1 Monday, 17 August 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon to you all. Welcome back.
6 Mr. Hannis, we had not expected this pleasure.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. It's nice to be here. I
8 hope you can still call it a pleasure at the end of my term here.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It is --
10 MR. HANNIS: Our first witness today will be Milan Djakovic. We
11 had initially proposed him as a 92 ter witness. Your Honours decided
12 that he should be called viva voce. I think our time estimate for him
13 previously was three hours. In light of the change from ter to viva, I
14 think it may take me a little longer, but I propose to end my examination
15 by the end of the day. I hope that meets with your satisfaction.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much for that. We look forward to
17 the witness who may be brought in now. Thank you.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Mr. Djakovic.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please read aloud the affirmation on the
22 card shown to you now.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
24 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis has some questions for you.
3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 WITNESS: MILAN DJAKOVIC
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 Examination by Mr. Hannis:
7 Q. Good afternoon, sir.
8 A. Good afternoon.
9 Q. Could you tell us your name, please.
10 A. My name is Milan Djakovic.
11 Q. And, sir, I understand you're retired from the VJ.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Can you tell us when you retired and at what rank.
14 A. I retired on the 31st of March, 2002, with the rank of
16 Q. And how long were you a professional soldier, from when to when?
17 A. I was a professional soldier from the 31st July 1971.
18 Q. General, can you tell us what position you held in the VJ and
19 where you were working in 1998.
20 A. In 1998 I was at the Pristina garrison of the Pristina Corps,
21 discharging the duty of the head of operations and training department of
22 the Pristina Corps.
23 Q. Who was your commanding officer at that time?
24 A. My immediate superior was General Vladimir Lazarevic, holding the
25 position of the head of -- Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps.
1 Q. And who was the commander of the Pristina Corps in 1998?
2 A. The Pristina Corps commander was General Nebojsa Pavkovic.
3 Q. Could you tell us briefly what your duties were as head of
4 operations and training department in Pristina Corps at that time.
5 A. My duties in 1998 when I assumed the duty of the head of
6 department on the 25th of December, year 1997, and I held this position
7 until February 2009 [sic] -- that is when I handed over my duties, and I
8 was transferred to the 3rd Army command in Nis.
9 Q. Let me stop you there for a second. The transcript reported you
10 as saying you held that position until February 2009. I think that was
11 probably a misinterpretation, because I understand you retired in 2002
12 so ...
13 A. Yes, I was retired in 2002. I don't understand what the problem
15 Q. The transcript reports that you said you held your position as
16 head of the operations and training section or department until February
17 2009. I think that probably should be --
18 A. 1999. I may have misspoken. So until February 1999.
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. Until I went to Nis
21 Q. And when you went to Nis
23 A. My job was similar to the one I had with the Pristina Corps, only
24 for the most part of the time I remained in Pristina throughout 1999 at
25 the forward command post in the village of Gracanica
1 Q. Okay. Thank you. General, the first topic I want to talk with
2 you about is something called the Joint Command in Kosovo and Metohija.
3 And can you tell us the first time that you saw or heard that term used,
4 if you recall.
5 A. For the first time we used this term, or it was mentioned in a
6 conversation between General Pavkovic and myself. That took place
7 sometime in the period -- or rather, in May 1998.
8 Q. Okay. Let me show you an exhibit, it is I think 65 ter number
9 02113. It will be coming up on your screen in a minute, sir. And this
10 is a document dated the 7th of July, 1998, from the brigade commander of
11 the 125th Motorised Brigade. Do you recognise that document?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. And you'll see there in the first paragraph, this is entitled:
14 "A ban on operations without knowledge and approval of the Joint Command
15 for Kosovo and Metohija."
16 And this order from the commander of the 125th is made apparently
17 pursuant to the order of the Joint Command number 1104-6. Can you tell
18 us about that? Do you know anything about that reference to a
19 Joint Command and a Joint Command order of 6 July?
20 A. This order dated the 6th of July, as far as I can recall, was
21 drafted by myself; and in this order much before any events that involved
22 civilians, members of the Ministry of the Interior and the engagement of
23 the army, we in a certain manner and in order to re-affirm the joint
24 coordination between MUP staff and the army, we mentioned this
25 Joint Command as a notion or as a term that was suitable at the time from
1 the point of view of drafting documents.
2 Q. Okay. This -- what we have on the screen is an order from the
3 commander of the 125th apparently to his subordinate units; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And he's citing his authority, the order he received is 1104-6.
6 Does that number mean anything to you?
7 A. It doesn't mean anything particular as a number. It's a number
8 from the register -- from the register. And I asked for a number from
9 the head of the administrative office, the next number that is in the
10 register, in order to make references in the correspondence between us
11 and the MUP with a view to coordinating certain activities. And this
12 number 1104 is quite accidental, and this number 6 that comes after that
13 is just the sequence number of the document.
14 Q. Okay.
15 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I don't know how much you may have
16 heard from other witnesses about the numbering system of VJ documents, so
17 if I'm starting to go into something that you're well aware of, stop me
18 and I'll break off.
19 JUDGE PARKER: You have not gone too far yet, Mr. Hannis.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Continue.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
23 Q. General, as I understand it from having looked at a lot of VJ
24 documents and heard from some other witnesses, that documents that were
25 used in the VJ would have a registry number assigned based on sort of the
1 topic of what the communication was about. And then, as you said, there
2 would be that number, it was a random number; and after that, if there
3 were multiple communications concerning that topic, they would get a
4 sequential number. Oftentimes it might be followed then by a slash with
5 the year. For example, if the topic was equipment in Kosovo, the number
6 might be 123, the first communication about that would be dash 01, and
7 then slash forward 98. Have I described it correctly?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Okay. Now, if 1104 related to the Joint Command in some way,
10 would -- does that mean there would have been five other communications
11 about the Joint Command before this 1104-6?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. And you said -- I think you referred to "we" as having
14 been the ones who produced this document. Who are you referring to when
15 you say "we" in that context?
16 A. Are you talking about 1104 specifically?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Well, I was referring to the operations organ of the
19 Pristina Corps command and some input of General Pavkovic was also taken
20 into consideration.
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. And could we see the second page of this
23 Did you know who the commander of the 125th was in 1998?
24 A. Yes, I do. That was Colonel Dragan Zivanovic.
25 Q. Okay. And on the second page do you recognise the name and the
1 signature that's on this document?
2 A. I never paid much attention to the signature, but I'm aware of
3 this document.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, we would like to tender 02113 at this
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. And next I'd like to -- oh, I'm sorry.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document would become
10 Exhibit P1216.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
12 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
15 Q. Next, General, I would like to show you Exhibit P886, which has
16 previously been marked for identification I believe. General, you have
17 the cover page of a lengthy document in front of you. Have you seen this
19 A. Yes, I have.
20 Q. And the title page is translated in English as: "Meetings of the
21 Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija."
22 MR. HANNIS: Could we turn to page 2 in both the English and the
24 Q. Do you recognise what's on the screen in front of you now?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Can you tell us what that is.
2 A. So this is the first page that I wrote on the 22nd of July, 2008
3 [sic] --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: This is what the witness
5 said --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- when we attended the meeting
7 with --
8 MR. HANNIS:
9 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt. The interpreters just told me that you
10 said July 22nd of 2008. I think that was a misspeak --
11 A. 1998.
12 Q. Thank you. And could you continue from where I interrupted you,
14 A. I went to attend this meeting pursuant to what General Pavkovic,
15 when he returned from Belgrade
16 come on the 22nd of July in the morning and told me that I was going to
17 accompany him at the meeting with the MUP. When I asked him what I was
18 supposed to do, he told me to, Come with me, so that he wouldn't be alone
19 there, by that he was referring to VJ officers. When I asked whether I
20 should bring something with me, he replied, Just bring a notebook with
21 you and note down whatever you believe to be of interest for us. This is
22 what I did. And on the 22nd of July, in the evening, at around 1800 or
23 1830, the aide-de-camp called me and asked me if I was ready. I said
24 that I was. And then 15 minutes before this recorded time we arrived on
25 the MUP premises which was about 100 metres from our command
2 The meeting started exactly at this time recorded here, which is
3 1900 hours. It started rather informally. Since I was not familiar and
4 acquainted at all of the attendees, I skipped the entire half of the page
5 without noting anything, without saying the meeting of the Joint Command
6 and the agenda and the persons present. I added that afterwards, based
7 on the fact that General Pavkovic and I, myself, established together
8 upon our return to the command HQ. I started taking notes from this
9 sentence which says that Mr. Minic opened the meeting, and I went on
10 recording as much as I could what everyone was talking about, the
11 propositions and proposals that were made, the information that was
12 exchanged during the next 60-odd meetings that I attended.
13 Q. And those -- how often did the group meet approximately during
14 the time that you attended meetings?
15 A. On the average we met two to three times a week, depending on the
16 intensity of the influx of information, the intensity of combat
17 activities, et cetera. But I would say two or three times a week on the
19 Q. And where were the meetings usually held?
20 A. These meetings, or rather, the first one was held in the building
21 of the MUP, and for the most part they were held in a building in the
22 centre of Pristina. I think that was in the provisional Executive
23 Council, and the room was in size similar to this one, although some of
24 the meetings between the MUP and the army were held when we had to deal
25 some issues that were exclusively relating to our coordination; and then
1 in that case we would hold them either on the premises of the corps or on
2 the premises of the Ministry of the Interior. However, the majority of
3 the meetings were held in the building of the provincial Executive
5 Q. I see on the page we have in front of us that at this first
6 meeting you list eight people in attendance, including yourself and
7 General Pavkovic. The other six, were these people known to you before
8 the meeting?
9 A. For the most part, no. I knew of Mr. Minic from the media, and I
10 knew that he held a high political position. As for Mr. Sainovic, the
11 same applies to him. I didn't know Mr. Djordjevic personally. I knew
12 Lukic because already in June and July, or rather, late June he was
13 already down there at the MUP staff, and I knew him. I didn't know
14 David Gajic. I didn't know Andjelkovic. I only knew of him through the
15 media. So practically speaking, Lukic was the only one that I sort of
16 knew because I became acquainted with him one month prior to this
18 Q. I see you have Mr. Djordjevic's first name is -- I think it's
19 translated here as Rodoljub; is that what you wrote?
20 A. Yes, I think that's correct.
21 Q. Do you see the man that attended that first meeting here in the
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you point him out for us, please.
25 A. The gentleman in the last row sitting next to the security
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. HANNIS: May the record reflect that the witness has
4 identified the accused.
5 Q. And we have his name down as Vlastimir. Where did you get the
6 name Rodoljub? Pardon my pronunciation.
7 A. I think that it was General Pavkovic who told me that. Actually,
8 I'm certain of that because I wasn't sure. I would normally just note
9 down the person's last name, and I think it was him - I don't know based
10 on what and for what reason - told me this name. But this is definitely
11 the man who is here in this courtroom today.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us how you came to put the names in this
13 particular order that they're in with Mr. Minic as first and you as last?
14 Was there any significance to that?
15 A. I personally did not put them together in this way, except that I
16 did the designation from the instructions of General Pavkovic because he
17 knew who occupied which political function at the federal level, the
18 political establishment, the police, and the army, and he dictated it
19 all. He dictated Mr. Minic, Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Andjelkovic, then himself,
20 then Mr. Djordjevic, Lukic, Gajic, and I added myself at the end as one
21 of those present.
22 Q. Okay. Could you tell us how you went about taking notes of the
23 meeting. What was your usual procedure?
24 A. In view of what General Pavkovic told me as to how to proceed, I
25 decided to make note of things that I believed to myself as chief of
1 department for operations and training needed in order to make certain
2 evaluations, to draft certain orders related to army members. I'd like
3 to emphasise that I made a certain analysis of this book because I made
4 most of the entries. Most of the information was provided by the state
5 security, Mr. Gajic and Mr. Radovic. Sixty to seventy per cent of the
6 information originates from reports made by security organs to the other
7 attendees regarding Siptar terrorist forces and the overall political
8 situation, and it is the usual job of the state security to do this. And
9 they would also provide information on possible impacts on members of the
10 corps and members of the army.
