1 Tuesday, 23 June 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. I must
7 start the day by raising a problem that my infallible assistant has
8 noticed. We admitted yesterday as an exhibit P996, the statement of
9 Witness Drewienkiewicz given in 2000. The version disclosed to us was
10 redacted and from it the following paragraphs are missing: From 147
11 through 154. And the Defence team worked with that version. However,
12 the version in e-court contains these paragraphs, and that's the version
13 that has been admitted. I believe this is not appropriate.
14 I don't know if the same version was given to the Trial Chamber
15 as the one given to the Defence, but I believe the version admitted and
16 the one uploaded into the e-court should be the one that we have, the
17 version identical for all parties.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
19 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, my case manager, Ms. Pedersen, is
20 telling me that we have disclosed the full version of this witness
21 statement. We are checking our records for the exact date of that. The
22 redacted version that my learned colleague is referring to is a version
23 that was admitted in the Milutinovic trial. That version had initially
24 been incorrectly uploaded in the e-court system that was corrected last
25 week, and -- so we have the complete version of this witness statement in
1 the e-court system.
2 JUDGE PARKER: In summary, the wrong version has been admitted.
3 MS. KRAVETZ: No, no, Your Honour, the correct version was
4 admitted and provided to the Defence. All I'm saying is that if my
5 learned colleague's printed out the version that was in e-court somewhere
6 before the beginning of last week, they would have had the wrong version
7 because we corrected the e-court system -- the copy in e-court system
8 just at the beginning of -- sometime last week. I don't remember exactly
9 which day that happened.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, I don't think we need to spend more
11 time on it now. You should have the version with all the paragraphs, not
12 the redacted version. If you haven't, if you would consult with the
13 court officer somewhere, you have a earlier redacted version and that
14 could be overcome. The formal admitted document is not redacted, it has
15 everything. If by tomorrow morning you haven't been able to find the
16 correct one, raise it again.
17 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honour, if I may, I'm being told by
18 Ms. Pedersen that the records shows that the full version was disclosed
19 in December 2007. It's been available to the Defence since.
20 JUDGE PARKER: What's available and what's admitted are two
21 different things. We want to be sure the correct version is admitted and
22 that the correct version is shown on e-court to Defence and anybody else
23 who looks.
24 MS. KRAVETZ: That was the case, Your Honour. That was the
25 correct version.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Can we leave it with you then, Mr. Djurdjic.
2 Thank you.
3 That's one problem. While the witness is being brought in, we
4 cannot as Judges get today's transcript on our screen. We have
6 THE REGISTRAR: I already informed the technician. They are
7 coming to fix it.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.
11 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
12 JUDGE PARKER: The affirmation you made yesterday to tell the
13 truth still applies.
14 THE WITNESS: Understood, sir.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz is continuing.
16 MS. KRAVETZ: Could we please have back up on the screen
17 Exhibit P1011 which was the last document we saw yesterday.
18 WITNESS: JOHN KAROL DREWIENKIEWICZ [Resumed]
19 Examination by Ms. Kravetz: [Continued]
20 Q. I would like to ask you to turn to tab 17 again of your binder.
21 Yesterday when we with left off we were looking at this document, and I
22 would ask you to turn to the last page, the almost-to-last paragraph of
23 the document. I'm just going to check if the document is there.
24 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could have the last page of it displayed.
25 Thank you.
1 Q. I just wanted to ask you for a clarification of what is stated in
2 the first sentence of this page where it says:
3 "6 to 8 K
4 to cross in the immediate border area. This morning we have seen a
5 further 7 K arrive by train."
6 What does that refer to?
7 A. It refers to thousands of displaced persons. 6.000 to 8.000
8 entered FYROM yesterday. There were reported to be up to 50.000 waiting
9 to cross an immediate border area. This morning we've seen a further
10 7.000 arrive by train. So that was just my shorthand.
11 Q. And what would have been the source of this information?
12 A. The numbers would have come through to me from my people on the
13 ground because I had people at the border watching what was going on. I
14 will be the first to admit that the exact numbers are subject to -- were
15 the judgement of the people that were there, but they had spent quite a
16 long time there by then, and they had got quite used to seeing several
17 thousand. So I think they were very capable of knowing what 1.000 people
18 looked like milling around in a muddy field.
19 Q. And just for clarification, what does FYROM stand for?
20 A. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the country to the
21 south of Serbia
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MS. KRAVETZ: Could we now have up on the screen 02541.
24 Q. And this is tab 18 of your binder. And I would ask that you turn
25 to that. I see we have the document up on the screen. Sir, I would just
1 ask if you could tell us what this document is, if you know, and I'm
2 particularly interested in a bullet point that's dated 20 March, 2009
3 which starts with "Evacuation of OSCE KVM."
4 A. Yes, this was another version of the previous serial. This was,
5 I think, the first draft of it on the assumption that I would have to
6 brief people who were utterly unaware of the situation and therefore I
7 needed to have one page in which everything that had happened starting
8 the previous October was set out. And so the aim, the buildup, the
9 current situation, were really the three issues. And as you saw in the
10 previous serial, the buildup part of that was -- was not used in the
11 briefing that eventually took place.
12 The 20th of March, which was the day we were ordered out, and as
13 it says, "The start of unconstrained operations by MUP and VJ against
14 civilians especially in the Podujevo area." Our authority for saying
15 that or -- my authority for saying that was that as we were driving out,
16 we were already seeing VJ and MUP forces leaving their areas in columns
17 and headed out towards the areas where KLA were known to be.
18 There was also a number of agencies, particularly UNHCR, that
19 stayed an extra day after we stayed, and they didn't evacuate until the
20 next day, the 21st. And when they came out, they reported to us that the
21 moment we had left, in their words, all hell broke loose; and therefore,
22 what we saw of people leaving their barrack areas was confirmed by the
23 UNHCR in particular as they remained there throughout the next 24 hours.
24 And the level of violence went up to such a degree that the UNHCR
25 promptly left because they had -- they had felt that although we were
1 ordered out that they had a duty to stay, despite our having left until
2 the level of violence became so great that they too had to leave for
3 their own safety. And that took just 24 hours before that decision was
4 made by them. Thank you.
5 Q. And when you were -- received this reports that the level of
6 violence had increased, what exactly were you told was happening on the
8 A. Well, we were told that the areas we were all familiar with were
9 subject to attacks by the various Serb forces that had been leaving
10 barracks as we were leaving.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, I seek to tender this exhibit. It is
13 02541, and I ask that that be received.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1027, Your Honours.
16 MS. KRAVETZ: I would now like to have P840 up on the screen.
17 Q. General, we're going to have a photograph displayed on the screen
18 right before you. We are no longer going to be referring to the binder
19 that you have there, so you can just close that.
20 A. Okay. Good. Thank you.
21 Q. And I would just like to ask you if you recognise the locality
22 that's shown in the photograph and if you can provide any comments as to
23 what is seen there.
24 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could please zoom in for the witness.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is the area immediately south of the
1 border crossing from Kosovo into Macedonia
2 Djeneral Jankovic. It's the view from the main road which runs along the
3 bottom edge of this photo. I would say it's about the 2nd of April
4 because it's not the moment that everybody arrived because you can see
5 that there are some fires that have been lit for cooking, and there have
6 been some temporary shelters put up by the people. And when we first saw
7 this about 24 hours before, there were no fires, there were no shelters.
8 It was just people stumbling around in that area.
9 And the people there are Kosovar Albanians who have just arrived
10 here by walking down the railway line which is at the top right-hand
11 corner of this picture. I think the picture was probably taken by
12 Richard Ciaglinski.
13 Q. Did you yourself travel to this area to see this field with
14 refugees that we see in the photograph?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. And when were you there?
17 A. I was there the day before this. After I -- after I was in the
18 Ministry of Defence in the UK
19 back to Macedonia
20 And when I landed, the first thing that happened was I got a call on
21 mobile phone from Richard Ciaglinski who said, Hey, you need to come and
22 see this because it has got a lot worse since you left in the 36 hours or
23 so since you've been away.
24 So I went immediately to this location where I met him, and we
25 stood on this hill and saw this sort of -- this sort of scene unfolding
1 in front of us. It was actually Good Friday, I seem to remember that it
2 was a bit of a funny old thing to have to be seeing on Good Friday.
3 Q. And while you were at this border point with Mr. Ciaglinski, were
4 you able to obtain any information as to why these persons that we see on
5 the photograph that are in the field had crossed the border into
7 A. Yes, because among all of these people were some of our former
8 security guards who made themselves known to us, and we had interpreters
9 with us anyway, so we were able to ask various people that came up to --
10 people came up to the road because although they weren't aloud onto the
11 road, there were a number of water bowsers, and their only way of getting
12 drinking water was to get water from the water bowsers. So they would
13 come up with empty soft drinks bottles, plastic bottles, and fill their
14 water containers. And at that point we were able to ask them what their
15 situation was.
16 Many of them said that they were from Pristina, that they had
17 been rounded up at very short notice and moved down to the station where
18 they were loaded onto the train, that the train took them down to the
19 border where they were ordered off the train and were ordered to walk
20 down the train lines to this location, and further were told that the
21 area either side of the train lines was mined and therefore if they
22 strayed from the train tracks, they would doubtless be blown up.
23 The other thing we were told was that as they were leaving at
24 various moments during this process, they were systematically robbed and
25 their identification documents were taken off them, and it was certainly
1 the case that almost everybody that we met had no identification
2 documents because it became obviously a serious issue later when we were
3 attempting to help some of these people be taken to countries of refuge
4 and they needed new identity documents to be created for them, and we
5 were involved in that. Thank you.
6 Q. Now, you say that the -- many of these persons told you they were
7 from Pristina and they had been rounded up at very short notice. Did
8 they tell you anything as to who had been involved in rounding them up
9 and moving them to the train station?
10 A. Yes, this was largely a police operation. They said that they
11 were -- that the police entered their locality, banged on all the doors,
12 told everybody that they had 5 minutes to get out, and then herded
13 everybody down to the station. But it was largely described as a police
15 Q. Now, you've spoken about these persons saying that they had been
16 systematically robbed and that their identification documents had been
17 taken from them. What was, in your view, the significance of that, of
18 the removal of the identification documents?
19 A. Well, I think it was to render them stateless. Throughout --
20 throughout the Balkan wars, the issue of who someone is and where he
21 comes from and how he can establish who he is and where he comes from has
22 been raised many times, and this was the first time I had had direct
23 experience of coming across this myself. But it was a consistent
24 complaint of these people, that they had -- had had their ID taken from
1 Q. Thank you. Now, moving on to the period of the end of the
2 conflict in 1999. Did you return to Kosovo after the conflict ended?
3 A. Yes, I did.
4 Q. When exactly did you return?
5 A. I arrived the day before KFOR went into Kosovo, attached to the
6 KFOR headquarters led by General Mike Jackson, and took Richard
7 Ciaglinski with me. So he and I went in as an additional liaison team to
8 assist the KFOR when it went in.
9 We arrived, as I say, the day before the -- the force went in,
10 and on the day that the force went in, I personally went in with
11 General Jackson; and then the day after that, I took -- I led the whole
12 of the UN convoy into Kosovo by road.
13 Q. Now, you say that you arrived the day before the KFOR went in and
14 that you later also went in with General Jackson. To which locality
15 specifically did you go when you returned to Kosovo?
16 A. On D day, on the day that the forces first went in, I went into
17 Pristina airport and then flew back out -- back down to Macedonia. And
18 the day, after I went with the UN convoy up to Pristina and we then
19 stayed in Pristina.
20 Q. Now, you've referred to staying in Pristina during this time.
21 Can you just very briefly tell us about your observations in the town
22 when you returned in this period to Pristina?
