1 Tuesday, 26 January 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. We will have the witness, who is
6 being brought into court now.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.
9 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE PARKER: The affirmation you made at the beginning of your
11 evidence to tell the truth still applies of course, and Mr. Djurdjic is
12 now continuing with his questions.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
15 WITNESS: ZIVADIN JOVANOVIC [Resumed]
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 Examination by Mr. Djurdjic: [Continued]
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.
19 A. Good afternoon.
20 Q. Please open tab 21 in your binder. I would like to retrieve
21 D008-4692. That would be 65 ter 1046. This is a note dated 19th of
22 October, 1998 of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Jovanovic,
23 this is a note on a meeting of Mr. Sainovic, deputy federal prime
24 minister, and head of the UN mission for Kosovo and Metohija, Mr. Staffan
25 de Mistura. I would like to ask you to comment paragraph 2 under item 1
1 on page 1.
2 A. Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Sainovic, pointed out to the
3 representative of the United Nations that segment of problems in Kosovo
4 and Metohija which are result of involving civilians into the armed
5 conflict as a result of the pressures exerted by the KLA organisation.
6 Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic pays particular attention to the fact that
7 the armed operations of the KLA which civilians getting involved in those
8 give rise to displaced persons in Kosovo and Metohija in the opinion of
9 Mr. Sainovic, and on the other hand, the Serb civilians are faced with
10 the hostage crises and he also points out and highlights the abduction of
11 a Tanjug reporter.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would move to admit this into
15 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00472.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's see D008-4336.
18 Q. That would be tab 22 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic, and 65 ter
19 document 984. Mr. Jovanovic, could you please briefly comment this
20 document on how our diplomacy acted with respect to the establishment of
21 the KVM.
22 A. This document shows that two days after the signing of the
23 Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement, the OSCE sent to Yugoslavia --
24 Q. Could you please turn to page 2, if I may interrupt. Please do
1 A. And that the management of the OSCE two days after the signing of
2 the Jovanovic-Geremek Agreement sent a technical team to the Federal
3 Republic of Yugoslavia
4 actions in Kosovo and Metohija and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the
5 deployment of the so-called Kosovo Verification Mission. And what is
6 also evident in this official OSCE report, that the technical team of the
7 OSCE was met with full co-operation, understanding of the both federal
8 Yugoslav authorities, the republican Serbian authorities, and the local
9 authorities in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to admit this into
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00473.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4698.
16 Q. That would be tab 23 and 65 ter 1047. This is a note dated 4th
17 of November, 1998 on talks between the Deputy Prime Minister of the
18 federal government, Mr. Sainovic, with the Austrian Ambassador, his
19 excellence Mr. Petritsch held on the 3rd of November, 1998.
20 Mr. Jovanovic, let's take a look at page 2 in English, please,
21 and in Serbian that would be page 1, paragraph 2. It is stated here that
22 Mr. Petritsch broached the issue of the further functioning of the EU's
23 monitoring mission in Yugoslavia
24 you comment -- respond to those requests, and what did the FRY do in
25 respect of this?
1 A. This is a note on the talks of Mr. Nikola Sainovic with the
2 Austrian Ambassador Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch, and it is evident from this
3 note that Sainovic briefed Mr. Petritsch on the creation of preconditions
4 for the return of the displaced persons and to bring the situation back
5 into normal, and he pin-points the need to do more to liberate the
6 kidnapped Yugoslav journalists. With respect to Mr. Petritsch, he mainly
7 agreed with such assessments, and what is important here is that he asked
8 representative of the federal government for the ECMM, the European
9 Commission Monitoring Mission
10 status in Kosovo and Metohija. Otherwise, ECMM had its headquarters in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina in principle.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you know who headed KDOM of the European Union?
13 A. During that period until the withdrawal of the ECMM, the head of
14 that mission in Kosovo and Metohija was a representative of the European
15 Union from Germany
16 Q. Thank you very much.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
18 into evidence, please.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00474.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look, please, at
22 D010-5395. That would be 65 ter document 1791.
23 Q. And, Mr. Jovanovic, that would be tab 24 in your binder.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we've come to a
25 document that we moved to be additionally added to our 65 ter list.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes. Mr. Djurdjic, perhaps you can -- is it going
2 to come up in English?
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that would be the first page
4 in Serbian, and we're about to see page 2 in English. Now we're going
5 back to page 1 in English.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Can you help me, Mr. Djurdjic. This is a
7 correspondence in 2007. How is this relevant in our case and admissible?
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this letter is one
9 that Mr. Hartwig, who used to be head of the KDOM of the European Union
10 in 1998/1999 wrote to the then-Chancellor of the Federal Republic
12 and what he knew about the events in Kosovo and Metohija while he served
13 there as the head of that mission.
14 JUDGE PARKER: I don't see the name of Mr. Hartwig on your list
15 of witnesses. Is it proposed to call him?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hartwig is not on our witness
17 list, but this is a letter which was delivered to Witness Jovanovic, and
18 Witness Jovanovic -- and this is from his personal archives and is
19 familiar with this letter.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Can you -- do you mean delivered to the witness in
21 his capacity as minister? In his capacity -- in what capacity?
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Hartwig and Mr. Jovanovic know
23 each other personally from the time when Mr. Hartwig headed the KDOM of
24 the EU in KiM, and after sending this letter he forwarded the letter to
25 Mr. Jovanovic as can be seen on page 1 of the English version. It is
1 seen here that this letter sent to the chancellor of the Federal Republic
2 of Germany
3 JUDGE PARKER: As we understand it, Mr. Jovanovic had been
4 retired for some time in 2007; is that correct?
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Of course. After the letter was
6 written, this copy was forwarded by Mr. Hartwig to Mr. Jovanovic. So
7 this must have happened after the date of the letter, but it has been
8 forwarded to Mr. Jovanovic.
9 JUDGE PARKER: I come then to my question: How is this
10 admissible, this document? It's a letter not written by a witness. It
11 is a letter sent to the head of state of another country. It is a letter
12 that happens to be written by somebody who sent as a personal gesture a
13 copy of it to the present witness, who was then an ordinary citizen
14 living in retirement. Now, how is the contents of this letter going to
15 be able to inform this Chamber anything about the facts of what occurred
16 relevant to the indictment? It could be very different if Mr. Hartwig
17 were to be a witness. We would certainly mark it for identification then
18 if you saw fit, but if he's not to be called as a witness, what possible
19 use can we make of this document in 2007 about events in 1998?
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the Defence holds
21 that this document was delivered to Mr. Jovanovic by the author of the
22 letter, and we believe that the contents of that letter are relevant for
23 these proceedings. Unfortunately, Mr. Hartwig could not respond
24 positively to the request of the Defence to testify in this trial. We
25 did try, however, to secure him as a witness, and we believe that --
1 well, I don't know whether you are questioning the authenticity of this
2 missive, and as to its contents I do believe that it is relevant for the
3 period when the witness, as an actor in those events, was active. This
4 is our proposal and our submission, and it's up to the Chamber to decide
5 on this matter.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 Mr. Stamp, any submission?
8 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours, may it please you. The
9 Prosecution submits that the letter is inadmissible. I had prepared some
10 written submissions on the jurisprudence of the Tribunal in regard to a
11 document of that nature to support the submission that it is
12 inadmissible, but I think the issue has -- we have addressed the issue in
13 a very direct way. This is a letter dated 2007 in which the person, the
14 maker, relates what he perceived in 1998. It really amounts to a
15 statement about his perceptions eight years before, and it is only
16 admissible if it can satisfy one of the rules or one of the provisions of
17 Rule 92 bis, or Rule 92 ter, or Rule 92 quater for admission of
18 statements made by persons who do not testify. There is nothing before
19 the Court which meets that foundation, and therefore it is not
21 It may well be said that it might be squeezed in, so to speak,
22 under the general provision of Rule 89(C), where the Court may use its
23 discretion to admit any document which is relevant and probative.
24 However, the submission in regard to that is that witness statements, as
25 this document amounts to, falls clearly under Rules 92 bis, ter, and
1 quater. Those rules being less lex specialis.
2 And secondly, to satisfy Rule 89, it would have to be of some
3 probative value, and it is the submission of the Prosecution that a
4 statement of this nature of a witness who is speaking in 2007 about some
5 events in 1999 could have no real probative value as to be admissible
6 under Rule 89(C).
7 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Stamp.
8 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Part of the jurisprudence of this
11 Chamber contradicts Mr. Stamp because we admitted a letter sent by Madam
12 Louise Arbour to President Milutinovic, and Madam Arbour was not a
13 witness in this trial either. This is P1511 in our case.
