1 Tuesday, 2 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. We await -- is there a matter you
6 wish to raise, Mr. Djurdjic?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask that
8 Ms. Marie O'Leary put forth our proposal on our behalf on the admission
9 of evidence from the Milutinovic case. It concerns a filing of Friday,
10 and we corresponded with the OTP. She would like to familiarise you with
11 the outcome of that effort.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
13 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour, just to clarify, there was
14 no filing on Friday; there was a discussion with the Prosecution about
15 perhaps tendering the underlying documents to the -- of the Milutinovic
16 transcript that were not tendered. They were ones that had been tendered
17 by the Defence teams largely in the Milutinovic case. We had an e-mail
18 today from the Prosecution that there was no objection to tendering these
19 exhibits, so we were wondering if now would be a good time to list
20 through those and receive numbers if so admitted.
21 JUDGE PARKER: How many are there?
22 MS. O'LEARY: We have 11.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Eleven. And they were all tendered and received
24 in evidence in the course of the Milutinovic --
25 MS. O'LEARY: I don't believe so. I am sorry, Your Honour. I
1 don't believe so. Two of them were discussed but were not tendered or
2 admitted into evidence in Milutinovic; the remainder of them were.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Well the associated exhibits in Milutinovic come
4 into one category. We will have to learn from you about the other two.
5 Could you tell us about those two, please.
6 MS. O'LEARY: Yes, Your Honour, the other two were a transcript
7 of testimony of Roland Keith in the Milosevic case, it was discussed, by,
8 I believe, one of the Defence teams, it was not admitted into evidence.
9 It was not tendered, I don't believe. Additionally, there was the ICTY
10 statement of John Clark which was given a number of 6D106; it was also
11 not admitted, but it was discussed.
12 JUDGE PARKER: On what basis do we receive those?
13 MS. O'LEARY: Your Honour, I believe that as they were discussed,
14 it would give some context to the totality of the transcript. And as the
15 Prosecution was not objecting, we thought that it might help round out
16 the fullness of the transcript. Of course, if you would like, of course,
17 Mr. Djurdjic can discuss it with the witness to give it a frame of
18 reference in this case, if you would like, of course.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Take, for example, the statement of a person, of
20 Mr. Clark, what are we going to do with that statement if it is received
21 in evidence? Do we treat it as evidence? And we have not seen the
22 person, we don't know anything about it.
23 MS. O'LEARY: I understand, Your Honour. But I think that it
24 will be --
25 JUDGE PARKER: Is it not the case that in the course of its, you
1 say, discussion in the Milutinovic case, that any material portions of
2 that statement would have been put to the witness and discussed by the
4 MS. O'LEARY: Yes, I think so, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE PARKER: You're getting a wise nod.
6 MS. O'LEARY: As I'm being directed over here, we would withdraw
7 that application then as far as those do not clutter the record, if you
8 would see it at fit.
9 JUDGE PARKER: I think the transcript in Milutinovic might help
10 us enough with those.
11 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE PARKER: So you then tender the ten or eight is it?
13 MS. O'LEARY: Nine.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Nine --
15 MS. O'LEARY: Nine.
16 JUDGE PARKER: -- well, I'm nearly there, aren't I? And the list
17 is with the court officer, is it?
18 MS. O'LEARY: It is.
19 JUDGE PARKER: And there's no objection?
20 MS. GOPALAN: No objections, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Gopalan. They will then be
22 received as Defence exhibits.
23 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour. Would you like us to read
24 through them one by one.
25 JUDGE PARKER: If you have the list with the Court officer, he
1 can probably do that and apply the number as you go.
2 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you.
3 JUDGE PARKER: There seems to be a problem.
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 JUDGE PARKER: We'll save time by a memo to follow setting them
7 MS. O'LEARY: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Ms. O'Leary.
9 Are we ready now for the witness? Let's have the witness,
11 Ms. Gopalan, you have something?
12 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honour, we do have some documents that we
13 wanted to tender into evidence in a similar fashion to the Defence.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Were these tendered as exhibits in the Milutinovic
16 MS. GOPALAN: Yes.
17 JUDGE PARKER: And how many are there?
18 MS. GOPALAN: In the Milosevic trial.
19 JUDGE PARKER: In the Milosevic trial. And how many were there?
20 MS. GOPALAN: And they were referred to in the Milutinovic trial.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
22 MS. GOPALAN: And those that have not been admitted into
23 evidence, five, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Five. There's no objection, I take it, to those?
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, no objections. We
1 put that forth in any case. I believe this should be treated as it was
2 with the Defence. If this concerns some exhibits from the Milutinovic
3 and Milosevic case, then the transcript should suffice, and I believe
4 some of these were not admitted as exhibits in the Milutinovic case. I
5 believe that was your position.
6 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ... with numbers
7 in due course. Thank you.
8 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, we would say that these are
9 associated exhibits to --
10 JUDGE PARKER: I think they've been received.
11 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Now we'll try for the witness once again.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Colonel. The affirmation that you
15 made at the beginning of your evidence still applies.
16 THE WITNESS: Right.
17 JUDGE PARKER: And Mr. Djurdjic is continuing with his questions.
18 Mr. Djurdjic.
19 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed]
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
22 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski. I went through the Friday
23 transcript. Could you please give precise and brief answers to my
24 questions so as to be able to save time in that regard, although I wasn't
25 limited per se during my cross-examination by the Chamber as opposed to
1 the previous two cases you testified in, in any case, I'd like to have
2 brief answers to keep matters as efficient as possible.
3 Mr. Ciaglinski, on Friday, we were discussing your position and
4 function you had with the Verification Mission. According to the
5 information I found in some written and other statements, your position
6 was at the headquarters of General DZ. You were coordinator or liaison
7 officer with the VJ, the liaison officer was Mr. Guy Sands, and the
8 coordinator for the KLA were for a while David Wilson; and once he took
9 up another position, it was done by David Meyer. Is the information I
10 gathered from the documents correct? Do you agree with it?
11 A. It sounds right, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Am I right in saying that General DZ believed that
13 the three of you were too many to submit reports to him, therefore he
14 appointed his assistant from military matters to be your superior,
15 Mr. Sinclair, to whom you reported and he reported to DZ in turn. And
16 then after Sinclair, several people went through that post; is that
18 A. Not entirely, no. When -- Sinclair was there for a very, very
19 short time, and when he left, I wasn't aware that anyone really replaced
21 Q. According to the information I had on General DZ, it was
22 David Meyer, then Piers Noble, and then Mr. Lovelock, if I'm pronouncing
23 that correctly and if I took that down correctly.
24 A. All right. Okay. I understand now what you are saying and who
25 you are referring to. Yes, Ben Lovelock was the last one, and this was a
1 function -- a person that carried out this function, whether it was
2 Sinclair or Ben Lovelock or Noble, it was to look after DZ 's office, it
3 was like his personal assistant. And so he controlled the access to DZ.
4 He would do office work for DZ. That was the main function of that
6 Q. Thank you. Mr. Richard Heaslip, what was his position or
8 A. Well, like all of us, he had different functions at different
9 times of the mission, as I did, so at one time he came into the
10 headquarters for a brief time to take over as head of liaison, but he was
11 then sent to Macedonia
12 functions. And also Heaslip was also the regional commander of the
13 region centred on Gnjilane.
14 Q. Thank you. In the information on DZ, I've found that
15 Richard Heaslip was the main liaison officer appointed by DZ in order to
16 coordinate the three coordinators; do you agree with that or not?
17 A. Yes, for a few weeks, for a very short period towards the end.
18 Q. Thank you. Now to go back to the head of mission, it was
19 Ambassador Walker; am I correct?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. General DZ was deputy head of mission for operations, and
22 Mr. Giovanni Kesler was deputy head of mission for the police?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Thank you. On Friday you said, I don't know whether I'll put
25 this correctly, but I believe you said that the major part of the
1 Verification Mission
2 with the Yugoslavian institutions was in Belgrade?
3 A. I don't remember saying that. What I think I said was that the
4 highest level of cooperation, the highest level of the
5 Cooperation mission was sitting in Belgrade, but the every-day running of
6 the organisation and the problem solving was done in Kosovo.
7 Q. Thank you. How did you arrive at that conclusion, that the top
8 level of the verification commission of the OSCE was in Belgrade, whereas
9 in fact there were only seven personnel there? Maybe they had the
10 closest ties with the mission in Belgrade, but concerning the meetings of
11 Mr. Walker and Sainovic as well as Loncar, that must have taken place at
12 a higher level than the level of Ms. Phelan who was in Belgrade at the
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. Thank you. Can we agree, nonetheless, that the
16 Kosovo Verification Mission, or rather its head, was Mr. Walker and that
17 you were all answerable to him?
18 A. Of course.
19 Q. Mr. Walker was the only person authorised, based on the reports
20 of the regional centres and his teams, to make decisions on the
21 violations of the agreement and to undertake measures that he deemed
23 A. The final decision was always his, yes.
24 Q. Thank you. Save for one occasion when you were also present when
25 he was replaced by his deputies, and it was up to them to decide whether
1 to issue a communique or not?
2 A. Which occasion are you referring to?
3 Q. I mean the report that was sent concerning the incident at Dulje,
4 and the kidnapping in Stari Trg? In any case, if you don't recall that,
5 I will put some documents to you.
6 A. I don't recall it exactly, but I am sure I can be reminded.
7 Q. I certainly will. There is a number of them.
8 I'd like to go back to your arrival. When the Cooperation was
9 discharged by a person by the name of Donna Phelan within the hierarchy
10 of the mission, in your statement you talk about the method planned by
11 Ms. Donna Phelan, it was called the method of maximum confrontation --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Maximum assistance.
13 Maximum resistance.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- to the Serbs. What did the
15 method consist of?
16 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm not aware of it being called the system
17 of maximum resistance, so.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I will read it out. In the English page 3, paragraph 2:
20 "The method we used that had been originally planned by
21 Donna Phelan was to resist to the maximum."
22 A. I think the word I used was confrontational.
23 Q. Very well. It should be the same confrontation in Serbian, I
24 thought it was the same. I'm sorry I failed to mention the exhibit
25 number. It's the statement of the witness.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the exhibit
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It was admitted in our case as
4 P832, the statement.
5 THE WITNESS: Sorry, what was the question?
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Could you explain Ms. Phelan's method? The method of
8 confrontation, as you called it. What did that entail?
9 A. Well, it was the result of not getting any response back to
10 our -- to Ambassador Walker's letter about our methodology of carrying
11 out the inspections. And so -- and also when we requested permission to
12 inspect the barracks at the Commission of Cooperation, we were told we
13 were not -- we would not be able to do that.
14 So the only way to try and carry out the inspection was to
15 actually turn up at the barracks at the main gates and confront the
16 problem. And, you know, try and get in, try and discuss with the
17 commander, even obstruct the gates if necessary, and to spend as much
18 time as possible at the barracks observing what was going on just outside
19 the barracks, which wasn't appreciated by the VJ; and so, therefore, you
20 can only describe this as a confrontational technique. It's the only
21 option we had left.
22 Q. Thank you. As far as I understood, her method failed, whereas
23 the method you introduced succeeded; am I correct?
24 A. It's possibly because of my diplomatic training that I decided
25 that maybe by talking and agreeing and discussing methodologies we might
1 make more progress, and that's what we tried to do, yes.
