Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11413

 1                           Tuesday, 16 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good afternoon.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  The affirmation you made to tell the truth still

 9     applies.  If you could sit down, please.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The witness's microphones

11     are off.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  And Mr. Popovic is continuing his questions.

13                           WITNESS:  MILOS DOSAN [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15                           Examination by Mr. Popovic:  [Continued]

16        Q.   Thank you, Your Honour.  Good afternoon, General.

17        A.   Good afternoon.

18        Q.   Before we continue, I wanted to remind you to pause briefly after

19     I have finished putting my question, wait for the transcript, please, and

20     then provide us with your answer so that we can help the interpreters.

21             We will continue where we left off yesterday.  We'll go back to

22     the statement of Nike Peraj.  In your binder it is tab 25.

23             We were with paragraph number 53.  Paragraph 53 where it says:

24             "The MUP needed VJ support for large operations, and the VJ would

25     order the MUP in large operations how to deploy and what to do."

Page 11414

 1             We can move on to paragraph 54 immediately the last sentence

 2     because it is related to paragraph 53, it says:

 3             "Usually, when the MUP did inform the VJ what operations it had

 4     planned, the VJ had no ability to prevent the MUP operation."

 5        A.   This is not true.  The army had its own chain of command, and the

 6     MUP had its own.  They never interlinked.  Neither could the army

 7     influence any MUP actions, nor did the army ever have a need to try and

 8     prevent any MUP actions.  That is simply incorrect.  Each of us had our

 9     own exclusive chain of command which we abided by throughout the NATO

10     aggression, and we never deviated from it.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Let's go to paragraph 65.  Here witness Peraj

12     mentions an incident in Meja.  In paragraph 65 he says:

13             "The operation was co-ordinated from Djakovica by Lazarevic and

14     Lieutenant-Colonel Goran Jeftovic, staff officer for operations in

15     Pristina Corps.  Could you please comment this?

16        A.   This is not true.  General Lazarevic on that day the 27th of

17     April was with me, or rather I was with him at the command of the

18     Pristina Corps in Pristina.  So physically he could not have been

19     elsewhere.  As for any control of that action, as I said yesterday, it

20     was commanded or led by Colonel Milan Kotur.  He was an officer of the

21     Pristina Corps, but he was not the commander.  And he could only have

22     been there following orders of the command or of the Chief of Staff, and

23     he commanded from the forward command post in Djakovica.

24        Q.   Thank you.  When you say that General Lazarevic was with you in

25     Pristina, can you tell us what was the reason for that, a bit more

Page 11415

 1     precisely?

 2        A.   Yes.  It was the national holiday of the then state which was

 3     Serbia Montenegro, the 27th of April, that is.  It is for that reason

 4     that a group of officers including General Lazarevic, as well as myself,

 5     received certain decorations.  There was a ceremony of awarding those

 6     decorations at the command of the Pristina Corps.  After that, there was

 7     a short cocktail session and we returned to my -- and we returned to our

 8     respective units.  Therefore, General Lazarevic was not in Djakovica on

 9     that day.

10        Q.   Thank you, General.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I am unable to follow the

12     transcript.  Thank you.  Could we next move to paragraph 80.

13        Q.   There, General, it is stated:

14             "Close to a Serbian house in Meja, I saw three jeeps with members

15     of the Arkan's paramilitary unit.  I knew they were from his unit because

16     I had seen them in front of our barracks in Djakovica.  I recall my

17     commander ordering me to allow access to those paramilitaries to our

18     barracks."

19             Can you please comment upon this?

20        A.   This is a complete untruth, as I've already said.  There were no

21     paramilitary formations in Djakovica.  As for me allegedly ordering him

22     to grant them access to our barracks, that is absurd.  At that time,

23     there was no one in our barracks because they were being constantly

24     targeted.  I could not have been in a position to direct anyone to be in

25     any barracks because the barracks were being targeted every night.  This

Page 11416

 1     is completely untrue and has nothing to do with reality.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Have a look at paragraph 83 next.  There Peraj says:

 3             "Majors Zdravko Vinter who worked in the personnel department

 4     prepared a report for the staff of the 3rd Army in Nis.  In the report,

 5     the VJ stated that 74 terrorists had been killed in Korenica, and 68 in

 6     Meja.  On this occasion, I was able to read over Major Vinter's shoulder

 7     part of the post-operation report saying terrorists had been killed.

 8     Vinter used large fonts when typing."

 9             Do you have any comment?

10        A.   The same as before, I just wanted to add another thing.  This was

11     simply impossible to have happened because in the chain of command, there

12     is a specific way of who orders whom and who reports to what person.  A

13     brigade commander cannot report to an army commander, and especially not

14     through his subordinate officer who is even lower in terms of rank than a

15     brigade commander.

16             I also know where Major Vinter was at the time.  This was in the

17     cultural hall, in the cellar.  It was very dark, and it would not have

18     been possible to see what another person was typing, especially not over

19     one's shoulder.  Major Vinter had no need and had received no orders to

20     type out any report, especially not in the command of the 3rd Army.  I

21     reject this allegation as completely unrealistic and untrue.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Next paragraph 93, please.

23             "Milos Dosan, commander of the ARBD, theoretically speaking was

24     the person who was supposed to command military operations in the area of

25     Djakovica, but the operations I saw in the valley of Carragojs were

Page 11417

 1     ordered by General Lazarevic, Colonel Kotur, and other staff officers of

 2     the Pristina Corps.  Dosan, who hailed from Bosnia and was around 48

 3     years of age, was a sensitive person.  He sympathized with those who

 4     suffered.  He was not aggressive and should have been promoted to the

 5     rank of general, but his deputy after the war was promoted and received a

 6     rank senior to his own."

 7             Can you comment this?

 8        A.   There are a couple of true things here.  For instance, that I

 9     hail from Bosnia, that I was 48 years of age, and that I am a sensitive

10     person.  I don't see how that could be used against me.  And this has no

11     impact on my abilities as officer.  I was made general, but my deputy was

12     not Colonel Novica Stankovic, who was my establishment deputy, was never

13     made general.  Therefore, the rest is incorrect, save for the origins of

14     mine.

15        Q.   Thank you.  At the beginning of this paragraph, it is stated that

16     you were the person who was supposed to order military operations in the

17     area of Djakovica.  Can you comment that?

18        A.   Yes.  As the brigade commander, I had tasks, orders, and duties

19     to command all anti-aircraft units, my anti-aircraft units.  I could not

20     have commanded over any land operations or actions.  I'm not an expert in

21     that.  By profession I'm an engineer.  This was far beyond my expertise,

22     and I could not have been able to command any land actions.  As I said,

23     that action was commanded by Colonel Kotur.  General Lazarevic did not

24     command that action.  And I was not supposed to and I did not command

25     that action.  That is the truth behind this.

Page 11418

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you please look at paragraph 95.  It

 2     says:

 3             "Dosan did not agree with the operation in Korenica and Meja and

 4     arrested Micunovic for his involvement in it.  However, Micunovic

 5     remained in prison for only three days."

 6             Can you give us your comments on this?

 7        A.   I'm not the one who plans or approves or disproves of actions.

 8     That is done by my Superior Command.  So I did not approve actions or did

 9     I plan them.  As for the arrest of Micunovic, I did not arrest him.  I

10     had no reason to arrest him or even any pretext to arrest him.  It's not

11     true that he was in prison for three days either.  What is particularly

12     not true is that he was released on the basis of a request made by

13     Vojislav Seselj, Zelko Rozantovic, Arkan.  Quite simply that could not

14     have happened.  Whoever was arrested was taken to the military court

15     straightaway, and I would have known about that, so none of this is true.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now look at paragraph 96.  Witness Peraj

17     says here:

18             "I got authorisation to go to Ramoc from Lazarevic and Jeftovic

19     in the headquarters in Djakovica.  They passed this authorisation on to

20     Kotur at the command post in north-east of Osek.  In Lazarevic's office

21     there was war-sized map covered in clear talc on which Jeftovic was

22     marking details of the operation occurring in the Carragojs valley.  The

23     details I saw on the map were confirmed by what I saw when I went to the

24     field."

25             Can you give us your comments on this paragraph and the ability

Page 11419

 1     of Nike Peraj to see this?

 2        A.   In Djakovica there was the forward command post of the Pristina

 3     Corps, and he says here that that is that office.  Although that is not

 4     General Lazarevic's office.  He could not enter that command post.  Only

 5     commanders can access command posts and only when they are asked to do so

 6     by the authorised officer involved.  So he did not have an opportunity of

 7     seeing that map.  Even if he had seen a map, at least half an hour is

 8     required to note details on a map, especially in infantry, to compare

 9     information from the map to information coming from the field.  Nike

10     Peraj as we have seen was a teacher by training.  He did not complete the

11     military academy.  He was a traffic officer.  Even if he had seen a map,

12     he could not have made any comparisons or drawn any conclusions of this

13     kind.

14        Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you please look at paragraph 97 now,

15     where the following is stated:

16             "Through discussions with Stojanovic and Perovic in 1998 and

17     early 1999, from operational briefings that I attended during the same

18     period in Djakovica and Pristina and from operational maps that were

19     presented in these briefings, I became aware of the general military plan

20     for the Djakovica area.  The territorial area of Djakovica municipality

21     near the Albanian border had been divided up into three geographical

22     areas or belts, which were to be cleared of Kosovo Albanian civilians one

23     after the other.  The villages of Meja and Korenica were included in the

24     second belt."

25             Can you give us your comments on this?

Page 11420

 1        A.   These allegations are just the same and totally in the spirit of

 2     what has been said so far.  All of these are fabrications that cannot be

 3     proven by anything and are unrealistic in their own right.  Quite simply,

 4     there were no such plans.  If I as brigade commander do not know about

 5     such plans, it is highly unlikely for anyone of my lower-ranking

 6     officers, especially in my own command and in my own brigade to know

 7     that.  So that is absolutely not correct.

 8             Especially this is not true, that there were areas from which

 9     Albanian civilians were to be cleansed.  We always struggled for the

10     protection of these civilians, and we were not pleased at all to see

11     columns of refugees.  I did not see any one of us feeling right about

12     seeing these columns of refugees.  There were also Serbs moving to Serbia

13     and Montenegro.  When people leave their hearth, that's a very sad thing.

14     My father left his home, and my relatives left their homes.  I know what

15     that feels like.  So there certainly were no such plans.

16        Q.   Thank you, General.  I showed you some paragraphs from one of the

17     statements given by Nike Peraj, he gave several statements, this is was

18     the last one, and I quoted over 20 paragraphs to you, and you said that

19     every one that I quoted to you was not true or was a lie.  Can you make

20     any assumptions as to why Nike Peraj would make such statements before

21     this Court?

22        A.   I thought about Nike Peraj for a long time because I received

23     Nike Peraj at the brigade command, I talked to him, and I saw him often.

24     When I say that, I mean that we moved very often, we were in a very small

25     area, so we did see each other rather often.  This is my observation:  He

Page 11421

 1     carried out the tasks that I entrusted to him properly, and he properly

 2     reported on them.  I think that Nike Peraj was brought into a particular

 3     situation to choose between the truth on the one hand and life on the

 4     other hand.  Not only his own life but the life of his nearest and

 5     dearest.  He made the logical choice.  And that most people would perhaps

 6     do in his position.  I don't know else I could explain that, namely that

 7     an officer makes this kind of statements.  Personally, I'm convinced that

 8     quite simply he was forced into doing that and that he had no choice,

 9     either to say this or to lose someone close to him or his very own life.

10     That's my assessment.  That is what I think of him as a witness.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know the reason why someone would want to have

12     him killed, and if so, who is it who would threaten him in that way?

13        A.   Well, of course, first of all, it would be the members of the

14     terrorist army.  He was within the army --

15             JUDGE PARKER:  Is this evidence we are to accept as something of

16     the knowledge of the witness, or is the witness trying to imagine a

17     possible explanation?  It has not been made clear.

18             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is a witness who

19     knows Nike Peraj personally, and he had the opportunity of spending quite

20     a bit of time with him.  He was his immediate superior.  Knowing the man

21     and knowing the situation that prevailed in Kosovo and Metohija at the

22     time in 1998 and especially in 1999, I think -- I assumed that --

23             JUDGE PARKER:  I think you are answering at length the answer

24     shortly being this is the witness's imagination.  He is trying to find an

25     explanation.  If that is the case, could you move on to the next.

Page 11422

 1             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  Very well, I'll move on to my

 2     next question.

 3             Could we please have on our screens D006-4389.

 4        Q.   It's tab 26 in your binder.  Yes.  General, the date of this

 5     document is the 3rd of May, 1999.  It says:  "Information concerning

 6     attempted rape."  If you know this document, could you tell us briefly

 7     what it's about?

 8        A.   Yes.  This is a document that I signed, and we are sending it on

 9     to the corps command.  We are sending a report on what had happened,

10     attempted rape, that is.  It was committed by two soldiers in the area of

11     Osek Hilja.  We are informing the corps command about what we had done.

12     Of course, the soldiers were arrested and handed over to the security

13     organs and further on to the military judiciary.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document,

16     Your Honours.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00706.

19             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'd like to see

20     D008-0027.

21        Q.   Number 27 in your binder.  General, we see a document of yours

22     dated the 4th of May, 1999, that you are sending to the Pristina Corps.

23     And you are saying where the civilian population is deployed.  I'm

24     interested in paragraph 3 that says:

25             "The town of Djakovica has a population of 35.000 to 40.000 and

Page 11423

 1     there are another 20.000 to 25.000 inhabitants in villages."

 2             First of all, can you tell us on the basis of which information

 3     did you in turn send this information on?

 4        A.   We forwarded this information on the basis of the information

 5     that we received from the municipal authorities, from the municipal

 6     government, that of course had information about the local population.

