Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2566

 1                           Friday, 20 March 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

 6             I understand, Ms. Gopalan, you have a matter to raise.

 7             MS. GOPALAN:  Yes, just a short procedural matter, Your Honours.

 8     I would like to use the witness's statement from 1999 during the course

 9     of his testimony today.  This statement was provided to the Defence --

10     they were notified of our intention to use the statement in the witness

11     notification.  We drew attention to the statement specifically, and the

12     reason I'm requested leave at this stage is because we did not include

13     the statement in our filing of 14th of January, 2009.  The witness was

14     led live in Milutinovic, and we only sought leave to use his transcript

15     from the Milutinovic case.  However, I think at this stage it would be

16     beneficial and expeditious to use a concise statement, and that is why

17     I'm seeking Your Honours' leave to use it with the witness and tender it

18     into evidence.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Why was it not done with the motion which dealt

20     with the transcript of the witness's evidence in the Milutinovic trial?

21             MS. GOPALAN:  Do you mean the motion where we --

22             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.  There's been an extensive --

23             MS. GOPALAN:  -- that's true --

24             JUDGE PARKER:  -- motion.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  That is true, Your Honours.

Page 2567

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  And in respect of this witness you put forward the

 2     transcript but not the statement.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  That's right.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Why is the question.

 5             MS. GOPALAN:  That is because the witness was led live in

 6     Milutinovic and therefore the statement was in use by the Prosecution

 7     then.  Now, having reviewed the statement, I think it will greatly speed

 8     up the process because it's a concise statement.  So it's not --

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll see what it is that the Defence feels about

10     the matter.

11             Mr. Djordjevic.

12             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, given that we were

13     notified late, in principle I'm going to object to it and this is all I

14     have to say at this moment.

15                           [Trial Chamber confers]

16             MS. GOPALAN:  May I just add something, Your Honours?

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Gopalan, we haven't called on you again,

19     although I see you thought we might.  The Chamber has noticed a tendency,

20     not only orally but in -- also in respect of written submissions, for a

21     motion to be moved with reasons, a response, and then further reasons

22     which are really matters which should have been dealt with in the first

23     instance, so we will not call upon you in response.

24             On this occasion, we have had notice and has the Defence of the

25     full oral evidence given in a previous trial of the witness.  Defence

Page 2568

 1     counsel objecting in principle to what you move has not, though,

 2     identified any particular difficulty or difference that can be seen from

 3     what is now proposed to be added as, from your description, a short

 4     version, as it were, of what is in transcript evidence.  The Chamber

 5     frankly is in two minds but has decided in the end that on this occasion

 6     it will allow the use of the short statement, but it is of two minds

 7     because the structure of the procedure is one which is designed to enable

 8     the Defence or the other party and the Chamber to have prior notice to be

 9     able to give consideration to a statement or transcript before the

10     witness comes in court so that there can be attention given to any matter

11     which on prior study has been identified.  And to simply allow a witness

12     to come and then tender without warning a statement is therefore likely

13     to be disruptive of orderly preparation and could lead to some

14     unfortunate issues.

15             So with those words, please understand this is no precedent for

16     what the Chamber will do should this sort of application be moved at some

17     other time with some other witness.  On this occasion, yes, you have your

18     motion.

19             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you, Your Honours, we're most grateful.

20                           [The witness entered court]

21             JUDGE PARKER:  [Microphone not activated]

22             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  [Microphone not activated]

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

Page 2569

 1     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 2                           WITNESS:  JAN KICKERT

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down.

 4             Ms. Gopalan has some questions for you.

 5                           Examination by Ms. Gopalan:

 6        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Kickert.  Please could you state your full name

 7     for the record?

 8        A.   My name is Jan Kickert.

 9        Q.   What is your nationality?

10        A.   I'm Austrian.

11        Q.   And what is your professional, Mr. Kickert?

12        A.   I'm a diplomat.

13        Q.   Just a reminder, as we are both speaking the same language, and

14     as you know there are translations and transcriptions in process, if we

15     could just pause between question and answer.  Thank you very much.

16             Mr. Kickert, where are you currently posted?

17        A.   I'm currently at Vienna at the foreign ministry.

18        Q.   In June 1999, did you provide a statement to the

19     Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY?

20        A.   Yes, I did.

21        Q.   Have you had the opportunity to recently review the statement?

22        A.   I re-read it again, yes, before coming here.

23        Q.   Are you satisfied that the information contained in this

24     statement is true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2570

 1             MS. GOPALAN:  This is 65 ter number 5240, and I seek Your

 2     Honours' leave to tender the statement into evidence.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  The statement will be received.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00478, Your Honours.

 5             MS. GOPALAN:

 6        Q.   Mr. Kickert, have you previously testified in this Tribunal in

 7     the case of Prosecutor versus Milutinovic et al in March 2007?

 8        A.   Yes, I did.

 9        Q.   Have you had the opportunity to recently review this testimony?

10        A.   Yes, I did too.

11        Q.   You had indicated that you wished to make some corrections to

12     this testimony?

13        A.   Just two minor corrections in -- on names.  I just found out that

14     at one page it was --

15        Q.   Can I stop you there, Mr. Kickert.  We can just get to that now.

16             MS. GOPALAN:  If I could call up 65 ter 5214, and if -- yes.  And

17     could we go to page 5 on the e-court, please.

18        Q.   Are you able to see the page on the screen, Mr. Kickert?

19        A.   Yes, this is exactly the right page where Emyr Jones-Perry and it

20     is not Mr. Fischer but Mr. Ischinger, so I must have -- and later on in

21     the text it correctly states Mr. Ischinger; he was the political director

22     in the foreign, German foreign ministry.

23        Q.   And those are the names referred to in lines 9 and 10 of that

24     page?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 2571

 1        Q.   And you also wished to make another correction and that was at

 2     page 64 of the same document.  We'll wait for it to be called up.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we have page 64 on the e-court, please.

 4     Thank you.  And if we could scroll down the page.

 5        Q.   What was the correction you wished to make here, Mr. Kickert?

 6        A.   Again on the name.  It's Bardhyl Mahmuti, Bardhyl is his first

 7     name:  B-a-r-d-h-y-l.

 8        Q.   Thank you very much.  And having made these changes, are you

 9     satisfied that if you were asked the same questions that you were asked

10     in the case of Prosecutor versus Milutinovic et al, that you would

11     provide the same answers today?

12        A.   Yes.

13             MS. GOPALAN:  With Your Honours' leave, I would like to tender

14     the witness's testimony into evidence.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  The transcript will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As P00479, Your Honours.

17             MS. GOPALAN:  Your Honours, during the course of the witness's

18     testimony I will be referring to a number of documents.  I would like to

19     hand over hard copies of these documents to the witness to ease the

20     process of referring to these documents.  They are in his original German

21     language, which I believe will assist him in providing clearer answers to

22     us in relation to the questions I seek to ask him.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  They will also come up on the screen for the

24     Defence and the accused?

25             MS. GOPALAN:  That's right.

Page 2572

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  -- thank you.

 2             MS. GOPALAN:  With the usher's assistance.

 3        Q.   Mr. Kickert, would you also like a copy of your statement?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I'd now like to read the summary of the

 6     witness's evidence.

 7             MS. GOPALAN:  The witness is a diplomat for the Austrian

 8     government and was a second secretary in the Austrian embassy in

 9     Belgrade.  In March 1998 the witness was part of a diplomatic corps which

10     was taken to Kosovo by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The

11     witness made several other trips in Kosovo.  He describes the use of

12     excessive force by the Serb forces during the 1998 summer offensive.  In

13     late July/early August 1998, a pattern emerged when the witness went on

14     field trips.  He passed villages going out into the field which were

15     intact, and when he returned on the same route later these villages were

16     destroyed or burning.  He concluded that this destruction or burning was

17     done by the police as they were the only ones he saw in these areas.  He

18     also saw many internally displaced persons and observed an increasing

19     level of destruction of Kosovo Albanian villages which he also noticed

20     were no longer inhabited.

21             That's the end of the in-court summary.

22             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, just a correction, the trip was in June 1998

23     taken to Kosovo by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  There was a

24     trip in March which I did not participate in, but in June I did.

25             MS. GOPALAN:

Page 2573

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kickert.

 2             Mr. Kickert, in your capacity as a diplomat, did you serve in the

 3     former Yugoslavia?

 4        A.   Yes, I was a diplomat posted as second secretary as you said to

 5     the Austrian embassy in Belgrade.

 6        Q.   And when was that?

 7        A.   November 1997.

 8        Q.   Who was the mission chief at the embassy there?

 9        A.   Wolfgang Petritsch.

10        Q.   And while you were in the embassy, did you go on trips to Kosovo?

11        A.   Yes, I started to go to Kosovo the first time in January 1998.

12        Q.   Mr. Kickert, in your statement, this is at page 2, paragraph 4,

13     you refer to an outing to the -- to Pec and Decani in the summer of 1998.

14             MS. GOPALAN:  I would like to call up 65 ter number 2666.

15        Q.   Do you recognise this document, Mr. Kickert?

16        A.   Yes, I do.

17        Q.   Does this relate to the trip that you made to Pec and Decani in

18     the summer of 1998?

19        A.   Yes, this is a report of the trip I participated in.

20        Q.   And who prepared this report?

21        A.   I did.

22        Q.   I'd like to take you to page 2 of this report that you prepared.

23     At page 2 in the paragraph headed "Decani," you say or the report states:

24             "Considerable devastation, but by no means as drastic ..."

25             And you go on to say that the town appeared dead.  Could you

Page 2574

 1     explain what you meant by the town appearing dead?

 2        A.   In German I say "ausgestorben," that means that -- dead in the

 3     sense that no people were there.

 4        Q.   I see.  And you also say that the people you saw, the patrons on

 5     the main square, looked as though they were on show.  What do you mean by

 6     the phrase "on show"?

 7        A.   Well, we were taken down to the area by the Ministry

 8     of Foreign Affairs, on the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

 9     and to show us how they saw the situation in the area and also to show

10     that they were in control of situation.  And we had the feeling or I had

11     the feeling - that's what I wrote in the report - that these few people,

12     this was at the cafe at the crossroads in Decani where you go to the

13     monastery, that there were just a few people apart from the police and

14     that they were just placed there because we got off the bus so that we

15     could see some people, else it was empty.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And in the next line you refer to the village of

17     Prilep or in the next line below the paragraph on Decani, and you say

18     "similarly extensive destruction."

19             Could you describe this destruction?

20        A.   As I write in the paragraph on Decani, you would see impacts from

21     bullets at the same time more obvious was destruction through fire.

22        Q.   And what about the inhabitants in Prilep, did you see anyone

23     there?

24        A.   I can't recall seeing anybody there.

25        Q.   And at the bottom of the page of this document you refer to a

Page 2575

 1     briefing by the Yugoslav foreign minister and Ministry of the Interior.

 2     Do you recall who attended this briefing as a representative of the

 3     Ministry of Interior?

 4        A.   No, I don't recall.

 5        Q.   I'd like to take you to another document now, Mr. Kickert --

 6             MS. GOPALAN:  Before I move on, may I tender 02666 into evidence,

 7     please.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00480, Your Honours.

10             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I call up 65 ter 2665, please.

11        Q.   Mr. Kickert, this is another report from the Austrian embassy,

12     and it's dated the 1st of July, 1998.  It's numbered 2665.  Do you recall

13     this document?

14        A.   Yes, I'm the author of it.

15        Q.   And in the summary section, in the middle of the page, the first

16     tab says:

17             "Official confirmation for the first time of participation of

18     army units in inland operations."

19             Had you had any information before on army units participating in

20     inland operations?

21        A.   No, it was denied that the army was involved, that it was only a

22     police affair, and this is the first time - and I cite Reuters, being

23     told by Mr. Veljko Odalovic, that the Yugoslav army had participated in

24     an action in Belacevac which is near Obilic.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  I would like to tender this document into evidence,

Page 2576

 1     please.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00481, Your Honours.

 4             MS. GOPALAN:

 5        Q.   Mr. Kickert, in your statement you refer to a trip that was taken

 6     by Ambassador Petritsch and yourself.  It was an inaugural trip for

 7     KDOM's arrival.  This is at the top of page 3 of your statement.  Can you

 8     explain what KDOM was?

 9        A.   KDOM stands for Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, and the whole

10     idea behind it was that we, as representatives of the international

11     community, had difficulties to get accurate information.  We would get

12     allegations from one side and allegations from the other side, and so we

13     wanted to have -- to make our own picture, that's why we wanted to have

14     international monitors in Kosovo.  And we have the European Union at that

15     time, it was not yet the EU, but we had the ECMM, European Community

16     Monitoring Mission, and we had to deploy one mobile team from the end of

17     May there; and the Americans also wanted to be present, and there was

18     some talks with Belgrade on officially allowing monitors from the

19     international community there in larger number.

20        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  And you mentioned that the Contact Group

21     ambassadors also came on this trip.  Who were they?

22        A.   The Contact Group is -- the Contact Group on the Balkans is a

23     group of the -- of six major powers, that is, the US, Russia, the UK,

24     France, Italy, who have I left out, Germany, four Europeans, the Russians

25     and the Americans.

Page 2577

 1             MS. GOPALAN:  Okay.  Could I call up 65 ter 2664, please.

 2        Q.   Mr. Kickert, this is another document from the Austrian embassy

 3     and is dated the 6th of July, 1998.  Do you recognise this document?

 4        A.   Yes, I do.

 5        Q.   And how does this relate to the KDOM trip that we just spoke

 6     about?

 7        A.   From the 1st of July, 1998, Austria was chairing the

 8     European Union, and for that purpose we are co-opted for this half year

 9     into the Contact Group as the EU Presidency and one of the tasks of

10     EU Presidency is also to inform all other EU members on events.  So what

11     I've done is to write my report direct in English so that my colleagues

12     in Vienna could transform this into what we call Coreu, meaning a

13     correspondence, EU correspondence, that they could inform the other EU

14     partners about this trip.

15        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kickert.

16             MS. GOPALAN:  I would like to tender 02664 into evidence, please.

17        A.   It will be received.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00482, Your Honours.

19             MS. GOPALAN:

20        Q.   Mr. Kickert --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers make breaks between

22     questions and answers.