2 Q. Thank you. You mentioned your diplomatic training, I believe
3 that you said that you now work for the foreign office; did I gather that
5 A. I am employed occasionally on a as-required basis by the foreign
6 office, yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Is there a special department that you work for, or
8 do you work for the various sections of it according to the needs at that
10 A. I mainly work for two departments within the foreign office; one
11 is the department for international development, and the other one is for
12 the department that deals with conflicts.
13 Q. Thank you. It means if we see you in the field, there must be a
14 conflict. Thank you.
15 Ms. Phelan eventually left the Verification Mission; she took up
16 a position for centre for intelligence gathering; am I correct?
17 A. I don't know. All I know is that she returned to the state
18 department. She was a state department employee, so the
19 American Foreign Office.
20 Q. Thank you, I know that. In any case, I wanted to learn from you,
21 if you know, what it was that the centre actually did, what is the centre
22 for information gathering or compiling?
23 A. I have no idea how the American system works or what departments
24 it has.
25 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, this centre for information gathering or
1 compiling concerns the Kosovo Verification Mission. Yes, you said she
2 went to the state department, although my information is different from
3 that. But have you ever heard of the Blue Book or the KVM?
4 A. Sorry, yes, I thought you were referring to the period after she
5 left the mission completely. I didn't realise you were still talking
6 about her moving to what we referred to as the fusion cell, which was the
7 information gathering, collation, and interpretation department of which
8 she headed up for a certain length of time, which created the Blue Book,
10 Q. To the extent that you can recall, could you tell us something
11 about the fusion cell, how it worked, if you know?
12 A. Well, yes, I worked on it for a time, so I probably know a little
13 bit about it.
14 Basically, the information that was sent and all the reports that
15 were sent in from regional centres were collated, brought into the same
16 location; people examined them; they then sort of looked at previous
17 reports dealing with the same topics, and tried to create a picture. So
18 we -- but it wasn't just incidents, it was the whole business of
19 information gathering in Kosovo.
20 So we gathered information about the VJ, what they were doing,
21 where they were; the MUP, what they were doing, what type of units they
22 were; designations on their uniforms if we saw any markings on the
23 uniforms. And then we tried to forecast what might happen in the future,
24 possible of variants of what the outcomes might be of various actions
25 that had taken place. So that's the type of work the fusion cell did.
1 Q. Yes, now I see why you were included as well, because I learned
2 that the cell employed an analyst from the UK, Germany
3 in the jargon it was called the KVM Intelligence Service?
4 A. In the jargon it was known as the KVM Fusion Cell, because it
5 fused the information together. But, you know, what is information
6 gathering? Some people call it intelligence, some people call it
7 whatever, you know.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Ciaglinski, you told us that you had three
9 documents that were your Bible and you carried them always with you. If
10 I'm not mistaken. One was the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement, the second
11 document was the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement, and the third was the
12 1199 Resolution. Am I correct? Are these the three documents?
13 A. No. It was the Shaun Byrnes, it was the Djordjevic -- sorry the
14 Djordjevic-Byrnes; it was the Naumann-Clark, not the 1199. So the two
15 you mentioned, but not the 1199. The third one was the Klaus-Naumann
17 Q. Correct, Clark-Naumann, you're right. Let me go back to that.
18 Weren't these three agreements the basis for the UN Resolution 1199?
19 A. Certainly two of them were, I don't think -- the
20 Byrnes-Djordjevic was outside that because the -- I think the
21 Resolution 1203 which followed 1199 confirmed the workings of the mission
22 under -- using those two agreements, including those two agreements in
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I know it was a long time ago,
1 that's why I'd like to show you the 65 ter document P456. We'll refresh
2 our memories.
3 That's the 1199 UN resolution from September 1998, and you will
4 see that it preceded these three documents, one of which I had gotten
5 wrong. I'd like us to discuss briefly -- there, there it is. It's the
6 23rd September, 1998
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to see page 2 in
8 English, please.
9 I'd like to tell the legal officer, we don't need on the screen
10 the B/C/S version. We need only the English version for the witness and
11 the Trial Chamber.
12 Q. Witness, would you agree that under these items at the bottom,
13 1, 2, and 3, in item 1 a cease-fire in Kosovo is envisaged, a cessation
14 of hostilities. Item 2 envisages an improvement of humanitarian
15 situation and averting the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and a
16 third point deals with the political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Do
17 you agree this is the essence of these three points?
18 A. Yes, I haven't got it on my screen, but that's the essence, yes.
19 Sorry, I have it, I was looking somewhere else. This is why, of course,
20 1199 was superseded by Resolution 1203 in which the -- two of the
21 documents were actually incorporated, in answer to your earlier question.
22 Q. When was the 1203 adopted?
23 A. If you remember on Friday I had a little piece of paper that you
24 wouldn't let me use. I had actually written down the actual date of the
25 Resolution 1203, but it was -- it mentions both -- it mentions both of
1 the Clark-Naumann and the Geremek Agreement to be, sort of, incorporated
2 into the resolution.
3 Q. I agree, that's probably right, but that is after the period
4 relevant to the indictment. During the break, please have a look and
5 tell us after the break the date of the 1203 Resolution. Thank you for
6 this answer.
7 Now, below this --
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at para 4 on the next
10 Q. Could you please look at item 4(a), the language there, and then
11 I'd like to ask you ...
12 Does it demand cessation of all action by the security forces
13 affecting the civilian population and orders the withdrawal of security
14 units only used for civilian repression, only those units that are in
15 contact with civilians? Do you agree?
16 A. I wouldn't use the word "only," but it says:
17 "... withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression."
18 Q. Right. But the other party to the conflict, the KLA, is not
19 mentioned anywhere, no measures are envisaged in application to them;
21 A. This is one of the problems of the agreement. This actually was,
22 if you like, one-sided. But reference had been made, I remember in the
23 Geremek Agreement and possibly in 1199 also, somewhere else, that
24 actually asked both sides to abide by the cease-fire.
25 Q. Thank you. We will briefly go through to all these documents.
1 But this first one, I did not have on Friday and that's why I started
2 with it. Also, it preceded the others.
3 Witness, under items -- sub-items (b) and (c), we can read the
4 provisions about verification, about the return of refugees, and the need
5 to establish dialogue. Now, in para 5, item (d), I would like your
6 comment. Is it right that sub-item (d) concerns measures against
7 peaceful population?
8 A. Sorry, item (d) says:
9 "Unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations and humanitarian
11 Q. The interpreters did not understand me. Sub-item (b).
12 A. What was the question, sorry?
13 Q. Item (b) also concerns only the civilian population, not the KLA,
14 the other party to the armed conflict; am I right?
15 A. Of course.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to call now for the next
18 page, para 10.
19 Q. Witness, it is the FRY that is primarily responsible for the
20 security of the mission; correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Whatever happens to any member of the mission, Yugoslavia would
23 be responsible and Yugoslavia
24 because you, the verifiers, were unarmed; right?
25 A. Right.
1 Q. And we'll come back to that again later. At the initiative of
2 the KVM sometime towards March, just before you left, an agreement was
3 made that with your consent, in areas affected by conflict with
4 terrorists, you would enter such areas once you signed away Yugoslavia
5 responsibility, you do it at your own risk; correct? I think it was on
6 the 15th of March.
7 A. You are right.
8 Q. Now, I'd like you to look at para 11. Does this paragraph relate
9 to the financing of the KLA and their gathering of funds to buy arms and
10 bring them into Kosovo and Metohija?
11 A. I'm not a lawyer, but that's what I would assume it to mean, yes.
12 Q. That's why you're a diplomat. Tell me now, did Albania and
13 other countries comply with these provisions of the resolution? During
14 your tenure in Kosovo and Metohija, what was the situation with the
15 supply of arms?
16 A. Well, we were aware that arms were being smuggled across the
17 border from Albania
18 Serbian security forces captured the -- had a confrontation with the
19 smugglers, we were told, so we knew about it.
20 Q. Thank you. And there were several cases involving you once of
21 border incidents on the border with Albania when 35 men got killed during
22 an attempt to illegally enter with weapons. Can you say your answer for
23 the record?
24 A. Well, when you say that I was involved, I wasn't involved in the
25 operation of smuggling the weapons, but I was certainly aware that this
1 had happened because we were informed. And later I was also instrumental
2 in dealing with the prisoners who were held in the prison in Nis, those
3 who had survived the ambush.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I tender this
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: And that will be assigned D00160, Your Honours.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us skip a few documents and
9 go to P838.
10 Q. Witness, do you remember where we left off on Friday?
11 A. Please remind me.
12 Q. Judge Parker asked me at a quarter to 2.00 whether I still have
13 questions for you in cross-examination because we were at the end of our
14 session. I said, Yes; and he seemed surprised. He said, I just asked.
15 Now, about this letter of the 23rd September addressed to
16 Mr. Milosevic by Mr. Walker. I'll get to the point straightaway. You
17 were a continuation of KDOM, and while you were getting settled and
18 starting to work, the agreements were being implemented, the three
19 agreements that we mentioned that you said were your Bible.
20 A. Well, of course, I mean, to get the mission going there had to be
21 concurrent activity. So, for example, the mission was being set up in
22 early October, ambassadors being appointed in October, I think the 17th
23 of October, Ambassador Walker was appointed well before the official date
24 the mission started. Preparatory work and teams were going out to Kosovo
25 and Belgrade
1 to operate it. Documents were being written ahead of the mission
2 starting its day-to-day work because you had to do this in order to start
3 the mission. So there was a lot of preparatory work which had to be done
4 to get the mission going as quickly as possible.
5 Q. I'll do my best, but please answer this question: My question
6 was, Before the KVM was formed, the Kosovo diplomatic mission took a
7 certain position on these three agreements and decided whether the FRY
8 was applying them?
9 A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. I don't know of
11 Q. All right. If you don't know. You know why I'm asking? Because
12 from the moment when the agreements were activated until you arrived,
13 more than a months elapsed; and there are certain document that I thought
14 you were familiar with because the KDOM were supposed to hand over, and,
15 I understood, handed over to you all the documentary evidence about the
16 application of these three agreements from the beginning.
17 Now, about this letter, you were not in Kosovo or in Yugoslavia
18 when it was written, and that's the reason I asked you this, because this
19 letter refers to certain questions that had already been settled with
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up P836.
22 Q. This is the agreement dated 25th October, 1998, between
23 Mr. Byrnes and Djordjevic. Please look at para 2. Do you agree that
24 this paragraph envisages that in case of incidents or increased tension,
25 the police will have the right to perform patrol duties in armoured
1 vehicles equipped with machine-guns up to 7.9 millimetres on the
2 condition of notifying the KDOM?
3 A. That's what it says, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. And now, regarding para 3, is it correct that the FRY
5 complied with the provisions of para 3 and withdrew its forces from
6 Dragobilje, Ostrozub, Opterusa, Dobrodeljane, Studencani, Samodraza,
7 Pecane, and Klecka?
8 A. You said that they complied with paragraph 2 and 3, I don't
9 remember but you can ask others like DZ later whether in fact the
10 paragraph says "... upon notifying KDOM/OSCE ..." I'm not sure this
11 notification was ever given.
12 In answer to your second part of the question, I believe that
13 those stationary forces were removed from those areas you mentioned, yes.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness kindly speak into the
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Is it correct that all these areas that the forces of the FRY
18 abandoned were occupied by the KLA?