11 Q. I understand you were not trying to take a verbatim record of
12 everything everyone said; is that correct?
13 A. Right, and that would have been impossible because some people
14 speak fast, some speak slower. There are certain blanks because I
15 couldn't understand certain words myself, and there are blanks that I
16 filled in only later when during a break I had the time.
17 Q. Before today have you had a chance to examine this copy of your
18 notes to see if there was anything that had been changed in the portions
19 that you wrote back in 1998?
20 A. Yes, I did have the chance even before the trial of
21 Milutinovic et al. last year and -- in fact, back in early 2008 I had the
22 chance to examine my notes and see how many meetings were held, what
23 subjects were the most discussed in terms of percentages. And I could
24 not see, I could not find any corrections or modifications. I do not
25 have any reason to believe that any alterations were made.
1 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to page 136 in the B/C/S. I'll see if I
2 can confirm the English page. I think we go to page 148 in the English.
3 Q. General, do you see that page in front of you in the B/C/S? I
4 think the date is 14 October 1998
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Did you write the entry on that date?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to the next page in the B/C/S then, I
10 think it's 137, and then two pages or three pages further on in the
12 Q. Did there come a time when somebody else started taking the notes
13 other than you?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. This page on the screen now, K022-8548, 21 October 1998, did you
16 write that?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you know who did?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. Tell us about that.
21 A. From the 21st of October the note-taking was done by one of my
22 assistants, Colonel Ratko Tesevic, and pursuant to an order by
23 General Pavkovic I was engaged on another assignment at the time because
24 the arrival of the OSCE mission was being prepared for in Kosovo, and I
25 had to deal with that, whereas Tesevic took over the note-taking and
1 attended briefings with General Pavkovic and he also attended exchanges
2 of information between civilians and army members. And as far as I know,
3 he worked at five meetings. And just before I arrived I once contacted
4 Tesevic and asked him to confirm that he had indeed attended the previous
5 meeting and he did. He even archived these documents, the first
6 documents, and that's why you see the typing in the header, minutes of
7 the Joint Command. This is not something I wrote. It was computer
8 printed when the whole collection was made, and that was in October 1998,
9 that was done with all the documents developed in the territory of Kosovo
10 and Metohija.
11 Q. And have you had the chance to examine those last few pages
12 regarding the meetings from 21 October until I think the last meeting
13 reflected is 30 October 1998
14 handwriting of Tesevic?
15 A. Of course I checked. It's his signature, and he attended these
16 five meetings. I'm sure of that.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Handwriting not
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
20 Your Honours, at this time I would like to tender Exhibit P886.
21 I think it's only been marked for identification up until this point.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Do you know the number with which it has been
23 marked, Mr. Hannis?
24 MR. HANNIS: I think it was marked as Exhibit 886.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will now become an exhibit of that number.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. General, when you were here in I think May of 2008 to testify in
3 the Milutinovic case, did you have occasion at the request of I think
4 myself and Judge Bonomy to go through these notes and help us identify
5 certain portions that the translators had not been able to read and had
6 transcribed or translated as being illegible?
7 A. Yes, I did have that opportunity and I did that.
8 Q. Okay. Could I show you now what is 65 ter number 04298. Do you
9 recognise that, General?
10 A. Yes. Yes. That's my handwriting.
11 Q. Did you have a chance to look at that -- a copy of that entire
12 document before today and satisfy yourself that those were the changes
13 you made in May of last year?
14 A. No, I did not have the chance to do that now, but I can see the
15 things I entered.
16 Q. Do you need to look at it any further to satisfy yourself that
17 those were the changes you made?
18 A. I am sure from the handwriting. I couldn't fail to recognise my
19 own handwriting, regardless of the text. And if there's a problem I can
20 help give you the answer. I'm sure this is mine.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would like to tender this document
24 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
1 Exhibit P1217.
2 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
3 Q. Now, General, there were a couple of items from the notes you
4 took in 1998 that I wanted to ask you to elaborate on briefly if you
5 could. At page 23 of the Exhibit 886, that's page 23 in both the English
6 and the B/C/S. General, this is a meeting from the 30th of July, 1998
7 And if in the B/C/S you could go down near the bottom of the page you see
8 General Djordjevic's name and the last entry under his name in my English
9 translation is written as: "Munja will tomorrow proceed to Vucak near old
11 Do you know what "Munja" was?
12 A. I can't be 100 per cent sure, but I believe it is a unit from the
13 area of Pec that was known in our jargon as Munja, or perhaps it was a
14 person that the members of that unit nicknamed Munja, which means
15 lightning, because of some physical abilities or skills. It was perhaps
16 a unit of the MUP that was engaged in the area of the Vucak village
17 facing Ovcara.
18 MR. HANNIS: And I apologise, Your Honours, I think the correct
19 English page is page 31. I have an earlier English translation with a
20 different number. My apologies to the Registry officer as well.
21 Q. Thank you, General. Next I would like to go to the meeting of
22 the 20th of August, 1998 --
23 MR. HANNIS: I apologise, Your Honours, I need a moment to find
24 my notes and the correct page number. The ERN in the B/C/S is K022-8466,
25 and I believe that's page 65 in the English.
1 Q. And this is from a meeting of the 20th of August, 1998. At the
2 bottom of your page there's an entry for General Djordjevic, and I'm
3 interested in the last two entries under his name.
4 MR. HANNIS: And for the English I think we have to go to the
5 next page.
6 Q. Can you read those out for us and tell us if you know what they
7 refer to?
8 A. The last two points say:
9 "720 have applied to the Ministry of the Interior."
10 And the next point:
11 "There are about 15.000 members."
12 This refers to the fact that the MUP staff, in view of the
13 current situation, opened a competition for the admission of new members
14 from the territory of Kosovo
15 total of 720 applications had been received. And the second item just
16 notes that there are about 15.000 personnel. I believe this is the
17 figure for the total MUP personnel, but I don't know in which territory.
18 I do not rule out the possibility that it means there are 15.000
19 conscripts not yet assigned. But I'm more inclined to believe it means
20 there are 15.000 MUP personnel in the territory of Kosovo
21 total, including the reserve forces.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. I think when we looked at this document on
23 Friday and Sunday there were a couple of entries we asked you about where
24 General Djordjevic on one or two occasions made reference to the
25 necessity to force some villagers to return to their homes. Do you
1 recall that?
2 A. Yes, I remember.
3 Q. And could you tell us why that was being done, if you know?
4 A. That was --
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic -- please, excuse me, General.
6 Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I
8 heard -- I'll tell you which kind of interpretation. I do not mind that
9 this is a cross-examination, but Mr. Hannis says on Friday or Sunday
10 Mr. Djordjevic told you that the villagers should be forced to go back
11 home. I don't think that's appropriate. If there was a problem -- the
12 question should still not put this as a statement. I think the witness
13 should be the one to give us the answer as to what really happened.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Introducing a radical idea, Mr. Djurdjic.
15 Mr. Hannis, you've heard that, and I'm sure you will take note.
16 Thank you.
17 MR. HANNIS: I will adjust accordingly.
18 Q. Let me take you specifically to another page in your notes. I
19 think it's page 75 of the B/C/S. It's ERN K022-8486, it's a meeting of
20 the 4th of September. Yes, do you see that entry for General Djordjevic
21 and item number 1.
22 MR. HANNIS: I believe it's page 86 in the English translation.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.
24 MR. HANNIS:
25 Q. My English translation says:
1 "Return all inhabitants to the village by force tomorrow" or "all
2 inhabitants are to be returned to the village tomorrow with the use of
4 Do you recall what that was about?
5 A. Yes, I do. In order to explain this, to explain the context to
6 this sentence, I have to say that when combat operations are to be
7 carried out, the army and the MUP and the Ministry of the Interior are
8 duty-bound to remove the civilian population from the area of combat and
9 to inform them in advance. So the civilians, the villagers, were
10 informed in advance by the army and the MUP and they fled to the woods
11 themselves, men, women, children, all. And then it was a big problem for
12 them to go back home because they were still in fear. And the
13 psychological pressure on the Albanian population was huge. They were
14 constantly told that the army and the police would mistreat them, harass
15 them, kill them; they were never told the truth, namely that the
16 authorities wanted them to go back to their homes and live a normal life.
17 And out of this fear the villagers would stay in the woods for days and
18 nights on end and would not dare to go back home. And in the meantime
19 their houses were looted by other Albanians because the army and the
20 police of Serbia
21 General Djordjevic said that if they still did not want to go back home
22 after being asked nicely and after all the explanations, they had to be
23 made to go back because they couldn't stay in the forest with all the
24 women and children and infirm people. I heard General Obrad Stevanovic
25 speak of an example when two policemen had brought a baby, an infant, two
1 or three months old, they brought this baby to the village to be fed
2 before returning it to the mother. And only then did the mother realise
3 it was her mistake to have kept the baby in the woods for such a long
4 time. And that's the context of this order, they should be forced to go
5 back to their village.
6 Q. Let me ask a question related to that. Right above that entry
7 General Lukic is noted as a speaker. And you see the second item under
8 his name, and I have translated as:
9 "Civilians were returned to the villages and able-bodied men have
10 been kept."
11 Can you tell us what that means?
12 A. Now I see what General Lukic was talking about. It follows up on
13 the previous sentence:
14 "There were civilians who turned a deaf ear to the warnings."
15 And then the next item says:
16 "Civilians were returned to the villages and able-bodied
17 [realtime transcript read in error "baseball-bodied"] men were kept."
18 Which means that able-bodied men who still carried weapons and
19 able-bodied men who had been terrorists but had discarded their weapons
20 were all tested by the paraffin glove test by the police to establish
21 which among them had been using fire-arms. That was not the only
22 instance when this was done. It was also done in other places, the
23 paraffin glove test, to establish which terrorists had been in action and
24 which had not. The former were detained and the latter were released to
25 go home.
1 Q. The way it reads, it says that all able-bodied men were kept
2 whether they were carrying weapons or not; is that correct?
3 A. You could say that. I know that all those who carried weapons
4 usually discarded their weapons, changed into civilian clothes, and
5 pretended they were civilians, even though they had used guns before.
6 The same thing happened in Prizren, and that's why MUP applied the
7 paraffin glove test and detained those who tested positive. They were
8 later prosecuted and the rest of the men were allowed to go home. Now,
9 what happened with them later I can only guess, I suppose they would join
10 the KLA again, take up arms again, and that's how it worked throughout
11 1998 and 1999.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis, if I could interrupt a moment before
13 we lose it from the screen.
14 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Page 21, line 15, refers to "baseball-bodied men"
16 in the quotation. The quotation origin appears to be military-capable
18 MR. HANNIS: Oh, Your Honour, I'm sorry, I may have been reading
19 from my other English translation. I had able-bodied, but if the correct
20 translation is --
21 JUDGE PARKER: Well, the one we have is military-capable, but
22 certainly not baseball-capable.
23 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, although I would think most
24 military men should be able to play baseball, maybe not well, but ...
25 I thank you. I stand corrected. I'll try and speak more clearly
1 for the court reporter and the interpreters.
2 Q. General, I want to set aside the Joint Command notes for now and
3 ask you a related question about Joint Command. In 1998, even before
4 this first meeting on the 22nd of July, within the Pristina Corps were
5 you preparing some kind of reports that were called Joint Command
6 operational reports?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can you tell us briefly what those were and what their purpose
10 A. Before any meeting took place on the 22nd of July, in view of the
11 situation that prevailed since March, we made our assessment in a way of
12 the situation, and we decided that it was becoming more and more complex.
13 Then sometime in late July, I think, through exchange of information
14 exclusively between the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps, we acquired
15 information relating to members of the MUP - and that is the police - as
16 well as the information from the State Security Service.