23 A. The day I arrived, my job was to go to the Grand Hotel and to
24 attend a meeting with the Serb military that was taking place in the
25 basement of the Grand Hotel. I did that, I suppose, about 7.00 at night.
1 And having finished that meeting at about half past 8.00 at night, I
2 walked around that area between -- between the Grand Hotel and where the
3 OSCE building had been because that was where many of the government
4 buildings had been. I really wanted to see what the state of the
5 building that the OSCE had been in. And in walking around there,
6 Richard Ciaglinski drew my attention to a bonfire which was burning. Do
7 you want me to describe this?
8 Q. Yes, please carry on.
9 A. And this was outside the public part of the police headquarters
10 on the opposite side of the road to the Grand Hotel. And a bonfire, a
11 conical shaped heap of stuff was smouldering about two and a -- about a
12 metre high. We warmed our hands at it because it was a chilly night, and
13 then to get a bit more flame we kicked at it. And as the bonfire sort of
14 fell apart, we realised it was actually a bonfire of identity documents.
15 And so we retrieved some of the documents and realised that the whole
16 bonfire was actually a bonfire of burning identity documents of various
18 Q. And were you able to ascertain to whom these identity documents
19 belonged to?
20 A. We got several of these, I suppose about half a dozen, and put
21 the fire out. And it was clear that they were Kosovar Albanians. The
22 dates of birth varied, but I think the earliest was about 1950, and the I
23 think there was one as late at 1970. But generally they belonged to
24 Kosovar Albanians of an age where they would still be alive.
25 Q. Thank you. I would like to show you one last exhibit.
1 MS. KRAVETZ: And this is 65 ter 00407. If we could have that up
2 on the screen. This is a document that is called the Blue Book. OSCE
3 Blue Book.
4 Q. And while that is being brought up, just to follow up from your
5 last answer, do you know who was burning the documents outside the MUP
6 building? Were you able to find that out?
7 A. No. I mean nobody was coming out to stack up the fire and throw
8 a few more on it while we were there. I think we might have asked him
9 what in the heck he was doing. We passed the documents and that
10 information to the Royal Military Police Detachment of the headquarters
11 of the KFOR since obviously at that stage there were no civilian
12 police -- international civilian police on the scene.
13 Q. Thank you. I see we now have the document up on the screen. Do
14 you -- are you familiar with this document, General?
15 A. Yes. Absolutely.
16 Q. Can you tell us what this is, the Blue Book?
17 A. The Blue Book was a briefing document whose purpose was to
18 attempt to show where things were happening. Each morning there was a
19 daily update for the head of mission and the deputies given by -- in the
20 presence of all of the heads of the staff branches. And this began as
21 a -- a written description of what was going on. But since not all of
22 the senior members of the mission were familiar with the area outside of
23 Pristina, it became clear that we needed to present this information more
24 visually, and also to give some value to the reports that were being
1 So we tried to show where there were clusters of activity, and we
2 tried to show how authentic we felt -- how reliable we felt the
3 information was. So it was -- it was not just a straight description of
4 what had happened, but a description with a commentary which attempted to
5 say that this is rather unusual, or this is following the trend, or this
6 looks very similar to something that we saw a week ago but in another
8 So the commentary on it was part of the value added that we
9 attempted to give to it. And it was put together by the fusion cell,
10 which was the cell which was not receiving all of the information on a
11 minute-by-minute basis, but it was what stepped back one step and was
12 trying to analyse all of this open source information that came to us
13 from all of the regional centres, from all sources. And to try to
14 collate it and make sense of it.
15 Q. You mentioned having tried to show how authentic the information
16 was and reliable you felt it was. How did you go about trying to check
17 the reliability of the information before including it in this document?
18 A. We used a system which is -- has generally been used in military
19 intelligence which is to rate it from A1 to F6 with the A to F rating
20 being the reliability of the source and 1 to 6 being the likelihood of it
21 being correct.
22 And so an A1 report would be something from a source you knew
23 very well and you trusted him and it was entirely probable that this
24 was -- that this was correct because it had maybe been checked with
25 another source and found to be correct. On the other hand, if someone
1 sidles up to you in a cafe and whispers something and you've never seen
2 him before in your life and it sounds most improbable, then the man with
3 the board on the street who says the world is going to end tomorrow is
4 probably F6.
5 Q. Thank you. I would like to go through some of the entries of
6 this book just so we can all understand what sort of information was
7 included there and how it was compiled.
8 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could first turn to page 247 of the English,
9 and in the B/C/S version this is page 24.
10 Q. And this is an entry that's entitled "Significant Events As
11 Reported" and the date is 15th January 1999.
12 MS. KRAVETZ: If the witness could only have the English
13 displayed for him.
14 THE WITNESS: Can we zoom it up, please. Thanks.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: And I indicated the B/C/S version was page 24 just
16 for reference for the Defence.
17 Q. So we see in this page we have six events that are indicated.
18 Could you explain what this is that we see here?
19 A. This is the visual depiction of what's been going on throughout
20 Friday the 15th of January.
21 JUDGE PARKER: If you could pause a moment, please.
22 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, is it possible for
24 me to have this page so that I can follow, please.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Not only possible, you should let us try and
1 ensure you do.
2 MS. KRAVETZ:
3 Q. General, I think if you could continue, if I could again request
4 for the witness only to display the English so he can be able to read
5 what it on the page. Thank you.
6 So, General, just if you could just continue with the answer you
7 were giving about the explanation of what we see here.
8 A. I need the font up, I'm afraid. Otherwise you're going to see me
9 half an inch away from the screen. Great.
10 Okay. Number 1, Regional Centre 3, that's Pec, report the
11 contact between the VJ and MUP and the KLA forces continued in the
12 vicinity of Gornji Ratis and Donji Ratis which as you can see is due
13 south of Pec.
14 Number 2, two of my people are wounded by small-arms fire and
15 glass fragments in approximately the same area, and we later discovered
16 that the wounds were not life threatening.
17 Q. Can I stop you there, sir. What I was -- what my question was
18 aimed at was just for you to explain how this information would have been
19 compiled by the fusion cell --
20 A. All right. Okay.
21 Q. -- more than the actual -- because we can read what is on the
23 A. Well, I certainly couldn't when it was down half a page size.
24 Yeah. The reports came into the operations cell which was dealing with
25 the reports as they came in. They logged them, they informed people that
1 needed to be told; and if they needed to adjust who send people to look
2 at things or reinforce a presence, then they gave those instructions.
3 And they noted it in a written log, sort of one serial after another, so
4 it was chronological. So if something happened at midday at the
5 left-hand end of Kosovo and something happened at 12.01 at the right-hand
6 end, they would appear in the log one after the other.
7 It was all passed to the fusion centre who mapped it all on the
8 map and then attempted to say what was going on in the broader picture.
9 So the fact that Serial 1 and Serial 2 are in the same area, they could
10 well have been -- the reports to those thing could well have been four
11 hours apart, so they could have been four pages away on the log. So
12 bringing it all together on the map and showing exactly where things are
13 is an attempt to show where the hot spots are.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could now turn to page 251 of the English and
16 this is 25 in the B/C/S. And I would again ask for the English to be
17 displayed for the witness and if we could zoom in.
18 Q. Do you have that before you, General?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. This is an entry entitled "Significant Events as Reported," and
21 it's --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- number 5. We see that this is a report from RC 1 of an attack
24 by combined VJ MUP forces in thee vicinity of Stimlje, and there are
25 several localities mentioned there including the village of Racak
1 Yesterday you had spoken about an incident in the village of Racak
2 this entry be a reference to that same incident that you referred to
4 A. Yes, it was, yes. It was -- it came from RC 5, which wasn't
5 Prizren. It was -- it was one that was further to the east and had only
6 just been set up. But yes, and again, this is a precis of obviously a
7 day's worth of events packaged together to try to put a consistent
8 narrative together. So it's really everything we knew about what had
9 gone on.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could now have page 563 up on the screen, and
12 this is page 42 on the B/C/S.
13 Q. This is an entry that is entitled "Significant Events As
14 Reported," and it's dated 21 February, 1999. And on the top we see "RC 3
15 large VJ convoy spotted." I believe that's still not up on the screen.
16 Do you have that up on the screen?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Yes. We see that in this entry there's a reference to a large
19 convoy of -- a VJ convoy of Serbs travelling south from Belgrade heading
20 towards Nis
21 "There is no indication that the convoy ever turned back to
23 How were you able to obtain this sort of information, that a
24 large convoy was travelling towards Kosovo, a VJ convoy?
25 A. This was because one of my vehicles was on the main -- was going
1 to or from Belgrade
2 various reasons. We had a liaison office in Belgrade as well which was
3 our foot on the ground in Belgrade
4 so for a number of reasons, people drove from Kosovo up the highway to
6 was -- that was obviously made by the -- I think by a vehicle going in
7 the opposite direction. So I think that as it was going north towards
10 Q. So this would have been an observation made by one of your
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you have further information as to what happened to this
14 convoy, if you remember?
15 A. Not off the top of my head, no.
16 Q. Thank you. Okay.
17 MS. KRAVETZ: If we can now turn to page 703 in the English; and
18 in the B/C/S this is page 74.
19 Q. This is an entry dated "Significant Events as Reported,"
20 12 March, 1999
21 And the heading of it is "RC 2 Houses Burning Near Vucitrn."
22 Now, yesterday you spoke about a large-scale offensive in the
23 Kacanik and Vucitrn areas, and you told us how you yourself went to
24 Vucitrn to see what was happening. Does this entry relate to the same
25 operation, or is this a different incident?
1 A. I think it's an earlier part of the operation I then went and
2 observed. The specific location here that's indicated is to the south
3 and east of where I went; and when I went it was at least the next day.
4 But I think it was part of the same operation which was -- which was over
5 quite a large area.
6 Q. Now, we see that at the end of the first paragraph we have an A1.
7 What does that mean?
8 A. A1 means that it's been verified on the ground by people whom we
9 trust, by more than one source.
10 Q. This refers to the system that you have referred to earlier?
11 A. Yes, yes.
12 MS. KRAVETZ: Could we now have page 735 up on the screen; and in
13 the B/C/S this is page 85.
14 Q. And this is an entry for the 14th March, 1999, and the heading
15 says: "Heavy Fighting in Southern Part of Klina."
16 I wanted to ask you, this entry indicates that there's heavy
17 fighting in a number of localities and speaks about the type of fighting
18 that has been observed. And there's a comment included in there, and I
19 wanted to ask you about the source of this comment.
20 A. This would be a comment inserted by the fusion cell when they had
21 got the report and they had compared it with all the other reports they
22 had, and would wish to put it in context for the people that were being
23 briefed. So it's a comment by the fusion cell sitting in Pristina on
24 something that happened some way away that they didn't personally
25 observe, but they had got other reports from other sources which were
1 relevant and so they put the whole thing together with a comment. And
2 when it says "comment," it's an opinion; but it's an opinion by somebody
3 who is a professional at doing this.
4 Q. Now, we see that -- I see that in the comment it says, second
5 sentence, The MUP said that they had not been involved - and the third
6 sentence - However MUP, including PJP milicija were observed by RC 3
7 operating in the the area.
8 Why was this significant and why has -- do you know why PJP has
9 been highlighted there?
10 A. Well, PJP is rather more competent. In other words, it's not
11 your average MUP who would have been garrisoning, for instance, a fixed
12 position like Malisevo. PJP milicija are the more competent units of
13 better people, better trained, and able to be deployed throughout the
14 area, not necessarily specifically tied to a particular location, but
15 deployed to areas of greater need.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MS. KRAVETZ: If we could now have page 851 up on the screen; and
18 this is 147 in the B/C/S.
19 Q. This is an entry for 26 March, 1999, and it's -- the heading is
20 "Djakovica Burning."
