1 Friday, 29 May, 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
6 [Closed session]
11 Pages 5224-5239 redacted. Closed session.
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
23 MR. STAMP: The next witness is Mr. Richard Ciaglinski who will
24 be taken by Ms. Gopalan.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
1 [The witness entered court]
2 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, sir.
3 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please read aloud the affirmation shown
5 to you on the card.
6 THE WITNESS: I certainly will. I solemnly declare that I will
7 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
8 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI
9 Examination by Ms. Gopalan:
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan has some questions for you, I believe.
13 Q. Good morning, sir.
14 A. Good morning.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Prosecutor, please.
16 Q. Please could you state your full name for the record.
17 A. Yes, it's Richard Andrew Zbigniew Ciaglinski. The surname is
19 Q. Could you spell your surname for us, please, sir?
20 A. I will. C-i-a-g-l-i-n-s-k-i.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Kindly pause between
22 questions and answers for the sake of interpretation and the court
23 reporter, thank you.
24 MS. GOPALAN:
25 Q. Thank you. As we will be speaking the same language, sir, we
1 should try to keep a pause between question and answer. Thank you.
2 Sir, did you give a statement to the ICTY in March 2000?
3 A. I did, yes.
4 Q. And in November 2000, did you provide a short supplemental
5 statement to the ICTY again?
6 A. I did.
7 Q. And have you had the opportunity to review both of these
8 statements recently?
9 A. I have.
10 Q. And having reviewed these two statements, are you satisfied that
11 they are true and accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?
12 A. I am, yes.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, both these statements have been
15 combined under 65 ter 2488, and I would like to tender them into
16 evidence, please.
17 JUDGE PARKER: The statements will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: And they would be assigned P00833 [sic],
19 Your Honours.
20 MS. GOPALAN:
21 Q. Sir, did you testify in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic before
22 this Tribunal in April 2002?
23 A. I did, yes.
24 Q. And have you recently had the opportunity to review your
25 testimony in that case?
1 A. I have.
2 Q. And having reviewed the testimony, can you attest that you would
3 provide substantially the same answers today if you were asked the same
4 questions again?
5 A. I will do my best.
6 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, this is 65 ter 0289. And I would
7 like to tender the testimony into evidence, please.
8 JUDGE PARKER: The transcript will be received.
9 MS. GOPALAN: And finally, sir --
10 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be assigned P00833, Your Honours.
11 And I note 65 ter 2488 should reflect P00832.
12 MS. GOPALAN:
13 Q. Sir, finally, did you testify in the trial of Prosecutor versus
14 Milutinovic et al. before this Tribunal in 2006?
15 A. I did.
16 Q. And have you recently had the opportunity to review your
17 testimony in that case?
18 A. I have.
19 Q. And having done that, can you attest that you would give
20 substantially the same answers today if you were asked the same questions
22 A. Again I'll do my best, yes.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, this is 65 ter 05154. And I'd like
25 to tender this transcript into evidence, please.
1 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
2 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00834, Your Honours.
4 MS. GOPALAN: I'd now like to read a brief summary of the
5 witness's evidence. The witness is a retired colonel in the British
6 armed forces. He describes his commencement of operational duty with the
7 OSCE/KVM in early December 1998. The witness was based in Pristina and
8 his duties included organising and planning arms verification visits.
9 He was able to conduct visits to VJ establishments and positions
10 but had very limited access to the MUP sites. The role of arms and
11 weapons verification was eventually abandoned as the verifiers were
12 repeatedly denied access.
13 The witness also had the role of chief liaison person for the KVM
14 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that's abbreviated FRY. The
15 witness and other KVM officials met with the FRY authorities who were
16 represented by the FRY Cooperation Commission. The FRY side was
17 initially headed by General Dusan Loncar who regularly travelled to
19 would inform the OSCE when there was an incident to a member of the Serb
21 The witness describes Loncar's contacts and approval of higher
22 authority in Belgrade
23 witness that Sainovic had the authority to speak on behalf of Belgrade
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we are reading out a
1 translation of a statement that the interpreters have been provided with,
2 then that's fine, but otherwise I can see that there is a significant lag
3 between what my learned friend is saying and the transcript itself, as
4 well as the interpretation we are receiving.
5 It's fine if the interpreters have been provided with the
6 translation, but I can see that there's a discrepancy in terms of pace
7 between the transcript and what Ms. Gopalan is reading out.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for your concern, Mr. Djurdjic.
9 You were reading fairly quickly.
10 MS. GOPALAN: I shall slow down, Your Honours.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 JUDGE PARKER: I don't like asking counsel to slow down, but we
13 would be grateful.
14 MS. GOPALAN: I most certainly will.
15 The overall commander for the police in Kosovo was
16 Lieutenant-General Sretan Lukic, but he refused to deal with the OSCE and
17 left the job to Colonel Miroslav Mijatovic, who was the MUP
18 representative on the Commission of Cooperation. The witness formed the
19 impression that he was the second most senior MUP representative in
20 Kosovo, and that Mijatovic was likely to have operational control of the
22 In late February or March, 1999, special MUP forces arrived from
23 outside Kosovo. The witness performed his duties until the withdrawal of
24 the OSCE in March 1999.
25 On 13 June, 1999
1 officer. He was involved in ejecting the MUP from an office; and during
2 this process, he witnessed MUP officers burning ID documents with
3 Albanian names in a courtyard adjacent to the Ministry of Interior.
4 And that's the end of the summary.
5 I seem to be having some problems with my headphones. If I could
6 just have a minute, please.
7 Q. Sir, as you know, the Judges already have your statements and
8 transcripts before them, and therefore I will only seek to highlight a
9 few areas of your testimony, and your statements. Now, to begin with,
10 sir, as your academic qualifications and military career are already set
11 out in the statement, could you just briefly tell us whether you joined
12 the British armed forces in 1974?
13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. And are you still serving with the British armed forces?
15 A. No, I retired four and a half years ago, and I now do work for
16 the British government with British foreign office and I sort of go to
17 conflict areas where I sort of take part in various aspects of conflict
19 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, I'd like to move on to your time in Kosovo.
20 Could you tell us when it was you went to Kosovo?
21 A. Yes, it was at the beginning of -- Kosovo -- we -- well, first of
22 all, sorry, I'll go back. We arrived in a Skopje at the end of November,
23 beginning of December, and then within a few days we moved across into
24 Kosovo to Brezovica where there was a training centre where there was an
25 induction course. And then a few days later, I moved into Pristina.
1 Q. And what year was this, sir?
2 A. 1998.
3 Q. And approximately when in 1998 did you arrive in Pristina?
4 A. I think it was the 10th of December.
5 Q. Thank you. And why did you go to Pristina at this time?
6 A. Because I was put on to the staff of General Drewienkiewicz,
7 known as DZ, who was the deputy -- one of the deputies of Ambassador
8 Walker, and DZ was responsible for the -- he was chief of operations, so
9 I was on the operation staff.
10 Q. And what organisation were you on the operation staff for?
11 A. Well, initially, I understudied a lady called Donna Phelan from
12 the American State Department, and she was responsible for weapons
13 verification. She then moved on to become head of fusion, the
14 intelligence information collection centre, and I took her job as head of
16 Q. Thank you. Sir, in your statement you say that you went to
17 Kosovo to be part of the British personnel on the KVM.
18 A. Right. Well, there was a British group that was sent. There
19 were 114, 115 British personnel who went, but when I say "member of the
20 British group" I think that's an error, because I was just -- it was an
21 international staff. So I was just one of the many international staffs,
22 but we were a British group that was sent to Kosovo which was then split
24 Q. And what does KVM stand for?
25 A. Kosovo Verification Mission
1 Q. Thank you. And if I understand correctly, these staff that you
2 joined, that was headed by General DZ, was part of the
3 Kosovo Verification Mission
4 A. Absolutely.
5 Q. Thank you. And what was the Kosovo Verification Mission or the
6 KVM's mandate?
7 A. Well, there were several. Obviously initially it was to carry
8 out verification of the mandate that we were given, it was signed up by
9 Slobodan -- President Slobodan Milosevic, and that was to verify that the
10 sides had disengaged and that the Serbian side was keeping to the
11 agreements and keeping the troops in barracks or heavy weapons were
12 withdrawn and so on. And there were further mandates which was then to
13 eventually run the elections but also there was a project to look at the
14 legal system, the judiciary, the police, housing, and so on. So it was
15 quite a wide mandate. But the initial one was to verify the state of
17 Q. Thank you. We'll come to the agreements that you referred to in
18 a moment, but just taking a step back, the requirement that verification
19 was to be conducted and that the sides had to be disengaged, so the --
20 one of the main tasks of the KVM, do you know why this was required at
21 that time? What was the background that led up to necessitating such
23 A. Right. Well, it does go back historically obviously, because
24 leading up to the mission deploying, there are obviously -- everyone
25 knows there was a great deal of fighting between the KLA and the Serbian
1 side. The west was very unhappy with the situation, and NATO was very
2 unhappy with the situation. And various threats were being made by NATO,
3 NATO activation order had been signed which threatened to bomb Serbia
4 So I believe that around the May/June of 1998,
5 President Milosevic and President Yeltsin met and there was agreed that
6 some sort of mission would go in to just see what was going on to prove
7 that everything was being done correctly. And that was known as an EU
8 and -- European Union Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. This preceded
9 the KVM. And it was made up really of Defence attaches and others from
12 So in about July of that year -- 6th of July, KDOM began its
13 work. Then, as we know, the fighting intensified throughout the period
14 and once again NATO got involved at making various threats. But,
15 sorry --
16 Q. Could I just stop you there for a moment. When you refer to the
17 KDOM are you referring to the Kosovo Diplomatic...
18 A. Observer Mission
19 Q. Thank you. And earlier on you mentioned the NATO activation
20 order that was signed. If you recall, when was that order signed?
21 A. I knew you were going to say that. I can't remember off the top
22 of my head, no, I might have written it down somewhere. I know it was
23 resigned in October. It was re-activated, second activation was given
25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic is going to help us.
1 THE WITNESS: Fine.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Two questions: First
3 of all, I can see that we are now discussing the period during which the
4 witness was not in Kosovo. Second of all, I see that the witness has an
5 aide memoire or some notes before him, I don't know whether that is
6 customary. In any case, he is now testifying about the period during
7 which he was not in Kosovo and as well as wondering about his notes that
8 he is using as reminders.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Firstly, he is merely indicating the capacity in
10 which he served and who it was that he succeeded, so I see no problem
11 with that, Mr. Djurdjic. As for notes, Colonel, would you mind not
12 referring to notes unless it's --
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I'm very happy to do that it was
14 just that there were so many dates there and although I followed the
15 entire sort of procedure from back home when it was happening, it's
16 difficult to remember exact dates and which UN Security Council
17 instructions they were.
18 JUDGE PARKER: If you need to verify from notes, would you
19 publicly indicate that you would like to refer to your notes, and we can
20 then decide whether that is appropriate.
21 Carry on please, Ms. Gopalan.
22 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Q. Sir, when we stopped off, we were discussing the second
24 activation order from NATO. I think that is sufficient background in
25 terms of the process that led up to the KVM being formed and your entry
1 into Kosovo. But specifically, could you tell us what your role was
2 within the KVM?