23             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you.  We will.

24        Q.   In your statement you refer to various trips that you made to

25     Malisevo in the summer of 1998.  I'd like to focus on the trip you made

Page 2578

 1     with the EU troika, and this is set out in your statement in page 3.

 2     Could you tell us about this trip, please.

 3        A.   The Austrians -- we were the EU Presidency, and at that time you

 4     had the troika, that's the outgoing and the incoming EU presidencies,

 5     that's the troika; and this was a trip undertaken by Secretary-General of

 6     the Austrian Foreign Minister Rohan and the two political directors

 7     Wolfgang Ischinger from Germany and Emyr Jones-Perry from the UK.

 8        Q.   What did you see during this trip?

 9        A.   First -- the first part of the visit in Kosovo was in Pristina,

10     talking to politicians, and then the decision was made that we would also

11     go inland into Kosovo.  And I remember that we were stopped by a police

12     check-point at one stage, eventually let through, and went more inland

13     and came back the same day.

14        Q.   And did you see anything during this trip when you went inland?

15        A.   Yes, the most remarkable for me was when we went inland we would

16     see unharvested fields, and when we returned these fields were burning.

17        Q.   And do you know who was responsible for the burning?

18        A.   I didn't see anybody setting them on fire, but I didn't see any

19     people but policemen around.

20        Q.   Do you have a specific area in mind when you say you went inland

21     during this trip that you made?

22        A.   At this time most of my trips, because that was a time when we

23     established contact with KLA, was to Malisevo.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And did Malisevo have any special significance as an

25     area?

Page 2579

 1        A.   Well, it was strategically located at a crossroads.  It's a

 2     juncture city, if you like, north, south, east, west, and at that time

 3     when I went there it was what the KLA had called their capital.

 4        Q.   And during the summer period, since you made a number of trips to

 5     Malisevo, did you recognise any changes to the city or were there any

 6     changes to the area of Malisevo?

 7        A.   Yeah, at the beginning when I first went to Malisevo, it was

 8     controlled by the KLA; and when the KLA abandoned Malisevo, it was empty,

 9     hardly any people there; and it was then re-taken by Serbian security

10     forces, by the police.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And apart from your own observations about Malisevo

12     that you made during your trips there, did you receive any other

13     information from other sources about the situation in Malisevo during

14     this period?

15        A.   Yes.  By that time we had already established quite a good group

16     of EU monitors, ECMM, and we received daily reports, weekly reports,

17     because my -- as a diplomat my main -- primary occupation was not to make

18     field trips but to leave that to the monitors.  So we got from them very

19     concrete reports of what they have seen.

20        Q.   And did you receive any specific information on perpetrators of

21     anything being -- of perpetrators who participated in actions in Malisevo

22     or that area?

23        A.   Yes.  We received a special report on Malisevo where it -- our

24     monitors reported that -- of destruction going on in Malisevo, and

25     particularly two sentences where, one, they saw policemen looting the

Page 2580

 1     shops in Malisevo; and a second one was that they saw a policeman in

 2     uniform setting fire to a house.

 3        Q.   And roughly what time-frame would this have been?

 4        A.   That must have been the end of July -- end of July, maybe the

 5     first days of August 1998.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'd now like to move on to a different topic.

 7             In your statement you refer to a number of trips that you made to

 8     Orahovac in the summer of 1998.  Could you explain why you made these

 9     trips to Orahovac?

10        A.   Orahovac is an ethnically mixed city, and there were some

11     fightings in July; and the purpose of our -- of my visits was to try to

12     establish a mechanism for people, IDPs, to return to the city,

13     Kosovo Albanian IDPs to return.

14        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

15             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to call up 65 ter 2655, please.

16        Q.   And if we could have a look at the first page, Mr. Kickert.  This

17     is a Telefax dated the 4th of August.  Do you recognise this document?

18        A.   Yes, I do.

19        Q.   Could you tell us why this document was prepared?

20        A.   This was a fax to my colleagues from the Contact Group embassies,

21     US, French, German, Italian, and British, and it was about speaking

22     points for a demarche, sort of an intervention if you like, with the FRY

23     authorities.

24        Q.   Can I take you to page 2 of that document and under the heading

25     "major concerns" in the second bullet point you say:

Page 2581

 1             "Reports about looting and burning of houses and setting fire to

 2     unharvested fields by members of the FRY security forces."

 3             What was the source of this information, Mr. Kickert, if you

 4     recall?

 5        A.   Yeah, that was the ECMM reports.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And in the bullet point below you refer to the number of

 7     IDPs growing every day and the situation worsening.  Are you able to

 8     provide an estimate of the number of IDPs, if you recall, again?

 9        A.   No.  I mean, we -- this point would have been based on report

10     from UNHCR, ICRC, and the bigger international NGOs working in the area

11     which I had contact with, that's Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And in the middle of the page under the heading:

13             "Therefore we urge the FRY government to ..."

14             The second bullet point you say:

15             "Stop FRY forces damaging houses and property; prevent

16     looting ..."

17             Could you explain what sort of damage you are referring to here?

18        A.   This bullet point relates to the second bullet points under major

19     concerns.  This is just telling them:  Since we have reports, we asked

20     them to stop these actions.

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kickert.

22             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender 2655 into evidence, please.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00483, Your Honours.

25             MS. GOPALAN:

Page 2582

 1        Q.   Mr. Kickert, I'd now like to turn to the trips you made with

 2     Ambassador Parak.  This is referred to in paragraph 3, page 4, of your

 3     statement and these trips were made, according to your statement, in

 4     September 1998.

 5             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we call up 65 ter 564, please.

 6        Q.   Mr. Kickert, do you recognise this document?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8        Q.   It's a report dated the 11th of September, 1998.  Did you prepare

 9     this document?

10        A.   Yes, I'm the author of it.

11        Q.   I'd like to ask you some questions about this document, but

12     firstly:  How does this relate to the trip that you made with

13     Ambassador Parak in September 1998?

14        A.   Well, Mr. Parak was the head of ECMM based in Sarajevo, that was

15     the headquarters of ECMM for the whole of ex-Yugoslavia, and he was

16     coming down to Kosovo, and I accompanied him on a trip.

17        Q.   If we have a look at this document, in the first bullet point you

18     say:

19             "Villages along the main Pristina-Pec road ...  with the

20     exception of Serbian villages, no longer inhabited."

21             How could you tell that these villages were not Albanian

22     villages?

23        A.   You could judge by way houses or compounds were built, whether

24     there was a mosque or an Orthodox church, and this particular one was

25     Serbian.

Page 2583

 1        Q.   And did you see anyone in this village?

 2        A.   Yes, I recall in this particular village that I saw a civilian

 3     walking around with a Kalashnikov.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And if we go a few bullet points down, the paragraph

 5     beginning:

 6             "Junik has been little damaged ..."

 7             There you say:

 8             " ...  there is nothing to be seen of the 1.000 people who have

 9     returned home from the Serbian side ..."

10        A.   No, that's an incorrect translation.  What I've written in German

11     is that there's nothing to be seen of the thousand persons the Serb side

12     claimed that have -- to have returned.  The Serb side claimed a thousand

13     persons have returned, but when we went in there, we didn't see enough

14     people to substantiate that this claim was correct.

15        Q.   Could you explain a little bit the background that led to this

16     claim being made?

17        A.   Well, the whole situation in summer, since end of July there was

18     clearly an offensive going on by the Serbian security forces against the

19     KLA, and because of this fighting there were huge numbers of IDPs; and

20     the big concern of the international community is:  Could we create

21     circumstances that these IDPs would return.  So whenever there were

22     claims of pockets of IDPs, UNHCR would try to contact them and we would,

23     through our monitors mainly, would check whether reports of these pockets

24     or of returnees are accurate or not.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we have a look at page 2 of this document,

Page 2584

 1     please.

 2        Q.   Mr. Kickert, you mentioned IDPs, and at the top of page 2 of this

 3     document there is a reference to 25.000 internally displaced persons.  Do

 4     you recall what the source of this figure was?

 5        A.   We would not rely on IDP figures from either the Kosovo Albanian

 6     or the Serbian side.  Most likely is this number from UNHCR.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And in the bullet point below you refer to forced

 8     transportation of internally displaced persons to Pec.  Could you

 9     explain, please, what you meant by "forced transportation."

10        A.   Yes, that's the ECMM -- I cite that the ECMM reported that people

11     were taken -- taken from the area where they were located to Pec; and

12     since Pec was controlled by the Serbian security forces, it can only be

13     that the Serb -- Serbian authorities have taken them to Pec.

14        Q.   And finally in the summer section of this document the first

15     bullet point you say:

16             "Number of internally displaced persons has not yet dropped" and

17     that these persons were "being shifted locally by action of the security

18     forces."

19             Can you explain what you mean by this bullet point?

20        A.   This is the assessment that we could not observe that the numbers

21     of IDPs dropped, but that they just moved around from -- just to avoid

22     the fighting and that this is the assessment I make on the reports we

23     got.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I tender 00564 into evidence, please.

Page 2585

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00484, Your Honours.

 3             MS. GOPALAN:  May I call up 65 ter 557, please.

 4        Q.   Mr. Kickert, in your statement you speak about a trip that you

 5     made to an area south of Komorane where you saw approximately 3.000

 6     internally displaced persons.

 7        A.   South of Komorane.

 8        Q.   Komorane, thank you.

 9             The document that is on the screen, that is 557, how does this

10     relate to this trip that you made?

11        A.   Yeah, I remember that we went with the Contact Group ambassadors

12     we went to Kisna Reka, which is an IDP camp in the hills.  And we went

13     there, and I saw a camp where approximately a thousand people would live

14     in the open.

15        Q.   And before we go into that, just to clarify, this report, who was

16     it prepared by?

17        A.   There are three authors, that is, mission chief, that means

18     Mr. Petritsch; myself; and my colleague Mr. Senfter in Belgrade.  So it's

19     a joint report.  I wrote the part of the IDP -- the visit to the IDP

20     camp.

21        Q.   And that is set out in page 2, paragraph 2; is that correct?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   Now, you've mentioned the IDPs that you saw when you visited the

24     camp in Kisna Reka, that's in the second paragraph of -- under the

25     heading IDP camps and possible repatriation.  Two paragraphs below you

Page 2586

 1     say:

 2             "Apart from the destruction of their villages, the main reason

 3     why the displaced persons do not return home is the lack of security in

 4     the villages."

 5             Could you please explain what you meant by that statement.

 6        A.   Well, it's what the IDPs told us, that they don't feel secure to

 7     return.

 8        Q.   And did they explain why they did not feel secure to return?

 9        A.   Yeah, it continues in this same paragraph that they told us, they

10     claimed, that when some villagers returned they were shot at or they were

11     shot, three persons having died it says in this report.

12        Q.   And did they say who shot at them?

13        A.   The way they portrayed it, of course, it was the Serbian security

14     forces.

15        Q.   I'd like to look at item 3 in this document.  It's headed

16     "alleged massacre by security forces."  And that is in page 3 of the

17     English.  In the second paragraph of item 3 you refer to an occurrence in

18     Gornje Obrinje reported on by the ECMM and the media.  Could you explain

19     to us what this occurrence in Gornje Obrinje was?

20        A.   Yes.  I saw photographs in the media.  It was a -- in a ditch in

21     Gornje Obrinje, IDP family which was killed.

22        Q.   So this information was based on a report?

23        A.   On ECMM report, as it says in the brackets, ECMM and media.

24        Q.   Okay.  How about the incident referred to above in the village of

25     Golubovac?

Page 2587

 1        A.   This is where we with the Contact Group ambassadors went

 2     ourselves.

 3        Q.   And what did you see there?

 4        A.   The main issue is that we -- Ambassador Petritsch, the

 5     undersigned, as it says, he and I, we saw a man who alleged that he

 6     survived a massacre on a group of young men.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to move on to another topic now, but if we

 8     could go back to the first page of 557, so the same document.  At the

 9     second-last bullet point you refer to security coordinators in 70

10     villages.  Could you explain what you mean by security coordinators?

11        A.   This was a project by Belgrade to set up -- they call it security

12     coordinators or assistant policemen of local ethnic Albanian origin who

13     were put into villages at -- in western Kosovo.

14        Q.   Is this the same as the initiative you referred to in your

15     statement where David Slinn travelled to Djakovica in 1998 to inquire

16     about Serbian claims on local Albanian police force?  This is in page 3,

17     the last paragraph.

18             I'm afraid we don't have your statement, but briefly it was a

19     visit that David Slinn made to Djakovica around August 1999 to inquire

20     about the Albanian police force.  Is it the same issue, this Albanian

21     police force, and the security coordinators referred to in this document?

22        A.   Yes, that's the same, and there were actually two trips, one I

23     accompanied Mr. Slinn and the second I could not accompany him because I

24     was dealing with the education agreement which was a totally different

25     front in Kosovo.  But he reported to me what he saw on this second trip

Page 2588

 1     where he was alone.  And that was beginning of September, both trips.

 2             MS. GOPALAN:  Can I tender 65 ter 557 into evidence, please.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00485, Your Honours.

 5             MS. GOPALAN:  Could we call up 65 ter 559, please.

 6        Q.   Mr. Kickert, this is a document dated 7th of September, 1998.  Do

 7     you recognise this document?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And it's headed or it refers to the Kosovo local police plan of

10     the Belgrade authorities.  Can you explain the background to this

11     specific document.

12        A.   We went to this area to see by ourselves whether this claim that

13     the local police force will be set up is true or not.

14        Q.   And what was your assessment?

15        A.   That there were some attempts, certainly, at the first visit but

16     we haven't seen it by ourselves; but on the second trip Mr. Slinn saw --

17     saw it by some people in uniforms but without side-arms yet and received

18     a list of villages and persons being members of this local police force.

19     But when he went to the villages after that from Djakovica, he did not

20     find any of these people in the area.

21             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I tender 00559 into evidence, please.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

23             MS. GOPALAN:  And I'd like to call up 0 -- I'm sorry.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00486, Your Honours.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  And I'd like to call up 00558.

