Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9594

 1                           Friday, 4 December 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The witness takes the stand]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

 7                           WITNESS:  VLASTIMIR DJORDJEVIC [Resumed]

 8                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 9                           Examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Djordjevic.

11        A.   Good morning.

12        Q.   Yesterday you talked about the meetings that you had with state

13     and military structures.  Tell us, was there a leader in charge presiding

14     over those meetings?

15        A.   You are referring to the meetings held in Pristina?

16        Q.   Yes, that is what I mean.  You told us that in the evening you

17     had meetings with representatives of state organs and representatives of

18     the military, that you attended it, the head of the staff, the deputy

19     General Obrad Stevanovic, and you yourself, and that these were

20     co-ordination meetings.  So shall I -- I'm asking you:  Was there a

21     leader who was in charge?

22        A.   No, there was no one who would be a leader.  We were the police,

23     the army, and the political representatives who were there, we were at

24     the same level so that no one had a leading or a commanding role.

25        Q.   Thank you.  At these meetings did you assign any tasks to police

Page 9595

 1     and army units?

 2        A.   At those meetings the next task would be specified in keeping

 3     with the global plan, and we discussed the planning documents that would

 4     be elaborated for that purpose.  There were no specific orders issued to

 5     the effect that perhaps the next day commands would be issued to someone

 6     to discharge that task -- to that effect, no.  We had a general plan on

 7     the basis of which documents, specific documents, were drawn up and those

 8     documents would then be realised in practice to give effect to the global

 9     anti-terrorist plan.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up document P688,

12     please.

13        Q.   It is your serial number 85 in your binder, Mr. Djordjevic.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, these are minutes from the staff meeting of the

16     28th of July, 1998.  Did you attend this staff meeting, and have you seen

17     these minutes?

18        A.   Yes, I looked at the minutes.  Three days after the beginning of

19     the first operation that we had down there in the Kosovo area, the

20     minister arrived with the intention of holding a meeting with the staff

21     and be satisfied for himself of the state security situation and the way

22     the work was being done.  As according to his orders, also my primary

23     duty was for activities in the field.  I asked him by telephone for me to

24     be excused from the meeting, and he agreed.  So this meeting was held in

25     my absence, and I was in the field.

Page 9596

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We see that escorting him and attending the meeting

 2     was also the deputy -- the assistant minister General Rade Markovic?

 3        A.   Yes, it is obvious from the minutes that the meeting was attended

 4     by Rade Markovic and staff members, MUP members, as well as heads of the

 5     secretariats.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  You did mention this yesterday, but in addition to

 7     you, yourself, and General Obrad Stevanovic, during the -- were other

 8     assistants there and stayed for a while in the territory of Kosovo and

 9     Metohija during the realisation of this global plan?

10        A.   Yes, Radomir Markovic on this particular occasion I believe that

11     orders of the minister, he was dispatched to the area of the autonomous

12     province of Kosovo and Metohija, and he attended a joint meeting, that

13     joint meeting which was held that evening, and he actively contributed to

14     the discussion.  In July the assistant minister, Jovica Stanisic, also

15     arrived in Kosovo and he also attended our co-ordination meetings with

16     the army.

17        Q.   Excuse me, you said assistant minister Jovica Stanisic?

18        A.   Actually, the head of the -- chief of the state security

19     department.

20        Q.   And of the military personnel, were there any military attending

21     the co-ordination meeting?

22        A.   Yes, there were military senior officers who when visiting the

23     Pristina units or the Pristina Corps would come there, and we met with

24     them.  They also actively participated in these meetings.  As far as I

25     can recall, General Samardzic, the commander of the 3rd Army, was there

Page 9597

 1     and there were also some lower-ranking commanders, officers who

 2     occasionally attended these meetings.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Where were you on the 28th of July?  You just told us

 4     that you were somewhere in the field where some activities were

 5     unfolding.

 6        A.   On that day the security forces were undertaking the final

 7     operations in order to enter Malisevo, which up to that point had been

 8     the principal stronghold of the terrorist forces and where their

 9     headquarters or their staff was which commanded their overall forces.  As

10     the situation was very serious, or rather, the action was very serious, I

11     asked the minister to allow me to be there in the field on that occasion.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you enter Malisevo then when that action was

13     over?

14        A.   Yes.  We, or rather, the units active on the planned axes, those

15     of major resistance, prior to entering Malisevo itself and when the

16     resistance was crushed and the barricades dismantled there no longer was

17     any resistance to us to enter the place of Malisevo proper, and in view

18     of the fact that there was no resistance the commanding officers of the

19     police and the army who were there reduced the use of all their assets.

20     And practically this action of entering Malisevo did not entail any

21     damage, but rather total control of the village was gained because the

22     terrorists had already left the village with all the civilians so that

23     there was no reason and there was no need for employing any assets.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Who was in charge of this action?

25        A.   This action was conducted by military and police forces operating

Page 9598

 1     from two directions, from two axes.  There were two police units and one

 2     military unit on each, and everyone commanded their own forces.

 3        Q.   Who commanded the police?

 4        A.   The police was commanded by the commanders of the PJPs, namely,

 5     on one axis Special Anti-Terrorist Unit was employed commanded by its

 6     commanding officer, and the PJPs were commanded by their regular

 7     commander.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  What was your role?

 9        A.   I have already stated that it was practically the most important

10     action because the fiercest resistance was expected then because actually

11     at that time Malisevo was being promoted as their centre, their

12     stronghold, the centre of that republic.  So for those reasons, as there

13     were many police and army units participating, a large number of people,

14     of men in other words, and since the situation was unfamiliar, I wanted

15     to participate.  I practically was an observer there, so if the situation

16     should actually deteriorated I wanted to be of assistance, to deal with

17     it.

18        Q.   Thank you.  So now we have come to Malisevo.  Tell me, before

19     that sometime in mid-July were there any terrorist activities from

20     Orahovac to Malisevo, Zociste, Padaliste, and that area there?

21        A.   This was an area where there were markedly pronounced terrorist

22     activities.  Practically from Malisevo through some forbidden [as

23     interpreted] passes one reached Orahovac, and sometime in mid-July 1998

24     the terrorists had taken -- took a part of Orahovac.  And all in all,

25     this area, Malisevo, Orahovac, Suva Reka, Dulje, Blace, and again towards

Page 9599

 1     Malisevo, this -- these were territories under terrorist control and

 2     their activity there was indeed intensive.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see D386, which is --

 5     should be a video recording.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The white building is the police

 8     station.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's watch for a little while

10     more.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the only civilian who

12     remained there whom I saw on that occasion.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, is this is what Malisevo looked like?  Was this

15     the state that it was in on the 28th of July, 1998?

16        A.   Yes, precisely, that was the state the place was in when the

17     police forces came to the entry point into that place.  There was a

18     petrol station at the entry point.  I came and some assistants of the

19     minister.  I asked them to convey the message to the minister that we

20     were there at the entry point into Malisevo, and the next day the

21     spokesperson of the MUP - at that time it was Colonel Bozidar

22     Filic - came together with journalists.  They came, and they toured

23     Malisevo.  It's a small place.  You could see the small shops and

24     businesses.  That is what we found when the police forces entered.

25     Practically not a single building was damaged at the time when we took

Page 9600

 1     control of the place.

 2        Q.   While we still have this video --

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at D010-1756.

 4             MR. STAMP:  And while it is brought up, perhaps we could clarify

 5     whether the witness said at page 6, line 21 Colonel Bozidar Milic - if

 6     that is the correct name.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Tell us again the name of the colonel.

 9        A.   Bozidar Filic, F, Filic.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have -- Marie, maybe we

11     could proceed with another document and then when you are ready with this

12     one, we'll present it later.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   Before we move on to the comments on this video, tell me for the

16     record, who was with you when you were entering Malisevo on the 28th of

17     July?  Who were you with?

18        A.   There were commanders of the police and army units.  At that

19     moment, there were no other personalities.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Djordjevic, tell us, did you see these

21     fortifications that we could see on the video?

22        A.   I saw them only on video footage, not there.

23        Q.   This was just an illustration.  Did fortifications actually on

24     the ground look like this, or could you describe what you saw?

25        A.   Precisely like these, in some places even better and stronger.

Page 9601

 1     There were really trenches several kilometres long dug according to all

 2     army regulations, and I can say that in terms of engineering and

 3     fortification they did the job really professionally.

 4        Q.   We saw on the video a moment ago this vehicle, the armoured

 5     vehicle of the police damaged.  Did the KLA have weapons capable of

 6     destroying such vehicles?

 7        A.   They had both the weapons, and sometimes they improvised weapons,

 8     built them manually.  This weapon was charged with explosive and other

 9     material, and they simply detonated the device, this improvised device,

10     when our vehicle would be arriving, vehicles carrying personnel as well.

11     And they also used traditional anti-tank mines by placing them on roads

12     or by the road, but they also had anti-armour weapons such as hand-held

13     launchers and other weapons.

14        Q.   We've just seen a trench and very tall corn-stalks above them.

15     You said at one point that the police was ambushed from such fields.  Do

16     you know anything about that?

17        A.   You can see at this point in the video footage this corn could

18     not burn because the vegetation is rich, but in the month of August in

19     the course of certain activities, there were fields with crops that had

20     not been harvested yet.  And during anti-terrorist actions and attempts

21     to break their resistance, the exchange of fire between police and

22     terrorists and the use of various weapons would sometimes set these

23     fields on fire because the crops were very dry and the temperature was

24     high.  It burned very easily.

25        Q.   Were there any deliberate torchings of these fields?

Page 9602

 1        A.   No, there was no reason to do that.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P133.

 4             Excuse me, can I ask the last video to be admitted into evidence

 5     first.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D428.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Here we see a letter of the 28th of July, 1998.  Would you tell

10     us, who is it addressed to and tell us a little about the contents.  How

11     did this come about?

12        A.   This is a classical letter describing the sending of PJPs to

13     execute special security tasks - in this case in Kosovo - and to replace

14     units sent before.  In this case the units specified here are sent, and

15     the letter is addressed to all secretariats so that each secretariat can

16     see what its particular obligations are.  So the administration of the

17     police was involved because special -- because members of the PJPs were

18     being sent on special missions.  It says where the units are being sent,

19     where they are to report, how they should be equipped, how their per

20     diems should be paid, which routes they should take, and that is the

21     format of all dispatches that deal with the sending of units or officers

22     to special missions.

23        Q.   Does it specify what exactly they would be doing?

24        A.   The first sentence says:  To lend assistance in carrying out

25     special security tasks.  That is the only thing that we can read here.