3 A. Of course. On arrival, I was working -- I was being trained for
4 a few days at Brezovica and there was a possibility that I would remain
5 in Brezovica as one of the trainers because of my background. And we
6 were training the observers mainly initially in observation. And having
7 been a Defence attache, I'm fairly well versed in the skills required to
8 look at equipment, look at group formations, dispositions, and make some
9 sort of assessment on it.
10 But what happened is rather than staying at Brezovica, I was
11 whisked away by General DZ; and within a few days of arriving in the
12 headquarters in Pristina, I was told to start -- beginning to start
13 working out a system of verifying what was in the agreement. In other
14 words, to go around Kosovo, to see where the troops were, to see what
15 weapons they had, to see what they were doing, to see if they had
16 actually gone back to barracks. To visit the three company position that
17 is were authorised by the agreement and so on.
18 Q. Thank you. And in addition to your role in verifying the arms,
19 did you have another role that you played at that time?
20 A. I certainly did. And that role initially was to be liaison
21 officer to both sides from the KVM, from the headquarters, that was to be
22 the liaison officer the KLA and to the commission which was based in
23 Pristina. Which is like a second-level commission because there was a
24 more -- a senior, higher level commission in Belgrade.
25 So I would carry out both these meetings, but in fact it became
1 very difficult for me to work on both sides because both sides became
2 suspicious of my motives, and they wouldn't tell me things. I could just
3 feel this wasn't a good idea; so I spoke to DZ and we appointed someone
4 else to liaison with the KLA, and I just became liaison with the
6 Q. Thank you. Just to clarify, when you refer to General DZ, I
7 understand that's an abbreviation?
8 A. Correct. Yes, he was known as DZ because of his difficult name.
9 Often I was known as CZ because of mine.
10 Q. What was his full name, please?
11 A. Karol Drewienkiewicz.
12 Q. Thank you. And I believe you referred to him in your statement.
13 Now, you also speak about a commission that was set up in Pristina or at
14 least based in Pristina. Is that the FRY Cooperation Commission that you
15 referred to in your statement?
16 A. Correct. We refer to it as the FRY Cooperation Commission, but
17 we were very well aware that there was a senior level of that commission
18 also in Belgrade
19 Q. And what was the purpose of this commission?
20 A. It was to deal with day-to-day problems, and passage of
21 information in both directions.
22 Q. In terms of membership in this commission, could you explain to
23 us who the members were both on your side and the other side?
24 A. Right. Well, on our side, I was not the senior member initially.
25 General DZ or even Ambassador Walker or one of the deputy heads of
1 mission would have been representing the KVM.
2 I was always there with him, and there was also obviously an
3 interpreter or two. And anyone else we needed to bring if there was a
4 specific issue. That was the KVM side.
5 On the other side, on the Serbian side, the commission in
6 Pristina was headed by General Loncar, a retired general, whom I believed
7 Mr. Walker had personally requested from Mr. Milosevic to be head of the
8 commission. And Colonel Mijatovic from the MUP was normally there. More
9 and more infrequently as time went on. And Colonel Kotur who was VJ
10 officer. And on top of that, we had the odd people from -- who often
11 changed, from Belgrade
12 and again. And others who sort of came and went.
13 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, in relation to the verification duties that
14 were carried out by the KVM, in general how successful was this process?
15 A. I would say that the verification that we had planned was very
17 Q. And why would you say that?
18 A. Because we weren't granted the access that we believe we had.
19 Q. And what was the access that you believed you had?
20 A. Well, the agreements specifically said that we had freedom of
21 moment and access throughout the territory of Kosovo
22 Q. Thank you, sir. I'd now like to have a look at a number of
23 agreements, some of which you have already referred to in your testimony.
24 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, with your leave, may I provide the
25 witness with a hard copy of these agreements just to ease the process of
2 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
3 MS. GOPALAN: I'd like to call up 65 ter 00658, please.
4 Q. Sir, if you could go to tab 2 on your binder, please.
5 A. Second tab.
6 Q. Yes, it's labelled number 2.
7 A. Yes, correct.
8 Q. Just waiting for the document to appear on the screen.
9 A. Okay.
10 Q. Sir, do you recognise this document that's on the screen?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. And what is it?
13 A. It's the original agreement between the OSCE and the FRY.
14 Q. And if we go to the last page of the agreement, we will see that
15 it was signed by Bronislaw Geremek?
16 A. Yes, Bronislaw Geremek.
17 Q. And who was Bronislaw Geremek at that time?
18 A. He was the Polish foreign minister who was the chairman in office
19 of the OSCE.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, this agreement between the OSCE and the FRY that
21 we have before us, what function did it play in terms of the duties of
22 the KVM?
23 A. Well, this was our Bible.
24 Q. Okay. And by that what do you mean?
25 A. It means that we carried out our mission in accordance with this
2 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to take to a specific portion of this
3 document. It is at the bottom of page 3, and it's section 3 that states
4 begin "...specific terms of reference..." On e-court it begins on page 2
5 and moves on to page 3. Now, the specific terms of reference paragraph 1
6 which follows on to the next page, the last sentence reads:
8 throughout Kosovo at all times."
9 Colonel, could you comment on this section of the agreement,
10 please? Was this term abided by?
11 A. Right. Well, as I said, this was the -- our raison d'etre from
12 the beginning of the mission. This allowed us, this sentence gave us the
13 authority to actually carry out our monitoring in the most effective way.
14 And the way we interpreted it was that it's the freedom of access and
15 movement was everywhere including barracks, garrisons, installations,
16 police stations, whatever, in the whole of Kosovo. That was the idea.
17 Unfortunately, we were often denied this freedom of access
18 because of various activities of the MUP and the VJ.
19 Q. And by various activities of the MUP and the VJ, what do you mean
21 A. Well, for example, if they declared an area to be an operational
22 area or if they declared it to be a training area, they would seal off
23 the entire countryside for miles around preventing us access to see what
24 was actually happening inside. Similarly, they -- we had no authority --
25 they wouldn't allow us to enter any barracks even if we gave them prior
2 Q. Thank you. And in terms of countryside being sealed off and
3 access being prevented, if you recall, is there a specific example that
4 you had in mind where you were faced with this situation?
5 A. It often happened. I mean, I was being rung up on a daily basis
6 by the regional centres. Your Honours, we had five regional centres that
7 commanded areas of responsibility. And they would ring me up knowing
8 that I had some access to Colonel Mijatovic or General Loncar or
9 Colonel Kotur, and I maybe had some influence on allowing them to enter
10 an area. So they would be ringing me virtually every day and saying, We
11 can't get into a certain area, and we've heard there's been a shooting, a
12 bombing, an artillery barrage whatever and we're not being allowed in,
13 can you fix it? There were just so many, so many incidents of this.
14 For example, when the training was going on near Podujevo, we
15 couldn't enter the sort of air field area at all. We could just sit
16 outside and see what was going on inside. When they were shelling
17 villages in March near Vucitrn, again, we were prevented to enter. About
18 the same time, another large exercise was going on in that area and both
19 General DZ and I were held by a century of gun point who threatened to
20 kill us if we insisted on entering the area. And that was until I rang
21 General -- sorry, Colonel Kotur, and he cleared it, and we were allowed
22 to go in.
23 Q. Okay. And when you referred to the training in Podujevo,
24 approximately what period of time did you have in mind?
25 A. That was -- it was the end of December.
1 Q. Thank you. And this incident where you were held at gunpoint,
2 was this in the Vucitrn area as well, if I understand correctly?
3 A. Yes, it was. Yes, it was.
4 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this
5 agreement into evidence, please.
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be assigned P00835, Your Honours.
8 MS. GOPALAN: I'd now like to move on to another document but as
9 it's a short while to the break, I wonder if I should proceed or whether
10 it's best that I begin with the next document after the break?
11 JUDGE PARKER: How long do you anticipate with that document?
12 MS. GOPALAN: Certainly more than three minutes.
13 JUDGE PARKER: By one or two minutes or a long time.
14 MS. GOPALAN: I would say about 5 minutes, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the break now. We will resume
16 sitting at 11.00.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Before the witness comes, I want
22 to say something quickly, and you will tell me if it's possible or not.
23 A large number of documents were admitted in the Milutinovic Defence case
24 when this witness testified, 15 to 20 documents. I would like to make
25 things brief and make a list of those exhibits used in Milosevic so that
1 they are admitted into evidence here in our case, if you agree.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
3 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, this matter was raised in the
4 Milutinovic case and there is a reference in the Milutinovic transcript
5 where the Prosecutor provided the corresponding exhibit numbers for the
6 Milutinovic documents in the -- sorry, for the Milosevic exhibit numbers
7 in the Milutinovic case. So that information is already contained in the
8 Milutinovic transcript.
9 I am able to provide the corresponding Djordjevic 65 ter or
10 exhibit numbers, if Your Honours would like, but from looking at the
11 Milutinovic P numbers which are listed in the transcript, the process of
12 conversion is fairly self-explanatory. I'm referring to page 6857.
13 JUDGE PARKER: It would be of assistance to ourselves and to
14 Mr. Djurdjic if there was a table which cross-referenced the numbers, and
15 if that is the case, we could, I believe, avoid the need during the
16 evidence of the present witness, of having to tender documents that are
17 on that list. We can deal with them when the witness is on his happy way
19 So we will take up your suggestion, Mr. Djurdjic, but if it can
20 be combined so that we see both the Milosevic and the Milutinovic
21 numbers. Thank you.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I agree completely
23 that all exhibits from the Milutinovic case admitted through this witness
24 be admitted in the same way in our case, because if we admitted the
25 transcript, it's normal that all these exhibits also be admitted. And
1 the same criteria should apply to the Prosecution and the Defence.
2 JUDGE PARKER: We'll leave that matter to counsel to prepare.
3 Thank you.
4 Sorry for that delay. We were acting in your interest as well as
5 our own.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 Ms. Gopalan.
9 MS. GOPALAN:
10 Q. When we left off, sir, we were going to look at another document,
11 and that is 65 ter 00395. That's the next tab on your binder. And while
12 that is being called up on your screen, I'd just like to take you back to
13 the answer that you gave in relation to the access issues we spoke about
14 earlier. This is in relation to the shelling that took place in Vucitrn
15 at the end of March.
16 Could you tell us who was responsible for the shelling?
17 A. Right. Obviously the shelling was if it was artillery it would
18 have been the VJ, but there was also a large number of MUP there who had
19 armoured vehicles and they were using those.
20 Q. And when you say Vucitrn, are you refer to the municipality or
21 are you referring to the town per se?
22 A. The municipality.
23 Q. Thank you. And for approximately how long did this shelling
24 commence for?
25 A. Well, that particular sort of action took nearly all day.
1 Q. And the day in question was somewhere in the late of March?
2 A. Yes, it was.
3 Q. And were there other actions in that area, around that time?
4 A. It was a very busy area, so there were -- there was often things
5 on a smaller scale going on, but this was a large scale where the
6 villages were being burned out.
7 Q. And in terms of the shelling and the burning, were it the same
8 forces that were responsible for both these activities?
9 A. How do you mean? Do you mean the shelling and the burning?
10 Q. Because initially you said that the shelling was VJ and supported
11 by --
12 A. Well, usually the other way around. It was always the MUP who
13 led on these activities with the VJ in support. The VJ usually providing
14 some sort of outer cordon or providing the -- all the heavy equipment, or
15 heavy artillery, whereas the actual ground forces were almost exclusively
16 the MUP. So the burning would have been carried out and the attacks on
17 the village would have been the MUP.
