Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11822

 1                           Wednesday, 24 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  Please sit.

 9             The affirmation you made still applies.

10             I thought you'd sat down, Mr. Djurdjic.

11             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I did.

12     I'm finished.  I just have an administrative issue.  There was a mistake

13     in e-court.  We have notified the OTP about it.  When the transcript of

14     the witness was being uploaded, which is D011-3778, it should be D723

15     under seal; and D011-4037 is D724.  Could we please make that correction.

16     D723 and D724 are the new numbers.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

18             Ms. Petersen.

19             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

20                           WITNESS:  MOMIR STOJANOVIC [Resumed]

21                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

22                           Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:

23        Q.   Good morning, sir.  My name is Paige Petersen.  I'm going to be

24     asking you some questions today.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 11823

 1        Q.   During 1998 and 1999 did you know the accused in this case,

 2     General Djordjevic?

 3        A.   Yes, during 1998 I saw the accused, Mr. Djordjevic, on one

 4     occasion.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Let's break this down a little.  So -- well, first let's

 6     follow that up.  You saw him on one occasion in 1998?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And what was that?

 9        A.   I saw Mr. Djordjevic in late July 1998 in the office of the Chief

10     of Staff of the Pristina Corps, General Lazarevic.  When I entered they

11     were sitting down, having coffee, and engaging in an informal discussion.

12        Q.   Was it a meeting, or was it just an informal talk between him and

13     General Lazarevic?

14        A.   It was an informal conversation between the two of them.

15        Q.   Now, did you personally know General Djordjevic?

16        A.   No, I didn't know General Djordjevic personally.  I did know,

17     though, that he was chief of the public security sector of the Ministry

18     of the Interior of Serbia.

19        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  And did you -- so you knew who he

20     was, although you didn't know him personally?

21        A.   Yes, exactly.

22        Q.   Was that from television or from the official capacity that you

23     held, or how was that?

24        A.   I knew about him based on the official capacity as well as

25     through the media.

Page 11824

 1        Q.   Okay.  And during the NATO bombing period, did you know of

 2     General Djordjevic, his official capacity at that time?

 3        A.   After the NATO bombing period, Mr. Djordjevic was chief of the

 4     sector of the MUP of Serbia and assistant minister to the Ministry of the

 5     Interior.

 6        Q.   And he had that position -- did he have that position during the

 7     NATO bombing as far as you know?

 8        A.   As far as I know, he stayed in that position even after NATO

 9     bombardment.

10        Q.   But I just want to be clear about the period of the NATO

11     bombardment.  Is it your understanding that that was his position at that

12     time?

13        A.   During the NATO bombardment, as far as I know, he was assistant

14     minister of the interior of the Republic of Serbia in charge of public

15     security.

16        Q.   And during the period of the NATO bombing, did you see General

17     Djordjevic in Kosovo at all?

18        A.   During the bombing of the -- of the NATO Alliance, I didn't see

19     Mr. Djordjevic in the area of Kosovo and Metohija.

20        Q.   In the capacity that General Djordjevic held, if he would have

21     visited Kosovo, is that something that you would have known about likely?

22        A.   In the capacity he had at the time, I didn't need to know of his

23     visit.  However, given that he was a senior official, I believe I would

24     have been informed of his visit to Kosovo and Metohija.

25        Q.   Were you aware of General Djordjevic visiting Kosovo on the 16th

Page 11825

 1     of April, 1999?

 2        A.   No, I was not.

 3        Q.   Were you aware of General Djordjevic being in Kosovo on the 18th

 4     of April, 1999?

 5        A.   No.  It is possible that Mr. Djordjevic did visit Kosovo briefly

 6     in the company of the minister of the interior, but I had no information

 7     to that extent.

 8        Q.   All right.  So I would just submit to you at this point General

 9     Djordjevic testified in his own Defence in this case and he told us that

10     he was, in fact, in Kosovo on these two dates, the 16th and the 18th of

11     April.  So can we agree, in fact, sir, that you would not necessarily

12     know if General Djordjevic was in Kosovo?  You would not necessarily have

13     been informed?

14        A.   Yes, we agree.

15        Q.   Now, sir, at this point in time as you sit here today what's your

16     relationship with General Djordjevic?

17        A.   There's no relationship.  I'm merely appearing as a witness in

18     his Defence case.

19        Q.   Sir, so he's not someone who you know very well or at all?

20        A.   I wouldn't quite agree with you.  He's not someone I know well,

21     but he's not someone I don't know at all either.  The position of

22     assistant minister of the interior and chief of the security sector is a

23     public function.  Through the media in the 1990s I frequently heard of

24     General Djordjevic's activities.

25        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you have told us that in 1998 and 1999 you

Page 11826

 1     were the chief of the security department in the Pristina Corps command.

 2     Do I have that right?

 3        A.   Not of the security department, but the security section of the

 4     Pristina Corps.

 5        Q.   The security section.  All right.  And I believe you've said that

 6     before that beginning in 1993 you were the deputy chief of the security

 7     section in the Pristina Corps; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.  Between 1993 and 1996 I was deputy chief of the security

 9     section in the command of the Pristina Corps.

10        Q.   At what point in 1998 did you become chief?

11        A.   I didn't become chief in 1998.  It was in 1996.

12        Q.   All right.  So in the testimony when you've been asked whether

13     you were chief in 1998 and 1999, that was the position you held but you

14     had assumed it even earlier; is that your answer?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   All right.  When in 1996 did you become chief?

17        A.   On the 12th of April, 1996.

18        Q.   Okay.  And you said that one of the tasks of the security section

19     was providing security for the corps commanders; is that correct?

20        A.   One of the tasks of the security section of the Pristina Corps is

21     providing security detail for senior officials and officers, including

22     the corps commander when stationary and in movement.

23        Q.   So who else did the security sector provide security for?  And we

24     can talk specifically about 1999.  So there was General Lazarevic, the

25     Pristina Corps commander.  Who else?

Page 11827

 1        A.   The security section was tasked with providing security to the

 2     corps commander as well as the Chief of Staff of the corps.  There is a

 3     list of persons who are -- provided security when stationary and in

 4     movement, and these two people are on the top of the list.  However, this

 5     is done through military police units that I was in charge of

 6     professionally.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And that leads to my next question:  What was your role in

 8     terms of providing security for these people, you specifically?

 9        A.   In the security section of the command of the Pristina Corps

10     there are two assistant chiefs, that is to say my assistants.  One

11     assistant is in charge of counter-intelligence.  He is there to put in

12     measures aimed at preventing agents from functioning.  The other

13     assistant is for security and staff affairs who, professionally speaking,

14     is in charge of military police units.  That assistant uses military

15     police units in order to provide security to the persons enjoying

16     protection; in this case, the corps commander and the Chief of Staff.

17        Q.   So the security detail itself came from the military police unit;

18     is that correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Now, were you responsible for assigning that security detail on a

21     day-to-day basis based on where General Lazarevic was?

22        A.   No, that was not one of my duties.  It was a duty of my assistant

23     for staff and security affairs.  With appropriate checks, the most

24     reliable personnel was chosen with the assistance of the person in charge

25     of the military police.

Page 11828

 1        Q.   All right.  So I believe you testified in Milutinovic - correct

 2     me if I'm wrong - but it wasn't necessary for you to know where General

 3     Lazarevic was every day?

 4        A.   Yes, I still claim that.  It is not an obligation of a superior

 5     to report to his subordinate; it is the other way around.  When General

 6     Lazarevic let me know of his whereabouts, then, of course, I was aware of

 7     it, but in certain situations as my superior he was under no obligation

 8     to inform me of his activities.

 9        Q.   Now, during the period of the NATO bombing, did the security

10     sector under your guidance provide security for the 3rd Army commander,

11     General Pavkovic?

12        A.   No.  General Pavkovic, commander of the 3rd Army, during the NATO

13     bombing when he was within the area of responsibility of the Pristina

14     Corps was always escorted by his security detail from the 3rd Military

15     Police Battalion, which is under the command of the 3rd Army and

16     stationed in Nis.  I had certain obligations to fulfill only if there

17     were requests put in to expand his security detail.  We would provide

18     assistance to the security detail of General Pavkovic, and we would

19     select people from the Pristina Corps and its MP battalion.  However,

20     such requests came in seldom.

21        Q.   What would cause something like that to take place, you being

22     requested to expand the security detail of General Pavkovic?

23        A.   A cause could be that there was a threat to General Pavkovic's

24     safety and security.  This could have come about if he were travelling to

25     Kosovo, touring certain units which were close to combat areas.

Page 11829

 1        Q.   So you said this happened seldom.  About how many times did this

 2     happen?

 3        A.   I can't recall exactly.  Say whenever General Pavkovic was in the

 4     border belt or when he had to go from Kosovo to the area of Metohija,

 5     since all roads were exposed to Albanian terrorist attacks.

 6        Q.   So are we talking about something closer to one or two times that

 7     his security needed to be expanded, or was it something more like 10, 15

 8     times?

 9        A.   During the NATO aggression, General Pavkovic quite rarely visited

10     front-line units in Metohija.  I believe that was quite seldom.  If

11     you're expecting me to tell you how many times exactly, that's really

12     something I can't recall now.

13        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And I assume if you did not need to know General

14     Lazarevic's schedule every day, you probably didn't need to know it for

15     General Pavkovic either; is that fair to say?

16        A.   I didn't need to be familiar with the schedule of

17     General Pavkovic and his activities, since he was commander of the

18     3rd Army.  He was not under the competence of my security service.

19     According to the regulation, I should have been familiar with the

20     activities of General Lazarevic, but it was his discretionary right to

21     decide whether he would ask of me as his security chief to provide a

22     military policeman for his escort or not.  It was up to him whether he

23     would inform me of his whereabouts at any point in time.  That was his

24     right as commander.

25        Q.   Now, aside from regulations, what we're interested in here in

Page 11830

 1     this courtroom is what, in fact, took place.  Did you, in fact, know

 2     where General Lazarevic was on most days?  Did he inform you of that or

 3     did you, in fact, not?

 4        A.   General Lazarevic throughout the NATO aggression had a squad of

 5     military policemen which did not change.  They were always escorting him.

 6     If there was greater risk in his movement calling for additional people,

 7     he would turn to me asking for that.  So it was the same unit, the same

 8     people who constantly escorted and provided security to

 9     General Lazarevic.

10        Q.   So just to be clear, other than those occasions when he requested

11     special security from you, you didn't need to be tracking his

12     whereabouts; is that fair to say?

13        A.   Yes, that's fair.

14        Q.   Thank you, sir.  During your time in Kosovo, did you work closely

15     with General Pavkovic?  And I'm speaking about your whole time in Kosovo,

16     from 1993 until 1999.

17        A.   I worked with General Pavkovic beginning with 1996 because he

18     came to Kosovo and Metohija in 1996 to assume the position of the chief

19     of operations organ in the command of the Pristina Corps.  For a while

20     General Pavkovic as the corps commander was my direct superior following

21     that period.  As with all other of his assistants, I also co-operated

22     with General Pavkovic professionally.  In January 1999, when he was

23     appointed commander of the 3rd Army, my contacts with General Pavkovic

24     ceased.

