1 Monday, 22 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. Please read aloud the affirmation
7 shown to you.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: MOMIR STOJANOVIC
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down. Mr. Djurdjic has
13 some questions for you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
16 Q. Good morning, General.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. For the transcript, could you please state your first and last
20 A. My name is Momir Stojanovic. I was born on the
21 12th October, 1958, in Djakovica, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and
22 Metohija, the Republic of Serbia.
23 Q. Thank you. Before we move on, I would kindly ask you the
24 following: Given that we use the same language, please pause briefly
25 before answering so as to enable the interpreters to interpret everything
1 and so that we would have a transcript that would reflect accurately our
3 General, in the Milutinovic case, you testified before this
4 Tribunal, and in the course of your proofing for today's testimony, you
5 were able to review that transcript. If asked the same questions today,
6 would you provide the same answers?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we please have
9 D010-2614, which is the transcript under seal, have admitted into
11 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received under seal.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00723 under
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, D011-2687 is the
15 redacted version of this transcript. I seek to tender that as well.
16 JUDGE PARKER: It too will be received.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00724.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I will acquaint you with the
19 summary of this witness's testimony now.
20 The witness was born in 1958 in Djakovica. Between
21 1998 and 1999, the witness was head of the intelligence service of the
22 Pristina Corps Command. He will testify about the organisation,
23 competencies, purposes, and tasks of the military intelligence, focusing
24 on the work and competencies of the security department in 1998 and 1999.
25 He will testify about the engagement of military intelligence and
1 military police units of the Pristina Corps in investigating and criminal
2 procedures in co-operation what other bodies and services active on the
3 territory pursuant to instructions, method, and means of operation.
4 He will also explain their co-operation with other state bodies
5 and relevant institutions. He will explain the relationship between the
6 intelligence sector of the Pristina Corps and the military corps --
7 police units of the Pristina Corps. He will testify about the security
8 section units, as well as the subordinate commands undertook preventative
9 measures in keeping with the orders of the Pristina Corps Command
10 concerning crimes committed by members of the VJ in the subordinate
11 units, as well as prosecuting civilians who committed criminal offences
12 against the Army of Yugoslavia.
13 He will testify about the number of criminal reports submitted
14 during the war for different types of crime, and that there were -- there
15 was a number of on-site investigations undertaken and under the direction
16 of the intelligence section of the Pristina Corps. He will speak about
17 the genesis of the terrorist movement in Kosovo with a particular accent
18 on 1998 and 1999, and the refusal of the leadership of the Albanian
19 separatist movement to accept numerous calls of the Government of the FRY
20 in the Republic of Serbia in order to resolve the political -- the
21 conflict in Kosovo by political means.
22 He will also testify about the choice the terrorist forces chose
23 to use violent means to be successful in seceding Kosovo and Metohija
24 from the rest of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The witness will
25 also testify about the knowledge and information that point out to the
1 links that existed between the terrorist forces and the
2 Kosovo Verification Mission and the abuse of authority by the
3 Kosovo Verification Mission as well as co-operation between the KVM and
4 NATO forces and the Siptar terrorist movement.
5 He will also explain the causes of migration for the -- of the
6 population of Kosovo and Metohija in the abuse of civilians by the KLA
7 and the Albanian separatist movement as a whole. He will also testify
8 about the crimes of the KLA committed against Albanians who were loyal to
9 the FRY and the Republic of Serbia and other non-Albanian population.
10 He will testify about the engagement of the Army of Yugoslavia in
11 protecting human life and property and securing safety of military
12 traffic, maintaining order and discipline in the VJ. This witness will
13 testify about the superior commands of the General Staff of the VJ and
14 the 3rd Army, carried out inspections and control of the intelligence
15 section of the Pristina Corps. He will specifically address control
16 carried out in the intelligence section undertaken by a number of
17 personnel from the security administration of the General Staff, in
18 particular, by General Vasiljevic between the 1st and 7th of June, 1999.
19 He will describe the meeting of the 1st of June, 1999, in the Grand Hotel
20 in Pristina.
21 Q. Sir, General, can you tell us briefly what is it that you do
23 A. I am a retired general of the Army of the FRY.
24 Q. Briefly tell us, please, what were your most important positions
25 in the VJ up until 1999?
1 A. I was at all the positions there are in the military security
2 service. That is to say, the chief of security in the regiment, in a
3 division, in a corps, in the counter-intelligence group. My position was
4 also that of director of the military security service of the
5 Army of Serbia and Montenegro. I also performed command tasks and duties
6 of brigade commander as well as Chief of Staff of a corps and
7 representative of the deputy commander of the land forces of the Army of
8 Serbia Montenegro.
9 Q. Thank you. In 1998 and 1999 until the end of the war, what was
10 your position?
11 A. In 1998 and 1999 until the end of the war, I was head of the
12 security section in the command of the Pristina Corps.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what is the role of military security
14 organs within the command system of the VJ?
15 A. Military security service organs are professional organs of the
16 competent commands and institutions of the army tasked with
17 counter-intelligence and general security protection provided to the
18 respective units and institutions as well as their commands.
19 Q. Thank you. What are the competencies of the military security
21 A. The organs of the military security service in keeping with
22 Article 30 on the Army of the FRY have the rights, duties, and authority
23 accorded to an organ of the Ministry of the Interior but only inside the
24 framework of the Army of the FRY.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who performed security tasks in the
1 Pristina Corps in 1998 and 1999, and what was the organisation of the
2 security organs in the Pristina Corps?
3 A. In 1998 and 1999 in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, there were
4 military security service organs of the Pristina Corps, as well as
5 military security service organs of the command of the military district
6 of Pristina, and the security organs of the 14th Counter-intelligence
7 Group, which was directly subordinated to the security administration of
8 the General Staff of the Army of the FRY.
9 Q. Thank you. Tell us how was the military security section in the
10 Pristina Corps organised? What was its structure?
11 A. The structure of the security organs of the Pristina Corps was
12 such that all corps military security organs were under the chief of
13 security of the Pristina Corps. In each brigade there was a separate
14 person in charge of security, as well as in each independent battalion.
15 Due to the complex security situation, in mid-1998 the security
16 administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY strengthened
17 the security organs of the Pristina Corps. As of that moment, the organs
18 of the military security service existed in all organisational units down
19 to combat groups and border posts of the Army of the FRY.
20 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us about the functional structure of
21 the security section of which you were in charge?
22 A. The functional structure of the security section comprised the
23 counter-intelligence sector and the security sector. The
24 counter-intelligence sector would monitor, intercept, and disclose any
25 enemy intelligence activity against the commands and institutions
1 belonging to the FRY army. Its task was also to prevent any terrorist
2 activity against the commands, institutions, and units of the army.
3 The staff security section dealt with things that had to do with
4 the day-to-day workings of the staff. They would also propose
5 pre-emptive command measures in the security field. They were also in
6 charge of technical guidance over the military police units of the
7 Pristina Corps.
8 Q. Could you tell us about the manning levels in the Pristina Corps
9 security bodies in 1998 and 1999 specifically?
10 A. As I said a while ago, the security bodies of the Pristina Corps
11 in 1998 and 1999 had manning levels well beyond their establishment.
12 There were the schools and military academies of the FRY. Some of the
13 students saw their education stopped, come to an abrupt halt, because
14 there was a seconded to the security organs of the Pristina corps to help
16 Q. What are the competencies of powers of the military security
17 service vis-à-vis the military police?
18 A. The military security service is technically in charge of the
19 military police and its work, the technical aspects of the work of the
20 military police.
21 Q. What about the security sector and the security organs, do they
22 have the right to order the use of military police units?
23 A. Security officers have no power to order even a single unit that
24 is part of the Army of the FRY, and that includes the military police
25 units. The unit commander was the only person who had the right to order
1 the use of these units, the commander of that unit that the military
2 police units were part of.
3 Q. In the Pristina Corps specifically, which military police unit
4 was that in 1999, and I believe earlier on as well?
5 A. Under the establishment and structure of the Pristina Corps, in
6 1998 and 1999, the units of the Pristina Corps had an A Class battalion,
7 more specifically, the 52nd Military Police Battalion. There were two
8 Military Police Companies as well, the 549 Motorised Brigade, that's
9 where it was at, and there was a company of the military police in the
10 152nd Motorised Brigade.
11 Under the war establishment, all A Class brigades of the
12 Pristina Corps each had a military police company attached to it.
13 However, in those brigades where there were no such units prior to 1998
14 and 1999, before a state of war was declared, these were simply mobilised
15 so they were now part of those brigades.
16 Q. In terms of command, who was the superior or the commander of the
17 52nd Battalion military police?
18 A. In terms of command, and this applied to all the units, the level
19 of a brigade or independent battalion, and this included the
20 52nd Battalion of the military police, the sole right to command these
21 units was held by the corps commander.
22 Q. Can you tell us about the specific obligations of the security
23 organs of the units of the Pristina Corps vis-à-vis their commanders?
24 A. The organs of the military security service in terms of
25 establishment are subordinated to the units of which they are a part. In
1 a technical sense, the direct superior of the military security service
2 of the superior command, superior to the unit in which this body or organ
3 happens to be, is in charge. The obligations of the military security
4 service were to gather intelligence, to make appropriate assessments, and
5 to analyse. They were also to propose specific measures to unit
6 commanders, as well as to document any activity undertaken by the enemy,
7 as well as to take pre-emptive action in order to keep any negativities
8 from occurring in the unit.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us this: What were the fundamental
10 tasks of the military security service in 1998 and 1999 when it came
11 specifically to terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?
12 A. Discovering, documenting, and intercepting any terrorist activity
13 in and against the commands, units, and institutions, which applied to
14 both peacetime and war time, and remained throughout one of the three
15 fundamental counter-intelligence tasks in terms of protecting the actual
16 units. Specifically, speaking of 1998 and 1999, the military security
17 service units of the Pristina Corps were particularly busy detecting,
18 documenting, and intercepting any terrorist activity in and against the
19 commands, the units, and the institutions of the Pristina Corps.
20 Q. Thank you. Throughout 1998 and 1999, did the military security
21 service deal with the terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?
22 A. Yes, due to the apparent danger posed by the terrorists vis-à-vis
23 the commands of our units and institutions, and particularly when it came
24 to our units in the border belt facing the Republic of Albania. Another
25 reason was obvious terrorist activity by the Albanian terrorists aimed at
1 the commands, units, and members of the Pristina Corps.
2 Q. Thank you. What about the security sector of the Pristina Corps,
3 did it have any obligation to report to its superior commands?