18 Q. Thank you, sir. Now going back to the document on the screen -
19 and that's in tab 3 of what you have - do you recognise this document,
21 A. I do, yes.
22 Q. And what is it?
23 A. Sorry, is this the Shaun Byrnes one, are we talking about the --
24 or the Clark-Naumann one? Sorry, 3, it's the Burns. I do, yes.
25 Q. And what is this agreement? What does it --
1 A. Right. This was an agreement that Shaun Byrnes who was the head
2 of the United States Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission that he made with
3 General Djordjevic about check-points. That was the main thrust of this
4 document about the number of check-points and observation posts that
5 there should be throughout the territory of Kosovo
6 Q. Thank you. And in paragraph 1 of this document, I note that --
7 JUDGE PARKER: Excuse me, Ms. Gopalan. Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think we have all the same
9 documents on the screen. This is not the document that the witness is
10 talking about. I think he is being shown the wrong document. I have
11 Clark-Naumann Agreement on the screen.
12 MS. GOPALAN: Yes, that's correct, that's my oversight. If I
13 could call up the correct document now. And that would be 00394, please.
14 My apologies. Now we have the correct document on the screen.
15 Q. And going back to paragraph 1, the first sentence refers to
16 check-points that will be dismantled, whereas the second sentence refers
17 to observation points. Could you explain what the difference is between
18 these two terms?
19 A. Yes. Check-points were originally in place and these were
20 physical barriers, physical obstructions, on the routes which impeded the
21 movement of traffic and people. So the agreement was that these should
22 be dismantled, removed, and instead replaced by observation posts which
23 would be a grouping of MUP police, off the main route, close to the main
24 route, so that they could actually observe the movement of personnel or
25 traffic and so on.
1 Q. And why was such a restriction required on the number of
2 check-point or, in this case, observation points?
3 A. Well, the reason we asked for the check-points to be removed is
4 because they were actually causing a great deal of hardship and
5 difficulty for everyone in moving around Kosovo, and we believe the same
6 could be established by having observation posts. And the observation
7 posts could actually observe, and if they needed to, they could stop
8 people as well, but they weren't physically blocking the roads and
9 intimidating traffic.
10 Q. Thank you, and now going to the numbers that are set out in
11 paragraph 1, there's a reference to 27 observation points on the lines of
12 communication, and then a reference to one-third of these observation
13 points being manned initially. Could you explain just a little bit about
14 these numbers, the 27 and one-third. What did they mean on the ground?
15 A. Well, what we wanted to achieve was that 27 areas would have been
16 designated as having observation posts. And you can see paragraph
17 subparagraphs 1 to 5 below on the routes showing how many we thought
18 would be a reasonable number, which was agreed by General Djordjevic.
19 And there was no point in having all these manned because they were the
20 same routes, so we believed it was sensible to just have no more than 9
21 of the 27 manned.
22 Q. And in terms of the implementation of this section of the
23 agreement, could you comment on that, please?
24 A. Yes. We became aware that this agreement was not actually being
25 adhered to at all, and so I, in my role as verification man, I arranged a
1 spot unannounced verification one day where we -- I sent out 40 teams of
2 people onto the ground to each of the locations that we had identified
3 that were being used as observation posts by the MUP, and we found that
4 there were at least 27 of those occupied that day, not 9.
5 Q. Thank you, I believe you referred to this spot-check in
6 paragraph 1, page 3, of your statement for the Court's reference. And
7 that this took place around February 1999?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Were there other spot-checks that you conducted?
10 A. We had -- this was the main spot-check carried out by me from the
11 headquarters in Pristina, but the local areas, the regional centres,
12 obviously kept a continuous record of how many of these check-points,
13 sorry, observation posts were being manned. And that was the reason for
14 this eventual spot-check and the report going off to the mission of
15 cooperation, to point out to them that we had actually you know, caught
16 them out. Because they were forever saying that they were sticking to
17 the agreement, there were only 9 ever manned. But in fact as we
18 discovered there were 27 at least that were manned that particular day.
19 Q. What happened after this report was sent off to the Commission of
21 A. Nothing.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this agreement
24 into evidence, please.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 MS. GOPALAN: And if I could call up --
2 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 00394, Your Honours, will be
3 assigned P00836.
4 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you. If I could call up 65 ter 00395,
6 Q. Sir, the agreement on the screen now, and that would be the next
7 tab on your binder, that's tab 4. Do you recognise this agreement?
8 A. Yes, I do. These are all agreements I carried with me all the
9 time I was in Kosovo.
10 Q. And what is this agreement?
11 A. This is the -- it's referred to as the Clark-Naumann Agreement
12 which was signed by Mr. Sainovic and General Djordjevic as a result of
13 one of the NATO visits to Belgrade
14 Q. Thank you. And --
15 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I just have to check if the
17 interpretation is correct. I heard that these are the agreements that
18 were made while I was in Kosovo as if the witness participated in this
19 agreement and in its drafting. That's the interpretation that I received
20 in B/C/S. I don't know what exactly is recorded in English.
21 JUDGE PARKER: I think we understand that the agreements were
22 those carried by the witness during the time he was in Kosovo. Yes. He
23 did not suggest that he was a negotiator or signatory, as I understand
24 the evidence.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, you know exactly what
1 is on the record. I only reacted to what I heard, and I wanted to make
2 sure if what you have just said is on the record is correct, rather than
3 what I heard, then it's fine.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
5 Yes, Ms. Gopalan.
6 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 Q. Now, sir, going back to the agreement, you said that it was
8 called the Clark-Naumann Agreement? I have some questions for you about
9 this agreement.
10 MS. GOPALAN: If we could go to the second page of the document.
11 Q. And it refers to a UN Security Council resolution 1199. Earlier
12 in your testimony you were referring to UN Security Council resolution.
13 Was this the resolution you had in mind?
14 A. It is, yes.
15 Q. Thank you. And moving on to the next page, paragraph 3. Just
16 waiting for the document to appear on the screen. Paragraph 3 refers to
17 police and Special Police and their normal peacetime activities. It also
18 refers to heavy weapons and equipment remaining under MUP control in
19 Kosovo and that they would be returned to cantonments and police
21 Now, this paragraph refers to the goals that the FRY authority
22 had in mind when they announced these measures. Could you comment on the
23 implementation of this paragraph in relation to the returning of heavy
24 weapons and equipment?
25 A. Yes, the -- most of the -- of the equipment was put into the
1 right places as was verified earlier on by the KDOM. But of course what
2 happened then is that once KDOM had hand over its operations to the OSCE,
3 KVM as was part of the agreement that KDOM would be absorbed into the
4 KVM, we no longer seemed to have access to check any of these things. We
5 were just told that that's where they are, that's what is happening. But
6 of course we had no way of checking this because we couldn't enter any of
7 the compounds or installations.
8 Q. When the reference is made to heavy weapons and equipment under
9 MUP control, could you clarify for us if you know what sort of weapons
10 are being referred to here?
11 A. Anything I believe over 12.7 millimetres. So any sort of vehicle
12 armament larger than 12.7 millimetres.
13 Q. Would this be within the regular range of weapons under MUP
15 A. Well, the MUP certainly had weapons larger that than later on in
16 March; they were using weapons larger than that.
17 Q. Thank you, I'd now like to take you to paragraph 5 where
18 reference is made to a number of locations. Now, early on in your
19 testimony you've referred to some VJ garrisons. Were these the ones that
20 you had in mind?
21 A. Yes. We wouldn't call them garrisons. These were company groups
22 which was agreed to, well never actually agreed eventually about the
23 actual size of it, but Ambassador Walker had written a letter to
24 Mr. Milosevic specifying what we believed was a reasonable size for a
25 company group and that was roughly 10 tank -- up to 10 tanks and 120
2 Q. Thank you. And in relation to the VJ, the paragraph above refers
3 to additional VJ units and equipment that were brought after
4 February 1998 into Kosovo being withdrawn. What was your experience in
5 relation to that section of the agreement?
6 A. Well, it certainly was withdrawn and the authorities were in
7 compliance with that, but of course in March we found a huge influx of
8 newer more modern and larger more powerful equipments being brought back
9 in again.
10 Q. And did this equipment belong solely to the VJ?
11 A. No, no. It was -- I mean, certainly the VJ wrought in new T-84
12 tanks and so on, but the MUP also brought in new armoured personnel
14 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you. Your Honours, I'd like to tender this
15 document into evidence, please.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00837, Your Honours.
18 MS. GOPALAN:
19 Q. Sir, in response to some questions on this agreement, you
20 mentioned that the KDOM had been absorbed into the KVM, if you recall,
21 when was this?
22 A. The absorption took place over a period of time. So some parts
23 of the KDOM took longer to absorb than others. So, for example, the
24 British element of the KDOM was absorbed really within the first part of
25 December whereas the American part of KDOM, for example, the
2 was fully absorbed.
3 Q. And in relation to the additional vehicles that were brought in
4 to Kosovo, what was the source of your information?
5 A. Me and my photographs and also the observers from that regional
6 centre near Mitrovica.
7 Q. If you could clarify for us what it is that you saw in this area
8 that you referred to.
9 A. Well, the particular -- the particular train load of equipment I
10 saw were T-84 tanks being brought in which are -- which was a step change
11 from the type of equipment that used to be in Kosovo which was a T-55,
12 for example. So we've gone from a 1950 type tank to a 1980s model which
13 is a completely different animal.
14 Q. And when was it you saw this?
15 A. This was again in March.
16 Q. In March. Thank you. And in relation to the MUP, are you able
17 to provide specific examples of what you saw in terms of what was brought
19 A. I didn't actually personally see the equipment being brought in
20 on trains that the MUP had, but the MUP had brought a lot of equipment in
21 by road. And it was just, again, a complete new generation of armoured
22 vehicle that were being brought in.
23 Q. And in terms of time-frame, is it also in March?
24 A. Yes. The whole buildup was throughout March.
25 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to move on to another document, that's
1 00396, which is the next tab in your file.
2 Sir, this document on the screen, do you recognise this?
3 A. I do, yes.
4 Q. And what is it?
5 A. This is the letter that Mr. Walker sent to Mr. Milosevic in
6 response to all the agreements that we had trying to develop a base-line,
7 if you like, of our operations and of what we -- the information we
8 needed as to what was actually in Kosovo, which equipments were actually
9 in Kosovo and the troop dispositions, troop numbers.
10 Q. And by "base-line" what are you referring to?
11 A. Well, we had to -- in order to verify, carry out our verification
12 mission that no new weapons were being brought in, we had to know what
13 the start number was. And so this would have established, A, how many
14 weapons that were actually in place, where they were; and also from
15 trying to interpret the previous other agreements, what we regarded as
16 heavy weapons, and what we regarded as check-points, observation post,
17 what we thought company team was, what the size and composition and so
18 on. So this was the base-line that was going to form our -- upon which
19 our work would have been based for the remainder of our time in Kosovo.
20 Q. And what was the outcome of this letter that was sent?
21 A. Nothing. There was no response ever sent to it.
22 Q. And if that were the case, who did you conduct your verification
24 A. We tried to -- we informed the Cooperation Commission that we
25 would carry out our tasks in accordance with this letter, as we had
1 nothing else to go on.
2 Q. I see. Now, in this letter reference is also made to meetings --
3 Tuesday morning meetings, and this is at the bottom of page 2. It's the
4 last sentence of page 2. It refers to a meetings on Tuesday morning.
