1 Tuesday, 1 September 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon.
6 Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I did want to bring up
8 some procedural matters before we had the witness in. The next witness
9 will be Colonel Michael Phillips. He is a Rule 70 witness. Pursuant to
10 your decision of 14 May, Prosecution was granted leave to add him as a
11 witness. And you ordered certain conditions regarding his testimony.
12 A, was that his testimony be limited to topics that were listed
13 in Annex A to that decision. B, that cross-examination was limited to
14 the scope of direct, and issues of credibility. C, that the witness
15 could decline to answer certain questions on grounds of confidentiality.
16 D, that representatives of the Rule 70 provider would be allowed to sit
18 And I will indicate that there are two Your Honour, one is
19 Ms. Karen Johnson and Elisa Skibsrud, S-k-i-b-s-r-u-d. And I believe the
20 arrangements that are Ms. Skibsrud will be sitting next to the witness,
21 and Ms. Johnson will be sitting beside us over here on the Prosecution
23 And E - and this a remainder for myself, the Defence, and
24 everyone else - that if there are questions concerning the contents of
25 Colonel Phillips' notebook that those questions should take place in
1 private session. Likewise if there's questions concerning his notes of
2 his interview. And that any pages of those notebooks, if they are to be
3 tendered into evidence, they should be tendered under seal. The Rule 70
4 provider then would review the transcript of any private or closed
5 session and any documents tendered under seal with an eye to releasing as
6 much as possible.
7 I understand this was the same procedure that was followed with
8 the witness Shaun Byrnes. And if there are no questions about that,
9 Your Honour, then I have three other matters concerning some of the
10 documents I want to use with this witness, if I can raise that now.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 MR. HANNIS: First of all, I would like to seek leave to add
13 seven documents, these are KDOM reports. The 65 ter numbers are 05354
14 through 05360. There are a total of seven of them. And my application
15 would basically echo what Ms. Kravetz presented to Your Honours in
16 connection with some KDOM reports that she sought leave to add at
17 transcript page 8153. These are contemporaneous reports that were
18 prepared by US KDOM. They relate directly to the evidence of this
19 witness. They were all written, I think, in February and March of 1999.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Are these reports different from those Ms. Kravetz
22 MR. HANNIS: No, they're not.
23 JUDGE PARKER: They are the same ones?
24 MR. HANNIS: They're from the same source. They were published
25 on the website --
1 JUDGE PARKER: I mean, are they the same reports, or are they
2 different reports?
3 MR. HANNIS: They're different reports for different days but
4 from the same source and published on the US Department of State website
5 and similar in all other fashion. Also we --
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. I was going to get Mr. Djurdjic's
7 reaction to that proposal.
8 MR. HANNIS: Sorry.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Let's go
10 one thing at a time since Mr. Hannis raised a number of issues. I object
11 to the introduction of these documents through this witness. This
12 witness has nothing to do with the US KDOM, he was a member of the KVM,
13 that is to say the mission founded by the OSCE. It has nothing to do
14 with any KDOM reports. And he did not forward any such reports to the
15 State Department. If I understood properly, he was an international
16 official not a State Department official. To conclude, I think I have
17 two out of the seven reports which are exclusively State Department
18 reports, not even KDOM reports. The 6th and the 7th report, that is.
19 We particularly object to those, and it encompasses the period
20 which is not covered at all by the topics you set out. Also expanding
21 evidence in such a way deviates from your decision and the decision as it
22 stood in the Milutinovic case. Not even in the summary under 65 ter, the
23 statement summary, mentions some of the things that we received in the
24 e-mail we received yesterday from the Prosecution.
25 If such evidence was supposed to be led and introduced, they
1 should have used Mr. Byrnes who remained a KDOM member until the end
2 working for the State Department at the same time.
3 This witness did not work for his government, and such documents
4 cannot be tendered through him. This is what we object to.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
6 Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. In reply, I should indicate to my
8 learned friend that the two he has the strongest objection to are 05361
9 and 05362; I'm not offering those, Your Honours. Those were reports for
10 the 31st of March, 1999, and the 5th of April, 1999. Upon review, I saw
11 that those were not from KDOM, those were State Department. They were
12 posted after Colonel Phillips had left Kosovo, so I'm not tendering
14 As for the others, yes, they are KDOM reports but I think the
15 witness's evidence will be that he did receive these when he was working
16 in KVM, he had a chance to review them. And what I propose to do with
17 those is I want to show him some of the entries in there about general
18 happenings in terms of activity of the VJ and the MUP in February and
19 March 1999 and ask if that's consistent with what he personally observed
20 and/or what he was getting from his own sources of information in KVM.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE PARKER: The documents proposed by Mr. Hannis to be added
23 to the list will be added to the Rule 65 ter list.
24 Can I be clear, Mr. Hannis, is it five or seven?
25 MR. HANNIS: It is seven, Your Honour. There were originally
1 nine on my list.
2 JUDGE PARKER: The two mentioned by Mr. Djurdjic would have made
3 it nine.
4 MR. HANNIS: Correct.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good. Well it's seven that are added to your
6 list, not nine?
7 MR. HANNIS: Correct. Thank you. I would also seek leave to add
8 65 ter number 05364. This is a document which contains excerpts from
9 Colonel Phillips' notebooks covering the time-period from
10 9 December, 1998
11 Defence. This was something that we only -- I don't know the date, but
12 we only recently received approval from the provider to us. I don't know
13 if Mr. Djurdjic has any objection to that.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Hannis knows better
15 than I do what happened with these documents in the Milutinovic case.
16 But since we realise that Mr. Hannis wanted to use these excerpts, we are
17 going to as well. The Defence in the Milutinovic case used certain
18 excerpts from the notes by Mr. Phillips. That is during the period when
19 he was in Kosovo before the 19th of February, I think. That is the
20 period that he is supposed to testify about.
21 JUDGE PARKER: You are quite correct, Mr. Djurdjic. Not only may
22 you use this document, but you can use any of the other seven if you
23 think it's of relevance to your case. They become available in the case
24 being on that list.
25 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be added to the list as well.
3 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. And lastly before we have the witness
4 in, regarding his prior transcript when application was made to have him
5 as a 92 ter witness, that transcript -- the full transcript including
6 some closed-session portions was given the number P1215. Even though it
7 has not been admitted yet. At the time, though, when it was uploaded in
8 e-court, I think we inadvertently omitted ten pages because of a break
9 when discussions were taking place during his closed-session testimony.
10 We seek leave to add those ten pages. And then once I've gone through
11 the appropriate questions with him about whether he can verify whether
12 that's correct, then I will be moving to add P1215 as an exhibit under
13 92 ter. But that one would need to be under seal because it contains the
14 closed session portions of his testimony. And then I need to seek leave
15 to add 05343.01 which is a public redacted version of that prior
17 JUDGE PARKER: Taking the bit we can deal with right now, the
18 P1215 may have added to it the omitted pages.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. And that concludes my --
20 JUDGE PARKER: Splendid. Are we ready for the witness?
21 MR. HANNIS: We are, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. While the witness is being brought in,
23 could I just be sure that you are aware of our admonition yesterday to
24 Ms. Kravetz that we must finish this witness by tomorrow evening.
25 MR. HANNIS: Yes, she did bass that on to me, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Not by tomorrow evening but by tomorrow at 1.45.
2 MR. HANNIS: I understand. I may go into the second session
3 today, but not very long, I hope. I believe that will leave adequate
4 time for the Defence.
5 JUDGE PARKER: You leave plenty of time for Mr. Djurdjic, that's
6 the message.
7 MR. HANNIS: I will.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Based on my previous experience
11 with Mr. Hannis, I do not believe the last part of what he said. In any
12 case, was this disclosed to the Defence? Was that a mistake concerning
13 the ten pages of transcript which did not make the record? Did we
14 receive the whole set? Yes, I guess so. Thank you.
15 JUDGE PARKER: You can attempt, if you like, to prove Mr. Hannis
16 a liar over this one, Mr. Djurdjic, but it's in your interest not to, I
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, sir.
20 THE WITNESS: Morning, sir.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please read aloud the affirmation which
22 is shown to you on the card.
23 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
24 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
25 WITNESS: MICHAEL PHILLIPS
1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down. Now, I see
2 you have with you the two representatives which have been authorised by
3 this Chamber's decision. Ms. Johnson is aware of the procedure. Could I
4 just indicate for your assistance that if you feel the need for any
5 advice or if your advisor feels the need to offer you any advice, that
6 can be done privately as you are situated.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Press the off button on the microphone before you
9 have that discussion. And if there is then -- you would then, in
10 accordance with that advice, if there was any objection or difficulty,
11 raise it, and we will then look at what it is and its nature and what
12 role, if any, your visors may then need to play in the resolution of
13 whatever it is.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15 JUDGE PARKER: And with a bit of luck, we won't have a problem.
16 Mr. Hannis has some questions for you.
17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. I would indicate that
18 sitting next to the witness is Ms. Skibsrud and Ms. Johnson is sitting
19 behind us.
20 Examination by Mr. Hannis:
21 Q. Sir, could you tell us your name, please?
22 A. My name is Michael D. Phillips. Do you want me to wear these
23 head sets?
24 Q. Thank you. Since we both speak English, Mr. Phillips, I would
25 ask if you would help me try to remember that we should take a pause
1 between my question and your answer and between your answer and my next
2 question so that the interpretation can keep up with us.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can you tell us what your occupation or your profession is?
5 A. I retired from active-duty air force yesterday, so I am currently
6 an unemployed civilian.
7 Q. Congratulations or condolences, as may fit.
8 How long were you in the air force?
9 A. About 28 years.
10 Q. Okay. And what was your rank upon retirement?
11 A. I retired as a full colonel in the air force.
12 Q. Have you had a -- well, did you previously testify at this
13 Tribunal in connection with the events in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 in the
14 Milutinovic case?
15 A. Yes, sir, I did.
16 Q. And I believe that was in March of 2007. Have you had a chance
17 to review a transcript of your prior testimony?
18 A. Yes, sir, I did.
19 Q. And are you satisfied that it's true and accurate?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. And would you answer those same questions in the same way if
22 those questions were put to you today?
23 A. Yes, sir, I would.
24 Q. Okay.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would at this time like to tender
1 the full transcript, P1615 under seal, and 05343.01 the redacted version
2 as a public exhibit.
3 JUDGE PARKER: First of all, the transcript itself will be
4 received under seal.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01215 under
7 JUDGE PARKER: The redacted transcript will also be received.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I see I misspoke and
9 said 1 --
10 JUDGE PARKER: I wondered where 1615 came from. And the redacted
12 THE REGISTRAR: The redacted transcript will be Exhibit P01303,
13 Your Honours.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
15 MR. HANNIS:
16 Q. Colonel, can you tell us how you came to be in Kosovo in 1998?
17 A. In 1998, I was stationed at pacific command in Honolulu Hawaii
18 and I had received a phone call in September from the vice-chairman of
19 the joint chiefs of staff, General Ralston, telling me that they had just
20 finished a session with Ambassador William Walker who had just been
21 assigned to be the head of mission in Kosovo. And in that meeting he was
22 asked is there anything that he needed, and when that question came he
23 said, yes, he needed this air force lieutenant-colonel, I didn't know
24 where he was assigned, that was me. And then I received a phone call a
25 week later from General Ralston asking if I would be willing to give up
1 my post in Honolulu
2 Pristina, Kosovo.
3 MR. HANNIS: Before I proceed further, I understand, Your
4 Honours, that for 92 ter witness the practice is for the Prosecution to
5 read a brief summary of the witness's evidence. And if I may, I would do
6 that now.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. This being a 92 ter witness, that would be
8 the procedure to follow.
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 This witness worked as Chief of Staff for William Walker, the
11 head of OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission or KVM from November 1998
12 until July 1999. He provides evidence on the role of this mission in
13 Kosovo. During his tenure in Kosovo, Colonel Phillips attended and took
14 notes of meetings in which KVM head William Walker met various high-level
15 officials of the FRY as well as with representatives of the VJ and the
16 MUP. He also speaks about the engagement of VJ and MUP units in joint
17 operations in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.
18 The witness recounts instances when KVM raised complaints with
19 Slobodan Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic, General Loncar, MUP General Lukic,
20 and other officials regarding the conduct of VJ and MUP units during
21 those operations.
22 The witness also provides evidence on the Podujevo incident in
23 December 1998, on the Racak incident in January 1999, and on ongoing
24 violations of October Agreements by the VJ and MUP.
25 Colonel Phillips describes how the Serb forces steadily increased
1 their presence and the level of their combat activities from January 1999
2 until the KVM was evacuated in late March. The witness also details
3 visits to refugee camps in Macedonia
4 about the information reported to him and KVM from many of those refugees
5 about how and why they left Kosovo and crimes committed against them by
6 VJ and MUP forces.
7 Q. Colonel, I'd like if you could describe briefly for the Judges
8 the general purpose of the Kosovo Verification Mission?
9 A. Sir, our mandate --
10 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. --
11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. The last portion of
13 the summary read by Mr. Hannis has to do with the refugees after their
14 departure from Kosovo. That part was not within the 65 ter submission we
15 received. This is an expansion of sorts that Mr. Hannis has just
16 introduced. I don't know why and how. I followed closely what he was
17 saying, and it is unclear to me. We don't find it in your decision
18 either, Your Honours, in the first several points Mr. Hannis enumerated
19 prior to the witness being led into the courtroom did not mention that as
21 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. This is information that we got
22 from Colonel Phillips when we spoke with him during his proofing
23 yesterday. We sent a supplemental information sheet to the Defence last
24 evening advising them of that additional information. We had discussions
25 with the provider about whether they viewed this as something that was
1 covered by the topics we were allowed to raise, and the consensus was
2 that this related to the non-compliance of the MUP and the VJ with the
3 Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreements and the consequences of that
4 non-compliance. It also relates to the actions of the VJ and MUP and
5 their general modus operandi. And although Mr. Phillips would have been
6 standing outside of Kosovo when he was talking to refugees in Macedonia
7 and Albania
8 period of July -- or, November 1998 through July 1999.