Page 9603

 1     There is not a single sentence about a specific security task or the way

 2     in which it would be executed.  Hereby, the units are only being sent to

 3     specific locations in order to obey others there.

 4        Q.   On whose orders were such units in Kosovo and Metohija acting in

 5     1998 and 1999?

 6        A.   Not only in those two years.  PJPs and the special unit of the

 7     MUP of Serbia was engaged exclusively on the orders of the minister.

 8        Q.   Yes.  But who gave them their specific tasks once they arrived in

 9     Kosovo?

10        A.   They received their specific tasks from the secretariat where

11     they were sent -- sent as assistants, or if the staff was in charge of

12     whatever tasks they were to execute, then they received them from the

13     staff.

14        Q.   Well, I asked you specifically in 1998 and 1999, from whom did

15     they received their tasks?

16        A.   In this period, exclusively from the MUP staff.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P1201.

18        Q.   Tab 87.  Mr. Djordjevic, could you comment on this dispatch of

19     the 14th of August, 1998.  This is in fact a Teletype text.

20        A.   Yes, this dispatch was sent to all organisational units within

21     the sector and some units outside of the sector, such as the police

22     academy, the college of internal affairs, and the secondary school of

23     internal affairs.  It describes abuses of sick leave because certain

24     members did not want to serve within special units and try to avoid it,

25     and the other matter is training, accommodation, certain status-related

Page 9604

 1     matters that apply to all members of the ministry.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have P886 now and -- to

 3     begin with -- now this will be difficult.  Page 12 in B/C/S and page 16

 4     of English.

 5        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, don't look in the binder, it's not there, you can

 6     only see it on the screen.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC:  It's a big document, but we have to see

 8     Mr. Pavkovic, Djordjevic, Lukic -- is this page 16 in English?  The

 9     Serbian is good.  Let's see the bottom -- next page then.  No, no.  Can

10     we see the next page in English.  No.  Can we try to see the date of this

11     meeting in Serbian, just to see the date of the meeting.  This page is

12     good, K022-8423.  26th of July.  In English -- in the English one it is

13     the 28th of July.  Can we look for the 26th of July in the English

14     version.  The B/C/S version is just right quite.  Let's see page 8 then.

15     July 26.  Let us just go to the next page to locate this section which

16     corresponds to the -- another page, please.  That's it.  We have

17     Mr. Djordjevic here.  And can we see page 12 of the Serbian version,

18     please.  Scroll down, scroll down, please.  We want to see Djordjevic in

19     the English version, please.  It should be page 12, 12 in the Serbian and

20     12 in the English version.  Okay.  Can you zoom in on Mr. Djordjevic in

21     the English.

22        Q.   Can you tell us what it is that you were talking about here.

23        A.   Well, I'm unable to read it.  I cannot see it all, but basically

24     at these meetings we exchanged information on everything, everything that

25     was going on in the field or activities which needed to be further

Page 9605

 1     regulated, adjusted in the plan in keeping with developments in the

 2     field.  Along those lines I gave my views and my contributions at all

 3     these meetings, informing the present about what I had personally seen in

 4     the field, my intention being for us to discharge our duties

 5     successfully, to give effect to the general plan.  I cannot see, I'm not

 6     able to read exactly what it was on that particular occasion, what it

 7     says here, The plan was -- I really -- I probably said something along

 8     the lines of that the tasks were overambitious and that we were to either

 9     reduce their scope or something to that effect as far as this specific

10     day is concerned.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let me just ask you this also:  On the basis of your

12     input at meetings like these, did comment of the Pristina Corps and the

13     staff, did they take decisions and implement those decisions in realising

14     specific plans?

15        A.   All the participants at the meeting would state their opinions,

16     and whatever input was amenable to the realisation of the general plan

17     would be accepted and other contributions would not be accepted.

18     Practically at these meetings we exchanged all the information that we

19     had available in order for us to be able to successfully discharge our

20     assigned tasks.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to July 27,

23     1998.  That is page -- it is K022-8424 in B/C/S, and it is page 17.

24        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic.

25        A.   Can you please zoom in on the -- this section which is in

Page 9606

 1     handwriting.

 2        Q.   Where it says, "Gen," G-e-n, "Djordjevic," directly under the

 3     number which is in the middle of the page.

 4        A.   I was on that axis, on that road, and this was the second day of

 5     activities to liberate, so to speak, this road.  There is reference to

 6     the village of Mlecane where there were barricades, and I talked about

 7     that at the meeting.  I said that there were concrete barricades, I

 8     believe, and I informed the meeting of that fact.  Also whilst working in

 9     the field there was an accident.  A policeman from the special unit got

10     killed.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down the English

12     text, please, to see another contribution of General Djordjevic's.  Yes.

13     That's it.

14        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, you also spoke a bit later.  Can you read out for

15     us what it was that you said?

16        A.   Yes.  Along that road there were quite a few activities and

17     fighting with the terrorists because we neutralised quite a few of their

18     strongholds along that road, and I informed all present that there were

19     no civilian -- that there had been no civilian casualties and that in the

20     villages that I saw by the road there were no civilians at all, and that

21     was also a bit of information which I offered to the assembled meeting.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now move on to page 14 of

24     the B/C/S version.  The date is the same.  It is K022-8425.  Fine.  In my

25     document it says page 19 in the English version -- no, rather, it's page

Page 9607

 1     14 in the English.  Can you scroll down page 225 in the Serbian version

 2     so that we can see where General Djordjevic is indicated.  Thank you.

 3        Q.   Do you see it?

 4        A.   Actually, it should be scrolled down a bit.

 5        Q.   No, no.  Where it says it should be solved, General Djordjevic,

 6     do you see that?

 7        A.   No, no, no.  The written version should go down a bit.

 8        Q.   Are you -- look at the Serbian version.

 9        A.   Yes, now I see it at the bottom of the page.  The village of

10     Dusevic must be resolved, and the villagers should enter the village.

11     Well, this was a general practice, namely.  In all our activities we

12     established that there were no villagers there and that later they would

13     be found as displaced persons in some other locations not far from the

14     villages where they had taken shelter because of the activities which

15     were being carried out by the terrorist forces targeting the police and

16     vice versa and not infrequently also according to the instructions of the

17     terrorist forces when it suited them.  We decided to have all the

18     villagers return to their villages and as far as -- and as far as

19     possible to continue living normal lives because no action of the police

20     was ever directed at civilians.  However, there were all kinds of abuses

21     by KLA members and there were many villages where all the villagers were

22     in the village and the police forces passed by, going about their duties.

23     There was no resistance put up to the police.  There were no attacks on

24     the police so that this unfolded normally, and the police went about

25     their regular duties without any such resistance being offered, but

Page 9608

 1     unfortunately there were also villages from which such resistance was

 2     offered because they were the strongholds of terrorists who pursued their

 3     activities from them.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get page K022-8436 in

 6     the B/C/S version.  That ought to be page 34 in the English version.

 7     Page 26 of the B/C/S version, please.  It should be page 26 in the

 8     English version as Marie just told me.

 9        Q.   You can of course consult the left side -- the left-hand side in

10     the Serbian, but if you can, you can also read the English.  So ...

11     please comment on this.

12        A.   Yes, according to the earlier principle, namely, according to

13     what I had observed in the field or what I had been told in the field, I

14     would inform and point to the security -- out the security situation in

15     the vicinity of the village of Dulje and elevation 925 and the Klecka

16     area.  And I'm not quite sure what the last sentence reads, Near Ostrozub

17     three men were captured and ten were killed -- I'm not sure what it

18     states.

19        Q.   This is the 31st of July, 1998; right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   The activities on the 31st of July had to do with the lifting of

22     the blockade of the -- on the Pristina-Prizren-via Dulje road, and the

23     road having been cleared, they proceeded towards where the assessed

24     locations were of the KLA headquarters.

25             Tell me -- it says here, ten -- Three were captured and then ten

Page 9609

 1     who were killed.  What -- in what way?

 2        A.   Well, this is the information given to me in the field that three

 3     terrorists had been captured, and as for the rest, I'm not sure whether

 4     Djakovic heard it and -- or how he heard it and how it was recorded.  But

 5     at any rate, I reported that three had been captured and ten had been

 6     killed.

 7        Q.   But were they killed in the activities, in the fighting?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to the 4th of

10     August, 1998.  It is page 33 in the B/C/S version, it's K022-8443.  It

11     should be page 33 in the English version, rather 32.  I'm sorry.  Can we

12     see the next page in the Serbian version, 443.  And the English also.

13        Q.   You see your name there, Mr. Djordjevic?

14        A.   Yes, yes, I do.  It says here, Execution of Albanians, 20 of

15     them, near Lapusnik.  So apart from this main task to free these roads,

16     in view of the fact that there had been many kidnappings in the past

17     period and we had intelligence that kidnapped citizens were kept in

18     various basements, such as Orahovac, Albanians, Serbs, and others.  So

19     that was the context.  When this road was again free, we had information

20     that there was some sort of camp in Lapusnik.  When our operation was

21     completed an acquaintance called me from Urosevac and told me that he had

22     an Albanian with him who had escaped an execution.  Rizah Rexhaj was the

23     name, and the name of the village he was from was Petrovo.  And I went

24     there, and I heard his story.  He described how he had been in a camp not

25     far from the main road in Lapusnik, he had been there with his father.

Page 9610

 1     He described how they were treated and mistreated.  And when the police

 2     and army forces were lifting the blockade off that road, the people who

 3     kept them in the camp took them out and put them before a firing squad,

 4     but he ran to the woods not far from that site.  Of course he was afraid

 5     and concerned about his father.  He didn't know what had happened to him.

 6     To me it was a very interesting situation.  I told him to report it to

 7     the SUP, and I called the chief of the SUP and asked him to take the

 8     necessary steps, to go to that area together with the man Rizah and to

 9     see if there were any bodies there.  And the chief of the SUP sent a

10     platoon of soldiers with the necessary equipment.  They found the site of

11     the camp.  The man -- the man found some clothes belonging to his father,

12     but they were unable to find any bodies of the people who had been, as he

13     said, executed.

14        Q.   The person who kept this record wrote something here.  Can you

15     explain?

16        A.   "Execution of 20 Albanians - they were later taken to another

17     place" --

18        Q.   And then?

19        A.   That the place is controlled by the KLA.  That they were

20     transferred to another territory deeper controlled by the KLA, and it

21     says that I said:

22             "Investigate the place above Lapusnik and see what's there."

23             That's indeed what I said, to deal with the situation.

24        Q.   You explained that, Mr. Djordjevic.  Just explain this execution

25     of Albanians and 20 in brackets.

