1. Miroslav Deronjic, son of Milovan, was born on 6 June 1954 in the Municipality of Bratunac, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  2. From September 1990 to the end of April 1992, he was President of the Bratunac Municipal Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter "SDS").
  3. He was appointed member of the SDS party Commission on Personnel and Organisation by the Executive Board on 6 September 1991.
  4. Miroslav Deronjic was President of the Bratunac Crisis Staff from the time when it assumed authority from the Executive Committee of the Municipality and the organs of the Municipal Assembly from the end of April 1992 to the time of its transformation to a War Commission established by the Presidency of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 1992.
  5. Miroslav Deronjic was appointed a member of War Commission of the Bratunac Municipality.
  6. Miroslav Deronjic became a member of the Main Board of the SDS in the summer of 1993.
  7. On 14-15 October 1991, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the participation of SDS Deputies, passed a Memorandum supporting the creation of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs were committed to the goal that all Serbs in the former Yugoslavia would remain in a common state. Following the decision of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to support sovereignty, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadzic, Mom~ilo Kraji{nik, Biljana Plav{ic, and Nikola Koljevic undertook steps to establish Serbian ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  8. The Bosnian Serb leadership, including Radovan Karadzic, Mom~ilo Kraji{nik, Biljana Plav{ic, and Nikola Koljevic, understood and intended that the creation of Serbian ethnic territories included division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the separation and the permanent removal of ethnic populations from municipalities designated as Serbian, either by agreement or by force. The Bosnian Serb leadership knew that any forcible removal of non-Serbs from Serbian-claimed territories would involve a discriminatory campaign of persecution.
  9. In order to ensure creation of Serbian ethnic territories, the Bosnian Serb leadership, in collaboration with members of the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter "SFRY"), including Mihalj Kertes, and with units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (hereinafter "JNA") and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, armed large segments of the Bosnian Serb population. The Bosnian Serb leadership co-ordinated with Serbian military, police and paramilitary units within and without Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve their objectives of establishing Serbian ethnic territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  10. At a meeting convened in Sarajevo on or about the 19th of December 1991, presided over by Radovan Karadzic and attended by, among others, deputies of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and by presidents of the municipal boards, including Miroslav Deronjic, "strictly confidential" written instructions were disseminated to the attendees relating to the establishment of Bosnian Serb municipal governmental bodies in divers municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The instructions, entitled "Instructions for the organisation and activities of the organs of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a state of emergency" and dated 19 December 1991, were directed to municipalities where Bosnian Serbs comprised either a majority of the population (Variant A) or a minority of the population (Variant B). The contents of these instructions were explained to the participants of the meeting by Radovan Karadzic. The instructions identified precise steps to be taken within the respective municipalities in order to establish Bosnian Serb control. The instructions described two distinct phases of action.
  11. Bratunac Municipality was a Variant B municipality. The steps described in the instructions for Variant B municipalities included the formation of Crisis Staffs and the formation of Serb Assemblies. Upon receiving these confidential written instructions, Miroslav Deronjic returned to the Bratunac Municipality where, under his leadership and direction, the Municipal Board immediately adopted and implemented the instructions. An SDS Crisis Staff was formed and Miroslav Deronjic was elected president. A Serb Assembly was established and Ljubisav Simic was elected president of that organ.
  12. In late February 1992, Goran Zekic, a member of the Bosnian Serb Republic Assembly from the adjacent municipality of Srebrenica and a member of the SDS Main Board, conveyed the order to implement the second phase of these instructions in the Bratunac Municipality and Miroslav Deronjic took positive and concrete actions to do so, including affirmative actions in the Bratunac Municipal Assembly.
  13. Miroslav Deronjic subscribed unequivocally to the policy of creating Serb ethnic territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later to the use of force to remove non-Serbs from Serb designated territories. In his leadership capacity in the Bratunac Municipality, Miroslav Deronjic actively participated in efforts to transform the Bratunac Municipality into Serb ethnic territory and achieve the objective set forth by the Bosnian Serb leadership.
  14. As part of the process of ensuring that Bratunac Municipality would become ethnic Serb territory, "volunteers" from the SFRY, with the co-operation of the SFRY authorities, crossed the Drina River on the 14th or 15th of April 1992 and entered Skelani (Srebrenica Municipality). Their purpose for entering Bosnia and Herzegovina was to assist the Bosnian Serbs in taking over power and forcibly removing Muslims from the area.
  15. On 17 April 1992, "volunteers" from the SFRY entered Bratunac and, at the Hotel Fontana, their commander met with and issued an ultimatum to the leaders of the Srebrenica and Bratunac Muslim communities to surrender weapons and legal authority to Bosnian Serbs or suffer destruction at the hands of thousands of Serb soldiers who were amassed across the Drina River in Serbia. Following the acquiescence to the ultimatum by the representatives of the Muslim community, the Crisis Staff assumed political power in the Bratunac Municipality.
  16. Thereafter, efforts to ethnically cleanse the Bosnian Muslim population from the Bratunac Municipality were undertaken. The means used to effectuate the cleansing included the intimidation and random killings of Bosnian Muslims by "volunteers" and others, and the looting of Muslim homes and businesses. This activity resulted in an unknown number of Bosnian Muslims fleeing from the municipality of Bratunac.