9 JUDGE PARKER: But not events witnessed by Mr. Phillips.
10 MR. HANNIS: No, but as I said, Your Honour, we took our
11 understanding from discussions with the provider about whether or not
12 their view was that this was covered by what they gave us permission to
13 lead evidence on was it did relate to non-compliance of the MUP and VJ
14 with the agreement
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis, the Chamber would take the view that
17 what Mr. Djurdjic has advanced has substance on this occasion. The list
18 of topics which were set out in the annex of this Chamber's decision does
19 not, on its usual understanding, nor on the understanding of the three
20 authors who sit here, extend to secondary evidence the witness may have
21 gathered after he had left Kosovo, even though it may relate to events
22 that he was told had occurred in Kosovo.
23 So I am afraid you need to limit his evidence to the other
25 MR. HANNIS: All right, Your Honour, I understand.
1 Q. Colonel, I think when we took out that intervention I had just
2 asked you about what was the purpose of the Kosovo Verification Mission?
3 A. Yes, sir, it was our understanding with the agreement that we
4 were there to ensure that there was cease-fire maintenance in place and
5 adhered to by both sides and which I refer to the KLA and the Serb, and
6 the VJ and the MUP.
7 Q. And when did you first arrive in Kosovo?
8 A. I arrived on the 4th of November, I believe.
9 Q. Was William Walker already there?
10 A. No, sir, I arrived with him, we flew in from Warsaw to Pristina
11 airport where we departed the airplane and had an immediate conference at
12 the airport stating what our mission was.
13 Q. How did you begin to go about your work in terms of contacting
14 the Serbian authorities and trying to implement the agreement?
15 A. The first few weeks after we arrived were really sent -- or spent
16 trying to build the OSCE operation before we had reached out to any of
17 the officials that were in Pristina representing the FRY.
18 So it wasn't until, I think, early December we had our first
19 meeting, we were invited to the government building where we met at that
20 time Nikola Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, I believe General Lukic, Mr. Slana,
21 Mr. Skoric, and others who introduced themselves to us and they would be
22 assisting us and helping our mission move forward.
23 Q. We have heard evidence in this case about a Federal Commission
24 for Cooperation with the OSCE, are you familiar with that body or that
1 A. I'm familiar with the name, but we had no direct meeting with
3 Q. Okay. And the gentlemen you described just meeting, this meeting
4 was in Pristina?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. And how -- do you recall how they introduced themselves to you?
7 Can you tell us individually how that went?
8 A. Mr. Sainovic introduced himself very friendly as a personal
9 representative of Mr. Milosevic. He introduced himself first. Our
10 assumption was he was in charge there. General Loncar introduced himself
11 as retired general but also as a representative of Mr. Milosevic. And
12 Mr. Lukic introduced himself as the chief of police, the MUP, and I'm not
13 a hundred per cent certain, but I believe he introduced himself the same
14 way when he was also a representative of the Government of Belgrade
15 referring to Mr. Milosevic.
16 Q. And after this meeting, did you have regular meetings with this
17 group of men, Mr. Sainovic, General Loncar, and General Lukic?
18 A. Yes, sir. We tried to have meetings on a weekly basis. It
19 didn't always occur that way, but we both had agreed that it would be
20 advantageous to both sides to try and meet regularly to work any issues
21 that had come up that were prohibiting the mission from standing up.
22 Q. Okay. And during your time in Kosovo before being evacuated in
23 March, did you and Mr. Walker have any meetings with Mr. Milosevic?
24 A. Yes, sir. We had two meetings, I believe one was in November and
25 one was in December.
1 Q. What can you tell us about those meetings and how they related to
2 your mission with the KVM?
3 A. The one I can recall, the first meeting, was a late November
4 time-frame. We were delivering a letter that Ambassador Walker hand
5 carried and delivered to him, kind of outlining what our understanding of
6 the mission for the OSCE was.
7 And the second meeting that we had in December was a meeting, I
8 believe Ambassador Miles attended with us. And that meeting regarded
9 non-compliance issues that were prohibiting and hindering the OSCE
10 Mission from standing up.
11 Q. You mentioned Ambassador Miles, can you tell us who he was?
12 A. I referred to him as ambassador, but at the time he was a
13 charge d'affair for the American Embassy in Belgrade.
14 Q. Okay. And you mentioned a letter that was delivered to
15 Mr. Milosevic at that first meeting?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. What can you tell us about that?
18 A. It was -- it was a letter of outreach. There was a lot of
19 discussion prior to the November meeting with Mr. Milosevic on the
20 interpretation of the agreement. Both sides were interpreting it in a
21 different manner, and it was an attempt by Ambassador Walker to achieve a
22 common understanding of the intent of what the mandate was. And it also
23 had in there, I believe, some request of Mr. Milosevic requesting his
24 assistance to get some things from a security aspect, from a -- we wanted
25 to move the visa process along so from a consulate request aspect to try
1 and set up the mission. So we had a few requests and a common
2 understanding with what the purpose of the mission was, what we were
3 going to try to do.
4 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to put up an exhibit for you to look at.
5 It's P838.
6 Q. It should be appearing on your monitor shortly, sir. Do you
7 recognise that document?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. What is it?
10 A. This is a letter that Ambassador Walker carried forward to
11 Mr. Milosevic.
12 Q. Okay. On the first page we see there some definitions of the
13 terms that OSCE proposed to be used in interpreting the agreement?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to the second page.
16 Q. This is in evidence already, Colonel, but we see here there are a
17 request for certain kinds of information from the FRY about the security
18 forces and requests for certain kinds of notifications?
19 A. Right.
20 Q. Were all these discussed at that meeting?
21 A. Yes, they were.
22 Q. And the last page, just to complete the document. Well, that's
23 the attachment. I was looking for the signature page. I thought it was
24 the third page.
25 MR. HANNIS: It's 0076-6679. Yes.
1 Q. Recognise that signature?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Now, what was Mr. Milosevic's reaction to receiving
4 this letter some time shortly after the 23rd of November?
5 A. As I recall - it's been a long time, it's been ten years - our
6 first meeting, we arrived and he met us at the car and very friendly.
7 The first meeting generally went well. A lot of discussion over
8 definitions and, as I recall, we really never got an agreement one way or
9 the other from Mr. Milosevic. So I believe we kind of walked away with,
10 it was great to have the first meeting, glad that you are here, my
11 representatives in Kosovo will work your needs.
12 Q. Who did you understand his representatives in Kosovo to be?
13 A. Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Loncar, and the group that I mentioned earlier.
14 Q. Were any of them present at this first meeting with
15 Mr. Milosevic?
16 A. Mr. Sainovic, I believe, was present.
17 Q. Okay. Now, the second meeting with Milosevic, do you recall when
18 that occurred?
19 A. That was in December. I think December 15th roughly.
20 Q. I'm sorry, going back to the first meeting, where did that take
22 A. That took place at the White Palace
23 Q. The second meeting?
24 A. At the White Palace
25 Q. Who was present for that one?
1 A. I believe Mr. Sainovic also, Mr. Milosevic, Ambassador Walker,
2 and, of course, myself.
3 Q. The purpose of the second meeting?
4 A. That was a less friendly meeting. We had delivered information
5 of non-compliance to Mr. Milosevic. And that was the purpose of the
7 Q. And the nature of the information and non-compliance?
8 A. We weren't getting -- we weren't receiving our consulate that was
9 promised to us - we were getting stood up - so we could get the verifiers
10 in on time in a quickened manner. We had requested some medical
11 helicopter support, and we had requested the body guards for Ambassador
12 Walker, armed body guards for Ambassador Walker, and those were not
13 received well.
14 Q. After that meeting on the 15th of December, did you continue to
15 have meetings with Sainovic, Loncar, and Lukic in Pristina?
16 A. Yes, sir, we did.
17 Q. For how long did that continue?
18 A. Really right up until about the time of mid-January when Racak
19 took place.
20 Q. Okay. And after Racak, any more meetings with those guys?
21 A. There was a meeting or two with General Loncar, but I can't
22 recall immediately if we had another one with Mr. Sainovic. I know he
23 was difficult to reach after that. But the meetings were less regular
24 and were often called in a reactive mode; when something had happened we
25 needed to speak to the government folks immediately, but we did not any
1 longer have any regular scheduled event after that.
2 Q. You've mentioned telling Mr. Milosevic about non-compliance, were
3 you also telling Sainovic and Loncar and Lukic about non-compliance
5 A. Yes, sir, we did.
6 Q. Can you give us a breakdown of some of the general areas of
7 non-compliance in KVM's view?
8 A. Well, there was an agreement that we would be provided some
9 base-line information which we could verify, and we needed strengths of
10 the MUP and the VJ, weapons counts. We needed to have our cars brought
11 across the border without delay. We needed the consulate stood up. Just
12 the logistics of the mission in general. We had -- we had asked for some
13 of the more provocative patrols to be reduced. We had asked for troops
14 in Malisevo to be reduced so we could bring back some of the IDPs. Those
15 sorts of issues were the bulk of our discussions with Mr. Sainovic.
16 Q. I want to ask you about something called the Blue Book, are you
17 familiar with that document?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 MR. HANNIS: Could we look now at Exhibit P1029.
20 Q. While that's coming up, can you tell us what that was, who put it
21 out, what was contained in it, what was its purpose?
22 A. The Blue Book was a KVM document that was produced by the head of
23 mission for operations referred to as Major-General DZ. And it was an
24 overview of operational events of that particular day.
25 Q. And did you see those reports on a regular basis in your position
1 as Chief of Staff?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Do you recognise the cover page that's on the screen now?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. And I would like to ask you about just two or three entries in
6 this document, if I may.
7 MR. HANNIS: First I'd like to look at page 2 in the English. I
8 think it's page 3 of the B/C/S.
9 Q. Have you seen this one before?
10 A. I have seen that, yes.
11 Q. Let me ask you, was -- under the agreement, was there some
12 requirement for MUP and VJ to notify KVM before undertaking certain
14 A. I don't know that was specifically in the agreement that that was
15 to happen, but we had had that discussion with Mr. Sainovic, the
16 government building, that it was advantageous to both of us to have prior
17 knowledge of an operation so we had some verification of both ongoing MUP
18 and VJ ops in a particular village, and we were generally told - and this
19 is kind of a good example here - generally the time that we got didn't
20 coincide with the actual time of such an operation.
21 Q. In discussion with Mr. Sainovic about this type of issue, was
22 there an agreement on his part that they would provide that information
23 to you?
24 A. Yes, there was.
25 Q. Was this the only time that happened where MUP notified you
1 apparently after an incident had taken place instead of before?
2 A. No sir, this happened on several occasions, and each time we
3 brought it to General Sainovic's attention he would turn to General Lukic
4 and ask him, you know, why this wasn't happening.
5 Q. Do you recall what Lukic said in those situations?
6 A. He didn't often speak English in there, so I didn't get the
7 direct interpretation of it. But what I do remember was that he would
8 look into why the coordination was not happening, but he always blamed it
9 on it was a coordination problem with the KVM.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. HANNIS: If we could look next at page 48 in the English,
12 page 50 of the B/C/S. I see Mr. Djordjevic [sic] on his feet.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djordjevic -- Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do not have this
15 exhibit on my list. I've been looking for it and I can't seem to be able
16 to find it. I have organised everything here, and I'm really trying to
17 find it but it's impossible. Of course, if it's not going to be used any
18 more, that's fine, but we can move on and then get back to this later. I
19 can't see the 26th of December. I do have the document of the
20 29th of December. Maybe it's my error, but I doubt it. Well, let's move
21 on, I have seen the document and I'm look it up, if you're done with it.
22 If you are not going to use it any more.
23 MR. HANNIS: I have two more entries from this document I propose
24 to show the witness, I think the problem is that on the initial
25 notification the document was listed as P1028. We sent a follow-up
1 e-mail to indicate that should be P1029. I think the problem before that
2 the pages were not uploaded in chronological order and a change was made
3 to get them into chronological order for easier use.
4 JUDGE PARKER: You are quoting there Rule 65 ter exhibit numbers,
5 are you?
6 MR. HANNIS: Those are admitted exhibit numbers, I understand.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Well, it seems that there may have
8 been notification, Mr. Djurdjic.
9 MR. HANNIS: I'm informed that 1028 was MFI and 1029 was
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, I don't have either 1028 or
13 1029 on my list, that's my problem. I mean, I only have documents
14 starting with --
15 JUDGE PARKER: I have been informed that 1028 marked for
16 identification is the whole of the book, was marked for identification
17 because much of it has not been translated. Exhibit 1029 are those parts
18 that have been translated and they were tendered.
19 MR. HANNIS: That's my understanding, Your Honour.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I haven't received anything for
21 1029. And as for P1028, I see that I have it on the list as P407.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis has told us about that, Mr. Djurdjic,
23 that in the notification to you there was an error quoting 1028 and a
24 follow-up e-mail told you it should be 1029.
25 Carry on, please, Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. And for the record, that
2 e-mail went out at 6.06 p.m.
3 JUDGE PARKER: I thought it was old history, it's new history is
5 MR. HANNIS: Yes, thank you.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Very new history.
7 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
8 Q. Colonel, can you see the page on the monitor now that is -- the
9 heading is titled "Probable New VJ Unit"?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. It makes reference to a unit wearing black berets?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Did you see any such unit or soldiers during your time in Kosovo?
14 A. We did see the VJ on occasion with a few wearing black berets,
16 Q. What did you learn or what did you know about this unit?
17 A. We were to understand that they were kind of considered like
18 Special Forces, kind of an elite force, kind of an anti-terrorist unit.
19 Q. And were you able to learn anything about their equipment or
20 weapons vis-a-vis other VJ units?
