obtain a translation.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry about that.
23 MR. ROBSON:
24 Q. Now, if we look at the document, it states "1. Sarajevo":
25 "BiH officers have been issued a small rules for the armed forces
1 handbook, "Pravila Oruzanih Snaga," dated 01 August 1992 and approved by
2 President Alija Izetbegovic. The book covers many aspects of BiH
3 procedures; e.g., general discipline, uniform, insignia, ranks, weapon
4 handling," et cetera, and then perhaps if I just move to the bottom of
5 this paragraph within the comment section it states:
6 "It is reportedly on issue to all BDE and BN commanders."
7 By "BDE" and "BN," does that mean brigade and battalion?
8 A. It does, yes.
9 Q. Now, Mr. Duncan, were you aware that the Bosnian army had
10 distributed such a handbook to the commanders of different units?
11 A. No, because at that stage I wasn't in Herzegovina.
12 Q. So it's not something that you found out about later, once you
13 actually arrived in the country?
14 A. I saw it, yes, later on, but at this stage I didn't yet.
15 Q. And, again, despite all the difficulties faced by the Bosnian
16 Army, does this demonstrate to you that the Bosnian Army Command was
17 taking serious steps to professionalise its army?
18 A. Yes.
19 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, if this document could please be
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
22 please be given an exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 296.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
25 MR. ROBSON:
1 Q. Now, during your testimony, you commented upon communications, and
2 I'd just like to explore the basis for what you told the Tribunal, if I
4 First of all, it's correct, isn't it, that during the time that
5 you were deployed to Bosnia, land line telephones weren't functioning in
6 Central Bosnia?
7 A. They -- that's correct, yes.
8 Q. Now, as to radio communication, it's right, isn't it, that was
9 also pretty dreadful; would you agree?
10 A. I would agree that it was difficult, but there is a difference
11 between -- technical difference between VHF and UHF and other forms. Some
12 of it is easy, the HF and VHF, but some of it isn't, and it requires the
13 skills and training of the people.
14 Q. Were you aware that when the JNA retreated from Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina in May of 1992, they destroyed all of the radio relay stations
16 throughout Bosnia?
17 A. As far as I was aware, the radio relay stations in the
18 Lasva Valley area, and I call that area, were still functioning and
19 functioned throughout most of the conflict.
20 Q. It's right to say, isn't it, that the HVO had equipment which
21 could block radio transmissions by the Bosnian Army, did it not?
22 A. It probably had, yes. On the balance of probability, I would say
23 it probably had, yes. Yes.
24 MR. ROBSON: I'd like the witness to be shown a document. It's
25 Exhibit 86. This is a daily operations report dated the 11th of April,
1 1993, from the commander of the 306 Brigade, Esad Sipic, to the 3rd Corps
2 Operations Centre and OG West Command.
3 Now, it's the third paragraph under point 2 that I'm interested
4 in. Perhaps before we read this, perhaps briefly if we could just -- we
5 see on the B/C/S version on the bottom through "Komandant, Esad Sipic."
6 If we can move down, please, a little in the English translation.
7 Q. What it states is:
8 "Communication with OG West Command has been practically
9 nonexistent in the past 10 days. This should be resolved immediately. The
10 lines with OG West Command are down or occasionally very bad so that it is
11 not possible to check, let alone work. Therefore, we are not able to
12 carry out your order number 017493 of 9 April 1993. The reason is that we
13 are 18 kilometres away from the Travnik communications centre, and we have
14 no means for sending a message three times a day."
15 So first of all, Mr. Duncan, were you aware that the 306 Mountain
16 Brigade operated in the OG West's area of responsibility at that time?
17 A. Yes, I am.
18 Q. And do you accept that this report from the commander to its
19 superior command clearly demonstrates that communication from the field
20 was not effective and, indeed, it hadn't been so for some time?
21 A. I'm surprised about this report, because as I mentioned before, I
22 was aware that the relays were all working and worked during that time.
23 Q. Perhaps if I could ask, if you had this sort of information, if it
24 had been presented to you, perhaps your assessment of the ability to
25 communicate by radio in that region would have been somewhat different?
1 A. It is difficult to communicate in that region, yes, and those same
2 problems of communication occurred with ourselves, given that we had more
3 sophisticated radios.
4 MR. ROBSON: Before we put this document away, perhaps if we could
5 just refer to the paragraph above this. It's not to do with
6 communications, but what it states is:
7 "Logistics support of the unit is bad, which made it practically
8 impossible for us to carry out regular jobs. The cause is a lack of,"
9 something illegible, "fuel, lubricants, and spare parts for the vehicles.
10 A constant problem has also been the lack of weapons, ammunition, and
11 clothing, which we have already warned about earlier."
12 Q. Would you agree, Mr. Duncan, that that paragraph accurately
13 reflects the poor conditions that you witnessed, whilst you were in
14 Central Bosnia, for the Bosnian Army?
15 A. Yes.
16 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I see it's quarter past. Perhaps this
17 might be a good opportunity to take a break.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you still have more questions about this
19 document or do you --
20 MR. ROBSON: I've finished with this document, thank you.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Shall we admit it before we take a break?
22 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, it's already been admitted. It was --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's an exhibit, thank you.
24 MR. ROBSON: It's an exhibit we have.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
1 We'll take a break and come back at quarter to 6.00.
2 Court adjourned.
3 --- Recess taken at 5.15 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Robson.
6 MR. ROBSON: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 Q. Now, Mr. Duncan, we were talking about communications, and during
8 your examination-in-chief you mentioned that one of the reasons that you
9 concluded that there were good communications in Bosnia was something that
10 you saw when you had lunch with the corps commander. Do you remember
11 saying that?
12 A. Yes, I did. Yes, I remember.
13 Q. When you said you had lunch with the corps commander, was that
14 Commander Hadzihasanovic?
15 A. No, it -- yes, Enver Hadzihasanovic, yes.
16 Q. And what you had to say was:
17 "We had a lunch in a hotel. The next door was quite clearly a
18 communication system back to wherever you want to be."