17 General Pavkovic told me that that was pursuant to his agreement with
18 General Lukovic [as interpreted] for them to provide us with certain
19 information so that we can use it in making our assessment of the forces
20 during the preparation of certain activities and in some other
21 situations. So all this started long before this first official meeting
22 of the 22nd of July. Also when MUP organs provided this information I
23 ordered Colonel Tesevic to type this information, to feed it into a
24 computer, and to add our information pertaining to the activities that we
25 reported and informed the 3rd Army command, including our planned
1 activities or the forthcoming activities that were included in the report
2 to the 3rd Army, that is the primary and the principal task, the securing
3 of the state border, the prevention of smuggling of arms, et cetera, all
4 the regular army duties. Tesevic would compile all this information, and
5 we would forward it to the Ministry of the Interior so that they would
6 have a rough idea about what our major tasks would be in the next two or
7 three days, just in general terms, training of soldiers without going
8 into any specifics. So Tesevic did that, compiled such reports, and
9 these documents were sent out without any signature because it did not
10 have any operational value. It was only for filing purposes. It also
11 served us as a basis for making an analysis for a certain period
12 vis-a-vis both our activities and the terrorist activities, because the
13 majority of the information was related to the state service, that is to
14 say the intelligence and counter-intelligence.
15 Q. If I could show you a document --
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would like to have a look at 65 ter
17 number 01197. And if the usher could assist me, I'll hand a hard copy to
18 the witness which may make it go a little faster as we go through pages.
19 Q. General, I think you may have seen this document before. The
20 first page appears to be just a cover sheet with a name written on it.
21 Do you recognise that document?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And what's written on that first page?
24 A. Let's see. This is Colonel Tesevic's handwriting, the same
25 handwriting that we see in the last notes in my notebook, and it says,
1 "to Milomir Minic personally." This is the gentleman who was listed at
2 the first meeting under number 1 among the attendees.
3 Q. If we can go to the next page and the first of typewritten text
4 in the B/C/S. This is a report dated the 20th of November 1998, the
5 Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija, strictly confidential number
6 1142-134, operations report. Is this the standard format for these
7 reports that you see in this document?
8 A. Yes, that's the standard format, although it hasn't been
9 prescribed by anyone or -- nor were any instructions were issued in that
10 sense. There's no rule governing how these kind of documents are to be
11 drafted because this kind of document was not an obligatory document for
12 the command to produce nor does it contain any orders. It only describes
13 what was happening in the past few days or in the last 24 hours and what
14 was to be done next. Even when there were no meetings we exchanged
15 information with the MUP.
16 Q. And to whom were these reports circulated, if you know?
17 A. One copy would be retained at the Pristina Corps command. I know
18 that another copy would be sent by Tesevic to the MUP staff. And he also
19 would send copies to certain individuals who were away from Kosovo for a
20 long time. Those were mostly civilians because Mr. Minic was often away.
21 And on a couple of occasions we sent some information to him, information
22 of this type. And this particular one pertains to this period, and it
23 was sent to him as [indiscernible] had explained to me to the office
24 where Andjelkovic was as the representative of the civilian defence in
25 Kosovo and Metohija as a member of the provisional Executive Council. So
1 he sent this report, or rather, left it on his desk on the premises that
2 I mentioned.
3 Q. And this number 1142, was that the number that referred to
4 Joint Command matters?
5 A. 1142, yes, this is a number taken by -- on the basis of the same
6 principle just like for any other document, in order for us to know how
7 many such documents were produced. The main number is 1142, and 134
8 refers to the last in order that was recorded and was prepared at the
9 Pristina Corps command.
10 Q. And were these -- how often were these issued, every day?
11 A. For the most part, every day. As I said, this did not depend on
12 the meetings of the Joint Command. This was an exchange of information
13 between the MUP staff and the army which took place on a daily basis. If
14 you look at the army tasks and the engagement of army units, it's a
15 copied version of the tasks that was sent to the 3rd Army. So we didn't
16 provide any other information apart from the one that was supplied to the
17 army. So the tasks are identical and one can check that in regular
18 reports that were being sent to the 3rd Army command, and you can see for
19 yourself that these tasks are identical to the ones received by
20 General Samardzic.
21 Q. And just quickly, on the first page item number I, Roman
22 numeral I, is the intelligence and security situation; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. On the next page, Roman numeral II is the activities of the
25 terrorist forces against the army, against the MUP, and against the
1 civilian population.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Roman numeral III
4 engagement of the MUP.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And Roman numeral IV is a proposal for further engagement of the
7 army and of the MUP?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Was that the format that was used in each of these reports?
10 A. More or less, yes. It was us who established this format at the
11 corps command because we thought that this would cover all the issues
12 that were of relevance for our exchange of information in order to avoid
13 daily meetings. So we can see what the general tasks of the MUP were.
14 Although this does not give us any detailed information, we can see,
15 roughly speaking, what are the principal tasks of the MUP and vice versa.
16 They could have familiarised themselves with our global tasks but without
17 going into any particulars.
18 Q. Okay. And on the last page at the end, it's just a typewritten
19 name, "Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija." No signature, no stamp.
20 Is that how each of these reports ended?
21 A. Yes, each of these documents was sent in this form. I explained
22 this in my previous testimony, that I considered the Joint Command to be
23 composed exclusively by the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps. That was
24 the only thing relevant to me because we were the only ones exchanging
25 information on a daily basis. This was our duty under the law.
1 Q. Was it typical for a VJ document not to have a signature or a
3 A. Yeah, there are some such instances if -- it's not typical, but
4 if a document is for information only it does not have to be signed, and
5 it can only be for certain individuals and their eyes only as information
6 to be used by them. However, if an order is contained in a document, it
7 must be signed.
8 Q. Thank you. I'd like you to have just a quick look at four or
9 five others just to tell me if these are part of the same series.
10 MR. HANNIS: If we could look at 01198. Your Honours, I don't
11 know whether it's more efficient for me move to tender that one now. I
12 want to do five of them, they're all the same, but it may be easier to do
13 them one at a time --
14 JUDGE PARKER: One at a time, I think, Mr. Hannis.
15 MR. HANNIS: In that case, Your Honour, I will tender 01197.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1218, Your Honours.
18 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
19 And if the usher could assist me, I will give General Djakovic a
20 copy of this one, and I will get the other one back. Thank you.
21 Q. Again, General, the first page appears to be just a cover sheet
22 with Mr. Minic's name on it.
23 MR. HANNIS: And then if we could go to the next page for the
24 typewritten transcript or the typewritten script.
25 Q. This is number 1142-136, two numbers up in the series and dated
1 the 23rd of November. And do you recognise that?
2 A. I don't understand. It seems to me to be the same document.
3 Q. Well, you see it has a different date and a different number.
4 The last one was November 20th, and it was a --
5 A. Yes, yes, yes. The format is the same, and also it says in
6 handwriting to Minic personally, but I see now that the date is
8 Q. Okay. And any reason to think that that's not an authentic copy
9 of one of your Joint Command operative reports?
10 A. No. This is not a report -- although it said in the heading
11 "Joint Command," this document was actually prepared at the corps command
12 based on the information received from the MUP and the army. I have no
13 reason to suspect that this is [as interpreted] an authentic document
14 because they practically have the same form, so there is no reason for me
15 not to believe.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. I would like to tender 01198.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1219, Your Honours.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 If the usher could assist, I'll make another trade.
22 Q. General, another one. Same question for you: Does this appear
23 to be another one in the series?
24 A. Yes, the same document, one of the series.
25 Q. Okay. And this 01203. And the date on that one, General?
1 A. 15th of October, 1998.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. HANNIS: I would like to tender 01203, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE PARKER: It, too, will be received.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit 1220, Your Honour.
6 MR. HANNIS:
7 Q. Two more, General. This will be 01204.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
9 Q. Also part of the series?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the date on that one?
12 A. 28th of October, 1998.
13 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to tender 01204.
14 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
15 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
16 Q. And the last one, General --
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P1221.
18 MR. HANNIS:
19 Q. The last one, General, looks like it's dated the 17th of October.
20 This is 01206. Same as the others.
21 A. [No interpretation]
22 MR. HANNIS: I would like to tender 01206 at this time.
23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit P1222,
25 Your Honours.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
2 Q. Next, General, I would like to take a look at 65 ter number
3 01064. Did you know a gentleman by the name of Petar Ilic in Pristina in
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Who was he, and where did he work?
7 A. He worked in the Ministry of Defence, one of its sections that
8 was in charge of Kosovo and Metohija. I think that was the department
9 within the Ministry of Defence for Kosovo and Metohija which practically
10 covered the area that was slightly smaller than the one covered by the
11 Pristina Corps. So the zone of the corps and the ministry did not
12 coincide exactly. I -- we had slightly larger area including Kursumlija
13 and other parts. I knew him personally, and we met a few times.
14 Q. Did he work in the same building as you?
15 A. Yes, I think he was two floors above from us, because all the
16 organs from the MOD and the Pristina Corps and the communications units,
17 part of the communication units of the VJ General Staff were all in the
18 same building for security reasons. We were mainly assembled in one
20 Q. Can you help me out with something here. We have in 1998 and
21 1999 in Pristina the VJ, the regular army, if you will; we have the MUP,
22 who has uniformed policemen, some regular police, and some who sometimes
23 engage in anti-terrorist operations or even combat in 1999. What are the
24 Ministry of Defence units? Do they have any kind of uniformed personnel;
25 and if so, how do they relate to the police and the army?
1 A. Well, those employed in the Ministry of Defence were mostly
2 civilians. I'm talking about those who were in our building, and they
3 were discharged on duties relating to the civilian protection. And they
4 carried out their duties pursuant to orders that they received from the
5 minister of defence from Belgrade
6 an obligation like we did, like all the other organs in the territory, to
7 exchange information at request or to provide information if required.
8 This is was fully in compliance with the rules. I know that there was an
9 Albanian among them. There were Muslims as well, Serbs, Montenegrins,
10 et cetera. In some earlier period many more Albanians were there, but
11 under pressure they left the Ministry of Defence, and only one, as far as
12 I know, remained. They carried out their regular duties preparing the
13 civilian defence and protection units for performance of their tasks that
14 were issued to them by the Ministry of Defence. Very seldom they had
15 contacts with us. This happened most often if we knew each other, and
16 then we would exchange information. However, the Ministry of Defence was
17 not involved in any activities directly or in any meetings that were held
18 under the name of Joint Command nor in any other meetings that we had for
19 that matter. If we exclude Mr. Zoran Andjelkovic who was appointed to
20 the provisional Executive Council in charge of civilian protection and
21 defence, as for the others we didn't have any contacts with Mr. Ilic and
22 others except the contacts that we maintained on a friendly basis. And
23 most often he was the one who would approach me. According to what he
24 told me -- yes.
25 Q. Let me stop you there, and ask you a couple of specific
1 questions. Did members of the civilian protection have a uniform that
2 they wore when carrying out their duties?
3 A. They had some uniforms and some weapons. I know for sure that
4 they had weapons and equipment for 30 per cent of their units in Kosovo.
5 As for the other weapons and arms was -- it was withdrawn from Kosovo and
6 Metohija because the units did not reach the required strength because
7 there were not sufficient number of Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims to
8 form these units. There were only Albanians, but the Albanians refused
9 to take part in the civilians defence and protection. And I know that
10 for sure because he personally told him that his staff had problems in
11 performing their tasks relating to the civilian protection and defence
12 because terrorists would shoot at civilians --
13 Q. Let me interrupt you, please. This is taking longer than I had
14 hoped. If you could try and just answer my question, and then I'll go to
15 the next one.
16 The uniform that civilian protection had, can you tell us what it
17 looked like and how it differed from a VJ or a police uniform?
18 A. Generally speaking, there was no difference between them and the
19 army. They only wore patches stating that they were members of the
20 civilian protection and defence. I personally saw some of these units on
21 the ground because our units were in their proximity, and that is how I
22 noticed them.
23 Q. I understand that there was some difference between civilian
24 protection and civilian defence. Can you explain to us what the
25 difference was between those two kinds of units, or are they two
1 functions for the same unit?
2 A. Well, that would be the best definition that you said, one and
3 the same part of the Ministry of Defence comprised both these functions.