21 A. Just from an observation point of view they seemed to look, you
22 know, the weapons they had were clean and new and they looked sharper and
23 uniforms looked new and pressed. They were a good-looking unit. Well
25 Q. Connected with that, let me ask a general question about MUP
1 units you saw in Kosovo. Did you see a difference between various MUP
3 A. Yes, sir. I kind of referred to it as there was the common
4 beat-patrol MUP that you would see walking the streets in Pristina with a
5 side-arm. And then there were what I call combat MUP who you would see
6 in the field commonly wearing helmets and camouflage blue uniforms, flak
7 vest, rocket packs on their back, long-barrelled weapons.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. HANNIS: And the last entry in this document I want to show
10 you is English page 91, I believe it's also 91 in the B/C/S.
11 Q. You see that entry about "large VJ convoy observed"?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Appears to be dated the 16th of March, 1999. What can you tell
14 us about that? Under the October Agreements, were there any prohibitions
15 on what equipment could be brought in to Kosovo?
16 A. We were looking for both troop size, strength, and weapons to be
17 reduced to pre-October numbers. And what we had observed really after
18 the middle of January was a general increase in both VJ strength and on
19 occasion MUP strength. We did see more armoured vehicles; the convoys
20 were larger than we had traditionally seen in the November/December
22 Q. Was that a regular trend that you saw after December and January?
23 A. Middle of January the trend was, in my view from what I observed,
24 an increase in those numbers. The convoys were larger and that sort of
1 Q. I see on the comment it makes reference to RC 2. Can you tell us
2 what that stood for?
3 A. That was one of the five regional centres that we had split
4 Kosovo up. We had OSCE commanders, if you will, in each one of the five
5 with a small contingent of OSCE verifiers in each of the regions.
6 Q. Do you recall who was in RC 2?
7 A. I don't.
8 Q. The last sentence in that comment is:
9 "Movement of M-84 assets into Kosovo is in clear violation of the
10 base-line agreement."
11 A. Right. Those were additional weapons, armoured vehicles that
12 were being brought in that were beyond the mandate. The idea was to
13 reduce, not to increase, and this was an increase.
14 Q. Okay. Do know what the M-84s were?
15 A. I believe they were tanks.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. HANNIS: That's all I have with that document.
18 Q. And next I would like to ask you about KDOM reports. The first
19 I'd like to look at is 05354.
20 Were you aware of KDOM reports in 1998 and 1999 when you were in
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. And what did you -- briefly, what did you know about KDOM, and
24 how did it relate to KVM?
25 A. When we arrived we knew that the KDOM -- there was an EU KDOM and
1 a Russian KDOM and a US KDOM and that they were an American-only
2 contingent, were not an international force. And we had no command and
3 control over them. We met with Mr. Shaun Byrnes who was leading the US
4 KDOM, but we did not use their reports to write our reports, but we were
5 familiar with the KDOM reports.
6 Q. Did you share KVM information with them?
7 A. I believe we did, yes, sir.
8 Q. Did you have occasion to review these reports during your time
10 A. The KDOM -- on occasion we did. We didn't make a daily habit out
11 of reviewing them, but Mr. Byrnes made us aware of them and from time to
12 time looked at them but more just as an interest item rather than a
13 reporting item.
14 Q. Have you seen -- well, the one that's on the screen now is from
15 February 12th. I have a question for you about the fourth paragraph that
16 says -- I don't think you can see it on the screen --
17 MR. HANNIS: We'll have to scroll down. Yes.
18 Q. "The extensive VJ troop and equipment movements we reported
19 yesterday resulted in about 50 villagers fleeing from their homes near
20 Lapusnik in what the VJ labelled as an exercise. The troops moved into
21 the villages firing weapons mounted on tracked vehicles."
22 Were you aware of this particular incident?
23 A. Not this particular incident, but this is consistent with that
24 time-frame about the VJ and MUP moving into villages and creating
25 widespread fleeing of the villagers. So not uncommon for that
2 Q. And based on your -- your information and your own observations,
3 from the KDOM reports that you looked at, did you see any information
4 that was in direct conflict with your personal observations?
5 A. In general they were reflective of being accurate, yes.
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I'd like to tender 5354.
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01304.
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. The next one, please, would be 5355.
10 Q. Two things on this one, Colonel, dated the 19th of February.
11 MR. HANNIS: And if we could scroll to the bottom of the page.
12 Q. The first paragraph under the date mentions Rambouillet, and the
13 second sentence says:
14 "A visible increase in the movement of FRY, VJ, and police units
15 and their equipment has been noted in the past 24 hours."
16 You were aware of the negotiations that were going on in
17 Rambouillet in February 1999?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And do you recall what the situation was in Kosovo in terms of
20 the VJ and MUP activity?
21 A. It was a very tense period. A number of VJ and MUP units were
22 deployed throughout Kosovo resulting in a number of IDPs, displaced
23 persons. But it was -- I would categorised it as -- try to characterise
24 it as a period of -- it was a desperate period. We were fearful of
25 losing a peaceful solution for a political solution in Kosovo.
1 Q. I think in the last paragraph there's mention of dead-line
2 approaching in Rambouillet. And then it said:
4 him of the FRY's responsibility for the safety of OSCE personnel in
6 Do you recall what that was about at that time?
7 A. We were concerned about our safety from day one, but generally
8 that was anticipating evacuation of the mission. And we had built a
9 contingency plan to evacuate the mission through a number of avenues of
10 departure, and we wanted Mr. Loncar to know that if we did, in fact,
11 evacuate that we were going to be safe in doing so and that he was to get
12 that word out.
13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. I'd like to tender 5355, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01305.
16 MR. HANNIS: Next, a few days later, 5356. 05356, please.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please switch off his
18 microphone when not using it. Thank you.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
20 Q. This is the 22nd of February, Colonel, and the fourth paragraph
21 down, the last sentence:
22 "There are reports also that the FRY is calling up reserve
23 military units and arming some civilians over the past few days."
24 Were you aware of that activity in late February of 1999?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to the second page of this
3 Q. The last paragraph in this report makes reference to KDOM mission
4 having departed Pristina. Do you recall when that happened?
5 A. I was aware of it, but I don't have any real precise memory of
6 that particular departure.
7 Q. Okay. And it says:
8 "... KVM remains on alert stand by status ..."
9 A. Right.
10 Q. Was that a particular --
11 A. That was an alert stand by to be prepared to evacuate. The whole
12 mission had been given procedures on what to do to evacuate, how much
13 they could carry out with them, and where they were to meet. That's what
14 that was about.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. HANNIS: I would like to tender 5356.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01306.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. And next if we could see 5357,
20 65 ter number.
21 Q. Colonel, this one is dated the 11th of March, 1999. The second
22 paragraph mentions reports that Serb VJ forces have conducted extensive
23 sweep operations to the west of the Kacanik to Djeneral Jankovic highway.
24 And mentions that these operations had forced villagers from their homes.
25 Do you know where the Kacanik and Djeneral Jankovic highway was?
1 A. I do. Yes, sir. It was in a mountain pass area.
2 Q. And were you aware of this situation?
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. I'd like to tender 5357.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01307.
7 MR. HANNIS: The next one is 5358, 65 ter number. I need the
8 third paragraph in English. Thank you.
9 Q. Colonel, this short paragraph says:
10 "Serb force levels have been augmented and remain poised
11 throughout Kosovo for what may be a wider offensive against the ethnic
13 Was that consistent with what you observed around the
14 12th of March?
15 A. Yes, sir, this time-period, late February, early March is
16 consistent with that paragraph.
17 MR. HANNIS: I would tender 5358.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01308.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Next is 65 ter 05359.
21 Q. Colonel, this one is dated the 17th of March. And the first
22 paragraph mentions:
23 "As the peace talks continue in Paris, the apparent Serb military
24 build-up in and near Kosovo continues."
25 Was that what you were seeing?
1 A. Yes, sir. I have to tell you, I was -- let's see, let me just
2 read this just for a moment. I was at the peace talks in Paris
3 this time-frame, but this was an issue that was delivered at Rambouillet,
4 not by me but it was brought up by Ambassador Walker. We were receiving
5 reports from the OSCE Mission that was left while we were away, but
6 that's consistent, yes.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. HANNIS: I would tender 5359.
9 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01309.
11 MR. HANNIS: And lastly, KDOM reports, 65 ter 5360.
12 Q. First paragraph mentions:
13 "... reports from the field that the Serbs continue to move
14 sizeable reinforcements in and around Kosovo. As of yesterday, there
15 were some 18-, to 21.000 troops poised just outside the province."
16 And the second paragraph, the last sentence says:
17 "The number of FRY and Serbian troops now out of barracks and in
18 Kosovo and the introduction of new battle tanks puts Belgrade grossly out
19 of compliance with the obligation it undertook last October."
20 Were you aware of that situation?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 MR. HANNIS: I would tender 5360.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01310.
25 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
1 Q. Now, Colonel, I want to talk a little bit about joint VJ and MUP
2 operations or actions. Did you have occasion to personally observe any
3 of that activity during your time in Kosovo?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. And in the course of doing that, can you tell us a little bit
6 about what you observed in terms of the different role of various MUP
7 units. You described the difference between what you term the beat cop,
8 something like the city policemen or the traffic policemen?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. And the others that appeared to be more combat ready, if you
12 A. Right.
13 Q. Where did you see combat MUP in Kosovo?
14 A. Wherever there was a village that was under stress by VJ presence
15 or MUP presence, they were obviously there. But generally saw the MUP in
16 the village proper and generally saw the VJ on the outskirts of those
18 Q. And what kind of actions were these MUP combat units
19 participating in, if you can describe?
20 A. They were managing everything from check-points in and out of the
21 village. They were house to house searching, in their view, for
22 terrorists. That was related to us and subsequent meetings of such
23 operations. They were making arrests. In general.
24 Q. And based on those observations, do you know under whose command
25 or direction they were operating -- deploying and carrying out these
2 A. It was our assessment that it was General Lukic who was directing
3 the MUP activity in the villages of Kosovo.
4 Q. Did you have occasion to take any photographs of some of this
5 activity that you observed?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to bring up now 65 ter number 02586.
8 Q. Can you tell us about this photograph, who took it, when and
9 where, what's going on?
10 A. I took that photo. It was December time-frame in Podujevo. The
11 blue personnel dressed in the camouflage blue there are MUP and the green
12 is the VJ.
13 Q. And I think you said this was near Podujevo?
14 A. Yes, sir, I believe it was near Podujevo.
15 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Could we go to the next photograph, I think
16 it's the third page in this exhibit.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... of this one. Who took it,
18 where, when?
19 A. I took the photo. I'm trying to recall exactly where it was.
20 I'm not a hundred per cent certain, sir, but I believe it was also
21 December time-frame, on the way into Podujevo.
22 MR. HANNIS: If we could look at the next page, please.
23 Q. How about this one?
24 A. Yeah, I took that photo. I believe it was in Podujevo on
25 December 1998 time-frame.
1 Q. And did you write anything on the back of these photographs?
2 A. I did, tried to an occasion, it took awhile to get photographs
3 back so there was always a gap between when I took it and when I could
4 record where I was with those.
5 MR. HANNIS: Can we see the next photograph, K057-7165. It's
6 still in this exhibit.
7 Q. How about this one?
8 A. I don't believe this was near Podujevo. I want to say this
9 photograph -- it was taken by me. I believe it was up near a place
10 called Junik but not a hundred per cent certain on the location.
11 MR. HANNIS: Could I see page 6 of the exhibit.
12 Q. How about this one, Colonel?
13 A. I took this one. This was a vehicle that had become stuck in the
14 mud. I believe that was up near Podujevo.
15 Q. Same time-frame?
16 A. Yes, sir. December 1998.
17 MR. HANNIS: And, next, page 8 of the exhibit, please.
18 Q. Tell us about this one.
19 A. I took this photo. I don't recall exactly where it was but this
20 is the MUP. I was doing a search of some sort.
21 Q. The tank that we saw in the earlier pictures, was it nearby when
22 this picture was taken?
23 A. I don't recall, sir.
24 Q. Okay.
25 MR. HANNIS: Can we see the next page.
1 Q. Same question.
2 A. Yes, sir. Podujevo, December 1998. I took this photo.
3 Q. All right.
4 MR. HANNIS: And two more. The next page and the following,
6 Q. Your photograph?
7 A. Yes, sir, I took this photo.
8 Q. Same place, same time?
9 A. I believe Podujevo, December, yes, sir.
10 MR. HANNIS: And the last page, please.
11 Q. Same questions.
12 A. Yes, sir. I took this photo, December time-frame. I don't
13 recall exactly where that was. I can't remember if that was Podujevo or
14 over near -- near the eastern side of the Kosovo mountain range.
15 Q. And do these photographs accurately represent the working
16 relationship you observed between the MUP and the VJ?
17 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, they do.
18 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Thank you. I would tender 2586,
19 Your Honours.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Is that ten photographs all together?
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I believe there are nine photographs
22 and the back side of two photographs with some handwriting on them. We
23 can look at the handwriting with this witness, perhaps just to be
24 completely safe.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Perhaps we should now, and then we'll receive the
2 MR. HANNIS: I think that's pages 2 and 4.
3 THE WITNESS: That's my writing on that screen, sir.
4 MR. HANNIS:
5 Q. Can you tell us anything about this writing? The description
6 doesn't sound like the photograph we looked at.
7 A. Yeah, this was a mistake that I had made. I remember -- I
8 remember the event, but it's on the wrong photo.
9 MR. HANNIS: Can we look at page 4.
10 Q. How about that, whose writing?
11 A. That is my writing, sir.
12 Q. And does that accurately depict the second photograph that we had
13 looked at in this series?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 A. Militia -- when I use the term "militia," it's in my notes as
17 well, I'm referring to the MUP.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. HANNIS: Now, Your Honour, I would tender that exhibit.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Can I be sure of that last comment, are you saying
21 that you referred to MUP as militia?
22 THE WITNESS: On occasion I did, yes, sir.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Did you refer to anything else as militia other
24 than MUP?
25 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Those photographs, nine plus the two backs will be
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01311.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
5 Q. Now, Colonel, I wanted to ask you about what is referred to as
6 the Podujevo incident. Do you know what I'm talking about there?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Can you tell us when that took place approximately?