19 And that was at page 21, line 16. Do you remember saying that?
20 A. Yes, I do, yes.
21 Q. Do you remember giving a statement to the Office of the
22 Prosecution on the 8th and 9th of May of 2000?
23 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that again?
24 Q. Yes. Do you recall making or giving a statement to investigators
25 of the Office of the Prosecution on the 8th or 9th of May of the year
2 A. If it was one of the -- yes, that I've given before, one of the
3 statements, yes.
4 Q. Because if I could perhaps just refresh your memory, at page 8 of
5 that document you discuss the lunch that you had with Commander
6 Hadzihasanovic, and what you said about this lunch was the following:
7 "When I arrived at the restaurant, I observed a portable command
8 truck which was parked close to the restaurant. I observed a series of
9 antennae on the back -- on the truck," sorry,"which again displayed to me
10 that the 3rd Corps did have efficient communications."
11 So perhaps you could first of all clarify, what was this
12 communications system that was next door to the restaurant? Was it a
13 truck or was it a building?
14 A. It was a truck equipped with aerials and, in particular, a
15 high-frequency aerial, which means you can transmit over great distances.
16 Q. Well, it's right, isn't it, that this was a very elderly ex-JNA
18 A. Yes, but ex-JNA vehicles are actually extremely robust and strong.
19 Q. And I'm right to say that you didn't enter that vehicle, did you?
20 A. No, I didn't enter.
21 Q. And you didn't assess its capabilities or speak to anyone about
22 it, about its performance, did you?
23 A. At that moment, no. But as I mentioned, it had a high-frequency
24 aerial, which enables you to transmit great distances.
25 Q. Now, the information you told us related to what you saw within
1 the 3rd Corps' area of responsibility, didn't it?
2 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?
3 Q. What you saw and what you told us about today related to things
4 that were limited to the area of responsibility of the 3rd Corps?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. At no stage did you ever travel to Sarajevo and visit the Supreme
7 Command headquarters or any of its forward command posts outside the area
8 of responsibility of the 3rd Corps; is that right?
9 A. That's right.
10 Q. A little earlier in your testimony, in relation to communications
11 with Sarajevo, what you told the Court was you felt you could get an
12 answer very quickly. Do you remember saying that?
13 A. Yes, I do remember saying that.
14 Q. Would you agree with me that a feeling is not a solid basis upon
15 which to conclude that there was an efficient communications system in
16 place with Sarajevo?
17 A. I was in -- I have communications with Sarajevo at the time, and
18 there were officers from BH Command in Sarajevo.
19 Q. What do you mean by "I have communications"? Do you mean that you
20 were using your communication?
21 A. Not at the time, no, but I had -- I had, in the field, I had
22 communications from where I was most of the time back to Sarajevo, if I
23 wished, using HF.
24 Q. Perhaps if I could just clarify this. Well, perhaps we can look
25 at a document. It's Defence document 267 which deals with this issue.
1 And whilst we're waiting for that document, I can explain that
2 it's a milinfosum dated the 28th of June, 1993. If we go halfway down
3 this page, we can see the heading "Meetings," and what it states here is
5 "The fourth meeting of the joint command, born of the 18 June
6 cease-fire agreement, took place in Brit-Bat Main with the following
8 And we can see under the heading "BiH," it states "Siber" and
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Were you familiar with both of those gentlemen?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And can we confirm the reference to "Karic" is to Vehbija Karic,
14 who was a member of the Bosnian Army General Staff; were you aware of
16 A. I wasn't -- no, I wasn't aware of that. Not of that.
17 Q. If we can turn over on to page 2, please, it's point 4 that I'm
18 interested in. If I could just read a couple of extracts from this
19 paragraph. It states:
20 "After the above agreements had been made, Karic spoke for the
21 first time at the meeting."
22 If we move down, it goes on to say:
23 "He personally knew many of the HVO delegation from his former
24 service in the JNA, and stated his incredulity that things had changed so
25 much in the last 15 months, that the situation in Bosnia was as it is."
1 And then at the bottom of this paragraph, there is a comment that
3 "The impression given by Karic's speech is that his previous
4 understandings of the realities of Central Bosnia was fragile in the
5 extreme. Given that he is in a position to be able to brief the
6 president, this suggests that the passage of information on the area and
7 the understanding of it is not particularly good. Comment ends."
8 Now, Mr. Duncan, would you agree that that comment, made by one of
9 your officers in the regiment, suggests that no matter what the state of
10 communications were like within the 3rd Corps area of responsibility,
11 communication from Central Bosnia to the General Staff HQ in Sarajevo was
12 not very good?
13 A. Yes, that's what it -- that's what the comment says.
14 Q. I'd like to move on to a different topic, if I may.
15 It's right to say, isn't it, -- sorry, I beg your pardon. Before
16 we go any further, please, could that be admitted into evidence?
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Document D267 is admitted into evidence. May it
18 please be given an exhibit number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 297.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 MR. ROBSON:
22 Q. It's right --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just get clarification.
24 Sir, to what does this comment relate, talking about his
25 understanding of the realities of Central Bosnia was fragile in the
1 extreme? Does it relate to communications?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, you're talking to me? I apologise for
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: I assume this was saying that the information in the
6 area of understanding was not very good, but that's not just restricted to
7 radio. Often staff officers come from headquarters and discover that they
8 haven't got the truth, and it's only by coming down they can understand
9 what's going on. And in that, in this case, I think the realities of
10 Central Bosnia were suddenly revealed, as it were, and it was -- they are
11 having a very difficult time. I would agree with that. But I think the
12 communication is still there. It's a lack of logistics and a lack of
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say it's a lack of logistics and a lack of
15 equipment, are you saying that's what the comment speaks to?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, it does.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: It speaks to logistics and --
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. It speaks to --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- and to communication?