19 A. It was normal for the -- [B/C/S/ on English channel]. Sorry,
20 yes, it was normal for the KLA to actually pull out -- to replace any VJ
21 or MUP positions upon the withdrawal of the Serbian security forces.
22 Q. Do you consider that a violation of the agreement, regardless of
23 the fact that the KLA was not a signatory?
24 A. Well, it's considering they weren't a signatory, then they
25 probably weren't violating anything, were they? Morally, yes, they were
1 in violation because there should have been a cease-fire, but legally
2 they hadn't signed anything.
3 Q. I must say that this opinion of yours is very interesting. The
4 FRY, by complying with the agreement, enables the KLA to occupy
5 territories it did not have, and that is called "complying." But if the
6 FRY tries to stop that from happening, despite a cease-fire, then it is
7 in violation of the agreement; would that be right?
8 A. I don't think we ever said that -- that the VJ and the MUP would
9 have no right to defend themselves or the population if the KLA were
10 actually posing any danger to the locals. The fact that they were
11 occupying land that was being vacated by the Serbian forces, as long as
12 it was done peacefully, had no bearing on the situation.
13 Q. Witness, both in your statements and in other evidence I found
14 that the KLA considered it a provocation when in Dragobilje or some other
15 village patrol of the army or the police were patrolling as usual and
16 they would then shoot at the vehicles --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Correction.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] -- the KVM considered it a
19 provocation when the army or the police were patrolling in villages and
20 then the KLA would shoot at them.
21 A. It was more than a provocation, and these Serb security forces
22 had every reason and right to take retaliatory action. But if they were
23 sitting in a position which they had occupied and not bothering anybody,
24 then that's a different situation.
25 Q. Let's take the notorious event in Dulje. The police forces were
1 performing regular patrol duty, and they were bothering the KLA which
2 launched an attack, but that was not what I wanted to say. I enumerated
3 certain areas from which the Yugoslav forces withdraw, and the KLA then
4 took control of these areas. They considered it a provocation when a
5 patrol passed through, and they would attack them. And to that you would
6 say that the Yugoslav forces were in violation and the KLA were not
7 responsible for anything because -- and they were not violating anything,
8 because they were not a signatory?
9 A. I wouldn't support that premise. What I was saying is that the
10 Serbian forces, I'll repeat, had every right to retaliate against any
11 attack upon them or upon the people the Serbian people in Kosovo; and I
12 would also add that the OSCE, the KVM, we spent a lot of time trying to
13 persuade the KLA not to occupy these positions and get off these
14 position. And in fact we had some success in the area of Podujevo where
15 we did keep the KLA a certain distance away and got them to relinquish
16 some of the positions which they had taken overlooking the main road. So
17 we tried pretty hard to keep the KLA out of these positions because we
18 knew what the response would be and what action it would provoke.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please come closer to the
20 microphones. Thank you very much.
21 THE WITNESS: I apologise.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Thank you. Let's make a little digression now. I understood
24 that the Kosovo Verification Mission based its work on reports and
25 observations that were put on paper through which you informed the head
1 of your mission and other agencies, if necessary; correct?
2 A. Whenever possible, yes.
3 Q. Well, tell me, when wasn't it possible for you to write down in
4 your reports whatever you observed?
5 A. Well, when I was in the field and I was staying out in the field,
6 I wasn't able to come back and submit a report. Or there was so much
7 going on that it was virtually impossible to, sort of, write everything
8 down, and quite often my reports would be just verbal reports by
9 telephone, by satellite telephone, by verbal debrief back at the
11 Q. Thank you. And when you come back to the headquarters, didn't
12 you have time to put down on paper whatever you had telephoned before or
13 notified verbally and submitted to the fusion cell?
14 A. Not always, no.
15 Q. All right. Let's accept that in cases of emergency and in
16 certain other situations when you simply couldn't do it, you did not
17 submit reports, but these were exceptions rather than the rule; correct?
18 A. I think most of my work was done verbally in the field where I
19 was just used, as I said before, as a firefighter, someone who would go
20 out and try and resolve a problem in the field. And I would report back
21 usually in verbal form because there were only so many hours in a day,
22 and we were already working 18 hours a day if not more sometimes, seven
23 days a week.
24 Q. Thank you. But if you are in the field and you are unable to
25 report, the person you informed, the headquarters in Pristina would pass
1 it on in some material form, wouldn't they?
2 A. What used to happen, I would go back -- come back, if I was back
3 in Pristina, I would go to the fusion cell, then I would debrief the
4 people in the fusion cell as to what had happened, and what had been
5 done, et cetera; and they would then incorporate it into their reports
6 directly from my comments.
7 Q. I'm asking you this because you said in your statement something
8 about the verification of police check-points, despite all the effort and
9 all the documents that I had at my disposal, verification in the
10 February of 1999 is something I haven't been able to find anywhere.
11 A. Well, that doesn't mean you don't have a copy of it. I don't
12 keep copies. But the report was written, I'm not sure whether I signed
13 it or one of my subordinates had signed it because I might have been
14 doing something else, but it was a long detailed report of exactly where
15 all the check-points had been found, the observation posts, who had
16 visited them, and it was a detailed report that was put in. Might not be
17 under my name.
18 Q. Thank you, I wasn't even looking for a report under your name.
19 This is the third time you are testifying. Did you use or show that
20 report in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial?
21 A. I referred to it in the Milosevic and the Sainovic trial, but I
22 don't have any documents with me. So the only documents would be the
23 documents with the Court or with the various witnesses like DZ, for
24 example, or others.
25 Q. Please, you understand very well what I asked you. Please answer
1 my question. Did you see the document, that report you just mentioned,
2 in the Milutinovic case or in the Milosevic trial? I know it is not
3 under -- I know your name is not on it, but it doesn't matter who
4 authored it.
5 A. I have seen the document, yes. Not in the court, but I've seen
6 it in Kosovo, yes.
7 Q. I'm asking you about the courtroom. Did you see it, perhaps, on
8 Friday, last Friday in the courtroom?
9 A. There might have been reference to it, but I did not see the
10 actual report, no. I don't believe I saw it.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be
12 switched off.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Witness, I have here a chronology of events from the operations
15 HQ where you worked where it says that on the 5th of January, 1999 -
16 that's para 58, Exhibit 65 ter 634, page 353 in English.
17 On the 5th of January, an inspection was carried out of all MUP
18 observation points, and in the comments it says "Mainly used by MUP ."
19 This is dated the 5th of January.
20 Is it possible that this is the report, the event you are
21 referring to?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you see that in the comments there is no mention of any
24 violation, do you agree? Have you seen -- do you see this document now?
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I called up document 65 ter P634,
1 if we can see that on the screen.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Gopalan.
3 MS. GOPALAN: Sorry, Your Honours, I was just going to ask for
4 the document to be called up, since the screen was blank - but I see now
5 that it has appeared - that it would aid all parties to have it
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page B-3, item 58.
9 THE WITNESS: I can see it. It says:
10 "All 27 OPs inspected. Most occupied by MUP."
11 Which implies that there was a violation because only 9 should
12 have been occupied.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. But you do agree it was the 5th of January?
15 A. Well, DZ was very meticulous with his paperwork, so this is one
16 of his pieces of work, so I wouldn't disagree.
17 Q. Thank you. I don't know if this is the correct translation, but
18 what I see, "Mainly used by MUP" in my version. I don't know if this is
19 the correct translation. Most. Most.
20 A. No, it doesn't -- it means that most of the -- of the OPs were
21 occupied by the MUP. That means nearly all, "most" as in "nearly all."
22 That's the correct translation.
23 Q. Very well, thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 65 ter 659.
25 JUDGE PARKER: You are not tendering that report?
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE PARKER: I'm told it's part of P844, already exhibited.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think we'll have a
4 problem with the admission of this -- of some of the evidence because
5 some exhibits have been admitted more than once, but it's good that this
6 one is already in evidence, because I was going to use it again and I
7 thought I would tender it; but if it's already exhibited, that's even
9 Now I'd like 659 from the 65 ter list. That's the daily report
10 for the 4th and 5th of January, 1999. I am sorry, I apologise to the
11 legal officer, it's D156.
12 Q. Witness, could you please look at this report for the period up
13 to the 5th of January, and then read para 1, the first passage in para 1.
14 A. Yes, it says:
15 "Not all OPs were manned."
16 Full details will be to follow. "Not all" means "most."
17 "Possibly" could mean "most."
18 Q. Thank you. That is contrary to what you've just said, that there
19 were violations. How come when not all were even manned, what kind of
20 violation is that?
21 A. I think I've already said on numerous occasions that the
22 agreement, Byrnes agreement, said that one-third of the 27 should be
23 manned at the most, and there were, that means 9 should have been manned.
24 The other report, DZ 's annex, shows that most were maned. This says
25 that not all OPs were manned, which means that there's no number on it,
1 but it's not all. But it's closer to all than not any.
2 Also, there were other OPs that had been set up on top of the 27
3 but there's a report to follow. The report's not here.
4 Q. Nobody has seen that report. You are just telling us about it,
5 but we can't find a document about it.
6 A. And in addition, there are the -- you can see there on the second
7 line of that first sentence, it says:
8 "Full details of the verification are contained in the individual
9 regional centre daily reports."
10 From which the -- we have to get those documents first to then
11 produce the main report.
12 Q. Tell me then, where is that main report containing your
13 assertions? That's what I'm saying. What you are saying is not backed
14 by documents, and what is written here is contrary to what you said, not
15 even to mention the fact that this is a completely different period, a
16 month before.
17 A. I think I've said it before, you know, if you read the English,
18 you can actually understand what it says. It says that most were manned,
19 which means most of the 27 were manned. This one says not all OPs were
20 manned, which confirms what the other statement made. And where the
21 report is, I do not know. I'm not a custodian of documents.
22 Q. I would appreciate it very much if you would read out to us the
23 English version of the first paragraph in item 1.
24 A. The "Verification (2/99) of all the 27 MUP OPs were conducted
25 today. Not all OPs were manned."
1 Q. Thank you. We can move on, and the Court will make its own
3 While we are still discussing verification, in item 58 we see on
4 the 4th of January an inspection was carried out of three approved
5 positions of the combat team. Do you agree this refers to the army?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. And again, there is no observation about a violation of the
9 A. I don't believe there were any violations.
10 Q. Thank you. But tell me now, I don't understand one thing, if
11 your main activity was verification and if you establish that a certain
12 agreement or part of that agreement is not complied with, isn't that a
13 reason to make a protest and tell the Commission for Cooperation, Look
14 here, such an such provision of the agreement is being violated, please
15 do something about it?
16 A. I'm sure that following the inspection of the MUP points,
17 observation check-points, this issue was raised at the
18 Cooperation Commission in Pristina.
19 Q. Witness, if such a document existed, I would show it to you and
20 then ask my question. It's not in the chronology, and it's nowhere in
21 the documents that the police or the army were responsible for any
22 violations; and there is no such document until the very end of your
23 tenure in Kosovo. There's only one towards the end of December when DZ
24 tried to enter the barracks of the Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed
25 in, and he wrote in his report that he wasn't allowed in. There were no
1 further assertions of any violations. Would it be right that this is --
2 this can be explained by the fact that you changed your method of work,
3 you wrote down the numbers of lorries and tanks --
4 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
5 MS. GOPALAN: Could Defence counsel please put a question for the
7 JUDGE PARKER: He has done that. Carry on, please.
8 THE WITNESS: I don't think it was because we changed our method
9 of work at all. I mean, I don't know where the documents are. As I said
10 to you before, there were so many documents, a lot of them have been
11 archived, some people have them in their possession, a lot of documents
12 were destroyed on our, sort of, departure from Kosovo. We spent three
13 days shredding paperwork in the OSCE building in Kosovo. Just looking at
14 the question...