5 Now, did such meetings occur between the FRY liaison officers and members
6 of the KVM?
7 A. I believe that there might have been the odd meeting that took
8 place in the KVM headquarters, but I believe that all this was superseded
9 by our daily meetings we had at the Cooperation Commission.
10 Q. And could you tell us about these daily meetings, please?
11 A. Mm-hmm. Yes, there was a daily planned coordination meeting that
12 we held every day at 10.00 at which said General DZ would normally lead,
13 but eventually I led these meetings. And I was to discuss any issue that
14 is we might have, any problems we've had, any problems we received from
15 the -- from our regional centres, any request we might have had, any
16 passage of documentation, reports that we wanted to give to the
17 Cooperation Commission. And in return, it was a chance for the
18 Cooperation Commission to brief us as to what was going on, express their
19 concerns or requests, passing it back to us.
20 So, if they had a convoy coming in, they might wish to tell us
21 about this convoy coming in so that we were aware of it. And we could
22 take measures to make sure that it was running through the -- for the
23 country-side safely.
24 Q. And how productive were these meetings?
25 A. Well, they were very long. It wasn't unusual for the meetings to
1 take five hours. Certainly in the early days of these meetings, maybe
2 the first month, a lot of the meetings would have to do with the history
3 of Kosovo. And once the Serbian side was happy that we all understood
4 the history of Kosovo, then the meetings became a bit more productive.
5 When I say productive, the meeting tended to be really an
6 exchange of complaints. Colonel Mijatovic, if he was there, would
7 usually rant and rave and shout at us telling us that we were responsible
8 for his policemen being killed. There was also an argument about what
9 the terminology for the KLA should be as terrorist, which we didn't
10 dispute, but he wanted to argue it anyway.
11 So sometimes they were not very productive, this is why they took
12 five hours, and at times the information used to be delayed until the --
13 crucial information would be delayed until the end of the meeting when it
14 could have been given to us at the beginning of the meeting.
15 Q. Why did you think that was the case?
16 A. I'm not sure. I don't know if it was to be deliberately
17 difficult or maybe that was the way the procedures worked, but that's the
18 way it happened.
19 Q. Thank you. And in terms of the frequency of these meetings over
20 time, you mentioned that initially they took place on a daily basis. Was
21 that the case throughout your time there?
22 A. No. As -- if we, for example, had -- if there was some activity,
23 major activity going on in Kosovo earlier on in the mission, then
24 obviously we had to have a follow-up meeting we would have another
25 follow-up meeting the same day. If we needed to go into the field, if I
1 had to go into the field with Colonel Kotur to look at something, we
2 would do that as well. But as the mission progressed, and towards the
3 March again when everything was kicking, starting up and kicking off, we
4 could have several meetings in a day to try and resolve it.
5 Around Christmas when we had the incident around Podujevo, again,
6 you know, it was coming and going and several times to the Cooperation
7 mission -- Commission.
8 Q. And during these meetings, did you raise issues in relation to
9 the violation of the various agreements, was this a topic of discussion?
10 A. All the time.
11 Q. And what was the consequence of these complaints that you made?
12 A. Well, I mean at times thing did improve, I mean, for example,
13 access, the limit of access to the areas when the VJ or MUP were
14 deployed. This was a real bug there of ours, you know, if our people
15 can't go in, they can't verify.
16 Eventually, we -- a letter arrived from General Lazerovic saying
17 to us that, well the letter said quite clearly, that the KVM would be
18 allowed to go into those area, but in practice, somehow the information,
19 this letter hadn't been disseminated to the units. And so when our
20 people turned up in the field, they were still turned away. Then it
21 really -- they would ring me, on my satellite phone, I would speak to one
22 of the commission; if it was a MUP access problem, I would speak to
23 Colonel Mijatovic. I passed the telephone to the guard of the company
24 battalion commander who was there, he would be told to let us in, and we
25 would go in. As soon as I left, ten minutes after me leaving, the
1 situation reverted back to normal again and our people were denied
2 access. So it was almost as if I was being allowed to go in, have a
3 look, but others weren't necessarily -- well others were being
5 Q. Thank you. And in relation to the MUP spot-check that you
6 conducted earlier in the year, was this raised during a meeting?
7 A. Oh yes, of course. Several times. And it was just, you know,
8 accepted; and I think it was just pointed out that the situation demanded
9 more observation points.
10 Q. That you.
11 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this document into
12 evidence, please.
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00838, Your Honours.
15 MS. GOPALAN:
16 Q. Now, I'd like to move on to some questions about the MUP's role
17 in Kosovo. And you speak about this at page 9, paragraph 3, of your
18 statement, and you say:
19 "In my view, the primacy in Kosovo was with the MUP as they were
20 responsible for the internal security problem. They led on all
21 operations until a week or so before we withdrew."
22 Now, could you explain to the Court how is it you formed this
23 view on the role of the MUP?
24 A. It was quite simple. The MUP were present everywhere, and any
25 need to negotiate any incident that took place it was the MUP who were in
1 command and in control. And the -- if the army was there, if the VJ were
2 anywhere in sight, then they would be there as support. I believe this
3 is fairly normal practice in an internal security situation where the
4 police have primacy, and the military power is there to assist. However,
5 you know, the situation had almost gone beyond what police would normally
6 be expected to do, I believe. Whereas, you know, here you had the MUP
7 actually fighting as infantry soldiers and behaving as infantry, and the
8 VJ was purely there as a seconds line, if you like, with tanks and
9 artillery, and heavy mortars.
10 Q. When you speak about the MUP being present everywhere, are you
11 refer together the regular MUP or are you referring to some other MUP
13 A. Well, I mean, we were all aware that there was, well, there was
14 several layers of MUP, of course. You know, you had the ordinary MUP
15 policemen who you would see in Pristina towns, villages, you would see
16 the ordinary traffic policemen occasionally. But then you, of course,
17 you had the MUP who wore clothing similar to the military, combat kit, a
18 camouflage kit; but of course it wasn't green, it was blue. And so, yes,
19 I mean, that's why I was saying that they were everywhere.
20 And of course there were different types of MUP also on top of
21 that. So you had -- the MUP had been there for some time, you know, you
22 had equipment which was fairly aged and the clothing, you know, can see
23 was fairly old style. And then from the new year we noticed more and
24 more, if you like, brand new MUP arriving with very nice uniforms, with
25 new equipment, much more highly motivated, more disciplined, almost like
1 elite Special Forces. So that was a sort of the final echelon of MUP, if
2 you like, that arrived in Kosovo.
3 Q. And this was sometime in the new year, you say?
4 A. Yes, it was.
5 Q. And in terms of just general MUP activities that you referred to
6 early on where you said the MUP was everywhere, did you witness any of
7 these actions yourself?
8 A. I'm trying to think. Usually I would arrive as the action was
9 coming to an end or had finished. So I mean, I often saw the results of
10 what had happened and the MUP was there. But for example, the incident
11 in Podujevo, that was before Christmas, that was an incident where the
12 MUP had tried to go in and sort of rescue a farmer and got involved in
13 some very serious fighting. Yes, I was there for that, so I saw that,
15 Q. And as you've referred to the Podujevo incident a number of
16 times, just to clarify, you've just mentioned an incident involving the
17 farmer. Was there another incident that related to the access issue and
18 the training-ground point that we spoke about earlier on in your
19 testimony in the Podujevo area?
20 A. I'm trying to refresh my memory. I mean, certainly in the
21 Podujevo area, there was a tank positioned and the access was controlled
22 to the area of -- to the west called Lapastica, Gornja Lapastica
23 [indiscernible]. Again, access was very very difficult there, that was
24 controlled completely by the VJ -- by the MUP. They were also guarding a
25 tank that was up there.
1 Q. And when was this?
2 A. That was all -- well, that particular position, the MUP position,
3 was there all the time.
4 Q. Okay. And so that would have been throughout the time --
5 A. Throughout the time, yes.
6 Q. -- that you were in Kosovo?
7 A. Yes.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Can the speakers please not overlap, and make a
9 pause for the sake of the the interpreters. Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: Apologies.
11 MS. GOPALAN: Apologies, we will do our best.
12 Q. Now, in relation to these operations, you also refer in your
13 statement to joint operations between the VJ and the MUP. You say the
14 army would supply the support, the fire-power, and set up the outer
15 cordon. The police would be the ones that would then advance on KLA
16 positions and villages. For the Court's reference, this is in page 9,
17 paragraph 3?
18 How did you come to form this view on how coordination operated
19 between the VJ and the MUP?
20 A. Well, for a start, even from our discussions in the mission, the
21 Cooperation Commission, it was -- we were told that the VJ had no part to
22 play in these activities. The primacy of security in Kosovo was the role
23 of the MUP. And they were only being used -- the army would only be used
24 if heavy support was require. So that was a statement actually from --
25 we heard many, many times, and it was seen, you know, that's the way the
1 system operated. The police had primacy.
2 Q. And did you see any of these joint operations --
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would only like to ask my
5 learned friend Ms. Gopalan to give me a reference in B/C/S, because I
6 cannot find these passages in the statement to which she refers. And the
7 witness just comments after her question and I cannot follow. That's one
9 I think it is the 2000 statement, that much is clear, but I
10 cannot follow anything when she gives the number of the paragraph, first
11 of all in my statement I have no paragraph numbers. That's all.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Are you able to improve your system of
13 referencing, Ms. Gopalan, as you go along?
14 MS. GOPALAN: I can, Your Honours. Although the paragraphs are
15 not numbered per se, my references to the paragraph numbers refer to the
16 order in which they appear on the page.
17 JUDGE PARKER: On the page or in the whole document.
18 MS. GOPALAN: On the page. On the page in question.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
20 MS. GOPALAN: And I believe I've always indicated the page and
21 the paragraph number.
22 JUDGE PARKER: We'll see if this helps. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It doesn't matter now that my
24 learned friend doesn't have it now. The pages do not coincide in our two
25 versions. That's where the problem lies. But please go on.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Are you able to give the B/C/S?
2 MS. GOPALAN: Not at the moment, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE PARKER: It would certainly assist for future reference.
4 MS. GOPALAN: I will certainly ensure that in the future.
5 JUDGE PARKER: You will notice that Mr. Djurdjic is usually
6 giving both English and B/C/S pages when he is doing it. Thank you.
7 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
8 Q. When we stopped off, I was talking about paragraph 3 in page 9
9 and this was in relation to the joint operations conducted by the VJ and
10 the MUP. And you finished off saying that the police had primacy. And I
11 was just about to ask whether you actually witnessed any of this joint
12 operations yourself?
13 A. Yes, for example, I mentioned it already. In the area in the
14 municipality of Vucitrn to the south of the town of Vucitrn, when that
15 large MUP operation was taking place against the villages to the west of
16 their position, the army was there but in support. Sitting back, sort of
17 waiting for a call to come forward if it was necessary.
18 Q. And this was the incident in Vucitrn that you said took place
19 some time in March --
20 A. March.
21 Q. -- early on. And you also spoke about an increasing number of
22 MUP Special Forces coming in to Kosovo. Where is it that you observed
23 this increase in Special Forces?
24 A. Well, wherever there was a new incident taking place, and we came
25 across these people. I mean, it was very difficult to identify which
1 unit they were from, because they almost always removed their unit
2 identification badges.
3 Q. And when you say an increase in the number, are you able to
4 provide an estimate as to the numbers in question that came in?