4 Only some of them were involved in civilian defence. They wore -- were
5 allowed to bear arms, and they could have used these fire-arms in order
6 to defend post offices and other enterprises that were on the list for
7 which the protection should be provided, such as bridges, petrol
8 stations, et cetera. As for the civilian defence, they were not issued
9 any fire-arms, and it was intended for fire-fighting, providing first
10 medical aid, et cetera. And their duties were carried out just like any
11 other units of the civilian protection that are established everywhere in
12 the world, so they operate on the same principles. And there is also
13 third part of this segment, and that involved early warning units in --
14 concerning certain situations on the ground. And that ranged from the
15 level of municipality up to the Ministry of Defence, even up to the
16 Ministry of Defence in Belgrade
17 went from the municipality all the way to Belgrade when it came to the
18 civilian protection and defence.
19 Q. Okay.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time, Mr. Hannis?
21 MR. HANNIS: That is, Your Honour. Thank you.
22 JUDGE PARKER: We must have a break now. We resume at quarter
23 past 4.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 3.46 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Please sit down.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. General, when we broke we just brought up this document which is
6 01064 from the 28th of July, signed by Petar Ilic. And you'll see in the
7 first paragraph it says:
8 "The Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija has issued
9 instructions for the defence of inhabited places from the activities of
10 the Siptar terrorists ..."
11 Were you aware of these instructions being issued in late July
13 A. I did not see that instruction immediately, but I saw it a bit
14 later, and I'm sure it wasn't drafted at the Pristina Corps, that much I
15 know, because in some way the operations organ of the Pristina Corps
16 would have been involved in the drafting.
17 Q. I have a question about that. And if we could go -- well, before
18 we go, I would like to tender this document, Your Honour, if I may.
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received -- yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I object to introducing this
21 document through this witness. This is not a military document at all.
22 The units involved were not within the jurisdiction of the army; they
23 were in the jurisdiction of the federal Ministry of Defence. That's what
24 the witness said, and he said that he saw the document only later. So I
25 don't see how it can be admitted through him.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, if I may, you'll see this is a cover
3 letter for instructions for the defence of residential areas, a document,
4 instructions for the defence of residential areas is, I believe, already
5 in evidence as Exhibit P1051. It was identified and tendered through
6 Mr. Cvetic, who testified that he had received those instructions. This
7 document itself appears regular in form, and it has a stamp, it has a
8 signature of a person that this witness has identified as working in the
9 department or Ministry of Defence in his same building. And we think
10 that's sufficient for admission of the document at this time.
11 JUDGE PARKER: The document will be received. It is a document
12 of which there is no apparent basis for questioning authenticity. The
13 witness was aware of it, not immediately but at about the time of its
14 issue. It does not need to be a document of his own making or of his own
15 immediate department for it to be sufficiently identified to enable it to
16 be admitted.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
18 Exhibit P1223.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
20 Q. General, if we could go back for a minute and look at your
21 Joint Command notes, that's Exhibit P886, and if we could look at page 3
22 of, I think, both the English and the B/C/S. General, I will tell you
23 this is the second page from the meeting of July 22nd, the first meeting
24 you told us about. And you'll see item number 2 at the bottom of the
25 page. I think -- I don't have the right English page. You see item
1 number 2?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Could you read out the first two lines that are on the screen
5 A. "There is a danger of attack against cities. Not a single town
6 or city may fall into the hands of the Siptars. General Pavkovic will
7 produce an instruction giving priority to crisis towns Pec, Suva Reka,
8 Kacanik" --
9 Q. Let me stop you there. It appears that General Pavkovic was to
10 give instructions regarding the danger of attacks on towns. Doesn't that
11 refer to these instructions for the defence of populated areas? This is
12 from a meeting of 22nd of July, and we see instructions being sent out by
13 Mr. Ilic on the 28th. It seems as though they're connected.
14 A. You could say they are connected, but I say with full
15 responsibility here that as chief of operations I do not know that any of
16 the commanders under me drafted this instruction. I reviewed the
17 instruction, and I suppose - as I told you - that the instruction was in
18 the possession in some form of the Ministry of Defence, including
19 Mr. Ilic in his department. And the instruction was only adjusted to
20 include certain modifications of names, and it remained a general
21 instruction of the kind that used to be made in the former Yugoslav
22 People's Army for schools and certain other organisations to set certain
23 general requirements for the defence of towns and other populated areas.
24 For anyone who understands about defence and organisation of defence,
25 this is just a check list basically for organising a defence, lest the
1 person in charge of organising forget something. That's why I saw it
3 Q. Let me ask you a question. The word that was translated just
4 now, I think, when you read it out in Serbian is "uputstvo," that's
5 spelled u-p-u-t-s-t-v-o, and that appears to be in capital letters and
6 underlined in your notes; correct?
7 A. Yes. I underlined it myself.
8 MR. HANNIS: Can I get some help from the booth, is that
9 translated as "instructions"?
10 Your Honour, maybe you have to make that request, because it's
11 translated in this document as "directions;" but when he spoke it now, it
12 was translated as "instructions." And in the earlier translation that I
13 had, it's translated as "instructions." And in the document we just
14 looked at, Mr. Ilic's cover letter, which was just admitted as P1223, the
15 word is "uputstvo," u-p-u-t-s-t-v-o.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis, we've had the translation that's
17 provided now. We will take your question as a request for a review of
18 the translation that's been given, and that in due course will be
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 Q. General, can you tell me why that word was put in all capital
22 letters and underlined?
23 A. Let me explain what we just discussed. Instruction, "uputstvo,"
24 instructions is a similar term, even in Serbian, "instrukcije." And
25 that's how it was understood, an instruction to the persons to prepare
1 the defence of towns against the Siptar terrorists. I think we can agree
2 on that. Why I put this here, I'm trying to think now. It must have
3 been interesting for me at some point to create an instruction. I
4 suppose that I thought that at some point General Pavkovic, himself,
5 would order me to make an instruction. I suppose I was -- I had my hands
6 full doing other things. But whether he received this instruction or he
7 discussed it with someone else, I don't know. But I'm convinced that the
8 instruction you showed me earlier is an instruction from the Ministry of
9 Defence. And in earlier times it was developed by the JNA, by people who
10 were very familiar with this subject. And then we used it as cadets and
11 junior officers for examinations. That's the origin of this instruction.
12 Because it's not a decision that involves the employment of forces. This
13 is just a guide-line, a direction, what you should do to prevent towns
14 falling into the hands of terrorists.
15 Q. Okay. I'm not sure you answered my question. Did you put it in
16 all capital letters and underline it because you thought that it was a
17 task that you might have to do?
18 A. Yes, that's what I said. I expected to receive an order to that
19 effect from General Pavkovic, but he never gave me that order and I never
20 asked him later whether it was necessary or not, and he gave me no
21 further orders.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. I want to look at a related document. This is
23 65 ter number 01065. General, this is another document from Petar Ilic,
24 dated 28 July, again referring to instructions for defence of inhabited
25 areas. And you'll see he talks about the Joint Command having issued
1 instructions, but I have a question about a couple of things in this
2 document. He makes reference to the OiO. Can you tell us what that was?
3 A. That's the third function that I explained, civilian defence is
4 one, civilian protection is another, and the third one within the
5 department of defence at the level of the SFRY is the service for
6 observation and warnings, monitoring and reporting, that is. It monitors
7 and reports on the activities of terrorists on the territory, and this
8 information is delivered to this department for monitoring and reporting
9 and is passed on through the ministry chain of command to -- up to
11 concerned in various areas.
12 Q. And have you ever seen this document before today, do you recall?
13 A. No, I would not have been able to see this document. I can only
14 suppose that he had to sell -- to send such documents to chiefs of
15 departments and subordinated commanding officers pursuant to assignments
16 he received from the Ministry of Defence. It was shown to me during
17 proofing, but I had not seen it before.
18 Q. Okay. It appears to have the same stamp and signature that we
19 saw on the other document from Mr. Ilic. Would you agree?
20 A. Yes.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would tender this exhibit at this
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't want to make
25 this trial longer and bother anyone, but what's the point? It's -- the
1 point is not in this instruction as it was with Witness Cvetic who said,
2 I received it, and I know about it. But this witness is not concerned.
3 It has to do with the Army of Yugoslavia and the -- and a certain
4 service. He only saw it during proofing, and now the Prosecution is
5 tendering a document from another organ, and the witness says, I suppose
6 it's from elsewhere and I suppose -- I haven't seen it before. I don't
7 mind documents being introduced through this witness, but perhaps
8 documents from his own organ. I would like one single criterion to be
9 established for admitting evidence.
10 JUDGE PARKER: There is no single criterion for the admission of
11 evidence, apart from relevance and reliability. And we have to evaluate
12 reliability according to the circumstances.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber will receive this document,
15 essentially the reasons given for the earlier objection will be repeated.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. And for the record I would
17 indicate that the numbering of the documents and the content relates them
18 as well, which I think would add to your -- add weight to your decision.
19 Thank you.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
21 Exhibit P1224.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. General, just one more related to this, and then I'll move on to
24 another topic. This is 65 ter number 01067. This also is a document
25 from Mr. Ilic in the Ministry of Defence, dated the 22nd of July, 1998
1 Have you seen this document before?
2 A. No. No, I've never seen this document before, and I could not
3 see it before. I had no access to documents of this kind unless somebody
4 showed it to me in proofing, but I really did not see this document at
5 all. That's what I explained. See point 1:
6 "Immediately start checking the working order of radio stations
7 with personal information on the heads of households ..."
8 Because that's one of the fundamentals of the system of the
9 service for monitoring and reporting; it is through these radio stations
10 that information is passed on, on all issues that are relevant, both
11 those regarding civilian defence and civilian protection and combat
12 actions and terrorists, accidents, emergency situations, everything goes
13 through this service for monitoring.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. Although I did not know that it was defined in the first point,
16 the first item of this. And through this order he orders that the radios
17 be checked and that personnel be at the ready in case orders are received
18 to activate these radio transmitters for the purpose of this service for
19 monitoring and reporting. That's the purpose of this document.
20 Q. Yes, you mentioned earlier about the service for monitoring and
21 reporting. You see in the paragraph above the word "order" that it
22 mentions communications centres in municipalities with the OUP, O-U-P,
23 department of the interior. Were you aware of the existence of these OUP
24 communications centres?
25 A. Well, I knew. I was aware. Here you have several communications
1 centres --
2 Q. [Previous translation continues]... and right above that you see
3 it talks about integrating communications in the municipal observation
4 and reporting centres installed in the homes of Serbs and Montenegrins.
5 Were there no communications centres in homes of Siptars? Were they only
6 in the homes of the Serbs and the Montenegrins, or do you know?
7 A. I can only suppose since I had been in Kosovo even before, prior
8 to 1992; I was absent for a while and then I went back again. The
9 Siptars refused to be involved in anything that had to do with defence,
10 including the civilian defence and civilian protection, they completely
11 ignored the whole system, and that's why he emphasises Serbs and
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would tender this exhibit now as
15 well. I think it relates to the ones that have previously been admitted
16 as well as the instructions, and P1051, I think, discusses OiOs and these
17 communication and monitoring systems.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Same objection, Mr. Djurdjic?
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Same objection, but let me say
22 that I don't think the document is irrelevant. My only objection is to
23 introducing it through this witness.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE PARKER: It, too, will be admitted for the same reasons
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
3 Exhibit P1225.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
5 Q. General, I want to ask you about the plan that was called the
6 plan to combat terrorism. You're familiar with that plan?
7 A. I don't know which plan you have in mind. You're talking about
8 the general plan?
9 Q. A plan that was referred to as the plan to combat terrorism --
10 A. Yes, that's right. That's how it was called, the plan to combat
11 terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and I'm familiar with that plan under
12 this name.
13 Q. Okay. And can you tell the Judges how -- when and how that first
14 got started?
15 A. This plan started being drawn up sometime in June. There was
16 some specific actions taken at the time. It started with a proposal for
17 engagement of military forces in the territory of Kosovo
18 order to combat terrorism, and for that reason the first draft was called
19 the proposal for the plan to combat terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. So
20 roughly speaking, it took place in June. That is when we carried out
21 some more extensive assessments and valuations because the terrorist
22 activities were of such intensity that they held control of 50 per cent
23 of Kosovo. Three main roads were totally closed which cut off the supply
24 lines, and for that purpose the army started making this plan. It was
25 followed by certain activities and coordination with the MUP staff which
1 took place in early June. And I suppose that parallel with us they
2 carried out their own activities in compliance with their own specific
4 Q. Thank you. You said it started with the proposal, and then you
5 began working on the plan. Was -- were you aware of a meeting that took
6 place at the end of May where there was first discussion about such a
8 A. Yes, I heard about that from General Pavkovic on the way to
10 and that these overall problems in Kosovo were discussed; and in a way
11 that is when an initiative was launched to make certain preparations in
12 order to monitor the situation so as to avoid any surprises either for
13 the army or the MUP or other authorities in Kosovo relating to the
14 forthcoming activities expected to be carried out by Siptar forces.