15 JUDGE PARKER: Was it a change in your method of work?
16 THE WITNESS: That caused the -- well, I mean, we were adapting
17 our method of work continuously, but that wouldn't have been the reason
18 that this wouldn't have been reported.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Witness, there is evidence that all that was done in
21 Kosovo and Metohija by the KVM was transferred on disks to Macedonia
22 during withdrawal and what was not necessary was destroyed. All this
23 documentation that I'm showing to you, I got from the Prosecution and
24 from the OSCE. So these are not private documents. But I'm telling you,
25 we have information from this chronology that on the
1 20 something December, General DZ went to the barracks of the
2 Pristina Corps and he wasn't allowed in. And he also went once to
3 Pristina to General Delic's office, he was allowed in and had a
4 discussion. Those are the only two instances of application of
5 Mrs. Phelan's method that I could notice, nothing else.
6 A. The entry into the barracks General -- into Colonel Delic's
7 barracks was not Mrs. Phelan's method, it was more the diplomatic way of
8 entering the barracks, when we were invited in.
9 Q. You probably mean some later instance. This is hardly one I'm
10 talking about, but never mind. I have more questions.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now call up P835. It is
12 already an exhibit.
13 Q. Witness, this is the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement. First of all,
14 I'd like to focus on item 3. These are the general provisions, but under
15 Roman III
16 Am I right in saying that the special mandate was for members to
17 maintain a cease-fire?
18 A. I think the -- it wasn't our mandate to maintain a cease-fire.
19 It was our mandate to verify the cease-fire. We had no way to enforce a
21 Q. I agree with you, but the translation I have says:
22 "The Verification Mission shall travel throughout Kosovo to check
23 whether all the participants are maintaining the cease-fire."
24 A. Sorry, I haven't got it on my screen. I only have the first
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That should be also page --
2 English page 3.
3 JUDGE PARKER: It's now on the screen. The problem is, the
4 paragraph has a line at the bottom of one page and then continues on the
5 next. You have the second page now.
6 Do you have a point about this paragraph, Mr. Djurdjic?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
8 Q. I want to say that the agreement envisages that you travelled
9 throughout Kosovo, not that you should inspect the military installations
10 and barracks of the Army of Yugoslavia --
11 JUDGE PARKER: Well, you are now going to ask the witness if that
12 is his understanding of the paragraph; is that correct?
13 Yes, Colonel.
14 THE WITNESS: Right. Well, it says that we have to verify the
15 maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements, and reports -- investigate
16 reports of cease-fire violations. But it continues with other phrases
17 that, you know, we are to be able to look at -- if you take all the other
18 agreements into consideration, we are checking if the weapons of the
19 12.7 millimetres are around, if everybody is back in barracks, and so on.
20 When it says "freedom of movement and access" if it said "freedom
21 of movement" that means moving around Kosovo, which we had. Access means
22 access. It means the entrance into places that we wish to go into in
23 order to verify all aspects of the cease-fire. And all aspects of the
24 cease-fire are compliance with all the agreements and you can only do
25 that by going into barracks.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I think I raised two
2 problems, but since it's time for the break, I'd like -- I'll put these
3 two questions after the break. It's time, I believe, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. We will continue after the normal break at
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Witness, we were still with the Geremek-Jovanovic agreement, and
13 I said that two issues have opened up. The first one is the issue of
14 interpretation -- interpreting the agreement. Not only at your level.
15 I also realise that there were issues at other levels such as the level
16 of General Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Walker.
17 Did you ever try to raise that issue to the level of the
18 presiding officer of the OSCE and the Yugoslav president in order to deal
19 with the issue of the way the verification agreement should be
21 A. That's why Ambassador Walker wrote the letter to Mr. Milosevic
22 spelling out exactly how the system would work, and it was mentioned
23 endlessly at meetings of access and verification at the meetings we had
24 between General DZ and General Loncar.
25 Q. Could you please answer my question. Mr. Walker drafted a letter
1 in November. You had problems in December with verification, that issue
2 included DZ and Mr. Walker later on. Did you try to raise the issue with
3 some higher instances such as the Presidency of the OSCE and the
4 Yugoslav Presidency in order to deal with the problem of agreement
6 A. I am aware that General DZ wrote letters to the OSCE, raised the
7 issue on many occasions as I don't know for fact, but I understand that
8 Ambassador Walker did the same.
9 Q. Thank you. The other issue is this: We touched upon this
10 question, but we haven't completed it, KDOM as of the moment the
11 agreement was signed, conducted Verification Missions until the KVM was
12 formed. In the the month and a half they were in charge of verifying
13 whether the FRY was meeting the conditions of the agreement, transfer
14 weapons, warehousing of equipment, whether the weapons were being brought
15 out into fields, and various other issues; am I correct?
16 A. You are correct.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at page 3 of the
19 agreement, that is to say, item 3.
20 Q. Witness, am I right in saying that police forces had the right to
21 set up check-points in order to control traffic or to control and prevent
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Did you know that the act of illegally possessing a fire-arm is a
25 criminal offence in Serbia
1 A. I didn't, but I believe you.
2 Q. Smuggling of different types of goods which are of limited
3 supply, drugs, all those are offences. Why do you believe that setting
4 up check-points in that regard without discrimination, that is to say
5 that all persons passing through such check-points would be subjected to
6 checks, would that be a violation of the agreement?
7 A. I believe that the agreement actually said we should be notified
8 of any such activities.
9 Q. But the issue at hand are security in placements and we had
10 check-points and crime control points. This is regular traffic control
11 and crime control, why would you need to be notified of that?
12 A. It just says -- I mean, I'm just reading from the document:
13 "We will receive notification should circumstances lead to a
14 establishment of a roadblock other than for traffic or crime control."
15 It's very difficult to differentiate between what the purpose of
16 your roadblock is. And that's the difficulty; this is where the
17 difficulty came in. Is the roadblock purely to look for people smuggling
18 cigarettes, or is it something else? Is it to make the life of the
19 people intolerable?
20 Q. I fully agree that it is difficult, but according to the
21 agreement, such controls, such check-points were allowed, and you did not
22 need to be notified. I believe the only criterion that was to be applied
23 was that there was -- they were placed indiscriminately irrespective of
24 people's ethnicity, and that the purpose of such check-points was to
25 exercise control without prejudice.
1 A. Sorry, that's a statement. Do you want an answer from me?
2 Q. Yes, I do expect an answer. I'm asking you whether you agree
3 that as regards traffic checks and crime control, the
4 Verification Mission
5 A. According to para 3 that's correct.
6 Q. Thank you. Let us move to para 4 concerning the borders. There
7 were also interpretation problems whether that needed to be notified or
8 not. First we need to see what your interpretation was of the border
9 belt of 5 kilometres. Was the Verification Mission allowed to enter the
10 5 kilometre border belt without prior notification?
11 A. Yes. I said yes because the Verification Mission had access and
12 freedom of movement. This paragraph refers to visiting border controlled
13 units and accompanying them on the normal border control roles. It
14 doesn't say anything about us actually going into the border belt, which
15 as you well know at one point became as wide as 15 kilometres and grew
16 wider by the day as the end of March came closer.
17 Q. I would not agree with that, but I think it at times was as large
18 as 10 kilometres. In any case, let us go back to para 4. It says:
19 "... through areas of Kosovo away from the border."
20 That is the end of the first sentences. This para concerns the
21 areas away from the border.
22 A. It doesn't talk about access, it say that we will maintain
23 liaison about border control activities away from the border. Nothing
24 about access.
25 Q. Yes, but look at the next sentence, that such missions will be
1 conducted when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request.
2 Therefore, there must have been a request. There should have been for
3 you to be able to do that.
4 A. Yes, a request was required from either side. However, it does
6 "... to visit border control units and to accompany them on their
7 normal border patrols."
8 But the border belt, as you say, was enormous and so you couldn't
9 prevent us entering the border belt to see what was going on. We went
10 always looking to accompany patrols.
11 I didn't write these rules, and I didn't -- I didn't, sort of,
12 screw up the meaning of these -- of what was actually meant.
13 Unfortunately, many agreements are writing very badly.
14 Q. You just commented on the second part of the sentence, whereas
15 the initial part, the first part of the sentence it is stated that the
16 mission needed to be invited by the authorities or upon its request.
17 Therefore a request must precede a verification visit, do you agree?
18 JUDGE PARKER: A visit to a border control unit is the answer
19 given in the beginning. Mr. Djurdjic, I am getting increasingly
20 concerned at the time you are taking. You've got points to make. They
21 can be made far much quicker than they are. You've got a point here to
22 make about paragraph 4, you've made it. The witness has given his
23 comment which disagrees with your interpretation. No further questions
24 are going to change that. Move on to the next point, please, or we'll be
25 spending the whole day with this witness. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Very
2 well. I thought and believe that the witness was interpreting the
3 provisions fairly. In any case, I leave it up to you.
4 Q. Let us move on, witness.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will no longer need this
6 document. Could we please have P837 next.
7 Q. Witness, this is the Clark-Naumann agreement of the
8 25th October, 1998
9 was basically the communique issued by the federal government in terms of
10 its obligations that it had undertaken? Do you agree with that?
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps we should move on to the
12 communique itself. That is page 3 in the English. The Roman
13 numeral III
14 "However, state authorities as the last measure in keeping with
15 the principle of self-defence retain the right to respond appropriately
16 and adequately to any type of terrorist activity and breaking the law,
17 endangering the lives of citizens, and security of a state body's
19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, I'm not able to see the reference in
21 the agreement that Defence counsel is referring to on the screen. I
22 think it will assist us to have that.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the court clerk
24 to show us the Roman numeral III
25 page. Yes.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm aware of this and the only thing that
2 doesn't apply is the word "proportionately."
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Where do you find the word "proportionately"?
5 A. It says:
6 "... the State authorities retain the right to respond adequately
7 and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity or violation of
8 law, et cetera."
9 Q. Thank you. My question is this: Was this the basis that the FRY
10 forces could be employed when terrorist activities occur and when the KLA
11 jeopardized the lives and safety of civilians?
12 A. Absolutely.
13 Q. Thank you. You mentioned proportionality. Did you ever see a
14 single protest that was sent to the Yugoslav authorities because there
15 was a disproportionate use of force? Did you ever see such a document
16 sent by Mr. Walker?
17 A. I did not. But I know it was -- we preached this concept of
18 proportionality at almost every meeting we had with the commission.
19 Q. Thank you. However, we said it was only Mr. Walker who could
20 decide, following consultations with you, what a violation was and that
21 it was he who could forward a protest on behalf of the KVM; am I correct?
22 A. Correct. Or a delegated member of his team could, yes, on his
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask for
1 document P -- I think this is a 65 ter document. 00677. Although, I'm
2 pretty sure it was admitted into evidence.
