Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 8117

 1                           Thursday, 20 August 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.29 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  Our apologies for the late start

 6     this morning.

 7                           [The witness takes the stand]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  Our apologies for the late start.

 9     I remind you the affirmation you made still applies.

10             Now, Mr. Hannis.

11             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12                           WITNESS:  MILAN DJAKOVIC [Resumed]

13                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

14                           Re-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

15        Q.   Good morning, General.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   I want to begin this morning by asking you a few more questions

18     about the notes and the Joint Command meetings or sessions that you

19     attended in 1998.  You have told us, I think, on Tuesday at page 8012

20     that when -- and yesterday at page 12 in particular, you said that when

21     you were taking notes you "only jotted down those details and facts that

22     I felt might be of use to my command in their assessment of the Siptar

23     terrorist forces' strength."

24             But that -- but you also wrote down additional things that were

25     said by those attending the meeting, didn't you?  We have several

Page 8118

 1     examples of the civilians talking about things that seem to deal with

 2     more than simply the strength of terrorist forces.  Do you recall or

 3     should we look at some examples?

 4        A.   Yes, I do recall.  There were additional matters that you are

 5     mentioning now that related to the protection of the civilians to

 6     supplies, assistance, to citizens of both Albanian and Serbian ethnicity,

 7     in terms of food stuffs and the daily problems that they had; but as a

 8     matter of course, this was something that Mr. Andjelkovic dealt with.

 9             As for the others, they took the floor as they felt that they

10     should perhaps add something or participate in the discussion and so on.

11     So yes, there were other matters and not only those that had to do with

12     the Siptar terrorist forces' strength and security.

13        Q.   Okay.  And in your discussion with Mr. Djurdjic about that matter

14     in general on Tuesday, at page 8012 and following, you agreed with him

15     generally when he asked you if it was fair to say that there wasn't a

16     single minute where any decision had been ordered by the Joint Command

17     when there was no decision issued by them or mentioned in your notes.

18             And I want to ask you about the meeting of July 27th.  And this

19     is in Exhibit 886, and it's at page 15 of both the English and the B/C/S,

20     the portion I want to ask you about.  Mr. Djurdjic talked to you about

21     this meeting, this was a meeting that was attended by General Samardzic

22     and there were discussions about what the plan was going to be.  And on

23     page 15 the last speaker at the meeting is listed in your notes as

24     Mr. Minic and he says:

25             "Continue the plan at 0700 hours as agreed."

Page 8119

 1             Do you remember him saying that?

 2        A.   I remember that Mr. Minic said that because the army commander

 3     was present and he advised -- he informed everyone that the plan was

 4     being implemented and then Mr. Minic in closing practically just

 5     reiterated what the army commander had already decided because the

 6     decision on the use of the forces was something that was made by the army

 7     commander, not by civilians.  And Mr. Minic basically just reiterated his

 8     words that this plan from their perspective as it were, I don't know

 9     whether he was referring to the MUP or something else, but in any case,

10     the commander, the army commander, had decided that the plan was to be

11     implemented as of 0700 hours.

12        Q.   Okay.  Let me ask you about a couple of -- couple of others.

13             MR. HANNIS:  If we can look at page 84 in the English, page 86 of

14     the B/C/S.

15        Q.   This next one, General, is a meeting of the

16     10th of September, 1998.

17             MR. HANNIS:  I think we'll have to rotate the B/C/S page.

18        Q.   And near the bottom of that page you'll see Mr. Minic speaking

19     and in my English translation among the things he says are:

20             "Go into Dubovik and Radovic villages and see what the situation

21     is like.  Go into Prapacan village," says VJ, "and have the police occupy

22     it."  Skipping a bullet point, "Go into all villages and pressure them

23     into handing over weapons.  Secure the roads and control the territory.

24     The army will adopt a plan on the arrangement of the territory on Monday.

25     The MUP should do the same."

Page 8120

 1             Do you remember him saying all those things?

 2        A.   Well, that was the gist of what he said for the most part.

 3     Whether I actually managed to write down every word that he actually said

 4     verbatim, I don't know, but for the most part it's as you have read out.

 5     What is he referring to there regarding the gathering of weapons, the

 6     collection of weapons, this was something that was on-going, and it was

 7     at the initiative of the command that this was undertaken but also at the

 8     initiative of the Albanian citizens who at this time were not willing --

 9     or actually even as of September we had the situation where the citizens

10     themselves were coming over, coming in to hand over their weapons, or

11     they were handing in weapons, small quantities of weapons, but then

12     holding back and keeping more sophisticated weapons with them.  So we

13     knew that this was really aimed at misleading the MUP into believing that

14     they had already handed over their weapons.  But there were also

15     instances where entire quantities of weapons were handed over by village.

16     For instance we even mortars handed over and --

17        Q.   General, let me stop there.  I was just asking if you remember

18     Mr. Minic saying all these things which on their face sound like they are

19     in the nature of decisions or directions or instructions or orders, at

20     least in the generic sense of those words?  Do you remember him saying

21     those things?  You wrote them down.

22        A.   Yes, I did write that down and that is the sense of what he said.

23        Q.   Okay.  And when you answered Mr. Djurdjic on Tuesday about this,

24     I think you're thinking -- well, let me ask you this:  Are you thinking

25     of the words "decision" and "order" in the technical military sense of

Page 8121

 1     something formal that you draft up and it has specific language in it and

 2     it's signed?  Is that what you're thinking of when you say nobody in the

 3     Joint Command ever ordered the VJ to do anything out of these

 4     Joint Command meetings?  Do you understand my question?

 5        A.   Yes, I understand it.  And I can confirm that that's how it was

 6     in terms of decisions.  As for initiatives, I'm not denying that certain

 7     individuals took some initiative.  However, that was not binding on the

 8     corps commander or the commander of the MUP staff in the sense that they

 9     would have had to implement that, but they could bear it in mind as a

10     bit, a piece of information that they would be aware of when they were

11     making their decision.  So that is the sense of what is there.

12        Q.   Did those kind of things expressed by Mr. Minic - and in the

13     minutes there are other similar statements by Mr. Sainovic and

14     Mr. Makovic at various meetings.  I understand you're saying those were

15     not binding on the corps, but in your experience did those kind of things

16     carry weight with the corps?  The fact that Mr. Minic or Mr. Sainovic or

17     Mr. Makovic had said, Let's go there, let's do that; did that carry

18     weight with the army?

19        A.   If a civilian, for instance, insisted on an issue, it was

20     General Pavkovic's duty to relay that to General Pavkovic to inform him

21     of the problem at a meeting, and then the commander would decide whether

22     he would accept the proposal or initiative that was put forth by one of

23     the gentlemen who were there or not.  There were instances where the

24     commander of the army would accept them fully.  There were other

25     instances where he would deny them or turn them down completely.  And

Page 8122

 1     there were cases where he would take them into account for a certain

 2     part, especially when -- so the commander was really the one who had the

 3     final say especially when the use of the army was at stake.

 4        Q.   Okay.  How about with regards to the use of the MUP or do you

 5     know?  Was the effect the same or did the MUP give more weight to what

 6     Mr. Minic and Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Makovic might say in the nature of a

 7     direction or instruction or an order?  Do you know?

 8        A.   I don't know about that, but I know that if there was a MUP unit

 9     of involved, the army commander, in view of the fact that the army

10     provided support to the MUP, we had to advise him and inform him of the

11     problem that had to do with the MUP unit, and then the commander would,

12     in keeping with his decision, determine which forces to use as far as

13     support was concerned.  But as a matter of principle, he did not deny

14     providing support except he never allowed the army to be used without the

15     MUP units being used as well.

16        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  I think two more -- two or three more I'd

17     like to show you.

18             MR. HANNIS:  Page 120 in the English and 123 in the B/C/S.

19        Q.   This is a meeting of 5 October 1998.  And I guess -- when did you

20     stop taking the minutes -- or taking the notes and you were replaced by

21     your subordinate Tesevic?

22        A.   It was approximately around the 20th, so I took notes at some

23     65 meetings, and the last five the notes were taken by Colonel Tesevic.

24     I think this was around the 20th of October.

25        Q.   So on the 5th of October, this is another one that you would have

Page 8123

 1     been taking the notes.  Mr. Sainovic is noted as saying:

 2             "Our operations should be commensurate with the number" and "we

 3     should go to minor or small-scale actions."

 4             And then next he says:

 5             "The leaders should be liquidated now that we have enough

 6     information.  Go with everything in order to deal with individuals."

 7             Do you recall what he was talking about in that meeting?

 8        A.   I recall it.  There were discussions about some individuals who

 9     were member of the command personnel who were found to be some of the

10     leaders of the terrorist uprising in Kosovo, especially among them a

11     sultan from Ovcarevo and Ramus Haradinaj in the area of Baranski Lug and

12     in the Junik mountains.  They were not mentioned by name then, but this

13     relate -- referred to those leaders of the extremist ideology, and the

14     gentlemen from state security were talking at this meeting about being in

15     pursuit of these individuals and that they were trying to capture them

16     and if not, then that they should liquidate them in combat.  And I assume

17     that Mr. Sainovic, based on the information that General Pavkovic

18     provided regarding the handing over of weapons in certain villages and

19     the reports of the MUP, he was probably stressing this particular problem

20     which had already earlier been pointed to by state security organs, and

21     he probably felt that the key issue was to separate the terrorists as

22     soon as possible from the civilian population.  And if that -- if they

23     were to be successful in that, that then there wouldn't be much

24     opposition among the civilian population in returning to their homes and

25     staying there.  So I'm just basically para-phrasing what he said then,

Page 8124

 1     but I do recall the meetings where this was under discussion.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  If we can go to the next page, 121 of the English,

 3     124 of the B/C/S.

 4        Q.   In that same meeting near the bottom of the page you'll see

 5     Mr. Sainovic talking again; three bullet points, the third one says:

 6             "DB operatives - liquidate individuals."

 7             DB is the state security; correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And in your last answer you suggested that this talk about

10     liquidating individuals was in combat.  It doesn't say "in combat."

11     Wasn't this just a matter of finding these leaders and killing them?  In

12     combat or any other way?

13             I see Mr. Djurdjic on his feet.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The first part of Mr. Hannis's

16     question also contains certain conclusions that are not actually valid,

17     but in the latter part of his question he actually corrected himself, so

18     I don't really have an objection.

19             MR. HANNIS:

20        Q.   Do you need me to repeat the question?

21        A.   It's not necessary; the question is clear.  Yes, I did mention

22     combat operation, but this does not preclude the use of units in combat

23     operations.  For instance, we had the case where sultan was attacked.

24     His commanding of Carevo was assaulted.  And some combat elements

25     captured of Carevo and not state security organs.  State security organs

Page 8125

 1     and being a member of the military security organ, I know this, their

 2     responsibility was to discover the leaders of terrorist activities in

 3     their operative work.  And when those individuals actually offer

 4     resistance during their attempt to arrest them, then they could use their

 5     weapons.  And of course in that sense Mr. Sainovic is here commenting the

 6     comments put forth by Mr. Radovic and Mr. Gajic because they frequently

 7     reported that they were in pursuit of certain terrorists.  But there was

 8     never an instance where they reported that there was any fighting or that

 9     they had caught someone.

10             And I recall a meeting where Mr. Radovic said that a Siptar had

11     been liquidated and this man was someone for whom the Albanians had

12     discovered that he had ties with the state security service and

13     apparently he provided them certain information.  However, they

14     themselves learned that some information that he provided in relation to

15     the mass grave in Klecka where remains, human remains, were found; and on

16     the basis of what I learned then, these were human remains of Serbian

17     civilians.

18        Q.   Let me stop you there.

19             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, what I'd like to do, if it's not

20     opposed by counsel and if it's agreeable to Your Honours, is rather than

21     go through several other points that I'd like to bring to your attention

22     I would simply name the pages where I think there are examples of the

23     civilian members of the Joint Command talking about things that on the

24     face appear to be in the nature of directions, orders, instructions.  For

25     your future reference when you are considering the issue I would just

Page 8126

 1     list the pages where they occurred on and move on or --

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I agree with my learned colleague

 4     and I trust that his quotations will be accurate, but let's not overdo

 5     it.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic is having an each-way position.

 7             Mr. Hannis, proceed as you proposed.

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.  For the record, Your Honours, I would

 9     suggest that examples of this can be found at page 130 of the English,

10     13 October meeting, Mr. Sainovic speaking.  At page 128 of the English,

11     11 October, again Mr. Sainovic speaking twice on that first page.  On

12     page 125 of the English, 8th of October meeting, Mr. Sainovic.  The 7th

13     of October meeting on 124 of the English, Mr. Sainovic.  We talked about

14     that one.  Page 112 of the English, 26 September, 1998 meeting,

15     Mr. Sainovic.  Page 113, 29th of September, Mr. Minic speaking.

16     22 September 1998, page 108, Mr. Sainovic speaking.  And finally I think

17     one in August that I'd like to bring to your attention.  The

18     1st of August, at page 27 of the English, Mr. Matkovic is speaking.

19        Q.   Now, General, I'd like to talk to you a little bit further about

20     the nature of the interaction between the Joint Command and the VJ.  And

21     I'd like you to have a look at P1229.  I think you talked about this

22     earlier.