 7     Also we received information from members of the MUP.  They have records

 8     of the civilian population as well.  So this document is based on that.

 9             We did not do any counting.  We simply base that document on that

10     information that we received.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What is your information, what was the population of

12     Djakovica before the NATO bombing started?

13        A.   Before the aggression started, the population of Djakovica was

14     between 50- and 55.000.  That is in total.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do you have any information as to how many Serbs

16     there were in Djakovica before the NATO aggression started?

17        A.   About 3.500 Serbs were there before the NATO aggression started.

18        Q.   After the NATO aggression started and during the NATO aggression,

19     do you have any information about how many Serbs left the area of

20     Djakovica?

21        A.   About 50 per cent of the Serbs left the area of Djakovica.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could this document

24     please be tendered.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

Page 11424

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00707.

 2             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, while we are discussing the people who left the

 4     territory of Kosovo and Metohija, do you know why, what the reasons were

 5     for people leaving, especially the territory of the municipality where

 6     you were yourself?

 7        A.   Of course I know because I was there all the time.  There are

 8     several reasons.  The first and basic reason is fear from indiscriminate

 9     persistent NATO bombing.  That is the first and basic reason.  And

10     especially fear of ammunition containing depleted uranium.  The next

11     reason is fear of cross-fire because while the NATO aggression was on,

12     terrorists were also very active and fighting against terrorists was

13     taking place on the ground.

14             The third reason was the persistent propaganda and fear of

15     retaliation if they would not move out.  Quite simply, the situation was

16     such down there that a normal person could hardly take it.  I am an air

17     defence officer, and I was afraid.  I can tell you that there were

18     officers who were afraid and who fled.  There were soldiers who didn't

19     dare leave shelters.  Fear is a normal phenomenon, especially for those

20     who do not know and who cannot seek shelter or mask themselves and take

21     other measures in order to protect themselves from air-strikes.

22             Also, it is hard to leave first, but it is also hard to be the

23     last person to stay.  It was very hard for someone to stay if everybody

24     was leaving.  It was hard to say, I'm just going to stay on.  People were

25     afraid and that is only human.  That is what I see as the reason for

Page 11425

 1     population movements.  That is valid anywhere in the world.  So that went

 2     for Serbs, Siptars.  It was actually even stronger among the Siptars

 3     because it also had to do with propaganda and calls made to them.  Serbs

 4     were running for their lives, the Albanians were running for their lives

 5     too from the bombing.  However, they had their own guides, they had

 6     certain localities as to where they were supposed to show up, at what

 7     point in time, which routes they would take and so on.

 8             Yesterday, I talked about what happened in Meja, and I concluded

 9     that the man who was in front of them was just their guide, nothing else,

10     and I can explain that very easily.  I can explain on the basis of what I

11     am alleging that.

12        Q.   Thank you, General.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D006-4401 next.

14        Q.   General, it is your tab 29.  It is your order of the 11th of May,

15     1999.  I'm interested in item 1.  It says:

16             "Use all available measures within your jurisdiction to prevent

17     any attempt at crime or its occurrence in the unit's combat disposition

18     sectors.  Vigorously prosecute and apply other measures against

19     perpetrators."

20             So May 11.  Can you comment briefly?

21        A.   This is in no way different to other orders.  We systematically

22     monitored this persistent trend of respecting international humanitarian

23     law and fair combat, although it is difficult to wage a war fairly

24     against terrorists.  In any case, we strove in any situation and at any

25     level to undertake all necessary measures in order to avoid the situation

Page 11426

 1     in which unsoldierly conduct could serve as yet another excuse for the

 2     population to move and to leave their residence, place of residence.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document into

 5     evidence, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00708.

 8             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Honour, I have two

 9     or three documents left that I wanted to use, and I will move through

10     them quickly.  I wanted to ask you this:  Since the documents in question

11     are maps drawn up by this witness, as such were not on the 65 ter list

12     forwarded to the OTP, although we included them in the notification of

13     documents we may use with this witness, if there is no objection by my

14     learned colleague, I wanted to show those maps to the witness.

15             JUDGE PARKER:  I see that your learned colleague is again

16     co-operative with your wishes, so please continue, Mr. Popovic.

17             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for that.  Could we

18     please have D010-2340.

19        Q.   General, please look at the screen since I think you will be able

20     to see things much more clearly than in the binder and the hard copy you

21     have in front of you.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] It is D011-2340.  That's the map.

23     Thank you.

24        Q.   General, the title is "Deployment of the Units of the 52nd ARBR

25     During the NATO Aggression."  Are you familiar with this map?  If you

Page 11427

 1     are, could you please tell us who created the map and what is the

 2     information contained therein?

 3        A.   The map is familiar because I created it based on a number of

 4     documents and war diaries of my subordinate units, as well as

 5     co-operating units.  We can't make things out clearly, but the map shows

 6     the positions of the units of the 52nd Air Defence Brigade.

 7        Q.   General, we can see the key in the lower left-hand side corner.

 8     It says, Deployment of the 52nd ARBR before the 9th of April, and then

 9     after the 9th of April.  Can you clarify why this is so?

10             MR. POPOVIC:  [Interpretation]Yes, this is much better.  Could we

11     zoom out now so that we could see the different colours and so that the

12     witness could explain to us what each colour means.  Perhaps we could use

13     the magic pen by Your Honours' leave.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We have two periods here.  One is

15     before the attempted land phase of the aggression.  That is to say,

16     before the attack on Kosare and afterwards.  Before the attack on Kosare,

17     the brigade units were concentrated mostly around the town of Djakovica

18     in certain areas and locations from which they were able to engage

19     air-space targets.  In keeping with the envisaged tactics of the use of

20     those units.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   What colour was used for that?

23        A.   I can't really make out the colours because it is unclear as it

24     is.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in.  I think

Page 11428

 1     it is yellow.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think so too.  Yes.  So mostly

 3     around Djakovica.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] That's good.  Thank you.  Much

 5     better.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the colour we can see.

 7     After the 9th of April and after the land phase of the aggression began,

 8     given the intended purpose of the brigade units, they were deployed

 9     throughout Kosovo and Metohija with the aim of defending certain elements

10     of the corps command deployment.  In Djakovica what was left there was

11     the command and the logistics battalion.  In the general area of

12     Djakovica, there was the 3rd Artillery Battalion, as you can see here.

13     This is the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion was sent to the area of

14     Kijevo.  The 2nd Battalion to the area of Pristina.  Am I of moving this

15     or is someone else?

16             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   No, it's not you.

18        A.   The 3rd Battalion was in Djakovica and Pec, the 1st Battalion in

19     Kijevo, the 4th Battalion in the area of Pristina, and the 2nd Battalion

20     in the area Gnjilane.  Their task was to defend the air-space concerned

21     and defend certain facilities which may be attacked in the course of the

22     land phase of the aggression which was expected to take place.  Kosare

23     was a clear indication of the possibility of such an aggression.

24        Q.   Thank you.  General, we can see certain parts, boxes with text.

25     What is the text about?

Page 11429

 1        A.   I symbolically tried to indicate where -- the places where

 2     certain members of my unit were killed by either terrorists or NATO

 3     aircraft, as well as to indicate the locations at which NATO airplanes

 4     targeted civilians in separate incidents.  I can't make everything out on

 5     this map.

 6        Q.   We needn't go into any further detail.  It is all in evidence.

 7             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] In any case, I seek to tender this

 8     document into evidence, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00709.

11             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we next have D011-2349.  It

12     is another map.

13        Q.   General, it might again be easier for you to follow this on the

14     screen.  The title of this document is, "Locations Targeted by NATO

15     Aviation in Kosovo and Metohija."  Tell us, are you familiar with this

16     document?

17        A.   Yes, I am.  I created it based on the war diaries of my units, as

18     well as those of the co-operating units and after various analyses, we

19     made after the NATO aggression was ended.  This is what we tried to

20     indicate on this map.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on the

22     bottom part of the document.  Thank you.

23        Q.   Can you see the key as well as civilian losses due to NATO

24     targeting in Kosovo and Metohija?

25        A.   I can see it.

Page 11430

 1        Q.   What does the key say?

 2        A.   Place of attack, attack on a column, use of depleted uranium, as

 3     well as attacks per units and areas in Kosovo by month.  Had we gone into

 4     any further detail, the map would have become illegible, but we can see

 5     here clearly what locations were hit during the first month of the

 6     aggression, the second, and the third.  They are indicated in different

 7     colour.

 8             For example, in red we have the period between the 24th of March

 9     and the 25th of April.  In blue, between the 25th of April and the 24th

10     of May.  In yellow, between the 25th of May and the 11th of June.  We

11     also have separate indications of attacks which took place on the -- on

12     Orthodox Christmas.  This was quite illustrative of their tactics because

13     they wouldn't let us rest even during our Christmas.  This was disastrous

14     for our combat morale and morale amongst the civilians.  When we were in

15     such a position to hear of our soldiers and civilians being killed during

16     Christmas.

17        Q.   You said that the period between the 25th of April and 24th of

18     May was in red.  It seems orange to me?

19        A.   Yes, you are right.  I'm having difficulty seeing the true

20     colours of this map.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Please leave it as it is.  Again we see certain text

22     boxes.  What do those boxes contain?  What kind of events?

23        A.   In the textural part, I specified those locations at which

24     civilians were killed.  For example, on the 3rd of May there was an

25     attack by a NATO aircraft against a civilian bus where 17 people were

Page 11431

 1     killed and 44 wounded.  On the 14th of April, a refugee column in Meja,

 2     which we have mentioned.  Next the 1st of May, attack on a civilian bus

 3     in Lucani on an overpass where 40 civilians were killed.  Among those

 4     civilians, there were parents who went to visit their sons in Kosovo and

 5     Metohija.  On the 13th of May, a refugee column was attacked in Korisa on

 6     the 22nd of April, a refugee centre was attacked in Bistrazin

 7     accommodating the refugees from Republika Srpska Krajina, they were there

 8     on a cattle farm.  This is all indicated in symbolic terms, but in

 9     addition to indicating the locations, we also wanted to indicate where

10     depleted uranium was used.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on the

13     bottom right-hand side corner.  There is a table there.

14        Q.   In it we have civilian losses due to NATO attacks in Kosovo and

15     Metohija.  Can you comment the table itself?

16        A.   Yes.  We have civilian losses indicated here, but only when such

17     events occurred in groups and where there was a number of casualties in a

18     single location.  This does not indicate individual buildings being

19     targeted when individuals were killed or if a single vehicle was

20     attacked.  And we know that occasionally they even targeted individual

21     passenger vehicles on the move.  This only indicates the more important

22     events which in a way attracted some media attention and that were

23     reported about and whereby the explanation offered was that it was all

24     collateral damage.  For example, Aleksinac, Surdulica and others were

25     attacked as well, but that was in Serbia proper.  This table only shows

Page 11432

 1     the figures in Kosovo itself.  In total, 320 civilians were killed there

 2     in only these few individual actions by NATO aircraft.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please go back to the

 5     central part of the document.

 6        Q.   General, I see certain triangles here.  What were they used for?

 7     Can you also tell us what were the usual targets of NATO aircraft?

 8        A.   Each of the triangles indicates a single air attack.  An attack

 9     could mean a single bomb or a single missile or 20 missiles or 20 bombs

10     or 300 pieces of ammunition with depleted uranium.  So an attack as such,

11     this does not indicate hits or type of ammo because that would have been

12     very difficult to count.  All this happens at high velocity from great

13     heights.  This merely indicates the number of individual attacks.  We can

14     see here that all the attacks were mainly concentrated around populated

15     areas, such as Pristina, which was in the lead.  Next Prizren, and

16     Djakovica.  To some extent it was also Gnjilane and Urosevac.  But this

17     axis from Srbica via Pristina down to Kacanik, and the other prong

18     between Istok, Klina, Djakovica, and Prizren all the way down to Albania.

19     These were the two prongs of their attacks.  They were basically

20     directing people towards Albania or Macedonia.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.  I tender this

22     document into evidence.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00710.

25             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  And the last document

Page 11433

 1     D006-4412.

 2        Q.   General, that is tab 34 in your binder.  I would not dwell on

 3     this one for a long time as it is about the NATO attack in zone 2 of the

 4     549th Motorised Brigade.  Can you just tell me if you are familiar with

 5     this document, who drew it up, and on the basis of what information?

 6        A.   Yes, it's a document that talks about who attacked and with how

 7     many projectiles on Djakovica and the environs.  As the 2nd Motorised

 8     Battalion had its own defence zone in that area, this is a document which

 9     was drawn up only on the basis of the war diary of the commander of the

10     2nd Motorised Battalion.  And it depicts the kinds of ordnance used, what

11     was dropped where in his defence zone.  The time is not depicted here,

12     but the ordnance is, so we can see rockets, bombs, cluster bombs, then

13     there are flash bombs which were dropped in the Kosare region.  Then also

14     ammunition with depleted uranium.  Then we also have one marking for

15     attacks on the refugee column, and also attacks on the refugee

16     settlement.  That was his zone of responsibility as the infantry units do

17     have a zone of responsibility by contrast to anti-aircraft units.

18             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I tender this document

19     into evidence.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00711.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, did you ever hear during 1998 or 1999, that there was a

24     plan or agreement in the Yugoslav Army to expel the Albanian population

25     from the territory of Kosovo?

Page 11434

 1        A.   I assert that I never heard about such a plan from anyone.

 2        Q.   During 1998 or 1999, did you ever see or hear that there was a

 3     plan or an agreement within the Yugoslav Army to change the ethnic

 4     composition of the population in Kosovo by expelling the Albanian

 5     population?