4 A. A security sector of the Pristina Corps was under an obligation
5 to continually report both in a vertical and in a horizontal sense. When
6 I say vertical reporting, what exactly do I mean? The security sector
7 was under an obligation to continually keep reporting to its own direct
8 superior, the superior's security organ within the hierarchy, which was
9 the security department of the 3rd Army.
10 Likewise, throughout 1998 and up until the point at which a state
11 of war was declared, the security service of the Pristina Corps Command
12 would send telegrams in addition to the security section of the 3rd Army,
13 also to the security administration of the General Staff of the
14 Army of the FRY. From the beginning of the NATO aggression, the security
15 service would only report to its direct superior which was the security
16 section of the 3rd Army.
17 Q. Why was there this discrepancy in terms of this chain of
18 reporting which came about in March 1999?
19 A. Throughout 1998 when it came to the security situation that
20 prevailed in the Republic of Serbia, if you forget about Kosovo, the
21 situation was relatively peaceful. The security sector of the
22 Pristina Corps Command had received orders from the security
23 administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY, in addition
24 to the security sector of the 3rd Army, to also inform about any of the
25 intelligence that it received, the staff administration of the
1 3rd Command. The reason probably being the security administration of
2 the Supreme Command staff wanted to familiarise itself with the security
3 situation in Kosovo and Metohija over the shortest time possible. And we
4 need to bear in mind the fact that the situation was worsening on a daily
5 basis. The security sector of the Pristina Corps, ever since the start
6 of the NATO aggression, no longer reported to the security administration
7 of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY, as ordered by the
8 administration itself.
9 If you want my opinion, the reasons probably were as follows:
10 Firstly, a state of war had been declared. Secondly, the entire staff of
11 the Supreme Command was now facing numerous problems as well as the
12 security administration itself, therefore, the security administration
13 tried to take things back to what the regulations actually stated. It
14 would not be receiving reports directly from the Pristina Corps but,
15 rather, through the security administration of the 3rd Army.
16 Q. Thank you very much. In addition to the security sector of the
17 Pristina Corps, were there any other players in the field of military
18 security that were reporting to these superior commands?
19 A. By all means, in addition to the security sector of the
20 Pristina Corps, as I pointed out earlier, there existed also the security
21 organs of the command of the Pristina military district. In a technical
22 sense, these were also subordinated to the security sector of the
23 3rd Army. Again, in a technical sense, they reported to the security
24 sector of the 3rd Army. Likewise, in Kosovo and Metohija throughout
25 1998 and 1999, there was the 14th Counter-intelligence Group which, both
1 in a technical sense and in terms of hierarchy, was subordinated to the
2 security administration of the General Staff of the Army of the FRY
3 because it was one of its components. The security organs belonging to
4 the 14th Counter-intelligence Group were permanently reporting directly
5 to the security administration General Staff of the Army of the FRY.
6 Q. Thank you. How exactly does one report to a superior command?
7 A. There are several regulations that are in force describing the
8 procedure for this. When it comes to horizontal reporting by a command
9 organ, this comprises briefing at collegium meetings attended by
10 commanders of the relevant units. If there is a situation that poses a
11 direct threat to that unit, in that case, the security organs would
12 report to the unit commanders or inform the unit commanders by an
13 Official Note.
14 When it came to vertical reporting, the organs of the military
15 security service, throughout 1998 and in the first half of 1999 up until
16 the cessation of combat activities in Kosovo, every day would send a
17 telegram to the security administration of the General Staff, up until
18 the end of March that is, of the Army of the FRY. And they continually
19 reported to the security sector of the 3rd Army.
20 Later on what was conveyed in these telegrams would have to be
21 backed by other documents specified by the regulations governing the work
22 of the military security service.
23 Q. Thank you. Could you acquaint us with the structure of those
24 reports of the security section sent to superior commands?
25 A. As I've already mentioned, the security section of the
1 Pristina Corps Command would daily, by telegram, inform their immediate
2 superiors in terms of the security hierarchy. Such telegrams contained
3 three units, so to speak. The first one had to do with the security
4 situation at state borders. The second had to do with the security
5 situation in the territory. And the third concerned itself with the
6 security situation in the units, commands, and institutions of the corps.
7 Q. Thank you. When did you start working on security matters in
8 Kosovo and Metohija?
9 A. Professionally speaking, I started working on the security
10 situation in Kosovo and Metohija in 1990. And it went on until I -- for
11 as long as I worked in the military security service of the
12 Army of Yugoslavia in 1999.
13 Q. Can you tell us what were the key factors influencing the change
14 for the worst in terms of the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija?
15 A. Many events which took place in Kosovo and Metohija in the recent
16 or more distant past have their cause and effect. They did not come
17 about as a result of political antagonism and changes in society, but
18 they were, rather, an expression of a century long wish of Albanian
19 separatists to see Kosovo and Metohija depart from the FRY and Serbia and
20 to have it annexed to the greater Albanian state that was supposed to be
21 created in the Balkans. I will refer to a number of key events which had
22 a direct impact on the worsening of the security situation in
23 Kosovo and Metohija.
24 In 1982, in Germany, several militant political Albanian parties
25 united, such as the Kosovo Party for the Socialist Republic of Kosovo in
1 the FRY, then the Communist Marxist Leninist Party of Kosovo, as well as
2 the People's Red Front. By uniting these illegal extremist Albanian
3 parties, the national movement for the Republic of Kosovo was created.
4 In the ore of their political activity was their wish to see
5 Kosovo and Metohija become a republic of the Yugoslav Federation.
6 Between 1982 and 1990, there were several isolated incidents in terms of
7 terrorist activity in Kosovo carried out by small terrorist groups which,
8 in hierarchical terms, did not share any links between each other.
9 Another reason for the worsening of the security situation in
10 Kosovo happened on the 2nd of July, 1990. Albanian separatists in
11 Kacanik illegally proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo and elected its
12 government headed by Bujar Bukosi. That government was active and
13 working in Germany. Its task was to provide financial and logistical
14 support for the project that was supposed to be implemented later on in
15 1998 and 1999. When the illegal assembly of the Republic of Kosovo was
16 elected, it was decided that military and police forces need to be
17 established. It was their belief that they needed 42.000 armed people in
18 Kosovo to achieve their desired goal. During that session, the basic
19 outline of the army structure was drawn up with operational zones which
20 coincided with the operative zones from 1988 --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1998.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- during which time there were
23 extensive activities by the KLA. Security organs of the FRY managed to
24 arrest 14 people belonging to the so-called Ministry of Defence of the
25 illegal Republic of Kosovo. In their statements, they acknowledged the
1 change of the national movement for the Republic of Kosovo and that they
2 were as of that moment being called the movement for independent Kosovo.
3 This marked a political change in their agenda. Kosovo was no longer
4 supposed to be a separate republic in the SFRY but their new goal was to
5 see Kosovo completely secede.
6 Next key moment is in 1994 when the national movement for Kosovo
7 made certain steps to meet the conditions necessary for what was to come
8 about in 1998. They drew up a document called the strategics and tactics
9 of the liberation war. In two volumes they worked out in detail their
10 guerilla tactic that were -- that was supposed to be put in place in
11 1998. One could hear of the KLA for the first time in December 1994. A
12 communiqué was issued to a number of people in Pristina by which they
13 informed the public in Kosovo that they were behind the assassination of
14 Lutvi Ajvazi, who was a retired member of the security forces. They also
15 acknowledged that there were other terrorist acts in Kosovo committed by
16 their members.
17 Their first public appearance, so to say, was marked in 1995 at
18 the funeral of Halit Becaj, a killed terrorist in the village of Laus.
19 As of that moment onwards, the KLA became a part of reality in Kosovo and
21 I wanted to stress in particular the next key moment. After the
22 crisis in Albanian in 1996 because of the savings scheme which collapsed,
23 basically all state institutions caved in, including their army and the
24 police. During that period, basically all weapons depots in Albania were
25 broken into and weapons and equipment of the Albanian army were taken by
1 bandits in the north of Albania. There is official data compiled by the
2 UN on the number of weapons and assets stolen. By end 1997 and early
3 1998, those weapons found their way across the border into
4 Kosovo and Metohija illegally.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 15, line 3, that seems to be
6 all right in the transcript now. Thank you.
7 Q. General, can you tell us something about the security situation
8 in Kosovo and Metohija in early 1998?
9 A. The key moments which were the cause of the worsening situation
10 in Kosovo-Metohija that year were actually two events. First, in
11 February 1998, a terrorist group led by Adem Jashari that was active in
12 the area of Drenica and it focused its activities on the villages of
13 Donja and Gornja Prekaze, carried out -- before I go to that, in addition
14 to that terrorist group, there was also a terrorist group in Jablanica in
15 Metohija. Those two terrorists groups, throughout 1997, were the best
16 known for their brutality and intensity of terrorist activities in Kosovo
17 and Metohija.
18 The terrorist group commanded by Jashari in February in Likosane
19 from ambush attacked a vehicle of the minister of the interior of Serbia,
20 on which occasion they killed four policemen and wounded two. In the
21 ensuing clash during that night due to poor visibility and general chaos,
22 the attack was repelled. And then by subsequent MUP activity,
23 Adem Jasari's house was surrounded in Prekaze. He was liquidated on that
24 occasion. The liquidation of Adem Jashari is very important because the
25 Albanian separatists chose to use solely forceful means to achieve their
1 proclaimed goals.
2 The other event that worsened the situation in 1998 took place in
3 early March. The Main Staff of the so-called KLA with its seat in
4 Switzerland transferred parts of its staff to the north of Albania. Some
5 staff members were also brought over the border into Kosovo and Metohija.
6 Those members were Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Kadri Veseli. The
7 task of that part of the main staff of the KLA was to organise and unite
8 the several terrorist groups in Kosovo and to introduce hierarchy and
9 subordination among them, as well as to set the conditions needed to
10 carry out an armed rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija.
11 Q. Thank you. What was done by the command of the Pristina Corps in
12 such a security situation in early 1998?
13 A. Believing that the overall security situation in Kosovo is
14 growing more complex, the command of the Pristina Corps in March 1998
15 issued a decision to use several combat groups which were supposed to
16 leave the barracks in order to provide assistance to the border
17 authorities in order to prevent any further incursions of terrorists from
18 Albania. Whereas parts of those groups were also supposed to be deployed
19 to different roads between Kosovo -- inside Kosovo and Metohija, so as to
20 prevent any danger to logistics and supplies being brought to the various
21 units of the FRY that were in Kosovo and Metohija.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3159.
