1 Friday, 4 December 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
7 WITNESS: VLASTIMIR DJORDJEVIC [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 Examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Djordjevic.
11 A. Good morning.
12 Q. Yesterday you talked about the meetings that you had with state
13 and military structures. Tell us, was there a leader in charge presiding
14 over those meetings?
15 A. You are referring to the meetings held in Pristina?
16 Q. Yes, that is what I mean. You told us that in the evening you
17 had meetings with representatives of state organs and representatives of
18 the military, that you attended it, the head of the staff, the deputy
19 General Obrad Stevanovic, and you yourself, and that these were
20 co-ordination meetings. So shall I -- I'm asking you: Was there a
21 leader who was in charge?
22 A. No, there was no one who would be a leader. We were the police,
23 the army, and the political representatives who were there, we were at
24 the same level so that no one had a leading or a commanding role.
25 Q. Thank you. At these meetings did you assign any tasks to police
1 and army units?
2 A. At those meetings the next task would be specified in keeping
3 with the global plan, and we discussed the planning documents that would
4 be elaborated for that purpose. There were no specific orders issued to
5 the effect that perhaps the next day commands would be issued to someone
6 to discharge that task -- to that effect, no. We had a general plan on
7 the basis of which documents, specific documents, were drawn up and those
8 documents would then be realised in practice to give effect to the global
9 anti-terrorist plan.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now call up document P688,
13 Q. It is your serial number 85 in your binder, Mr. Djordjevic.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, these are minutes from the staff meeting of the
16 28th of July, 1998. Did you attend this staff meeting, and have you seen
17 these minutes?
18 A. Yes, I looked at the minutes. Three days after the beginning of
19 the first operation that we had down there in the Kosovo area, the
20 minister arrived with the intention of holding a meeting with the staff
21 and be satisfied for himself of the state security situation and the way
22 the work was being done. As according to his orders, also my primary
23 duty was for activities in the field. I asked him by telephone for me to
24 be excused from the meeting, and he agreed. So this meeting was held in
25 my absence, and I was in the field.
1 Q. Thank you. We see that escorting him and attending the meeting
2 was also the deputy -- the assistant minister General Rade Markovic?
3 A. Yes, it is obvious from the minutes that the meeting was attended
4 by Rade Markovic and staff members, MUP members, as well as heads of the
6 Q. Thank you. You did mention this yesterday, but in addition to
7 you, yourself, and General Obrad Stevanovic, during the -- were other
8 assistants there and stayed for a while in the territory of Kosovo
9 Metohija during the realisation of this global plan?
10 A. Yes, Radomir Markovic on this particular occasion I believe that
11 orders of the minister, he was dispatched to the area of the autonomous
12 province of Kosovo
13 joint meeting which was held that evening, and he actively contributed to
14 the discussion. In July the assistant minister, Jovica Stanisic, also
15 arrived in Kosovo and he also attended our co-ordination meetings with
16 the army.
17 Q. Excuse me, you said assistant minister Jovica Stanisic?
18 A. Actually, the head of the -- chief of the state security
20 Q. And of the military personnel, were there any military attending
21 the co-ordination meeting?
22 A. Yes, there were military senior officers who when visiting the
23 Pristina units or the Pristina Corps would come there, and we met with
24 them. They also actively participated in these meetings. As far as I
25 can recall, General Samardzic, the commander of the 3rd Army, was there
1 and there were also some lower-ranking commanders, officers who
2 occasionally attended these meetings.
3 Q. Thank you. Where were you on the 28th of July? You just told us
4 that you were somewhere in the field where some activities were
6 A. On that day the security forces were undertaking the final
7 operations in order to enter Malisevo, which up to that point had been
8 the principal stronghold of the terrorist forces and where their
9 headquarters or their staff was which commanded their overall forces. As
10 the situation was very serious, or rather, the action was very serious, I
11 asked the minister to allow me to be there in the field on that occasion.
12 Q. Thank you. Did you enter Malisevo then when that action was
14 A. Yes. We, or rather, the units active on the planned axes, those
15 of major resistance, prior to entering Malisevo itself and when the
16 resistance was crushed and the barricades dismantled there no longer was
17 any resistance to us to enter the place of Malisevo proper, and in view
18 of the fact that there was no resistance the commanding officers of the
19 police and the army who were there reduced the use of all their assets.
20 And practically this action of entering Malisevo did not entail any
21 damage, but rather total control of the village was gained because the
22 terrorists had already left the village with all the civilians so that
23 there was no reason and there was no need for employing any assets.
24 Q. Thank you. Who was in charge of this action?
25 A. This action was conducted by military and police forces operating
1 from two directions, from two axes. There were two police units and one
2 military unit on each, and everyone commanded their own forces.
3 Q. Who commanded the police?
4 A. The police was commanded by the commanders of the PJPs, namely,
5 on one axis Special Anti-Terrorist Unit was employed commanded by its
6 commanding officer, and the PJPs were commanded by their regular
8 Q. Thank you. What was your role?
9 A. I have already stated that it was practically the most important
10 action because the fiercest resistance was expected then because actually
11 at that time Malisevo was being promoted as their centre, their
12 stronghold, the centre of that republic. So for those reasons, as there
13 were many police and army units participating, a large number of people,
14 of men in other words, and since the situation was unfamiliar, I wanted
15 to participate. I practically was an observer there, so if the situation
16 should actually deteriorated I wanted to be of assistance, to deal with
18 Q. Thank you. So now we have come to Malisevo. Tell me, before
19 that sometime in mid-July were there any terrorist activities from
20 Orahovac to Malisevo, Zociste, Padaliste, and that area there?
21 A. This was an area where there were markedly pronounced terrorist
22 activities. Practically from Malisevo through some forbidden [as
23 interpreted] passes one reached Orahovac, and sometime in mid-July 1998
24 the terrorists had taken -- took a part of Orahovac. And all in all,
25 this area, Malisevo, Orahovac, Suva Reka, Dulje, Blace, and again towards
1 Malisevo, this -- these were territories under terrorist control and
2 their activity there was indeed intensive.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see D386, which is --
5 should be a video recording.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The white building is the police
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's watch for a little while
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the only civilian who
12 remained there whom I saw on that occasion.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, is this is what Malisevo looked like? Was this
15 the state that it was in on the 28th of July, 1998?
16 A. Yes, precisely, that was the state the place was in when the
17 police forces came to the entry point into that place. There was a
18 petrol station at the entry point. I came and some assistants of the
19 minister. I asked them to convey the message to the minister that we
20 were there at the entry point into Malisevo, and the next day the
21 spokesperson of the MUP - at that time it was Colonel Bozidar
22 Filic - came together with journalists. They came, and they toured
23 Malisevo. It's a small place. You could see the small shops and
24 businesses. That is what we found when the police forces entered.
25 Practically not a single building was damaged at the time when we took
1 control of the place.
2 Q. While we still have this video --
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at D010-1756.
4 MR. STAMP: And while it is brought up, perhaps we could clarify
5 whether the witness said at page 6, line 21 Colonel Bozidar Milic - if
6 that is the correct name.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Tell us again the name of the colonel.
9 A. Bozidar Filic, F, Filic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have -- Marie, maybe we
11 could proceed with another document and then when you are ready with this
12 one, we'll present it later.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Q. Before we move on to the comments on this video, tell me for the
16 record, who was with you when you were entering Malisevo on the 28th of
17 July? Who were you with?
18 A. There were commanders of the police and army units. At that
19 moment, there were no other personalities.
20 Q. Thank you. Mr. Djordjevic, tell us, did you see these
21 fortifications that we could see on the video?
22 A. I saw them only on video footage, not there.
23 Q. This was just an illustration. Did fortifications actually on
24 the ground look like this, or could you describe what you saw?
25 A. Precisely like these, in some places even better and stronger.
1 There were really trenches several kilometres long dug according to all
2 army regulations, and I can say that in terms of engineering and
3 fortification they did the job really professionally.
4 Q. We saw on the video a moment ago this vehicle, the armoured
5 vehicle of the police damaged. Did the KLA have weapons capable of
6 destroying such vehicles?
7 A. They had both the weapons, and sometimes they improvised weapons,
8 built them manually. This weapon was charged with explosive and other
9 material, and they simply detonated the device, this improvised device,
10 when our vehicle would be arriving, vehicles carrying personnel as well.
11 And they also used traditional anti-tank mines by placing them on roads
12 or by the road, but they also had anti-armour weapons such as hand-held
13 launchers and other weapons.
14 Q. We've just seen a trench and very tall corn-stalks above them.
15 You said at one point that the police was ambushed from such fields. Do
16 you know anything about that?
17 A. You can see at this point in the video footage this corn could
18 not burn because the vegetation is rich, but in the month of August in
19 the course of certain activities, there were fields with crops that had
20 not been harvested yet. And during anti-terrorist actions and attempts
21 to break their resistance, the exchange of fire between police and
22 terrorists and the use of various weapons would sometimes set these
23 fields on fire because the crops were very dry and the temperature was
24 high. It burned very easily.
25 Q. Were there any deliberate torchings of these fields?
1 A. No, there was no reason to do that.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P133.
4 Excuse me, can I ask the last video to be admitted into evidence
6 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D428.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Here we see a letter of the 28th of July, 1998. Would you tell
10 us, who is it addressed to and tell us a little about the contents. How
11 did this come about?
12 A. This is a classical letter describing the sending of PJPs to
13 execute special security tasks - in this case in Kosovo - and to replace
14 units sent before. In this case the units specified here are sent, and
15 the letter is addressed to all secretariats so that each secretariat can
16 see what its particular obligations are. So the administration of the
17 police was involved because special -- because members of the PJPs were
18 being sent on special missions. It says where the units are being sent,
19 where they are to report, how they should be equipped, how their per
20 diems should be paid, which routes they should take, and that is the
21 format of all dispatches that deal with the sending of units or officers
22 to special missions.