21 Now, my question about this entry is that it's dated after the
22 period that you and your verifiers left Kosovo. So I would like you to
23 explain to the Court how you were able to continue reporting what was
24 going on on the ground after you had left.
25 A. We left mobile phones -- no, we didn't leave mobile phones. The
1 people that worked for us all had mobile phones, all had their own mobile
2 phones, and generally we knew what those mobile phones were. And so we
3 were able to ring our former civilian employees, both Albanian and Serb,
4 and say to them, What's going on? And we received quite a lot of reports
5 that way.
6 Six days after we left, we were still in contact with quite a lot
7 of these people, and so this would be a report or a report compiled from
8 a number of reports which -- which appeared to indicate what was going on
9 on the ground. The fact that we've rated it C3 as opposed to A1 mean's
10 that we were absolutely not convinced it was all exactly as described,
11 and it was a useful way of reminding ourselves that this is not firsthand
13 Q. Now, the comment on this page says:
14 "The pattern continues in outlying towns as well as in Pristina.
15 Initially, it was thought that the major cities would be spared, however,
16 that appears not to be the case now."
17 What would have been the source of this information? Would that
18 have again been information you obtained on the ground from persons who
19 were there in the province?
20 A. Yes. And the comment "it was thought the major cities would be
21 spared" reflects the fact that in the first few days the action of the
22 Serb forces was in the areas where the KLA appeared to be concentrated,
23 i.e., not in the cities. And so to start with, we saw a pattern of
24 activity by the Serb forces in the country-side, and then we see this
25 change and they start to clear out the Albanians from the cities as well.
1 Q. Thank you. Just the last entry I want to show you in this
2 document is page 855; and it's 149 in the B/C/S. And this is also an
3 entry for the same date, 26 March, 1999
4 "Armed Serb Civilians Patrolling Pristina."
5 Now, we see that this entry says - I think it's up on the screen
6 now - it is reported that there were groups of armed Serb civilians
7 patrolling through the city of Pristina
8 of looting and burning of Albanian houses and businesses throughout the
9 city and also of these civilians participating murders of Albanian
11 And we see that it has the same rating as the previous page. So
12 would the source of this information again have been from your sources on
13 the ground at the time.
14 A. Yes, yes, it would.
15 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to the comment that's included
16 in this entry. It says:
17 "The VJ and MUP had allowed lawlessness to get out of hand."
18 What does that refer to?
19 A. I think at the time I probably chastised the author and said
20 that's a blinding glimpse of the obvious. But given that we are where we
21 are today, I think it's very apposite that they wrote it. But clearly
22 they are reporting on the fact that what is taking place is not an
23 operation by people attempting to promote the rule of law by going after
24 criminals and detaining criminals in the KLA, that the the local Serb
25 population or elements of the local Serb population have been allowed to
1 join in the overall lawlessness and persecution of the Albanian civilians
2 in Pristina.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, at this stage I have no further
5 questions for the witness. I seek to tender this exhibit into evidence.
6 This is 00407. I know that my learned colleague from the Defence had
7 raised an objection, and I would like to clarify our position regarding
8 this document. Since my learned colleague very rightly so yesterday
9 raised the issue of the lack of translations in the e-court system for
10 this exhibit, these have now been located and uploaded and the full set
11 has been provided to the Defence. It is my understanding that only a few
12 of them had been previously disclosed and the full set was provided
13 yesterday and is now in the e-court system.
14 We had made a selection of the pages we wanted to have admitted.
15 These sum up approximately to 160 pages, so this is a very lengthy
16 document. Of course, I can't go through each page with the witness and
17 have him comment on them, but I would request that based on the evidence
18 he has given on how this document was compiled and what sort of
19 information is contained within the document, I would request that
20 Your Honours receive that portion that has been translated into evidence.
21 It is our view that this document contains contemporaneous
22 reports of what was going on on the ground and that it will assist
23 Your Honours in having an overview of events for the dates that are
24 included within the document.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz, are you saying that 160 pages have
1 now been translated and are in the e-court system, or are you saying the
2 whole of the book has been translated?
3 MS. KRAVETZ: Only 160 pages have been translated. This was a
4 selection that was made in the Milutinovic case when the same document
5 was used, and these are the pages that we have also selected to rely on
6 in this case. So the whole document has not been translated. The reason
7 for that is that it's a very lengthy document and of course we know that
8 CLSS has very limited resources and the document has almost 1.000 pages.
9 So we did not request the entirety of the document to be
10 translated, only -- and the number I'm giving of 160 pages is an
11 approximate number, Your Honours. It's -- we have prepared a spreadsheet
12 which indicates all the pages that we intend to rely upon and that have
13 translations which are now in the e-court system. And we are happy to
14 provide that to the Registry Officer and the Defence at a convenient time
15 so the relevant pages can be admitted.
16 JUDGE PARKER: How many of these had been provided and translated
17 for before yesterday?
18 MS. KRAVETZ: It's my understanding that less than 10. I do have
19 to check that, but that is my understanding.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Can you explain why not 160?
21 MS. KRAVETZ: That is something a bit difficult to explain,
22 Your Honour. I was under the impression the entirety of the translations
23 had been disclosed because, as I said, this is material we had in the
24 Milutinovic case. However, when my learned colleague raised this issue
25 yesterday, which in fact came as a surprise to me, because I wasn't aware
1 that this was the situation, we did run a check in our system and did not
2 find that these translations had been provided.
3 The explanation that was given to me is, by one of our
4 assistants, is that these translations have been re-stamped with a
5 different reference number and so they didn't come up as directly linked
6 to this document when a search was run in the system. So for some
7 reason, I can't explain why this re-stamping was done, but this is the
8 explanation I was able to obtain yesterday. And they have all-- they
9 were all put together yesterday during the course of this witness's
10 evidence and were provided at the end of yesterday's session.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Now, you want to tender the whole book
12 but you've uploaded into e-court the 160 pages you wish to rely upon.
13 Have I got that clear?
14 MS. KRAVETZ: Well, our view, Your Honour, is that it will assist
15 the Chamber to have the whole book just in terms of context, but having
16 regard to the objection raised by my learned colleague, we are -- we
17 would agree to only tender the portions that have been translated because
18 I am aware that my learned colleague has not had the opportunity to
19 review in B/C/S the portions that have not been translated.
20 So we would be willing to agree to tender only the translated
21 portions which approximately sums up to 160 or so pages.
22 JUDGE PARKER: I still need to know more. Can you tell me the
23 dates of the first and the last of the entries in the book?
24 MS. KRAVETZ: The first entry, it starts in December 1998 and the
25 last one is early April 1999, so it covers that entire period. I didn't
1 start showing -- to show the witness from the first entry because simply
2 I wanted to draw and get the witness comments on specific entries which
3 are the ones we've seen today, but that is specifically the period.
4 JUDGE PARKER: And the original reports are all in English?
5 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, the entire document is in English.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
7 Mr. Djurdjic.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I even
9 more object now after what we heard from the witness and from the
10 Prosecution. First of all --
11 JUDGE PARKER: Is this an A1 objection?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think so, yes. We are on a very
13 slippery ground. I don't mean in a bad way. We are dealing here with
14 intelligence professionals who are providing opinions and conclusions in
15 this book. However, this is the only thing that can be done by the
16 Chamber. I'm not talking about confidential material, but the value of
17 everything else will be weighed and valued by the Chamber. But as I
18 said, we are on a slippery ground and I intend to address this issue in
19 more detail with the witness.
20 If we adopt this approach, then we would have lots and lots of
21 document of the same nature that do not only relate to the
22 Kosovo Verification Mission
23 intelligence services of other countries; the conclusions of the EU
24 Observation Mission
25 that would be the basic objection that I have.
1 As for the rest, not a single page of this document according to
2 65 ter has been translated, if my memory serves me well, I'm not sure.
3 None of the pages from the Blue Book has been admitted in the Milutinovic
4 case, so this is where this error may have stemmed from, and this mistake
5 was just today revealed and detected.
6 How is it possible that the service, the CLSS failed to translate
7 this document over the period of ten years? And what I'm even more
8 fascinated by is that suddenly yesterday we received 200 pages during
9 this witness's testimony for me to review and to prepare myself for
10 cross-examination. I just randomly found and recognised a page that I've
11 seen elsewhere, but having all this in mind, I am afraid that the Defence
12 might not be fully prepared to deal with this witness and act
14 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, if I can very briefly be allowed to
15 reply to that.
16 JUDGE PARKER: I think you've had a fair enough go, Ms. Kravetz.
17 Thank you.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber will not receive either the Blue Book
20 or the 160 pages as exhibits at the present time. It will mark both of
21 them separately for identification. It will listen, of course,
22 attentively to your cross-examination, Mr. Djurdjic. At the end of that,
23 the position may be clearer; or it may be that it will be necessary to
24 give this matter further consideration later in the course of the trial,
25 in the light of your full consideration of the materials that are there,
1 and possibly other evidence that touches upon it.
2 So at the moment, they will be marked for identification. You
3 will, of course, in your cross-examination deal with them as you think
4 appropriate, Mr. Djurdjic. Is that clear enough for your purposes?
5 Thank you.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, therefore the book which is
7 65 ter 407 will become Exhibit P1028 marked for identification.
8 And the excerpt of 160 pages will become Exhibit P1029 marked for
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
11 Are you ready to commence now, Mr. Djurdjic?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
14 Q. Good morning, General. My name is Veljko Djurdjic, I'm a member
15 of the Defence team for the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic. I am assisted
16 by Ms. Marie O'Leary, also a member of our team.
17 May I kindly ask you, since you are a fast talker, as am I, to
18 wait for the typing on the LiveNote to finish before you start answering
19 so that the interpreters and court reporters can do their job properly.
20 I would also appreciate it if you could give me precise and
21 concise answers to save time. So far you have given a number of
22 statements and I have read them all. You also testified twice. That's
23 why I will try to ask only questions that have not been asked before and
24 concentrate on points that are of special interest to us.
25 But there's one thing that intrigues me: In your 2000 statement
1 I have not found this point where you speak about the large number of
2 people on the border of Macedonia
3 et cetera. How come you as a human being did not find it important
4 enough to mention in 2000 when you were giving the statement?
5 A. I think it was so recent that it was a constant back-drop to
6 everything that was going on at the time. I certainly was deeply
7 affected by it. I have got at home photos of me actually there, if you
8 doubt whether I was there or not; but if I didn't mention it specifically
9 in 2000, it was because the question did not come up. And I think at the
10 end of the week in which I gave that statement in 2000 we felt we had
11 probably suffered enough at that stage.
12 Q. Thank you. You've just opened up another issue. How did it come
13 about that you gave a statement in 2000?
14 A. I was approached by the United Nations International Criminal
15 Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
16 made a statement. I checked with my superiors because I was still a
17 serving officer, and they agreed it was the appropriate thing to do.
18 Q. Thank you, General. Did the UK
19 waiver from the Official Secrets Act? Did you communicate absolutely
20 everything to the investigators, and are you able to share with us all
21 the information you have today without any restrictions?
22 A. I have been given no restriction from the official secrets -- no,
23 no waivers from the Official Secrets Act; and I have tried not to breach
24 the Official Secrets Act. Luckily, almost everything we did in Kosovo
25 relied on open-source information; and while at the time I grumbled that
1 I was getting very little background or specific intelligence material,
2 it's actually quite an advantage when it comes to moments like this.
3 Q. Thank you. I did not quite understand this, but let's move on.
4 When you were giving that first statement in 2000, what kind of
5 documentation did you use?
6 A. Over the course of a week, I sat with -- with the investigator
7 who had been sent -- sent to England
8 assistants, and we sat for about six hours a day, and he -- he went
9 through everything, and it was taken down pretty much verbatim. And it
10 was then produced for me, and I went through it and agreed that that was
11 a true record of what had been stated over the course of about five days.