  17. Glogova was a Muslim village located in the Bratunac Municipality on the main road between the town of Bratunac and the town of Konjevic Polje. According to the figures from the 1991 census, the population of Glogova numbered 1913. Of these residents, the census described 1901 of them as Muslim, 6 as Serbs, 4 as Yugoslavs, 1 as a Croat, and 1 as "other."
  18. Between the end of April 1992 and early May 1992, Miroslav Deronjic, in his capacity as President of the Bratunac Crisis Staff, authorised the Territorial Defence (hereinafter "TO") and the Bratunac police forces to disarm the Bosnian Muslim population in the village of Glogova. On at least three occasions during that period, Bratunac police forces and the TO, working in concert with members of the JNA, went through Glogova and secured weapons from the Bosnian Muslim population.
  19. On one occasion toward the end of April 1992, the Bosnian Muslim population of Glogova was directed to appear at a meeting at the community building in Glogova and directed to turn in their weapons. On or about 27 April 1992, the villagers of Glogova were told by Milutin Milo{evic, Chief of the Bratunac police, that they would not be attacked because they had turned over their weapons.
  20. The disarming of the Bosnian Muslims in Glogova and in other Muslim villages was an important element in ensuring and facilitating the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims from Glogova, the town of Bratunac, Suha and Voljavica and achieving the objectives set forth by the Bosnian Serb leadership.
  21. Between the 21st and the 23rd of April 1992, a small JNA formation arrived in the Bratunac municipality. The unit was part of an armoured mechanised unit and was under the command of a JNA Captain by the name of Reljic. Approximately 20-30 men were in the unit. The unit was part of a mechanised armoured brigade that was located in Sekovici.
  22. Captain Reljic planned and assisted in the disarming of Muslim villages in the Bratunac municipality. Captain Reljic’s JNA unit, the TO, and the police would jointly participate in the disarming of the Muslim villages. Following the disarming of a Muslim village, the JNA and the police announced that the army would guarantee the safety of the residents. The disarming of Muslim villages continued until the 6th of May 1992.
  23. A second group of "volunteers" from Serbia also arrived in Bratuanc. The commander of this group of volunteers was an individual nicknamed "Peki." As soon as they entered Bratunac, they committed several murders of Muslims, including the owners of a restaurant in Bratunac and several Muslims from the suburban neighbourhood called @ljevice. They also engaged in widespread looting of Muslim property. The activities of the "volunteers" were known to the Bosnian Serb leadership in Bratunac, including the authorities of the Crisis Staff, the Bratunac police, and the TO. These activities created panic amongst the local population and resulted in an unknown number of Muslim residents fleeing from the Bratunac Municipality.
  24. The arrival of the JNA unit under the command of Captain Reljic and the arrival of the "volunteers" from Serbia was agreed upon by the top leadership on the Republika Srpska and the SFRY.
  25. On the 6th or 7th of May 1992, and in furtherance of a plan to attack the village of Glogova, Miroslav Deronjic and Captain Reljic travelled to the village of Maga{ici from which point they were able to view the entire village of Glogova. The purpose of this visit was to reconnoitre Glogova in preparation of the attack on the village.
  26. On the 7th of May 1992, the preparations for the attack on Glogova began and it was agreed that the attack would commence within 48-72 hours.
  27. In the afternoon of 8 May 1992, Goran Zekic, a well-known and popular political figure in Bratunac who was a member of the Bosnian Serb Republic Assembly from the adjacent municipality of Srebrenica, was killed near Srebrenica and his body was brought to the town of Bratunac.
  28. Later the same day, at 2200 hours, the Bratunac Crisis Staff met principally about the events surrounding the death of Goran Zekic and with the operation to attack Glogova. Miroslav Deronjic presided over this meeting. The portion of the meeting dealing with the attack on Glogova was attended only by members of the Crisis Staff, Captain Reljic, Ra{a Milo{evic, Commander of the Kravica Detachment of the TO, and another individual who was a member of the State Security of Serbia.
  29. At this session of the Crisis Staff, Miroslav Deronjic made introductory remarks that included an announcement that the operation against Glogova would be carried out the following day. He explained the strategic significance of taking Glogova and said that the plan to create Serbian ethnic territory could not be implemented in the Bratunac municipality without taking Glogova first and transferring the entire Bosnian Muslim population from Glogova to non-Serb territory within Central Bosnia. He said that that if there was no resistance from the Muslim residents of Glogova, all the Muslim residents should be brought to the centre of town and transported by bus and truck out of the Bratunac municipality to Kladanj. He also stated that if everything went well with the Glogova operation, the operation to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims would continue in the following days in the town of Bratunac and the communities of Voljavica and Suha. Following the introductory remarks by Miroslav Deronjic, and a discussion about the Glogova plan, the Bratunac Crisis Staff adopted the plan.
  30. Miroslav Deronjic, with the specific intent to discriminate against the Bosnian Muslim residents of Glogova and the Bratunac Municipality on political and religious grounds, ordered the attack on Glogova.