3 Q. You will recall this document, Witness. Yes, this is it. It
4 says 1(a) "Prizren District."
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Can you read out the part of the sentence or the sentence that
7 begins with "EUAG." Just that one single sentence out loud, please.
8 A. "EUAG observed several armed civilians. An OSCE patrol reported
9 a shooting in the village. Two dead male bodies and a wounded woman were
10 found. Details to follow."
11 Q. Thank you. That suffices. First of all, can you tell us what
12 the acronym EUAG stands for, if you recall?
13 A. Yes, I've looked at this a few times, and I just cannot at all,
14 unless it observes to -- refers to some sort of EU mission that was based
15 in Belgrade
16 Q. Thank you. Did you know that KLA members also operated in
17 civilian clothes?
18 A. I do, and they didn't really have a uniform as such, the KLA.
19 Q. Thank you. What conclusion do you arrive at based on this
20 formulation when it says the EUAG observed several armed civilians?
21 A. It's impossible to tell from this whether it refers to Serb or
23 Q. Thank you. On Friday, when the Prosecutor asked you about this,
24 you said that this referred to some Serbs. That is why I was asking you
25 this since there was no indication as to who it referred to, and we
1 didn't see any evidence of that. In any case, thank you.
2 Could you tell me something about the acronym SITCEN, what does
3 it stand for?
4 A. That's the situation centre.
5 Q. Thank you. Whose situation centre?
6 A. Where is the reference to this, sorry, so I can see what context
7 it's mentioned in?
8 Q. It is in the context of the OSCE report. It says to be delivered
9 to the deputy head of mission and Mr. DZ, and then it says SITCEN.
10 JUDGE PARKER: That is not on the screen.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Very well. We can have that
12 placed on the screen at this --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Djurdjic please repeat the number of
14 the document.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is document 65 ter 00650, last
17 JUDGE PARKER: For the record, the last document the witness
18 commented on was Exhibit P839.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise, the
20 previous document was P389.
21 JUDGE PARKER: 839.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] 839, yes. Could we please have
23 the last page.
24 Q. This says distribution. From the top, the second abbreviation is
1 A. Right. Sorry. I would have initially guessed that the situation
2 centre would have been the fusion centre, but there must be another
3 organisation that slipped my mind completely. The situation centre is an
4 organisation, I presume, within the OSCE that monitored the current
5 situation. I thought it was the fusion cell, but.
6 Q. Was it perhaps the situation centre of the NATO staff or
8 A. We didn't have NATO as one of our places that we distributed our
9 documents to, so I thought it would have said NATO's SITCEN or saying
10 similar, but it doesn't say that. I don't believe that we sent anything
11 to NATO like this.
12 Also, these -- this would be an internal distribution, otherwise
13 it would say external distribution as well. So if it's just
14 distribution, it insinuates it's an internal distribution. Only these
15 people within the organisation, the headquarters of the OSCE, would
16 receive it; liaison, current ops, fusion.
17 Q. Thank you. Witness, you are familiar with the statement of
18 Mr. Afrim Aziri from the previous cases. Can you tell me what jobs, what
19 tasks this Mr. Afrim Aziri performed for the KVM while he was in Kosovo?
20 A. Mr. Aziri was originally General DZ's driver, and then he became
21 my driver for tasks basically around Pristina.
22 Q. Thank you. Is it correct that you enabled him to receive KLA fax
23 messages via your friends who were in Macedonia?
24 A. The only thing that Mr. Aziri helped us with was before we left,
25 he spent some time giving me the plan and the information of how the
1 airfield -- military airfield in Pristina was organised.
2 Q. I want to ask you about the time after the 24th that you enabled
3 him to receive fax messages from the KLA in Macedonia?
4 A. Are we talking now about the time after the mission had left
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Well, having -- in the last -- in the Milutinovic et al. trial
8 I've been show the letter that Mr. Aziri had written. I've already
9 commented on this. And I had nothing to do with any fax messages or
10 anything he was doing for anyone while he was sitting in Macedonia.
11 Q. Thank you. And do you know whether he was in contact with
12 Mr. David Meyer?
13 A. Well, Afrim was always trying to do something to help the KLA,
14 and I mean, we had -- we used to sit and have coffee together in one of
15 the hotels in Macedonia
16 others; and Afrim kept -- often would talk about trying to do something
17 to help the KLA. But we had no need of that type of help because we had
18 our own ways of finding out what was happening in Kosovo after we had
20 Q. Thank you. And can you tell us about this own way you had of
21 receiving information about developments in Kosovo after the
22 24th of March?
23 A. Yes, NATO had its own people in Kosovo throughout.
24 Q. Do you mean inside the KLA?
25 A. No, NATO had its own, as anyone would -- I mean, it's a normal
1 thing you do when you are carrying out a campaign or a bombing campaign
2 you're going to carry out later on, you'd have somebody on the ground, if
3 you can, one of our own highly trained NATO soldiers, nothing to do with
4 the OSCE, who would be actually providing targeting data for NATO,
5 observing what is on the ground. Isn't that what good armies do?
6 Q. They certainly do, but through forces on the ground, not through
7 their own soldiers. But do you know if there was a direct contact
8 between the KLA headquarters and NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania
9 A. I have no idea. I mean, I was attached as a liaison officer by
10 the OSCE to NATO. I wasn't part of the NATO staff.
11 Q. I understand that, but I asked not about yourself, but in general
12 terms. Do you know about that?
13 A. I can't know about that. I mean, I wasn't in a position to know
15 Q. Can you explain what was the substance of your function as KVM in
17 A. Well, I had several functions. I was work along with the UNHCR
18 and making sure -- looking at the refugees and helping the refugees,
19 helping set up the camps. I was also as -- in my liaison function
20 between NATO and --
21 Q. I am sorry, I am sorry, I have to interrupt you. I'm interested
22 exclusively in your connection with NATO. I know from your statement
23 about what you did, but I'm interested in the connection between the KVM
24 and NATO and exactly what was the job of the liaison officer.
25 A. Every day I attended a NATO briefing along with other NGOs where
1 I was able to take notes of what was going on in general with a mission,
2 the operation, and I was able to put questions as well if we had any
3 questions about building refugee camps, helping refugees, and so on. It
4 was not a military activity. It was a coordinating activity. As at that
5 time, NATO was spending a lot of its time building refugee camps.
6 Q. At the same time it was bombing Yugoslavia. And you, as a member
7 of the KVM, an international organisation, were communicating with the
8 organisation that was at war with the FRY?
9 A. I was attending briefing meetings in the morning. I don't know
10 what you mean I was communicating or collaborating with the -- with NATO.
11 Q. Well, I asked you to explain to me the substance of that
12 connection. But tell me, who was the liaison officer? Who was liaising
13 within the KVM with the authorities of Yugoslavia at that time?
14 A. I believe there was one contact between the OSCE mission in
16 General Loncar about something, I can't remember what it was, but I don't
17 think there was very much negotiation at our level. If there was
18 negotiation going on, it would have been at the Vienna level, not at our
20 Q. Thank you. I'm only talking about the KVM, the
21 Verification Mission
22 OSCE. I'm talking about the same level on which you were communicating
23 on a daily basis with NATO. Did anyone on behalf of the KVM in Macedonia
24 or Albania
25 A. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.
1 Q. Thank you. According to the documentation that I have, in your
2 work you also communicated with Mr. Kotur?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Do you remember recognising on the footage, the equipment and
5 weapons belonging to the KLA? Equipment bearing a visible emblem of the
6 FBI, on caps?
7 A. Which footage? There was a -- I have a vague memory of seeing
8 somebody once with a -- someone in the KLA with an FBI hat, but I can't
9 remember where it was.
10 Q. That was in Pristina, if I may remind you, at the meeting with
11 Mr. Kotur.
12 A. And what was the footage? I'm sorry.
13 Q. I suppose it was actually photographs that were shown to you.
14 A. Fine. There is a vague memory of this.
15 Q. Thank you. And do you remember the comment, that the message of
16 the photo was clear in view of that emblem?
17 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
19 MS. GOPALAN: The witness has already said that he only has a
20 vague memory of these photographs, and he is now being asked further
21 questions about the photograph in question. I wonder if it's possible
22 for Defence counsel to show the witness the photograph in order to aid
23 him in answering the question.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Do you have the reference?
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't have the
1 photograph. I've just reminding the witness of a conversation about that
2 photograph. He said he had a vague memory, and I am asking him whether
3 he remembered the conclusion of that conversation, if he remembers what
4 he --
5 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ... the
6 conversation, Mr. Djurdjic.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski and Mr. Kotur.
8 I've already said that, at the beginning.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Are you putting to the witness that he had a
10 conversation with Mr. Kotur in which it was suggested that the presence
11 of an FBI hat was sending a very clear message? Is that what you are
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I only asked if he remembered
14 something like that being said as a conclusion when he was shown the
15 photograph. He said he remembered vaguely the photograph, now I'm asking
16 if he remembers the conclusion. I'm not trying to influence the witness.
17 I'm just asking if he recalls it or not, and then maybe later I'll
19 JUDGE PARKER: You are obscuring completely, as far as I'm
20 concerned at the moment what you are at, but perhaps, Colonel, you can
21 help us. Do you remember any comment about a hat in that conversation?
22 THE WITNESS: I can't. I could probably try and sort of put a
23 meaning on to it now, but I'm not sure if that's the meaning that would
24 have applied at the time, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Your own interpretation or imagination is not
1 something we are searching for today.
2 There you are, Mr. Djurdjic. Now, do you want to move on from
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No problem. I just tried to jog
5 the witness's memory.
6 Q. Is it true that you brought back some, or rather, sent back some
7 verifiers because they were reporting in a biased way?
8 A. I personally didn't, but I believe that a number of verifiers
9 were sent home for being biased, yes.
10 Q. Now, when I'm asking you these questions about the mission, I
11 know that you did not personally work in administration, but I'm asking
12 you about some personal knowledge that you may perhaps have. I don't
13 mean to imply that it was part of your own duties.
14 A. Yes, I understand.
15 Q. Witness, would you be so kind as to tell us something about your
16 visit to Decani on the 15th of January and what happened there, who were
17 you with and what happened?
18 A. It's quite a long story, but I'll try to make it shorter. The
19 actual plan was that on the -- on that date, the VJ -- sorry, the MUP
20 were going to exchange personnel at a forward observation post between
21 Decani and Jablanica and this was well inside what the KLA considered to
22 be their territory. And to ensure the safety of the personnel of the
23 MUP, they were going to be supported quite heavily with VJ and other
24 assets. And this looked as if it was going to become quite ugly, and it
25 could have turned up -- turned into another confrontation, armed
2 And so I spent the entire day negotiating with the MUP and with
3 the KLA, with Ramush Haradinaj, personally, to ensure that this thing
4 went smoothly and try to explain to everyone that it wasn't a
5 reinforcement but it was a exchange of personnel and the status quo would
6 remain the same. All went well until we actually tried to do the
7 procedure. After driving down this track for a few of kilometres, two of
8 my vehicles were leading, I was in the second vehicle, and we were
9 followed by a truck with a MUP personnel in it, and behind me I had
10 another vehicle belonging to the KVM. And unfortunately we came under
12 We were attacked and two of my personnel were wounded. And it
13 transpired that the firers were not Serb, but they were actually KLA
14 fighters who had a personal grudge against the OSCE. I think originally,
15 it was incorrectly reported as an attack by Serbian forces, but that was
16 later corrected.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up Exhibit
18 65 ter 00637. Second page, please.