Page 2589

 1        Q.   Mr. Kickert, this is a report dated the 20th of September, 1998,

 2     and it refers to the Kosovo local police force.  Is this document related

 3     to the previous document that we saw?

 4        A.   Yes.  This is the follow-up visit by Mr. Slinn, which I said he

 5     made on his own.

 6        Q.   And just above the paragraph headed "verdict" right at the bottom

 7     of the page --

 8        A.   It should read "assessment," not verdict.

 9        Q.   Assessment, thank you.  The sentence above that reads:

10             "Most villages were empty of inhabitants; only a very small

11     number of people had returned even to Junik."

12             What's the source of this information, Mr. Kickert?

13        A.   That's Mr. Slinn.

14        Q.   And you also refer to a cover-up operation right at the end of

15     the document, this is at the end of the assessment paragraph.  What do

16     you mean by that term?

17        A.   Yeah, I think that's also a mistranslation.  I wrote in German

18     "alibiaktion" so in the sense that we had a feeling it was not a

19     serious -- serious move or attempt to create security by the locals

20     themselves.

21             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender this document into evidence,

22     please.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00487, Your Honours.

25             MS. GOPALAN:  Can we have 00556, please.

Page 2590

 1        Q.   Do you recognise this document, Mr. Kickert?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   Did you draft this document?

 4        A.   I'm the author of it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to ask some questions to clarify some points

 6     made in this document.  On the issue of the security coordinators or

 7     local police that we have been talking about, if we look at paragraph 5

 8     of page 1, this is towards the bottom of the page, the first bullet point

 9     that begins with the word "police."  You say:

10             " ...  the Serbian side still appears to favour the model of

11     'security coordinators' ...  "

12             Could you explain this, please.

13        A.   This was -- in the brackets this is what my assessment is, that

14     the Serbs still favour this model.  I think it must have been -- must be

15     in the context of international presence.

16        Q.   I'm sorry, what do you mean by the context of international

17     presence?

18        A.   This was the time there were intensive talks with Belgrade mainly

19     done by the United States to -- to talk about models and -- both on the

20     political side but also on the security side how to make arrangements to

21     stabilise Kosovo and to get to the end of hostilities.  And I

22     think - that's what I now suspect - is that the Americans have proposed

23     some international -- stronger international presence which would also

24     give some sort of sense of security.  And Belgrade probably tried to

25     portray this model of local police, security coordinators, as being

Page 2591

 1     enough to assure the local Kosovo Albanian population that they were

 2     safe.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kickert.  Before we leave this document, could we

 4     go to paragraph 2, also on page 1, where a reference is made to an IDP

 5     repatriation initiative.  Is this the initiative you have been speaking

 6     to us about today?

 7        A.   Yes, that's the Kisna Reka project.  So there -- that's in the

 8     context there were two concrete projects, one was the return into

 9     Orahovac and the second one was the Kisna Reka return project.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender this document into evidence,

12     please.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00488, Your Honours.

15             MS. GOPALAN:

16        Q.   Moving on to my final topic, Mr. Kickert.  In your statement you

17     refer to exhumations in Gornje Obrinje.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  Could I call up 65 ter 561, please.

19        Q.   At the bottom of the page at the paragraph heading

20     "forensic experts."  The first bullet point you speak about individual

21     international experts.  Could you explain the background and context to

22     this bullet point, please?

23        A.   The whole issue of international forensic experts had to do with

24     allegations from both sides of massacres, and the international community

25     said, Well, we cannot rely on either side of the story, so what we would

Page 2592

 1     ask for is that independent international experts would look into these

 2     cases, and that was the whole idea which was already since June discussed

 3     with the Belgrade authorities.  And here I just refer that Mr. Shattuck,

 4     who gave us a debrief, was cautiously optimistic that the Belgrade

 5     authorities might consider accepting individual international experts.

 6             MS. GOPALAN:  I would like to tender 561 into evidence, please.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P00489, Your Honours.

 9             MS. GOPALAN:  If we could now have a look at 65 ter 560, please,

10     at page 2.

11        Q.   Before we go there, do you recognise this document, Mr. Kickert?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   Did you prepare this document?

14        A.   I'm the author of this document.

15        Q.   And in paragraph 1 you refer to Mr. Sainovic being considered a

16     close associate of the Yugoslav President Milosevic and him being taught

17     to be responsible for coordinating the security forces.  What was the

18     source of this information?

19        A.   Him being present in Kosovo, and the source of information was

20     the Americans.

21        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Could I take you to page 2 of this document,

22     please, and the fourth bullet point from the bottom says:

23             "Open with regard to dispatch of forensic medical experts."

24             Is this related to the issue of international experts that you

25     were just speaking about in relation to the exhumations?

Page 2593

 1        A.   Absolutely, yes, that's the same issue.

 2        Q.   And this document is dated the 7th of October, 1998.  By this

 3     stage had any international experts entered Kosovo to carry out

 4     exhumations?

 5        A.   Not yet.  It was -- at the beginning of October there were --

 6     there was already -- I re-read that from another report - a call from the

 7     foreign policy advisor of President Milosevic, Mr. Bugarcic, to

 8     Mr. Petritsch, saying, yes, they would be willing to accept the Finnish

 9     forensic expert team, the team we, as the Austrian EU Presidency had

10     proposed to come.

11        Q.   I think you refer to that matter in your statement.  Could you

12     explain what the outcome of this issue was, the access of the Finnish

13     forensic team to exhume certain sites?

14        A.   In October it was -- the whole of October it was a back and forth

15     on the mandate or the room of manoeuvre given to the Finnish team.

16     Belgrade first wanted only to invite them through the

17     Belgrade Forensic Institute; that was not enough for us.  Then there came

18     an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of the FRY,

19     Mr. Jovanovic, and the Foreign Minister of Finland, Ms. Halonen, where an

20     invitation, an official invitation was spelled out for the Finnish

21     experts to come and make not only exhumations but just to come and talk

22     to them on specific sites which would be investigated.

23        Q.   Mr. Kickert, when did you leave Kosovo?

24        A.   During --

25        Q.   During your various trips.  You mentioned earlier that you made a

Page 2594

1     number of trips to Kosovo during the summer and latter half of 1998.

 2     When was the last trip that you made to Kosovo?

 3        A.   Well, during our -- during the Austrian EU Presidency, the second

 4     half of 1998, I spent about half of my time in Kosovo and half of my time

 5     in Belgrade.  I was -- in the beginning of 1999 I was also in Kosovo.

 6     Then in February we had the Rambouillet conference.  Between the

 7     Rambouillet conference and the Paris conference I was also in Kosovo.

 8     And soon thereafter the NATO bombing started.  I left the day -- in the

 9     morning, when in the evening the NATO bombing started.

10        Q.   And to your knowledge what was the outcome of the exhumations

11     that were proposed in Gornje Obrinje?

12        A.   During my time there, there were no exhumations of the Gornje

13     Obrinje victims to my knowledge.

14             MS. GOPALAN:  I'd like to tender 561 into evidence, please.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the document under 00560 would be

17     P00490.

18             MS. GOPALAN:  Thank you.

19        Q.   I have no further questions for you at this stage, Mr. Kickert.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much.

21             Mr. Djordjevic, do you have cross-examination?

22             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Let me just

23     prepare, please.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Djordjevic:

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kickert.

Page 2595

 1        A.   [Interpretation] Good morning.

 2        Q.   I have several questions for you.  You said that you didn't need

 3     your statement in writing before you, which was admitted as P478.  I will

 4     have some questions concerning your statement.  Mr. Kickert, before we

 5     start working on it, I would like to know, From the moment you left

 6     former Yugoslavia - and that would be the morning before the NATO bombing

 7     started in 1999, so the 24th of March - to date could you explain your

 8     diplomatic career for us?

 9        A.   Yes.  Thereafter we were in Vienna.  Mr. Petritsch was still the

10     Special Envoy of the European Union for Kosovo.  He was then nominated to

11     be the High Representative in Bosnia.  After the NATO bombing, I myself

12     returned to Kosovo, to Belgrade first and then to Kosovo.  I opened up

13     the Austrian office in Kosovo; was then political advisor to the SRSG of

14     the UN mission in Kosovo, of Mr. Kouchner.  After that I went to Canada

15     on a posting and returned five years ago to Vienna.

16        Q.   I read somewhere that you were advisor to Mr. Solana or

17     representative of Mr. Solana's in Kosovo.  I would like to know if that's

18     true and something more about it.

19        A.   Yes.  This was -- I was filling in for Fernando Gentilini.

20     Fernando Gentilini had a car accident, must have been September 2004; and

21     I filled in for three months in his position as personal representative

22     of Javier Solana in Kosovo.

23        Q.   What was your duty then?  In other words, what was the purview of

24     Mr. Gentilini, the person that you stood in for?

25        A.   It was mostly reporting to Brussels so that they had first-hand

Page 2596

 1     information.  Therefore, I was in contact with Kosovo Albanian

 2     politicians, but I was also dealing with the Contact Group ambassadors.

 3     We had regular meetings to discuss the political situation.

 4        Q.   Mr. Kickert, concerning your statement to this Court that I

 5     mentioned, the first that you gave to representatives of this Court in

 6     Vienna.  In paragraph 2 of your statement you say that your duty as the

 7     second secretary of the Austrian embassy at the time was to talk to

 8     politicians of Kosovo Albanians, intellectuals, and to maintain contacts

 9     with the parallel university at Pristina.  You also said that you had

10     frequent contacts with Albanian journalists.

11             I would be interested in this:  What was the purpose of your

12     task, meaning maintaining contacts with ethnic Albanians and their

13     institutions, and you mentioned the parallel university.  We can agree

14     that was a paralegal institution as well, can't we?  So I would be

15     interested to hear why were you tasked by your government, by your

16     country, by your ambassador to perform those duties?

17        A.   On the parallel university, Austria has continued to recognise

18     the parallel university as a university and has accepted the diplomas of

19     this university.  The rationale was after the autonomy was revoked we

20     didn't want the Kosovo Albanian students to be punished doubly, A, that

21     they didn't have their own university anymore; and B, that we -- they

22     would not be recognised in Austria.  So we had many Kosovo Albanian

23     students who first studied in Pristina; and based on their diplomas from

24     the parallel university, they were accepted to universities in Austria to

25     final -- to finalise their studies.  So one of my tasks was also to be in

Page 2597

 1     contact with the rectorate of the parallel university, to see whether

 2     these diplomas are correct, whether they really enrolled and made these

 3     diplomas because there was always a threat of forgery.

 4        Q.   And my next question would be:  Didn't your diplomacy see this as

 5     interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state such as the

 6     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia being at the time.  Can you imagine an

 7     opposite situation?

 8        A.   I think the recognition of diplomas is mainly an issue of

 9     universities accepting diplomas of other universities.

10        Q.   But you will agree with me, won't you, that contacts with

11     paralegal institutions, including a university, within the framework of a

12     sovereign state, is no business of Austria?

13        A.   I wouldn't say so.  We were also in contacts with opposition

14     figures.  Why -- why wouldn't we be in contact with other institutions?

15        Q.   You mentioned that a second group of your tasks was to prepare

16     the education agreement in Kosovo; am I right in saying so?  Your answer

17     is yes --

18        A.   No, no.  No --

19        Q.   Or no?

20        A.   The main interlocutors with Belgrade were -- was St. Edigio and

21     Monsignor Paglia to discuss the education agreement.  We came in from the

22     European Union side because from the European commission we had projects

23     to give money into the repair of some university premises.  And there was

24     a special group even tasked, and they stayed with us in the Austria house

25     in Pristina to do this project because that summer there was an agreement

Page 2598

 1     that three buildings of the Pristina University would be given to the

 2     Kosovo Albanian students.

 3        Q.   Do you know after that agreement what was the conduct of the

 4     Kosovo Albanians with respect to the high education system?  After that

 5     agreement was concluded, do you know whether those institutions started

 6     working; if not all of them, do you know which of them did since you were

 7     a direct participant in all that, do you recall?

 8        A.   I do recall that one of the big buildings at the technical

 9     faculty was never taken over and used.  I think they also gave over the

10     Institute of Albanology.  That was used by -- by professors.  And I think

11     the -- if I'm not mistaken, there must have been the Faculty of Arts also

12     given back to the Kosovo Albanians.  I think this was also used.  And

13     then another project was dormitories.

14        Q.   Faculty of philosophy?

15        A.   "Filozofski," yeah.

16        Q.   And given that you dealt with this matter, education, did you

17     learn that there was a possibility to use the maternal tongue and listen

18     to Jewish in mother tongue in official universities before the parallel

19     system emerged?

20        A.   Well, to my knowledge the Pristina University was a

21     mixed-language university until the autonomy was revoked, and then it was

22     mainly Serbian, since 1989.

23        Q.   How do you know that it was only in Serbian, that there was no

24     possibility for Albanian classes?  Do you know what it's all about?  Do

25     you have any direct personal knowledge about that?

Page 2599

 1        A.   If you ask me whether I was hearing classes, no; I was told.

 2        Q.   What would be the source of your information in this respect?

 3     Maybe the rector of the parallel university or persons of that sort or

 4     any official institution maybe?

 5        A.   Yeah, I also had a meeting with the -- with the Serbian rector of

 6     the university in Pristina, and he was very much against any education in

 7     Albanian.  He says, This is Serbia, they should learn Serbian.

 8        Q.   I will agree that Serbian had to be the official language, but I

 9     will not be able to agree with you that the use of Albanian language was

10     denied in the then-institution of high education of Serbia.  I would like

11     to ask you whether you know that there were Albanian classes in primary

12     and secondary education?  Do you have any information about that?

13        A.   Yes, yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Given that you've said that Austria as a state, that

15     you represented as a diplomat, that was concerned over the rescission of

16     autonomy and that you maintained contacts, as you state in paragraph 2 of

17     your statement.  I would like to be interested to hear before

18     establishing contacts with the parallel university in Pristina with

19     Kosovo Albanian intellectuals, politicians, journalists that you were

20     personally involved in, did Austria conduct talks with official Serbian

21     institutions and their politicians concerning this matter?  So before you

22     established contacts that you described in paragraph 2.