15 Q. Do you remember what Pavkovic told you about that May 30th
16 meeting, where was it, who was there?
17 A. I remember him saying, because I insisted to hear who attended
18 the meeting, and he told me that the meeting was in the president's
19 office or with the president. I didn't insist any further on that, and
20 that present there were certain MUP organs, representatives of the army,
21 and government officials, certain government officials. I then insisted
22 on him telling me exactly who there was, and then he gave me the names.
23 As far as I can remember of all the persons mentioned here, I think that
24 Mr. Sainovic was not present at this first meeting with
25 President Milosevic, whereas the others were, and that included Stanisic
1 as the chief of the State Security Service; Minister Stojiljkovic, the
2 minister of the interior; General Lukic, as the commander of Kosovo
3 staff; General Djordjevic; General Obrad Stevanovic; and from the army
4 General Perisic, Chief of General Staff; General Dimitrijevic, chief of
5 the security administration; and as for the civilians, I only remember
6 that Mr. Sainovic was absent, and I think that all the others were there,
7 although I must admit I wasn't much interested in that section as I was
8 in the representatives of the army. And of course General Samardzic was
9 there. I omitted him earlier.
10 Q. And after that meeting, did you in the Pristina Corps do any
11 works -- any work on a proposal for this plan?
12 A. General also told me that the Supreme Defence Council was going
13 to issue a decision on the use of force. I think that took place on the
14 9th of June, but I learned about that some seven or eight days later. So
15 roughly speaking on or around 15 or 20th of June, we, in the operations
16 organ, started thinking about how to engage our forces in the event of an
17 armed rebellion and some high-intensity clashes. That was in line with
18 our rules of service, and it is particularly the duty of the operations
19 organ to constantly monitor the situation, and in keeping with that,
20 record the situation and make proposals to the command structures in
21 order to rectify some emergency situation. This organ was particularly
22 set up for these purposes, and it also involved other command organs as
24 Q. Did you and your team then draft up a proposal; and if so, what
25 did you do with it?
1 A. Once we received an order for this to be done, we recorded on a
2 daily basis the activities of Siptar terrorists on -- in a map. And then
3 after that we carried out an extensive analysis at the level of the corps
4 command pursuant to General Pavkovic's order. But I asked him that if
5 possible I receive information from all the structures operating in the
6 territory of Kosovo for this analysis to be veritable and for avoiding
7 any unconfirmed information. Therefore, we received information from the
8 MUP, the State Security Service, the brigade commanders, the military
9 district; in other words, from all the structures that I thought, along
10 with the staff organs, can provide relevant information. And in this we
11 involved the corps command to prepare this analysis. Our estimate was
12 that there were between 22 and 25.000 Siptar terrorists of the
13 manoeuvring structure, which means that they were capable of carrying out
14 certain activities against the army and the MUP. And this information,
15 as far as I know, was presented to President Milosevic and the political
16 and state leadership in Belgrade
17 Q. On the 21st of July when this was presented to
18 President Milosevic, do you know who was present? Was there some sort of
19 meeting, or was it just mailed to him?
20 A. There was a meeting attended by representatives of the MUP, the
21 army, and other state officials, because all the state officials were up
22 there. None of them were in Kosovo yet, only General Lukic and
23 General Pavkovic. And on the 21st of July none of those that I mentioned
24 before -- I was not personally acquainted with them. As I told you, I
25 saw Mr. Djordjevic and the others on the 21st of July for the first time.
1 I'm referring to the names who are on the first page of this list that
2 the Joint Command kept.
3 Q. Yes, those eight names including yourself and General Pavkovic,
4 but that was on the 22nd of July; right?
5 A. Yes, and I'm talking about the 21st of July now. That's one day
6 before. And objectively it was impossible for me to be there.
7 General Pavkovic had just arrived in Belgrade. General Lukic presented
8 his plan relating to the deployment of military, what they were capable
9 of doing realistically, and then a decision was made to make a plan for
10 the use of force in order to break up the terrorist forces in Kosovo and
12 Q. Just so I'm clear, on the 21st of July at that meeting in
14 the first page of your Joint Command notes, everyone was there except
15 you? The other seven were there at the meeting in Belgrade?
16 A. Let me just go case by case. I think Minic was there. Sainovic
17 appeared for the first time. I think that Andjelkovic was there.
18 Matkovic, but he's not on the list. Djordjevic, yes. Lukic, yes.
19 Pavkovic, yes. Yeah, roughly speaking, that's it.
20 Q. Anyone else that you remember?
21 A. So the same composition, General Perisic and General Samardzic
22 were there. General Dimitrijevic, the chief of administration was there
23 as well. Nothing changed, except that now Sainovic joined them as a new
24 person. Now I'm telling you all this because I received this as indirect
25 information. Also present there was Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the
1 minister of the interior, and other officers of the MUP. I think
2 Obrad Stevanovic was there too at this meeting.
3 Q. Thank you. Let me show you a few documents that relate or make
4 reference to the meeting and see if you can tell us anything about them.
5 The first is 65 ter 04302. This is dated the 22nd of July, 1998, to the
6 3rd Army command from General Pavkovic. Do you recognise that document?
7 A. Yes, I've seen this document.
8 Q. And --
9 A. It was drafted personally by General Pavkovic.
10 Q. And in it he's telling his boss, his superior, General Samardzic,
11 that at the meeting with President Milosevic an order was given to
12 implement the plan for combatting terrorism. And in the last sentence he
14 "In view of the above, please work out in more detail the
15 engagement of the Pristina Corps units in the implementation of the
17 As a civilian and a layperson, it seems rather strange to me.
18 It's almost as though the subordinate officer is telling his boss what to
19 do. Can you enlighten us any about that? Do you know what was going on
21 A. I talked to General Pavkovic practically every time when he came
22 from Belgrade
23 of documents. Later, not on the 21st but later, he told me that there
24 were some problems when General Samardzic is present at the meeting with
25 President Milosevic. He never has any objections then, but once he goes
1 down there he imposes certain conditions on certain activities. And for
2 that reason already on the 22nd General Pavkovic made it known to him
3 that President Milosevic had ordered certain activities to be carried out
4 by the MUP and the army in Jasic and Junik, this is close to the border,
5 and to lift the blockade on the Pristina, Pec, and Komorane and other
6 roads. He also requested him to give me precise tasks for implementation
7 because the general had certain objections to this plan.
8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'd like to tender 04302 at this time.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1226, Your Honours.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
12 Q. General, I want to move to another document related to that one,
13 and this is 65 ter number 04303. This is the following day on the 23rd
14 of July. Have you seen this one before, General? Let me hand you a hard
15 copy so you can see both pages at one time.
16 A. Yes, that would be much easier.
17 Q. Do you recognise that one?
18 A. Yes, this is a follow-up of this written exchange between
19 Generals Samardzic and Pavkovic.
20 Q. Okay. And the number on this item is 1187-1; correct? I'm
21 sorry, did you say yes?
22 A. Yes, yes.
23 Q. Okay. And you'll see in the last paragraph above the signature
24 General Pavkovic is saying:
25 "On the basis of the above, please approve the use of units
1 according to this proposal and plan in the spirit of the order of the
2 president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."
3 It seems as though General Pavkovic finds it necessary to invoke
4 President Milosevic's name to get General Samardzic to do something. Am
5 I understanding that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Why was General Samardzic reluctant about this, if you know?
8 A. I have to say that the planned proposal was handed over to
9 General Smiljanic on the 15th of July at the headquarters and he knew
10 exactly the assessment of the Pristina Corps and what kind of proposals
11 for the use of forces they made. Now, it was up to them to approve this
12 use and to carry out the breaking up of terrorist forces at a certain
13 time. Now, what was the intention of General Pavkovic? Probably this
14 was due - and this is my opinion - to pressure that was exerted on
15 General Samardzic by General Perisic and perhaps General Dimitrijevic to
16 carry out certain activities in which they were involved to be slowed
17 down or even suspended or suppressed for some reason. I don't know what
18 the reason was. However, there were different opinions and views.
19 Now, if you have 50 per cent of your territory under the control
20 of terrorist forces and it's your responsibility to unblock the roads as
21 an army command and you do nothing, then we the officers couldn't
22 understand what was going on within the relations between the highest
23 army leadership and the state leadership.
24 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would tender 04303.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1227, Your Honours.
2 MR. HANNIS:
3 Q. And the next one, General, related to this is 65 ter 04304. And
4 this is dated the 23rd of July, 1998, and it appears to be a response to
5 that one you're just looking at because you'll see it makes reference to
6 that document number 1187-1. Have you seen this before?
7 A. Judging by its content, it is completely clear to me. The main
8 objection was that we did not include in the plan exactly what we were
9 going to present, and the plan, anyway, was not attended for it to
10 contain every point where activities were going to take place, but rather
11 general outline of the activities. Based on this plan, other combat
12 documents are then made which contain precise locations where the Siptar
13 terrorist forces would be attacked and broken up. So the plan was not
14 supposed to give us all these details.
15 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'd move the admission of 04304.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1228, Your Honours.
18 MR. HANNIS:
19 Q. General Djakovic, were you aware that at that time, in July 1998,
20 that there was a rift or a disagreement between General Perisic and some
21 of his associates on one hand and President Milosevic about whether and
22 how the army could and should be used in Kosovo?
23 A. Well, as the chief of the operations and training, my duty was to
24 study combat documents and other orders regulating the use of the army.
25 Therefore, it was my duty to tell General Pavkovic what I proposed to be
1 done, on the basis of which he would make decisions. We were command
2 organs, and as such we proposed to General Pavkovic to raise the issue of
3 the lifting of the blockade of the roads because that was within the
4 jurisdiction of army command and commander. It was his prerogative to
5 provide supply to the Pristina Corps as well as to all other units and to
6 secure that other activities of the army can be carried out unhindered.
7 According to the Rules of Service, General Perisic had the right to use
8 special army units in order to break up terrorist groups in Kosovo; that
9 included the police and the special 72nd Brigade. And we invoked this in
10 our presentation; however, none of this materialised. Then when the
11 problem became so serious and that we had 50 per cent of the territory
12 under their control, we were not capable with the existing forces to
13 break up 25.000 terrorists who were well familiar with the territory, who
14 were young, healthy, and well trained and with whom not even the army,
15 regardless of how well equipped it was, could handle. And that included
16 the MUP units as well.
17 Q. But General Perisic had a different view, didn't he?
18 A. As far as I heard he said once officially during the briefing in
19 Pristina that his proposal was to introduce a state of emergency in
20 Kosovo, to carry out mobilisation, and then proceed with the breaking up
21 of the terrorist forces but only after a state of emergency or the state
22 of war was introduced. So that would constitute a legal basis for that,
23 although he could have used some other regulations in order to effect
24 this, other than the state of emergency. But this is my personal view.
25 Q. Thank you. The plan to combat terrorism, I think, from other --
1 when you testified in Milutinovic, you had a discussion with Judge Bonomy
2 about the phases of the plan. How many phases were there? Was it three,
3 or was it five? And can you tell us how those came into being and what
4 they were?
5 A. I already testified to this, and I said in answer to Mr. Bonomy's
6 question about the number of stages, I said the following: Initially the
7 plan had three stages; and then subsequently, which was precipitated by
8 the situation which developed in October and November, additional two
9 phases were added. And now I can explain these stages to you. The first
10 stage, as far as the army was concerned, was to break up Siptar terrorist
11 forces in the border areas. Therefore, on the 21st of April, 1998, an
12 IKM was established in Djakovica headed by --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please repeat the name of the
14 officer who was in charge of the IKM --
15 MR. HANNIS:
16 Q. The interpreter was asking you to repeat the name of the officer
17 who was in charge, and could you also explain what IKM means. Thank you.