24 Your Honours, could we please provide the witness with a hard copy of
25 this and other documents so that it would be easier for him to read and
1 this may speed things up.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] This is a 65 ter Defence
4 document 118.
5 Q. It's the first document in your binder. The date is the
6 18th of April, 1998. It's a document of the 3rd Army Command.
7 Witness, do you recognise this document?
8 A. Yes. This is a telegram of the 3rd Army Command. It was
9 dispatched to the 14th Counter-intelligence Group of the Pristina Corps.
10 Q. You actually received this, didn't you?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I'm looking at paragraph 2. Can you comment on the, or, rather,
13 bullet point number 2, item number 2, can you comment on the first
15 A. You see that this is a telegram from April 1998. And the second
16 paragraph identifies the organisers of the import of illegal weapons from
17 Albania into Kosovo. It also talks about the role of the Haradinaj
18 family in the village of Glodjane. The information applies to both 1998
19 and 1999 throughout. Glodjane was sort of a halfway station in this
20 whole business of bringing illegal weapons from Albania into Kosovo and
21 Metohija, and from Glodjane these weapons were transported to other
22 terrorist strong holds across Kosovo and Metohija.
23 Q. And what about the second to last and last paragraphs of this
25 A. The second to last paragraph talks about information that the
1 security organs received on a number of different occasions. It talks
2 about the village of Jablanica which was the second most important
3 terrorist strong hold in Djakovica municipality. It tells us there was a
4 group of 180 Albanian citizens there training the local population. This
5 all tells us what would be happening later on and escalating in May and
6 June 1998.
7 Q. What about page 1, could you please comment on paragraph 3 where
8 it says that some terrorists were being illegally infiltrated from other
9 places abroad such as Turkey?
10 A. We had reliable information indicating that among the so-called
11 Kosovo liberation army ranks throughout 1998 and 1999, there were certain
12 mercenaries, as well, fighting from the countries of the Arab world. I
13 will be talking about other documents which you will probably be using,
14 but here it says that three Arabs and two Muslims from the Kostris region
15 were illegally infiltrated to Kosovo and Metohija.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Can we
17 please have this document exhibited?
18 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
19 MS. PETERSEN: I just wanted to point out in the English version
20 the date is different. It says 1996. So I just wanted to maybe have
21 clarification on that.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, I've noticed that. The original appears to
23 be 1998 when it's examined more closely, and the contents seem to suggest
24 1998 rather than 1996, including the date in the third paragraph, which
25 is a 1998 date. So I think we can take it as a 1998 document, wrongly
1 translated as 1996 in the English version.
2 It will be received.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00725.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank my learned
5 friend and the Chamber too.
6 Could we please have D008-3706. 65 ter Defence document 573.
7 Q. This is tab 1 in your binder, Mr. Stojanovic. I would like to
8 know about this position that is being put forward here. We are talking
9 about the security section of the Pristina Corps telegram dated the
10 31st of May, 1999 -- 1998. I want to know your opinion about paragraph 2
11 of this telegram.
12 A. Paragraph 2 talks about information indicating that the
13 terrorists were fortifying their positions in some of their villages that
14 were ethnically pure Albanian villages. They were moving women and
15 children out of these villages and taking them further into their
16 territory. This was the kind of information received on a daily basis.
17 These terrorists were continually manipulating the population and moving
18 them about all the time, the purported objective being to better prepare
19 for their defence.
20 Q. If you could please just comment on this: We have
21 Colonel Djindjic who apparently signed the document. Do you have
22 anything to say about that?
23 A. Throughout 1998, he was seconded to the security sector of the
24 Pristina Corps as were other high-ranking officers from the security
25 department of the 3rd Army. In this specific case, the telegram was
1 signed by Colonel Slobodan Djindjic who was the deputy chief of the
2 security section of the 3rd Army. At this point in time, he was seconded
3 to this unit. In nine out of ten cases I, as chief, would sign these
4 documents. But he was my direct superior, and I was probably elsewhere
5 at this point in time, so we see that he was the officer who signed this
6 particular document.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May we please have this document
9 Exhibited. Thank you.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00726.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D006-3252. 65 ter Defence
13 document 132.
14 Q. Tab 2 for you, General. This is a telegram of the security
15 sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 10th of June, 1998. Could you
16 please first of all comment on paragraph 5?
17 A. This is another telegram dealing with intelligence that was
18 indicated in the previous one, the terrorists were moving the women,
19 children, and the elderly out of the villages in the Djakovica
20 municipality leaving only terrorists behind who were preparing for armed
21 actions. Furthermore, this telegram shows that a secret KLA military
22 police was set up in Djakovica, and they were mobilising people. The
23 reference here is to groups of men who the terrorists leaders in civilian
24 clothes were sending about town and they were trying to persuade all
25 Albanians to join the terrorists staffs of the KLA. And if I may,
1 towards the end of this telegram, there is information indicating that
2 for one particular battalion of the 549 Brigade, five Albanian soldiers
3 fled who had previously received a transfer from Valjevo.
4 Generally speaking, before and during 1998 and 1999, units of the
5 Pristina Corps were being reinforced by soldiers from training centres
6 across Serbia.
7 Q. Thank you very much.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00727.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3255,
12 Defence document 133.
13 Q. This is a telegram of the security sector of the Pristina Corps
14 dated 12th of June, 1998. Could you please comment on paragraph 3,
15 page 1?
16 A. Indeed. I'm looking at Article 3 of the document before us, it
17 tells us that the people of Korenica village in Djakovica municipality
18 were prepared to request protection from the VJ. They got in touch with
19 the security organs of the Pristina Corps precisely for that purpose. We
20 conveyed to them our position and said that the condition for their
21 protection, which we would be providing, was them not joining any KLA
22 terrorists units and then handing over their weapons.
23 I know that the action came to nothing. We are talking about
24 June and July 1998 when several Albanian villages throughout
25 Kosovo and Metohija publicly expressed a desire to issue a guarantee to
1 the Pristina Corps that they would not be joining any units of the KLA.
2 However, they requested protection from the VJ. They wanted the VJ to
3 protect them and to protect them from any abuse by the terrorists who
4 sometimes came to those villages. There were cases like that occurring,
5 and there were several villages across Kosovo and Metohija that
6 negotiated with VJ in order to hand over their weapons of their own free
7 will. Nevertheless, the terrorists brutally punished some of those
8 people involved in those negotiations.
9 You might say that the initiative was nipped in the bud by the
10 actions of the KLA. Had this got off the ground, this initiative, I'm
11 quite certain that violence in Kosovo and Metohija would never have
12 escalated to begin with.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. May this
14 please be received.
15 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00728.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Defence document D006-3260.
18 Q. Tab 4 in your binder, Mr. Stojanovic. Defence document 134.
19 What we are looking at is a telegram by the security sector of the
20 Pristina Corps, and the date is the 13th of June, 1998.
21 Sir, could you please comment on paragraph 5. This is page 2 in
22 the English version. It says the villages around Prizren.
23 A. I do apologise, I don't have that.
24 Q. This is tab 4; have you got that? It reads, the paragraph starts
25 like this:
1 "Such intelligence as is available indicates ..."
2 And then it goes on to say villages around Prizren. Can you see
4 A. Yes, yes. The document talks about the fact that in the villages
5 around Prizren, the terrorists were seising all-terrain vehicles from the
6 local population in order to transport their own men. And then in the
7 villages of Gjakove municipality, they were looting houses that had been
8 abandoned. If I may just add this, we are talking about May and June,
9 that's the time-frame, the time when the terrorists declared a
10 mobilisation of all able-bodied young men who would then be joining the
11 units of the KLA. At that point time, the Pristina Corps recorded many
12 cases of torture and inhumane treatment of Albanians who chose to remain
13 loyal to the authorities in cases where these Albanians were refusing to
14 join the terrorist units of the KLA. So these terrorists were seising,
15 by force, all-terrain vehicles from the locals. They would break into
16 their homes to tell them that the least they had to do was provide a
17 weapon, a rifle for their purposes, and their family members should be
18 joining the KLA and their units. So this document talks about precisely
19 that period of time and what was going on.
20 Q. Thank you very much. Let's move down the page, a single
21 paragraph down the page, where it talks about the 12th of June. That one
22 and the last paragraph on this page, please.
23 A. I understand. The last paragraph talks about information
24 covering the attacks being carried out by the Albanian terrorists against
25 Serb enclaves in Kosovo and Metohija, the small ones actually, and those
1 with a mixed population, both Serb and Albanian. There was a lot of
2 information indicating that there was a gradual ethnic cleansing effort
3 of that particular area and primarily of central Kosovo. The last
4 paragraph of this document tells us specifically about the village of
5 Rudnik, continually under the sniper fire of the terrorists, where the
6 house of recently murdered Blagoje Jovanovic from Leocine was set on
7 fire. During that night, another 11 Serbian houses had been set ablaze.
8 And the fate of four people from that village is unknown.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. May the document
10 please be received.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00729.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D011-3437.
14 It is document 1806 of the Defence. By your leave, Your Honour, I would
15 like to add this document on our 65 ter list. It is an information note
16 concerning an event in the Radanovic border post area.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Have you had time to consider this, Ms. Petersen?
18 MS. PETERSEN: I don't have an objection, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be added, Mr. Djurdjic.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] The number of the document is
23 Q. General, can you you comment on this document briefly?
24 A. This information note deals with a border incident in the area of
25 the Radanovic border post dated the 15th of June, 1998. On that
1 occasion, an illegal entry was prevented of a large group of Albanian
2 terrorists from Albania. Among the documents and personal IDs found on
3 the liquidated terrorists, there were also documents found belonging to a
4 Norwegian journalist by the name of Pal Refsdal, born 9 September 1963 in
5 Kongsvinger, as well as a camera.
6 This indicated that not only terrorists were using illegal
7 channels to enter Kosovo, but also foreign nationals, journalists, as
8 well as workers of international humanitarian organisations according to
9 our information. This was very difficult to comprehend, having in mind
10 that any journalist could have asked for official accreditation, which
11 could be obtained by -- from Serbian organs in order for them to legally
12 spend periods of time in Kosovo.
13 Q. Thank you. According to the information you have from that time
14 concerning journalists and members of humanitarian organisations as well
15 as various NGOs, did you have any information on their subversive
16 activities directed against the FRY and the Republic of Serbia and
17 Kosovo and Metohija in addition to their illegal entries in co-operation
18 with separatist organisations and the KLA?