Page 9611

 1        A.   I said that there were Albanians, Serbs, and people of other

 2     ethnicities who were in this camp in Lapusnik.  That's what I had been

 3     told by the man who had escaped from there.

 4        Q.   And who executed them?

 5        A.   KLA forces who controlled the camp.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get page 29, 2nd August

 7     1998, K022-8440.  Page 29 in English.  This is good.  Let us see the

 8     bottom of the page in B/C/S, thank you, where Mr. Djordjevic is speaking.

 9        Q.   So on the 2nd of August, 1998, what was the discussion about?

10        A.   It was about the implementation of the plan and the entry into

11     one of the greatest strongholds of the terrorists in Jablanica village.

12     We had to cross a lot of territory to get there and many other villages.

13     Here I inform all those present that the units approaching

14     Jablanica - and I was there too - Jablanica village being populated by

15     ethnic Albanians who were Catholics, all the villagers had found refuge

16     in the local church.  And the terrorists had set ablaze some haystacks

17     around the village but dispersed when they saw the police approaching.

18     Therefore, there was no serious fighting and the village was not damaged,

19     and all the villagers were hiding in the church, over 200 of them.  When

20     we got there we met with the people, talked to them, and as we were

21     leaving people were going back to their homes.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we move to the 19th of August,

24     1998.  That's page 52 in B/C/S, K022-8462.  And in English it's 52.  It's

25     at the top of the English page.

Page 9612

 1        Q.   Could you tell us, Mr. Djordjevic, what did you say here?

 2        A.   As before, I reported on these activities and where they were

 3     carried out, in keeping with the plan; described the consequences; I

 4     shared what I knew at that moment as far as the police force is

 5     concerned; I told those present that the resistance in that area from

 6     Orahovac to Suva Reka was very strong.

 7        Q.   I see you also mention that some rifles were surrendered and some

 8     weapons were found?

 9        A.   Yes, there were some peculiar cases.  Here I mention one

10     hand-held launcher.

11        Q.   And towards the end?

12        A.   It says:

13             "Rogovo has handed over 30 to 40 rifles and so has Kapesnica

14     village," Kapesnica being another village where there were a lot of

15     terrorists with a lot of weaponry, and Rogovo had received weapons from

16     the terrorists and then they turned over, surrendered, 30-40 rifles of

17     their own free will.  That's what I reported at the meeting.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to the 20th August

19     1998, page 55 B/C/S, K022-8466.  English page 54.  If we could see the

20     lower part of the page.

21        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, do you see at the bottom of the page in B/C/S?

22        A.   Yes.  When I was in SUP Pec I received this information that

23     Rogovo village has surrendered three sub-machine-guns, 19 semiautomatic

24     rifles, six hand-held launchers, et cetera.  I reported what I learned

25     during my stay there, and I -- what I thought was important for all those

Page 9613

 1     present.

 2        Q.   Thank you, but in bullet point 5 you're mentioning a person from

 3     Lipovica.

 4        A.   What I see, this comes from a report we received when a person

 5     came in and said that there were 30 [as interpreted] to 400 persons

 6     kidnapped, both Serbs and Siptars being held there, but that is just me

 7     sharing something that I heard.  I don't think the number is realistic.

 8        Q.   You said the number was not realistic.  What is written in this

 9     record?

10        A.   It says there were 300 to 400 kidnapped persons, and that's a lot

11     for one location.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to 4 September

14     1998.  It's 75 in B/C/S, K022-8486, and page 73 in English.

15        Q.   Do you see this?  Your contribution is in the middle of the page.

16     Could you explain.

17        A.   Well, I see the way it's written here.  I'm not sure I used those

18     words, but never mind.  As in prior occasions we were really very

19     concerned about the civilian population, and we were anxious that after

20     all these operations that had been carried out for villagers to return to

21     their homes as soon as possible.  Now, there were various problems.  We

22     were wondering on whose orders they had left, on whose orders they were

23     staying away from their homes, and I suggested -- it says here that I

24     suggested to bring them back by force, but I don't think that's what I

25     was trying to say.  I was trying to say that villagers should return to

Page 9614

 1     their villages as soon as possible and continue to live there and that we

 2     should persuade them in direct contacts that there was no reason to stay

 3     away.  And this was not only one situation but in all other similar cases

 4     wherever we found civilians hiding somewhere away from their village in

 5     groups of one, two, three, or a thousand.  We always wanted them to go

 6     back to their homes as soon as possible and continue to live normally,

 7     and we would always try to get them to return home whenever we found

 8     groups of several thousand people hiding somewhere.

 9        Q.   What about the -- you were talking about the objectives of the

10     police and forces and the authorities.  How about the objectives of the

11     KLA and the reactions of various diplomatic missions and journalists?

12        A.   Let me just finish with this.  The first point says that

13     villagers should be returned to the villages by force, and the fourth

14     point is important, Action against terrorists.  These two points are

15     distinct.  On the one hand, civilians should be returned to their homes

16     and we should continue to fight terrorists.  Those who were found hiding

17     away from their homes should be brought back, and then there were various

18     interpretations given by all sorts of international organisations,

19     humanitarian and others, who were all pointing out and highlighting the

20     humanitarian problem.  They were condemning the Serb forces, saying that

21     it was allegedly their activities that caused a lot of harm and suffering

22     to civilians, forcing them to leave their homes.  There were situations

23     in which this was true, but those civilians left their homes before the

24     police arrived on orders they received from members of the KLA, this

25     terrorist organisation.

Page 9615

 1        Q.   For the record, could you just repeat what you said about the

 2     number of people you would find in villages and around villages.  Could

 3     you repeat that part.

 4        A.   We've just seen this picture from Malisevo.  There was only one

 5     person.  In Glodjane village, which was one of the main terrorist

 6     strongholds of Ramush Haradinaj, we found again one person alone.  In

 7     other locations, in Pusto Selo there was only one man; in other places

 8     there were two or three.  And in large columns of people on the

 9     move - and this would usually be in large places after the end of

10     operations - large numbers of these civilians were in large groups in

11     woods outside the village or perhaps a few kilometres outside a village

12     where anti-terrorist actions took place.  Thank you.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to -- can we

15     have the minutes of the 6th of September, 1999 [sic], that's page 82 in

16     the B/C/S version.  It is K022-8493 and page 72 in the English version.

17             The 6th of September, 1998, is actually the date of the meeting.

18     I apologise.

19        Q.   Do you see what is noted here as your words, Mr. Djordjevic?

20        A.   Yes.  This fits into the general pattern of conduct towards

21     civilians.  Then, namely after having learned that the villagers of a

22     village - specifically in this case of Sedlare - were outside their

23     village, I proposed that we go there with a company and return them

24     through their villages, to talk to them, explain the situation to them,

25     guarantee their security, and have them returned to their village.

Page 9616

 1        Q.   And this is under item 2, you say one company?

 2        A.   Yes, one company because this was a territory where there were

 3     also terrorists.  So the villagers were in the woods near the village,

 4     and in order to ensure the safety of the policemen, I proposed that we go

 5     and see these refugee groups or provisionally displaced persons,

 6     temporarily displaced persons, with a company and to tell them to return

 7     to their homes.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter apologises, she didn't hear the

 9     beginning of this sentence of Mr. Djurdjic's, please.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   While we have General Lukic's contribution at the meeting --

12             JUDGE PARKER:  We have not had co-ordination of the Serb and the

13     English pages.  The minutes of the 6th of September we've not had in

14     English what the witness is speaking about, and now we have the meeting

15     of the 7th of September, 1998, on screen in English.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know whether

17     something has been changed.  I was looking at the Serbian version.  It

18     was good.  Can we now again see the 6th of September in the English

19     version, please?  The Serbian is good, just the next page in the English.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Well, this seems to be in English, minutes of the

21     6th of September, and at the moment we cannot see anything that compares

22     to the Serbian.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in the

24     English version, please.  Your Honours, at the bottom of the English

25     version it is stated "General Djordjevic."  Let us please not get

Page 9617

 1     confused.  So far we have been dealing with September 6th, and these are

 2     the two versions that the accused talked about.  Now we are moving on to

 3     the 7th of September.  Do they correspond now, the two versions, Your

 4     Honours?

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise and thank to you.

 7             Let us now move on to September the 7th, that is page 83 of the

 8     B/C/S version.  It's K022-8494.  We have the words of General Lukic.  Let

 9     us not go through all of that.  What I'm interested in is the fourth

10     bullet point from the top?

11        Q.   Do you see it, Mr. Djordjevic?

12        A.   Yes, I do.  Lukic is informing here that in keeping with what had

13     been said the day before, a company was to try and to return the

14     villagers to the village of Sedlare, and he is informing the meeting that

15     they tried to do so but the KLA did not allow it.

16        Q.   Read it out.

17        A.   Yes.

18             "An attempt was made to return to Sedlare with one company, but

19     the KLA did not allow it."

20             So this company actually met with the villagers who were outside

21     the village of Sedlare and proposed to them that they return home, but

22     they told the policemen that they could not because they were not allowed

23     to do so by the KLA, the KLA forbade them to do that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We are still in the same document but page 84 of the

25     Serbian version.  It is K022-8495 and 82 of the English version.  In the

Page 9618

 1     Serbian version it is right below these numbers.  Do you see that?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Can you comment on this.  Here in the English version it's near

 4     the top after Mr. Minic.

 5        A.   Here I commented on the use of artillery, and I suggested and

 6     pointed to the need to perhaps reduce the use of artillery, namely, that

 7     the artillery should not be used unnecessarily but only according to the

 8     concept which was that artillery should only be used to destroy their

 9     strongholds and that that would be the end of the use of artillery.  And

10     further action should be taken by police forces according to the plan

11     which I earlier described.  So I just pointed to the obligation of using

12     artillery in keeping with the situation, namely, not unnecessarily, when

13     it was not required for that particular field.

14        Q.   And the next?

15        A.   When I spoke later, I pointed out the practices that I had

16     encountered in the field and also learned of by talking to the heads of

17     secretariats there, namely, that after police actions in fighting with

18     the terrorists there would be subsequent torchings of -- or destruction

19     of houses or of buildings where terrorist activities had already ended

20     and that that territory should be protected by the territorial organs, by

21     the SUPs, that they should prevent any such actions.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And were any measures taken to detect the

23     perpetrators of these offences?

24        A.   Yes, of course.  This was a task issued by the staff to all, to

25     the participants in the anti-terrorist activities, as well to the

Page 9619

 1     secretariats in the field.  They were to take account of these matters

 2     and to take the legally envisaged measures against the perpetrators of

 3     these acts.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that it is

 6     time for our break.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.