14 JUDGE PARKER: What was the purpose of the admission of that
15 letter, Mr. Djurdjic?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] What was the purpose, I don't
17 know. I think that this was admitted through a bar table motion, not
18 through a witness. This was something I could find now doing a rush
19 job --
20 JUDGE PARKER: There are a variety of situations in which a
21 letter may become admissible, but what we are dealing with here is a
22 letter, the only relevance of which could be proof of the contents of the
23 letter as representing the situation in 1998 and 1999. It's a letter
24 that was not sent at that time to any official in the Government of
1 the government of another country. And it happens that out of personal
2 relationship, a copy came into the hands of Mr. Jovanovic. That doesn't
3 lend any substance or verification to the truth and reliability of what
4 is set out in the letter by the author of the letter. That's why I
5 checked with you that it's not proposed by you to call as a witness the
6 author of the letter. In the absence of that, I do not see how this
7 document could properly be admitted into evidence in this trial.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, had we been able to
9 secure the presence of the witness we wanted to bring here very much
10 Mr. Hartwig, then yes we would have tendered this letter into evidence
11 through him, but due to his health condition, he was unable to come and
12 testify for Defence. And given all the circumstances that you just
13 enumerated, it is our position that you will be able best to assess the
14 value of this -- probative value of this letter.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE PARKER: In the view of the Chamber, Mr. Djurdjic, the
18 document, the letter, in 2007 is not admissible on any present basis for
19 the purposes of this trial.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4364.
21 Q. Tab 25, Mr. Jovanovic, for you. This is 991 Defence 65 ter
22 document. Mr. Jovanovic, this is a report from a check-point dated 13th
23 of November, 1998, outpost of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see the second page of
25 this document.
1 Q. Could you please give us your comment -- but it seems that I have
2 made a mistake. It should be page 2 in the English. Could you comment
3 on item 3.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see item 3 from the
5 beginning, please.
6 Q. Yes, please go ahead.
7 A. In item 3 they discuss the statement of the OSCE chairman,
8 Mr. Geremek, who stated that he was concerned for further developments in
9 Kosovo and Metohija and also estimated that March 1999 would be decisive
10 for Kosovo and Metohija. And following that, you see the reaction of the
11 Italian Ambassador, Mr. Sessa, who says that he did not understand such a
12 statement of Mr. Geremek because one needed to look at the situation as
13 it was without going into what was going to happen in March. This
14 statement by Geremek could probably be dated to the first half of
15 November when he said that March would be a crucial month for the
16 situation in Kosovo and Metohija.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
19 evidence, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00475.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4368, 65 ter
24 Q. Tab 26 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.
25 A. Yes. This is written communication between the outpost of the
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pristina and the headquarters in Belgrade
2 dated the 14th of November, 1998. In this letter they convey the request
3 of the head of the KVM, Mr. Walker, to meet with the president of FRY on
4 the 15th of November at 1500 hours in Belgrade. So this request is from
5 the 14th, and the request was for Walker
6 Milosevic on the 15th at 1500 hours.
7 Q. Thank you. It would be interesting to have you explain to us who
8 was the counterpart of Mr. Walker in him discharging his duties in Kosovo
9 and Metohija. Who was his counterpart on the Yugoslav side and then who
10 was his superior within the OSCE framework?
11 A. From the point of view of normal, regular, diplomatic framework,
12 Mr. Walker would communicate in Kosovo and Metohija with the head of the
13 outpost of the foreign affairs ministry in Pristina and also high state
14 officials who were located in Kosovo and Metohija. As for Belgrade
15 accordance with the regular diplomatic practice, he would normally meet
16 with the assistant minister of foreign affairs in charge of multi-lateral
17 relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And as for
18 Mr. Walker's superior, that was the chairman of the OSCE at the time
19 foreign affairs of -- minister of Poland, Mr. Geremek.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
22 evidence, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00476.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4380, which is 996 on the
1 Defence 65 ter list.
2 Q. Your tab 27, Mr. Jovanovic. Briefly, please, can you tell me
3 what steps were taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- just a
4 moment, please. This is a note from the foreign affairs outpost in
5 Kosovo and Metohija dated the 18th of November.
6 A. In this note we can see what was done by the Government of the
7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to facilitate the work of the
8 OSCE mission in Kosovo and Metohija and make it more efficient. You can
9 see what elements of the government were involved in this effort to have
10 the OSCE mission deployed as soon as possible and in order to have it
11 operational as soon as possible. Let me just add that Ambassador Zoran
12 Veljic who was in charge of these talks was prior to that and also later
13 head of protocol within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the federal
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into
17 evidence, please.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00477.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-4372, please, 1048 on the 65
21 ter Defence list.
22 Q. Your tab 28, Mr. Jovanovic. This is a note from the Ministry of
23 Foreign Affairs from the 20th of November, 1998, and it deals with the
24 talks between Mr. Sainovic and Bo Pellnas, head of the OSCE office in
1 A. Mr. Bo Pellnas was head of the OSCE liaison office with the
2 government and authorities of Yugoslavia
3 the absence of Ambassador Walker, head of the KVM, Mr. Sainovic lodged a
4 protest with Mr. Pellnas in relation to the latest developments in Kosovo
5 and Metohija, and he asked him to convey that protest to the leadership
6 of OSCE in Vienna
7 situation, giving the reasons for lodging the protest, and the reasons
8 were the killings and kidnapping of civilians of Albanian and Serbian
9 ethnicity as well as constant attacks on policemen, which clearly
10 represented huge losses and also endangered the political process.
11 Sainovic also pointed out that a false balance was being
12 established in various violations of accepted agreements and that law
13 enforcement officials, state officials, were treated in the same way as
14 terrorists who were attacking the state and its organs.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into
17 evidence as well.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00478.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D1234, please,
21 which is 504 on the 65 ter list of the Prosecution.
22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this is tab 29 in your binder.
23 A. This is official informative note of the foreign affairs outpost
24 in Pristina on the talks between William Walker and the Army of
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. This is quite a long document, so I
2 will just ask for certain parts of it. Page 3 in English and page 2 in
3 the Serbian version. Page 2, paragraph 2, somewhere in the middle.
4 Could you please comment this portion.
5 A. Loncar gave a proposal to Ambassador Walker as the head of the
6 KVM mission to step-up verifications in the Pec, Pristina, Prizren,
7 Podujevo, and some other places where there is an increased delivery of
8 weapons from Albania
9 observed. He further points out that the terrorists in Kosovo and
10 Metohija receive from abroad, mostly from Albania, standard weaponry plus
11 some modern weaponry including rocket-launchers, black arrows, and
12 similar systems. He further warns that such weapons delivery goes
13 against the goals and objectives to which the Government of Yugoslavia
14 and OSCE were committed. This is why it was in the joint interest to put
15 an end to such activities, to put an end to further supply of weapons and
16 other encouragement of terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija which was in
17 accordance with the requests of the Security Council of the UN.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 4 in the
19 English and page 3 in the Serbian version.
20 Q. Under item 2, Mr. Kotur says something. Could you comment on
21 this, please.
22 A. Mr. Kotur emphasized that co-operation with the KVM is ongoing
23 and should be developing in accordance with the signed agreement on the
24 establishment and the terms of reference of the KVM and that the Yugoslav
25 side remains committed to consistent application of the signed agreement,
1 nothing more or nothing less of what had been agreed upon.
2 Q. Thank you. Were there any requests at that time, and you may
3 know of such on the part of the KVM, which surpassed the agreement or
4 what was regulated by the agreement?
5 A. Yes, there was such requests. I remember quite well that the
6 bulk of the energy and the time was spent working on requests to enable
7 the KVM to use their own aircraft, more specifically helicopters, and to
8 allow the use, or rather, carrying of weapons for the security detail of
9 the head of the mission in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] We are going to come to some
12 documents which deal with that, but in the meantime I would like to
13 tender this into evidence, please.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00479.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let's take a look at
17 document 65 ter 1236. That would be 507 on the Prosecution's 65 ter
19 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this is a report dated 25th of December, 1998,
20 coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs's outpost in Pristina
21 concerning Mr. Sainovic's talks with Mr. Walker, head of the KVM. Let's
22 see page 2 of the English version, please, and that would be page 1 on
23 the Serbian. Please take a look at the segment just below the mid-point
24 line discussing that he was -- he expressed regret about the
25 co-operation, et cetera.
1 A. As I already stated, quite a number of meetings, quite a lot of
2 energy and time were expended to meet the requests of the KVM which
3 surpassed the framework of the agreement, and this document demonstrates
4 that Mr. Nikola Sainovic expressed his regrets to Ambassador William
6 and Serbian institutions was undergoing in the light and under the
7 pressure on the basis of such unjustifiable requests such as the requests
8 to use helicopters and to bear arms on the part of OSCE personnel.
9 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
11 into evidence, please.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be D00480.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's please see D004-0145.
15 That would be 65 ter 1229 on the Defence list.
16 Q. That would be tab 31 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. This is an
17 outpost report on talks of deputy Federal Prime Minister, Mr. Sainovic,
18 with the Deputy Head of Mission
19 took place on the 6th of January, 1999, and the report is dated the 7th
20 January 1999.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's please move to page 3 in
22 English and page 2 in Serbian.
23 Q. You see the beginning under the dash on the second page, the
24 first sentence, could you please comment on the state of affairs during
25 that period in Kosovo and Metohija at the time of these talks.