25        Q.   They ceased entirely?

Page 11831

 1        A.   No, not entirely.  Not until -- well, occasionally we met by

 2     chance or if he visited a certain unit while I was there we had regular

 3     contact.  But all contact with General Pavkovic did cease in 2000 when I

 4     completed the national defence school, when I was assigned to another

 5     duty not within the security service, although up to that time my entire

 6     career was in that service.

 7        Q.   Would you say based on your working relationship with

 8     General Pavkovic which started in 1996, did he respect you as far as you

 9     know.

10        A.   General Pavkovic respected my professional attitude.

11        Q.   Did he listen to what you had to say?

12        A.   For the most part he accepted our proposals, but it was his

13     right - as any commander's - not to have to accept them.  He had to

14     listen and acknowledge our proposal, but he didn't necessarily have to

15     adopt them.

16        Q.   Was it your perception that he generally took you seriously?

17        A.   Yes, it is.

18        Q.   What kind of a leader was General Pavkovic?

19        A.   General Pavkovic, whom I've met in 1996 as I've already said, is

20     one of the best staff officers of the army of the FRY.  I can freely

21     state that, given the fact that I was stationed in ten garrisons

22     throughout my career; therefore, I had numerous superiors.  He was quite

23     courageous, given the fact that during the time when he was the corps

24     commander he frequently went to the front lines where there was combat.

25     But as any other person, he had flaws as well.

Page 11832

 1        Q.   Would you say that you were close to him?

 2        A.   Generally speaking, General Pavkovic was never that close to the

 3     security service.  I think the roots of this situation reach back into a

 4     period that preceded his arrival in Kosovo and Metohija, at least that's

 5     what I was told.  He had some trouble with the security service during

 6     his time in the Belgrade garrison, as far back as that.  Therefore, he

 7     did not have any strong positive feelings about the security service

 8     generally speaking or indeed about me because I was part of that service.

 9     There is a widespread opinion in the VJ that given the nature of the job

10     done by the security service it might end up harming some people were

11     they to make a misstep.  This was the feeling that prevailed among a

12     certain group of officers, and General Pavkovic belonged to that group.

13        Q.   And that's because you're supposed to report on them if they do

14     anything wrong, is that correct, or commit a crime?  Let's be more

15     specific.

16        A.   Yes.  Each of our members, regardless of the rank or level, were

17     under an obligation as soon as they realised that a crime had been

18     committed to immediately report this, and this obviously pertained to any

19     command level at all.

20        Q.   During your time in Kosovo, did you work closely with General

21     Lazarevic?

22        A.   Yes.  I was close with General Lazarevic.  Every time you perform

23     some tasks, for example, in an army setting, in a military setting,

24     you're likely to work better with some people and not so well with

25     others.  You could say that I worked well with General Lazarevic, and I

Page 11833

 1     would call him a top-notch professional.

 2        Q.   And were the two of you close?

 3        A.   No.  I always did my best to keep my relationships with my

 4     superiors perfectly in compliance with the regulations and professional

 5     standards.  I tried not to take things to a private level.  I was

 6     subordinated to both General Pavkovic and General Lazarevic.  I had

 7     respect for them as my superiors, and I would regularly keep them

 8     informed on anything that was going on in my own domain.

 9        Q.   I think we need to clarify something here.  On the previous page,

10     page 11, line 22, I believe your answer -- when I asked whether you

11     worked closely with General Lazarevic your answer was:

12             "Yes, I was close with General Lazarevic."

13             And I believe you just told us you were not close with General

14     Lazarevic.  I think we should clarify.  Are you saying that you were

15     close with him in terms of a working relationship but not personally

16     close outside of work?  Or can you just clarify in your own words?

17        A.   I'm in a position to fully confirm what you have just suggested.

18     I was close with him in terms of our professional lives.  Nevertheless, I

19     did not privately socialise with him outside work.

20        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Would you in your perception say that

21     General Lazarevic respected you professionally?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And he would listen to what you had to say?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   All right.  As chief of the Pristina Corps security section, who

Page 11834

 1     specifically would you receive reports from?

 2        A.   As chief of the security section of the Pristina Corps, I would

 3     receive reports from my direct subordinates from the security organ in a

 4     purely technical sense.  The security organs of subordinate brigades in

 5     this specific case, those from subordinated battalions.  After July 1998

 6     a forward command post was set up in the Djakovica garrison.  There was

 7     always an experienced operative working there who would regularly submit

 8     reports from this forward command post.  As for the Pristina Corps

 9     brigades, there was several combat groups that were set up.  In each of

10     these combat groups there were security organs, and it was their duty to

11     report back to the brigade security officer.  And then the brigade

12     security chief would come back to me with all this information.

13        Q.   So each brigade stationed around Kosovo had officers within it

14     who were part of the security organ; is that correct?

15        A.   Each brigade from the Pristina Corps stationed in Kosovo and

16     Metohija had an officer who was the chief of the security organ, then

17     there would be an administrator, another officer or normally an NCO.  And

18     whenever combat groups were set up, they would have an officer or an NCO

19     within them who worked there as a security officer.

20        Q.   So the combat security -- the security officers in the combat

21     unit would report up to the brigade level, and then all of those security

22     officers in the various brigades would report up to you; is that

23     accurate?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And how often would this reporting occur?

Page 11835

 1        A.   As I have pointed out several times while giving evidence now and

 2     earlier, there was an obligation for security chiefs in the brigades

 3     every morning and every evening to use their communications equipment and

 4     submit their reports to me.  Every time an anti-terrorist operation was

 5     completed, they had to submit a written report on the progress of the

 6     operation.

 7        Q.   I just want to make sure I'm understanding this.  Outside of when

 8     there was a terrorist operation, were they still reporting to you every

 9     day and night, or was that only when there was a terrorist operation, an

10     anti-terrorist operation, I'm sorry?

11        A.   Each and every day throughout 1998 and 1999, both mornings and

12     evenings, they were submitting to me oral reports, telegrams, and such

13     documents as envisaged by the Rules of Service.  These regulated reports,

14     if you like, would normally follow their oral reports.  Then they would

15     put together a telegram and this would be followed by a batch of original

16     documents, normally much more extensive.  The methodology of our work

17     sets out exactly how they arrived at this information, what sort of

18     information they had, what methods they used while obtaining this

19     information, what was the reliability of the information, how they

20     processed the information or what they did with it, what was their

21     assessment, what was their analysis, what measures were they proposing,

22     and what requests were they making vis-à-vis the security section of the

23     Pristina Corps.

24        Q.   So is it accurate to say that you would get a phone all every

25     morning and every evening followed by these other things that you've just

Page 11836

 1     spoken of?

 2        A.   Those were oral reports, and as I said these were followed by

 3     written reports.

 4        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And what type of information were these officers

 5     in the security organs supposed to report to you?

 6        A.   Their duty was to inform me about any security-related

 7     intelligence in a unit or in a zone of responsibility.  Each

 8     brigade-level unit in Kosovo and Metohija had its own zone of

 9     responsibility.  Those security organs that covered the border belt, or

10     rather, the Albanian border had the duty to report on the situation along

11     the borderline as well.

12        Q.   When you say "security-related intelligence," what does that

13     include?

14        A.   I'll try to explain.  Let us take the example of an

15     anti-terrorist operation.  The security officer would be under an

16     obligation to talk to me in the morning, to tell me that on such and such

17     a day such and such an operation was planned involving such and such

18     forces, the objective being this or being that.  And then that same

19     evening the operation would normally be completed.  The brigade chief

20     would talk to me to tell me about the progress of the operation, were any

21     of our soldiers killed, what were the steps taken by the Siptar

22     terrorists, were any of them taken, were there any unlawful actions

23     committed by the army during the operation, were there any instances of

24     poor command.  Their duty was to do this by mail as soon as possible.

25     They were to submit a detailed written report on any operation at all

Page 11837

 1     that was launched and completed.

 2        Q.   So one of their responsibilities is to report to you whether

 3     there was any criminal conduct or misbehaviour on the part of the VJ

 4     soldiers?

 5        A.   Yes.  Any issues at all that had to do with the work of the

 6     military security service.

 7        Q.   Now, during times when there was not an operation going on, what

 8     kind of information would you get in these morning and evening reports?

 9     Would you get intelligence information about the KLA from these people?

10        A.   This wasn't really intelligence information.  The military

11     intelligence service was in charge of that.  I was in the

12     counter-intelligence section, the security section, which is different.

13     In such situations my subordinate security organs would be under an

14     obligation to submit oral and written reports to me, much the same as

15     before.  But now these reports for the most part concerned the situation

16     across the units because some soldiers would be wounded, there were

17     disciplinary infractions, sometimes criminal offences.  Nevertheless,

18     when there was no operation that was underway these reports would

19     normally relate to such intelligence as was gathered concerning certain

20     locations, concerning manpower, concerning the composition of the

21     Albanian terrorists or indeed their intentions and objectives.

22        Q.   I'd like to talk to you about the relationship between the

23     security section and the military police battalions for a bit.  Now,

24     yesterday you said that primarily in the Pristina Corps when we speak

25     about the military police we are speaking about the 52nd Military Police

Page 11838

 1     Battalion; is that correct?

 2        A.   No, no, no.  In addition to the 52nd Military Police Battalion,

 3     and I'm talking about 1998, please, bear that in mind, in the Pristina

 4     Corps there were another two military police companies, A-class military

 5     police companies, one of them with the 549th Motorised Brigade in the

 6     Prizren garrison, and that was its name, the 549th Military Police

 7     Company.  The other A-class unit was with the 125th Motorised Brigade and

 8     it was called the 125th Military Police Company.  On the eve of the NATO

 9     aggression, in addition to these two brigades that within their

10     establishment had military police companies, all the other brigades to

11     immobilise their own military police companies, meaning each brigade had

12     a military police company in it and these were subordinated to their

13     respective brigade commanders.  The 52nd Military Police Battalion was a

14     unit attached to the corps, but it was independent.  It was a corps unit

15     that was independent and directly subordinated to the corps commander.

16        Q.   Directly subordinated to the Pristina Corps commander?

17        A.   Yes, that's right.

18        Q.   Now, you told us yesterday -- actually, I believe this was two

19     days ago now, that the military security service is technically in charge

20     of the military police; is that correct?

21        A.   No.  The military security service is in charge of

22     counter-intelligence work and staff security work in any unit including

23     the 52nd Battalion of the military police.  In an operative sense, if

24     that's what you're asking and I'll try to simplify, who exactly did

25     security work in the 52nd Military Police Battalion --

Page 11839

 1        Q.   Let me --

 2        A.   -- that was my --

 3        Q.   Let me just clarify, sir, on the 22nd of February on page 7 of

 4     the transcript, I realise these now have page numbers, but it's page 7 of

 5     that day, at line 14 you were asked:

 6             "What are the competences of powers of the military security

 7     services vis-à-vis the police?"