 8             We adjourn and resume at 11.00.

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

13        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, in the implementation of this global plan, was

14     any report being submitted to the relevant organs in Serbia and

15     Yugoslavia?

16        A.   Yes, reports were being submitted.  Generally speaking, as soon

17     as a stage was completed we would convene a meeting, and we would update

18     everyone on the progress made so far.

19        Q.   Can you tell us approximately when did this reporting take place

20     about the implementation, who attended, and who was specifically the

21     person submitting this progress report?

22        A.   I think that the first meeting was held with the president of the

23     FRY at the Beli Dvor, and the attendees were the same persons who had

24     been present at the time when the plan was adopted.  I think that the

25     first such meeting took place after the implementation of this basic

Page 9620

 1     stage which involved the liberation of certain territories.  It may have

 2     been in early August 1998.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us who was there representing the

 4     Government of Republic of Serbia?

 5        A.   The President of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovic; the Chief of General

 6     Staff and his associates representing the army; the minister of the

 7     interior; and the heads of both services, Obrad Stevanovic, the assistant

 8     minister, and the head of the Pristina MUP, General Sreten Lukic,

 9     basically all the people who were there at the first meeting.

10        Q.   Who submitted this progress report up to that stage?

11        A.   On that occasion concerning the portion that the Army of

12     Yugoslavia was engaged in was submitted by General Pavkovic, the

13     commander of the Pristina Corps, providing all the details of how this

14     was accomplished.  On behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, the report

15     was submitted by the head of the staff of MUP in Pristina, General Lukic.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Until this final implementation of the plan, did you

17     have any other meeting with the highest leaderships of Yugoslavia and

18     Serbia?

19        A.   Towards the end of August I think another meeting with the same

20     composition and with the same agenda was held.  The procedure was

21     identical.  All the people who reported before submitted reports this

22     time again, and following the endorsement of these reports by the

23     leaderships, also and indication was made of what was required to do in

24     the forthcoming period and also we needed approval to continue with the

25     implementation of this general plan.

Page 9621

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now have on our

 3     screens document 1145 from the Defence list, or rather, 4137 from the

 4     Prosecution's 65 ter.

 5        Q.   And in your binder, Mr. Djordjevic, it's number 58.  Just a

 6     moment, please.  Mr. Djordjevic, who has sent this dispatch and when?

 7        A.   This is a dispatch sent on the 14th of September to the office of

 8     the minister of the interior by the head of the staff, General --

 9     Major-General Sreten Lukic.

10        Q.   Thank you.  What kind of information does this dispatch relate

11     to?

12        A.   This dispatch relates to a previous dispatch sent on one day

13     before, where basically and probably the information about the same event

14     was provided, but here we have some additional details that the head of

15     the staff wanted to inform the minister.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Were you familiar with the situation in Istinic, and

17     what do you know about the content of this dispatch?

18        A.   Well, this is practically confirmation of what I said before,

19     which is to say that members of the police wanted the civilians to go

20     back to their homes and that at the level of the secretariat talks were

21     being held with displaced persons; however, in certain international

22     organisations, having their own agendas in a way, wanted to prevent the

23     fulfilment of these obligations in an appropriate manner.  In this letter

24     Major-General Lukic points out some activities carried out by the

25     representatives of the International Red Cross, who practically did not

Page 9622

 1     want the civilians to accept the offer from the police and return to

 2     their homes.

 3        Q.   Did you have any direct experience, or were you in the village of

 4     Istinic at the time?  If so, please tell us.

 5        A.   This is mid-July, if I'm not wrong -- or rather, this is the 10th

 6     of September, actually, so mid-September.  At that time we had certain

 7     intelligence that in that area there were civilians, and we were

 8     discussing how to return them to their homes because there were people

 9     from some other villages as well.  I personally wasn't present there, but

10     I was there towards the end of September when a large-scale operation was

11     being carried out in the area from Jablanica and Glodjane which were

12     known to be strongholds of the terrorists.  And since the terrorists had

13     re-captured these areas, we launched a new action against them.  At that

14     moment we were faced with a large crowd of civilians in this village, so

15     I'm talking about the end of September.

16             At that time I was in the area of the secretariats of Pec and

17     Djakovica, or rather, the municipal secretariat of Decani.  I'm talking

18     about the time when one of these final operations was in progress.  I was

19     there with the head of the section of the interior, Mircic, who informed

20     me that he had intelligence about tens of thousands of civilians who were

21     in Istinic and who had come from some 20-odd villages in the area.  These

22     villagers found shelter there because of the operation that was ongoing

23     and probably as instructed by the terrorist organisations.  He told me

24     that if all these actions were to be carried through as planned and since

25     the village of Istinic was sealed off, one would expect that the

Page 9623

 1     terrorists would put up fierce resistance in the area.  And his estimate

 2     was - given that he was quite familiar with the situation there - that in

 3     the clashes and neutralisations of their strongholds, the result -- they

 4     might result in a large number of civilian casualties.

 5             In these talks he proposed that because he had good relations

 6     with ethnic Albanians to send someone to the village and to demand or to

 7     convey a message for the terrorists to move away from the barricades, to

 8     surrender their arms, and also that the civilians who had been given the

 9     weapons by the terrorists should do the same.  In other words, they

10     should not put up any resistance to the police in order to avoid huge

11     civilian casualties in this fighting with the terrorists.  I accepted

12     this proposal of his, believe that this could contribute to solving the

13     situation in a peaceful way and without any consequences for the

14     civilians.

15             He did send this person to the Istinic village, and he gave them

16     a certain time-limit.  I think this man went at around 11.00 and the

17     time-limit was 1600 hours in the afternoon, by which they were supposed

18     to leave the barricades and the police would then come in and collect the

19     weapons, both from the terrorists and from the civilians who had received

20     them from the terrorists.  About an hour or two later this person came

21     back and informed the chief of the OUP that his instruction has been

22     accepted and that at 1600 hours all the barricades would be removed and

23     that no armed persons would be positioned there because all the weapons

24     will be collected by that time.  The only thing left to do was for us to

25     wait until 1600 hours to see how the situation was going to develop.

Page 9624

 1             In the meantime, the president of the Decani municipality arrived

 2     and the chief of the OUP, and he discussed this issue.  We had

 3     information that there was a really huge crowd of people, so the issue

 4     was raised of providing assistance to these people if the outcome was to

 5     be the one as we expected.  The president of the municipality called the

 6     president of the provisional Executive Council of Kosovo, Mr. Zoran

 7     Andjelkovic, and informed him about a potentially high number of

 8     civilians in the areas and told him that these civilians should be given

 9     help and assistance given their numbers and the situation that they were

10     in.

11             After receiving his call, Zoran Andjelkovic came to the area of

12     the municipality, and we all met there at the president of the

13     municipality's office.  He undertook certain measures to ensure some

14     basic first aid in food and other necessities for the citizens.

15             At 1600 hours, as previously agreed, we entered, or rather,

16     passed by these barricades that had been abandoned, meaning

17     Zoran Andjelkovic, the president of the municipality, the chief of the

18     OUP, myself, and some other people.  We entered the village and from the

19     opposite direction we saw some [indiscernible] people from the village,

20     they had a tractor full of weapons.  We greeted each other, and indeed

21     there were quite a few civilians in the village.

22             In addition to the weapons that had been left there, we also

23     parked a truck in the centre of the village where the villagers brought

24     their weapons on their own initiative and left it with the police.

25     Zoran Andjelkovic asked all presidents of local communes from these

Page 9625

 1     villages to come to a meeting.  We had reached an agreement with all

 2     these senior people or village elders, Albanians, because our primary

 3     desire was to organise gradually their return to their respective

 4     villages.  In the meantime, all the police or military activities ceased.

 5     The situation was resolved in a peaceful way.  We also discussed on that

 6     occasion how to make sure that everyone goes back to their village.

 7             After that, the president of the provisional Executive Council

 8     brought a few trucks full of milk and bread, some shops were opened, and

 9     this food was distributed to the people who were there.  This process of

10     returning people to their villages lasted, based on the agreement with

11     all the prominent people from their villages, about two or three days.  I

12     was there on the first day when we reached this solution, as I described,

13     without the use of force, without any damage or any consequences

14     whatsoever.  The officers from the regional secretariat remained there in

15     order to ensure that everyone got back.  They provided buses in

16     co-operation with the local socio-political communities.  Anyway, two or

17     three days later practically all the villagers returned home.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Djordjevic, please repeat the part when you

19     entered the village, the group of people that you were with, how many

20     civilians were there in the village then?

21        A.   The village was, so to speak, occupied by civilians.  There was a

22     huge crowd like at a football match.

23        Q.   Thank you.  It was just for the record.

24        A.   Several thousand civilians were there.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 9626

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I ask for this

 2     document to be admitted into evidence.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D429.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, did you have any other similar experience with

 7     civilians in some other place?

 8        A.   This happened in many places, starting with several civilians up

 9     to several thousand civilians.  There was this remote village, this

10     deserted village, beneath the slopes of Mount Koznik [as interpreted]

11     when the civilians due to the imminent terrorist activities had taken

12     shelter at the foot of that mountain and also villagers from the nearby

13     villages had done so.  There was a shoot-out on the next day with members

14     of the terrorist group.  Normally they withdrew in the direction of those

15     civilians.  In the village we found only one civilian, and not far from

16     that village some 4 to 5 kilometres away at the foot of the mountain were

17     all the villagers from that village as well as from other villages at the

18     foot of the mountain as well as in the general area, in the wooded

19     sections of the area.  The civilians who were found on that occasion were

20     escorted by the police to the centre of the village, and all other

21     civilians who were on other locations were informed by the police that

22     they should arrive at the centre of the village for consultations, for an

23     agreement to be reached.  And the political echelons were also informed

24     that these civilians had been found so that the municipality provided

25     urgent aid in food and other supplies.  Medical aid was also provided.

Page 9627

 1     And in agreement with the police commanders on the spot, all the village

 2     elders assembled, were met with, and agreement was reached for them for

 3     the villagers to return to their homes, and many did so within a couple

 4     of hours.  Others who so wished were rendered assistance by the police

 5     which escorted them to their homes in their villages in order to prevent

 6     them from coming to any harm or being attacked.  At any rate, they all

 7     went to their homes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Just for the record, what village beneath --

 9     beneath -- at the foot of this mountain was in question?