18 A. This was General Lazarevic, Vladimir Lazarevic, Chief of Staff of
19 the Pristina Corps, who was in charge of the implementation of the first
20 phase of the plan. And the IKM stands for forward command post, which
21 was set up or is normally set up pursuant to an order of a commander of a
22 certain unit for the purpose of carrying out tasks because of the
23 distance between Pristina and the border which, roughly speaking, exceeds
24 100 kilometres. And due to inability to effect command,
25 General Lazarevic was in the barracks in Djakovica, and he commanded
1 these forces as stand-in officer for General Pavkovic. The second stage
2 involved the breaking up of the Siptar terrorist forces in concert or,
3 rather, by providing support to MUP forces in breaking up the Siptar
4 terrorist forces within the area 10 to 15 kilometres from the border,
5 from the state border. In other words, along the line
6 Pec-Djakovica-Prizren. Since this road was blocked, the main task of the
7 MUP was to deblock it, and the army was to provide support. The third
8 stage involved providing support to MUP forces in lifting blockade of the
9 main roads which lead from Kosovo to Metohija, and these were
10 Kosovska Mitrovica-Rudnik-Pec road, Pristina-Klina-Djakovica road, and
11 one section to Pec as well, and a third road was
12 Stimlje-Suva Reka-Prizren. And that's where this initial proposal of the
13 plan should end.
14 But later, as the situation developed and as these Siptar forces
15 kept moving constantly, avoiding direct conflict, direct clashes, and
16 appeared in other new places, a plan was developed to include the fourth
17 stage, breaking up their forces in main centres, Srbica and Cicavica
18 mountain, in the area of Mount Jablanica
19 Glodjane village, where, according to our information, Ramush Haradinaj
20 was the commander. And breaking up their forces in the area of Jezero
21 mountains, Dulje, and the mountains behind Dulje where new forces were
22 appearing. That's the fourth stage. And the fifth stage was developed
23 at the moment when it was decided to send an OSCE mission to Kosovo, and
24 in keeping with the agreement between the OSCE and our authorities
25 certain forces were kept on the border, all the three border battalions
1 in full combat-readiness. Also, seven combat groups who were tasked to
2 provide security behind the border belt on the roads, mainly
3 Djakovica-Prizren and Djakovica-Pec, plus three mixed companies in the
4 area of Volujak mountains, that's the broader area of Klamovik [phoen]
5 near Klina, one mixed company near Iglarevo, that's on the Pristina-Klina
6 road. And a third mixed company in the area of Dulje to keep the road
7 open. As far as I know, the MUP was tasked with setting up patrols and
8 certain check-points, and I believe there were, all in all, 24
9 check-points. In any case, we put all of these check-points on a map
10 that was kept as the working map for us, and I believe we did our job and
11 the MUP staff did their job. So that was the fifth stage.
12 Q. Thank you. Related to that, I'd like you to look at 65 ter
13 number 01435. And I know that some of the phases of the plan were
14 discussed in those Joint Command meetings that you kept notes of,
15 correct, from time to time?
16 A. I have to say this: When he said this he did not mean this
17 specific plan because not everyone was familiar with the exact sequence.
18 They were only aware of certain stages, but they didn't know that a
19 particular stage was the first or the third or the fifth. So they did
20 not keep it in strict order like we did. For them it was just a number
21 of stages, and the numbers did not necessarily coincide with the real
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. Because they didn't have the plan before them.
25 Q. Let me have you look at the document that's on the screen now
1 dated the 22nd of September, 1998, from General Pavkovic in the
2 Pristina Corps command. And it's entitled: "Implementation of stage
3 five of the plan to combat terrorism."
4 Have you seen this before?
5 A. Can you show me the last page, please.
6 Q. Yes. I don't have a hard copy. If we can get you to the bottom
7 of the page or the next page.
8 A. Yes, yes. I always try to see whether I wrote the document
9 myself or some other organ did. When I wrote something myself, I know
10 exactly what it is at first sight. And when somebody else drafted it, I
11 still have some sort of recollection.
12 Q. Okay --
13 A. This fits in basically with what I've said.
14 Q. Okay. And this is Pavkovic writing about what was discussed at a
15 meeting in Belgrade
16 talked about; right?
17 A. I believe so.
18 Q. Okay.
19 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would tender 01435.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That will become Exhibit P1229, Your Honours.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. Now, General, when VJ units were carrying out certain
24 anti-terrorist actions pursuant to the plan, were they required to report
25 about those activities, particularly the ones that were done jointly with
1 the MUP, report up to the Pristina Corps?
2 A. The commanders were required to send daily combat reports, and,
3 from time to time, in seven- to ten-day intervals they provided summary
4 reports about the activities of the army and the MUP, if they had any
5 contact with the MUP, such as joint action, coordination, et cetera.
6 Q. Let's have a look at 65 ter number 01420. Related to that last
7 question, General, is a document that I think you've seen before. And
8 it's dated --
9 A. Yes, I wrote this document myself, and I'm well familiar with the
11 Q. Okay. And this is requesting information from the subordinate
12 units about activities between 25 July and 6 August and activities
13 carried out in conjunction with MUP; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MR. HANNIS: I move to tender 1420, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit P1230, Your Honours.
19 MR. HANNIS:
20 Q. And, General, if we could look next at 65 ter 01423. Did you get
21 reports back from the subordinate units in response to this?
22 A. Yes, yes, we received it from all units; we received them
23 regularly from all units. Not a single unit could fail to submit
24 reports, and they had to follow a check list of issues to cover.
25 Q. This is a document dated the 7th of August, 1998, from the
1 15th Motorised Brigade, and this is one of those -- this is an example of
2 one of the responses you got; am I right?
3 A. There's one mistake here, perhaps in the translation. It's not
4 the 15th Mechanised or Motorised Brigade, as the interpreter said, it's
5 the 15th Armoured Brigade, the 15th Armoured Brigade --
6 Q. Thank you. That's my fault, not the --
7 A. So, yes, it's one of the reports.
8 Q. My fault, not the interpreters.
9 MR. HANNIS: I move to tender that exhibit, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit P1231,
12 Your Honours.
13 MR. HANNIS:
14 Q. Now, in the -- during the course of this plan in late summer
15 1998, I assume there were orders issued for activities to be carried out
16 by VJ units in conjunction with the MUP.
17 MR. HANNIS: An example, Your Honours, I think in evidence
18 already is P890.
19 Q. But I'd like to show you another one, General, this is 65 ter
20 number 01428 and ask you if you're familiar with this one.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Dated the 14th of August, 1998, for breaking up Siptar terrorists
23 in the Slup and Voksa villages sector. Do you need to see the rest of
24 the document?
25 A. No need. I personally took it to General Samardzic for approval.
1 Q. And I see handwritten what's translated as "MUP forces." Do you
2 know who made that change on the document, "SNAGA MUPA" I think is the
4 A. Judging by the handwriting, I would say it's General Pavkovic.
5 When he checked the document, as a superior officer, he had the right to
6 make certain corrections that do not change the substance before signing.
7 And this one doesn't change the substance because General Samardzic did
8 not want to approve a single decision that did not contain the phrasing
9 "support the MUP forces." I was personally present when he ordered that
10 MUP forces be drawn in green on maps and the phrase be included in the
11 document. So that MUP performs the operation and the army acts in
12 support. This was done probably because the typist omitted these two
14 Q. Okay.
15 MR. HANNIS: Could we look at the last page, please.
16 Q. And you'll see, General, that this order was signed by
17 General Lazarevic; right?
18 A. Yes. As I just said, General Pavkovic told General Samardzic to
19 go to the forward command post where General Lazarevic was. And when he
20 was there I asked him, Did you make the plan, Pavkovic? He said, Yes.
21 Who can bring it for approval? He said, Djakovic. And then he said,
22 Okay, let Djakovic bring it and you go to Lazarevic and deal with these
23 problems. I don't know what the problems were. And when the plan was
24 approved, I passed on the decision to the forward command post, to
25 General Lazarevic, and he, since he was the one leading the operations,
1 signed it, signed the order.
2 Q. I remember in your Joint Command notes that there was a
3 discussion where Pavkovic mentioned that General Lazarevic was going to
4 be delegated or designated to lead this particular operation, is that
5 right, in Slup and Voksa?
6 A. I think so.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. Since it was called order and Lazarevic was down there, he was in
9 command not over large, strong forces, but he had constant insight into
10 the developments.
11 MR. HANNIS: In the English if we could go back one page, to
12 page 3 of the English.
13 Q. Item number 6, General, in your B/C/S page on the screen, it
14 talks about command. And it says that the operation is to be commanded
15 by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. Can you explain why that
16 was in there? Who was commanding? Was it General Lazarevic in the VJ,
17 or was it the Joint Command which was something else? What does that
19 A. Perhaps during my last testimony, I explained in much greater
20 detail how this part came to be, how the term "Joint Command for Kosovo
21 and Metohija" came to be. And it was related to the arrival of persons
22 who were present on the 22nd. In the computer there must have been a
23 template for all types of command orders, and the operator probably kept
24 this term "Joint Command." As far as I know, General Lukic was in
25 Pristina and he had an office there where he received reports from his
1 underlings. General Lazarevic was at the forward command post in
2 Djakovica, and he would go into the field from time to time as required.
3 General Pavkovic was in Pristina, in his command post, in the building of
4 the command. I don't know that anyone else anywhere else formed a
5 command that governed combat operations. From what I saw, General Lukic
6 was in charge of the MUP, and General Pavkovic and Lazarevic were in
7 charge of the activities of the corps after their decisions were approved
8 by Samardzic. Why they put "Joint Command" on documents over a long
9 time, I don't know. They probably wanted all the participants to know
10 that the activities had been harmonised and coordinated between the army
11 and the MUP. That's how I understood these documents when I received
12 them. So for the most part it was General Lukic or perhaps somebody he
13 authorised like a detachment commander or another commanding officer that
14 he authorised. One of his assistants or his deputies could have led this
15 operation together with General Lazarevic, but I don't know of any
16 specific instance.
17 Q. Didn't you testify earlier that you personally delivered this one
18 to General Samardzic ? Did I misunderstand?
19 A. The decision, the decision that needed to be approved. It was a
20 decision on a map. I believe the Office of the Prosecutor has that map.
21 I have seen it, in any case, I think at the Milutinovic trial. And in
22 the right top corner, if you remember, there is writing that says
23 "decision, approved, General Samardzic."
24 Q. Did you in the summer of 1998 ever see any of those documents
25 that had that term, "Joint Command," in it?
1 A. Well, in nearly all documents, but it didn't bother any of us
2 because we thought it meant that the coordination between the army and
3 the MUP had been completed. Certain organs asked me about that at the
4 time, and I explained that it only meant that coordination had been
5 completed between the army and the MUP as a required element in combat
6 operations. It doesn't mean that they could do anything just on the
7 basis of this Joint Command document without receiving orders from their
8 directly superior command.
9 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me show you 65 ter 01440. While we're
10 waiting for that to come up, was there an obligation of the J --
11 commanders to report up the chain whenever they learned about any crimes
12 that may have occurred during the course of carrying out anti-terrorist
13 actions or combat activities?
14 A. Yes, yes. That was prescribed by general rules. Even without a
15 specific order, he was required to inform his superior officer.
16 Q. Okay. Before I ask you a question about this one, could I tender
17 the last one we were looking at, 01428?
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit P1232,
21 Your Honours.
22 MR. HANNIS:
23 Q. Okay. Now, General, this one we're looking at, 1440, have you
24 seen it before? It's dated the 5th of October, 1998. I can give you a
25 hard copy so you can see all three pages at once in the B/C/S.
1 A. I remember the contents and the problems described here -- I
2 mean, I am aware of the problems dealt with in this document, but I have
3 not seen it before. It was done at the level of General Pavkovic and
4 other organs perhaps, because I dealt mainly with things that concern
5 operations. But these reports on human losses and expenditure of
6 ammunition, et cetera, that was not the job of the operations.