5 A. No, but it was just a greater number, obviously greater number.
6 Q. And how were they different from the local MUP?
7 A. Well, I think I said already, that their clothing and their
8 equipment -- their command structure seemed to be much more highly
9 regimented and organised. So that they behaved very much like military
10 units under command, very tough, very determined, very professional in
11 what they were doing. By professional I mean that they knew what they
12 were doing, they knew how to do it.
13 Q. In terms of the command structure that you say was different or
14 more professional, was this something that you observed from the general
15 professionalism or was there a specific example that you had in mind?
16 A. No, it was general professionalism. You could see that they were
17 highly motivated, whereas the -- it was just the body postures, the --
18 their behaviour on the positions, their organisation, the way that they
19 planned and sort of carried out the operation was much more military in
20 style than previously when we had seen -- observed the MUP operation, you
21 would quite often see the MUP just wandering up a hill towards a KLA
22 position in the open. These people were quite different, they knew how
23 to skirmish, they knew how to, sort of, behave as soldiers as opposed to
25 Q. And you said that you would usually arrive -- arrive when an
1 action was coming to an end or just about to finish. And that you saw
2 the results of what had happened and that the MUP was there. What were
3 the results that you saw as a result of these operations?
4 A. Well, one of our -- our main complaint was the -- it was the
5 disproportionate use of force. That was our complaint all the time.
6 There was no need to raze a whole village to the ground just because
7 there might be some suspected KLA in the village. There was no need
8 to -- at Rugovo, for example, when the minibus full of KLA was taken out,
9 there was no need to fire 300 rounds and throw grenades into the back of
10 the minibus to turn the people inside into slush. That was excessive.
11 So this was the -- this was the normal problem. As I was saying, we
12 tried to discuss, often discuss the meetings of the commission to try and
13 bring about a degree of proportionality.
14 Q. And this incident in Rugovo that you talk about, when was this?
15 A. That was December, I think around the 10th somewhere, just before
17 Q. And what was the source of information in relation to this
18 excessive use of force? How did you know about this?
19 A. Well, we went there and we saw it, and we have photographs of it.
20 There were photographs taken. DZ was there personally, Walker
21 General Loncar was there, et cetera. So it was witnessed. I mean the
22 actual scene was there for us to see and, of course, unfortunately, the
23 scene we believe was also elaborated. People were taken out of the
24 minibus and laid around the area to make it look as if there had been a
25 major fire fight.
1 Q. And were complaints of excessive use of force raised during the
2 meetings you had with the Cooperation Commission?
3 A. Yes, there were.
4 Q. And what was the reaction to this?
5 A. Well, that usually that you know it was a legitimate action and
6 they were chasing down terrorists and what would we do in a similar
7 situation. And I used to point out that we wouldn't do it that way. And
8 I believe that Racak was finally a good example -- the funeral at Racak
9 was a good example where we managed to persuade the authorities to scale
10 down what they wanted to do.
11 Initially they wanted to -- were basically informed that if they
12 saw any terrorist at Racak funeral, they would attack immediately and get
13 in there and take them out. So over a number of meetings, we persuaded
14 them to do it a different way which, in fact, they did; and they did it
15 very successfully, and they managed to pick up some of the terrorists
16 after the funeral without causing any further incidents at the funeral.
17 So it could be done.
18 Q. And you referred to Racak. What was it that happened in Racak?
19 A. I personally didn't go to Racak. I was in Kosovo, I was
20 following up later on with the funeral arrangements and the bodies -- the
21 repatriation of bodies with various negotiations to enter Racak village,
22 but the world does know that 45 villages, people, Albanians, were killed
23 at Racak.
24 Q. And who in the KVM was involved in visiting Racak? You mentioned
25 you personally didn't go.
1 A. I didn't go. No. It was Ambassador Walker and General DZ were
2 there for the first group to actually see what had happened.
3 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to move on to another document. That's
4 00677, 65 ter number. And that would be the last document in your
5 binder, sir. Waiting for it to come up on the page and in the English, I
7 "Main areas of activity in Bukos ..."
8 And follows on the third sentence says:
9 "...this has changed the quality of such former exercise areas
10 higher than usual levels of MUP VJ vehicle and weapon movement has been
12 Could you comment if this -- sorry, before I do that, let me just
13 ask you a few questions about the document itself. Do you recognise this
14 document, sir?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. And what is it?
17 A. It's a daily report published by the headquarters.
18 Q. And by the headquarter, which headquarters?
19 A. In Pristina.
20 Q. And were you involved in preparing such daily reports?
21 A. I had some input to them, yes. I didn't personally write them,
22 but everyone be contributed to the input.
23 Q. And in relation to the sentence that I just referred to, "the
24 higher than usual levels of MUP and VJ vehicles," was this consistent
25 with your observations on the ground at that time?
1 A. Of course.
2 Q. And what is meant by this statement, could you explain to us?
3 A. Well, with the larger number of vehicles and personnel, obviously
4 the -- there are either more people in the -- more VJ and MUP in the
5 territory, or they are preparing for some sort of activity, or they are
6 sort of carrying out training. But there are certainly more, and if
7 there are more people actually on the ground than the actual level of
8 movement is restricted for the rest of the people. Ourselves and the
9 local population.
10 Q. Thank you. This update is dated 27th of February, 1999?
11 A. Mm-hmm.
12 Q. And it covers the period for the day before. Does this date have
13 any special significance or this time-period have any special
14 significance in relation to the observation that we have just spoken
15 about? The date is right at the top of the page.
16 A. Mm-hmm. Well, certainly there's a great deal more activity going
17 on throughout Kosovo.
18 Q. At this time?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. And I'd now like to take you to the section headed
21 "Security Situation Prizren District"?
22 MS. GOPALAN: On the B/C/S that is on the same page, but we have
23 to scroll down the B/C/S just a little.
24 Q. A few lines down, and that would be the third line from the
25 bottom, there's a statement that reads:
1 "EU AG observed several armed civilians." I'm interested in this
2 reference to the armed civilians. Could you explain to us what this
4 A. Yes, we normally refer to armed civilians being Serbian armed
5 civilians. We wouldn't refer to Albanian armed civilians, we would just
6 refer to KLA usually because the only people armed in the -- amongst the
7 Albanian side would have been the KLA; so armed civilians almost
8 certainly refers to Serbian civilians.
9 We did raise this issue at the commission, and we were basically
10 told that in times of crisis it was normal to arm civilians because they
11 had all -- they were all reservists anyway and they were trained and this
12 was part of their duty.
13 Q. And did you have information on who armed these civilians or
15 A. Well, we were told that they were just armed by the Serbian
17 Q. And how did you come to know this -- this arming of Serb
19 A. Well, we discussed this again at the commission with
20 Colonel Mijatovic and with the General Loncar and Kotur, and they would
21 just explain to us that it was quite a normal procedure.
22 Q. Did you actually see such armed civilians yourself?
23 A. Yes, we did.
24 Q. When did you start seeing them?
25 A. From about this period.
1 Q. And where in Kosovo did you see them?
2 A. Well we certainly -- I didn't see them in Pristina, for example.
3 But certainly out in the country areas and the village, yes.
4 Q. Do you have in mind any specific villages, if you recall?
5 A. I mean, almost everywhere we went we were seeing this. Not
6 particularly, I mean I can't give you, I mean, I can name villages, but
7 it would mean nothing. I saw them in the field.
8 MS. GOPALAN: If I could just have a moment, I'm having some
9 problems with my interpretation and headphones. Apologies.
10 Q. Thank you for that, sir.
11 MS. GOPALAN: I'd like to tender this document into evidence,
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00839, Your Honours.
15 MS. GOPALAN: Sir, I'd now like to move on to some other topics.
16 In your statement, you referred to Nikola Sainovic and his activities in
17 Kosovo and you provide some examples of his authority there. In your
18 view, what was Sainovic's role in Kosovo?
19 A. Well, I would say that he was a lynch pin. He was the conduit to
20 which everyone reported in Kosovo. He was often in Kosovo. And I don't
21 have personal knowledge that he spoke regularly on meetings with higher
22 level in Belgrade
23 information, if anything had to be referred by the commission, they
24 always said they had to refer it to Mr. Sainovic. And certainly from my
25 experience, one of the meetings which I attended with Mr. Sainovic it was
1 very apparent that he made things happen.
2 Q. Thank you. And did you often have the opportunity to meet with
3 him, or was it just, as you say, at this meeting you referred to?
4 A. Mr. Sainovic would normally meet with the Ambassador Keller who
5 was one of our deputy heads of mission, a French ambassador. So that was
6 a level of contact. So if we had problems at the border, border crossing
7 from Macedonia
8 it was very easy that Keller would ring up Sainovic and the whole thing
9 would be resolved in minutes. But I certainly had one meeting --
10 attended a meeting at which Mr. Sainovic presided.
11 Q. Was this the meeting in Pristina that you --
12 A. This was a meeting in Pristina. The meeting of cooperation, yes.
13 Q. Are you able to provide any examples of his authority?
14 A. Yes, of course. For example, the day that -- going even back
15 towards December when there was a possibility -- almost certain
16 possibility likelihood of a battle between the Serbian side and the KLA,
17 west of Podujevo, when I suggested that if I personally attended --
18 attempted to get the Serbian farmer out of KLA hands, would the MUP and
19 the VJ hold back their attack until I had a go? And it was at that point
20 that I was initially told that Loncar said he would contact Sainovic, and
21 that he went next door and made a phone call, came back and said that it
22 had been done.
23 Q. Thank you. And do you know if Mr. Sainovic had authority over
24 the MUP or the VJ?
25 A. Well, he could certainly make decisions without counselling them
1 about what could be done. For example, the example of Podujevo. But the
2 meeting that Ambassador Keller would represented the OSCE at which
3 Mr. Sainovic was presiding on the Serbian side, there were several
4 examples there where he was able to make decisions, immediate decisions,
5 as to, you know, what the outcomes are of in response to our requests.
6 So, for example, I was allowed to go and see the prisoners in
8 helicopters, fuel; any issue at all that was raised, he was able to
9 answer on the spot and give us guarantees that it was -- it would be
11 Q. Thank you, sir. And how about Lieutenant-General Sretan Lukic,
12 in your view what was his role in Kosovo?
13 A. Well, as far as I was concerned and as far as most people that I
14 worked with were concerned, he was the boss of the MUP in Kosovo.
15 Q. How did you come to know this?
16 A. Well, we were told. And we could -- whenever Mijatovic had to
17 refer to someone, he would defer to Lukic and, again, we were told at the
18 cooperation mission [sic] that Lukic was the boss.
19 Q. And did Lukic attend any of the meetings with the
20 Cooperation Commission that you had?
21 A. If he did, I can't remember. I'm not aware. It was almost
22 always Mijatovic.
23 Q. Thank you, sir. I'd now like to move on to another time-period.
24 This is your departure from Kosovo, so sometime in March. If you could
25 just clarify. When was it, if you remember, you left Kosovo?
1 A. 20th of March.
2 Q. 20th of March. And around this time, or after you left Kosovo,
3 where did you go to?