23 Q. Does it specify what exactly they would be doing?
24 A. The first sentence says: To lend assistance in carrying out
25 special security tasks. That is the only thing that we can read here.
1 There is not a single sentence about a specific security task or the way
2 in which it would be executed. Hereby, the units are only being sent to
3 specific locations in order to obey others there.
4 Q. On whose orders were such units in Kosovo and Metohija acting in
5 1998 and 1999?
6 A. Not only in those two years. PJPs and the special unit of the
7 MUP of Serbia
8 Q. Yes. But who gave them their specific tasks once they arrived in
10 A. They received their specific tasks from the secretariat where
11 they were sent -- sent as assistants, or if the staff was in charge of
12 whatever tasks they were to execute, then they received them from the
14 Q. Well, I asked you specifically in 1998 and 1999, from whom did
15 they received their tasks?
16 A. In this period, exclusively from the MUP staff.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have P1201.
18 Q. Tab 87. Mr. Djordjevic, could you comment on this dispatch of
19 the 14th of August, 1998. This is in fact a Teletype text.
20 A. Yes, this dispatch was sent to all organisational units within
21 the sector and some units outside of the sector, such as the police
22 academy, the college of internal affairs, and the secondary school of
23 internal affairs. It describes abuses of sick leave because certain
24 members did not want to serve within special units and try to avoid it,
25 and the other matter is training, accommodation, certain status-related
1 matters that apply to all members of the ministry.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have P886 now and -- to
3 begin with -- now this will be difficult. Page 12 in B/C/S and page 16
4 of English.
5 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, don't look in the binder, it's not there, you can
6 only see it on the screen.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: It's a big document, but we have to see
8 Mr. Pavkovic, Djordjevic, Lukic -- is this page 16 in English? The
9 Serbian is good. Let's see the bottom -- next page then. No, no. Can
10 we see the next page in English. No. Can we try to see the date of this
11 meeting in Serbian, just to see the date of the meeting. This page is
12 good, K022-8423. 26th of July. In English -- in the English one it is
13 the 28th of July. Can we look for the 26th of July in the English
14 version. The B/C/S version is just right quite. Let's see page 8 then.
15 July 26. Let us just go to the next page to locate this section which
16 corresponds to the -- another page, please. That's it. We have
17 Mr. Djordjevic here. And can we see page 12 of the Serbian version,
18 please. Scroll down, scroll down, please. We want to see Djordjevic in
19 the English version, please. It should be page 12, 12 in the Serbian and
20 12 in the English version. Okay. Can you zoom in on Mr. Djordjevic in
21 the English.
22 Q. Can you tell us what it is that you were talking about here.
23 A. Well, I'm unable to read it. I cannot see it all, but basically
24 at these meetings we exchanged information on everything, everything that
25 was going on in the field or activities which needed to be further
1 regulated, adjusted in the plan in keeping with developments in the
2 field. Along those lines I gave my views and my contributions at all
3 these meetings, informing the present about what I had personally seen in
4 the field, my intention being for us to discharge our duties
5 successfully, to give effect to the general plan. I cannot see, I'm not
6 able to read exactly what it was on that particular occasion, what it
7 says here, The plan was -- I really -- I probably said something along
8 the lines of that the tasks were overambitious and that we were to either
9 reduce their scope or something to that effect as far as this specific
10 day is concerned.
11 Q. Thank you. Let me just ask you this also: On the basis of your
12 input at meetings like these, did comment of the Pristina Corps and the
13 staff, did they take decisions and implement those decisions in realising
14 specific plans?
15 A. All the participants at the meeting would state their opinions,
16 and whatever input was amenable to the realisation of the general plan
17 would be accepted and other contributions would not be accepted.
18 Practically at these meetings we exchanged all the information that we
19 had available in order for us to be able to successfully discharge our
20 assigned tasks.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to July 27,
23 1998. That is page -- it is K022-8424 in B/C/S, and it is page 17.
24 Q. Mr. Djordjevic.
25 A. Can you please zoom in on the -- this section which is in
2 Q. Where it says, "Gen," G-e-n, "Djordjevic," directly under the
3 number which is in the middle of the page.
4 A. I was on that axis, on that road, and this was the second day of
5 activities to liberate, so to speak, this road. There is reference to
6 the village of Mlecane
7 that at the meeting. I said that there were concrete barricades, I
8 believe, and I informed the meeting of that fact. Also whilst working in
9 the field there was an accident. A policeman from the special unit got
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down the English
12 text, please, to see another contribution of General Djordjevic's. Yes.
13 That's it.
14 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, you also spoke a bit later. Can you read out for
15 us what it was that you said?
16 A. Yes. Along that road there were quite a few activities and
17 fighting with the terrorists because we neutralised quite a few of their
18 strongholds along that road, and I informed all present that there were
19 no civilian -- that there had been no civilian casualties and that in the
20 villages that I saw by the road there were no civilians at all, and that
21 was also a bit of information which I offered to the assembled meeting.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now move on to page 14 of
24 the B/C/S version. The date is the same. It is K022-8425. Fine. In my
25 document it says page 19 in the English version -- no, rather, it's page
1 14 in the English. Can you scroll down page 225 in the Serbian version
2 so that we can see where General Djordjevic is indicated. Thank you.
3 Q. Do you see it?
4 A. Actually, it should be scrolled down a bit.
5 Q. No, no. Where it says it should be solved, General Djordjevic,
6 do you see that?
7 A. No, no, no. The written version should go down a bit.
8 Q. Are you -- look at the Serbian version.
9 A. Yes, now I see it at the bottom of the page. The village of
10 Dusevic must be resolved, and the villagers should enter the village.
11 Well, this was a general practice, namely. In all our activities we
12 established that there were no villagers there and that later they would
13 be found as displaced persons in some other locations not far from the
14 villages where they had taken shelter because of the activities which
15 were being carried out by the terrorist forces targeting the police and
16 vice versa and not infrequently also according to the instructions of the
17 terrorist forces when it suited them. We decided to have all the
18 villagers return to their villages and as far as -- and as far as
19 possible to continue living normal lives because no action of the police
20 was ever directed at civilians. However, there were all kinds of abuses
21 by KLA members and there were many villages where all the villagers were
22 in the village and the police forces passed by, going about their duties.
23 There was no resistance put up to the police. There were no attacks on
24 the police so that this unfolded normally, and the police went about
25 their regular duties without any such resistance being offered, but
1 unfortunately there were also villages from which such resistance was
2 offered because they were the strongholds of terrorists who pursued their
3 activities from them.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get page K022-8436 in
6 the B/C/S version. That ought to be page 34 in the English version.
7 Page 26 of the B/C/S version, please. It should be page 26 in the
8 English version as Marie just told me.
9 Q. You can of course consult the left side -- the left-hand side in
10 the Serbian, but if you can, you can also read the English. So ...
11 please comment on this.
12 A. Yes, according to the earlier principle, namely, according to
13 what I had observed in the field or what I had been told in the field, I
14 would inform and point to the security -- out the security situation in
15 the vicinity of the village of Dulje
16 area. And I'm not quite sure what the last sentence reads, Near Ostrozub
17 three men were captured and ten were killed -- I'm not sure what it
19 Q. This is the 31st of July, 1998; right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. The activities on the 31st of July had to do with the lifting of
22 the blockade of the -- on the Pristina-Prizren-via Dulje road, and the
23 road having been cleared, they proceeded towards where the assessed
24 locations were of the KLA headquarters.
25 Tell me -- it says here, ten -- Three were captured and then ten
1 who were killed. What -- in what way?
2 A. Well, this is the information given to me in the field that three
3 terrorists had been captured, and as for the rest, I'm not sure whether
4 Djakovic heard it and -- or how he heard it and how it was recorded. But
5 at any rate, I reported that three had been captured and ten had been
7 Q. But were they killed in the activities, in the fighting?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to the 4th of
10 August, 1998. It is page 33 in the B/C/S version, it's K022-8443. It
11 should be page 33 in the English version, rather 32. I'm sorry. Can we
12 see the next page in the Serbian version, 443. And the English also.
13 Q. You see your name there, Mr. Djordjevic?
14 A. Yes, yes, I do. It says here, Execution of Albanians, 20 of
15 them, near Lapusnik. So apart from this main task to free these roads,
16 in view of the fact that there had been many kidnappings in the past
17 period and we had intelligence that kidnapped citizens were kept in
18 various basements, such as Orahovac, Albanians, Serbs, and others. So
19 that was the context. When this road was again free, we had information
20 that there was some sort of camp in Lapusnik. When our operation was
21 completed an acquaintance called me from Urosevac and told me that he had
22 an Albanian with him who had escaped an execution. Rizah Rexhaj was the
23 name, and the name of the village he was from was Petrovo. And I went
24 there, and I heard his story. He described how he had been in a camp not
25 far from the main road in Lapusnik, he had been there with his father.
1 He described how they were treated and mistreated. And when the police
2 and army forces were lifting the blockade off that road, the people who
3 kept them in the camp took them out and put them before a firing squad,
4 but he ran to the woods not far from that site. Of course he was afraid
5 and concerned about his father. He didn't know what had happened to him.
6 To me it was a very interesting situation. I told him to report it to
7 the SUP
8 necessary steps, to go to that area together with the man Rizah and to
9 see if there were any bodies there. And the chief of the SUP sent a
10 platoon of soldiers with the necessary equipment. They found the site of
11 the camp. The man -- the man found some clothes belonging to his father,
12 but they were unable to find any bodies of the people who had been, as he
13 said, executed.
14 Q. The person who kept this record wrote something here. Can you
16 A. "Execution of 20 Albanians - they were later taken to another
17 place" --
18 Q. And then?
19 A. That the place is controlled by the KLA. That they were
20 transferred to another territory deeper controlled by the KLA, and it
21 says that I said:
22 "Investigate the place above Lapusnik and see what's there."
