1 Monday, 25 January 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. We try again. If the witness could
6 be brought in. While that is happening, I will mention three matters.
7 In November the Chamber ordered the Defence to disclose three of its
8 expert reports by the 18th of January. One of those has been disclosed
9 only in B/C/S so far, and the delay is in obtaining a translation into
10 English. I understand that will be done this week. Because of that, the
11 Chamber is prepared to extend until the 5th of March the requirement that
12 the Prosecution give its notice under Rule 94(B). That's in respect of
13 that one report only.
14 There was a motion of the Prosecution regarding Exhibit 509, and
15 that will be granted.
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE PARKER: There was also a motion of Mr. Djordjevic's
18 Defence regarding Exhibit 217. The Chamber will grant leave to the
19 Defence to upload the missing two pages to Exhibit D217. The Chamber
20 also notes that the English translation currently in e-court appears to
21 be a draft rather than a final translation. When a final translation is
22 available, the Defence should replace the draft with the official
24 And now, sir, we welcome you this morning. Would you be so kind
25 as to stand and read aloud the affirmation which is shown to you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down.
4 Mr. Djurdjic has some questions for you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. May I
6 just ask you two things before we start with the testimony of this
7 witness. First, the exhibit D452 marked for identification in the
8 e-court under D010-5382, could it please be admitted into evidence
9 because the translation has been completed.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Yes, that will be done.
11 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
12 JUDGE PARKER: The only procedural difficulty, Mr. Djurdjic, is
13 that our number in e-court is different from the D010-5382 that you
14 quote. MFI
15 precise number later.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Just a
17 question of numbers for the Serbian and English versions. One further
18 thing, last week we asked for our 65 ter list to be extended for the
19 number 1791. So could that be allowed too, please.
20 JUDGE PARKER: We will deal with that later, Mr. Djurdjic.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 WITNESS: ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 Examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Jovanovic.
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. For the record, could you please introduce yourself and give us
3 your particulars.
4 A. My name is Zivadin Jovanovic. I was born in 1938 in Serbia.
5 Q. Thank you. I should like to briefly inform you of the summary --
6 of the summary of the witness statement.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The witness in the period from
8 1998 until the year 2000 was the minister for foreign affairs in the
9 Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He will testify about
10 the activities of Yugoslav diplomacy in the context of attempts of
11 Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia to deal with the problem of Kosovo
12 and Metohija by peaceful and political means. He will testify about the
13 efforts of the federal government to enable foreign diplomatic
14 representatives to familiarise themselves on the spot with the actual
15 state of affairs in Kosovo and Metohija and also to facilitate their work
16 on the ground. For that reason, in Kosovo and Metohija offices were
17 opened within the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
18 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to provide logistic support to foreign
19 diplomatic representatives. As the federal minister of foreign affairs,
20 the witness signed an agreement with Bronislaw Geremek, who at the time
21 was the chairman of the OSCE on the establishment of a Kosovo
22 Verification Mission. The federal government formed a special body for
23 co-operation with the OSCE, a commission of the federal government for
24 co-operation with the Kosovo Verification Mission. The tasks of that
25 commission were to establish contact and co-operation with the
1 verification mission, and primarily with the leaders of that mission.
2 The witness will confirm that the federal government, the
3 commission, and all the ministries had a positive attitude towards the
4 verification mission, their aim being to seriously review and deal with
5 all the requests of the verification mission wherever possible. The
6 witness will confirm that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had --
7 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry to interrupt, I really am. I didn't
8 realise my friend was going to embark on reading a very long summary of
9 what is in the previous testimony of the witness, which is not yet
10 received. Now, I will have no objection to the application to tender the
11 evidence, the previous evidence, on a Rule 92 ter -- as a matter of fact,
12 I think the Court has already approved the -- or granted the submission,
13 but I think the practice has been and the proper way is that the
14 statement or the 92 ter transcript should be brought before the Court and
15 formally become part of the evidence before we read the summary. It
16 might well just be a procedural point, but I don't know if it's right to
17 be reading the factual contents without the statement being put before
18 the Court and given an exhibit number.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber does agree with Mr. Stamp,
21 Mr. Djurdjic, that it would be more convenient and appropriate to receive
22 the statement as an exhibit and then to receive a summary of it. It may
23 in most cases be a matter of mere form, but there are cases where that
24 can be an issue of some significance. So we will follow that procedure.
25 You tender this previous transcript?
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. I
2 reviewed the transcript during the Prosecution case, and the procedure
3 was as I am doing now, so that is why I started without asking leave of
4 the Chamber. I realise now how we will work in the future, so I will ask
5 for the transcript to be admitted first.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Our recollection of the procedure before is a
7 little different, Mr. Djurdjic, but no matter. The transcript of
8 evidence of the witness in the previous trial is evidence having been
9 given on the 20th and 21st of August, 2007, will be received.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We have two versions, a revised
11 and a non-revised version. So the transcript under seal D101-3359 should
12 be admitted into evidence, please. And the revised and non-revised
13 version, the number being D011-0768.
14 JUDGE PARKER: That is merely a redacted or edited version; is
15 that correct?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
17 JUDGE PARKER: I was dealing with the primary document. It first
18 will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the statement will be given Exhibit
20 Number D00454.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
22 And the redacted statement will also be received.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that statement will be Exhibit
25 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
1 Now your summary which was interrupted, Mr. Djurdjic, may
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Another technical matter.
4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you remember and you read the transcript of the
5 statement you made in the Milutinovic case on the 20th and 21st of
6 August, 2007. Would you today provide the same answers to the same
7 questions that you were asked then?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The witness during his testimony
11 will also convey his knowledge about the withdrawal of the forces of the
12 Army of Yugoslavia and the MUP after the signing of the agreement on the
13 establishment of the KVM led to the intensified -- intensification of
14 activities of the Kosovo forces and the capture of territory by the
15 Kosovo forces which had been abandoned by the forces of Serbia and
16 Yugoslavia. The witness will speak about the negotiations in Rambouillet
17 and will explain that the agreement was never fully disclosed to the
18 Yugoslav and Serbian side, and the delegation that was led by Professor
19 Ratko Markovic had the authority to reach an agreement with a view to
20 dealing with the crisis by political means. The federal ministry had a
21 team of experts in diplomacy, law, and other areas who provided logistic
22 support to the delegations in Rambouillet and Paris.
23 The witness will testify that the policy of the federal
24 government and the Government of the Republic of Serbia advocated the
25 resolution of the problems in Kosovo by peaceful means, and this policy
1 remained unchanged in 1998 and 1999, including the Milutinovic-Rugova
2 Agreement which envisaged the possibility of forming a provisional
3 government for Kosovo.
4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, could you tell us what your educational background
6 A. By education, I'm a jurist; and by profession, I'm a diplomat.
7 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us whether your years of
8 service were spent mostly in the diplomacy.
9 A. Yes, I worked in the diplomatic service from 1994 until -- I'm
10 sorry, from 1964 until the year 2000.
11 Q. Could you tell us in 1998 and 1999 what position you held?
12 A. I was federal minister for foreign affairs from January 1998
13 until December 2000.
14 Q. Thank you. Mr. Jovanovic, could you tell us briefly what was the
15 status of the republics within the Federation, the legal and political
16 status of the republics from the standpoint of foreign policy of the
17 Yugoslav Federation in the 1998/1999 period, and how those policies were
18 formed and implemented.
19 A. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was, by its constitution, had
20 a unique and uniform foreign policy, whereas the members of the Yugoslav
21 Federation by constitution took part in creating and carrying out that
22 single foreign policy of the FRY.
23 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us, at the federal level which
24 actors influenced the policy making and what was the task of the Ministry
25 of Foreign Affairs?
1 A. By constitution of the FRY, the responsibility for policy making
2 and carrying out foreign policy of the federal state was in the hands of
3 the federal government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Other --
4 others who had a hand in creating foreign policy were the constitutional
5 bodies, the Federal Assembly of the FRY and the president of the Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia. And the division of competencies and
7 responsibilities in creating and carrying out of foreign policy are
8 written in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us how republics took part in
10 creating the foreign policy at the federal level?
11 A. First of all, when it comes to the federal government it
12 comprised representatives of the republics, members of the Federation;
13 and in that respect, each republic through the federal government took
14 part in conducting foreign policy. Furthermore, republics also had a
15 constitutionally laid-down number in -- of delegates or deputies in the
16 Federal Assembly, and to the extent that the Federal Assembly had a role
17 in creating and carrying out foreign policy of Yugoslavia, to that extent
18 those deputies influenced such creation in carrying out foreign policy in
19 the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had the constitutional role
20 of carrying out the determined single foreign policy of federal
21 Yugoslavia, minister was from one republic and the deputy minister was
22 from the other member of the Federation.
23 Q. Thank you. Let's go back, please, since Federation is a
24 composite state, who had the international entity, the member republics
25 or the federal republic?
1 A. The sovereignty was with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
2 exclusively, and only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an actor in
3 international relations with other states and with international
4 organisations. Republics could take part in certain contacts at
5 international level, but exclusively in the carrying out of foreign
6 policy when it's related to the immediate, direct interests of the said
7 republic member of the Federation.
8 Q. Thank you. The Kosovo and Metohija autonomous province was
9 within which republic? It was a constituent part of which republic?
10 A. Kosovo and Metohija had always been an integral part of the
11 Republic of Serbia. To wit, the Republic of Serbia by all the
12 constitutions from World War II to date has had two provinces, one was
13 Kosovo and Metohija and the other one was Vojvodina. It would be
14 interesting to note that the Kosovo and Metohija autonomous province
15 during World War II changed names and competencies. Immediately after
16 the World War II it was an autonomous district within Serbia. Later on
17 it became autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.
18 Q. Thank you. In terms of foreign policy, terrorism which had in
19 Kosovo and Metohija, was it an internal affair of the Federal Republic of
20 Yugoslavia, or was it an international issue?
21 A. For many years -- many decades, Serbia had been facing separatist
22 tendencies in Kosovo and Metohija. And in the 1980 and 1990s, those
23 separatist tendencies worked hand in hand with terrorism. So leaders of
24 the separatist movement in Kosovo and Metohija growingly used terrorism
25 as means for achieving political -- their political goal, and that would
1 be for that part of Serbia to secede from the rest of Serbia.
2 Q. Thank you. I would like you to slow down because of the
3 transcript and to make a pause between question and answer.
4 Mr. Jovanovic, what was the international position of the Federal
5 Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998?