 6        A.   No.  Just like in the answer to my previous question, I never

 7     heard or saw that there was such a plan from anyone, nor did I implement

 8     any sort of plan, nor did I do any such thing, nor did I receive any

 9     orders that might support such a plan.  So I energetically refute any

10     possibility that I was ever aware of the existence of any kind of plan

11     aimed at changing the ethnic composition of the population of Kosovo and

12     Metohija.

13        Q.   General, when you attending meetings as the garrison commander

14     and met up with civilian authorities and the MUP organs, did you ever

15     hear or see or discuss any kind of plan to expel the Kosovo Albanians and

16     change the ethnic composition of Kosovo?

17        A.   Never.  Not at a single meeting.  I have said what we discussed

18     at these meetings and that was the sole reason for us to meet when that

19     was possible considering the dangers both from the enemy, from the

20     air-space, and also the Siptar terrorist forces on the ground.

21             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] General, thank you.  I hereby end

22     my direct examination.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Popovic.

24             Ms. Kravetz.

25             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 11435

 1                           Cross-examination by Ms. Kravetz:

 2        Q.   Good afternoon, General.

 3        A.   Good afternoon.

 4        Q.   Yesterday during the course of your testimony you told us that

 5     from mid-1998 to the end of 1999, you were the commander of the 52nd

 6     Artillery Rocket Brigade and were based in Djakovica municipality;

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Yes, in the town of Djakovica.

 9        Q.   And you also told us that you, in your capacity as commander of

10     this brigade, you regularly toured your units, the units of this brigade?

11        A.   Yes, that is correct.

12        Q.   And if I understood correctly, you also had frequent or regular

13     meetings with the senior officers of your brigade, that is with battalion

14     commanders, company commanders?

15        A.   Yes, not with all officers, but with commanding officers and

16     organs of the command.  I had meetings with organs of the command on a

17     daily basis and with the commanding officers as necessary.  Considering

18     that certain artillery battalions and their commanders were deployed very

19     far away, for example, in Gnjilane or in Pristina or Kijevo, wherever an

20     artillery battalion was deployed, its commander was also there.  That was

21     why I had regular meetings with command organs and occasionally, and

22     mostly while I was touring the units, I would talk with the commanders of

23     these units and the officers who were in charge of the units.

24        Q.   And where did these daily meetings that you had with commanding

25     officers take place?

Page 11436

 1        A.   Until the beginning of the NATO aggression, we held the meetings

 2     at the commander's office in the Metohija barracks or in the Devet

 3     Jugovica barracks.  My unit was deployed into these two barracks in

 4     Djakovica town.  Most often they were held at the Metohija barracks where

 5     my command was located.  After the beginning of the NATO aggression, we

 6     kept moving from one location to another.

 7        Q.   So after the beginning of the NATO campaign, your command post

 8     moved from different -- or was based in different locations, you moved;

 9     is that correct?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   Sir, you also told us that your direct superior, while you held

12     this position of brigade commander, was General Lazarevic, the Pristina

13     Corps Commander; correct?

14        A.   In the first period it was General Pavkovic.  And then beginning,

15     I think, at the new year or since the end of 1998, it was General

16     Vladimir Lazarevic.

17        Q.   Thank you, yes.  And the main command post of the Pristina Corps,

18     was in Pristina?

19        A.   It was the same as with the brigade.  Until the beginning of the

20     aggression, it was in the building of the Pristina Corps Command, and

21     then after that once the aggression began, it was also moved to various

22     locations either within the town or in the surrounding area.

23        Q.   And as a brigade commander, did you have the duty to send regular

24     reports to the Pristina Corps commander, be that General Pavkovic in 1998

25     or General Lazarevic in 1999?  Was that one of your duties?

Page 11437

 1        A.   Yes.  We sent daily reports but we had an advantage because a

 2     forward command post of the Pristina Corps was located in Djakovica all

 3     the time so we could bring the telegrams physically to them, but in any

 4     case, they were considered reports like any others, so the answer is yes,

 5     we did inform the command about all events.

 6        Q.   And in these daily reports you would have included any activities

 7     your units were engaged in, any losses, any events that took place in

 8     which your unit participated?

 9        A.   As for combat reports, which we sent regularly, they had their

10     usual format.  For example, under item 1, enemy activities were

11     described.  And then under item 2, activities of our forces would follow.

12     Item 3, related to certain events such as those which you just mentioned.

13     And finally, expenditure of ammunition and fuel would be included, and I

14     think the last fifth item was the situation on the roads.  Everything

15     that was important for a unit to able to function normally.

16        Q.   And if we just focus on 1999 when General Lazarevic was commander

17     of the Pristina Corps, in addition to sending these regular daily reports

18     and the combat reports that you've spoken about, did you also participate

19     in meetings or briefings with other brigade commanders and with General

20     Lazarevic?

21        A.   That happened perhaps once or twice as far as I can remember at

22     the command in Pristina.  Just once or twice throughout the NATO

23     aggression in 1999.  The commanders were in different places.  It was

24     very difficult and dangerous to reach Pristina, and commanders were

25     mainly in charge of operations.  They had to carry out their basic tasks,

Page 11438

 1     and, as I said, it was very risky and dangerous to travel around Kosovo

 2     and Metohija, especially since the beginning of the NATO aggression, but

 3     even before that.

 4        Q.   I understand, sir.  And did General Lazarevic tour his units

 5     deployed in the field, the different brigades?  I'm speaking about the

 6     period in 1999.

 7        A.   Yes, he did tour them.  As a rule, a plan of a tour of units is

 8     made or it could be by the commander's personal decision.  He was doing

 9     that.  Just like I was touring my own units, he was also touring his

10     subordinated units, and he was doing that very frequently.

11        Q.   And based on your interactions with General Lazarevic and the

12     time you worked together when you held this position of brigade

13     commander, would you say that he was commanding officer that kept himself

14     well informed of what was going on in the ground, of events on the ground

15     and the activities of his units?  Would that be a fair assessment of

16     General Lazarevic?

17        A.   General Lazarevic was a commander whom any officer would wish for

18     his superior in every respect.  It was important for him to know what the

19     situation was like in units.  It was important for him to receive

20     reports.  He tried to help us so he was a fine man and a fine commanding

21     officer.

22        Q.   And based on that answer you gave, sir, would it be fair to say

23     if any large-scale operation had took place that involved units of the

24     Pristina Corps, General Lazarevic would be aware of such an operation?

25     He would be aware of the details of these operations?

Page 11439

 1        A.   I would use the word action rather than operation.  Operation is

 2     a very general term.  In military terminology, the word "operation"

 3     implies a huge area, numerous forces, a period of time varying between 5

 4     to 10 days, and so on.  Actions were carried out in Kosovo and Metohija,

 5     and there was only one operation being carried out and it was the

 6     operation of defence against the NATO air campaign.

 7        Q.   Thank you for that correction, sir.  I am a layperson and I may

 8     confuse terms which for you are very clear and very distinct.

 9             Sir, just going back to my question, based on the answer you gave

10     that General Lazarevic was a commander whom any officer would like to

11     have as his superior in every respect, would it be fair to say, sir, that

12     if he -- if there were any large-scale actions which involved units of

13     the Pristina Corps Command, he would be fully informed of some -- of

14     these actions, of the details of such actions?

15        A.   He would be informed if conditions were such that he could be

16     informed.  What do I mean by that?  There were certain days on which due

17     to the attacks of NATO aircraft all our communication systems were

18     destroyed, and it was difficult to maintain courier service also because

19     of this disruption of communication.  But believe me, whenever it was

20     possible for him to be informed, he demanded to be informed.  However,

21     there were situations, even in my own unit, when for as much as five days

22     I could not get in touch with my artillery battalion deployed in Kijevo

23     or for example in Gnjilane.

24        Q.   Thank you, I understand that, sir.  You've spoken about the

25     forward command post of the Pristina Corps, and you said that it was

Page 11440

 1     based throughout in Djakovica, and would I be correct to understand that

 2     you were referring to both the period of 1998 and 1999?

 3        A.   Yes, you are right, both.

 4        Q.   In 1998, General Lazarevic was Chief of Staff of the Pristina

 5     Corps; correct?

 6        A.   Correct.

 7        Q.   And, sir, is it also correct that he was based almost very

 8     regularly or permanently at the forward command post of the Pristina

 9     Corps in Djakovica during that period, I'm talking about 1998?

10        A.   That's right.

11        Q.   Do you recall who was the Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps,

12     or who became Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps in 1999 when General

13     Lazarevic was promoted to commander of the Pristina Corps?

14        A.   Yes, he was appointed commander and promoted to the rank of

15     general, but it doesn't matter.  I remember that it was Colonel Veroljub

16     Zivkovic who became Chief of Staff.  From that moment onwards, he was in

17     Djakovica.

18        Q.   So once Colonel Zivkovic became Chief of Staff, he was based at

19     the forward command post of the Pristina Corps in Djakovica?

20        A.   That's right.

21        Q.   And the purpose of this forward command post, would it be fair to

22     say that the purpose was to monitor closely the situation on the ground

23     in Djakovica and especially the situation along the border area?

24        A.   Well, you're right.  Military rules envisage that the so-called

25     forward command post should be positioned in areas that were under the

Page 11441

 1     highest degree of threat.  The commander should be there, the deputy

 2     commander, or an officer who they believe is professional enough to make

 3     appropriate decisions, but there has to be an authorisation for him to do

 4     that.

 5        Q.   And when you refer to the commander being at the forward command

 6     post, who are you speaking of?  Would this be Colonel Zivkovic, or were

 7     you speaking about someone else?

 8        A.   I said theoretically that it would be as follows:  At a command

 9     post as soon as the commander arrives there, it automatically becomes the

10     forward command post.  However, forward command post is always placed in

11     areas that are under the highest degree of threat, and it is usually the

12     Chief of Staff who is there.  Just like General Lazarevic was until he

13     became corps commander.  Also, Colonel Zivkovic, who later became a

14     general too, of course, he was also in Djakovica all the time.

15        Q.   Okay.  And you've told us that General Lazarevic regularly toured

16     units in the field.  I take it, sir, that he would also -- if the need

17     arose, he would also come to the forward command post in Djakovica?

18        A.   Whenever General Lazarevic came to tour the unit in Djakovica, he

19     regularly went to the command post, and then we, the commanders who were

20     closest to Djakovica would come as well.  So that would be myself, the

21     commander of the border battalion, that is to say all of those who

22     gravitate towards that particular position.

23             General Lazarevic never came to the command post or to Djakovica

24     without me knowing about that.  That is, after all, what military rules

25     call for, namely that the brigade commander has to be informed of the

Page 11442

 1     arrival of the corps commander, although it is his right to come whenever

 2     he so wishes.

 3        Q.   I understand, sir.  And once the NATO bombing campaign began in

 4     1999, did the forward command post at Djakovica move locations in the

 5     same way that you've explained the Pristina Corps Command in Pristina

 6     moved locations?

 7        A.   Yes, yes.  That change did take place from the barracks Devet

 8     Jugovica where it was before the aggression, the forward command post was

 9     moved according to the same system according to which I moved my command

10     post.  That is the principle involved with regard to all units, that they

11     should be on the move all the time, as it were.

12        Q.   So I understand from that answer that it did not have a fixed

13     location once the NATO campaign began in 1999?  Speaking about the

14     Djakovica forward command post?

15        A.   Well, that command post moved less frequently than, say, my

16     command post, but it was not at a single place all the time either.

17        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Yesterday during the course of your testimony

18     you were shown the war diary of your brigade, and I don't want to go into

19     too much detail, so I'm not going to bring it up on the screen, but do

20     you remember, sir, discussing with my learned colleague and Mr. Popovic

21     the war diary of your brigade?

22        A.   Yes, I remember that.

23        Q.   And if I understood your evidence yesterday correctly, you

24     indicated that all important events that concern your brigade were

25     recorded in this war diary?

Page 11443

 1        A.   For the most part.  For the most part.  Sometimes something could

 2     have been missed but for the most part that was the case.

 3        Q.   So this would include any losses suffered but your brigade, any

 4     activities the units were engaged, attacks or any incidents that concern

 5     the units in your brigade, correct?  This would be the type of

 6     information that you -- that would be included in this war diary?

 7        A.   Yes, for the most part.

 8        Q.   Now, just a moment ago we were talking about reporting and your

 9     reporting duties to the Pristina Corps Command.  In your reports to your

10     superiors -- or would the reports to your superiors correspond, meaning

11     in the terms of information contained within those reports, with the

12     information that had been included or written down in the war diary of

13     your brigade?

14        A.   Well, not necessarily.  Not necessarily because the form of a

15     combat report is strictly prescribed.  It is exactly stated what should

16     be included under which paragraph.  Whereas a war diary does not have a

17     particular form.  In that case --

18        Q.   Sir, if I can just interrupt you there.  I understand the

19     distinction.  Maybe I'll just make my question simpler.

20             Would the reports to your superiors coincide, to a large extent

21     with what -- I'm just speaking about the information included in the war

22     diary, that is information about activities, events, losses suffered by

23     the brigade, et cetera?  I understand the format is completely different,

24     we've seen examples of reports here in this court.

25        A.   Well, in most cases.  Some things may have been missed, but as a

Page 11444

 1     rule that should be the case.  However, perhaps there's something else I

 2     should add.  For instance, in the war diary, the amount of ammunition or

 3     fuel spent was never recorded.  Also what the situation of the roads was,

 4     things like that.  That was an integral part of the combat report.

 5             However, key events in the brigade were usually recorded there.

 6     Perhaps sometimes there may have been some omissions or, well, the

 7     problem was that combat reports regularly had to be sent by 1600 hours.

 8     By 1600 hours, we had to file our combat reports.  If something would

 9     happen after 1600 hours on that day, then such an event would not be

10     included in the combat report for that day.