10        A.   It was Pusto Selo, if I'm not mistaken.  And there was similar

11     situations elsewhere.  On this particular occasion all the people who

12     were taken in this refugee group that had taken shelter there were

13     returned to their homes.  There were perhaps some ten-odd citizens that

14     we had grounds to believe at that time that they were perhaps members of

15     the KLA who had discarded their weapons.  So these ten or so people were

16     on the basis of that suspicion apprehended, taken to the police station

17     there.  And in their processing in conjunction with the state security

18     people, we established whether they did or did not belong to the KLA, and

19     if it had been proven that they have been -- were members of the KLA and

20     had participated in the fighting, then criminal proceedings were

21     instituted against them followed by a normal traditional procedure and

22     those who were established not to have been all of that were let go and

23     released to go home.

24             MR. DJURDJIC:  Can we now have P1202.  It's 89 your tab, Mr.

25     Djordjevic.

Page 9628

 1             Your Honours, I have the impression that the transcript has

 2     stopped at a certain point.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  That is correct, Mr. Djurdjic, I don't think it's

 4     your fault.  It's being attended to.  I think you can carry on.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 6        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, please take a look at this dispatch.  I believe

 7     it is of the 18th of September, 1998.  Who are the addressees, and what

 8     is the subject?

 9        A.   The Ministry of the Interior pursued a permanent operational

10     action, the name of which was Sat, and it envisaged measures and

11     activities by the secretariat aimed at preventing terrorist activities in

12     the area of Serbia generally.  This is a dispatch dated the 18th of

13     September, 1998, namely from a time when anti-terrorist activities had

14     already been undertaken in Kosovo, and at that point it was assessed in

15     the ministry that there existed the possibility of terrorist activities

16     from Kosovo spilling over to the rest of the territory of the Republic of

17     Serbia and that by way of clockwork or other mechanisms the damage could

18     be inflicted on significant facilities in Serbia.  This dispatch is in

19     that connection and in conjunction with the previous dispatch it

20     instructed that additional attention should be devoted and additional

21     measures taken in order to prevent a spillover of terrorist activities

22     from Kosovo to the rest of Serbia.  That is the substance of this

23     dispatch.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And who signed this dispatch?

25        A.   The -- all the documents related to this basic action that were

Page 9629

 1     in existence for several years in the ministry, the entire file was in

 2     the police administration and all instructions and orders were actually

 3     issued by the police administration to be executed in the field.

 4     Therefore, this was signed by authority given him by me -- actually, I

 5     can only suppose judging by the handwriting by Ljubomir Aleksic, who was

 6     the deputy head of the police.  And he signed this because this dispatch

 7     was to be forwarded to all the SUPs, to the ministry's staff, to the

 8     border police posts, and to other public security department

 9     organisational units.  And as he as a deputy head of the administration

10     could not convey a dispatch of this type to these organisational unit in

11     his own name, that is why it was signed in my name.  But again, this job

12     and this task was discussed - and I'm quite sure of that - at the

13     collegium meeting called by the minister.  And it was at that collegium

14     meeting that the minister actually gave orders that measures should be

15     taken to pursue this action.  And this dispatch only pointed out the

16     additional measures to be taken in that context.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Djordjevic, we had stoppage in the record, in the

18     LiveNote, while you were replying to my previous question.  When you said

19     that there were several tens or ten or so persons who were suspected of

20     being KLA members, that they had been brought into the responsible SUP.

21     So please complete that answer for the sake of the record --

22             JUDGE PARKER:  I don't think you need to.  It will be picked up,

23     I believe, in due course.  It will be on the tape.  No need to repeat.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   We shall now move on --

Page 9630

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Do you tender the dispatch of the 18th of

 2     September?

 3                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  It is already a Prosecution exhibit.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that is already an

 6     exhibit in the file.  Can we now see D244.

 7        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, now I shall like us to broach a subtopic related

 8     to this topic, and I shall use this dispatch by the MUP staff dated the

 9     20th of September, 1998, concerning the handing over of weapons for that

10     purpose.  Can you tell me what information you had about that, what was

11     the situation like in KiM territory in September and at the end of

12     September in 1998 in this regard?

13        A.   We had information about large quantities of weaponry having been

14     brought in especially from Albania to Kosovo, both light infantry arms as

15     well as heavier weaponry up to recoilless guns.  In view of such

16     intelligence as well as in view of our -- the information that we had

17     that such weapons had been in fact distributed by force to certain people

18     or to certain villages, measures were taken primarily to have this --

19     these weapons obtained from terrorists and which -- the source of which

20     was illegal entry into Kosovo had to have them handed over to the

21     Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the secretariats in Kosovo.  It was to

22     that end that head of the staff issued these instructions to the heads of

23     the secretariats, pointing out the issue and the way in which to register

24     the received weapons and in which way to report back to the MUP staff in

25     Pristina.

Page 9631

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.

 2             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see document 0068-0558.

 3        Q.   It is 92 in your tab, and it is 918 according to the Defence 65

 4     ter list.

 5             Mr. Djordjevic --

 6             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is D008-0558.  Can we please

 7     see page 3 of this document.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Acting according to the

 9     instructions in the dispatch that we just saw, this is an example of how

10     the SUP in Djakovica received weapons from citizens in their area.  The

11     authorised officials of that secretariat drew up a record of the

12     hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and mines and explosives, and then on

13     the pages that follow they indicate the type of weapons, their numbers.

14     And on the last page there is a recapitulation of the weaponry returned

15     up to that point in time in the area of just that secretariat.

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Thank you.  On page 4, here we see what one could call hand-held

18     weapons, but on page 4 we also see some other types of weaponry.  Can you

19     tell us what these are?

20        A.   Yes.  They are listed according to type, beginning with light

21     infantry, then through sub-machine-guns, and then machine-guns which are

22     very heavy but still an infantry weapon, and then hand throwers, hand

23     launchers, several types of them, rocket-launchers, hand-held

24     rocket-launchers, several pieces, mines, grenades, explosives, et cetera.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 9632

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may this be tendered

 2     into evidence?

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D430.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             Can we now see document D008-0569.  It is 919 for the Prosecutors

 7     according to the 65 Defence list, 65 ter list.

 8        Q.   And for you, Mr. Djordjevic, it is tab 93.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.

10        Q.   This is a record on the hand-over of weapons in the organisation

11     of the unit Decani.  That's an organisational unit of the secretariat in

12     Djakovica.  And according to the same principle, all types of weapons are

13     listed, they are usually made in China.  I think, and the date seems to

14     correspond, that these were weapons turned over by civilians when we

15     entered the village of Istinic in the way that was agreed.  We must

16     emphasise here that on that occasion, it says on page 8, 70

17     sub-machine-guns of one type were handed over -- just a moment.

18             MR. DJURDJIC:  [Interpretation] Can we see page 7 in English.

19                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20             JUDGE PARKER:  There are three pages in the English document, I'm

21     afraid, Mr. Djurdjic, so there's no page 7.

22             MR. DJURDJIC:  [Interpretation] All right, then page 2.

23        Q.   You were saying about sub-machine-guns, Mr. Djordjevic.  What

24     else was turned over?

25        A.   A sub-machine-gun is a very dangerous weapon and almost 200 of

Page 9633

 1     them were handed over this time but also 50 hand-held launchers made in

 2     China and very typical six recoilless guns.  These are the heaviest

 3     calibres, an artillery weapon that the terrorist forces had, so early in

 4     the territory of Decani six recoilless guns were turned over and one

 5     mortar 82-millimetres and 760-millimetre [as interpreted] mortars.  These

 6     are very serious weapons that the terrorists had that were turned over by

 7     the -- to the police.

 8             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document,

 9     please.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  It will be received, Mr. Djurdjic, but

12     there is a difficulty -- the Serbian has 12 or so pages, the English 3.

13     There's a mystery there somehow which needs to be looked at and resolved.

14             MR. DJURDJIC:  [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me explain.

15     The translations, quite smartly, did not list all the serial numbers of

16     these automatic rifles.  We have page 3 here where it says, Chinese

17     hand-held launches from one to 53.  They did the same with rifles, and

18     instead of listing all the serial numbers that the police needs, they did

19     not include that in the translation.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  It will be, I believe, Exhibit D431.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, for the record, while we're still at this

24     document we have this 60-millimetre mortars.  How many of them, how many

25     60-millimetre mortars, are mentioned in the document?

Page 9634

 1        A.   Seven mortars of 60-millimetre calibre.

 2        Q.   This was admitted.  Now I'd like you to go back to D245.  It's

 3     your tab 91.

 4             Mr. Djordjevic, this is a staff document of 2nd of October, 1998.

 5     Were you aware of this?  Could you explain?

 6        A.   Yes, yes.  I know about this.  The highest authorities in Serbia

 7     were informed of the number, the quantity of weapons turned over up to

 8     that point, and also the amount of weapons still at the disposal of

 9     ethnic Albanians that they were forced to accept from the terrorists.

10     Now, proceeding from these assessments of how serious the situation was,

11     the Assembly of Serbia at its session of 28th September decided to invite

12     ethnic Albanians who had been forced to accept weapons to turn over those

13     weapons to the competent authorities, promising them that no steps would

14     be taken against them, although possession of such weapons constituted a

15     crime.  So the Assembly of Serbia is practically offering amnesty to all

16     such citizens so that they may return such weapons without suffering any

17     consequences.  And in keeping with that conclusion of the National

18     Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, the staff issues tasks to

19     secretariats, telling them what to do in order to collect weapons in this

20     drive.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see D009-0769.  That

22     would be 65 ter 2.

23        Q.   And your tab 94.  Unfortunately we still have not received the

24     translation.  Translation is pending.  Can you tell us what kind of

25     information this is.  We see it comes from the ministry staff.  It

Page 9635

 1     concerns operations carried out to fight terrorism in the area of Kosovo

 2     and Metohija.  Mr. Djordjevic, first tell us, to whom was this addressed?

 3        A.   This information was made for the minister and the staff provided

 4     information that it had specifically concerning the period from the 1st

 5     to 25 July 1998.

 6        Q.   That is the first i.  What about ii?

 7        A.   First of all, terrorist attacks and outcome; and number ii,

 8     combat activities.  It's a very brief report covering only the units

 9     engaged in these combat activities, how many anti-terrorist actions had

10     been carried out, and the main results described in a few sentences,

11     lifting the blockade of roads or sections of the roads, which routes, et

12     cetera.  All this information you can find in the report.

13        Q.   Just tell me, could you read -- could you read from the --

14             MR. STAMP:  Before you read, I just wonder if we could be told

15     whether it's dated and if it's signed by who and how he knows about it.