9 A. Roughly December 25th, 1998.
10 Q. And what was the nature of that event?
11 A. It was on a sizeable VJ deployment. We were aware that it was
12 going to happen. We were given notice. It was at an airfield location.
13 We were told that the VJ were deploying up there for a normal training
14 event, it was in their cycle. It was our understanding that they hadn't
15 trained up there in some time, but they now in fact were training up
16 there in good sized numbers with weapons, heavy weapons, artillery such
17 as tanks and artillery. Also in the same time-period there was a heavy
18 KLA presence in the area there.
19 Q. And in KVM's view, was this a violation of the
20 October Agreements?
21 A. I don't know that we necessarily say it was a violation. We
22 found it odd that it was definitely provocative in nature. There had
23 been some fire fight sporadic between KLA positions and some of the
24 Serbian position, the VJ positions. But it was odd to see the -- a large
25 number of VJ and MUP in that area at that particular time for training.
1 Q. Do you recall this incident being the subject of discussions in
2 your meetings with Mr. Sainovic, General Loncar, and General Lukic?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Okay. We'll come back to that in a minute. I want to ask you
5 about something else that happened shortly after Podujevo. In early
6 January, do you remember an incident involving certain VJ soldiers who
7 had gotten captured by the KLA and then eventually KVM being involved in
8 trying to obtain their release?
9 A. Right, there were eight or nine VJ that had strayed from a normal
10 patrol and were captured by the KLA.
11 Q. And how did KVM get involved in this and what transpired, how did
12 it come out?
13 A. There was a meeting with Mr. Sainovic and General Loncar about
14 it. We were asked to assist in getting their release. KDOM also was
15 involved in getting their release. If I recall along the same time there
16 were also captured KLA by the VJ, and we were working very hard to get
17 both sides released.
18 I recall meetings that we'd have Mr. Sainovic and then we'd have
19 subsequent meetings but he had had to talk to Belgrade first, then get
20 with us. And with the help of KDOM, KVM won the release, but I remember
21 that we did not want to have the release appear that there was an
22 exchange of prisoners. So I believe the VJ were released first by eight,
23 ten days, and then later on the KLA were released and nobody was harmed.
24 It was considered a pretty big victory for KVM, that KDOM helped
25 facilitate. And I remember Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Loncar being very very
1 happy and very high that this event had taken place. There seemed to be
2 a sense of optimism that, you know, in his view that KVM was worth its
4 Q. Would you characterise that probably as the high point of the
5 cooperation between KVM and the Serbian authorities?
6 A. Yes, sir, I would. I would.
7 Q. And the low point during your time there?
8 A. Was the evacuation.
9 Q. Okay. And before the evacuation, was there something else that
10 took place that was a significant drop down from the prisoner exchange,
11 if you will?
12 A. Right, January 15th with the Racak incident.
13 Q. Just for right now just tell me briefly what that was and where
14 Racak was?
15 A. Racak was a village just outside Stimlje, and it was the massacre
16 of approximately 45 Albanian people.
17 Q. And do you know what Serbian units participated in that event, if
19 A. The VJ was on the a bluff just outside the limits of Racak with
20 heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks. And the MUP were down in the
21 village and managing check-points in and out of the village.
22 Q. I don't know if you detailed that before, but in describing the
23 joint VJ/MUP actions, who did what exactly?
24 A. I observed both the MUP and the VJ at check-points. The VJ on
25 the 15th had fired into the village with heavy weapons and occupied
1 homes. And the MUP had gone -- after the shelling of the village, had
2 gone in essentially house to house and were rounding up the young men and
3 they separated them from children and the women.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I know it's not quite the time for the
6 break, but the next and last document I want to go over with this witness
7 is 65 ter 05364, which are the excerpts from his notebooks which we need
8 to do in private session, so I'm wondering if we might break a couple of
9 minutes early.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Sounds a practical idea, Mr. Hannis. We will
11 adjourn now, we need to have our tapes rewound, and we'll resume at 4.15.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.
15 --- Upon commencing at 4.14 p.m.
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 JUDGE PARKER: You may be seated.
18 Yes, Mr. Hannis.
19 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I now request if we could
20 move into private session; I want to look at excerpts from his notebooks.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Private.
22 [Private session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are in private session.
24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. And this is 65 ter number 05364.
25 Q. And, Colonel, I don't know, do you have a hard copy of the
1 excerpts of your notebook? I think it's a 51-page document.
2 A. Yes, sir, I have those.
3 MR. HANNIS: And the first one I want to ask you about is at
4 page 6 of the English, and this is actually at page 9 in the B/C/S. I
5 will tell you and the Court that this appears to be from a
6 9 December, 1998
7 Q. And DZ is speaking and you'll see the next -- the, well, near the
8 bottom of the page right above where Sainovic is listed as speaking,
9 someone is saying, I think it's DZ:
10 "Our interpretation is far wider than the FRY interpretation, the
11 definition and compliance is determined by KVM and not the FRY
13 Do you remember that discussion at this meeting?
14 A. I remember that, yes.
15 Q. Okay. And let me ask you a general question about these notes:
16 How did you go about taking notes of all these meetings you attended in
17 Kosovo in 1998 and 1999?
18 A. I would attend the meetings and try and be as verbatim as I could
19 in taking the notes. At the end of the evening, sometimes I would go
20 back and try and fill in the gaps of those. But the purpose of the notes
21 was intended for an end-of-evening discussion and for our own personal
22 uses to record some of the past conversations for the next meeting. And
23 they certainly weren't intended to be in this venue.
24 Q. I understand. These -- this document I'm working with is a typed
25 document. Your original notes, I take it, were not typewritten?
1 A. No, sir. I hand wrote all my notes and these were transcribed.
2 Q. Okay. And did you have occasion to compare what's in this
3 typewritten document or the typewritten version of your notes with your
4 original notes to be sure that these are accurate?
5 A. No, sir.
6 Q. Do you have any doubt having looked at these typewritten notes
7 about whether or not they accurately reflect what you wrote at the time?
8 A. I have no doubt. They are pretty accurate. But that's to say,
9 if I might, sir, that's to say --
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. -- that there is not discrepancies which I have found myself in
12 here of meetings and people that were at those meetings and so forth
13 sometimes was not correct.
14 Q. I understand. And Mr. Sainovic is quoted or is noted as saying:
15 "The 23 November letter is outside the agreement."
16 Earlier in your testimony we looked at Exhibit P838, the 23
17 November letter from William Walker, is that what Mr. Sainovic is talking
18 about here?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Do you recall what Sainovic said at this meeting about how or why
21 the 23 November letter was outside the agreement?
22 A. Well, he had always maintained that the OSCE agreement was the
23 mandate and there was nothing else to supplement that. And he felt that
24 the 23 November was a supplement to that agreement that hadn't been
25 approved by any body of authority. So he really dismissed it, he didn't
1 see it as a letter of any kind of authority.
2 Q. Okay. At the bottom of the English page we see Walker's name.
3 MR. HANNIS: And then if we can go to the next page in English,
4 we can stay on the same B/C/S page.
5 Q. Since Walker
6 assume these next two are comments from him?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Okay. And he says:
9 " I will notify NATO, Brussels
10 to not honour the agreement."
11 Who is he speaking to there?
12 A. Mr. Sainovic.
13 Q. What about the next entry, did he say that during the meeting?
14 A. Which entry are you referring to.
15 Q. "This meeting was very tension-filled..."
16 A. Oh, okay. The first one. "I will notify NATO, Brussels
17 That's Mr. Walker speaking. The second entry there, the second
18 meeting there was our -- my comment, not necessarily a word and then
19 Mr. Walker saying that we want a base-line, no-notice inspection, but
20 Mr. Minister, you're saying no.
21 Q. And we are to verify tension and feeling, what did that mean in
22 the context, if you recall?
23 A. That meeting was what I would define as a very emotional meeting.
24 There was a level of frustration that had built-up over time. None of
25 the requests that we had been asking for were being answered. And, you
1 know, Mr. Walker was a fairly emotional man, and I think that this is a
2 result to levy a threat of NATO and a threat of Brussels and of course
3 the OSCE member states. And he knew that that was a sensitive point with
4 FRY government because they wanted to be seen as a cooperative body in
5 this effort. And he knew that was a - for lack of a better term - it was
6 a button he could push to hopefully get some attention on it.
7 Q. Do you recall, did he make such a call the next day?
8 A. No. I would have end up probably having to make that call, and I
9 never made that call.
10 Q. Let me turn next to page 14 in the English.
11 A. Sir, if I might just go back, I will say that issue and that
12 meeting did come out in Vienna
13 the meeting, but it came out when we addressed the member states with an
14 update on how the mission was progressing.
15 Q. Do you recall when that meeting was, approximately?
16 A. I don't. I don't.
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. HANNIS: If we could go next to page 14 of the English and
19 page 15 in the B/C/S.
20 Q. Colonel Phillips, that is a meeting that's listed as being
21 18 [Realtime transcript read in error "15"] September 1998 Sainovic,
22 Loncar, and Slana. Who was Slana, if you recall?
23 A. He was an assistant of Mr. Sainovic that was typically at our
24 meetings at the government building.
25 Q. Okay. If you could go to the middle of the page, you have S and
1 is that Sainovic?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Saying:
4 "It is in our interest that you chart our deployments of MUP and
5 VJ units, FT is not a problem to get the data."
6 Do you know what FT means there?
7 A. Trying to find FT. I might be looking at the wrong paragraph
8 here. Where did you say?
9 Q. Under B, we have an entry for someone B and then it is a
10 paragraph that's about six --
11 A. Got it. Okay. Yeah, I can't recall what FT refers to, sir.
12 Q. Future time? Forward time?
13 A. I just don't know.
14 Q. Okay. Did -- he said that, but did he provide, subsequently,
15 information about the deployments of MUP and VJ?
16 A. We got -- we got sporadic information on deployments, but
17 Mr. Walker never received the base-line strengths that we had asked for.
18 Q. Okay. And on that same page, if you could go to the third
19 paragraph up from the bottom, it's a two sentence paragraph, I think
20 you've got your finger on it there, Sainovic or S:
21 "We don't want you to be surprised about big units going
22 somewhere. Sainovic will provide copies of additional map with MUP and
23 VJ locations."
24 Did that happen?
25 A. I believe that our LO, our liaison officer, for the MUP and the
1 liaison officer for the VJ did get deployment locations on occasion but
2 it was not consistent.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. HANNIS: I want to turn next to page 17 in the English and
5 page 19 in the B/C/S.
6 Q. And the name at the top of your page should be "Byrnes." Do you
7 have that one?
8 A. What page number would that be for me?
9 Q. It's page 17 in mine.
10 A. Page 17 doesn't reflect ... I can refer to the screen, but I
11 don't have a hard copy here.
12 Q. Okay. Byrnes is Shaun Byrnes, I take it?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 MR. HANNIS: I note for the transcript that earlier I was listed
15 as saying that the meeting was the 15th of September with Sainovic and
16 Loncar. That should be the 18th of December in case that's what I said.
17 And it's page 44, line 12.
18 Q. Sorry, Colonel, Byrnes -- Shaun Byrnes is listed as speaking and
19 the second line says:
20 "VJ battle group; 27 vehicles, nine T-72 tanks, starting to dig
21 in at the crop dusting airfield, 6 kilometres south of Podujevo ... this
22 is a clear and outright violation."
23 Do you recall this discussion?
24 A. I do. The words that I transcribed here were directly from
25 Shaun Byrnes.
1 Q. And skipping the next two lines, again it's still Byrnes:
2 "This is a violation - Byrnes wants them out right away. Clark
3 will raise immediately."
4 Do you know what that was about?
5 A. Well, in this particular time-frame and location we were very
6 fearful of a KLA/VJ exchange that would end up being out of hand for us
7 to handle. As you know, Mr. Shaun Byrnes was KDOM and, US KDOM, and he
8 refers to General Clark and his comment about Clark raise immediately
9 that they needed to de-escalate the situation in Podujevo before it got
10 out of hand. The tension was very high. The troop disposition, the
11 heavy weapons that were there, was not going to be good, we were fearful
12 of major problems there.
13 Q. And at the bottom of the page you'll see an entry for 19 December
14 at 2130 hours.
15 MR. HANNIS: And in the B/C/S I think we have to go to page 20.
16 Q. It says:
17 "Call from Shaun Byrnes, situation critical in Podujevo.
18 Recommend we call Ambassador Miles."
19 And the next one is:
20 "Call to Ambassador Miles."
21 How does this relate to the earlier comments from Byrnes? Does
22 it get even worse than what was noted at the top of the page?
23 A. Right, KDOM and KVM had been working all day trying to get the
24 de-escalation to occur by meaning pulling back the MUP and pulling back
25 the VJ deployment and that wasn't happening, in fact, it was building.
1 So hence the call to the embassy to get the information to Mr. Milosevic
2 to see if he couldn't turn this off.
3 Q. Do you know what happened as a result of the call to
4 Ambassador Miles and efforts to contact Milosevic?
5 A. I don't recall exactly right after the meeting, but I do know
6 over time we did get the de-escalation and we did get the VJ and the MUP
7 to reduce their numbers up there and not be so -- not be such a
8 provocative deployment.
9 Q. Can you explain what you mean by "provocative deployment" in that
11 A. Well, it was a proportionality of force, I mean, we had VJ with
12 heavy weapons and tanks and artillery, and the KLA of course had small
13 arms. And the fear was was that they would -- the VJ would annihilate
14 the whole village down there where the KLA was supposedly in place.
15 Q. Okay. Let's go forward a few days.
16 MR. HANNIS: Page 19. At the top it says 24 December, 1998,
17 1245. I don't know if that's ... Okay. And it's page 21 in the B/C/S.
18 Q. And in the English it says:
19 "Podujevo events have unravelled somewhat, VJ units deployed once
20 again to Podujevo and threats were levied against a US KDOM vehicle."
21 Further on in the paragraph:
22 "Ambassador Miles confirmed the report and levied a formal
23 protest with the FRY government."
24 Do you recall this?
25 A. I do.
1 Q. So it sounds like between the 19th and the 24th the VJ might have
2 backed off a little bit but they returned?