7 Q. In this one I'm not so interested about the ammunition issue, but
8 in paragraph 2, that's on page 4 in the English version, and I think it's
9 the second page in B/C/S, you'll see there's mention about an alleged
10 massacre against the civilian population in the village of Gornje Obrinje
11 on the 26th and 27th of September, 1998. Do you remember that there was
12 some -- there was some public, domestic and international, media
13 attention to this alleged massacre in Gornje Obrinje? Do you recall
15 A. Well, I remember some of these things, but I can't pin-point a
16 time-frame, whether it was the 26th or the 27th. But I remember one
17 thing. Once we had reports that allegedly in the tunnel where the train
18 from Pristina passes on the side of Dobrinja there were many persons who
19 were injured and dead, that personal items were strewn around, and
20 General Pavkovic sent a unit, I believe, led by
21 Lieutenant-Colonel Milicko from Pec, and he didn't find anything there
22 that would indicate a massacre or anything like that.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. I remember this incident with the tunnel, but I'm not sure it's
25 the same case.
1 Q. Let me stop you. The same item under paragraph number 2,
2 General Pavkovic reports about certain unchecked information, that the
3 army security services had sent to the General Staff, indicating that
4 unidentified members of some MUP units had executed persons that had been
5 taken into custody. Do you recall, was that reported to the MUP by the
6 VJ about this report that MUP members had executed people taken into
7 custody? Do you know, just yes or no?
8 A. No, no.
9 Q. Okay.
10 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I know Exhibit P753 is in evidence. I
11 think that was Mr. Abrahams who introduced that. That's a Human Rights
12 Watch report about Gornje Obrinje, and I just bring that to your
13 attention at this point in time because it relates to this document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Is that a convenient time?
15 MR. HANNIS: It is, Your Honour. Could I tender that before we
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
18 MR. HANNIS: 1440.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
21 Exhibit P1233.
22 JUDGE PARKER: We will break now and resume at ten minutes past
24 --- Recess taken at 5.42 p.m.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, while the witness is coming in, I just
3 wanted to advise you that I had advised Mr. Djurdjic during the break
4 that I don't believe I am going to be able to finish today. I hope the
5 Court will permit me perhaps to have as much as 45 minutes or an hour
6 tomorrow to finish.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Silence reflects our disappointment, but realistic
8 assessment --
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you --
10 JUDGE PARKER: -- of the situation.
11 MR. HANNIS: I will do my best to get as much done as possible
12 and not have much for tomorrow.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Be seated, please.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. General, we've been talking about the plan and the five phases.
19 We've talked about some meetings in Belgrade related to that plan. Were
20 you aware of a meeting in late October 1998 that General Pavkovic
21 attended regarding the plan to combat terrorism?
22 A. In October?
23 Q. Yes, I think on the 29th of October to be precise.
24 A. Yes, I have a vague idea about the date, but I know about the
1 Q. Okay.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, if I may, I'd like to hand the witness
3 a hard copy of the exhibit that I'm going to talk about now. This is
4 P087 already in evidence.
5 Q. General, this reflects the minutes of a meeting that's described
6 as the operations Inter-Departmental Staff for the suppression of
7 terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. Is that the meeting that you heard
9 A. Yes, I know this because these documents were available to me,
10 but I will have to look at it because there's such a bulk of information
11 for me to tell you specifically what it is all about. Therefore, I would
12 like to hear a specific question from you. But, as I said, I know about
13 this meeting in October.
14 Q. Well, if you start at page 2 or at the -- I'm sorry --
15 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I have
18 to be cautious here. This is a document, and it involves a meeting that
19 the witness did not attend. I think it would be appropriate for
20 examination-in-chief to ask witness first what he knows about this, who
21 he heard it from, and then possibly about some information contained in
22 the document. Let us first separate what he knows personally and what he
23 learned from the document, and he will give opinion then. If you just
24 read the contents of the document to him, that's informing him.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS: I understand that, Your Honour, but I have the
2 dilemma that I have shown the witness the document before during proofing
3 and preparing, so he has seen it. So I don't want to mislead anybody
4 about that.
5 Q. General, you mentioned that you were aware of this meeting. How
6 did you hear about this meeting?
7 A. I heard it from General Pavkovic because, generally speaking, I
8 received information from him. Before every departure of his for
10 maps or some written reports. Normally this would be very short
11 addresses, two pages at the most, and it all related to army issues. And
12 upon his return, he would just inform me that something was either
13 approved or not approved and what has to be amended. Therefore, he had
14 to supply certain information for me to be able to carry on with my
16 Q. Do you recall what kind of information you provided to him to
17 take with him when he went to the meeting, because I think you said that
18 was part of what you did.
19 A. Are you referring to this particular meeting?
20 Q. Yes. Do you recall if you prepared anything for
21 General Pavkovic --
22 A. No, I can't remember that. It is difficult for me to tell you
23 this at the moment. I can only tell you what I know, and the reason is
24 because in the course of these preparations for all kinds of meetings,
25 not only those held in Belgrade
1 made a mental note of remembering because I never imagined that this
2 would be needed in the future. I just told you that we had to prepare
3 some short address, as I said, two pages, two and a half pages, dealing
4 and addressing the issues relating to the army because the General spoke
5 on behalf of the army for the most part. If he had to show a map we
6 would prepare this map for him, and he would present it. Therefore, I
7 would need a specific question from you, and I will respond and confirm
8 or not confirm whether I or any other organ prepared something.
9 Q. Okay. Do you recall what he told you when he returned from the
10 meeting, if anything?
11 A. I can't tell you that I recall anything in detail that would
12 remind me of what he told me upon his return. Sometimes one can remember
13 things easily, but I'm not sure. This was already the end of the year.
14 That's the period when the OSCE had arrived, when the terrorists had
15 stepped up their activities sometime in December. I know what the
16 situation was, but I don't know anything in particular.
17 Q. All right. Let me move on to something else then. I'd like to
18 show you what's in evidence as Exhibit P889. This one will come up on
19 your screen in a minute. I don't have a hard copy of it with me, but
20 I'll tell you it's a document dated the 16th of February, 1999
21 General Lazarevic. And you'll see the reference number is 455-1. It's
22 an order to break-up and destroy Siptar terrorist forces in the sector of
23 Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo. Have you seen that document before?
24 A. Yes, yes, I'm aware of this document.
25 Q. And do you know what it is, what it was for?
1 A. I saw this document during the previous trial of Mr. Milutinovic.
2 I am aware of these activities that were carried out in the area of
3 Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo. This had been planned by the army
4 relating to the use of the army units in these particular regions. This
5 is a wide area. Malo Kosovo is the area of Podujevo, Drenica is Srbica,
6 and Malisevo is a mountainous area. It's the whole belt that goes via
7 Bajgora, Cicavica, to Malisevo, so it's a wide area encompassed by these
9 Q. Okay. And in this document under item number 1 where it talks
10 about the enemy, paragraph number 2 says:
11 "The STS
12 in the areas of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, Malisevo" et cetera.
13 This looks like this is an order to do what you described as
14 phase four of the plan to combat terrorism, which, as I recall your
15 answer, was phase four, was breaking up the terrorists or the KLA in
16 their main centres. Am I interpreting that correctly?
17 A. Not entirely. We are talking here about 1999. The fifth stage
18 was completed in 1998. The General Staff issued a directive called
19 Grom 3, and pursuant to it there was a basis for carrying out the
20 activities of crushing the terrorist forces, including these activities.
21 So this was done with the knowledge of the General Staff. The corps
22 commander pursuant to this directive relating to Grom 3 which in one item
23 says that for the breaking up of Siptar terrorist forces, they should be
24 ready within three or four days, and they used this as the basis for
25 planning because the Siptar terrorist forces had re-organised,
1 re-structured, and were preparing armed rebellion in the spring of that
2 year in the entire territory of Kosovo
3 the five phases that we were talking about. This is an entirely new
4 situation, and it has to do with Grom 3. I already mentioned this, and
5 this had to do with the preparations for anti-landing activities in order
6 for the Grom 3 to be fully implemented. Because without the
7 implementation of these tasks there could be no implementation of the
8 order relating to Grom 3. Because this is the first phase of preventing
9 the bringing in of NATO ground forces and to break-up the forces that
10 were deployed on the landing line. According to our rules, the basic
11 task in that situation is to crush these terrorist forces, to occupy the
12 positions, to fortify them, and prepare -- make preparations for the
13 defence from the landing of NATO multi-national brigade. So in
14 operational terms this is what is consistent with our rules.
15 Q. Well, Grom 3 was a different plan than this one, wasn't it?
16 Because it specifically said it was directed at preventing the arrival or
17 introduction of NATO forces into Kosovo. It's something separate and
18 distinct from this, isn't it?
19 A. No, this is closely related to it. The basic rule is that in the
20 area where landing of the enemy forces is expected, you have to break up
21 all terrorist forces and other special units in order for you to take up
22 positions. Now, it was the battle of who is going to take up positions
23 on the edge of this territory. Since the Siptars were holding the
24 places --
25 Q. Let me stop you there. I asked that question because I was under
1 the impression that there was a separate document called Grom 3, but
2 unless and until I find it, let's move on.
3 Let me show you then a document that is 65 ter number 04141.
4 Now, this is a document, General, that's dated just two or three days
5 later in February 1999. And you'll see that the heading on this one is
6 MUP command. It's dated the 19th of February, 1999. It has a blank for
7 a confidential number. There's no signature on the last page. Have you
8 seen this one before?
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. And it's entitled: An order to break-up and destroy forces of
11 the Albanian terrorists in the sector of Malo Kosovo, Drenica, Malisevo.
12 So in the name of the order, in the description of the enemy and their
13 zones of operation, it appears to be nearly identical to
14 General Lazarevic's that we just looked at; correct?
15 A. The format is identical, only General Lazarevic is giving
16 specifics -- or rather, his operations and training organ has this
17 template order on their computers, and by filling in on the blanks prior
18 to certain activities they carried out. And the template of this order
19 remained in the computer. This is what I did in the Pristina Corps
20 because all the officers were there. Those people were working there and
21 I know all of these men, and I was a kind of superior to them in
22 professional terms, and I, myself, was also involved in some activities
23 which I can explain later if necessary.
24 Q. Okay. Yeah, just a second.
25 MR. HANNIS: Can we go to the last page of both the B/C/S and
1 English versions.
2 Q. And you'll see there's just a typed word "commander," and on the
3 left there are some initials. Whose initials are those on the left?
4 A. MDj is my initials.
5 Q. And that's the author of this document? The first two initials
6 are those of the author; correct?
7 A. Yes, in this instance, because this is the template that was made
8 back in 1998. It was only amended from time to time. That is why I have
9 my initials as the author of this template. And as the situation
10 developed, it was amended by adding specific information. So this is not
11 an order in itself. It's just a format of how you should write an order,
12 and it is a kind of tool that helps you do certain things.
13 Q. Okay. And another difference between this document and
14 General Lazarevic's which we looked at just before this one is that this
15 one contains task for MUP units instead of tasks for VJ units; right?
16 A. The reason for that was because we sent this document to the MUP
17 units to enable them to use it if they thought that that could be helpful
18 for them in a specific situation. So this was not an order. It was just
19 a format in which we provided assistance according to combat rules is
20 something like this to be done, and we just offered them an opportunity
21 to make use of it.
22 Q. Okay. I think you testified in Milutinovic that that was because
23 you in the VJ knew how to write combat orders because that's your job,
24 and in the police they're not used to doing that. Is that fair?
25 A. That's a basic thing in an army. You cannot carry out combat
1 operations without an order. Therefore, the same should apply to the
2 police. However, how they issue their tasks, it's their affair. I never
3 said that we were authorised to control the police. They were
4 nonetheless obliged to carry out certain tasks and to coordinate their
5 activities, especially combat activities.
6 Q. Okay. So did you physically prepare this document?
7 A. I prepared this document, and you see that the command post of
8 the MUP staff is in the peacetime building in Pristina, because on the
9 29th it was bombed. So on this particular date it was still in its old
10 location. I ordered the computer operator to print this form for me and
11 to send it to the duty service in order to be delivered to the MUP,
12 without any obligation on their part vis-a-vis the army or vice versa.