23             MR. HANNIS:  And I have a hard copy if the Usher could hand it to

24     you.  It's a two-page document, so that may help.

25        Q.   This is a 29 September 1998 document authored by and sent from

Page 8127

 1     General Pavkovic to the 3rd Army command personally to the commander.

 2     The title is "Implementation of Stage 5 of the Plan."  You've looked at

 3     this one before, yes?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   If we can go to item number 4 --

 6             MR. HANNIS:  And that's on page 2 of the English, Your Honours.

 7        Q.   You find that?  My English translation reads as follows:

 8             "During the briefing on the course of implementing stage five of

 9     the plan which was given at the meeting of the ZK."  And in this context

10     I take it ZK means "Zajednicka Komanda," Joint Command?

11        A.   [No interpretation]

12        Q.   "... at the meeting of the Joint Command for Kosova-Metohija on

13     10 September 1998, the other command organs pointed out that the VJ had

14     not carried out two of its duties under the plan.  Namely, number 1, it

15     had not formed rapid intervention helicopter units as the FRY president

16     had ordered at the meeting on 31 August 1998; and 2, two BGs, battle

17     groups, had not been moved down to Kosovo and Metohija."

18             Did you see this document in 1998?  Did you know General Pavkovic

19     had written it to General Samardzic?

20        A.   Yes, I did.

21        Q.   And do you remember this matter being discussed at a

22     Joint Command meeting on the 10th of September?

23        A.   I do.

24        Q.   Okay.  My question is in this paragraph where General Pavkovic

25     says:

Page 8128

 1             "The other command organs at the Joint Command meeting pointed

 2     out that the VJ hadn't carried out its duties."

 3             I understand that the MUP would be another command or organ, but

 4     this says other command organs in the plural.  Who besides the VJ and the

 5     MUP would be a command organ that's participating in the Joint Command

 6     meetings?

 7        A.   In my testimonies both last year and this year I repeatedly said

 8     that there were only two organs where I was.  They were the MUP staff and

 9     the Pristina Corps staff command, and they were responsible for

10     coordinating the work based on the decision of the army commander.  I

11     never denied that there were also representatives of the Government of

12     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there as well as representatives of

13     Serbia.  As you mentioned there yourself, there were these four

14     individuals who had frequently attended these meetings of, as it says

15     there, the Joint Command.

16             Whom General Pavkovic actually was referring to here, I wouldn't

17     know.  But I know that he considered other organs to be mainly the MUP

18     command or the MUP staff because they were the ones who were supposed to

19     take part in the creation of these intervention units.  But I also

20     believed that he probably meant the other civilian representatives from

21     the federal and republic governments because General Pavkovic sometimes

22     referred to them as the Joint Command.

23             I can only reiterate my claim now that they did not take any

24     decisions, the decisions were taken in Belgrade; and they probably

25     informed President Milosevic either through phone calls or in person how

Page 8129

 1     the activities were evolving, developing.  And then based on that, he

 2     would make a decision on the use of forces and issue orders to the

 3     Chief of the General Staff and the MUP staff.

 4             I am certain that these civilians who came down there to Kosovo

 5     were very fair in their treatment of the commands.  They never insisted

 6     on anything being implemented.  But as you were saying or pointing out,

 7     they had some sway by providing -- by offering their initiatives and

 8     opinions, they had some sway with the commanders to take them into

 9     account in their decisions.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And what you just described as that sway related in

11     part to their relationships with Mr. Milosevic; would you agree with that

12     statement?  That's what gave them weight?

13        A.   [No interpretation]

14             THE INTERPRETER:  There was a technical error.  The wrong channel

15     was on.  Could the witness please repeat.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  We missed that answer.  Would you be able to tell

17     us again what you were saying, General.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try to repeat.  I know that

19     the gentlemen from the authorities of the federal republic and the

20     Republic of Serbia were in touch from time to time with

21     President Milosevic, and I know they occasionally travelled to Belgrade

22     and I suppose they met with him also.  But what they discussed, I do not

23     know.

24             MR. HANNIS:

25        Q.   Thank you.  And one more thing on this document down near the

Page 8130

 1     bottom of the page, immediately above the words "we propose."

 2     General Pavkovic says:

 3             "Moreover, we are giving the members of the ZK, Joint Command for

 4     Kosovo and Metohija, the opportunity to report to the president of the

 5     FRY that the VJ has not carried out its duties under the plan."

 6             Do you know why General Pavkovic inserted that in this document

 7     to General Samardzic?

 8        A.   General Pavkovic is letting the army commander know that he too

 9     had attended the meeting with the president when the problem was

10     discussed.  And he reminds him that the problem with the creation of

11     helicopter units and bringing in two combat groups into Kosovo had

12     practically been approved by President Milosevic's plan, but that

13     assignment had not been carried out.  And he warns that members of the

14     Joint Command are reminding everyone, and he is informing the army

15     commander in writing of this problem.

16             Now, what is Joint Command here?  We know that in Belgrade

17     everybody is there with President Milosevic.  There is some sort of

18     intersectorial command or staff - I don't know what they call it in their

19     minutes.  And all those members working in Kosovo were at the same time

20     participating in Belgrade in that intersectorial command.  They were just

21     sent on a mission to Kosovo to provide the president with some factual

22     information that could contribute to making political decisions because

23     what is discussed here is the political situation, not combat with Siptar

24     terrorists.

25             If it had been ordered to neutralise all the forces in Kosovo, I

Page 8131

 1     think the army would have achieved that within seven to eight days.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I want to refer to you another document that

 3     is sort of related to this continuing issue between General Pavkovic and

 4     General Samardzic.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  This is Exhibit D212.  I think it's just one page,

 6     so if you'll have a look at it on your screen.

 7        Q.   This is dated the 5th of October, 1998.  And I see what appear to

 8     be your initials on the lower left.  Is this the one that you drafted?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And we have Pavkovic writing to General Samardzic, item 2, he

11     says:

12             "The plan to smash the DTS sabotage forces on the territory of

13     Kosovo and Metohija authorised by the president stipulated that when the

14     DTS had been smashed by the MUP and VJ forces rapid intervention forces

15     shall be formed to be at full readiness, with the engagement of

16     MI-8 helicopters to intervene at threatened sectors and features, as

17     ordered by the President.

18             "On my return from the reporting session with the ZK,"

19     Joint Command, I assume, "on 19 and 20 September, 1998, I informed you

20     personally by telephone of the decision to form rapid-intervention

21     forces."

22             When he speaks there of the decision to form these forces, he is

23     talking about a decision of the Joint Command, isn't he?

24        A.   He is talking about Mr. Milosevic's decision at state level.  So

25     it's not the Joint Command.  The Joint Command, or rather, one of its

Page 8132

 1     member, perhaps even General Pavkovic, proposed that rapid-intervention

 2     forces be formed and that proposal was submitted to the president.  And

 3     based on that briefing, that reporting, that was done by General Pavkovic

 4     on behalf of the army and someone else on behalf of the MUP, he, the

 5     president, decided that forces should be created dedicated to rapid

 6     intervention, so as to be ready in case of emergency to act quickly so as

 7     not to have -- to engage larger army forces.  These rapid-intervention

 8     forces with some helicopters, perhaps, would be sent immediately to a

 9     particular sector to deal with the situation.

10        Q.   Okay.  The next sentence says:

11             "As part of the conclusions from the Joint Command for Kosovo and

12     Metohija meeting, I sent you the decision to form rapid-intervention

13     forces..."

14             What decision is he talking about, and what conclusions from the

15     Joint Command is he talking about, if you know?

16        A.   I don't know exactly what he is talking about here because he

17     mainly dictated to me.  I did type it out, he did make some corrections,

18     but most of this document I wrote myself.

19        Q.   Okay.  Let's take a look then at the Joint Command meeting for

20     the 20th of September.

21             MR. HANNIS:  This is P886.  At page 105 -- or 105 of the English,

22     109 of the B/C/S.

23        Q.   You see, that's for the meeting on the 20th of September, but I

24     need to take you to the last entry from that meeting which is actually on

25     page 110 of the B/C/S and 106 of the English.  The speaker is

Page 8133

 1     Mr. Sainovic, and in my English translation he is noted as saying:

 2             "Prepare and train the units for quick interventions.  Form

 3     groups and then /?/ ask the air force to send helicopters, prepare the

 4     task and plan."

 5             And then on Thursday it's scratched out, it says Friday.

 6             "The commanders of the helicopter units commanders to come at

 7     1000 hours and an army operations officer."

 8             That appears to be the only noted reference to helicopters and

 9     intervention units in that meeting, and it's Mr. Sainovic at the

10     conclusion of the meeting making those comments?

11             So is that what's referred to in General Pavkovic's communication

12     to General Samardzic that we just looked at?

13        A.   Yes, I understand.  From what I understand, I don't rule out the

14     possibility that Mr. Sainovic had contacted President Milosevic to

15     discuss the issue.  I don't rule out that possibility because here he

16     puts forward certain details that he may have personally learned from the

17     president about the creation of these units.  I don't believe

18     Mr. Sainovic was deciding on his own.

19             His practice was to travel to Belgrade to meet with the president

20     personally, and I don't rule out the possibility that the president had

21     given him very specific tasks to tell General Samardzic such and such a

22     thing and then that he, in keeping with his own powers, make the decision

23     on the use of forces.  Mr. Sainovic did not have the right, nor did he

24     ever try to order Samardzic or Pavkovic anything.  But he must have seen

25     President Milosevic to share with him his opinions about the creation of

Page 8134

 1     that unit in Kosovo.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I think I'm done with Joint Command notes for

 3     now.  I wanted to ask you about a document that you were shown yesterday.

 4     This is Exhibit D324.  If you can have a look at the on screen.  It's a

 5     document dated 1st of August, 1998, from General Pavkovic to the

 6     3rd Army.  And it's a request for approval to launch the third stage of

 7     the plan.

 8             My question deals with the document itself.  We have what appears

 9     to be the signature of General Pavkovic and a stamp, but there's no --

10     nothing else on it in terms of what we often see in other VJ documents.

11     There are no initials of the author or -- and the typist, and there's no

12     delivery information.  There's no archival stamps that we sometimes see

13     when the documents have been retrieved from the VJ archives.  Is that

14     unusual?  Can you comment on that?

15        A.   There's nothing particularly unusual because as far as these

16     activities around Ovcarevo are concerned, I've already described that.

17     This was followed by activities around Liko vac, Ovcarevo, and combat

18     actions.  This is a command of the Pristina Corps sending to the forward

19     command post of the 3rd Army; General Pavkovic was sending it to the

20     forward command post of the 3rd Army.  Whether it was handed in to

21     someone in person, I don't know why they did not register it.  But we see

22     the designations, the -- and the signature of General Pavkovic; we see

23     that he signed it himself, how he had it transmitted.  He could have

24     handed it to someone.  Now, whether the 3rd Army registered it in a

25     log-book, it was up to them.  Because you have seen that document that

Page 8135

 1     concerns General Djordjevic, it was shown him on the 18th of April.

 2     General Pavkovic handed it on to the competent office for registration

 3     only two days later, so it must have been a simple omission and the same

 4     thing is possible here.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  You were asked, I think, yesterday at page 8

 6     about Mr. -- by Mr. Djurdjic about who was in charge of the MUP units or

 7     the MUP units in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and you gave an answer about

 8     1998 regarding Mr. -- General Lukic and the MUP staff.  Do you know why

 9     General Djordjevic and General Stevanovic were attending Joint Command

10     meetings in 1998?

11        A.   Well, I can hardly answer the direct question.  I can only give

12     you my impressions about their engagement there in Kosovo.

13        Q.   If you can't answer, that's fine.  Let me ask that next question:

14     Do you know who in the MUP was responsible for sending PJP units from

15     outside Kosovo to Kosovo in 1998 and in 1999?  Do you know who that

16     person would have been?

17        A.   From what I heard from General Pavkovic, it was within the

18     exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior,

19     Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic.

20        Q.   And was that for 1998 and 1999 both?

21        A.   Well, I suppose so because in 1998 at all meetings with the

22     president, Mr. Vlajko attended as the most senior officer in the

23     Ministry of Interior, and without his decision, units of the ministry

24     could hardly be sent to Kosovo in any scenario.

25        Q.   You were asked about how often you saw General Djordjevic in

Page 8136

 1     Kosovo after October 1998.  I think your answer was you just saw him that

 2     one time at the meeting on or about the 18th or 19th of April.  How about

 3     General Lukic?  Did you see him in Kosovo in 1999, and if so, how often?

 4        A.   I did not go to meetings and it's true that I saw Mr. Djordjevic

 5     and Lukic and Obrad Stevanovic on the 18th of April.  I knew Lukic was

 6     there; I heard that from other people because I was no longer involved in

 7     any coordination in 1999.  I don't know about Obrad.  And about

 8     Mr. Djordjevic, I don't know either.  And I did not see either him or

 9     Mr. Obrad Stevanovic, and I do not know whether they came there or not.

10             During proofing, I was asked about the 1st of June, but what I

11     know, I know from double hearsay.

12        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  Thank you.