6 A. It was complex for several reasons, the basic reason being why
7 the position of the FRY at that time was so complex was the suspension of
8 its membership rights within the UN system, the OSCE system, and in many
9 other international organisations. The second element why it was so
10 complex is reflected in the fact that despite the decision of the
11 Security Council of the UN dated end of 1995, after the conclusion of the
12 Dayton-Paris accords on peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stipulating that
13 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is to see the sanctions introduced in
14 May 1992 lifted. Despite all that, the US of A as key international
15 actor continued contravening UN Security Council's decision to maintain
16 the out of all -- the so-called out of all of the sanctions. Complexity
17 lie also in the fact that a substantial part of the FRY's borders - and I
18 mean the borders of Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija towards Albania - its
19 integrity was infringed by the influx of arms after the well-known events
20 in Albania, meaning arms went into Serbia or Kosovo and Metohija.
21 Complexity also was reflected in the fact that Yugoslavia had
22 inherited substantial economic and financial debts and losses due to a
23 long period of isolation and sanctions. So that was the position of the
24 FRY which prompted all its institutions to invest great efforts to --
25 into overcoming the consequences of the isolation and sanctions which
1 were still in force contrary to UN Security Council's decision.
2 Q. Thank you. You've just mentioned that those sanctions sponsored
3 by the US of A, the so-called out of all of the sanctions remained in
4 force. I would like to ask you in practical terms what the out of all of
5 sanctions was, what consequences it had on the FRY?
6 A. The sanctions had -- the so-called out of all of sanctions
7 influenced or resulted in a very dire economic and social situation in
8 Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did not have any opportunity to withdraw or draw
9 down loans from international financial institutions, first and foremost
10 from the IMF and the World Bank or from European financial institutions.
11 Yugoslavia could not take part in free trade without restrictions,
12 whereby the principle of free trade and open borders was being violated.
13 This had consequences on our insufficient utilisation of industrial
14 capacities in Yugoslavia. They went idle because important raw materials
15 could not be imported for the dearth of financial resources. We had very
16 low foreign exchange influx into the country and this directly resulted
17 in reduced manufacture of pharmaceuticals, for instance, because despite
18 the fact that Yugoslavia was a rare example of a country in that region
19 to produce large quantities of pharmaceuticals, but since it could not
20 import the raw materials, the chemicals, that had an effect that
21 Yugoslavia which had been a net exporter of pharmaceuticals, now faced a
22 situation where it could not meet its own demand -- domestic demand for
24 Q. Thank you very much. You just stated that the Republic of
25 Yugoslavia was excluded from certain international organisations. Could
1 you please tell us, are we discussing the SFRY or the FRY, how it was
2 excluded from certain international organisations, and which
3 organisations those were.
4 A. We have to be very precise and specific about this matter. The
5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had never been excluded from any
6 international organisation, had never been a decision on cessation of
7 FRY's membership in any international organisation, including the UN and
8 the system of the United Nations, international financial institutions
9 and co-operations, the OSCE, and others. After the destruction of the
10 SFRY, what was inherited by the FRY was the suspension of membership
11 rights, provisional suspension of membership rights from those
12 international organisations I mentioned a minute ago. So SFRY was
13 suspended from the membership of the OSCE at the beginning of the 1990s
14 when the Yugoslav crisis broke out. In a very peculiar way that was done
15 too. Ever since its establishment to date, in principle the OSCE
16 decisions are taken by consensus of all the member states.
17 At the beginning of the 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of
18 Yugoslavia was suspended. It was not thrown out. It was suspended
19 provisionally through an imposition of an ad hoc principle of consensus
20 minus one, and this was the only case in the history of the OSCE where
21 the principle of consensus was not upheld. Otherwise, the Federal
22 Republic of Yugoslavia as one of the successors of the Socialist Federal
23 Republic of Yugoslavia has always considered itself as, in terms of
24 continuity, as being a member of the United Nations, the OSCE, and all
25 the other international organisations, not only that. The Federal
1 Republic of Yugoslavia co-operated with those organisations, had a very
2 positive attitude towards those organisations throughout that period. It
3 had a positive attitude to all initiatives and requests coming from those
4 organisations. As far as membership in the UN is concerned, the decision
5 was to suspend Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's right to participation at
6 the General Assembly. Later on in the EKOSOK and later on in other parts
7 of that systems, the system of the United Nations. But throughout that
8 time while the FRY was suspended, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
9 allowed to maintain its permanent missions to both New York and Geneva
10 headquarters of the UN, and to use those missions to continue to build
11 contacts and co-operation up to the level it was allowed to do so. FRY
12 maintained continuous diplomatic communication with the heads of the
13 United Nations, the OSCE, and all the other international organisations,
14 and it met its financial obligation towards those organisations in terms
15 of membership fees.
16 I personally on two occasions during -- at General Assemblies of
17 the UN, I personally handed to the Secretary-General of the United
18 Nations cheques to cover the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 's
19 contribution to the finances of the UN. Both times it was construed as a
20 positive gesture at a time when there were many UN member states and some
21 international organisations who were not in such dire economic
22 circumstances, that were not under sanctions, that were not isolated, but
23 who failed promptly to honour their financial contributions towards
24 international organisations.
25 Q. Thank you. Mr. Jovanovic, could you please tell us what was the
1 internal political situation like in the spring of 1998 in the Federal
2 Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.
3 A. The social and economic situation throughout that period was
4 complicated. The deficit in the payments and trade balances, there was a
5 deficit with respect to many needs and commodities required for the
6 normal functioning of a state and society. However, with something that
7 was of the utmost importance for assessing the internal stability and the
8 situation at home, was the rather abrupt increase of terrorist activities
9 of the so-called KLA in the province of Kosovo and Metohija. There were
10 certain social tensions, but the economic or the difficult social
11 situation did not affect the overall internal situation as much as did
12 the sudden escalation of terrorism of the so-called KLA in Kosovo and
14 Q. Thank you. What was the aim of these terrorist activities?
15 A. As I have already pointed out, the key problem, the basic issue,
16 and the root cause of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija was the
17 long-term strategy of separatist forces in Kosovo and Metohija, the aim
18 of which was for a long period of time the secession of Kosovo and
19 Metohija from Serbia, that is, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
20 Q. Thank you. And could you tell us as far as you know what those
21 terrorist activities consisted of.
22 A. The separatism was reflected in many areas and primarily the
23 separatist leadership in Kosovo and Metohija boycotted the constitutional
24 order, the legal order, and the state which Kosovo and Metohija belonged
25 to. The boycott consisted of failure to participate in elections,
1 non-participation in other activities initiated by Serbia and the Federal
2 Republic of Yugoslavia, a boycott in the educational area, boycotting the
3 system of health care and education, and other institutions and state
4 functions as well as the formation of illegal counter-constitutional
5 parallel institutions by the separatist leadership, or rather, bodies of
6 a separatist nature. This separatist organisation and the leaders of
7 separatism in that period of time resorted to many measures of
8 intimidation, threats, blackmail, and even revenge against compatriots of
9 Albanian ethnicity who would in any way whatsoever express loyalty
10 towards the state in which they were citizens. Along those lines of
11 separatism, a wave of terrorist activity escalated so that certain
12 political aims, such as the secession of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia
13 were pursued by terrorist means. How did this terrorism manifest itself?
14 In many ways and in many areas, but primarily it was directed against the
15 legitimate representatives of the authorities against everything that
16 represented the state, its institutions, and the overall constitutional
17 system. There were many attacks and assassinations and killings of
18 policemen, soldiers, and other members of public services such as, for
19 instance, teachers in schools that were part of the legal and legitimate
20 educational system, foresters who were wearing state uniforms, postmen
21 who were also uniformed wearing postal service uniforms. So there were
22 attacks against civilians as well, and not only against members of the
23 Serbian people but also against members of the Albanian national minority
24 who as I have mentioned showed loyalty. An atmosphere was being created
25 in which no one dared to be loyal to the state of which he was a citizen.
1 And, if I may be allowed to mention, all this was not just running
2 counter to the valid constitutional and legal system, not only was it in
3 contravention in the rule of law, but it was also contrary to the
4 Convention of the Council of Europe on the rights of members of ethnic
5 minorities which contains a provision saying that the rights of ethnic
6 minorities do not reduce the obligation of members of ethnic minorities
7 to be loyal to the state in which they are citizens.
8 Q. Thank you. Let me just ask in connection with this issue,
9 regardless of such a situation in Kosovo and Metohija did all the
10 inhabitants avail themselves of their collective rights in respect of
11 pensions, social benefits, and contributions, et cetera?
12 A. Yes. Even in the case of Kosovo and Metohija, the boycott of the
13 institutions of the system, the boycott of the legal system, and the
14 formation of illegal and parallel institutions with separatist goals was
15 implemented selectively to a certain degree. Namely, no member of the
16 Albanian ethnic minority and members of any other ethnic communities in
17 Kosovo and Metohija did not renounce their pensions, social benefits, and
18 other benefits provided by the state. When we talk about a boycott, it
19 applied in the first place to boycotting the institutions of the
20 authorities, of the state authorities, a boycott of legal local
21 self-government, a boycott of the police, the educational system. But
22 this did not go so far as to anyone renouncing or being forced to
23 denounce his rights to any material or financial benefit provided on the
24 basic of the principle that applied to all the citizens of Serbia or
25 Yugoslavia by the state.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could we give the
3 witness a hard copy of the documents to facilitate their use?
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I will now give you the number of the tab in which
7 you will find the document. Could you please open the binder so as -- so
8 that you can turn the pages more easily. Before we move on to the first
9 document, Mr. Jovanovic, let me ask you, this situation in Kosovo and
10 Metohija, how did it affect the movement of goods and services and of
11 people in Kosovo and Metohija and the functioning of the economy in
13 A. If you are referring to 1998, then it should be noted that in the
14 spring, that is, early that year, the terrorist KLA virtually had control
15 using armed means of a considerable part of the territory of Kosovo and
16 Metohija, a territory which in legal and political terms was an integral
17 part of the Republic of Serbia, and thereby also an integral part of the
18 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In a considerable part of the territory
19 of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, there was no freedom of movement.
20 There was no freedom -- free traffic or circulation of goods and people
21 or any other elements because those parts of the territory were under --
22 were by force of arms under the control of the so-called KLA. This
23 affected the overall atmosphere, the economy, the normal life and work of
24 citizens of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija and, on the other hand, this
25 raised major problems for the authorities of Serbia and the Republic of
1 Yugoslavia, whose obligation it was to ensure the normal traffic, normal
2 functioning of the economy and public services such as the educational
3 and health care systems, public security, freedom of movement of
4 citizens, et cetera. In those days, in a large part of the territory of
5 Serbia, in Kosovo and Metohija there were barricades, check-points, which
6 prevented the normal functioning of social and economic life and which
7 disrupted the unity of authorities.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you please now look at document -- document
9 number 1.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have document D008-5801.