11             Things are different with the war diary.  The war diary wasn't

12     sent anywhere.  It was at the command all the time so every event could

13     have been recorded in the war diary, even those that were not recorded in

14     the combat report for that day.

15        Q.   And just one final question before we take the break, just to

16     finish with this topic.  You said that if an event took place after 1600

17     hours, that would not go in the combat -- the daily combat report.  But

18     would that -- but it would go in the war diary.  But if I understand,

19     based on what you've told us of reporting, that it would be included in

20     the next day's combat report, so it would be reported on?

21        A.   Yes.  Yes.  If it was of particular significance.

22             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, sir.  Your Honours, I see it's time for

23     the first break.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  We will have the break now and resume

25     at 4.15.

Page 11445

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2                           --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 4.19 p.m.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.  Yes, Ms. Kravetz.

 6             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   Sir, yesterday during the course of your evidence, you told us

 8     that in addition to being brigade commander, you were also commander of

 9     the Djakovica garrison; correct?

10        A.   Yes, that's right.

11        Q.   And you told us that during 1998 and 1999 from time to time to

12     resolve specific matters, you would meet with the president of the

13     municipality and the chief of the Djakovica SUP?

14        A.   Yes, that's what I said.

15        Q.   Do you recall the name of the chief of the Djakovica SUP in 1998,

16     who he was?

17        A.   His last name was Adamovic in 1998.  I cannot remember his first

18     name, but I know his last name was Adamovic.

19        Q.   Would the person that you are referring to be a Mr. Dusko

20     Adamovic; is that the person you are speaking about?

21        A.   Possibly Dusko, but know it's Adamovic, and I know that he left

22     that position at the end of the year.

23        Q.   And when he left that position at the end of 1998, who replaced

24     him?  Do you remember the name of the person who replaced him?

25        A.   Yes, I remember.  He was replaced by his deputy until then,

Page 11446

 1     Colonel Milovan Kovacevic.

 2        Q.   Did Colonel Kovacevic remain in the position of the chief of the

 3     Djakovica SUP throughout the period of the NATO bombing campaign?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now, yesterday, and this starts at transcript page 11381, you

 6     told us that in 1999 you had talks or meetings with these persons, the

 7     chief of the SUP -- the chief of the Djakovica SUP and the president of

 8     the municipality, and you said that you would meet occasionally in order

 9     to resolve specific issues.  Do you recall saying that, sir?

10        A.   Yes, I recall that.

11        Q.   And on the next page, this is 11382, you said during these

12     meetings you did not go into the subject of activities or tasks of

13     others, they were very brief meetings, short meetings, sometimes you said

14     even standing up, you wouldn't even sit down.  Do you recall saying that,

15     sir?

16        A.   Yes, that's what I said.

17        Q.   So I understand from the evidence that you gave yesterday that

18     you would meet with the president of the municipality and Mr. Kovacevic

19     since we are talking about 1999, only when the need arose.  These were

20     not regular meetings, they were only occasional meetings?

21        A.   You are right, yes.

22        Q.   And there would be no exchange of information during these

23     meetings about the activities that you were carrying out or that the MUP

24     was carrying out, you wouldn't have any sort of exchange of information

25     of the tasks each other was carrying out?

Page 11447

 1        A.   No, we would meet briefly and only in order to deal with the

 2     matter at hand.  Not everybody would be there every time.  Sometimes it

 3     was only myself and the president of the municipality.  Sometimes perhaps

 4     it was the president of the municipality and Mr. Kovacevic.  But we would

 5     just meet in order to resolve a particular problem.  We did not go into

 6     other obligations or discussions or tasks, and we didn't have time to do

 7     so either.

 8        Q.   And do you recall the name of the president of the municipality

 9     in 1999?  Who was he?

10        A.   I think his first name was Milan or perhaps Momcilo, but his last

11     name was Stanojevic.  I think it was Momcilo Stanojevic.

12        Q.   And yesterday when you were referring to these meetings, you said

13     the types of issues that were discussed were water-supply, power supply,

14     those types of things, no?

15        A.   Yes, for the most part.

16        Q.   Sir, you've told us that you testified before in the Milosevic

17     case, and I wanted to read a passage when you were put questions by

18     Mr. Milosevic in relation to these meetings.  Do you recall testifying in

19     the Milosevic case about these meetings that you held with the SUP chiefs

20     and the chief of the municipality?

21        A.   Well, I don't remember that particular question, but if that's

22     what the transcript says, I'm sure that no one just made it up.

23        Q.   Okay.  So the passage I'm referring to starts at page 45405, and

24     Mr. Milosevic in this passage is asking you about events in Djakovica

25     municipality.  Specifically he is asking you about a massacre on Ymer

Page 11448

 1     Grezda Street and which was -- had allegedly taken place on the 26th of

 2     March, 1999.  And you were asked:

 3             "And you were the commander of the Djakovica garrison at the time

 4     were you not?"

 5             And you say:  "Yes.  I was the commander of the Djakovica

 6     garrison at the time, and I did have talks with the president of the

 7     municipality and also head of the Ministry of Interior."

 8             And later on you were asked:

 9             "When you say talks, did you have regular meetings, you were the

10     garrison commander?"

11             You say:  "Yes."

12             "Did you have any regular meetings with those leaders, civilian

13     police, and other leaders at the level of Djakovica municipality?"

14             And you said:  "Yes.  We did have meetings from time to time.

15     When the need arose."

16             "How frequent would they be?"

17             And you say:  "Well, two or three times a week depending on the

18     situation.  And therefore we exchanged information, each other's

19     information, and at no point did I receive any information to that effect

20     which would indicate that anything like that was going on in town or had

21     happened in town."

22             Do you recall giving that testimony, sir?

23        A.   I believe that that is what I said.  If that is what is written

24     there, but I believe that that is what I said.  However, there's

25     something else I would like to add.  When I say "meetings," I would have

Page 11449

 1     an officer in my unit who was in charge of garrison affairs and that was

 2     Major Zdravko Vinter.  He went to these meetings more often when it was

 3     necessary if matters in town were being dealt with.  That's what I meant.

 4     But anyway, what I did say was true.

 5        Q.   Now, on the next page of this transcript, this is 45406, you are

 6     asked again about the same event I referred to, and Mr. Milosevic says:

 7             "Could something like that have happened without you knowing?"

 8             And you say:

 9             "No, that could not have happened.  Something like that could not

10     have happened without me knowing about it.  Learning about it from the

11     head of the municipality or from the chief of the police in Djakovica."

12             Do you recall giving that evidence, sir?

13        A.   As for the chief of SUP and the president of the municipality, I

14     did not mean them personally just like I as commander of the unit always

15     have someone to stand in for me.  I did not mean that the president of

16     the municipality would have to call me personally or that Milan Kovacevic

17     would have to call me personally.  Rather, one of my officers would find

18     out in the municipality or in the MUP if something like that had

19     happened.  That's what I meant.  It's not that I met up with them every

20     day or that I have occasion to do that.

21        Q.   You did say, sir, that something like that could not have

22     happened without you knowing are learning from it from the chief of the

23     municipality or from the head of the municipality of the chief of police

24     of Djakovica, so you are speaking about your personal knowledge that you

25     would -- information that you would have obtained from them?

Page 11450

 1        A.   That's what I think to this day.  Had something like that

 2     happened, I probably would have found out.  I've already said quite a few

 3     of my officers lived in Djakovica and they would hear this information

 4     and I would know about it.  Once I would find out, I would notify my

 5     superiors.  However, I did not receive any information about these

 6     alleged events or did I know about any such thing.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all microphones

 8     please be switched off when the witness is speaking.  Thank you.

 9             MS. KRAVETZ:

10        Q.   Sir, but the testimony you provided in that case in relation to

11     these meetings that you held with the SUP chief of Djakovica and the

12     president of the municipality is quite different than the one you gave

13     yesterday.  You, in fact, said these meetings were regular, you exchanged

14     information, and you are even suggesting that information on crimes would

15     have been exchanged at these meetings.

16        A.   When I say an exchange of information concerning crimes, I still

17     assert there -- there was information -- had there been information in

18     circulation about the existence of certain crimes, I would have known

19     about it.  I would have either been told that by the municipal organs or

20     by my officers who were in town.

21             I have no knowledge of such crimes, and I don't think I said that

22     I had any knowledge of those crimes back then.

23        Q.   Sir, I'm just asking about the evidence you gave on these

24     meetings.  Would you agree with me, sir, based on the previous testimony

25     that we read out that these meetings, in fact, were not occasional, but

Page 11451

 1     that they occurred on a regular basis, sometimes two and three times a

 2     week?

 3        A.   No.  Not me personally with the municipal president and the chief

 4     of MUP.

 5        Q.   But during your previous testimony, you did not make that

 6     distinction.  In fact, you said that you would meet with them, you said:

 7     "Yes, we did have meetings, and we exchanged information."  You were

 8     speaking about yourself attending these meetings.

 9        A.   At the time I either said occasionally or I misunderstood the

10     interpretation.  May have not been sufficiently attentive.

11             MS. KRAVETZ:  I see my learned colleague is on his feet, but.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

13             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Concerning this

14     question, although we already have an answer, concerning the part

15     Ms. Kravetz read out, the response was that two or three meetings were

16     held, but never did the witness say that he attended them personally.

17     That is why I objected to the way this question was put.

18             JUDGE PARKER:  That can be dealt with in re-examination if you

19     wish.  Thank you.

20             Carry on, please, Ms. Kravetz.

21             MS. KRAVETZ:

22        Q.   Sir, just to finish off with these meetings, you told us

23     yesterday that there was no exchange of information on -- no exchange of

24     information about each other's tasks, but you did say before that the

25     purpose of these meetings was to exchange information, correct?

Page 11452

 1        A.   The purpose of those meetings was not exclusively to exchange

 2     information.  For example, from the chief of MUP, I received information

 3     of my soldiers for attempted rape in Crmljan I received that piece of

 4     information from him because there was a police unit there at Crmljan and

 5     a bit further afield there was a unit of mine there.  These two units

 6     were separate, having separate tasks.  The inhabitants complained to the

 7     police commander who was there.  The chief of MUP called me and told me

 8     about it.  The first piece of information I received about the attempted

 9     rape came from him.  This is what I also understand as exchange of

10     information.

11        Q.   So these meetings were not only about re-establishing

12     water-supply, but if there was any information about crimes committed in

13     the town, they would be discussed at these meetings?

14        A.   No.  He called me the very moment by phone when he learned about

15     it.  He did not wait until the meeting that was to be held the next day.

16     He called me right away to tell me that my soldiers had attempted to rape

17     two Albanian women in Crmljan.  This was not a process of gathering

18     information in order to present them at a meeting.  At the moment he

19     learned that, he called me.  I got that information from him immediately

20     given the circumstances and importance of that event because it was out

21     of the ordinary.

22        Q.   And just a last question in relation to this, when you were

23     responding to Mr. Milosevic, you said had any events as the ones he was

24     asking you about occurred, you would have learned that from the chief of

25     the Djakovica SUP or the head of the municipality.  This was information

Page 11453

 1     that was exchanged between you?

 2        A.   I still believe if something like that were to take place and if

 3     people knew about it, that he would let me know.  Why not?  One must

 4     notify others of crimes.  Whenever I learned of a crime, I took measures

 5     and informed my superiors.  I do not wish to depart from that rule.  I

 6     firmly believe if there is a crime, it should be made known.

 7        Q.   If you were to learn of any crimes involving MUP officers, would

 8     you inform the chief of the SUP about that?

 9        A.   Of course I would.

10        Q.   I want to move away from this topic, sir, and take you to an

11     exhibit that you were shown yesterday.

12             MS. KRAVETZ:  And this is D687.  If we could have that up on the

13     screen, please.

14        Q.   And this is a statement that you gave to the Commission For

15     Co-operation with the ICTY.  Do you recall looking at this statement

16     yesterday, going over it with my learned colleague?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   I just wanted to clarify something in relation to this statement

19     and which I'm not sure if it was clarified yesterday, and it concerns the

20     date.  We see in the Serbian version that the date indicated that this

21     statement was taken as the 28th of December 2002, while in the English

22     it's shown as November.  Which one is the correct date, sir?  Do you

23     recall if this was December as indicated in the Serbian when you gave

24     this statement to the commission?

25        A.   I think it was December, although I'm not completely certain.  I

Page 11454

 1     see no reason why I would have put anything differently.

 2        Q.   And if I understand your evidence in relation to how this

 3     statement came about, you said yesterday that you were called to an

 4     interview by this commission for co-operation?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And you said you were shown a book that was published by the

 7     Humanitarian Law Centre?

 8        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 9        Q.   The Humanitarian Law Centre, sir, is that an institute or

10     institution that's based in Belgrade and is headed by Natasha Kandic?

11        A.   I don't know where the seat of that organisation is.  Natasha

12     Kandic does appear in our media stating that she is the director of that

13     fund or of that centre.  I didn't even know much about the Humanitarian

14     Law Centre prior to the publishing of that book.

15        Q.   And in your statement, it indicates that this report which you've

16     been referring to as book was called a "Kosovo As Seen, As Told."

17        A.   I think that's the title of the book.

18        Q.   And I understand, sir, that you were shown portions of the book

19     relevant to the events described here in your statement?

20        A.   Yes, I was shown that.  Other commander were shown something

21     else.  They indicated certain passages from the book.

22        Q.   And just to understand how this statement came about, once you

23     were shown these portions of the book, what were you asked to do?

24        A.   They asked me to read a certain paragraph and to write what I

25     could recall about the specific event.