23        A.   Yeah, it was usual practice that when we would go down to

24     Pristina to meet Kosovo Albanians, we'd also meet Veljko Odalovic, the

25     prefect in Pristina.  That was standard practice, so -- and it was

Page 2600

 1     everybody, every diplomat who went to Pristina did the same -- did a

 2     little circus of meetings.

 3        Q.   Which function was performed by Veljko Odalovic at the time?

 4        A.   We had known him as the prefect of Kosovo, but I think he was of

 5     a certain "okrug," group, the head of it.  But he was the representative

 6     in Pristina, and so because the trips we diplomats usually took just took

 7     us to Pristina, we would see him.  Later on there was also Minister

 8     Andjelkovic who was in Pristina, and we would also see him.

 9        Q.   Were you addressed to those persons by the

10     Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the time or by some of the competent

11     politicians that you conducted talks at a higher level?

12        A.   No, we would establish contact directly with their offices and

13     make appointments.

14        Q.   In paragraph 3 of your statement you say that you went to Kosovo

15     in January 1998, as you confirmed today; and you said that in the autumn

16     of 1998, after the Serb offensive against the KLA, you say that your

17     efforts in Kosovo ensued from the prevailing conflict between the Serbs

18     and the Kosovo Albanians.  I would like, given that the transcript does

19     not contain what you meant to say on that occasion, could you please

20     explain what you mean by the prevailing conflict between the Serbs and

21     the Kosovo Albanians.  Do you see it as a conflict between the Serbs and

22     the Albanians or a conflict between the then-established KLA, the

23     so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, and the Serb security forces, do you

24     see it as a legitimate action of Serb security forces against outlaws or

25     faction of a certain group; or do you really mean a conflict between

Page 2601

 1     Serbs and the Albanians?

 2        A.   When I came to Belgrade to the Austrian embassy in November 1997,

 3     there were already an intensifying string of reports of incidents in

 4     Kosovo.  When I first went down to Kosovo, I just went to Pristina; I was

 5     introduced by a Swedish democrat who used to go more frequently and for

 6     years down to Kosovo and also to -- outside of Pristina; and then with

 7     the -- with the events, a situation escalated.  If you say -- if you ask

 8     me whether there was a conflict between the Serbs and the Kosovo

 9     Albanians, I say no.  It was a conflict between KLA, if you can call them

10     armed elements, and security forces.  Where the civilian population was

11     dragged in, we have many allegations, maybe that's what you want to refer

12     to, is of abductions at the time.  We -- people in Kosovo at that time,

13     there was little interaction between the ethnic groups.  Shkelzen Maliqi

14     an intellectual wrote two -- "Separate Worlds."  They were living next to

15     each other but not with each other.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this is

18     the right time for the technical break, given that's it's past 10.30.  So

19     I would stop with my cross-examination.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.  Yes, we need now to

21     break for half an hour.  I think you're a little used to the system,

22     Mr. Kickert.

23             THE WITNESS:  By now, yes, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  We resume at 11.00.

25                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

Page 2602

 1                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic.

 3             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Kickert, we left off citing the words of

 5     Mr. Shkelzen Maliqi concerning the relationship between the Serbian and

 6     the Albanian people.  When I say "the Albanian people," I mean the

 7     Albanians living in Kosovo and Metohija, since Mr. Shkelzen Maliqi was

 8     born there as well.  And you mentioned, answering my question, that the

 9     civilian population was dragged into the conflict.  Please, try to

10     explain to me what you meant by saying that the civilian population got

11     involved into this conflict and what you meant by it, given that you had

12     good information about the nature of the conflict that was prevailing in

13     that area?

14        A.   Can I describe for the number of IDPs this was a direct

15     consequence of the fighting between the KLA and the security forces.  The

16     same time when I described the civilian with a Kalashnikov in a village

17     on the main road, Pristina-Pec.  It's not by coincidence; he must have

18     felt insecure that he had to carry a gun with him.

19        Q.   Those civilians that you saw with Kalashnikovs, which ethnic

20     group did they belong?

21        A.   It was one person in a Serbian village, but I didn't stop and

22     talk to him.  But my guess is since it was a Serbian village it was a

23     Serbian civilian.

24        Q.   Would you agree with me that members of the KLA, with respect to

25     the civilians of the towns and villages where their combat operations

Page 2603

 1     were underway against the Serb security forces, that they had removed and

 2     moved those civilians in those areas away to safety?

 3        A.   There were certain allegations.  Whether they had moved them away

 4     or forced them to leave, this was -- I was asked the last time I was

 5     witnessing here, and I cannot say what was the correct thing.  But the

 6     fact was that civilian population was moving, there were many in the

 7     open.  For whatever reason, they stayed in the open.  When asking them,

 8     they told us that they felt insecure because of the Serbian security

 9     forces.

10        Q.   My question to you is not coincidental, since you were a person

11     authorised by the -- your embassy to talk to the persons that you

12     mentioned in your statement.  My question was direct:  Do you know that

13     within the framework of the guerilla or terrorist tactics of the KLA

14     army, was it their strategy and tactics to remove civilian or ask

15     civilians to move to a safer place before they launched their attacks.

16     Whether you had such information or not, this is my question.

17        A.   No, I didn't have any information on that.

18        Q.   Did you have information about the situation where after combat

19     operations members of the KLA would intermingle with the civilian

20     population in the area where they had undertaken offensive actions, did

21     you have such information?

22        A.   Well, I think that's general guerilla tactics, but what I can

23     tell you is when I was visiting the IDP camp in Kisna Reka, I think it

24     was two or three times there, at one occasion I did -- ran into a KLA in

25     uniform, KLA soldier in uniform.

Page 2604

 1        Q.   As a diplomat of a country presiding over the European Union and

 2     person in frequent contacts with the most powerful countries in the world

 3     and maintaining contacts with powerful military alliances -- but my

 4     question to you as a diplomat who frequently visited Kosovo in --

 5     starting from January 1998, do you know that the KLA was treated and

 6     considered as a terrorist organisation at the time?  Do you have such

 7     information; and if so, could you tell us what you knew about that?

 8        A.   It was called terrorist organisation by Belgrade, and I think at

 9     one occasion even the US Envoy Gelbard used this term, but in general

10     this term was tried to avoid it by the internationals.

11        Q.   I can understand your answer because you yourself stated that you

12     had contacts with the KLA and their politicians and that they asked them

13     to organise themselves so that they could have a single Albanian platform

14     for negotiations.  Do you consider your activities inappropriate in terms

15     of diplomatic activities in the territory of a foreign country?

16        A.   No.  The whole idea was to get the KLA into the political

17     process.  This was the reason why we met with the KLA.  Because we saw

18     the situation escalating and what we were fearing was a destabilisation

19     of Kosovo and the region and which would have repercussions to us.  As

20     you are aware, there are many Kosovo Albanian refugees in western

21     European countries, including my own, and we had no interest that this

22     number would increase.

23        Q.   Do you know today as a diplomat that anybody is investing efforts

24     to reach any arrangements with the leading terrorist organisations to try

25     to make them a part of the main stream or of a process.

Page 2605

 1        A.   Time and again this is part of diplomacy, whether that's the

 2     Hezbollah in Lebanon, whether it's the Hamas in the Gaza Strip, whether

 3     it's the FARK in Colombia, time and again diplomats are in contact with,

 4     whatever you want to call them -- rebel groups.

 5        Q.   Now things seem clearer to me.  My next question is going to

 6     concern part of your testimony today during your examination-in-chief

 7     conducted by my learned friend.  You mentioned Pec, you mentioned

 8     internally displaced person, and you mentioned a village by the name of

 9     Istinic.  You said that there were 20, 25.000 internally displaced

10     persons.  Would you agree with me when I say that the village of Istinic

11     at the time was controlled by the KLA?

12        A.   At that certain moment I cannot tell you.  I know that this was

13     an area where there was intense fighting going on between the KLA and the

14     security forces, but I couldn't say at that particular moment whether it

15     was controlled by KLA, this village, or not.

16        Q.   What was the source of your information concerning Istinic, your

17     direct observations during your outing there, or did you receive regular

18     reports from European Monitoring Mission, Contact Group representatives,

19     and other NGOs?

20        A.   I was not myself there.  Having read the report, we got regular

21     ECMM reports, European monitors, and this particular case I cite the

22     Dutch military attache who gave me his assessment.

23        Q.   You are right when you say that fierce fighting was going on

24     there, but the village of Istinic was at the time under KLA control and

25     this is why ethnic Albanians sought refuge there.  You do not know that,

Page 2606

 1     but do you know that those Albanians would later return to their homes

 2     after Serb security forces managed to enter the village of Istinic and

 3     maintain a degree of control for a time?  Do you have such information

 4     from the sources that you just cited, not necessarily the Dutch embassy,

 5     but other sources as well?

 6        A.   I can't recall them now, but in other cases there were also --

 7     like, as I mentioned, Orahovac, there were returns which also tried to

 8     facilitate into areas which were controlled by Serb security forces.

 9        Q.   You mentioned Orahovac.  Do you know who actually caused the

10     conflict in Orahovac on the 17th, the 18th, and the 19th of July?

11        A.   No.  I'm just -- I just thought a little bit more carefully

12     because a few days after, I did go to Malisevo and -- so I wouldn't know

13     what happened these days, but I heard a story that the KLA tried to enter

14     Orahovac and based on that the offensive started and the KLA had to

15     abandon Malisevo.

16        Q.   Do you know that what you heard, that the KLA attacked Orahovac,

17     do you know that they actually took Orahovac; and do you know that they

18     killed and kidnapped a number of people, that those people were taken to

19     prison in Malisevo, the place that you just mentioned?  Do you have any

20     knowledge of that?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   Do you know that on that occasion Zyrapi, the witness who -- whom

23     we have heard recently, and Mr. Thaqi were actually in Orahovac?

24        A.   No --

25        Q.   Do you have any knowledge of that?

Page 2607

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Do you know that the KLA attacked Opterusa, that's the name of

 3     the place, and that it took ten men and nine women to the prison in

 4     Malisevo.  The women were taken to Sali Revkija's [phoen] shop and were

 5     sexually molested.  Do you have any knowledge of that?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   I see that your memory is selective.  So did anyone in the

 8     Austrian embassy have as his or her task contacts with Serbs?  And this

 9     involves some really key events.  And you were drafting reports that came

10     in from the European monitors, and I actually went through many of those

11     reports.  So I'm asking you that how come that you don't have any

12     knowledge of that?

13        A.   The monitors were often not given access to areas where there

14     were fights going on.  They had, like I, to pass check-points.  And if

15     they were not allowed to continue, they could not write reports, like you

16     said, on the Opterusa case.  Of course we were in contact with both

17     sides.  The whole operation, the whole idea, of the monitors were that

18     they would look into allegations from both sides and try to verify them.

19             I -- talking about Orahovac, after regaining the control of

20     Orahovac there were allegations of mass graves in Orahovac, where we

21     sent - allegations by the Kosovo Albanians - where we sent specifically

22     our ECMM monitors to go there and report.  And they said, Well, this was

23     again exaggeration by the Kosovo Albanians.  There were some grave-sites,

24     indeed, at a waste dump, but it was certainly was not a mass grave as

25     described in their allegations.

Page 2608

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that on the 17th of July the KLA attacked

 2     Retimlje, took it, that they took 15 Serb civilians prisoner, and

 3     transported them to the prison in Malisevo and they have never been seen

 4     since?  Do you have any knowledge of that event?  So it's approximately

 5     the same time-period, this major offensive launched by the KLA?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Do you know anything about -- well, I think it was the

 8     21st of July that the KLA members attacked the village of Zociste, looted

 9     it, burnt down the houses, and expelled all the Serbs who had been living

10     there.  Do you have any knowledge of that incident in any way, any kind

11     of knowledge?

12        A.   No.  There was just general knowledge of these allegations that

13     Serb civilians were abducted.  On that, yes, but on -- concretely on

14     Zociste, no.

15        Q.   I will now take you back to an earlier period, the Pristina-Pec

16     road.  Do you know that on the 18th of June the traffic along this road

17     was cut off in the place of Iglarevo?  Near Klina a roadblock was set up

18     from the Pec side, and from the Pristina side a roadblock was set up near

19     Lapusnik, it's the Glogovac municipality.  Did you receive such a report

20     from the monitors?  Do you have any knowledge of that, about this road

21     being blocked, both from the Pristina and from the Pec side?

22        A.   I have knowledge that the road was blocked.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell me, what do you know about the village

24     of Kijevo and the KLA activities?  What do you know?  When I say

25     "Kijevo," what does that make you think of?  Does that jog your memory in

Page 2609

 1     any way?

 2        A.   Yeah, the famous Holbrooke sentence:  Kijevo, the most dangerous

 3     place on earth.  It was a mostly Serbian- and I think also Roma-inhabited

 4     village which was cut off from the surrounding.

 5        Q.   Well, you just saved a question regarding Ambassador Holbrooke,

 6     but do you know that this village was blockaded; and if you do, for how

 7     long after the KLA attack?

 8        A.   I know it was cut off, blockaded as you call it; but I do not

 9     know for which period.  But it must have been a suspended period because

10     it was at that time pretty much an issue which was discussed.

11        Q.   Thank you.  This would be quite sufficient.  My next question

12     regarding the KLA activities and the reporting from various NGOs and

13     monitors of the European Commission.  Do you know anything about the

14     attack on the Obilic thermal power-plant?  It's the late spring or early

15     summer of that year, 1998, and do you know that some employees working

16     there at the power-plant were abducted by the KLA in the summer of 1998?

17     Do you have any knowledge of that?  So first of all the attack in the

18     late spring/early summer; and the second question is the kidnapping of

19     the nine employees of the Obilic thermal power-plant.  Do you have any

20     knowledge of that?

21        A.   I have no knowledge that the thermal power-plant itself was

22     attacked, but the surroundings of Obilic.  And I think what I referred

23     to, Belacevac, maybe that's the one you also wanted to refer to, but I

24     know that's very near and that could be the same issue.

25        Q.   Yes, Belacevac is fine, but I'm talking about the thermal

Page 2610

 1     power-plant and one part that was attacked by the KLA.  So that was my

 2     question.  Do you have any knowledge; and if yes, what knowledge, what do

 3     you know about Belacevac?  You mentioned it after all.