11 MR. STAMP: I'm wondering if we could get the Defence 65 ter
12 number. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. 65 ter it is 1264, document
15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, could you comment on this document and tell us
16 what political issues it deals with.
17 A. Excuse me, which document?
18 Q. Document number 1.
19 A. I see. Thank you. In a -- the situation that I have
20 illustrated, the questions facing the political leadership of Serbia, of
21 which Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part, was how to deal with the
22 problems of Kosovo and Metohija. The strategy of addressing this problem
23 can be understood from the declaration issued by the President of the
24 Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, about the political process in
25 Kosovo and Metohija, and this is the document we have before us. It is
1 clearly stated in that document the public and consistent platform by the
2 Republic of Serbia, of which Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part, for
3 the problems in Kosovo and Metohija to be successfully resolved only if
4 political dialogue were to be accepted without delay and without any
5 previous conditions.
6 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at page 2 in the B/C/S and in
7 English page 2 as well. Please discuss that part of the declaration
8 which concerns international integrations.
9 A. It illustrates what has already been demonstrated, to wit that
10 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as an actor in international relations
11 accepts and commits itself to all the basic documents underpinning the
12 international legal order, first and foremost the UN Charter, the final
13 document of Helsinki, and the values enshrined in the Paris Charter. It
14 reflects a constructive and positive attitude of the Federal Republic of
15 Yugoslavia towards all international organisations, particularly openness
16 and interest for full normal co-operation with the OSCE which presumes
17 the need to have its full membership rights restored in the OSCE, a
18 precondition for which would be a cessation of the suspension of
19 membership rights that had been imposed at the time by the implication of
20 the principle of consensus minus one.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you please discuss the following paragraph
22 about the education and the 3 plus 3 group, if you could expand on that.
23 A. In co-operation with the organisation of St. Egidio headed by
24 Monsignor Palija, a group 3 plus 3 was established to carry out the
25 agreement on the normalisation of education in Kosovo and Metohija, which
1 meant that a single system of education had to be restored and put in
2 place, which means that the parallel separatist educational system had to
4 Q. Did the Albanian representatives take part in this process, did
5 they join this process, and did they do their bit in restoring the
6 educational system of the Republic of Serbia?
7 A. This is a specific issue, where as foreign minister I did not
8 have any direct participation. But I was familiar with the agreement
9 that had been reached on that, and I was briefed on a certain degree of
10 progress in resolving this issue. To wit, at that time, despite the
11 problems in the work in the 3 plus 3 group and despite certain
12 obstructions, an increase in the number of members of the Albanian
13 minority enrolling at the Prishtina University. That increase was
14 significant and this is what I remember.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I move to tender
16 this document.
17 JUDGE PARKER: The declaration of the 18th of March, 1998 will be
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00456.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. If we could please take a look at tab 2 for your benefit,
22 Mr. Jovanovic.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And for the OTP it would be 65 ter
24 966, and in e-court that would be D008-4250.
25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, here we have a request sent by the FRY to be
1 admitted into the Council of Europe. You signed it on the 18th of March,
2 1998. Could you please comment this document from the perspective of the
3 then-policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 A. The main preoccupation, the focus of foreign policy of the
5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the time when I was federal minister
6 of foreign affairs, was to normalise the country's status in terms of
7 membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international
8 organisations. In the ministry that I headed, we saw that as an
9 important, inevitable course that we had to take to take our country out
10 of isolation, out of sanctions, and a course towards the Federal Republic
11 of Yugoslavia's taking responsibilities to help achieve those
12 international organisations' goals.
13 The document that I have before me is an illustration, an example
14 of such policies and such direction that we took to overcome our
15 isolation and to normalise the international standing and position of our
16 country through the normalisation of its membership status. The Federal
17 Republic of Yugoslavia on the 18th of March, 1998, submitted its official
18 request for admission into the Council of Europe. And in this letter
19 that I sent on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of
20 Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, first of
21 all it is stated the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's desire to be
22 admitted into the membership of the Council of Europe --
23 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic. We can see that in the
25 A. If you allow me, but what is evident in this document is that
1 Yugoslavia by that time had ratified two key conventions of the Council
2 of Europe, one on rights of members of ethnic minorities and the other on
3 human rights. The document also demonstrates Yugoslavia's readiness and
4 its capacity to contribute to the goals of the Council of Europe.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
7 tender this document.
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE PARKER: In the B/C/S version it appears there is a page
11 which is in French which has no English translation.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a document
13 from the Milutinovic case. The problem then was the same, and the
14 solution is this: The first page of the document is a memo to the
15 government, and then the rest is the French original of the document
16 because the Council of Europe's official language is French. And it was
17 not translated from one official language of this Court into another
18 official language of this Court. And this is why this document remained
19 in French. If you wish something else to be done then we can discuss it
20 and try to see what we can do and about the Serbian translation as well.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be preferable if you could obtain an
22 English translation as well, and you are hereby authorised to include the
23 English translation into the exhibit when you obtain it. That will be
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00457.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
2 Q. Now I would like to see the 65 ter document 960. That would be
3 tab 3, Mr. Jovanovic. And the -- that would be D008-4223 in the e-court.
4 Mr. Jovanovic, we are about to see a letter. I think that it is
5 the document letter from Federal Government of the FRY to the Federal
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to the 76th Session concerning
7 the initiative by the Yugoslav diplomacy from the 20th of March, 1998. I
8 would like you to explain to us mechanisms of policy-making and what was
9 the -- what were the methods of reporting back and forth between
10 different bodies at the time while you were minister?
11 A. This document is one of many illustrations about how the federal
12 government carried out its role as creator and executor of foreign
13 policy. As a member of the cabinet, minister reports to the government
14 and the government as the body which by constitution is in charge of
15 conducting foreign policy, after such report issues instructions on how
16 to proceed in terms of carrying out foreign policy and what should be
17 done. In this case, the minister briefs the cabinet on what had been
18 accomplished and receives from the cabinet, from the government,
19 instructions on how to proceed further.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document,
23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00458.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now please can we see document
1 D008-5809. That would be 65 ter document 1266.
2 Q. And that would be tab 4, Mr. Jovanovic. It's on the screen.
3 That would be Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs news bulletin dated
4 31st of March, 1998. Could you please comment this document in the light
5 of the third and forth paragraph therein.
6 A. First of all, I would like to say is that this document
7 illustrates the continuity of efforts by constitutional institutions of
8 Serbia to launch the political process of resolving the issues in Kosovo
9 and Metohija. After President Milutinovic's statement and declaration,
10 the government which carries out policies, the Government of Serbia that
11 is, accepts that and makes public their own opinion of the political
12 process which is single and based on dialogue, based on European
13 standards on human and civil rights, and based on a solution which would
14 guarantee equal rights of all communities and citizens of Serbia in
15 Kosovo and Metohija. This document also illustrates how Yugoslav
16 diplomacy was being informed and briefed about those matters because this
17 document was on the 31st of March -- was dispatched to all Yugoslav
18 diplomatic and consular representative offices abroad which numbered more
19 than 100 at the time. And this method of dissemination of information
20 also testifies to the carrying out of single foreign policy when it comes
21 to essential matters of peace, security, and the development of Serbia.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I should like to tender this
24 document, please.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00459.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I should now like to ask you to look at document
4 number 5 in your binder.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And this is Exhibit D1074 -- P, P,
7 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we have before us Resolution 1160 of the
8 Security Council of the United Nations of the 31st of March, 1998.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see the second page,
11 Q. Could you comment, please, on item 2 on page 2.
12 A. In item 2 of the Security Council Resolution 1160 dated the 31st
13 of March, 1998, calls upon the Kosovo Albanian leadership to condemn all
14 terrorist action and that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community
15 should pursue their goals by peaceful means.
16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, are you aware whether terrorism was condemned by
17 the Albanian political parties?
18 A. Yes, I do know that the political leaderships and elements within
19 the Albanian national community in Kosovo and Metohija never carried out
20 this obligation stemming from the Security Council Resolution, not only
21 that provided by this resolution but by many others in which the request
22 for condemnation was repeated several times over.
23 Q. Thank you. Could you now comment on paragraph 5.
24 A. In item 5 the Security Council asserts the principles and
25 proposals of the Contact Group of the 9th and 25th of March, 1998, and
1 asserts the need for a political solution in Kosovo and Metohija with
2 full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
3 Republic of Yugoslavia. Also, it points out that a solution to the
4 Kosovo problems must be in accordance with the OSCE standards with the
5 standards and principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and that any
6 solution in Kosovo and Metohija must respect the principles, these
7 principles, and must take into consideration the right of Albanians and
8 all those living in Kosovo. The final request in that context and which
9 is contained in this item of the Security Council Resolution is that a
10 solution in Kosovo and Metohija must be reflected in an enhanced status
11 of Kosovo within the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
13 Q. Thank you. To the best of your knowledge, was there any direct
14 contact or negotiations between the Government of the Republic of Serbia
15 and Yugoslavia and representatives of the political parties of Kosovo
16 Albanians during 1998?
17 A. It is clear from the previous document that the Government of the
18 Republic of Serbia formed a delegation for negotiations on a peaceful
19 political settlement in Kosovo and Metohija, and that that delegation was
20 headed by the Vice-Premier of the Republic of Serbia, Professor Ratko
21 Markovic. Representatives of those forces in Kosovo and Metohija which
22 upheld separate tendencies refused to accept offers for a political
23 dialogue with the legitimate representatives of the state, that is, with
24 the delegation of the Republic of Serbia.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. We'll look at the next document and
1 discuss this in somewhat greater detail. Could I ask you now to comment
2 on item 8.
3 A. This is a request by the Security Council for an embargo on the
4 import of weapons to the entire territory of the Federal Republic of
5 Yugoslavia, and therefore including Kosovo and Metohija as a part of the
6 Republic of Serbia. This paragraph also calls on member states of the
7 United Nations not to allow from their territories or using their flag
8 vessels and aircraft for the transport of arms and ammunition, military
9 vehicles, equipment, and spare parts, and this is also a call on all
10 members of the United Nations to stop all activities linked to the
11 arming, training, or financing of terrorist activities in this part of
12 Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
13 Q. Thank you. In relation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
14 did the international community observe this request?
15 A. Yes, it did but not in relation to Kosovo and Metohija.
16 Q. Could you explain that a little, please.
17 A. This request of the Security Council for all UN member states to
18 prevent the financing and arming and training of members of the terrorist
19 KLA is repeated in virtually all Security Council Resolutions and in some
20 resolutions the Security Council expresses its regret that this call,
21 that this order, by the Security Council is not being implemented. It is
22 ironic that this request for stopping arming, financing, and training of
23 terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija was not respected even by certain
24 permanent members of the Security Council, who had taken part in making
25 this decision by the Security Council.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you just tell us which countries you're
2 referring to in most cases that did not observe the -- these provisions.
