1 Monday, 8 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. We understand there is a matter
6 to be raised by the Prosecution and a matter to be raised by the Defence.
7 Are they the same matter? It seems that they may be the same matter.
8 This is the question of exhibits for the next witness.
9 Do you want to have first go, Mr. Djurdjic?
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I don't like
11 starting our working week with an objection, but I have to. I don't know
12 whether Mr. Stamp should go first in terms of introduction and then
13 respond to our objection. In any case, it may not be relevant. We
14 wanted to raise an issue which would be raised in any case eventually
15 during the day.
16 I'll start by drawing a broad picture which has to do with the
17 use of certain witnesses as expert witnesses in a broad sense of the
18 word. By this I mean that these people were in certain positions at the
19 relevant time and then they are asked to offer their comments and
20 interpretations of certain things, which as fact witnesses they would not
21 be able to. On the other hand, they frequently discuss matters that can
22 only be weighed by the Bench itself and used in the judgement.
23 What is interesting in terms of the next witness is that he was
24 retired between 1992 and 1999. He was reinstated and in one part of the
25 relevant period for this indictment he was in active duty and was an
1 eye-witness. We know of the position that certain witnesses, due to
2 their tasks at the time, can provide us with significant assistance. I
4 Namely, Defence believes that one needs to prepare differently when one
5 needs to hear an expert witness pursuant to Rule 94, I believe; and it is
6 another matter when we hear fact witnesses be live or pursuant to 92 ter.
7 When it comes to witnesses, Defence comes up with its own witness,
8 analyses the documents commented upon by the witness of the other party.
9 We know what their opinion is, we know what their finding is, and then we
10 argue facts. And it is up to the Bench to see whether their witness
11 testimony is viable or not.
12 With fact witnesses used as expert witnesses, this becomes far
13 more difficult to do.
14 Now to go back to the issue of proposed exhibits and the
15 expansion of the 65 ter list. Defence received from the Prosecution a
16 request to amend their 65 ter list which was on Friday, the 5th of June,
17 this year after 5.00 p.m.
18 Prosecutor seeks to amend and add items to the 65 ter list by means of
19 nine new exhibits or documents.
20 On Sunday, the 7th of June of this year, at 6.00 p.m., the
21 Prosecutor contacted Defence with a filing which was a corrigendum or an
22 addendum to their filing of the 5th of June, stating that by mistake an
23 additional eight documents were omitted. In both these filings the
24 Prosecutor seeks to expand its 65 ter list by these new 17 documents.
25 This fact alone, that is to say that we have quite a large number of
1 documents, poses a problem for the Defence given the resources that we
3 Another issue is that all of those 17 documents is something that
4 the Prosecutor envisaged to use during this witness's testimony today.
5 The reasons that the Prosecutor states for which they seek to add these
6 documents are as follows. One of them is omission, oversight. These
7 documents are of great importance for these proceedings. Defence
8 believes that this was no oversight on the part of the OTP or that these
9 are not important documents for the following reasons. Today's witness
10 has been on the 65 ter list of the OTP as of 1 September 2008. As of
11 that time, there was an initial list of documents pursuant to 65 ter that
12 the Prosecutor had planned to use. We believe that that 65 ter list,
13 which was forwarded at that stage, enabled both the Chamber and Defence
14 to prepare themselves given the scope, the volume, of the documents to be
15 studied and prepared.
16 After 1 September 1998
17 14th of January a request that this witness be heard under Rule 92 ter;
18 having in mind this proposal, the Prosecutor at that time put forth some
19 exhibits and documents that were to be used during that witness's
20 testimony. They stated the documents they intended to use. In that
21 submission, we find none of the 17 documents they are seeking to
22 introduce now.
23 I would particularly like to point out that Defence is aware of
24 the technical problems that the OTP may run into, particularly since we
25 will face the same problems once our case begins and that none of the
1 dead-lines are set in stone and that one needs to interpret those
3 However, we received the Prosecutor's report on the
4 25th of May, 2009, stating that this witness will be heard this week. He
5 was the first person on the list for the week. In the course of the past
6 11 days, the Prosecutor did not notify Defence of their wish to expand
7 the 65 ter list with the documents to be used -- put through to this
8 witness. They did so for the first time last Friday and then yesterday
10 I would like to state that this witness testified twice before
11 this Tribunal in the Milosevic case and the Milutinovic case, and that we
12 find it strange that after such two cases they only discover relevant
13 documents now, some relevant documents that should be admitted through
14 this witness here today.
15 I would like to tell the Chamber that some, perhaps most of these
16 documents, were disclosed to Defence at the end of last week. And some,
17 although disclosed earlier, were not marked as documents to be heard
18 during the testimony of this witness, it was pursuant to our request.
19 Several other Chambers from other proceedings ordered that these
20 documents be disclosed to us. We believed that we might find some of
21 those documents useful during our case. That disclosure was not done for
22 the sake of the Prosecutor, and in the 65 ter list of the OTP we now find
23 some of such documents as I have already stated.
24 In addition to the request to expand the list with the
25 17 documents, we simultaneously received a set of documents under
1 Rule 66. All those documents, if we put them together, have over 1.000
2 pages. Defence was physically unable to even leaf through those
3 documents, so as to be able to prepare within this very short period.
4 Your Honours, I believe that there are no justified reasons to
5 accept this 65 ter list expansion with the 17 documents put forth by the
6 Prosecutor. Defence also wanted to tell you that in all likelihood those
7 documents are relevant for this case, as all of the documents we have
8 used so far were. I don't think there was a single document that was
9 irrelevant for the proceedings. Still, one has to raise the issue of
10 criteria of admission in this case and whether some documents - although
11 I may be skipping ahead -- and if all documents can be introduced through
12 any which witness. One such witness was shown a document signed by a
13 person whose signature he could recognise. For example, I'm now quite
14 familiar with Mr. Stamp's signature by now. Does that mean that I can
15 testify to the veracity of his signature and whether that document could
16 be admitted solely on that basis? That is why I believe that this Bench,
17 in keeping with its earlier decisions, should try to regulate or channel
18 the principle used when admitting documents; and to reiterate our
19 request, we seek that the Prosecutor not be allowed to expand their
20 65 ter list with those 17 documents. Thank you.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
22 Mr. Stamp.
23 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 I think I should start by agreeing and accepting what my friend
25 said, that these documents are clearly relevant and probative to the
1 issues before the Court. I also concede, as in the -- as indicated in
2 the filing, that these documents were missed by oversight. I -- looking
3 at the numbers, I see that it is likely that many or most of them were
4 documents that were brought by various of the Defence teams in the
5 Milutinovic case.
6 And I also agree with counsel that when we are handing such a
7 huge mass of material in cases of this nature that oversights will occur,
8 and he did concede that he expected that when his time comes there will
9 be such oversights with documents, although I'm not sure I would take the
10 same position as he normally takes when these things occur.
11 That being said, Your Honour, I wish to submit that the primary
12 consideration is whether or not the prejudice to the Defence is undue and
13 cannot be remedied. The Prosecution sought to add these documents at
14 this time because this is a witness who can identify them, and the
15 Prosecution at this stage will not be asking the witness to discuss the
16 contents of these documents.
17 However, it is also mentioned that the countervailing issue is
18 whether or not a witness who is here who can comment on documents which
19 both parties accept and agree are relevant to the issues before the
20 Chamber, whether he should be allowed to comment on these documents or to
21 at least identify them or if we should just allow him to leave without
22 being given the opportunity.
23 I also seek to mention and I mention that this is an application
24 to just expand the list so that he could be shown these documents and
25 comment on it -- on them. And depending on whether or not in the course
1 of time when the witness is in The Hague - and we could ask him if he
2 will remain here for a day or two more - the Defence could consider over
3 that period of time whether or not these additional documents would
4 prejudice them in terms of their preparation and if they would have
5 additional questions for that witness.
6 So although I -- there are many areas where I agree with counsel,
7 especially as regards relevance and probative value of the documents and
8 the fact that -- and this is not an excuse, it is just a reality that
9 sometimes these things happen in respect to managing so many
10 documents - I think the Court should consider the balance of prejudice
11 and whether it is irremediable. And I think we, the Prosecution, can
12 take steps to accommodate the Defence if they have problems reviewing
13 these 17 documents to give them an opportunity to do whatever
14 preparations they might want to address these documents with the witness
15 while he is in The Hague
16 add them to the list, Your Honours, it was a review of the documents
17 relate that he could legitimately comment on that caused us to believe
18 that it would benefit the Court if the witness, while here in The Hague
19 exercised his opportunity to do so.
20 And those are my submissions, Your Honour. I would respectfully
21 ask that he just be allowed to comment the issue as to whether or not
22 they be received in evidence, be reserved, and he will be in The Hague
23 for a few days. Your Honours, the issue of prejudice probably will be
24 remedied in those days while he is here, and we could undertake to let
25 him remain for a little longer, if there are problems.
1 May it please Your Honours.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp, before you sit, do I understand
3 correctly that in most cases these 17 documents were tendered in evidence
4 in the Milutinovic case?
5 MR. STAMP: Yes. Yes, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE PARKER: In all cases?
7 MR. STAMP: All of these 17 documents, Your Honours, yes.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Were they tendered in the Milosevic case?
9 MR. STAMP: No, Your Honours, not all of them. I am not sure if
10 any of them were. I do believe that -- I know that not all of them were
11 but I'm not sure if any --
12 JUDGE PARKER: In the Milutinovic case were they tendered by the
13 Prosecution or the Defence?
14 MR. STAMP: Most of them were tendered by the Prosecution. I can
15 see by the numbers, but I am not sure of some of them, of the last -- the
16 last six. I could probably get verification of that.
17 JUDGE PARKER: So they were Prosecution documents for the
18 purposes of the Milutinovic case?
19 MR. STAMP: I believe the last six were. I'm just looking at the
20 numbers and --
21 JUDGE PARKER: The numbers may not provide an answer. It depends
22 whether a document was merely put to a witness by the Defence but not
23 tendered, and it might then be tendered in re-examination, you see.
24 MR. STAMP: Indeed, indeed, Your Honours. So -- I -- the numbers
25 indicate to me that the majority were tendered and brought by the
1 Defence; however, those that might be from the numbers, Prosecution
2 documents, they might also have been brought by the Defence. I could not
3 be sure about that here and now.
4 JUDGE PARKER: If they were Prosecution documents, the question
5 of how an omission of this nature could occur becomes more pressing. Are
6 you able to assist us in any particular about that?
7 MR. STAMP: I do know that in reviews of the documents from the
8 Milosevic [sic] case an effort was made - and there was a short period of
9 time, but I'm not complaining about the time we had between that one case
10 to move on to this case - an effort was made to winnow out of the
11 material in the MOS case which was huge. Some of the material that we
12 thought might not be of -- of great importance to the issues, the
13 separate issues in this case; and it is probable that in that exercise
14 which was done very quickly between the end of the MOS case and when we
15 had to file the 65 ters that these might have been removed. These are
16 all military documents and that is a -- I think that is the probable
18 JUDGE PARKER: When you say "MOS" case you mean --
19 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry --
20 JUDGE PARKER: -- Milutinovic and others.
21 MR. STAMP: Milutinovic. I'm so sorry for that.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic also mentioned being served at the
23 same time or about the same time with a total of over 1.000 pages of
25 MR. STAMP: I am trying to make inquiries into that,
1 Your Honours. I do know that when we receive what are called -- when we
2 receive searchs of the system of documents that relate to the witness,
3 any material that the witness has testified before is disclosed
4 immediately or as soon as possible to the Defence. What I believe is the
5 situation in this case is that his testimony in the Milosevic case, his
6 testimony in the Milutinovic case, and all of his testimony related to
7 the matters that are before this Court was disclosed to Defence a long
8 time ago, from early in the case and probably again when the 65 ters were
10 I am not sure what material the counsel for the Defence is
11 speaking of, but there might have been documents that came up on recent
12 searches that related to evidence that he might have given in other cases
13 or in Belgrade
14 evidence archives that came -- that have come up in searches and have
15 been disclosed to the Defence. These would be disclosed as soon as the
16 searches reveal that we have them, but if -- I could only give precise
17 answers if I'm told what precisely those documents were that he speaks
18 of, but the practice is to disclose this material as soon as they come up
19 in the electronic searches of the archives.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Now, even in this case you seem to have had two
21 bites at the cherry; the original motion, and then on Sunday evening
22 another group of documents. Is there a simple reason why that should
23 have occurred?