23 That's indeed what I said, to deal with the situation.
24 Q. You explained that, Mr. Djordjevic. Just explain this execution
25 of Albanians and 20 in brackets.
1 A. I said that there were Albanians, Serbs, and people of other
2 ethnicities who were in this camp in Lapusnik. That's what I had been
3 told by the man who had escaped from there.
4 Q. And who executed them?
5 A. KLA forces who controlled the camp.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get page 29, 2nd August
7 1998, K022-8440. Page 29 in English. This is good. Let us see the
8 bottom of the page in B/C/S, thank you, where Mr. Djordjevic is speaking.
9 Q. So on the 2nd of August, 1998, what was the discussion about?
10 A. It was about the implementation of the plan and the entry into
11 one of the greatest strongholds of the terrorists in Jablanica village.
12 We had to cross a lot of territory to get there and many other villages.
13 Here I inform all those present that the units approaching
14 Jablanica - and I was there too - Jablanica village being populated by
15 ethnic Albanians who were Catholics, all the villagers had found refuge
16 in the local church. And the terrorists had set ablaze some haystacks
17 around the village but dispersed when they saw the police approaching.
18 Therefore, there was no serious fighting and the village was not damaged,
19 and all the villagers were hiding in the church, over 200 of them. When
20 we got there we met with the people, talked to them, and as we were
21 leaving people were going back to their homes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we move to the 19th of August,
24 1998. That's page 52 in B/C/S, K022-8462. And in English it's 52. It's
25 at the top of the English page.
1 Q. Could you tell us, Mr. Djordjevic, what did you say here?
2 A. As before, I reported on these activities and where they were
3 carried out, in keeping with the plan; described the consequences; I
4 shared what I knew at that moment as far as the police force is
5 concerned; I told those present that the resistance in that area from
6 Orahovac to Suva Reka was very strong.
7 Q. I see you also mention that some rifles were surrendered and some
8 weapons were found?
9 A. Yes, there were some peculiar cases. Here I mention one
10 hand-held launcher.
11 Q. And towards the end?
12 A. It says:
13 "Rogovo has handed over 30 to 40 rifles and so has Kapesnica
14 village," Kapesnica being another village where there were a lot of
15 terrorists with a lot of weaponry, and Rogovo had received weapons from
16 the terrorists and then they turned over, surrendered, 30-40 rifles of
17 their own free will. That's what I reported at the meeting.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to the 20th August
19 1998, page 55 B/C/S, K022-8466. English page 54. If we could see the
20 lower part of the page.
21 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, do you see at the bottom of the page in B/C/S?
22 A. Yes. When I was in SUP
23 Rogovo village has surrendered three sub-machine-guns, 19 semiautomatic
24 rifles, six hand-held launchers, et cetera. I reported what I learned
25 during my stay there, and I -- what I thought was important for all those
2 Q. Thank you, but in bullet point 5 you're mentioning a person from
4 A. What I see, this comes from a report we received when a person
5 came in and said that there were 30 [as interpreted] to 400 persons
6 kidnapped, both Serbs and Siptars being held there, but that is just me
7 sharing something that I heard. I don't think the number is realistic.
8 Q. You said the number was not realistic. What is written in this
10 A. It says there were 300 to 400 kidnapped persons, and that's a lot
11 for one location.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move to 4 September
14 1998. It's 75 in B/C/S, K022-8486, and page 73 in English.
15 Q. Do you see this? Your contribution is in the middle of the page.
16 Could you explain.
17 A. Well, I see the way it's written here. I'm not sure I used those
18 words, but never mind. As in prior occasions we were really very
19 concerned about the civilian population, and we were anxious that after
20 all these operations that had been carried out for villagers to return to
21 their homes as soon as possible. Now, there were various problems. We
22 were wondering on whose orders they had left, on whose orders they were
23 staying away from their homes, and I suggested -- it says here that I
24 suggested to bring them back by force, but I don't think that's what I
25 was trying to say. I was trying to say that villagers should return to
1 their villages as soon as possible and continue to live there and that we
2 should persuade them in direct contacts that there was no reason to stay
3 away. And this was not only one situation but in all other similar cases
4 wherever we found civilians hiding somewhere away from their village in
5 groups of one, two, three, or a thousand. We always wanted them to go
6 back to their homes as soon as possible and continue to live normally,
7 and we would always try to get them to return home whenever we found
8 groups of several thousand people hiding somewhere.
9 Q. What about the -- you were talking about the objectives of the
10 police and forces and the authorities. How about the objectives of the
11 KLA and the reactions of various diplomatic missions and journalists?
12 A. Let me just finish with this. The first point says that
13 villagers should be returned to the villages by force, and the fourth
14 point is important, Action against terrorists. These two points are
15 distinct. On the one hand, civilians should be returned to their homes
16 and we should continue to fight terrorists. Those who were found hiding
17 away from their homes should be brought back, and then there were various
18 interpretations given by all sorts of international organisations,
19 humanitarian and others, who were all pointing out and highlighting the
20 humanitarian problem. They were condemning the Serb forces, saying that
21 it was allegedly their activities that caused a lot of harm and suffering
22 to civilians, forcing them to leave their homes. There were situations
23 in which this was true, but those civilians left their homes before the
24 police arrived on orders they received from members of the KLA, this
25 terrorist organisation.
1 Q. For the record, could you just repeat what you said about the
2 number of people you would find in villages and around villages. Could
3 you repeat that part.
4 A. We've just seen this picture from Malisevo. There was only one
5 person. In Glodjane village, which was one of the main terrorist
6 strongholds of Ramush Haradinaj, we found again one person alone. In
7 other locations, in Pusto Selo there was only one man; in other places
8 there were two or three. And in large columns of people on the
9 move - and this would usually be in large places after the end of
10 operations - large numbers of these civilians were in large groups in
11 woods outside the village or perhaps a few kilometres outside a village
12 where anti-terrorist actions took place. Thank you.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to -- can we
15 have the minutes of the 6th of September, 1999 [sic], that's page 82 in
16 the B/C/S version. It is K022-8493 and page 72 in the English version.
17 The 6th of September, 1998, is actually the date of the meeting.
18 I apologise.
19 Q. Do you see what is noted here as your words, Mr. Djordjevic?
20 A. Yes. This fits into the general pattern of conduct towards
21 civilians. Then, namely after having learned that the villagers of a
22 village - specifically in this case of Sedlare - were outside their
23 village, I proposed that we go there with a company and return them
24 through their villages, to talk to them, explain the situation to them,
25 guarantee their security, and have them returned to their village.
1 Q. And this is under item 2, you say one company?
2 A. Yes, one company because this was a territory where there were
3 also terrorists. So the villagers were in the woods near the village,
4 and in order to ensure the safety of the policemen, I proposed that we go
5 and see these refugee groups or provisionally displaced persons,
6 temporarily displaced persons, with a company and to tell them to return
7 to their homes.
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter apologises, she didn't hear the
9 beginning of this sentence of Mr. Djurdjic's, please.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. While we have General Lukic's contribution at the meeting --
12 JUDGE PARKER: We have not had co-ordination of the Serb and the
13 English pages. The minutes of the 6th of September we've not had in
14 English what the witness is speaking about, and now we have the meeting
15 of the 7th of September, 1998
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know whether
17 something has been changed. I was looking at the Serbian version. It
18 was good. Can we now again see the 6th of September in the English
19 version, please? The Serbian is good, just the next page in the English.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Well, this seems to be in English, minutes of the
21 6th of September, and at the moment we cannot see anything that compares
22 to the Serbian.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in the
24 English version, please. Your Honours, at the bottom of the English
25 version it is stated "General Djordjevic." Let us please not get
1 confused. So far we have been dealing with September 6th, and these are
2 the two versions that the accused talked about. Now we are moving on to
3 the 7th of September. Do they correspond now, the two versions, Your
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise and thank to you.
7 Let us now move on to September the 7th, that is page 83 of the
8 B/C/S version. It's K022-8494. We have the words of General Lukic. Let
9 us not go through all of that. What I'm interested in is the fourth
10 bullet point from the top?
11 Q. Do you see it, Mr. Djordjevic?
12 A. Yes, I do. Lukic is informing here that in keeping with what had
13 been said the day before, a company was to try and to return the
14 villagers to the village of Sedlare, and he is informing the meeting that
15 they tried to do so but the KLA did not allow it.
16 Q. Read it out.
17 A. Yes.
18 "An attempt was made to return to Sedlare with one company, but
19 the KLA did not allow it."
20 So this company actually met with the villagers who were outside
21 the village of Sedlare and proposed to them that they return home, but
22 they told the policemen that they could not because they were not allowed
23 to do so by the KLA, the KLA forbade them to do that.
24 Q. Thank you. We are still in the same document but page 84 of the
25 Serbian version. It is K022-8495 and 82 of the English version. In the
1 Serbian version it is right below these numbers. Do you see that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Can you comment on this. Here in the English version it's near
4 the top after Mr. Minic.
5 A. Here I commented on the use of artillery, and I suggested and
6 pointed to the need to perhaps reduce the use of artillery, namely, that
7 the artillery should not be used unnecessarily but only according to the
8 concept which was that artillery should only be used to destroy their
9 strongholds and that that would be the end of the use of artillery. And
10 further action should be taken by police forces according to the plan
11 which I earlier described. So I just pointed to the obligation of using
12 artillery in keeping with the situation, namely, not unnecessarily, when
13 it was not required for that particular field.
14 Q. And the next?
15 A. When I spoke later, I pointed out the practices that I had
16 encountered in the field and also learned of by talking to the heads of
17 secretariats there, namely, that after police actions in fighting with
18 the terrorists there would be subsequent torchings of -- or destruction
19 of houses or of buildings where terrorist activities had already ended
20 and that that territory should be protected by the territorial organs, by
21 the SUPs, that they should prevent any such actions.
22 Q. Thank you. And were any measures taken to detect the
23 perpetrators of these offences?