19 A. Yes, in our military security service documents, there is a lot
20 of information about such employees of international humanitarian
21 organisations and journalists. This information concerns their
22 objectivity in work and reporting. They were quite inclined towards the
23 KLA, and we also have certain information about their activities in the
24 General Staff or the Main Staff of the KLA during that year.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document
2 into evidence.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00730.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next have D006-3263. It
6 is number 135 of the Defence.
7 Q. Your tab 6, General. This will be a telegram of the security
8 section of the Pristina Corps dated the 16th of June, 1998. Please
9 comment on the first paragraph of this telegram.
10 A. In the first paragraph of this telegram which is related to the
11 first one, we have the following information: That there was information
12 that the MUP had about the action in the Koranovic [phoen] border post
13 area. This information indicated that a Norwegian journalist was
14 wounded. His name is Refsdal Pal who is undergoing medical treatment in
15 the illegal Siptar hospital in the territory of Prizren.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 2 in the
19 Q. Could you comment please on the penultimate paragraph of this
21 A. In that paragraph, it is stated that there was an exchange of
22 information with the Prizren SUP
23 in the area of Sopot village and that they have pressured locals - and I
24 need to mention here that it was an ethnically pure village - they
25 pressured locals into leaving the village. And the Djakovica SUP has
1 information that terrorists are planning to set ambushes in the very area
2 where the 52nd Military Police Battalion is deployed.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I seek to tender this
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00731.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Next could we please have
8 D006-3155. It is Defence number 117.
9 Q. And your tab 7, General. It's another telegram of the security
10 section of the Pristina Corps dated the 23rd [as interpreted] of June,
11 1998. At the bottom of your page 1 - which in English should be page 2 -
12 the one before last paragraph, please comment. It begins with the words
13 "using electronic surveillance."
14 A. The last paragraph of the first page states certain information
15 about something we have already referred to, that is, the five Muslim
16 soldiers who fled their unit after being relocated to Kosovo from
17 Valjevo. By using electronic surveillance, we learned that those
18 soldiers were in the terrorist stronghold in the village of Drenovac,
19 Orahovac municipality. They made some phone calls to their relatives in
20 which they were trying to talk their relatives into relocating to the
21 Republic of Albania. Also, instruction was given to them to tell the
22 authorities there that the Army of Yugoslavia had forced them to kill
23 innocent civilians. This was in order to claim political asylum. This
24 was yet another propaganda activity of which there were many in 1998.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know whether
2 we have the right date for this document. It is the 28th of June, 1998.
3 I apologise if I misspoke. I seek to tender this document into evidence.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00732.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time, Mr. Djurdjic?
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] You are quite right, Your Honour,
8 as always.
9 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break now, and we resume in
10 half an hour. A Court Officer will assist you during the break.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. General, were you informed in early July about the situation in
18 Metohija, especially in the municipality of Orahovac? Did you have any
19 knowledge about that?
20 A. Yes. In several zones in the area of Kosovo and Metohija, the
21 overall security situation was quite grave. One of such areas was the
22 general area of Malisevo and Orahovac. During 1998 and especially in the
23 first part of that year, Orahovac as a town was completely surrounded by
24 Albanian terrorists and there was this constant danger that the town will
25 remain completely blocked by the Albanian terrorists.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-2501.
3 Q. It is your tab 8, General. Defence number 106. This document is
4 dated the 8th of July, 1998, by the speaker of the Municipal Assembly of
5 Orahovac, Mr. Andjel Kolasinac. Did you know that this letter was sent
6 and were you familiar with its contents in 1998?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-3730.
10 Q. This is a telegram of the security section of the Pristina Corps
11 dated the 17 July 1998. Please comment paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 on this
13 A. In this telegram there is information about an event which took
14 place on the 16th of July, 1998, when our border authorities in the area
15 of Kosare prevented an attempt of illegal entry by a group of civilians
16 and armed terrorists from Kosovo to Albania. What is particularly
17 noteworthy is that among those arrested on that occasion, there was a
18 foreign national, Sally Becker, born 29 March 1960. She introduced
19 herself to the police as a person belonging to a humanitarian
20 organisation. She had a Motorola, a two-way hand-held radio, on her and
21 according to her statement, she was in contact with representatives of
22 the humanitarian organisations present in the north of Albania. She also
23 admitted to having spent some time in terrorist headquarters in the
24 villages of Junik, Nivokaz, Dobros, and Smonica. She also had a piece of
25 paper we are the names of Naim Maljoku and Lum Haxhiu who were well-known
1 commanders of the terrorist headquarters. In addition to representatives
2 of the media in 1998, there were illegal crossings between Albania and
3 Kosovo by members of international humanitarian organisations. Although,
4 according to my information at the time, there was no prohibition for any
5 international humanitarian organisation staff which would limit them to
6 enter Kosovo and Metohija, provided they had legal permission by our
8 The way they tried to enter Kosovo territory raises certain
9 doubts as to their intentions.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in the English.
12 Q. It is the bottom of page 1 in your version, please comment on it.
13 A. In one of the paragraphs of this document it is stated that on
14 the 17th of July, Albanian terrorists attacked a Serb village called
15 Zociste, exclusively populated by Serbs in the municipality of Orahovac.
16 At the moment when this report was written, one could hear shots from
17 Orahovac itself according to the report.
18 Q. Thank you. Please turn to your page 2 towards the middle,
19 application of electronic surveillance measures. It is the last
20 paragraph in English. Please comment.
21 A. Here it is stated that by the application of electronic
22 reconnaissance measures, information was received that in Bajram Curi, a
23 town in the north of Albania, there were two known terrorists who are
24 planning to cross the state border and introduce 100.000 Swiss francs
25 into Kosovo as well as 11 radio sets, uniforms, medicine, and equipment
1 for the terrorists and the territory of Stimlje municipality.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have the next page
4 in the English version, which is also your page 3, Witness.
5 Q. Please comment. In the English, it is the last paragraph of
6 page 3, and in your version it is the third from the top, "the latest
7 information," it says.
8 A. Yes, we received this information as an exchange of information
9 procedure with the security service in Kosovo and Metohija. It is
10 indicated that medical supply for the use of terrorists in the so-called
11 Baranski Lug which is between the municipalities of Decani and Djakovica,
12 that said supplies are being transported by vehicles using -- the
13 vehicles belonging to the Medecines Sans Frontieres and the ICRC through
14 Grabovica where they were taken over by members of the terrorist forces.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, I seek to tender this
16 document into evidence.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, what has this document to do with
18 the case we are trying? Now, this is part of a bigger question, that is,
19 the amount of time that is being spent on matters that aren't central to
20 our case. Could you assist us with what you see is important about this
21 document in the case we are trying, which is an indictment concerning
22 events commencing some nine months after any of this.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the year of 1998 is a
24 period that has to do with knowledge of what happened and how things came
25 about. Much of the OTP case was about that. We, the Defence, are now
1 trying to show how the reporting was done in Kosovo and Metohija starting
2 back in 1998. There are some important elements there. For example,
3 regarding the way the security forces worked and the disproportion use of
4 force; how the rural republic public was being made aware of going on in
5 Kosovo; and then later the Kosovo Verification Mission, how it went about
6 its work, what it had to do with the Kosovo Liberation Army, and how it
7 misused its mandate, all of which, I believe, is evidence that must be
8 evaluated by the Trial Chamber in this case.
9 We also have to look at the media, how the media worked. We have
10 to look at how civilians were misused in 1998 and 1999. Who was in
11 charge of that and how exactly was this done? I believe this constitutes
12 knowledge that is relevant in this case in terms of evaluating evidence
13 that we have seen so far and evidence that is still to be produced in
14 this trial.
15 We have had a long sequence of exhibits in relation to this
16 period, the five-stage plan, and everything that when on later on before
17 reaching October and the arrival of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
18 These same persons then testified about what they did later on in Albania
19 and Macedonia and were offering up witnesses who would be making
20 statements to the ICTY. I do believe that this is highly significant in
21 terms of actually judging the evidence in this case.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. --
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, there is another
24 thing. Most of these documents were used previously in the Milutinovic
25 case, some of these documents. And some, especially those in relation to
1 later on, are documents that are being used for the very first time in
2 this trial.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, we are not persuaded by what you
4 say, that the material you are presently canvassing is important in our
5 case. We have received, and are prepared to receive from you, a limited
6 amount of general background information. We have certainly been
7 prepared and will need to look more closely at what is being advanced
8 concerning the activities of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but those
9 activities did not start until much later in 1998 and our primary
10 interest will be in 1999.
11 Now, what you are dealing with here are documents which are
12 painting a picture about events that are of no interest in the trial we
13 have to deal with at all. You have spent some minutes dealing with this
14 last interest that some medical supplies were being brought in to a dig.
15 That is just completely irrelevant to anything we have to deal with.
16 What we are becoming very concerned about is the perception of
17 the Defence as to its case is losing sight of the indictment in this
18 case. This Chamber is not going to try the rights and wrongs of the
19 battle that seems to have been fought over a year and a half or so
20 between the Kosovo Liberation Army, as it came to be known, and the
21 forces of the Government of Serbia. We are going to be focusing on those
22 events which are in the indictment.
23 Now, we will not confine you to giving evidence only about the
24 period of the indictment, but every time you are dealing with matters
25 9 or 12 months earlier, which this witness has done now for over an hour
1 and a half, you need to ask the question, how is this important to the
2 Defence case? And the Chamber, for its part, is not persuaded that the
3 importance of what you have dealt with is of such significance in this
4 case that it can't have learnt all about these matters from the
5 transcript in the Milutinovic case which is already an exhibit. You have
6 spent an hour and a half dealing with detail which is all canvassed in a
7 much shorter time in the Milutinovic case.
8 Now, what I'm saying is not to stop you dealing with these
9 matters at all, but it is to put to you that you are giving to them an
10 importance and an emphasis and you are spending time way beyond their
11 possible relevance in our case.
12 Now, if you would, as you look at your case from now on, try and
13 be more clear as to whether a particular document or a particular event
14 is going to advance your case in answer to this indictment, and if you'll
15 answer to yourself, Well, it's part of the background picture; then ask
16 yourself very carefully, is it adequately dealt with in the transcript
17 already? And if it is, there's no need to repeat it. If it is not,
18 there might be something more that you need to deal with, deal with that,
19 but don't go over the whole story again.