24 MR. STAMP: That -- without going too much into administrative
25 issues, that was just a miscommunication on my part. I probably should
1 say as to what documents should be included, what documents we would want
2 to show him -- show the witness.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
4 Do you have more, Mr. Djurdjic?
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Defence is open for cooperation.
6 I think Mr. Stamp put a proposal acceptable to us, and I believe it will
7 contribute to a more efficient proceedings. There will be a need that we
8 be given some time, given that this will obviously last a few days at
9 least. I see that the Prosecutor put five hours for this live testimony,
10 and that will probably increase, during which time we'll be able to study
11 those documents. I've just received information that we haven't even
12 identified some eight documents that we received. We would need precise
13 reference, and we will do our utmost to process these documents; however,
14 we stand by that part of our objection requesting that the Bench should
15 see to it that some documents be not introduced through this witness that
16 we believe should not be introduced through him. This refers to his
17 expertise. And it's a different issue whether such documents could be
18 admitted through this witness if he were used as an expert witness or if
19 this is merely a signature recognition witness, as I have just explained,
20 who says, Well, I simply passed by this or that building, and I know
21 where that was.
22 In any case, we will make an effort, along the proposal of
23 Mr. Stamp, to do this. Perhaps we may require a little bit more time to
24 prepare, provided all these documents can be admitted through this
1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE PARKER: We are thankful for the submissions of counsel.
4 The Chamber takes the view at the moment that this very unfortunate
5 chapter may be able to be dealt with without undue difficulty and
6 without, certainly, undue prejudice to the Defence if as each of these 17
7 documents are reached in the course of evidence of the witness, the issue
8 of whether the witness is able to speak of personal knowledge or not is
9 raised and able to be dealt with. So that if there's a document which is
10 beyond the scope of what is properly the evidence of that person as a lay
11 witness, that matter can be dealt with that way. Clearly we will need to
12 deal with each document separately to reach a decision on that subject.
13 With respect to the bulk of the submission, the question of
14 whether or not the documents can be admitted in evidence will depend upon
15 the degree of prejudice and whether it can be overcome with some moderate
16 delay to enable the Defence to give consideration to the document. We
17 say that accepting, as counsel has, the clear likelihood of relevance and
18 of reliability of these documents. And we there focus our attention on
19 the question of prejudice, and we do that against the background that no
20 real justification is offered which would enable us to adjust the scales
21 in favour of the Prosecution.
22 So we must look at this from the eyes of the Defence and look at
23 the question of prejudice accordingly. But it does seem to us that it
24 could well prove to be the case that if documents are considered and
25 marked for identification, it will be possible in the course of the week
1 for Mr. Djurdjic to be in a position to cross-examine in respect of those
2 documents, even if it does mean that we move to the next witness, deal
3 with the next witness, and then come back to finish the evidence of this
4 witness, that could well give additional time. We will see.
5 So the position becomes this, Mr. Stamp, and I'm sure you will be
6 thankful for Mr. Djurdjic, for his cooperative attitude, that you can
7 proceed and present these documents to the witness. They will not be
8 admitted into evidence at this stage, though. If they are used, they
9 will be marked for identification. And we will then, if necessary, delay
10 the cross-examination on those documents, perhaps by having another
11 witness called and dealt with before coming back to this, and we will see
12 whether by that process the prejudice that clearly is presently obtaining
13 can be overcome to enable the matter to be dealt with and the evidence to
14 be admitted.
15 Is that clear?
16 MR. STAMP: Yes. Thank you very much, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 We are ready then for the witness.
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please read aloud the affirmation which
23 is shown to you now.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 WITNESS: ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down.
4 Mr. Stamp has some questions for you.
5 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Examination by Mr. Stamp:
7 Q. Good afternoon, General Vasiljevic. Can we start by you telling
8 us your full name and your date of birth.
9 A. My name is Aleksandar Vasiljevic, I was born on the
10 8th of July, 1938. Place of birth Vitkovic, municipality of Kraljevo, in
12 Q. I understand that you had a long career in the military. Can you
13 give us an outline, a brief outline, of your career in the military of
14 Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia and Serbia from start to finish.
15 A. After secondary school, I graduated from the military academy in
16 1961. For three years I occupied command posts in units. In 1964 I was
17 admitted into security organs of the Yugoslav People's Army; after that,
18 I graduated from a one-year security school. And throughout all the time
19 until 1988, I occupied security positions from basic positions within a
20 battalion to the highest-level duties in the army and in the
21 Federal Secretariat for People's Defence.
22 In the meantime, I graduated from command staff academy in 1973,
23 and I graduated also the war college, as it was called then, or the
24 National Defence School
25 Sarajevo army into the security administration in Belgrade as head of the
1 counter-intelligence department. After that, since I had met the
2 conditions for promotion into the rank of general, the criteria being
3 that I had to leave the security apparatus and occupy some other posts
4 outside the security service, so within -- between 1988 to 1990 I was a
5 division -- motorised division commander in Sarajevo, where I received my
6 rank of general.
7 After that, I was transferred back to the security
8 administration. I was assistant head or deputy head of the security
9 administration in 1991. In June, I became head of the security
10 administration of the JNA. I held that post until the 8th of May, 1992,
11 when I was pensioned off among a large number of generals; 70 generals
12 were pensioned off in that wave, halving practically the body of generals
13 of the former JNA.
14 I was retired until the 27th of April, 1999, when I was
15 re-activated under the war conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia at the
16 time. I was appointed deputy head of the security service of the VJ.
17 One year later, I was appointed security advisor to the
18 Chief of the General Staff, and I was pensioned off again towards the end
19 of 2000 -- and on the 31st of March, 2001, officially my duties ceased.
20 Q. Thank you. When you were pensioned off in 1992, what was your
22 A. I was major-general at the time, and in 1999 I was promoted to
24 Q. And when you ended your service in the VJ in 2001, what was your
1 A. I was lieutenant-general at the time.
2 Q. Now, in the course of your career in the JNA and later on when it
3 became the VJ, did you receive awards and decorations for your work?
4 A. Yes. There is a number of decorations. First of all, I have to
5 explain that there was a practice whereby if you are successful in your
6 post on average every five years one can receive a medal or a decoration.
7 Out of those decorations that I received, there is one which is not your
8 run-of-the-mill decoration. In 1990, I was decorated with a decoration
9 for courage. I was also decorated after the end of the war in 1999.
10 Q. You mentioned earlier that you spent your career in the security
11 administration of the JNA and later on the VJ -- I should rephrase that:
12 that you spent most of your career in the security administration of the
13 JNA and later on the VJ.
14 Could you explain to us what is the security administration or
15 what was it at that time?
16 A. If I may be more precise, it would be more correct to state that
17 most of my military career I spent in security organs of the JNA at
18 different positions within units starting from battalions up to an army
19 and the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence.
20 Security administration is the umbrella and top organisation
21 which controls and commands security organs in subordinated units. I
22 spent four years there, two terms of duty, from 1986 to 1988, and from
23 1990 to 1992. Should I explain the remit and the tasks of organs of
24 security within the JNA? I can do so.
25 Q. That indeed was my next question. What was the role and function
1 of the security organs in the JNA and the VJ?
2 A. That is a two-fold service: Counter-intelligence, first, and
3 prevention, functions of the security organs. The counter-intelligence
4 activities are directed at detecting, monitoring, surveying, and
5 prevention. Intelligence activities, through agents, earlier extreme
6 émigrés that used to work against the armed forces and Yugoslavia in
7 general, and also persons working illegally and in an organised manner to
8 destroy the constitutional order of the country.
9 The constitutional order was defined through criminal offences in
10 chapter 20 of the penal code. There is a catalogue of criminal offences
11 of such nature from stealth of weapons, disrupting defence capabilities,
12 organising illegal enemy groups, sabotages, et cetera. This was part of
13 the counter-intelligence effort which was the basic activity of the
14 security organs. 90 per cent of working tasks in security organs were
15 focused on counter-intelligence, and this is the raison d'etre of such
16 security organs.
17 The other string of duties was preventive, which means supporting
18 command organs to organise preventive security measures, such as, setting
19 up a protection system for military installations, taking actions to
20 prevent theft of documents or weaponry, to organise security measures in
21 combat operations, general measures that are applied anywhere. There is,
22 I believe, a sixth or seventh item which details security measures for
23 documents or weaponry of a security officer within a command is in charge
24 of detailing out such security measures pursuant to the commander's order
25 and to see to it that those measures are implemented.
1 Q. In seeking to achieve the tasks and assignments of the security
2 organs, what would their sources of information be?
3 A. Counter-intelligence effort and collection of information on
4 issues of subjects came from different sources. One of the major sources
5 was a live person living in a community or, in a context, in a position
6 where it has been assessed that there was some enemy activity or that
7 there is intelligence that actual enemy activities were going on. We
8 called such people collaborants of the security organs in our parlance,
9 and the relationship with such sources was defined by law. There were of
10 course mutual obligations in such a relationship.
11 The second source of such intelligence could relate to specific,
12 technical, or other methods applied by security organs, and -- which are
13 subject to special approvals pursuant to law. In the JNA, the
14 lowest-ranking officer who could approve such measures or methods was
15 army commander. So security officers, even the head of the security
16 administration, did not have the right to order secret surveillance,
17 wire-tapping, or methods which violate certain rights and entitlements,
18 but the constitution said that under certain circumstances such measures
19 could be applied.
20 Q. [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
22 MR. STAMP:
23 Q. Was there a system in place - and I'm speaking primarily in 1999
24 but also generally - for the security organs to report up to security
25 administration, where you were assigned, the information that they
1 received through their operations?
2 A. All security organs at all levels are duty-bound, when coming
3 upon information and intelligence from within their purview, to report
4 back on such -- along two lines: The first basic reporting line was to
5 relay such intelligence to the immediate superior security officer. So
6 if we're talking about a brigade security officer who may collect some
7 intelligence or security service data, he would report to the corps
8 security officer who would then assess the importance of such
9 intelligence. If he can deal with it at his level, then there is no
10 obligation to forward such intelligence upwards towards the army command.
11 Then selection is done at army level command and security
12 administration would receive -- select information of such importance
13 that merit that these be imparted to the Chief of the General Staff and
14 the head of the security administration, that this would be the vertical
15 reporting. But there is also horizontal reporting.
16 If there is some piece of information which is not of
17 counter-intelligence interest - and I explained and described
18 counter-intelligence activities - but is of importance for the overall
19 security of the unit, then whoever comes upon it is duty-bound to inform
20 of such information to the superior officer because security organs in
21 the JNA were subordinated to their unit commanders in terms of discipline
22 and others. In terms of subordination towards the superior security
23 officer, there they were subordinated only within their purview.
24 And the lowest level where counter-intelligence information could
25 be imparted to a commanding officer was the army commander. All other
1 information of general importance for military units were regularly given
2 to commanders usually at collegium meetings that commanders convened, but
3 also whoever had this information could seek a personal meeting with the
4 commander to impart it.
5 Q. You said you were reinstated on the 25th of April, 1999, into the
6 VJ. May I just backtrack a little. In your last answer you referred a
7 couple times to the JNA. Your answer, I take it, also applies to the
8 situation that obtained within the VJ, as it later became; is that
10 A. Well, the system was more or less the same. There was one
11 change, though. Earlier, the approval for the application of special
12 measures for counter-intelligence activities or the so-called technical
13 measures or tactical measures applied by security organs used to be
14 approved at the lowest level by the -- an army commander. After the JNA
15 ceased to exist and when VJ took over, the threshold of reporting on
16 counter-intelligence matter was elevated to the level of
17 Chief of the General Staff. This was the only difference, but the
18 obligations in terms of reporting horizontally and vertically remained
19 the same, horizontally to the unit commander and vertically to the
20 superior security officer.
21 Q. Can I take it that you are saying that the change is that after
22 the JNA ceased to exist, the so-called technical measures and tactical
23 measures could only be approved by the Chief of the General Staff in the
24 VJ? Is that what you meant by your last answer?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Yes. You said that you were reinstated in April,
2 the 27th of April, 1999. Can you briefly tell us the circumstances in
3 which you were reinstated to the security administration of the VJ.