24 A. Yes, of course. This was a task issued by the staff to all, to
25 the participants in the anti-terrorist activities, as well to the
1 secretariats in the field. They were to take account of these matters
2 and to take the legally envisaged measures against the perpetrators of
3 these acts.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that it is
6 time for our break.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic.
8 We adjourn and resume at 11.00.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, in the implementation of this global plan, was
14 any report being submitted to the relevant organs in Serbia and
16 A. Yes, reports were being submitted. Generally speaking, as soon
17 as a stage was completed we would convene a meeting, and we would update
18 everyone on the progress made so far.
19 Q. Can you tell us approximately when did this reporting take place
20 about the implementation, who attended, and who was specifically the
21 person submitting this progress report?
22 A. I think that the first meeting was held with the president of the
23 FRY at the Beli Dvor, and the attendees were the same persons who had
24 been present at the time when the plan was adopted. I think that the
25 first such meeting took place after the implementation of this basic
1 stage which involved the liberation of certain territories. It may have
2 been in early August 1998.
3 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who was there representing the
4 Government of Republic of Serbia
5 A. The President of Serbia
6 Staff and his associates representing the army; the minister of the
7 interior; and the heads of both services, Obrad Stevanovic, the assistant
8 minister, and the head of the Pristina MUP, General Sreten Lukic,
9 basically all the people who were there at the first meeting.
10 Q. Who submitted this progress report up to that stage?
11 A. On that occasion concerning the portion that the Army of
13 commander of the Pristina Corps, providing all the details of how this
14 was accomplished. On behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, the report
15 was submitted by the head of the staff of MUP in Pristina, General Lukic.
16 Q. Thank you. Until this final implementation of the plan, did you
17 have any other meeting with the highest leaderships of Yugoslavia and
19 A. Towards the end of August I think another meeting with the same
20 composition and with the same agenda was held. The procedure was
21 identical. All the people who reported before submitted reports this
22 time again, and following the endorsement of these reports by the
23 leaderships, also and indication was made of what was required to do in
24 the forthcoming period and also we needed approval to continue with the
25 implementation of this general plan.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now have on our
3 screens document 1145 from the Defence list, or rather, 4137 from the
4 Prosecution's 65 ter.
5 Q. And in your binder, Mr. Djordjevic, it's number 58. Just a
6 moment, please. Mr. Djordjevic, who has sent this dispatch and when?
7 A. This is a dispatch sent on the 14th of September to the office of
8 the minister of the interior by the head of the staff, General --
9 Major-General Sreten Lukic.
10 Q. Thank you. What kind of information does this dispatch relate
12 A. This dispatch relates to a previous dispatch sent on one day
13 before, where basically and probably the information about the same event
14 was provided, but here we have some additional details that the head of
15 the staff wanted to inform the minister.
16 Q. Thank you. Were you familiar with the situation in Istinic, and
17 what do you know about the content of this dispatch?
18 A. Well, this is practically confirmation of what I said before,
19 which is to say that members of the police wanted the civilians to go
20 back to their homes and that at the level of the secretariat talks were
21 being held with displaced persons; however, in certain international
22 organisations, having their own agendas in a way, wanted to prevent the
23 fulfilment of these obligations in an appropriate manner. In this letter
24 Major-General Lukic points out some activities carried out by the
25 representatives of the International Red Cross, who practically did not
1 want the civilians to accept the offer from the police and return to
2 their homes.
3 Q. Did you have any direct experience, or were you in the village of
4 Istinic at the time? If so, please tell us.
5 A. This is mid-July, if I'm not wrong -- or rather, this is the 10th
6 of September, actually, so mid-September. At that time we had certain
7 intelligence that in that area there were civilians, and we were
8 discussing how to return them to their homes because there were people
9 from some other villages as well. I personally wasn't present there, but
10 I was there towards the end of September when a large-scale operation was
11 being carried out in the area from Jablanica and Glodjane which were
12 known to be strongholds of the terrorists. And since the terrorists had
13 re-captured these areas, we launched a new action against them. At that
14 moment we were faced with a large crowd of civilians in this village, so
15 I'm talking about the end of September.
16 At that time I was in the area of the secretariats of Pec and
17 Djakovica, or rather, the municipal secretariat of Decani. I'm talking
18 about the time when one of these final operations was in progress. I was
19 there with the head of the section of the interior, Mircic, who informed
20 me that he had intelligence about tens of thousands of civilians who were
21 in Istinic and who had come from some 20-odd villages in the area. These
22 villagers found shelter there because of the operation that was ongoing
23 and probably as instructed by the terrorist organisations. He told me
24 that if all these actions were to be carried through as planned and since
25 the village of Istinic
1 terrorists would put up fierce resistance in the area. And his estimate
2 was - given that he was quite familiar with the situation there - that in
3 the clashes and neutralisations of their strongholds, the result -- they
4 might result in a large number of civilian casualties.
5 In these talks he proposed that because he had good relations
6 with ethnic Albanians to send someone to the village and to demand or to
7 convey a message for the terrorists to move away from the barricades, to
8 surrender their arms, and also that the civilians who had been given the
9 weapons by the terrorists should do the same. In other words, they
10 should not put up any resistance to the police in order to avoid huge
11 civilian casualties in this fighting with the terrorists. I accepted
12 this proposal of his, believe that this could contribute to solving the
13 situation in a peaceful way and without any consequences for the
15 He did send this person to the Istinic village, and he gave them
16 a certain time-limit. I think this man went at around 11.00 and the
17 time-limit was 1600 hours in the afternoon, by which they were supposed
18 to leave the barricades and the police would then come in and collect the
19 weapons, both from the terrorists and from the civilians who had received
20 them from the terrorists. About an hour or two later this person came
21 back and informed the chief of the OUP that his instruction has been
22 accepted and that at 1600 hours all the barricades would be removed and
23 that no armed persons would be positioned there because all the weapons
24 will be collected by that time. The only thing left to do was for us to
25 wait until 1600 hours to see how the situation was going to develop.
1 In the meantime, the president of the Decani municipality arrived
2 and the chief of the OUP, and he discussed this issue. We had
3 information that there was a really huge crowd of people, so the issue
4 was raised of providing assistance to these people if the outcome was to
5 be the one as we expected. The president of the municipality called the
6 president of the provisional Executive Council of Kosovo, Mr. Zoran
7 Andjelkovic, and informed him about a potentially high number of
8 civilians in the areas and told him that these civilians should be given
9 help and assistance given their numbers and the situation that they were
11 After receiving his call, Zoran Andjelkovic came to the area of
12 the municipality, and we all met there at the president of the
13 municipality's office. He undertook certain measures to ensure some
14 basic first aid in food and other necessities for the citizens.
15 At 1600 hours, as previously agreed, we entered, or rather,
16 passed by these barricades that had been abandoned, meaning
17 Zoran Andjelkovic, the president of the municipality, the chief of the
18 OUP, myself, and some other people. We entered the village and from the
19 opposite direction we saw some [indiscernible] people from the village,
20 they had a tractor full of weapons. We greeted each other, and indeed
21 there were quite a few civilians in the village.
22 In addition to the weapons that had been left there, we also
23 parked a truck in the centre of the village where the villagers brought
24 their weapons on their own initiative and left it with the police.
25 Zoran Andjelkovic asked all presidents of local communes from these
1 villages to come to a meeting. We had reached an agreement with all
2 these senior people or village elders, Albanians, because our primary
3 desire was to organise gradually their return to their respective
4 villages. In the meantime, all the police or military activities ceased.
5 The situation was resolved in a peaceful way. We also discussed on that
6 occasion how to make sure that everyone goes back to their village.
7 After that, the president of the provisional Executive Council
8 brought a few trucks full of milk and bread, some shops were opened, and
9 this food was distributed to the people who were there. This process of
10 returning people to their villages lasted, based on the agreement with
11 all the prominent people from their villages, about two or three days. I
12 was there on the first day when we reached this solution, as I described,
13 without the use of force, without any damage or any consequences
14 whatsoever. The officers from the regional secretariat remained there in
15 order to ensure that everyone got back. They provided buses in
16 co-operation with the local socio-political communities. Anyway, two or
17 three days later practically all the villagers returned home.
18 Q. Thank you. Mr. Djordjevic, please repeat the part when you
19 entered the village, the group of people that you were with, how many
20 civilians were there in the village then?
21 A. The village was, so to speak, occupied by civilians. There was a
22 huge crowd like at a football match.
23 Q. Thank you. It was just for the record.
24 A. Several thousand civilians were there.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I ask for this
2 document to be admitted into evidence.
3 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D429.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, did you have any other similar experience with
7 civilians in some other place?
8 A. This happened in many places, starting with several civilians up
9 to several thousand civilians. There was this remote village, this
10 deserted village, beneath the slopes of Mount Koznik [as interpreted]
11 when the civilians due to the imminent terrorist activities had taken
12 shelter at the foot of that mountain and also villagers from the nearby
13 villages had done so. There was a shoot-out on the next day with members
14 of the terrorist group. Normally they withdrew in the direction of those
15 civilians. In the village we found only one civilian, and not far from
16 that village some 4 to 5 kilometres away at the foot of the mountain were
17 all the villagers from that village as well as from other villages at the
18 foot of the mountain as well as in the general area, in the wooded
19 sections of the area. The civilians who were found on that occasion were
20 escorted by the police to the centre of the village, and all other
21 civilians who were on other locations were informed by the police that
22 they should arrive at the centre of the village for consultations, for an
23 agreement to be reached. And the political echelons were also informed
24 that these civilians had been found so that the municipality provided
25 urgent aid in food and other supplies. Medical aid was also provided.
1 And in agreement with the police commanders on the spot, all the village
2 elders assembled, were met with, and agreement was reached for them for
3 the villagers to return to their homes, and many did so within a couple
4 of hours. Others who so wished were rendered assistance by the police
5 which escorted them to their homes in their villages in order to prevent
6 them from coming to any harm or being attacked. At any rate, they all
7 went to their homes.