3 A. Yeah, there was in general an agreement that some of the MUP
4 would pull back and the VJ would pull back. The VJ pulled back not so
5 much with the heavy vehicles or artilleries as they did with the
6 personnel. But they came back, I don't remember exactly the date, and I
7 have to rely on my notes here that that was the date, but they came back
8 in its original strength, in -- responding to KLA activity in the area.
9 Q. And further down on that page there's another 24 December entry
10 listing General DZ and an update, a single line in the middle there
11 General Loncar says:
12 "DZ said verifiers threaten being shot by VJ."
13 Do you know what that was about?
14 A. This was a tension-filled time. Many of us, including myself who
15 had walked past the Pristina barracks were often threatened by VJ
16 soldiers that were standing guard or post outside the walls there. They
17 didn't want any photographs taken of them mounting up and deploying. It
18 was a very, you know -- you had to walk on the other side of the road.
19 KDOM was intrusive and KVM was intrusive to the extent of taking
20 photographs of the deployment, radioing ahead to other units that they
21 are leaving and which way that they were headed. And we were later
22 informed that through the KVM LO for the VJ that they felt that this was
23 a serious issue for their security by advance notification of their
25 Q. Did KVM take the position that this was something that you were
1 entitled to do?
2 A. Well we felt that we were entitled to do it especially when we
3 didn't get advance notice of a deployment which was the agreement which
4 was sporadic at best, but generally, you know, we would have expected to
5 get information from the MUP or the VJ of where they were heading the
6 next day. We at least wanted 24-hour notice on what those deployments
7 were. And because we weren't getting that, we tended to kind of camp
8 outside those areas and then follow where they were headed.
9 MR. HANNIS: Next we could look at page 22 of the English. It's
10 listed as page number 38 at the top in typewriting, if that helps you
11 find it in your hard copy. And this would be page 25 of the B/C/S.
12 Q. And I'll tell you, Colonel, I'm starting kind of in a middle of a
13 meeting that appears to have taken place on Christmas eve,
14 24 December, 1998
15 Slana, Gordana, and General Lukic. Gordana was an interpreter?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Okay. Now, on this page 22 in the English in e-court at the top
18 we have S; I take it is Sainovic?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. "We have been cooperative of KDOM and KVM."
21 He regrets that issues about the helicopter and security are
22 rejected and not IAW agreement. Is that in accordance with?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And then skipping the next entry:
25 "The result of investigation showed no grenade."
1 What was that about?
2 A. That was an event where Mr. Walker and I had left our apartment
3 and were walking to work and we were confronted by a drunken policeman
4 who was out of uniform and we had our Albanian security with us, and he
5 was verbally abusive to the Albanian security. The tension escalated
6 there. Mr. Walker and I were trying to, you know, separate all of this.
7 And our security guard saw the drunken policeman have a grenade in his
8 hand and throw it and the security took Mr. Walker and put him in a car
9 and he left the scene.
10 Q. You say he was out of uniform, how did you know this person was a
12 A. He called himself a policeman.
13 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to the next page in B/C/S, still
14 on the same page in English.
15 Q. We see Mike, as a the speaker, saying I was never talked to. Who
16 was Mike?
17 A. That was me.
18 Q. Okay. And Lukic -- before that it said all persons were talked
19 to, is that in connection with investigating this incident?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. All right. Were you ever talked to or was a statement ever taken
22 from you?
23 A. No, sir. And that was a point of contention in that the
24 investigation was incomplete because not all parties who witnessed the
25 scene were talked to, including the Albanian security guards.
1 Q. The next to the last -- or two entries above the bottom of the
2 page, S, Sainovic I assume says:
3 "Mistake - people of your mission have not given a statement.
4 I'm asking you to do that right now."
5 Did any policemen take your statement?
6 A. No, sir.
7 Q. Walker
8 was no follow-up?
9 A. Not that I am aware of. There certainly wasn't with me as one of
10 the members there.
11 Q. Okay. Did it ever come up again with Sainovic about your
12 personal security in this incident not being fully investigated?
13 A. It did come up again, but it wasn't in the context of requirement
14 of a full meeting, it was just continually used thereafter as an example
15 of non-cooperation.
16 MR. HANNIS: Go to the next page in English, page 23, and this
17 will be page 27 in the B/C/S.
18 Q. Two more pages to talk about relating to Podujevo. We see DZ
19 speaking in the big paragraph says:
20 "Last Sunday, I saw Loncar in asked him the purpose of the VJ
21 company leaving the Podujevo airfield. He said it had to conduct
22 training on a training arena, returning on Tuesday."
23 Now, this meeting was on the 24th of December which according to
24 my master calendar would have been a Thursday in 1998. So the previous
25 Sunday would have been the 20th of December. Do you recall this
1 discussion that DZ had with Loncar at this meeting on the
2 24th of December?
3 A. I vaguely recall it. I'm familiar with the discussion but.
4 Q. Okay. And DZ goes on to say:
5 "The area was described as 10 kilometres. It had Podujevo and
6 many villages in the training area. It was not an area the way armies
7 understand training area."
8 Do you remember that point being made?
9 A. No, sir, I don't.
10 Q. Okay. Did you have any discussions with anybody in the VJ about
11 what their training areas were in Kosovo?
12 A. I personally did not, but that was a mission Ambassador Walker
13 had given DZ to understand what their definition of training area was and
14 that's what DZ was up in Podujevo to do.
15 Q. And that related to part of KVM's job in terms of monitoring the
16 VJ and their activities?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Okay. And this sounds like VJ took the position that Podujevo
19 the town itself was within their training area?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. For tanks to drive through?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. And then going on a couple more lines it said -- this is
24 DZ saying :
25 "I told him, Loncar, this what a provocative action. The next
1 day a column of the unit went to the south of Podujevo and fired machine
2 fire toward the village. On the way back a KDOM vehicle was hit by fire.
3 This was a provocative exercise. On Tuesday the exercise didn't cease."
4 Do you recall that?
5 A. Yes, sir, I do.
6 Q. Did KVM consider this a violation?
7 A. We did. And we did in the context that we refer to as
8 provocative because at the time the KLA, also in the area, had not fired.
9 We had a KVM member in the village down there, spent the night with them
10 to ensure that they showed restraint. And we felt it was provocative
11 because there was an effort to try and get the KLA to fire and return
12 fire. And that was one of the things I remember DZ was upset about, was
13 that this is going to create problems for us if you continue to do that
14 and we can't help you when that happens.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to page 28 in the B/C/S.
17 Q. And, sir, at the bottom of this page you'll see it's L speaking,
18 I assume that's Loncar?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. If we could go to 24 in the English, it continues, Loncar
21 speaking, he says:
22 "I told you I am competent to stop firing but not authorised to
23 withdraw forces from Podujevo."
24 So that's Loncar, the VJ representative to this commission saying
25 he is not authorised to withdraw forces?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you know who was?
3 A. I do not know who was authorised to do that.
4 Q. You said sometimes in these meetings Sainovic would call
6 A. I do not.
7 Q. Do you have an opinion of who he was talking to based on all your
8 dealings with him and the context of this KVM agreement?
9 A. My view was he was talking to somebody in Milosevic's inner
10 circle to try and get the word to him on what they were going to need to
11 do to resolve the situation.
12 Q. Okay. The next entry is DZ speaking again saying he saw a column
13 of 40 vehicles saying proportional rezoned is needed here. Do you know
14 what that meant, "proportional rezones," or is that a typo?
15 A. Let me just read the whole paragraph just for a moment.
16 Q. Sure.
17 A. Those are DZ's words, sir. I'm not exactly sure what he meant,
18 what's needed there. But I know that he was working hard in that period
19 to get the forces that were there dispersed. So that may have been what
20 he referred -- but it's purely conjecture on my part.
21 Q. But doesn't this relate to the comment you made before about
22 proportionate or disproportionate?
23 A. Force size.
24 Q. He goes on to say: "Overwhelming force was ..."
25 A. Yes, it relates to that.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly not overlap for the
2 interpreters, thank you.
3 MR. HANNIS: My apologies to the interpreter. We are speaking
4 too fast after one another.
5 Q. DZ said there a major breach of cease-fire by the VJ and MUP.
6 The next speaker is S, Sainovic?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And Sainovic says:
9 "I asked for intervention of the VJ units in that spot."
10 You recall him saying that?
11 A. Right. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. I'd like to have you look at an excerpt from another
13 document -- well, let me ask you this question: Were you aware of any
14 concerns on the part of the VJ that they were being directed by civilians
15 instead of army commanders?
16 A. I am sorry, could you --
17 Q. Were you aware of any concerns by General Loncar or anybody in
18 the VJ that their units were being controlled or directed by civilians
19 instead of VJ commander?
20 A. I was not aware of any of that concern.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I would like, at this point in the
22 record, like to direct your attention to the 65 ter number 0928. This
23 was one of the VJ collegiums that I showed Phil Coo when he was here.
24 It's been tendered into evidence subject to any objections from the
25 Defence, which we're waiting to get. But I'm assuming that it will be
1 admitted, and if so in connection with this entry in Colonel Phillips's
2 notebook I would ask you to look at 0928 in the English at pages 13
3 and 14 where General Dimitrijevic is talking about what he called a
4 so-called pretend or real planned exercise in the vicinity of Podujevo
5 and talking about a concern about ensuring that not even Sainovic or any
6 other Sainovic can solve these problems by lightly deciding to use the
8 Now, the last -- I think that was the last one I had for
9 Podujevo. I have --
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. HANNIS: Sorry.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I have many objections. First of
13 all, it seems that Mr. Hannis is bringing this to a close. In my view, I
14 think it would be appropriate for the witness to see the text and have
15 his interpretation. We now have Mr. Hannis offering his comments,
16 prompting the witness by way of certain remarks.
17 On the other hand, any mention of any civilians commanding the
18 army, we don't find that in the documents and he is now invoking certain
19 evidence that the witness is not familiar with. Maybe the Chamber is,
20 but the witness has nothing to do with that and he is supposed to state
21 his opinion.
22 I think this way of conducting the examination-in-chief is
23 inappropriate, and we have more of Mr. Hannis's conclusions than the
24 witness's. He should not be doing so. It should be the witness who is
25 supposed to offer his interpretation of what he took down.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Hannis.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would be happy to show him the
3 excerpt from 00928. My problem was, I don't think that was on my list of
4 notifications of documents I was going to use with this witness.
5 JUDGE PARKER: That might dig you a hole a little deeper rather
6 than get you out of one, Mr. Hannis.
7 MR. HANNIS: I know, but I have to tell you about that. And I
8 tried to quote from the document itself, but I'm happy to show it to the
9 witness, I think that does make sense if the Court is willing to give me
10 leave to do that.
11 JUDGE PARKER: My problem is that I don't understand or did not
12 understand from your comments that you were seeking to have the witness
13 comment at all. As I understood it, you were saying please for
14 cross-reference, Chamber take note of a certain document not yet an
15 exhibits but which you hoped would be an exhibit. You were stretching
16 the role of an advocate very far Mr. Hannis, but I don't think you were
17 doing what Mr. Djurdjic was concerned you were doing.
18 MR. HANNIS: Well, I'm not sure, Your Honour. I had -- if we
19 went back in the transcript you may see I had a hesitation when I started
20 to ask him about that because I think I realised that this wasn't on my
21 list so I couldn't show it to him and I was trying to think how to
22 present it, and I did that sort of by the seat of my pants, I guess.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Well we might leave your pants where they are and
24 when we come to final submissions, no doubt if it is an exhibit by then,
25 this may feature.
1 MR. HANNIS: Thank you. Before I move from Podujevo though, one
2 last question, Colonel. We looked at some of your photographs, and I
3 think you told us those related to Podujevo in December?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. Okay. What date -- I saw a date on one of them was the
6 27th of December, were they all on the same day or do you know?
7 A. No, sir. They were somewhere on the 25th when we were up there.
8 We were up there, I think, every day, I can't recall how many days, but
9 nearly every day we had tensions up there.
10 Q. So during that sort of whole week proceeding and around the
11 25th of December?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. HANNIS: Now, I want to go to page 43 in the English, and
15 it's page 54 in the B/C/S. This is listed as a meeting on the
16 22nd of January --
17 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic again anxious.
18 MR. HANNIS: Sorry.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 Mr. Hannis, can you tell me what the date of the meeting is and
22 the time next time you put up a new document. You did say it's the
23 22nd of December -- no, January it seems for this one. Thank you.
24 MR. HANNIS: Yes. 22nd of January, 1999. It says:
25 "CIO Meeting Part 11."
1 Can you tell what the acronym CIO is.
2 A. That was chairman in office, sir.
3 Q. What person did that refer to in this context?
4 A. That would have been Mr. Vollebaek the Norwegian chairman in
5 office at the time.
6 Q. Oh, okay. OSCE?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And we see an entry for, it looks like, AMB,
9 Ambassador Travik [phoen]?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Who was he?
12 A. He was Mr. Vollebaek's assistant.
13 Q. Okay. It he says:
14 "A sinister activity is ... MUP using orange vehicles."
15 Do you know what that was about?
16 A. Right. Our KVM had observed some of the MUP, not many, but some
17 of the MUP were using their once blue vehicles now having been painted
18 orange to get access into some of the villages. And I say "get access"
19 whether they were blue or orange, they had access, but it was a way to
20 lessen their threat initially in the area there because KVM vehicles were
21 orange, KVM was considered, and the orange vehicles, were considered
22 friendly and safe.
23 Q. And more likely to receive easy entry than a blue vehicle that
24 might be MUP?
25 A. Right. Not likely to be fired upon.
1 Q. Okay. Now, this is about a week after Racak.
2 MR. HANNIS: And if we could go to the next page, it's 44 in the
3 English. And page 54 at the bottom in B/C/S.
4 Q. Says:
5 "Tough week, 2 of our verifiers shot last week."
6 Do you recall what that was about?
7 A. Right, that was two verifiers that as I recall were shot by the
9 Q. Okay. And then this event has been a setback, Racak?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. "The scene in the village of Racak
12 one can imagine."