 8             And you answered:

 9             "The military security service is technically in charge of the

10     military police and its work, the technical aspects of the work of the

11     military police."

12             And I'm just asking you to confirm:  Is that the case?

13        A.   I'll clarify.  Right now your question was:  What about in an

14     operative sense?  Who did security work in the 52nd Battalion?  And

15     that's what I was trying to explain.  It was my assistant for staff

16     security, who even in a technical sense would have been in charge of

17     supplying the appropriate equipment and training military police units,

18     generally speaking, as well as any personnel-related matters.  In a

19     technical sense, yes, it was in charge of military police units, not just

20     the 52nd Battalion but also all the other companies across the brigades.

21        Q.   Now, I believe two days ago you told us that security officers

22     including you can't order a single unit, even a military police unit; is

23     that a fair statement?

24        A.   Completely fair, yes.  This is about deciding on the unit's

25     involvement, on its use.  Military security officers had no power or

Page 11840

 1     authority over any units, including any military police unit.  Only the

 2     brigade commander could have issued any orders.  As for the 52nd

 3     Battalion, only the commander of the Pristina Corps had the power to

 4     issue any orders to it because the unit was directly subordinated to him.

 5        Q.   Now, in Milutinovic you explained - and this is at page 162 of

 6     that exhibit, your Milutinovic testimony - that the security service

 7     proposed the use of units of the military police; is that accurate?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And I'll read a little more here.  In your Milutinovic transcript

10     at page 5, line 15, you stated:

11             "The organs of the military security service in technical and

12     professional terms are in charge of the military police organs."

13             Then you were asked:

14             "Do the military security service organs have the right to issue

15     orders to the military police?"

16             You answered:

17             "No, only the commander of the unit that has military police

18     units within its formation has the right to do so.  The military security

19     service organs proposed to the commander of such a unit how the military

20     police units are to be -- should be used."

21             Is that your statement, sir?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, if we could look at Prosecution Exhibit 1341.

24             Now, sir, these are minutes of the collegium of the VJ

25     General Staff for 25 February 1999.

Page 11841

 1             MS. PETERSEN:  And if we could just go to page 15 in English and

 2     I believe page 15 in the B/C/S, although I had a difficult time matching

 3     this up.  But I believe it's page 15 and if it's not I'm sure my learned

 4     friend will let me know if he's not seeing the same thing.

 5             If we could go to the bottom of the page on page 15 of the

 6     English.

 7        Q.   We see that General Dimitrijevic is about to speak.  Now, at this

 8     time what was the position of General Dimitrijevic?

 9        A.   Colonel-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic at the time was the chief

10     of the security administration of the General Staff of the VJ.

11        Q.   So he was your superior's superior; is that fair to say, sir?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   All right.  Now, let me just check with Mr. Djurdjic, are you

14     seeing where General Dimitrijevic is about to speak?  We have the right

15     page?  All right, thank you.  If we could go in the English to the next

16     page where we actually see what he says.  He says:

17             "With respect to the departure of an anti-terrorist battalion

18     from the 72nd Special Brigade for KiM, I found it inappropriate that

19     nobody had every consulted me about it.  I had been informed about a

20     written order and the dispatch of the best anti-terrorist unit only after

21     it had arrived down there.  These initial moves demonstrate that this

22     unit will not be used properly.  Part of the unit has been resubordinated

23     to the 52nd" --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could you slow down, please, thank you.

25             MS. PETERSEN:  Sorry.  Thank you.

Page 11842

 1        Q.    "... has been resubordinated ..."

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Carry on, please.

 3             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Just one thing.  Page 14 in the

 4     Serbian, that is what my learned friend is reading from, because it goes

 5     on at page 15.  Dimitrijevic appears on page 14 of the Serbian, which is

 6     what my learned friend is currently reading from.

 7             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you.

 8             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you for the record, sir.

 9        Q.   And just not to read too much of this, going down General Curcin

10     speaks and then we hear briefly from General Ojdanic, and then

11     Dimitrijevic says again:

12             "At any rate, it is clearly stipulated that police units are to

13     be used at our proposal, and we presumably know better than anyone else

14     to what use these units can be put.  My only objection was that we should

15     be consulted."

16             Now, in looking at this, sir, would you agree with me that the

17     security sector took seriously their ability to propose the use of these

18     military police units?

19        A.   If I may explain the essence of what General Dimitrijevic said

20     here.  You see, while giving evidence yesterday I said that the

21     anti-terrorist battalion, being one of the battalions belonging to the

22     72nd Special Brigade during the NATO aggression, was resubordinated to

23     the 3rd Army and then to the Pristina Corps.  Given the fact that the

24     military security service essentially under the regulations has three

25     channels or lines of work, as it were, one of them being

Page 11843

 1     counter-intelligence, the other being terrorism, and the third line of

 2     work being organised crime, if you look at number 2, terrorism, the

 3     security service would make proposals to the appropriate commands

 4     concerning the use of anti-terrorist units.  In the case at hand, General

 5     Dimitrijevic's observation here boils down to what follows.  Why was the

 6     unit detached from the 72nd Brigade and attached or seconded to the

 7     Pristina Corps, resubordinated to it, without him being consulted?  Let

 8     me remind you of this, nevertheless, the Guards Brigade, the 72nd Special

 9     Brigade and the Parachuters Brigade were part of another corps which was

10     called the Special Forces Corps.  This Special Forces Corps was stationed

11     in Belgrade.  What he's saying here is observing to General Ojdanic or

12     complaining to General Ojdanic, who was Chief of the General Staff at the

13     time, which boils down to the following:  Why was the anti-terrorist

14     battalion resubordinated and sent away without his prior consent?  And

15     then if you go to the last line he openly complains about the following.

16     He says:  I think the expert, the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army probably

17     made that proposal and who does he have in mind there?  He means

18     Colonel-General Ljubisa Stojmirovic, who before he took up his post as

19     Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army was commander of the Special Forces Corps.

20             So what is Dimitrijevic saying here?  That General Stojmirovic

21     got the Chief of the General Staff to have that battalion sent or

22     resubordinated to the Pristina Corps, making General Dimitrijevic himself

23     quite unimportant in the process.

24        Q.   And it appears that he is re-asserting the right of the security

25     sector to propose how those military police units are used, correct?

Page 11844

 1     He's making clear that he should have been consulted about this?

 2        A.   Here is what he's saying:  He should have been consulted, but not

 3     necessarily asked.  It is an inviable right for any commander to take a

 4     decision because General Dimitrijevic was actually General Ojdanic's

 5     subordinate, and the battalion could not be sent away without a decision

 6     from the Chief of the General Staff.  Therefore, General Ojdanic need not

 7     necessarily have asked him.  If we talk about military rules or

 8     behaviour, if we talk about good business practice and communication, he

 9     could have opted to ask him to consult with him, but he was certainly

10     under no obligation to talk to him.

11        Q.   Sir, yesterday you were shown a number of telegrams --

12             MS. PETERSEN:  I'm finished with this exhibit.

13        Q.   You were shown a number of telegrams from the Pristina Corps

14     security section, which I believe is you, and the 3rd Army security

15     section.  A lot of these were in the form of telegrams; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes, most were.

17        Q.   All right.

18             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could look at D749, please, the first

19     page -- first we'll look at the first page in both English and B/C/S.

20        Q.   Now, sir, you were shown this two days ago, and it appears that

21     this is a Pristina Corps command security department telegram from 19th

22     of December, 1999 [sic]; am I accurate on that?

23        A.   Yes, you are.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  And if we could look at the last page in B/C/S,

25     e-court page number 3.

Page 11845

 1        Q.   I note that there's no signature on this page; is that correct?

 2        A.   That is correct.  If you want me, I'll explain.  Most telegrams

 3     do not have a signature.  That is why originals are kept in the archives.

 4     When I draft this telegram late in the evening and summarise a report for

 5     the command for that day, I then give the text to those in the code

 6     department responsible for encoding it and sending it on to this superior

 7     command.  They receive my telegram in this version, but I guarantee that

 8     all this information is original and true.  You can see my initials

 9     there, meaning that I drafted the telegram, as I did most of them.

10        Q.   So you would say that this copy of the telegram is an authentic

11     copy of your telegram, even though it has no signature?

12        A.   Is completely authentic.

13        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Yesterday -- or actually, I'm -- you've got two

14     days of testimony, so sometimes I'm not sure if it was yesterday or the

15     day before, but at some point in your testimony the last two days when we

16     were looking at these Pristina Corps security department telegrams, it

17     appeared that a number of these telegrams contained information from the

18     state security department or section; is that correct?

19        A.   We exchanged information regularly.  Some information came from

20     the State Security Service, some information was our own, some came from

21     the 14th counter-intelligence group.  I would put that all together in a

22     single telegram.

23        Q.   All right, sir.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could look at Prosecution 65 ter 02945.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  While that is happening, page 23, line 21, you

Page 11846

 1     gave the date of the last exhibit as 19th of December, 1999.  I think it

 2     should be 1998.

 3             MS. PETERSEN:  You're very correct, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Sir, is that a picture of you in this article?

 5        A.   Yes, it is.

 6        Q.   And is this an interview you gave to the Nedeljni Telegraf on, I

 7     believe it is the 22nd of November, 2000?

 8        A.   2000.

 9        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  If we could look at page 5 in the

10     English and in B/C/S on page 4, the first full paragraph in the first

11     column.  And the type is very small in the B/C/S so I will read this out

12     because I'm not sure if you'll be able to make it out.

13             Now, this article you're criticising the MUP and some others for

14     failing to adequately address terrorism in Kosovo as it built up in the

15     1990s.  And on page 5, midway through the second paragraph in the English

16     it says:

17             "That which is true is that the state security delivered some

18     information to the army about the directions of the entry of terrorists

19     and weapons from Albania to Kosovo across the border.  However, I

20     responsibly claim that the majority of the information was not true.

21     Acting on that information in a certain number of cases, we engaged

22     significant forces, but it almost always turned out that that was not

23     necessary, by which we were exhausting the people and maybe leaving some

24     other directions of entry open.  Not once the question was asked to which

25     degree was reliable and verified the information that they would provide

Page 11847

 1     us with sometimes."

 2             Is that your statement, sir?

 3        A.   Yes, this is my statement.  Perhaps I should clarify something.

 4     There were frequent situations in which representatives of the State

 5     Security Service forwarded information, stating that along a certain

 6     route towards Albania there was supposed to be a convoy of beasts of

 7     burden of sorts carrying weapons, and then we had to allocate certain

 8     units from our combat disposition to set up ambushes and spend all night

 9     there.  On several occasions such information proved incorrect because

10     there were simply no terrorists passing there.  This further exhausted

11     our forces, and this is what I was referring to in the interview.

12        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'd like to ask you a little bit about your role

13     in the Pristina Corps command.  You were part of the Pristina Corps

14     command; is that correct?

15        A.   Certainly.

16        Q.   Okay.  And what meetings did you attend related to that?

17        A.   Do you have in mind the question in the interview or the meetings

18     of the Pristina Corps?