3 A. For instance, Germany. There was an influx of considerable funds
4 from Germany for financing the so-called KLA. The president of the
5 so-called government in exile of Kosovo and Metohija were Bukoshi.
6 Throughout these terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija, he enjoyed
7 the hospitality of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany.
8 He had his own offices in several towns in the Federal Republic of
9 Germany, through which frequently resorting to coercion and threat he
10 collected taxes for what he called the liberation struggle in Kosovo and
11 Metohija. This tax of several percentages was taken from every Albanian
12 living and working in Germany. And even my ministry learnt of cases that
13 this "tax" had to be paid even by Albanians who were receiving social
14 benefits, unemployment benefits, in Germany. Our diplomacy, for
15 instance, filed complaints on several occasions with the Ministry of
16 Germany or we sent a demarche to the German embassy in Belgrade,
17 requesting that the German government undertake appropriate measures to
18 prohibit such illegal collection of funds on its territory, to prohibit
19 the activities of illegal representatives whose aim is to jeopardise the
20 constitutional order of a country which was a traditional partner of
21 Germany's. The reaction was not appropriate.
22 It is also quite well-known that weapons and some sophisticated
23 equipment was obtained in the United States of America, which is a
24 permanent member of the Security Council. There were no bans or efforts
25 to prevent this from happening, even though Yugoslavia and the United
1 States of America had the greatest contributions to achieving the peace
2 agreement in Dayton. Nevertheless, there was a lack of will on the part
3 of the US government to prevent the procurement of weapons and equipment
4 in the United States of America for the needs of the so-called KLA in
5 Kosovo and Metohija. Italy, Switzerland also failed to represent this
6 ban. From Switzerland via Italy light weapons were sent to Kosovo for
7 the terrorist KLA; from Turkey too we had information that weapons were
8 provided. Great Britain, another permanent member of the
9 Security Council, provided instructors for training members of the KLA.
10 Such centres, training centres, were formed in the territory of Albania,
11 in Tropoja and in a number of other places, the names of which I cannot
12 recollect at this moment. The most important transit route for the
13 import of weapons was Albanian, and via Albania the greatest part of the
14 weapons arrived from these and other countries for the needs of the KLA.
15 As for funds, the money was also collected in the United States
16 of America, in Switzerland. Especially after Germany, Switzerland was
17 also a country where considerable funds were collected. There were also
18 certain criminal activities --
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think it's time for
21 the break.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, we will have our first break now. The tapes
23 will be rewound in 30 minutes, so we will resume at 11.05. An officer
24 will assist you during the break, Mr. Jovanovic.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.^ spell checked to
4 JUDGE PARKER: I see you, Mr. Djurdjic, signalling.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, until the witness
6 comes in for the needs of the transcript, the unrevised transcript D454,
7 could it be admitted under seal, please.
8 JUDGE PARKER: There are private sessions in there, are there?
9 Very well, for the moment it will be under seal.
10 [The witness takes the stand]
11 JUDGE PARKER: You're continuing with Mr. Jovanovic,
12 Mr. Djurdjic?
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we were dealing with tab 6 in your binder. I
15 would now like to ask you to move on to page 3 and to look at the end of
16 paragraph 10. And if you could tell us briefly it says:
17 "In this connection, the importance of the entering into force of
18 the prohibitions imposed by this resolution stresses in this context the
19 importance of implementation of the agreement on subregional arms control
20 signed in Florence on the 14th of June, 1996."
21 Could you briefly tell us what this agreement in Florence was
22 about and what its significance is.
23 A. The agreement signed in Florence on the 14th of June, 1996,
24 represents the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Agreement on peace in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This agreement on subregional arms control
1 stipulated the proportions of heavy weapons that the three states of the
2 former SFRY may have possession of, that is the Federal Republic of
3 Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a set of
4 agreements that was signed at the time, and this set of agreements
5 includes a protocol on inspection and supervision of the implementation
6 and observance of the dead-lines and established proportions.
7 Q. Thank you. And in this item the UN Security Council calls on all
8 parties for that agreement to be implemented further?
9 A. Yes, it is important to note is that this agreement on the
10 subregional arms control signed in June 1996, but that the UN
11 Security Council re-affirms it through its resolution 1160 dated the 31st
12 of March, 1998. Therefore, the UN Security Council de facto reminds
13 everybody on the continuity of the validity and the need to implement
14 that Florence Agreement dated 1996.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please take a look at
16 document 65 ter document 1267, e-court D008-5813.
17 Q. And that would be the next tab for you, Mr. Jovanovic.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Madam O'Leary states 65 ter 1267
19 for the benefit of the OTP.
20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we have a statement by the President of the
21 Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovic, ahead of us. It was dated 7th of
22 April, 1998. Could you please comment on paragraph 2 of this statement
23 and what you know about that.
24 A. From the previous document it is evident what the state
25 leadership had invested in terms of efforts to launch the political
1 process of resolving the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, particularly
2 the efforts invested by the President of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic;
3 the Serbian government's efforts; and the support that that process and
4 that those efforts received from the federal level. This statement dated
5 the 7th of April, 1998, issued by President Milutinovic in Pristina is
6 another of those efforts, and it is evident from the paragraph that you
7 mentioned that Kosmet Albanian representatives had not by that point
8 accepted invitations to accede to political dialogue and to adopt
9 political means for resolving the problems; rather, they had imposed
10 conditions to that dialogue, thereby they deferred the process of
11 political solution finding and continued de facto the tensions in Kosovo
12 and Metohija.
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
15 into evidence, please.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00460.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation].
19 Q. If we could please take a look at tab 7 for you, Mr. Jovanovic,
20 961 is the 65 ter number, and Exhibit D008-4226 in e-court. 4226, yes,
21 that's correct. Mr. Jovanovic, we see here a document dated 7th of May,
22 1998. It is information by your ministry to the federal government
23 concerning the opinion of the Contact Groups adopted in Rome on the 29th
24 of April, 1998. Could you please tell us what was the government's
25 assessment concerning the attitudes of the Contact Group in terms of
1 their understanding of the Kosovo problems in connection with paragraph 3
2 of this document.
3 A. The federal government and Yugoslav diplomacy paid primary
4 attention to the statements from the UN Security Council's resolution and
5 conclusions and opinions of the Contact Group. This is another example
6 illustrating that attention on the part of the federal government to the
7 opinions of the Contact Group. In the report that I submitted at that
8 government session, it was stated that the opinions of the Contact Group
9 in connection with Kosovo and Metohija were at least in part biased, that
10 they were not completely objective, where the responsibility for the
11 deferral of political dialogue in Kosovo and Metohija is placed squarely
12 and exclusively on the Serbian, that is, Yugoslav side, overlooking the
13 fact that the representatives of the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo
14 and Metohija had rejected many offers and calls on the part of
15 constitutional institutions and organs of the Republic of Croatia [as
16 interpreted] to launch political dialogue.
17 The government stated that it had been surprised that attention
18 is not being paid to the less-than-constructive attitudes of the
19 representatives of the Albanian ethnic minority, who by rejecting
20 political dialogue were sabotaging in effect the process of trying to
21 find a political solution to the problems.
22 Q. Thank you. I can read about several efforts and initiatives to
23 launch negotiations, to launch political dialogue. Why were they so
24 adamant in rejecting such initiatives and such calls on the part of
25 Albanian leadership?
1 A. I personally believe, and intelligence specific information
2 hinted at that, that representatives of the Albanian ethnic minority did
3 not accept any negotiations on a peaceful political solution because they
4 predicted that that solution would be within the framework of Serbia and
5 the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia when their real
6 goal was secession. So representatives of the Albanian political
7 structures from Kosovo and Metohija were not interested in any solution
8 that would fall short of secession. And that -- and in that work they
9 felt that certain powers that be looked favourably on their efforts,
10 including countries in the Contact Group.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on page 33, line 15,
13 it is stated Republic of Croatia where it should stand Republic of
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to
17 tender this document into evidence.
18 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00461.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Now, please, Mr. Jovanovic, take a look at tab number 8.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] That would be 65 ter 1062, and in
23 e-court that would be document K009-2901. That would be 65 ter of the
24 Prosecution 4014, 4014.
25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, here we have joint statement of the president of
1 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the president of the Russian
2 Federation dated 16th of June, 1998. Please tell us whether you took
3 part in those talks, what was the reason for them, and what was the main
4 point of this joint statement.
5 A. Yes, I did take part in the talks by President Slobodan Milosevic
6 and President Boris Yeltsin on the 16th of June, 1998, in Moscow. That
7 meeting took part at the initiative and on the invitation of Russian
8 Federation's president Mr. Boris Yeltsin took part in the Ekaterina Hall
9 of the Kremlin castle. It's in my opinion an important -- a very
10 important international document, all the more important because this is
11 not a document which ensues from run-of-the-mill bilateral meetings, but
12 is rather a document whereby the president of the Russian Federation,
13 Mr. Boris Yeltsin, worked on it as a member of the Contact Group, meaning
14 that he represented the international community in those talks.
15 Q. Thank you. Could you please offer your comments. The fifth
16 bullet point and the attitude of Yugoslavia in terms of getting an
17 insight in the situation.
18 A. Well, this provides political basis for an acceptance of
19 international civilian presence in Kosovo and Metohija, with a view to
20 getting an insight in the situation on the ground. In practical terms,
21 this document and this paragraph is the basis for the setting up of the
22 KDOM mission, the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission.
23 Q. Thank you. Now, please, the penultimate and the last bullet
24 point, if you could offer your comments on those.
25 A. Since those activities and the presence in the Kosovo and
1 Metohija area are conducted under the wing of the OSCE, Organisation For
2 Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the two presidents stated that the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was ready to start conducting negotiations
4 with the OSCE on the reception of their mission to Kosovo and Metohija
5 and on the restoration of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's membership in
6 that organisation, that is, on the lifting of the suspension which was in
7 force at the time.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to admit this
10 document, please.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00462.
13 MR. STAMP: Before we leave the document, Your Honours, could I
14 just indicate that the English version has a date or the year being 1996.
15 That should be corrected. I think it's a pretty obvious error, but I
16 note it for the record.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now if we could take a look,
19 please, at 65 ter document 1060.
20 Q. That would be tab 9 in your binder and D008-4788 in the e-court.
21 Mr. Jovanovic, before we start working on this document which is dated
22 10th of July, 1998, of the SMIP point in Kosovo and Metohija, I would
23 like to ask you this question. We heard about the efforts invested by
24 Serbian and Yugoslav authorities to use political means to resolve the
25 problems in Kosovo and Metohija, but what was the actual situation on the
1 ground in June and July 1998 in Kosovo and Metohija?