13 Who wrote this? Is this you speaking?
14 A. Those are my notes to myself. I believe I usually kind of wrote
15 those things end of the day in the evening.
16 Q. "A true tragedy, we counted 45 bodies, all were shot in the
18 Next paragraph:
19 "The majority of those killed were older men in their 50s and
20 60s. We also came across three women and one 12-year-old boy."
21 You were out there on what date.
22 A. We were out there between 6.30 and 7.00 in the morning on
23 16 January.
24 Q. Now, did you have at that time information or get information
25 about how that operation had proceeded in Racak, who was involved?
1 A. Mr. Gilbertson who was at one time, I believe, a member of the
2 KDOM, and I'm not sure when, but he was absorbed into our mission as a
3 true verifier - just want to emphasise, was not dual hatted, not KDOM and
4 KVM, but did come to KVM - and he notified the head of missions office
5 that there had been this tragic event at Racak. I believe
6 General Maisonneuve, who I believe was at Prizren region, was also
7 involved in on the scene and was notified of this event.
8 Q. What did you know or what did you learn about what forces had
9 been involved in the action at Racak?
10 A. We -- you know, this event, from what I can remember, really
11 began to build around the 8th and 9th of January. There was a couple of
12 MUP policemen that had been killed. And there was a gradual build-up of
13 VJ forces and an increase in the MUP forces. The VJ not so much in and
14 around Stimlje or the Racak area but up on a bluff that overlooked the
15 region. And the MUP were more heavily deployed in Racak and Stimlje
16 proper, setting up check-points and going through the village in good
18 Q. In the action in which these 45 were killed, who was involved?
19 A. The MUP were involved.
20 Q. Was there any VJ involvement in the incident?
21 A. The VJ involvement consisted of the shelling into -- into the
22 homes in the village.
23 Q. Before, during, or after the MUP going in?
24 A. That was before the MUP went in. The villages typically, in all
25 of these incidents, the village was typically shelled, softened up, then
1 these combat MUP spread throughout the village.
2 Q. Okay. Did you -- when you were out there that morning did you
3 see any VJ presence throughout the area?
4 A. Saw them at check-points with the MUP.
5 Q. And see any VJ equipment, vehicles, whatever in the immediate
7 A. At the check-points. They were parked there with the MUP
9 Q. And in the hills around the area?
10 A. We could see that there was vehicles up there, couldn't ID
11 exactly what they were, but we knew that it was a VJ deployment location.
12 Q. All right. Let me take you down near the bottom the page, you
13 have a question:
14 "What do we do next?"
15 And can you read what you wrote there?
16 A. I made a question:
17 "What do we do next?"
18 I say:
19 "We will continue our mission, continue to verify until it simply
20 becomes too risky and dangerous to carry out our mandate. Remember, we
21 are all unarmed here, very tough situation."
22 Q. That's what you wrote on the 22nd of January, 1999?
23 A. Right.
24 Q. That's what you tried to do?
25 A. That's what we tried to do. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. HANNIS: I don't have any further questions for the witness.
3 I would like to tender this Exhibit 0564 under seal.
4 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received under seal.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01312 under
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Colonel.
8 THE WITNESS: Sir.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, if he is not going to talk about the
11 notes, I suppose we can go back into open session now. As long as he is
12 not talking about the notes of interview or the notebooks.
13 JUDGE PARKER: I was waiting for Mr. Djurdjic to indicate where
14 he wanted to start. Do we need to be in private for your commencement,
15 Mr. Djurdjic?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I would need to
17 organise myself a bit, but we can go back into open session. I think
18 it's still a bit too early for the break, so we can resume in open
20 JUDGE PARKER: Open.
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
24 Q. Colonel, can I address you as colonel first of all?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Thank you. My name is Veljko Djurdjic, Defence team member of
2 the accused Vlastimir Djordjevic. With me is another Defence team
3 member, Ms. Marie O'Leary.
4 I wanted to share with you that I read all of your statements and
5 notes made as well as the transcript of your testimony in the Milutinovic
6 case, as well as followed what you said today. I will try to put only
7 those questions which have not been put to you until now.
8 Since we are in open session, I would like to start with your
9 engagement with the verification mission. You spoke about that today. I
10 would like to know the following: Prior to the mission itself, had you
11 ever participated in another verification mission or a mission that would
12 be similar to this one in nature?
13 A. No, sir.
14 Q. Thank you. I made a note here that you said today that you were
15 invited by General Ralston, he made an offer. Can you tell us why you
16 were recommended, what previous activities of yours made you a good
17 candidate for Mr. -- for General Ralston and to be a team member for
18 Mr. Walker?
19 A. Sir, I was -- I honestly don't know why General Ralston selected
20 me, although I was grateful for the opportunity. Ambassador Walker was
21 the one who asked for me when General Ralston asked, Is there anything
22 that you need to assist you? And Mr. Walker called for me. General
23 Ralston really facilitated making that happen.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you know Mr. Walker from an earlier time?
25 A. Yes, sir, I did.
1 Q. Did you ever work together with him?
2 A. Yes, sir, I did.
3 Q. At that time, was Mr. Walker a State Department employee?
4 A. He was a State Department employee, but he was working at
5 National Defence University
6 National Defence University
8 Q. Thank you. There was one other thing I wanted to ask you. I
9 know from this trial that American generals, in addition to their
10 military backgrounds, have civilian specialties. What was your civilian
11 specialty at university?
12 A. I don't understand the question exactly, but I think you are
13 asking me what did I study at the university? In my undergraduate work I
14 was studying economics and geography.
15 Q. Thank you. What was offered to you when you were asked to work
16 together with Mr. Walker and his team? What made you accept the offer?
17 A. I think whenever you are wearing a uniform and you have trained
18 for years to work in environments like this, it's an excellent
19 opportunity to learn. So I was excited to accept, to be involved in
20 something that I had never been involved in before, but had great
21 interest in international missions. So I accepted.
22 Q. Thank you. Did you apply for a KVM post or were you appointed or
23 sent there, rather, by the US
24 A. I never applied for the job. I had no idea that I was being
25 looked at for the job. I accepted the job on a Thursday and had a plane
1 ticket on Friday to meet Ambassador Walker in New York. It happened that
3 Q. Thank you. Very well. Did you ever conclude a contract, and
4 agreement, with the OSCE Secretariat concerning your engagement with the
6 A. I'm not sure what you mean by did I "conclude a contract." When
7 I was seconded to work for Ambassador Walker, I was still an active-duty
8 military air force officer sent on what we call temporary duty, initially
9 the duration was not to exceed 30 days, but upon 30 days, I was asked if
10 I would stay longer and I agreed. But I never recall signing any
11 contract that made me an employee of the OSCE. I was always told that I
12 was seconded by the OSCE with the US support to do so.
13 Q. Can I conclude based on your answer that, speaking in broad
14 terms, you remained a US
15 between the 4th of November, 1999, and until you left the country on the
16 20th of March, 1999?
17 A. I guess a troubling word there for me there is "official." I was
18 an OSCE verifier, I considered myself a verifier, I never wore my
19 military uniform during that whole deployment period. I did not report
20 back to US government officials, I reported through OSCE channels. So I
21 would tell you that I considered myself a true OSCE verifier although I
22 remained an active-duty military officer with the US government.
23 Q. That is why I raised this issue. Were you an employee of an
24 international organisation, which in this case is the OSCE, or were you
25 an employee of the Government of the United States assigned to assist
1 Mr. Walker?
2 A. Sir, I'd have to answer that question both as yes. Yes, I was an
3 OSCE employee; yes, I was a US Air Force officer seconded to the OSCE to
4 perform an international mission.
5 Q. Can I conclude then that you continued receiving your salary from
6 the US Air Force during your stay in Kosovo and Metohija as a member of
7 the KVM?
8 A. Yes, sir, I received my base pay as an air force officer, and I
9 received per diem from the OSCE for the deployment location.
10 Q. Thank you. Can you please expand this further. Which part of
11 your expenses was borne by the Vienna Secretariat, your expenses, while
12 you were in Pristina?
13 A. OSCE.
14 Q. Yes, but which expenses specifically?
15 A. My per diem expenses for food and rent and that sort of thing.
16 Q. Thank you. Could you tell me what was your function in the
17 Kosovo Verification Mission headquarters in Pristina?
18 A. My original position was to arrive as Ambassador Walker's
19 Chief of Staff and his special advisor. My Chief of Staff functions in
20 the early part of the mission consisted of helping locate a facility to
21 stand up the OSCE. It entailed the planning for standing up the mission,
22 getting -- bringing in verifiers. Standing up a training facility.
23 Getting computer networks and phones and all the basic logistics
24 established. Establishing an organisational chart on how the mission
25 would be organised.
1 Later on my duties transferred into the area of being more
2 operational in orientation in the sense that once we got the mission
3 stood up, we began to go to the field more often and observe activities
4 with the verifiers.
5 Q. Thank you. First I'd like you to tell us who appointed you to
6 the position of Chef de Cabinet and in what way, when Mr. Hannis led you
7 in his examination-in-chief, you confirmed that you were the
8 Chef de Cabinet, and now you said so yourself, who appointed you to that
10 A. Ambassador Walker gave me that title.
11 Q. When?
12 A. Before we left the United States in New York, he defined that
13 that would be my role for him.
14 Q. Was the Secretariat of the OSCE in Vienna informed thereof that
15 you were appointed as Chief of Staff to Mr. Walker?
16 A. I would have to assume that they were. I was never myself
17 officially notified that they knew, but when I went and visited Vienna
18 talk to member states, they knew me as his Chief of Staff.
19 Q. The simplest way to establish to determine what somebody's
20 position is is to look at the payroll. Now, did you ever have occasion
21 to see the payroll list, whether it actually identified your position
22 there? For instance, Mr. Michael Phillips, and then your position, what
23 was it?
24 A. Yes, sir, I never saw that payroll.
25 Q. Thank you. The reason I'm putting all these questions is that I
1 noticed from what you said, but I think I also observed this in the
2 transcript, that you were an advisor for military matters to Mr. Walker;
3 and today we've heard here twice already that you were the
4 Chief of Staff?
5 A. Right. My opening comment was, to you, that I was his
6 Chief of Staff and also his advisor. I was referred as a military
7 advisor, but my role, as I said, we moved into the operational scene,
8 consisted of writing speeches for him, to transcribing notes with him,
9 prepping him for interviews with the press, to visiting military units.
10 Q. Thank you. Colonel, sir, when you heard that you were going to
11 deploy on a mission in Kosovo and Metohija, did you undergo any type of
12 preparation for this mission?
13 A. You mean, medical preparation, or operational preparation,
14 training? What do you refer to exactly?
15 Q. No, you are a pilot, an air force pilot, so I'm not referring to
16 medical preparation, but operational, in the operational sense. Whether
17 you were apprised of where you were going, what the situation was there,
18 what type of situation you can find there? So did you undergo any type
19 of training? And I mean more in political terms than historical.
20 A. Right. I had not received any preparation for the area, and I
21 must tell you when I was in Hawaii
22 I was not looking at Europe
23 I would also add that my occupation in the air force is not that of a
24 combat pilot.
25 Q. Thank you. Well, now I'd like to continue putting questions
1 along this line but I won't.
2 Now, tell me, did you have any idea, did you have any picture in
3 your mind as to what was going on in Yugoslavia, what it was that was
4 happening there? In other words, before you were offered this post by
5 Mr. Walker?
6 A. No, sir, I did not. I was truly caught by surprise to be in the
7 pacific to go to Europe
8 deal on what was happening there. I was aware of Bosnia, but not of what
9 was happening in Kosovo.
10 Q. You mentioned Bosnia
11 business or no missions in operational sense in Bosnia in the 1990s;
13 A. No, sir, I did not.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you have occasion at all to read through some
15 documents that you would be encountering during your verification mission
16 in Kosovo and Metohija, and if so, who provided those documents and which
17 documents were they?
18 A. I had no documents to read when we arrived. The deployment came
19 very fast, and I was more concerned of taking care of my family upon my
20 quick departure and getting my personal issues squared away. So there
21 was no documents to travel with, no documents to read. My entry into
22 Kosovo really started in Warsaw, Poland
23 chairman in office who acquainted us with the mission prior to entry of
24 4 of November into Pristina.
25 Q. If I'm not mistaken, this was in early November, the time when
1 you were in Warsaw
2 terms of what it was that he expected of you, not necessarily what it was
3 that he expected of Mr. Walker's mission?
4 A. I was a note-taker in that meeting. He did not address me
5 specifically. I was introduced to him as Mr. Walker's assistant and he
6 welcomed me. Mentioned that this should be an exciting opportunity and
7 wished me luck. That was about the extent of my in-briefing to Kosovo.
8 Q. Very well. And you ended up in Pristina on the 4th of November.
9 Now, tell us, please, when you arrived there, did you read any documents
10 that you were to comply with or implement during your verification
12 A. I believe I got ahold of what's referred to often as the
13 Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement somewhere in the first couple of weeks of
14 our arrival. The first couple of weeks I will tell you were spent more
15 logistically internal to OSCE requirements than they were of political
16 requirements. I don't recall exactly, but I would tell you the first
17 discussion we had on the agreement was in early December with
18 Mr. Sainovic and Mr. Walker trying to lay out a broad understanding of
19 really what the agreement said and what the intent of the agreement would
20 be for us to live up to as an OSCE international mission.
21 Q. Could you please tell us what the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement
22 was, and how and where did you see it? What form did you see it in?
23 A. I saw it in a paper copy. And my interpretation of it was, was a
24 mandate that essentially was to help us arrive at a peaceful solution for
25 some sort of a co-existence between the Serbian and Albanian people in
1 Kosovo, and cease-fire maintenance, until a political solution process
2 could run its course.
3 I do not have the actual agreement in front of me. I could refer
4 to it if you like.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you tell me where you saw this document and who
6 it was who showed it to you?