12 So we went through things, it was recorded, it was typed up, I
13 went through it again, agreed that was an accurate description of what I
14 had said, and we put the statement together that way. That's why it's so
16 Q. Thank you. Was it a spontaneous account on your part, or did you
17 receive from the investigator a list of topics?
18 A. The investigator wanted to specifically focus on certain issues,
19 asked me to focus on certain issues which I did. But broadly I had -- I
20 had most of the documents that I referred to myself and offered them to
21 the investigators. The investigators were not able to offer me any
22 documents to help me, as I recall it.
23 Q. Thank you. The documents you were using, were they your own
24 private documents or were they official documents?
25 A. They were a mixture. The notebooks that I used that I made my
1 contemporaneous notes in were obviously my -- my notebooks. But from
2 time to time I would glue into them, as you have seen, useful briefing
3 notes that were made for me by my staff.
4 The daily updates, the Blue Book, were all documents which were
5 open documents within the headquarters; so while they were official
6 documents, they were unclassified. They were not in any way
7 confidential. They were made available to -- in the most part to Vienna
8 to the 54 participating countries of the OSCE, and so they were pretty
9 widely available.
10 Q. I did not understand this. Weren't the reports of the
11 Kosovo Verification Mission intended for Vienna?
12 A. The reports that were sent up to Vienna, the daily reports were
13 sent up for the Permanent Council, and for the Secretariat in Vienna
14 That's where they were prepared for, and that's where they went. And as
15 part of that, they were distributed among the 54 delegations which were
16 the participating states of the OSCE. So they were widely distributed.
17 Q. Yes. And outside that circle of users, others were or were not
18 able to get hold of those reports?
19 A. Yes. Yes, they were. We routinely passed them to the NATO
20 headquarters in Kumanovo in Macedonia
21 responsibility to liaise with them as well since they were -- they were
22 conducting the air Verification Mission, if you recall, so we passed our
23 reports to them. We passed them to the EU Monitoring Mission. And
24 frankly, if anybody else asked for them, we passed them to those people
25 as well, if asked. I've certainly got no doubt that they probably even
1 found their way to Belgrade
2 not in the OSCE.
3 Q. Thank you. May I then conclude that you did not forward your
4 reports to Belgrade
5 A. I am not aware that the mission forwarded the reports to
7 then that would have been considered. It may actually have happened, but
8 I'm not aware of it. And I'm certainly not aware of any request.
9 Q. Thank you. I just want to go back to the documents you used.
10 Were these documents kept in your own private premises or in some office?
11 A. They were kept in my garage in cardboard boxes.
12 Q. Thank you. I see here in paragraph 10 you mention
13 Captain Rupert Witherow, Mr. John Harding, and the librarian of the
14 British Army Historical Branch. Did you use any of their documents?
15 A. Right, when I returned from Kosovo to the UK in April of 1999, I
16 was required to write a report which was a separate report for the UK
17 government. And to do that, I had to do it inside Ministry of Defence
18 premises. The premises used were the Army Historical Branch; and while I
19 was doing that, my notebooks were indeed secured in locked containers
20 inside the Army Historical Branch for the ten days that it took me to
21 write that report.
22 Rupert Witherow was one of my staff in Kosovo. John Harding was
23 the appropriate official of the Army Historical Branch. The report I
24 wrote is not part of the the documents that this Court has seen because
25 it is classified, and it is subject to the Official Secrets Act.
1 Q. Thank you. So these documents of yours, were they ever kept in
3 A. The personal -- the nine personal books were in my possession the
4 entire time, apart from the period that I was writing that report, which
5 was about ten days. And during those ten days, as I have indicated, they
6 were kept within a locked safe inside Whitehall. Apart from that,
7 they've been with me all the time.
8 Q. Thank you. And when exactly were you writing that report, those
9 ten days?
10 A. It was -- it was the last week of April, 1999, immediately after
11 I had -- I had left the mission. I left the mission, I think, on the
12 24th of April. And I think it was the week immediately following that
13 and ran into I think the first couple of days of May.
14 Q. Thank you. And then those documents were returned to you?
15 A. Yes. I mean, I had access to them obviously when I was writing
16 the report. It was simply a case of them being kept secure in the --
17 inside the Ministry of Defence overnight because I was not sleeping on
18 the floor in the Ministry of Defence overnight during that period, I was
19 going home every night.
20 Q. That must be standard procedure. Why did you then mention
22 were giving the statement in 2000?
23 A. Because as part of the -- as part of the preamble as we were
24 sitting talking about the statement, this was one of the issues that was
25 thought to be possibly significant by the investigator at the time. You
1 will note that it's very early on in the statement, so this would have
2 been something that we discussed in the first morning probably. How
3 relevant it was to him, I don't know. It wasn't particularly relevant to
4 me. And it's not a piece of the statement that I ever dwell upon.
5 Q. Thank you. Now, during this interview with the investigators,
6 you provided a large number of documents, at least that's what's stated
7 in the statement itself, as we see in paragraphs 20 to -- in the last 20
8 to 22 paragraphs.
9 From what source did these documents come from, the documents you
10 were using or were shown during the interview?
11 A. They were my personal archive. Each day I would receive a copy
12 of these documents as part of my duties. They would come first to me
13 because it was one of my staff branches that had initiated them, and so I
14 would review them before they -- they were presented to the head of
15 mission and to the morning meeting. And I would then -- I would then
16 keep if not that copy, a copy, in one of the files.
17 I think some of them were on disk and I then printed them out.
18 But Rupert Witherow, the captain who you've referred to, was working
19 directly for me at the time; and one of his duties was to make sure that
20 we kept all of the documentation against such a moment as this.
21 Q. Excellent, you see that it was a good idea. But let me
22 understand this correctly, it was your private documentation that you
23 showed to the investigators?
24 A. There were two sets of documents. One was the official document
25 such as the daily reports, which I routinely had a copy of, which were
1 the public documents. The private documents were the nine booklets that
2 I retained which were my working booklets, which were my personal -- my
3 personal notes.
4 I certainly referred to those in my -- when I was making my
5 statement in 2000; and where appropriate, they took photocopies of the
6 relevant pages and they have been made available to the Court where
8 Q. Thank you. I understood that part very well. But it means you
9 were providing documents from your personal archive to the investigators,
10 and the investigators took them?
11 A. They took copies of them, yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me, how did they make copies?
13 A. They stood at the photocopier and pressed print. That's how you
14 make copies.
15 Q. Thank you. That's about hard copies. What about computer
16 copies, electronic copies?
17 A. Where some of the reports were on disks, I printed off copies of
18 the appropriate -- I had printed off copies of the appropriate papers.
19 They simply photocopied those papers.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe it is time
22 for the break.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We will adjourn and resume at 11.00.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
5 Q. Sir, can we begin? General, I'm looking here at your brilliant
6 professional career. What I'm interested in is to hear how it came about
7 that you became an officer in the UK
8 A. I was born in the UK
9 army as an officer. It required a waiver by the secretary of state
10 because my father had not been born in England. That waiver was given
11 and that enabled me to enter Sandhurst
12 Q. Thank you. I'm interested in this last part particularly. Was
13 that a secondary military school or was it a military academy, higher
14 education institution that you joined?
15 A. It was a two-year course which had six terms, the first and last
16 of which was military, and the middle four were one-third military and
17 two-thirds academic in order to help us prepare to go to university.
18 Q. Thank you. Was that a civilian university or a military
20 A. After the two years at Sandhurst
21 one year with soldiers went to Cambridge
22 university, where I studied engineering because I was a member of the
23 Royal Engineers. So the whole of my military education in effect took
24 six years.
25 Q. Thank you. When you finished your education, which rank were you
2 A. A lieutenant. I was a 2nd lieutenant when I finished at
4 academy, if that's what you're asking. And then I spent one year with
5 soldiers and I then went to Cambridge
6 And during that period I took the exam to be promoted from 2nd lieutenant
7 to lieutenant and was promoted lieutenant, I think, 18 months after being
8 commissioned as 2nd lieutenant.
9 Q. Thank you. I'm not very familiar with military matters so
10 therefore don't be surprised at the questions that I'm asking you. This
11 academy that you finished, was that the army academy?
12 A. Yes, it was called the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and was
13 the place of military education for officers who were granted -- who were
14 applying for a regular commission, that is, a career commission which
15 would be the start of a career to the age of 55. There was another
16 academy where a shorter course went on at the time called Mons
17 was for officers who were going to do short-service commissions and who
18 would have a shorter career in the army.
19 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me what is your military specialty?
20 A. I have two military specialties. One is as staff officer, and
21 the original one was as a military engineer.
22 Q. Thank you. After you finished your studies at Cambridge, you
23 were, I suppose, working as an officer. With what kind of units were you
25 A. As a lieutenant and a captain I worked with engineer units. I
1 then went to the army staff college for a year, where we learned to be
2 staff officers and we learned more of all of the other pieces of the
3 army. I then -- my career then alternated between positions doing staff
4 work and positions commanding engineers.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me, did you serve all the time in
6 Great Britain?
7 A. No. I served in the Persian Gulf, in Canada
9 Q. I'm sorry, your mission in Kosovo and the time spent there as
10 well as in Bosnia
11 or as part of your civilian career?
12 A. I was a serving British officer until March 2001, and so when I
13 was in Bosnia
14 headquarters and later working for the civilian high representative. And
15 then in Kosovo I was a serving British officer seconded to our foreign
16 office, our ministry of Foreign Affairs; and further seconded to the
18 I remained a serving officer.
19 Q. Thank you. When were you in the Persian Gulf and why were you
21 A. That was 1971. I was commanding a unit of 44 engineers in the
22 Persian Gulf and down in Oman.
23 Q. Thank you were only British forces there where you served or were
24 there NATO force?
25 A. They were British, I was commanding a British unit; but in Oman
1 there were also Omani forces that were operating.
2 Q. Thank you. I think you mentioned being in Germany for a certain
3 period of time. Can you give me the time frame and in which unit or
4 formation did you serve?
5 A. From February 1967 until September 1967 I was a 2nd lieutenant in
6 the 2nd division engineer battalion. From December 1978 until -- until
7 December 1980, I was the chief operational logistics officer of the
8 headquarters third armoured division in Soest, Germany. Then for two
9 years immediately after that, I was an engineer company commander in the
10 26th engineer battalion in Soest, Germany
11 until October 1996, I was a major general on the staff of the
12 headquarters allied land forces central Europe which was a NATO
13 headquarters situated in Heidelberg, Germany
14 to Sarajevo
15 Q. Thank you. When were you promoted to the rank of major-general?
16 A. December 1994.
17 Q. Thank you. I don't know if the translation was good. Were you
18 speaking about East Germany or West Germany when you discussed your time
20 A. In 1967 and from 1978 until 1982 I was in West Germany. By the
21 time I went back to Germany
22 was only one Germany
23 Q. Thank you. I heard in the translation on the East Germany,
24 that's why I wanted to clarify this with you. General, throughout this
25 whole period and throughout your military career were you ever in the
1 employ of any security service?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Thank you. With the exception of the Kosovo Verification Mission
4 and Colonel Ciaglinski, did you throughout any of the periods that you
5 mentioned --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The counsel hasn't
7 finished the question.
8 JUDGE PARKER: You appear to have stopped mid-sentence.
9 Something isn't completed.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I finished, but probably I wasn't
12 Q. Throughout your military career, with the exception of the Kosovo
13 Verification Mission
14 A. Right. I had met him in early 1995 when he was the assistant
15 defence attache in Warsaw, Poland
16 chief engineer as part of my duties as chief engineer of the British
17 army. So that's when I had met him before.
18 I was aware of his existence before because of his name which has
19 similar roots to mine.
20 Q. Thank you. When you said that you were the head of the
21 department for NATO support, that was in 1995; right?