19        Q.   No, sir.  I'm not asking you about the exhibit at this point.

20     Just -- I'm asking you about a new topic now.  And I should be a little

21     more precise.  I mean regular meetings.  I'm sure you had various

22     meetings here and there, but what regular meetings were you part of as

23     part of the Pristina Corps command?

24        A.   By function I was a member of the Pristina Corps commanders'

25     collegium comprising the Chief of Staff of the corps, the chief of the

Page 11848

 1     operations department, assistant commander for logistics, assistant

 2     commander for morale, chief of the security section, as well as assistant

 3     commander for garrison affairs.  As for the meetings of the collegium of

 4     the corps commander, these were held during 1998 regularly.  And after

 5     the NATO aggression, there were never such comprehensive meetings with

 6     all of those people in attendance.

 7             During 1998 I briefed on all security aspects in the units and

 8     information I gathered in the field.  I also carried out analyses and

 9     proposed measures to the corps commander.  In 1999 the Pristina Corps

10     command was never in a single location.  It was dispersed per or by

11     command organs.  For example, the logistics organ was in one location,

12     the morale organ and second operations organ on a third location.  They

13     were all in the general area of Pristina.  Therefore, due to the

14     air-strikes and constantly changing situation in units, movements, as

15     well as numerous problems of the corps, it was impossible to have full

16     collegium meetings.  During 1999 there were meetings, though, of the

17     corps of the collegium.  For example, when decisions needed to be made,

18     the Chief of Staff and the commander would meet and they would call us

19     individually if they needed any of us to join them.

20             Also, on -- of my own initiative when I had information that were

21     of significant security interest, I was under an obligation to locate the

22     commander and convey it to him.

23        Q.   Did you know about actions that the Pristina Corps had planned

24     for its units in your role?

25        A.   Not necessarily.  I received certain information from the

Page 11849

 1     operations organ who was supposed to plan such actions and draw maps, but

 2     if I didn't know when such actions were planned at least I was always

 3     informed of such actions after their taking place.

 4        Q.   Did you take part in any capacity in planning the actions of the

 5     Pristina Corps?

 6        A.   In the staff part when a plan is drawn up is something I never

 7     participated in, but I did participate in activities before any decisions

 8     are made.  Whenever asked, I was supposed to provide a security

 9     assessment in certain locations where the action was supposed to take

10     place.  I was supposed to provide information on the presence of

11     terrorists, their personnel numbers, weapons, plans, deployment, as well

12     as information on any fortifications.  I forwarded such information to

13     the operational affairs organ, who kept that in mind when planning the

14     operation.  He needed to decide which forces we needed and in which

15     manner such an action would be executed.

16        Q.   This seems like pretty important information to have before an

17     anti-terrorist action, do you agree, know what you're going up against?

18        A.   Anti-terrorist actions were not planned solely based on my

19     information.  There was also information coming from the staff in Kosovo

20     and Metohija as well as information from the state and public security

21     sector and the 14th counter-intelligence group, which was under -- which

22     was not under my command.  Some information also came from the security

23     organs of the military district which was under the command of the

24     3rd Army.  Some information also came from field commanders who

25     encountered terrorists all the time.

Page 11850

 1             In addition to the counter-intelligence service there was also an

 2     intelligence service in the Pristina Corps command.  When all that

 3     information found its way to the operations organ, it was only then that

 4     they would start drawing up plans for a specific anti-terrorist action.

 5        Q.   Now, these other sources of information, were some of these

 6     channelled through you?  All of these individual people weren't coming to

 7     meet with the Pristina Corps command, were they?  Was it channelled

 8     through you to pass on that information?

 9        A.   No.  I apologise.  It seems that this microphone is off.

10             My answer is no.  Information coming from the 14th

11     counter-intelligence group and intelligence organs as well as security

12     organs of the military district, including information from the state and

13     public security sector did not need necessarily go through my hands for

14     me to forward them to the organs of the Pristina Corps.  It is true that

15     I exchanged information with them, but it was possible for the Pristina

16     Corps command to call the chief of the state security sector and ask him

17     for an assessment.  He could also call the commander of the 14th

18     counter-intelligence group to receive information.  We did exchange

19     information, but it wasn't necessary to have all of them, in particular

20     the intelligence organs because they were separate and they followed a

21     different method since the assistant commander for intelligence affair

22     was also subordinated to the commander of the Pristina Corps.  He

23     informed him of the situation in Albania, about the border belt, as well

24     as all the other issues that fall within their remit.

25        Q.   Sir, I'm speaking specifically about the planning of an operation

Page 11851

 1     and your role in assisting that.  Are you telling us that before an

 2     operation, instead of just getting information from you about the

 3     security situation that they would hear from all these various groups

 4     about all their information?

 5        A.   No.  For the most part they received information from the

 6     security section of the Pristina Corps, and they relied heavily on that

 7     information because that information was most of the time correct.  But

 8     the commander had the right to seek opinion from the field commanders as

 9     well as other organs.  However, the biggest part of information came from

10     the security section of the Pristina Corps in terms of possible planning

11     of any anti-terrorist action.

12        Q.   And just to help clarify this, I think your testimony, sir, in

13     the Milutinovic case at page 143, you were asked:

14             "Did you participate in the preparation or plans for combat

15     actions or manoeuvres of the various units of the Pristina Corps?"

16             And you said:

17             "I participated in the part which related to giving over

18     information and providing knowledge about the locations, plans,

19     intentions, strength of the Albanian terrorists, and that information I

20     sent to the chief of the department for operations of the corps command."

21             Is that a fair statement of your role and planning in assisting

22     in the plans for operations?

23        A.   Yes.  I see nothing in dispute.  There is no difference between

24     what I said then and now.  The operations department and its chief serve

25     as the brain when it comes to any planning of operations by the Pristina

Page 11852

 1     Corps.  As I said then I say now, that I forwarded information to the

 2     chief of operations who would then follow it up with the core of the

 3     command and the corps commander because not the entire command

 4     participated, only those officers for whom the corps commander believed

 5     he needed for a specific operation.

 6        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And it seems that it would be important for this

 7     information to be as up-to-date as possible; would you agree with that?

 8        A.   That information was always up-to-date.  In my view, we had very

 9     able personnel.  I believe our information was very reliable throughout

10     1998 and 1999.  Of course it's a different matter as to what use that

11     information was put.  After the war certain terrorist leaders published a

12     number of books, such as the book of Ramush Haradinaj, and by having read

13     that I was able to conclude that at the time we had very good

14     information.

15        Q.   And I'm asking you something slightly different.  I don't doubt

16     that your information was very up-to-date.  I'm asking you -- it was

17     important for the commanders and the command of the Pristina Corps to get

18     that most up-to-date information for that anti-terrorist action, is that

19     fair to say, for them to know this information?

20        A.   Yes, in full.  They always wanted information, and we were always

21     in the field, so the pace of work was very fast.

22        Q.   So before an anti-terrorist operation they would probably need to

23     know things like:  Have the terrorists shifted positions?  Have they

24     gained reinforcement?  Have they gotten better weapons?  Things like

25     that, that would be important to pass on?

Page 11853

 1        A.   That is partially true.  It is true that they needed to have the

 2     type of information you specified; however, primarily they had to know

 3     the locations, which settlements, which geographical and topographic

 4     features are held by the terrorists and by what means and forces.  They

 5     needed to know about their system of defence in terms of engineering and

 6     mining.  They needed to know who is in command, the manning levels, and

 7     the type of weapons.  They needed to know what the force morale was and

 8     what those forces planned to do in the ensuing period.  They also needed

 9     to know whether there were experts, so to say, foreign mercenaries or

10     instructors from other countries such as was the case.  We also needed to

11     know what were their pull-out routes and links to other terrorist staffs.

12     This was a host of problems and issues that was always kept up-to-date,

13     and it was constantly assessed.

14        Q.   And the command would need to know that information as of right

15     then, not two weeks ago or even a week ago; they would need to know what

16     is the situation with regard to those things right now.  Is that fair to

17     say?

18        A.   Yes, daily and in real time.

19        Q.   Thank you, sir.

20             MS. PETERSEN:  I see we have reached the time for the break.

21     Before we do, I would seek to tender Prosecution 65 ter 02945.

22             JUDGE PARKER:  It will be received.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P01543.

24             JUDGE PARKER:  We will have the first break now resuming at

25     11.00.

Page 11854

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Mr. Djurdjic.

 5             MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my inadequate

 6     explanation concerning an administrative question was apparently not

 7     sufficiently clear.  I believe I should leave it to Ms. O'Leary to

 8     explain what this is about.

 9             JUDGE PARKER:  Things are best left in the hands of experts,

10     Mr. Djurdjic.  I'm learning that every day.

11             Ms. O'Leary.

12             MS. O'LEARY:  Thank you, Your Honour.  While I don't claim to be

13     an expert, I will say that what we were seeking was leave of the

14     Trial Chamber to replace D723, which is under seal, and D724, which are

15     the trial transcripts from Milutinovic et al. of this witness,

16     Mr. Stojanovic.  The ones that were entered into evidence on Monday

17     actually were missing the 11 December 2007 transcript in its entirety.

18     So we've reloaded them at the numbers given by Mr. Djurdjic this morning.

19     So we're just seeking a ruling from the Trial Chamber to replace those in

20     evidence.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, that is granted.

22                           [The witness takes the stand]

23             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

24             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25        Q.   Sir, in your Milutinovic transcript you said at page 5, line 5:

Page 11855

 1             "The organs of the military security service participate in the

 2     actions that precede the institution of criminal proceedings."

 3             Do you recall saying that?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   [Microphone not activated] --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             MS. PETERSEN:  All right.

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  That was my fault.

 9             MS. PETERSEN:  Okay.

10        Q.   In layman terms, sir, does that mean you would -- you in your

11     section would investigate crimes?

12        A.   It means that I and my department or the members of my

13     department, as soon as we found out about a crime that occurred, would

14     first inform our superiors, after which we would take such steps and

15     measures as were required to initiate criminal proceedings, the objective

16     being to arrest the perpetrator or at least keep the perpetrator from

17     escaping.  It means securing the crime scene, it means gathering any

18     information that might prove helpful in shedding light on the commission

19     of the crime.  And if the perpetrator was arrested and handed over to the

20     appropriate judicial authorities, we would then follow any further orders

21     and requests by the investigating magistrate.

22        Q.   So you would secure the crime scene; is that correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And when you say it means gathering any information that might be

25     helpful, does that include both interviewing potential witnesses and

Page 11856

 1     gathering physical evidence?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And what was your responsibility with regard to that evidence?

 4     Would you keep the evidence secure?

 5        A.   We would normally familiarise the relevant judicial authority or

 6     prosecutor with the evidence, and the evidence would then be duly handed

 7     over to the appropriate judicial authority.

 8        Q.   Sir, how was an investigation - and I'm using the term

 9     "investigation" to basically describe what you just spoke of, is that a

10     fair word, "investigation," to describe what your unit was doing during

11     this period?

12        A.   Perhaps that term is not entirely appropriate, but gathering

13     appropriate information and gathering evidence that might help shed light

14     on a crime.