7 A. I saw it for the first time in Pristina, and I can't recall who
8 showed it to me. I think it might -- I don't think anybody specifically
9 showed it to me. It was just kind of in a stack of papers on my desk
10 that I -- that I had gotten ahold of. I don't recall specifically how I
11 got it.
12 Q. Can you tell me then something about the substance of that
13 document. Who signed it, did you see the signatures on the document, and
14 what it was about?
15 A. In general I think the document listed how many verifiers were to
16 come into the mission. I think 2.000 was the number. I don't recall the
17 signatures on the document. Although it was called the
18 Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, I don't recall ever seeing Mr. Milosevic's
19 signature on the document.
20 I can't recall specifically the content of the document, haven't
21 looked at it in over ten years, so.
22 Q. Tell me then, did you see Mr. Holbrooke's signature on it?
23 A. I don't recall his signature, sir. Not that it wasn't there, I
24 just don't remember if it was there or not.
25 Q. Thank you. What did you do with this document when you left
1 Kosovo and Metohija?
2 A. I don't recall what I did with it. It might be part of my own
3 archives somewhere. I don't know what I did with the document.
4 Q. Thank you. Did you have a personal archive, your own personal
5 files, or did you have an official file as the personal assistant to
6 Mr. Walker?
7 A. Just some personal files. I never turned any of those files over
8 to any government official or State Department or Department of Defence.
9 Those were, I considered them kind of academic papers, experience papers,
10 that I hope to write about one day.
11 Q. Mr. Witness, I am not going to ask you about your private files,
12 nor do you need to speak about that. All I'm interested in is the
13 official files and archives that you had to keep as the Chief of Staff.
14 What I would like to know is, first of all, whether such files existed at
16 A. I kept papers that Mr. Walker wanted to maintain. I would
17 consider those official papers.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you tell me whether these were the official
19 documents of the Kosovo Verification Mission, or?
20 A. They would have been documents of the
21 Kosovo Verification Mission, yes, sir.
22 Q. Did you hand over those documents to the OSCE Secretariat in
24 A. No, sir, I did not.
25 Q. Could you tell us why not?
1 A. Because we shredded them when we evacuated our mission, except
2 for just a handful of documents which were really KVM reports that the
3 OSCE in Vienna
4 Q. If I'm not mistaken, we've heard the testimony of Mr. DZ who told
5 us that the entire archive of the OSCE was taken out during the -- or
6 withdrawal of the OSCE Verification Mission, that it was taken to
8 in a different manner than they were treated or held in the OSCE KVM?
9 A. I can tell you the papers that I collected, I shredded,
10 Mr. Walker had papers. Some documents he gave to me, very casual matter
11 to keep on file, but the papers that I collected consisted of everything
12 from press statements, newspaper articles, KDOM reports, some Blue Book
13 reports, some KVM reports. It was not necessary for me to take all of
14 those out because they were already in Vienna. So -- and because we were
15 only allowed to take a certain amount out with us pound-wise,
16 weight-wise, in the evacuation, I shredded a lot of that material. It
17 wasn't shred to keep from anyone, it was shredded just to reduce the
18 load. We didn't -- obviously didn't want to leave them all behind.
19 I would add that I cannot speak to General DZ. I'm quite certain
20 that he would have responsibly taken many of his operational papers with
21 him. But I can't speak to what he did with his archives. And I guess I
22 would be careful to call - and I use this term archives, I realise
23 that - but I would be careful to call my desk drawer an archive. It was
24 just some papers that we had collected.
25 Q. Well, this reminds me, General DZ actually delivered these
1 documents at the Whitehall
2 your files is you handed them over to the State Department; correct?
3 A. I never said that I handed anything over to the State Department.
4 The documents that I had were shredded. Reports, I didn't take with me
5 because, as I say, Vienna
6 Q. Colonel, sir, the notes that were shown to us by Mr. Hannis, what
7 did you do with those notes? Where did you file them when you left the
9 A. When we left the KVM, I had my personal notes and I turned those
10 over to the ICTY upon request along with photos in Macedonia and those
11 notes first were allowed to be transcribed for me. And I do believe
12 Helena who was Ambassador Walker's secretary who did work for the
13 State Department actually typed those notes out and gave me the copy
14 because I turned the originals over to the Tribunal.
15 Q. Then it was my misunderstanding. Because I read this to mean
16 that your notes were turned over to the OTP by the US, but you told us
17 that this is how it transpired. Now, when was this happening? Was this
18 in 1999?
19 A. Yes, sir, this would have been 1999. I want to clarify: When we
20 left Kosovo and went to Macedonia
21 the ICTY --
22 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to know about the notes. But obviously
23 it was my erroneous conclusion.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time then?
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I've already gone
1 over the time. Yes, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE PARKER: I was waiting for some logical break in your line
3 of questioning. We will have our second break now and resume at 5
4 minutes past 6.00.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, while we are waiting
10 for the witness to be brought in, I would like to propose something, and
11 I've already discussed this with Mr. Hannis, but we have addressed this
12 to the Trial Chamber. What I'm talking about is the exhibits that were
13 admitted into evidence in the Milutinovic case relating to the notes
14 prepared by this witness that were put forth to him individually and then
15 admitted into evidence in this case.
16 So my proposal is, and Mr. Hannis has agreed to it, that the list
17 of documents that I provided to the Trial Chamber be admitted into
18 evidence in total so that we don't have to waste any time here by putting
19 them to the witness one by one. So this is my proposal to both
20 Mr. Hannis if he agrees and of course to the Trial Chamber.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have no objection to that. Those
22 exhibits on the list though that are excerpts from his notebooks, I
23 request be entered under seal, and I think there are I think two or four
24 on his list which are not from Phillips' notebooks, I have no problem
25 with them being in the open. But all of those in the notebooks under
2 JUDGE PARKER: Is the Court Officer in a position to know which
3 is which at the moment?
4 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Please be seated.
7 Mr. Djurdjic and Mr. Hannis, the proposal you make is a sensible
8 one, but you will need to provide the Court Officer with a list of the
9 exhibits identifying which are to be under seal so that we get it right.
10 Please carry on, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
12 Q. Colonel, sir, when you took up position at the verification
13 mission in Kosovo, I understand that it was in the very earliest days of
14 the mission. Could you tell me how the headquarters of the KVM in
15 Pristina were set up. I'm not interested in the regional centres, but
16 just the headquarters, how was it set up and did you participate in its
17 setting up?
18 A. Well, the Norwegians had the responsibility to bring in the
19 computer network to network all of our systems together. We established,
20 I believe, five sections in the organisation underneath the head of
21 mission. I don't recall them all, but one was a political office, and
22 one was an operations office, one was a press office. One was kind of a
23 mission support or logistics office. Human rights office. Each
24 component had a job description that was written for its
1 We were hiring and interviewing both national and international
2 staff to work in the mission. I did some of the hiring for the national
3 staff in the press room, the security guards, drivers, things like that.
4 So it was a period of time that was just, you know, building the
5 necessary logistical requirements to sustain the mission. There was a
6 transportation office, that sort of thing.
7 My role was helping Ambassador Walker build a functional
8 organisational chart that would make his work most efficient. He had
9 asked me on several occasions to cut layers of bureaucracy, so he could
10 be in the field and not be in the office that much. He wanted to be out
11 and about Kosovo. So I looked for ways to organisation a mission that
12 way that would enable him to do that.
13 I would say that my role in doing that, really establishing job
14 descriptions for those that we brought in, probably lasted for a good six
15 weeks before we transitioned to more operational sorts of activity.
16 Q. And what was the fusion centre? Was that something that you set
17 up or somebody else?
18 A. Ambassador Walker asked that I help establish the fusion centre.
19 It's a very good point. It was the kind of, I guess, the heartbeat of
20 the organisation. It's where all of our reporting would go into. It's
21 where reports would be written and compiled and disseminated to the OSCE
22 in Vienna
23 countries. Not all were represented in there. It was sort of an
24 intelligence cell - for a lack of a better word - to pull together
25 information and data and get it disseminated.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you now tell us who of the Russians was a
2 member of the fusion cell or who was there?
3 A. I can't recall any of the names of any of the personnel that
4 worked in the fusion centre. I know that there were no restrictions on
5 the countries that were to be represented in there and participating. As
6 I mentioned, I knew of the Russians, I knew of the American, I knew of
7 the British, I knew of the Norwegians. And that rotated out
8 periodically. People would come four to six months and rotate back and
9 then others would be brought in. So it was the director of the fusion
10 centre, I believe, early on was an American. He left after a short time
11 and a another American came in behind him. I think the deputy in there
12 was a Russian.
13 Q. Thank you. I'll get back to the Russian representative a little
14 later, because it seems to me from your notes that there were different
15 positions on whether there should be any Russians at the fusion centre or
16 not because of the information that was shared with NATO, do you recall
18 A. I do. That was a large issue. There was imagery that we were
19 concerned about sharing in there. Ambassador Walker was concerned about
20 a Russian contingent in there. There were secure phones in there that
21 were US in nature. We found ways to work around those problems to
22 accommodate the Russians. It was important, and Ambassador Walker knew
23 it was important, to have the Russians represented in there. Again, I'm
24 not sure of all of their levels of responsibility or actual capacities
25 and whether they were just reporters or they had true positions of
1 responsibility, but they were a part of the process in the fusion centre.
2 Q. What I would like to know is what profile, what kind of experts
3 actually worked at the fusion centre? And I don't mean the personnel at
4 large, I mean the people who did the core functions, who performed the
5 core functions at the fusion centre?
6 A. I can't speak to all the members in the fusion centre. I do know
7 that some of them had intelligence backgrounds. Some of them had
8 collection -- intelligence collection backgrounds. Some of them had
9 Special Forces background. In general, that's what I can recall.
10 Q. Thank you. Who carried out the selection of that cadre?
11 A. From what I can remember the Secretariat put out the
12 advertisements for the positions, and they would, you know, people that
13 were interested would fill out an application and the Secretariat would
14 select the fusion centre.
15 Sometimes we would get mission members on board and recognise
16 their writing skills or their communication skills and sometimes we would
17 take them from the mission, from say from the political office, human
18 rights office, and ask them to come to the fusion centre to work because
19 they wrote well and they could articulate and interpret well. But for
20 the most part, I believe it was the Secretariat, Mr. Krasnai [phoen], I
21 think, down there had a role on selecting how the fusion centre and other
22 fields would be populated. We generally put out what our needs were back
23 to the Secretariat and they would go out and recruit what we needed.
24 Q. Thank you. So you were not the person who ultimately decided on
25 who it was to become a member of the fusion cell?
1 A. Me personally?
2 Q. You and Mr. Walker?
3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. Thank you. A thing just came to my mind. Ms. Donna Phelan, did
5 you know her?
6 A. I don't remember that name, no, sir.
7 Q. Then I may be wrong. In January 1999, who was appointed as the
8 head of fusion cell?
9 A. I believe at the time it was a civilian who was an American. I
10 can't be sure, but I believe it was an American.
11 Q. I'm certain that up to that time that person was an American by
12 the name of Andy Isruk [phoen]. Do you recall that name?
13 A. Army -- army background, I do remember him, yes, you are correct.
14 Q. And I just recalled that it was actually Ms. Donna Phelan who
15 replaced him. At the beginning of your mission, she was or she had been
16 tasked with operations.
17 Another interesting thing is this: I wanted to ask you about the
18 method of total or complete confrontation. Have you ever heard of such a
20 A. No, sir.
21 Q. Thank you. And you don't seem to recall Ms. Donna Phelan?
22 A. I sure don't. I'm sorry.
23 Q. Very well, many years have gone by and many people were involved,
25 If I'm correct, perhaps you can correct me if I'm not, but I
1 believe the fusion cell contained two parts; one part was supposed to
2 with summarising the most important events of the day from the reports
3 they received and to provide a collective report to Mr. Walker and his
4 deputies. Am I correct in saying that that was one part of the fusion
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Or better yet, you tell us what the segments of that work were,
8 because I may go astray and risk you misunderstanding me. So one job to
9 do was to collate a report for a day, have it in one place, and what were
10 the other activities of the fusion cell?
11 A. It was to -- dissemination to the OSCE in Vienna, what was
12 happening in the field. They wanted reports and the fusion centre was
13 providing that because the member states were asking for it. So we had
14 an internal and an external requirement for the fusion centre.
15 Q. Did it also do something related to security assessment, say,
16 what is going to happen?
17 A. I don't recall security assessments. You know, from what I can
18 remember, there -- on the reports there was an assessment. I don't know
19 if it was called security assessment, but it was based on the day's
20 events. There were assessments made and analysis done on what we could
21 expect for the next day or the week and sometimes the idea was was to
22 trigger us to bring those things up in meetings as Mr. Sainovic when we
23 were concerned about them.
24 I guess the best way to say is that they conducted some trend
1 Q. Thank you. In addition to yourself, who was in the immediate
2 circle in Mr. Walker's cabinet?
3 A. Well, each of his deputy heads of mission, which would have been
4 a German and a French, a British, Norwegian, I believe there were five.
5 Then of course his inner office was myself, Albanian and Serb
6 interpreter, and an American secretary from the State Department, and
7 that was generally who was in his staff meetings.
8 Fusion centre director early on attended those staff meetings,
9 which helps me define the inner circle, but that didn't sustain itself
10 for very long. And I'm referring -- I'm referring only to the fusion
11 centre director. The staff meetings were regular occurrences for
12 Ambassador Walker.
13 Q. Thank you. What sort of decision-making mechanism existed in the
14 KVM headquarters?
15 A. Mr. Walker really made the final decisions. His -- he would take
16 the inputs from each of his deputy heads of mission. There were, you
17 know, inputs from each member regarding everything from a press statement
18 to where humanitarian needs were needed, to where KVM operations needed
19 to be focused, to how we handle missing Serbs and missing Albanians.
20 Discussion and strategy was laid out. He was given advice and then
21 Mr. Walker would make a decision based on that input.
22 Q. Thank you, Colonel. I'd like to focus on the most important
23 thing, which is verification as the most important role of the mission.