1 A. Mr. Sainovic informed French ambassador, Mr. Keller, deputy head
2 of the KVM, on the detrimental effects to the general climate which were
3 result of an explosive device being thrown at a cafe in Pristina, which
4 resulted in deaths of several young men, Serbs. He demanded that the
5 OSCE react more promptly and energetically, first and foremost in terms
6 of them being faster to respond and to arrive to the crime scene whenever
7 crimes were perpetrated against Serbian civilians or representatives of
8 Serb authorities there.
9 Furthermore, Mr. Sainovic highlighted the amassment of weapons
10 and the fact that such weaponry is being modernised in the area of
11 Podujevo, which is close to Albania
12 such as the area of Pec and the area of Pristina, there were -- there was
13 unrest there and that the consequences of weapons being amassed are that
14 regular citizens are being more and more upset about the situation,
15 uneasy, and that the conditions for political dialogues were being
17 Q. Let's going to Serbian page 3 and English page 4. Under item 2
18 you can see what Mr. Keller said. I would like to hear what you know
19 about that, and if you could offer your comments. That would be sentence
20 number three in that paragraph. The sentence is:
21 "He confirmed that the departure of Serbs ..." et cetera.
22 A. As a consequence of more frequent terrorist actions, such as the
23 placement of explosive devices in cafes, in other public places, there is
24 more and more Serb civilians in Kosovo and Metohija who leave their
25 settlements, and Mr. Keller characterised that as ethnic cleansing of the
1 Serbs, and he was deputy head of the KVM.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Defence counsel, please.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into
6 Now let's take a look at D008 --
7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00481.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4547.
10 That would be Defence 65 ter document 1014.
11 Q. And tab 32 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. Could you please
12 explain what this document represents in terms of the functioning of your
14 A. Each visit of Yugoslav representatives abroad or to international
15 organisations could have been effected only after the federal government
16 or other institutions had adopted a platform for the Yugoslav
17 delegation's work abroad. So -- and each such visit would be documented
18 in the form of a note or a report on the talks held by the Yugoslav
19 delegation with representatives of international organisations or foreign
20 states. This is an information on the talks of the federal government's
21 representatives with the European Commission officials and Belgian
22 representatives. And this is just one of the activities of the foreign
23 affairs ministry and the federal government and the conclusions of such
24 and results of such meetings.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into
2 evidence, please.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00482.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look at, please,
6 D008-4495. That would be 1007 on the 65 ter list.
7 Q. This is a report on the visit of Sadako Ogata high Commissioner
8 for Refugees of the UN. And that is dated, if we -- this is dated 6th of
9 January, 1999. Let's take a look at page number 2 in English and page
10 number 3 in Serbian. Just a second, please. Please focus on item 2 --
11 no, that's in English, page 2, that's okay.
12 Item 2, Mr. Jovanovic, could you offer your comments, please, on
13 that paragraph.
14 A. What is evidence -- evident from this report on Madam Sadako
15 Ogata's meeting is that Serbia
16 $150 million US to relieve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo and
17 Metohija, and that an additional 87 villages inhabited by both Serbs and
18 others had been ethnically cleansed of Serbs, and those 87 villages had
19 become exclusively Albanian. It is also said that openness of Yugoslavia
20 and Serbia
21 at least reduce or put an end to terrorist attacks --
22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, that would be page -- next page in your binder in
23 the Serbian version. What I'm referring to are pages in the e-court.
24 A. Madam Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, among others,
25 visited Pec, Dragobilje, and Prizren. What is being stated is that the
1 number of internally displaced persons had dropped significantly, that
2 there was no humanitarian catastrophe. She pointed out that she had no
3 objection with respect to the freedom and security of movement of the
5 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
7 into evidence, please.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00483.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we've seen several documents making reference to
12 requests of the KVM to use helicopters and to carry personal weapons or
13 side-arms. Was that in keeping with the agreement that you signed with
14 Ambassador Mr. Geremek?
15 A. That fell outside the scope of the agreement. The use of
16 aircraft in the territory of any sovereign state is regulated exclusively
17 by an express bilateral agreement or by provisions on that of some other
18 agreements in terms of security aspects, et cetera. With respect to the
19 side-arms, that also fell outside the scope of the agreement because the
20 OSCE's mission was civilian and there was an express provision that -- to
21 the effect that the federal government of Yugoslavia would be providing
22 security and guaranteeing the security and safety of the verifying
23 officers in its territory. Let us add that the federal government, since
24 it was feeling constant pressure on the issue of the helicopters, offered
25 to Mr. Walker Yugoslav civilian or other helicopters and Yugoslav airmen
1 to be available 24/7 to Mr. Walker or to mission personnel for the
2 purposes of verification. But despite repeated offers by the Yugoslav
3 side, Mr. Walker, Mr. Drewienkiewicz, and others kept on insisting on
4 using their own helicopters and using their side-arms.
5 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic. Who was authorised within
6 the OSCE to request amendments to the agreement that was reached?
7 A. Only one of the signatories was authorised to do that in
8 accordance with their internal procedures. So only OSCE or Yugoslavia
9 could have done it in accordance with their internal regulations.
10 Q. Did OSCE ever launch such an initiative to amend the agreement?
11 A. No, it was never done, either in writing or verbally such
12 initiative was never launched.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-43 -- 4203.
15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this is the foreign affairs ministry note dated
16 the 5th of January, 1999, on the talks between Sainovic and Austrian
17 President Heinz Fischer and minister of foreign affairs, Wolfgang
18 Schussel. These talks were held in Vienna
19 On the first page of this document, what do they say, what was the
20 situation like? This is at the end of the page in the English.
21 A. The assessment of the Government of Yugoslavia at the time was
22 that the leadership of Kosovo Albanians did not accept political dialogue
23 and that it wasn't just their position, as it seemed at first glance, but
24 also that their position of refusing political dialogue was also
25 something that was effected and that came into being under the influence
1 of international political factors. In order to stabilise this and to
2 facilitate political dialogue, Yugoslavia through bilateral contact
3 attempted to secure a support from other European, American, and
4 international partners for political dialogue. This is one of the visits
5 illustrating this effort on the part of Yugoslavia to win support of
6 important countries and important partners in order to exert some
7 pressure on Albanian leadership, to accept political dialogue as the only
8 avenue for reaching a political solution.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, could we, please, turn to the last page in your
10 version, which is page 3 in the English version. And could you now,
11 please, comment on this portion where Mr. Schussel says that on behalf of
12 the EU he promises to do everything to bring to negotiations the Albanian
13 side. So please tell us, what was the situation like when it comes to
14 involving the Albanian side in negotiations, and what did Serbia do in
15 order to secure their presence in order to reach a political settlement?
16 A. Representatives of Kosovo Albanians practically sabotaged all
17 efforts on the part of the Government of Serbia and Government of
19 without any further delay. The assessment was that Kosovo Albanians and
20 their representatives were not interested in a compromise or in a
21 political settlement that would be in accordance with the positions of
22 the Security Council of the UN on sovereignty and territorial integrity
23 of Yugoslavia
24 Metohija. They simply accepted the tactics of delay, the tactics of
25 rejecting dialogue, awaiting a moment when somebody would bring them
1 their statehood on a plate, if I may say so. This is a meeting, this is
2 a dialogue, in which Austria
3 influential member of the European Union, undertook a certain kind of a
4 diplomatic obligation to ensure the presence of Albanians at
5 negotiations, to convince Albanians that it was in their interest to
6 accept these urgent negotiations.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to have this admitted into
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00484.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we see D008-4524, which is
13 1229 on Defence 65 ter list.
14 Q. This is tab 36 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. We're interested
15 in chronology. This is the basic position for the talks held by the
16 federal government.
17 A. What position and what initiative will be put forward by the
18 representatives of the Yugoslavia
19 of other countries and of international organisations was not a personal
20 matter for them to decide upon personally, no. These issues were
21 determined by the federal government, and their -- its representatives
22 are duty-bound to use it in their contacts with representatives of
23 foreign government in order to achieve the goals set by the government.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this into evidence as
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00485.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4711, 1050
5 on our 65 ter list.
6 Q. Which is your tab 35, Mr. Jovanovic. Briefly, please, this
7 document is from the 21st of January. This is a letter sent by the
8 federal government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You mentioned
9 this in passing just now. This is binder 35, please -- tab 35 in your
11 A. This is a conclusion of the federal government which accepted the
12 platform and the programme for the visit of a delegation headed by
13 Sainovic to Sweden
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into
16 evidence, please.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00486.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D228, please.
20 Q. 37 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic.
21 A. This is a protest note of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
22 sent to the OSCE mission in Kosovo and Metohija due to an incident at a
23 border crossing caused by the OSCE representatives --
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. We can read that. I'm interested in
25 this: So this was a protest that was formally lodged in writing. Have
1 you ever received any protest from KVM or OSCE in relation to the
2 agreement on verification during their stay in Kosovo and Metohija?
3 A. No, we never received such protest.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I would now like to move to a different topic, namely,
9 Rambouillet negotiations. Mr. Jovanovic --
10 JUDGE PARKER: Are you tendering this last document?
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's already in
12 evidence in our case, D228.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Microphone not activated]
15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for counsel.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, did you personally participate in Rambouillet
18 negotiations, Mr. Jovanovic?
19 A. No. At the time I was not in Rambouillet, and incidentally there
20 were no negotiations held there anyway.