2 A. In Kosovo and Metohija not only did the tensions continue because
3 the political process had been deferred due to the rejection by the
4 representatives of the Albanian ethnic minority of Serbia's initiatives
5 to launch political dialogue, but also in that period terrorist
6 activities had intensified and almost attacks with tragic consequences
7 had become daily occurrence. Those attacks were directed at
8 representatives of the legal institutions or civilians. In our
9 assessment it had become apparent that the tactic being applied on the
10 part of the representatives of political structures of the Albanians was
11 to bide time, to create tensions, and to provoke the international
12 community to get involved and for the matter to be internationally
13 highlighted as broadly as possible. I cannot recall any numerical
14 indicators, but in 1998, in the first half of 1998, there were intensive
15 terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija, very many of them.
16 Q. Thank you. Mr. Jovanovic, we have here according to the records
17 of your office in Pristina the number of members, representatives of
18 various countries in Kosovo and Metohija. My question is: What did the
19 foreign ministry and the Government of Yugoslavia undertake after the
20 statement issued by Yeltsin and the President of FRY, Milosevic, and what
21 were the efforts undertaken by these diplomatic representatives?
22 A. Yugoslav diplomats asserted the Moscow statement as a very
23 significant document which needed to speed up the process of political
24 settlement with the inclusion of international representatives by their
25 presence in Kosovo and Metohija in view of the escalation of terrorist
1 activities on the one hand and the obvious lack of understanding and
2 impartiality in assessing the causes of the problem in Kosovo and
3 Metohija in parts of the international community, the Yugoslav side and
4 the Republic of Serbia wanted Kosovo to be fully open to representatives
5 of other states to gain insight into the situation there. And to that
6 effect, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, very quickly, almost
7 simultaneously with the Moscow declaration, opened three outposts in
8 Kosovo and Metohija, the main purpose of which was to provide logistics
9 support to international diplomatic representatives so that they might
10 effectively gain insight and on that basis develop an objective picture
11 of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. The foreign ministry outposts
12 were opened in Pristina, Gnjilane, or Zanilove [as interpreter] close to
13 Gnjilane, and in Kosovska Mitrovica. I wish to point out that the
14 purpose of these outposts was to provide logistics aid and support to
15 facilitate the work of the mission of foreign diplomatic representatives.
16 Q. Thank you. Line 38 -- page 38, line 12, after the word
17 "Gnjilane," it should say the village of Ranilug next to Gnjilane,
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, could this document
20 be admitted?
21 Q. Yes, I'm sorry, if you haven't finished, please continue.
22 A. Your Honour, I should like to draw your attention that within
23 only 20 days since the agreement in Moscow, there were more than 50
24 foreign diplomatic representatives sent to Kosovo and Metohija from an
25 important number of countries, I think more than ten countries. Out of
1 those 50 diplomatic representatives, more than a third came from the
2 United States of America. And this reflects the responsibility and
3 openness of the Yugoslav side to enabling objective reporting and
4 objective understanding of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could the document be admitted,
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00463.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Could we now go on to tab 10, Mr. Jovanovic. D008-4761 in the
12 e-court and 65 ter 1057, 1057. Mr. Jovanovic, we now have a report of
13 the foreign ministry outpost in Pristina dated the 24th of July, 1998.
14 Could you tell us what this document is about and what it is reporting.
15 Page 2, please.
16 A. This document, Your Honour, contains a list of actual cases of
17 terrorist attacks on various categories of persons in Kosovo and
18 Metohija, representatives of state authorities and official institutions
19 against citizens of Serb ethnicity, citizens of Albanian ethnicity, and
20 citizens of other ethnicities in this multi-ethnic community within the
21 territory of Serbia. This review covered the period from the 1st of
22 January until the 15th of July, and we can see by category and by names
23 of persons how many such terrorist actions and attacks were carried out
24 and what the consequences were of the same.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I should like to
2 tender this document.
3 A. I do apologise if there is any misunderstanding. This is a list
4 which the federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs received from the
5 appropriate bodies of the Republic of Serbia and passed on to the outpost
6 in Pristina in order to inform diplomatic representatives, members of the
7 KDOM mission.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic, for the transcript. Let me indicate
10 the date of this letter. It is the 24th of July, 1998, and now I should
11 like to tender it.
12 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00464
14 [Realtime transcript read in error "D00646"].
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, during the activities of this KDOM mission -- yes,
17 yes, Mr. Stamp?
18 MR. STAMP: If I may, a matter on the record here which I think
19 is important. At line 25 it has a statement here attributed to
20 Mr. Djurdjic, but this is in fact testimony from the witness.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, I think that's so.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
23 JUDGE PARKER: While that's being looked at, I think page 40,
24 line 11 should be 464 rather than 646 as the exhibit number.
25 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour, it should be D464.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we proceed, Your Honour?
2 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I wanted to ask you what was the situation
5 regarding the number of these diplomatic representatives during the
6 summer of 1998 who were members of this KDOM mission?
7 A. The Yugoslav side did not limit in any way the number of foreign
8 diplomatic representatives in Kosovo and Metohija. It is important to
9 note that these were diplomatic representatives of foreign countries who
10 were accredited and who were headquartered in Belgrade, but they were
11 temporarily detached from their embassies, the embassies of their
12 countries, and sent to Kosovo and Metohija in accordance with the
13 Milosevic-Yeltsin Agreement. This number, as it was not limited,
14 increased and it reflected exclusively the interest of other countries in
15 monitoring the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. This number did not in
16 any way depend on the will of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
17 number increased, but I think that it did not reach a very high level.
18 Possibly -- I'm afraid I can't be precise about this, but what is
19 important is that in July, 20 days after the Milosevic-Yeltsin Agreement,
20 there were more than 50 foreign diplomatic representatives in Kosovo and
21 Metohija. There may have been more, but the interest at the time was not
22 greater. It increased later. And the attitude of the Yugoslav side
23 could be seen from the fact that the ministry which I headed sent to
24 Kosovo and Metohija between 20 and 30 diplomats from the ministry for
25 logistic support for the foreign representatives.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us briefly what the -- this KDOM
2 mission in Kosovo and Metohija was designed to do?
3 A. From the standpoint of the interests of the country of which I
4 was the minister, the most important thing for us was that impartial
5 information should be sent from Kosovo and Metohija to centres of
6 decision making. That is the countries which had an influence over the
7 initiation of the process of political settlement. That is why Yugoslav
8 diplomacy and the federal state and the Republic of Serbia was keenly
9 interested in having as many diplomatic representatives of foreign
10 countries there as possible because we believed that this would
11 contribute to a more objective representation of the problems in Kosovo
12 and Metohija, and thereby could initiate and encourage the process of
13 political settlement.
14 Q. Were countries and organisations abroad provided with more
15 objective information by those diplomats in Kosovo and Metohija?
16 A. The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs naturally did not have
17 insight as to how foreign diplomatic representatives informed their
18 embassies in Belgrade and their governments in their capitals from where
19 they had come. Therefore, it remains for us to conclude that the
20 reporting depended on the representatives of each country that had its
21 diplomats in Kosovo and Metohija. Judging by the reactions of a certain
22 number of influential countries, there was no significant improvement in
23 their attitude towards the process of political settlement in Kosovo and
24 Metohija. But judging by the reaction of other also influential
25 countries, there was a positive fact and that is that the dialogue and
1 communications were intensified through the KDOM so that there was an
2 ever-present hope that this would, though slowly, contribute to more --
3 to a more objective representation of Kosovo and Metohija and in the
4 final analysis that this would speed up a political solution.
5 I wish to recall here that in June 1998 for Yugoslavia and Serbia
6 there was an unexpected meeting between a senior representative of the
7 American administration, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, with armed commanders of
8 the terrorist KLA. This happened around the 20th of June, 1998, in the
9 village of Junik. I do not remember many things in detail from that
10 period, but I do remember this particular detail because this meeting
11 between a representative of the representative of the United States and
12 representatives of the KLA we saw as an about turn in American policy,
13 and that meant that a terrorist organisation was being accepted by the
14 United States as a political partner in a dialogue, that a formal and
15 public dialogue was being established between the United States of
16 America, the most influential country in -- globally; and a terrorist
17 organisation. We felt then - and I personally still feel - that this was
18 an enormous mistake by the American administration and that it was
19 harmful not only for the political process in Kosovo and Metohija, but
20 that it was an encouragement that terrorism elsewhere too. Because
21 clearly there can't be any good or bad terrorists. And the 11th of
22 September, 2001, will show how tragic failure to see the link that
23 existed among terrorists throughout the world and the identity of their
24 philosophy and their methods, this will be a declaration of recognition
25 and removal of a terrorist organisation from the list of terrorist
1 organisations to the list of liberation organisation and liberation
3 I mention this fact to illustrate that such moves had an
4 encouraging effect on the intensification of terrorist activities against
5 the state, against Serbia, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
6 against its institutions, against its constitutional and state order.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Now if we could take a look at tab 11
8 in your binder and that would be D008-4749 or 1053, the 65 ter for the
9 Defence [as interpreted].
10 Mr. Jovanovic, we're about to see a press release issued by the
11 information secretariat of AP Kosovo and Metohija dated 28th of July,
12 1998, on talks of the Vice-President of the government, Mr. Nikola
13 Sainovic, and Ambassador Chris Hill. Prompted by this, I would like to
14 ask you whether Serbia and Yugoslavia continued bilateral talks and
15 negotiations with individual countries and international organisations
16 throughout that period in 1998.
17 A. It's absolutely clear that the position of the United States of
18 America determined the further course of action and events in Kosovo and
19 Metohija and that the US of A had the most influence on the conduct of
20 the separatists in Kosovo-Metohija and on the conduct of the exponents of
21 the separatist movement. And for that reason, Yugoslavia paid utmost
22 attention to dialogue with the United States of America, because only
23 through such dialogue could positive breakthrough have been effected.
24 For instance, that meeting with the terrorists in Junik, United States of
25 America continually pressed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and through
1 them the leadership of Serbia to launch political dialogue and political
2 process, but on the other hand, they would take under their wing those
3 with whom Serbia was supposed to enter into dialogue. And the meeting of
4 Mr. Nikola Sainovic, Vice-President of the Federal Republic, with
5 Ambassador Chris Hill was a reflection of such take on the situation and
6 an indicator of Yugoslavia's continued interests in essential dialogue
7 with the United States of America in the hope that the United States of
8 America would influence the separatist movement in Kosovo and Metohija to
9 accept political dialogue.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
12 into evidence, please.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00465.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you stated that in summer of 1998 terrorist
17 activities intensified in Kosovo and Metohija. I would like to ask you
18 with respect to that, what was that intensification, how did it look
19 like, and what measures were undertaken by Republic of Serbia and the
20 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
21 A. As has been stated on several occasions, the intensification of
22 terrorist activities and actions was reflected in more frequent attacks
23 on representatives of state institutions, on representatives of
24 authorities at different levels, particularly terrorism was reflected in
25 ambushes against policemen and other representatives of public services.