  31. Miroslav Deronjic knew that the attack on Glogova and the forcible displacement of the Bosnian Muslim population from it was part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim civilian population within parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina designated as the Republika Srpska.
  32. The attack on Glogova occurred within the context of an armed conflict within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  33. The decision to attack Glogova and to displace permanently its Muslim residents was done in order to further the plan to create Serb ethnic territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  34. Following the adoption of the plan to attack Glogova, the Bratunac Crisis Staff debated the issue of burning Glogova. Miroslav Deronjic said that while it was impossible to forecast the events in Glogova, some houses should be set on fire as a warning to the Muslims in order to spread panic and fear among them and part of the houses should be preserved for refugees. Miroslav Deronjic also said that if fighting erupted, he did not care what happened to the houses.
  35. Captain Reljic informed the Bratunac Crisis Staff that the JNA would participate in the operation. Miroslav Deronjic urged Captain Reljic to fire a tank shell into a house at the initial stage of the attack in order to sow panic amongst the Muslim residents of Glogova.
  36. The attack on Glogova was a joint operation. The attacking forces were comprised of members of the JNA (Reljic’s unit), the Bratunac TO, the Bratunac Police, and paramilitary "volunteers" from Serbia (hereinafter "attacking forces"). Miroslav Deronjic co-ordinated and monitored the attack on Glogova.
  37. Miroslav Deronjic participated in the military operation against Glogova. On the evening of 8 May 1992, Miroslav Deronjic and other Bosnian Serbs took positions on an elevated ridge above Glogova and remained there until the operation against Glogova commenced at 0600 hours on the morning of 9 May 1992. The role of Miroslav Deronjic and members of his unit was to interdict Bosnian Muslims fleeing from Glogova in the direction of Srebrenica and to prevent Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica from coming to the assistance of the residents of Glogova. Miroslav Deronjic and others remained at their positions until about 1000 hours on 9 May 1992.
  38. Immediately after the commencement of the attack on Glogova, members of the attacking forces set fire to Bosnian Muslim houses and outbuildings. Miroslav Deronjic was aware of this as the smoke from the burning houses and out-buildings was clearly visible to him. He was informed, via a hand-held radio, that there was no combat or resistance and that everything was going according to plan. He did not intervene to prevent the additional burning the Bosnian Muslim houses.
  39. At approximately 1000 hours on 9 May 1992, Miroslav Deronjic and other members of the military unit with whom he was associated left their positions and descended in the direction of Glogova. When Miroslav Deronjic and others arrived at the edge of Glogova, they came upon 5-10 Muslim houses. After checking the houses to determine if any Muslims remained in them, and finding none, Miroslav Deronjic authorised soldiers to burn the houses and they were burned.
  40. Thereafter, Miroslav Deronjic and his companions came upon another 5-6 Muslim houses from which the occupants had fled. At that location were members of the Kravica Detachment, including Nedjo, nicknamed "Djedura." Miroslav Deronjic encouraged Nedjo, nicknamed "Djedura," and his companions set fire to these Bosnian Muslim houses.
  41. There was no resistance from the Bosnian Muslim residents of the village. During the attack on the village, members of the attacking forces murdered 65 unarmed residents of the village identified in Schedule A which forms part of the Second Amended Indictment.
  42. Miroslav Deronjic did not physically commit any of the murders of the 65 civilians identified in Schedule A. However at the time he ordered the attack, given the purpose and objective of the attack, the existing political climate, and the units that were to participate in, it was foreseeable to him and he was prepared to take the risk , that innocent Muslim residents of Glogova could be murdered as it was a consequence that was natural and foreseeable.
  43. During the attack on Glogova, and in fulfilment of the operational objective of the plan to permanently displace Bosnian Muslims from the Bratunac Municipality, many Bosnian Muslim residents of Glogova, principally women and children, were forcibly displaced from Glogova.
  44. As a result of the attack on the village of Glogova on the 9th of May 1992, 65 Bosnian Muslims residents of the village were murdered, the entire Bosnian Muslim population of the village was forcibly displaced and a substantial number of Bosnian Muslim residences in Glogova were razed to the ground. The mosque was also burned and destroyed.
  45. Miroslav Deronjic was invited to Pale to report on the events in Glogova and on either the 10th or the 11th of May 1992, and he travelled to Pale to attend a meeting to report about the events in the Bratunac Municipality.
  46. Present at the meeting in Pale, held in a large conference room, were Radovan Karadzic, Velibor Ostojic, and Ratko Mladic and presidents of crisis staffs in the Republika Srpska. Miroslav Deronjic made his report to Radovan Karadzic, Velibor Ostojic, and Ratko Mladic, who were seated together at a table in the conference room. On the wall behind them were maps that identified the ethnic composition of portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in various colours. Serb areas were designated by the colour blue.

  47. Miroslav Deronjic reported that Glogova had been partly destroyed and torched to a large extent and that the Bosnian Muslim population had been forcibly removed. After making this report, those assembled in the conference room applauded him and Velibor Ostojic commented "now we can colour Bratunac blue."