Page 11455

 1        Q.   And in the Milosevic case when you testified about this, and this

 2     is at page 45627, you indicated also that you had the book at your house

 3     for two days and you leafed through it and read the part relating to

 4     Djakovica?

 5        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 6        Q.   Are you aware, sir, that this publication by the Humanitarian Law

 7     Centre was the Serbian translation of a report that had been published

 8     some years prior by the OSCE under the same name, "As Seen, As Told," or

 9     "Kosovo, As Seen, As Told?"

10        A.   I supposed as much.  I supposed that it was a translation.

11        Q.   But you didn't see in the cover of the report that it said OSCE

12     human rights division?

13        A.   I didn't pay attention, but I'll take your word for it, why not.

14        Q.   And I imagine, sir, that when you read the portions of this

15     report that related to Djakovica, you realised or noticed that the

16     allegations contained within the report were based on statements taken

17     from refugees that had fled Kosovo during the events that we are

18     concerned with in 1999?

19        A.   I think that in the footnotes there were some initials.  I think

20     it said that these were statements of certain witnesses or refugees from

21     Kosovo and Metohija.

22        Q.   And these would have been Kosovo Albanian refugees that it also

23     would have been stated in the report, correct, who these persons cited in

24     the Djakovica section were?

25        A.   I don't know.  I don't remember who these people were.  It did

Page 11456

 1     say, though, that these were Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, if we just focus on the statement which is on the

 3     screen before us, I believe when you were going through this yesterday

 4     with my learned colleague you indicated that once -- I'm referring

 5     specifically to, I don't know if we have it -- yeah, we have it on the

 6     screen -- to the portion that mentions on the night when the NATO

 7     aggression started, I was at the Cabrat hill near Djakovica.  And you

 8     told us yesterday you confirmed that that is where you were when the NATO

 9     bombing campaign began?

10        A.   That is correct.

11        Q.   And we are speaking about the night of the 24th of March, 1999?

12        A.   Yes.  The day the aggression began.

13        Q.   Now, in relation to this statement yesterday, you said that from

14     Cabrat hill you saw buildings burning in the old town of Djakovica in

15     Katolicka Street; do you recall saying that?

16        A.   Yes, I do.  I said what I had seen, and it is the way you just

17     read out.

18        Q.   And you said, sir, that you had come to the conclusion that the

19     fire had been caused by NATO bombing?

20        A.   Yes.  That's what I said.

21        Q.   Now, if we turn to page 2 of your statement, and it's the first

22     paragraph in the English, you say that because you were observing the

23     firing from the hill, you could not reach any conclusions as to what had

24     caused the fire on Katolicka Street; that is correct, sir?

25        A.   I couldn't see it, but I could make my own conclusions because

Page 11457

 1     prior to that, I had heard an explosion.

 2        Q.   And you were, in fact, in a shelter that night, a shelter you

 3     were occupying up on Cabrat hill?

 4        A.   Yes.  It was a shelter underground.  One could hear things in it,

 5     but not see what is going on outside, not until you peek out, that is.

 6        Q.   And just to finish off that same sentence, you say, "but I assume

 7     this was the consequence of strikes by NATO planes."

 8             Now, based on what you've told us, sir, I understand this was not

 9     your personal knowledge, you didn't personally see that the fire on

10     Katolicka Street was caused by NATO bombing?

11        A.   I said I had heard an explosion and that afterwards I saw the

12     street in flames.  I supposed that the fire broke out as a result of NATO

13     aircraft strikes.

14        Q.   So can we agree, sir, that this was just an assumption from your

15     part that the cause of this fire was NATO bombing?

16        A.   I discussed this with my subordinate officer who had seen it

17     happen.  From the shelter itself, I did not see when the bomb landed in

18     Katolicka Street, although I heard it.  And I did see Katolicka Street

19     ablaze.  But in my immediate vicinity, there was an officer who drew up a

20     statement.  I asked him what it was that he had seen.  He told me that he

21     saw NATO planes strike at the appropriate time.  Based on his statement

22     and what I could observe, I presumed that NATO air-strikes caused the

23     burning of -- the burning down of Katolicka Street.

24        Q.   Okay.  So what you -- I mean, what you personally observed was

25     the fire?

Page 11458

 1        A.   Yes.  I saw the fire myself.

 2        Q.   But you have no personal knowledge of what happened on that

 3     street?

 4        A.   It is not clear to me what you mean by personal knowledge.

 5        Q.   I'm speaking about your personal observation, and I'm just asking

 6     a yes or no question.

 7        A.   Personally I didn't see the bomb land, but I heard it after which

 8     I saw Katolicka Street on fire.

 9        Q.   What you told us earlier that you had heard was an explosion,

10     correct?

11        A.   Yes, it is.

12        Q.   And from the hill you saw fire?

13        A.   Of course.

14        Q.   And that's the extent of your personal knowledge?

15        A.   I have personal knowledge from my subordinate officer.

16        Q.   I'm just asking of your knowledge.  You've explained about your

17     subordinate.

18        A.   Very well.  Yes.  It is as you say.

19        Q.   Sir, when this statement was made, this is in December 2002, the

20     trial against Slobodan Milosevic was underway in The Hague, correct?

21        A.   I don't remember.  I do remember, though, that I testified here

22     in 2005.  I really cannot recall when his trial began.

23        Q.   Do you recall when he was arrested, Mr. Milosevic?  I mean, that

24     must have been in the news in your country, no?  Covered quite

25     extensively?

Page 11459

 1        A.   Of course.  It was widely covered.  Everyone was talking about it

 2     in our country.

 3        Q.   And do you recall when that was?

 4        A.   I think it was in March or April, perhaps late March, early April

 5     of 2000 or 2001.  I'm not sure.  No, not 2000, 2001 probably.

 6        Q.   And are you aware, sir, that the indictment against Mr. Milosevic

 7     included allegations regarding the destruction of the old town of

 8     Djakovica?

 9        A.   In the indictment against Mr. Milosevic, there are all sorts of

10     allegations from the original sin onwards.  Among others, allegations

11     about Djakovica.

12        Q.   Okay.  So I take that as a yes.  Sir, are you aware that this

13     commission for -- or the so-called Commission for the Co-operation with

14     the ICTY was established by General Pavkovic?

15        A.   I don't know who established it.  In any case, I followed their

16     order or request.

17        Q.   And do you recall approximately when it was established?

18        A.   I suppose it must have been at some time before they summoned me.

19     I really don't know when it was established exactly.

20        Q.   Okay.  And in this statement you say - this is at the end - you

21     say:

22             "I declare that my unit and I did not have anything to do with

23     the allege destruction either of this part of Djakovica town or of this

24     place of worship."

25             Do you recall saying that, sir, in your statement?

Page 11460

 1        A.   Of course, I can see it before me.  That's what I said.  I still

 2     stand by it.

 3        Q.   And when you came here to testify in the defence of

 4     Mr. Milosevic, you brought this statement with you, did you?

 5        A.   I don't know if I brought it with me or if I handed it over to an

 6     attorney in Belgrade.

 7        Q.   And this was one of the statements that you made to the

 8     commission that was discussed during your testimony in the Milosevic

 9     case?

10        A.   That is correct.

11             MS. KRAVETZ:  I want to look at another of these statements, sir.

12     This is D689.

13        Q.   And this is a statement dated the previous day, 27th December,

14     2002.  And it refers to unit activities on 1st April, 1999.  Do you

15     recall going over this one yesterday with my learned colleague?

16        A.   Yes, I recall that.

17        Q.   And can I take it, sir, that this statement was prepared in the

18     same way as the previous one we've looked at?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   So you were again called by members of the commission and shown

21     portions of the report "As Seen, As Told" that concerned events in

22     Djakovica?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And on the basis of what you read, then you prepared this

25     statement that we have here?

Page 11461

 1        A.   Yes.  Based on what I could remember and what I read, that is how

 2     I drew up the statement.

 3        Q.   Now, I have a question in relation to this statement.  You say -

 4     and this is towards --

 5             MS. KRAVETZ:  Maybe we can see page 2 on the screen in both the

 6     English and the B/C/S.

 7        Q.   You say in the almost two last paragraphs:

 8             "I learned of the alleged crime committed in the Cerim quarter

 9     from the Humanitarian Law Fund book, "Kosovo:  As Seen" -- here it's

10     written, "As written or As Told."

11             And then you say:  "I affirm that no one from my unit has any

12     connection with the alleged crime in the Cerim quarter."

13             Having read this statement of yours, sir, I'm just wondering

14     which alleged crime in the Cerim quarter you are referring to?

15        A.   It says here "alleged."  I believe in Serbian it said the

16     "aforementioned," which is different.  Allegedly, that is something that

17     one claims.  Although, it may be uncertain.  It could be hypothetical.

18     That's what allegedly means in our language.

19        Q.   Mm-hmm.  But, sir, which crime are you referring to in the Cerim

20     district that you are denying having had any connection with?

21        A.   Well, this alleged crime that is written about in this book of

22     the Humanitarian Law Fund.  In this statement, I'm actually responding to

23     some of the paragraphs in that book where this alleged crime in Cerim is

24     mentioned.

25        Q.   And which crime is that?

Page 11462

 1        A.   It mentions some civilians there.

 2        Q.   And what specifically did it say about these civilians, this

 3     book?  I'm just trying to understand what your statement is about because

 4     it's not explained there.

 5        A.   A picture was shown there.  I think it was a house, a burned-down

 6     house.  And it said something about a street.  I don't even know where

 7     that street is, but an alleged crime was described there.  I read that

 8     and then I wrote on the basis of that.

 9        Q.   And what had had happened at this house according to the report?

10        A.   Well, right now I can't remember exactly, but I know that what

11     was mentioned was an alleged crime against some civilians as far as I can

12     remember.  Now, it's been quite awhile, but as far as I can remember,

13     that is what it was about.  And also about the burning of some house.

14        Q.   This alleged crime against civilians, would that have been a

15     massacre, sir, in the Cerim district?

16        A.   Well, if I say alleged crime, then I could say alleged massacre

17     as well, you see.  You are saying alleged crime to me now and then you

18     you give me a concrete form of crime.  I don't know how to define it now,

19     but what I said here was that as for this alleged crime that was

20     described in the book, I have no knowledge about it whatsoever.  But I

21     claim that it certainly wasn't committed by any member of my unit, that

22     alleged crime, I mean.

23        Q.   Okay.  So you are denying any participation in an alleged crime,

24     but you don't remember which crime that was?

25        A.   Let's put it that way.

Page 11463

 1        Q.   Sir, in this statement you refer - and this is on the same page

 2     we are looking at - to a statement by a 3rd Battalion commander, Major

 3     Dusko Vukasinovic.  Do you see that?  You say:

 4             "According to a statement, one of the platoons was located in

 5     Vinarski Podrum facility in the immediate vicinity of the Cerim quarter."

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Is this a statement you looked at before preparing your own

 8     statement about this alleged crime in the Cerim district?

 9        A.   Yes.  When the commission called me and when they gave me the

10     task to describe that event, I then called the commander of the unit that

11     was nearby, that was a wine cellar, Vinarski Podrum, and I asked him

12     whether he had any knowledge of that alleged crime.  I told him to write

13     up what he had said to me then.  As I read his statement, I then wrote my

14     own statement.

15        Q.   And this wine cellar that you referred to, Vinarski Podrum, is

16     that a locality where members of your brigade were based?

17        A.   Yes.  Part of the unit, a smaller unit, perhaps a platoon.

18     Maximum up to 20 men, perhaps even less.

19        Q.   And was this also in the Cerim district?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Do you know which neighbourhood of Djakovica that was?

22        A.   Well, it's on the right-hand side of the road.  Perhaps it's 400

23     or 500 metres away from the Cerim neighbourhood.

24        Q.   And in your statement you say that on the night of the 1st of

25     April, you travelled by -- you headed to Djakovica town to the bridge

Page 11464

 1     command post and you travelled this route and once again observed no

 2     activities in the Cerim quarter?

 3        A.   Yes, that's the way it was.

 4        Q.   Did you just happen to have been driving through the Cerim

 5     quarter on the night of the 1st of April?

 6        A.   No, it didn't just happen.  That night, or rather, the 30th of

 7     April [as interpreted], we had a unit of ours in Ljug Bunar which is also

 8     not very far away from Cerim and radar of ours was hit there and two of

 9     my soldiers got killed on that occasion.  We were then trying to get them

10     out to rescue them, and when that job, I mean, maybe I shouldn't say job,

11     activity, when that was over, then I left and went to the command post,

12     of course.

13        Q.   Now, sir, are you aware that the -- oh, I'm sorry, I see my --

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Just for

16     the transcript, the date that was registered in the previous answer,

17     could my colleague just have a look at that and could she perhaps check

18     that.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Kravetz, I leave that to you.

20             MS. KRAVETZ:

21        Q.   Sir, I was speaking about the night of the 1st of April, and we

22     have on the transcript that you are referring to that night the 30th of

23     April.  Is that correct?  That you were speaking about the 30th of April?

24        A.   May I have a look at my statement?  If that's what the statement

25     says.  No, that our radar was hit on the 31st, between the 31st and the

Page 11465

 1     1st.  Around 2300 hours on the 31st.  As we are extinguishing the fire,

 2     as we were trying to save the soldiers, it did actually spill over to the

 3     1st, so I was going back on the 1st of April, yes, it would be the 1st of

 4     April.

 5        Q.   Okay.  So you are speaking about the night from the 31st to the

 6     1st of April?  31st of March to the 1st of April?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And you say in your statement that you have no information of any

 9     kind about an alleged crime in this quarter, in the Cerim quarter?

10        A.   That's right.

11        Q.   Are you aware, sir, that the indictment against Mr. Milosevic

12     contains specific allegations concerning the Cerim quarter?  When I'm

13     speaking about specific allegations, I mean a massacre of civilians.

14        A.   I don't know what I'm supposed to answer in relation to that.  Do

15     I know that that is written in the indictment?  As I have already said,

16     everything is written in the indictment against Mr. Milosevic.  If you

17     are asking me about a specific event, I hereby state that I have no

18     knowledge about that.