15        Q.   So, sir, we don't have to repeat all that, would you agree with

16     me that we can use the word "investigation," and it will mean what you

17     just said?  Can we agree on that?

18        A.   Yes, we could.

19        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  How was an investigation triggered?

20        A.   An investigation would normally be preceded by gathering

21     information to the effect that a specific crime was committed.  After

22     that a team would go to inspect the scene, secure the scene, and carry

23     out investigative steps.  And then the forensic team would draw up a

24     criminal report.  Any persons potentially having knowledge of the crime

25     would be interviewed.  Statements would be taken and recorded.  Any other

Page 11857

 1     items or objects might be gathered that could help with the investigation

 2     of the crime in question.  There was a whole set of steps and rules to be

 3     followed.

 4        Q.   In the very first instance, how did you learn of a potential

 5     crime that needed to be investigated?

 6        A.   There were two ways -- or rather, there were many ways.

 7     Sometimes a commander in a unit would report a crime or else any member

 8     of a certain unit would report a crime or else we would use our

 9     operatives to receive -- in the units to receive intelligence indicating

10     that a crime was committed without the relevant superior officer in that

11     unit necessarily being aware of the crime.

12        Q.   Just so I am sure I understand, when you talk about your

13     operatives in the unit, are those the people who are within the security

14     organ, or are you talking about people who were acting as operatives

15     unbeknownst to the unit?

16        A.   The security organs of any unit - and this applies to any service

17     or indeed any army in the world - work more or less in keeping with the

18     same methods.  There is a methodology that is prescribed in terms of

19     gathering information and intelligence.  One of the ways to go about this

20     is through agents or associates.  That's what we called them.  These

21     positions, so to speak, existed in all units.  Wherever there was

22     something going on and wherever there could be expected some enemy

23     activity, within the army or against the army.

24        Q.   So these associates within the units would tell you if some of

25     the troops, for example, were actually meeting with the KLA and were

Page 11858

 1     possibly going to desert; would that be an example?

 2        A.   Yes.  They would tell us that whenever they had information like

 3     that.

 4        Q.   Now, you said that the security organs in the brigades would

 5     report up to you every day and night.  Was that a source of learning

 6     about any crimes that were committed by VJ units?

 7        A.   Yes.  That worked through my subordinates, the security organs in

 8     the brigades, and that was my basis for establishing whether a crime was

 9     committed or not.

10        Q.   So you've listed, just to make sure I have this all, getting

11     information from your subordinates in the security organs within those

12     units; possibly a commander would tell you that one of his troops had

13     committed a crime; or an officer may come forward and say that a crime

14     was committed; or your associates may say something is going on in the

15     unit.  Were those your basic sources of information that would then lead

16     to an investigation?

17        A.   Yes, or else we could use the chain of command.  As you

18     suggested, one of the commanders comes forward and reports this to his

19     own security chief.  To me, for example, or his own brigade security

20     chief.  Or the security officers would do their work in the unit, they

21     would receive information like that, and they would go up the chain and

22     report it.

23        Q.   What types of crime were within your sector's authority and

24     competence to investigate?

25        A.   Any type of crime committed in the line of duty.

Page 11859

 1        Q.   So primarily you were looking -- or maybe exclusively, correct me

 2     so that I'm accurate.  You were looking at crimes committed by the VJ; is

 3     that correct?

 4        A.   Partially true, yes.  Any crimes committed by the VJ, committed

 5     by any member of the VJ, but also including those crimes committed

 6     against the unit commands, institutions, or members of the VJ.

 7        Q.   And so in those instances primarily you would be talking about

 8     terrorists or others who tried to subvert the VJ; is that an accurate

 9     description?

10        A.   No.  Enemy activity and illegal activity against the army was not

11     a thing that pertained to terrorists alone.  There was a broad spectrum.

12     You had illegal intelligence activity, terrorist activity, links between

13     organised crime from that area and some members of the army.  There were

14     regulations governing the work of security organs detailing the

15     procedures.  It wasn't just about any crimes committed by the terrorists

16     targeting army units or army commands.  This covered all of the other

17     crimes committed within the army or indeed against the army, thus a broad

18     spectrum.

19        Q.   Sir, I have sort of a general question that I just want to make

20     sure I understand.  It seems in your description of your job you have two

21     important functions.  One of them is intelligence or possibly

22     counter-intelligence, I'm not sure how you would describe it,

23     intelligence of information that may be harmful to the VJ such as KLA

24     activity or whether other people are meeting with the KLA or whether

25     troops within the VJ are doing something disloyal.  So you have that one

Page 11860

 1     the one hand.  Is that accurate?

 2        A.   The work of the security service breaks down in the roughest of

 3     terms into two sections.  One is counter-intelligence.  I spoke about

 4     that a while ago.  This is key.  Nearly 90 per cent of our activity comes

 5     down to that.  This is, to be perfectly clear, military

 6     counter-intelligence.  So that's the counter-intelligence component.  And

 7     then the breakdown within counter-intelligence is as follows:  Preventing

 8     any agents from taking action against the army, any army facilities or

 9     members, or against the country's defence as a whole.  The other

10     component is unclosing -- monitoring and intercepting any terrorist

11     activity within the army or indeed against the army.  And the third

12     component is uncovering, monitoring, and intercepting any criminal

13     activity within the army or any links between criminal activity within

14     the army and external factors within the territory.  The other function

15     that you asked me about today is really about taking pre-emptive measures

16     within unit commands and institutions, normally those of general

17     significance or broader significance.  This has to do with safety and

18     security.  For example, running military police units, for example,

19     securing military facilities or high-ranking military persons or

20     preventing the theft of weapons, pre-empting acts of sabotage, and so on

21     and so forth.

22        Q.   So counter-intelligence includes, for example, your information

23     about the KLA, that would be classic counter-intelligence information; is

24     that fair?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 11861

 1        Q.   Are you also including in counter-intelligence gathering

 2     information about whether VJ units or troops are engaging in crimes?  And

 3     when I mean crimes here, I'm not talking about crimes against the army

 4     like, you know, treason or desertion.  I'm talking about crimes against

 5     others, crimes against the population.  Do you include that in

 6     counter-intelligence?

 7        A.   Yes, yes.

 8        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  Now, when we're talking about crimes

 9     by the VJ, are you -- is part of your responsibility to investigate any

10     kind of crime committed by the VJ?

11        A.   It is my duty and legal obligation to investigate any illegal

12     activity committed by any member of the army.  In a technical sense, yes,

13     it would be something for the military security service.

14        Q.   So that would include crimes against civilians, correct?

15        A.   By all means.

16        Q.   That would include any instance where members of the military

17     murdered a civilian?  Would it include that?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Rape?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Looting?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   How about expelling civilians from their homes, would that be a

24     type of crime committed by a VJ member that you would be responsible for

25     investigating?

Page 11862

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Now, during the period of the NATO bombing and before that in the

 3     summer of 1998, the MUP and [Realtime transcript read in error "the

 4     movement of] the VJ worked closely together, correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And just to correct the transcript, page 41, line 2, it's the

 7     MUP, M-U-P, and the VJ worked closely together.

 8             Now, during a co-ordinated action between the MUP and the VJ,

 9     were security organs in those units supposed to report up to you about

10     any crimes that the MUP might have committed?

11        A.   No.  Again I'll have to take you back to the laws and regulations

12     governing the work of military security organs.  The only thing they're

13     in charge is their own members and their own ranks; nevertheless, any

14     person would have been under an obligation including military security

15     officers.  As soon as they came across information that there was a crime

16     that someone else committed, to report this to their own superior

17     commander or their own superior officer down the more technical chain.

18     In this case that would have been me.  That is, if they ever came across

19     information like that.  But it wasn't in their job description to follow

20     that sort of thing.  It would have been illegal for them to monitor or

21     follow closely what the MUP people were doing.  This was something that

22     was down to the State Security Service.

23        Q.   Sir, we've heard from a Defence witness, Mr. Gojovic, and I

24     believe he spoke about a duty of all officers, all military officers,

25     that if they were aware of a crime they were to report on it.  Are you

Page 11863

 1     aware of that, or could you assist us with that rule?

 2        A.   I'll try to explain.  For example, there was a joint action being

 3     performed by the MUP and the army.  Very often they don't operate along

 4     the same axes or indeed in the same areas, rather, they simply

 5     co-ordinate.  If you have an action like that being performed and now one

 6     of the military security men comes across information suggesting that a

 7     member of the MUP committed a crime or indeed violated the provisions of

 8     international law of war, this person would have been under an obligation

 9     to immediately report this to the appropriate army unit commander, the

10     commander of the unit that was involved in the action, and also to report

11     this to the superior security officer, that is, me.  And I would be

12     forwarding this information to the appropriate MUP authorities and to the

13     appropriate state security authorities.

14        Q.   All right.  So if a security officer became aware of a MUP crime,

15     they should report that information to you; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes, that's correct.  But he has no authority to launch an

17     investigation or indeed take any other steps.  This would have been

18     illegal.  This would have clashed with the regulations because there were

19     other bodies that were in charge of that, the state security bodies and

20     Ministry of the Interior, of which the State Security Service was a

21     component.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  You would agree if in co-ordinated actions where

23     the VJ is supporting the MUP, if in those actions the MUP is repeatedly

24     committing crimes that would be something that's important for you to

25     know, would it not?

Page 11864

 1        A.   I'm not sure about this formulation of yours whereby you said the

 2     MUP is repeatedly committing crimes.  In any case, as I've told you,

 3     concerning information on any illegal acts that we received, we were

 4     duty-bound to report on that.

 5        Q.   And when this information involved someone from the MUP, once you

 6     reported on it do you know what would happen at that point, who would

 7     take over?

 8        A.   If we received some information of a member of the army

 9     committing something like that, then those responsible to undertake

10     measures would be the superior commanders or in this case those competent

11     were organs of the Ministry of the Interior as well as security organs,

12     state security organs.

13        Q.   And at that point, and I'm speaking specifically about

14     information about the MUP committing crimes, you would not follow it

15     after that point?

16        A.   No, we were under no legal obligation to do so.

17        Q.   Let's speak for a minute about when you learn of information that

18     a member of the VJ has committed a crime.  Can you just tell us

19     specifically once you learned about that and you begin the investigation,

20     how do you -- what's the next step?  What then happens with that case?

21        A.   If we learned of an army member having committed a specific

22     crime, we would first inform the competent commander.  Second, we would

23     undertake a number of measures to have that perpetrator arrested as

24     quickly as possible so as to prevent him from fleeing.  We would also

25     secure the crime scene with the help of military policemen and undertake

Page 11865

 1     measures there.  If the perpetrator is arrested together with all

 2     material evidence and conclusions of an on-site investigation, he is

 3     handed over to an investigating judge.  If a perpetrator is unidentified

 4     or fleeing, we also undertake all measures in terms of collecting

 5     evidence and an on-site investigation, and we submit a criminal report

 6     against an unidentified perpetrator.  Following that, we resume taking

 7     measures in order to establish who the perpetrator is and any other

 8     follow-up activities which may have to do with the specific crime.