21 Q. Thank you. Tell us, please, how was the delegation of the FRY
22 and Serbia
23 A. It was a joint Yugoslav-Serbian delegation that was set up by the
24 Government of Serbia
25 Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia
1 delegation comprised officials mostly from Serbian authorities. As for
2 the representatives of the federal government, there were two deputy
3 prime ministers of the federal government, Professor Kutlesic and
4 Professor Sainovic.
5 Q. Thank you. Mr. Jovanovic, can you tell us, please, do you know
6 what were -- what was the mandate of our delegation?
7 A. This Yugoslav-Serbian delegation had a mandate to negotiate
8 directly with the representatives of the Albanian national minority in
9 order to achieve a compromise, a political and peaceful settlement which
10 would be based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the
11 agreement, final act of the OSCE, and which would be based on the right
12 to equality of all ethnic communities and all citizens in Kosovo and
13 Metohija. These solutions were to represent the broadest autonomy of
14 Kosovo within the framework of Serbia
15 sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please see D008-2666.
17 Q. Which is tab 38 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. This is a
18 statement of our delegation. This is D004-2666. So this is a statement
19 of our delegation from the 11th of February, 1999. I'm interested in
20 paragraph 1, where it says:
21 "The delegation accepts the following general elements set by the
22 Contact Group ..."
23 Tell me, please, were these ten principles of the Contact Group
24 negotiable, could they negotiate on it?
25 A. No, this was not negotiable. The Serbian and Yugoslav delegation
1 faced a boycott of the negotiations in Rambouillet. These negotiations
2 simply failed to commence, and in order to jump-start negotiations and to
3 make a breakthrough in the stalemate, our delegation proposed that the
4 two delegations signed to these basic principles set by the Contact Group
5 and to use this as a basis to commence negotiations in order to implement
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have this admitted into
9 evidence, please.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00487.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you told us that you did not personally
14 participate in these negotiations. Could you tell me what was the role
15 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in organising these negotiations and
16 implementing them. Briefly, please.
17 A. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided technical and
18 administrative logistics for negotiations, but as I have mentioned to you
19 they were no negotiations because there were no direct dialogues between
20 the two relevant delegations. There are some perceptions present that an
21 agreement was reached in Rambouillet. An agreement presupposes some sort
22 of an accord between the two sides. There was no accord, which means
23 there was no agreement.
24 Q. Thank you. We will have some further documents to look at and to
25 comment upon, but please tell me this: In this mediation that took
1 place, was there any effort to link up political agreement and
2 implementation with the bringing in of foreign troops in the territory of
4 and reached an agreement on?
5 A. When it comes to events in Rambouillet, this was a very peculiar
6 form of shuttle diplomacy under one roof. The two delegations that came
7 to negotiate there did not in fact negotiate; rather, the so-called
8 international negotiators, Mr. Chris Hill, US ambassador; Mr. Petritsch,
9 the Austrian ambassador; and a representative of the European Union; as
10 well as Mr. Mayorski, the Russian Federation ambassador, served as
11 mediators or facilitators between the two delegations staying in the same
12 palace. There was no possibility of a breakthrough there of achieving
13 some progress because the two delegations never actually met. However,
14 the tactics of the two out of three international negotiators was to
15 distribute the text of the so-called agreement to the Serbian delegation,
16 to feed it to them in small doses, to spoon-feed it to them. So the
17 Serbian delegation, in fact, never received the entire proposal or the
18 entire draft agreement, so-called agreement. No. It was given to them
19 in small doses, bit by bit. What was particularly peculiar was that the
20 two international negotiators practically concealed, until the very end,
21 their texts which pertained to the military presence and the military
22 components of international forces in Kosovo and Metohija, or rather, in
23 the territory of entire Yugoslavia
24 Q. Yes, we will come to that.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's now take a look at
1 D008-4567. That would be 1018 on our 65 ter list.
2 Q. Briefly, Mr. Jovanovic, that would be tab 39. Let's not waste
3 time. Please tell us, is this usual method of reporting, and it concerns
4 report on the visit of Greek minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Pangalos on
5 the 10th and 11th [as interpreted] of February, 1999?
6 A. Yes, this is the usual way of briefing the government on the
7 results of each international visit received.
8 Q. Thank you very much.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
10 evidence, please.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00488.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Now let's take a look at
14 D008-4589. That would be 1020 on our 65 ter list.
15 Q. Tab 40, Mr. Jovanovic.
16 These are positions of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
17 submitted to the president of the federal government, Momir Bulatovic on
18 the 19th of February, 1999. Could you please tell us the reasons for
19 drafting those positions and to explain those positions briefly, why they
20 were adopted and how?
21 A. In mid-February 1999, public speculation abounded on military
22 presence by NATO forces in the territory of the Federal Republic
24 accords from Rambouillet were being published in daily newspapers in
25 Albanian in Kosovo and Metohija. And those texts contained solutions or
1 proposals for a military presence of NATO in the territory of Yugoslavia
2 To curb such speculations and to explain the position of Yugoslavia
3 against the deployment of NATO forces throughout its territory, the
4 Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted those positions and the
5 federal government adopted them.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this into
8 evidence, please.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00489.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's please take a look at
12 document 1280 on our 65 ter list and that would be 4001 on Prosecution's
13 65 ter list.
14 Q. And that would be tab 41 in your binder. Mr. Jovanovic, please
15 explain what this document is, and this is a letter dated the 5th of
16 March, 1999, by the President of Serbia, Milutinovic, and the Deputy
17 Prime Minister Markovic. I would like you to comment paragraph 3 which
18 starts with the words "unfortunately," with respect to those alleged
20 A. As has been noted the head of the Serbian and Yugoslav delegation
21 was Professor Ratko Markovic, vice-president of the Serbian government,
22 but during the delegation's stay at Rambouillet, if I remember correctly,
23 President of Serbia
24 two or three occasions. After such a visit, after an assessment had been
25 made that the Albanian side influenced or in concert with certain
1 influential countries is sabotaging talks at Rambouillet, President of
2 the Republic of Serbia
3 foreign affairs of the Contact Group of such things in writing, first and
4 foremost he addressed the three -- the troika which managed the
5 negotiations, which would be ministers of foreign affairs of the US, the
7 Mr. Milutinovic, sent to those ministers warning them that the Albanian
8 side was spreading news and speculations, rumours, that the agreement had
9 been reached and that was about to be signed in the shortest possible
11 Paragraph 3 on page 1 confirms that chapters 2, 5, and 7
12 regulating the military component and military presence of NATO in the
13 territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been hidden away and not
14 disclosed and that the tactics at play boiled down to public pressure
15 being exerted against the Serbian side to accept those chapters which it
16 had not been informed upon at all.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
19 into evidence.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00490.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's take a look at D008-4593.
23 That would be 1021 on our 65 ter list.
24 Q. That would be tab 42 in your binder. This would be a report on
25 your talks with Mr. Joschka Fischer, German foreign affairs minister,
1 submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the federal government,
2 talks were conducted on the 8th of March, 1999, in Germany. Please turn
3 to page 3, Mr. Jovanovic, of that agreement. That would be page 7 in
4 e-court. Please comment this paragraph:
5 "On behalf of the EU and the Contact Group," that would be
6 paragraph 1 on the top of the page.
7 A. European Union and the Contact Group through an influential
8 member, which Federal Republic of Germany was, confirmed that they were
9 continually committed to peace in Kosovo, but also for Kosovo and
10 Metohija to remain within the boundaries of the Federal Republic
12 opinion that the military presence was necessary. I personally and my
13 side on that occasion handed over a written aide-memoire, it was a
14 document, that I handed over to Mr. Joschka Fischer, foreign minister of
15 the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled The Activities of Separatists
16 and Terrorists From Within the Territory of the Federal Republic
18 activities which were illegal activities, launched from the territory of
20 Kosovo and Metohija through the funding, arming, and training of the
21 so-called KLA.
22 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jovanovic.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I move to tender this document
24 into evidence, please.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00491.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I see that we are past the time
4 for our break. I have -- I need five minutes to admit two documents
5 after the break.
6 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the break and you can be sure that
7 you have not overlooked anything, and we will finish in the few minutes
8 after we resume. Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic. We resume at a quarter past
10 [The witness stands down]
11 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 4.18 p.m.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before the witness
15 comes in, may I avail myself of this opportunity to say this. You
16 instructed us yesterday to have this document MFI'd from French into
17 English. We've done that. We've requested a translation, and we've
18 repeatedly received an answer that there is no translation from one
19 official language of this Court to another official language of this
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If the Chamber wishes to do so,
23 the Defence will take it upon themselves to have the document translated.
24 It would be no problem for us, an authorised translation, not a draft
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE PARKER: We will not step on the corns of authority,
3 Mr. Djurdjic. We will read the document for ourselves in French. Thank
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. There is
6 a pot of money available to us, and we can make use of it to fund this
7 translation into English. That would be no problem.
8 JUDGE PARKER: No, don't bother. Keep the pot of money for more
9 useful purposes.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Let's take a look at document D008-4612. That would be 1022 on
12 the Defence 65 ter list.