20 THE WITNESS: And communication.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: And communication.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you very much.
24 MR. ROBSON:
25 Q. Moving to this new topic, Mr. Duncan: It's correct, isn't it,
1 that it was common practice for the HVO in Central Bosnia to make false or
2 exaggerated claims in relation to the Bosnian Army?
3 A. With respect to what aspects of the Bosnian Army?
4 Q. Well --
5 A. I'm not quite sure what your question is. You're asking to make
6 exaggerated claims. On what, on their performance, on their equipment, on
7 their people, or ...
8 Q. Rather than answering your question, Mr. Duncan, what I'll do is
9 perhaps show you two documents, and then we can discuss that.
10 The first document -- and, Your Honour, I think at this stage it
11 would be prudent of me to go into private session.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
13 [Private session]
11 Page 1988 redacted. Private session
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 Yes, Mr. Robson.
24 MR. ROBSON: I'd ask to see Defence document D269.
25 While we're waiting for this document to appear, perhaps if I
1 could just explain that this is a document to the UN BH Command based at
2 Kiseljak. It's dated the 21st of June, 1993. It's an HQ BH Command daily
3 infosum. Perhaps if we could just scroll down this page a little to just
4 to confirm what I've told the Court.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where does it come from? Do you know?
6 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, sorry, if we could just go back up. What
7 we can see, in the top two -- top four squares, we can see who it's
8 addressed to. The left-hand square shows us that. And on the right-hand
9 side, that square tells us it's from HQ BH Command-Kiseljak. I'm so sorry,
10 I apologise if I said earlier it was to the Command.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed. Sorry.
12 MR. ROBSON:
13 Q. Mr. Duncan, have you seen this type of report before?
14 A. Yes, I've seen this document before.
15 Q. Have you? Perhaps if you can turn to page 2, please, point 4.
16 It's in the lower half of the page. There we go.
17 We can see at point 4 it states "Brit-Bat Sector," and the second
18 paragraph, in the section (a), deals with Kakanj. And what it states is
19 "Freng-Bat reported that the HVO had told the Croats the Haljinci Valley
20 that 2.000 Mujahedin were heading towards them, so they moved to Vares."
21 First of all, perhaps we can clarify, who and what is"Freng-Bat"?
22 A. Freng-Bat is the French engineer Battalion based on Kakanj.
23 Q. Do you actually recall this report then?
24 A. Yes, I do, because it's issued from BH headquarters, so I would
25 have seen it. I was somewhat surprised when I saw it, because it's issued
1 from a very junior officer and -- released by a relatively junior officer,
2 which is quite a surprise with a headquarters of the size of BH Command.
3 Q. Now, that junior officer had obviously received information from
4 the HVO that enabled him to make this entry; would you agree?
5 A. No, I suspect that that junior officer had got information from a
6 number of milinfosums across the pitch and has attempted to produce a
8 Q. This is speculation, isn't it, Mr. Duncan?
9 A. Well, I know the officer. It's Chambers, isn't it, Guy Chambers,
10 who's done that, his report, if you go up it?
11 Q. Perhaps we'll --
12 A. It's relatively junior -- a major, a junior officer in the
14 Q. Perhaps so I can understand, Mr. Duncan, because Guy Chambers held
15 the rank of major, this somehow made his reports less reliable so that
16 they should not be trusted; is that so?
17 A. No, not at all. I'm saying that such a report would have been
18 signed off at a high -- should have been signed off at a high level,
19 because somebody higher may have disagreed with this.
20 Q. Okay. Well, let's look at what this document says about the
21 Mujahedin. As I say, it's the HVO:
22 "Freng-Bat reported the HVO had told the Croats that 2.000
23 Mujahedin were heading towards them ..."
24 During your time in Central Bosnia, you did see one single foreign
25 Mujahedin fighter, did you, let alone 2000?
1 A. Me? I saw-- I've seen certainly seen at least two or three. I'm
2 not saying hundreds, because I don't go out on the ground and deal with
3 these people every day. There are others that would see them.
4 Q. Excuse me. You are saying that you have seen foreign Mujahedin
6 A. I believe them to be foreign Mujahedin fighters, yes.
7 Q. Okay. We'll explore this in a little more detail in a while, but
8 according to what you've told the Tribunal on earlier occasions, you've
9 never seen a foreign Mujahedin during your time in Central Bosnia; isn't
10 that so?
11 A. If I've stated that, it's on the record, then that's what I'll
12 have to stick with.
13 Q. Coming back to this report, the suggestion that there were 2.000
14 Mujahedin heading towards these Croats, that was obviously a gross
15 exaggeration, wasn't it, made by the HVO?
16 A. I think it's a gross exaggeration made by whoever Guy Chambers is
17 who provided this report.
18 Q. So your evidence is that --
19 A. I just -- I would go back to my -- Your Honour, if I go back to
20 this business, may I make a comment?
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may, sir.
22 THE WITNESS: I go back to this business of such statements being
23 made which enable people to make the ground for an attack, and therefore,
24 suggesting that 2.000 Mujahedin are coming down is going to put the wind
25 up an awful lot of people and that could be well part of a plan. I'm
1 just -- I'm quite surprised of that number of people.
2 MR. ROBSON:
3 Q. So if Major Chambers had prepared this report, we shouldn't really
4 accept what's contained in it; is that what you're saying, in a nutshell?
5 A. I would -- I would question the report, and we probably did
6 question the report when it came in and put it on one side.
7 MR. ROBSON: Can we look at page 1 of the report, please. If we
8 can go to the top. And we can see the squares, and on the right-hand side
9 there are a number of columns, and we can see in the fourth box down from
10 the top, on the right-hand side, some information.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And what we can see in here, drafter, "G2 milinfo," and there's a
13 signature there. That doesn't look like Major Chambers' signature, does
15 A. No, but it's next to a major's title, Major Turle, I think it is
16 there, isn't it? I can't-- I don't who Turle is either, but it's --
17 Q. So -- Major Turle. I'd like to return back to page 2, please, on
18 what we were talking about.