4 A. I was pensioned off on the 8th of May, 1999 --
5 THE INTERPRETER: 1992. Interpreter's correction.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- in some special circumstances.
7 Those special circumstances were as follows. Out of the 70 generals,
8 only two generals did not meet a single requirement for pension. The
9 conditions were either being at least 57 years old or having 40 years of
10 work experience. I and my deputy were the only two not to meet either of
11 these requirements. We were pensioned off due to the general situation,
12 and it would take too much time for me to explain it all now. We were
13 basically removed from the army.
14 In 1999, when the aggression on Yugoslavia began, quite a number
15 of the officers that had been pensioned off previously, both generals and
16 lower-ranking officers, put themselves at the disposal of the
17 General Staff of the army, should there be any need for their assistance
18 irrespective of their former rank. Together with a group of security
19 officers, I put myself at the disposal of the armed forces.
20 On the 28th, I believe, of March an interviewer conversation took
21 place between myself and General Geza Farkas, who was head of security.
22 He mentioned that there was a possibility that I be assigned activities
23 coordinator between the Military Security Service and the
24 State Security Service of the Republic of Yugoslavia
25 proposal; and after a whole month, I believe, around the 25th of April
1 was when I was contacted for the first time after that.
2 The Chief of General Staff, General Ojdanic, summoned me to his
3 office, saying that in the security service they changed their mind about
4 having a military officer around. Therefore, I was going to be appointed
5 security advisor of the Chief of General Staff.
6 Prior to that, Mr. Milosevic, the Yugoslav president, wanted to
7 see me. On the 25th of April, I went to his office. If you're
8 interested in what it was we discussed I can tell you but perhaps there
9 is no need. He changed the decision and ordered that I become deputy
10 head of the security service of the VJ rather than a security advisor.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
12 be asked to move closer to the microphone and that all other microphones
13 be switched off during the time he's answering. Thank you.
14 MR. STAMP:
15 Q. You mentioned that General Geza Farkas was head of security.
16 Just tell us, he was head of which security?
17 A. He was the head of the army security service of the VJ. The
18 official title was head of security administration of the VJ. In terms
19 of professional command, he was in charge of all security organs within
20 the armed forces.
21 Q. When you were appointed his deputy by President Milosevic, did
22 General Farkas indicate to you what your tasks and assignments would be
23 in the security administration?
24 A. There was no need for him to explain to me what the role of a
25 deputy head of security administration is --
1 Q. Very well. Thanks. Did he appoint you to any particular area of
3 A. Basically, my activities as the deputy head of security
4 administration was to be in charge of all counter-intelligence activities
5 of the security administration. In terms of establishment, the way the
6 security system is set up, that function or that post is officially
7 called deputy head of security administration who is also deputy --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- assistant for
10 counter-intelligence. A person appointed to that position stands in for
11 the head of administration in his absence. Therefore, there was no
12 need -- if there was a need for a collegium meeting, the deputy would
13 attend it. However, basically he was the deputy in charge of
14 counter-intelligence. He was in charge of all professional activities of
15 the security organs.
16 When I was reinstated, President Milosevic divided that unified
17 function between two people. I was appointed deputy, and
18 Colonel Branko Gajic, who before the war was deputy and assistant for
19 counter-intelligence, was appointed to the other part of the post which
20 is assistant for counter-intelligence. This effectively meant that the
21 two of us exercised the functions previously performed by one person.
22 Both myself and Mr. Gajic dealt primarily with counter-intelligence.
23 Q. Thank you. I'm going to just ask you to briefly describe to us
24 the structure of the VJ during war time, during the NATO intervention,
25 when a state of war was declared. Who was the overall commander of the
1 VJ during the war?
2 A. The supreme commander, as far as I know, according to the
3 constitution, did not exist as such. Previously when the JNA was in
4 place, the supreme commander was a collective Presidency, the Presidency
5 of the former SFRY, meaning to say that the eight members of the
6 Presidency constituted the Supreme Command. The president of the
7 Presidency - and that function was something that people rotated in - had
8 the executive function in commanding the army pursuant to the Presidency
10 In the latter period, during the VJ and the FRY times, the armed
11 forces were in charge basically of the Supreme Defence Council. And the
12 person presiding over the council was also the president of the FRY. His
13 was the executive function to convey orders to the armed forces pursuant
14 to the Supreme Defence Council decisions.
15 In addition to the president of the FRY, in the
16 Supreme Defence Council there were also presidents of Serbia and
18 military cabinet who was in charge of all technical aspects. When the
19 war broke out, the Montenegrin president, Momir -- his last name escapes
20 me, I think Djukanovic --
21 Q. Djukanovic --
22 A. -- he left the Presidency because of certain issues, and then
23 what was in place was a Rump Supreme Defence Council, meaning to say that
24 Mr. Milosevic was there alongside Mr. Milutinovic. However, there were
25 other members who occasionally participated in peacetime in the work of
1 the Supreme Defence Council. Usually it was the Chief of the
2 General Staff, the minister of defence, and other people who may be
3 summoned depending on the agenda to be discussed --
4 Q. Very well --
5 A. -- it was President Milosevic who was in charge of that function
6 that one may call supreme commander. The General Staff of the VJ, under
7 such circumstances as well as during the time of the Socialist Federal
8 Republic of Yugoslavia
9 Supreme Command. Perhaps this is a broader answer to your question, but
10 I foresaw perhaps a future question of yours.
11 Q. Yes, but for the time being can we just focus on the situation as
12 it was during the period after the 24th of March, 1999, when a state of
13 war was declared.
14 You said the president then, Milosevic, would be the supreme
15 commander and he would have a staff. Who were the members of the staff
16 that the president as supreme commander had?
17 MR. STAMP: In the meantime, while the translation is going on,
18 can I ask that we bring up 06 -- sorry, 02601.
19 Q. Yes, could you just describe the staff of the Supreme Command.
20 A. The Supreme Command Staff was headed by the Chief of the
21 General Staff, General Ojdanic. I will have to use my glasses, given my
22 eyesight and the number of years that have passed. His deputy was --
23 Q. Stop.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Your Honours, is this a witness's schematic or who drew it up
2 since the witness is supposed to comment on it?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can do it without it.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It doesn't matter. I just want to
6 MR. STAMP: This is a schematic that the witness can identify and
7 speak to. The purpose of this schematic is to set out in graphic form
8 what --
9 JUDGE PARKER: Is it a schematic prepared by the Prosecution or
10 is it an official document --
11 MR. STAMP: It's a schematic prepared by the Prosecution to show
12 the witness's evidence in a graphic way to represent the evidence --
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. The evidence is clear.
14 Please continue.
15 MR. STAMP:
16 Q. If you look at this document does this document indicate to you
17 that the military forces that -- and the chain of command in respect to
18 the military forces that were relevant in Kosovo in 1999?
19 A. No, this is not a schematic of the Supreme Command Staff. This
20 could be a schematic representing the organisation of the VJ. Why do I
21 say this? because the Supreme Command Staff comprises the Chief of the
22 General Staff with his assistants and heads of aspects and branches and
23 services. I wanted to have my glasses on because it -- this would entail
24 referring to a number of people, but this would be a rough chart of the
25 way the VJ was organised. At the Supreme Command Staff, its head was the
1 Chief of the General Staff, General Ojdanic. His deputy was
2 General Marjanovic. Assistants to the Chief of the General Staff for the
3 air force was General Velickovic, who was killed during the war and
4 replaced by another person; then assistant for the navy was
5 Admiral Nonkovic. And I can go through each and every one of them, but
6 there is at least a dozen.
7 Q. I think maybe my last question wasn't clear. I was asking if
8 this was a schematic that indicates the forces that were -- the VJ forces
9 that were relevant to Kosovo in 1999 and the chain of command.
10 A. The Army of Yugoslavia had its 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army. The first
11 one was the Belgrade Army. The 2nd Army was in Podgorica, in Montenegro
12 However, some of its forces were in Sandzak and in Serbia itself. The
13 3rd Army is the Nis Army, within whose area was the southern part of
15 The 3rd Army comprised two corps, the Nis Corps and the
16 Pristina Corps. Some forces of the Nis Corps and some forces of the
17 2nd Army, of whose command was in Podgorica, were engaged in Kosovo
18 during the war by virtue of resubordination. Some units which did not
19 organically belong to the 3rd Army were used to strengthen it by using
20 certain brigades or military territorial detachments.
21 The 3rd Army had two basic operational strategic units, these
22 being the Nis
23 had two districts: The Nis and Pristina Military District. The corps
24 comprised a number of brigades, independent battalions, service
25 regiments, and so on and so forth.
1 Q. Thank you. What was the area of responsibility of the
2 Pristina Corps?
3 A. The Pristina Corps for the most part encompassed the area of
4 Kosovo and Metohija.
5 Q. And also you mentioned the Pristina Military District. What was
6 their zone of responsibility?
7 A. The Pristina Military District also encompassed the area of
8 Kosovo and Metohija; and in terms of the geographical distribution, it
9 had branches in various municipalities such as Prizren, Djakovica, Pec,
10 Urosevac, and so on and so forth.
11 Q. Who was the commander of the 3rd Army in 1999?
12 A. It was General Nebojsa Pavkovic.
13 Q. And the Pristina Corps?
14 A. General Lazarevic.
15 Q. That's General Vladimir Lazarevic?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you know brief -- and if you could be brief in your answer,
18 whether or not the normal chain that you see here with the General Staff
19 headed by Colonel Ojdanic being between the supreme commander was always
20 respected by General Pavkovic? In other words, do you know if
21 General Pavkovic normally or always respected the normal chain of command
22 going up?
23 A. To the extent I am familiar with the situation, for the most part
24 he respected the chain of command. I can explain why I say "for the most
1 Q. Very well. If you could be very brief, I'd be grateful.
2 A. Briefly then, in Pristina as of 1998, objectively speaking, there
3 was an organ in place called the Joint Command. That body was supposed
4 to encompass the activities of the VJ and MUP in the area of
5 Kosovo and Metohija. Occasionally, certain activities that had to be
6 ordered directly from the general -- Supreme Command Staff to the
7 3rd Command and were to be implemented pursuant to the further decisions
8 of the Joint Command, and then in turn the staff was supposed to be
9 informed of the decisions made by the Joint Command.
10 I know of certain documents following which the
11 Chief of General Staff warned the 3rd Army commander that those planned
12 activities should not be implemented the way that was envisaged, but in
13 some other way. However, he did not use the customary term which would
14 be "I order you to do so," but rather, I warn you that this or that
15 should be done in a different way. This was rather unusual in terms of
16 military hierarchy.
17 Q. Very well. We'll get to that and to the Joint Command. But
18 basically do you know if General Pavkovic always reported up through the
19 Supreme Command Staff or if he sometimes bypassed General Ojdanic and the
20 Chief and the Supreme Command Staff and went straight to Mr. Milutinovic,
21 the supreme commander -- Mr. Milosevic, I beg your pardon, the supreme
23 A. These are two separate issues. The first one, whether he
24 reported regularly to the Supreme Command Staff, yes, he did by virtue of
25 daily combat reports. All units starting with brigades and up to the
1 Supreme Command Staff were expected to report daily. The daily reporting
2 was always followed through. The other issue is whether the 3rd Army
3 commander without the knowledge of his immediate superior,
4 General Ojdanic, communicated with the supreme commander -- well, that
5 happened as well.
6 It happened, and I was in a situation to see that myself. He
7 didn't notify his superior General Ojdanic of being in Belgrade and that
8 he was to see the state president, for example.
9 Q. State president being President Milosevic?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. 02601, Your Honours, I would ask that it be received in evidence.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be assigned P00883, Your Honours.
14 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
15 Q. When you took up your responsibilities in the latter part of
16 April, 1999, did you receive information from your subordinates and your
17 sources about events in Kosovo that were relevant to security and
18 criminal activity?
19 A. I could give you a very extensive answer. If you have in mind
20 when it was that I received information for the first time, then I can be
21 precise about that, and I suppose this is what you had in mind.