19 Q. Witness, is this a press release by the KLA regarding this
20 incident of the 15th of January, you just discussed?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00161, Your Honours.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. May I now call up
3 65 ter 00638.
4 Q. Witness, this is another press release regarding the events of
5 the 8th of January at Dulje. Can you tell me what you know about this
7 A. I think basically what it says on the press release.
8 Q. Do you know that? Were you informed?
9 A. I wasn't there, so it was just what I read and what I had heard
10 about it.
11 Q. Does this press release reflect what you heard at the time?
12 A. I believe so, and we, I mean, Colonel Mijatovic -- whenever there
13 was such an attack took place would come to the meetings in the morning
14 at 10.00 and brief me about these incidents, yes.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to tender
16 this as well.
17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00162, Your Honours.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 65 ter 00643.
20 Q. Do you know and were you involved in an incident of
21 hostage-taking by the KLA on the 8th of January in Stari Trg?
22 A. I'm pretty sure I heard about it, but I don't think I was
23 involved in it.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's page 3 in this document.
1 Q. It says: 10.05 "Lieutenant-Colonel Ciaglinski called up DZ to
2 inform that verifiers were on the ground only 5 minutes away from VJ
4 A. Sorry, I need to read, I mean, I haven't seen this document for
5 some time, if ever. You threw this thing at me, I can't remember
6 immediately if I was there, involved, knew about it, read about it. Is
7 this the incident where the VJ soldiers were captured? Is this the one?
8 Right. Okay.
9 Q. It has to do with the eight soldiers.
10 A. Right. I remember now, yes, sorry, I was involved, quite
11 closely, intimately.
12 Q. And I see that you informed General DZ at least twice because you
13 were on the ground?
14 A. Probably.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I suggest that this document be
16 also admitted into evidence.
17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00163, Your Honours.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I'd like to refresh your memory now about these inspections of
21 border areas. Do you remember that, among other things, you spoke to
22 Mr. Tomislav Mladenovic on the Yugoslav side?
23 A. I can't remember, but it's possible.
24 Q. According to my information, he was deputy head of the
25 coordination team of the federal government in Pristina. Did you have a
1 meeting with him on the 18th of January regarding border inspections and
2 that this gentleman, or perhaps someone else you don't remember by name,
3 warned you that verifiers were still coming to the border area without
4 prior notification, and he said that every such visit needed to be
5 notified in advance?
6 A. We had several such meetings, so it's -- what you are saying
7 almost certainly happened, but exactly with whom and what date, I can't
9 Q. Thank you. According to the information I have, you replied that
10 you had your instructions about the procedure for border inspections and
11 that you had agreed a joint inspection with Colonel Kotur, which
12 inspection had been postponed because of the kidnapping of VJ soldiers,
13 and you were engaged personally in attempts to free them.
14 A. I remember that, yes.
15 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that on that occasion you said you were
16 visiting KLA prisoners in jail in Nis
17 the way they were treated?
18 A. In general, yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Ms. Gopalan.
22 MS. GOPALAN: The witness is being referred to previous
23 information, occasions that he spoke or information that the Defence
24 counsel has. I wonder if it will assist if the source of such
25 information is provided, whether it's a document or statement of prior
2 JUDGE PARKER: Clearly, Ms. Gopalan is at a disadvantage trying
3 to pick up if there is a reference to these incidents, Mr. Djurdjic. You
4 are simply asking the witness whether he recalls something. If you have
5 a particular documentary reference, it would help if you could give that.
6 Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have my notes of
8 the conversation, that's why I'm not showing them. I'm asking the
9 witness if he remembers the conversation. The notes originate from third
10 persons, and I'm just asking the witness to confirm whether something is
11 correct or not. What I have are notes, not witness statements, so I
12 can't use them with the witness.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, that clarifies the matter.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. We discussed something on Friday, and I told you I found a
16 reference in your documents to the fact that you prepared several times
17 for evacuation from the FRY. And in something written by Mr. Wilson, I
18 read the recommendation to all verifiers that they should have a suitcase
19 packed at every -- at all times.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I call up now D003-0860.
21 Q. I don't know if you know this document. It's dated
22 22nd January, 1999
23 verifiers from Kosovo. Are you familiar with this document?
24 A. Yes. Mm-hmm. I've seen it before.
25 Q. Thank God at that time there was no need for an evacuation;
1 right? On the 22nd of January. You remained in the territory of
2 Kosova and Metohija. Generally speaking, were you happy with your
3 withdrawal when you made decisions on it on the 17th and the 20th? And I
4 have in mind the way you were treated by FRY forces during your
6 A. It's relevant of, you know, what the situation at the time is.
7 Every international organisation has to have a withdrawal plan from any
8 theatre. Recently in Georgia
9 plan to withdraw and how we would withdraw from Georgia as a mission if
10 we had to. The situation was degenerating things were becoming more
11 difficult, and we believed that it was imperative to have an evacuation
12 plan that everybody was happy with and prepared for, so -- because if
13 the -- once the evacuation was announced, should it be necessary, then it
14 had to happen very quickly, within hours, not within days or weeks. And
15 we're not dealing with, I told you before, purely military personnel on
16 this mission, there are a lot of the personnel were civilians who had
17 very little experience with missions.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this
19 document, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00164, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Witness, while you were in Kosovo until the 24th, do you know of
24 any situations in which certain villages were vacant of their Albanian
25 population because that population had joined the KLA?
1 A. No, I did not personally, no.
2 Q. Thank you. Given that you are very familiar with
3 Kosova and Metohija during the relevant time, could you tell me this:
4 Where was the focus of all activity in Kosovo, and I don't mean the
5 Verification Mission
6 A. Well, there were certain pockets, as you well know, of activity,
7 there was a pocket in Podujevo; and to the west of it, there would have
8 been pockets in Stimlje, there would have been Orahovac, I mean, all over
9 the place there were pockets, Jablanica where Haradinaj had his
10 headquarters. That was a little area to the -- not exactly Jablanica
11 because that's where he was, but on the peripheries of that area. So
12 yes, there were many areas where the KLA had activity and the VJ and MUP
13 had an interest.
14 Q. Would you agree with me that for the most part activities took
15 place in the villages?
16 A. That's where most of the damage and fighting took place, yes.
17 Q. Can you describe for me the yard of a typical countryside
18 Albanian home?
19 A. Well, it depends if you are talking about one of the larger homes
20 with a wall around it and a number of dwellings inside. But normally
21 there were animals, there were haystack, wood piled up, hay piled up.
22 Animals, pigs, chickens -- no pigs, chickens. What else would you like?
23 Q. I'm not interested in that. I'm interested in the walls. What
24 were the walls made of and of what height were they?
25 A. Well, they varied a lot but, I mean, some of the bigger
1 properties had quite tall walls, over 2 metres, and quite solid. I never
2 personally examined the wall to see if it was made of rocks or mud, but I
3 was aware that the walls were there.
4 Q. Thank you. During your preparations to go to Kosovo, were you
5 told anything about the percentages of Albanian population in the
7 A. I'm not sure what you mean by country-side, but we were told
8 where major population areas were, and these were mainly rural people,
9 agricultural people living off the land, so we knew that they were all
10 over the place.
11 Q. Thank you. Witness, do you recall that in February 1999 - and
12 whether you were familiar with it - that there was an incident between
13 Lipovica and Magore which is 20 kilometres from Pristina, a police column
14 was ambushed by the KLA during which 15 policemen were injured?
15 A. Again, vague recollections. I can't remember exactly. But the
16 name Magore is somehow indelibly marked on my brain, so please reminds
18 Q. Yes. There was a meeting with Colonel Kotur. He told you about
19 it, and then you checked that over the phone and eventually confirmed his
20 allegations. The verifiers confirmed that on the spot. Do you remember
22 A. Vaguely, yeah.
23 Q. Thank you. Do you remember notifying Mr. Kotur about the visit
24 of Mr. Vollebaek, presiding officer of the OSCE? During that visit you
25 also acquainted Mr. Vollebaek with the Serb position resulting in
1 Mr. Kotur being satisfied with the information you shared with
2 Mr. Vollebaek?
3 A. Again, I can't remember exactly what was said or done. Again, I
4 remember that there was the -- Vollebaek came occasionally, and I might
5 have said something about this. I just can't remember that, I'm sorry.
6 Q. Very well. Do you remember your position that it was possible
7 that the KLA by provoking wanting to create conditions by a NATO
9 A. This was something I occasionally heard people discussing, that
10 it would be in their interest to create a situation which would force
11 someone else to intervene in the Kosovo crisis.
12 Q. Am I right in saying that on that occasion you stated that
13 Great Britain was not a KLA mentor?
14 A. I always said that, A, we had nothing to do with the KLA and
15 didn't in any way sponsor it or their terrorism, but I also, I believe,
16 mentioned that - and I said this on several occasions - that our
17 defence minister at the time I think it was Lord Robertson said that the
19 Kosovo. So I said if you are considering doing this to entice NATO to
20 come, you are barking up the wrong tree because we have no intention ever
21 of -- well, not me personally, but our UK government has no intention of
22 supporting a NATO action here.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have D003-0867 next.
25 This was not translated. In any case, I wanted to read out a part of it.
1 Q. This is an Official Note of a meeting held in Pristina on the
2 9th of February, 1999. In attendance was Richard Heaslip I think, if I'm
3 pronouncing that right, and Major-General Sretan Lukic.
4 Concerning what we have just discussed here, I wanted to say that
5 on that occasion, General Lukic informed Mr. Heaslip that the police had
6 information on the number of policemen at Kosovo that was forwarded to
7 the American KDOM. Once the agreement was signed, they had a role in the
8 OSCE, and they were also involved in the police withdrawal. They were
9 also forwarded a patrol map of the police and the different check-points
10 envisaged by the annex of the agreement, were you familiar with these
12 A. I wasn't aware of that meeting. I mean, that was a meeting I
13 probably wasn't at.
14 Q. Sir, there were many meetings, but I'm short on time and I cannot
15 go through all of them. In any case, such meetings were held between
16 representatives of the Kosovar Verification Mission and the police, and
17 you were not in attendance. There must be 20 or 30 of them, however, I
18 don't believe they are that important. Am I right in saying that other
19 people from KVM had meetings with police representatives in Pristina and
20 that you only attended those meetings which involved Mr. Loncar and the
22 A. No, I attended the meetings of the Cooperation Commission daily
23 in Pristina, but I told you before in my evidence that there were
24 meetings between the police, it was Guy Sands, I believe, originally he
25 used to go and have meetings with the MUP; and later on February, March,
1 I believe General Heaslip was talking to the MUP, yes. But the official
2 organ of exchange of information was the Commission.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My infallible associate just told
5 me that I had wrong information and that indeed we do have a translation
6 of this document. Therefore, I seek to tender it.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned D00165, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Do I take it you have more questions,
10 Mr. Djurdjic?
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I have some documents left.
12 I'm going through the documents. I wanted to show them to the witness
13 and then ...
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We must adjourn now for the second
16 break, Mr. Djurdjic. You may continue after the break, but I hope you
17 use the break to concentrate down to the matters that are important.
18 There must be time for re-examination of this witness so that he finishes
19 today. Thank you.