19        Q.   Sir, I'm asking specifically if you knew that Mr. Milosevic when

20     he was on trial here at The Hague was accused, among other things, of a

21     massacre in the Cerim quarter, massacre of civilians, specifically on

22     Milos Gilic Street?

23        A.   I know that that question was put when I was testifying here,

24     yes.

25        Q.   So you are aware that that was one of the allegations against him

Page 11466

 1     at the time when this statement was prepared?

 2        A.   When I testified here, I knew that that question was being asked

 3     because he asked me about that too.  When I wrote this statement, I did

 4     not know that that was contained in his indictment.

 5        Q.   But you had read specific allegations in the report, "As Seen, As

 6     Told," about events in that district, before preparing your statement?

 7        A.   Of course.  On the basis of that which was written in that book

 8     of the Humanitarian Law Fund, I was actually given the task of writing my

 9     statement, otherwise, I wouldn't have known about that, about that event.

10     And I never would have thought about that.  I mean, when I received that

11     book, then I read what was written there about Cerim.

12        Q.   Sir, we've had testimony here from former residents of the Cerim

13     district about a massacre that took place on 157 Milos Gilic Street, and

14     it's a massacre that involved the killing of 20 civilians in a house

15     which was later burnt down.  Have you heard about that incident, sir?

16        A.   I read that in that book otherwise, I hadn't heard of it.  How

17     else would I have heard about it?  I did not know anything about that.

18        Q.   So you do recall what the specific allegations or the alleged

19     crime referred to in your report had to do with?

20        A.   Yes, yes.  Some civilians were being referred to in a house, but

21     I couldn't remember the name of the street.

22        Q.   And, sir, based on the evidence we have of persons who were in

23     the neighbourhood at the time these civilians were shot at by members of

24     the MUP, killed, and then the house was set on fire, did you know about

25     that incident, sir?

Page 11467

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Had a massacre of that nature taken place in the Cerim district,

 3     would that have been reported to you by members of your unit who were on

 4     the ground?

 5        A.   Had they had such knowledge, yes.

 6        Q.   And had a massacre of that nature taken place, would that also

 7     have been reported to the head of the SUP in Djakovica?

 8        A.   If I had found out about something like that, I would have

 9     notified him about that.

10        Q.   In fact, sir, if a massacre of that nature had taken place in the

11     Cerim district, it would have been quite difficult to hide it, no?  It

12     would have been -- information about that would have been shared and

13     would have become known by you and by the head of the SUP?

14        A.   I don't know about that.  I had not found out about that.  I

15     cannot make any assumptions.  I didn't find out about anything.

16        Q.   Very well, sir.  I want to move away from this statement now and

17     ask you about some testimony you gave yesterday regarding the large-scale

18     movement of the civilian population in Kosovo.  Do you remember speaking

19     being that, sir, yesterday?

20        A.   Of course.  There were movements by civilians.  Now, the question

21     was what people considered to be large scale.  I said that I saw groups

22     of people.  The biggest group that I had seen was between 200 and 300

23     persons.  There was movement, yes, and now what people say in terms of

24     what was large scale or smaller scale, that varies, but there were --

25     there was movement by people, yes.

Page 11468

 1        Q.   And you said, sir, yesterday, that when the NATO bombing began in

 2     March of 1999, you began seeing this movement on a daily basis, and I

 3     believe you gave the same numbers you've just given, 200, 300 persons?

 4     Do you recall giving that testimony?

 5        A.   Well, if not every day, but it was frequent at any rate.  Very

 6     frequent.  Since I was not in Djakovica every day but when I was there,

 7     there was movement very frequently.

 8        Q.   And, sir, you said that some five or six or ten days after the

 9     NATO bombing began, especially when people started talking about

10     ammunition with depleted uranium, and you said - and these are your

11     words - "they arrived in waves."  You were speaking about the refugees.

12     Do you recall saying that?

13        A.   It wasn't ammunition that was coming in waves, it was refugees

14     that were coming in waves, yes, that is what I said.

15        Q.   And you said they weren't single families, they were, in fact,

16     large groups moved on foot and tractors?

17        A.   Yes, yes.  There were certain places where they would gather and

18     wait for one another, and then they would continue their journey

19     together.

20        Q.   And when you say they would continue their journey together, I

21     understand from the evidence you gave yesterday that they were continuing

22     a journey leaving Djakovica, in fact?  They were heading out of Djakovica

23     town?

24        A.   For the the most part, yes.

25        Q.   And this reference you made to "they arrived in waves," this

Page 11469

 1     would mean that, if I understand you correctly, approximately towards the

 2     beginning of April, that is six or ten days after the NATO bombing

 3     campaign began, end of March, beginning of April, that is when you saw

 4     the largest groups of refugees heading out of town, these waves of

 5     refugees that you are speaking about?

 6        A.   Well, for the most part, the beginning of April or end of March.

 7        Q.   So that was the period when you saw the largest groups of

 8     refugees heading out of town?  End of March, beginning of April?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Now, yesterday and also today you said that -- you you referred

11     to the fact that these persons were leaving for fear of ammunition

12     containing depleted uranium.  In fact, yesterday you said that these

13     waves of refugees, you started seeing them after people started talking

14     about ammunition with depleted uranium; do you recall saying that, sir?

15        A.   I recall saying that, but I did not say that that was the main

16     reason.  I said one of the reasons.  I said there was the bombing, any

17     kind of bombing, then at the end I said knowledge that depleted uranium

18     ammunition was being used.

19        Q.   Yes, I understand you have also today indicated other causes not

20     only depleted uranium, but you did say that this was one of the causes

21     that you considered to be the reason why these persons were leaving, fear

22     of ammunition being used by NATO containing depleted uranium?

23        A.   Yes, inter alia.

24        Q.   And how do you know that, sir?

25        A.   I know that because certain people talked to refugees and there

Page 11470

 1     was -- there was talk going around town that depleted uranium ammunition

 2     made men sterile, and that is what they were particularly afraid of.

 3     That was their concern about their offspring.  That's what I heard from

 4     some of my soldiers and officers.  I had soldiers and officers from

 5     Djakovica who knew people who were leaving.  They had talked to them.  I

 6     didn't hear that from anyone because I didn't talk to anyone since I

 7     don't speak a word of Albanian, but I did hear these things.  I had

 8     knowledge of that kind.

 9        Q.   Sir, so this is not personal knowledge?  You spoke to no one

10     about this?  You did not ask the refugees yourself about this?

11        A.   I personally did not talk to a single refugee who had said that

12     kind of thing.

13        Q.   Sir, earlier in this case, some weeks ago, we had the testimony

14     of General Petkovic, the chief of administration of land forces.  Do you

15     know who he is?

16        A.   Yes, yes.

17        Q.   And General Petkovic told us that he conducted some sort of study

18     on the use of depleted uranium by NATO, and he said that the first

19     physical samples of this type of ammunition being used in Kosovo was not

20     found until sometime in late April, sometime around 20th of April, 1999.

21     Do you accept that testimony, sir?

22             MS. KRAVETZ:  I can give a reference.  I believe this is in his

23     statement D512, page 2.  The date of 18th of April is given.

24        Q.   Sir, this would have been -- 18th of April would have been well

25     after the time when you said you saw the large waves of refugees leaving

Page 11471

 1     town, correct?

 2        A.   I cannot fully agree with him because I was in Djakovica, and I

 3     saw an A-10 aircraft operating.  That is the only aircraft that uses

 4     depleted uranium ammunition in addition to cruise missiles that can also

 5     have warheads containing depleted uranium.  However, now you are trying

 6     to say to me that the use of depleted uranium ammunition was the only

 7     reason for population movement, but I said --

 8        Q.   Sir, sir, sir --

 9        A.   -- that was one of the reasons.

10        Q.   I'm not suggesting that.  I'm just referring you to your

11     statement of yesterday when you said that the refugees began arriving in

12     waves when word spread that NATO was using depleted uranium.  And you

13     have told us that you recall saying that yesterday, so I'm not suggesting

14     that that is the only reason that you said was the cause of the movement.

15     But you, in fact, had no personal knowledge that that was the reason why

16     the refugees were leaving in such large waves towards the end of March,

17     early April?

18        A.   I said that that was one of the reasons, that they had heard --

19        Q.   I'm not challenging that you said there were other reasons.  What

20     I'm asking you specifically is, or what I'm putting to you is that you

21     had no personal knowledge that that was the reason why there was such a

22     large-scale movement, these waves of refugees leaving Djakovica town in

23     the end of March, early April?  You have no personal knowledge that this

24     was one of the reasons?

25        A.   I don't agree with you.

Page 11472

 1        Q.   You are, in fact, sir, just simply speculating that that was the

 2     reason that they were leaving?

 3        A.   Of course I'm not speculating.  I don't speak Albanian.  I didn't

 4     discuss this with any of the refugees, but I had information coming from

 5     my officers and soldiers who could speak Albanian who told me that.

 6     Personally, I didn't speak to a single refugee.

 7        Q.   And I was just asking for your personal knowledge, sir.  Thank

 8     you.

 9             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I think it's time for the break.  I

10     think Your Honour indicated that we are breaking at 5.30.

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, we will break now and resume at 6.00.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13                           --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Kravetz.

17             MS. KRAVETZ:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18        Q.   Sir, I want to now turn your attention to an operation that you

19     spoke about extensively during your testimony, and this is an operation

20     with a code-name Reka.  Do you remember being asked some questions about

21     that by my learned colleague?

22        A.   Yes, it was actually an action called Reka.

23        Q.   Okay.  We'll refer to it as action Reka.  I understood from your

24     testimony, sir, that this is an action that took place over two days, the

25     27th and 28th of April, 1999?

Page 11473

 1        A.   That is so.

 2        Q.   And you've indicated that a logistic battalion of your brigade

 3     under the command of Zlatko Odak took part in this operation?  I

 4     apologise if the pronunciation of the name is incorrect.

 5        A.   Your pronunciation was quite good, however, the name of the unit

 6     is incorrect.  It was not a battalion.  It was a company.  The difference

 7     is quite important in terms of size.  Major Odak was the commander of the

 8     logistics battalion.

 9        Q.   Yes, I think I misspoke there.  So it's a company from this

10     logistic battalion which was commanded by Major Zlatko Odak, correct?

11        A.   Yes, it is.

12        Q.   And I think you spoke about this action taking place in the

13     Carragojs valley?

14        A.   I pronounce it as Carragojs, that's how it's spelled, and that's

15     how I pronounce it, although I'm not positive that is the correct name.

16     In any case, we refer to that area as Reka.

17        Q.   And the general area of Reka, does that also include the Trava

18     valley?

19        A.   That's the same name.

20        Q.   Okay.  So I said general, we won't be too picky with

21     pronunciations here, so don't worry about that.  The village of Meja,

22     sir, is this a village that is close to the town of Djakovica, in fact,

23     just outside the town?

24        A.   I think it's some 7 or 8 kilometres away from the town.

25        Q.   And would it be correct to say that this village, if you are

Page 11474

 1     heading out of Djakovica going west, this would be somewhere towards the

 2     start of this Carragojs valley area?

 3        A.   I suppose so.  I suppose so.  I have never been to Meja and I

 4     don't really know that exactly.  Although, I suppose it is in that

 5     general area.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And you've told us, sir, during the course of your

 7     evidence, that this company from your brigade was deployed on Cabrat

 8     hill?  You've, in fact, marked it on a map; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And you said that the highest point of this hill was of above

11     Djakovica town?

12        A.   Yes, possibly.

13        Q.   So, in fact, the area where your company was deployed was a

14     vantage point in that area, from where you would have visibility to

15     localities surrounding Djakovica?

16        A.   No, it was not.  From that place one could not observe Djakovica.

17     You could only observe the rear where the company was deployed.  It was

18     at an elevation.  They could see this way, but on the other side there is

19     a forest, and it is still pretty far from Djakovica.  That is not the

20     place at Cabrat hill where I was when the aggression started.  It's not

21     the same place.

22        Q.   Maybe my question wasn't clear.  I wasn't saying whether it was

23     vantage point to look out to Djakovica, but you were high enough so you

24     could look in the point opposite direction?  So looking west?

25        A.   From that place, well, to the west, it's actually south-west, but

Page 11475

 1     one can't see much from there.  It is at the edge of a forest.  I visited

 2     them, and I saw their positions.

 3        Q.   And you've told us that this action, Reka, was led by Milan Kotur

 4     from the Pristina Corps forward command post?

 5        A.   Yes.  By decision of the forward command post of the Pristina

 6     Corps, he commanded that action.

 7        Q.   You also said that the purpose of the action was to neutralise

 8     terrorists?

 9        A.   Yes, the basic goal of that action was to have that area, which

10     is strategically very important, in which there was a great number of

11     terrorists, and from which they made incursions and carried out attacks

12     on our columns to neutralise that area, to have the area clear of them.

13        Q.   You also said, sir -- well, before I put that question, on the

14     days preceding the Reka action there had been a killing by the KLA of

15     five policemen in the general area of Meja; correct?

16        A.   I heard something about that, but well, yes, I think it happened.

17     As for whether five people were killed or if there was anyone wounded,

18     that's something I'm not completely sure of.

19        Q.   A local policeman by the name of Milutin Prascevic was among

20     those killed, correct?

21        A.   I think his name was Prascevic or Prosevic, in any case, similar

22     to that.

23        Q.   And this was someone you knew yourself?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   When you testified about this action in the Milosevic case, and

Page 11476

 1     this is at page 45436 of the transcript, you were asked about this

 2     action.  And you said:

 3             "It was common knowledge that that part belongs to the general

 4     area of Reka and there were many terrorists."