4 A. We -- our whole KVM retired to Macedonia, and we moved to an area
5 near the Ohrid Lake
6 Q. Did you go to a town in Macedonia
7 A. Blace?
8 Q. Blace.
9 A. Probably. Many times. Sorry, I was there often.
10 Q. At this time period, did you go to such a place?
11 A. I did.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MS. GOPALAN: Could I call up 65 ter 655, please.
14 Q. You'll see a photograph appearing on the screen shortly, sir.
15 Thank you.
16 Sir, do you recognise this photograph?
17 A. Yes, I do. I took it.
18 Q. And where -- where is this?
19 A. This is just south of the border crossing, General Jankovic Blace
20 and it's at the end -- it's where the railway line comes in from Kosovo
21 into Macedonia
22 Q. And when was this photograph taken?
23 A. Probably within a few days of us arriving in Macedonia.
24 Q. And what does this photograph depict?
25 A. Well, it depicts fairly early stages of refugees arriving in
2 Unfortunately, the Macedonians wouldn't let them leave the field, so they
3 had built up and built up until they were in the region of, we estimate,
4 25.000 people in an area of probably the size of four football fields.
5 Q. When you say that they were expelled, do you know who expelled
7 A. Well, what I did is -- this is one of my pictures I took, but I
8 actually went down and I spoke to the people over several days in that
9 field; and every one of them told me the same story that they had been
10 rounded up from their houses, told to pack a bag, and get their bodies
11 down to the railway station in Pristina where they were put onto trains.
12 Prior to that, they had ID documents removed, all of their ID
13 documents removed, put on the train. They had no idea where they were
14 going. They then arrived several kilometres short of the border with
16 track. And that's how I first saw them, I just saw a long thin line of
17 people carrying suitcases which is very reminiscent of what you might
18 have seen if you were in the Holocaust.
19 Q. Thank you. And in relation to the removal of their ID documents,
20 did you learn why is it their documents were removed?
21 A. Yes, every one of them I spoke to told me the same story and that
22 was that they were told they were having their -- any link with Kosovo
23 removed so that they would not be able to return.
24 Q. Thank you, sir.
25 MS. GOPALAN: I'd like to tender this photograph into evidence,
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be assigned P00840, Your Honours.
4 MS. GOPALAN:
5 Q. Sir, just moving on on this issue of identity cards. I'd like to
6 take you to the time that you re-entered Kosovo as a NATO officer
7 sometime in June 1999. In your statement in the English you refer to --
8 sorry the correct reference is page 10, paragraph 4, of the English.
9 You refer to MUP officers burning tens of thousands of
10 document -- court documents in a courtyard adjacent to the MUP building.
11 And that MUP officers were throwing documents from the windows. Could
12 you elaborate more on what you saw?
13 A. Yes. When we arrived in -- back in Kosovo, the main headquarters
14 were set up just on the road out of Pristina towards the airport, but we
15 were going to have a Cooperation Commission, if you like, headed by
16 Brigadier-General Bailey, in one of the buildings actually in town. And
17 the building that was selected was a building that wasn't the MUP police
18 station, that was behind -- the MUP headquarters was behind these
19 building. These were administrative buildings fronting the main road.
20 And we moved into that building and we noticed that the -- the
21 police were very busy emptying the building and throwing out whole boxes,
22 files, through the window into a little courtyard sort of like a little
23 nook in between the buildings, which they were burning. We were very,
24 sort of, aware of this because the whole building as a result of this
25 burning was full of smoke and it was, you know, pervading -- it was --
1 you have difficulty breathing. So we actually went down and had a look
2 eventually at this fire, and I took out handfuls of documents and
3 discovered that these were ID documents of various types.
4 Q. Who did these ID documents belong to?
5 A. Albanians.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MS. GOPALAN: For the Court's reference, the B/C/S of this
8 paragraph would be the fourth from the bottom of the last page before the
9 witness acknowledgement, if it assists.
10 Your Honours, I'd like your guidance on a matter. In the
11 Milutinovic case, the witness had marked a document depicting what he has
12 described to us now. I could either tender the document with the
13 markings that he has made, or if Your Honours prefer, I can provide the
14 witness with a clean copy to mark the document itself. I merely suggest
15 this in the interest of time.
16 JUDGE PARKER: These markings were made in the course of the
17 testimony in the earlier trial?
18 MS. GOPALAN: Yes, that's right. These are in-court markings.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to assist. I fully agree
22 with what Ms. Gopalan says since the witness did that during a hearing,
23 it was admitted into evidence. It tallies with the proposal I made. I
24 believe all such exhibits should be admitted in our case as well. If we
25 admitted the whole transcript in the other case, then it will be logical
1 to have that accompanied with the exhibits referring to it and then
2 assign our respective Exhibit numbers. And Defence would like to have
3 this practice accepted as well
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE PARKER: We will receive the marked document, Ms. Gopalan.
6 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you. Could I call up the exhibit --
7 65 ter number please on the screen. It's 05157.
8 Q. And I will ask the witness to briefly explain his markings. Sir,
9 this photograph before you, do you recognise it?
10 A. I do.
11 Q. And what does it depicts?
12 A. It's a very nice picture of the car I was driving around Kosovo
13 in, but behind the car is where the pile of burning papers is. The red
14 markings on the top right-hand of the photograph show the window through
15 which the papers are being thrown out. And you can just see this is
16 taken several days later, but the fire is smouldering. You can see some
17 of the smoke rising behind the vehicle. The reason I took the picture
18 with the vehicle there was because I didn't want to be seen openly taking
19 photographs of what I considered to be quite important evidence in front
20 of the MUP.
21 Q. And what about the red marking around your vehicle, what does
22 that denote?
23 A. That denotes the actual sort of size of the fire that was burning
24 when we first arrived will.
25 Q. And where are these burning ID documents that you saw?
1 A. Right behind the vehicle. They are behind the vehicle in that
2 nook there between the buildings.
3 Q. And if you recall, how big was this pile?
4 A. About the same size as my car is.
5 Q. Thank you, sir.
6 MS. GOPALAN: I'd like to tender this document into evidence,
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00841, Your Honours.
10 MS. GOPALAN:
11 Q. Sir, when you were in Pristina at this time, so in June, 1999,
12 what did you -- what else did you witness in terms of the activities of
13 the VJ or the MUP forces there?
14 A. Well, I mean, it's it probably didn't come as a huge surprise,
15 but we were there -- I arrived on the very first day of the NATO arrival,
16 and I was there throughout the first three weeks. And it took several
17 days for the VJ and the MUP to pull out their forces.
18 And the morale of the Serbian troops and the personnel was very
19 high they were riding about leaving on the backs of all of their vehicles
20 they could get their hands on, but the disturbing part was that every
21 vehicle was loaded with loot. Every vehicle was loaded to the top with
22 all sorts of things, refrigerators, TVs, there were cars being taken out,
23 driven out, just endless convoys of this type of equipment being taken
24 out. So obviously looting had gone to a very large extent.
25 Q. And where were these vehicles heading?
1 A. Heading back to Serbia
2 Q. And for how long did you witness this?
3 A. This went on for days, until all the Serbs had pulled out,
4 probably five or six days.
5 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, sir. Sir, at this stage, this is all
6 the questions I have for you.
7 Before I sit down, Your Honours, there's one remaining in-court
8 exhibit that the witness marked in the Milutinovic case as well which I
9 would like to tender into evidence as I wasn't intending to ask the
10 witness to remark it.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 MS. GOPALAN: And that is 05156. And in the Milutinovic case, it
13 was referred to at T-8626.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Are you going to tell us anything about the
16 MS. GOPALAN: Yes. It --
17 JUDGE PARKER: Or is the witness going to, or you just want to
18 tender it?
19 MS. GOPALAN: I would just like to tender it, Your Honours. I
20 can explain the markings for you, or I could call it up and have the
21 witness explain it to us.
22 JUDGE PARKER: It's on the screen now, I believe.
23 MS. GOPALAN: Yes, it is.
24 Q. Before I tender it then, sir, perhaps you could explain the
25 markings on the screen.
1 A. As I mentioned earlier on, you asked me questions about Podujevo
2 and the action that was going to take place there as a result of the
3 Serbian farmer being kidnapped by the KLA.
4 Meeting I had in the morning with General Loncar and the rest of
5 the commission, right at the end of the meeting I was informed that the
6 unit, the tank battalion which is marked with the X, the circle with the
7 X inside it, which is an air field location near the Batlava reservoir,
8 that unit and other units had been ordered to use force or every method
9 at their disposal to recapture the captured farmer. And this is when I
10 proposed that I would volunteer to go and get the farmer out if
11 permission was given.
12 The other circles, just to the west of Podujevo, you can -- top
13 left-hand corner, that dark area is the village of Podujevo
14 Podujevo, and there are three circles there. The small circle on the
15 right -- bottom right of that group is the position we referred to as
16 "tank hill" that was a MUP position with a VJ tank on it which was a
17 perfectly working tank. And it controlled -- that position was a hill so
18 it overlooked the road to the right which is the main road -- the main
19 resupply route, if you like, for the Serbian authorities. That road went
20 straight to Serbia
21 came in and out of Kosovo.
22 The larger circle is the area of activity where the KLA were
23 functioning. And right to the left is -- the circle on the left is a
24 village of area the Gornja Lapastica which is where the actual farmer was
25 eventually found that was being held.
1 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you very much, sir.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00842, Your Honours.
4 MS. GOPALAN: I have no further questions, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.
6 We could go for some 12 minutes before the next normal break, or
7 we could break early and resume early, which is your preference,
8 Mr. Djurdjic?
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I could start right away, or if
10 you want to have a break first, I'll start then -- well, let's take the
11 break and then move on uninterrupted.
12 JUDGE PARKER: I think it will be most practical for everybody if
13 we have the break now. We'll resume at 10 minutes to 1.00 and we'll go
14 through to the end of the session.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE PARKER: Now, Mr. Djurdjic.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
22 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski. Did I pronounce that right?
23 A. Ciaglinski.
24 Q. Just to make sure that I was addressing you correctly. My name
25 is Veljko Djurdjic member of the Defence team of the accused
1 Vlastimir Djordjevic, with me is Ms. Marie O'Leary, also a member of the
2 Defence team. I have a few questions for you.
3 Given that we do not speak the same language, nonetheless I would
4 ask you to wait for the end of interpretation before you start replying.
5 The same goes for me as well, of course.
6 First at the outset I'd like to clear up a few things that may
7 have been matters of translation.
8 First of all, am I right in saying that you were not a witness to
9 or present to the signing of the agreements Geremek-Jovanovic and
10 Clark-Naumann, Sainovic-Byrnes?
11 A. You are correct, I did not witness any of the signings
12 personally, no.
13 Q. Thank you. Secondly, I think there may have been a
14 misunderstanding as to the dates of the incident in Rugovo. I think it
15 was the 29th of January, 1999, am I correct, rather than December 1998?
16 A. I'm trying to remember exactly, but I thought it was pretty close
17 to the -- to my incident on the 15th of December. But I haven't got my
18 paperwork with me, so I can't argue the date with you, I'm sorry. But I
19 think we all know which incident we are talking about.
20 Q. Thank you. I will show you some documents, and then we'll
21 discuss it further. Another thing, you said you were not in Rogovo.
22 However, the interpretation I received was that you said that there were
23 some 300 shells fired at the minivan, or did you mean to say 300 bullets?
24 What did you say exactly, could you please repeat?
25 A. They were bullets.
1 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ciaglinski, reading your statements that you
2 provided in the course of the proceedings, I wanted to clear one thing
3 up. Your basic degree was in what field?