13 Q. And tab 43 in your binder, Mr. Jovanovic. These are minutes of
14 the 52nd meeting of the federal government, dated the 19th of March,
15 1999, and it is evident from the minutes that you attended that meeting
16 and makes reference to an information that you provided on the talks
17 about the Kosovo and Metohija situation at Rambouillet, Paris. So please
18 briefly tell us something about your report and what was the main point
20 A. The gist of that report which I submitted to the federal
21 government is that the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation departed for
22 Rambouillet and Paris to achieve a peaceful political solution for Kosovo
23 and Metohija, but that the negotiations or, in other words, the meetings
24 or activities were discontinued against the wish of the Serbian and
25 Yugoslav delegation. Here in my report what is laid down are an
1 understanding of the reasons why no negotiations practically took -- had
2 taken place in Rambouillet, and there is a section of the report on the
3 withdrawal of the KVM from the territory of Kosovo
4 important assessment is contained therein to the effect that the end of
5 the meetings at Rambouillet and Paris were a result of developments which
6 could not be ascribed in any way to Serbia
7 hinder the achievement of a political solution. And on the other hand,
8 those represented enormous public endorsement of separatism and terrorism
9 of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 Q. Thank you. Please go to page 2. That would be page 5 in e-court
11 in the English version. Mr. Jovanovic, please comment item 3.
12 A. This item makes reference or is -- has to be construed in the
13 light of the so-called Act. Order, an unveiled threat against Yugoslavia
14 because of the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation is now being blamed for
15 failure to accept -- or that it has tried to dispute the Rambouillet
16 agreements. I have to highlight the fact that no agreement was reached
17 at Rambouillet or Paris. There were no negotiations. There was not a
18 single working meeting of the two delegations, and I would like to say
19 that the international mediators were continually hiding the key elements
20 of the agreement from the Serbian-Yugoslav delegation, those which
21 concerned the deployment of NATO forces throughout the territory of the
22 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
23 Q. Let me interrupt you here and ask you about this Annex B in the
24 chapters 2, 5, and 7 of the implementation of the alleged agreement.
25 What that annex referred to and what kind of powers did it bestow upon
2 A. The chapters 2, 5, and 7 were virtually expressly empowered NATO
3 to occupy the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
4 Let me cite you, if you allow me, Your Honours, two or three
5 illustrations concerning that alleged agreement from Rambouillet. One is
6 that NATO is given the right to carry out manoeuvres, to bivouac, to
7 transit through the territory, to use all transport communications and
8 infrastructure for waterways, air traffic, road traffic, and railway
9 traffic without seeking prior consent from the Serbian or Yugoslav
10 authorities and without any compensation for possible damage resulting
11 from the manoeuvres, exercises, or the presence of NATO troops in the
13 The second provision was that members of NATO or so-called
14 international military forces would be entitled to put behind bars any
15 citizen of Serbia
16 any decision by competent authorities, and that provision makes reference
17 only to the following situation. Shortly after an arbitrary arrest of a
18 Yugoslav citizen, NATO would hand such persons over to the competent
19 authorities. Such a provision entitling members or representatives of
20 foreign countries in the territory of federal Yugoslavia to more rights
21 than enjoyed by the domestic population is what can be deemed or termed
22 capitulation in international legal framework.
23 The third provision was that international military forces or
24 NATO in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be
25 expressly entitled to take over and manage for an unlimited period of
1 time of the overall electro-magnetic spectrum in Yugoslavia, which
2 practically means that without prior announcement or without seeking
3 anybody's approval or consent to use the installations of civilian TV,
4 civilian radio network without limitation in time or space, to use the
5 frequencies of the Ministry of the Interior, of the military, of the
6 health system, of the utility companies. So the entire electro-magnetic
7 spectrum of the country, which is a national resource, may be taken by
8 NATO without prior announcement, without seeking consent, without any
9 limitations in space or time.
10 Q. Thank you. Just very briefly, item 4, the penultimate and
11 ultimate sentence, namely that the negotiations are being postponed if
12 FRY declared that they will not accept the agreements.
13 A. This is a contradiction. The first part says that the talks are
14 being postponed, and the second part says that the talks would not
15 continue unless - and this is a very interesting provision - because they
16 say the "Serbs," not Serbia
17 that they accept the agreements. So this is effectively an ultimatum.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I ask that this document be
20 admitted into evidence, please.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00492.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-43629 --
24 4629, which is 1029 on the Defence list. Could we see page 2, please.
25 Q. We have conclusions of the federal government from the 19th of
1 March. Let me just repeat the number, D008-4629, 1025 on our 65 ter
2 list, which is your tab 44. Item 1 of the conclusions. Were you
3 informed about the evacuation of the KVM?
4 A. No. The agreement was signed jointly by the OSCE and the Federal
5 Republic of Yugoslavia
6 was implemented by Yugoslavia
7 was an expression of accord between the two sides, we see here in this
8 provision that this agreement was signed unilaterally without even
9 notifying the other signatory.
10 Q. Thank you. Could you please comment on item 4 as well.
11 A. Yes. This is the position of the federal government that it
12 would protect the OSCE property in its territory in accordance with the
13 Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations.
14 Q. Thank you. And did the FRY and Serbia ensure safe withdrawal of
15 the KVM from the territory of Kosovo
16 A. Serbia
17 measures for the work of the KVM and ensured that they could withdraw
18 without any hindrance, which is what they did.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
21 evidence as well.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Before we receive it, Mr. Djurdjic, the witness
23 may be able to help the Chamber. This purports to be conclusions reached
24 by the federal government at a meeting, yet the report does not give the
25 date of the meeting. It seems to be something that is prepared in
1 anticipation. It's a session held on blank March 1999. Could you assist
2 the Chamber with that, please, Mr. Jovanovic?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is hard now to
4 remember all the details, especially concrete dates, but knowing the
5 situation at the time and the urgency of everything that was happening I
6 think that this meeting was held either at the 19 -- either on the 19th
7 or 20th at the latest.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, if I can assist, would you please look at the
10 first page. There is a stamp there. Can you see a date there? Perhaps
11 that could assist us.
12 A. The copy is illegible in the part where the date is and it's hard
13 for me to see it. However, Your Honour, there is no doubt, if I may,
14 that this draft of conclusions or this proposal for conclusions was sent
15 to the federal government, as it says in the introductory portion on the
16 19th of March, most likely, 1999; and that the government received the
17 draft which is certified by the received stamp on the first page of the
19 JUDGE PARKER: The document will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00493.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see D008-4783, 1058
22 on our 65 ter list.
23 Q. Very briefly, during the aggression against the FRY, were there
24 any attempts, and what do you know about efforts to maintain contact with
25 representatives of the Albanian political parties which had not been
1 engaged in terrorism?
2 A. Even though the war was on, the federal government and the
3 Republic of Serbia
4 political settlement with the representatives of Albanian minority in
5 Kosovo and Metohija on the basis of compromise and abiding by all the
6 principles of the Security Council. This information on the talks held
7 between Nikola Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister of the federal government;
8 and the political leader representing the moderate political option in
9 Kosovo and Metohija, Ibrahim Rugova, is yet another illustration of these
10 constant efforts by the Government of Yugoslavia and Serbia.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] For the transcript, this is a
13 joint communique following the meeting held in Pristina between deputy
14 Federal Prime Minister, Sainovic, and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova from the 5th of
15 April, 1999. I tender this into evidence, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit D00494.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D002-1730, 1251 on the 65 ter list
19 of the Defence.
20 Q. This is a joint communique of the federal government and Serbian
21 government from the 6th of April, 1999. Just very briefly,
22 Mr. Jovanovic, what can you tell us about it?
23 A. This joint communique, even though it was joint, had been adopted
24 at the separate sessions of the federal government and Serbian
25 government. It was previously harmonised between the two governments,
1 and this reflects the constitutional relations between two subjects of
2 the Yugoslav Federation in accordance with the constitution. This
3 communique is yet another example of efforts made during NATO aggression
4 as well aimed at finding a peaceful political settlement. And at finding
5 an agreement with the representatives of the moderate factions, among
6 whom was Ibrahim Rugova, yet again trying to reduce tensions and find a
7 peaceful political settlement.
8 Q. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
10 evidence, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Do we know its date?
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think that I said that it was on
13 the 6th of April, 1999. That's the last page of the document, if we can
14 turn to that page, please.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. It will be received.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00495.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, thank you for responding to the invitation of the
19 Defence to come and testify.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] And, Your Honours, thank you for
21 allowing us to conclude our examination-in-chief. I have no further
22 questions for Mr. Jovanovic.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Djurdjic. We will wait a
25 few moments while a technical problem with the transcript is dealt with.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 JUDGE PARKER: I am told the technical problem is affecting other
3 courtrooms as well, so we will wait a few moments in the hope that it
4 will be corrected.
5 We are advised it may be some five minutes or so. The Chamber
6 will rise temporarily and return as soon as the equipment is functioning
8 --- Break taken at 4.48 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.57 p.m.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:
13 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Jovanovic.
14 A. [In English] Good afternoon.
15 Q. In the course of your testimony here today you spoke about some
16 United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and it seemed that you're
17 advocating that they ought to be respected and complied with. Is that
18 your position, that the United Nations resolutions ought to be respected
19 and complied with?