20 Thank you very much.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 May this document please be received, the last one that the
23 witness commented on.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE PARKER: The Chamber does not see that it is sufficiently
1 relevant, Mr. Djurdjic.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour, this
3 is a document from the Milutinovic trial. It was exhibited there. I was
4 merely trying to point out a number of matters that didn't have anything
5 to do with what preceded it.
6 JUDGE PARKER: You realise, Mr. Djurdjic, we are not trying the
7 accused that are on trial in the Milutinovic case; we are trying
8 Mr. Djordjevic. And it is an indictment focused on his conduct and
9 focused on his conduct over a period of time which is over nine months
10 later than this document. There may be, in the events of this period in
11 1998, a general picture that you want to paint for us and which it will
12 be important for us to understand, but this document that you are
13 offering doesn't tell us anything of relevance to the indictment against
14 Mr. Djordjevic. So just because it was used in the Milutinovic trial,
15 doesn't mean that it's going to help us try the case against your client.
16 It might have had some relevance to some of the other accused in that
17 case. We don't see it as having a sufficient relevance in this case to
18 assist us.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, but I
20 would like to receive further instructions from you. We had Mr. Crosland
21 here who testified to this time-period and the period that preceded this
22 period, fields being set on fire, internal displacement, disproportionate
23 use of force; the whole period up to the 28th of March. One of the
24 witnesses, who I believe is relevant in terms of what the Prosecution put
25 forward, in 1998 and those periods of time, one of the sources of
1 information to counter Mr. Crosland's evidence, and provide the Chamber
2 with a different perspective, this is the witness we are dealing with
3 today, and we are not just talking about how KDOM continued to work.
4 They came before the Kosovo Verification Mission, but a lot of other
5 evidence about internally displaced people, about the disproportionate
6 use of force in 1998, and so on and so forth. We have seen the evidence
7 of the OTP, and now we are trying to counter their evidence by our own
8 evidence. That's what we are trying to achieve. Had we not spoken so
9 much about 1998 in the Prosecution case, then I hardly think we would be
10 giving it so much attention in our own case, had we only stuck to 1999 to
11 begin with. But we have the Human Rights Watch, Witness Abrahams who
12 testified about what went on in Albania from 1996 onwards; I can't
13 remember each and every one ever the OTP's witnesses, but they testified
14 to these circumstances. And then particularly the international media,
15 how they covered the situation, international humanitarian organisations,
16 plenty of documents have been admitted in various ways showing us how
17 they worked, the representers of these international humanitarian
18 organisations. That is the reason that we -- well, I don't know, how are
19 we could counter such evidence produced by the OTP unless we reflects on
20 1998 as well? We lost a lot of time during the OTP's case discussing
21 1998. I do feel I have to point that out.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, you are misunderstanding the thrust
23 of our comments. We are not saying that there is no relevance to your
24 case of events in 1998. Very early in this trial the view was urged on
25 us by both counsel, that is Prosecution and Defence, that the events in
1 1999 could not be viewed in isolation and we had to be aware of the
2 events particularly in 1998 that had led to the time in the indictment.
3 For that reason, out of respect for the views urged on us by
4 counsel, we have heard evidence both from the Prosecution and from the
5 Defence about the period in 1998 and even earlier. We have done so,
6 though, if you look at it, in a general overall perspective. We have not
7 gone into a detailed history of what may have been the struggle or events
8 in 1998 at all. We have been looking at the general picture.
9 Our constant call both to the Prosecution and to the Defence has
10 been to concentrate on the period of the indictment, and to be not misled
11 by the possible relevance of the general picture into thinking that we
12 are going to be determining the guilt or innocence of your client by
13 trying all the events that occurred a year, or more even, earlier than
14 the events with which he is charged.
15 Now, this particular document to us is reaching down to trying to
16 look at detailed events over nine months before the indictment period.
17 The fact that a group of civilians came across a border, the fact that
18 among them was one woman who claimed to be a member of an humanitarian
19 organisation, the fact that there may have been a member of the
20 international media crossing a border without normal customary
21 formalities, the fact that an international organisation or two may have
22 been providing medical supplies to a dig, how are any of those matters
23 going to help us determine the guilt or innocence of your client as
24 charged in this indictment?
25 The thing that comes nearest to anything of relevance in this
1 document is that there was an attack on the village of Zociste, I'm not
2 sure of the pronunciation. A Serb village. That's the nearest to
3 anything of relevance in this case. And the point is that without the
4 document we've heard about that attack, what this witness knows about it.
5 So we ask again, how is this document going to help us?
6 I've stopped you here because it's just clearly that you are
7 going to be going through every document this witness might talk about,
8 about events in 1998, and the point we are making is that some or many of
9 those documents are not going to help us at all. This witness, no doubt,
10 will be able to tell us some matters that are of some relevance to us.
11 We want to hear those. But we don't want to canvass the whole history of
12 1998 as this witness knows it, because it's just going too far into
13 matters of little or no relevance.
14 Does that help you?
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I hope I understood, Your Honour.
16 I will be dealing with some documents very swiftly. I will be skipping
17 some and I will be addressing some that I believe might contribute.
18 Thank you.
19 Could we please have D006-3163.
20 Q. I'm interested in the first paragraph, Witness. It is your
21 tab 10, another telegram of the Pristina Corps Command dated 18 July.
22 Can you comment on the first paragraph, please.
23 A. This telegram has do with the action undertaken by the terrorists
24 against Orahovac between the 17th and the 18th of July, 1998, when they
25 occupied most of the town and took 30 Serb locals in an unknown
1 direction. They also seised a large quantity of medical material.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
4 JUDGE PARKER: We are trying to understand the right-hand top of
5 the document which appears to have in handwriting 19 of February, 1998.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, it is
7 rather the 19th of July, 1998, the handwritten note. It is a 7. It was
8 sent on the 18th of July and received by the General Staff of the VJ on
9 the 19th. I don't know if you can see it in the English version, maybe
10 it's typed out there. Oh, it says 19 February.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you for that.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I think it's a 7.
13 JUDGE PARKER: We'll receive the document.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D00733.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we next please have
16 Prosecution document 4188 on the 65 ter list. This is an information
17 note of the security service and its Prizren centre in 1998, the
18 1st of August, concerning the attack on Orahovac.
19 Q. General, did you used to receive such information from the state
20 security administration in 1998 and 1999, and did you have any exchanges
21 of information between your intelligence section of the Pristina Corps
22 and the state security service?
23 A. During 1998 and 1999, we regularly exchanged information with the
24 state security service in Kosovo and Metohija, although I'm not familiar
25 with this document.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3170.
3 Q. It is the 14th tab in your binder. Defence number 120. This is
4 a letter that was sent as a telegram by the security section of the
5 Pristina Corps on 24 July 1998 to the General Staff security
6 administration in the VJ, security department of the 3rd Army, as well as
7 the security organ of the 14th Counter-intelligence Group. What is this
8 document, and why was it drawn up? What was the situation like at the
10 A. This telegram of 24 July 1998, it was drafted following a request
11 of the security head in the Pristina Corps Command. It gives an overview
12 of security in late July 1998. Among other things, there is an assessed
13 number of 25.000 armed terrorists. We can also find the security
14 section's opinion as to what their further plans will be.
15 At that time, regular life and work in Kosovo and Metohija ground
16 to a halt when all of the roads were basically blocked by the terrorists.
17 At this point in time, the situation was the most complex and difficult
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
21 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D00734, Your Honours.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D011-3348.
24 Q. Witness, can you tell us what this map represents? Please
1 A. At the level of the security section, we kept a working map
2 constantly plotting locations and information we had on the whereabouts
3 and numbers of terrorists, as well as the territory under their control.
4 On this map that was created in late June 1998, which I personally
5 created, we can see precise locations of the terrorist groups in
6 Albania -- in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the locations of their
7 brigades and operational zones in which those brigades were active. We
8 also see the disposition of combat groups of the Pristina Corps in
9 Kosovo and Metohija.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Please -- could we please have
12 this document admitted.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Can you help me a little more there. The
14 locations of the combat groups, how are they depicted on the map? That
15 is, of the Pristina Corps.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, they are in red.
17 Those are the combat groups of the Pristina Corps. In blue we have the
18 terrorist forces.
19 JUDGE PARKER: I'm seeing roughly 14, then, combat groups of the
20 Pristina Corps; is that correct?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't have time to count them,
22 but these were their precise locations.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.
24 Yes, that will be received.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D00735, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
2 MS. PETERSEN: Just one thing. We don't have a translation of
3 the text at the top, and I was wondering if the witness could assist with
4 that so we know what it says at the top of the map.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Do you mind reading aloud the text at the top of
6 the map.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the top of the map it says:
8 "Disposition of the combat groups of the Pristina Corps and
9 terrorist formations of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija in mid-1998."
10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 And I'd like to thank my learned friend.
13 Q. Could we also have you read out the key.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The key of this map says, in red,
15 it says: "The forces of the VJ." And in blue: "Siptar terrorist forces
16 and operational zones."
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It seems that my learned friend
18 had the same question as I did. Very well, let us move on then.
19 Q. General, after this period, we know that there were certain
20 anti-terrorist activities that took place which were completed by late
21 September and early October of that year. Can you tell us what the
22 security situation was like in late September and early October 1998?
23 A. Based on the assessment we saw a moment ago, as well as on the
24 assessment of other professional bodies between late July and late
25 September 1998, there were several phases planned to carry out
1 anti-terrorist operations carried out by security forces and the Army of
2 the Republic of Yugoslavia. During that large operation, basically all
3 significant Albanian terrorist strongholds were eliminated that we can
4 see on the map. We also managed to completely break-up the terrorist
5 composition of the KLA, and they were reduced to a number of small groups
6 scattered about the mountainous terrain in Kosovo and Metohija.
7 Since there were negotiations under way on the 13th of October,
8 the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was signed, which, among other things,
9 envisaged for all units which were brought in as reinforcements of the
10 Pristina Corps be withdrawn from the area of Kosovo and Metohija. This
11 was done. It was also envisaged that parts of combat groups be returned
12 to their home garrisons, and that in the territory there should only be
13 several combat groups in the border belt to the Republic of Albania with
14 the task of assisting border units in order to prevent en masse entry of
15 terrorists and weapons, as well as three combat groups along the road
16 Pristina and Prizren at Dulje pass, which was a critical point, and
17 another group on the road between Pristina and Pec in the Volujak region,
18 and the third combat group which was I believe was in the area of
19 Stimlje. All other forces under that agreement were withdrawn to the
20 barracks of the VJ in Kosovo.