19 So would you agree that the author of this piece of information
20 that appears in an UNPROFOR document believed that the HVO was creating
21 disinformation, and in fact it was the HVO that was frightening the Croat
22 population of the Haljinci Valley into believing that an attack by the
23 Mujahedin was imminent? That's what it says, doesn't it?
24 A. That's what he said, yeah.
25 Q. And it would appear that the HVO has told the Croat civilians that
1 with the purpose that the Croat civilians would move; is that right?
2 A. Possibly, yes.
3 Q. So on the face of this report, and I know that you question it,
4 but on the face of this report, would you agree that the HVO appear to be
5 using the concept of the Mujahedin as a propaganda tool to manipulate
6 their own people?
7 A. I would -- I would -- sorry. That tool has been used by both ABiH
8 and HVO throughout this business. It is part of propaganda machines.
9 Q. You have told us earlier on in your evidence how large numbers of
10 Croats left the Travnik region and crossed through Serb lines. 3.000 was
11 the figure you mentioned. Are you aware -- can you help us, is this type
12 of manipulation of Bosnian Croats by the HVO, telling them something to
13 create fear, something that you'd come across during your time in Bosnia?
14 A. I believe, in Bosnia, both ABiH and HVO used propaganda and
15 statements to manipulate people and to pave the ground for further
16 advances or whatever they wanted to do.
17 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I'd like to tender this document in
18 evidence, please.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
20 please be given an exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 299.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 MR. ROBSON:
24 Q. Now, Mr. Duncan, I'd like to turn to the issue of the Mujahedin.
25 And in doing so, I'd like to refer you to your testimony in the
1 Hadzihasanovic case, which you gave on the 13th and 14th of May, 2004.
2 Now, during your examination-in-chief on the 13th of May, at page
3 7293, the Prosecutor asked you the following question. And I should say,
4 Your Honours, that we do have the copies of the transcript on e-court,
5 should we need to look at those documents. What the Prosecutor asked was:
6 "General, did you ever discuss the issue of the Mujahedin with
7 Hadzihasanovic and/or Merdan?"
8 And what you replied was:
9 "Yes, I did. It came up on a number of occasions because I never
10 really knew whether they existed or not."
11 Now, this point was raised during cross-examination on the
12 following day, and it's page 7424 that deals with this, and this time I
13 would ask for the document to be put on the page [sic] as it's a rather
14 long extract. So it's Defence document D294.
15 Okay. If we can scroll down to the bottom half of the page,
16 please, we can see that the question put to you by Defence counsel was the
18 "And, General, you did not know -- you had no information about
19 the Mujahedin in terms of who they were, what the money was, what the
20 resupply was, how many there was, how many units there was, where they
21 were, who were their chief, what their relationship with the region was,
22 you knew nothing about that.
23 "How can you today come in this courtroom and say that
24 General Hadzihasanovic had the power to take on an unknown enemy that you
25 don't even know who this enemy is? Please comment on this question,
2 A. Could I ask you to scroll down a bit further so that people can
3 see my reply?
4 Q. Well, let's have a look at the reply. What you said was:
5 "I have said on a number of occasions that I'm not sure they
6 existed or were used, but the fact that they were around was a powerful
7 tool to be used."
8 And if we can just look on the second page, we'll just see that.
9 A. That is exactly the point about the use of the Mujahedin, that's
10 exactly what -- nobody knows what they're going to do or where they're
11 going to be and how they can be used.
12 Q. Well, with respect, Mr. Duncan, that isn't really what you're
13 saying, is it, because your position is unclear. According to what you've
14 said during the Hadzihasanovic case, you couldn't confirm whether or not
15 the Mujahedin actually existed in Central Bosnia. Isn't that right?
16 A. But it doesn't -- the point is that whether they exist or not,
17 they have an effect. If people perceive that they're there, you don't
18 have to be -- they're having an effect. I didn't know, personally,
19 whether they were or not, as I've said.
20 Q. Mr. Duncan, General Delic here is on trial, charged with
21 responsibility for the acts -- the alleged acts of Mujahedin fighters.
22 Whether they existed or not is extremely, extremely important. And
23 according to what you've said here, and indeed what you've told us today,
24 it seems to me that you didn't even know they existed. Can you explain?
25 A. The use of Mujahedin, whether they were there or not, is -- I will
1 come back to in a moment, but what I would point out is that their
2 behaviour, or whatever acts were taken in their name, should never be
3 tolerated by anyone.
4 As it happens, as an aside, in the British Army at the moment
5 we're going through a bit of a problem with that business. But I didn't
6 know they were there because I didn't see them, and I put that on -- you
7 have on record. But --
8 Q. Sorry. If I can interrupt there --
9 A. -- they're like special forces. They don't have to be there on
10 display all the time.
11 Q. So now you accept that you didn't see them, and what you told us
12 about 15 minutes ago, when you saw two or three of them, that wasn't
14 A. How do you tell the difference between somebody dressed up in
15 uniform and somebody who's not, somebody dressed up in Mujahedin outfit or
17 Q. It's a very good question.
18 A. I don't know. You could meet people at Rowbucks who were dressed
19 up as Mujahedin because it's what the local boys wanted to do.
20 Q. Perhaps I could clarify another matter. You've told in your
21 evidence today that, "on the one hand the Mujahedin were a special unit,"
22 and then you went on to say that "they may have completely fooled us," and
23 then you went on to said that they weren't -- you not sure that they were
24 used by the 3rd Corps at all. It's a confusing situation.
25 A. It is a confusing situation. You're absolutely right.
1 Q. Now, the Prosecution showed you a series of documents relating to
2 the Mujahedin, many of which were milinfosums prepared by your regiment.