22 Q. Please. Please go ahead.
23 A. I was reinstated on the 27th of April, and I went to office that
24 day. On the 8th of May, a security officer from the organ of the
25 Pristina Corps came to the security administration. It was the
1 then-Lieutenant-Colonel Djurovic who was deputy of the chief of security
2 for the Pristina Corps. He was there for another reason concerning the
3 case of a paramilitary unit which was absorbed by the VJ. In addition to
4 that problem that we tried to resolve, I inquired of him to tell me what
5 was happening in the field. He told me then that there were individual
6 cases of crimes, rape, murders, and that there were other paramilitary
7 formations in the territory in addition to the Jugoslav Petrusic group
8 that we discussed.
9 Q. Sorry. I'm going to ask you to continue with your answer, but I
10 just want to just get something clear. When he was reporting to you, did
11 he report to you as part of his duty and report to you in your official
12 capacity, or was this informal?
13 A. This was a subordinate/superior type of contact. It could not
14 have been informal --
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. He simply notified me of some events that they omitted to inform
17 us along the regular lines of reporting. Because of what he told me
18 then --
19 Q. Sorry, sorry, I don't think you finished telling us all that he
20 told you. You were telling us that there were cases of crimes, of rape,
21 murder, and other paramilitary formation in the territory in addition to
22 Jugoslav Petrusic's group.
23 Could you tell us about the paramilitary formations and also
24 Jugoslav Petrusic's group?
25 A. The Jugoslav Petrusic group numbered 25 persons who did not
1 respect the standard procedure they would have to undergo to be accepted
2 by the centre for volunteers in Brocna near Belgrade. A colonel from the
3 General Staff intervened instead issuing them with uniforms without
4 registering them individually and sending them to another volunteer
5 reception centre in Medja near Nis
6 They were then sent to the Pristina Corps and its 125th Brigade,
7 from whence they were sent to the border at Kosare. In terms of
8 information the security service had, Jugoslav Petrusic was an agent of
9 the French DST
10 that we had a French agent amongst our ranks. That's why the
11 Pristina Corps assistant for security was contacted to verify that.
12 In any case, a few days later they were withdrawn from the field,
13 disarmed, and arrested by the security organs of the VJ. Those arrested
14 were Jugoslav Petrusic and his deputy Mr. Orasanin. There was an
15 investigation which lasted for a month which resulted in an epilogue.
16 That was the one paramilitary group. As for the other paramilitary
17 groups in the field for which there were indications that they had
18 committed crimes, he specifically mentioned the Skorpion unit. They
19 arrived in Kosovo as part of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit commanded by
20 Colonel Trajkovic. In his words, upon their arrival in Podujevo they
21 went house to house killing, in his words, a dozen children and two
22 women. The 12 persons were allegedly killed, and once he learned of
23 that, they were immediately expelled from Kosovo. That was one event he
25 Another event had to do with the information he had that in
1 Kosovo Polje there were members of Arkan's guard. That was the initial
2 information we had regarding those events, and I put that down in my
3 notebook, after which I ordered to him that they should send a written
4 report to the security administration on that matter.
5 MR. STAMP: On that note, Your Honours, I'm wondering if it might
6 be a convenient time.
7 JUDGE PARKER: We will resume at 4.15, Mr. Stamp.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
12 Q. Before I forget, General, you said that you had some knowledge of
13 General Pavkovic bypassing General Ojdanic. Can you just tell us when in
14 terms of the approximate month and year, if you can remember?
15 A. Mid-June 1999. I had a contact with a person, but he testified
16 in private session, it's irrelevant who that person was, but I can name
17 him. I sought from the head of security administration and the
18 Chief of General Staff the green light to meet that person, and after the
19 meeting with that person I reported back to General Ojdanic. But the
20 state security division had reported that I had this contact with the
21 opposition member and General Ojdanic was summoned to discuss this
22 matter. General Ojdanic and I had arrived earlier to this meeting with
23 Milosevic, and when we were 100 metres from the White Palace
24 General Pavkovic emerged from the White Palace and went in the direction
25 of his car. General Ojdanic told me, Can you see him? He's coming to
2 When we attended this meeting with President Milosevic,
3 General Ojdanic reacted and brought this matter to the president, and he
4 said, President, please do not have my subordinates coming to your
5 residence without prior clearance from me. And President Milosevic said,
6 No, well, he was on a private matter, unofficially. And General Ojdanic
7 told me that General Pavkovic was more frequently reporting immediately
8 to Mr. Sainovic, who was in the Joint Command in Pristina, than him as
9 Chief of the General Staff.
10 Q. Thank you. If we could return now to the information that was
11 reported to you by the security officer from the Pristina Corps in
12 Kosovo. The crimes that we were talking about, the serious crimes, the
13 rapes, the looting, the murders; did he say who committed them or the
14 members or the organisations that the persons who committed them were
16 A. I don't know whether you mean the first meeting with
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Djurovic or my tour of Kosovo from the 1st to the
18 7th of June, 1999?
19 Q. First meeting.
20 A. What emerged there were the first information about the scope
21 that I already mentioned. After the first information about the
22 so-called Skorpion group, which is not a usual term for unit in the
23 military and in MUP because they have their own establishment titles, and
24 after learning that Djurovic had learned that they came from Vojvodina,
25 those persons, I ordered our counter-intelligence group in Novi Sad who
1 was working out on the ground to check who those persons were and report
2 back everything that they had learned about them. And four days later,
3 in May, I received a report that it went for 120- to 150-strong group
4 depending on the circumstances.
5 Q. Sorry. Maybe you should slow down. This now is very, very
6 important so -- and I'm not sure of the interpretation -- if you are
7 going too fast for the interpretation.
8 You remember the date you received the report from your organs
9 from Novi Sad
10 A. On the 12th of May I received it.
11 Q. What was the report -- what did the report say was the result of
12 your investigations of this Skorpion group?
13 A. I'll try to slow down. What was stated in the report was that
14 the group was headed by Slobodan Medic, also known as
15 Aca [as interpreted], and that the group he organised around himself
16 comprised of 120 to 150 people, that there were practically two groups
17 who went to Kosovo, one that was organised by Slobodan Medic, a.k.a.
18 Boca, at the initiative of Mrgud Milanovic who in 1991 had been appointed
19 there in Slavonia
20 organised and led by Dalibor Novakovic.
21 The report also said that in essence those persons had experience
22 in battle-fields in former Yugoslavia
23 had criminal records but no names were named there, and that they had
24 returned from Kosovo a couple of days earlier. And since the check was
25 conducted between the 8th and the 12th of May, we could say that they had
1 returned from Kosovo at the beginning of May and that they were preparing
2 another group to depart for Kosovo and that that group was being
3 organised by Sokolovacki Zivan but his nickname was Zivan Chetnik. So
4 this was the initial intelligence that we received identifying this
5 person Medic, a.k.a. Boca, as the organiser of that group. They had been
6 engaged as security detail around oil wells in Slavonia after they had
7 ceased their operations in Croatia
8 Q. Briefly, in maybe a sentence or two, did your operative report
9 indicate what their reputation was in respect to what they had been up to
10 on the battle-fields in the former Yugoslavia
11 A. I don't know specifically what [Realtime transcript read in error
12 "that"] they had done there. I know they appeared as an organised group
13 in the so-called Bihac operation. Similarly, there were some MUP units,
14 JSO to be more precise, in that area. The general classification was
15 that there were criminal types in their ranks, problematic people, which
16 was written in the dossiers of those people who had returned from
18 Q. Thank you. You had mentioned earlier that they went down there
19 as part of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit commanded by Zivko Trajkovic.
20 Which organisation was that anti-terrorist unit a part of?
21 A. SAJ
22 the MUP of Serbia
23 Q. Thank you. You also mentioned that they -- your security organ
24 from Pristina told you about Arkan's guards. Did he tell you what they
25 were engaged in Kosovo and whether or not they were --
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic -- just a moment, please, if you
2 would, General.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I have an intervention, page 35,
4 line 7 of the transcript. It should read I do not know specifically what
5 they did or what they had done. What is required is the word "what" and
6 not the word "that."
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
8 Please carry on, Mr. Stamp.
9 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 Q. I was asking you about the information on that first occasion you
11 received in respect to the conduct of Arkan's guards and whether they
12 were associated with any organisation or formation in Kosovo.
13 A. What we received was general information when Djurovic said that
14 all those things had been going on in Kosovo and that there were also
15 paramilitary formations outside the classical organisation of the
16 military and the MUP. He mentioned that in Kosovo Polje they registered
17 the presence of Arkan's guards there who were not part of any legal
18 structures per establishment. But there was no details about what was
19 the number of them there. We learned that subsequently.
20 Information was that there was a camp at Kosovo Polje housing
21 them. On the 8th of May there was no broader information about that, but
22 of course on other occasions we received information on that, and I can
23 discuss those subsequently.
24 Q. Yes. Yes, we will, but I want to take it step by step. Just
25 briefly, what type of reputation did Arkan's guards have in security
1 circles, if I may put it that way?
2 A. I could tell you what their reputation was in military security
3 circles; I cannot tell you about the overall security circles or
4 community. Arkan's armed units had been registered as early as the
5 beginning of 1991, at the time when I worked in the security
6 administration. We received operative reports about that initial group
7 containing -- comprising of 21 persons. We did some security checks on
8 who those persons were, what was the structure of the group; and out of
9 the 21 members, they had collected convictions of 105 years of prison
10 sentences on average five years of prison sentence each, which means that
11 they had come from criminal background.
12 Later on, that unit was expanded. If I were to go back to the
13 Vukovar and January 1992 when they were supposed to be disbanded and
14 expelled from the area of Srem and both eastern and western Srem, at that
15 time the order on their expulsion from the Vukovar area was transmitted
16 or relayed as an order by General Zivota Panic and it was relayed by
17 Colonel Petkovic. What I mean to say, there were 150 of them at that
18 point in time and that a person from the state security division of MUP
19 of Serbia
20 that that they would enter a special unit formation of theirs. Their
21 reputation was of crime, of different types of crime that they had
23 But let me cut a long story short. May we -- may I add that they
24 wore rifles in Belgrade
25 premises of the SSJ party and nobody objected. At Arkan's funeral they
1 also wore automatic rifles and nobody objected to that. Most of them had
2 MUP personal cards or identity passes.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, let's stick to 1999. When you say "most of them
4 had MUP personal cards," did the personal cards relate to the state
5 security section of the MUP or the public security section of the MUP?
6 A. I'm not clear as to the interpretation of the security detachment
7 and security division. No, they were more in line with the state
8 security division of the MUP of Serbia.
9 Q. So I can take it then that these ID cards were issued by the
10 state security sector or division?
11 A. I presume so. I cannot tell you specifically because I never saw
12 them. I know about the -- Arkan's official pass.
13 Q. You mentioned that you were also told that there was a second
14 group from the Vojvodina area or the Novi Sad area that was sent to
15 Kosovo, that is the group of Dalibor Novakovic. Can you comment on that?
16 Did you receive information on that first occasion whether or not this
17 group was in fact sent to Kosovo and were they integrated into any
18 formation there?
19 A. No. Initial information referred only to the Slobodan Medic
20 group and that that group had returned at the end of April/beginning of
21 May but also was informed that Dalibor Novakovic's group was being
22 prepared to leave. And then there was a third group of Zivan Chetnik,
23 these were the persons who organised these groups. One such group was
24 organised by Goran Hadzic as well.
25 Q. Were these groups -- did you ultimately learn whether these
1 groups were dispatched to Kosovo?
2 A. I don't know that. I cannot state with any degree of
4 Q. Very well. Now, the information you received from - I'm probably
5 going to get the name wrong - from Mr. Djurdjicic [sic] or from your
6 Pristina Corps operative should -- and I'm not referring to counsel,
7 should that have been reported up through the chain of command to the
8 General Staff where you were or to the security administration?
9 A. Yes, that should have been written down as information of the
10 Pristina Corps security organ, and it should have been sent to the
11 security department of the 3rd Army. And then the security department of
12 the 3rd Army would decide whether to report on that briefly to the
13 security administration, but they did not forward this information,
14 neither to the Nis
15 that - and on that occasion I ordered Djurovic, when he relayed that oral
16 information, to prepare a written note and to corroborate it with other
17 details that we had no occasion to discuss at the time because he was in
19 But out of the information that we received then, which included
20 apart from the Jugoslav Petrusic group there were information -- there
21 was information about soldiers raping some young girls in Kosovo, and I
22 received names; and information that they had allegedly been prosecuted.