21 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether this concluded any
22 anti-terrorist measures by Serb forces and the army once the agreement
23 was reached?
24 A. Yes. All anti-terrorist actions stopped after the
25 Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was signed.
1 Q. Thank you. Did the KLA also cease its activities following the
2 signing of the agreement?
3 A. Immediately after the agreement was signed and the MUP and army
4 forces were withdrawn, and I also forgot to mention, I believe, that
5 parts of MUP units also returned to their respective areas of deployment
6 and that they only left a few check-points along certain roads.
7 In this newly created situation, as we can see from numerous
8 reports by command organs and the security section of the Pristina Corps,
9 the terrorists used that situation to resupply and take up all positions
10 in Kosovo and Metohija from which the security forces had withdrawn.
11 They also continued unhindered supply of weapons and equipment. It can
12 be seen from numerous intelligence section telegrams that they were
13 preparing themselves for a spring offensive. In a way, the agreement
14 enabled the terrorist staffs to consolidate and resupply for a renewed
15 action against security forces.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have
17 Defence number 586.
18 Q. Your tab 18.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We didn't catch the number
20 of the document.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0749. Item 2 and item 3,
23 Q. It is on your page 2, General, as well as in the English.
24 A. It is stated in this item that terrorists also attacked business
25 facilities in Kosovo and Metohija in addition to attacking security
1 forces. In this document, an incident is mentioned where workers of the
2 Bilacevac [phoen] mine were attacked as well as certain workers being
3 kidnapped from that area.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00736.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0762.
9 It is Defence number 587.
10 Q. Your tab 19. This is a document of the 20th of October, 1998, a
11 telegram by the security section of the Pristina Corps.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have item 2 in
13 both versions. I believe it is your page 2, General, and the same in the
14 English version.
15 Q. Can you see 2.2? Can you comment briefly, please.
16 A. This corroborates my previous assertion. Two terrorist staffs
17 leaders in Kosovo and Metohija who were active in the
18 Dukadjin operational zone, Ibrahimaj [phoen] and Ramush Haradinaj,
19 regrouped their terrorist formations, formed a number of smaller groups,
20 and carried out abuse and intimidation of Albanians loyal to the Serb
21 state as well as follow the activities of our security services focusing
22 on roads.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00737.
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0774. Defence document 589.
3 Q. This is tab 20, sir. Could you please tell me about paragraph 4
4 and paragraph 1.
5 A. Paragraph 4.1 tells us as follows: According to verified
6 information, a member of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission,
7 Nick Turnbull, and an unidentified member of the observer team on the
8 21st and 22nd October this year established contact for the purpose of
9 persuading them to accept the provisions of the agreement on resolving
10 the Kosovo problem, previously signed by representatives of the federal
11 republic of Yugoslavia and the special envoy. The OVK for the time being
12 is refusing to accept the provisions of this agreement.
13 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 5, please. The last portion of
14 paragraph 5.
15 A. The very end of this paragraph tells us that the political
16 representative of the OVK abroad Balema Kute [phoen] believes that the
17 Kosovo Liberation Army did not take up its rifles in order to stay under
18 Serbia, this being the message impressed upon the Albanian population.
19 This hard-line wing says, Regardless of any difficulties - meaning
20 difficulties the KLA are facing - we shall never surrender; this is a
21 sacred war; it's now or never.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, may this be received.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00738.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. D008-0801.
1 Q. This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps,
2 the date is the 5th of November, 1998. 2.6, please. That's page 2 in
3 both versions of the text.
4 A. 2.6 talks about the meeting at Sion in Switzerland. There was a
5 meeting of KLA members in supporters in connection with the current
6 situation in Kosovo and Metohija following of the signing of the
7 Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement. It indicates that the agreed joint NATO
8 KLA tactic is being fully implemented with regard to the withdrawal of
9 our forces, after which they take the territory, link up their forces,
10 and again take control of the territory. It was also said at the meeting
11 that the terrorist activity on the ground should further be stepped-up
12 and new terrorist groups set up and that the enlisting of volunteers
13 should continue.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be admitted.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00739.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-810. D008-0810.
19 Q. This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps
20 dated the 8th November, 1998. 2.1, please. If you can. Just hold on a
21 second until we see the English on our screens. 2.1.
22 A. This paragraph of the telegram indicates that there were efforts
23 being made by the international community to deal with the Kosovo crisis
24 in a peaceful way. Along these lines, it tells us that on the
25 6th of November, 1998, the US ambassador to Macedonia Christopher Hill
1 together with the chief of KDOM Shaun Byrnes established contact with
2 representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army who were then shown a
3 US plan for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo issue. In terms of
4 time-line, this is perhaps the earliest situation showing that important
5 international players were establishing contact with this terrorist
6 organisation, the KLA, trying to promote or upgrade this terrorist
7 organisation as a party to the conflict.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. May this
9 please be received.
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00740.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0814.
13 Q. Briefly, please, paragraph 2.1, Defence number 597. Tab 23 for
14 you, sir. Paragraph 2.1, please.
15 A. 2.1 talks about the fact that despite the apparent lull that
16 lasted throughout September following the signing of the agreement, there
17 were again acts of retaliation by the terrorists against both
18 non-Albanian and Albanian people in the area. In the Djakovica area,
19 they are some of the MUP members to go to their villages in order to
20 protect them from terrorists. The same thing was done by people from
21 Decani municipality.
22 Q. Thank you. 2.5. This is page 2 in the English.
23 A. 2.5 --
24 Q. Hold on a second, we'd like to see it in English on our screens
1 A. Many of the Albanian inhabitants in Kosovo and Metohija, an
2 enormous number of those, in fact, were loyal to the existing
3 authorities. This paragraph shows that they started reporting cases of
4 robbery, property being seised by the terrorists. Their own property.
5 They started reporting this to the MUP. An assessment is presented here
6 which is quite accurate given the escalation of terrorism, that the state
7 did not do everything within its power to protect the Albanian population
8 not involved in any KLA activity.
9 Q. Thank you very much.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00741.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0820, please. Thank you.
14 Q. This is a telegram dated the 11th of November, 1998. Security
15 sector at the Pristina Corps again. Sir, could you please do 1.2 for us,
16 comment briefly, please.
17 A. 1.2 describes the fact that members of the so-called
18 Kosovo Liberation Army were taking up positions along the roads gradually
19 controlling the passing traffic, checking travelers, mistreating citizens
20 as well as detaining them, seising vehicles and goods, which led to
21 disquiet on the part of the population. It also says that they were
22 kidnapping some non-Albanians, all of which caused unrest among the
23 non-Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija. The idea was the first
24 voice for people to try and organise the defence of their own villages.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00742.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0827, please.
5 Q. This is a telegram by the security sector of the Pristina Corps
6 dated the 17th of November, 1998. Sir, briefly, please, 2.2.
7 A. Again, this describes attacks being carried out by the leaders of
8 the KLA against their own fellow Albanians. They were going about
9 villages trying to explain to the people there that it was necessary to
10 immobilise for the war that would come the next spring.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, that's
12 sufficient for our present purposes.
13 May this please be received.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00743.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0838. Thank you.
17 Q. Let us wait for the English to come up on our screens first.
18 2.1, please. That's the next page in the English.
19 A. Again, this talks about the arrogance displayed by the leaders of
20 the KLA, specifically Ramush Haradinaj and his group, visiting Albanian
21 villages, firing barrages and bursts of gun-fire, seising goods, putting
22 across the message that they would kill all those who betrayed them,
23 meaning handing over their weapons to the legal authorities and those
24 working with bodies of the Ministry of the Interior.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00744.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0867, please. Defence
5 document 607.
6 Q. Tab 28 for you, sir. The 15th of December security sector of the
7 Pristina Corps telegram. Sir, just briefly, what does it say?
8 A. It describes a large-scale incident on the border to the
9 Republic of Albania, the Liken border post, specifically. A large number
10 of terrorists were prevented from illegally crossing the state border
11 there. Under the procedures that had been agreed with the OSCE Mission
12 from the moment the agreement was signed on, the Pristina Corps was to
13 report these things to the OSCE. Their mission went to the scene of this
14 incident and photographed the scene, but they refused to sign the Serbian
15 and English records saying that this was not part of the procedure that
16 that their orders were different. General Loncar was the president of
17 the commission for co-operation with the OSCE Mission was informed about
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Indeed.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00745.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0875. Tab 29,
24 Defence number 608.
25 Q. A telegram by the security sector dated the 15th of December,
1 1998. 2.1, please, if you can, sir, briefly.
2 A. Again, this is the intelligence gathered by the state security
3 service. They arrested terrorists Bajrami, Gazmend. They interrogated
4 him and obtained information indicating that orders by the staff of the
5 KLA, several small terrorists groups, were infiltrated into towns across
6 Kosovo, the idea being to carry out several acts of terror across Kosovo
7 specifically in order to intimidate people and targeting catering
8 establishment including those owned by Albanians who continued to
9 operate. Because these terrorists believed that these Albanians by
10 continued to operate were expressing their support of the authorities.
11 Q. Thank you very much. Next page 2.8, please, briefly.
12 A. This picks up where the previous paragraph left off. It
13 describes the terrorist incident in the town of Pec it itself on the
14 14th of December, 1998. The terrorists attacked a cafe by opening random
15 fire, wounding several Serbian youngsters who happened to be in the cafe
16 at the time.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received, please.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00746.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D006-3178.
22 Q. General, can you tell us whether illegal arms continued arriving
23 from Albania in late 1998 as well as the training of KLA terrorists in
24 Albania? Did that continue?
25 A. Yes. This telegram indicates that the terrorist training camps
1 in the north of Albania resumed their work and that terrorists are being
2 introduced from Albania after having been trained there. Also, some of
3 the training curriculum, so to say, is addressed in this document.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I seek to tender this.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00747.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have D008-0883.
8 It's a telegram of the security section of the Pristina Corps dated
9 18 December 1998. Defence number 609. Your tab 31. Could we please
10 have 2.6 displayed in the English.
11 Q. It is your page 2, General.
12 A. In this item, there is information of the state security
13 administration that there had been a meeting of the Government of the
14 Republic of Kosovo chaired by Bujar Bukoshi in Bonn, Germany, where the
15 work of the ministry of the interior was discussed. It was concluded on
16 that occasion that there was a need to carry out more complex terrorist
17 actions against command personnel of the state security and other
18 high-ranking state officials, stressing that the forces of the Serbian
19 MUP were no longer capable of confronting organised terrorism in
20 Kosovo and Metohija and were not able to intervene due to the presence of
21 foreign representatives.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00748.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I would kindly asked for
2 D006-3237. It is Defence number 129, tab 32 in your binder.
3 Q. A telegram by the security section of the Pristina Corps dated
4 19 December 1998. A short comment only of items 2.5 and 2.7 on your
5 page 2.