3 You explained earlier that the -- that that information, certainly the
4 bulk of it, came from the various officers that worked throughout Central
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Am I right in saying that typically the way your officers gathered
8 information from the members of the HVO and the Bosnian Army involved a
9 lot of drinking of Sljivovica, drinking coffee, and offering cigarettes in
10 exchange for information?
11 A. Yes, that's quite normal. That's the way things were done.
12 Q. Your liaison officers, when they went out into the field, were
13 accompanied by local people, weren't they, who acted as translators during
14 these meetings with the Bosnian Army and the HVO?
15 A. Yes. There would be the driver, a commander, and probably an
16 interpreter, a team of three in a Land Rover.
17 Q. Mr. Duncan, even in the calm surroundings of this courtroom, where
18 we have professional interpreters, we've found that sometimes
19 misunderstandings in translation can arise. Would you agree with me that
20 during a wartime situation, where time is precious and Sljivovica and
21 amateur translators are involved, the scope for translation errors was
22 there, it existed?
23 A. I would agree, but we took great cares to make sure we had the
24 best interpreters we could get at the time.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just for my own edification, what is Sljivovica?
1 THE WITNESS: Sljivovica is a very strong brandy, alcohol. It is
2 very strong, and it is frequently used throughout that part of the world.
3 MR. ROBSON:
4 Q. Sir, from what you've told us, the milinfosum was prepared
5 quickly, wasn't it? Your officers had to get the information back for the
6 6.00 meeting so that your captain could begin compiling the information so
7 it could be issued the next day; is that so?
8 A. Yes, and I said if there were anything to be corrected, it would
9 be corrected in that.
10 Q. Now, it's right to say, isn't it, that the officers that provided
11 that information from the field to your military information officer, they
12 didn't have the chance to review the document before it was issued out to
13 the field, did they?
14 A. No, they didn't, no.
15 Q. So if the information they had passed on to the military
16 information officer was incorrect or had been wrongly understood, there
17 was no opportunity for them to correct that?
18 A. The 6.00 meeting is when they would be able to correct it, because
19 they would attend the 6.00 meeting.
20 Q. Now, the information that your men gathered was, in the main,
21 limited to do what they saw and what they heard, wasn't it? And by that,
22 perhaps I should just explain. They didn't have access to any military
23 communications from the Bosnian Army or the HVO, such as orders,
24 directives, et cetera?
25 A. No.
1 Q. They also didn't have access to confidential military information
2 held by those parties, did they?
3 A. No.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Registrar, shall we redact that part of the
22 transcript, starting from --
23 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour --
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Starting from line 14.
25 MR. ROBSON: Obviously, the Statute of the Tribunal emphasizes
1 that trials should be held in an open forum, and I would just perhaps
2 submit that this might be a matter that counsel should both make
3 submissions on before a final decision is taken, with respect.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm so sorry. Let's here what the opposite number
7 has to say.
8 Yes, Mr. Mundis.
9 MR. MUNDIS: Your Honours, although it's not directly on point, I
10 would submit, in light of the witness's prior answer, that perhaps Rule 70
11 might be an applicable analogy for what's being requested here. I think
12 that the relatively limited scope of what the witness is asking to be
13 redacted is such that this does not in any way render these proceedings to
14 be -- to have the public's interests detrimentally harmed by a slight
15 redaction such as this.
16 I would also say, while I'm on my feet, that on page 21, lines 17
17 through 21, from the direct examination, also alludes to this point. So I
18 would object to my learned colleague's statement a few moments ago that
19 this is new information. But to the extent that the witness has now
20 indicated that perhaps that information should not be made public, I draw
21 to the Chamber's attention page 21, lines 17 through 21, where similar
22 information is -- was given by the witness.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Your learned friend has asked that you be
24 allowed to make submissions later. I don't know, is that the sum total of
25 your submission, or would you like to make further submissions later when
1 he makes his?
2 MR. MUNDIS: Of course, the problem with that would be that the --
3 we have a very limited time in order to make redactions, and thus to make
4 submissions later would render it moot.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would defeat the purpose.
6 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, if --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's see what --
8 MR. ROBSON: If it assists, the Defence adopts a neutral position
9 here, and we leave it in the hands of the Tribunal -- I beg your pardon.
10 We leave it in the hands of the Chamber as to how it wishes to deal with
11 this matter.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: That being the case, then may we redact page 21,
13 lines 14 to 22, and -- sorry, where was this now?
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Page 96, from line 14 to 23.
16 Thank you very much.
17 MR. ROBSON:
18 Q. Would you agree with me that when your men attempted to gather
19 information from one of the parties to the conflict, each side often had
20 its own interests and reasons to either supply information or withhold it?
21 A. Yes, that's true.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just interrupt you again, Mr. Robson. I'm
23 just being advised, and I think rightly so, that page 21 is already in the
24 public domain.
25 MR. MUNDIS: So be it, Your Honours. Of course, there is always
1 the possibility that the transcripts, as they'll be made available to the
2 public, could be redacted, notwithstanding the fact that the broadcast has
3 gone out. But again, as with the position by the Defence, I leave that
4 entirely in the Trial Chamber's hands as to whether the Chamber wishes to
5 order a redaction of the actual transcripts which would be posted on the
6 website and made available to the public once they are corrected.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: If that is possible, may we redact the transcripts
8 that are posted to the public.
9 Thank you very much.
10 I'm sorry, Mr. Robson. You may proceed.
11 MR. ROBSON:
12 Q. What I'd like to do, if I may, is bring to your attention what
13 your predecessor, Colonel Robert Stewart during the Hadzihasanovic trial
14 which occurred on the 31st of January 2005 at page 15.209, and what he
15 said was the following --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before you ask that question, and I'm very
17 sorry to do this to you: According to my notes, this document 294, which
18 was supposed to be on the screen, are you still referring to it or are we
19 done with it?
20 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, perhaps it can be taken from the screen,
21 and I won't admit it into evidence.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay, thank you very much. That's what I wanted to
23 find out.