23 I wanted him to write it down and announce that we would be coming to
24 Kosovo to consider those matters. If you allow me, what was the outcome
25 of all this? We received initial information, more complete information,
1 from the counter-intelligence group of Novi Sad on the 12th of May. On
2 the 13th of May, which was Security Services Day, on that occasion of
3 that holiday, General Ojdanic, Chief of the General Staff, received a
4 delegation of security circles. General Geza attended as well as I did
5 and Colonel Branko Gajic. That's --
6 Q. That's General Geza Farkas?
7 A. Yes. The then-Colonel Branko Gajic, who was promoted to general
8 on the 16th of June, and I were there. General Krga, Branko Krga, head
9 of the intelligence department administration of the General Staff.
10 General Farkas informed General Ojdanic about -- what had been learned
11 about the goings-on in Kosovo. This was the initial information to him.
12 He was surprised, and he reacted promptly in front of our eyes. He
13 phoned President Milosevic and literally said, Mr. President, I learned
14 that all things -- all sorts of things are going on down there in Kosovo,
15 that there are paramilitary groups, that there are rapings, murder. I
16 don't know what Milosevic replied. After that conversation ended,
17 Ojdanic told us, The President orders you to prepare all sorts of reports
18 on such developments and to attend a meeting at the command post on the
19 17th of May, bringing those written reports.
20 After that, General Ojdanic called General Pavkovic and asked
21 him, Commander, what is going on down there? I don't know what the reply
22 was. And then General Ojdanic said, On the 16th of May report back to me
23 with all relevant information at a meeting here at the General Staff.
24 And on the 17th of May there will be a meeting at President Milosevic's.
25 Q. Did that meeting of the 16th of May take place?
1 A. Yes. It was attended again by General Geza,
2 Colonel Branko Gajic, and I.
3 By that time we had acquired more information because Djurovic
4 from the Pristina Corps had sent a dispatch containing more details,
5 particularly the presence of Arkan's units and that camp of theirs than
6 individual details of crimes perpetrated individually by military
7 personnel. I recall a Captain Stekovic, if I'm not mistaken, who
8 murdered a number of Albanians.
9 We had received more information supplementing the initial
10 information we had received from the Pristina Corps, and General Pavkovic
11 also came up with his information. On behalf of the security
12 administration, I briefed them on what we had learned. Then
13 General Pavkovic briefed us exhaustively about the developments in
14 Kosovo, about the crimes committed by both members of the army and the
16 When I spoke about the presence and the crimes in Podujevo and
17 when I mentioned Slobodan Medic, General Pavkovic said that he had
18 personally seen at Prolom Banja, Medic, with whom he had a brief contact.
19 Medic was wearing a NATO-style uniform and wore SAJ insignia, the Special
20 Anti-Terrorist Unit of Serbia
21 general, I think General Djakovic, who had a lengthier discussion with
22 Boca, and who had related to him that they had arrived to Kosovo
23 following the orders of General Djordjevic of the MUP and that the MUP
24 would collect them and send them to those areas where the situation was
25 the worst out on the ground. And then General Pavkovic said he had
1 notified Vice-President Sainovic of those things but he offered no
2 special reaction to that.
3 So they did have information that they had been expelled from the
4 ground and that that had been done by the deputy commander of the SAJ
5 Dragan Stojanovic or somebody else - and there was a nickname, but I
6 forgot that man's family name - saying that that officer had expelled
7 them from there.
8 Furthermore, General Pavkovic referred that on the occasion of
9 the murders and the corpses they had found on the ground, he said that
10 they had suggested to General Lukic that they set up a Joint Commission
11 to determine who might have been responsible for those crimes judging by
12 the areas where those corpses were found, maybe the army or the MUP of
14 Q. Firstly, General Lukic was the chief of the MUP staff for Kosovo
15 at the time?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Before we go into what he said about a Joint Commission, did he
18 say how many corpses they had found or were on the ground in Kosovo?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. Later on in General Ojdanic's briefing, he complained of a degree
22 of obstruction on the part of the MUP organs in Kosovo to try and deal
23 with those problems. He stated that they were only sent a letter by the
24 MUP to the Pristina Corps in which they said that there were around 800
25 corpses for which the VJ was responsible in terms of committing crimes.
1 However, Lukic did not accept the proposal to establish a
2 Joint Commission. Then General Pavkovic set up his own commission, and
3 it was established that there were 271 corpses in the areas where the
4 army was. There were 326 corpses in the area where MUP units were
5 active. This gives us a total of 597 persons. That was the data
6 provided by General Pavkovic based on the results of the work of his
8 Some people were inquiring about what kind of corpses those were.
9 We all arrived at the same conclusion. These corpses were not victims of
10 crimes. These people were killed in operations, either by NATO forces or
11 VJ forces. But all of those corpses were not victims of crimes, but they
12 were killed as a consequence of operations.
13 General Pavkovic informed Mr. Sainovic accordingly, but we did
14 not receive any particular feedback.
15 Q. Firstly, if you could just have a couple brief answers to clarify
16 one or two things. Did General Pavkovic explain about the difference
17 between the 800 bodies that were reported found and the 597 bodies that
18 could be associated with territory that either the MUP or the VJ
20 A. The initial information that MUP had was that the 800 corpses --
21 that those deaths were caused by the army; however, the commission's
22 finding was that there were 597. As I said, the breakdown was 271
23 corpses in the army area and 326 in the MUP area. There were no 800
24 corpses, but 597. Am I clear on that?
25 Q. Thank you. Did General Pavkovic mention whether or not these
1 corpses or some of these corpses had been exhumed; and if so, where?
2 A. He did not discuss that. It was my impression that this did not
3 involve any exhumations, but rather that these corpses had simply not
4 been buried by that time. No sanitation and hygiene measures were
5 undertaken. I suppose preceding that it was --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- it can be my assumption perhaps
8 that some of these corpses were registered or reported as having been
9 found, and therefore one would conclude that they had been buried, but it
10 is only my presumption.
11 MR. STAMP:
12 Q. When you said we all arrived at the same conclusions, these
13 corpses were not the victims of crimes, these people were killed in
14 operations, either by NATO forces or VJ forces; could you elaborate on
15 that a little bit further? Is that what General Pavkovic reported to
17 A. No. I can provide a factual basis for that. I was in Kosovo
18 with General Gajic between the 1st and 7th of June. We visited 12
19 security organs in subordinate units. At the end, at a meeting in
20 Pristina, we collated all the information the army had per crimes and
21 victims --
22 Q. General, if I may have a moment. Let's just focus for the time
23 being on the 16th of May meeting. We are going to get to your tour of
24 Kosovo a little bit later on. I just want to know if this is what -- if
25 General Pavkovic had told you about the causes of death of the people
1 that were in the military areas at that 16th of May meeting.
2 A. No, not at that time.
3 Q. Okay. Very well. Did you decide upon any procedure in respect
4 to the meeting that you expected to have the next day with
5 President Milosevic?
6 A. General Ojdanic said that all the matters that we discussed
7 without skipping or avoiding anything should be passed on to
8 President Milosevic. The decision was made to the effect that I was to
9 put the army case to him; however, I declined, given that
10 General Pavkovic had much more information than I did. I only had some
11 initial information provided by my security organs. I briefed the
12 meeting on the information we received through security organs, and
13 General Pavkovic spoke about the information he had gathered along his
14 chain of command.
15 Q. You just said you briefed the meeting on information received
16 through your security organs. Is that the meeting with the late
17 President Milosevic you are speaking of now?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Very well --
20 A. It was the meeting on the 17th of May.
21 Q. Where did this meeting take place?
22 A. The meeting took place at the command post.
23 Q. Who was present?
24 A. From the army there was General Ojdanic, General Pavkovic,
25 General Geza Farkas, myself, and Colonel Gajic; the five of us from the
1 General Staff. The other attendees were President Milosevic,
2 Vice-President Sainovic, and head of the state security sector
3 Rade Markovic. There was no one there of the generals or people from the
4 public security sector. Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, minister of the
5 interior, was not present either.
6 Q. Did -- did the absence of the minister of interior or any of the
7 generals from the public security sector strike you as -- well, I
8 withdraw that. Let me ask you an open question.
9 Did you form any conclusions as to the reasons for the absence of
10 the head of the public security sector or the minister in a meeting of
11 this nature?
12 A. I didn't pay much heed. It was a bit odd that no one was present
13 on that side, especially --
14 Q. Very well --
15 A. -- if you had General Pavkovic, commander of the 3rd Army there,
16 who was in the field in Kosovo. It would have been natural to have there
17 at least General Lukic who, in a way, corresponded to him in rank. In
18 any case, President Milosevic only briefly said that they were all busy
19 and that they were in no position to attend the meeting.
20 Q. Thank you. Do you recall whether or not you made notes of what
21 happened at that meeting?
22 A. No. No notes were taken in terms of official minutes. People
23 noted things down individually if they thought it was necessary. I
24 usually have the habit of noting things down in meetings. Specifically
25 concerning that meeting to the extent of what I could note down, I did
1 keep notes as well as the then-Colonel Branko Gajic.
2 Q. Thank you --
3 A. In my notebook, if I may, I did not make notes on the
4 contributions of General Pavkovic or on my contribution because we had
5 typed reports, papers, to present at that meeting. Therefore, you cannot
6 find any of my or Mr. Pavkovic's contributions in my notebook because I
7 believe those contributions should be in written form, typed somewhere.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. STAMP: Could we bring up 65 ter number 02592.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Page 46,
12 line 20, a part of the witness's answer is missing whereby the witness
13 stated that those reports should be in the archives.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MR. STAMP:
16 Q. Can you identify the document there before you?
17 A. I recognise it. It is a photocopy of a page in my notebook.
18 Q. And that is dated --
19 A. The 17th of May, 1999.
20 Q. And that is the record of your meeting that you just described?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. At this meeting, did you give a report?
23 A. To whom?
24 Q. To the persons present at the meeting. Did you brief them?
25 A. No, not after the meeting. As I said, I intervened during the
1 meeting as well as General Pavkovic.
2 Q. Yes. So the question is: Did you brief them at the meeting as
3 to what your security organs had discovered?
4 A. I did.
5 Q. And I think you also said Mr. -- or General Pavkovic also made a
7 A. Yes, he did.
8 Q. You have in your note here that General Pavkovic -- or that
9 someone said - and tell us who said it - there is no problem with
10 Petronijevic's group. Who said that?
11 A. It was Pavkovic's comment. Yes, it's a mistake, actually, it
12 should be Petrusic, Jugoslav Petrusic's group, because by that time he
13 had been arrested as well as Mr. Orasanin; that group had been disbanded,
14 disarmed, and withdrawn from Kosovo.
15 Q. Thank you. Did the report that you gave and the report that
16 General Pavkovic gave generally repeated the same matters that you had
17 discussed the previous day, the 16th of May?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, after you gave these reports I have it here that Rade spoke.
20 Who is Rade?
21 A. Rade was the head of the state security sector, Rade Markovic.
22 Q. He said that the volunteers are a necessary evil. What did he
23 mean by that? What did you understand him to mean.
24 A. Well, perhaps it would be better if I describe that part of the
25 meeting in order to give you a full context --
1 Q. Very well --
2 A. -- but I can answer your individual questions as well. In any
3 case, since I mentioned the presence of Arkan's Tigers in Kosovo Polje in
4 my report, on that topic he said that it was correct that Arkan had
5 contacted him offering about a hundred of his men. He only accepted
6 around 30, provided they wore uniforms. He also said that he had learned
7 the day before, the 16th, that some people, some among them, killed a
8 married couple in Kosovo and that an investigation had been ordered and
9 proceedings initiated. I think he said that they would be returned.
10 Because of the hundred that was offered and since Medic's group
11 was mentioned, he said, They are a necessary evil and one cannot win the
12 war with 100 people, 100 men. Since in my intervention I refer to
13 Medic Slobodan's group, Rade Markovic said he spoke with
14 General Djordjevic, who told him that they had been withdrawn from Kosovo
15 to Prolom Banja.