 5             And then you say:

 6             "It was an area where terrorists engaged in large-scale

 7     operations and activities, and it's true that terrorists killed five

 8     policemen."

 9             And you were referring to a statement that was being put to you

10     and you said:

11             "He mentions Prascevic, I knew Prascevic myself."

12             Is that correct, sir, the evidence that you gave in the Milosevic

13     case, that Prascevic was a policeman that you knew yourself?

14        A.   I heard of him, but I didn't know him personally.  Prascevic, I

15     couldn't recognise that person if I met him.

16        Q.   And you don't recall saying when you testified here earlier that

17     this was, in fact, a person that you knew yourself?

18        A.   I don't remember that.

19        Q.   Sir, in relation to this same action, you say:

20             "As for Meja" - and this, I'm reading your Milosevic transcript,

21     same page - "it was an anti-terrorist operation exclusively which was

22     legal, lawful with the aim of rounding up the killers of those

23     policemen."

24             Do you stand by that statement, sir, that this was a legal,

25     lawful action aimed at rounding up the killers of these five policemen?

Page 11477

 1        A.   That was not the goal of that action, and it wasn't the only

 2     goal.  Quite a contrary.  I think the basic goal of the action was to

 3     neutralise the Siptar terrorist forces in that area --

 4        Q.   Sir --

 5        A.   So as to secure --

 6        Q.   I just want to go back to my question.  I read something out to

 7     you, and I'm just asking if you stand by what you said in the Milosevic

 8     case?  I can read it out again, that this was a legal, lawful --

 9        A.   Please do.

10        Q.   That this was a legal, lawful action with the aim of rounding up

11     the killers of these policemen.  This is what you said when you testified

12     here the previous time.  Do you stand by that, sir?  It's really just a

13     yes or no question.

14        A.   Do you want me to tell you whether I said so or -- could you

15     please repeat.  I'm not sure what I should answer to.

16        Q.   Sir, I'm putting to you what you said when you testified here

17     previously as to the aim of this action, and I'm asking whether you stand

18     by that statement, by what you said when you testified in the Milosevic

19     case?

20        A.   At the time, I didn't sufficiently explain the basic goal of that

21     action when I said that.  Perhaps I didn't use the right words to explain

22     what was the main reason for that action.

23        Q.   I'm not sure you are answering my question, sir.  I understand

24     that you are saying there might be more than one goal for the action, I'm

25     just asking if this was one of the aims, to round up the killers of the

Page 11478

 1     five policemen, which is what you said when you testified here the

 2     previous time?

 3        A.   I would need to know the question put to me at the time.  Was the

 4     question for me to enumerate all the goals of that action or maybe the

 5     question was put in such a way that I provided this answer.

 6        Q.   Sir, the question simply -- you were being put a statement by

 7     another witness and this is a statement you gave on your own about the

 8     action, and all I'm asking, sir, is whether you stand by it or not, and I

 9     don't believe you are answering my question.  It's simply just a yes or

10     no.

11        A.   I claim that the basic goal of the action Reka was to neutralise

12     the Siptar terrorist forces in the Carragojs valley.  As for whether it

13     was legal, of course it was.  It was a legal action.  It had been planned

14     and of course, among other things, one of the goals was to catch the

15     killers of those policemen.  This was one of many incidents which took

16     place.

17        Q.   And that was all I was asking, sir.

18             Now, if we move on from this point, this action, the Reka action,

19     did not only involve a company from your brigade.  In fact, it involved

20     many units from other brigades as well, correct?

21        A.   Several units participated, among others mine.

22        Q.   And among those units that participated was the 125th Motorised

23     Brigade, correct?

24        A.   I don't know about that one.  It is possible that it

25     participated.

Page 11479

 1        Q.   But you don't recall hearing about that from Major Odak, which

 2     units were involved?

 3        A.   Major Odak could only have seen the units which were adjacent to

 4     him.  This was the second battalion of the 549th Brigade.  He could not

 5     have known of the participation of other units.  The 125th Brigade was at

 6     Kosare, in that part of the area.

 7        Q.   You've referred to the 2nd Battalion of the 549th Brigade, do you

 8     know who commanded that battalion?

 9        A.   The commander of that battalion was Colonel Vlatko Vukovic.

10        Q.   Now, you say you don't have any recollection of whether the 125th

11     Motorised Brigade participated in this action; am I understanding you

12     correctly?

13        A.   I don't know whether it participated or not.  It may have, it may

14     have not.  It was decided by the person who planned the action.

15        Q.   I want to show you a document in connection to this action.

16             MS. KRAVETZ:  This is P950.  If we could have that up on the

17     screen.

18        Q.   This is a document dated 27th of April, 1999, sent by the 125th

19     Motorised Brigade Command to the Pristina Corps Command in the Djakovica

20     forward command.  You have the document there, sir, in front of you?

21        A.   Yes, I can see it.  I can see it as a document of the 125th

22     Motorised Brigade although it's a bit difficult to read.  In any case, I

23     can see it's their document.

24        Q.   Yes, it is.

25             MS. KRAVETZ:  If we could turn to page 2, and I'm looking for

Page 11480

 1     number 2.

 2        Q.   I'm just waiting for that to be up on your screen, sir.  We see

 3     that the second sentence of number 2 says:

 4             "Part of the forces is engaged in mopping up the terrain from STS

 5     in the general area of Reka in keeping with your decision."

 6             Do you see that, sir?

 7        A.   Which item was that?

 8        Q.   Number 2.

 9        A.   "Units of the brigade are focused on reinforcement, setting up

10     obstacles."  I don't see that.  On page 1 or page 2?

11        Q.   Second sentence of number 2.

12        A.   "Part of the forces is engaged in mopping up the terrain from STS

13     in the general area of Reka, in keeping with your decision."  Yes, that's

14     what it says.

15        Q.   I know this is not a document from your brigade, sir, but would

16     you agree with me based on what we've been discussing that this reference

17     here to the general area of Reka is, in fact, a reference to the same

18     action that we've been speaking about?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And we see in the Serbian version - it's not up on the screen in

21     the English - that this is a document that was sent by the commander

22     Colonel Dragan Zivanovic.  That would be the commander of the 125th

23     Brigade?

24        A.   That is correct.

25        Q.   In addition to this unit that we spoke about, the battalion from

Page 11481

 1     the 549th and the 125th Brigade and the elements from your brigade that

 2     you spoke about, do you know, sir, that there were also -- or there was

 3     also a MUP unit involved in this action?  Do you have any information on

 4     that?

 5        A.   I only have information about my unit and the unit adjacent to

 6     mine.  As for the rest of the forces, including the 125th Brigade, I have

 7     no information or knowledge about that.  They may have been there and yet

 8     they may not have.  I have no knowledge based on which I could assert

 9     that they did or did not participate.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  Okay.  And if we could just have another document

11     up since you've mentioned the 125th.  This is P920.

12        Q.   And, sir, I was speaking specifically about whether there was a

13     MUP unit involved, and you responded as for the rest of the forces

14     including the 125th Brigade you have no information of knowledge.  I'm

15     understanding that also includes the MUP unit, you had no information of

16     whether there was a MUP unit involved?

17        A.   That is correct.

18        Q.   Now, if we look at the document here in front of you, sir, we see

19     it is again a document from the command of the 125th Motorised Brigade.

20     This is dated 28th April.  So it's the day following the document that we

21     just looked at.  And we see that this is a regular combat report sent by

22     this unit.

23             MS. KRAVETZ:  And I would like to go in this document, I believe

24     it's on the same page in the B/C/S, but in the English it's number 2.

25        Q.   And the second sentence says:

Page 11482

 1             "Some forces have been used to clear the terrain of STS in the

 2     general Reka sector, as per your decision."

 3             Again, sir, based on what we've been discussing here, would you

 4     agree with me that this reference here to an action or participation in

 5     clearing the terrain in the general Reka sector will be -- is a reference

 6     to the same Reka action that we've been speaking about?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you for that.  Now, sir, we'll move away from this document

 9     and while you were being questioned about this action by my learned

10     colleague, you were shown a statement that you gave to the Commission for

11     Co-operation with the ICTY, and this is D703.

12             MS. KRAVETZ:  If we could have that up on the screen.

13        Q.   This is a statement dated 27th December, 2002.  Do you recall

14     discussing this with my learned colleague during your testimony

15     yesterday?

16        A.   Yes, I do.

17        Q.   And, sir, if I understood your testimony yesterday correctly, you

18     wrote this after you read allegations in what you've referred to as a

19     book called "As Seen, As Told?"

20        A.   That's right.

21        Q.   And we've already looked at two other statements of yours that

22     were given to this commission.  I understand, sir, from your evidence

23     that this statement that we have here, the 27th of December, 2002

24     statement was prepared in a similar fashion as the other ones that you've

25     prepared, that is, you were called by the commission, shown these

Page 11483

 1     allegations, and asked to respond to them?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Sir, if we turn to page 2 of this statement, and I just want to

 4     direct your attention to the second paragraph.  It's a paragraph starting

 5     with:

 6             "On 27th and 28th of April, part of my unit, the intervention

 7     company, which comprised sections of the logistics battalion and command

 8     battalion, participated in an operation to seal off the designated

 9     territory in the Cabrat sector from elevation 478 to k. 442 (overlooking

10     the poultry farm)" it says.

11             Is this the same positions you were referring to yesterday during

12     the course of your evidence when you drew on the map the location of your

13     unit on Cabrat hill?

14        A.   I did not quite understand the interpretation I received.  So

15     could you please repeat your question.

16        Q.   It was a rather long question so probably my fault, sir.  I just

17     read a passage which is the second paragraph here, and my question was

18     just simple.  It refers to your -- part of your unit being deployed on

19     Cabrat hill.  Yesterday you drew on a map an area of deployment, and I'm

20     just asking you to confirm whether what you drew on the map yesterday

21     refers to the same area that's being discussed in the statement that you

22     prepared?

23        A.   Yes, yes.  What I drew yesterday does relate to the positions of

24     my unit on Cabrat hill, yes.

25        Q.   Now, earlier today, sir, my colleague was putting to you

Page 11484

 1     several - I think it was at the beginning of today's session - several

 2     passages of the statement of one of your subordinates, Nike Peraj.  Do

 3     you recall going through several passages of that with my learned

 4     colleague earlier today?

 5        A.   Yes, I recall that.

 6        Q.   And there was one passage, in, I believe, it was paragraph 65 of

 7     Nike Peraj's statement which referred to this operation Reka being

 8     commanded from the forward command post by several officers including

 9     General Lazarevic.  Do you remember that was put to you?

10        A.   I remember that that is what was written in the statement.

11        Q.   And you told us, sir, that that was not true?  You said it was, I

12     believe the words you used was "physically impossible."  This is at

13     transcript page 2, line 14 onwards of today's transcript.  Because you

14     said that General Lazarevic was, in fact, with you on the 27th of April

15     in Pristina.  Do you recall that, sir, saying that it was physical

16     impossible --

17        A.   The 27th of April, not the 28th.  He was with me on the 27th of

18     April, not the 28th.

19        Q.   I said 27th of April, sir.  And the passage, in fact, in

20     Mr. Peraj's statement referred to the 27th, and you said that is not

21     true, General Lazarevic was with me.  Do you recall saying that, it was

22     physically impossible because he was in Pristina with you attending, I

23     think, an award ceremony, did you say, sir?  That you were attending an

24     award ceremony on the 27th of April in Pristina?

25        A.   Yes, we were together at that ceremony.

Page 11485

 1        Q.   Sir, just drawing your attention to paragraph 3 of this statement

 2     that you yourself wrote, you say:

 3             "Between 1300 hours and 1400 hours on the 27th of April, 1999, I

 4     personally inspected the unit on the sealed-off line and ensured that

 5     they had taken correct position."

 6             And you say:

 7             "As I did so, I pointed out some minor things they had failed to

 8     do while fortifying the camouflage position because NATO aircraft were

 9     flying over the area the whole time."

10             Do you see that paragraph, sir?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12        Q.   So, sir, it is in fact physically impossible, using your same

13     words, for you to be at an award ceremony with General Lazarevic in

14     Pristina and also be inspecting the line -- the sealed-off line that your

15     unit had set up on Cabrat hill, correct?

16        A.   Correct.  I reviewed the unit perhaps somewhat later.  I

17     inspected it somewhat later.  When I wrote this statement I really could

18     not remember all details.  This statement was written on the basis of

19     memory only, without any documents.  I'm not sure, I mean, I wrote that

20     it was between 13- and 1400 hours, but it must have been somewhat later.

21     I arrived from Pristina via Igarevo and Kijevo which is the shortest

22     route.  Now that I go back, as I try to remember it, it was on the same

23     day but it must have been later.

24        Q.   So you are saying that General Lazarevic was with you part of

25     that day but not the whole day because you did spend part of the day

Page 11486

 1     reviewing your -- or inspecting your units up on Cabrat hill?

 2        A.   He was there, or rather, I left the ceremony before he did.  I

 3     don't know how long he stayed there, but I came straight there to inspect

 4     that unit after the ceremony.  In a way, it was in passing that I did

 5     that because that is the way you do go to Djakovica anyway.

 6        Q.   And you say you have no idea how long General Lazarevic remained

 7     at the ceremony?

 8        A.   That's right, I have no idea.

 9        Q.   You, in fact, have no idea of what were the whereabouts of

10     General Lazarevic for the rest of that day because he wasn't with you

11     clearly?

12        A.   Of course.  It's not for me to ask General Lazarevic where he is,

13     but I did leave and he stayed on.

14        Q.   So when you said, sir, that the statement made by Mr. Peraj that

15     General Lazarevic was commanding the action from the forward command

16     post, Djakovica forward command post of the Pristina Corps, in fact, sir,

17     when you said that that was not true, that is not correct, is it?  He may

18     have -- Mr. Peraj could be completely correct when he is saying that,

19     that General Lazarevic was commanding this action?