20 We resume at 5 minutes past 6.00.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 6.07 p.m.
24 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
1 MS. GOPALAN: While the witness is being brought in, I have a
2 procedural matter to raise.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 MS. GOPALAN: I should have raised this before the break, and I
5 wasn't sufficiently speedy. My apologies for that. This is to do with
6 the admission into evidence of D00165. And although it's been admitted,
7 we would like to object to its admission simply because we believe that a
8 sufficient basis hasn't been established for the document to be admitted
9 into evidence.
10 A part of it was read out. We subsequently were told that an
11 English translation was available, but in terms of the witness's comments
12 on the document, he said he wasn't aware of the meeting in question and
13 that it wasn't a meeting that he probably attended. That would be his
14 extent of information on that document which is not very much, and that
15 would be the basis of our objection.
16 JUDGE PARKER: We'll consider this as some later time. We want
17 to be sure to finish the witness.
18 MS. GOPALAN: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 [The witness takes the stand]
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 May I now call for Exhibit P841.
23 Q. Witness, you recognise this photograph, you said it was your
24 photograph. I'd like to ask you, What prevented you from filming such
25 documents that we don't see on this photograph?
1 A. It was just -- it was a large presence of Serbian security
2 forces, and I didn't really want to, sort of, annoy or upset people. I
3 mean, to give you an example, I already had an experience around this
4 time where I was threatened by some VJ soldiers with being shot just for
5 being in the wrong place elsewhere.
6 Q. Did you expose yourself to danger when making this photograph?
7 A. No, I didn't think so.
8 Q. What is your assessment of that documentation that was burnt?
9 What kind of documents were they?
10 A. They were all sorts. I took out several handfuls, and it was
11 application forms, documents, passports, ID cards.
12 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you, How come you were not afraid to take
13 those IDs and you were afraid to make photos?
14 A. Because I went behind the vehicle where I couldn't be seen where
15 I was taking those documents out of the pile of rubbish that was still
16 there, that was smouldering. You couldn't see me. You notice if I step
17 behind the vehicle, someone from the side here cannot see me. So I
18 opened the back of the car, you know, to make it look as if I was doing
19 something else, got a few handfuls of paper, and took them with me, put
20 them in the car.
21 Q. Why didn't you photograph them then?
22 A. I don't know. Because it was easier for me to just pick up some
23 handfuls of stuff and put -- at the time I thought it was a good idea to
24 just take some of the documents and put them in the car.
25 Q. Thank you. Would you agree that that building was supposed to be
1 turned over to the successor of the KVM or KFOR, whoever?
2 A. Well, I understand that certainly not the KVM - because the KVM
3 went back into the original building, I believe, where the OSCE was
4 before, which is up the road from this location - but I believe that some
5 agreement had been made for NATO to use part of this building.
6 Q. Is it normal for archives that are no longer necessary to be
8 A. I can't answer that question. I don't know.
9 Q. Thank you. When the KVM was evacuating from Pristina, did you
10 destroy archived material that you didn't want to carry with you?
11 A. We destroyed everything that, regardless of what it was, all
12 paperwork was shredded except what we could take out with us on disks or
13 hard drives. But for a different reason, it wasn't because it wasn't
14 needed, it was impossible to carry it all.
15 Q. Have you ever seen a single document of those that you took away
16 during any of the proceedings where you appeared as a witness?
17 A. Do you mean did I look at the documents that I took away? Yes, I
18 did. And I discussed it with the interpreter who looked at the documents
19 to tell me what they were.
20 Q. No, I'm asking you, Were you shown any of those documents that
21 you took away in the Milosevic trial or the Milutinovic trial, or in
22 these past two days in this courtroom?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Thank you. Let's stay on that period. You said you arrived
25 after the 13th of June. Do you know how many Serbs left Kosovo after the
1 NATO arrived in June 1999?
2 A. Thousands, I presume. I don't know exactly, but DZ and I spent a
3 lot of our time going around Kosovo trying to persuade the Serbian
4 population to remain.
5 Q. Were there any professional officers, professional policemen, who
6 lived in Kosovo and worked there?
7 A. There were. Of course there were professional policemen and
8 soldiers who lived in Kosovo, yes.
9 Q. Did they have to withdraw from Kosovo when the NATO forces
10 arrived under the agreement?
11 A. I honestly don't know, but I know that people like Colonel Kotur,
12 who was a professional officer, was trying to get me to help him to
13 retain his apartment in Kosovo. So I don't know if everybody in the VJ
14 had to leave, including people who actually were living there normally.
15 I don't know.
16 Q. I can't believe you don't know something like that. But let me
17 tell you, under the agreement, all the troops and the police of the FRY
18 had to leave Kosovo with a proviso that one day when the conditions are
19 ripe, a thousand of them come back to the border.
20 You said that troops and policemen were carrying looted property
21 on their way out of Kosovo, how do you know that they were carrying
22 looted property? How do you know that they were not carrying their own
23 property as they would have had to leave Kosovo?
24 A. Well, because I would have found it unlikely that virtually every
25 vehicle that was leaving was covered in some sort of personal property.
1 If what you are say is true, then a few of them would have been carrying
2 personal possessions such as wardrobes, refrigerators, and so on. But
3 not every vehicle. I mean, there were so many vehicles going out with
4 this type of equipment strapped to the top of it.
5 Q. Well, they had to move their entire moveable property from Kosovo
6 to Serbia
7 vehicle they had. By the way, if you were on the border with Macedonia
8 didn't you see Albanians come in with truckfuls and tractorfuls of
9 possessions when you were there in April 1999?
10 A. I would say that people who were leaving Kosovo at that time
11 going to Macedonia
12 Q. Very well. Thank you. I'd now like to come back to one incident
13 you told us about when verifiers were mistreated at the border in
14 contravention to the Vienna Agreement and the other covenants that were
16 Do you know that the FRY lodged in a protest to the mission
17 because of the conduct of personnel at the border with Macedonia on the
18 25th and 26th of February, 1999?
19 A. Well, there were accusations flying in both directions.
20 Q. Yes. But would you agree with me that first in two out of three
21 vehicles of the KVM there were no verifiers, only drivers who were
22 Yugoslav nationals?
23 A. Well, we used local drivers, whether they were Albanians or
24 Serbs. It was normal for the mission to use those sort of drivers. And
25 it's normal in every embassy in the world that it's locals who are
1 employed as drivers, but the vehicles still have diplomatic immunity.
2 Q. Witness, you know very well what I said. Yugoslav nationals,
3 regardless of ethnicity. But in those vehicles there were no members of
4 the mission, whereas under the agreement at least one member of the KVM
5 had to be in a KVM vehicle, the vehicle was not supposed to cross the
6 border with just the driver in it.
7 A. I wasn't aware of such a regulation.
8 Q. Thank you. Do you know that on the containers carried by those
9 vehicles, there were no diplomatic markings. There was no proper
10 inventory as envisaged by the Vienna Convention?
11 A. If it's a cargo vehicle, then I can understand you talking about
12 inventories, but ordinary diplomatic vehicles normally with diplomatic
13 personnel in them don't require this type of inventory.
14 Q. And do you know that among other things those vehicles carried
15 optical sights, a case for a pistol, chemical and other substances, and
16 other equipment that were subject to declaration?
17 A. I am aware of the pistol case being sent because there was always
18 a discussion whether the body-guards for the ambassador or for senior
19 members of the mission should be armed. And that was never allowed. And
20 although this pistol case might have come, it's a leather pouch, but
21 there was no pistol, and no one had arms. Chemicals, what chemicals?
22 Are we talking about Sarin? I doubt. Maybe bleach or chemicals for
23 photography or photocopiers, optical sights or binoculars? I don't know
24 what you mean by this.
25 Q. Regardless, medical and chemical substances must be declared at
1 the border. In this specific case, the persons who were at the border
2 did not do that.
3 A. Well, I'm pretty sure that if the vehicle is coming in with
4 diplomatic personnel, and in the case of this - I know for a fact - in
5 the case of this leather holster for the weapon, the diplomats, the KVM
6 members, were actually in their vehicles. I don't believe it has to
7 provide any inventory at all of what is in that vehicle. The vehicle is
8 not subject to search.
9 Q. Witness, in the introductory part, I told you that two members of
10 the Kosovo Verification Mission were in one vehicle, whereas the other
11 two vehicles held no members of the mission, just Yugoslav drivers; and
12 under the Vienna Convention, the goods in the vehicles needed to be
13 declared, that's why a protest was lodged to the federal commission for
14 the -- for cooperation of the FRY.
15 Never mind. Do you know that on the 25th of February a KLA
16 action to the south-west of Kacanik was noted and DZ put in his comment:
17 "The first appearance of the KLA in this area."
18 A. I remember, yes, something about this, yes.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Gopalan.
20 MS. GOPALAN: Your Honours, perhaps the source of this comment
21 could be provided.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic?
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I just said chronology, item 112,
24 25th February, 1999
25 Q. Witness, I'm interested in something else. This was just a
1 reference. Can you explain why the KLA appeared in this area on the 25th
2 of February, which was followed by a series of other incidents? I'm
3 asking you as an intelligence officer.
4 A. Speculation again. There was a void, they were filling a void,
5 an empty space that provided an opportunity. Kacanik is a strategically
6 important area, obviously, so maybe that's the reason they might have
7 been there.
8 Q. Do you know that the Kacanik canyon, the Kacanik gorge, is the
9 only passage to the FRY and when NATO reaches Urosevac they need not stop
10 before Belgrade
11 A. You are assuming of course, that NATO was going to come through
12 Kacanik, and it wasn't going to go straight from Kumanovo and straight up
13 from that way. Much easier and less troublesome than going through a
14 narrow gorge, if they are heading for Belgrade.
15 Q. I don't know if I was interpreted correctly. I meant when they
16 were going from Macedonia
17 Urosevac there are no more obstacles towards Belgrade
18 the strategic path for NATO if an aggression occurs.
19 A. It's certainly one way of NATO entering, but it was the most
20 dangerous and the one that would have caused the greatest number of
21 casualties, and I believe NATO had other options as well.
22 Q. Thank you. And do you know anything about Operation Arrow and
23 the cooperation between the KLA and NATO?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call for 6D -- sorry.
2 Never mind.
3 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Ciaglinski, the meeting of the 5th of March
4 with Colonel Ademovic at the MUP headquarters in Pristina?
5 A. I think so, vaguely again, but I need reminding.
6 Q. That was on the 5th of March. It had to do with the protest
7 launched to the Verification Mission claiming that it obstructed passage
8 on the road Pristina-Pec.
9 A. I'm still no wiser at the moment.
10 Q. Very well. Thank you. And do you recall that on the
11 10th of March you spoke to Colonel Kotur and that you told him that in
12 Kacanik and Ivaje some houses were damaged but that was far from what the
13 KLA was claiming and what certain media reported? And you said there
14 were witnesses on the ground who would deny such claims of the KLA in
15 their reports.
16 A. I remember it well.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My last question and my last
18 document: 65 ter 00641. It's an evaluation of the KLA positions as of
19 15th March, 1999
20 Q. But that's not what I want to ask you. I'm interested in item
21 4(a). 4(a), do you see this passage:
22 "In the course of preparations for the operation, brigade
23 commander of the KLA for this area did not allow the UNHCR to evacuate
24 displaced persons. This was interpreted as a cynical attempt to use
25 Albanian civilians as human shields."
1 Do you remember this?
2 A. No.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. This is already an
4 exhibit. I would in fact have a lot more to discuss with you, Colonel,
5 but thank you for your answers. I must leave some time for the
6 Prosecution as well. Thank you, Your Honours, for your patience. I have
7 completed my cross-examination.