22 A. Yes. I arrived there in August 1995 in a headquarters which was
23 a NATO headquarters and where there were two major-generals, one
24 responsible for operations, and one for support. I was the major-general
25 responsible for all support aspects.
1 Q. Thank you. And you returned to Heidelberg in 1997. Which post
2 did you hold at that time?
3 A. I held -- I went back to the same post. While I was in Sarajevo
4 I was the Chief of Staff of the headquarters.
5 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, from 23rd of April until
6 13th of June 1999, which posts did you hold during that period?
7 A. I was the senior army teacher at Royal College of Defence Studies
8 in London
9 Q. Thank you. And after the 27th of June, 1999, until retirement,
10 what jobs did you perform?
11 A. I returned to that post as the senior army member of the staff at
12 the Royal College
13 Q. Thank you. Sir, can you explain to us how it happened that in
14 October 1998 you were dispatched to Vienna?
15 A. I understand that a request was made by someone in the OSCE for a
16 senior British officer with -- who was known to the OSCE to go and assist
17 them, start their planning for the mission. Two names were asked for.
18 The first one, his wife didn't let him go; and I was the second.
19 Q. Thank you. So your wife let you go. Can you please tell me
20 this: The British government actually sent you to Vienna
21 apply for this post like some other persons might have done?
22 A. I indicated that I was happy to go if asked for. There wasn't a
23 post. On the day -- let me explain. On the day that the newspaper
24 reports said that there was possibly going to be a mission put together
25 by the OSCE, I spoke to my Ministry of Defence and said that if asked, I
1 was prepared to go.
2 This was not unusual since a similar process had happened a year
3 earlier when I had been asked to go back to Bosnia to be the military
4 advisor to the high rep. The reason I did this was that normally it is
5 assumed that people will not be redeployed quickly after being deployed
6 on an operation unless they are willing to be so deployed. So I needed
7 to be a volunteer.
8 Q. Thank you. If I understand you correctly, you were attached to
9 the UK
10 by the army? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the army?
11 A. I was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in order to be
12 able to deploy me, they had to ask the Ministry of Defence. And so my
13 minister of defence had to formally -- was formally requested by my
14 minister of foreign affairs it he could borrow me, and he agreed to that.
15 And I was called to the Ministry of Defence and literally walked with the
16 minister of defence over to the minister of foreign affairs and, so to
17 speak, handed over to the minister of foreign affairs personally.
18 Q. Very well done. So two ministers dealt with you. Now, tell me,
19 how did you become an OSCE official?
20 A. I was, as you describe, attached to the UK delegation in Vienna
21 and I was working to write a plan to put together the
22 Kosovo Verification Mission to get it on the ground and operating as
23 quickly as possible, because its mandate which was 12 months was already
25 At some stage, Ambassador William Walker was nominated as the
1 head of the mission and at some stage he asked to see me and asked if I
2 would be prepared to join the OSCE Mission in Kosovo as one of his
3 deputies. The matter was then referred to my Ministry of Foreign
4 Affairs, and I understand that the decision was made by the OSCE
5 Permanent Council that I should be appointed a deputy head of the mission
6 on the 2nd of November, although I was not actually told until a few days
8 Q. Thank you. After that appointment went through, did you have any
9 kind of former or legal relationship with the OSCE in terms of having a
10 contract signed with them stipulating what your duties were going to be?
11 A. I signed a normal OSCE contract, yes.
12 Q. And what were the terms and continues contained therein? What
13 were your duties and obligations?
14 A. They were -- I mean, it was a normal contract that any person who
15 is seconded by his nation to the OSCE signs which says that he will do
16 what he is told by the head of mission, that he will not do anything that
17 brings the OSCE into disrepute, and he will probably not make off with
18 any OSCE property. I think those were the three things. I would need to
19 be reminded of it, but it was a perfectly normal contract for any
20 secondee from any nation being seconded to the OSCE, as opposed to a
21 contract position where you worked directly for the OSCE without the
22 intervention of your country.
23 Q. Thank you. I understand then that thereby you became an OSCE
24 official, but you had to earn some money for a living while you were
25 working for the OSCE. Who was paying your salary at the time?
1 A. The British Ministry of Defence.
2 Q. Thank you. General, during the period between October and your
3 appointment, did you undergo any preparations in the interim period
4 preceding your departure and arrival in Kosovo, and what kind of
5 preparations if any you had?
6 A. Well, I had no preparation because I was -- I was rung up at
7 10.30 in the morning and asked if I was genuinely prepared to go to the
8 OSCE when I was in England
9 I was told to please get myself from where I was to the
10 Ministry of Defence by 4.00 in afternoon so that I could be interviewed
11 by the minister of defence. And as I've described, he marched me over to
12 the minister of foreign affairs, handed me over there. And I was put in
13 a vehicle with three other members of UK staff and we were taken to
14 Royal Air Force Northolt, and we went to Vienna that night.
15 Q. Thank you, could you just be briefer in your answers. You say
16 you did not have any preparation in Britain
17 preparation when you arrived in the OSCE in Vienna? Yes or no?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Thank you. But if I understood you correctly even at the
20 beginning after you arrived in Vienna
22 A. The original OSCE agreement between Geremek and the Yugoslav
23 minister of foreign affairs whose name escapes me had been signed, and it
24 was on that basis that we went down to Kosovo to see what -- what the
25 situation looked like.
1 Q. Correct. It was signed on the 16th, but it was known a while
2 before that the agreement had been reached.
3 You say that on the 17th October, 1998, you attended a meeting in
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Would you tell us who John Sandrock is?
7 A. At the time he was in charge of administration and procurement as
8 a contracted OSCE official.
9 Q. Thank you. What was his occupation and what was his nationality?
10 A. He was American and he was in charge of the IT and logistics of
11 all deployed OSCE missions.
12 Q. Apart from you two, were there any other members of the
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Could you tell us who the other members were and something about
16 their profile?
17 A. Yes. Sorry, I was trying to be brief. The other members, the
18 key members, were a couple of the staff of John Sandrock because the
19 purpose of this trip was to find out what the requirements were for
20 support to enable the mission to operate inside Kosovo. Added to that,
21 at the request of the contact group were, I think, two members from each
22 contact group -- two people from each contact group mission.
23 Q. Thank you. And please give me brief answers, I'll ask more
24 sub-questions, that's better than having a long answer.
25 Am I right in thinking that the Yugoslav side was interested in
1 the contents and the method of verification that you were planning on?
2 A. I went to a meeting in Belgrade
3 Sandrock at which the question was raised, What will your method of
4 operation be?
5 Q. Did you provide an answer?
6 A. The answer that was provided was provided by Sandrock, and he
7 said this is an administrative reconnaissance. We don't yet have a clear
8 idea of how we will be operating, and we will let you know as soon as we
10 Q. Thank you. General, in your career did you have any combat
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Where and when?
14 A. I got shelled in the Oman
15 Northern Ireland on two occasions but one mainly.
16 Q. What were your duties in Northern Ireland and when was that?
17 A. I was the adjutant of the engineering regiment that was deployed
18 to Northern Ireland in 1974 after the Maze prison was burnt down in an
19 internal riot, and I was part of that unit which among other things
20 carried out a number of operations inside the Maze prison.
21 Q. Thank you. How long did you stay in Northern Ireland?
22 A. About a week.
23 Q. I heard in the interpretation that you were an ADC. Is that a
24 command position or some other kind of position, what are the duties of
25 an ADC
1 A. It's the executive officer of the battalion.
2 Q. And the engineering unit, what were its responsibilities?
3 A. Its prime responsibility was to rebuild the part of the prison
4 that had been burnt down by the rioters. It had a secondary duty to
5 carry out searches in the -- inside the compound.
6 Q. Thank you. Was there any fighting while you were building that
8 A. No.
9 Q. Was there any fighting while you were carrying out the searches?
10 A. Not specifically, no.
11 Q. Thank you. In your military career, have you ever taken part in
13 A. Not hand-to-hand combat, no.
14 Q. Thank you. Tell me about Colonel Ciaglinski, what was his
16 A. I was under the mistaken impression obviously that he had already
18 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, we have listened now for a
19 considerable time to a great deal of interesting personal history of the
20 witness. We have not yet discerned what the relevance of any of this can
21 be to the issues we have to decide in the case. That is the first and
22 general concern I raise with you.
23 The more particular concern is your last question, what is it
24 that you could not have asked the previous witness, Mr. Ciaglinski, that
25 you feel you must now ask this witness about Ciaglinski? For heaven's
1 sake, we must get on to the issues that are material in this case. And I
2 wonder whether you might be able to direct your questions to that instead
3 of us spending more time on this, at the most, very remote background.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I was
5 just going to ask about the combat experience of the people who were
6 members of the Kosovo verification members and the expertise they had
7 gained before Kosovo. And I also asked Colonel Ciaglinski what his
8 specialty was. Another witness from the KVM was not an infantry man, he
9 was also something else. That's why I wanted to ask these questions to
10 elicit those answers, but I'll move on to another topic. I just thought
11 this was interesting.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It's very interesting and we can spend a long time
13 on it, but we must watch time. And there are things that are not merely
14 interesting, but they are important to our decision. And it is those
15 that we would like you to concentrate on. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Competency is the most
17 important thing, whatever job you are doing.
18 Q. General, you were the brain of the team that had been prepared
19 for the Kosovo Verification Mission
20 of the staff?
21 A. The OSCE in Vienna
22 called for as though it were a normal OSCE mission of 12 people. That
23 is, that they called for people -- they invited the participating
24 countries to send forward nominations of individuals with their CVs which
25 were then boarded and people were selected. I was part of that selection
1 system, but it had other members on it, mainly coming from the other
2 contact group countries.
3 Q. Thank you. I asked you about the military specialty or other
4 specialty of the people you recruited to the Verification Mission. We
5 know that it was a civilian mission, but what were the specialties that
6 you were looking for to be provided by the OSCE Secretariat?
7 A. We were hoping for a mix of civilian and in some cases military
8 and ex-military people with a broad spread of competence, so we wanted in
9 some cases lawyers, in some cases people with human rights experience, we
10 wanted policemen, and we wanted military and ex-military. And we wanted
11 them all quickly.
12 Q. Thank you. When you were appointed deputy chief of mission on
13 the 2nd of November, 1998
14 November -- 23rd November, sorry, when you left for Pristina?
15 A. I was still involved in writing the plan. I made one other trip
16 down to Kosovo between the 2nd and the 23rd of -- between the 2nd
17 of November and the 23rd of November which was about a four-day trip, and
18 the purpose of that trip was to review the locations that we had already
19 located that we could use and also to find a location for the induction
20 centre where we would bring new mission members in order to give them
21 some familiarisation training before they took up their operational
23 Q. Thank you. Did the OSCE Secretariat provide you with any
24 information about the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
25 and did they give you some kind of instructions or mandate?
1 A. We received some information about the current situation in the
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Some of it was from open-source media
3 and some of it was mainly telephone reports from the very small number of
4 people that were already on the ground conducting reconnaissance and
5 trying to find locations.
6 Q. Thank you. Were you familiar when you were leaving for Kosovo
7 with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
8 constitution of Serbia
9 Law on Internal Affairs, about the organisation of the army and the
10 police? Did you have any knowledge about that?
11 A. No, I would have been delighted if that sort of knowledge had
12 been offered by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
13 Q. Thank you. Tell me, was there a document that governed the
14 internal organisation of the Kosovo Verification Mission?
15 A. Well, if there was, I probably wrote it. We received almost no
16 formal instructions beyond the original OSCE agreement. Everything
17 thereafter was created by my team working directly to Ambassador Walker.
18 Q. Thank you. So you governed the internal relations yourself. And
19 how about the relationship between Ambassador Walker, chief of the
20 mission, and the Secretariat of the OSCE, was that relationship governed
21 in some way outside the framework of this agreement?