1 Another aspect of such intensified activities and the fact that the
2 situation in Kosovo and Metohija was growing more complicated was
3 inability to conduct public traffic and to conduct normal economic
4 cultural life. The circulation in terms of the economy, everyday life,
5 cultural activities was hindered by check-points, by barricades, and a
6 large swathe of Serbia's territory in Kosovo and Metohija came under the
7 control of the terrorist KLA. Yugoslavia and Serbia took two types of
8 activities. The first was to be open towards the international community
9 for it, through its presence, to allow objective understanding of the
10 problems in Kosovo and Metohija and to influence for an early acceptance
11 of the initiatives offered by official institutions to find a political
12 solution. That was a constant which included a proposal for an
13 unconditional launch of political dialogue without delay, with a
14 perspective of a political solution engendering essential autonomy of
15 Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia without impinging on Serbia and
16 Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The second type of
17 activities was aimed at using legitimate means to eliminate the threat of
18 terrorism to resolve the consequences of terrorist conduct and terrorist
19 activities, to prevent their reoccurrence, and thereby to contribute to a
20 normalisation of the economic, social, and other forms of life in Kosovo
21 and Metohija. Those were the two tracks which were concurrent.
22 In both cases, the authorities, the institutions, did nothing to
23 impede the possibility for the international factors and international
24 community to grasp the situation in Kosovo and Metohija.
25 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you this: The measures
1 undertaken in Kosovo and Metohija, were they directed against people who
2 were not engaging in terrorism irrespective of their ethnic background?
3 A. Of course. Serbia's policy and the strategy of Serbia and from
4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to prevent terrorism by means which
5 can be used anywhere in the world to thwart terrorism or the threat of
6 terrorism anywhere in the world, be it terrorism in the Near or Middle
7 East, in Afghanistan or in Corsica or anywhere else. And by the same
8 token, Serbia undertook measures to protect the state from clear evident
9 separatist tendencies and terrorism being used as means to achieve
10 political goals and ends.
11 As has already been stated, apart from several resolutions of the
12 UN Security Council, there have been no other calls on terrorists to
13 cease their terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija. Calls were
14 directed mainly at Serbia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while in
15 the meantime calls by the Security Council to members of the UN were just
16 dead letters on paper.
17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic. Let's please take a look at
18 D160, Exhibit D160. That would be tab 12 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.
19 Let's take a look at page 2, please. Could you please comment, and
20 acting pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, that
21 would be item 7.
22 A. As per paragraph of UN Security Council 1199, UN Security Council
23 requests that all parties, groups, and individuals immediately cease
24 hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo which would enhance the
25 prospects for a meaningful dialogue and the reduction -- and to reduce
1 the risks of human catastrophe.
2 Q. Could you please go back to paragraph 2 on this page, starting
3 with "condemning all acts of violence," could you please comment that
5 A. Here UN Security Council's call is reiterated, in other words,
6 their condemnation was reiterated, condemnation of a practice which had
7 been going for a long time, which had been incontestable by anybody, and
8 that practice boiled down to allowing terrorists, a terrorist KLA, to be
9 armed, funded, and trained. That was a practice which was uncontested
10 and not for the first time the UN Security Council states that as a fact
11 in one of their documents and calls on member states to desist or to make
12 sure that it ceases.
13 Your Honours, I would like to use one example as an illustration
14 on the attitude of certain member states towards this obligation. I
15 would like to cite the example of the United Kingdom. So the United
16 Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Not only did
17 they vote for this UN Security Council Resolution, but were one of the
18 initiators and proponents of it. And, inter alia, this resolution
19 contains a request which could be paraphrased as follows: No member of
20 the UN Security Council or no member of the UN should encourage in any
21 way the conflicts in Kosovo, neither through funding, arming, or
22 training. And when the UK representative voted for this UN Security
23 Resolution 1199, at the same time Mr. Paddy Ashdown visited the camps of
24 the terrorist KLA in Kosovo and Metohija - we have video footage of
25 that - and practically encouraged that terrorist organisation to persist
1 with their commitments. He inspected their weapons. He asked them how
2 did they get those weapons, which route it took, and he said, "Be mindful
3 and be careful so that the other side does not get information that you
4 possess those weapons."
5 Your Honours, I must be serious and honourable here, but I must
6 say that this is political hypocrisy.
7 Q. The Court will hand down their determination. Let's deal with
8 the facts here in your examination. Could we please focus on paragraph
10 A. This is an important position of the Security Council because
11 finally they had accepted the -- Serbia and Yugoslavia's position that
12 meaningful political dialogue should be started without imposition of any
13 conditions with strict dead-lines. That would mean that this represents
14 support, in my opinion and to the best of my knowledge, to the
15 initiatives launched by Serbia, supported by the Federal Republic of
16 Yugoslavia, to launch political dialogue without delay and without
17 preconditions on a peaceful political solution, with due respect being
18 paid to the equal rights of all ethnic minorities and communities and all
19 individuals in Kosovo and Metohija.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Could we move on to page 3, please,
21 and could you tell us briefly under 5(b).
22 A. By decision of the Security Council, the Milosevic-Yeltsin
23 statement of June 1998 is being accepted as a part of the positions of
24 the Security Council. And in this part of the resolution, the agreement
25 between Milosevic and Yeltsin is being re-affirmed. Under (b) it is
1 stated that no repressive actions against the peaceful population may be
2 carried out. I wish to point out that the official policy of Serbia and
3 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the struggle against terrorism and
4 the protection of the civilian population. And I wish to recall the fact
5 that the terrorist KLA in my conviction was not an armed force in the
6 sense of an army; it was a terrorist organisation which here and there
7 had uniformed individuals and groups, but very frequently there were
8 terrorists who carried out terrorist acts wearing civilian clothes. A
9 policy was resolutely against any kind of violence towards the civilian
11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, do you know whether repressive measures were ever
12 undertaken against the peaceful civilian population in Kosovo and
14 A. Though this area is within the terms of reference of other
15 departments, as the minister for foreign affairs, I never had information
16 on use of force against the peaceful civilian population.
17 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like you to look at item (c) regarding the
18 freedom of movement. Does this apply to the period from the beginning of
19 the summer, or is this something new?
20 A. There were never any problems for foreign diplomatic
21 representatives even before the Kosovo Diplomatic Mission was formed to
22 travel and stay in Kosovo and Metohija, to contact any entities, be they
23 state entities or civilian bodies. So this is just a statement which was
24 given I think primarily out of caution and in expectation of a broader
25 international presence in Kosovo and Metohija so that personnel of
1 international organisations and diplomatic missions should be safe, and
2 they were. During my term of office, there wasn't a single case of
3 violence or any serious incident in respect of foreign diplomatic
4 representatives. Yugoslavia fully respected the Vienna Convention on
5 diplomatic immunity for foreign diplomatic representatives.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at page 4 and tell me briefly
7 under item 6, it is pointed out that the leadership of Kosovo Albanians
8 should condemn all terrorist activities. Was this requirement observed
9 by the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians?
10 A. This requirement was never met, and that is not the whole problem
11 because no one undertook any steps or measures on a bilateral level to
12 oblige representatives of the Albanians, both the political
13 representatives and the terrorist wings, to condemn terrorism. The
14 political representatives of the Albanian national minority never
15 condemned publicly the terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, and they were
16 never identified in the Security Council for not observing this
17 obligation. And this was the discrepancy with respect to the treatment
18 of the other side, if I may put it like that.
19 Q. Could you please look briefly at items 7 and 11. Were these
20 prohibitions implemented after this resolution was adopted?
21 A. I'm sorry, you said items 7 and 11?
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. These are calls on the members of the United Nations by the
24 Security Council addressed in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN
25 Charter, according to which member states of the world organisation in
1 accordance with their own legislation should prevent the financing,
2 arming, and training of terrorists. And this obligation was never
3 fulfilled, and except for being repeated from one resolution to the next,
4 there were no practical concrete steps taken to see it implemented. The
5 consequence of this was the continued influx of arms, the accumulation of
6 funds, the most sophisticated electronic and other equipment for military
7 use, and uncontrolled escalation of terrorist attacks.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you inform us regarding the security situation
9 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia at the end of September
10 and beginning of October 1998.
11 A. I've already said that in the summer of 1998 the state launched
12 an anti-terrorist campaign to suppress terrorism and to normalise the
13 social, economic, and other activities in Kosovo and Metohija. At the
14 end of September, 1998, Kosovo again had a system of unified authority
15 throughout the territory, public services were functioning, the local
16 government bodies which had been disenfranchised in the territory held by
17 the terrorist KLA resumed their activities and in many places a local
18 police force was formed from the local inhabitants to keep the law and
19 order so that in that period terrorist activities were halted and social
20 and economic life and in Kosovo and Metohija normalised to a maximum
22 Q. Thank you. Now could you tell us when talking about the
23 authority established at the end of September and beginning of October,
24 which authorities do you mean?
25 A. I'm referring to the official authorities and the authority of
1 local governments which had been prevented from functioning in parts of
2 Kosovo and Metohija that were controlled by the terrorist KLA.
3 Q. Thank you. And are you aware of the response of NATO and its
5 A. The reactions were to criticise Serbia and the Federal Republic
6 of Yugoslavia, accusing them that in resorting to these measures
7 excessive force had been used. I think there was a lack of necessary
8 understanding for a legitimate defence of state institutions and for the
9 establishment of a unified system that would be functional throughout the
10 territory of Serbia. This criticism was also a reflection of the bias on
11 the part of a segment of the international community with respect to the
12 separatist forces and the terrorist organisation in Kosovo and Metohija.
13 Q. Thank you. Was there any danger of an armed conflict or a
14 unilateral attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
15 A. There were threats by NATO representatives addressed at the
16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and if I am not mistaken, at the
17 beginning of October 1999 [as interpreted] NATO adopted an Act. Order in
19 Q. Was this Act. Order a unilateral NATO act, or was it under the
20 auspices of the UN and Security Council?
21 A. This Act. Order was adopted without consultation with the
22 United Nations and without the approval of the Security Council, which is
23 the only body authorised for questions of peace and security in the
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] A small correction, page 53, line
2 14, "October 1998" it should say instead of "1999.
3 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, how did the international political situation
4 develop further at the beginning of October 1998?