13             MR. HANNIS:  Next I want to look at Exhibit 340.  This was shown

14     to you yesterday by Mr. Djurdjic.  And I have a hard copy for you because

15     it's several pages.

16             If the Usher could help me with that.  Thank you.  D340.

17        Q.   This is at 2nd October, 1998, analysis of task executed on the

18     territory of Kosovo and Metohija from the 3rd Army.  Do you remember

19     looking at this before?

20        A.   Yes.

21             MR. HANNIS:  If we could go to, first of all, page 4 in the

22     English.  And it's page 3 for you, General.  Item number 3.

23        Q.   It talks about experiences gained.  And my first question relates

24     to the positive experiences.  You see the last item under positive

25     experiences, my English translation reads as follows:

Page 8137

 1             "The distribution of weapons to citizens loyal to the

 2     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," and then in parentheses it says, "of

 3     Serbian and Montenegrin ethnicity has made it possible for large-scale

 4     resistance against the terrorist to be organised."

 5             So was it only Serbian and Montenegrin citizens in Kosovo that

 6     were being provided weapons in 1998?

 7        A.   In 1998 all the citizens except Albanians received as part of the

 8     general mobilisation or partial mobilisation weapons that they were

 9     entitled to by establishment.  I said that two days ago.  And in the

10     Ministry of Defence, units of the civilian protection and civilian

11     defence were also given weapons including members of other ethnicities to

12     protects their own lives and property and local communes in villages and

13     hamlets.

14             There were several attempts to create some mixed Serb/Albanian

15     units in Kosovo Polje.  One of these attempts was made by Mr. Pesic who

16     was commander of the military district.  However, the response from the

17     Albanian community was not great, and he did not succeed in creating any

18     mixed units.  The Albanian community refused outright to receive weapons

19     and to put up any resistance to the terrorists in Kosovo.

20             If you ask me what the reason was, I think that many of them

21     supported separatism but many others also feared reprisals, revenge,

22     including torture by other ethnic Albanians if they joined the army and

23     the police in any kind of effort whatsoever.

24        Q.   Let me jump ahead to a related document right now.

25             MR. HANNIS:  Exhibit P889.

Page 8138

 1        Q.   This is on the issue of armed non-Siptars in Kosovo.

 2             MR. HANNIS:  And if we could go to page 4 of the English.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think I never asked the General

 5     anything on this subject.  Mr. Hannis could have dealt with it in direct

 6     examination if he had wanted to.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, it arises from his use of that document

 8     which has negative aspects of -- positive and negative aspects of what

 9     the 3rd Army and Pristina Corps had done in 1998.

10             JUDGE PARKER:  So it flows, in your submission, from the use of

11     the document --

12             MR. HANNIS:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  -- in cross-examination?

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Continue, Mr. Hannis.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

17        Q.   And, General, this is General Lazarevic's 16th February document

18     that you've seen before.  And in item 2 - in the English at page 4 and in

19     your B/C/S I think we need page 3 - there's reference to the

20     Pristina Corps task and it talks about engaging the non-Siptar

21     population.  Do you see that?

22        A.   I haven't found that.  Oh I see it.  It's fine.

23        Q.   Do you know who that refers to?  That -- so that would not be

24     members of the MUP or members of the VJ?

25        A.   This refers to something I've already explained.  Serbs,

Page 8139

 1     Montenegrins, Muslims, the Roma, and other people who were vulnerable and

 2     undefended in Serbian villages, where they suffered from frequent Siptar

 3     terrorists attacks, and where the army and the MUP were unable to assign

 4     forces to protect villages.  Therefore, as part of the general measures,

 5     such population was equipped and armed to protect their own lives and

 6     property.  And these were people aged 65 to 80, the elderly, and

 7     children.  Those who were not mobilised, who were not subject to

 8     mobilisation and who were certainly not capable of combat.

 9        Q.   And in relation to that, if you'll go a little farther down, in

10     response to your answer about using the forces to protect villages, do

11     you see where it says -- talks about using those forces to protect

12     non-Siptar villages?  Or places with non-Siptar populations?

13        A.   If you mean this part of the text which says:

14             "... and also for the protection of villages with non-Siptar

15     population ."

16        Q.   Yes.

17        A.   Well, that's precisely what I'm trying to tell you.  The army and

18     the MUP were unable to detach any stronger forces to protect the

19     population because they had their main task to carry out.  For the army

20     to protect the population, it would have had to dedicate at least a

21     platoons or company-size units, and we were unable to afford that because

22     we were busy protecting roads.

23             And in order to protect that population somehow, within the

24     effort at the level of the Ministry of Defence, they were given certain

25     weapons in addition to some weapons they already had from earlier on.

Page 8140

 1        Q.   Okay.  But what about protecting Siptar villages with loyal

 2     Siptars?

 3        A.   Places where loyal Siptars lived were perfectly accessible to the

 4     army and the MUP, and the units could be deployed there just as easily as

 5     in Serbian villages.  And we did not have any problems there such as

 6     attacks on units until 1999.  There were no attacks of the population

 7     against our units.  You have reports that I wrote signed by

 8     General Pavkovic sent to armoured brigades instructing units how to treat

 9     the population.  Those commanders spoke to the seniors in villages and

10     they reached some sort of understanding.  But when these elders were

11     replaced by younger men, these understandings were no longer valid.

12        Q.   Okay.

13        A.   And I personally ran across columns of Albanians who were leaving

14     their own villages for that reason.

15        Q.   Okay.  Let me take you back to D340.  And it's on page 3 of the

16     B/C/S version.  And page 3 of the English.  The report includes

17     information about the number of terrorists that were killed or liquidated

18     in my translation here.  It says a total of 1299.  And I guess this is in

19     the period up to the 1st or 2nd of October.

20             You saw the -- you saw the document of the minutes of the meeting

21     that took place on the 29th of October, 1998, in Belgrade where

22     General Pavkovic had reported on the work of the Joint Command.  And in

23     that report I will tell you that he reported that between the

24     25th of July and the 29th of October, that 3500 [Realtime transcript read

25     in error "33500"] were killed, another 560 were liquidated, referring to

Page 8141

 1     terrorists, and another 666 were liquidated in the border area.  That's a

 2     total of about 4700.  Is it possible that 3400 terrorists were killed

 3     between the 1st and 29th of October during joint VJ and MUP actions?

 4        A.   Well, what I can say with certainty is that this -- these are not

 5     accurate details and accurate data regarding the deaths on the other

 6     side.  And the reason is that in 1998 we almost never found Albanians who

 7     had been killed in combat.  So we concluded that they most probably

 8     collected these bodies and took them out to their territory so that the

 9     commanders when preparing our reports and also our reports which we

10     prepared for General Pavkovic for his briefing to the commander of the

11     army and the Chief of General Staff and the president, we used figures

12     that were just assessments of what their losses would have been.  And

13     that is possible in the army based on some indicators that you have

14     during combat operations.

15             So we didn't really know how many casualties they had.  Me

16     myself, I did not even see five dead Albanians.  Perhaps I did see one

17     person once in a barracks in Djakovica and maybe by the roadside as I

18     travelled on the road.  So I didn't see any other bodies.  In other

19     words, we just made assessments and the most accurate data on their

20     casualties was the data we had from the border area because they left

21     their bodies behind on these occasions and then these bodies were taken

22     to Djakovica and handed over to the municipality.

23        Q.   Let me stop you there.  I think you answered my question.

24             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, because of our delayed start -- I am

25     sorry, I see Mr. Djurdjic --

Page 8142

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] On page 24, line 5, there is the

 3     figure of 33500.  If you can just take a look at that.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  3,350.

 5             MR. HANNIS:  I may have misspoke.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  An extra zero has been added.

 7             MR. HANNIS:  I actually meant to say 3500, I think is what's in

 8     the document at that point.  3500 plus 560 plus 666.

 9             If I may, Your Honours, because of our late start, I don't know

10     what time we'll be stopping.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  I'm holding on in the expectation that you may

12     finish shortly.

13             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I think I can finish in the next 15 or

14     20 minutes.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  That would be perfectly acceptable.

16             MR. HANNIS:  Thank you.

17        Q.   Related to this document, you agreed to a question from

18     Mr. Djurdjic about the -- whether or not there were any indications in

19     this Exhibit D340 of any problems with the Pristina Corps not abiding by

20     the commands of the 3rd Army, et cetera.  But as of October 1998, were

21     you aware that there indeed had been some complaints at the higher levels

22     in the VJ about the use of the Pristina Corps units?  And I'm talking

23     specifically about at the General Staff level with General Perisic.  Were

24     you aware of that?

25        A.   Well, I learned that from General Pavkovic.  In other words, on

Page 8143

 1     the basis of a few letters and exchange of instances where information

 2     was exchanged between General Pavkovic and Samardzic, I noticed that

 3     General Samardzic, although he attended the meetings with

 4     President Milosevic and the Chief of General Staff and the chief of the

 5     security administration, once he went back to Pristina he tried to

 6     suppress, sort of, initiatives that were -- and that was not acceptable

 7     in the army because without something coming from the commander in the --

 8     it could not be really implemented.

 9             So he tried to -- General Pavkovic tried to resolve this in his

10     contacts with General Samardzic.  But from what I heard on one occasion,

11     General Perisic and Dimitrijevic in late September and early October

12     began to stress this issue of Joint Command and all of a sudden that

13     surfaced as an issue, emerged as an issue.  Whereas throughout this

14     period of July through August in 1998, they knew that civilians were in

15     Kosovo, there were Mr. Matkovic, Mr. Andjelkovic, and others; and on one

16     occasion I even heard from a man that General Perisic proposed - and I

17     cannot claim that this is accurate - but I heard this a few months

18     earlier, that he himself, he personally proposed that Mr. Andjelkovic be

19     there.

20             I personally did not attend these meetings, but I do not exclude

21     that possibility.  I can only assume why this proposal was put forth, but

22     I can claim that General Dimitrijevic and General Perisic knew of this

23     and all of a sudden this issue emerged as a problem and was emphasised.

24        Q.   Were you aware that it was a problem as early as July of 1998

25     with General Perisic?

Page 8144

 1        A.   I don't know that there was any issue with General Perisic in

 2     July, but I know that there was some pressure put on General Samardzic

 3     because I cannot see why General Samardzic would actually try to

 4     undermine a decision by the president which was made at the meeting where

 5     he was present.  But in a way, he was actually seeking to accomplish

 6     something that had not been agreed at this meeting with

 7     President Milosevic in Belgrade.  So my only conclusion was that there

 8     was a certain pressure put on General Samardzic to proceed in this way,

 9     in the way that General Perisic felt that it should be done.

10        Q.   In October, November, December, 1998, did you have any

11     involvement or engagement in dealing with the KVM personnel from the OSCE

12     in trying to carry out the terms of the October Agreements?

13        A.   Yes, I did.

14        Q.   Were you aware of an incident that happened in December 1998, in

15     and around Podujevo, which the OSCE, KVM, were pointing to as being a

16     violation of the agreement where a VJ unit was engaged?  Do you know the

17     one I'm talking about?

18        A.   I'm not certain that I know what you mean.

19        Q.   The VJ argued that it was just a training exercise and that they

20     were attacked and then they returned fire.  Does that ring a bell?

21        A.   I think this must have been in the area of Batalovo Lake if

22     that's the incident you are referring to.  Because we had training

23     grounds there in the area of Batalovo Lake, and this is where a unit of

24     the 15th Armoured Brigade actually had their training.  And we had

25     rotation of troops every three months because we had to provide training

Page 8145

 1     to the troops in an organised manner; we couldn't do it in barracks.  But

 2     for the most part there were training grounds close to the garrison.

 3     They would have two or three training grounds.  And each of those would

 4     have one shooting range.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I take it you're not aware that there were

 6     discussions at the General Staff level concerning that in which

 7     General Dimitrijevic suggested that this was not a genuine training

 8     exercise but a provocation of the -- by the VJ of the KLA, and there were

 9     discussions involving the Joint Command and Mr. Sainovic's role in using

10     VJ units?  Did you know about that?

11        A.   I did.  But I would like to clear something up, and I feel this

12     is very important.  Since the arrival of the OSCE Mission up until the

13     end of the year, and I'm referring to 1998, there were 500 instances of

14     attacks on representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and civilians.

15     And as of May 1st -- as of January 1st and up until the beginning of the

16     aggression, there were 652 instances.

17             Now, the claim that the army was the one who actually engaged in

18     provocations, that's untrue, because the army had no intention of

19     provoking the Albanian terrorist forces unless they were conducting an

20     attack.

21        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt.  I'm running out of time.  And the point

22     I was inquiring about was whether you were aware that there had been

23     discussions at the General Staff level of concerns about Mr. Sainovic's

24     role, a civilian, in using or having an influence on how VJ units were

25     used.

Page 8146

 1             I just -- two or three more areas to cover with you, General, and

 2     then I will be done.  This is regarding the subordination order from

 3     General Ojdanic.  And I had a question.

 4             MR. HANNIS:  If he we could look first at P887.

 5        Q.   You see that one?  It has a 3rd Army command number at the top,

 6     872-94/2.  It's dated the 19th of April.  But the text of it seemed to be

 7     basically just General Ojdanic's order from the Supreme Command staff.