4 A. In mathematics.
5 Q. Thank you. When did you complete that course?
6 A. Sometime in the 1970s, I think.
7 Q. Thank you. Once you've completed your math degree, did you work
8 anywhere? Were you employed?
9 A. Yes, I was, because I did a math degree and a teaching degree as
10 well, so I was employed for one year in a school teaching mathematics
11 before I joined the army.
12 Q. Thank you. I see in your statement that in 1974 you enrolled at
13 the academy in Sandhurst
14 right, and that you were there until 1985? 1975, sorry.
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. It wasn't a full military academy in the UK as far as I
17 understand. Could you explain this one year only, how can one graduate
18 from the military academy in a year?
19 A. It's quite simple, really. What happens in the British military
20 is that the British military accepts graduates, people who have already
21 spent three or four years at university sharpening their minds, and then
22 they spend one year at Sandhurst
23 Following Sandhurst
24 on further courses, whether it's platoon commanders courses, infantry
25 courses, engineering courses, or whatever, during your first few years
1 after you graduated from Sandhurst
2 course takes, and this is how we churn out British officers. It seems to
4 Q. I have no doubts about that. What is your specialty? What did
5 you specialise in during that one year?
6 A. Are we talking about the one year at Sandhurst? We all do the
7 same. Every cadet at Sandhurst
8 we leave Sandhurst
9 company level, so in other words, the ability to be able to command a
10 company of 120, 130 men. But obviously as you -- on leaving Sandhurst
11 you are not given a company, you are given a platoon, so you work your
12 way up, but with your qualified to that level.
13 Q. Thank you. From your statement I see that in May 1975 you
14 obtained a degree and probably assigned a platoon. What was your rank
15 after the one year of academy?
16 A. Second lieutenant.
17 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me how did you progress through the
18 military ranks?
19 A. Well, my specialism, because of my previous teaching, was -- I
20 was in training. I was a trainer within the military, so I held a number
21 of training appointments in the army. But I was always attached to a
22 different type of unit, so my first three years I commanded a platoon in
23 an infantry unit. Later on, I was posted to a Gurkha engineer unit in
24 Hong Kong
25 things, mainly do with working on the border, sending the Chinese back or
1 the Vietnamese boat people back, capturing them as they came in.
2 I went -- I did various junior college of division staff college,
3 so there was staff training involved during this -- my career. I did a
4 masters degree while I was in the army for one year which was in training
5 design. I was later on sent to Poland
6 part of the embassy staff.
7 I also did a whole tour in Bulgaria
8 So my career is varied, and one thing I can say having worked on training
9 with units from artillery, engineers, aviation, tanks and having studied
10 and worked alongside these people, I have a very good cross-section of
11 all arms of the military and how they function.
12 Q. Thank you. You've shared a lot of information. However, I
13 wanted to know what it was that you taught those soldiers. What were you
14 training them in? What kind of training were you teaching?
15 A. Well, when -- when I was working, for example, with the infantry
16 units, I was actually training my own platoon. So I was actually, you
17 know, training my platoon in war fighting. That was for three years.
18 Later on, as I progressed through the ranks, I was responsible
19 for the training, for the design of training of all sorts of things, but
20 to do with military. So whether it was to do with training helicopter
21 pilots, training tank commanders, designing simulation and training
22 systems for -- to enable the people to train.
23 At one point - I didn't say - I was actually running a team of
24 consultants who were responsible for all the training in the army. In
1 was my job to make sure that they were fully trained in war fighting or
2 whatever skills they required, so I would plan and organised and arrange
3 the training for the troops.
4 Q. Thank you. You said in the statement that your career was in
5 terms of supporting training systems and intelligence activities. These
6 intelligence activities, did they have to do with the training, or your
7 work within the British army? Before you became an attache.
8 A. Some of my work, for example, in Hong Kong I was the unit
9 intelligence officer for a time. In my work in Berlin, I was doing some
10 intelligence work because Berlin
11 Russians and others there, and so some my work was involved in
12 intelligence in Berlin
13 a defence attache which is an art of collecting information.
14 Q. Thank you. In 1998, as I see, you were deployed to the British
15 staff or headquarters for support in Rhinedahalen, again, I apologise if
16 mispronouncing it; in any case, in Germany. Could you tell me what that
17 location is, what were your tasks, and what were the units that you were
18 assigned to?
19 A. Right. The Rhinedahalen is a home of two groupings. One is the
20 United Kingdom support command which I was part of and their job is to
21 support the 1st Armoured Division in Germany, and that's what I just
22 mentioned to you. I was actually responsible for designing the training
23 and securing training areas, et cetera, for that division.
24 And the other unit within the Rhinedahalen is the -- was the
25 headquarters of the allied rapid reaction corps which
1 General Mike Jackson was the boss.
2 Q. The other unit, was that a British or a NATO unit? The rapid
3 reaction unit headed by General Jackson.
4 A. General Jackson's unit was a NATO unit.
5 Q. Therefore you were part of a NATO unit back in 1998?
6 A. No. I was part of the United Kingdom support command grouping,
7 which was in the same compound but a different function.
8 Q. I apologise for misunderstanding what you said.
9 You say that you saw there was a vacancy, if I understood
10 properly, within the KVM, and it's British part. Was that a public open
11 vacancy or were you recommended? How did you come to apply for that post
12 with the KVM, and the OSCE, of course?
13 A. The way the system worked was when the British government decided
14 to send a contingent and seconded to the OSCE - when I said the
15 British Army, it's not the MOD - it was the foreign office who actually
16 requested the personnel and then requested that the MOD provide a certain
17 number of serving military officers, because the foreign office also
18 recruited a number of retired personnel as well.
19 So the MOD then decided how many people were required at which
20 rank and they sent out signals, messages, to various commands saying, We
21 require so many people at a certain rank from your unit to go to Kosovo.
22 And I happened to be on duty that night when the signal arrived -- a
23 written document arrived saying we require one lieutenant-colonel to go
24 to Kosovo.
25 So rather than giving it to anybody else, I spoke to my boss and
1 he said, Yes, I think you're the man to go; you can volunteer for it, if
2 you like. Because I didn't, I personally didn't -- he didn't have to
3 select me, could have selected somebody else, because there were a number
4 of people probably in Rhinedahalen that would have probably liked to go
5 on this mission. Maybe because it was late at night and I was there, so
6 I was offered the chance to go.
7 What happened then, the second part of your question, is that
8 the -- all the names were submitted by the MOD to the foreign office.
9 The foreign office then passed the names to Vienna. And the OSCE then
10 tried to match the skill sets of the people they were looking at to the
11 jobs that they had wanted to fill in Kosovo.
12 Q. Thank you. I may have misheard, but I think that year you were
13 still a lieutenant-colonel; am I right in saying that?
14 A. Sorry, I was just waiting for the interpreters to catch up,
15 that's why I didn't answer your question so quickly. Correct, I was a
16 lieutenant-colonel, yes.
17 Q. Thank you. Back in 1998, in Germany in Rhinedahalen, did you
18 work on any intelligence tasks?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Thank you. The group numbering 115 British personnel, well, who
21 were selected for the KVM OSCE mission, out of that number, how many of
22 them were active duty officers and how many retired officers, military
24 A. I believe the majority were serving officers. There probably
25 were just a handful of retired officers.
1 Q. Thank you. Since you were placed rather high in the hierarchy of
2 the mission in Pristina, can you tell me how many US personnel were there
3 in the KVM, approximately?
4 A. It's hard to tell because they kept themselves much to themselves
5 when they were part of the KDOM, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission,
6 and some of them always remained in that sort of side, I believe. But I
7 don't know. I mean, I think there were -- there seemed to be less of
8 them than there were of us, so not more than 100, I don't think.
9 Q. Thank you. When referring to the mission, I don't mean the
10 attached KDOM members, UK
11 went directly into the verification mission of the OSCE the same way you
12 did. Do you know how many French personnel were there in the
13 verification mission?
14 A. I think there's a slight problem here, because the French, the
15 British, the Americans all sent personnel who had already been selected
16 to be part of the verification mission. Part of those contingent
17 selected for the verification mission were sent immediately to Kosovo to
18 be part of a -- of the the KDOMs, because we wanted to have a presence
19 straightaway in Kosovo. So for example, the British sent a dozen people
20 immediately on activation, but the remainder, there were, sort of, 80
21 then, sort of, arrived in slower time after having gone through training
22 in Brezovica. But then within a few weeks all the 115 had become part of
23 the KVM, those who had been in the KDOM had become KVM. So how many
24 French were there? Probably also somewhere between 50 and 100.
25 Somewhere -- somewhere there are the figures, because we
1 published the actual state of the number of personnel in Kosovo on a
2 daily weekly basis so somewhere these figures do exist telling you
3 exactly how many personnel of each nation there were on a daily basis in
5 Q. Thank you. You are correct. I simply wanted to know the number
6 without the nation.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: I only had numbers
8 and not the nations that they pertained to.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Can you tell me how many Italians were there?
11 A. I think I'm going to give you the same answer every time, because
12 I cannot tell you the exact numbers of each nation that were there
13 without referring to some documents which I don't have, but they do exist
14 in the system. But yes, there were Italians, there were Russians, there
15 were Poles, there was there almost everybody that was represented,
16 virtually everyone from the whole of the OSCE.
17 Q. Yes, yes, that is correct, there were; but I'm interested in it
18 for a different thing, as to how many people were there from the
19 different countries. The last thing I wanted to ask you about the
20 numbers is this: What about the federal republic of Germany
21 verifiers did they provide?
22 A. Probably a similar number to the ones I've just been speaking
24 Q. Thank you. Doesn't it seem to you that the greatest number of
25 verifiers came from NATO member states, if you look at the total?
1 A. It's possible that there was a reason for that, if that's the
2 case. I mean, I'm not disputing it, but there were also quite a few
3 Russians there, they were not part of NATO.
4 But the reason for the very quick deployment of, if you like,
5 NATO nations, is because they have professional standing armies. And so
6 we could quite easily produce 100 personnel, 200 personnel to sends on
7 the missions. As could the Americans, as could the Germans, as could the
8 French, as could the Italians; so these personnel are there, and they're
10 The difficulty is that a lot of the other nations didn't provide
11 people with military police experience, they provided civilians. And
12 it's much more difficult choosing a civilian for a combat zone, A,
13 because they might not be very keen to go there, and secondly, they might
14 not have the skills to be able to survive in a combat zone. We had no
15 idea if there was going to be accommodation, if we had to live in the
16 field, what the conditions were of security and safety. So you can't
17 expect a civilian person to be deployed, a young woman or young man
18 straight from university, college, with no survival skills built in. No
19 skills of recognising what tanks are.
20 I mean, we came across civilians who if they saw a large vehicle,
21 to them it was a tank. It didn't matter if it wasn't a tank, it was an
22 armoured personnel carrier but they described it as a tank. So what I'm
23 saying to you is that we were able -- the NATO nations, the major ones,
24 had the personnel trained and ready to go on these types of missions.
25 Maybe the other smaller nations didn't, and it took them longer to select
1 suitable people that could survive the rigors of Kosovo.
2 Q. Thank you. I see your point. But that's a matter of selection
3 that is up to the person who decides. And who, by the way, decided on
4 the selection, how many people would come from different countries?