5 A. As far as Kosovo and Metohija is concerned, I can say that the
6 terrorist activities were reduced to such an extent that they almost
7 entirely stopped --
8 Q. Excuse me for interrupting. I'm not referring to the situation
9 in Kosovo and Metohija, but I'm talking about the development of the
10 political situation in the direction of dealing with the crisis in Kosovo
11 and Metohija and in the context of this NATO Act. Order.
12 A. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia remained dedicated
13 to their platform of peaceful political settlement and the initiation of
14 a political dialogue without preconditions and without delay. This
15 strategic policy never changed for a moment, regardless of all
16 pressure --
17 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you. I'd like us to see a document,
18 9008-4296 [as interpreted], 65 ter 972-6.
19 Mr. Jovanovic, this is a document of the 5th of October,
20 conclusions of the joint chamber, of the chamber of citizens, and the
21 chamber of republics of the Assembly of the Federal Republic of
23 A. These conclusions of the Federal Assembly of the Federal Republic
24 of Yugoslavia of the 5th of October in essence meant a confirmation of
25 the strategy of a peaceful political settlement which had been adopted by
1 the Republic of Serbia. And the implementation of a unified concept of a
2 peaceful political settlement on the basis of clear principles evident
3 from the documents of the Republic of Serbia were now adopted and
4 reinforced at the level of the federal state, and those principles are:
5 Dialogue, territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia, solutions on
6 autonomy in accordance with international standards and in conformity
7 with the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia, the equality of all
8 national communities and all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted
11 into evidence, please.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00466.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would suggest that
15 we have our technical break now because we will be moving on to a new set
16 of interesting documents, so I think it would be better not to interrupt
18 JUDGE PARKER: [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for His Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: -- Mr. Djurdjic, with a view to resuming just
21 before 1.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. Let's take a look at tab 14, Mr. Jovanovic, and D008-4318 in
2 e-court, and 65 ter of the Defence 976 -- correction, 978 -- 976, 65 ter
3 document 976 -- I apologise, 978, my mistake. Yes, that's the document.
4 Mr. Jovanovic, here we have a document by the federal government
5 dated the 14th of October, 1998, proposed agenda on the draft agreement
6 between the federal government and the OSCE. But before we start working
7 on that document, could you please tell us - that would be tab 14 in your
8 binder - could you please tell us were there any talks preceding the
9 signing of that agreement between you and Mr. Geremek at the political
10 level and who was involved in that?
11 A. Yes, there were talks by the president of the Federal Republic of
12 Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, and representatives of the US
13 administration, Mr. Richard Holbrooke. These talks took place over two
14 or three days, and they ended on the 13th of October, 1998 in Belgrade.
15 During those negotiations, an agreement was reached on the 13th
16 of October labelled in the media as the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement.
17 Q. Thank you. Were you present during those negotiations between
18 Milosevic and Holbrooke?
19 A. I did not take part in those talks because at the same time I
20 took part at the south-east Europe summit at Antalya. A head of the
21 Yugoslav delegation was the president of the federal government, Momir
22 Bulatovic. I was a member of that delegation in my capacity as minister
23 of foreign affairs, and there was some other members of the delegation.
24 So at that time I was not in Belgrade, I was in Antalya.
25 Q. Thank you. You told us that Milosevic and Holbrooke reached that
1 agreement. When you say that, our first association would be a written
2 document. To the best of your knowledge, what was the form of that
4 A. Finesse, I did not say agreement, I said an arrangement. I'm not
5 sure what the term will be in translation. An agreement is a formal,
6 signed document; an arrangement may not be signed document but it can be.
7 It can retain its political character and it can rely on bona fide
8 carrying out on the parts of the parties to the arrangement. I am
9 familiar with the positions that were agreed upon within that arrangement
10 and later on I will testify that the Serbian government accepted those
11 positions. But in my work I did not have occasion to see any signed,
12 formal agreement on those matters. As I said, it was a political
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Let's take this document and in the
15 briefest possible terms as per that agenda could you tell us -- and in
16 keeping with the manner in which foreign policy was conducted -- could
17 you please expound on this document, familiarise us with it.
18 A. So an arrangement had been reached by the president of the
19 federal republic, Mr. Milosevic, and representative of the international
20 community, US envoy, Mr. Richard Holbrooke, on the 13th of October. As I
21 already stated, foreign policy is within the remit of the Federal
22 Republic of Yugoslavia, but other actors within the political system and
23 other institutions take part in creating that foreign policy, in keeping
24 with their constitutional powers. And within that system it was not
25 enough to reach an agreement on matters. It was necessary for the
1 federal government to accept such arrangements or agreements because the
2 federal government was in charge of foreign policy. And here we have an
3 invitation to the members of the federal government and an agenda is
4 attached to it, and we'll later see that that agreement will be later on
5 adopted as the position of the federal government.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please admit this
8 document into evidence.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00467.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Tab number 15 for your benefit, Mr. Jovanovic. That would be
13 D008-4320 in e-court and the 65 ter number 979. Mr. Jovanovic, you're
14 about to be shown a document by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
15 dated 14th October 1998. Could you please comment it briefly.
16 A. This is a coded circular memo issued by the Federal Ministry of
17 Foreign Affairs to Yugoslav diplomatic representative offices abroad,
18 whereby those diplomatic representation offices are notified that they
19 had received en clair federal government's communique on the adoption of
20 the agreement between Yugoslavia and OSCE on the verification mission's
21 establishment in Kosovo and Metohija, and those diplomatic representative
22 offices are hereby instructed to hand over at the appropriate level this
23 communique to the representatives of the countries they are accredited
24 to. There are particular notes for New York mission, Vienna, Strasbourg,
25 and the Geneva mission, depending on the specific tasks of each
1 particular mission as being very important in this case.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into
3 evidence, please.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00468.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Now please could we take a look at Exhibit P835. That will be
8 tab 16 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. But before that I would like to
9 ask you this: Who was your interlocutor, or who was the other party in
10 this agreement and what was their position?
11 A. The agreement on the verification mission of Kosovo and Metohija
12 I signed on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the federal
13 government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; on the part of the OSCE
14 this document was signed by Bronislaw Geremek, the then-foreign minister
15 of Poland and then chair of the OSCE in 1998.
16 Q. Thank you. Let's take a look at Roman numeral I, item 1. Let's
17 hear your comments on that.
18 A. This is a part concerning the establishment of the OSCE Kosovo
19 Verification Mission as a mission of the OSCE. It discusses that in
20 principle mission will be valid for one year, to be extended either at
21 the initiative of the OSCE or at the initiative of the Yugoslav side.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. What is important to note here, as been heard in previous
24 testimony, that before that verification mission we had had the KDOM,
25 Kosovo Diplomatic Missions, and this document discusses that KDOM being
1 upgraded and transformed into the Kosovo Verification Mission. Another
2 important paragraph is item 6 under Roman numeral I, which lays down the
3 obligation of the FRY government to guarantee the safety and security of
4 the Kosovo Verification Mission and all its members.
5 Q. Thank you. To the best of your knowledge, pursuant to item 5 of
6 this document, did the OSCE take over the missions and tasks of the KDOM,
7 and did KDOM end up as part of the verification mission?
8 A. For a while, for a long while, KDOM ran and functioned in
9 parallel with the Kosovo Verification Mission. There were problems in
10 certain degree of slowness in setting up the Kosovo Verification Mission.
11 There were problems which in no way were connected with the Yugoslav side
12 because the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission depended
13 primarily on the goodwill and the readiness of member states to delegate
14 their representatives to the Kosovo Verification Mission. From the
15 establishment until its end, the KVM never surpassed the 1200-member
16 mark, although the agreement envisaged that they number 2.000 and even
17 more if needed.
18 Q. Thank you. Let's try to analyse items 6 and 8.
19 A. As I've already stated, this agreement envisaged that only the
20 Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be to guarantee
21 the security of the mission and all its members. It was not only due to
22 the fact that it was established and envisaged so in this agreement, but
23 also because in item 8 it is stated that the members of the verification
24 mission will enjoy the diplomatic status in terms of the Vienna
25 Convention and it will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by
1 such status, which means that all members of the KVM were guaranteed
2 immunity and entitlements pursuant to the Vienna Convention on diplomatic
3 relations by the federal government.
4 Q. Thank you. Let's take a look at item 1 under Roman numeral II.
5 A. Yes. In this provision it is envisaged that there -- the tasks
6 of the mission was to be to verify whether all parties in Kosovo comply
7 with council -- UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and that the KVM is
8 to report instances of progress to both the OSCE Permanent Council in
9 Vienna and to the United Nations Security Council in New York, but from
10 the viewpoint of the interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
11 where I held the position of federal minister, an important provision was
12 this envisaging the obligation of the KVM to send all reports submitted
13 to the Permanent Council of the OSCE and the United Nations
14 Security Council, to send those at the same time to the federal
15 government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, did the OSCE honour this obligation, and did they
17 send those reports to the Yugoslav authorities?
18 A. Although the mission was slow to be set up, they from the very
19 beginning sent their initial reports to the addressees specified herein,
20 but from its first steps until it withdrew on the 20th of March, 1999,
21 that mission submitted to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no written
22 reports. Simply, they did not honour this reporting obligation as
23 established by the presiding person of the OSCE, Mr. Geremek, by his
24 signature on the agreement that I co-signed.
25 Q. In this period from the establishment of the mission until they
1 left the Federal Republic, did you take steps to obtain these reports and
2 did you send such requests; and if so, to whom?
3 A. Yes, both through the offices in Belgrade where the Kosovo
4 Verification Mission had an office for liaising with the federal
5 government and the foreign ministry, also through the staff of the
6 verification mission in Pristina we did request that we be provided with
7 these reports and we expressed our dissatisfaction because of the failure
8 to comply with the signed obligation. Nevertheless, we never received
9 even any explanation, there could be no justification, nor did we receive
10 a single report from the mission.
11 Q. Thank you. Could you now look at Roman numeral III, special
12 terms of reference, item 1?
13 A. Yes. In this item headed by the words "special terms of
14 reference," it is envisaged that the mission would travel throughout
15 Kosovo to verify whether a cease-fire was being observed, that the
16 mission would investigate reports of cease-fire violations, and that the
17 mission would have freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo and
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. This provision on the freedom of
20 movement and access throughout Kosovo, what did it mean?
21 A. This meant that freedom of movement and access should not be
22 disputed, and in my view, it is quite clear. The verification mission in
23 Kosovo and Metohija was of a civilian nature, and this follows from the
24 agreement. Its security was guaranteed by the Federal Republic of
25 Yugoslavia, and it had freedom of movement, which meant that they could
1 visit any part of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, throughout Kosovo and
2 Metohija and access means that they could go to certain locations,
3 settlements, and that there would be no restrictions or problems with
4 respect to the freedom of movement.