16     How he's able to speak to its contents.  I know it refers to the period

17     1st to 25th of September, but we don't know the date.  We don't know if

18     it's signed by somebody, if a particular person sent it, what basis it is

19     that he speaks about it.  In documents that are translated, these things

20     are obvious on the face of it, but here I'm just in a vacuum, listening

21     in a vacuum.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, unfortunately we

23     don't have the translation.  We could see that from the first page.  This

24     document was received from the National Council at the Ministry of the

25     Interior for the area of Kosovo and Metohija.  Unfortunately, we don't

Page 9636

 1     have the date here, but on the first page of this document provided by

 2     the MUP it says:  "Information of the MUP staff for Kosovo and Metohija

 3     about operations to fight terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija,

 4     anti-terrorist actions, combat activities, impact on civilians, ways of

 5     securing the liberated territory" --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel read a little slower, please.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think the chapters of -- various

 8     chapters are described here.  On the first page of the document it says,

 9     Information on operations executed to fight terrorism in the area of

10     Kosovo and Metohija.  There is no signature.  It's just the report, a

11     brief.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Is there a date?

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no, not on the document.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Are you suggesting it was prepared by the National

15     Council or merely that it was stored by the National Council?

16             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.  While reviewing

17     the documentation at the Ministry of the Interior, I saw this document

18     and then I requested through the national counsel for the document to be

19     made available to me to use in this court, and the National Council made

20     it available to me.  And I then showed it to the accused in proofing.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Now, we haven't yet heard whether the witness

22     knows anything about this document and its contents.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You've heard the question, Mr. Djordjevic.  I don't want to -- I

25     don't need to reformulate it.

Page 9637

 1        A.   I know all about the contents of this document because I was

 2     directly involved for a good part.  All the activities of the staff are

 3     familiar to me, especially from the period when I was there myself.  And

 4     from this material, I don't see exactly but I assume it was done for the

 5     minister and for his purposes, so that he can use it to brief others.

 6     But it covers the information available to the staff at that time.  I was

 7     familiar with most of this information, the weapons, the movements of

 8     civilians, most of the combat activities, the activities to deblock

 9     roads, and I believe this material faithfully represents the situation

10     prevailing at the time and the events unfolding.  Most of these terrorist

11     attacks and their consequences were reported to the ministry in daily

12     reports, and it's also based on that information that the staff prepared

13     this summary report chapter by chapter.

14        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, do we see in this material anything about the

15     activities of both the public security and the state security

16     departments?

17        A.   Yes, we see the number of criminal reports filed by the state

18     security and the number of persons named in these criminal reports, and

19     also in the process of deblocking roads and in anti-terrorist activities

20     the unit for special operations and the state security department JSO was

21     involved, so their activities are also covered.

22        Q.   Can you turn to page 2 and read slowly the first paragraph --

23             MR. STAMP:  Your Honours, with -- I don't want to sound pedantic,

24     but what the witness is saying is that he's aware -- or he thinks, he

25     believes I think he said that the contents of the document are accurate,

Page 9638

 1     but he has not really testified about the document itself, the provenance

 2     of the document.  It is neither signed nor stamped or dated.  You know,

 3     he could be asked to read from a document that could have been created

 4     any time, anywhere, in any country.  All he can say is that this looks

 5     true to me, but there are quite a lot of possibilities about the creation

 6     of documents that might contain contents that are true to him.  The

 7     witness needs to speak, it is my submission, more about the document

 8     itself.  Does he know about this document?

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  The answer is he has told us he does not.  You're

10     sounding almost like Mr. Djurdjic in some of the objections he made to

11     your case, Mr. Stamp.

12             MR. STAMP:  Well, in future I'll try to be more brief --

13             JUDGE PARKER:  No, I meant the substance of your objection.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE PARKER:  You are proposing to tender this document,

16     Mr. Djurdjic?  Pending translation, it will be marked for identification

17     as D432.  We are not minded to follow-up Mr. Stamp's objection.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

19             Your Honours, can we now see Exhibit P1203.  But should I propose

20     that this number is marked for identification?  So I move that the

21     previous document be marked for identification pending the translation --

22     or we have already received it.  I am totally messed up.  I'm sorry, Your

23     Honours.  Please accept my apology.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues]...  Mr. Djurdjic,

25     leave it alone and keep moving.

Page 9639

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, your tab is 95.  This here is a dispatch.  The

 3     English version does not indicate what day in October it was.  Can you

 4     make out what date it was in October 1998 and the dispatch number is

 5     1827.

 6        A.   The date is the 7th of October, 1998.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  This is signed by you.  Can you tell us briefly what

 8     it was about and why was it sent?

 9        A.   This is the period after the completion, practically speaking, of

10     anti-terrorist activities of -- or rather, terrorist activities in Kosovo

11     and Metohija.  The end of September they were over.  After that, followed

12     very significant political activities aimed at an overall resolution to

13     the problem in Kosovo and Metohija involving resolutions of the United

14     Nations, the agreement between Minister Jovanovic, the minister of

15     foreign affairs and the OSCE Geremek, also to follow-up negotiations

16     between the president of the FRY, Milosevic, and Holbrooke.  However, the

17     situation was such that this threat of war was hovering above Serbia and

18     the organs in Serbia very realistically assessed that the territory of

19     Serbia would be bombed, and practically that war would start in the area.

20     And on the basis of this imminent danger and on the basis of that

21     assessment, I am forwarding this dispatch to all the organisational units

22     of the public security department as well as to units outside the

23     department such as the institute for security, the police academy, the

24     college of internal affairs, the secondary school of internal affairs,

25     and so on.

Page 9640

 1             In the first paragraph I give the basic indications of my

 2     estimation of what might happen, and in the second paragraph I point to

 3     the measures that we need to take, namely, the measures that we have to

 4     undertake to be able as a state organ to respond to any attacks.  To that

 5     end, first instruction to the secretariat and to all the units is to

 6     update their defence plans and in particular their mobilisation plans.

 7     So all the organisational units of the public security department and

 8     outside the department had their own defence plans within the framework

 9     of which they had their mobilisation plans as well.  Here I instruct them

10     to update all these plans of theirs, and that is the basic intent of this

11     dispatch and the basic instruction in it.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please see D004-1649.

14        Q.   Tab 96 for you, Mr. Djordjevic, and it is 1777 of the Defence's

15     65 ter list.

16        A.   This is a dispatch sent to these same units as the previous

17     dispatch.  It was forwarded on the 8th of October, 1998, the day after

18     that is, attached to which and submitted with which is a decree of the

19     Government of the Republic of Serbia concerning the imminent security

20     situation and possible NATO attacks targeting our country.  This decree

21     of the Government of the Republic of Serbia was forwarded by me to all

22     organisational units of the public security department as well as to

23     other units outside the department, making it incumbent on them to

24     elaborate the decree, study its content, and identify and put into

25     practice the measures that the organs of the interior should undertake in

Page 9641

 1     order to give practical effect to the instructions contained therein.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I ask that this exhibit be

 4     admitted into evidence.

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D433.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, just a slight digression.  When did you return

 9     from Kosovo and Metohija where you were there the instructions of the

10     minister to carry out this global plan, when did you return to Belgrade

11     from there?

12        A.   The moment these activities were finished, namely, the end of

13     September/early October, that is when I returned to Belgrade.  And

14     already on the 7th of July I sent my first letter to the secretariats and

15     continued discharging my duty of chief of the public security department

16     of the Republic of Serbia.

17        Q.   Repeat the 7th of which month?

18        A.   The 7th of October.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20        A.   The first dispatch that I sent to units in the field was sent on

21     the 7th of October, but I had returned from Kosovo before that.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see document D004-1918,

24     please.  That is 1798 according -- I apologise, 1748 according to the 65

25     ter list.

Page 9642

 1        Q.   And it is 97 in your binder.  Please tell us what kind of a

 2     document this is, who drew it up.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2 of this

 4     document in both languages.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First I should like to say that in

 6     addition to the meetings and ministers' collegium meetings, there were

 7     also held occasional meetings in the ministry with all heads of

 8     secretariats and with the leaders of the different administrations within

 9     the headquarters of the ministry.  As a rule, these meetings would be

10     held once every three months.  The first meeting along those lines would

11     be held after the expiry of the first quarter to consider and discuss the

12     results of the work of the Ministry of the Interior in the previous

13     period of the preceding year, and future tasks which were yet to be

14     carried out.  This was one of such meetings which was held with all the

15     heads of secretariats, and the heads of the different lines of work in

16     the ministry it was held on the 16th of October, 1998.  And the principle

17     of work was -- you can see on the next page --

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please turn to the next

19     page, please.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here we can see that the first item

21     on the agenda was results of work in the period from January to

22     September.  Namely, it was for a period of nine months, and then the next

23     one, the next item, was forthcoming tasks.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Just one minute.  Who actually opened the meeting?

Page 9643

 1        A.   The meeting was presided over by Assistant Minister Stojan Misic,

 2     but the minister with all the assistant ministers and other superiors was

 3     also present as well as the heads of the secretariats.  The principle of

 4     work at these meetings was like this:  The people in charge of the

 5     different lines of work, namely, the heads of the administrations, would

 6     brief on the security situation in keeping with their line of work and

 7     the measures taken for the reporting period.  The reporting period here

 8     is nine months in the year 1998, so all the heads of administrations

 9     reported to the meeting on the most important developments and actions

10     and the state -- situation of -- with security in their particular lines

11     of work over the past nine months and as a rule, proposed measures which

12     were to be taken in the forthcoming period in order to adequately and

13     successfully discharge work in the Ministry of the Interior.  That is the

14     pattern that all meetings followed, and of such meetings there would be

15     at least four during the year with all the heads of the SUPs.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me this:  In this document that you are familiar

17     with, are there any reports about anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo and

18     Metohija?

19        A.   As I have said, every administration reported on what had been

20     done within their respective ambits in the previous period, the reporting

21     period for which the security status was being reviewed.  And in that

22     sense, the police administration also reported on what it had -- what it

23     had done in that period.  So on the several pages which follow, they very

24     briefly informed the meeting of -- or about the activities of the special

25     units outside their home secretariats.  I'm not quite sure which page it

Page 9644

 1     would be here, perhaps page 4 in the Serbian version.

 2        Q.   It would be page -- it would be that page, and in the English

 3     version -- just bear with me for -- the Serbian page is D004-1923.