 4        A.   No, I don't have a recollection of an attack on the Obilic

 5     power-plant, and Belacevac I was mentioning because this was in my report

 6     when I said that Mr. Odalovic said it in the end of June that --

 7     officially the first time that VJ was involved in inland operations.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know anything about kidnapping of the nine

 9     employees who were on the company bus or van, whatever it was, they were

10     kidnapped by the KLA and have never been seen since or their remains were

11     found?  Do you have any knowledge of that?

12        A.   There were many reports of abducted people, could also be this

13     one.  I also remember that even a Russian journalist was abducted; he was

14     freed, though.  It was a time when there were many allegations of

15     abductions.

16        Q.   And do you have any knowledge of the kidnapping of the nine

17     workers who worked in the Obilic thermal power-plant, yes or no?

18        A.   If I would look through my documents and would find it there, I

19     could refresh my memory; but if you ask me now directly whether I

20     remember, I cannot with certainty say yes.  I'm sorry.

21        Q.   I'm quite satisfied with the answer that I got.

22             Please tell me, do you know anything about illegal, semiprivate

23     prisons that were run by the KLA where they kept non-Albanians?  Do you

24     have any knowledge; and if so, what knowledge do you have?

25        A.   At the time there were these allegations and more information

Page 2611

 1     about them I only got when I was hear as a witness in the Limaj et al

 2     case.

 3        Q.   I read that part, the -- His Honour Judge Parker was on that case

 4     too, but could you please remind me because I can't recall now, what kind

 5     of knowledge?  What was the source?

 6        A.   These were the same spirit as the allegations were of kidnappings

 7     and killings of civilians, there were also allegations which you would

 8     also find in the press, in the media, of detention camps which the KLA

 9     had.  But we had no first-hand information, and at that time in June we

10     didn't have the observers, the monitors, in larger numbers.  We had one

11     team from the end of May which is two persons, and they could only go

12     where, A, the security was enough and where they were not stopped by

13     roadblocks, either by the Serbian security forces or the KLA.

14        Q.   Well, it was not my impression that the monitors did not go to

15     dangerous areas.  My impression was, in fact, quite the opposite.  The

16     only question was the physical ability of reaching some areas.  For

17     instance, you mentioned Malisevo many times.  But let me ask you this:

18     Did you ever go to Lapusnik?

19        A.   Yes, but I -- yeah, I would have to think when exactly, but I

20     went to Lapusnik, yeah.

21        Q.   At any rate, you're much more familiar with Malisevo than with

22     Lapusnik, you went there much more often, didn't you?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Did you hear about any camps or prisons, prison camps, set up by

25     the KLA in Malisevo and in Lapusnik?

Page 2612

 1        A.   Again, the only -- not concretely, just generally, the rumours

 2     that there were some camps.  And when I was in Malisevo there was also

 3     the ICRC, same what I was looking for, a responsible person to talk to on

 4     the KLA for the political side, they tried to contact somebody in the KLA

 5     to talk about these allegations.  And also when we talked to them, we

 6     would -- we would ask them to follow international humanitarian law rules

 7     which -- also, because of these allegations, we brought them up with the

 8     KLA.

 9        Q.   Who did you talk to from the political -- from the top political

10     wing people in the KLA as you describe them?

11        A.   At the time we had no knowledge of how the KLA was organised.  So

12     what we tried was to get in contact, the first contacts, and to see who

13     they would represent to us as their spokesperson, as a decision-maker,

14     and that was the from -- must have been the 22nd of July, since I've read

15     my reports again, when Mr. Rohan came we went to Malisevo, and then the

16     day after, 23rd it must have been, I met Mr. Thaqi, which I didn't know

17     it was Mr. Thaqi at the time because they themselves introduced only by

18     numbers to us at the time.

19        Q.   Was Mr. Thaqi number one?  Who was number one?

20        A.   No, it was -- he was number three.

21        Q.   That's right.  That's right.  Who was number one?

22        A.   I don't know until today.  Maybe it was Mr. Adem Jashari.  I

23     don't know.

24        Q.   Fair enough.  Maybe we won't.  Do you know about any other

25     numbers?  Three, that's Hashim Thaqi.  Two, four, five, six, do you

Page 2613

 1     remember?  That's how it was, yes.  You don't remember?

 2        A.   No, of course.  The number seven, the one we saw first, Mr. Kadri

 3     Veseli I learned later on; he was number seven.  And in one of my later

 4     reports I was speculating Jakup Krasniqi being number 11 or 12.  But we

 5     were sort of all of us a little bit in the dark on the organisational

 6     structure of the KLA.

 7        Q.   Have you ever met Zyrapi?  Yes?  No?

 8        A.   What was his first name?

 9        Q.   Well, I can't recall at this moment, Zyrapi, that's the last name

10     that I know him by.  He was the -- he was also a commander in the KLA --

11     well obviously you don't remember since you're asking for his first

12     name -- and his name is actually Bislim, Bislim Zyrapi.

13        A.   The name rings a bell, but I don't know in which context.  I've

14     certainly not at that time met him by name.  Certainly not by name.

15     Where was he commander, in which area?

16        Q.   Well, now we're getting beyond the context of the questions that

17     I'm dealing with now, so we'll stop here.  My next question:  When did

18     you learn that Mr. Hashim Thaqi was number three?  When did you learn

19     that Mr. Veseli was number seven?  What time in relation to the time when

20     you knew them only as three and seven respectively?

21        A.   They introduced themselves as -- at the meeting itself as number

22     seven and Hashim Thaqi as number three.  So we just knew at that time

23     just the numbers, no names.

24        Q.   When did you learn their names and what they actually were, who

25     those numbers actually designated?

Page 2614

 1        A.   I learned the name of Mr. Thaqi rather fast after the meeting

 2     with him because the journalist who brought me there was a friend of his

 3     from university time.  So that's how I got to contact him in the first

 4     place.  But I kept it -- I didn't even put it into my reports.  And

 5     about, I don't know, late summer it was public knowledge, it was also in

 6     Kosovo Albanian media, his name.

 7        Q.   In your frequent contacts with the Serbian authorities, did you

 8     hear from them about Mr. Thaqi -- well, I'm just now going to limit

 9     myself to him.  I'm not going to ask you questions about anyone else.

10     And if yes, what is it that they told you about him?

11        A.   If his name was mentioned, it was also in late summer, and he was

12     labelled as -- probably as a leading terrorist.

13        Q.   Probably or for sure?

14        A.   Probably.

15        Q.   Well, now it's much clearer.  Mr. Thaqi, or rather, Mr. Three,

16     did he introduce himself by saying, I'm number three and my powers, my

17     authority, my function is such and such?  Did he tell you what he was in

18     charge of, and why is it that he is the one talking to you?

19        A.   He introduced himself as number three, but he didn't state what

20     he was responsible for.  I said we were looking for high leaders of the

21     KLA to introduce them to the political process, and he said, We are

22     willing to consider that.  But he did not say whether he had to ask

23     somebody else or that he would decide on his own.

24        Q.   You know, diplomacy is a very delicate matter; you will agree

25     with me as an experienced diplomat.  I could say as an intelligence

Page 2615

 1     officer -- well, you might agree with me or not.  But did it occur to you

 2     that number three might be a Serbian mole?  How could you be so sure that

 3     here is a representative of that organisation that was labelled terrorist

 4     by the other side and they wanted to -- and he wanted to talk to you

 5     about it their future activities?

 6        A.   Well, I mean if you're in a city like Malisevo and you see nobody

 7     else but KLA and no Serbian security forces, you would assume that he is

 8     from the KLA.  And I was -- before I was led through to him I was

 9     questioned by a different gentleman in a cafe.  He was clearly sounding

10     me out, trying to establish whether I was really a diplomat and serious.

11     As many were returning from German-speaking countries, I could

12     communicate directly in German with them.  And this person who was

13     sounding me out, it was about certainly an hour that I was questioned

14     before I was allowed to meet Mr. Thaqi.

15        Q.   This gentleman who questioned you -- well, who brought you to

16     him, the journalist that you mentioned or somebody else?

17        A.   The journalist.  We went to Malisevo.  There we were seated.

18     Then this --

19        Q.   Dukadjin?

20        A.   Dukadjin, Gorani.

21        Q.   [In English] Correct.

22             [Interpretation] My next question:  Did this gentleman introduce

23     himself by number or by name and did he tell you who he was when he

24     talked to you?

25        A.   He had a nickname and introduced himself as -- with his nickname,

Page 2616

 1     and let me just think what his nickname was -- Hoxha?

 2        Q.   Hoxha, very well.  Did he tell you what his function was, that he

 3     was a member of the KLA, that he was a security officer in the KLA?

 4        A.   I think he told me he was a security officer.  He was not in

 5     uniform, he was in civilian clothes, whereas Thaqi when I met him and

 6     Veseli, they had uniforms on.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  My next question is:  What other officials of the KLA

 8     or of the parallel political hierarchy of the Kosovo Albanian government

 9     did you meet, either alone or as part of various delegations that went

10     there, what politicians, what officers of the KLA possibly?  And, for

11     instance, intellectuals, journalists.  In a word, key figures that you

12     deemed to be persons that you should contact.  Either -- it was either

13     your opinion or the opinion of the people that you worked with.

14        A.   Our primary interlocutors were the politicians in Pristina, the

15     LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, Fehmi Agani, then many others in the LDK.  Then

16     there was a group which split off from the LDK, Mehmet Hajrizi, there

17     were others in this group, Qosja, and also -- so we had contacts with the

18     LDK; the splinter faction, which was in opposition to the LDK; and then

19     as a third pillar, the KLA outside, which was very difficult to meet

20     because, A, we didn't know who were the right interlocutors; and B, then

21     because of the fighting and they would move.  So it was after two

22     meetings in Malisevo I had, as you are aware, the meeting in Klecka with

23     Jakup Krasniqi, Ram Buja, and Fatmir Limaj, together with my British

24     colleague David Slinn and thereafter we had lost contact because they

25     moved somewhere else.  And it was not until we had -- until late summer,

Page 2617

 1     September, that we had contact, but it was only via phone.

 2        Q.   We have understood what you were doing for your country and in

 3     what way.  But from your testimony I garnered that you did not do that as

 4     Austria, not even as the European Union, but in the broadest sense of the

 5     word in terms of diplomatic activity of the USA and the European Union.

 6     I want to know who else - I don't mean persons but states - who was

 7     involved in those joint activities that also involved Austria, either

 8     through you or through Ambassador Petritsch, in observing and monitoring

 9     the situation in Kosovo?  Who were the key players, what states?

10        A.   I mean, the key state was United States.  In KDOM,

11     Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions, there was -- there were many

12     components, or three main components, one was the US component, the

13     second one was the European component, and then there was also a Russian

14     component.  And there were also joint trips into the country-side.  There

15     was also a Canadian car, one team from Canada I remember -- yeah, that's

16     it.  Then the Contact Group, of course, as I explained, they are the main

17     political formation where Mr. Hill, the -- at that time the ambassador --

18     the US ambassador to Skopje was designated as the Special Envoy

19     for Kosovo.  We didn't have, on the European side, anybody yet, and we

20     were accused of inaction, inactivity, even ridiculed at times.  And it

21     was only until September that Ambassador Petritsch was named

22     Special Envoy and formalised at the foreign ministers' meeting in early

23     October only.

24        Q.   The working of the international community you just described

25     through what countries it was implemented.  I want to know about the

Page 2618

 1     coordination.  You mentioned European Union, the USA, and the Russian

 2     Federation as the key players.  Now I want to know about the interaction,

 3     their interaction, not in formal terms, but substantively.  What was the

 4     cooperation like between the Russians and the EU, the Americans and the

 5     EU, Americans and Russians.  So not formally because we all know what it

 6     looked like on the surface, formally.  But I want you to try and answer

 7     this question for me because you are the right person.  You can tell me

 8     what their relationship was like in the actual fact.

 9        A.   You had various initiatives and the interaction was either formal

10     meetings, Contact Group ambassadors would meet or they would give

11     briefings, so if Mr. Hill saw a high-ranking Serbian politician he would

12     tend to debrief us afterwards, he would not include us, but he would

13     debrief us.  The Russians also sent somebody down, Afanasievsky, if I'm

14     not mistaken, to -- so that the Russians would also talk to -- in

15     Belgrade to the politicians and say, We need to do something, this here

16     is escalating.  They did participate as I said in KDOM.  So there was a

17     joint cooperation in -- on all levels, whether that was the diplomatic

18     level or the monitor level.

19             There were joint reports by the monitors, there were joint

20     outings by the monitors.  And they would then also important to put some

21     basic information to New York on Security Council Resolution 1199,

22     whether that was kept or not or honoured.  So I think their -- they did

23     give different inputs, the three different -- the Americans, the

24     Europeans, and the Russians, input to New York.  Does that answer your

25     question?

Page 2619

 1        Q.   Partly, but thank you anyway.  My next question:  You did say

 2     that the most important country in this whole process were the

 3     United States of America.  Am I right in saying so?

 4        A.   Absolutely.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell me now, are you familiar with the oath

 6     that members of the KLA or perspective members of the KLA had to take

 7     while entering that military organisation?  Do you know the text of their

 8     oath?

 9        A.   No, never heard of it.

10        Q.   Very well.  As a diplomat, did number three, that is, Mr. Thaqi;

11     number seven, Mr. Veseli; and the other numbers that we can't recall, did

12     they tell you what their political goals were and how they intend to go

13     about realising them?  Did they tell you that?

14        A.   I mean, their -- they even stated it publicly,

15     Mr. Jakup Krasniqi, as a spokesperson, that independence was their goal.

16        Q.   But how did they intend to go about achieving that independence?

17        A.   By military means.

18        Q.   And what were the goals, the reported goals, of the most

19     important and strongest political party, Mr. Rugova's party, what did he

20     say about his goals?

21        A.   The same, independence.  But he -- sorry.  But he was committed

22     to peaceful means and sort of the whole in our assessment is that there

23     was a lot of impatience by some circles of the Kosovo Albanian community

24     that this way Rugova took -- will not lead to anything, and this is why

25     you had one political faction breaking away from Mr. Rugova who wanted to

Page 2620

 1     have a more proactive way.  And then you had the KLA who chose the

 2     military way.