20        A.   It's not the same thing to go and inspect a unit and to go and

21     command a unit.  That action in Meja started in the morning on the 27th,

22     and I was with General Lazarevic around 11.00, 12.00.  There was a

23     cocktail afterwards, a reception, and we stayed, say, until 2.00 or 3.00.

24     For him to go and command, he would have to go to the command post first,

25     familiarise himself with the situation, and then command.  However, that

Page 11487

 1     is not what happened.

 2        Q.   But you really don't know, sir, if that's what happened because

 3     you've told us that you do not know what were the whereabouts of General

 4     Lazarevic once you left that awards ceremony?

 5        A.   That's right.

 6        Q.   And you've also told us today earlier in your evidence that when

 7     you were speaking about General Lazarevic, that he was someone who would

 8     tour units in the field and who would always be informed of actions that

 9     would take place that involved his units, correct?  You recall saying

10     that when you were speaking about him?

11        A.   There is no dispute in terms of that.  He had units all over

12     Kosovo and Metohija.  It's action Reka, but he had actions going on

13     throughout Kosovo and Metohija and he could have gone to inspect any unit

14     at any point in time.  I really don't know where General Lazarevic was

15     when I left Pristina.  I don't know, and it wasn't his obligation to tell

16     me, and it's not customary for me to ask him where he went.

17        Q.   So he could have gone to the forward command post of -- in

18     Djakovica of the Pristina Corps?

19        A.   I don't know.  I'm saying that I did not see him.  I was not

20     there either.  I was not at the command post, that is.  I did not see

21     him, and I know that he stayed on after me.  That's what I can tell you.

22     I cannot speculate as to where he was, whether he could have arrived

23     there, whether he did arrive there and so on.

24        Q.   So the truth is, you don't know?  You don't know if he was there

25     or not?

Page 11488

 1        A.   The truth is that I did not see him there and that he stayed on

 2     in Pristina after I left.

 3        Q.   When you say "I did not see him there," did you personally go to

 4     the forward command post of the Pristina Corps while this action was

 5     taking place?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   So you wouldn't know if he was there or not?  You weren't there?

 8        A.   I was not there.  My Chief of Staff, Colonel Stankovic, was

 9     there, and he would have told me had the commander come.  If the

10     commander was in Djakovica, I'd have to know that.  Whenever the

11     commander came, I as brigade commander was duty-bound to meet him there,

12     to salute him, report to him, and if the corps commander came to

13     Djakovica, I would have to know that.

14        Q.   But, sir, based on what you've told us about General Lazarevic as

15     a commander and the way he kept himself well informed of the actions of

16     his units, you would agree with me that an action of this nature

17     involving so many different units of the Pristina Corps Command would be

18     an action that he would have been fully informed of?

19        A.   First of all, it's not that that many units participated.  If it

20     was the case, it was parts of units.  You showed me the 125th Brigade

21     document a few moments ago, I believe what I saw in the commander's

22     report.  He said part of his unit, and then part of my unit was there.

23     Now, if someone were to interpret this, they might say two brigades.

24     However, that didn't even have to be two companies, to say it could have

25     been two companies only.  That is not any kind of meaningful force that

Page 11489

 1     it would be a task of primary importance for the corps commander.  The

 2     corps commander deals with other matters.  After all, it is not customary

 3     for the chief of the staff of the corps to be at the same place where the

 4     corps commander is.  The Chief of Staff of the corps was certainly there.

 5     Colonel Milan Kotur was the one who was in charge of the action, so I

 6     assert that General Lazarevic was not there, to the best of my knowledge.

 7        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, but you don't know that for sure?

 8        A.   Well, I cannot be sure because I wasn't with him all the time,

 9     stuck to him.  How could I know?  Also, I would have been informed had he

10     come to Djakovica, but my Chief of Staff did not inform me about that.

11        Q.    You've told us that.  Sir, when actions were carried out by

12     Pristina Corps units that involved multiple units, would these actions

13     have to have the approval of the Pristina Corps Commander before being

14     carried out?

15        A.   A forward command post had the right to make decisions.

16     Therefore, I don't know about that.  I do know that the tasks that I

17     received from the forward command post I treated the same way as any

18     other task that I was given by the corps commander.  I cannot go into

19     that now.

20        Q.   Sir, could a large-scale action involving multiple units of the

21     Pristina Corps be launched without the knowledge of General Lazarevic?

22        A.   I don't know about that.

23        Q.   You don't know.  You don't know whether he had to approve actions

24     that involved multiple units of the Pristina Corps?

25        A.   The forward command post was in Djakovica, and the Chief of Staff

Page 11490

 1     was there.

 2        Q.   Sir, I'm asking you about General Lazarevic, not about the

 3     Pristina -- the Djakovica forward command post.

 4        A.   I don't know whether he had to know or not.  I cannot give you an

 5     answer to that.

 6        Q.   You don't know whether he had to be even informed of actions that

 7     involved multiple units of the Pristina Corps?

 8        A.   To approve is one thing and to be informed is another.  I'm sure

 9     that he could have been informed.

10        Q.   And you are saying that large-scale operations that involve

11     multiple units did not require his approval?  They did not require the

12     approval of the commander of the Pristina Corps; is that what you are

13     saying?

14             MS. KRAVETZ:  I see my learned colleague is on his feet.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

16             JUDGE PARKER:  Your answer, sir?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, units did not

18     participate.  It was parts of units that participated.  If parts of units

19     participate, depending on the size of the force involved, he may or may

20     not be informed.  However, the forward command post in Djakovica had the

21     right to plan and order us commanders to carry out certain actions that

22     had been planned according to their concept.

23             I cannot go into the relationships and authority between the

24     forward command post and the corps.  I cannot tell you exactly now.

25             MS. KRAVETZ:

Page 11491

 1        Q.   I'm not asking that, sir.  You said that depending on the size of

 2     the force involved, he may or not be informed.  So I take it from that,

 3     sir, that you were speaking about a sizeable operation involving multiple

 4     units or sections of units, however you want to call it?  This is

 5     something that he would have been informed about?

 6        A.   That's right.

 7        Q.   This is something that he would have had to approve before the

 8     operation or the action was launched, if we are talking about a

 9     large-scale sizeable action involving multiple units?

10        A.   I don't know about that.  What I do know is that I had to receive

11     from the corps commander everything that had to do with my unit, or I can

12     receive a task from the forward command post.  You are asking me to go

13     into some kind of relationships that go beyond my powers.  The corps

14     command is above my level.  I know what my obligations are vis-à-vis the

15     corps command, and I know what the rights of the corps command are in

16     respect of me.  As for the relations between the forward command post and

17     the corps command and corps commander, I don't know about that in great

18     detail, and the situation may vary from one case to another.

19        Q.   Okay, sir, we'll leave that.

20             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

21             Mr. Popovic.

22             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  The

23     objection is no longer valid because the question has been answered.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

25             MS. KRAVETZ:

Page 11492

 1        Q.   Sir, I want to - we have very little time left today - show you

 2     another statement.

 3             MS. KRAVETZ:  This is, in fact, I should point out, Your Honours,

 4     in the English it's part of D730, but we noticed when looking at this

 5     document that the corresponding B/C/S translation hasn't been uploaded as

 6     part of D730, so we have uploaded it as a separate exhibit in e-court for

 7     the purpose of being able to show the witness the B/C/S version of the

 8     document.  And this is 65 ter 60 -- 06050.  If we could have that up on

 9     the screen.

10        Q.   This is, again, a statement that you prepared for the Commission

11     of Co-operation, and it's dated also 27th of December, 2002, like the one

12     we had looked at previously, and it refers to activities of your unit on

13     the 28th of April, 1999.  Do you see that, sir?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Sir, when you -- this statement -- when you prepared this

16     statement and the previous one that we looked at, did you consult any

17     other documents other than the book or report "As Seen, As Told?"

18        A.   No, we had no documents.  We had no documents made available to

19     us.  It was only based on memory and memory only.

20        Q.   You've told us, sir, that you yourself didn't participate in the

21     Reka action, correct?  You weren't involved, it was your subordinate,

22     Mr. Zlatko Odak?

23        A.   Yes, I was not there.  I just visited them.  I checked on that

24     unit, but I was not involved in the action itself, no.

25        Q.   And if I understood your evidence yesterday and today correctly,

Page 11493

 1     the information that you have about this operation is the information

 2     that Mr. Odak gave to you?

 3        A.   Yes, yes.

 4        Q.   So just drawing your attention, sir, to paragraph 2.  We see at

 5     the bottom part you are referring to a seal-off operation on the

 6     following line, and then you said:

 7             "To the left trig point 442, to the right 478 Batraki, aimed at

 8     preventing the withdrawal of STS on the axis Racaj village - Skivljan

 9     village."

10             You see that, sir?

11        A.   Yes, yes.

12        Q.   And you say at the bottom of the statement:

13             "I hereby state categorically that neither I nor anyone else from

14     my unit committed or participated in any war crime during that time.  I

15     also do not have any knowledge that such a crime was perpetrated by any

16     other unit."

17             Do you see that, sir?

18        A.   Yes, I see that.  I do.

19        Q.   I take it you stand by that, what you stated here?

20        A.   Yes.

21             MS. KRAVETZ:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this exhibit into

22     evidence 65 ter 0650.

23             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01539.

25             MS. KRAVETZ:

Page 11494

 1        Q.   Sir, do you know if your subordinate Major Odak was interviewed

 2     by this commission in relation to this incident that we've been

 3     discussing?

 4        A.   I think that he did testify here.

 5        Q.   I'm asking if he gave a statement to this same Commission for

 6     Co-operation with the ICTY?

 7        A.   Oh, this commission, yes.

 8        Q.   And were you present during the time that he gave his statement?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Did you consult his statement before preparing yours?

11        A.   I think so.

12        Q.   So you had a look at his statement before you did yours?

13        A.   Yes, I had a look at it.

14        Q.   I had asked you earlier, sir, if you had consulted any other

15     sources other than the book called "As Seen, As Told," and you had told

16     me that you had not.  Do you recall saying that?

17        A.   Not any document, but I didn't mean statements.  I mean, I

18     thought documents that could be found in archives and things like that.

19     I'm saying that I did not look at other documents from the brigade from

20     that given period, but Odak's statement, yes, I did have a look at that.

21     If you meant at that point in time when you were asking me whether I

22     looked at something like his statement too, then I certainly did.  I'm

23     saying now, yes, I did.

24             MS. KRAVETZ:  And if we could have that up on the screen, it's 65

25     ter 06045.

Page 11495

 1        Q.   Sir, I'm just going to draw your attention to the bottom of this

 2     document if we could scroll it down, the paragraph beginning with, "On

 3     the 25th of April, I was given the task," and I'd like to direct your

 4     attention to the sentence that refers to the following line for the

 5     seal-off operation and then it indicates the trig point for the

 6     operation, and it goes on to say, "with the aim of preventing the

 7     withdrawal of STS on the axis Racaj village -- Skivljan village."

 8             Do you see that?

 9        A.   The aim of his unit I carried out indispensable preparations for

10     carrying out combat task within which I regulated; is that what you

11     meant?

12        Q.   Mm-hmm.

13        A.   The procedure for the unit and individuals in the event of

14     encountering the Siptar terrorist forces --

15        Q.   Sir, sir, I'm going to stop you there because we are running out

16     of time.  Sir, I put to you that this sentence that refers to the trig

17     point and the aim of preventing the action is, in fact, almost verbatim

18     in this statement that you prepared for the commission?

19        A.   Well, I did say that I used Odak's statement because I wasn't

20     there.  I wrote my statement on the basis of his statement.  Just as the

21     commission gave me the task of writing my statement, I called him and I

22     said, "How did all of that go, write it up."  Because he was there all

23     the time.  I was there for 10 or 15 minutes.  I went there, I visited

24     them, made certain remarks, and left.

25             As for the events that are being asked about here, my only

Page 11496

 1     knowledge comes from him as commander of the unit.  I never said that I

 2     was there all the time.  My statement is based on Major Odak's statement.

 3        Q.   Okay.  So you looked at the statement and made sure that both

 4     statements contained the same information?

 5             JUDGE PARKER:  I think the answer of the witness was that he had

 6     asked the major to write what occurred.  He then read what the major

 7     wrote and he wrote his statement based on what the major had said.

 8             MS. KRAVETZ:  I withdraw that question.  Your Honour --

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  We do need to stop.

10             MS. KRAVETZ:  I seek to tender this exhibit and my apologies for

11     going over time.

12             JUDGE PARKER:  This will be received.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, that will be Exhibit P01540.

14             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Popovic.

15             MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know what the

16     possibilities of the Court are, but our request, the request of the

17     Defence is to go on for about 10 minutes or so.  The redirect will be

18     very short so if Ms. Kravetz does not have many more questions, then we

19     would complete our redirect very quickly, and we would greatly appreciate

20     it if you could extend our working hours a bit so that we would finish

21     this witness.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  We would often like to accommodate you,

23     Mr. Popovic, but that sort of request creates many problems.  They are

24     problems about transport and your client being returned to custody.

25     There are problems about the times for the interpreters and the other

Page 11497

 1     support staff, some of whom are outside this courtroom, and my experience

 2     is that those problems are such that it is not justified for us to extend

 3     our time.

 4             I'm sorry about that, but given the time that's been spent with

 5     the witness in examination-in-chief, I don't think we can hurry

 6     Ms. Kravetz, and I don't believe that in fairness to the administrative

 7     organisation, that we can just on the spur of the moment extend the

 8     hearing.  So we must continue tomorrow.

 9             We adjourn.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.

12                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of

13                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.

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