13 This was simply assistance provided to them because under the law our
14 duty was to provide them with professional assistance particularly in the
15 domain of training. And that was the duty of the army, both regarding
16 the police and the civilian protection units.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I move to tender 4141.
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P1234, Your Honours.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
22 Q. I want to ask you a few more questions about Joint Command in
23 1999. I'd like to look at exhibit or 65 ter number 02003. General, this
24 is an order dated the 2nd of April, 1999. I don't know if you will
25 recall that General Lazarevic's order of February 16th, 1999, that you
1 described as being Grom 3-related bore the number 455-1. So this
2 document appears to be related to the same theme or the same general
3 topic. And this is an order to smash and destroy the Siptar terrorist
4 forces in the Jablanica sector. That seems that this is an order, then,
5 to carry out part of what was described in General Lazarevic's
6 February 16th order; is that correct?
7 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet, Your Honour.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes --
9 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask this document
11 that -- the previous document that Mr. Hannis is referring to be shown,
12 and that would help us to resolve this matter quickly. Well, I can say
13 right now we're talking here about the Jablanica sector, and in the
14 previous document there was Malo Kosovo and other sectors. And,
15 Mr. Hannis, the numbers are not identical.
16 JUDGE PARKER: I leave that to you, Mr. Hannis.
17 MR. HANNIS: Okay. I'm sorry if my learned friend understood me
18 to be saying the numbers were identical, but the 455 is identical, and
19 then I was just trying to suggest that 115 was a part of the series that
20 the 16 February document in P889 is the first of, as 455-1. But I'll
21 move on to a different question.
22 Q. This is -- you'll see in the upper left-hand corner this is
23 described as Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija. Did you see any of
24 these Joint Command orders in 1999 shortly before and/or during the NATO
1 A. I said last year that I did not take part in the preparation of
2 these documents in 1999, but I am aware of the activities that were
3 carried out in Jablanica, Malo Kosovo, Drenica, and Malisevo, which is
4 mentioned in the 16th of February document. This was part of the
5 activities that were basically related to Grom 3, because Grom 3
6 specified the task, and now it was up to the corps commander to decide
7 what the possible objectives of the terrorist forces would be and to
8 carry out the tasks in compliance with the order issued. This is perhaps
9 the third time that there was an attack on Jablanica, because Jablanica
10 and Baranski Lug were a stronghold that the army and the police had
11 failed to break-up practically until the end of June 1999. That is why
12 this order relating to Jablanica, Bajgora, Malo Kosovo, Cicavica, et
13 cetera, appears several times because the forces were constantly flowing
14 in and coming back to the same area. You managed to destroy 10 to 15
15 soldiers and then 3 or 400 new soldiers emerge. That is why we have
16 documents being repeated. This does not mean that these activities were
17 not carried out because this order had to be carried out to a certain
19 Q. I'm not suggesting it wasn't carried out. My question, though,
20 is: The number 455, the first one that we saw, 455-1, 16 February 1999,
21 signed by General Lazarevic was, I think, listed as a Pristina Corps
22 document; and this one says "Joint Command." Do you know why "Joint
23 Command" is being used for what appears to be a Pristina Corps reference
25 A. Yes, yes. Now I understand the question. At the previous trial
1 also I said that there was an order template in the computer, and people
2 mechanically wrote "Joint Command" because the activities were harmonised
3 between the army and the MUP and without this harmonisation and
4 coordination, we were not able to go into fighting. The MUP, too, could
5 have not supported the army where the army was the primary player in the
6 activities. We needed to finish that part of the work before we
7 proceeded to anything else, Radojko Stefanovic was in charge of
8 coordination with all the entities on the territory, and he was also in
9 charge of coordination with MUP units. Even when we are not acting
10 together and we are not supporting them, we have to coordinate with them
11 to avoid friendly fire. And the number appears because -- you see, it
12 says 115 here, and it used to be 1. There were many other orders that
13 has nothing to do with using combat, and they are repeated under 455,
14 like it was with the corps command, and here, the Joint Command.
15 Basically this is an order from General Lazarevic.
16 Q. Okay. Let me, then, ask if we can go to the last page of both
17 the English and B/C/S versions. And you'll see, General, that we don't
18 have a signature. It just says -- there's a typewritten "Joint Command
19 for KiM," Kosovo and Metohija. And on item number 11 on your copy, it
20 talks about the operation being commanded by the Joint Command, no?
21 MR. HANNIS: I think we have to go back one page in the English
22 for Your Honours to see item 11 -- well, I guess it's at the very
23 bottom -- I'm sorry, if we could return.
24 Q. At the very bottom it says:
25 "The Joint Command for KiM from the Pristina sector shall command
1 and control all forces during the combat operations."
2 Do you see that, General, the last sentence above the signature
4 A. Yes, I see that.
5 Q. Can you explain to us why this Pristina Corps document isn't
6 signed and makes reference to the action being commanded by the
7 Joint Command?
8 A. Well, the only reason could be that one of the brigade commanders
9 was the main person in charge of certain combat actions. I always told
10 you that in my mind Joint Command was the MUP staff and the command of
11 the Pristina Corps. There could have been coordination between them, and
12 that coordination had to be confirmed to the MUP units, because MUP units
13 did not want to carry out any activities unless they have received
14 confirmation that coordination had been done between the MUP staff and
15 the Pristina Corps under the name Joint Command. And they consistently
16 refused any such thing in the area of the 125th Brigade. The chief of
18 from the MUP staff, although he had in his hands the document headed --
19 titled "Joint Command." But whenever he would receive orders from the
20 MUP staff, then this person Cvetic -- sorry, when the commander Cvetic
21 received orders from the Pristina Corps, then he would make no problem in
22 providing support to the MUP.
23 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's not an objection. It's a
1 comment on the transcript. Could the witness please repeat this part
2 concerning who Cvetic received orders from before he was willing to act.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that Cvetic and all our
4 commanders, operation commanders of brigades, reported that if SUP
5 secretaries or special units of the police detachments and companies had
6 not received assignments from the MUP staff in the form of document
7 headed "Joint Command" or a dispatch -- I don't know how it worked with
8 them. I know only about our documents, our units received orders
9 Joint Command for the KiM, and they would communicate it to all the SUPs.
10 But if they did not receive orders in that form, then they were not
11 willing to carry out the combat activities that had been planned. Once
12 they had received them, then there was no other problem.
13 MR. HANNIS: Okay -- I see Mr. Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Again we have a problem. It's not
15 the SUP
16 least it should be, the staff of the MUP.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The MUP staff is at the level where
18 General Lukic was, but secretaries, as far as I know, were based in
19 towns, Kosovska Mitrovica, Prizren, Pec, and so on.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic. You see the transcript
21 and if you're not happy with it, I suggest you use cross-examination to
22 clarify any unsatisfactory point. We can't go on with this sort of
24 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. General, just to be sure I understand, it sounds like you're
2 saying that for these coordinated activities the MUP units would not have
3 accepted an order directly from General Lazarevic and the Pristina Corps,
4 somebody in the army, unless it was titled "Joint Command." And if it
5 said "Joint Command," then they would follow along. Is that what you
6 just said?
7 A. Yes, but they have to receive the order through their own chain,
8 from the MUP staff down the line, as it worked there. So regardless of
9 the fact that Zivanovic showed them the document, it was not relevant for
10 them. Yes, they believed him, but they did not receive specific orders.
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. I'd like next to look at --
12 MR. HANNIS: Oh, could I tender that document, 02003.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: The document will become Exhibit P1235,
15 Your Honours.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
17 Next if we could show the witness 01487.
18 Q. General, this is a document from General Ojdanic in the Supreme
19 Command Staff, dated April 1999. I think it's the 5th -- no, it's the
20 17th, the 17th of April, and it's to the 3rd Army command, to the
21 commander personally, which would have been General Pavkovic at the time.
22 It's -- it says "Link," and then it's a link to Kosovo and Metohija Joint
23 Command order number 455-148 of 15 April and it's entitled "Suggestions."
24 Did you have a chance to see this document before testifying today?
25 A. Yes, I saw it.
1 Q. And I have a couple of just general questions for you. In your
2 military career of 30 years, did you ever see a superior officer sending
3 to a subordinate officer some document called "Suggestions"?
4 A. Never.
5 Q. And if you were a subordinate officer and received a document
6 from a superior entitled "Suggestions," would you feel that you were
7 under any obligation to follow what was in that document?
8 A. If I received such an order called "Suggestions," it would not be
9 binding. I could act upon it and then I could not. General Ojdanic made
10 certain suggestions or I made certain suggestions, and the superior
11 officer can accept them and may not. It's not binding. To be binding,
12 an order has to be phrased with "I hereby order ..."
13 Q. Are you aware of what this is about? Do you know what the linked
14 Joint Command order related to? And what operation or action that
15 pertained to?
16 A. Yes, I know.
17 Q. What was it?
18 A. It was about certain activities in the Rugova gorge and the
19 engagement of -- some requests had been made to engage the army, and I
20 know for sure that the army was not engaged there, apart from a unit
21 of -- from that military district which performed a blockade in the
22 north-west part of Djakovica town. Their only mission was to prevent the
23 entry of terrorist forces into the territory of Djakovica
24 they could hide. And as far as I know, this activity was carried out by
25 units of the Ministry of the Interior. It's on the map, and there is a
1 text also created for the Rugova gorge.
2 Q. Okay. My question is: As a civilian and a layperson, it seems,
3 though, that General Ojdanic - who was the highest uniformed officer in
4 the VJ - is making suggestions about an order that came from the
5 Joint Command. That looks like General Ojdanic is recognising the
6 Joint Command as some sort of superior authority to him. Would you agree
7 with that, or do you have some other explanation for that?
8 A. No, no. This command could not be superior to General Ojdanic.
9 There is no scenario in which it could be superior. As I see the
10 situation, Ojdanic did not want to interfere directly with the execution
11 of combat operations because it -- that is at the level of one combat
12 group. And a Chief of Staff would have to lower himself five levels to
13 do that. That is the job of lieutenant-colonel, a colonel at most. It
14 would have been better if he had ordered simply, saying, I hereby order,
15 otherwise he should have left it to the command to finish that job. Why
16 he gave General Pavkovic the right to decide for himself what to do, I
17 don't know. General Pavkovic must have used his own discretion. And the
18 action itself had already been planned and may have even been under way
19 at the time this arrived.
20 Q. Well, I'll --
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, if I may, I'll stop there because
22 there's one administrative issue I want to raise with regard to an
23 exhibit we used earlier. Could I tender this one, though, before we do
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will become
2 Exhibit P1236.
3 MR. HANNIS: That's all I have for the witness. I can discuss
4 this issue while he's here if that's all right.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Very well, if you're not troubled by that.
6 MR. HANNIS: No, it's not a problem. It's Exhibit P886 which are
7 the witness's notes of the meetings of the Joint Command.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 MR. HANNIS: You noticed I was having problems getting the page
10 numbers to match up. The English translation that is in e-court is an
11 earlier non-CLSS translation, and what I had in hand is ERN 0308-5476
12 through 5619, which is the official CLSS translation. And what we would
13 propose to do is substitute this updated CLSS official translation into
14 e-court for the previous unofficial version, if Defence has no objection.
15 That way we won't have to make a request for clarification about that
16 translation issue that I raised concerning the Serbian word for
17 "instruction" or "direction."
18 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I don't understand a thing, but I
20 trust the CLSS, and I see no problem in replacing the translation.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that. The new authorised
22 translation will be substituted.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
24 And then if I may end for the day and have 45 minutes or an hour
1 JUDGE PARKER: You mean you want to finish early, Mr. Hannis?
2 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I think I'm at an appropriate
3 breaking point, going to a new topic.
4 JUDGE PARKER: That's a good breaking point. Very well, we will
5 adjourn two minutes early.
6 I'm afraid we must finish for the day now. We resume tomorrow at
7 2.15. We would ask you to be back then to continue with your evidence.
8 The court officer will give you further specific assistance if you need
9 them. Thank you.
10 We now adjourn.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59,
12 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th day of
13 August, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.