 3        Q.   You mentioned this faction which split off from Rugova.  Was the

 4     method of achieving independence was armed struggle or something else?

 5     Can you tell us anything about that?

 6        A.   The splinter faction was also political means, not military

 7     means.

 8        Q.   What was the reason for them going their own road because it's

 9     the same goal and the same method of achieving it?

10        A.   They wanted to have a more active approach, making

11     demonstrations, and like in the Kosovo Albanian political spectrum you

12     always have different fractions, and it was very difficult - and this was

13     one of our aims - is to get these fractions together because who would be

14     able to talk to Belgrade on what we were at the time working on some

15     autonomy if they would not represent the whole spectrum of the

16     Kosovo Albanians or, like the LDK, would be not willing to go it alone

17     because they said, We have no influence over the KLA.  How could they

18     negotiate something with Belgrade which would include a secession of

19     hostilities if they had no influence on those, meaning the KLA, who did

20     engage in the hostilities.

21        Q.   Your ambassador at the time, Mr. Petritsch, and the UK ambassador

22     and the American ambassador to Skopje and to Belgrade, the

23     Russian Federation's ambassador to Belgrade, they all conducted talks

24     with the political elite of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the

25     time.  I'm not going to specify Mr. Milosevic and his closest associates.

Page 2621

 1     I'm not going to mention the top brass of Montenegro.  But I would like

 2     to call them collectively the political elite of the FRY of the time.

 3     I've no -- listed the ambassadors of the countries which I see as key --

 4     being key in that process.

 5             What I'm interested in is was there a single unified diplomatic

 6     stance at one place concerning the problem of Kosovo and Metohija and

 7     autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia, one of two, and within

 8     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whether there was a common stance

 9     with respect to the political efforts invested by the political elite of

10     Serbia at the time and whether they were amenable to peaceful

11     negotiations with the Albanians; and if not, why not?  What was the crux

12     of the political stance of the political elite of Serbia as assessed by

13     international diplomats because you were there in this hot spot at the

14     time?  What are your impressions and your knowledge generally speaking?

15     This is what I'm getting at .

16        A.   The lead clearly were with the United States and with Mr. Hill.

17     There was also an initiative, so if that's what you're aiming at -- there

18     were various initiatives.  One was certainly Mr. Hill who was -- who had

19     lead, then the Russians, with Mr. Afanasievsky, also tried to talk to the

20     leadership.  The European Union at that time didn't play a role yet.  As

21     I said, Mr. Petritsch was at that early stage in summer nothing but the

22     EU Presidency ambassador.  I -- if I may recall, the OSCE and the EU had

23     a double-hatted envoy for ex-Yugoslavia, Mr. Gonzales, if I'm not

24     mistaken, and he was virtual impossible to perform his duties because he

25     was not given a visa to enter the FRY, and this was the -- one of the

Page 2622

 1     reasons Mr. Petritsch was picked as a Special Envoy of the European Union

 2     because he could not be denied a visa because he was already on the spot.

 3        Q.   There were certain internal political reasons why Mr. Gonzales

 4     was denied a visa.  You will agree with me.  The authorities had reasons

 5     to deny him the visa, he was a persona non grata at the time.  What I'd

 6     like to hear, whether the attitude of the ambassadors and the reports

 7     that they sent to their respective countries and governments was that the

 8     Serbian authorities are trying, through negotiations and in a peaceful

 9     manner, to resolve all problems concerning Kosovo and Metohija, or was it

10     different?  This is the gist of the whole matter concerning that period

11     of time.  Do you know what was the explanation of -- proffered by the

12     Serb authorities about why the Serb security forces, why the Serb army,

13     was there on the ground?  What was the thinking and the opinion of

14     foreign ambassadors about that problem at the time about the position of

15     the Serb government, Serbian government, sorry.

16        A.   Belgrade saw it, the whole Kosovo issue, as an internal issue.

17     And as you also accused me of meddling into internal issues.  And their

18     opposition towards a greater role, was they didn't want to

19     internationalise the issue.

20        Q.   They did not?

21        A.   They did not want to have it internationalised.  We -- remember,

22     we had OSCE long-term mission before also in Kosovo and Sandzak also

23     and -- which was terminated.  And the idea was to have an international

24     mission there to stabilise it, being there so that things would not

25     escalate.  And that was so that the thinking from the KDOM led into the

Page 2623

 1     Kosovo Verification Mission which -- in October.  So the idea was to be

 2     present there to stabilise things and not have them getting out of the

 3     hand, and one part of it was also to establish a political process where

 4     Belgrade and Pristina or, if you like, the Kosovo Albanians with Serb

 5     authorities would talk about the future status of Kosovo.

 6        Q.   Mr. Kickert, I absolutely understand your position, and I

 7     appreciate your service.  I know that you're a cog wheel in the mechanism

 8     of your government who does what he's told.  I'm not accusing you of

 9     anything.  You have to share the prevailing opinion of your government.

10     It's nothing personal.  But let's move on.

11             Using your rich experience in the field, now you're entering a

12     contradiction when you say, We have monitoring missions, I'm not going to

13     list them all to save time, OSCE, KDOM, European monitors, a

14     Contact Group, and tens of NGOs.  That doesn't fit with your claim that

15     there was no -- that the issue was not internationalised, this issue of

16     Kosovo and Metohija, by the Serb government and that they had not allowed

17     that.  Could you please disentangle this illogic stance that you have.

18        A.   For me it's not illogic at all, but the international presence,

19     of course there were international NGOs working in the humanitarian

20     field.  There was at the time when I went down from 1998 on there was a

21     US information office but nothing else.  I was among the few diplomats

22     who would go down to Kosovo regularly.  There were just periodic visits

23     by ambassadors, and they only went to -- mostly to Pristina.  There were

24     two colleagues, one from the British, one from the Swedish embassy, who

25     would deal more intensively, but there was hardly any international

Page 2624

 1     presence there in Pristina.  When we agreed on KDOM, and interestingly

 2     enough this D came in on the insistence of Belgrade to call it

 3     diplomatic, and all these monitors had to be accredited by the -- by

 4     the -- by their embassies of their nationality and they were not allowed

 5     to have the EU umbrella because that's going too far.  So they were

 6     always on their national capacity.  Of course we organised them as the EU

 7     jointly, but the wish of the Belgrade authorities was not having too much

 8     of an international presence.  That's also why they denied the European

 9     Union to have -- house a presence there.  And that's the reason why we in

10     our national capacity rented a house in Pristina which we would sublet to

11     European institutions, like ECHO, the humanitarian office, to make some

12     sort of hub for the EU there.  That was in July of 1998.

13             But the whole effort, we also -- as I told you before, we had a

14     lack of information and being present we wanted to have our own sources

15     of information and not rely on allegations and counter-allegations.  And

16     as I wrote in my report when we went to Decani, inflating news and -- I

17     say, well, what the LDK claims is nonsense, it's not a second Vukovar,

18     because we were dependent because we had no presence on the ground on

19     what other sources, open sources, we had.

20        Q.   Thank you.  What I could gather is that eventually there were

21     many monitoring missions in Kosovo.  What Ambassador Hill was doing

22     there, the Dutch ambassador was there, Ambassador Walker was there.  Had

23     they not been there, there would not have been the reports that you

24     received at different times from different places in Kosovo.  But let's

25     move on to a different line of questioning.  I'd like to honour my

Page 2625

 1     promise that I will finish your cross-examination today because of your

 2     obligations.

 3             My question is going to concern your statement, your 1999

 4     statement, taken in Vienna.  You said - that would be paragraph 4:

 5             "In March 1998 members of the diplomatic corps were taken by the

 6     Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Prekaz in Kosovo to show them

 7     what the KLA had done there.  The Austrian government did not send a

 8     representative on this trip because we did not want to be used as a pawn

 9     in a propaganda campaign."

10             Of course doesn't say by whom, but it can be concluded that it

11     would be the propaganda launched by the Serbian or Yugoslav government.

12     I would like you to comment on your obviously personal opinion of this.

13        A.   It was a decision by all the EU countries not to participate in

14     this particular outing.  We changed our opinion, I'll tell you then why.

15     But why do I talk about propaganda?  Because when you're there you see

16     the embassy representatives, see the footage, and then the caption is the

17     story which one side gives.  And they would say, Okay, we were taken to

18     see by ourselves the terrorist hideouts and so on.  That there was an

19     allegation that -- that sort of a massacre happened there, and we didn't

20     want to be misused to go there.  The disadvantage was that we couldn't

21     see by our own.  Military attaches then went to this area, but we, as

22     diplomats, not yet.  And that's the reason we said at the second offer to

23     Decani that we would take this offer up and go there so that we could see

24     by ourselves what it looked like.

25        Q.   The very claim that it went for a propaganda campaign launched by

Page 2626

 1     the Serbian government automatically begs the question of your

 2     credibility seen through the eyes of the Defence team in this case.

 3     Since you took this stance in an uncompromising manner, I can conclude

 4     from that - and you've explained it a bit better - but for it to be clear

 5     to everybody in the courtroom, I will have to ask you the next question.

 6     What was the quantity and extent of your knowledge about what had

 7     happened at that location at Prekaz in Kosovo, the place you were invited

 8     to by the Serbian government -- or I mean the

 9     Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Did you have information about that; if so,

10     from whom, and what was the content of that information?

11        A.   I did have information from my then-British and -Swedish

12     colleague who went there the day after it had happened.  They saw it by

13     themselves and reported it to me.  Later on I also remember I saw

14     photographs of the victims which were laid out in Srbica, Skenderaj,

15     taken by the deputy defence attache of Germany, and they were also in the

16     newspapers, the Kosovo Albanian newspapers, I believe.

17        Q.   I see that you remember that.  What was -- what were the name of

18     the colleagues that informed you about Prekaz, those who went there the

19     day after.  Could you please supply us with their names?

20        A.   The Swedish colleague was called Jonas Weiss and the British

21     colleague Julian Braithwaite.

22        Q.   Do you recall their positions, what were their titles in their

23     embassies?

24        A.   The Swedish colleague was, like myself, I think second secretary,

25     had the similar portfolio as I did; and Mr. Braithwaite maybe was first

Page 2627

 1     secretary but certainly not -- like myself, a junior diplomat at the

 2     time.

 3        Q.   Was he in charge exclusively of Kosovo, I mean Mr. Braithwaite,

 4     do you know that?

 5        A.   No, he also dealt with media affairs.

 6        Q.   My question concerning your answer will be as follows:  What kind

 7     of information they relayed to you the day after the Prekaz event?  What

 8     did they tell you about that?

 9        A.   They told me about the destruction of the compound, which I've

10     only seen much later, and that apparently there were some heavier --

11     heavier guns or -- used to perform this sort of destruction.

12        Q.   What did the Serb authorities determine in connection with Prekaz

13     at the time?

14        A.   That they have taken out a terrorist stronghold.  I even remember

15     that that very day of Prekaz, the German ambassador was seeing

16     Mr. Odalovic; and during the meeting somebody came in and told

17     Mr. Odalovic something and he turned to the German ambassador and said

18     that, The terrorist issue is solved.

19        Q.   Between receiving those two pieces of information, the one you

20     received by the Swedish and British colleague and that received by the --

21     from the Serbian government, did you have any other information

22     concerning Prekaz incidents?  Do you have any personal knowledge about

23     Prekaz gleaned from other sources?

24        A.   I didn't have any personal experience from Prekaz at that time.

25        Q.   Your colleagues arrived there the day after the skirmish at

Page 2628

 1     Prekaz and they reported seeing destruction, damage?

 2        A.   I -- maybe it was the day after or maybe even the same day

 3     because I think it was in the early morning this action, and they had

 4     slipped in, I don't know through which way, to Prekaz.  And they told me

 5     also that when they returned on the normal road that the Serbian police

 6     was taken by surprise that they were there, and I think that they were

 7     even taken into custody briefly.  But -- yeah, that's what they told me,

 8     and I think that the next day they returned to Belgrade.  That's when I

 9     was informed by them.

10        Q.   They were detained?  They were not put into custody?  There is a

11     significant difference in those two terms.  Custody is a very strong

12     measure.  Maybe it is a matter of interpretation.  This is what I heard

13     in my headphones.  So they were detained --

14        A.   I apologise.

15        Q.   -- for a while to check and verify?

16        A.   -- could be questioned --

17        Q.   No, it's not up to you or up to me.  This is the interpretation

18     that I heard.  I do not follow the transcript at the same time.  I rely

19     on what I hear.

20             Concerning this information we can conclude - and will you agree

21     with me - that there was a conflict, that it happened there between Serb

22     security forces, whichever forces they may be, and the KLA, which in the

23     eyes of the Serb government at the time was a terrorist organisation?

24     Would you agree with me?

25        A.   The problem with Prekaz and why it became such a big thing is

Page 2629

 1     because many family members were killed as well from the Jasharis.  So

 2     you had these pictures of women and children, dead women and children as

 3     well, and you didn't have the sort of what we later saw, the classical

 4     uniformed KLA against Serbian security forces.  I don't recall that any

 5     one of those victims had any kind of insignia on them.  I know that we

 6     were presented or the military attache were presented with weaponry found

 7     there.  This is true.

 8        Q.   It is true that a conflict had taken place there between the KLA

 9     and the Serb security forces; did I understand you correctly now or not?

10        A.   I would be cautious stating that because it was very different to

11     what happened in summer, where it appeared that it was much more

12     organised, the KLA.  Here it was an action to a family compound and if --

13     and now in the aftermaths we know that Mr. Jashari was an important

14     member of the KLA, but not necessarily between the KLA only as such and

15     the police forces.  I think it was an attack on a compound of somebody

16     who belonged to the KLA but involved many other family members at the

17     time.

18        Q.   Did you hear who Mr. Adem Jashari was?

19        A.   Well, now he's heralded by the KLA as the founding father of the

20     KLA, the legendary leader.

21        Q.   Do you know that had been warrants for arrest, that there had

22     been investigations undertaken against him because of his work against

23     the constitutional order of the republic?  Do you know that?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Do you know that several Serb police officers were killed and

Page 2630

 1     injured there?