16 Q. And you noted in respect to SM. Who is SM? Could you just tell
17 us that?
18 A. SM is Slobodan Milosevic.
19 Q. Mr. Milosevic said, Sit down with Vlajko and Rodja and clear it
20 up with them. Their heads won't be chopped off, but Boca must answer.
21 Who is Vlajko is who is Rodja?
22 A. This intervention by President Milosevic represents his comment
23 on what Rade Markovic had said in terms that he had spoken with
24 General Djordjevic about Boca Medic and that he informed them that they
25 had been withdrawn from Kosovo. He was actually turning to Rade Markovic
1 and telling him, Convey to Vlajko and Rodja, Vlajko was the MUP minister,
2 Vlajko Stojiljkovic; and Rodja is General Djordjevic.
3 Q. And later on you have a comment here from Sainovic. Do you know
4 what Sainovic's role was or could you just tell us now what Sainovic's
5 role was in relation to the forces, the MUP forces and VJ forces, that
6 were operational in Kosovo? And if you could tell us briefly, I'd be
8 A. I know that he spent some time in Kosovo. On the 1st of June, I
9 attended a meeting of what was called the Joint Command. He was probably
10 called to that meeting because he was responsible for overall activities
11 down in Kosovo. That was his role. He offered a short comment saying
12 that, Obviously with the SAJ
13 reserves or reserve forces.
14 Q. And Mr. Milosevic said, I support the work of the RDB and the
15 security organs to have all cases of big Serbs resolved.
16 What did you mean -- what is the meaning of this note?
17 A. The meaning has to do with the way the reserve forces of the MUP
18 were being assembled. There were many of them representing themselves as
19 big Serbs who, in his words, caused damage and that they tarnish the
20 positive image of what was achieved in Kosovo. He meant it that way. He
21 was referring to the way the MUP reserve force was being gathered,
22 cherry-picking people such as Boca, Arkan's men, et cetera.
23 I think he insisted greatly on the importance of dealing with
24 Vlajko and Rodja in the sense that they have no reason whatsoever to
25 protect such people. And having in mind Rodja and Vlajko, he said, Their
1 heads would not fly because of that, their heads would not roll. That
2 was the sense of his comment. He also wanted to sort of calm tensions
3 down in terms of the reserve forces. There was mention made of people
4 paying 500 or 1.000 German marks to get a uniform to be able to go to
5 Kosovo in order to loot freely, but he said that at the time he had no
6 knowledge of any presence of Arkan's men in Kosovo Polje or any camps of
8 I can describe further the course of the meeting if you wish.
9 Q. Yes, but may I just check something before you --
10 President Milosevic also said neither Vlajko nor Obrad nor Rodja have
11 reason to protect them. Who is Obrad?
12 A. MUP General Obrad Stevanovic who I encountered during my trip to
13 Kosovo at the meeting of the Joint Command.
14 Q. What was his function in the MUP, do you know?
15 A. What I know is in terms of rank. He was the third-ranking man in
16 MUP there. I think his function was assistant minister of internal
17 affairs for special units of police.
18 Q. Who were the two people senior to him ?
19 A. Well, I cannot specify whether he was subordinated to assistant
20 minister of internal affairs for the public security sector,
21 General Djordjevic, or there were parallel assistants to the minister of
22 the interior. I'm not familiar specifically with the chain of command.
23 But from communications we all knew that they were heads of the public
24 security sector of the MUP.
25 Q. Okay. And the third person mentioned in this note, the
1 translation has it as Radja, who is that person that Mr. Milosevic is
2 referring to?
3 A. No, Rada should read -- maybe it should spell out Rade,
4 Rade Markovic. It could be my long hand which could be illegible -- no,
5 no, no, this is Rodja -- no, neither Obrad nor Rodja. Obrad Stankovic
6 [as interpreted] and Rodja is General Djordjevic --
7 Q. Obrad Stevanovic?
8 A. Obrad Stevanovic and Rodja is General Djordjevic. So it's not
9 Rada or Rade.
10 Q. Thank you. What at that time did you understand to be
11 President Milosevic's role in respect to the MUP, his de facto role I'm
12 asking you about.
13 A. You know what, President Milosevic was president of the
14 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Hierarchically speaking, Ministry of
15 Interior is an integral part of the Serbian government. At that time
16 there was no federal Ministry of the Interior, practically it did not
17 function because of the state of affairs in Montenegro. So the minister
18 of the interior was supposed to be linked directly to the president of
19 the government or the prime minister. But since President Milosevic was
20 president of Yugoslavia
21 direct links with the minister of the interior.
22 And within the Ministry of the Interior, there are two key
23 divisions: Public security division and state security division.
24 Rade Markovic headed the state security division, and practically he was
25 supposed to be subordinated to Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic. But in
1 practice, ever since 1998 when head of the state security division was
2 Jovica Stanovic [as interpreted] after Stojiljkovic became minister of
3 the interior who wanted briefs from the state security division's head,
4 Jovica Stanovic [as interpreted] did not want to accept that. He reacted
5 very sharply, and he addressed President Milosevic about that matter,
6 seeking that he remain in direct contact with him although he was then
7 president of Yugoslavia
8 state security division head. I know this on the basis of my
9 conversations with State Security Service who were top brass of that
10 department. And from then on --
11 Q. Okay. Very well. I think you are coming to the conclusion.
12 A. From then on, the state security division practically was
13 directly subordinated and managed and controlled and ordered by
14 Slobodan Milosevic and Rade Markovic was there on that basis.
15 Q. In this -- in your note you record President Milosevic as saying
16 that Vlajko, the minister, and I think you said earlier that the minister
17 of interior was supposed to be linked directly to the president of the
18 government or the prime minister, by that you mean that the minister of
19 interior was supposed to be linked to the president or prime minister of
20 the Republic of Serbia
21 A. Yes, I said that this was regulated by regulations, by laws. So
22 you know -- should I go further --
23 Q. No, no --
24 A. Well, he could more be linked to the president of Serbia in some
1 Q. However, we have the president of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milosevic, at
2 this meeting saying, Neither Vlajko's nor Rodja's heads would be chopped
3 off. Later on, Neither Vlajko nor Obrad nor Rodja have reason to protect
4 them. What was President Milosevic's relationship, influence, or
5 authority de facto in respect to the MUP and the public security sector
6 of the MUP in 1999?
7 A. I already stated that practically those persons were under the
8 direct jurisdiction of the president of Yugoslavia, namely,
9 President Milosevic, Slobodan Milosevic. As you can see,
10 President of Serbia
11 have been supposed to have a more direct link of the minister of interior
12 than the president of Yugoslavia
13 Q. The remainder of your notes, and I'm afraid we will not have time
14 to go through all of it, but --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please bear in mind the
17 MR. STAMP: Maybe I'm going too fast.
18 THE INTERPRETER: It's the background noise, counsel.
19 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry. My apologies.
20 Q. You have had an opportunity, I understand, to review the
21 remainder of your notes. Are they accurate as to what you recall to have
22 transpired in that meeting?
23 A. I did not read this note. I have only the first page shown to
24 me, but I have no reason to believe that other pages are false. I can
25 verify them for your purposes if you want to.
1 Q. Could you flip to the next page and then the next, please.
2 A. Yes, we should turn the page. Now it's okay. Yes, you don't
3 have to zoom in. I can see. Thank you.
4 Q. Yes, there are your notes of the meeting.
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I tender 02592 and ask that it be
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 MR. STAMP: Thank you.
10 THE REGISTRAR: And that, Your Honours, will be assigned P00884.
11 MR. STAMP:
12 Q. You see later on in the meeting somebody that you refer to as
13 Saja spoke. Who is that?
14 A. That was Mr. Sainovic.
15 MR. STAMP: And in English could we go back to the first page.
16 Q. And he said - and this is at the bottom of the first page:
17 "... and there's the task of working on clearing up the
19 What at that time did you understand that expression, "clearing
20 up of the terrain," to mean?
21 A. Clearing up of the terrain is the professional term which implies
22 that after combat operations what has to be conducted are smaller-scale
23 operations to neutralise or destroyed residual enemy groups or another
24 term that may be used in military circles, the pockets of resistance.
25 Clearing up of the terrain in such documents should not be taken to mean
1 sanitation of the battle-field. These are two separate operations.
2 Clearing up of the terrain is a common term shared by both the military
3 and the MUP implying dealing with residual or remaining enemy groups or
5 Q. Thank you. About this meeting that you had on the 17th, when you
6 noted what General -- sorry, President Milosevic said in respect to
7 Vlajko, Obrad, and Rodja, did they -- did what Mr. Milosevic said
8 indicate to you what role or authority these three persons had in respect
9 to the MUP forces in Kosovo?
10 A. Well, yes. It was -- what was discussed there was the situation
11 in Kosovo, not other security issues in the territory of Serbia
13 persons who bear the highest responsibility for the use of MUP forces
15 Q. Thank you. After this meeting, did you receive any tasks from
16 General Ojdanic?
17 A. I feel the duty to expound my answer a bit. During the meeting,
18 both General Pavkovic and General Ojdanic and Mr. Sainovic also
19 concurred. They raised the issue that a special state commission should
20 be dispatched to Kosovo to look into what was going on there. However,
21 Mr. Milosevic did not offer any comment, and he bypassed this issue all
22 together. What he offered in return was that obviously there were bad
23 relations between the Military Security Service and MUP organs, probably
24 on the basis of an earlier information coming from General Pavkovic that
25 he had not encountered General Lukic's understanding on the establishment
1 of a Joint Commission. He issued a task -- well, the only task issued
2 then was for the relations to be cleared and that poor relations between
3 those two services may be tantamount to sabotage, and that for that
4 reason General Ojdanic had to convene a joint meeting with MUP organs at
5 which those misunderstandings had to be cleared. This was the task that
6 he issued.
7 After that meeting, immediately after it, General Ojdanic ordered
8 me and General -- Colonel Branko Gajic in the light of what had been said
9 in the meeting to go to Kosovo as soon as possible, to contact our
10 subordinate security organs, and to collect information on everything
11 that was going on there, but also to perform a classical inspection tour
12 of security organs in the light of their counter-intelligence activities.
13 This was the tasks -- task we were issued by General Ojdanic, the two of
15 Q. Thank you. Incidentally before we move on to the task, at the
16 end of the meeting did you military officers leave the office and could
17 you tell us if anybody remained?
18 A. Well, we rose after the meeting was over, we discussed the
19 summary for people to leave the meeting. Rade Markovic also stood up,
20 head of the state security sector, but President Milosevic told him,
21 Rade, you should stay behind. So he stayed behind together with
22 Mr. Sainovic in President Milosevic's presence. We had an impression
23 that a conversation is going to take place or to be continued which would
24 not welcome our presence. And we commented so and we stated so after
25 emerging from the conference room.
1 Q. Thank you. You said General Ojdanic issued a task or gave a task
2 to convene a joint might with the MUP organs in order to clear
3 misunderstandings. Was this meeting -- were efforts made to convene this
5 A. Yes. General Geza was tasked with convening the meeting with
6 Rade Markovic; but in spite of repeated efforts to get in contact with
7 him, the latter was always absent or otherwise engaged. So until July,
8 the beginning of July, that meeting did not take place and Chief of
9 the General Staff, General Ojdanic, had to insist for that meeting to
10 take place. That meeting took place on the 9th of July, 1999, at the
11 premises of the General Staff.
12 Q. Thank you. And we will get to that meeting later on. You
13 indicated that you were also tasked the conduct or control of -- or an
14 inspection tour of the security organs in Kosovo and also to make
15 inquiries as to what was happening down there. Did you go to Kosovo?
16 A. Yes, we did. We departed immediately after that meeting,
17 General Gajic and I; but in the meantime, a serious incident with the
18 7th Brigade from Krusevac had occurred. That brigade used to be in
19 Kosovo. Almost half of the brigade's ranks left their positions with
20 weapons and materiel and returned to Krusevac. Because of this major
21 incident, the two of us were tasked together with the head of security of
22 the 3rd Army, Colonel Antic, to identify the ringleaders of this mutiny
23 and to secure through the organs of the authorities in Krusevac the
24 return of the army personnel and the weapons and materiel back to Kosovo.