 8     Was this just simply forwarded on to the 3rd Army forward command post

 9     and the Pristina Corps?  There seems to be no other information other

10     than just General Ojdanic's order.

11        A.   Well, I think this is perfectly clear, this is an order by

12     General Ojdanic issued to the commander of the 3rd Army and then he is

13     drafting his own order and forwarding it to General Lazarevic, so they

14     should approximately be the same.  He is not allowed to change it.  If a

15     commander of the General Staff issued an order, then he would re-issue a

16     similar order to the commander of the 3rd Army, and then he can actually

17     expand it and make it more precise for the units in the ground.

18        Q.   The question I'm -- the point I'm trying to get at has to do with

19     the numbering.  I see this is 872-94/2 which, as I understand the system,

20     would indicate this is like the second document related to that specific

21     topic.  And it's dated the 19th of April.  If you could look next at

22     D204, and this is a document dated the 20th of April.  It appears that

23     you were the author by the initials.  And we see General Pavkovic's

24     signature and stamp.  And it bears the number 872-94/1.

25             So I am confused.  This seems to have the lower number indicating

Page 8147

 1     it was done earlier, and yet it's sent apparently a day later.  Can you

 2     explain that?

 3        A.   I have to refer back to the number of the document.  So it's

 4     872-94.  Could I just see the number of the first -- the original

 5     document.

 6        Q.   Let me give you a hard copy of both of them so you can look at

 7     them side by side.  Thank you.

 8        A.   Well, I answered this question yesterday.  So we have a situation

 9     General Pavkovic held on to this telegram.  He kept it for himself.  And

10     that is why it appears as if this first order was signed and then only

11     subsequently filed.  In other words, the person who was on duty at the

12     command post first filed this, and then once he had done that probably

13     General Pavkovic came up to him and asked him to also file this document

14     that he was working on.

15             So what happened is, he was probably unable to make -- enter this

16     correction because then he would have to scratch everything out and also

17     he would have to stamp those scratches.  So we can see based on this that

18     there is an order, then there is a response from the army commander, and

19     an order that he had drafted in connection with the order received from

20     the General Staff.  Yes, there was an error in the order in which these

21     documents were filed.

22        Q.   Okay.  From looking at those two documents, are you able to

23     determine when you at the 3rd Army received General Ojdanic's order?  Is

24     there any information on there that would indicate when it came in, what

25     date, what time?

Page 8148

 1        A.   Do you mean the resubordination order?

 2        Q.   Yes.

 3        A.   Well, I've already said that this order arrived before 1730 hours

 4     on the 18th of April.  It is certain that it arrived before that

 5     dead-line.  How much earlier we can establish on this basis of this

 6     document that was received, the incoming stamp which says 1640 hours.

 7     I've just noticed that now, that it was received at this time.  So what

 8     we have here is the General Pavkovic, after an hour later practically, he

 9     called the MUP organs and told them that an order had been received on

10     their resubordination.

11             And yesterday I explained why this was done -- why he did this on

12     the 19th, because he probably kept this document for himself and then it

13     was subsequently filed.  So we can see on the basis of this stamp - and

14     there cannot be any error here - where we see this incoming stamp which

15     says it was received at 1640 hours.

16        Q.   And let me be clear, if I understand your prior testimony, was

17     the meeting that you and Pavkovic and Lazarevic then had with Djordjevic,

18     Lukic, and Obrad Stevanovic the same day or the following day?

19        A.   As far as I can recall, it was on the same day.  I did not

20     receive that document, but I think it was -- it must have been on that

21     same day because I don't think that General Pavkovic - and I know him

22     well - I don't think that he would have waited until the next day to

23     provide this information.

24             But I can see now on this incoming stamp that the time noted

25     there is 1640 which actually confirms what I said, the meeting was about

Page 8149

 1     5.30, 1730, which was, in other words, about an hour after the document

 2     was received.  Because the incoming stamp, the code system that is used,

 3     it would note even the minute when the -- when a telegram arrives.  Had

 4     it been 1642 minutes, it would have said so in the document there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MR. HANNIS:  Your Honours, I don't have any other question for

 7     the witness.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

 9                           Questioned by the Court:

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  General, I would like to ask you something about

11     certain irregularities you mentioned yesterday.  It's on page 44 of the

12     transcript of yesterday.  In the 3rd Army command, you discussed certain

13     irregularities in conducting combat operations, and you were asked if

14     these informations you received from units, would you have to refer this

15     to the higher, to your superiors.  And you answered, Yes, this had to be

16     done on the basis of the corps units and independent units.

17             That sounds that these have been the rules and the regulations.

18     Do you remember if at any stage these such reports were received by

19     your -- by you or by your colleagues about irregularities in the field?

20        A.   When I testified both on this occasion and last year, I talked

21     about our having received a report from the commanders of the 125th and

22     549th Brigades, that there were certain problems in implementing these

23     decisions because the competent organs of the civilian police units had

24     not received an order from the MUP staff which had been coordinated at

25     the Joint Command, this cooperation.  So as long as the police units did

Page 8150

 1     not receive approval from General Lukic that they could conduct combat

 2     operations together with the army regardless of the army commanders'

 3     decision, those operations were not conducted.  And in my view, that was

 4     the greatest error that was made because that cooperation had not taken

 5     effect and it did not work in practice.

 6             Although, I can state that it wasn't really that the police units

 7     refused to participate.  Rather, they were just waiting for an order from

 8     the MUP staff to arrive, and once that happened, there were no problems

 9     of that kind anymore.

10             As for irregularities in the field, I can only deduce that from

11     some information that we received from time to time, but not in the sense

12     that this was a major problem.  What I assume is that the brigade

13     commanders and the lower level commanders were probably better acquainted

14     with the problems in the fields.  I could only analyse the situation

15     within units based on their reports, and based on those I would propose

16     to General Pavkovic what measures to take and send to lower commands.

17             Now, there were some reports, there was -- I found a report, for

18     instance, about two Albanian civilians having been killed in Kosovo Polje

19     by three members of the 37th Motorised Brigade who had come to Kosovo

20     Polje from Srbica and killed those people.  And the command was informed

21     of this incident, measures were taken, the general ordered

22     Colonel Stojanovic to apprehend these men, arrest them.  They -- an

23     investigation was conducted, but I don't know what the outcome was.  In

24     other words, an investigation was conducted into their actions.

25             The same is true regarding the incident with the killings in

Page 8151

 1     Lipljani, and of course I'm just talking about the incidents that --

 2     where there was army involvement, because I couldn't speak about any

 3     reports with the MUP.

 4             Now, had they been subordinated to us, then we would have

 5     received reports from them in the same way that we received reports from

 6     the 125th, 549th, and 15 Brigades.  Simply put, we did not have any MUP

 7     combat reports on their participation because their reports were sent to

 8     the MUP staff.  That's all that that means.  And the MUP staff was the

 9     one who then decided how to use MUP units whereas the army role at this

10     time was exclusively to provide support to MUP units.  And I've already

11     explained this, I believe.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did you receive reports of this kind from units

13     subordinated to you?

14        A.   There were reports, regular combat reports, but no.  When I

15     learned of some events and incidents that have come to light today, I can

16     see the link; and you have been shown one document here where

17     General Pavkovic, in regular intervals in seven to ten days after a

18     certain stage of combat operations, ordered that a detailed report be

19     submitted on the activities of the army and the MUP on the ground

20     focusing on the execution of combat activities and possible

21     irregularities, if any, or any other deviations from the orders.

22             In those summary reports - because that's what we call them,

23     summary reports - there was no specific knowledge provided by brigade

24     commanders and commanders of independent brigades.  And there was a

25     curious case, if you allow me to tell you, in Zegra village when in 1999

Page 8152

 1     Colonel Stojanovic informed General Pavkovic that in Zegra one ethnic

 2     Albanian family had been liquidated by members of the reserve force of

 3     the 175th Infantry Brigade based in Gnjilane.  Instantly,

 4     General Pavkovic ordered me, Djakovic, we're going to Gnjilane now.  I

 5     have to replace that brigade commander.

 6             I knew the man, this Colonel Petrovic, from earlier on.  He was a

 7     very decent officer who certainly wouldn't have allowed anything like

 8     that to happen if he had any control, but he did not have control because

 9     that unit had just been mobilised.  And included about 4.000 reservists.

10     And I can understand the man.  He was not able to achieve complete

11     control at all levels within just a few days.  So General Pavkovic

12     immediately replaced the brigade commander and a few other senior

13     officers, and a prosecution was started for this crime.  I believe these

14     reservists were convicted and sentenced to several years' imprisonment

15     for the killing of civilians in Zegra village.  That's the information I

16     had and the command had as well.

17             Now, in all other matters, I know that the corps command and the

18     army command did take measures.  We reacted to every report.  There must

19     have been deviations from orders, but commanders were not always apprised

20     of everything and were not always able to take steps.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much, General.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  General, that concludes the questions for you.

23     I'm pleased to be able to tell you that you may now continue with your

24     ordinary activities and you are no longer required here for further

25     questions.  We thank you for your attendance and the assistance that

Page 8153

 1     you've given us, and a Court Officer will assist you when we rise.

 2             We now adjourn, and we'll resume at 20 minutes to 12.00.

 3                           [The witness withdrew]

 4                           --- Recess taken at 11.06 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.44 a.m.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  You stand for a reason, Mr. Djurdjic?

 7             Is there a procedural matter, Ms. Kravetz?

 8             MS. KRAVETZ:  Yes, Your Honour.  I have two matters.  The first

 9     one is an oral application to add some exhibits to our exhibit list.

10     These are 65 ter 05346 and two zeroes 5350.  They are five US KDOM

11     reports.  Four of them are dated December 1998 and relate to events in

12     the area of Podujevo.  The fifth one is dated January 1999 and it relates

13     to events in the village of Racak that month.  These reports are

14     contemporaneous reports prepared by the US KDOM and relate directly to

15     the evidence that this witness will be providing regarding these two

16     events, so we seek to add them as we -- it is our position that these

17     documents will assist the Chamber in understanding the witness's evidence

18     on these matters.

19             These exhibits have already been disclosed to the Defence both in

20     English and B/C/S.  They -- we became aware of their availability as

21     public documents on Monday when the witness came for proofing.  In

22     discussions with him, he informed us that all US KDOM reports from that

23     period are now available publicly in the US Department of State website.

24     Previously these documents had been classified documents and were

25     US Rule 70 documents.

Page 8154

 1             I should point out these quite specific reports, these five

 2     reports, had not been provided to us in the past.  So they are new

 3     documents for us as well.  And we have alerted the Defence to the fact

 4     that all this documentation is available on the website in the event that

 5     there may be also Rule 68 material in these reports that may be of

 6     interest to them.

 7             That is my application, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 9             Mr. Djurdjic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  The

11     Defence is aware of everything that Ms. Kravetz presented, and we have no

12     objection to these five documents that she proposed.

13             We have another problem.  It's a huge batch of documents and the

14     Defence has not had enough time to go through all of them, especially

15     since many of them are in English.  We have to have them translated.

16     And, if necessary, I should like to have your permission to tender some

17     documents ourselves if the Prosecution does not have any objection.  And

18     since we have very little time, we would appreciate it if we could start

19     our cross-examination tomorrow.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  You haven't indicated the nature of these

21     additional documents.  I'm still leaping with you in your mind.  First

22     you say, We've got a big problem because we've been given a large number

23     of documents therefore we want to add more documents.  Now, I'm a little

24     breathless keeping up with your mental process there.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this Monday we were

Page 8155

 1     given notification that confidentiality has been lifted from

 2     State Department documents regarding KDOM reports, the US KDOM reports

 3     from 1998 and 1999.  Ms. Kravetz selected five documents she wants to use

 4     relevant to the topics covered by this witness, and we have no objection

 5     to these.  I believe I'm clear now.

 6             But since there is a large number of documents that have been

 7     made public now, we did not have enough time to go through all of those,

 8     and some of them we would certainly like to use.  And we have had no time

 9     to put them on the list yet.  That's all I meant.  And, of course, it is

10     Ms. Kravetz's agreement that we are seeking.  This was not actually an

11     application to the Chamber.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll take things in stages.  Firstly, your motion

13     to add the five documents to the list is granted.  We will watch the time

14     today with a point is reached or not whether it will be necessary to

15     decide whether cross-examination should be delayed.  And that too then

16     will assist us with the further question of your own documents.  But we

17     appreciate your difficulty.

18             Are we ready now for the witness, Ms. Kravetz?

19             MS. KRAVETZ:  I do have another matter, Your Honour.  As

20     Your Honours are aware, there will be a government representative in the

21     courtroom today during the testimony of this witness.  We just wanted to

22     inquire with the Court regarding contact, if we are allowed to have

23     contact with this US representative during the testimony of the witness.

24     This was not made clear in the Chamber's decision, and I understand from

25     discussion with this representative, her name is Ms. Karen Johnson that

Page 8156

 1     she way want to inform us of matters, if in any issues arises, that may

 2     be sensitive, she may want to draw our attention to that so we can alert

 3     the Court.  So we would just want to receive some guide-lines as to how

 4     to proceed in such a situation.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you have any objection to the proposal that the

 6     US government representative might speak to the Prosecution if some

 7     matter arises, Mr. Djurdjic?