20 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
21 Q. One of them that you referred to specifically was Security
22 Council Resolution 1199 of September 1998, and that is D160. And could
23 we go straight to paragraph 13 in both the English and the B/C/S. You
24 see that paragraph calling upon the authorities of the FRY, among others,
25 to co-operate fully with the Prosecutor of this Tribunal?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What was your -- well, I could take it that your position is that
3 this provision ought to be respected and complied with?
4 A. Yes. The resolution -- according to the resolution of the
5 Security Council, all decisions need to be implemented in their entirety.
6 Q. Do you recall giving a speech on the occasion of the 11th
7 anniversary of the Socialist Party of Serbia in July 2001?
8 A. I don't remember the details. At the time there were numerous
9 speeches that I held, there were numerous occasions when I gave
10 statements. And despite all my efforts, I'm unable to remember that
11 particular speech from July that you are mentioning.
12 Q. Very well. But in July 2001 you recall that you were the
13 president or acting president of the SPS?
14 A. Yes. For some time I was acting chairman of the SPS.
15 MR. STAMP: Could we look at 65 ter 06021. This is taken from
16 the official ...
17 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my learned friend,
19 Mr. Stamp, asks that we see a document which was put on the list after
20 the witness started his evidence, or rather, after the Defence was banned
21 from having any communication with the witness. So the witness is
22 completely unaware of this document. And as for this first document, I
23 don't think we even have the Serbian translation, this particular
24 document that Mr. Stamp has just announced. So we received in the night
25 between Sunday and Monday some two documents, and then yesterday while
1 Mr. Jovanovic was testifying and today we received two documents as well.
2 I have no objections to Mr. Stamp putting questions to Mr. Jovanovic in
3 this manner, but putting such documents to the witness, especially
4 untranslated documents, I think is improper.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Djurdjic. Clearly, untranslated
6 documents are not usually convenient or fair. We will see whether the
7 witness has difficulty understanding the document; and if that is the
8 case and that can't be overcome by oral quotation from it in the course
9 of the hearing, we will have to make some other arrangements. But for
10 the moment, please continue, Mr. Stamp.
11 MR. STAMP: Thank you.
12 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, do you read and speak English?
13 A. I do.
14 Q. The speeches including -- or in particular speeches delivered by
15 yourself as acting president of the SPS, the Socialist Party of Serbia,
16 were published on the official web site of the party. You recall that
17 was the practice in 2001?
18 A. No matter how I try, I cannot give you an affirmative answer to
19 that question because to tell you the truth, I never followed web sites.
20 Now, even though everything is hardly legible, very small font, I have to
21 tell you that this is not an official document, either an official
22 political or state document, nor is it an official SPS document. And
23 please look at what's written under the heading. It's a document of a
24 certain Miroslav Antic.
25 Q. Mr. -- very well, very well --
1 A. And understandably, I do not want to be drawn into commenting on
2 the documents which do not have a clear provenance.
3 Q. Very well, Mr. Jovanovic. This document, I represent to you, was
4 taken from the official web site of your party, and I want you -- and it
5 purports to be a record of a speech you gave on that day. And I'd like
6 to show you a part of it and ask you if you recall making those
8 A. By your leave, would you please take a note of the fact that this
9 is a private document of Mr. Miroslav Antic, who I'm totally unfamiliar
10 with, either as a member of the SPS or either as a member of the
11 diplomatic corps. I simply do not know this person. I do not think it
12 would be fair from you to attempt to draw me into commenting upon the
13 content of the document, whose character and provenance are not entirely
15 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend, Mr. Stamp,
17 insists for the second time that this is a document of the Socialist
18 Party of Serbia
19 document where this can be seen.
20 JUDGE PARKER: That, I suggest, is not going to be a useful use
21 of our time. The course Mr. Stamp proposed is a proper and usual one, to
22 see whether the witness recalls saying words that are quoted in this
23 document. If he does, there will obviously be some questioning
24 following; if he does not, the matter comes to an end for the moment.
25 Carry on, please, Mr. Stamp.
1 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 If we could look at page 8 of the -- of this document. Perhaps
3 we could just go to the last two lines of page 7 and then return to page
4 8. And if it could be -- if we could pan in a little bit. And then if
5 we could move to page 8 at the top.
6 Q. In reference to Slobodan Milosevic and the fact that he was sent
7 here for trial, this records you as saying that:
8 " ... the so-called trial they are preparing, whose farcical
9 beginning indicates how it will proceed, cannot fool most people.
10 Virtually all Serbian people and a vast part of the real international
11 community knows that this stage-managed affair aims to justify the crimes
12 of NATO's leaders, especially the leaders of the former American
13 administration, crimes against peace and humanity."
14 Can you recall saying that, and speaking in particular to your
15 reference to the proceedings before this Tribunal as farcical and
17 A. No, I don't recall that.
18 Q. Can you remember at any time describing the proceedings in
19 respect to Mr. Milosevic as stage-managed or farcical?
20 A. No, I don't remember that.
21 Q. Very well --
22 A. May I observe something? If I may, please. It is true,
23 Mr. Prosecutor, that I would like to believe that I speak and write
24 English quite well, but that doesn't mean that I always believe in
25 translation of texts from Serbian in to English.
1 Q. Very well. That's -- you had it in front of you in English and I
2 read it so it was translated to you in Serbian. You said -- your answer
3 is you never -- or you have no recollection of saying that the -- these
4 proceedings were stage-managed.
5 MR. STAMP: Could we look at page 15 of the same document.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would kindly ask
7 that portions of this text not be quoted as a document. This is a text,
8 what I have in front of me, and from what I can see, it has 18 or so
9 pages. For me, this is no document, but rather a text of an
10 unestablished provenance. And I'm afraid that it is not proper to quote
11 from that text. It is not entirely proper.
12 MR. STAMP:
13 Q. I'm only asking you if you remember.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Jovanovic, the Chamber is well aware of the
15 point you have made or the points you have made, that this is not your
16 document, you say it is not an official document, it is a document on its
17 face prepared by somebody you do not know, it is a document in English
18 rather than what I would expect to be the language in which any speech of
19 this nature that you may have made would have been. We're well aware of
20 all those things. Nevertheless, what Mr. Stamp is doing is in accordance
21 with our normal and proper procedures, and we will take into account the
22 matters you've mentioned if any point emerges from what is now being
23 pursued that is of relevance to our decision in this case. So if you
24 could please listen to Mr. Stamp's questions and answer them.
25 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 If we could just expand the top half a little bit.
2 Q. The question is simple. Can you recall saying while you were
3 president of the party in a speech, in any speech at any time, words to
4 this effect:
5 "Above all, this applies to persistence in demanding that
6 responsibility be established for those who violated the Constitution,
7 laws, moral and international rules in connection with the abduction of
8 President Slobodan Milosevic. The vast majority of Yugoslav people also
9 demand abolition of The Hague Tribunal as an extended hand of NATO."
10 In particular, that the Yugoslav people were demanding the
11 abolition of this Tribunal, can you recall at any time saying that or
12 words to that effect?
13 A. I cannot recall that.
14 Q. Did you ever advocate the abolition of this Tribunal?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Very well.
17 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, could this document be marked for
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be marked. It will not be received as an
20 exhibit, Mr. Stamp.
21 MR. STAMP: Very well, Your Honour.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01517, marked
23 for identification.
24 MR. STAMP:
25 Q. Do you recall saying at any time that the circumstances
1 surrounding the transfer of Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik to this Tribunal were
2 such that the Tribunal should be abolished?
3 A. No, I don't remember that.
4 Q. Could we quickly, just to see if it might refresh your memory,
5 look at 65 ter 0602 -- 06020, I think. This is a press report, as you
6 can see, Mr. Jovanovic. And it says that you sent a letter to the UN
7 Security Council around April 2000 in which you said that this Tribunal
8 should be abolished as "a creation unfounded in law."
9 Firstly, do you recall sending a letter to the Security Council
10 in 2000?
11 A. I cannot remember sending such a letter because during the NATO
12 aggression against Yugoslavia
13 and dozens of letters and various written initiatives, if not hundreds of
14 them --
15 Q. Very well --
16 A. -- we sent it moth to the Security Council and --
17 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
18 A. -- numerous international organisations. I have in front of me a
19 piece of news by the Belgrade
20 Q. Yes, we understand that in your official capacity you would have
21 sent many letters. I'm just asking you if you recall sending one in
22 which you said that Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik should be released?
23 A. No, I have already replied that I do not recall that.
24 Q. Very well. Well, is it possible that you might have sent such a
25 letter and not remember?
1 A. I have replied by saying that I do not remember, and it's not an
2 issue of being -- that being possible or not. I simply do not remember
3 sending such a letter to the Security Council.
4 Q. Very well, Mr. Jovanovic.
5 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, could this document also be marked for
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01518, marked
9 for identification.
10 MR. STAMP:
11 Q. What's your present occupation, Mr. Jovanovic?
12 A. I have been retired for several years now. I work in certain
13 not-governmental organisations, however.