 9        Q.   When does your role end in the investigation?

10        A.   My role in the investigation does not end with the submission of

11     a criminal report and the case file being handed over to the competent

12     court.  We would also have to undertake all other measures requested by

13     the investigating judge if a person needed to be brought in, if witness

14     statements needed to be taken, anything that may lead to an official

15     indictment being issued against the perpetrator of a crime.

16        Q.   So your section has a role up until the period of indictment.  Do

17     you continue having any role up until a particular individual is

18     convicted or their case terminates?

19        A.   After an indictment is issued, we can only act following an order

20     of the competent prosecutor, otherwise we wouldn't take any other

21     measures.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, when we just -- when we spoke a minute ago

23     about the obligation of a security officer to report to you if they

24     learned of the MUP committing a crime, how often did that happen during

25     the period of the NATO bombing that you heard from your security officers

Page 11866

 1     that the MUP was committing crimes during operations?

 2        A.   You probably wanted to ask me how frequently that happened --

 3        Q.   Yes, how frequently or how many times, if you can estimate that.

 4        A.   It was quite seldom.  The zones of combat activities of army

 5     units did not correspond to the zones of activity of MUP units.  Also

 6     axes of engagement and the activities in question did not necessarily

 7     correspond.  Security organs mainly focused on the activities of the

 8     army; however, if we got by information of that nature, of which there

 9     were very few such as cases of lack of discipline or certain MUP members

10     being found while looting Albanian property, then we advised their group

11     commander who, in turn, was supposed to inform the competent commander of

12     the MUP unit participating in that action.

13        Q.   And your testimony is that this occurred quite seldom?

14        A.   Depending on the type of crime you want to know.  If these are

15     simple criminal offences, then this occurred quite frequently.  If you're

16     asking me about the crime of inhumane treatment, then that was quite

17     rare.

18        Q.   Yes, I think we're most interested here in crimes against the

19     civilian population in Kosovo.  How frequently did you receive reports

20     from your security organs that the MUP was engaging in crimes against the

21     civilian population, and specifically the Albanian civilian population?

22        A.   I basically cannot recall any information like that, but I did

23     receive information concerning the problem of co-ordination with the MUP.

24     It was stated that in certain locations after combat activities, no

25     sanitation and hygiene measures were taken.  And in such areas,

Page 11867

 1     individual corpses were found.  That is why the line of command and the

 2     line of the security service was used to pass on that information.  I

 3     always passed that information on to the MUP staff and the State Security

 4     Service in Pristina.  This was also done by the corps commander.

 5        Q.   Sir, when you speak of sanitation and hygiene measures after

 6     combat activities, does that mean cleaning up dead bodies from the

 7     terrain?

 8        A.   In the military there was an instruction on sanitation and

 9     hygiene measures.  That instruction prescribes the measures to be

10     undertaken in terms of sanitation and hygiene after combat, including

11     what units are to participate, what services, and the procedures.  Army

12     units were in charge of sanitation and hygiene measures in those areas in

13     which they had carried out combat activities; whereas, MUP units were

14     responsible to do the same in those zones where they had combat

15     activities.

16        Q.   And by sanitation and hygiene measures, do you mean getting rid

17     of the dead bodies that are out on the combat field?

18        A.   Yes, certainly.  Selection and removal of corpses as well as the

19     procedure to be followed with those corpses, then evacuation of the

20     wounded.  On occasion there were also animal corpses.  So this is an

21     entire set of measures.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, on Monday at page 16, line 6, of the

23     transcript you were asked about some of the background history of the KLA

24     in Kosovo, and you stated:

25             "The key moments which were the cause of the worsening situation

Page 11868

 1     in Kosovo-Metohija that year," and I believe we're talking about 1998 at

 2     this time, "were actually two events ..."

 3             And then you went on to discuss those two events, and one of them

 4     you discussed at page 16, line 13, you said:

 5             "The terrorist group commanded by Jashari in February in Likosane

 6     from ambush attacked a vehicle of the minister of interior of Serbia."

 7             I think that may be a translation error.  I don't think it's

 8     actually Minister Stojiljkovic.  You probably were saying of the Ministry

 9     of Interior; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes, correct.  It was a patrol vehicle of the Ministry of the

11     Interior.  The MUP members were on patrol.  It wasn't a vehicle of the

12     minister of the interior.

13        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And you went on to say:

14             "On which occasion they killed four policemen and wounded two.

15     In the ensuing clash during the night due to poor visibility and general

16     chaos the attack was repelled and then by subsequent MUP activity Adem

17     Jashari's house was surrounded in Prekaz.  He was liquidated on that

18     occasion.  The liquidation of Adem Jashari is very important because the

19     Albanian separatists chose to use solely forceful means to achieve their

20     proclaimed goals."

21             Sir, this last sentence is a little unclear to me.  Do you mean

22     there that the liquidation of Adem Jashari led or caused Albanian

23     separatists to employ forceful means, or did you mean something

24     different?

25        A.   The Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija had previously

Page 11869

 1     before this event -- and I was referring to the time as far back as 1990

 2     when the Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed and when the decision was made

 3     to establish a parallel police military force.  Then I spoke about 1993

 4     when the 14-member group of terrorists was arrested who were members of

 5     the illegal Ministry of Defence of Kosovo who admitted to having included

 6     in their plans a plan to organise 15 brigades of 500 men each and to

 7     establish operational zones in Kosovo, which coincided, which was rather

 8     odd, with the operational zones as they existed in 1998 and 1999.

 9             Next, I said that in 1994 they made a final decision, that is to

10     say the national movement for Kosovo, that violent means must be used to

11     secure the independence of Kosovo.  They even put together a study in

12     three volumes, which I believe the Prosecution has.  They worked out in

13     detail the tactics and strategy of their, as they called it, "liberation

14     war" to be rid of the occupier.  This is the tactics they employed in

15     1998 and 1999.  The killing of Adem Jashari was just a trigger which

16     marked the beginning of the implementation of that plan.

17        Q.   So how specifically did the killing of Adem Jashari worsen the

18     situation in your view?

19        A.   I will explain.  In the transcript it is incorrect that

20     immediately after the attack on the MUP vehicle in Likosane the

21     subsequent action took place.  It was a few days later that Adem

22     Jashari's house was surrounded.  After clashes which lasted for a number

23     of days, he was killed since he refused to surrender to the MUP.  Adem

24     Jashari was a resistance symbol and the symbol of an independent Kosovo

25     in the minds of Albanians.

Page 11870

 1             As of the 1980s he had been carrying out terrorist attacks

 2     against MUP members.  There were many MUP members in Srbica, Glogovac, in

 3     Donji, and Gornji Prekaz who were killed from ambush where his terrorist

 4     unit was active.  A large monument was erected to honour him after the

 5     war in Kosovo.  That is why they saw that point in time as important.

 6     Their key extremist was killed.  And as I said yesterday, and this

 7     testifies to the synchronicity of events, in March right after his murder

 8     of the Main Staff which was in Switzerland, the Main Staff of the KLA,

 9     dispatched parts of its Main Staff to the north of Albania, and a number

10     of personnel headed by Hashim Thaqi, Ramush Haradinaj, and Kadri Veseli,

11     and Jakup Krasniqi were transferred to Kosovo with the basic aim of

12     organising and preparing an armed rebellion of Albanians in Kosovo and

13     Metohija.

14        Q.   Now, sir, during the attack or the action on the Jashari

15     compound, it wasn't just Adem Jashari who was liquidated, as you put it,

16     was it?  Many members of his family were killed during that action also,

17     were they not?

18        A.   The army did not participate in that action.  It was done by the

19     MUP.  I was well informed of that action.  Mr. Jashari had barricaded

20     himself in two family homes.  After several days of fighting and calls

21     for surrender, he did not allow the members of his family to leave the

22     house and surrender to the authorities.  He personally killed his cousin

23     or nephew, who was trying to get through the door.  He was on his way out

24     to surrender.  There is an Official Note about that.  He killed him

25     personally.  He was such an extremist and hated Serbs so much that he was

Page 11871

 1     ready to liquidate his entire family rather than allow them to surrender.

 2     His brother was also killed in that action and other people, although I

 3     don't remember who precisely.  In any case, he did kill his cousin when

 4     he tried to surrender to the security organs.

 5        Q.   Now, for a little context here, if we could please look at

 6     Prosecution exhibit 741, and in the English if we could go to page 35 and

 7     in the B/C/S page 36, paragraph 2.

 8             Sir, this is an exhibit that has been admitted in this trial.

 9     It's a report from Human Rights Watch.  It's called "Humanitarian Law

10     Violations in Kosovo," and it was distributed in October 1998 by

11     Human Rights Watch.  If we look at the last paragraph on page 35 in the

12     English and beginning second paragraph on page 36 in the B/C/S:

13             "The police attacked Prekaz and the Jashari compound again on

14     March 5th, 1998, this time in a more prepared and determined manner.  All

15     evidence suggests that the attack was not intended to apprehend armed

16     Albanians considered 'terrorists' by the government, but as Amnesty

17     International concluded in its report on violence in Drenica, 'to

18     eliminate the suspects and their families.'"

19             If we go to the next page, page 28 -- I'm sorry, page 36, and I

20     think it continues in the B/C/S on the same page:

21             "Testimonies collected by human rights groups and journalists

22     indicate several cases of extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings

23     from excessive force.

24             "An estimated 58 ethnic Albanians were killed in the attack,

25     including 18 women and ten children under the age of 16, and then

Page 11872

 1     summarily buried by the police before autopsies could be performed."

 2             Now, sir, I know you may not have seen this report from

 3     Human Rights Watch, but the estimate of 58 ethnic Albanians, including 18

 4     women and ten children under the age of 16, were you aware that that many

 5     people were killed in the action on the Jashari compound?

 6        A.   I will answer.  In the proofing for this testimony I was able to

 7     read the Human Rights Watch report in detail.  I believe that the report

 8     is superfluous in several regards.  Firstly, when it refers to the

 9     victims in Kosovo and Metohija, such victims should be identified by

10     their first and last name and other data, just as the criminals or

11     perpetrators are always identified by their first and last name.  I

12     didn't read this portion specifically, but in some other places in the

13     report it seemed to me that the research undertaken by that organisation

14     was aimed to have all the victims in Kosovo and Metohija who were killed

15     in terrorist and anti-terrorist actions as well as those killed in the

16     border area and killed by NATO airplanes and liquidated by Albanian

17     terrorists because some Albanians had refused to be mobilised, they

18     wanted to have all those victims shown as people killed due to inhumane

19     treatment and because of the violations of international humanitarian law

20     and the laws of war.

21             In this particular example concerning Prekaz and the Jashari

22     family, I know that on the same day the location was visited by basically

23     all accredited ambassadors in the FRY.  They entered Jashari's house and

24     until I saw this report I had never heard of any MUP organs having killed

25     and then buried 50-plus Albanians whose bodies were not autopsied.  First

Page 11873

 1     of all, there were no so many people in these two houses, the house of

 2     Mr. Jashari and his brother.

 3             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could just go to page 40 in the English,

 4     please, and I'm not entirely sure what page this would be in the B/C/S

 5     that corresponds to page 40.  It says page 32 in the -- and maybe a

 6     translation is not as important because these are just names.