24 MR. ROBSON:
25 Q. Sorry, Mr. Duncan. So what your predecessor at Brit-Bat said was,
1 "One of the things I quickly learned in Bosnia was if we don't actually
2 see it ourselves, don't trust it." Would you agree with his comment?
3 A. It's his comment, the first thing, and I obviously took over from
4 him, and one of the things I did when I took over was to continue that
5 five-level, if you like, intelligence plan to gather information, because
6 people had to see things with their eyes, and that's what my people out on
7 the ground were doing.
8 Q. So, broadly speaking, you would go along with what he had to say?
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. Now, as to the purpose for your men gathering information, you
11 said at the beginning of the cross-examination, that it was to enable
12 Brit-Bat to create the conditions whereby aid could be delivered. It's
13 right, isn't it, that Brit-Bat's intelligence requirements in Bosnia were
14 not the same as if it had been a belligerent party to the conflict or,
15 indeed --
16 A. Yes, yeah, we would tailor the intelligence requirements to the
17 task, and that's what we did.
18 Q. And the information that your men gathered was short-term
19 intelligence to enable you to make decisions on how and whether to act on
20 a day-to-day basis as opposed to long-term intelligence; would you agree?
21 A. I would not be reacting on a day-to-day basis. I would be
22 listening to and getting information in. We wouldn't do any knee-jerk
23 reacting, and I would want confirmation, particularly if something was
24 very suspicious or odd or strange or didn't fit in with our patterns, we
25 would like to verify it and perhaps investigate it a little bit more.
1 Q. So re-investigation is something that was important to you?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You've also mentioned during your evidence that the milinfosum
4 represented a snapshot in time of how the situation on the ground appeared
5 at that particular moment; is that right?
6 A. That's correct, yes.
7 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that the opinions contained in those
8 milinfosums or that snapshot in time, if you like, could at a later date
9 be changed if new information came to light that revealed a different
11 A. Are we talking about the opinion or the information that comes
12 before the opinion, because that's quite important.
13 Q. Well, I suppose --
14 A. There's a difference between what we believe to be fact and a
15 difference between the opinion that came out, and we didn't use the
17 Q. You're absolutely right, and I suppose what I should have asked
18 you is that it's correct to say that at a later stage, both the factual
19 information and the comment that had been expressed in an earlier infosum
20 could both be changed?
21 A. It would be -- we would change the fact. We probably wouldn't
22 change the comment.
23 Q. Okay. Earlier on in your evidence, you mentioned the 306th
24 Brigade. I'd like to show you Exhibit 90, if I may. And if I can just
25 explain, this is an official note dated the 28th of May, 1993, from
1 Asim Delalic, the assistant commander of security of the 306th Mountain
2 Brigade, and concerns the death of Sakib Brkic.
3 Perhaps if we can just go to the bottom of the English document
4 just to confirm who it came from.
5 Now, I'd like to read out paragraph 3, and what it says is:
6 "On 25th of May, 1993, a group of Mujahedin who are not under the
7 control of our brigade and are billeted in Mehuric, in the area of
8 responsibility of the 306th Brigade, reconnoitered the Probijeno Brdo
9 sector without having asked for permission and without having informed
11 Do you see that?
12 A. Yes, I do, yes.
13 Q. And it's right that this document was prepared not long after the
14 Prince of Wales' Own Regiment arrived in Bosnia; is that so?
15 A. We arrived on the 5th and I took over on the 11th of May.
16 Q. Do you accept that this document indicates that the Mujahedin were
17 not under the control of the 306th Mountain Brigade?
18 A. Sorry, run that through again, please. I'm not -- sorry, just the
19 question. I do apologise.
20 Q. Do you accept that this document indicates that the Mujahedin were
21 not under the control of the 306th Brigade?
22 A. Yes, I accept that.
23 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, this document can be removed from the
25 Q. You also mentioned the 7th Muslim Brigade during your testimony,
1 and in respect to this particular brigade I'd like to refer you to the
2 testimony that you gave in the Kordic case, and that was on the 25th of
3 November, 1999, and it was at page number 10.528. Again, we do have --
4 perhaps the document could be put on the screen. It's D293.
5 Now, while we're waiting for that to come up: You were asked,
6 Mr. Duncan, by Defence counsel during cross-examination whether you knew
7 anything about the relationship between imams and commanders of units. If
8 we can scroll down to the bottom half of this page, please. Again, you
9 can see it's a lengthy question, but in respect of that question, your
10 response was:
11 "I can't remember ever meeting an imam on any of my visits to any
12 ABiH unit. I think, sir, you will be aware of an organisation called the
13 7th Muslim Brigade. Whether this is fact or fiction, I don't know. These
14 were hard-line or purported to be hard-line religious zealots with the
15 Mujahedin who had apparently had come from outside, but I cannot -- I
16 never saw 7th Muslim Brigade or saw anyone in it, so I can't verify that."
17 Now, presumably when you testified in 1999, Mr. Duncan, your
18 recollection of events in Central Bosnia was much fresher than it is
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Would you agree?
22 A. Yes, I would agree with that.
23 Q. And if we consider the language that you used in that response
24 when referring to the Mujahedin and the 7th Muslim Brigade, you mention
25 "purported, apparently, whether this is fact or fiction." The truth is
1 you didn't know for certain whether either the Mujahedin or the 7th Muslim
2 Brigade existed, did you?
3 A. No, it's on the record. I mean, this is eight years ago for me,
4 and if that's what I said, that's what I said.
5 Q. I'd like to turn to the document that you were shown that was,
6 interestingly enough, prepared by Colonel Guy Chambers at UNPROFOR, and
7 this is the UNPROFOR BH Command at Kiseljak.
8 You discussed Colonel Chambers a little earlier in your evidence,
9 but the fact is he was a -- it was his role at Kiseljak to analyse and
10 collate evidence -- I'm sorry, I beg your pardon, to analyse and collate
11 information received from UNPROFOR units at a lower level; is that right?