14 Q. Are you still a member of the SPS?
15 A. I am.
16 Q. Do you occupy any position in the party?
17 A. No. No, I don't have any position. I'm just an ordinary SPS
19 Q. Would I be correct in summarising your activities over the past
20 decade as being dedicated to defending the policies and activities of the
21 government that was in power in Serbia
22 A. Understandably, you can summarise at your own discretion these
23 activities that you are mentioning. However, I wish to point out that in
24 all the offices I held, be it state or political offices, in my work I
25 was solely guided by the legitimate interests, state and national
1 interests of Yugoslavia
2 Q. But you have spent the last ten years or so writing and giving
3 speeches in which you have defended the conduct and the management of the
4 Yugoslav government and the Serbian government in 1999?
5 A. It is true that I served as a minister of foreign affairs until
6 December of 2000. From that date on, I have not held any state office.
7 I was a member of the parliament elected at the multi-party parliamentary
8 elections. I was a member of the parliament in the Federal Assembly of
10 time on, I have held no political state offices and the activities that I
11 engage in, I do so in my capacity as an ordinary citizen, as a member of
12 non-party associations of citizens -- non-partisan and non-profit NGOs.
13 Q. And the -- for the third time I'm going to ask you. And the
14 activities that you're engaged in over the last few years involve making
15 statements in defence of the conduct of the Yugoslav government in 1999?
16 A. I've defended and advocated the policy of the government in which
17 I was a minister understandably. I was minister of foreign affairs, and
18 particularly I was engaged and responsible for the implementation of
20 MR. STAMP: Could we turn to another aspect of your persona. If
21 we could have a look at D454. This is the record of his testimony in the
22 Milutinovic case.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. Jovanovic.
3 Your Honours, I have a very important procedural matter to
4 discuss. That section Mr. Stamp started discussing was provided in
5 private session at the Milutinovic trial. Shall I sit down or continue
6 to explain the situation?
7 JUDGE PARKER: You say this passage is still the subject of an
8 order of its -- Mr. Stamp is checking.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If I may explain. It goes for
10 questions about an investigation, and that stage of investigation is
11 secret pursuant to Yugoslav Criminal Procedure Act, and this is why the
12 testimony was given in private session.
13 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour, I do apologise. It seems that that
14 is correct and that --
15 JUDGE PARKER: Should we go into private session, and should we
16 redact? Mr. Stamp?
17 MR. STAMP: Very well. Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Two questions: Should we go into private session
19 and should we redact?
20 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much. I thought
21 these were statements or decision that had been made. We should go into
22 private session.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Am I to understand that perhaps from page 51, line
24 19 onward there should be redaction?
25 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE PARKER: I think that's the passage that starts to quote
2 from the transcript. 19 to 21 I think should be redacted.
3 We will now then go into private session if you have further
4 questions about this subject.
5 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
7 [Private session]
11 Pages 10293-10296 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
12 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now and resume at 20 minutes past
14 [The witness stands down]
15 --- Recess taken at 5.52 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 6.21 p.m.
17 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, while the witness is being brought in,
18 might I just indicate that in the break I checked in respect to the
19 evidence that was given, that was given in private session in the
20 previous case, and it was not and it really should have been in open
21 session. I had made a hasty check in court and I didn't realise -- I
22 didn't see where they had returned to open session before this testimony
23 was taken.
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE PARKER: Have you showed this to Mr. Djurdjic?
1 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Do you accept that position, Mr. Djurdjic?
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I only wanted to warn
4 the Chamber that that portion of the trial in the Milutinovic et al. case
5 was private, and Mr. Stamp just told me that it was in relation with the
6 documents used then. If we can see what was being adduced and what was
7 given in response to questions pertaining to those documents, whether
8 that was under seal or not, I cannot say. I just wanted to warn the
9 Bench that some portions were under seal or in private session. If
10 testimony can be given without publicating [as interpreted] the
11 documents, then I have no objection to that.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Stamp, the Chamber would make orders reversing
13 the private session and making it public if we can be assured that there
14 is no infringement of the protective order made in the Milutinovic case.
15 Is that something that you would like to check overnight?
16 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I did check it and I thought it had
17 been resolved. However, it is a matter of record because it is part of
18 the -- it is evidence of the witness which was received by 92 ter. So I
19 could sort it out very clearly by another communication with the Defence
20 and we could advise the Court -- the Chamber --
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
22 MR. STAMP: -- tomorrow.
23 JUDGE PARKER: In the meantime, we will continue in public
25 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Q. In October, I think on or about the 19th of October,
2 Mr. Jovanovic, you were involved in talks with Mr. Geremek, and you
3 signed an agreement with him, that is the -- that's October 1998. Do you
4 recall that?
5 A. Yes, in October 1998.
6 Q. Now, shortly after that, a few days after that, on or about the
7 24th/25th of October, do you recall there being further negotiations with
8 Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Wesley Clark, General Wesley Clark, General Naumann,
9 and Mr. Milutinovic, resulting in an agreement sometimes referred to as
10 the Clark-Naumann agreement?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Do you know or recall that on or about the 24th or the 25th of
13 October 1998, Mr. Milosevic was involved in discussions with General
14 Clark and General Naumann?
15 A. I personally do not recall when that was, but it is known to me
16 that the meeting between Milosevic and Clark did -- and Naumann did take
17 place. However, as far as I'm concerned, those were talks with military
18 representatives which did not involve any particular obligation for me or
19 my ministry.
20 Q. So you were -- you did not participate in those talks; is that
21 what you're saying?
22 A. To be frank, I do not recall. I do confirm that the
23 Milosevic-Clark-Naumann meeting did take place, but I cannot recall
24 whether I attended that meeting or not.
25 Q. Well, do you recall that Mr. Djordjevic was present at those
2 A. For your information, I did not know Mr. Djordjevic at the
3 time --
4 Q. Yes, but not whether you knew him. Did you know of him?
5 A. No, no. By the very nature of my position in the government, I
6 was never involved in any military or police negotiations or
7 arrangements, neither was my ministry involved in any way in such
9 Q. Firstly, you knew that Mr. Djordjevic was the chief of the
10 police, the RJB, the public service department of the police, in 1998 and
12 A. Yes, I do know that Mr. Djordjevic was head of the public
13 security department --
14 Q. And --
15 A. -- service. But frankly, I cannot pin-point the period --
16 Q. Very well --
17 A. -- during which he held that position.
18 Q. When did you first meet him, can you remember that?
19 A. Excuse me, have you been listening to me while I was testifying?
20 I said that I do not know Mr. Djordjevic, neither did I know
21 Mr. Djordjevic at the time.
22 Q. That's what I see here. You said at line 23, page 60, that you
23 did not know Mr. Djordjevic at the time. So I'm asking you whether at
24 any time thereafter you met him?
25 A. No. There were no official needs for us to meet. I personally
1 have never tried to establish private contacts and relations with anybody
2 from the government structures.
3 Q. Very well. So can I take it from your answer that you would not
4 be able to tell us what his -- or let me ask you the question this way:
5 Do you know what role he played in those negotiations in respect to the
6 military and police deployments in Kosovo in October 1998?
7 A. I can only limit myself to the fact that from the public and from
8 the media I knew that Mr. Djordjevic was the chief of the public
9 security, but I really did not follow nor was it my duty in my capacity
10 as the foreign minister what were the negotiations in which
11 Mr. Djordjevic took part.
12 Q. Very well. We could move on then rather quickly to another
13 topic. You -- did you visit Kosovo in 1998?
14 A. No, I did not.
15 Q. In 1999?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Okay. We could move to another topic. You said in your evidence
18 yesterday that as far as you were concerned or your conclusion as to why,
19 according to you, the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians rejected
20 negotiations in 1998 or rejected the call of President Milutinovic to
21 negotiate in 1998 was because they only were concerned about secession,
22 and you were shown a declaration of President Milutinovic dated the 18th
23 of March, 1998, that's D456, and also a statement of President
24 Milutinovic dated April 1998, that's D460, in which he made invitations
25 to them to participate in talks. Can you recall that about the time when
1 Mr. Milutinovic issued these public statements, there had been an assault
2 by Serbian security forces on the home, the compound, of Adem Jashari?
3 A. I remember the Jashari incident, yes; however, I cannot establish
4 a connection in time between the statements of the President of Serbia,
5 Mr. Milutinovic, and the events relating to the Jashari incident. I do
6 not remember what happened before, what happened after, because my duty
7 was to follow the positions of the constitutional institutions and the
8 positions of the institutions and the president of the republic --
9 Q. Very well --
10 A. -- that was politics for me.
11 Q. Very well. But, I mean, you expressed your opinion as to why the
12 leadership of the Kosovo Albanians did not answer or did not treat his
13 call to the table favourably was because they were interested in
14 secession. Would you agree with me that if - and this is a hypothetical
15 question, but I'm sure that you can deal with it - that it would have
16 been difficult for the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians to be involved
17 in negotiations while at the same time there were serious allegations of
18 the security service -- security forces of the FRY killing women and
19 children or Kosovo Albanian women and children?
20 A. Well, understandably you do not expect me to repeat an assessment
21 which I have already expressed, namely, what I said was not only my
22 personal assessment, it was an assessment of the government whose member
23 I was. And if you allow me, let me just recall that separatism of the
24 Kosovo Albanians did not appear in 1998 nor in 1999. The separatism has
25 deep roots in Kosovo and Metohija, roots that go back almost 100 years;
1 and therefore, I can understand the arguments that you used and why it
2 would be a very sensitive issue for Albanian representatives to accept at
3 a certain moment --
4 Q. No, no, no, Mr. Jovanovic, please understand me, I'm making no
5 argument, none at all. I'm only asking a couple questions. So please.