 7        Q.   But, sir, you said that names of the victims here were not

 8     identified.  If we look down this list we can see a 74-year-old, a

 9     72-year-old, going down the list we see a 13-year-old, an 11-year-old, a

10     16-year-old, a 12-year-old, an 8-year old, another 7-year-old.  Going

11     down, a 16-year-old, a 12-year-old.

12             So, sir, you would agree there are names of these people who were

13     in the home and ages to back up this claim?

14        A.   With all due respect for the victims shown here as well as all

15     other victims in Kosovo and Metohija, I wanted to draw your attention to

16     the following:  It is correct that there are names here including

17     children, which is a sorry fact, but I wanted to put forth another

18     thesis.  Were all these people killed during the attack on the Jashari

19     compound, or were they killed in all actions during 1998 and 1999?

20        Q.   Well, sir, this is a list of people who were killed on the attack

21     at Donji Prekaz from March 5th to 7th it says.  There are some additional

22     ones who were killed in a nearby village, but I'm not referring to those

23     at this point.

24        A.   It all depends on when the Human Rights Watch conducted this

25     investigation.  Was it three, four, five, ten days later or a full year

Page 11874

 1     after the event in the village of Prekaz?

 2        Q.   Well, let me ask you this, sir:  Does this coincide with what you

 3     were aware of taking place in the action at the Jashari compound?

 4        A.   No, it does not coincide with what -- with my knowledge at the

 5     time.

 6        Q.   All right.  If we could go back to the article in the Nedeljni

 7     Telegraf.  I don't recall the exhibit number now.  It was 65 ter 02945,

 8     and I am informed that it is P1543.  If we could look at that and go

 9     to in the English version page 13, and if you could scroll down to the

10     box at the bottom, and if we could look at the B/C/S page 3, and if we

11     could just scroll down to the very bottom over to the box there on the

12     left-hand side.  And I'll just read this, sir.  This is your interview

13     with the Nedeljni Telegraf.  You state:

14             "Already in the first armed conflict with the OVK, the members of

15     the MUP demonstrated incapable and unfit.  The first organised attack of

16     the members of the OVK on the members of the MUP of Serbia took place on

17     the 28th February, 1999 [sic] in the village of Likosane near Glogovac.

18     On that occasion four members of the MUP were killed while two were

19     wounded.  In this conflict, which lasted two days, it was demonstrated

20     that the members of the MUP are not capable of effectively confronting

21     the escalated terrorism in the area of Kosmet.  Due to bad planning, the

22     anti-terrorist units of the MUP and the State Security Service used too

23     great of a force in the action which followed, aiming to neutralise the

24     terrorist group of Adem Jashari in the village of Gornji Prekaz near

25     Srbica.  Such usage of force resulted with unnecessary civilian victims

Page 11875

 1     which provoked a reaction and rapid escalation of terrorism in the entire

 2     Kosovo and Metohija, especially in the area of Drenica."

 3             Sir, was this your statement to the Nedeljni Telegraf?

 4        A.   Yes, this was my statement to Nedeljni Telegraf.  Nevertheless,

 5     in the document you showed me a while ago it said about 80 or about a

 6     hundred victims.  My information at the time suggested, although I myself

 7     was not involved nor indeed was the army involved, that the figures

 8     regarding casualties were more about 30-ish.  The visibility was poor.

 9     This was at about midnight.  The MUP vehicle was attacked.  When the

10     vehicle was attacked because there was firing some civilians were hurt,

11     but not two or three days later when the Jashari family home was

12     attacked.  There was an attack on that MUP vehicle because of the low

13     visibility and because of the fog in Likosane.  That was when some

14     civilians came to grief.  It wasn't as a result of the attack on the

15     Jashari family home or at least that was what my information suggested at

16     the time.

17        Q.   Now, sir, just to have accurate information, I believe the

18     Human Rights Watch report didn't say a hundred casualties but 58, just so

19     we're clear on that.

20             But, sir, if we look at your statement here in the Nedeljni

21     Telegraf, it says:

22             "Due to bad planning the anti-terrorist units of the MUP and the

23     State Security Service used too great of a force in the action which

24     followed, aiming to neutralise the terrorist group of Adem Jashari in the

25     village of Gornji Prekaz near Srbica.  Such usage of force resulted with

Page 11876

 1     unnecessary civilian victims ..."

 2             Do you agree you were not talking about the initial ambush of the

 3     MUP vehicles.  Your criticism here is precisely with the following action

 4     against Adem Jashari?

 5        A.   Yes, I will agree with you.  Nevertheless, this is a newspaper

 6     piece, not an original document.  What I'm saying here is the action that

 7     followed, meaning after the MUP vehicle was ambushed that night --

 8     nevertheless, I will agree with you as far as what you say about the

 9     newspaper piece goes.  Nevertheless, 58 victims -- it doesn't make any

10     difference.  Even if there had been a single victim, that would have been

11     dramatic.  But I'm talking about February 1998 and what I was doing at

12     the time based on the information I was receiving from the state security

13     and the MUP, the suggested number of casualties was about 30.

14        Q.   Now, sir, you say that this was just a newspaper piece, not an

15     original document.  But if we look at the first page, if we go to page 1

16     in English and if we go to page 1 in B/C/S -- I don't think that's page 1

17     in English.  Thank you.

18             And if we look at the first paragraph you say:

19             "Although it is not common - it is even a precedent - for a

20     member of a military security service to talk to the newspapers about

21     such important issues, I still decided to do it because of the truth

22     about the fighting in Kosovo and Metohija and because all of those men of

23     mine whom I was sending to the most dangerous spots day and night so that

24     we could have true and timely information about that which the

25     separatists, terrorists, and their foreign mentors prepare for us, to

Page 11877

 1     speak up and say the truth.  I will answer all your questions but under

 2     the condition that first you allow me five to six minutes to say what is

 3     bothering me."

 4             Sir, you spoke with them because you wanted to tell the truth

 5     about what you saw in Kosovo and Metohija; is that not correct?

 6        A.   Yes, that's what the entire article suggests.  I don't think I'll

 7     dispute anything about that.

 8        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And are you aware that General Djordjevic was on

 9     the staff that drew up the plan for the action on the Jashari compound?

10        A.   No, I wasn't aware of that.

11        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Moving on to a different topic now, I would like

12     to ask you a question -- some questions about a few names and ask if you

13     knew these people during the relevant time-period, the period of the NATO

14     bombing.  Did you know a Sreto Camovic?

15        A.   Sreto Camovic, chief of the Djakovica state security department,

16     yes, I certainly knew him.

17        Q.   And did you know Nikola Micunovic?

18        A.   Yes, I did.

19        Q.   And what was his position?

20        A.   I believe he was a major by rank.  He was an assistant clerk with

21     the military department in Djakovica, their headquarters being in Pec.

22     The Djakovica office was a branch office of Pec.

23        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And I believe you spoke of Sergej Perovic

24     yesterday, you knew him?

25        A.   Sergej Perovic, captain 1st class was chief of security in the

Page 11878

 1     52nd Rocket and Artillery Brigade of the anti-aircraft defence.

 2        Q.   So was he someone who had a responsibility to make these morning

 3     and evening reports to you?

 4        A.   Yes, by virtue of being a security chief in a brigade.

 5        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And Veroljub Zivkovic, did you know him?

 6        A.   Colonel Veroljub Zivkovic was Chief of Staff of the Pristina

 7     Corps in 1999.

 8        Q.   And where was he located during the NATO bombing?

 9        A.   In Djakovica, he was commander of the Pristina Corps forward

10     command post there.

11        Q.   And Stevo Kopanja?

12        A.   Stevo Kopanja was the commander of the 52nd Military Police

13     Battalion.

14        Q.   Now, you know -- you seem to know these people and what they were

15     doing pretty well.  Were you yourself during the NATO bombing campaign in

16     Djakovica frequently?

17        A.   Both in 1998 and 1999 I was on the move all the time and so were

18     my security officers.  We weren't working in an office at the time.  We

19     were all over the place.  I was guiding the work of my team of security

20     officers in 1998 and 1999.  Just because it was more difficult -- it was

21     getting more difficult to move about, I was beginning to spend more time

22     in the Djakovica garrison as well.

23        Q.   So during the period of the NATO bombing, how often would you be

24     at the Djakovica garrison?

25        A.   It's been 11 years, hasn't it?  Well, twice a month or

Page 11879

 1     thereabouts.  I spent a total of perhaps five or six visits there.

 2        Q.   And each visit, would it be a visit for a day, or would you stay

 3     longer?

 4        A.   It would always be a single day, always at the forward command

 5     post.  All the chiefs would be there, the brigade chief, the 52nd

 6     Artillery Brigade, and combat group chiefs from the battalions deployed

 7     along the border.  They would brief me on the situation, and we would

 8     agree on any future tasks and assignments.

 9        Q.   Sir, when you would travel from Pristina to Djakovica, about how

10     long did that take during the period of the NATO bombing, travel time?

11        A.   Sometimes it would take quite a long time.  In normal

12     circumstances at one point in time -- well, at different points in time

13     there were roads that you couldn't use because they were cut off, the

14     Kosovska-Mitrovica-Pec road and the Pristina-Pec road and the

15     Pristina-Prizren road, and the only road that was always under our

16     control and remained throughout under our control was the route across

17     Mount Strbac on towards Prizren and then from there to Djakovica.

18     Nevertheless, if you're asking me about the time it would have taken me

19     to reach Djakovica in normal circumstances, it would have taken about an

20     hour and a half driving.  In wartime circumstances, certainly not under

21     three hours.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you grew up in Djakovica, correct?

23        A.   Correct.  I was born there.  I went to elementary school there

24     and secondary school too.  After that I was off to military academy.

25        Q.   And what area of Djakovica did you grow up in?

Page 11880

 1        A.   I spent my childhood days in a village.  I come from a family

 2     that back in 1933 first came to Kosovo and Metohija, a village called

 3     Dobrivare [phoen] on the banks of Beli Drim.  This is east of Djakovica,

 4     a distance being some 12 kilometres.  After 1968 we were in Djakovica

 5     town itself.  Our house was right next to the bus terminal there and also

 6     right next to one of the two barracks that existed at the time in

 7     Djakovica.

 8        Q.   At the time of the NATO bombing, did you still have a home in

 9     Djakovica?

10        A.   Yes.  I had a house until the army and the police withdrew.

11     After that all Serb houses, including mine, suffered the same fate.  The

12     roofs were set ablaze.  I found out from other sources that after that an

13     Albanian had moved in and revamped or rebuilt the whole building.  This

14     was a house shared by my uncle and my father.  At my uncle's initiative

15     the house was sold off in 2005.  Right now I own two flats in Djakovica

16     belonging to my brothers, and I have a total of 12 hectares of land, and

17     my father has no intention of selling that.

18        Q.   So before the end of the NATO bombing you did not sell your

19     house?