12 A. I believe so, yes, because he worked in the G2 cell, which was
14 Q. And so to that extent, Colonel Chambers or Major Chambers, as he
15 was then, was desk-bound, and he didn't go out himself to investigate and
16 gather information; is that right?
17 A. He -- I would hope he would get out and have a look around, but he
18 might not have done at all, yes.
19 Q. Would you agree that his primary source of information about the
20 Mujahedin was from Brit-Bat?
21 A. Well, he would have hopefully not used just one source but as many
22 as he could find. It would have been foolish, I would have thought, to
23 have just one source as you're putting out a message to somebody across
24 the force.
25 Q. And would you agree with me when I say that the document that we
1 saw doesn't really introduce any fresh source of information about the
2 Mujahedin; when that report was prepared, Colonel Chambers was simply
3 repeating information that he had been provided to him by others?
4 A. Yes, I assume that's what he's done, yes, in that document.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: I was just going to ask you, how much longer do you
6 still have to go?
7 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I would anticipate about 30 minutes.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: You've logged the same time now as the Prosecution
10 MR. ROBSON: Well, with the Court's indulgence, I would
11 respectfully ask for a little more time, because obviously this is an
12 important witness that touches upon crucial issues. I will try to be as
13 quick as I can.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please.
15 MR. ROBSON:
16 Q. I'd like to show you a series of documents that show a different
17 picture relating to command and control in Central Bosnia.
18 We can start with document D270.
19 While we're waiting, this is a milinfosum dated the 8th of May,
20 1993. At the top -- just under the heading, it states: "1. Vitez Area
22 If we can look at the bottom of the second paragraph, just above
23 the part that says "a cessation of all hostilities," there's a comment
24 prepared there, and I'm interested in the final sentence, and what it
25 states is:
1 "After initial mutual hostility, an agreement was reached even
2 though both sides mentioned uncontrollable elements.
3 "Comment: Command and control is often tenuous at best and
4 elements of both factions operate outside of all authority. Comment
6 Now, Mr. Duncan, this was a generalised comment, but would you
7 agree that this described problems found across the whole of the 3rd
8 Corps' area of responsibility?
9 A. The first point -- am I allowed to point out this was -- we hadn't
10 taken over at this stage as a regiment. We took over afterwards, I think
11 on the 11th. And the main thrust of your comment was about the comment,
12 and we've discussed that before, that the comments are not exact fact. So
13 that comment about uncontrollable elements has been made by -- as a
14 comment, and it's not a fact, unless I've got it horribly wrong.
15 Q. Can I clarify this, please, because --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you clarify, there's a little housekeeping
18 Now that you have asked for extra time, can we ask the witness who
19 is waiting in the waiting room to go back to the hotel and be excused for
20 the day.
21 Thank you very much. You may proceed.
22 MR. ROBSON:
23 Q. Can I just clarify your last answer?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You've said that --
1 A. We haven't actually taken over the regiment at that stage, I don't
2 think. It's a minor problem, but it means that I'm not reading this as
3 checking it through. And, secondly, you've pointed out about -- the bit
4 about uncontrollable elements was a comment, and I thought that we
5 discussed earlier that comments should be looked at with caution.
6 Q. I entirely agree with you, Mr. Duncan, in respect of that last --
7 in respect of the last part of that answer, but if I could just clarify
8 this. We see here a document which has "PWO Milinfosum" written on the
9 top of it. Are you saying that somebody else produced this document?
10 A. It's part of the takeover, hand-over.
11 Q. And I would remind you that at the beginning of your
12 examination-in-chief, you told the Trial Chamber that the Prince of Wales'
13 Own Regiment arrived on the 11th of April, 1993. Is that not right?
14 A. Yes, I've obviously mistimed my comment on that.
15 Q. I'd like to move on to a second document, if I may. It's D271.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: What shall we do with D270?
17 MR. ROBSON: I keep forgetting. I apologise. Please, could it be
18 tendered for admission into evidence?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. May it be given an exhibit
20 number, please, and entered in evidence.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number 300
22 [Realtime transcript read in error "293"].
23 MR. ROBSON: While we're wait for this document, I'll explain that
24 it's milinfosum number 20, dated the 19th of May, 1993. It's page 1 that
25 we're interested in.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Again, sorry, if I may interrupt. Again, the
2 record says "this is Exhibit 293", and I thought I heard you say "Exhibit
3 300", Mr. Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: If the record will please show it's 300 and not
7 MR. ROBSON:
8 Q. First of all, concerning the date of this document, do you agree
9 that the Prince of Wales' Own was firmly on the ground and operating by
10 this time?
11 A. Yes, thank you.
12 Q. If we can just look towards the bottom, we don't have to move the
13 screen, actually, it's the comment at the bottom that I'm interested in;
14 although, the value of this may be in question, but taking into account
15 what you've just told us, what it says is that:
16 "Certain individuals are beyond the control of all recognised
17 authority has been apparent for some time. Whether because it is a
18 convenient excuse for noncompliance or not, uncontrollable elements are
19 constantly referred to in the meetings of the joint commissions for all
20 areas. The concern is that their actions will incite others."
21 Have you seen this document before?
22 A. Yes, I have, that one.
23 Q. So it's correct to say, isn't it, that at the 19th of May, 1993,
24 ARBiH commanders in different areas were telling Brit-Bat repeatedly that
25 there were elements beyond their control; do you agree with that?
1 A. Everybody was reporting elements beyond their control. It's not
2 just ABiH or HVO, it's everybody's reporting this, and it's a comment,
4 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, I'd like to tender that document for
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
7 please be given an exhibit number.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 301.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's Exhibit 301.
10 MR. ROBSON: The next document I'd like to refer to is D273, and
11 it's milinfosum number 29, dated 28 May 1993, and it's page 1 that we're
12 interested in.