6 Were you aware, Mr. Jovanovic, that just at about the time when
7 Mr. Milutinovic made those calls for talks, Human Rights Watch had
8 recorded grave crimes being committed against Kosovo Albanian civilians
9 in the areas of Cirez and Likosane in Kosovo?
10 A. I'm not aware of that assessment of Amnesty International --
11 Q. Human Rights Watch --
12 A. Human Rights Watch, yes, I'm not aware of that assessment, but of
13 course I cannot exclude that such an assessment was made.
14 Q. And did you know Colonel Crosland from Britain?
15 A. I did not know him personally, nor did I ever meet him. But I
16 did hear that he participated as a witness in one of the cases before
17 this Tribunal.
18 Q. Very well.
19 A. You know, foreign military representatives in any country are
20 dealt by the defence ministries, and these foreign military
21 representatives have no regular contacts with the ministries of foreign
22 affairs except accidentally and sometimes not even accidentally.
23 Q. Well, he observed, according to his testimony here, in the
24 summer -- that in the summer of 1998 the forces of the FRY and Serbia
25 were engaged in attacks which involved the use of excessive force against
1 Kosovo Albanian civilians and their property. Was that type of
2 information, that type of protest, brought to the attention of the
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
4 A. It is possible that Mr. Crosland as a military envoy of his
5 government intervened through the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs;
6 however, I was not aware of his assessment of these events until now. So
7 as I understood, Mr. Crosland assessed that the forces of Yugoslavia
8 Kosovo used excessive force.
9 Q. Very well. If you could bring up D361 or 388. This was a
10 document that was shown to you yesterday. This is just the document in
11 which -- or a document whereby the FRY government established the
12 commission of the federal government for co-operation with the OSCE
13 mission, which included or was headed by Mr. Sainovic and the other
14 members included yourself, Pavle Bulatovic, Momcilo Perisic, Mihalj
15 Kertes, Zoran Andjelkovic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, to name a few persons who
16 are of interest to us. Did this commission meet weekly?
17 A. No. I'm not aware that it would meet so frequently. Actually,
18 apart from the setting up of the commission, my deputy, Ambassador Zoran
19 Novakovic, actually stood in for me in this commission. He was the
20 deputy of the federal minister, and I wish to clarify that the minister
21 really has too many other obligations to -- he has to attend government
22 sessions and so on and so forth --
23 Q. Yeah --
24 A. He did not week meet on a weekly basis -- at least I think he did
25 not meet on a weekly basis.
1 Q. Your deputy Zoran Novakovic, he's also called Slana?
2 A. Zoran Novakovic. No, Slana was one of my representatives in
3 Kosovo and Metohija. It is possible that Slana participated, but Velimir
4 Slana was a member of the outpost of the Federal Ministry of Foreign
5 Affairs in Kosovo and Metohija.
6 Q. So -- but you are saying that it's possible that he attended
7 these meetings on behalf of the ministry?
8 A. Velimir Slana did not take part in these meetings because I
9 suppose that the meetings were held in Belgrade, and Velimir Slana was in
10 Kosovo. He was in Pristina.
11 Q. Did your representative, Mr. Novakovic, Mr. Zoran Novakovic,
12 bring to your attention that there were protests being made by the KVM
13 about the use of excessive or indiscriminate force by the police and the
14 army in Kosovo?
15 A. In principle, my deputy, Zoran Novakovic, reported to me about
16 the most important issues which were raised at the federal government
17 meetings, where he stood in for me, as well as in other working bodies of
18 the federal government, such as this commission. The commission was a
19 working body of the federal government.
20 Q. I know. But you know Minister Stojiljkovic was here, and he was
21 the head of the -- or the political head of the police; and Mr. Perisic
22 was here from the army. I'm just asking you: Was it communicated to you
23 in foreign affairs that the police force and the army in Kosovo were
24 committing acts involving excessive force against the Kosovo Albanian
1 A. You see, as for protests, in diplomacy that means primarily
2 written protests and notes. Written protests are always sent whenever
3 there is anything of importance, whenever anyone wishes to emphasize the
4 importance of an event or a fact. If it is the excessive use of force,
5 if there is violence committed against civilians, these are certainly
6 important issues which fall under the category of formal protests, and in
7 previous testimony we said that there were no protests from the
8 verification mission, which was the key factor for the monitoring of the
9 overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija.
10 Q. All right. Let me ask you the question a different way. Did
11 Mr. Novakovic, is it, did your representative who attended these meetings
12 of this commission tell you that they discussed issues of the police
13 engaging in conduct that involved excessive force against Kosovo Albanian
15 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
16 Q. You -- but you are aware, I take it, that in the Security Council
17 Resolutions that you were shown earlier in your testimony, the -- there
18 was reference to the excessive and indiscriminate force by the police and
19 army or the Serbian police and the VJ against Kosovo Albanian civilians?
20 A. Yes. I am aware of the complete contents of the resolutions of
21 the Security Council, including the item which you quoted. I may add
22 that I was also aware of such accusations and such assessments that force
23 had been used excessively and that the Serbian leadership, including
24 President Milutinovic and the government, as well as other political
25 institutions, were aware of the criticism that force had been used
1 excessively, but that there was no agreement about this issue. There
2 were various positions within the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia
3 about what excessive force was. So there was no single position of the
4 international factors and the local domestic Serbian and Yugoslav
6 Q. Very well. Let's move on. During the NATO campaign, were there
7 meetings that you attended with Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Milutinovic on a
8 weekly basis at Beli Dvor in Belgrade
9 A. The meetings were held, I know that, and I did take part in most
10 of these meetings or I attended them. I cannot confirm whether they were
11 held every week or not.
12 Q. And did General Ojdanic attend?
13 A. The composition was extensive, which means about ten leaders.
14 Whether General Ojdanic was there or not, I cannot remember --
15 Q. But can you recall whether or not they had representatives of the
16 VJ or the MUP present at these meetings?
17 A. Yes, I can tell you this. The meetings with the representatives
18 of the army and the Ministry of the Interior were held separately from
19 these meetings. These were separate meetings.
20 Q. Very well. In that period did you attend any meeting where
21 Mr. Stojiljkovic was present, that's the period of the NATO bombing?
22 A. I have tried to answer your question. I do not remember the list
23 of people who attended, the officials. The only thing I can confirm is
24 that at all meetings that I attended were also attended by the President,
25 Slobodan Milosevic, and President Milan Milutinovic.
1 Q. Well, did you attend any meeting where the security situation in
2 Kosovo was discussed and policy decisions made?
3 A. At the time the agenda most often included the military
4 situation, the situation in the theatre of war, if I may put it that way,
5 who was supposed to do what from within their area of responsibility.
6 And of course I was always in charge of the obligations of the Yugoslav
7 diplomacy, and I was not interested in the obligations of any other
9 Q. Can I take that as a yes, that you participated in meetings where
10 the situation in Kosovo - and that is what I'm asking you about - Kosovo
11 was discussed and policy decisions made with respect to the security
12 situation there?
13 A. I'm afraid that this is an interpretation that is somewhat wider.
14 Political decisions concerning Kosovo and Metohija were only made at the
15 government meetings, primarily those of the Serbian government, because
16 in the Yugoslav system and practice, Kosovo was primarily linked with
18 at informal meetings with President Milosevic, then I could not agree
19 with that.
20 Q. Yeah, I think maybe by your answer, the way it is that you think
21 I'm suggesting or I'm arguing, I'm not. I just want to know whether you
22 know about the decision-making apparatus of government in respect to the
23 use and application of force in Kosovo. Did you participate in that?
24 A. Am I to understand, Mr. Prosecutor, that you believe that the
25 government took decisions on using force against the civilian population?
1 I wish to confirm that the government's policy, the policy of the
2 governments of both Yugoslavia
3 Kosovo and Metohija only by peaceful, political means, through dialogue,
4 and by respecting all human and all other rights of all minorities. So,
5 Mr. Prosecutor, I can only interpret what was the official policy because
6 I was involved with the official policy.
7 Q. Yes, I know that. There were thousands of police and army
8 personnel in Kosovo. Leadership decisions had to be taken in how they
9 were supposed to be used. I only want to know if you participated in
10 those decisions. If you say yes, I have more questions; if you say no, I
11 would move on.
12 When decisions at a political level were being made in respect to
13 the use and deployment of troops and police in Kosovo, were you a
14 participant? And I'm speaking about 1999.
15 A. No. That is a chain of command which goes from the Supreme
16 Command and the subordinate commands, whether that was the army or the
17 police. So the minister of foreign affairs did not participate in making
18 any decisions relating to military or police aspects of the situation.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I would like to move on to something
21 else, and I could wrap up in 10 to 15 minutes on our return tomorrow. I
22 had hoped to complete the witness today, but there are just one or two
24 JUDGE PARKER: I think we should break now. We can't go on
25 beyond 7.00 for physical reasons that you know here. So we must adjourn
1 and we continue tomorrow. We sit again at 9.00 tomorrow morning, not in
2 this courtroom, I believe.
3 So we adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow morning.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.
5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of
6 January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.