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood that a

 9     representative of the US government is here to react to some questions

10     that could pose a risk to confidentiality.  And it's the American

11     government that insisted on his [sic] presence here.  What is important

12     to me is that in view of the fact that confidentiality has been lifted

13     from these facts and documents and these statements had been originally

14     taken under Rule 70, I'm not sure whether the restrictions still stand on

15     these topics.  I thought it was up to the Trial Chamber to make the

16     ultimate decisions whether a question falls within these topics and

17     whether an answer is required regardless of what the US representative

18     may insist on, correct me if I'm wrong.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, the topics identified in the Annex A

20     to our decision still apply.  The decision which has made available to

21     the public certain written records, which have now been provided to you

22     apparently, is not one which alters the decision we have made about

23     subjects that can be considered.  The sole issue at the moment is whether

24     the representative who is here of the provider may speak to the

25     Prosecution if there is a concern that something the Prosecution wishes

Page 8157

 1     to do or is doing is leading into some area of difficulty.  Ms. Kravetz

 2     is being careful to ensure that she doesn't upset you or us.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I understand that's why the

 4     representative of the government is here, and even if he [sic] is opposed

 5     to something, the Chamber will decide whether that falls within a certain

 6     topic or not, and the same will apply to me.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  In the Chamber's view, Ms. Kravetz, it would be

 9     preferable if the representative of the government were able to speak

10     with the witness; and the witness as a consequence if there's objection

11     to providing information or answering a question, may then make that

12     objection and that it would be preferable in the course of evidence if

13     there was not any communication between the representative of the

14     government and prosecuting counsel.

15             MS. KRAVETZ:  That's fine with us, Your Honour.  I would just

16     request that once the representative comes in the courtroom, she be

17     informed that this is the procedure to be followed during this testimony.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  And it's Ms. Johnson.

19             MS. KRAVETZ:  Karen Johnson, yes.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

21             MS. KRAVETZ:  So, Your Honours, the next witness is

22     Mr. Shaun Byrnes.

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon, Mr. Byrnes.  Would you please read

25     aloud the affirmation which is shown to you now.

Page 8158

 1             Would you please read aloud the affirmation which is shown to you

 2     now, Mr. Byrnes.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 4     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Please sit down.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, I understand that with you pursuant to our

 8     earlier order is Ms. Johnson as a representative of the government.

 9     Could I indicate, Ms. Johnson, to assist you, that your role is one which

10     may probably best be conducted initially by you having conversation with

11     the witness if some issue arises which concerns you.  If there is

12     objection to a question or something that is proposed, the witness should

13     make that objection and you, of course, could consult with him before

14     that occurs.  Whether or not it will be necessary for any further

15     submission about the matter, will depend on the circumstances.  So if you

16     would confine yourself to consultations with the witness and not, for

17     example, with prosecuting counsel, I hope that will prove satisfactory.

18             MS JOHNSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, Mr. Byrnes, I believe Ms. Kravetz has some

20     questions for you.

21             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, Your Honour.

22                           WITNESS:  SHAUN BYRNES

23                           Examination by Ms. Kravetz:

24        Q.   Good morning, sir, could you please begin by stating your full

25     name for the record.

Page 8159

 1        A.   My full name is Shaun Michael Byrnes.

 2        Q.   I understand, Mr. Byrnes, that you are a retired officer from the

 3     United States foreign service?

 4        A.   That's right, yes.

 5        Q.   In 1998, Mr. Byrnes, did you become involved in the work of a

 6     mission known as the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, also known as

 7     KDOM?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And, sir, in April of 2007, did you provide testimony before this

10     Tribunal in a case of Milutinovic et al. in relation to your work with

11     the US KDOM mission?

12        A.   Yes, I provided testimony in the case of Milutinovic et al.

13        Q.   Before coming to court today, did you have the opportunity to go

14     over the transcript of your previous testimony?

15        A.   Yes, I did.

16        Q.   And having reviewed your testimony, if today you were asked the

17     same questions that you were asked during the course of your testimony in

18     that case, would you provide the same answers?

19        A.   Yes, I would.

20             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honours, I seek to tender this transcript.  I

21     understand that it's been assigned a provisional exhibit number of P1214.

22     We would like it to be tendered under this exhibit number as a public

23     exhibit.  I wish to point out that there are some sections of this

24     transcript which used to be under private -- or were initially private

25     session due to a later order of the Milutinovic Chamber in relation to

Page 8160

 1     this transcript; the confidentiality with respect to those portions on

 2     the transcript was lifted.  So we are tendering the whole of the

 3     transcript as a public exhibit.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  The transcript will be received as an

 5     exhibit.

 6             Your electric personality is creating some problems, Mr. Byrnes.

 7             THE WITNESS:  My personality, Your Honours, has never before been

 8     described as electric, but I think proper measures have been taken, sir.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honours, as this witness is a Rule 92 ter

11     witness, I will proceed to read the in-court summary of his evidence.

12             The witness was the head of the United States Kosovo Diplomatic

13     Observer Mission from August 1998 until March 1999.  He provides evidence

14     on the role of this mission in Kosovo.  He also provides evidence on the

15     structure and chain of command of the VJ and MUP in Kosovo in 1998

16     and 1999.

17             During his tenure in Kosovo, Mr. Byrnes had meetings with the

18     heads of sections of the VJ and the MUP and provides evidence on these

19     meetings.  He also speaks about the engagement of VJ and MUP units in

20     operations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.

21             The witness recounts instances when he raised complaints with

22     MUP general Lukic and other officials regarding the conduct of the MUP

23     units during these operations.

24             In October 1998, the witness led the negotiations with the MUP to

25     agree on specific actions to be taken by FRY and Serbian forces to comply

Page 8161

 1     with UN Security Council Resolution 1199.  He describes his negotiations

 2     and indicates that General Djordjevic chaired for the Serbian side.

 3             The witness also provides evidence on the Podujevo incident in

 4     December 1998 and on the Racak incident in January 1999.

 5             That is the end of the in-court summary.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 7             MS. KRAVETZ:

 8        Q.   Mr. Byrnes, you had told us at the start of your testimony that

 9     you were involved in the work of the mission known as KDOM.  Could you

10     tell us -- could you please first start by explaining to the Chamber how

11     it is that you became involved in the work of that mission?

12        A.   I was asked by Washington in late July of 1998 if I would be

13     willing to leave my current position as political minister councillor at

14     our embassy in Rome to help stand up this mission which had been just

15     recently agreed on.  Washington was interested in having somebody with my

16     background in Yugoslav and Balkan affairs.  I had proper rank, and I was

17     close.  And so I agreed to do so.

18        Q.   And when did you begin your work with this mission?

19        A.   I believe I landed in Belgrade on August 10th, 1998.  And after a

20     day or two of orientation at our embassy there and which involved also

21     meeting with a number of Serbian officials, I arrived in Pristina,

22     Kosovo, on, I believe, the 12th of August and took command our

23     Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission.

24        Q.   What was your mandate and what did your role entail of the

25     US KDOM mission?

Page 8162

 1        A.   Our mandate was to provide accurate and objective information

 2     about what was occurring on the ground in Kosovo.  This information was

 3     to be provided to Washington and the Contact Group capitals through our

 4     embassy in Belgrade.

 5        Q.   You told us that you arrived in Kosovo on 12th of August in

 6     Pristina specifically.  Just very briefly, can you describe what was the

 7     situation on the ground in Kosovo at the time when you arrived there?

 8        A.   We were looking at an increasingly violent insurgency on the

 9     ground in Kosovo.

10        Q.   Can you elaborate.  Exactly what was happening at the time?  Why

11     did Washington deem it necessary to set up this mission?

12        A.   If I may, let me -- let me add a little bit of context.  Our

13     mission grew out of an agreement made in mid-June in Moscow by

14     Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and then-president of the

15     Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin.  The agreement was intended by the

16     Russians, I think, to try to head off another western intervention a la

17     1995 in Bosnia.  It was intended to try to put a lid on growing violence

18     between Albanian separatists and Serb security forces which was leading

19     to the deaths of people on both sides, it was leading to increasing

20     numbers of displaced persons, mostly Albanians but not always Albanians,

21     and it was leading to growing western press attention which rest again a

22     western intervention.

23             The agreement provided for foreign observation, the hope was that

24     this would lead to a diminishing of the violence and therefore provide

25     time to seek a political solution.  The violence, nevertheless, continued

Page 8163

 1     to grow.  And my recollection -- I don't have the dates unfortunately,

 2     our special envoy for the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, travelled to

 3     Belgrade in, I believe, early July to try to -- to meet with Milosevic to

 4     try to find a way of bringing this to a stop.

 5             They agreed at that point that the international community should

 6     be permitted to establish formal diplomatic observation missions.

 7     Holbrooke certainly knew that western embassies, the interested

 8     embassies, particularly the United States, Great Britain, France,

 9     Germany, and others, lacked the resources to provide observers on the

10     ground in Kosovo on a sustained basis.  In other words, they lacked the

11     resources to make a difference.  And they agreed therefore, to the

12     establishment of three diplomatic observer mission:  One would be

13     American which I headed, a second would be a mission of the

14     European Union, and the third was a Russian mission.  That's what brought

15     me there.

16             Overall, our instructions were, again, to provide accurate,

17     objective information on what was occurring.  I think the hope was that

18     by doing so pressure would be brought on both parties to restrain

19     themselves.  I think the ultimate objective was to buy time, to put the

20     conflict, if you will, on hold and buy time so that a negotiated mutually

21     acceptable political resolution could be found.

22             I hope that answers your question.

23        Q.   Yes, thank you for that.  Now, you have referred to the existence

24     of three diplomatic observer missions.  Was there any difference between

25     these missions, the other two missions, and US KDOM; or did all three

Page 8164

 1     missions carry out the same type of mandate that you've described?

 2        A.   We all tried to carry out the same mission.  The American mission

 3     had an advantage in that it was larger, it had more resources.  The

 4     Russian mission never -- never was very large.  I think at maximum it

 5     contained about five or six officers, and they lacked off-the-road

 6     vehicles.  You needed off-the-road vehicles to work in areas where

 7     conflict was occurring.  But we worked very closely.  We -- the

 8     American -- the US KDOM worked very very closely with the EU counterpart

 9     and the Russian KDOM.

10             I would add that the EU KDOM actually preceded the establishment

11     of the KDOMs.  The European Commission had established a monitoring

12     mission in Kosovo in, I believe, April.  And they had some 10 or 12 or 15

13     officers and vehicles on the spot.  That -- it was headed by an

14     Englishman.  That EU monitoring mission or EC monitoring mission was

15     simply renamed the EU KDOM and then they added additional resources to is

16     it.

17        Q.   By 12 August when you arrived in Pristina, was the US KDOM

18     already functioning and operating, or did you get there to set it up, to

19     carry out this task of setting it up?

20        A.   Yes, the European Union KDOM mission, I think that was your

21     question, was already operating.

22        Q.   I was asking about the US, the United States KDOM mission.

23        A.   I'm sorry, I misunderstood.  Yes, the US KDOM -- the core of our

24     mission had been established a couple of weeks earlier.  We had a very

25     small group of people, we had three or four off-the-road vehicles, and

Page 8165

 1     yes we were operating.

 2        Q.   You have told us that your mandate was to provide accurate and

 3     objective information, how did you go about obtaining such information

 4     and carrying out this mandate?

 5        A.   We -- we ran daily patrols with our off-the-road vehicles into

 6     those parts of Kosovo where either there was ongoing conflict or we had

 7     reason to believe that there might be conflict.  Are -- we had -- at that

 8     point we had three or four teams.  Our teams consisted of two American

 9     officers and a local national interpreter.  Local nationals were either

10     Serb or Albanian.  But in either instance, they had to be fluent in both

11     languages.  And that was not -- that was not a difficult condition for us

12     to fulfill.

13             So what we would do was we would usually launch our missions 8.00

14     in the morning, they would go to areas that we believed needed to be

15     watched, where we might make a difference by getting in between the

16     conflicting forces, and they would stay in those areas until nightfall.

17     We were under instructions to be back at base by nightfall.  Washington

18     and Brussels did not want their people on the roads at night.

19             We would stay in those areas, talk to people, collect information

20     about what was going on, collect information about the humanitarian

21     situation, about displaced people, that sort of thing.  And then we would

22     come back in, we would meet -- I would meet with the patrol leaders who

23     would submit brief written reports, and then I or one of my other

24     colleagues would put a report together which we faxed on a daily basis,

25     usually late in the evening, to our embassy in Belgrade which then send

Page 8166

 1     it to Washington and to the other Contact Group embassies.

 2             Let me add that in this connection we worked very closely with

 3     the EU.  Particularly in the beginning when both sides had limited

 4     resources and there seemed to be quite a bit of tension and even conflict

 5     occurring in Kosovo.  I would meet every evening with my counterpart, an

 6     Englishman named Nicholas Turnbull; we would share our reporting from

 7     that day's activities, and we would discuss our expectations of what was

 8     likely to happen on the next day.  And then we would divide up, because

 9     neither of us had enough people or enough vehicles to be everywhere.  So

10     we would, on a priority basis, decide where we would send our people, so

11     we would avoid overlap.