6 A. In 2.5, it is stated that the head of the US KDOM Shaun Byrnes,
7 after having talked to the political representative Adem Demaqi
8 accompanied by him and his personal secretary, went to conduct talks with
9 members of the so-called Main Staff of the KLA, and that such a meeting
10 was also head on the 17th of December.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00749.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0900.
16 Tab 33.
17 Q. General, it's a telegram of the security section of the
18 24th of December, 1998. 2.1, please comment. Just wait for the English
19 version, please. 2.1 is on the second page at the top.
20 A. In 2.1, we see information of the 14th Counter-intelligence Group
21 indicating that the leadership of the national movement of Kosovo decided
22 at a meeting held in Switzerland to have the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija
23 put under its control at any cost parts stated here in order to create
24 conditions for the secure supply of weapons from the air by NATO
25 airplanes and helicopters.
1 Q. And tell us what we can see in the last paragraph of 2.1?
2 A. At that meeting in relation to that it was stated at the meeting
3 that the Americans instead of a frontal attack suggested the
4 concentration of greater forces at key intersections and roads, as well
5 as in the area specified therein.
6 Q. What about the last paragraph?
7 A. Well, we see here that there is a connection between this
8 information and the assistance of the KVM, representatives on the full
9 withdrawal of VJ forces and the forces of the MUP from the municipalities
10 of Kacanik, Malisevo, Glogovo, Klina, and Orahovac, which directly
11 correlates with the conclusions of the meeting of the Kosovo national
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00750.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D006-3187.
17 Q. It is a telegram of the 27th of December, 1998, by the security
18 section of the Pristina Corps. Defence number 122. Your tab 34.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have in English
20 page 2, item 2.6.
21 Q. That is at the end of page 1 in your copy. Please comment.
22 A. We see here information by the SDB concerning a comment by a
23 member of the OSCE Verification Mission, Jean-Pierre Quinton, a Belgian
24 diplomat, that much time will be needed in order to convince individual
25 countries of the correctness of our positions, thus alluding to the USA
1 and Great Britain. The Belgian diplomat considers that there are enough
2 objective reports on the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, having in mind
3 the reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission, but that two of the three
4 people at the top of the mission make a selection among them and send
5 them on according to their country's needs and interests.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00751.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0913.
11 It is Defence number 614. It is a telegram of the Pristina Corps
12 security section dated the 28th of December, 1998.
13 Q. Comment briefly upon items 2.1.
14 A. Item 2.1, it is stated that the latest terrorist acts and
15 killings of Serbs in territory of the municipality of Podujevo caused the
16 remaining Serbs to move out from the few villages inhabited by Serbs in
17 that area.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
20 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D00752, Your Honours.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0916.
23 It is Defence document 615.
24 Q. Tab 36, General. I'd like to hear your comment of item 2.1.
25 A. In 2.1 of this document, we see information obtained through the
1 application of electronic reconnaissance measures indicating the
2 preparations of terrorists for a spring offensive as well as information
3 about increasing numbers of Albanians moving to Albania and on to some EU
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00753.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0920.
10 Defence number 616.
11 Q. This is a telegram of the Pristina Corps security section dated
12 the 9th of January, 1999. Please comment item 3.4. Page 3 in the
13 English as well. 3.4. It begins on this page and then it spills over to
14 page 3. The top.
15 A. In 3.4, there is mention made of talks under the auspices of
16 members of the OSCE Mission between the terrorists and ourselves in order
17 to have eight military police members released who had been kidnapped
18 during an on-site investigation. There were taken to the terrorist staff
19 in the village of Bare. Richard Ciaglinski participated in on those
20 investigations and upon his return he stated that he was told by the KLA
21 that the KLA will start carrying out attacks against VJ and MUP members
22 in the whole territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
25 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00754.
2 JUDGE PARKER: We are doing much better. Keep it up.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I suggest we take the
5 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, we will now and resume at 1.00.
6 [The witness stands down]
7 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Djurdjic.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 D008-0926. Number 38.
13 Q. Tab number 38 for you, sir. It's a telegram by the security
14 sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 13 of January, 1999. Paragraph
15 2.4, please.
16 A. 2.4 of this document talks about information obtained from
17 several sources to the effect that families of Albanians from Kosovo and
18 Metohija living and working abroad were making suggestions to their
19 relatives in Kosovo and Metohija and warning them in a dramatic fashion
20 to get out of Kosovo and Metohija because soon large-scale terrorist
21 attacks would be launched on the MUP and the VJ.
22 Q. Thank you. Were you, yourself, involved in the events described
23 in paragraph 3.3?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the English, please,
1 3.3. That's the next page.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is the development that I
3 talked about a while ago. Mr. Richard Ciaglinski from the OSCE was there
4 and together we liberated eight members of the military police. This
5 says that on the 13th of January, following several days of negotiations,
6 these men were set free by the KLA.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00755.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0932.
12 Q. Tab 39, sir. Defence document 618. A telegram by the security
13 sector of the Pristina Corps dated the 19th of January, 1999. Could you
14 please have a look page 2, paragraph 2.6.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we could have that in English
16 as well. Slowly, please, until we see that on our screens.
17 Q. Just a minute, sir, we don't have that yet.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Page 2 in the English, please.
19 Paragraph 2.6.
20 Q. Please go ahead, sir.
21 A. 2.6 of this document tells us about information suggesting that
22 the OSCE Verification Mission members were making visits to some fringe
23 areas in Kosovo and Metohija, specifically Vitina municipality in this
24 case. They wanted to know about the quality of the bridges in that area
25 and possible landing areas for helicopters. At the time, this caused
1 people to suspect that preparations were referred for the arrival of
2 NATO. There was another source indicating that, as opposed to the
3 previous period of time, the OSCE members were renting flats for 15-day
4 periods which indicated that the OSCE might soon be leaving Kosovo and
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page of the
7 English and the Serbian as well.
8 Q. General, sir, same document last page. 3.2.
9 A. I don't see 3.2 in my document.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise. May this be
11 received, please. I was looking at the next document already. Thank
13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00756.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please move on to
16 D008-0943. Tab 40. Defence document 620. A telegram dated the
17 21st of January, 1992 [as interpreted]. Security sector of the
18 Pristina Corps.
19 Q. Sir. Can we focus on 2.2, page 1.
20 A. 2.2 talks about information having to do with shedding light on
21 the crime of kidnapping of Serbs, Albanians, Roma people, and other
22 nationalities in the area of Prizren. There was an interview with
23 Mazreku, Luan, from Malisevo, he was shown some evidence, photographs,
24 and such, whereupon this person admitted that, along with other members
25 of the KLA from Klina and Orahovac municipality, he had been involved in
1 executing 34 persons from the Prizren area, burning them -- burning them,
2 as the document states.
3 Q. 3.2, the last passage, please, if you can. Can we have that in
4 English, please. That's the last page. 3.2.
5 A. This portion of the document talks about the fact that there was
6 a meeting in the Prizren barracks, our rank commander, representatives of
7 the OSCE Mission, and we know that each unit had liaison officers.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could you please pull down the
9 part where it says the Prizren garrison, like that, thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A representative of the OSCE
11 Mr. Mijhalo Krasnosekov admitted to our own liaison officer that he had
12 gone with Walker to the village of Racak and that he had personally
13 counted a total of 26 dead bodies in civilian clothes but with weapons
14 and KLA insignia. He said that we had won that battle in the military
15 sense but that we had lost in a political sense, meaning that NATO would
16 be bombing us.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.
19 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00757.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0958. The
22 20th of February, 1998. Defence document 622, tab 41.
23 Q. It's a telegram by the 14th Counter-intelligence Group, the
24 22nd of February, 1999, dispatched to, among others, the security sector
25 of the Pristina Corps. Could you please briefly comment on the first two
1 paragraphs in the briefest possible terms.
2 A. This is a period that coincided with the negotiations at
3 Rambouillet. This shows that the terrorist organisations, specifically
4 the KLA as the political wing over in Switzerland, had no intention of
5 giving up, putting up armed resistance in order to try and achieve their
6 goals. Therefore, volunteers are still being dispatched to Albania's
7 north; the leaders of the KLA found it unacceptable that the Albanian
8 delegation at Rambouillet would accept the disarming of the KLA, and they
9 would not allow Kosovo to remain in Serbia.
10 Q. Thank you. If you could just briefly comment on the last
11 paragraph on this page.
12 A. This confirms that the terrorists were carrying out preparations
13 for an offensive and was going on across all the village Kosovska
14 Mitrovica municipality, those inhabited by Albanians. There was a curfew
15 that was imposed --
16 Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry, sir. I'm talking about the previous
17 document, the last paragraph.
18 A. The last paragraph on page 1 talks about Azem Vllasi's position;
19 he was one of the leaders of Kosovo Albanians, that the Albanian
20 delegation in Rambouillet could not make sure that autonomy was achieved
21 in keeping with the 1974 constitution, let alone independence in any
22 shape or form. He was, however, convinced that NATO would be arriving in
23 Kosovo and Metohija but as peacekeeping forces, or else their arrival
24 would be preceded by air-strikes against the Republic of Serbia.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this document please be
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00758.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0961. Defence document 623,
5 tab 42, sir.
6 Q. A telegram received by the security sector of the Pristina Corps
7 and dispatched by the 14th Counter-intelligence Group on the
8 25th February, 1999. If you can, sir, please, at paragraph 3, in
9 relation to the 23rd February, 1999.
10 A. Indeed. It talks about terrorists groups from the Drenica area
11 which was the strongest -- the major extremists' stronghold throughout
12 the clashes in Kosovo. They ordered all Albanians in the village of
13 Brusnik to leave the village by the 24th of February, Brusnik was
14 predominantly Albanian, because they planned to conduct combat operations
15 in that area over the following days.
16 Q. Thank you very much.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this please be received.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00759.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0964.
21 65 ter number 624.
22 Q. A telegram by the 3rd Army Command security department dated the
23 1st of March, 1999. Could you please comment on paragraph 1. Just to
24 make sure we have both on our screens -- that's right, thank you.