24 When a meeting takes place and Mr. Walker decides that there was a
25 violation of the agreement, what was the procedure after that? In simple
1 terms. So everything is concluded, it is determined that a certain event
2 amounts to a violation. What follows? What is the procedure?
3 A. From what I can remember, it was documented, it was forwarded to
4 the OSCE Mission in Vienna
5 violations, of non-compliance.
6 Q. Who was supposed to implement or put his decision in practice, if
7 anyone? Was it you perhaps?
8 A. On occasion I would be asked to make a phone call, but we had a
9 mechanism where the reports were disseminated out of the OSCE KVM to
11 call Ambassador Travik who was the assistant to Ambassador Vollebaek,
12 CEO. I worked more with him than I did in the early going Mr. Geremek, I
13 believe was his name, in Poland
14 down the mission became operational. So he would inform the chairman of
15 office directly and I often did that through his assistance.
16 Q. Colonel, save for such verbal reports, when there was a
17 violation, was there an office that would draft a protest and forward it
18 to the OSCE, or did you forward such a protest letter to anyone in
19 particular? Are you familiar with any of that?
20 A. Our political office, I think, sometimes got involved in that. I
21 don't recall ever writing such reports and sending them off in a
22 unilateral fashion. That was what the staff was to do. I don't recall
23 all of the activities at the political office, but it seems to me they
24 had a role in wording that properly to send it off.
25 Q. If such a document existed, was Mr. Walker supposed to sign it?
1 A. I don't recall if he ever had to sign those or not, sir. I'm
3 Q. Thank you. When you testified in the Milutinovic case, do you
4 recall being shown a document of that nature? It was an official letter
5 of protest signed by Mr. Walker?
6 A. I do remember him with letters of protest. I don't remember that
7 specific document, but I do remember letters of protest.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. And they were [Overlapping speakers] ... presented to
10 Mr. Sainovic.
11 Q. Colonel, the problem is that we have to put questions to
12 witnesses and this concerns material --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: This concerns
14 witness's opinions.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. -- if we had all the documents, things would be pretty clear.
17 But if a decision was made that there was non-compliance and we don't
18 have a letter that would show that such protest letters were indeed sent,
19 for example, there was an event that was protested and a letter was sent
20 to Mr. Milosevic, but we don't actually have a letter of protest that I
21 could show you. Are you familiar with any such instances in which
22 occurrences of this nature happened?
23 A. Familiar with letters going to Mr. Milosevic? Or just letters of
25 Q. Letters of protest?
1 A. I remember some documents that Mr. Walker wanted on the record
2 that clearly defined non-compliance issues. One of those was in the form
3 of a letter that went in December, verbally, primarily to Mr. Milosevic.
4 We often took them to the government building and spoke to Mr. Sainovic
5 and Mr. Lukic and Mr. Loncar. They were also incorporated into some of
6 the KVM reporting where there was non-compliance as interpreted by the
8 Q. Let's simplify things. There was a thing on the border on the
9 25th of February concerning some KVM vehicles, when they were crossing
10 from Macedonia
11 affairs of the FRY sent a letter of protest to the KVM headquarters in
12 Pristina. It was sent by Mr. Jovanovic. Are there any such letters
13 issued by the KVM headquarters that would resemble situations such as
14 this one that would be sent to the other party, and if so, do you know
15 where we could find that.
16 A. Sir, I cannot answer that easily. I'm not a hundred per cent
17 certain of a formal stand-alone letter of protest that might have been
18 presented by Ambassador Walker. I know that it was documented, and I
19 know that it was in reporting, and I know that it was in a letter to
20 Mr. Milosevic on occasion, but as far as stand-alone letters of protest,
21 I'm just not a hundred per cent certain to be able to tell you that there
22 in fact was.
23 Q. While we are on the topic of reports, KVM reports, do you recall
24 any problems that the Yugoslav authorities asked that the reports you
25 sent to Vienna
1 be sent to the Yugoslav authorities as well?
2 A. I think there was some discussion on that in the government
3 building with Mr. Sainovic. I don't remember what the disposition was as
4 a result of that discussion. I honestly don't know if we did agree to
5 send those to the FRY or not. I suspect not though.
6 Q. Thank you. Staying with the issue of reports, were there
7 differences in the level of protection or coding of certain documents,
8 were some documents unprotected and some others could only be copied to
9 certain addressees, and I mean the KVM headquarters?
10 A. Are you referring was there NATO restricted documents that were
11 not authorised for all member states to see versus unrestricted
13 Q. Yes. Was there a difference in the degree of confidentiality or
14 restriction, and if so, what were the levels and to whom did they apply?
15 A. We -- we did request a desire to be able to handle NATO
16 classified documents. NATO had lots of trouble with that. Putting it in
17 the international mission like that. So what instead was arrived at was
18 a secure phone capability that was in a sound-proof booth that was put in
19 the fusion centre and it was a secure line that -- that the Americans
20 could access and use and NATO member countries could use. I don't think
21 that we ever received the clearance to publish and classify specific
22 documents with NATO classifications. But we did have a secure phone to
23 be able it to discuss issues of that nature.
24 Q. Thank you. You've explained that in relation to NATO and how it
25 was used. What about the other users, say, the member states and the
1 presiding officer of the OSCE as well as its Secretariat, or perhaps
2 within the mission itself, were there any restrictions in that regard?
3 A. I don't recall any specific restrictions on documents that you
4 are referring to. I think Ambassador Walker had, you know, I guess I
5 would refer to him as eyes-only documents that were met for just his
6 senior staff that weren't meant for the review of the KVM mission at
8 Q. Thank you. Given that you were Mr. Walker's closest associate,
9 do you recall whether there were any problems in the drafting of reports
10 sent to the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna
11 of certain verifiers were not being forwarded to Vienna, but rather kept
12 in Pristina only?
13 A. I am not aware of any reports that were purposely held back by
14 Ambassador Walker not to go to Vienna
16 Q. If my memory is correct, on the 12th of February, 1999, you were
17 with Mr. Walker during his visit to Moscow; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do you recall whether the Russian side had any objections to make
20 as to the reports of their verifiers and their reports being sent to the
21 headquarters in Pristina complaining about those reports not being sent
22 to Vienna
23 Russian side as a result of that?
24 A. I don't recall that kind of thing or discussion on that. And if
25 you're looking for was there disagreements in the mission about various
1 events intent of an operation, results of an operation, there was
2 discussion with Ambassador Walker and his staff, there were contentious
3 arguments with the French ambassador, Ambassador Keller and
4 Ambassador Walker on interpretation. So there were certainly issues.
5 Ambassador Walker did have the final say on contentious issues and how it
6 would be worded and how it would go out.
7 Q. Well, you know, I was confused when I learned that, in addition
8 to the verifiers sending their reports to the headquarter, they also sent
9 reports to their respective states. Was this also a practice in the
10 Kosovo Verification Mission
11 A. Yes, this was occurring on a frequent basis and concerned
12 Mr. Walker greatly. He was not happy that there were member states that
13 work international mission were sending things home to their member
14 states, to their home office, if you will.
15 Q. Thank you. Colonel, could you tell us which were the basic
16 documents you applied in the process of verification?
17 A. I can't recall the documents. I know one of the documents of
18 course was the agreement. I believe there were others, but I don't
19 recall their name or their title. It's just been too long ago.
20 Q. I apologise. When I say "you," I don't mean you personally but
21 the verification mission, you should know that.
22 Would you agree with me that the basis of the verification
23 process was laid down by Resolution 1199 by the Security Council of
24 the UN?
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit D160 on the
3 screen. Can we see page 2, please.
4 Q. Witness, in the third paragraph from the top, am I right in
5 saying that violence exerted by any of the sides, as well as terrorism
6 committed by individuals or groups in order to achieve political goals is
7 condemned as is any such activity in Kosovo coming from outside of the
8 country, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist
9 activities in Kosovo?
10 A. And the question, is that correct?
11 Q. Well, the question is this: In view of this paragraph in the
12 preamble to the resolution, what actions did the mission take in order to
13 prevent, to stop, the supply of arms and training for terrorist
14 activities in Kosovo and Metohija?
15 A. I know that it was a deep concern to Ambassador Walker. He
16 wanted assets and money frozen so they couldn't procure weapons. We did
17 not want the KLA to have new weapons or more weapons. It was a concern
18 that was delivered to us from Mr. Sainovic. And it was a concern that we
19 agreed with and that we delivered to the OSCE Mission in Vienna
20 I think we also raised this issue with Ambassador Holbrooke that
21 it needed to stop, it wasn't helping us. We also raised it with the KLA
22 in meetings at a place called the Ice House that this was not helpful
23 for -- our advantageous to them to be doing this. We had no major to
24 turn off funds. All we could do was to carry that. We could levy the
25 protest with the KLA and give that to the OSCE to help us with.
1 Q. Thank you, Colonel. During your stay in Kosova and Metohija, did
2 you have any information or knowledge that the Republic of Albania
3 providing logistical support to the Kosovars in terms of providing
4 training and assisting them in supplying weapons, running weapons, to
5 Kosovo and Metohija?
6 A. We had knowledge that this was occurring. We had knowledge that
7 there was an Albanian in Switzerland
8 weapons. I think they knew the individual's name. I can't recall off
9 the top of my head, but we had knowledge that this was moving to
10 Albanian. And we also knew that there were Albanians wanting to come
11 back to Kosovo to join family and that the KLA was their ticket to get
12 back into Kosovo, and the cost of doing so was to have them carry weapons
13 across mountains and into Kosovo to provide to the KLA.
14 Q. Thank you, Colonel, but my question related to the government and
15 bodies, government bodies of the Republic of Albania
16 facilitated this and provided logistical support on their territory to
17 the KLA?
18 A. I have no idea what the Government of Albania knew or didn't
19 know. I just had knowledge that it was occurring, but I don't know what
20 the government knew in Albania
21 Q. And the Yugoslav authorities did not inform you of this?
22 A. Yugoslav authorities did. It was a discussion that we had with
23 Mr. Sainovic. It was a great concern of theirs, and so we were aware of
24 their concerns. But as for the government, if you are asking me if the
25 FRY had information from the Albanian government, I don't know that.
1 Q. Thank you. Did the KVM staff conclude that the KLA actually
2 engaged in whatever their activities were on the territory of Albania
3 without the knowledge and support of the Albanian government?
4 A. I think -- if you are asking me my opinion here, my opinion is is
5 that I believe the Albanian government was aware of KLA activities. And
6 naturally being the case, what their stated goals were, the Albanian
7 government was fairly passive in what the KLA was doing. They neither
8 stopped it or came out and publicly supported it.
9 Q. Thank you. Well, my question to you is, because you were a
10 witness, you actually attended the meetings of the highest leadership,
11 the top leadership of the KVM in Pristina, and my question really relates
12 to whether there was any position taken by the KVM on these complaints
13 that were raised by the FRY?
14 A. We agreed with the FRY; it had to stop. It was not helpful for
15 us, for our mission, it was not helpful to the FRY. And it was hurting
16 the KLA. And so we were in full agreement that this funding of weapons
17 needed to stop. We suggested that both within the OSCE member states and
18 when Ambassador Walker and I went back to Washington, that that was an
19 issue that needed to be curtailed.
20 Q. Thank you. And did you inform the president of the OSCE, the
21 OSCE Secretariat, and perhaps the Security Council, the
22 UN Security Council thereof?
23 A. My memory says to me that we -- we did inform the OSCE member
24 states in a briefing to all members. I can tell you that we did inform
25 Secretary Albright. We did inform Mr. Walt Slocum who was
1 Department of Defence for policy. And we did inform members of congress.
2 As for the United Nations, I don't recall -- I would be surprised if we
3 didn't on that issue.
4 Q. Thank you. Are you aware of any practical steps taken to cut
5 these channels through which the weapons were funnelled into
6 Kosovo and Metohija from Albania
7 A. From a KVM perspective or from a policy perspective of the
8 United States? I'm unaware of -- how best to word this. It was clearly
9 something we didn't want to happen. We sought help from the OSCE member
10 states, but I'm -- I'm unaware of any actual steps that were taken to
11 prohibit that. It was very hard, being a small mission, we never grew to
12 2.000 people to get us out on the border. And so I'm unaware -- in the
13 case of KVM the practical steps would have been, you know, we go to the
14 primary LOCs and have our own check-points and prohibit those weapons
15 from coming in. The best we could do was to speak to the KLA commanders
16 that this needed to stop. It was provocative and not helping. So we did
17 give some verbal warnings. We did that at the Ice House to people like
18 Sokol Bashota, Krasniqi, other KLA members.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page of
21 this document, please.
22 Q. Colonel, sir, would you please look at 4(a). Paragraph 4(a).
23 Would you agree with me that this paragraph calls on the
24 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease all action only in relation to
25 the civilian population and to withdraw its security units that are used
1 for civilian repression?
2 A. I would agree with that, yes.
3 Q. Thank you. Would you now look at 5 -- item 5, sub-item (b). Am
4 I correct that the Republic of Yugoslavia
5 repressive actions against the peaceful population?
6 A. That's what the document says, so, yes, I agree with that.
7 Peaceful population.
8 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me that this Security Council
9 document was the document underpinning the next document, the
10 verification mission document of the OSCE, I'm not sure whether we have
11 time to see the other document.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we just pull it up on the
13 screen, P835, to jog the witness's memory.
14 Q. Unfortunately, Colonel, based on the format, perhaps you can't
15 recall this document, but do you recall its content?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Colonel, this is a document dated 16 October 1998 signed by the
18 minister of foreign affairs of the FRY, Zivadin Jovanovic, and
19 Mr. Bronislaw Geremek who at the time was the presiding of the OSCE, and
20 this was the document that facilitated the verification mission, would
21 you agree with me?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think this is the
25 time when we should end for the day because I have a few more questions
2 JUDGE PARKER: You have run your time indeed, Mr. Djurdjic. We
3 must adjourn, and we continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
4 We must ask you to return tomorrow at 9.00.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Court Officer will assist you and those advising
7 you when we rise. Now adjourn.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.
10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of
11 September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.