5 A. I believe, I mean I wasn't there, so this is hearsay, you'd have
6 to ask General DZ when he comes, because he was actually in the -- in
8 would have been asked to provide. From my experience, often what happens
9 is that nations are asked to provide 100 people; they come back and say,
10 Sorry we can only we can provide 10. So then we have to go back to
11 another nation and say, Okay, we've asked you for so many, can you
12 provide more? And this is almost certainly what happened in Kosovo.
13 Q. Thank you. Formally and legally speaking, I understood that you
14 signed a contract on engagement with the OSCE; is that right?
15 A. I'm trying to rack my brain, but we probably had to sign some
16 documents to say that we were going to be complying with the rules and
17 regulations; health and safety of the OSCE; financial matters; security,
18 in terms of internal security. But I don't actually remember if there
19 was a contract; I can't remember. It might have just been part of the
20 myriad of paper that we had to fill in and sign for inoculations, for
21 experience, knowledge of the area, suitability for the task, and so on.
22 But -- you'll probably produce a piece of paper showing my contract, but
23 I haven't -- I can't remember.
24 Q. I don't want to lose my train of thought.
25 What was your combat experience before Kosovo?
1 A. Before Kosovo, the British Army had very little combat
2 experience, current, except for Northern Ireland and for the Falklands
3 war. I was not in Falkland
4 job in Ireland
5 Q. Thank you. Did you become an international employee when you
6 joined the OSCE? Or you continued to become a member of the British
7 armed forces?
8 A. We were seconded to the OSCE, so we were in the chain of command
9 of the OSCE and therefore I took all my instructions from members of the
10 OSCE and that's where my responsibilities lay. However, I was paid still
11 by the British Ministry of Defence, and so I was still a British army
13 Q. Thank you for this answer. I'd like to know about the
14 relationship between the OSCE and NATO at the time when you were a
16 A. Well, again, personally I had no contacts or connections with
17 NATO. But I am aware, because I was present on a few occasions when, for
18 example, General DZ would be on the phone to Wesley Clark because
19 something serious had happened in Kosovo and NATO had found out and they
20 wanted to know from DZ what the situation was. But there was no chain of
21 command between NATO and the OSCE.
22 The only other thing we had was in Kumanovo, as you know, we had
23 what we call the KVM extraction force, and their job -- it was a military
24 unit commanded by Brigadier-General David Montgomery, and his task was if
25 worse came to worse and the KVM had to be extracted in safety because of
1 the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, they could have assisted us to get
2 out in one piece so -- and that was part of NATO as well. So yes, we had
3 to keep in touch with them.
4 And of course, we had the NATO air element, you know, which was
5 part of the agreement as well, so there were observation -- NATO
6 observation aircraft flying over Kosovo at regular intervals with which
7 we had contact.
8 Q. Thank you. You were highly placed official of the OSCE, and I
9 would like to ask but the flow of information between NATO and the
10 Kosovo Verification Mission, the exchange of information and data. As
11 far as the intervention is concerned, I am happy that it never happened.
12 And it is a big question whether it would have succeeded if it had.
13 A. Well, I'll repeat again that if anyone was communicating at that
14 level, the most senior NATO officer in the OSCE would have been
15 General DZ, but what discussions he had with Wes Clark and others, I
16 really can't tell you.
17 Can I just ...
18 Q. Of course you can't tell me about their personal communications
19 even if you had overheard them. But I'm interested in official
20 communications: the information you were providing and documents you
21 were sharing. The official exchange of information, nothing on the
22 private level. And to be quite frank with you, I've seen on many
23 occasions that you have been on standby. You were on standby, you
24 interrupted the mission on several occasions in order to maintain other
25 contacts. I'm interested in the institutional communication between NATO
1 and OSCE.
2 A. I'm not quite sure what you mean talking about me being on
3 standby, but there would have been an official exchange of information at
4 the higher level, so in other words, our reports which went daily to the
5 OSCE in Vienna
6 obviously would have gone to NATO. And also, nations individually and
7 the, sort of, head of each national contingent would have been writing a
8 report on the daily or weekly activities which he would have sent back to
9 his own country.
10 So probably in the case of the Brits, we would have been write --
11 DZ would have been writing a report on every night which went to Vienna
12 Similarly, he would occasionally write a report which went to the
13 Ministry of Defence mainly dealing with what was happening to us, to the
14 British military personnel in his -- under his care. Not command, care.
15 Q. Thank you. And that means that the members of the mission also
16 had communication and maintained contact with the country that sent them,
17 did I understand this correctly?
18 A. Absolutely. I think it's standard procedure in every mission
19 that takes place in the world.
20 Q. Thank you. I don't have that kind of experience, but I thought
21 that the international employees were in the service of the organisation
22 that employed them, but it can be that I'm wrong.
23 Let me ask you this: When you were joining the verification
24 mission of the OSCE, did you get an appointment to a particular position,
25 or did someone else decide what you were going to do?
1 A. Initially, I believe they wanted to appoint me as being
2 responsible for the training of all the verifiers coming into Brezovica;
3 but a lot of those jobs had been taken by the Italians already and they
4 were very keen to keep them, and so DZ, who knew me, took me into the
6 Q. Thank you. I was a little confused reading all the statements,
7 not only yours but other statements as well, about the function you
8 discharged. Before Brezovica, did you have any training outside of
9 Brezovica as preparation for this verification mission?
10 A. Yes. In the first place, as I mentioned, the army, British army
11 has its personnel trained to a fairly high level, so you know, most of
12 the functions of -- on an international mission would have been carried
13 out without any additional training. But because this was a new mission
14 area, we had several days of training in a location in the UK where we
15 were given all the background -- or as much as we could get -- background
16 information on the war, the history of Kosovo and Kosovo Polje, and all
17 this type of stuff, the language, the way things happened in this part of
18 the world. Then we had additional medical training. We had additional
19 mine awareness training, and communications training, evacuation
20 procedures. All this type of stuff was given to us before we went to
21 Brezovica. And at Brezovica we had additional training.
22 Q. Thank you. I'm not interested in anything save for the
23 information you received about the war. Tell me, what kind of
24 information did you receive about the war during that training?
25 A. Well, as I said, we were given the historical run-through, what
1 had happened, what was going on, you know, casualties, equipments,
2 personnel involved, reasons for it, levels of destruction, this type of
4 Q. I would like you to explain that in greater detail. What kind of
5 information did you carry into Kosovo that you received in Britain
6 kind of destruction was going on, what was happening on the ground?
7 A. Well, I think, if I remember correctly, we were basically shown a
8 lot of the photographs and film footage that journalists and others had
9 shot of Kosovo at the time. And we also had people that came from
10 Kosovo, so we had Kosovar Albanians that came to talk to as well.
11 Q. Tell me about the information derived from the news and the
12 media. In what form did you receive such information, did it include
13 video footage and films?
14 A. Of course.
15 Q. What kind of communication did you have with the media, the
16 foreign news crews that were present there from the UK, the US, Germany
17 and others?
18 A. Can you clarify? Do you mean? During our training or once we
19 got to Kosovo?
20 Q. When you got to Kosovo?
21 A. Well, I think pretty good communications with the press. I
22 remember doing a few interviews with the British and American press while
23 I was here. We had our own press office as, as you know, in Pristina,
24 which was manned by both Serbs and Albanians to try and get a balance.
25 Q. Thank you. I did not mean the press conferences, I meant in
1 terms of sharing information. Was it customary for media representatives
2 to be used as sources of information?
3 A. Well, we certainly had our own press and information section, so
4 we had a press spokesman who made statements on behalf of the mission.
5 But if the press came into the field and spoke to verifiers, they were --
6 it could be done, and we didn't prevent our members speaking to the press
7 because they usually spoke the truth, so there was nothing to hide.
8 Q. How do you know that journalists tell the truth?
9 A. I didn't say that the journalists spoke the truth, I said that
10 the members usually spoke the truth.
11 Q. Sorry, it must have been a misunderstanding. But, for instance,
12 Batam Hadjiu [phoen] was also a journalist, wasn't he?
13 A. I don't know him.
14 Q. Thank you. Let me go back to what you said about having some
15 information from Kosovar Albanians before you arrived. Did you have any
16 information from Yugoslavs, because it was still the time of Yugoslavia
17 about what was going on in Kosovo?
18 A. Of course we did. We had input from our foreign office to try
19 and make the balanced view from both sides, but we also -- not only did
20 we have Albanians who came to talk us to, but we also had Serbs who came
21 to talk to us.
22 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, I was just referring to your answer concerning
23 training. You said you had talks with Kosovar Albanians, you did not
24 mention members of any other ethnic communities from Yugoslavia, but you
25 did mention them now.
1 What was your official title when you went from Brezovica to
3 A. Well, within a very short time I became the head of
4 verification -- head of verification, weapons verification.
5 Q. Thank you. That was within the framework of the operations team
6 of the KVM; correct? In addition to you when you say verification of
7 weapons, I suppose that was part of the staff of General DZ. Were there
8 any other deputies for other areas in addition to yourself?
9 A. Well, of course there were. The operations department was the
10 largest department of all of them at the time and DZ had a number of
11 deputies. So for example the head of the fusion cell, the information
12 cell, was one key player. The head of operations office, DZ was chief of
13 operations, so we had a head of operations as well.
14 I was responsible for planning the verification so throughout
15 Kosovo in writing instructions on it, so if we were sending a -- carrying
16 out a centralised verification planned for Kosovo, then I would plan it;
17 but I was just one of the planners. It was a very coordinated, very
18 integrated headquarters, so we all knew what we were doing; each person
19 knew what the other person was doing.
20 Q. On the same position that you occupied -- on the same level that
21 you occupied, was there anyone in charge of the MUP or the KLA who was
22 not a liaison officer?
23 A. How do you mean "in charge of the KLA"? I don't understand.
24 Q. You say your responsibility was weapons verification and
25 verification of equipment and materiel, I would say that that is the
1 military area you, you were DZ's deputy for the Army of Yugoslavia.
2 Similarly, was there anyone covering the MUP, or as I seem to understand
3 from your statement, anyone covering the KLA?
4 A. Yes, of course there was. So what we had was we had, for
5 example, a section where they were responsible to liaising and contacting
6 the working with the -- with the MUP. Then we had -- we didn't have a
7 section for the KLA, but we had a liaison for the KLA; someone had to
8 talk to them. So I mean, when I stop doing the -- well, I was doing the
9 verification work, and I was doing the liaison work at the same time with
10 the Serbian commission, so if you like, I was the link there, at my
11 level. And there were higher levels, but they didn't usually take part
12 in the discussions unless there was something very very serious or
13 something gone badly wrong.
14 I'm trying to think, there probably were also policemen because
15 we had real policemen in the mission. So I think that combined with the
16 police element and the military, DZ's element, there were people working
17 together talking to the MUP.
18 I know that there was a Swedish policeman and a retired American
19 colonel called Guy Sands who were doing most of the liaison for most of
20 the time with the MUP.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, we've run out of time. I take it
22 you have further questions? No harm in trying, Mr. Djurdjic.
23 We must adjourn now for the day, and we resume -- Monday is a
24 United Nations holiday, so we resume on Tuesday, I am afraid. It is
25 at -- we are the afternoon sitting, I believe, which will be 2.15. Sorry
1 about that, Colonel.
2 THE WITNESS: The only thing, Your Honour is that if we go too
3 far into next week I have commitments in places like Armenia which I have
4 to get to.
5 JUDGE PARKER: I'm confident that you will finish on Tuesday, and
6 that will occur by fair means or foul.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 2nd day of
10 June, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.