13 Q. So if we can see there, point number 2 is headed "Travnik," and
14 I'm interested in point number 4, which is lower down the page. What we
15 can see here is that it states:
16 "This afternoon the Travnik LO," that's "liaison officer,"
17 "... reported that Leutar and Alagic had told him that they were losing
18 control of their respective commands and, therefore, the situation as a
20 Now, would you agree with me that around the 28th of May, the
21 system of command and control was breaking down in the area of
22 responsibility of General Alagic, i.e., the OG Bosanska Krajina area?
23 A. We're talking about Travnik at this stage, and the relationship
24 between the HVO and BiH in Travnik?
25 Q. Well, yes, yes, yes.
1 A. Yes, okay. Yes. And as it says here, because of that situation,
2 we deployed additional people there.
3 Q. So command and control was breaking down in Travnik around the
4 28th of May; you would agree with that?
5 A. Yes, I would admit that, yes.
6 MR. ROBSON: Okay. Your Honour, if we could admit this document
7 into evidence, please, or tender it.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 302.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 MR. ROBSON: Now I'd like to turn to the issue of control over the
12 Mujahedin, and in this respect if we can refer to Exhibit D274. This is
13 milinfosum number 32. It's dated the 31st of May, 1993, and it's the
14 first page that we're interested in.
15 If we could scroll down the page, please, to the Zenica section.
16 That's fine.
17 If I could read this extract to you, it states:
18 "The Zenica LO today attended a meeting with the Mujahedin
19 elements based in Zenica. He spoke with three representatives, all from
20 Turkey, with only one able to speak Serbo-Croat. They were friendly but
21 guarded when asked questions of a military nature, such as their relations
22 with the mainstream BiH. They were very suspicious of the activities of
23 both UNPROFOR and the UNHCR. The LO formed the impression that they
24 regarded the Croats as a bigger enemy than the Serbs and that they were
25 not under control of 3rd Corps."
1 Now it's right, Mr. Duncan, isn't it, that the liaison officer who
2 provided this information and concluded that those Mujahedin were not
3 under the control of the 3rd Corps, had actually met those men and talked
4 with them?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And that's something that you never did, isn't it?
7 A. Yes, yeah. Have you considered they could be under the
8 headquarters above the 3rd Corps?
9 Q. Mr. Duncan, it's not my role to question the evidence. I'll leave
10 that for the skills of the Judges. But what I'm interested in is that
11 this report is dated the 31st of May and comes some four days after
12 another milinfosum that the Prosecutor showed you, which indicated that
13 the Mujahedin in Zenica were under the control of the 3rd Corps, and to
14 come back to what you said about five minutes ago, perhaps could this have
15 been a situation where the liaison officer had gone back to try and
16 clarify the situation or investigate?
17 A. It could well have done, yes, because when he brought the
18 information in, it would have to be verified if we've got another source
19 against a single source. So we'd try and find out more information, if we
21 Q. And if indeed he verified, the conclusion is clear here, isn't it,
22 that the Mujahedin were not under control of 3rd Corps?
23 A. As it stands, yes.
24 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, please could I tender that for
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated] May it please be given
2 an exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number 303.
4 MR. ROBSON: Your Honours, I'd now like to turn to document D275,
5 but I'm conscious that it's -- I think it was admitted as an exhibit
6 earlier, but perhaps if we can bring up 275, and we can identify the
7 exhibit number, if indeed that's the case, just to explain that this is
8 another milinfosum, number 45, dated the 13th of June, 1993. It's the
9 first page we're interested in.
10 Q. So Mr. Duncan, if I can just touch upon what the first paragraph
11 says. At the bottom, the last sentence of the first paragraph, it says:
12 "ACs conducted an extensive recce of the area and noted the
13 following detail:" And if we look at point B it says that:
14 "The village of Guca Gora is occupied by Mujahedin elements in
15 some strength, 25 to 30 observed the group contained Arabic speakers and
16 refused to talk via a female interpreter. Some of the group were clearly
17 hostile to the UN. When asked about the cease-fire, they denied all
18 knowledge, and when shown a copy, they claimed that it did not apply to
20 First of all, by "cease-fire," this would have been an agreement
21 between the HVO and Bosnian Army; is that right?
22 A. I think so, yes.
23 Q. Now, according to this statement, the fact that the Mujahedin
24 elements stated that they did not consider themselves to be bound by such
25 agreements, would you agree that that provides a clear indication that
1 they were not under the control of the Bosnian Army?
2 A. That's what they've said, that they're not under control.
3 Q. That was the information reported back to Brit-Bat headquarters
4 that day.
5 Your Honour, I'm told that that was Exhibit 287.
6 Your Honour, I do have only a small number of exhibits, not many
7 at all, but I did receive a letter -- a note informing me that the
8 Prosecutor had some matters to raise, so -- and perhaps this might be an
9 appropriate moment for my learned friend to interject.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You have issues to raise before we break?
11 MR. MUNDIS: I had just a couple of very brief issues before we
12 break. I'm assuming that Mr. Robson needs some time tomorrow morning. I
13 would ask that I be given just a couple of minutes before we -- before we
14 break. If it's clear that he's going into tomorrow, then I would need a
15 couple of minutes.
16 MR. ROBSON: Your Honour, what I would say is that I've probably
17 got no more than 15 minutes worth of questions.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll have to go into tomorrow, then. Let's give
19 Mr. Mundis an opportunity.
20 Thank you very much.
21 Yes, Mr. Mundis.
22 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that we go into private session. There's
23 no need, actually, for the witness to remain. He can be released.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Let's do that.
25 Mr. Duncan, we are about to knock off in another four minutes'
1 time, and apparently there are other issues to attend to. You are excused
2 for the day, but please come back tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning in this
3 courtroom, Courtroom II.
4 THE WITNESS: Right, sir. Thank you very much.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are now excused.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.
8 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask we go into private session,
9 Mr. President.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
11 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Now that we are in open
20 session, we can adjourn to tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning, Courtroom II.
21 Court adjourned.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.57 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Friday, the 31st day of
24 August, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.