8 Q. Thank you. Just for the record, what village beneath --
9 beneath -- at the foot of this mountain was in question?
10 A. It was Pusto Selo, if I'm not mistaken. And there was similar
11 situations elsewhere. On this particular occasion all the people who
12 were taken in this refugee group that had taken shelter there were
13 returned to their homes. There were perhaps some ten-odd citizens that
14 we had grounds to believe at that time that they were perhaps members of
15 the KLA who had discarded their weapons. So these ten or so people were
16 on the basis of that suspicion apprehended, taken to the police station
17 there. And in their processing in conjunction with the state security
18 people, we established whether they did or did not belong to the KLA, and
19 if it had been proven that they have been -- were members of the KLA and
20 had participated in the fighting, then criminal proceedings were
21 instituted against them followed by a normal traditional procedure and
22 those who were established not to have been all of that were let go and
23 released to go home.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: Can we now have P1202. It's 89 your tab, Mr.
1 Your Honours, I have the impression that the transcript has
2 stopped at a certain point.
3 JUDGE PARKER: That is correct, Mr. Djurdjic, I don't think it's
4 your fault. It's being attended to. I think you can carry on.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, please take a look at this dispatch. I believe
7 it is of the 18th of September, 1998. Who are the addressees, and what
8 is the subject?
9 A. The Ministry of the Interior pursued a permanent operational
10 action, the name of which was Sat, and it envisaged measures and
11 activities by the secretariat aimed at preventing terrorist activities in
12 the area of Serbia
13 September, 1998, namely from a time when anti-terrorist activities had
14 already been undertaken in Kosovo, and at that point it was assessed in
15 the ministry that there existed the possibility of terrorist activities
16 from Kosovo spilling over to the rest of the territory of the Republic of
18 be inflicted on significant facilities in Serbia. This dispatch is in
19 that connection and in conjunction with the previous dispatch it
20 instructed that additional attention should be devoted and additional
21 measures taken in order to prevent a spillover of terrorist activities
22 from Kosovo to the rest of Serbia
24 Q. Thank you. And who signed this dispatch?
25 A. The -- all the documents related to this basic action that were
1 in existence for several years in the ministry, the entire file was in
2 the police administration and all instructions and orders were actually
3 issued by the police administration to be executed in the field.
4 Therefore, this was signed by authority given him by me -- actually, I
5 can only suppose judging by the handwriting by Ljubomir Aleksic, who was
6 the deputy head of the police. And he signed this because this dispatch
7 was to be forwarded to all the SUPs, to the ministry's staff, to the
8 border police posts, and to other public security department
9 organisational units. And as he as a deputy head of the administration
10 could not convey a dispatch of this type to these organisational unit in
11 his own name, that is why it was signed in my name. But again, this job
12 and this task was discussed - and I'm quite sure of that - at the
13 collegium meeting called by the minister. And it was at that collegium
14 meeting that the minister actually gave orders that measures should be
15 taken to pursue this action. And this dispatch only pointed out the
16 additional measures to be taken in that context.
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Djordjevic, we had stoppage in the record, in the
18 LiveNote, while you were replying to my previous question. When you said
19 that there were several tens or ten or so persons who were suspected of
20 being KLA members, that they had been brought into the responsible SUP.
21 So please complete that answer for the sake of the record --
22 JUDGE PARKER: I don't think you need to. It will be picked up,
23 I believe, in due course. It will be on the tape. No need to repeat.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. We shall now move on --
1 JUDGE PARKER: Do you tender the dispatch of the 18th of
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It is already a Prosecution exhibit.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that is already an
6 exhibit in the file. Can we now see D244.
7 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, now I shall like us to broach a subtopic related
8 to this topic, and I shall use this dispatch by the MUP staff dated the
9 20th of September, 1998, concerning the handing over of weapons for that
10 purpose. Can you tell me what information you had about that, what was
11 the situation like in KiM territory in September and at the end of
12 September in 1998 in this regard?
13 A. We had information about large quantities of weaponry having been
14 brought in especially from Albania
15 well as heavier weaponry up to recoilless guns. In view of such
16 intelligence as well as in view of our -- the information that we had
17 that such weapons had been in fact distributed by force to certain people
18 or to certain villages, measures were taken primarily to have this --
19 these weapons obtained from terrorists and which -- the source of which
20 was illegal entry into Kosovo had to have them handed over to the
21 Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the secretariats in Kosovo. It was to
22 that end that head of the staff issued these instructions to the heads of
23 the secretariats, pointing out the issue and the way in which to register
24 the received weapons and in which way to report back to the MUP staff in
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Djordjevic.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see document 0068-0558.
3 Q. It is 92 in your tab, and it is 918 according to the Defence 65
4 ter list.
5 Mr. Djordjevic --
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It is D008-0558. Can we please
7 see page 3 of this document.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Acting according to the
9 instructions in the dispatch that we just saw, this is an example of how
10 the SUP
11 authorised officials of that secretariat drew up a record of the
12 hand-over of weapons, ammunition, and mines and explosives, and then on
13 the pages that follow they indicate the type of weapons, their numbers.
14 And on the last page there is a recapitulation of the weaponry returned
15 up to that point in time in the area of just that secretariat.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Thank you. On page 4, here we see what one could call hand-held
18 weapons, but on page 4 we also see some other types of weaponry. Can you
19 tell us what these are?
20 A. Yes. They are listed according to type, beginning with light
21 infantry, then through sub-machine-guns, and then machine-guns which are
22 very heavy but still an infantry weapon, and then hand throwers, hand
23 launchers, several types of them, rocket-launchers, hand-held
24 rocket-launchers, several pieces, mines, grenades, explosives, et cetera.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may this be tendered
2 into evidence?
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D430.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Can we now see document D008-0569. It is 919 for the Prosecutors
7 according to the 65 Defence list, 65 ter list.
8 Q. And for you, Mr. Djordjevic, it is tab 93.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.
10 Q. This is a record on the hand-over of weapons in the organisation
11 of the unit Decani. That's an organisational unit of the secretariat in
12 Djakovica. And according to the same principle, all types of weapons are
13 listed, they are usually made in China
14 correspond, that these were weapons turned over by civilians when we
15 entered the village of Istinic
16 emphasise here that on that occasion, it says on page 8, 70
17 sub-machine-guns of one type were handed over -- just a moment.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see page 7 in English.
19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
20 JUDGE PARKER: There are three pages in the English document, I'm
21 afraid, Mr. Djurdjic, so there's no page 7.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right, then page 2.
23 Q. You were saying about sub-machine-guns, Mr. Djordjevic. What
24 else was turned over?
25 A. A sub-machine-gun is a very dangerous weapon and almost 200 of
1 them were handed over this time but also 50 hand-held launchers made in
3 calibres, an artillery weapon that the terrorist forces had, so early in
4 the territory of Decani
5 mortar 82-millimetres and 760-millimetre [as interpreted] mortars. These
6 are very serious weapons that the terrorists had that were turned over by
7 the -- to the police.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document,
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It will be received, Mr. Djurdjic, but
12 there is a difficulty -- the Serbian has 12 or so pages, the English 3.
13 There's a mystery there somehow which needs to be looked at and resolved.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me explain.
15 The translations, quite smartly, did not list all the serial numbers of
16 these automatic rifles. We have page 3 here where it says, Chinese
17 hand-held launches from one to 53. They did the same with rifles, and
18 instead of listing all the serial numbers that the police needs, they did
19 not include that in the translation.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It will be, I believe, Exhibit D431.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, for the record, while we're still at this
24 document we have this 60-millimetre mortars. How many of them, how many
25 60-millimetre mortars, are mentioned in the document?
1 A. Seven mortars of 60-millimetre calibre.
2 Q. This was admitted. Now I'd like you to go back to D245. It's
3 your tab 91.
4 Mr. Djordjevic, this is a staff document of 2nd of October, 1998.
5 Were you aware of this? Could you explain?
6 A. Yes, yes. I know about this. The highest authorities in Serbia
7 were informed of the number, the quantity of weapons turned over up to
8 that point, and also the amount of weapons still at the disposal of
9 ethnic Albanians that they were forced to accept from the terrorists.
10 Now, proceeding from these assessments of how serious the situation was,
11 the Assembly of Serbia at its session of 28th September decided to invite
12 ethnic Albanians who had been forced to accept weapons to turn over those
13 weapons to the competent authorities, promising them that no steps would
14 be taken against them, although possession of such weapons constituted a
15 crime. So the Assembly of Serbia is practically offering amnesty to all
16 such citizens so that they may return such weapons without suffering any
17 consequences. And in keeping with that conclusion of the National
18 Assembly of the Republic of Serbia
19 secretariats, telling them what to do in order to collect weapons in this
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see D009-0769. That
22 would be 65 ter 2.
23 Q. And your tab 94. Unfortunately we still have not received the
24 translation. Translation is pending. Can you tell us what kind of
25 information this is. We see it comes from the ministry staff. It
1 concerns operations carried out to fight terrorism in the area of Kosovo
2 and Metohija. Mr. Djordjevic, first tell us, to whom was this addressed?
3 A. This information was made for the minister and the staff provided
4 information that it had specifically concerning the period from the 1st
5 to 25 July 1998
6 Q. That is the first i. What about ii?
7 A. First of all, terrorist attacks and outcome; and number ii,
8 combat activities. It's a very brief report covering only the units
9 engaged in these combat activities, how many anti-terrorist actions had
10 been carried out, and the main results described in a few sentences,
11 lifting the blockade of roads or sections of the roads, which routes, et
12 cetera. All this information you can find in the report.
13 Q. Just tell me, could you read -- could you read from the --
14 MR. STAMP: Before you read, I just wonder if we could be told
15 whether it's dated and if it's signed by who and how he knows about it.