 4        A.   Somewhere around the fourth paragraph from the top the police

 5     administration reports that by preventive activities and engagement --

 6     the engagement of the PJPs outside their home secretariats, grave

 7     incidents have been prevented -- which were of particular significance

 8     from the aspect of security.  They also reported - and that is reflected

 9     in this record - that they had ensured the necessary level of police

10     mobility and training to discharge the most complex security duties.  So

11     this is the only segment of this document which deals with the PJPs in

12     this nine-month report, which the police administration had at its

13     disposal, namely, the police administration had no information on combat

14     actions of the dispatched special units, nor was it able to report to

15     this meeting on that topic.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Unfortunately, we don't have the translation,

17     Mr. Djurdjic.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is not -- let me take a

19     moment to see if I can help.  Can we see the next English page.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues]...

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Or maybe the one after next.  No,

22     that's not it.  Next.  Could we zoom in on the English.

23                           [Defence counsel confer]

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic, we will adjourn now a little early,

25     if you can find your page.  We will resume at five minutes to 1.00.

Page 9645

 1                           --- Recess taken at 12.27 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.

 3             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  We did

 5     manage to find that page in English.  It is now on the screen, paragraphs

 6     1 and 2 in English are the ones we're dealing with.

 7        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, can you read from your binder the sentence that

 8     begins with the words:

 9             "Over the past period ..."

10        A.   "Over the past period of this year, police units were carrying

11     out tasks from their purview."

12        Q.   And could you read the first sentence of the next paragraph.

13        A.   "Through increased preventive coverage of the territory by

14     special police units outside their home secretariats in executing special

15     security tasks ..."

16        Q.   At this meeting of ministers with chiefs of secretariats, were

17     there any reports about completed anti-terrorist actions and the

18     situation in Kosovo and Metohija?  Were there any such activities up to

19     that meeting?

20        A.   As we can see from this record, there is no mention about combat

21     activities.  There was no reporting about that.  I would just like to

22     draw your attention to page 9 in Serbian, where in paragraph 3 it is

23     reported that joint services had been engaged primarily in equipping PJPs

24     to carry out special security tasks in the area of autonomous province

25     Kosovo and Metohija.  To that end, the joint services report that they

Page 9646

 1     had procured the necessary vehicles -- it's page 9 in Serbian.

 2        Q.   You can finish your sentence.  We'll find it.

 3        A.   The joint services informed the minister and others at the

 4     meeting what they had done in their line of work.  They have provided the

 5     vehicles, the mines and explosives, night-vision devices, and procured

 6     the most necessary equipment.  So these were the issues that were being

 7     dealt with, and they relate to the PJPs in this period of nine months.  I

 8     believe it is also important that we find later in the conclusions what

 9     instructions the minister gave for further action in Kosovo and Metohija.

10     It's below in the same material.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did the topics discussed at this meeting relate to

12     the actions of the public security department for the past nine months?

13        A.   Yes, all of these were regular activities and tasks of the public

14     security department.  It was active in the entire territory of Serbia and

15     it monitored the relevant indicators and trends for the whole Republic of

16     Serbia.  Perhaps it is interesting to note on page 14 of the Serbian

17     version the minister says in the conclusions the following:

18             "Further energetic struggle to crush Albanian separatism in

19     Kosovo and Metohija."

20             That's all that was said at this meeting relating to the use of

21     PJPs and actions in Kosovo.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In the English version, what you see on the screens

23     now, the paragraph that the accused just read begins with the words:

24     "Over the past nine months..." thank you.

25             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

Page 9647

 1     tender this document.

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D434.

 4             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, we've seen documents which could lead us to

 6     conclude that you were involved in the making of agreements that followed

 7     in October.  I'll show you document P835 now and you will tell us what it

 8     says.

 9        A.   Which tab?

10        Q.   98.

11        A.   This is the agreement on the verification mission, the Kosovo

12     Verification Mission, concluded between the federal foreign minister,

13     Zivadin Jovanovic, and Mr. Geremek in the name of the OSCE.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel repeat the number.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Tab 99.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D361, please.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am aware that the federal prime

19     minister established a commission of the federal government for

20     co-operation with the OSCE mission.  I also know that the head of that

21     commission of the federal government was Nikola Sainovic, whereas Vlajko

22     Stojiljkovic, minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia, was one

23     of the members.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 9648

 1             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have D235.

 2        Q.   It's your number 101, Mr. Djordjevic.

 3        A.   After these negotiations in Belgrade between OSCE representatives

 4     and NATO representatives and our authorities, agreements were signed.

 5     And on the 19th of October the minister submits these signed agreements

 6     to the MUP staff in Kosovo.

 7        Q.   What exactly is he sending?

 8        A.   This is the agreement on the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo

 9     and Metohija for their use, for their purposes.  That's the previous

10     agreement we discussed, Jovanovic-Geremek agreement.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have P836 now.

13        Q.   Could you tell us, how did you come to be involved in these

14     negotiations that led to the signing of the other agreements in October,

15     apart from that first one?

16        A.   Following Milutinovic's instructions, I mean the president of

17     Serbia, the minister summoned Sreten Lukic, General Obrad Stevanovic, and

18     myself to attend the meeting that was held at the office of the FRY

19     president to negotiate with certain other agencies, primarily NATO.  We

20     went and we arrived at the White Palace, Beli Dvor, the residence of the

21     FRY president.  He informed us of what would be discussed.  There would

22     be negotiations with NATO, and therefore President Milosevic decided that

23     the head of that negotiating team should be the Chief of General Staff,

24     Perisic.  And then he asked that someone be named from the Ministry of

25     the Interior.  The Minister Stojiljkovic decided that I would be the

Page 9649

 1     co-chairman of our team, and that's how the negotiations started.

 2        Q.   Just for the record, tell us after this instruction given by the

 3     president of the FRY, he decided who would be heading the negotiating

 4     team on behalf of the army, who and how decided who would be the

 5     representative on behalf of the Republic of Serbia?

 6        A.   He asked Milutinovic to designate a representative of the MUP of

 7     the Republic of Serbia.  Milutinovic then consulted Minister Stojiljkovic

 8     while we were still all standing there, and the two of them decided that

 9     I would be the representative of the MUP.  They suggested that to

10     Milosevic, that was accepted, and the negotiations could proceed.

11        Q.   In your tab 102 we have an agreement that we see on the screen,

12     an understanding, between KDOM and the Ministry of the Interior of

13     Serbia.  You signed on behalf of the MUP, and Shaun Byrnes signed on

14     behalf of KDOM.  Could we concentrate on para 1, the dismantling of

15     check-points and installation of observation points.

16        A.   Yes.  The main objection in the negotiations was that the MUP

17     check-points were disrupting normal movement of civilians and also

18     provoke the KLA into attacking check-points, and then the police responds

19     with proportionate or disproportionate force - that's less important.

20     But in any case, this understanding was reached to remove these

21     check-points, and thus reduce overall tensions through negotiations.  We

22     agreed that some observation points would be established further away

23     from the roads, allowing traffic to proceed normally, and observation

24     points are quite different in function from check-points.  So that is

25     defined by para 1.

Page 9650

 1        Q.   Can you just explain in para 3, it says:

 2             "In the coming 15 days the police will not move along the

 3     Malisevo-Orahovac road.  This road must remain fully open at all times

 4     for unimpeded traffic and flow of people and goods."

 5        A.   It was a demand of the opposite side in these negotiations.  They

 6     demanded that this road that goes from Orahovac via Zociste towards Suva

 7     Reka and Dulje - and I said earlier it was a very important area for the

 8     KLA - it would have given time for the KLA to regroup and to control this

 9     road freely.  And in those 15 days there would be no police presence and

10     no possibility for an exchange of fire between the KLA and the police.

11     We honoured this agreement, but this paragraph also stipulates that the

12     Malisevo-Orahovac road must remain open for traffic.  On that road, in

13     view of the layout, the KLA was able to put up roadblocks and impede

14     traffic.  That's why we wanted to ensure that the road remained open and

15     that the terrorists handle their own activities and business using

16     byroads.  They probably insisted on that and the KDOM accepted those

17     demands.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get P837.

19        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, how was it that this record of the 25th of

20     October came to be -- 1998, came to be signed with -- by you, by

21     Mr. Naumann and Mr. Clark?

22        A.   The decision of the leadership was that I as a specialised staff

23     member should actually sign this, as I was the one in -- heading the team

24     of the ministry.  In the negotiations they decided that it should also be

25     me to sign this record, these minutes.  They did not sign it on their

Page 9651

 1     part, but General Clark insisted that Slobodan Milosevic also sign the

 2     document and Mr. -- President Milosevic's initials can indeed be seen on

 3     this original.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  In these agreements -- by these agreements both

 5     Serbia and the FRY undertook some obligations.  Tell me according to what

 6     you know, did Serbia and the FRY actually honour the obligations they

 7     undertook under these agreements?

 8        A.   We embarked on the negotiations first and foremost in the best of

 9     faith.  In addition to myself, Generals Obrad Stevanovic and General

10     Lukic were on the team and these negotiations which [indiscernible] took

11     place in the General Staff were also attended by the president of Serbia,

12     Mr. Milutinovic.  So we embarked on these negotiations in the best of

13     faith and very earnestly, and just as we embarked on fulfilling the

14     obligations that we had undertaken under the agreement because had that

15     been not so, had we not honoured what we had signed and within the

16     time-frame work that had been envisaged there probably would have been an

17     attack on Serbia by the NATO Alliance.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see P769, Exhibit P769.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  These are minutes -- or

21     rather, these are conclusions of a meeting held in Pristina attended by

22     heads of secretariats, chiefs of police sections, and commanders of

23     special police unit detachments, PJPs.

24             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Just a minute.  I want to ask you a question before you proceed.

Page 9652

 1     We see here that this meeting was attended also by the assistant

 2     minister, Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic.  If you know, tell us why

 3     did he attend this meeting, how did that come about?

 4        A.   I just said that he was a member, that he was on the negotiating

 5     team, and that he was completely au courant on what had been done

 6     throughout these negotiations and knew everything that had been signed.

 7     Namely, when the negotiations were completed, the agreement was signed,

 8     and we undertook our obligations on that basis.  General Lukic fell ill,

 9     the head of the staff fell ill, and he had to stay in Belgrade.  And

10     according to the instructions from the minister, his assistant General

11     Obrad Stevanovic was charged with bringing together the heads of the

12     relevant units and secretariats in Pristina to brief them on the

13     development of the situation as well as with the obligations that we had

14     undertaken by the signed agreements.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Here we can see the number of forces, the strength of

16     the forces, in fact that needed to be employed and by which date.  Has

17     everything that is contained in the minutes -- had everything been

18     realised within the time-frame specified in the agreement?

19        A.   All the undertaken obligations had to be fulfilled by the police,

20     i.e. the Ministry of the Interior, as well as by members of the army.