25 A. The paragraph talks about the fact that late in February 1999
1 there were Albanians gathering around the Djeneral Jankovic border
2 crossing to the Republic of Macedonia. They asked the border police to
3 allow them to cross into the Republic of Macedonia, saying that there was
4 an imminent outbreak of large-scale hostilities between the terrorists
5 and the VJ along the border.
6 Q. 2.5 of the same document, please.
7 A. This paragraph talks about continuing acts of provocation by the
8 Albanian terrorists targeting the local security members in the village
9 of Osek Hilja. As you know, there were attempts being made to overcome
10 the crisis from July 1998 on, and then a multi-ethnic police force was
11 established in some villages across Kosovo meant to reduce tensions and
12 regain the trust of the local Albanian population by having their
13 representatives in the authorities. But they refused to go along with
14 that. Instead, they attacked some members of this multi-ethnic police
15 force. That's what the paragraph tells us.
16 Q. Very well, thank you.
17 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this be received.
18 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00760.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] D008-0968. Defence document 625.
21 Q. For you, sir, tab 44. A telegram by the security sector of the
22 3rd Army dated the 2nd March, 1999.
23 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 2.6.
24 Q. Page 2 in your document, sir.
25 A. 2.6 tells us that there was pressure being exerted by the
1 terrorist forces of KLA on Serb villages of Podujevo in the municipality,
2 forcing people to leave their homes. The intention being to set those
3 homes ablaze once the people left. We are talking here about the village
4 of Pirane and other Serb inhabited villages.
5 Q. Excuse me, 2.6. I'm not sure if we are looking at the same
6 document. I'm talking about the 2nd of March, 1999.
7 A. 44, right?
8 Q. Yes. Can you please read 2.6, how it begins?
9 A. Following an order by the terrorists of the so-called KLA on the
10 27th of February this year, a large number of residents of the village of
11 Pirane, presently [indiscernible] left their homes, leaving at least some
12 30 families behind.
13 Q. Can you just comment?
14 A. Well, one can see here that in addition to expelling
15 non-Albanians, the terrorists did not shy away from driving out some
16 Albanians from their own villages in order to achieve their own goals.
17 They also burned down some homes which shows that they were certainly not
18 averse to looting, themselves.
19 Q. Thank you. 2.7, please, if you could have a look. That's the
20 next page in English.
21 A. We had several sources suggesting that members of the
22 Verification Mission, primarily those from the US contingent, to a large
23 extent were providing the logistical assistance for the benefit of the
24 terrorists in terms of sharing information with them. And they were in
25 charge of monitoring the overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija.
1 Therefore, that is the information presented here. They were also
2 adamant that the terrorists should reduce their activities before the
3 Rambouillet conference on the 15th of March in order to avoid them being
4 blamed for an escalation -- for a potential escalation.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] May this document please be
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00761.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have D008-0974. It is
11 Defence document 626.
12 Q. Your tab 45. Yes, 45. Can you comment on this telegram of the
13 14th Counter-intelligence Group dated 5 March 1999 sent, amongst others,
14 to your intelligence section.
15 A. This telegram is about a meeting held in Macedonia between
16 Robert Dole, an American congressman, and a delegation of Albanian
17 political parties, as well as the KLA terrorist organisation delegation.
18 The meeting was attended by the leaders of Albanian political parties,
19 but what we can note is that Hashim Thaqi was not there on behalf of the
20 KLA. As we see later, he was the only person against the signing of that
21 agreement. Ibrahim Rugova, as well as the Democratic League of Kosovo,
22 as a moderate wing in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis,
23 left open the possibility for the Kosovar delegation in Rambouillet to be
24 able to sign such an agreement but that such an agreement would not be
25 binding on the KLA to accept any disarmament. There's also an assessment
1 provided that Naim Jerliu, one of the political leaders, stated his
2 suspicion for Hashim Thaqi not being present because he knew that there
3 would be some pressure exerted upon him to sign it. It says here,
4 literally, He is an American player and as such will not accept the
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00762.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we have D006-3247.
11 Document number 181.
12 Q. Tab 46. This is a telegram of the 2nd Army intelligence
13 section -- sorry, the 3rd Army, dated the 5th of March, 1999. Could you
14 comment item 2.2.
15 A. In this item we have information about terrorist preparations in
16 the area of Drenica for an offensive. This is dated the
17 5th of March, 1999. What is also mentioned is that there would be a
18 general mobilisation of all able-bodied Albanians who were to be armed
19 and dispatched to different KLA units.
20 Q. Thank you. A brief comment of 2.3 as well, please.
21 A. Here we have information gathered by the SDB about a multi-member
22 delegation of the Albanian lobby on the 3rd of March, 1999, attended a
23 meeting in the White House where, apart from the US state top political
24 leaders, there were also people present from national security and armed
25 forces. This concerns the talks in Rambouillet. The Albanian delegation
1 received guarantees that, in the political part of the agreement, nothing
2 will be changed. What is key is that the Albanian delegation required
3 guarantees that after the signing of the agreement, there will be no
4 changes concerning the disarmament of the KLA.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
7 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00763.
9 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0981.
10 Q. This is a telegram of the 6th of March, 1999, by the security
11 department of the 3rd Army Command. Could you please comment item 2.2.
12 A. There is mention made of illegal incursions of foreign
13 mercenaries from Albania into Kosovo and Metohija from Islamic countries.
14 There is information that one such group was in the area of Kacanik.
15 What was characteristic of the situation throughout 1998 and 1999 was
16 that the terrorist staffs collected financial aid from the Albanian
17 population by force as well as required that they be supplied with
19 Q. Thank you. Could we next go to 2.1.
20 A. According to operative data collected all terrorist headquarters
21 in Kosovo and Metohija were ordered to carry out intensive liquidations
22 of Albanian individuals who are members of the local police. I've
23 already referred to the multi-ethnic police force. This is the police
24 force referred to.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00764.
4 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Document D008-0985, tab 48.
5 Defence document 629.
6 Q. It is a telegram by the security section of the 3rd Army Command
7 dated 13 March 1999. Please comment on item 2.2.
8 A. This document also points to the aggressive approach of KLA
9 members towards their ethnicity in order to force them to mobilised.
10 This concerns the villages in the surroundings of Prizren. Terrorists
11 entered houses and issued threats due to which certain locals were forced
12 to flee, since some of them wanted to avoid being mobilised or
14 Q. Thank you. What about item 2.3? Tell us something about that.
15 A. Information contained in 2.3 has to do with
16 OSCE Verification Mission members organising transportation of food
17 articles for the KLA as well as their wounded to certain locations, in
18 particular the village of Ljubovac in Srbica municipality.
19 Q. We can see, I believe, that your security section of the
20 Pristina Corps sent daily reports to the security section of the 3rd Army
21 in relation to Kosovo and Metohija and the three items you mentioned?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What we see in these reports is the information you had forwarded
24 to the security section of the 3rd Army?
25 A. I can't say that exactly, sitting here today, because in addition
1 to receiving information from us, they also received information from the
2 security organs of the military district of Pristina.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00765.
6 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D008-0990.
7 It is tab 49, 65 ter number 630.
8 Q. Item 2.3, please comment.
9 A. In item 3.2 [as interpreted] we have information about
10 representatives of the KVM in Suva Reka insisted in getting regional
11 terrorist leaders to use new code-names as well as numerical codes in
12 their internal communications with members of the mission. And in
13 contact with the verifiers about the whereabouts of certain terrorists
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
17 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00766.
19 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
20 MS. PETERSEN: I'm just noticing with this document, it's from
21 the command of the 3rd Army security department, and I thought the
22 specific paragraph we're talking about was information from the state
23 security service. So I'm just wondering if, in this one, if this witness
24 has personal knowledge of the contents of this document.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. You've heard my learned friend. Can you please address that.
2 A. There was always an exchange of information between us and the
3 3rd Army security section and back, as well as including the state
4 security service in their exchange of information with my service and the
5 3rd Army.
6 Q. Thank you. Please look at item 2.2 on the second page. In the
7 English as well, please.
8 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, I ran ahead of
9 myself. It's the next document. First I'd like to tender this document.
10 JUDGE PARKER: I believe it's an exhibit now.
11 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I apologise. D008-0994,
12 please. It is Defence number 631.
13 Q. Tab 50 for you, Witness. This is another telegram of the
14 3rd Army Command security section dated 22 March 1999. Please look
15 at 1.1.
16 A. In 1.1 there's information by the Nis Corps and their security
17 organ about the village of Lojane which is in Serbia proper -- or, sorry,
18 in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia that there had been a
19 collection centre formed for NATO intelligence analysis where Albanian
20 individuals are being interviewed who had crossed into Macedonia.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00767.
25 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Document D008-1695.
1 Q. Tab 51. Defence document 642. It's a telegram dated
2 29 March 1999 by the security section. Sorry, 3rd Army Command.
3 Item 1.1, please.
4 A. It is a combat report of the 3rd Army Command sent to the
5 General Staff of the Yugoslav Army dated 29 March. There is information
6 about the complex security situation in the country. In item 1.1, it is
7 stated that the border units of the neighbouring countries remain at full
8 combat readiness levels in the general area of Bajram Curi and Tropoja
9 where there is a group of NATO officers conducting training of Siptar
10 terrorist groups as well as creating lists of Siptar volunteers that are
11 dispatched to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D00768.
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have
17 Prosecution document 02811 on the 65 ter list. It is a report of the
18 Pristina Corps Command dated the 30th of March, 1999.
19 Q. It is tab 52, witness.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] It's already an exhibit. P1466.
21 Q. Sir, I'm interested in item 1.1(b).
22 "During the 29th of March ..." Can you see that part?
23 A. Yes. During the 29th of March, a strong terrorist group was
24 inserted from the Republic of Albania into the sector of the
25 Mitar Vojnovic border post. It was detected and broken up, in the course
1 of which 13 terrorists were killed. Part of the terrorists had NATO
3 Q. What about item 5, security situation? Can you comment upon
5 A. Item 5, security situation. It is stated that in the units
6 within the area of responsibility of the Pristina Corps detected an
7 increase in crime levels caused by an increase in the number of
8 reservists and people from Territorial Defence detachments. There is
9 also information there on criminal reports submitted per personnel
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this document. I
13 am sorry, it's already been admitted.
14 JUDGE PARKER: What is the correct exhibit number for that
15 document? Is it P466?
16 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] P1466.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Transcript had it as P2466. I think that needs to
18 be a convenient time, Mr. Djurdjic. Now, we sit tomorrow afternoon at
19 2.15, so we must adjourn until then. We now adjourn.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd day
23 of February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.