8 May I just tender 65 ter 650.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Which is that one? What is that?
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That's the document dated
11 26 February -- [in English] 26 February 1999
12 Organisation for Security and Cooperation. [Interpretation] That's lines
13 -- sorry, pages of the transcript 40 and 41.
14 JUDGE PARKER: The reference you have seems to be a document
15 dated the 23rd of December, 1998. Is that the one that you meant?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. My infallible assistant is
17 correcting me again. I was wrong. In any case, I don't want to take up
18 any time. Let's leave this to Ms. Gopalan, and I will seek to tender
19 this particular document through another witness.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
21 You re-examine, Ms. Gopalan.
22 Re-examination by Ms. Gopalan:
23 Q. Good afternoon, sir. I have a few questions for you arising from
24 Defence counsel's cross-examination. I'd first like to begin with
25 document P839. In the interest of time, I don't think it's necessary to
1 call up the document, but just to remind you, you were referred to a
2 section in this document that spoke about armed civilians. That was in
3 today's transcript at page 39, 16. And in response to Defence counsel's
4 questions, you responded that from this reference in the document, it was
5 impossible to tell if this reference was to Serbs or Albanians. Do you
6 recall that, sir?
7 A. I do.
8 Q. Now, taking a step back from this document, just speaking about
9 armed civilians generally, you had testified last week about armed
10 civilians whom you saw in Kosovo, and for the Court's reference, this is
11 at page 5284. And just to remind you, you were asked about the arming of
12 Serb civilians, and you said that this was discussed at the Commission
13 with Colonel Mijatovic, General Loncar, and Kotur.
14 Now, in relation to these armed civilians, the ones you discussed
15 with General Loncar, and General Kotur, and the ones who you say you also
16 saw in the field, are you able to help us with whether these were
17 Albanian armed civilians or Serb armed civilians?
18 A. Although it was impossible to tell, you know, from that statement
19 who they were, as it was an area where there were Serbs. It was a
20 Serbian area. It's more than likely that they would have been Serbs as
21 opposed to Albanians. Albanian civilians were not normally armed. The
22 only people in the KLA -- sorry, on the Albanian side would have been the
23 KLA; and although they had no uniform, they usually had some vestige of
24 uniform whether it was a white band wrapped around their arm indicating
25 which sort of group they belonged to or so on. So if you saw somebody
1 without any of this, then it was probably a civilian. And in this case
2 it was more likely -- the probability was more likely to be a Serb than
3 it was to be an Albanian.
4 Q. Thank you. And just to clarify, if you recall, where was it you
5 saw such civilians in Kosovo?
6 A. Well, usually in the Serb villages.
7 Q. And if you recall, are you able to name any such villages?
8 A. Many. Top of my head I can't, no.
9 Q. Thank you. And in terms of time-frame, again if you recall, when
10 did you see these civilians in Serb villages, as you say?
11 A. This would have been in the final part of our, sort of, stay in
13 Q. Would you be able to clarify the time-frame for that, please?
14 A. Well, it was certainly in the last three, four weeks, there
15 about, four or five weeks.
16 Q. Thank you. Are you able to provide any information on how these
17 Serb civilians obtained their arms, if you know?
18 A. I was told by the members of the Commission that they were issued
19 the weapons.
20 Q. And who issued them with these weapons, sir?
21 A. I believe -- I don't know -- I can't remember exactly, it was the
22 VJ or the MUP; but they were issued locally in the local villages.
23 Q. Thank you very much, sir.
24 I'd now like to move on to another topic.
25 MS. GOPALAN: If we could call up P836, please.
1 Q. Sir, you will see on your screen shortly that this is the
2 Shaun Byrnes Agreement. And I would like to take you to paragraph 2 of
3 this document. This is in relation to the process of notification.
4 That's what paragraph 2 is referring to.
5 Now, in relation to paragraph 2 and the notification requirements
6 set out in this paragraph, could you tell us, please, what was your
7 understanding of how this process of notification would operate?
8 A. Well, there would be some official document, probably following a
9 meeting with the Commission or directly between the MUP and our
10 representative who would first of all inform us and then give us a
11 written document explaining why and what they were intending to do and
12 where, which never happened.
13 Q. And in terms of time-frame, are you able to provide any
14 information on such meetings, if such notification was ever provided?
15 A. Well, to my knowledge, no such information was ever provided.
16 Q. Thank you, sir.
17 MS. GOPALAN: I'd now like to call up P837, and that's the
18 Clark-Naumann Agreement. And if we could go to page 4, please.
19 Q. And you were shown this paragraph by Defence counsel today. I'm
20 interested in the sentence that refers to the right to respond adequately
21 and proportionately to any form of terrorist activity. When you were
22 asked about this paragraph, you responded saying that the only thing that
23 doesn't apply is the word "proportionality," what do you mean by your
24 statement when you said "proportionality did not apply"?
25 A. Well, if gunmen are sitting in the house, the sniper are sitting
1 in the house and shooting at the Serbian security forces and causing
2 injury and death, then obviously the legal authorities have the right to
3 deal with him. And you can deal with him in any number of ways,
4 including totally destroying the building in which he is sitting. That's
5 quite fair. It's extreme, but it's fair. But it's unfair to shell the
6 entire village, you know, in order to try and flush him out of the
8 And this we know -- we saw a number of times where this sort of
9 thing was happening, including the, sort of, the, again, west of Podujevo
10 and Lapastica, and those sort of areas there where extreme force was used
11 by the MUP against a doctor's house which was, you know, totally
12 destroyed, ransacked and everybody in the area was killed, wiped out.
13 That that was disproportionate, and we did preach
14 proportionality. And that's why when Defence counsel spoke about the
15 area to the south near the salient coming into Kosovo. The reason that
16 the action there carried out by the Serbian security forces was
17 proportionate is, I think, they were beginning to sort of listen to what
18 we were saying because it was, A, giving them bad press.
19 I mean, the terrible thing about disproportionality is the press
20 lives on this, and we were try to say, Look, if you want a better image,
21 if you want to, sort of, be seen as defending yourself against
22 terrorists, then, you know, behave proportionately and appropriately.
23 And I believe that there was a phase when that was happening. And Racak
24 was an example, after Racak, the funeral, as was Kacanik.
25 Q. Thank you sir. And in terms of conveying such information on
1 proportionality to the commission, could you comment on how such
2 information was provided, if at all, to the commission?
3 A. In endless discussions on how we sort of dealt with these types
4 of problems, for example, from our experience working in Northern Ireland
5 which is a sort of similar situation with terrorists and urban warfare
6 with people with no uniforms.
7 Q. Thank you. Are you able to provide a rough figure on how often
8 such issues arose during the meetings that you had with the commission,
9 discussions about proportionality that is?
10 A. I would say right from the very beginning. It was started even
11 earlier on when General DZ was leading the meetings, and it went on
12 throughout the entire time we were there. It never stopped.
13 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that there was an improvement from the
14 time Racak occurred. Are you able to give an example of an extreme case
15 where proportionality wasn't adhered to as a contrast? If you recall.
16 A. Yes, I mean, the -- I mean, we saw an extraordinary thing one day
17 where the troops were -- this is VJ was carrying out a live-fire exercise
18 but against a village. There were two villages down range of the
19 artillery and tanks, and they were just firing, and we said, you know,
20 Why are you doing this? They said, Well, we are training. I said,
21 Aren't the villagers -- aren't there villagers? They said, Yes, but we
22 told them to leave, but they decided that they were going to take these
23 villagers out and just shell the entire area.
24 Q. In terms of time-frame, do you recall when this was?
25 A. In the new year. That was the new year.
1 Q. In the new year. And the names of the villages, if you recall,
2 or if not, the general vicinity?
3 A. It's the Vucitrn area again.
4 Q. Thank you, sir. Moving on to my final topic, this is the UN
5 resolution that was shown to you today by Defence counsel.
6 MS. GOPALAN: Could I call up D160, please.
7 Q. Sir, you were asked a number of questions today about this
8 UN resolution. Could you tell us, if you know, what were the background
9 circumstances that led to the adoption of this resolution in
10 September 1998?
11 A. Well, it was a whole series, a whole period of worsening
12 situation in Kosovo, and various, sort of, cease-fires, various lulls.
13 But it got worse and worse and eventually there were a series of
14 activities by the Serbian security forces which hit the headlines and,
15 you know, they have now, sort of, gone into almost Albanian folklore as
16 to what happened in these areas, the deaths that were caused.
17 And they were just, sort of, NATO got involved and as with
18 activation order for the bombing threatened Mr. Milosevic, and that's how
19 it just developed.
20 Q. Thank you. And this whole period of the worsening situation in
21 Kosovo, are you able to provide a rough time-frame of what this period
23 A. It was several years it went over, two or three years.
24 Q. Thank you. And these incidences that hit the headlines that were
25 caused by the Serbian security forces, again, if you recall, when did
1 this happen?
2 A. I've just gone out of my mind, but I think they were somewhere in
3 the area of Klina and that was the sort of area this happened.
4 Q. When did this happen?
5 A. In the year before, I think, we came in.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. Sorry, brain is drained.
8 Q. That's fine. It's been a long day. Thanks for that, sir.
9 MS. GOPALAN: I do not have any further questions for you sir,
10 thank you very much.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Gopalan.
12 You will be pleased to know, Colonel, that we have finished, that
13 you will be able to get away. We thank you once again for your
14 attendance and for the assistance you've been able to give. We are sorry
15 that you had to be -- continue today over the weekend. The court officer
16 will show you out, but we thank you again for your attendance.
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, thank you very much, indeed, for your
18 indulgence as well.
19 [The witness withdrew]
20 JUDGE PARKER: Clearly no point in contemplating a fresh witness
21 at this hour. So we will adjourn until tomorrow, but before doing so,
22 could I mention, Ms. Gopalan, or Ms. Kravetz, a concern the Chamber has
23 that the witness notifications for the next two weeks following this week
24 are each for only four witnesses, and they are in each apparent case
25 witnesses with which the Prosecution will not be long. In most cases
1 half an hour, at the most I think an hour. It ought to be possible with,
2 other than extensive witnesses, to finish at least five witnesses in a
3 week, and if we are to keep this Prosecution proceeding at a reasonable
4 pace, we need to set that sort of general objective.
5 There will be longer witnesses unquestionably, and time, as
6 usual, will be allowed. There will be times when witnesses may even be
7 shorter, and we can think of six or seven in a week. But to be setting
8 for relatively routine witnesses, a programme of only four in a five-day
9 week, is in the Chamber's view not an adequate rate of progress. So that
10 if you could convey that to Mr. Stamp and try and ensure that there is
11 some attention to that.
12 And we would ask all counsel to bear in mind our growing concern
13 that we are not making an adequate rate of progress, and the Chamber will
14 therefore become more insistent about the rate at which we progress
15 through the witnesses.
16 Thank you for that. We now adjourn until tomorrow morning at
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.54 p.m.
19 to be reconvened on Wednesday the 3rd day of
20 June, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.