25 And only after we've dealt with the Krusevac situation we could depart
1 for Kosovo on the 1st of July. I reached Kosovo together with
2 General Gajic and Colonel --
3 Q. What was the date?
4 A. The 1st of June, 1999.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 A. So together with Colonel Antic, head of security of the 3rd Army,
7 we reached Pristina.
8 Q. Now, on the 1st of June in Pristina, did you conduct any work
9 there in respect to your tasks or the tasks that you had been assigned?
10 A. Yes. The evening of the 1st of June we were briefed on the
11 situation by the head of the security service of the Pristina Corps,
12 Colonel Momir Stojanovic. However, military regulations order us, and
13 it's a matter of ethics, is that whenever somebody comes to a command
14 post, the commander should be informed of that. Colonel Stojanovic
15 phoned General Pavkovic, telling him that I had arrived to Pristina. He
16 expressed a wish for us to meet. He invited Stojanovic and me to come
17 over to the command of the Pristina Corps where we could find him.
18 At the time he did not indicate that that evening's meeting was
19 going to be a Joint Command meeting. He just invited us over. The two
20 of us went to the Pristina Corps command, to that building, and after
21 greetings General Pavkovic told me, Well, stay here. We will have a
22 meeting of the Joint Command. Why don't you attend it and after that we
23 will have dinner.
24 Soon afterwards persons started arriving, persons who were
25 supposed to attend the meeting.
1 First of all I have to say that my impression was that it was
2 something as an operations centre. There were maps on the walls, there
3 were officers doing their tasks, and there was a separate conference
4 table seating --
5 Q. What kind of operations centre?
6 A. I think it was the command post of the Pristina Corps, and that
7 this room was operations centre to communicate with subordinate units and
8 maintain maps of the present situation in the field.
9 Q. When you arrived there with Colonel Stojanovic, who was present
10 in the room?
11 A. I already stated that there was a number of officers, some of
12 whom I knew and some of whom I saw for the first time. But of the key
13 personnel, General Pavkovic was there, General Lazarevic as well, and the
14 two of them attended the meeting. So of the military personnel, on the
15 one hand you had Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and I sitting next to him, and then
16 Colonel Momir Stojanovic. At the other end of the table were MUP
17 generals, General Djordjevic, General Stevanovic, and General Lukic. A
18 couple of minutes later, after we'd gathered there,
19 Vice-President Sainovic arrived with some person from Kosovo whose family
20 name I will remember for sure. We sat down and the meeting was opened by
21 a brief on the current state of play that day --
22 Q. Could you stop a minute.
23 MR. STAMP: I wonder if we could go into private session just for
24 one moment, Your Honour, just to ask the name of someone.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Then we will need to have the break, Mr. Stamp.
1 MR. STAMP: Oh, yes. Yes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
3 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
19 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 6.14 p.m.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Stamp.
22 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Q. We were at the meeting of the 1st of June, the Joint Command
24 meeting. When Mr. Sainovic and the other person arrived, how were they
25 treated by the MUP and VJ generals gathered there?
1 A. Mr. Sainovic was accompanied by Mr. Andjelkovic. We all rose.
2 When Sainovic sat down, we sat down as well. Mr. Andjelkovic sat on the
3 side with the MUP generals, whereas Pavkovic was facing him from the side
4 where the army representatives were. General Djordjevic briefly said
5 that a MUP general was missing, I can't tell you what his name is,
6 because he was busy in the field. I was a bit taken by surprise by that
7 meeting. I did not take down detailed notes of who was present and who
8 was not.
9 Q. Can we move into private session.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
11 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 [Private session]
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
25 MR. STAMP:
1 Q. The other person that attended or the person who attended with
2 Mr. Sainovic, you said Mr. Andjelkovic, that's Zoran Andjelkovic; am I
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What was his position at that time in respect to Kosovo?
6 A. I don't really know precisely what his position was, whether he
7 was president of the Kosovo Executive Council or something else. In any
8 case, he was one of the top politicians in Kosovo. I don't know what the
9 exact name or title of his position would be.
10 Q. Did you know General Djordjevic personally before that day, the
11 1st of June?
12 A. I know -- I knew from the media who General Djordjevic was;
13 however, this was the first time I met him. I think we met on one other
14 occasion at the meeting in the General Staff on the 9th of July. In any
15 case, I had seen him on television; therefore, it was easy for me to
16 recognise him.
17 Q. At the meeting on the 1st of June was he introduced?
18 A. No, there were no introductions made. I knew General Lukic from
19 before that; I greeted him before the session, and spoke to him briefly.
20 I did not speak to the other generals there.
21 Q. Can you summarise for us what happened and what was said and by
22 whom after the meeting began, that is, after Mr. Sainovic and
23 Mr. Andjelkovic arrived?
24 MR. STAMP: And while you're proceeding to do that, could I ask
25 the Registrar if we could bring up ERN -- not ERN, 65 ter number 02862.
1 Could we move to page 2 in the B/C/S copy.
2 Q. What you see there is a cover of your work notebook?
3 A. Yes. This is the photocopy of a cover -- of the cover page of my
4 work notebook. We can see on the screen now the note pertaining to the
5 1st of June, 1999. In it I noted down briefly what was discussed at the
6 Joint Command meeting. Perhaps I can continue what I tried -- what I
7 started explaining at the outset.
8 I said I was taken by surprise by that meeting. It was my custom
9 to take notes of the meetings I participated in. I marginally wrote
10 things down as to who said what at the meeting, and I did not include a
11 list of attendees. I was not keeping minutes. I was not even an
12 official at that meeting. In any case, I did take some very brief notes.
13 I don't need to refer to this page. I can tell you some things from my
14 memory. The first was General Lukic, after whom we had General Lazarevic
15 speak. Then there was a quick interjection by Deputy President Sainovic,
16 then we had Lazarevic and Pavkovic. It was my opinion that it was a
17 daily reporting session or meeting of the past 24 hours. No broad issues
18 were discussed. They only discussed what took place the day before and
19 what was being planned for the next day.
20 From what I recall, General Lukic briefly spoke about having
21 information that in the area of Trpeza and Drenica there was a larger
22 group of Albanian terrorists and that because of that they were preparing
23 an operation that was to clear that area and deal with that group. For
24 that purpose, they envisaged some 300 policemen to be used.
25 Then he said that in the course of the previous day there were
1 some activities dealing with a larger group of terrorists in the area of
2 Jablanica and that their front -- their first defence line was broken
3 through, causing casualties on their side. I believe he mentioned some
4 15 terrorists being killed, whereas only one policeman was wounded.
5 After that we had General Lazarevic speak who referred to the
6 situation in his area of responsibility. He may have gone outside of
7 that topic on occasion. What was interesting for me was that some
8 equipment or cargo was parachuted during the night. It probably was some
9 sort of assistance for the terrorists, and he also mentioned an illegal
10 radio station being in operation. Then he discussed the situation along
11 the border with Albania
12 operations and many losses in the area of Kosare. During the day, seven
13 soldiers were killed there and some 300 different types of projectiles
14 were fired including rockets. He said that it was twice as many as the
15 average of the days before that, which was around 160 rockets if I recall
17 He also said that the losses were great. I knew of that from the
18 reports of my security organs I had received since there was an
19 MP battalion there in which at least 50 soldiers and officers were either
20 killed or wounded.
21 Then we have General Pavkovic, who expressed his dissatisfaction
22 with the fact that certain positions and areas were not held on to. He
23 believed that they were easily abandoned, and he even said that measures
24 should be taken against the people responsible for that. He also stated
25 that they had information that in Albania
1 groups, larger groups, assembling which could mean that the beginning of
2 a land operation could be expected from those areas. He also said that
3 they noticed some 2.000 people in Albania along the border and the front
4 line were active in one particular area which was about 6 kilometres. He
5 also said or reiterated that every foot of land or building should be
6 held onto and that -- and that operations should be intensified so as to
7 avoid any surprises in the future. Mr. Sainovic agreed that the issues of
8 Jablanica and Trpeza have to be dealt with in the next three or four
9 days. That's what I recall, and I took some brief notes of that.
10 Q. Two things, your notes in respect to Mr. Sainovic's contribution
11 is that Mr. Sainovic tasked them with action to be completed within three
12 or four days. What did you mean when you wrote that he tasked them?
13 A. About what was discussed before that, that there seems to be an
14 operation prepared in Jablanica, Trpeza, and the border --
15 Q. Okay. But --
16 A. -- and that we should deal with these terrorist sabotage
17 groups --
18 Q. Yes, but I'm just focusing on when you say he tasked them. What
19 do you mean by that?
20 A. I cannot recall any particular tasks assigned to anyone. He
21 probably spoke to the effect that such tasks should be implemented and
22 distributed among the units. I simply noted down the gist of what I
23 believed important and what I can recall --
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the B/C/S we don't
1 see that part of the document and -- nor does the witness. We only see
2 the English version.
3 MR. STAMP: I'm so sorry. Could we -- yes. I think the witness
4 said that he can speak --
5 JUDGE PARKER: The witness said he didn't need to look at the
6 document at the commencement of his evidence about this, Mr. Djurdjic.
7 MR. STAMP:
8 Q. Having -- can you now answer my questions, General --
9 JUDGE PARKER: Just a minute, General.
10 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I did not react until the moment
12 you started discussing the translation in the English version. It was
13 then that I reacted, asking that we see the B/C/S version to see what is
14 written. That was my reaction to your statement, and I have no idea what
15 the witness will say.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Once I read this, I realise that
17 this may have been unclear to the translator. It says, Sainovic assigned
18 the task or a task that the operation be completed within three or four
19 days. He issued a task, i.e., that the operation should be completed in
20 three or four days, and I believe I said that even before I looked into
21 the notes.
22 MR. STAMP:
23 Q. Yes. Having regard to your record and your memory, can you tell
24 us what was your understanding of Sainovic's -- of Mr. Sainovic's
25 standing and relationship in respect to Generals Lukic, Lazarevic, and
2 A. Mr. Sainovic was deputy president of the federal government or
3 deputy prime minister. He was one of the closest associates of
4 President Milosevic. His authority was beyond dispute. He came from the
5 very top of politics. He enjoyed trust for that reason, and he was there
6 as a person representing Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. We were there
7 discussing things when he and his escort came in, Zoran Andjelkovic, and
8 then we all stood up. You can see from that that he was the central
9 figure. You can also see that by the position he was seated at the
10 table. There were neither Andjelkovic nor Pavkovic next to him. They
11 were on the sides. It was my conclusion that he was a person of
12 authority. He also concluded that the operation be undertaken, setting a
13 dead-line of three or four days.
14 I don't know whether I'd call that a command function. No one
15 reported to him as it usually would be when reporting to a military
16 officer, but obviously he was the most important person. People listened
17 to him. He listened to the daily debriefing and concluded the meeting.
18 I apologise if I spoke too fast.
19 Q. Thank you. You said he concluded the meeting, which was going to
20 be the next question I was going to ask you, but you have said it. What
21 do you mean when you say he concluded the meeting? What can we gather
22 from that?
23 A. Well, people can have various interpretations, but I believe I've
24 stated my conclusion. I'm not sure I should go any deeper than that. I
25 stated the facts, and I leave it up to anyone's conclusion. I stated
1 that I believe he was the person of most authority there, respected by
2 others, and that the meeting began with his arrival. It was also
3 concluded once he said, We're done, let's go and eat. I didn't write
4 that down, but more or less that's the way it ended.
5 Q. And thank you because it reminds me of another thing I need to
6 ask you about this document. You don't have General Djordjevic's name
7 here. Is there any reason why, as he was present at the meeting?
8 A. I have explained at the beginning that I was no notekeeper. I
9 wasn't even ready to attend. Among other things, I also believe I
10 omitted General Stevanovic, Obrad Stevanovic, although he was present.
11 As far as I recall, since it seems I need to go into further detail and I
12 believe Defence will have some questions as well, I wanted to say this:
13 When I contacted The Hague Tribunal's office in Belgrade, I reported
14 there as a suspect for certain crimes in Croatia. As regards Kosovo and
15 whatever happened in 1999, I wasn't prepared to speak about that.