 2        A.   Yes.  There were, since I arrived in Belgrade, reports of attacks

 3     on police cars, escorts -- so, yes, I'm aware of that.  And also killings

 4     of individuals.  I remember a case of a woodworker who was killed and

 5     that was in the village of Drenica area, yes.

 6        Q.   Do you know that the Serb security forces called on them to

 7     surrender to get out peacefully?  Do you know that?  Do you know that

 8     Adem Jashari refused to do that?

 9        A.   This is what I heard.

10        Q.   Do you know that -- do you know what Adem Jashari's house looked

11     like?  Have you ever seen it, the house where he lived?  Do you know what

12     the walls, the ramparts around his house looked like?  There were

13     embrasures there.  It was a veritable fortress.  Did you know that?

14        A.   At the time I didn't know the compound -- later, I did see it,

15     yeah.  But sort of the way it is now with the destructions.

16        Q.   Do you know -- well, you say that you know that Serb police

17     officers were killed there.  Well, I don't know if the interpreter will

18     be able to interpret that properly, but they were not killed by

19     slingshots.  They were killed by fire-arms.  Did you see the fire-arms

20     that he had in his house, and will you agree with me that the fire-arms

21     are not what is considered to be personal weapons, side-arms?  Those were

22     hand-grenades, heavy machine-guns?  And after this question my last

23     question, because I can see that you are confirming that by nodding, but

24     I would like to hear you say yes for the record.

25             Is it logical then that now that we've agreed about that that you

Page 2631

 1     are labelling this Serbian propaganda?  Can you imagine the very same

 2     situation, for instance, in your own country?  There's a crazy Slovene, a

 3     Corinthian Slovene -- I'm quite familiar with this because I see Slovenia

 4     to this day as my former country, my homeland, and now you have an

 5     Adem Jashari and he decides to gain independence for the Slovenian

 6     minority in Austria.  Would it then be Austrian propaganda if your state

 7     were to take any measures against such a man or do you think it is his

 8     democratic right to arm himself with mines, heavy machine-gun,

 9     hand-grenades, and to open fire on the Austrian security forces?  That's

10     why I'm asking you:  Why did you say that you didn't want to be a pawn in

11     the hands of the Serbian propaganda?  I see this as a tragic event and

12     this is something that I find really very upsetting --

13             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djordjevic.

14             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I apologise, yes.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  You are making an extremely lengthy political

16     speech, including in it a great deal of factual substance.  If you want

17     the witness to comment on a particular matter, raise it, in a short

18     manner, directly --

19             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right, you're right,

20     of course, Your Honour.  Your Honour, you're absolutely right.  I just

21     wanted to ask why is this labelled propaganda if we have this state of

22     affairs?  And I do apologise for making this lengthy speech.  It was not

23     politically motivated, believe me.

24             THE WITNESS:  First to answer beginning of your statement.  Yes,

25     we were presented with the weaponry - that's what I mentioned

Page 2632

 1     before - and it is certainly not side-arms or hunting rifles, but far

 2     from that.  Point one.  Point two, you had two allegations on this Prekaz

 3     thing.  One was that it was a legitimate police action against

 4     terrorists, the other one was that it was a massacre on a family.  I'm

 5     aware of the fact that apparently Mr. Jashari was asked to give himself

 6     up, and he refused to, and that was the reason for the attack on Prekaz.

 7             On the, if I may, on the political issue.  The situation was that

 8     the province of Kosovo had substantial autonomy which was revoked.  So

 9     there is not -- there is an avenue where we wanted to get the political

10     leaders of Kosovo, engage with Belgrade to agree on circumstances where

11     they would be willing to live in a common state of the future.  Why

12     didn't we want to be sent there?  As I said, propaganda.  You would be

13     just sent there and with the footing you would just get one side of the

14     story and not the other one.  And that's the reason.

15             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  My next question:  Have you ever been to Obrinje?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Did you go there via Lipovac, the road that goes through the

19     village of Lipovac, or not?

20        A.   Lipovac or Likovac?

21        Q.   Likovac, Likovac, yes.

22        A.   Yes.  I've been to Likovac, also must have been a few times,

23     because it was also one of headquarter of the KLA; and I remember

24     particularly went to Likovac between the Rambouillet and Paris

25     conferences to see the -- what they call themselves General Staff of the

Page 2633

 1     KLA.  But when -- whether I went through Gornje Obrinje via Likovac, I

 2     don't know.  But it's nearby and -- but I couldn't tell now which exact

 3     road we took.

 4        Q.   Do you have any knowledge about the fact that a Red Cross mission

 5     came across a mine in Likovac and there were casualties?

 6        A.   Yes, indeed.  There were actually two incidents.  One incident

 7     was that Canadian KDOM hit a mine, it must have been a bigger mine, a

 8     land-mine, and their armoured vehicle was totally destroyed but there

 9     were no casualties in this particular instance.  And soon thereafter, a

10     car of the ICRC hit a land-mine and at least one local doctor was killed

11     in this incident.

12        Q.   Do you know who provided first aid immediately after the incident

13     and took the survivors to nearest medical institutions and so on?

14        A.   I suppose it was the Serbian authorities who got them out.

15        Q.   Again, is it something that you know or something that you

16     assume?

17        A.   Assume.

18        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  And do you know who laid the mine on the

19     road?  Who controlled the territory?

20        A.   Again, I assume.  I don't know who laid the mines, but it is --

21     our assessment was that the KLA laid these mines.  And I do know how the

22     Canadians got out.  They were lucky enough that their cellphone worked on

23     a nearby hill because their satphone was also destroyed through the --

24     through hitting the land-mine.

25        Q.   My next question pertains to your statement where you say in

Page 2634

 1     July 1998 - that's what you said several times - that you went to

 2     Malisevo.  You accompanied Dr. Albert Rohan, the Secretary-General of the

 3     Austrian foreign affairs ministry, and then you mentioned number seven,

 4     Mr. Kadri Veseli.  And you speak about the so-called Thaqi government,

 5     and now I want to know this.  I'm not going to go into your notes and

 6     dispatches that you sent to your embassy, to Luxembourg, to Vienna, and

 7     so on.  But I'm going to ask you:  What do you consider as your

 8     achievement?  Do you consider that you actually achieved anything through

 9     those contacts with contact number seven and number three, Mr. Veseli and

10     Thaqi respectively.  And if yes, what, in your view, was the consequence

11     of the diplomatic efforts pertaining to the contacts with the KLA?  Not

12     the politicians but just the KLA.

13        A.   I think if there was an achievement it was that they were in the

14     end willing to integrate into a political process, and as it is shown,

15     they have participated in the Rambouillet conference.  So I think having

16     contacted them led them into the political process.  That's -- that was

17     our aim, and from this perspective we did achieve something through these

18     meetings.

19        Q.   And did they cease their operations until the beginning of the

20     NATO air-strikes, the 24th of March, 1999, in other words, and continue

21     their struggle by political means through talks, negotiations?

22        A.   The conflict was, at best, through the OSCE

23     Kosovo Verification Mission, detained to a certain degree but it

24     continued.  Skirmishes were frequent also thereafter, and I'm talking

25     about the time leading to Rambouillet.  Is that what you refer to?

Page 2635

 1        Q.   You say that it was your achievement, your success, that you

 2     managed to reach this result that they embarked on political negotiations

 3     and that they came up with those platforms.  My next question -- I'm not

 4     talking about now -- negotiations now.  We'll deal with Rambouillet at

 5     the end of the cross-examination today.  So my next question has to do

 6     specifically with the KLA.  Are you familiar with all the cease-fire

 7     agreements between the Serb security forces and the KLA.  That's my first

 8     question before the break.

 9        A.   No, I was not involved in any of these negotiations.  I was

10     involved in January 1999 on the exchange of VJ soldiers, but on

11     cease-fire arrangements, no, I was not involved.

12             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that this

13     is time for our break, and I will have no further questions on this

14     because the witness has no knowledge of the cease-fire agreements reached

15     between the KLA and the Serbian security forces.  So this is it as far as

16     this topic is concerned.  I will continue after the break.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.  We've been waiting for

18     a logical moment to interrupt, but we will resume now at 1.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djordjevic.

22             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

23        Q.   [Interpretation] My next question.  You spoke several times about

24     a diplomat from Great Britain, Mr. David Slinn.  Could you please tell

25     us, who was he?

Page 2636

 1        A.   He was at the UK embassy in Belgrade and filled in in the moment

 2     Mr. Braithwaite left.  He filled in his position and was covering Kosovo

 3     from that time on, must have been spring/early summer of 1998.

 4        Q.   Could you tell me, to the best of your recollection, what talks

 5     did he participate in, who did he talk to while you were both in Kosovo?

 6        A.   He would talk to the same group of people in Pristina, the

 7     politicians, and he was not tasked and not given the permission to meet

 8     the KLA until end of July shortly before we went together to Klecka.

 9        Q.   My next question:  You mentioned the events in Obrinje, and I

10     have a document here and it's a document D0024615.  I think that's the

11     version in B/C/S and the English document is right next to it, so if you

12     could just show the two documents side by side.  It's a document from the

13     Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.  We have yet to

14     receive it on our screens.  We'll have to wait a while.  This is -- okay.

15     Now we have the translation too.

16             A very quick question:  Are you familiar with this document from

17     the Ministry of the Interior?  It pertains to Obrinje.

18        A.   No, this is not a document I've seen at the time, but I remember

19     the incident, yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know who Kari Korklo is a forensic

21     pathology expert from Finland, have you heard of him?

22        A.   He must have been on the team of Finnish pathologists which we

23     had agreed that they would do investigations in three plus three cases,

24     six altogether.  But I remember particularly Helena Ranta, she was

25     heading this Finnish team, and Mr. Timo Lahelma who was an ambassador for

Page 2637

 1     human rights issues in the Finnish foreign ministry.  They both were on

 2     this team which -- which was heading out on the 10th of December to

 3     Gornje Obrinje to do the exhumations.

 4        Q.   And do you have information that the team of Finnish experts who

 5     headed to the site together with the investigating of the Pristina

 6     district court, Ms. Danica Marinkovic, actually was not able to reach the

 7     site because the site was already under the control of the KLA forces and

 8     this created some danger because the investigating judge of that court

 9     was escorted by the police?  Do you have any knowledge of that?

10        A.   Yeah, I was on this trip.  I was in the Austrian car which was at

11     the top of the convoy.  There was ECMM, including trucks, and the whole

12     operation was organised before, and it was no problem whatsoever for the

13     Finnish forensic team in -- accompanied by ECMM to go to Gornje Obrinje,

14     as you said, UCK-held territory.  It was only this very morning where

15     they headed out to do the actual exhumations, they had prepared the sites

16     beforehand, that not only Mrs. Marinkovic wanted to participate, but as

17     she did not feel safe enough without, we had a long tail of Serbian

18     police cars, armoured vehicles, following our convoy; and we did not

19     enter the UCK-held territory because we knew this would mean a direct

20     clash where we, meaning the Finnish forensic team, ECMM, and myself would

21     have been in the middle.  So we did not enter at that particular day

22     and -- yeah.

23        Q.   But it was postponed at the proposal of the investigating judge,

24     Madam Marinkovic, was it not?

25        A.   Postponement is a nice word.  As it was not possible because the

Page 2638

 1     investigating judge insisted to come along with police, these exhumations

 2     could not take place.  And in the aftermath the Finnish forensic team

 3     decided, although everything was prepared, including taking them to

 4     Pristina to the forensic laboratory, that they would concentrate on a

 5     different site, the one in Orahovac.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] Now I would like to tender this

 8     document into evidence.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be D00061, Your Honours.

11             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   My next question has to do with the document 2654.

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation} It's a 65 ter document, and I

14     would like to ask the usher to show this document in English and in

15     Serbian on our screens -- or in German.

16        Q.   Now we have both documents.  This document was drafted on the

17     7th of October, 1998.  Did you draft it, and do you recognise this as

18     your document?

19        A.   Yes, I do recognise my document, and I see that instead of

20     7 October at the beginning I write 7/9, 7 September, which is a mistake.

21     It was drafted 7 of October and the meeting of Petritsch with

22     Mr. Holbrooke took place on the 7th of October and not the 7th September.

23        Q.   I will not ask you to quote the UN Security Council

24     Resolution 1199 because we know that, but regarding the comments made in

25     this document could you please explain why this is written in this way

Page 2639

 1     and what was the position of the Austrian embassy and what was the

 2     position of Mr. Holbrooke regarding this issue or any talks about the

 3     actions of the Republic of Serbia and President Milosevic.

 4        A.   Well, this was the first time that Mr. Holbrooke met with

 5     Mr. Petritsch in his capacity as UN Special Envoy on Kosovo.  He must

 6     have been officially nominated just a few days before.  And I remember

 7     that I called the US deputy head of mission from Belgrade asking for at

 8     least a briefing of Mr. Holbrooke on his talks with Mr. Milosevic because

 9     they didn't take us along in these discussions they had with top brass of

10     the leadership -- republic leadership in Belgrade.  And he reports, as I

11     cite here, that he had a grim impression that was one of the hardest

12     talks he had with Milosevic in years.  Mr. Milosevic told him that all

13     requests of Security Council Resolution 1199 have been fulfilled and that

14     Mr. Holbrooke said that if the talks he held did not have success, were

15     not successful, they would turn an ACTORD.  That's I don't know which

16     level of NATO, but this was clearly a threat of bombardment.  That's the

17     beginning of October, so that's before what we call the agreement on the

18     Holbrooke package.  And about that time, 7 October, I think the early

19     October, the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to

20     Security Council Resolution 1199 was due.

21             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

22     document into evidence.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be D00062, Your Honours.

25             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation] The next document is

Page 2640

 1     2656 65 ter, both in English and in B/C/S.

 2        Q.   We have both documents.  Mr. Kickert, do you recognise this

 3     document?