12        Q.   How would you obtain information of areas where there was ongoing

13     conflict or that you thought should be particularly monitored?

14        A.   Generally from our observation during the day, police movements,

15     army movements, the International Red Cross had a mission there.  UNHCR

16     had a mission there.  They were running teams into the field on -- for

17     humanitarian purposes.  We worked -- we stayed in touch with them.  They

18     would often tell us about build-ups of troops or villages being burned or

19     that sort of thing.

20             And we would often receive information from Albanian sources.

21     People would call from villages wherever and say -- and tell us that

22     there was a build-up of Serbian security forces in their area, and they

23     were worried about what might happen the next day.  So these were the

24     basic sources of our information.

25        Q.   And did you personally also participate in this sort of daily

Page 8167

 1     patrols as your mission was carrying on?

 2        A.   I did, but not every day.  My rule of thumb was to go out twice a

 3     week.  I felt it was important to do so so that I had a -- at least

 4     somewhat of a feel for what was going on in the field.  And it was also a

 5     way, of course, of evaluating how my people were working, what were they

 6     doing, were they doing what they should have been, were they collecting,

 7     were they talking to the right kind of people.  That sort of thing.

 8             Primarily it was so that I had a feel -- I was dealing with our

 9     ambassador in Belgrade, sometimes with the Contact Group ambassadors.  I

10     didn't want to have -- I didn't want to deal with them on the basis of

11     second-hand information from my people.  I wanted to have some personal

12     experience.

13        Q.   And when you were not on the field participating in these

14     patrols, where were you based?

15        A.   We were based in a suburb of Pristina called Kosovo Polje perhaps

16     6 kilometres south-west of Pristina.

17        Q.   You spoke very briefly earlier about daily reports that you would

18     compile and send to Washington and other organs -- other places.  Could

19     you tell us what sort of information would normally be included in these

20     daily reports that your mission compiled?

21        A.   The daily reports began with a general summary of the situation

22     in the province of Kosovo, and then it had a section in which dealt with

23     conflict situations, where we'd observe conflict, and briefly what had

24     ensued.  Then there was also a section, there was a humanitarian section

25     which dealt with displaced persons.  That information came both from our

Page 8168

 1     teams in the field who would come back and say, for example, Village of X

 2     had been attacked or subject to pressure from Serbian security forces,

 3     the population had left, the population was 1800 people, nobody is there

 4     now.  That sort of thing.

 5             We also included information we received from the ICRC and UNHCR

 6     which, again, had teams in the field monitoring humanitarian situation.

 7     Washington and Brussels were interested in that as well.

 8        Q.   So would any important events that occurred during a specific day

 9     which -- regarding which you would obtain information, would these be

10     always included in the daily reports that you would send to Washington

11     and Brussels?

12        A.   Yes.  If we were aware of them.

13        Q.   Now, during your work with the mission, did you have any contacts

14     with local Serb authorities?

15        A.   Yes, I did.  I had considerable contact with them.

16        Q.   Did you have any contact with officials from the MUP?

17        A.   Yes, I did.

18        Q.   Who specifically were you in contact with?

19        A.   My primary point of contact as chief of US KDOM was

20     General Sreten Lukic who was the -- was in charge of the Serbian police

21     forces in Kosovo.  I -- because General Lukic was periodically absent in

22     Belgrade, I also saw his deputy, it was a colonel named Mijatovic.  I

23     don't recall what his first name was.  And then on a fairly regular

24     basis, I would see the chief of the Kosovo Polje police department, his

25     headquarters was down the street from where our, if you will,

Page 8169

 1     headquarters was established.  He was good friends with the two Serbian

 2     brothers who owned the building we were in.  It was a motel which had

 3     been converted into a sort of dormitory.  And he was often down there for

 4     dinner.  I got to know him, we talked.  We had actually -- we had a very

 5     cooperative relationship with him.

 6             Those were the Serbian police officials that I would see

 7     regularly in Pristina.  Of course, I -- when I made trips into the field,

 8     I often had contact with Serbian police officers there and I had some

 9     contact with the Serbian police officials when I was in Belgrade.

10        Q.   You mentioned that your primary point of contact was

11     General Lukic.  How frequently would you have meetings with

12     General Lukic?

13        A.   Very frequently.  Often -- often daily.  On some occasions when

14     there was something serious going on, I would see him more than once a

15     day.

16             He -- let me add.  He often would call me and ask me to come and

17     see him.  Most of the time I would -- it was at my request.

18        Q.   And what was the nature of these meetings with General Lukic,

19     what sort of topics would you discuss?

20        A.   Well, the primary nature of the meetings was to discuss the

21     security situation in the province and MUP compliance with the -- later

22     on with the -- what we called the October Agreements.  I would also use

23     these meetings to raise objections or bring to his attention what we

24     considered were unaccept -- from our standpoint unacceptable behaviour on

25     the part of the Serbian police.  And what I have in mind here is when

Page 8170

 1     villages were attacked, the inhabitants driven out and the villages

 2     burned after -- they were usually burned after the homes had been looted.

 3     That sort of thing.

 4        Q.   Now, you referred to meetings prior to the October Agreements and

 5     after the October Agreements were signed.  These specific issues that you

 6     have just mentioned to attacks on villages and inhabitants being driven

 7     out, were these the subject of your meetings during which of the two

 8     periods or throughout the period there both before and after the October

 9     Agreements were signed?

10        A.   The discussion of police behaviour was -- for the most part

11     occurred prior to the October Agreements.  The reason for that is that

12     the October Agreements led to the establishment of OSCE's

13     Kosovo Verification Mission which once it was stood up assumed the

14     responsibilities that had originally been those of the KDOMs.  And

15     therefore the responsibility for dealing with compliance issues passed

16     from Nick Turnbull, Sergey Lavrov, and myself, to William Walker and his

17     staff at OSCE KVM.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I don't want to get into this topic in too much

19     detail as it has already been addressed in your previous testimony.  But

20     just going back to your previous answer when you mentioned that you would

21     raise complaints regarding behaviour that you considered unacceptable of

22     the -- on the part of the Serbian police.  When you would raise these

23     complaints with General Lukic, what was generally his reaction to the

24     issues that you were bringing to his attention?

25        A.   General Lukic generally rebuffed the complaints and my

Page 8171

 1     recollection was often attributed the actions his security forces had

 2     taken as the consequence of engagement with the KLA.

 3        Q.   And when you were out in the field during this period, and I'm

 4     speaking specifically about the period prior to the October Agreements,

 5     what sort of MUP units did you observe in the field, if any?

 6        A.   We saw -- we saw police units that were manning check-points on

 7     the roads, and they -- from our contact with these police they were --

 8     they seemed -- my impression was they were regular Serbian police

 9     officers, for the most part seconded to Kosovo for 30 days, 30 days

10     assignment, then they would return to their home city Kraljevo or Beograd

11     or Novi Sad or wherever.  These people manned the check-points.

12             We also saw what we call the PJP which is Special Police, and

13     they were dressed -- they were dressed differently and they appeared to

14     be in an organised unit such as a military unit.  In my previous

15     testimony, I described them as light infantry, and that was our clear

16     impression.  These were not individual policemen put together to man a

17     check-point or a roadblock.  They were a coherent unit, had light

18     infantry weapons including armoured cars, light anti-aircraft guns, heavy

19     machine-guns, that sort of thing.  They seemed to be in short a, at

20     least, quasi-military formation.

21        Q.   And were the tasks that you saw these PJP units performing in the

22     field, was that at all different or -- from that of just regular police

23     officers?

24        A.   Yes.  My impression was that regular police officers served in

25     effect in control functions, check-points, they provided security on the

Page 8172

 1     streets of Pristina and other large cities.

 2             The PJP units were used in, let's just say, anti-insurgency

 3     operations.  They were used in combat operations.

 4        Q.   During your daily patrols or your routine patrols, did you have

 5     the opportunity of seeing PJP units in action?

 6        A.   On one occasion which I related in my previous testimony, I saw a

 7     PJ unit which had just completed an operation in a village between the

 8     small town of Kijevo which was west of Pristina.  And it was -- this

 9     village was located midway I think midway on a road running from Kijevo

10     to the town of Malisevo and --

11        Q.   And when you say they had just completed an operation, what

12     exactly were you able to observe taking place?

13        A.   What I clearly still recall seeing in my mind's eye was arriving

14     with a team at the edge of the village which was in flames.  There was

15     no -- there were no hostilities that we were aware of underway.  We heard

16     no sounds of gun-fire.  There were a number of blue MUP buses parked at

17     the edge of the village along with blue MUP trucks and several armoured

18     personnel -- basically armoured scout cars.  And what I remember is the

19     MUP troops, if you will, with their weapons, coming out of the village

20     and getting on to the buses and preparing to leave.

21        Q.   And in what condition was the village after these units had left?

22        A.   The village was in flames.

23        Q.   Were you able to observe whether there was any civilian

24     population in the village or the surrounding areas at the time?

25        A.   We -- other than the Serbian police, we saw nobody else.

Page 8173

 1        Q.   Did you bring this specific incident that you were able to

 2     observe to the attention of General Lukic?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And what was his explanation of what was taking place there, or

 5     did he provide any explanation?

 6        A.   To be honest, this was neither the first nor the last time I

 7     brought such incidents to his attention.  This was a more personal

 8     intervention on my part because I had seen it with my own eyes, but to be

 9     frank, I do not remember precisely what he said in response.

10        Q.   And just a last question on this topic.  When you would bring

11     issues like this to the attention of Mr. Lukic, would you later observe

12     any change in the actions of MUP units in the field, or would they just

13     continue carrying out the same type of operations?  Did you perceive your

14     complaints as having any effect on what was going on on the ground?

15        A.   My recollection, frankly, is no.  And may I add a little comment

16     here?

17        Q.   Yes, of course.

18        A.   And that is, I quickly learned after arrival that with the MUP,

19     not with the Yugoslav army, but with the MUP, our missions were playing

20     basic cat and mouse games.  Let me illustrate it with one quick anecdote.

21             We initially ran missions Monday through Friday, and we would

22     stand down on Saturday and Sunday to service our vehicles and just to

23     give our stressed staff a break.  We learned -- we learned very quickly

24     that Yugoslav security -- or the Serbian security forces would often go

25     to a low level of activity particularly towards the end of the week but

Page 8174

 1     then on Saturday and Sunday when we were not in the field they would go

 2     back into high gear and we would get reports from various sources that

 3     things were happening.  Villages were being attacked or whatever.

 4             So Nick Turnbull and I decided we would run missions seven days a

 5     week and so we - as would make sense - we set up a schedule so we could

 6     still service our vehicles.  And that seemed to change things a little

 7     bit, but it was very interesting and very challenging.

 8        Q.   Thank you for that.  I want to move forward in time a bit to

 9     October 1998.  You have mentioned the October Agreements.  Did you have

10     any involvement in negotiations that took place in October 1998 in

11     Belgrade with Serbian officials to try to control the situation on the

12     ground?

13        A.   You are referring, madam, to the 24, 25, October talks in

14     Belgrade?

15        Q.   I am specifically.

16        A.   I was present -- I was present at those primarily in an expert

17     capacity.  The negotiations in effect involved two Working Groups.  One

18     which was headed by General Clark, and dealt with the regime under which

19     the Serbian Yugoslav army, we called it the VJ, Vojska Yugoslavia, the

20     regime under which the VJ would work once this agreement came into

21     effect.

22             The second Working Group dealt with the regime under which the

23     Serbian police would work once the agreement came into effect.  And on

24     our side -- the -- our head of delegation was General Naumann a German

25     was head at that time of the NATO Military Committee and who had

Page 8175

 1     accompanied General Clark to Belgrade for these meetings.  I served in

 2     effect as his advisor.

 3        Q.   How is it that you became involved in these negotiations in

 4     Belgrade?

 5        A.   I was asked by General Clark and by Ambassador Holbrooke to

 6     participate because they wanted somebody on their team who had good

 7     knowledge of the situation on the ground in Kosovo.

 8        Q.   And what was the purpose of these negotiations?

 9        A.   The fundamental purpose of the negotiations was to stop the

10     fighting and save lives.  Secondary purpose was to allow for what we

11     estimated to be about 200-, 250.000 displaced persons to return to their

12     homes before the harsh winter set in.  There was very great concern in

13     New York at the United Nations and Brussels and in major European

14     capitals and in Washington about an impending humanitarian disaster if

15     the fighting continued.

16        Q.   Now, who from the Serbian police was -- participated in these

17     negotiations in this second Working Group that you yourself was involved

18     in?

19        A.   I did not know all of the participants, but the officers that

20     participated that I did know and recognised were General Djordjevic,

21     General Lukic, General Stevanovic, and Colonel Mijatovic who was General

22     Lukic's deputy was also present.

23        Q.   Now, you have already spoken about General Lukic and

24     General Mijatovic.  At the time, what did you understand to be

25     General Djordjevic's position within the MUP?

Page 8176

 1        A.   General Djordjevic was the deputy minister of interior

 2     responsible for the -- for Serbia's public security forces.  He was the

 3     deputy minister responsible for the police.