5 Q. Thank you. We have heard during the proceedings here various
6 interpretations of the freedom of movement and access by representatives
7 of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but I'm interested in something else.
8 Did you officially as the government of Yugoslavia or the foreign
9 minister receive any formal protest against any limitation on the freedom
10 of movement and access from members of the verification commission?
11 A. No. The ministry never received a formal protest from the
12 verification mission in Kosovo and Metohija because of any possible
13 violation of this obligation of freedom of movement and access. I know
14 that there were different interpretations of this provision; however,
15 freedom of movement and access should not be confused with inspection.
16 Q. Thank you. I'm interested in something else when dealing with
17 this issue. First of all, who was authorised to interpret the agreement
18 should there be any differences in the implementation?
19 A. Provisions on the right of interpretation were not contained in
20 the agreement itself. In that case, the parties' signatories could
21 interpret the contents of various provisions, but sometimes
22 interpretation is necessary and it is assumed that it would be done bona
23 fide, but an interpretation cannot change the signed provisions.
24 Q. Thank you. But since you and Mr. Geremek as the chairman signed
25 this agreement in this period during the stay of the verification
1 mission, did the two of you ever discuss different interpretations of
2 individual provisions of the agreement?
3 A. I think that what you said is important, the more so as only the
4 signatories by their agreement and through mutual contacts can by
5 agreement provide co-ordinated interpretation of what they signed.
6 There's no one above the signatories who could interpret the contents of
7 these provisions. Throughout the mandate of the verification commission,
8 no protest, no request, no intervention did I receive from Minister
9 Bronislaw Geremek as a signatory.
10 Q. And during the mission stay in Kosovo and Metohija, did you
11 receive any request from the OSCE for a revision of the agreement or a
12 revision of any provisions?
13 A. No. No such requests were addressed in formal terms, in writing,
14 or orally.
15 Q. Thank you. Could you now please look at item 4 and the end of
16 it, the end of that paragraph, regarding the question of border control.
17 Could you say a few words about that.
18 A. This provision envisages that the verification mission at the
19 invitation of bodies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or upon its
20 own request will visit units for border control and accompanying them as
21 they perform their normal border control duties.
22 Q. Thank you. Does this provision envisage the obligation for the
23 verification mission to submit a request to do this; and if there is no
24 such request, that it can do so only upon the invitation of the Federal
25 Republic of Serbia's [as interpreted] authorities?
1 A. Yes, that is true.
2 Q. Would you now look at Roman numeral IV, item 1.
3 A. Yes, this segment defines the composition and facilities.
4 Heading the verification mission is the director, the mission director.
5 It is assumed that he is responsible -- accountable for his work to the
6 chairman of the OSCE. The next item envisages, as I have mentioned, that
7 the mission will consist of 2.000 unarmed verifiers, and as I have
8 already noted this figure was never achieved. The maximum number was
9 about 1200 verifiers. There is here also the possibility envisaged that
10 in addition to these 2.000 verifiers and assistants, the mission may
11 engage experts for various areas. This provision was never referred to
12 because the basic number of 2.000 verifiers was never achieved.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. It says here, 2.000 unarmed verifiers.
14 Could you tell me first, by profession these verifiers, mission members,
15 what were they by profession?
16 A. In the spirit of the agreement and all the arrangements made,
17 this was a civilian mission of a diplomatic nature and enjoying
18 diplomatic treatment and immunity in accordance with the Vienna
19 Convention on diplomatic relations. Therefore, it is clear that it was
20 necessary to observe the civilian and diplomatic character of the
21 mission. However, in view of the difficulty in filling in the required
22 number, in practice the personnel that had previously performed certain
23 duties in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia or elsewhere moved to Kosovo and
24 Metohija as part of this verification mission. I know that within the
25 mission there were many profession soldiers, either active-duty or
1 retired soldiers, military and police experts who were in civilian
2 clothes but there were colonels, generals, and other lower-ranking
3 officers who were members of this diplomatic mission. So there was a
4 certain discrepancy. The Yugoslav side as a signatory of the agreement
5 did not expect this to be transformed partly into a mission of military,
6 police, and other specialists, but that in good faith it would preserve
7 its diplomatic and civilian nature.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you just tell us what was the principal role of
9 this civilian verification mission?
10 A. According to the negotiations and the document signed, this
11 should have been the personification of neutrality and objectivity in
12 reflecting the real situation, the real problems, and the real processes
13 in Kosovo and Metohija.
14 Q. Thank you. And according to Roman III, item 1, I see that it is
15 noted that verification had to be carried out of the observation of
16 cease-fires, that was a specific duty.
17 A. This does not change the civilian and diplomatic character of the
19 Q. Thank you. But in that context I wanted to ask you whether this
20 formulation of the mandate, does it have anything to do with control of
21 armaments and military facilities and equipment?
22 A. I'm not a military expert. For 40 years I have been a
23 professional diplomat, but in my view arms control is the duty of
24 inspection and not of verifiers of cease-fires.
25 Q. Thank you. And since you're signatory of this agreement, was its
1 intention verification and not inspection?
2 A. Precisely so. That is how the agreement is called, on the
3 establishment of a verification mission. There is no grounds for
5 Q. On the basis of your own diplomatic experience, what is the
6 difference between verification and inspection?
7 A. I'm not quite sure that I can be fully qualified to give you the
8 etymology of the words inspection and verification, but when talking
9 about verification in the way it was conceived by the authors of this
10 agreement, it is quite clear what its mandate, what its goals and methods
11 were. As for inspection, in my conviction, inspection is the subject of
12 separate agreements, protocols, and specialist arrangements.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. We shall now look at a document within
14 the framework of this topic. D008-4186 and e-court tab 17 in your
15 binder, Mr. Jovanovic, and 65 ter it is 954.
16 Mr. Jovanovic, we have here an agreement on subregional arms
17 control signed in Florence, and as far as I can remember the Resolution
18 1160 refers to it, which was passed in March. So to come back to this
19 agreement, did it envisage arms control in the territory of the signatory
20 countries, and which were the signatories of this agreement?
21 A. Yes, every agreement of this kind on arms control establishes its
22 own mechanism for implementation and inspection. By this agreement, the
23 proportions of arms were established which Yugoslavia,
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia were allowed to have, and this agreement
25 is accompanied by a separate protocol on inspection. This is a very
1 specific form of activity and mandate that can be entrusted to military
2 experts only.
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Bearing in mind that provision of
4 Resolution 1160, which refers to this agreement and all the countries'
5 signatories of this agreement, was it possible for each of the parties'
6 signatory of this agreement during the term of office of the Kosovo
7 Verification Mission to carry out arms control throughout the territory
8 of the Republic of Yugoslavia?
9 A. Yes, it could on the basis of the Security Council Resolution.
10 Q. But for the transcript will you tell us who the signatories were.
11 A. On the document itself we see Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
12 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
13 Republika Srpska, then as witnesses representatives of France, Germany,
14 the Russian Federation, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States
15 of America; in other words, all members of the Contact Group.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could this document be admitted,
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00469.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now take a look at
22 D008-4325, please. That would be 65 ter document 981.
23 Q. Or tab 18 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. Please, very briefly,
24 could you offer this -- your comments to this document.
25 A. The genesis of the agreement on the arrival of the verification
1 mission was first item, the arrangement between Milosevic and Holbrooke;
2 secondly, consent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the minister
3 of foreign affairs to sign that document; the third stage was the signing
4 of the agreement; and the fourth stage was the delivery of the signed
5 agreement which had become part of the legal system of the Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia to all ministries having specific tasks and
7 obligations to carry it out. This document discusses the delivery of a
8 legal document to departments who have duties to implement it.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: I would like to tender this document.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00470.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now if we could please take a look
14 at D388, Exhibit D388 [as interpreted].
15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this is a decision on the establishment of the
16 federal government's mission for co-operation with the OSCE Kosovo
17 Verification Mission that would be dated 16th of May [as interpreted],
18 1998. Could you please briefly say what's the mandate of this commission
19 and what would be its position within the framework of the federal
21 A. Departing from the fact that the signed agreement envisages for
22 different departments of the federal government to become involved, this
23 document shows that a commission is being established with a basic task
24 to co-ordinate different departments and services within the government
25 on the task of implementing the agreement concluded with the OSCE. So
1 this is a document that is adopted only seven days after the agreement on
2 the verification mission had been signed, which means that this document
3 was adopted practically before the OSCE mission was set up in Kosovo and
5 Let me construe this as an illustration of the federal
6 government's attitude towards an international obligation of it.
7 Q. Thank you. Could they report to and who were they responsible
9 A. To the federal government who established it.
10 Q. Thank you. I see it's 19th of October, 1998, that is the date,
11 and your agreement was signed on the 16th, so it's three days?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Quickly one document, Y009-1917 -- 0907. That would be 1128 on
14 the 65 ter list. And on Prosecution's 65 ter list is 4013.
15 Briefly, Mr. Jovanovic, could you please tell us what is the
16 federal government's decision on the 29th of October, 1998?
17 A. That's a decision is on including two additional members to the
18 federal commission, Loncar and Mr. Jankovic, justice minister of Serbia.
19 Q. Let's go back to the first document. Were you a member of that
21 A. Yes, that was the government's decision.
22 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that it is
24 time for us to adjourn, but I do -- before that move to tender this
25 document into evidence, the last one, and the previous one is Exhibit
1 D388, the one dated 19th. And the supplement is dated 29th of October
2 and --
3 JUDGE PARKER: The supplement will be received.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be D00471.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic. Are you saying that
6 concludes your examination?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] For today, yes, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE PARKER: I know it's time. How much longer should we
9 expect, Mr. Djurdjic?
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't want to be
11 misguiding in my estimates, but what awaits us are documents which can be
12 briefly tendered very fast. I would like to familiarise you with a
13 failure of mine, an omission of mine, and to apologise to Mr. Stamp. I
14 did not react in time and to notify you that our next witness is not
15 going to be Mr. Andric but Mr. Gojovic, Radomir Gojovic, and I believe
16 that I have failed to notify the Bench of that fact. He's the next
18 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
19 I didn't understand clearly what you were saying about the time
20 that you need to complete your examination.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I hope, Your Honour, that another
22 session will be sufficient for me to tender the document -- the remaining
23 documents -- with the testimony.
24 JUDGE PARKER: We must adjourn now for today. We resume tomorrow
25 at 2.15. And if there is any assistance needed by Mr. Jovanovic about
1 arrangements overnight, an officer will be available for that purpose.
2 We adjourn until 2.15 tomorrow.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 26th day of
6 January, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.