16 How he's able to speak to its contents. I know it refers to the period
17 1st to 25th of September, but we don't know the date. We don't know if
18 it's signed by somebody, if a particular person sent it, what basis it is
19 that he speaks about it. In documents that are translated, these things
20 are obvious on the face of it, but here I'm just in a vacuum, listening
21 in a vacuum.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, unfortunately we
23 don't have the translation. We could see that from the first page. This
24 document was received from the National Council at the Ministry of the
25 Interior for the area of Kosovo and Metohija. Unfortunately, we don't
1 have the date here, but on the first page of this document provided by
2 the MUP it says: "Information of the MUP staff for Kosovo and Metohija
3 about operations to fight terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija,
4 anti-terrorist actions, combat activities, impact on civilians, ways of
5 securing the liberated territory" --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel read a little slower, please.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think the chapters of -- various
8 chapters are described here. On the first page of the document it says,
9 Information on operations executed to fight terrorism in the area of
10 Kosovo and Metohija. There is no signature. It's just the report, a
12 JUDGE PARKER: Is there a date?
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no, not on the document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Are you suggesting it was prepared by the National
15 Council or merely that it was stored by the National Council?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. While reviewing
17 the documentation at the Ministry of the Interior, I saw this document
18 and then I requested through the national counsel for the document to be
19 made available to me to use in this court, and the National Council made
20 it available to me. And I then showed it to the accused in proofing.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Now, we haven't yet heard whether the witness
22 knows anything about this document and its contents.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. You've heard the question, Mr. Djordjevic. I don't want to -- I
25 don't need to reformulate it.
1 A. I know all about the contents of this document because I was
2 directly involved for a good part. All the activities of the staff are
3 familiar to me, especially from the period when I was there myself. And
4 from this material, I don't see exactly but I assume it was done for the
5 minister and for his purposes, so that he can use it to brief others.
6 But it covers the information available to the staff at that time. I was
7 familiar with most of this information, the weapons, the movements of
8 civilians, most of the combat activities, the activities to deblock
9 roads, and I believe this material faithfully represents the situation
10 prevailing at the time and the events unfolding. Most of these terrorist
11 attacks and their consequences were reported to the ministry in daily
12 reports, and it's also based on that information that the staff prepared
13 this summary report chapter by chapter.
14 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, do we see in this material anything about the
15 activities of both the public security and the state security
17 A. Yes, we see the number of criminal reports filed by the state
18 security and the number of persons named in these criminal reports, and
19 also in the process of deblocking roads and in anti-terrorist activities
20 the unit for special operations and the state security department JSO was
21 involved, so their activities are also covered.
22 Q. Can you turn to page 2 and read slowly the first paragraph --
23 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, with -- I don't want to sound pedantic,
24 but what the witness is saying is that he's aware -- or he thinks, he
25 believes I think he said that the contents of the document are accurate,
1 but he has not really testified about the document itself, the provenance
2 of the document. It is neither signed nor stamped or dated. You know,
3 he could be asked to read from a document that could have been created
4 any time, anywhere, in any country. All he can say is that this looks
5 true to me, but there are quite a lot of possibilities about the creation
6 of documents that might contain contents that are true to him. The
7 witness needs to speak, it is my submission, more about the document
8 itself. Does he know about this document?
9 JUDGE PARKER: The answer is he has told us he does not. You're
10 sounding almost like Mr. Djurdjic in some of the objections he made to
11 your case, Mr. Stamp.
12 MR. STAMP: Well, in future I'll try to be more brief --
13 JUDGE PARKER: No, I meant the substance of your objection.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE PARKER: You are proposing to tender this document,
16 Mr. Djurdjic? Pending translation, it will be marked for identification
17 as D432. We are not minded to follow-up Mr. Stamp's objection.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Your Honours, can we now see Exhibit P1203. But should I propose
20 that this number is marked for identification? So I move that the
21 previous document be marked for identification pending the translation --
22 or we have already received it. I am totally messed up. I'm sorry, Your
23 Honours. Please accept my apology.
24 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Djurdjic,
25 leave it alone and keep moving.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, your tab is 95. This here is a dispatch. The
3 English version does not indicate what day in October it was. Can you
4 make out what date it was in October 1998 and the dispatch number is
6 A. The date is the 7th of October, 1998.
7 Q. Thank you. This is signed by you. Can you tell us briefly what
8 it was about and why was it sent?
9 A. This is the period after the completion, practically speaking, of
10 anti-terrorist activities of -- or rather, terrorist activities in Kosovo
11 and Metohija. The end of September they were over. After that, followed
12 very significant political activities aimed at an overall resolution to
13 the problem in Kosovo and Metohija involving resolutions of the United
14 Nations, the agreement between Minister Jovanovic, the minister of
15 foreign affairs and the OSCE Geremek, also to follow-up negotiations
16 between the president of the FRY, Milosevic, and Holbrooke. However, the
17 situation was such that this threat of war was hovering above Serbia
18 the organs in Serbia
20 And on the basis of this imminent danger and on the basis of that
21 assessment, I am forwarding this dispatch to all the organisational units
22 of the public security department as well as to units outside the
23 department such as the institute for security, the police academy, the
24 college of internal affairs, the secondary school of internal affairs,
25 and so on.
1 In the first paragraph I give the basic indications of my
2 estimation of what might happen, and in the second paragraph I point to
3 the measures that we need to take, namely, the measures that we have to
4 undertake to be able as a state organ to respond to any attacks. To that
5 end, first instruction to the secretariat and to all the units is to
6 update their defence plans and in particular their mobilisation plans.
7 So all the organisational units of the public security department and
8 outside the department had their own defence plans within the framework
9 of which they had their mobilisation plans as well. Here I instruct them
10 to update all these plans of theirs, and that is the basic intent of this
11 dispatch and the basic instruction in it.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please see D004-1649.
14 Q. Tab 96 for you, Mr. Djordjevic, and it is 1777 of the Defence's
15 65 ter list.
16 A. This is a dispatch sent to these same units as the previous
17 dispatch. It was forwarded on the 8th of October, 1998, the day after
18 that is, attached to which and submitted with which is a decree of the
19 Government of the Republic of Serbia
20 situation and possible NATO attacks targeting our country. This decree
21 of the Government of the Republic of Serbia
22 organisational units of the public security department as well as to
23 other units outside the department, making it incumbent on them to
24 elaborate the decree, study its content, and identify and put into
25 practice the measures that the organs of the interior should undertake in
1 order to give practical effect to the instructions contained therein.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I ask that this exhibit be
4 admitted into evidence.
5 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D433.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, just a slight digression. When did you return
9 from Kosovo and Metohija where you were there the instructions of the
10 minister to carry out this global plan, when did you return to Belgrade
11 from there?
12 A. The moment these activities were finished, namely, the end of
13 September/early October, that is when I returned to Belgrade. And
14 already on the 7th of July I sent my first letter to the secretariats and
15 continued discharging my duty of chief of the public security department
16 of the Republic of Serbia
17 Q. Repeat the 7th of which month?
18 A. The 7th of October.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 A. The first dispatch that I sent to units in the field was sent on
21 the 7th of October, but I had returned from Kosovo before that.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see document D004-1918,
24 please. That is 1798 according -- I apologise, 1748 according to the 65
25 ter list.
1 Q. And it is 97 in your binder. Please tell us what kind of a
2 document this is, who drew it up.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see page 2 of this
4 document in both languages.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First I should like to say that in
6 addition to the meetings and ministers' collegium meetings, there were
7 also held occasional meetings in the ministry with all heads of
8 secretariats and with the leaders of the different administrations within
9 the headquarters of the ministry. As a rule, these meetings would be
10 held once every three months. The first meeting along those lines would
11 be held after the expiry of the first quarter to consider and discuss the
12 results of the work of the Ministry of the Interior in the previous
13 period of the preceding year, and future tasks which were yet to be
14 carried out. This was one of such meetings which was held with all the
15 heads of secretariats, and the heads of the different lines of work in
16 the ministry it was held on the 16th of October, 1998. And the principle
17 of work was -- you can see on the next page --
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please turn to the next
19 page, please.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here we can see that the first item
21 on the agenda was results of work in the period from January to
22 September. Namely, it was for a period of nine months, and then the next
23 one, the next item, was forthcoming tasks.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Just one minute. Who actually opened the meeting?
1 A. The meeting was presided over by Assistant Minister Stojan Misic,
2 but the minister with all the assistant ministers and other superiors was
3 also present as well as the heads of the secretariats. The principle of
4 work at these meetings was like this: The people in charge of the
5 different lines of work, namely, the heads of the administrations, would
6 brief on the security situation in keeping with their line of work and
7 the measures taken for the reporting period. The reporting period here
8 is nine months in the year 1998, so all the heads of administrations
9 reported to the meeting on the most important developments and actions
10 and the state -- situation of -- with security in their particular lines
11 of work over the past nine months and as a rule, proposed measures which
12 were to be taken in the forthcoming period in order to adequately and
13 successfully discharge work in the Ministry of the Interior. That is the
14 pattern that all meetings followed, and of such meetings there would be
15 at least four during the year with all the heads of the SUPs.
16 Q. Thank you. Tell me this: In this document that you are familiar
17 with, are there any reports about anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo and
19 A. As I have said, every administration reported on what had been
20 done within their respective ambits in the previous period, the reporting
21 period for which the security status was being reviewed. And in that
22 sense, the police administration also reported on what it had -- what it
23 had done in that period. So on the several pages which follow, they very
24 briefly informed the meeting of -- or about the activities of the special
25 units outside their home secretariats. I'm not quite sure which page it
1 would be here, perhaps page 4 in the Serbian version.
2 Q. It would be page -- it would be that page, and in the English
3 version -- just bear with me for -- the Serbian page is D004-1923.