21     And orders to that effect were actually issued at this meeting.  All this

22     was done -- because as I have just said, had it not all been carried out

23     according to plan, there would have been a bombing of Serbia.  All the

24     duties discharged and fulfilment of the obligations that we had

25     undertaken had a specially designated representative of the staff who was

Page 9653

 1     to liaise with the KDOM and OSCE, and it was his duty to acquaint them of

 2     everything that we had done.  And it was his duty to deal in the future

 3     with all matters with the KDOM as well as with the representative of the

 4     co-operation commission, exponent, shall I say, which was formed for

 5     co-operation with KDOM and Kosovo who was General Loncar, I believe.  And

 6     he saw to it that all the obligations undertaken would be indeed honoured

 7     and also that the verification mission would be apprised at all times of

 8     all the measures undertaken.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have Exhibit P715.

11        Q.   Just briefly, please.  It is your tab 105.  Just tell us briefly,

12     to whom was this dispatch addressed and why?

13        A.   This is a dispatch which was sent from the public security

14     department to the department's organisational unit at the headquarters,

15     to all the secretariats, to all the border police stations, and to the

16     staff of the ministry in Pristina, as well as to the state security

17     department for their information.  This dispatch spells out in detail the

18     obligations of the Ministry of the Interior to the verification mission.

19     It explains the status of members of the verification mission, their

20     crossing of the state border, as well as all the contacts with the

21     Ministry of the Interior and the secretariats in the territory of Kosovo

22     and Metohija had towards members of the verification mission.  Starting

23     with security, accommodation, supplying fuel up to their personal safety,

24     and all this has been spelled out in detail in and by this dispatch and

25     instruction.  All the secretariats and all the organisational units of

Page 9654

 1     the department were to abide by the instructions given in it.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have Exhibit P770.  It is your tab 107.

 3             This is a meeting which took place on the 5th of November, 1998.

 4     It shall shortly come up on the screen in both versions, so until that

 5     happens would you be so kind as to tell us, Mr. Djordjevic, why was this

 6     meeting held and what was your role in it?

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can see page 2, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I attended the meeting, and

 9     according to Minister Stojiljkovic's instructions I was there.  The

10     minutes show who the attendees were.  Basically this had to do with the

11     visit of the president of the Serbia to the entire police and army

12     complement down there, by way of support to them after all the

13     negotiations that had been conducted and to support us in strictly

14     honouring the obligations that we had undertaken.  Namely, for the

15     competent organs who were in charge to strictly see to the honouring of

16     those obligations, and that was the gist of that meeting and the spirit

17     of that meeting.

18             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have Exhibit P1204 now.

21        Q.   Your tab 107.  Mr. Djordjevic, this is your document dated the

22     25th of November, 1998.  Tell us in a nutshell what it was about and to

23     whom was it addressed.

24        A.   This is a routine dispatch from the public security department

25     sent to all the organisational units within and without the public

Page 9655

 1     security department as well as to the staff in Pristina, and it was

 2     customary for the national holidays.  We have already seen a similar

 3     dispatch of similar contents sent for the 1st of May holidays, while this

 4     one refers to the taking of intensified security measures in connection

 5     with the republic day, which was the 29th of November.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit P689,

 8     please.

 9        Q.   Mr. Djordjevic, this is a -- these are staff minutes of the 2nd

10     of December, 1998.  As far as I can see from the introductory section you

11     were not present there.

12             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We need to see page number 2,

13     please.

14        Q.   I shall like to read out for you a section and hear your comments

15     on it.  That is paragraph 3.

16             "Major-general Sreten Lukic stated that on the 27th of November,

17     1998, in Belgrade a meeting at the Ministry of the Interior, which was

18     chaired by Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, was attended by the chiefs of

19     the public and state security departments, assistant ministers, heads of

20     the staffs, and Nikola Sainovic.  The current security situation in

21     Kosovo was discussed in the meeting in which the duties and further

22     engagement of the members of the police in Kosovo were defined.  The

23     essence of the meeting was to continue carrying out anti-terrorist

24     actions aimed at suppressing terrorism in Kosovo and that in this regard

25     the police should be more offensive in taking measures in the situation

Page 9656

 1     that had developed."

 2             Do you remember whether a meeting at the ministry was held; and

 3     if so, what was discussed at the meeting and how did it end?

 4        A.   I remember that there was such a meeting.  Basically what was

 5     discussed were the obligations that the Ministry of the Interior had

 6     primarily towards the verification mission, and that is why Nikola

 7     Sainovic was there as the president of the Federal Commission for

 8     relations with the verification mission.  So there generally was talk

 9     about the security situation.  At that meeting also, the minister gave

10     the instruction that the police should practically continue to undertake

11     anti-terrorist actions.  Namely, that it should not be on the defensive

12     in view of the signed agreements -- namely, that the signing of the

13     agreements and the reduction of the police forces in the area had already

14     been made use of by the terrorist organisation, i.e., the KLA, and that

15     they had started to take territory which until that point had been under

16     police control.  So it was to that effect that the minister instructed

17     the present to continue undertaking anti-terrorist activities in the

18     broader sense of the word without any -- giving any specific assignments

19     to anyone.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I forgot to ask you a while ago, as the FRY and the

21     Republic of Serbia had honoured the agreement and withdrawn their forces

22     from the part of territory that had been under their control, what

23     happened to those territories after the withdrawal of their forces, of

24     their security forces?

25        A.   After the withdrawal of the security forces and as -- shall I put

Page 9657

 1     it this way, the extremely controlled activity of the police, the

 2     situation was such that it actually contributed to the terrorist groups

 3     again nearing the main roads and again taking some positions that they

 4     had occupied in the previous period.  So wherever the police had

 5     withdrawn, the KLA took those areas.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And was -- did the KLA intensify its terrorist

 7     activities after these agreements and the withdrawal of the police?

 8        A.   Not immediately.  They needed some time to consolidate their

 9     ranks, in view of the fact that in the previous police activities they

10     had been quite shaken.  And after that, also with some assistance from

11     body KDOM and the verification mission, their activities were revived.

12     And as time went by the incidents became ever more serious and the

13     territory which came to be under the control of the terrorist forces

14     became increasingly big.

15             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit 48 [as

16     interpreted] according to the Prosecution's 65 ter list.

17        Q.   It's your tab 110.  Just very briefly if you can tell us.  We

18     have a few more documents to deal with.

19        A.   This is a dispatch dated 18 December sent by the minister to the

20     MUP staff in Pristina to the state security centre in Pristina and to the

21     secretariats in the whole province, where he highlights one of the issues

22     covered by this agreement between Jovanovic and Geremek.  One of the

23     obligations related to the right of the Republic of Serbia to respond

24     proportionately to certain terrorist activities.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let us go back to tab 109.  The 65 ter number of the

Page 9658

 1     Prosecution is 4257, or rather, 1083, and before that may I tender the

 2     previous document.  The 65 ter number document 4080 is the one I'm

 3     tendering, the one we had on the screen a moment ago.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, it will be received.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D435.

 6    MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have the

 7     Prosecution's 65 ter 4257.  There it is.

 8        Q.   Very briefly.  It's a dispatch you signed.  What's the subject?

 9        A.   This is a dispatch that came from the state security department

10     to all SUPs, the border police posts, and the MUP staff in Pristina.  It

11     deals with the illegal trade in foreign currency and smuggling, and there

12     was a section in the ministry in charge of these matters.  This is a

13     regular task, but since the illegal exchange of foreign currency had

14     intensified the SUPs are warned to step-up their activity.

15        Q.   What does it say exactly?

16  A. On the instructions of the minister, measures are to be taken to suppress

17   these trends.  We've spoken about this before.  The minister's attention

18  was focused on the Criminal Investigation Department of the police, and

19  these are the affairs and obligations of a Criminal Investigation

20  Department.  It says here -- in fact, it's sent under my name because it

21  includes border police posts and the CID cannot order them anything.

22             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document now?

23             JUDGE PARKER:  The document says it's from the sector of public

24     security.  The witness in the translation said it was a state security

25     document but sent under his name.  Is it a document sent by the

Page 9659

 1     minister -- by the witness as head of public security dealing with the

 2     subject that was a state security subject?  Is that what was intended?

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No.

 4        Q.   Please, tell us very briefly so that we have time.

 5   A. This is a classical dispatch of the Criminal Investigation Department of

 6   the public security department.  The dispatch relates to public security.

 7   I signed it as chief of public security.  But the role of the minister is

 8   highlighted here above regarding the general instructions he issued.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted now?

11             JUDGE PARKER:  [Previous translation continues]...

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D436.

13             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]

14     Q. Mr. Djordjevic, now we have this exhibit.  To whom was it sent?  P717.

15        A.   This is a usual activity.  Ahead of holidays, in this case the

16     new year holidays, our measures are stepped up to anticipate possible --

17     a possible increase in terrorist activity and to ensure safety during the

18     holidays.

19        Q.   P1043, please.

20             Mr. Djordjevic, just very briefly, tell us about this record from

21     the MUP staff meeting.  I see you did not attend.  Can you comment on the

22     way the minister attended?

23        A.   This is a record of a meeting held at the staff attended also by

24     the minister on the 12th -- 21st of December, 1998, after a report on the

25     general situation made by the chief of secretariat, the minister went on

Page 9660

 1     a different assignment and authorised the general, General Obrad

 2     Stevanovic - we can see that on the next page - and says, "Today General

 3     Obrad Stevanovic will convey to you my instructions on the new methods of

 4     activity in the new conditions.  It is necessary to increase the secrecy

 5     of our actions and so on and so forth.  Here the minister left the

 6     meeting and General Obrad Stevanovic conveyed his instructions to the

 7     other members.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I believe, Your Honours, our time

10     is up for today.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  That is so, Mr. Djurdjic.  Can I mention two

12     matters.  First, we have been able to arrange to sit for longer hours on

13     Monday.  We will commence sitting at 10.00 in the morning and continue

14     until 4.30 in the afternoon.  The second is to inquire how you are seeing

15     your progress for time, Mr. Djurdjic.  We've given you the whole week

16     uninterrupted.

17             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour, but it's a

18     very difficult question.  Do you want an optimistic answer or a

19     less-optimistic one?  I expect --

20             JUDGE PARKER:  A realistic, optimistic answer.

21             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If we proceed more

22     quickly on Monday, I expect to finish my direct examination not later

23     than the first session on Tuesday.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  That's making life quite difficult for Mr. Stamp,

25     I would think.  Look hard at your papers over the weekend, Mr. Djurdjic.

Page 9661

 1             We will adjourn now and resume on Monday at 10.00.

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

 3                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 7th day of

 4                           December, 2009, at 10.00 a.m.