22 A. I believe he had separate instructions as to his -- his
23 relationship with the OSCE Secretariat. The OSCE Secretariat also
24 attached a number of people to the KVM who worked directly for
25 Ambassador Walker and who were the regular link for the staff of the
1 OSCE Secretariat and the mission on the ground.
2 Q. Thank you. If I understood that correctly, he had a team in
3 Pristina outside of the KVM headquarters?
4 A. No, inside the KVM headquarters but who were part of his personal
5 staff, who worked directly for him.
6 Q. Thank you. Did I understand correctly that Ambassador Walker was
7 the only person able to decide whether something is to be considered as
8 an incident or not? The whole purpose of the mission was to provide him
9 material on the basis of which he would decide?
10 A. That's broadly the case, yes. And I do want to make this answer
11 longer. In a mission that was going to be 2000 people strong, and where
12 we had not been able to develop any ethos for the mission because it had
13 been put together so quickly, we got people who did not necessarily fully
14 understand the background of the mission. Therefore, the role of the
15 people on the ground was to report what they saw, not to decide whether
16 or not something was compliance with the agreement or not. That that
17 decision would be made in the OSCE headquarters, in the KVM headquarters,
18 so that consistent standards were applied. Thank you.
19 Q. Thank you. Was there anyone -- did anyone else apart from
20 Ambassador Walker had the ability to decide what constituted a violation
21 of the agreement or not in his absence?
22 A. In his absence it would have been whoever was acting head of
23 mission. It was a requirement -- you had to be the head of mission to
24 decide compliance or not. Obviously within the KVM headquarters there
25 were a lot of people who knew what the precedents were and, therefore,
1 were able to advise him whether this resembled something which had been
2 decided as non-compliance earlier or not.
3 Q. Thank you. Would you tell me, in what form was the decision made
4 that the rules of the agreement had been breached?
5 A. It was made in whatever the reports were -- that were sent to
7 reported to Vienna
8 IFOR and SFOR, so this was not unique. It's quite usual in these
9 international missions not to allow every lance-corporal on the ground to
10 jump up and down and declare something compliance or non-compliance.
11 Q. Thank you. Would Ambassador Walker or the acting chief sign that
12 report to Vienna
13 A. Normally, yes. He would certainly be aware of it, and he would
14 be the person that approved the document and agreed it should be
16 Q. Thank you. This signed document would be submitted to the
17 Secretariat in Vienna
18 A. I know that often happened. I don't know if it always happened.
19 Q. During the proceedings today and yesterday, were any such
20 protests shown to you?
21 A. I'm aware of one document which was produced in -- from the
22 mission which had a long list of incidents which were collated against
23 the different paragraphs of, I think, the Security Council --
24 UN Security Council resolution, and which showed where in the opinion of
25 the mission there had been non-compliance.
1 Now, what I cannot remember is whether that's been shown today,
2 yesterday, or last week, or back in December of 2005 when I was last
3 here. But I'm certainly aware of that document.
4 Q. You did not see that document, General, although it exists. I'll
5 show it to you later. I'm asking something else.
6 These reports were made to the UN Security Council at regular
7 intervals. I'm asking you about something else. Among what
8 Ambassador Walker sent to Vienna
9 violation of the agreement shown to you yesterday or earlier today?
10 A. No, I don't think so.
11 Q. Thank you. Now I'll be asking about your internal correspondence
12 between the headquarters and regional centres and vice-versa. Was it
13 customary for the author of the report to sign the report?
14 A. It depended. If it was coming from a branch, it would not
15 necessarily be signed. It would come -- it would be understood that it
16 was issued with the knowledge and approval of the head of that branch,
17 and if there were any questions, it would be referred back to the branch.
18 At other times if an individual signed it, it was because he had been
19 asked specifically to produce a piece of paper by me which summarised
21 Q. Perhaps my question was not clear enough. I wasn't asking about
22 urgent operative information, but, for instance, at the end of a day when
23 a regional centre were sending a report to the headquarters, would the
24 commander of that regional centre sign what he was sending to you, and
25 would he enter that in the log-book in his regional centre?
1 A. No, not necessarily. I mean, we probably would have been able to
2 do this if we had spent two months putting this headquarters together and
3 having staff procedure exercises which preceded the deployment. But as
4 you have heard, it was put together at short notice on the ground with no
5 procedures. And so it was not a model of staff procedures, but we
6 weren't down there to have our staff procedures examined.
7 Q. I didn't mean staff procedures in general. I meant only personal
8 signatures on correspondence.
9 A. Well, again, I say not necessarily. And in my experience in the
10 region, I know that when a senior person issues a document, it is not
11 valid without his signature and the stamp, and that is a procedure that
12 the rest of the world stopped doing about 40 years ago.
13 Q. Thank you. Technically speaking, how did you receive reports
14 from the regional centres?
15 A. If it was routine, it came in to the operation centre where the
16 person on duty would look at it and make a decision who should get it.
17 If it was an incident that had happened and was deemed important enough,
18 then there would be what we called a spot report sent straight up
19 immediately without waiting to see what else happened that day. So it
20 was a mix of reports that were rendered at specific moments in the day
21 and spot reports that were rendered if the situation demanded it.
22 Q. Thank you. Were they sent to Pristina by courier, by fax, by
23 mail? How did they reach Pristina?
24 A. Many were sent by fax. I think there was e-mail connectivity
25 between the different regional centres, but I would need to be remind --
1 I think it was, but I'm not absolutely one hundred per cent sure. A lot
2 of stuff came by fax. And radio, because as the situation -- there was a
3 radio link between each regional centre and the operations centre, and so
4 if something happened, then that would be sent by radio and would be
5 entered in the log by the watch-keeper.
6 Q. Thank you. This operation centre was within your purview because
7 you were in charge of operations; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. How did the operations centre act once they received a report
10 regardless through which channel and in what mode?
11 A. Well, if it was routine they would send it to the branch that
12 needed it. And if it was urgent, they would tell someone.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm only interested in the reports that deal
14 with verification. I'm not interested in the humanitarian aspect or the
15 political aspect. Let us focus only on what you were in charge of. Who
16 did you send these kind of reports to?
17 A. They formed -- they went to the fusion cell and to the people in
19 together. If they needed to go to anybody else, then that decision would
20 be made by the chief of the operation cell.
21 Q. Was that you?
22 A. No. I was the chief of operations for the mission. The chief of
23 the operation cell was a German former colonel.
24 Q. This operation cell for fusion, within which staff or
25 headquarters of which unit was it?
1 A. The pieces of the staff that answered to me were the operation
2 cell which did minute-to-minute -- which watched the situation minute to
3 minute. The fusion cell, which did analysis. The plans cell, which
4 spent most of its time writing the evacuation plan. And the liaison cell
5 from where all of the liaison duties were carried out. Those were the
6 four primary cells that -- primary staff groups that I ran.
7 Q. Thank you. So if we were to put together all the daily reports
8 from the operation cell, they would go to the office of Mr. Walker where
9 an aggregate daily report would be compiled; am I right?
10 A. Yes, but it would include other input, for instance, from the
11 media cell and from the political side, as you've mentioned.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me who was in charge of these
13 duties in Mr. Walker's office? I'm talking about compiling daily
15 A. For much of the time it was a Norwegian called Kaare Eltervaag.
16 The actual people down there varied because they were detached from the
17 Secretariat in Vienna
18 that group of report writers was led by that Norwegian.
19 Q. What special skills did these people have? What kind of
21 A. I think Eltervaag was a junior Norwegian diplomat. I know that
22 one of the other members of that group was a British ex-officer who had
23 done something similar in the EUMM in Bosnia. And there were others.
24 Q. Thank you. If I understood you correctly, one copy of the daily
25 report would be sent to Vienna
1 other copies to his deputies for briefing purposes?
2 A. Yes, and we sent copies of the report to other addressees as
4 Q. Tell me, what are these other individuals outside of the OSCE
5 headquarters that you as deputies send reports?
6 A. I sent that report to -- also to the NATO headquarters in
8 also sent a UK IS report many days which was through my UK channels,
9 which was classified.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, the team that we discussed today that was not
11 involved in preparing daily reports and processing raw materials, but
12 were rather involved in analysis, they were analytical team. How many
13 people were on this team and what were their professions and occupations?
14 A. Their role was analysis. Some but not all had an intelligence
15 background. And I suppose there were about 16 of them. It took time to
16 build up.
17 Q. Thank you. It seems to me that I saw somewhere, but correct me
18 if I'm wrong, that you had mentioned that there were three members in
19 this group, one from the UK
20 I wrong?
21 A. There were a lot more than that. I've certainly got a photo at
22 home of the fusion cell in, I think, late March, and I think there's at
23 least 15 people on that picture. It came and went. People came into the
24 cell and were then -- then finished their contracts and moved on. But
25 there were certainly at least 12 and there may have been as many as 20 at
1 some stages because they were running a 24-hour operation.
2 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me who was in charge of that
3 fusion unit or cell?
4 A. There were three people who were in charge in succession. One
5 was a lady called Donna Phelan, one was a retired colonel called Irzuk,
6 and the third one was a retired navy captain whose name will come to me.
7 I'm not being deliberately obstructive; I just can't remember it. But it
8 will pop in, and I'll tell you it as soon as I get it. Lawrence.
9 Sorry -- his surname was Lawrence
10 Q. Thank you, General. I was not very accurate in my question.
11 What I wanted to ask you, Who was their subordinate --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Their superior.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Were they under Walker
14 they under any other body that was in charge of this fusion cell?
15 A. They worked direct to me.
16 Q. Thank you. As I understand, the Blue Book contains daily
17 reports. Can you tell me who were the users of these reports?
18 A. Who used the Blue Book? The deputy heads of mission and the head
19 of mission were the principal people at whom the report was aimed.
20 Because there were five or six deputy heads of mission, each of whom had
21 a particular focus, and they didn't necessarily remain up to date with
22 the minute-by-minute events that were going on. And therefore we needed
23 to keep them aware of what was going on so that as they had contact with
24 other people, they did not inadvertently adopt a view that was at odds
25 with the experience elsewhere.
1 Q. Thank you. While you were a part of the mission, did the size of
2 the mission change or were the number of members permanent and constant
3 throughout the whole period?
4 A. They changed dynamically from almost day-to-day but very broadly.
5 They began at naught in October of 1998, and once we had managed to get
6 the recruitment and selection process moving, we increased the size of
7 the mission by about a hundred a week until we got to 1379 on the day we
9 Q. Thank you. My question was much too broad. I'm interested in
10 deputy chiefs of mission. From the moment when you joined the mission on
11 23rd November, 1998
12 chiefs remain the same or did it change?
13 A. The number of deputy chiefs allowed for remained the same, but it
14 took some time to nominate and for them -- and for them to arrive.
15 Q. Sir, when you left Kosovo on the 20th of March, did you leave
16 behind the same number of deputy chiefs until the 23rd of April when you
17 left yourself? I'm only asking you about deputies.
18 A. The Russian deputy left in late March with all of the Russian
19 verifiers because they were recalled by Russia. And the French deputy
20 may have left just before I did in April, but I would need to check that.
21 But the Russians certainly left.
22 Q. Thank you. If my memory serves me well, from 1380 the mission
23 was down sized to 270 members after the 20th of March; am I right?
24 A. Yes, and it was then increased to 350 in the first week of April.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you tell me how many people were deployed on the
1 ground in Macedonia
2 A. I would say most of them. We detached about 80 to Albania to
3 deal -- to help deal with the refugee crisis in Albania. The rest of
4 them remained in Macedonia
5 Q. Thank you. I've noticed something relating to the Blue Book. So
6 you kept preparing the reports and giving them to the deputies, even
7 during the period after you left Kosovo, but, however, you never
8 mentioned anything about that period of time when you gave your 2000
10 A. Then it wasn't asked.
11 Q. Thank you. Let us now go back to your organisation that was in
12 place before the 20th of March. General, you arrived in Pristina on the
13 23rd of November, 1998; am I right?