4 A. Somewhere around the fourth paragraph from the top the police
5 administration reports that by preventive activities and engagement --
6 the engagement of the PJPs outside their home secretariats, grave
7 incidents have been prevented -- which were of particular significance
8 from the aspect of security. They also reported - and that is reflected
9 in this record - that they had ensured the necessary level of police
10 mobility and training to discharge the most complex security duties. So
11 this is the only segment of this document which deals with the PJPs in
12 this nine-month report, which the police administration had at its
13 disposal, namely, the police administration had no information on combat
14 actions of the dispatched special units, nor was it able to report to
15 this meeting on that topic.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Unfortunately, we don't have the translation,
17 Mr. Djurdjic.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is not -- let me take a
19 moment to see if I can help. Can we see the next English page.
20 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]...
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Or maybe the one after next. No,
22 that's not it. Next. Could we zoom in on the English.
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, we will adjourn now a little early,
25 if you can find your page. We will resume at five minutes to 1.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.27 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We did
5 manage to find that page in English. It is now on the screen, paragraphs
6 1 and 2 in English are the ones we're dealing with.
7 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, can you read from your binder the sentence that
8 begins with the words:
9 "Over the past period ..."
10 A. "Over the past period of this year, police units were carrying
11 out tasks from their purview."
12 Q. And could you read the first sentence of the next paragraph.
13 A. "Through increased preventive coverage of the territory by
14 special police units outside their home secretariats in executing special
15 security tasks ..."
16 Q. At this meeting of ministers with chiefs of secretariats, were
17 there any reports about completed anti-terrorist actions and the
18 situation in Kosovo and Metohija? Were there any such activities up to
19 that meeting?
20 A. As we can see from this record, there is no mention about combat
21 activities. There was no reporting about that. I would just like to
22 draw your attention to page 9 in Serbian, where in paragraph 3 it is
23 reported that joint services had been engaged primarily in equipping PJPs
24 to carry out special security tasks in the area of autonomous province
25 Kosovo and Metohija. To that end, the joint services report that they
1 had procured the necessary vehicles -- it's page 9 in Serbian.
2 Q. You can finish your sentence. We'll find it.
3 A. The joint services informed the minister and others at the
4 meeting what they had done in their line of work. They have provided the
5 vehicles, the mines and explosives, night-vision devices, and procured
6 the most necessary equipment. So these were the issues that were being
7 dealt with, and they relate to the PJPs in this period of nine months. I
8 believe it is also important that we find later in the conclusions what
9 instructions the minister gave for further action in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 It's below in the same material.
11 Q. Thank you. Did the topics discussed at this meeting relate to
12 the actions of the public security department for the past nine months?
13 A. Yes, all of these were regular activities and tasks of the public
14 security department. It was active in the entire territory of Serbia
15 it monitored the relevant indicators and trends for the whole Republic of
17 version the minister says in the conclusions the following:
18 "Further energetic struggle to crush Albanian separatism in
19 Kosovo and Metohija."
20 That's all that was said at this meeting relating to the use of
21 PJPs and actions in Kosovo.
22 Q. Thank you. In the English version, what you see on the screens
23 now, the paragraph that the accused just read begins with the words:
24 "Over the past nine months..." thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
1 tender this document.
2 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D434.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, we've seen documents which could lead us to
6 conclude that you were involved in the making of agreements that followed
7 in October. I'll show you document P835 now and you will tell us what it
9 A. Which tab?
10 Q. 98.
11 A. This is the agreement on the verification mission, the Kosovo
12 Verification Mission
13 Zivadin Jovanovic, and Mr. Geremek in the name of the OSCE.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel repeat the number.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Tab 99.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D361, please.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am aware that the federal prime
19 minister established a commission of the federal government for
20 co-operation with the OSCE mission. I also know that the head of that
21 commission of the federal government was Nikola Sainovic, whereas Vlajko
22 Stojiljkovic, minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia
23 of the members.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have D235.
2 Q. It's your number 101, Mr. Djordjevic.
3 A. After these negotiations in Belgrade between OSCE representatives
4 and NATO representatives and our authorities, agreements were signed.
5 And on the 19th of October the minister submits these signed agreements
6 to the MUP staff in Kosovo.
7 Q. What exactly is he sending?
8 A. This is the agreement on the OSCE verification mission in Kosovo
9 and Metohija for their use, for their purposes. That's the previous
10 agreement we discussed, Jovanovic-Geremek agreement.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have P836 now.
13 Q. Could you tell us, how did you come to be involved in these
14 negotiations that led to the signing of the other agreements in October,
15 apart from that first one?
16 A. Following Milutinovic's instructions, I mean the president of
18 myself to attend the meeting that was held at the office of the FRY
19 president to negotiate with certain other agencies, primarily NATO. We
20 went and we arrived at the White Palace
21 FRY president. He informed us of what would be discussed. There would
22 be negotiations with NATO, and therefore President Milosevic decided that
23 the head of that negotiating team should be the Chief of General Staff,
24 Perisic. And then he asked that someone be named from the Ministry of
25 the Interior. The Minister Stojiljkovic decided that I would be the
1 co-chairman of our team, and that's how the negotiations started.
2 Q. Just for the record, tell us after this instruction given by the
3 president of the FRY, he decided who would be heading the negotiating
4 team on behalf of the army, who and how decided who would be the
5 representative on behalf of the Republic of Serbia
6 A. He asked Milutinovic to designate a representative of the MUP of
7 the Republic of Serbia
8 while we were still all standing there, and the two of them decided that
9 I would be the representative of the MUP. They suggested that to
10 Milosevic, that was accepted, and the negotiations could proceed.
11 Q. In your tab 102 we have an agreement that we see on the screen,
12 an understanding, between KDOM and the Ministry of the Interior of
14 behalf of KDOM. Could we concentrate on para 1, the dismantling of
15 check-points and installation of observation points.
16 A. Yes. The main objection in the negotiations was that the MUP
17 check-points were disrupting normal movement of civilians and also
18 provoke the KLA into attacking check-points, and then the police responds
19 with proportionate or disproportionate force - that's less important.
20 But in any case, this understanding was reached to remove these
21 check-points, and thus reduce overall tensions through negotiations. We
22 agreed that some observation points would be established further away
23 from the roads, allowing traffic to proceed normally, and observation
24 points are quite different in function from check-points. So that is
25 defined by para 1.
1 Q. Can you just explain in para 3, it says:
2 "In the coming 15 days the police will not move along the
3 Malisevo-Orahovac road. This road must remain fully open at all times
4 for unimpeded traffic and flow of people and goods."
5 A. It was a demand of the opposite side in these negotiations. They
6 demanded that this road that goes from Orahovac via Zociste towards Suva
7 Reka and Dulje - and I said earlier it was a very important area for the
8 KLA - it would have given time for the KLA to regroup and to control this
9 road freely. And in those 15 days there would be no police presence and
10 no possibility for an exchange of fire between the KLA and the police.
11 We honoured this agreement, but this paragraph also stipulates that the
12 Malisevo-Orahovac road must remain open for traffic. On that road, in
13 view of the layout, the KLA was able to put up roadblocks and impede
14 traffic. That's why we wanted to ensure that the road remained open and
15 that the terrorists handle their own activities and business using
16 byroads. They probably insisted on that and the KDOM accepted those
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now get P837.
19 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, how was it that this record of the 25th of
20 October came to be -- 1998, came to be signed with -- by you, by
21 Mr. Naumann and Mr. Clark?
22 A. The decision of the leadership was that I as a specialised staff
23 member should actually sign this, as I was the one in -- heading the team
24 of the ministry. In the negotiations they decided that it should also be
25 me to sign this record, these minutes. They did not sign it on their
1 part, but General Clark insisted that Slobodan Milosevic also sign the
2 document and Mr. -- President Milosevic's initials can indeed be seen on
3 this original.
4 Q. Thank you. In these agreements -- by these agreements both
6 you know, did Serbia
7 undertook under these agreements?
8 A. We embarked on the negotiations first and foremost in the best of
9 faith. In addition to myself, Generals Obrad Stevanovic and General
10 Lukic were on the team and these negotiations which [indiscernible] took
11 place in the General Staff were also attended by the president of Serbia
12 Mr. Milutinovic. So we embarked on these negotiations in the best of
13 faith and very earnestly, and just as we embarked on fulfilling the
14 obligations that we had undertaken under the agreement because had that
15 been not so, had we not honoured what we had signed and within the
16 time-frame work that had been envisaged there probably would have been an
17 attack on Serbia
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we see P769, Exhibit P769.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. These are minutes -- or
21 rather, these are conclusions of a meeting held in Pristina attended by
22 heads of secretariats, chiefs of police sections, and commanders of
23 special police unit detachments, PJPs.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Just a minute. I want to ask you a question before you proceed.
1 We see here that this meeting was attended also by the assistant
2 minister, Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic. If you know, tell us why
3 did he attend this meeting, how did that come about?
4 A. I just said that he was a member, that he was on the negotiating
5 team, and that he was completely au courant on what had been done
6 throughout these negotiations and knew everything that had been signed.
7 Namely, when the negotiations were completed, the agreement was signed,
8 and we undertook our obligations on that basis. General Lukic fell ill,
9 the head of the staff fell ill, and he had to stay in Belgrade. And
10 according to the instructions from the minister, his assistant General
11 Obrad Stevanovic was charged with bringing together the heads of the
12 relevant units and secretariats in Pristina to brief them on the
13 development of the situation as well as with the obligations that we had
14 undertaken by the signed agreements.
15 Q. Thank you. Here we can see the number of forces, the strength of
16 the forces, in fact that needed to be employed and by which date. Has
17 everything that is contained in the minutes -- had everything been
18 realised within the time-frame specified in the agreement?
19 A. All the undertaken obligations had to be fulfilled by the police,
20 i.e. the Ministry of the Interior, as well as by members of the army.