 4        Q.   And what about General Stevanovic?

 5        A.   General Stevanovic?

 6        Q.   Stevanovic.

 7        A.   Stevanovic was a deputy to General Djordjevic.  My understanding

 8     when I arrived in Kosovo in August of 1998 was that he was the senior

 9     police official directly responsible for Kosovo.  In other words -- and

10     General Lukic was his deputy on the ground in Pristina.  But at some

11     point in the autumn, Lukic became formally responsible, he was the

12     Serbian police commander in Pristina, in Kosovo.  And General Stevanovic

13     remained in Belgrade with whatever responsibilities he had.  I, to be

14     perfectly honest, never completely understood what his responsibilities

15     were at that point.

16        Q.   And what did you understand to be the relationship between

17     General Djordjevic and General Lukic?  What was --

18        A.   Well, General Lukic was clearly General Djordjevic's subordinate

19     and he reported to him.

20        Q.   During the conduct of these negotiations, what was the role of

21     General Lukic?  Did he have any specific role in the negotiations?

22        A.   General Lukic participated in the negotiations, but I do not

23     recall him participating actively --

24        Q.   I'm sorry, I don't know if there was a problem with the

25     transcript, maybe, but I said -- I was asking about the role of

Page 8177

 1     General Djordjevic?

 2        A.   Okay.

 3        Q.   Maybe I misspoke.

 4        A.   General Djordjevic headed the Serbian team that dealt with the

 5     question of the regime the police would operate under in Kosovo once the

 6     October Agreement was put into effect.  He was in charge of the -- of

 7     that working -- Serbian side of that Working Group.

 8        Q.   And for how long did these negotiations last?

 9        A.   They ran for a day and most of the next -- most of the ensuing

10     night.

11        Q.   And what was the -- what were the main points that you were

12     negotiating about?  What was the substance of the negotiations you were

13     having with the MUP during this day and a half?

14        A.   Basically we were negotiating definition of terms.

15        Q.   Specifically what are you referring to?

16        A.   What constituted a check-point, what constituted a -- even what

17     constituted a road because if you look at the document, at least what I

18     recall from that is - and I think this is in the document - the Serbian

19     police were to be restricted to patrolling certain types of road, but

20     they weren't -- the operational aspects.  How do you implement the

21     agreement.  What are the rights, if you will, of the Serbian police under

22     the terms of the agreement.

23             We were trying to define them as precisely as we could so as to

24     avoid problems of ambiguity which could lead to conflict and disagreement

25     in the field.

Page 8178

 1        Q.   Now, you've told us that General Djordjevic headed the Serbian

 2     MUP team.  Were these points that you are referring to now issues that

 3     you were negotiating directly with him, or were you negotiating with one

 4     of the other members who were present there?

 5        A.   No, General Djordjevic was the lead negotiator.  What I recall is

 6     General Lukic would very occasionally be involved or say something, but

 7     General Djordjevic was clearly in charge.

 8             MS. KRAVETZ:  I would like to have at this stage Exhibit P836 up

 9     on the screen.

10        Q.   This document will appear on the screen before you, Mr. Byrnes.

11     Do you have the document there?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   Do you recognise this document?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   Can you explain to us what it is?

16        A.   This is the document that was agreed at the end of these

17     negotiations.  This was the product, if you will, of the negotiations.

18     It's an understanding between KDOM and the Ministry of Interior regarding

19     the regime under which the Serbian security -- Serbian police in Kosovo

20     would operate following the -- under the terms of the October Agreement.

21        Q.   Now, we see that the document is signed by

22     Colonel-General Djordjevic and also by you.  Why is it that you are the

23     person who signed for KDOM?

24        A.   General Clark and General Naumann wanted me to sign it because I

25     was on the ground.  General Naumann had negotiated this primarily, but he

Page 8179

 1     was not on the ground, he was in Brussels.  They wanted somebody -- they

 2     wanted me to take responsibility for, in effect, ensuring that this

 3     document and this agreement was lived up to.  And General Naumann simply

 4     could not do that in Brussels.

 5        Q.   So this is why you were the person appointed to sign the

 6     agreement with General Djordjevic?

 7        A.   That's right.

 8        Q.   I would like to --

 9             MS. KRAVETZ:  Well, before I continue, Your Honours, I'm not sure

10     when we are taking the next break or if there will be a next break since

11     I know we are sitting on a different schedule today.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  We are looking at the times, but I think we

13     probably best use our time by going through in one session to about 1.30,

14     which will be the limit of our tape, and then calling it the day.

15             MS. KRAVETZ:  That's fine, Your Honour.

16        Q.   Mr. Byrnes, I would like to direct your attention to paragraph 1

17     of the document that's there.  We see it refers to the dismantlement of

18     all check-points and it speaks about the establishment of 27 observation

19     points on certain lines of communication.

20             At the time, why was it considered necessary to dismantle all MUP

21     check-points?

22        A.   To permit displaced persons to return home.

23        Q.   And what did you understand to be -- when there's the reference

24     here to 27 observation points, what did you understand what allowed of

25     the MUP, what did you understand these observation points to mean?

Page 8180

 1        A.   Observation points were not to be check-points.  If I may, let me

 2     say, check-points were, in effect, I would call them roadblocks.  They

 3     were physical structures of a temporary nature placed on a road so that a

 4     vehicle or an individual travelling that road would have to stop.  An

 5     observation point was to be precisely that.  It was to be a physical

 6     structure of some sort.  It could be a hole in the ground, if you will,

 7     but had to be off the road.  The road had to be unobstructed and open to

 8     free passage of vehicles and individuals.

 9        Q.   And during the course of these negotiations, did you have the

10     impression that General Djordjevic was aware or had sufficient

11     information about the areas in Kosovo where MUP units were deployed?

12        A.   Yes, I did.

13        Q.   And what gave you that impression?

14        A.   General Djordjevic demonstrated a very clear knowledge of the

15     facts on the ground in Kosovo.  He was clearly a professional.  He took

16     his job as deputy -- as head of the police, deputy minister of interior

17     seriously, and he knew down to detail what was going on and where his

18     people were and what they were doing.

19        Q.   And was there anything specific that was discussed during these

20     negotiations that gave you that impression, that he had such detail about

21     where his people were and what they were doing?

22        A.   Yes.  Discussions about locations of observation points, how

23     close to the roads they would be, potential flash-points that he was

24     concerned about.  This -- General Djordjevic had -- very frankly, had a

25     professional's command of the facts.  He was on top of his brief, and he

Page 8181

 1     was a very tough negotiator.

 2        Q.   And why is that?

 3        A.   He was on top of his brief.  The sort of thing that General Clark

 4     and General Naumann was pushing for would, from an objective standpoint,

 5     would clearly impede the ability of General Djordjevic's policemen to go

 6     after the KLA.  This put -- these restrictions were real constraints on

 7     the ability of the Serbian police to actively engage the KLA.

 8             From his standpoint, he was dealing with an insurgency and I -- I

 9     can -- I understand now and I understood then why he would want to defend

10     to the maximum extent or preserve to the maximum extent his flexibility

11     to deal with situations as they might arise.  He was a very -- he was

12     very tough in negotiating these issues.

13        Q.   While these negotiations were ongoing, were you provided any

14     information by General Djordjevic or by other members of the MUP

15     delegation as to the number of MUP personnel in Kosovo at the time?  And

16     we're talking end of October.

17        A.   To be very honest, I simply do not remember.  During the course

18     of the negotiations, I just don't have a memory of that.

19        Q.   Was this discussed at all, the numbers of MUP personnel that

20     would be allowed in Kosovo after the conclusion of this agreement?  Was

21     this a matter of discussion?

22        A.   It certainly was, and that's reflected in one of the other

23     documents that was agreed, or -- if I can add, there was discussion and

24     agreement on a number of Serbian police that could remain in the province

25     and the number of VJ units and their equipment that could remain in the

Page 8182

 1     province.

 2        Q.   And during the course of these negotiations at any time did

 3     General Djordjevic have to consult with anyone before reaching an

 4     agreement with you or the other international negotiators on issues to be

 5     included in this agreement?

 6        A.   I personally never saw him consult outside the room in which we

 7     were working.  But he did leave the room on a number of occasions.  I can

 8     only presume that it was for that purpose.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  Could we now have Exhibit P837 up on the screen.

11        Q.   Do you recognise this document, sir?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And can you tell us briefly what this is.

14             MS. KRAVETZ:  Maybe the witness could also be shown the second

15     page of the document in English.

16             THE WITNESS:  Basically this was a document reflecting the

17     results of the negotiations held on 24 and 25 October.

18             MS. KRAVETZ:  Now, if we could scroll down on the second page to

19     Roman numeral II, paragraph 1, we see that it says:

20             "With these goals in mind the state authorities of the FRY have

21     announced the following measures."

22             And number one says:

23             "Special units deployed to Kosovo after February 1999 [sic] will

24     be withdrawn from Kosovo."

25             Do you recall why the date of February 1999 [sic] was chosen as a

Page 8183

 1     date to include in this agreement?

 2        A.   It was chosen because there was a big build-up of Serbian

 3     security forces, the police, and the army after -- in March of 1998.

 4        Q.   And in your understanding, were special units allowed to

 5     remain -- were there any special units that were allowed to remain in

 6     Kosovo after the conclusion of this agreement?

 7        A.   My understanding -- my memory is that the Special Police units

 8     were to be withdrawn from Kosovo.  But as I look at this document at

 9     page 2.1 under Roman numeral II I see the statement:

10             "Combined police/special police strength in Kosovo will be

11     reduced to February 1998 duty level."

12             And that suggests to me that there was a provision allowing the

13     Special Police -- some Special Police to remain in the province provided

14     it was not more than -- their numbers were not more than they were in

15     February 1998.

16        Q.   At the time, did you have that information of what the numbers

17     were prior to February 1998?  Was this information that was provided to

18     you by the MUP?

19        A.   The MUP provided us with information.  However, we had no idea

20     whether that was accurate information.  We had no clear idea, in my

21     recollection, as to what MUP strength was in February 1998.  We simply

22     didn't have a yard-stick.

23             MS. KRAVETZ:  Could we go to the next page, top paragraph of the

24     next page in the English, paragraph 2.  And in the B/C/S I think we need

25     to remain in the same page.

Page 8184

 1        Q.   Directing your attention to paragraph 2 it refers to additional

 2     heavy weapons or equipment brought into Kosovo or transferred from the VJ

 3     to police or Special Police units, and it says that this will be

 4     withdrawn from Kosovo, returned to the VJ.  Why was it necessary to

 5     include such a provision in this agreement, if you recall?

 6        A.   To enable the police to return to traditional police functions.

 7        Q.   And was this a specific issue that you were aware of that heavy

 8     weapons were being transferred from the VJ to police or Special Police

 9     units for their operations?  Was this an issue of concern at this time?

10        A.   It was indeed because the Special Police units that we observed

11     in the field often had equipment with them, heavy weapons that we did not

12     normally assume a police unit would have.  And I'm talking about mortars,

13     I'm talking about armoured -- not only armoured scout cars but armoured

14     personnel carriers and light anti-aircraft weapons mounted on trucks or

15     armoured vehicles.  Those are not -- that's not equipment that most

16     observers, I believe, would consider as part and parcel of a police

17     inventory.

18             And, of course, our concern was that this equipment was being

19     used against the population.  We were anxious to see people return from

20     the fields and the woods and the mountains to their villages and concern

21     was that if they saw police units with this kind of weaponry, they would

22     be much more hesitant about going back to their homes.

23        Q.   Was this an issue that was discussed during your negotiations

24     with General Djordjevic or was it discussed in a wider frame?

25        A.   It was discussed.

Page 8185

 1        Q.   And what was the MUP position at the time regarding the use of

 2     heavy weaponry and the transfer of heavy weaponry from the VJ to the

 3     police, if you recall?

 4        A.   Well, as the document shows, they agreed to it.

 5        Q.   They agreed to the withdrawal?

 6        A.   They signed this document.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I would like to direct your attention to

 8     paragraph 5.  I know you were not involved in the negotiations with the

 9     VJ, but we see that here with regard to the VJ there's a reference to all

10     VJ elements remaining in Kosovo or returned to garrison except three

11     company-sized teams.  And there are certain lines of communication that

12     are indicated there.  Do you have any information as to why these

13     specific lines of communication included in this agreement and why these

14     company-sized teams were allowed to be deployed along these communication

15     lines?

16        A.   Yes.  In brief, the VJ was permitted to establish these

17     outstations, these deployments, in order to protect key roads through

18     which they were reinforced, supplied, and basically which they travelled.

19     These were roads that from a local perspective had strategic importance.

20     They argued that the KLA, which was armed, threatened them and if these

21     roads were cut off, their units would be isolated.  That is the reason

22     they were allowed to establish these deployments.

23        Q.   Thank you for that.

24             Now, moving away from the document, after these agreements were

25     concluded, did you return to Kosovo?

Page 8186

 1        A.   Yes, I did.

 2        Q.   And what was your role then after the conclusions of these

 3     agreements?  Did it remain the same as in the earlier months or did it

 4     change in any way?