14 A. Yes, that would have been the third time I arrived, but that was
15 the time I arrived in order to stay there as chief of operations.
16 Q. Thank you. Before you there is mention in the document of KDOM
17 which is the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission. Did you have any instructions as
18 to what should exist in terms of relationship between KDOM,
19 Kosovo Diplomatic Mission
20 A. Yes, we were to -- we were to include them in -- into the KVM as
21 quickly as we were able to.
22 Q. Thank you. In the light of the problems that you encountered
23 even at the time when you arrived in Pristina, and that was nearly a
24 month after the signing of all the agreements, were you aware that those
25 agreements were limited in certain times? That is to say that they
1 continued certain dead-lines for certain requirements to be met?
2 A. In what respect? I mean, I knew that they were dated as at the
3 date that they were signed, yes. I knew that the situation that they
4 described was the situation immediately after the moment they were
6 Q. Let's try to rephrase it. When you first learned about
7 Resolution 1175 --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel, please repeat the number of the
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I am sorry, you didn't hear my question. When did you first
12 familiarise yourself with Resolution 1199, resolution of the Security
13 Council of the United Nations?
14 A. I believe we must have reviewed that while I was in Vienna
15 course of November, and I think we reviewed that again when we were
16 deciding and when we were drafting the document that was sent to Belgrade
17 describing how we proposed to verify.
18 Q. Thank you. And when did you become acquainted with the agreement
19 Sainovic-Djordjevic-Naumann-Clark signed on the 25th October, 1998
20 which included the governments of the FRY announcement?
21 A. I think it was three or four days after it was signed. There
22 seemed to be little urgency on the part of anybody to get it to the OSCE.
23 Q. I presume that you familiarized yourself with the
24 Djordjevic-Byrnes Agreement thereabout the same time?
25 A. Yes, I mean, these were the documents we were looking at as we
1 were working on how we would verify.
2 Q. Thank you. Well, that is why I'm asking you. Let's say this is
3 the early November, did you see that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
4 particularly in view of these two agreements, has committed itself to
5 fulfill certain obligations within specific dead-lines?
6 A. Yes, I understood that.
7 Q. Thank you. Am I right in saying -- to say that there was an
8 executive order, a NATO executive order in late October 1998?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you recall that the decision to launch an attack
11 on Yugoslavia
12 A. Well, it was postponed. The Activation Order remained active; it
13 remained in force. So it was in Sakir's [phoen] pocket.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you ever wonder why it was postponed?
15 A. No, I knew exactly why it was postponed. It was postponed
16 because the decision was made to give the authorities in Yugoslavia
17 chance to improve their behaviour in Kosovo.
18 Q. Thank you. Were you aware of the dead-lines imposed on the FRY
19 in order for this order not to be activated?
20 A. Yes, they were broadly around about the end of October.
21 Q. Does that mean that the FRY had met all the requirements by the
22 end of October 1998?
23 A. That was my understanding, yes. That was why the act order was
24 not activated, because at that moment, the FRY was in compliance.
25 Q. Thank you. Do you know who confirmed and verified the fact that
1 the FRY had been in full compliance with all its obligations and that it
2 achieved that by the end of October 1998?
3 A. It would have been as a series of reports made to NATO or made
4 available to NATO which would have been a combination of air observation
5 by NATO and the KDOMs on the ground.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this is a
8 good time for a break.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We resume at 1.00.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Can we go on, General. I'd like to show you a few documents now,
17 documents that we have referred to before.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can I first call up D160. It's
19 already an exhibit. May I ask the AV booth to display only the English
20 document, because I have the B/C/S version for myself.
21 Q. This is a resolution of the UN Security Council, 1199. Perhaps
22 you have a hard copy in your binder, perhaps not. I'm interested only in
23 some of the provisions; we won't be looking at the entire document. It's
24 para 4(a). That's page 3 in English.
25 General, would I be right in saying that para 4(a) says that
2 population and only the civilian population, not the KLA?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. In item (b), can you see that since the KVM had not
5 been established yet, there is a reference to the
6 Kosovo Diplomatic Mission as performing the functions of verification?
7 A. Yeah, got it.
8 Q. Now, would you please look at para 5 (b). The FRY undertakes not
9 to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population
10 alone. That's at least the translation I have.
11 A. It also at (a) said it was going to resolve existing problems by
12 political means, I note.
13 Q. And what about (d) -- sorry, (b), not to carry out any repressive
14 actions against the peaceful population. That does not include the KLA
15 or any other offenders, or those who violate the law. Do you agree with
16 me, General?
17 A. I see what it says, yes. I'm intrigued to know where the nominal
18 role is of who the KLA were and who the peaceful population were. That
19 was our big problem throughout. When you are dealing with insurgents,
20 they dress in civilian clothes for much of the time, and it's very
21 difficult to know the difference between an insurgent in civilian clothes
22 and a peaceful member of the population in civilian clothes. That's my
23 point. Thank you.
24 Q. I agree with you that the difficulty exists, but I'm telling you
25 what the resolution stipulates and what the mandate was. How, for
1 instance, do you decide in Northern Ireland who is a member of the
2 peaceful population and who isn't?
3 A. You carry out operations which give you proof which can be
4 offered in court, you arrest the people, you convict them, and you put
5 them in jail. A process that was sadly lacking in Kosovo.
6 Q. I agree on the condition that those you are supposed to arrest
7 surrender, but if they shoot at you what did they do in Northern Ireland
8 They won't surrender, they shoot at you - that is, your army - in
9 Northern Ireland.
10 A. Yes, and there are moments when that happens, and when that
11 happens -- I'll slow down, sorry -- and when that happens, the incident
12 is thoroughly documented, the number of rounds are counted, careful
13 statements are taken from all of the security forces involved, a forensic
14 examination is carried out of all weapons that took place -- took part in
15 the operation, and it leads to an investigation which will decide whether
16 or not the killing was lawful. That takes quite a long time and needs
17 quite a lot of specialists, but it shows that you were carrying out your
18 duties in a way that involved the minimum application of lethal force.
19 Q. I agree with you completely. Did you have any personal
20 experience with such investigations in Northern Ireland?
21 A. I was never personally involved in such an investigation, but I
22 was part of an organisation that routinely did it that included such
23 things in the syllabus of its various military college. I attended the
24 military Staff College where that sort of instruction was carried out,
25 and I then instructed for two years at that same military college,
1 instructing in those subjects. Thank you.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P837.
4 Q. General, this is the Naumann-Clark Agreement of 25th October and
5 the Sainovic-Djordjevic Agreement, I believe, in fact this is the press
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] So let me call up page 2 of the
9 Q. General, here we see eight points, undertakings of the FRY. Do
10 you agree that this was the legal framework for your verification?
11 A. Yes, and I'm perfectly willing to accept that this all happened
12 on the date that it was due to happen at the end of October. I'm
13 perfectly happy to accept that.
14 Q. Thank you. Can I draw your attention to item 5. It concerns the
15 deployment of three companies of the Army of Yugoslavia that were allowed
16 to be outside of the terrain.
17 Sorry, did you receive interpretation of what I said?
18 A. Yes, yes, I can see that at paragraph 5 it defines the three
19 locations at which company-sized teams are allowed. And again I
20 completely understand that.
21 Q. When you agree with me, please indicate yes or no for the record.
22 Do you also agree that units were exempted if they served as temporary
23 reinforcement to border units?
24 A. Can you remind me where it says that?
25 Q. "The beginning except for those VJ currently augmenting border
1 guards..." para 5.
2 A. Yes, I see that. Yes. We understood that to mean within the
3 5 kilometre border zone.
4 Q. Right. And then item 6 says:
5 "VJ border guards will remain in position along the international
6 border of the FRY and conduct ongoing border security operations."
7 A. Yes. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you. Now, if I may make a small digression. One of your
9 documents, the one drafted by Colonel Ciaglinski concerning the ability
10 to protect the border with Albania
11 A. Yes, I do. Yes.
12 Q. Do you remember that the evaluation of the VJ was that between
13 6-, and 7.000 troops were needed on the border; and Colonel Ciaglinski's
14 evaluation, taking into account the lack of material resources, was
15 between 5-, and 6.000?
16 A. Yes, I mean I recall that very well. That was a document which
17 was produced with a view to the future. It in no way amended the
18 agreements that were already in place. It was a document which was
19 produced for the people at Rambouillet in February. And the question
20 was: In the future, how many people will be needed? And we looked at
21 it, and we came to the conclusion that it needed about 1200 on the
22 border; and if you rotated them, it was going to need more than that
23 because of the need to have one lot on the border, one lot resting, and
24 one lot getting ready. But the other ones did not need to be inside
1 But this -- that document in no way is connected with this
3 Q. I agree about that. That was my digression. But you know, and I
4 think you were told, that at that time and while you were in
5 Kosova-Metohija, there was around 3.000 troops in the border belt;
7 A. Yes. Well, no, sorry -- no one ever told me there were about
8 3.000 troops in the border belt. We became aware that there were about
9 3.000 troops in the border belt, but nobody ever said it, no.
10 Q. Thank you, I did not actually say you were told. But let me go
11 back to that document. It was a preparatory document in the event that
12 an agreement should be signed in Rambouillet, then a certain amount of VJ
13 would be allowed to stay on and secure the border?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. So at that time, there was no talk about war when this document
16 was drafted; correct?
17 A. Talk by whom?
18 Q. Anyone.
19 A. Of course there was. Of course there was talk about war. We
20 were constantly ready to evacuate if the situation got any worse. The
21 first evacuation plan was written before the end of December. And so we
22 were constantly reviewing the security situation to see whether or not
23 the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that we would have to
24 leave. So there was constantly talk about war, yes. War was what was
25 going to happen if a deal didn't get done.
1 Q. And you drafted documents at the same time concerning securing
2 the border and implementation of a future agreement?
3 A. Yes. It's called contingency planning. It's what we do all the
5 Q. No, I meant this planning for border security. I meant the
6 document of Mr. Ciaglinski.
7 A. Yes. We were doing two things simultaneously: We were prepared
8 to move the mission out quickly if the situation got any worse; and if
9 the situation at Rambouillet led to a peaceful resolution, as we very
10 much hoped, then they were going to need a bit of preplanning. And we
11 were doing a lot of things which were preplanning, which was working out
12 how we would operate differently in Kosovo under a different agreement,
13 possibly with a NATO force in alongside us.
14 We did a huge amount of planning in that respect because we knew
15 that the possibilities were that the talks would succeed or they would
16 fail. If they succeeded, we wanted the international community to be in
17 a better position than the flat-footed position we had found ourselves in
18 in October.
19 Q. Thank you. Why was the international community in a flat-footed
20 position in October?
21 A. Because it was told to put together an OSCE mission of 2.000
22 people at one day's notice when there had been no preparation for it.
23 And as you saw, it took a long time.
24 Q. Thank you. And whose problem was that?
25 A. It was my problem because I was given the job of finding 2.000
1 people and 500 vehicles, and the OSCE didn't have them stuffed in a broom
3 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at Roman numeral III. Would I
4 be right in saying that the authorities of the FRY reserved the right in
5 keeping with their right to self-defence to adequately respond to any
6 form of terrorist act and violation of law as a last resort, any
7 terrorist activity or violation of law which could jeopardise the lives
8 and safety of citizens?
9 A. You've missed out the word "proportionately" haven't you, again?
10 THE INTERPRETER: Apologies of the interpreter, I missed it.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. I don't think I did.