21 And orders to that effect were actually issued at this meeting. All this
22 was done -- because as I have just said, had it not all been carried out
23 according to plan, there would have been a bombing of Serbia. All the
24 duties discharged and fulfilment of the obligations that we had
25 undertaken had a specially designated representative of the staff who was
1 to liaise with the KDOM and OSCE, and it was his duty to acquaint them of
2 everything that we had done. And it was his duty to deal in the future
3 with all matters with the KDOM as well as with the representative of the
4 co-operation commission, exponent, shall I say, which was formed for
5 co-operation with KDOM and Kosovo who was General Loncar, I believe. And
6 he saw to it that all the obligations undertaken would be indeed honoured
7 and also that the verification mission would be apprised at all times of
8 all the measures undertaken.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have Exhibit P715.
11 Q. Just briefly, please. It is your tab 105. Just tell us briefly,
12 to whom was this dispatch addressed and why?
13 A. This is a dispatch which was sent from the public security
14 department to the department's organisational unit at the headquarters,
15 to all the secretariats, to all the border police stations, and to the
16 staff of the ministry in Pristina, as well as to the state security
17 department for their information. This dispatch spells out in detail the
18 obligations of the Ministry of the Interior to the verification mission.
19 It explains the status of members of the verification mission, their
20 crossing of the state border, as well as all the contacts with the
21 Ministry of the Interior and the secretariats in the territory of Kosovo
22 and Metohija had towards members of the verification mission. Starting
23 with security, accommodation, supplying fuel up to their personal safety,
24 and all this has been spelled out in detail in and by this dispatch and
25 instruction. All the secretariats and all the organisational units of
1 the department were to abide by the instructions given in it.
2 Q. Thank you. Can we now have Exhibit P770. It is your tab 107.
3 This is a meeting which took place on the 5th of November, 1998
4 It shall shortly come up on the screen in both versions, so until that
5 happens would you be so kind as to tell us, Mr. Djordjevic, why was this
6 meeting held and what was your role in it?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we can see page 2, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I attended the meeting, and
9 according to Minister Stojiljkovic's instructions I was there. The
10 minutes show who the attendees were. Basically this had to do with the
11 visit of the president of the Serbia
12 complement down there, by way of support to them after all the
13 negotiations that had been conducted and to support us in strictly
14 honouring the obligations that we had undertaken. Namely, for the
15 competent organs who were in charge to strictly see to the honouring of
16 those obligations, and that was the gist of that meeting and the spirit
17 of that meeting.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have Exhibit P1204 now.
21 Q. Your tab 107. Mr. Djordjevic, this is your document dated the
22 25th of November, 1998. Tell us in a nutshell what it was about and to
23 whom was it addressed.
24 A. This is a routine dispatch from the public security department
25 sent to all the organisational units within and without the public
1 security department as well as to the staff in Pristina, and it was
2 customary for the national holidays. We have already seen a similar
3 dispatch of similar contents sent for the 1st of May holidays, while this
4 one refers to the taking of intensified security measures in connection
5 with the republic day, which was the 29th of November.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit P689,
9 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, this is a -- these are staff minutes of the 2nd
10 of December, 1998. As far as I can see from the introductory section you
11 were not present there.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We need to see page number 2,
14 Q. I shall like to read out for you a section and hear your comments
15 on it. That is paragraph 3.
16 "Major-general Sreten Lukic stated that on the 27th of November,
17 1998, in Belgrade
18 chaired by Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, was attended by the chiefs of
19 the public and state security departments, assistant ministers, heads of
20 the staffs, and Nikola Sainovic. The current security situation in
21 Kosovo was discussed in the meeting in which the duties and further
22 engagement of the members of the police in Kosovo were defined. The
23 essence of the meeting was to continue carrying out anti-terrorist
24 actions aimed at suppressing terrorism in Kosovo and that in this regard
25 the police should be more offensive in taking measures in the situation
1 that had developed."
2 Do you remember whether a meeting at the ministry was held; and
3 if so, what was discussed at the meeting and how did it end?
4 A. I remember that there was such a meeting. Basically what was
5 discussed were the obligations that the Ministry of the Interior had
6 primarily towards the verification mission, and that is why Nikola
7 Sainovic was there as the president of the Federal Commission for
8 relations with the verification mission. So there generally was talk
9 about the security situation. At that meeting also, the minister gave
10 the instruction that the police should practically continue to undertake
11 anti-terrorist actions. Namely, that it should not be on the defensive
12 in view of the signed agreements -- namely, that the signing of the
13 agreements and the reduction of the police forces in the area had already
14 been made use of by the terrorist organisation, i.e., the KLA, and that
15 they had started to take territory which until that point had been under
16 police control. So it was to that effect that the minister instructed
17 the present to continue undertaking anti-terrorist activities in the
18 broader sense of the word without any -- giving any specific assignments
19 to anyone.
20 Q. Thank you. I forgot to ask you a while ago, as the FRY and the
21 Republic of Serbia
22 from the part of territory that had been under their control, what
23 happened to those territories after the withdrawal of their forces, of
24 their security forces?
25 A. After the withdrawal of the security forces and as -- shall I put
1 it this way, the extremely controlled activity of the police, the
2 situation was such that it actually contributed to the terrorist groups
3 again nearing the main roads and again taking some positions that they
4 had occupied in the previous period. So wherever the police had
5 withdrawn, the KLA took those areas.
6 Q. Thank you. And was -- did the KLA intensify its terrorist
7 activities after these agreements and the withdrawal of the police?
8 A. Not immediately. They needed some time to consolidate their
9 ranks, in view of the fact that in the previous police activities they
10 had been quite shaken. And after that, also with some assistance from
11 body KDOM and the verification mission, their activities were revived.
12 And as time went by the incidents became ever more serious and the
13 territory which came to be under the control of the terrorist forces
14 became increasingly big.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Exhibit 48 [as
16 interpreted] according to the Prosecution's 65 ter list.
17 Q. It's your tab 110. Just very briefly if you can tell us. We
18 have a few more documents to deal with.
19 A. This is a dispatch dated 18 December sent by the minister to the
20 MUP staff in Pristina to the state security centre in Pristina and to the
21 secretariats in the whole province, where he highlights one of the issues
22 covered by this agreement between Jovanovic and Geremek. One of the
23 obligations related to the right of the Republic of Serbia
24 proportionately to certain terrorist activities.
25 Q. Thank you. Let us go back to tab 109. The 65 ter number of the
1 Prosecution is 4257, or rather, 1083, and before that may I tender the
2 previous document. The 65 ter number document 4080 is the one I'm
3 tendering, the one we had on the screen a moment ago.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D435.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have the
7 Prosecution's 65 ter 4257. There it is.
8 Q. Very briefly. It's a dispatch you signed. What's the subject?
9 A. This is a dispatch that came from the state security department
10 to all SUPs, the border police posts, and the MUP staff in Pristina. It
11 deals with the illegal trade in foreign currency and smuggling, and there
12 was a section in the ministry in charge of these matters. This is a
13 regular task, but since the illegal exchange of foreign currency had
14 intensified the SUPs are warned to step-up their activity.
15 Q. What does it say exactly?
16 A. On the instructions of the minister, measures are to be taken to suppress
17 these trends. We've spoken about this before. The minister's attention
18 was focused on the Criminal Investigation Department of the police, and
19 these are the affairs and obligations of a Criminal Investigation
20 Department. It says here -- in fact, it's sent under my name because it
21 includes border police posts and the CID
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May I tender this document now?
23 JUDGE PARKER: The document says it's from the sector of public
24 security. The witness in the translation said it was a state security
25 document but sent under his name. Is it a document sent by the
1 minister -- by the witness as head of public security dealing with the
2 subject that was a state security subject? Is that what was intended?
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No.
4 Q. Please, tell us very briefly so that we have time.
5 A. This is a classical dispatch of the Criminal Investigation Department of
6 the public security department. The dispatch relates to public security.
7 I signed it as chief of public security. But the role of the minister is
8 highlighted here above regarding the general instructions he issued.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted now?
11 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]...
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D436.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Djordjevic, now we have this exhibit. To whom was it sent? P717.
15 A. This is a usual activity. Ahead of holidays, in this case the
16 new year holidays, our measures are stepped up to anticipate possible --
17 a possible increase in terrorist activity and to ensure safety during the
19 Q. P1043, please.
20 Mr. Djordjevic, just very briefly, tell us about this record from
21 the MUP staff meeting. I see you did not attend. Can you comment on the
22 way the minister attended?
23 A. This is a record of a meeting held at the staff attended also by
24 the minister on the 12th -- 21st of December, 1998, after a report on the
25 general situation made by the chief of secretariat, the minister went on
1 a different assignment and authorised the general, General Obrad
2 Stevanovic - we can see that on the next page - and says, "Today General
3 Obrad Stevanovic will convey to you my instructions on the new methods of
4 activity in the new conditions. It is necessary to increase the secrecy
5 of our actions and so on and so forth. Here the minister left the
6 meeting and General Obrad Stevanovic conveyed his instructions to the
7 other members.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I believe, Your Honours, our time
10 is up for today.
11 JUDGE PARKER: That is so, Mr. Djurdjic. Can I mention two
12 matters. First, we have been able to arrange to sit for longer hours on
13 Monday. We will commence sitting at 10.00 in the morning and continue
14 until 4.30 in the afternoon. The second is to inquire how you are seeing
15 your progress for time, Mr. Djurdjic. We've given you the whole week
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour, but it's a
18 very difficult question. Do you want an optimistic answer or a
19 less-optimistic one? I expect --
20 JUDGE PARKER: A realistic, optimistic answer.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. If we proceed more
22 quickly on Monday, I expect to finish my direct examination not later
23 than the first session on Tuesday.
24 JUDGE PARKER: That's making life quite difficult for Mr. Stamp,
25 I would think. Look hard at your papers over the weekend, Mr. Djurdjic.
1 We will adjourn now and resume on Monday at 10.00.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Monday, the 7th day of
4 December, 2009, at 10.00 a.m.