 5        A.   It changed only in the sense that Nick Turnbull and I,

 6     Nick Turnbull of the EU KDOM were designated stand-ins for the new

 7     OSCE KVM mission which had been agreed but had to be established.  So our

 8     responsibilities were to monitor the implementation of the

 9     October Agreement until such time as OSCE KVM was in a position to do so.

10        Q.   And when you say "monitor the implementation" of the agreements,

11     was your role to deal specifically with the MUP or did you have to deal

12     both with the VJ and the MUP in the monitoring of the compliance of this

13     agreement?

14        A.   It wasn't just monitoring complaints, it was monitoring the draw

15     down of VJ units and withdrawal of the Special Police, for example, from

16     the province.  It was to monitor the full implementation of the

17     agreement.  And, yes, we did have to deal with the VJ.

18        Q.   Did you have any meetings with General Djordjevic after the

19     conclusion of the agreement that we saw earlier in relation to the

20     compliance of this agreement?

21        A.   Frankly, I don't remember precisely.  I know -- what I remember

22     is I -- I was a participant in a fairly large meeting in Pristina in

23     which he participated and Ambassador William Walker, who was head of the

24     OSCE KVM mission, and again it was get acquainted, let's go over what our

25     responsibilities are, what our obligations are to one another.  I

Page 8187

 1     remember that meeting.  On our side, Bill Walker was the point man.  It

 2     must have occurred after the agreement, but unfortunately I can't give

 3     you a date.  And it was in Pristina.

 4        Q.   And do you recall who participated at this meeting?  You said it

 5     was a fairly large meeting in Pristina.

 6        A.   I remember from our side it was myself, Nicholas Turnbull from

 7     the EU KDOM, it was General -- William Walker, his aid

 8     Colonel Michael Phillips, the British head of -- the British deputy

 9     director, deputy head of KVM OSCE who was deputy head for operations

10     General Drewienkiewicz, those are -- on our side those are faces I

11     remember.  On their side:  Nikola Sainovic, Veljko Dalovic, who was the

12     prefect for -- basically the head of the Pristina municipality, and

13     General Djordjevic.  I honestly can't remember if General Lukic was

14     there, it would make sense that he was, but I don't have a clear

15     recollection.

16        Q.   You have referred to Nikola Sainovic, what at the time did you

17     understand to be Mr. Sainovic's position?

18        A.   Mr. Sainovic was first deputy prime minister and had as part of

19     his duties he had -- he had responsibility for Kosovo.  Within the

20     government, he was the point man on Kosovo.

21        Q.   Did you have any subsequent contacts with him or was this the

22     only occasion when you met with Mr. Sainovic?

23        A.   I had a fair amount of contact with Mr. Sainovic over the months.

24        Q.   And generally what was the nature of this meetings you had or

25     contacts you had with Mr. Sainovic?

Page 8188

 1        A.   It was generally the consequence of problems we had in the field,

 2     you might say crises, there were periodic crises.  Each time we -- each

 3     time we had a crises, for example, the capture of eight VJ soldiers by

 4     the KLA, there was a risk that this would provoke serious violence, and

 5     that, of course, put at risk the October Agreement and our efforts to

 6     calm things down so a political solution could eventually be found.

 7             Sainovic was interested from his standpoint trying to find a

 8     resolution to crises.  And over time, as our relationship developed, he

 9     expressed an interest in -- and even meeting privately with KLA leaders

10     in an effort to explore the possibilities of some sort of broader

11     agreement, truce, unfortunately we never were able to get that far.

12        Q.   And did you understand Mr. Sainovic at the time to have any sort

13     of authority over the units that were deployed in the field, and I'm

14     speaking about VJ and MUP units.  Did understand him to have any

15     authority over these units?

16        A.   Only in the sense that Mr. Sainovic represented the political

17     side of the government.  I never had the sense that he could personally

18     order the police or the military to do -- to take specific action.  But

19     again, let me stress, that's an impression, I was not on the inside, I

20     didn't attend their meetings, I didn't have documents.  And my impression

21     is clearly influenced by my own experience as -- I served as a navy

22     officer years ago and then as a foreign service officer, so I'm clearly

23     influenced by the way our system works.

24        Q.   And did you perceive him to have any influence on events in the

25     grounds --

Page 8189

 1        A.   Yeah.

 2        Q.   -- when you would raise a complaint with him, could he influence

 3     what was happening on the ground?

 4        A.   Absolutely.

 5        Q.   And how was that?

 6        A.   The clearest anecdote I can give you is going back to the case of

 7     the eight VJ soldiers who were captured.  We worked directly with

 8     Sainovic to find -- to cut a deal, to find a way to get these people

 9     free.  The KLA was simply not going to let them go because Bill Walker or

10     Shaun Byrnes or anybody else from the international community went to

11     them and said please let them go.  They weren't going do that.  So it was

12     with Sainovic that we dealt with an order to put together something, and

13     that something involved basically a prisoner exchange.  And he was the

14     guy, he was the fellow that made it happen.  He clearly -- clearly he had

15     influence.  I don't think General Lukic could have done that.  I mean,

16     that was fundamentally a political decision.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to now move on to a different topic.

18             MS. KRAVETZ:  And have Exhibit 05346 up on the screen.  If only

19     the English could be displayed for the witness.

20        Q.   Do you have the document before you, Mr. Byrnes?

21        A.   Yes, I do.

22        Q.   Do you recognise this document?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Can you tell us what it is.

25        A.   This is a copy of the -- one of our daily reports.

Page 8190

 1        Q.   We see that this is dated December 19th, 1998.  I understand from

 2     your answer that at the time you were still producing daily reports up

 3     until -- at this period you were still producing daily reports?

 4        A.   Yes, we were.

 5        Q.   Now, directing your attention to the first paragraph, it refers

 6     to fragile cease-fire that came under further pressure as the VJ deployed

 7     an armoured battle group to the Podujevo region, and in paragraph 2 of

 8     this document --

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Excuse me, Ms. Kravetz.

10             Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we received some

12     kind of version of this translation, and for the accused to be able to

13     follow I would like the B/C/S version to be put up.  I myself cannot

14     follow very well, although I have it on paper.

15             MS. KRAVETZ:  I had only requested for the the English to be

16     displayed for the witness, but of course for the Court -- we can't do

17     that.  Okay.  That's fine.  If we could zoom in then a bit more on the

18     document, second paragraph in the English just so the witness is able to

19     follow.

20             THE WITNESS:  That's fine.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I am sorry, if the witness cannot

22     see, well, now that the screen is split, then it's all right with us, you

23     can keep the English version on the screen alone and I'll give the

24     accused the translation on paper.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It's being brought up as much as we can, and I

Page 8191

 1     think he should be able to follow it in the Serbian.  Thank you.

 2             MS. KRAVETZ:  And I had asked for the second paragraph of the

 3     first page to be displayed, not the second page.

 4        Q.   Sir, directing your attention to paragraph 2 of this document, we

 5     see that it says:

 6             "The VJ told KDOM that the armoured battle group which moved into

 7     the area of Podujevo early today was a 'training exercise' VJ officials

 8     had failed to notify KDOM of the movement, in violation of the Kosovo

 9     verification agreement."

10             Do you recall the incident to which this report is referring to

11     in the area of Podujevo?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   And based on your recollection, what took place there at this

14     time?  We are speaking of the period of 19th of December.

15        A.   The army moved a company-sized battle group from the Marshal Tito

16     barracks in Pristina to an area east of Podujevo.  The convoy included

17     Serbian police and Serbian police vehicles.

18        Q.   And how did you become aware of this event, that this was

19     occurring?

20        A.   We observed it.

21        Q.   Okay.  Where were your observers at the time?  Where were they

22     based when they observed this deployment?

23        A.   I don't remember precise locations, but what I can tell you is

24     that OSCE KVM maintained observation posts in proximity to the entrance

25     and egress points of the Yugoslav army's bases or garrisons.  So they

Page 8192

 1     monitored, as they were required to and permitted to under the agreement,

 2     they monitored the movement in and out of garrison of VJ movements -- VJ

 3     vehicles.

 4             Later on after this battle group had moved into position in the

 5     Podujevo area, I placed one of our vehicles right at the gate of the

 6     encampment that they established.  So we kept very close eye on them.

 7        Q.   And did anyone within the KDOM or KVM at the time contact VJ

 8     officers to find out what was happening, why this deployment was

 9     occurring?

10        A.   Yes, they did.  Let me stress here that KVM -- OSCE KVM was up

11     and operating by this time and they had taken over responsibility for

12     dealing with the Serbian authorities in Kosovo on implementation issues.

13     So they dealt specifically, officially, and formally with the Serbian

14     authorities.

15             My recollection is that Bill Walker sent General Drewienkiewicz

16     to deal with his counterpart on this specific incident and Drewienkiewicz

17     stayed in touch with this fellow.  It may have been General Loncar, I

18     can't recall directly.  But Drewienkiewicz was in direct contact with his

19     Serbian counterpart throughout the period in which this incident

20     unfolded.

21        Q.   And we see from the document that the VJ -- the information

22     received from -- by KDOM from the VJ was said that this was a training

23     exercise.  And it's put in quotes in the document, is there a reason for

24     that?

25        A.   Because that's a direct quote; that's what they told us when we

Page 8193

 1     asked them about it.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honours, I seek to tender this document at

 4     this stage.  It's 05346.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01246.

 7             MS. KRAVETZ:  If we could now have 05347 up on the screen.  If we

 8     could zoom in on paragraphs 1 and 2 on the first page.

 9        Q.   Sir, we see that this is another daily report.  It's dated

10     December 20th, 1998, a day after the one we just saw earlier.  And we see

11     in paragraph 1 there's a reference to KDOM and KVM monitoring the

12     activities of the VJ armoured battle group undertaking a training

13     exercise near Podujevo; and in paragraph 2, there's a reference to the

14     continued deployment and an indication of the type of vehicles and

15     personnel deployed, and the last sentence says "the group's exercise

16     include sending heavily armed patrols along the Podujevo-Pristina road."

17             Now, at the time, this is the day after you had been told that

18     this was a training exercise, when these deployments were observed by

19     your observers, were you still under the impression that the VJ was

20     deploying these units to the area to conduct training or did you have any

21     information as to what was happening?

22        A.   Our very distinct impression at the time was that this was not an

23     exercise and that it was being done to protect the most strategic road

24     linking Kosovo with Serbia.  The road between Pristina-Podujevo went on

25     to cross the border into Serbia proper, and then went on to Nis which was

Page 8194

 1     the headquarters of the -- I believe it was the Yugoslav 3rd Army.

 2             That's where -- and I would add that parallel to the road ran a

 3     rail line, the only major rail line running into Kosovo.  On those two

 4     communications links depended the Serbian security forces supplies and of

 5     course other things.  These roads and this railroad were important for

 6     the movement of civilians and commerce and trade.  So it was very

 7     important to Belgrade that they be kept open.

 8             The road had come under increasing pressure from the KLA in the

 9     area.  I don't know if that's reflected in this report, I don't recall,

10     but the KLA commander in the Lap region was very aggressive, was not

11     particularly interested in fulfilling the terms of the October Agreement

12     to which of course the KLA was not party.  Our job and then Bill Walker's

13     job in large part had been to sell this agreement to the KLA, to get them

14     to play by the agreement's rules.  This fellow had begun to move his

15     troops closer to the road and there had been incidents along the road in

16     the period leading up to this.

17             In short, this was the response of the Yugoslav -- of the Serbian

18     security forces.  This was a critical strategic link and they had -- they

19     had to defend it.  They had to keep it open.

20        Q.   Now, we saw earlier when we were looking at one of the agreements

21     signed in October that company-sized teams were authorised along certain

22     lines of communication.  Was the Pristina-Nis road --

23     Podujevo-Pristina-Nis road included?  I mean, were units allowed to be

24     deployed along that axis?

25        A.   No, it was not.  I've looked at the documents to prepare for

Page 8195

 1     this, and it was not included.  And I have to say ten years later or 11

 2     years later, I have to wonder about that omission.

 3             I don't have any information on that because that -- those

 4     deployments and the regime which governed the behaviour, if you will, of

 5     the Serbian army was negotiated by the other Working Group led by

 6     General Clark.  I wasn't party to it.  And we were up all night

 7     negotiating these documents after which Slobodan Milosevic treated us to

 8     a brunch and then everybody got on airplanes and left.  I'm sorry for

 9     being long-winded, but I just don't know.  I -- from a strategic

10     standpoint, I don't understand why the Serbian army wasn't allowed to

11     have a battle group up there to protect a strategic -- clearly the most

12     important strategic line of communication.  I don't know.

13        Q.   Thank you for that.

14             MS. KRAVETZ:  I see, Your Honours, that it's already 1.30.

15     Before we break, I would like to tender this document, 05347.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01247.

18             MS. KRAVETZ:  This is a convenient time to interrupt,

19     Your Honour.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  We have run out of the time we can run on our

21     tapes, Mr. Byrnes, and we must adjourn although it's a quarter of an hour

22     before our normal time as we've had a disrupted programme today.  We

23     resume this trial tomorrow at 9.00, and we would ask that you be back for

24     that.  The Court Officer will assist you with any further details that

25     you need in the interim.  And no doubt Ms. Johnson with you.

Page 8196

 1             So we adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.31 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 21st day

 5                           of August, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.