16 However, given that the discussion included Kosovo, the OTP
17 probably found the meeting in Pristina on the 1st of June interesting. I
18 believe I then mentioned that Lukic did not intervene at the meeting,
19 rather, it was General Djordjevic. Perhaps I even repeated that in the
20 Milosevic case. However, when I was being proofed for the
21 Milutinovic et al. case and referring to Kosovo, I started going through
22 my notebooks and then I found Lukic as having contributed. Then when I
23 said that he participated in the meeting and his Defence tried to deny
24 that, I asked -- I consulted my notebooks. It was then that the Tribunal
25 asked for the notes to be photocopied, showing that Lukic was in
1 attendance. That's it.
2 Q. Very well.
3 A. There is no dilemma that what I am talking about now is
4 absolutely correct.
5 Q. Yes, I just wanted you to explain the absence of his name and now
6 you have indicated that not all the names of the generals present were
7 there or were recorded in your short note. Am I correct in saying that
8 these persons you have mentioned here are the persons who made
9 contributions or substantive contributions at the meeting?
10 A. That is correct. I only wrote down the names of those who
11 contributed; therefore, I didn't even mention (redacted). That's why I
12 couldn't recall his first name off the cuff. I still remember his
13 nickname but not his first name. I only noted down the names of those
14 who contributed. General Djordjevic did not. He only briefly
15 interjected saying that General Ilic was not in attendance. I didn't
16 write that down; I merely remembered it. And I wanted to protect that
17 person and not mention his name in open session.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. STAMP: That is why I think -- I ask that that part be --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic --
21 MR. STAMP: -- redacted from the open, public record.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, my mistake. I apologise.
24 MR. STAMP:
25 Q. After the meeting, did you leave with Colonel Stojanovic?
1 A. Yes, I did. We were supposed to stay over a dinner. It was
2 supposed to be a plain military dinner, but I went to see some officers
3 who had been waiting for me at the corps and their security organ.
4 Q. Thanks --
5 A. I left with Colonel Stojanovic.
6 Q. Thanks.
7 MR. STAMP: Before I forget, Your Honours, could the copy of this
8 page or pages from the notebook 052 -- sorry, 65 ter number 2862 be
9 received in evidence?
10 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That, Your Honours, will be assigned P00885.
12 MR. STAMP:
13 Q. Did you speak to your security -- or the Pristina Corps security
14 operative, Colonel Stojanovic, about the Joint Command?
15 A. I did while we were going back, since as I said I was taken by
16 surprise by that meeting I asked him what it was. He said, Well, it's a
17 Joint Command. It was formed back in 1998. When I asked him who were
18 its members and who attended meetings, I first and foremost wanted to
19 know about General Dimitrijevic, who was the head of administration. At
20 that point he told me that initially it was Mr. Minic who attended, then
21 Sainovic, and that during a longer period the head of the state security
22 sector, Mr. Jovica Stanisic was there. He said that Dimitrijevic did not
23 attend their meetings. As for state security, from Kosovo he said
24 David Gajic was present since he was the key state security sector person
25 in Kosovo. He also said that in the initial stages Colonel Stojanovic
1 attended the meetings of what was called the Joint Command and that he
2 drafted reports about what was discussed and he sent them to the security
3 administration --
4 Q. One moment, please.
5 A. I guess I'm going too fast.
6 Q. He also said that in the initial stages -- I'm reading the record
7 to you. He also said that in the initial stages Colonel Stojanovic
8 attended the meetings. Is that what you intended to say?
9 A. Yes, that's what I said. He also said that he drafted reports
10 about the matters discussed and sent them to General Dimitrijevic to
12 Q. Who is speaking here? Who told you this?
13 A. Stojanovic.
14 Q. So I take it that you are saying that he also said that at the
15 initial stages he himself attended the meetings of what was called the
16 Joint Command and that he drafted reports?
17 A. Yes. What you say is correct. He didn't keep the minutes, but
18 he simply drew reports to be sent to the security administration chief.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I, Your Honours?
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, now.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The witness is completely clear
22 and unambiguous. I believe my learned friend's interpretations are
23 unnecessary and wrong. I think it should be left to the witness to
24 provide answers which is precisely what he's doing clearly and concisely.
25 Thank you.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, please, Mr. Stamp.
2 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
3 Q. Did he -- before I get to that, you mentioned
4 General Dimitrijevic. What was General Dimitrijevic's post in 1998 going
5 into 1999?
6 A. General Dimitrijevic was the head of the security administration
7 from 1993 until January 1999, so in 1998 he was head of the security
8 administration of the General Staff in Belgrade.
9 Q. And I take it General Farkas succeeded him?
10 A. Yes, he succeeded him as he received that post from him.
11 Q. And did Mr. -- sorry, did Colonel Stojanovic tell you who were
12 the -- who, if anybody, were the attendees of the Joint Command meetings
13 from the MUP or from the VJ?
14 A. He did not tell me who the MUP attendees were; but I also already
15 stated very clearly, he mentioned David Gajic from the state security
16 sector, he mentioned Jovica Stanovic [as interpreted] who was head of
17 state security sector, Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Minic. I'm not sure about a
18 person by the name of Vlatkovic, somebody from the PS [as interpreted],
19 some of the officials, but he did not mention any officials from the MUP
20 public security sector.
21 Q. Okay. He mentioned Jovica Stanisic, is that the correct name?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. And you said a Vlatkovic from the PS. What is the PS?
24 A. I don't know anybody by the name of Vlajkovic.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the witness said SPS
2 not PS; it did not enter the transcript correctly. Mr. Stamp may try to
3 clarify it. It's line 19, the PS is what is written down and the witness
4 stated SPS. And I noted down an official -- a functioner from the SPS.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not say Vlajkovic, rather, I
6 said Vlatkovic, but I am not sure about the family name of that person,
7 so this is why I referred to the SPS.
8 MR. STAMP:
9 Q. You --
10 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, counsel.
11 Q. You remained general in Kosovo for how long after the
12 1st of June?
13 A. I stayed there until the 7th of June. On the 8th of June, I was
14 back in Belgrade
15 Q. We'll get back to Belgrade
16 course of time there, did you receive information as to exactly what was
17 the role and function of the Joint Command in Kosovo?
18 A. No, we no longer discussed that. It wasn't a relevant issue for
19 me to be dealing with at the time. What I related, I omitted in that
20 only one detail in that conversation while we were going back to the
21 command of the Pristina Corps, Colonel Stojanovic told me that soon he
22 was removed from attendance of the sessions of the Joint Command. He was
23 told that there was -- that his attendance served no purpose, that corps
24 commander was there, the army commander was in attendance. His personal
25 assessment was that he was eliminated because he was reporting back to
2 story of the Joint Command when it came to our discussions and later on
3 we never discussed it further.
4 Q. In the course of that discussion, did he mention to you what the
5 purpose of the Joint Command was?
6 A. No, he did not. It wasn't an issue for us. It wasn't of
7 interest to me, and this is why I did not ask questions about that. I
8 just listened to what he had to say during that drive to Pristina Corps
9 command, and this was the last time that we discussed this matter.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. STAMP: Could we bring up on screen document
12 65 ter number 01462.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] An objection in advance. This
15 document has nothing to do with this witness. The person who is supposed
16 to verify this document has been placed - by the Trial Chamber's
17 decision - placed on the list of witnesses for the Prosecution. I don't
18 believe that this is appropriate for this document to be shown to this
19 witness, especially I object to this document being introduced through
20 this witness.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Now, what's the direction you're taking here,
22 Mr. Stamp?
23 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I would submit that the document is
24 relevant and probative --
25 JUDGE PARKER: That's not in dispute.
1 MR. STAMP: As long as the witness can identify the document and
2 it's -- and give evidence as to its authenticity, it becomes admissible.
3 What he might be able to say about the contents may be limited, but that
4 is a matter for the Court to address. But if he can authenticate it, it
5 is also my submission that it becomes admissible.
6 JUDGE PARKER: So you're planning to put this to the witness with
7 a view to the witness identifying it in such a way as to justify its
9 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Go ahead, and we'll see whether you achieve your
12 MR. STAMP:
13 Q. Are you familiar with Colonel Djakovic who was formerly a
14 member -- a senior member of the Pristina Corps in the 3rd Army in 1999?
15 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first we have to ask
17 the witness what Colonel Djakovic was, which post he occupied. My
18 learned colleague reaches his own conclusions and then wants the witness
19 to continue and follow up with his answers. This is a time when the
20 witness was not in active service. On the 27th of April, 1999, he was
21 reinstated. And before he answers, I would like to hear from him when
22 was the first time he learned about this document if he -- any -- has any
23 knowledge about this document. Thank you.
24 JUDGE PARKER: The issue that needs to be addressed at the
25 moment, Mr. Stamp, is that you were leading and that should not occur.
1 You're on notice clearly about this document and these events against
2 leading and tread carefully with the document so that we can see where
3 you're going and whether it's justified.
4 MR. STAMP:
5 Q. Do you see the document in front of you -- and perhaps I
6 should -- if I could, with the leave of the Court, hand the witness a
7 binder --
8 JUDGE PARKER: Are you proceeding with your question about
9 Colonel Djakovic?
10 MR. STAMP: I was -- I intended to get back to that, but I
11 could -- I could --
12 JUDGE PARKER: The admissible question is: Do you know him?
13 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.
14 Q. Do you know Colonel Djakovic?
15 A. I know a General Djakovic who early on was a security officer in
16 a brigade in the 1970s. General Djakovic became head of the security
17 administration after General Geza Farkas was removed from that post. At
18 that time, June 2000, I was an advisor to the Chief of the General Staff
19 for security. However, I continued working at the security
20 administration to help General Djakovic to find his bearings because he
21 had not reached that position from a position of responsibility in the
22 security service but from the command of the 3rd Army. And that's why
23 from June 2000 until 2001, in March when I left active service, I worked
24 with him. I know him very well. We maintained contacts after I was
25 pensioned off, and soon thereafter he was pensioned off as well. He at
1 the time, received invitations to contact The Hague office in a certain
2 capacity. He phoned me because he knew I had gone through such
3 procedures. He told me that he kept minutes and this was his assessment
4 why he was being contacted by The Hague office, the minutes of the
5 meetings of the Joint Command in Pristina. I was interested in the
6 circumstances leading to him keeping the minutes, and he says he himself
7 suggested that for the first time he attended with General Pavkovic,
8 seeing that nobody was taking the minutes as a soldier he said,
9 General Pavkovic, nobody's noting down anything and General Pavkovic told
10 him, Well, you take the minutes. So General Djakovic told me that for a
11 time he kept the minutes of the sessions of the Joint Command.
12 When I came here, I was shown a photocopy most probably of
13 that -- those minutes. I know General Djakovic's handwriting because I
14 worked with him, he signed documents that we sent, et cetera, so I can
15 recognise his handwriting. I cannot be an expert graphologist, but from
16 what I saw I gained an impression that this was General Djakovic's
17 handwriting in the initial pages that I saw and the rest of the pages.
18 So to cut a long story short, to resolve this enigma of me being asked
19 about this -- in circumstances when in 1998 I was not in active duty.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, after such an answer by the
22 witness, I do strenuously believe that this document cannot be introduced
23 through him, irrespective of his subsequent knowledge gained in 2000,
24 despite the fact that he is not a graphologist, and anyway that witness
25 is going to testify here. I agree that this is a relevant piece of
1 evidence, but not through this witness. Thank you very much.
2 MR. STAMP: Your Honours.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp.
4 MR. STAMP: We plan and we hope and anticipate that the witness
5 will testify and the witness will deal with this document, as we hope and
6 expect that he will. But the fact that another witness may come and is
7 expected to come, it is my submission does not prevent an earlier witness
8 who can authenticate a witness from doing so, and we never know what can
9 happen --
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp, we adjourn for the night because we
11 have passed 7.00.
12 MR. STAMP: Right. I'm so sorry.
13 JUDGE PARKER: You reflect on it. If you propose tomorrow to --
14 in the morning to continue with your effort to tender the document. As
15 I've indicated, proceed carefully with your questions, and we have
16 already noted Mr. Djurdjic's objection and it will be the subject of
17 decision at an appropriate time as you pursue the matter if that's the
18 course you take in the morning.
19 I'm afraid, General, we have to stop now. We have to finish at
20 7.00. We resume tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning. We look forward to
21 continue your evidence then.
22 We now adjourn.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 a.m.
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of
25 June, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.