13 A. Right, well the interpreter missed it. And my point will be now
14 and for the rest of my life that the problem that was on the ground in
15 Kosovo was the actions that took place that we saw that we testified to
16 were generally disproportionate. Highly disproportionate.
17 Q. Thank you. We'll come to specific examples and discuss them.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I now call up P835.
19 Q. General, this is the Geremek-Jovanovic Agreement. First of all,
20 I'd like to know about Roman numeral I.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down the B/C/S
22 version. Thank you.
23 Q. Under Roman numeral I, am I right that in item 5 it says that:
24 "KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending
25 its establishment, and once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by
1 the Verification Mission
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, let me ask you, since they were your
4 predecessors and you were supposed to replace them, what kind of
5 documentation and background material did you require and receive from
7 A. We got nothing.
8 Q. I have not seen here a single document showing that the KVM or
9 the Vienna
10 A. No, nor have I.
11 Q. Thank you. How, then, did you take over certain members of KDOM
12 technically? What happened with their archives, documents, vehicles,
14 A. The KDOM was not a single entity. The KDOM was a number of
15 diplomatic missions each reporting through their own national chains to
16 their embassies in Belgrade
17 went and what they looked like, I have not the foggiest clue.
18 We did indeed absorb many of the KDOM members and their vehicles,
19 but not their archives. It is possible that the reports that they sent
20 to their national embassies were classified, but we did not get them.
21 I certainly raised this with the head of mission, and his
22 direction was not to worry because the KDOM was not a single entity. It
23 did not have a central Registry. It was five or six groups of people,
24 each operating in a different area, to the best of my knowledge, and
25 sending its reports back; I think they were sent individually by the
1 nations back to NATO in Mons
2 and analysed. None of that went past me.
3 Another difficulty that we had was that some of the KDOMs, in
4 particular the American KDOM, changed almost all of its staff between
5 October and December. Specifically, they moved out the serving military
6 and replaced them with contract personnel. So although they were in the
7 KDOM, there were very few people who had experience of what had taken
8 place in the summer.
9 Q. Thank you. You have mentioned more than once in your statements
10 and in your prior testimony that you did not have any background
11 information for verification, and KDOM as your predecessor confirmed
12 compliance by the FRY. You as a soldier of the British army of the UK
13 which had its own monitoring mission and the European Union had its own
14 monitoring mission including representatives of Germany, Italy
15 and others, were informed of all that, did have this information. And
16 KDOM stayed present in Kosovo until the 20th March or so, and yet you did
17 not ask them for that background information.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Just before you continue.
19 Yes, Ms. Kravetz.
20 MS. KRAVETZ: Your Honours, just wanted to ask for a reference
21 from my learned colleague as to the passage of this statement in prior
22 testimony that he is referring to.
23 JUDGE PARKER: A number of references, statements, and prior
25 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, thank you.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Can you help there, Mr. Djurdjic?
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, it's all -- it's in the all
3 the statements of this witness and in the evidence given by the witness
4 yesterday and earlier today that they had no background information for
5 verification. They asked for this information from the Yugoslav
6 authorities, and they referred him to KDOM and other agencies.
7 Q. Is that in dispute, or did you perhaps not state that?
8 A. That is what I said. We attempted to find people in the KDOMs
9 who had this information, and we were unable to find them. Many of them,
10 as I say, had changed over. They were submitting many reports that I
11 think were verbal, and I believe the case to be that the reports were
12 collated not by KDOM because it didn't have a KDOM headquarters but they
13 were sent to their embassies where they were sent on.
14 And so we very quickly realised we were not going to get a full
15 picture, and indeed that the information that the KDOMs might have was
16 not going to be as exhaustive as we believed we needed. And therefore,
17 the direction from the head of mission was that I should stop wasting my
18 time trying to track down some person in KDOM who might have this
19 treasure trove of information that was probably spread over six KDOMs in
20 the notebooks of people who had gone home and go back to the authorities
21 and ask them for it. Because what was the harm of it being supplied to
22 the KVM if it was supposed to be given to the KVM? That's what I never
24 I'm finished for now. I'm hoping you are going to help me with a
25 few more questions.
1 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation to be over. It
2 was a long answer.
3 Will you agree with me, General, that Mr. Dietmar Hatrik [phoen]
4 was in Pristina throughout the whole period as head of the mission of the
5 ECMM regional centre, and all of this time he was next to you, and he
6 used to send his reports to the HQ in Sarajevo?
7 A. Why would he send reports to the headquarters in Sarajevo,
9 Q. I suppose that his HQ was in Sarajevo. And I'm telling you this
10 based on his own statement.
11 A. Okay. Well, in case you are not aware, Pristina is not an easy
12 stroll from Sarajevo
13 monitoring mission reports of any sort. I begged for them. I shook the
14 people by the -- in the chest by their clothes and said, Why is it that
15 every day we give you our reports but you are unwilling to reciprocate?
16 And they said, We are terribly sorry; EU rules and regulations.
17 Q. Thank you. So they were in Pristina all the time, as I said
18 before, and they had four coordinating centres in the territory of
19 Kosovo and Metohija. But let's leave that aside for the moment.
20 General, would you be so kind as to look at item 2, that's page 2
21 in English. General, if you look at item 2 under Roman numeral II, was
22 your duty and obligation to submit reports to the UN Security Council and
23 the OSCE Permanent Council on compliance or non-compliance by the FRY of
24 its obligations?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at
3 Roman numeral III
4 page in English.
5 Q. So the main obligation is to monitor the cease-fire and the
6 compliance with the cease-fire agreements?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And the KVM is supposed to report on this as well to the
9 Security Council and the United Nations?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, let's look at item 3, General. Would it be fair
12 to say that the Yugoslav authorities were allowed to erect cheque-points
13 for the purpose of regulating traffic and monitoring criminal activities?
14 A. Yes. And they were specified in one of the agreements, in the
15 Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement.
16 Q. General, we'll come to the Byrnes-Djordjevic Agreement.
17 This item 3 provides that the Verification Mission will be
18 informed about roadblocks and other emplacements that effect traffic but
19 were not intended -- but were not erected with the purpose of traffic or
20 crime control?
21 A. Well, I don't recall being give than sort of information on any
22 regular basis whatsoever. That's the sort of information we hoped we
23 were going to get, but we didn't get.
24 Q. Well, you were not supposed at all to receive any information
25 about the roadblocks and other placements that were put there for the
1 purpose of traffic and crime control, according to what is written here?
2 A. Well, it depends how you read it. We were -- we were told we
3 were going to get regular reports on police activity and regular reports
4 on army activity, and those reports would have been the things that would
5 have reassured us that such operations were as you describe. But since
6 we didn't get any of them, every time we saw a roadblock, we had no idea
7 what its purpose was.
8 Q. Thank you. Well, you see, you and I cannot agree on how to
9 interpret item 3. And this is normal. Wherever there is an agreement,
10 there is a dispute in how to construe it. You had similar disagreements
11 with the FRY authorities. What steps did you take in order to obtain a
12 proper interpretation of this agreement?
13 A. We wrote the letter signed by William Walker to Milosevic saying
14 this is now we intend to carry out verification and this is what we
15 require. That is what we did, and we never got an answer to it.
16 Thank you.
17 Q. General, you and I can exchange as many letters as we wish. If
18 we continue to disagree, nothing will come out of it. Neither you or I
19 drafted these agreements. Who did you address with the request, maybe
20 the Security Council, anyone else -- any third party to provide you with
21 a proper interpretation of the agreement? This shouldn't be done between
22 the parties who are in dispute over certain matters.
23 A. Well, I'm sure that the head of mission reported what he was
24 doing to the Security Council in the OSCE and they took such measures as
25 they deemed necessary. It's one of the areas I wasn't in charge of.
1 At my level that I can answer for, we asked every time that we
2 met with the liaison officers for the proper documentation of these
3 regular reports that we were going to receive. And we got the odd spoken
4 statement of what was happening after the event, which was not what was
6 Q. General, your office, your position was a very high level
7 position, maybe number 2 or number 3. Did you launch any protests
8 regarding different interpretations of this agreement with the FRY, with
9 the OSCE, or the Security Council?
10 A. At my level, I was consistent in the sort of discussions that
11 I've described and this was reported to the head of mission. That was my
12 chain of command. I was not authorised to deal direct with the OSCE in
14 Q. Thank you. Did you see a single document in which the head of
15 mission was writing to anyone outside the KVM in Pristina stating that
16 the FRY and the KVM were in dispute when it comes to interpreting the
18 A. I cannot remember seeing any specific document, but I am
19 absolutely positive that the security -- the Permanent Council in Vienna
20 and the Secretariat in Vienna
21 ongoing issue for us.
22 Q. Thank you. Now, if we go further down in item 3, can you see
23 that in emergencies that have nothing to do with traffic or crime control
24 related reasons, were the organs or the authorities obliged to inform the
25 mission about this?
1 A. Yes, but I would say that the word emergent is not about an
2 emergency, it's about circumstances that arose, not necessarily an
3 emergency. So we were expecting a lot of information, and we got very
5 Q. Very well. We have a couple of minutes more. Let's look at
6 item 4 dealing with the border.
7 I know that you are tired, we are all tired, if you don't mind.
8 Or would you prefer that we start with this item tomorrow morning?
9 A. No, no, I'm happy to go on. I'll do this as long as you want
10 today. I've read it, yes. Please ask your question.
11 Q. I will. It says here that there should be control or movement of
12 units outside the border area, and this offers limitless possibilities
13 for your mission. Would you agree with that?
14 A. When invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, that's
15 not limitless, that's not full and unfettered freedom of movement, but
16 that's what it says.
17 Q. Again, we disagree in how to read it. First part -- first thing,
18 does it refer to border units or the units outside the border area? And
19 secondly, only by invitation or at the request you can enter this zone?
20 A. Our understanding of this was that the 5 kilometres immediately
21 close to the border had a different status, and therefore we normally
22 informed the authorities, the FRY authorities, when we were going into
24 I don't believe this allowed units of the VJ or MUP to go around
25 in Kosovo without notification because that would have led to confusion
1 between units that were out of barracks in an unauthorised way unless
2 that information was given to us beforehand. And such information was
3 never given to us.
4 Q. Thank you. I asked you only about the border area and this
5 particular section of the agreement.
6 Unfortunately, it seems that our time is up for today.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We will take note of that,
9 Mr. Djurdjic.
10 Now, I understand, Ms. Kravetz, there's a matter you wish to
11 raise. Is it something we need to keep the witness here for?
12 MS. KRAVETZ: No.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Sir, you will be in part pleased to know that we
14 must now adjourn for the day to continue tomorrow at 9.00. I believe we
15 can assure you you will be free to go after tomorrow's sitting.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Kravetz.
20 MS. KRAVETZ: Yes, Your Honours. Just a matter concerning
21 witness scheduling for tomorrow. The witness that was scheduled to
22 follow the testimony of General DZ was Mr. Martin Pnishi. This was in
23 our notification filed on 8th June -- of this 8th June; and the witness
24 to follow was Ms. Merita Deda. We would like to switch the order and
25 call Ms. Merita Deda before Mr. Pnishi. The reason for that is that
1 Ms. Deda is here with, I understand, two small children and has more
2 urgency to return back home to her normal activities than Mr. Pnishi. So
3 we would like to request to change the order and to call Ms. Deda
4 tomorrow when the testimony of Mr. -- General DZ concludes.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, there will be no difficulty from the Chamber
6 with that proposal. Counsel will, of course, remember that because of
7 the wish of the accused to give evidence before the Belgrade war crimes
8 Chamber, we will not be sitting on Thursday or Friday. So there will be
9 a sitting tomorrow and then the following Monday.
10 We adjourn now until 9.00 in the morning.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.
12 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of
13 June, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.