 4        A.   Yes, I do.

 5        Q.   Is the date on this document correct, the 9th of October, 1998?

 6        A.   That's the same mistake as before.  I wrote it on the

 7     9th of October, and it is on the talk of -- and I was there present of

 8     Ambassador Petritsch with Ambassador Kotov on the 9th of October because

 9     it makes reference to a meeting on the 8th of October of Mr. Ivanov with

10     President Milosevic.

11        Q.   Could you please tell me, we have your report here where you say

12     that Russians are still opposed to the use of military force, it's in the

13     second paragraph.  And then you go on to say that the Russians believed

14     that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has already put a lot of things

15     in motion in order to fulfil the Security Council Resolution 1999 [as

16     interpreted] requirements.  Can you tell me, what was the practical

17     consequence of this discussion between your ambassador and Mr. Kotov and

18     I can see that the Russian Defence Minister Sergeyev is also mentioned

19     here and also Ivanov who he had talks with the then-President of Serbia

20     Milosevic.  You say in the end that on the 4th of October Milosevic was

21     pressured to agree to a substantial OSCE mission for Kosovo.  So I would

22     like you to comment briefly on the diplomatic talks that you participated

23     in.

24        A.   That briefing of Russian Ambassador Kotov was to fill

25     Mr. Petritsch in on what the Russians did.  As I explained beforehand,

Page 2641

 1     there was sort of the US stream, the -- and the Russian stream to -- and

 2     I write in my third paragraph that they were trying to convince

 3     Mr. Milosevic to agree to international monitors, and the idea was to

 4     expand the KDOM into an OSCE mission, like -- as I state in my one, two,

 5     three, four, five, sixth paragraph.

 6        Q.   This report of yours obviously confirms what you said a little

 7     while ago, that Ambassador Holbrooke threatened air-strikes and any kind

 8     of force.  What was the Russian position regarding the use of military

 9     force?  I'm sure that after this discussion you did form some

10     impressions.

11        A.   I mean, this was not a secret.  It was even -- the threat of

12     bombing was even mentioned in public domain, in the media.  And this --

13     whatever these steps were, ACTORD, and so on, these were used as a means

14     to convince - if I may put it that way - the Belgrade leadership to give

15     in and to agree to what then became the OSCE-KVM plus the NATO air

16     surveillance agreement.  So there was a whole package which Mr. Holbrooke

17     in the end negotiated.

18             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Before I continue with another line of

19     questioning I would like to tender this document as well, please.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be D00063, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJORDJEVIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Kickert, since you're a diplomat I'm going to ask you this

24     question.  There was mention of threat of military force being used by

25     the most powerful military alliance in the world, NATO, against a

Page 2642

 1     sovereign state of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Who was supposed to

 2     apply this instrument of pressure or this threat of force against a

 3     sovereign country?

 4        A.   As you're well aware, this is NATO.  ACTORD -- is different

 5     levels of activating this threat, and all NATO member states would have

 6     to agree to this.  And I have to add that Austria is not a member of

 7     NATO, so I had no insight on what was going on and at which level and --

 8     I don't even know how NATO really works in this.

 9        Q.   My question - obviously we did not understand each other very

10     well - is:  When we talk about the application of military might of NATO,

11     should have that application of military force been confirmed by a UN

12     resolution because of president?  And since you are a career diplomat and

13     an educated man, trained for to be a diplomat, I'm asking you this:

14     Could NATO conduct air-strikes of its own volition, and that would be a

15     unilateral decision of its member states; or could NATO have been able to

16     do so pursuant to a decision of the United Nations?  If you can answer,

17     please do so; if not, I'll be content with that as well.

18        A.   I mean, I would have to look into Security Council

19     Resolution 1199, but I doubt that it was a Chapter 7 resolution which

20     enabled the use of force.  I very much doubt that.  And the discussion we

21     had after the NATO bombardment, also -- the one which happened and

22     started, as you said, 24 March 1999, was that there was no UN resolution

23     empowering NATO to do so.

24        Q.   Can we conclude then that this was a decision primarily taken by

25     NATO member states, not all of them but primarily by the United States of

Page 2643

 1     America or was it something else?

 2        A.   To my knowledge, all NATO member states have to agree to such a

 3     decision, but as I said I have no clear insight into the mechanisms --

 4     the decision-making mechanisms of NATO.  But as you've seen subsequently

 5     in the NATO bombing, that decision was clearly taken by all NATO member

 6     states.

 7        Q.   My next question is:  Do you have any knowledge that NATO had

 8     ever before used force against any country anywhere in the world the way

 9     that they did then when they conducted air-strikes against the

10     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

11        A.   I think my recollection that there was bombings in Bosnia, must

12     have been 1995.

13        Q.   Apart from that?

14        A.   Not to my recollection.

15        Q.   When you mentioned Bosnia, you will agree with me that they

16     bombed the position of the Bosnian Serbs there?

17        A.   Yeah, now I'm sort of just talking what I get from the media.  I

18     was never in Bosnia, so --

19        Q.   It doesn't matter.  I withdraw my question.  My last question or

20     the last topic that we are going to discuss is Rambouillet.  What was

21     your role there?

22        A.   In the moment Mr. Petritsch was named UN Special Envoy I became

23     his assistant because I was dealing with Kosovo, and my particular role

24     was not only to assist him but also to be the liaison with the

25     Kosovo Albanians.

Page 2644

 1        Q.   In that situation did any other diplomats from any other country

 2     work with you with respect to Kosovo Albanians or was your role there

 3     exclusive to you?

 4        A.   No, no, not exclusive.  There was also a German colleague --

 5     because from the beginning of January 1999 Germany took over the

 6     EU Presidency and the German colleague was also present and had also

 7     contacts with the Kosovo Albanians.

 8        Q.   What was that colleague's name and he acted on behalf of the

 9     Federal Republic of Germany or the United Nations or some other country,

10     do you know, and what was his name, please?

11        A.   His name was Axel Dittmann, D-i-t-t-m-a-n-n, and he was a German

12     diplomat, and so representing Germany, but at the same time the

13     EU Presidency in the first half of 1999.

14        Q.   To the best of your knowledge of the time and to the best of your

15     recollection, a mixed composition of the Albanian declaration which

16     included politicians coming from different parts of the spectrums and

17     members of the KLA - I'm not going to name them - did any of them put up

18     anything less in terms of demands other than full independence of Kosovo?

19        A.   Of course they put up this as their ultimate goal, but the whole

20     Rambouillet accord was not going to be independence.  It was going to

21     be -- was about being some sort of autonomy within the -- within the FRY.

22        Q.   Would you agree with me that the basic part of that accord

23     envisaged a final decision on the status of Kosovo being deferred for a

24     number or for a number of years, you can count them on the fingers of one

25     hand, and then to be decided by a referendum of the inhabitants of

Page 2645

 1     Kosovo?  What would be your answer to this?

 2        A.   That was one of the most contentious issues in the Rambouillet

 3     accord is what we call the review clause, meaning that at a certain time,

 4     in this case I think the last version was three years, there would be a

 5     decision on the final status of Kosovo and it avoided the mention of the

 6     notion referendum, but it said "taking into account the will of the

 7     people."

 8        Q.   Did the Serbian delegation accept such provisions of such an

 9     agreement and the eventual, final version that was supposed to be signed

10     in Paris?

11        A.   No, it didn't accept it and they refused in Paris.  They said

12     they will not agree to this, the whole agreement.

13        Q.   Do you recall whether the Serbian side were told that they were

14     going to be attacked by the mightiest military force in the world had

15     they failed to sign such an agreement?

16        A.   I think it was clear to everybody there that this threat of

17     bombardment was evident.  I mean this was clear that should there not be

18     agreement then the bombardment would start, and I think the decision of

19     the Serbian and FRY delegations, they were a mixed composition, was done

20     in the knowledge that this would lead to bombardment.  There was after

21     Paris still some last-ditch efforts.  The three negotiators Petritsch,

22     Mayorski, and Hill seeing Milosevic and then Holbrooke himself came to

23     Belgrade.  And after he left, as we all know, the bombardment started.

24        Q.   Do you have knowledge about the position of the international

25     community's negotiation team individually, I mean -- by this I mean the

Page 2646

 1     leaders of those teams, most important persons, who took part in the

 2     negotiations and if you could share this with us, Albright, Holbrooke,

 3     Mayorski, Petritsch, all of them.

 4        A.   There were three negotiators Chris Hill for the United States,

 5     Petritsch for the EU, and then Mayorski for the Russian Federation.  Also

 6     present in the castle were representatives of the Contact Group and sort

 7     of in the large Contact Group also the chairman in office of the OSCE in

 8     1999, that was Norway.  So there would be frequent meetings of this

 9     Contact Group often with the political directors coming in, and then they

10     were less frequent but also meetings of the Contact Group on ministerial

11     level.  We had visits of individual Contact Group ministers.  We had the

12     French, we had the British, and we had the US Secretary of State also

13     visiting and staying for quite some days.

14        Q.   Could you please relate the positions of the main three figures,

15     the main negotiators, representing the US of A, EU, and

16     Russian Federation after the Serbian side had refused to sign the

17     agreement and when the negotiations fell through.

18        A.   You mean now in Paris or at Rambouillet itself?

19        Q.   In Paris, in Paris, because in Paris we found out that the

20     negotiations fell through and that the bombardment will follow.  What was

21     the opinion of the US representative, of Mr. Petritsch, and of

22     Ambassador Mayorski?  Was their position unique about the need to bombard

23     the FRY or the Republic of Serbia or not?

24        A.   No, there's also no secret that there were some discrepancies in

25     the opinion, and for sure there was a great degree of disappointment that

Page 2647

1     no decision could be taken in Paris.  And I think things have developed

 2     so far that nobody could backtrack anymore.  As I said, these last-ditch

 3     efforts were made in Belgrade where I understood, because I was not

 4     present at these meetings, that some offers were made also to

 5     Mr. Milosevic maybe to reconsider, to change things.  But as we were told

 6     there was an outright no, and what happened afterwards was -- is part of

 7     history.

 8        Q.   Mr. Kickert, could you please explain your formal academic

 9     degrees that you hold.  What is your academic education?

10        A.   I am a geographer and historian by education.

11        Q.   Now certain things have begun falling into place.  Thank you very

12     much and this would be all for me.  Thank you for coming to testify.

13             MR. DJORDJEVIC:  Your Honour, I have finished with my

14     cross-examination.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you very much, Mr. Djordjevic.

16             Ms. Gopalan, do you have re-examination?

17             MS. GOPALAN:  Yes, I do, Your Honours, just a few questions.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Please.

19                           Re-examination by Ms. Gopalan:

20        Q.   Mr. Kickert, I have a few questions about the exhumations in

21     Gornje Obrinje or the attempts as you described it.  You mentioned in

22     response to Defence counsel that the original plan -- you mention that

23     the original plan was for the Finnish forensic team and the ECMM to

24     travel to the area and you said that this would not have been a problem.

25     Just to clarify, what was the cause of the problem on that day that

Page 2648

 1     resulted in the exhumations not being conducted?

 2        A.   It was the that our convoy was accompanied by the Serbian police

 3     force because, as I said before, we - and I was even present at least one

 4     of the visits to the burial site with the Finnish team - we had access

 5     even if it was KLA-controlled, we had full access.  And in the terms, in

 6     these exchange of letters which I mentioned this morning between the

 7     foreign ministers of the FRY and of Finland, there was free access and

 8     also -- guaranteed.  So we thought that we would do these exhumations.

 9     Ms. Marinkovic wanted to be part of it.  There was no problem with it.

10     But then when she insisted to take along police, we had to abort this

11     operation or else we would have ended up, as I told before, in between

12     the lines and who knows what would have happened.

13        Q.   Thank you.  So you were not able to access the site on that day.

14     Were any steps taken later in the day or in the preceding days to arrange

15     for access to be regained?

16        A.   Yes.  I mean, by pure coincidence on this very day the minister

17     of justice was in Pristina, and we were able to secure a meeting with him

18     in the government building in Pristina, and we complained about what had

19     happened.  He was not in a position to grant us what we wanted, meaning

20     access on our own to do the exhumations and bring the people -- the

21     exhumed people to Pristina on our own.  It was later then also in the

22     month brought up in Belgrade by Ambassador Petritsch but to no avail.

23     The Finnish team then packed their things and went for Christmas

24     holidays.

25        Q.   You also said that following access being denied to this site,

Page 2649

 1     specific site, Gornje Obrinje, the Finns decided to concentrate on

 2     Orahovac.  Did they face any access issues in that site?

 3        A.   No, that was -- Orahovac was controlled by Serbian police, so

 4     there was no access whatsoever -- no access problem, sorry, no access

 5     problem whatsoever.

 6        Q.   And could you give us a little bit of background as to what

 7     incident was being investigated in Orahovac?

 8        A.   That was this allegation of mass graves in a waste dump.  So the

 9     idea was to exhume the bodies there as well and try to - I'm not a

10     forensic expert - to get some information on who these people were and

11     how they were killed.

12        Q.   And just my final question going back to Gornje Obrinje:  Do you

13     know if exhumations were conducted there?

14        A.   Maybe after the NATO bombing.  I'm not aware that there were done

15     beforehand, because then things were overtaken by events because then

16     we -- we entered the phase of Racak and so the -- on the -- the whole

17     concentration of the international community was then on this particular

18     incident and no longer on the others.

19        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  So just to clarify, prior to the NATO bombing,

20     to your knowledge there were no exhumations that were conducted in Gornje

21     Obrinje?

22        A.   To my knowledge, no.  But from beginning of 1999 I was no longer

23     directly responsible for -- for the Finnish team because they worked for

24     the EU, and then my German colleagues would take over dealing with them

25     directly and no longer myself.

Page 2650

 1        Q.   Okay.  Thank you very much, Mr. Kickert.  I have no more

 2     questions for you.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Kickert, you'll be pleased to know that once

 6     again we have come to the end of the questions for you.  We would thank

 7     you for your attendance here and the assistance you've been able to give,

 8     and you of course may now return to your normal activities.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honours, and thank you

10     also the Prosecution and the Defence that I could finish today.  Thank

11     you very much.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, we've got two minutes to go.  I don't think

13     there's any point in trying to occupy that.  We shall adjourn for the day

14     and resume Monday afternoon, at 2.15.

15                           [The witness withdrew]

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of

18                           March, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.