20        A.   No, it wasn't before 2005.  There are judicial records and other

21     types of records showing that, land registry.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you spoke yesterday that -- about a person

23     named Nike Peraj.  You knew Mr. Peraj well, correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's right.

25        Q.   And I believe in the Milutinovic case you described him as your

Page 11881

 1     friend for many years; does that sound correct?

 2        A.   Well, an acquaintance of many years.

 3        Q.   And be aware if we go into any topic that we need to go into

 4     private session in your answer, let me know if we need to do that.

 5        A.   We respected everyone who tried to enhance general security in

 6     Kosovo.  When I say a "friend," a long-time acquaintance of many chiefs

 7     who came there before me.  Let me tell you about an example that I base

 8     this on.  In 1997 I went to see him in his home at a wedding.  His cousin

 9     was getting married, and I was there as a guest of honour.  There was a

10     group of Serbs there.  He would often come to see me in Djakovica.  We

11     would brew some brandy or something.  And whenever he was passing

12     through, he was a cosmopolitan, quite simply.  He associated equally with

13     Serbs and Albanians.

14        Q.   And you said yesterday that you had met his father also; is that

15     correct?

16        A.   Yes, that's right.  I met both his father and his brother.

17             MS. PETERSEN:  Your Honours, if we could just quickly go into

18     private session, I have just one or two questions.

19             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

20                           [Private session]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 11882











11 Pages 11882-11884 redacted. Private session.















Page 11885

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

21             JUDGE PARKER:  We will adjourn now for the second break and

22     resume at 1.00.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

Page 11886

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE PARKER:  Ms. Petersen.

 3             MS. PETERSEN:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 4        Q.   Sir, I'd like to ask you about one other individual, Milos

 5     Djosan, I think you mentioned him yesterday.

 6        A.   Milos Djosan, colonel, commander of the 52nd Rocket Anti-aircraft

 7     Brigade.

 8        Q.   And yesterday you were shown the statement of Nike Peraj.  You

 9     said you've read this statement?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And one thing that you corrected was in paragraph 6, the

12     description of Milos Djosan was incorrect; is that right?

13        A.   I don't know which description exactly you mean.

14        Q.   Let me refer to it.  In Exhibit P313, paragraph 6, it said that

15     Colonel Milos Djosan was the commander of the 52nd ARBR.  He was

16     responsible for the VJ units in the municipality of Djakovica.  Colonel

17     Milos Djosan was also responsible for MUP reservist units, and you stated

18     that that was inaccurate, correct?

19        A.   Yes, you're right.

20        Q.   Okay.  I just wanted to give you some additional information and

21     get your answer to this.  In the testimony of Nike Peraj, which was in

22     February of last year, this is at transcript page 1189, he makes a

23     correction to this paragraph.  He states:

24             "It should say 'Colonel Milos Djosan.'  He was a commander of the

25     52nd Brigade ARBR and he was responsible for this brigade only, not

Page 11887

 1     responsible for MUP reservist units."

 2             And then he went on to say in the next question:

 3             "Would it be correct to say that he was responsible for VJ

 4     reservist units also?"

 5             And he said in answer:

 6             "He was responsible for regular forces and reservist forces," and

 7     they're speaking about the VJ.

 8             Now, hearing that correction, sir, would you still say paragraph

 9     6 inaccurate, or is that corrected in your opinion?

10        A.   Colonel Milos Djosan was in charge of the 52nd Artillery Rocket

11     Brigade, which as its part also had military conscripts who had been

12     mobilised.  He was only in charge of the conscripts within his brigade.

13        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  I have one other question for you.

14     We spoke just before the break of Nikola Micunovic, correct, and you said

15     that you know him?

16        A.   Yes.  Nikola Micunovic worked in the military secretariat in Pec

17     in Djakovica.

18        Q.   Sir, were you aware of a nickname for Nikola Micunovic?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   You didn't hear him called Dragan?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Sir, in 1999 did you know an individual named

23     Milutin Prascevic?

24        A.   No, not in 1999, but --

25        Q.   I'm sorry, 1998 --

Page 11888

 1        A.   -- for many years before that.

 2        Q.   I'm sorry, in 1998.  That's my error.  Did you know him in 1998

 3     and up until 1999?

 4        A.   Certainly.  He is a relative on my wife's side.  He is her

 5     uncle's brother.

 6        Q.   Do you have a term for that, a term to describe that?

 7        A.   My wife's father and Milutin Prascevic's father were brothers.

 8        Q.   Okay, so he is your relative?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And how long did you know Mr. Prascevic?

11        A.   Ever since I got married in 1982, that's how long I've known him.

12        Q.   And can you explain what his occupation was?

13        A.   Milutin Prascevic was a desk officer in the service for

14     combatting crime in the SUP of Djakovica.

15        Q.   All right.  I'd like to give you a little more information again

16     and get your answer to this.  Yesterday, as you were being shown the

17     witness statement of Nike Peraj, in paragraph 58 it said -- it described

18     Prascevic.  It says:

19             "He used to be the chief of the state security in Djakovica."

20             Now, you said that that was an error, correct?

21        A.   Absolutely incorrect.  The head of the state security sector was

22     Mr. Camovic.

23        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And in Nike Peraj's testimony, transcript page

24     1191, he was asked if he had any corrections to his statement and he said

25     with regard to paragraph 58:

Page 11889

 1             "This is not correct.  Milutin Prascevic was never a state or

 2     public security chief.  He was an inspector and not even a senior

 3     inspector, just an inspector.  That's what he was, just an inspector, as

 4     I said, not a senior inspector in the MUP."

 5             Is that more accurate, sir, based on your knowledge?

 6        A.   I know him very well.  He's a relative.  He was a desk clerk in

 7     the crime prevention service of the SUP of Djakovica.  He wore a civilian

 8     suit.

 9        Q.   So your answer is he did work for the MUP in Djakovica.  You say

10     he's a desk clerk as opposed to an inspector, but you agree he worked for

11     the police in Djakovica?

12        A.   He worked in the secretariat of the interior in Djakovica, and

13     his job description was as I've already said.

14        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, I'm -- this may sound like a silly question

15     but I need to ask you for the record.  Were you aware that Mr. Prascevic

16     was killed in 1999?

17        A.   Yes.  I heard that from my relatives because my family at that

18     time resided in Djakovica as well as the Prascevic family.  I knew that

19     he was killed in an ambush near Djakovica.  I only learned of the

20     circumstances of his death later on.

21        Q.   When you say "an ambush," who was the ambush by?

22        A.   I don't have that information, and I never investigated.  What I

23     can remember being said by his wife and cousins, and they probably

24     received that information from MUP representatives, what is that before

25     his murder there had been an incident.  In a location near Djakovica a

Page 11890

 1     MUP patrol was attacked.  By Motorola they asked for MUP backup.

 2     Prascevic, without waiting for the others, sat in a vehicle and went

 3     there with another person to help his comrades whose vehicle had been

 4     attacked from fire-arms.  During that intervention he was killed and

 5     ambushed.

 6        Q.   And was your understanding that the attack was from the KLA?

 7        A.   At the time that was not my conclusion.  I cannot recall the date

 8     when he died, but I think it was in 1998 when the terrorists were

 9     basically everywhere.  But I couldn't get any information as to who

10     killed him.

11        Q.   Sir, wasn't he killed in April of 1999?

12        A.   It is possible, but a lot of time has passed.  I described to you

13     how he was killed, but I can't recall exactly when it was.  It may as

14     well be, as you say, in April 1999.

15        Q.   All right, sir.  And are you saying that he was killed in an

16     ambush, an attack, but you don't know if it was by KLA terrorists?

17        A.   No, I don't.  All I know, and I didn't busy myself with that too

18     much, was that he was killed in an ambush en route to helping his

19     associates who had been ambushed previously.  I can only suppose that the

20     terrorists killed him, but I can't conclude that with any degree of

21     certainty.

22        Q.   Well, sir, who in April of 1999, who else is going around

23     ambushing and shooting at the MUP?

24        A.   In 1999 only terrorists opened fire on MUP members.

25        Q.   Now, sir, are you telling us today that your own relative was

Page 11891

 1     killed in an ambush and you were not -- you did not take any actions to

 2     find out who the perpetrators were?

 3        A.   Madam, you keep asking me whether I took any measures in cases

 4     where I wasn't competent to.  Milutin Prascevic was a SUP worker.  MUP

 5     organs must have taken some measures to investigate the event.  They

 6     probably did everything they had to.  They had an on-site investigation.

 7     As far as I recall, he had been wounded to the head and died en route to

 8     the hospital.  I never undertook any measures to investigate.  This was

 9     not my job.  There were organs in charge of that.

10        Q.   Now, sir, it may not have been your job to investigate the death

11     of MUP officers, but isn't -- wasn't it part of your job to know what the

12     KLA was doing?  They're the perpetrators here, are they not?

13        A.   During 1999 I had so many obligations that I didn't know which

14     one to turn to first in terms of my function.  To conduct an

15     investigation I wasn't competent to do was something I didn't have time

16     for.  It is -- it was enough for me to be told by his family members of

17     the way he was killed.

18        Q.   All right.  So just to be clear, your testimony to this Court is

19     that as intelligence chief who is supposed to be on top of what the KLA

20     is doing, when circumstances appear that your relative was killed in an

21     ambush by the KLA you took no further steps to ascertain who the killers

22     of your relative were?

23        A.   Milutin Prascevic was a member of the MUP and not the Army of the

24     FRY.  Had he been an army member, in that case I would have been obliged

25     to together with the military police and others to investigate all the

Page 11892

 1     details surrounding his death.  However, for me as his relative, it was

 2     enough to know about the rough circumstances of his death and that the

 3     MUP organs had shared all the information they had during the

 4     investigation with his family members.  Why would I have investigated

 5     that?  Following that logic, whenever a relative of mine would have been

 6     killed, I basically would have said, "Well, MUP organs are no longer

 7     competent," and I would have conducted my own private citizen's

 8     investigation.

 9        Q.   Sir, are you aware how many others were killed with your

10     relative?

11        A.   No, I don't know that.  I think there were others, but I can't

12     say that with certainty.  It's been a long time.  I think some were

13     wounded, and there may have been another casualty, although I don't know

14     any details.

15        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Did you travel to Djakovica to attend

16     condolences for Prascevic?

17        A.   Yes, I went to Djakovica to attend condolences; however, I didn't

18     attend the funeral itself.  I was there on that day in the morning to see

19     his family and express my condolences.  Then I returned to Nis.  The NATO

20     aggression was underway and by my function I had no time to spare in such

21     war-like circumstances.

22        Q.   Okay.  So you recall now that this was during the time of the

23     NATO aggression, not in 1998?

24        A.   Yes, yes, I was wrong.

25        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And so did you just stay for one day in

Page 11893

 1     Djakovica when you went to attend condolences?

 2        A.   Just one morning I went to his family house, or rather, to the

 3     yard of his family house where there were another 100 citizens to express

 4     my condolences.  I spent a short time there and went on to attend to my

 5     tasks.

 6        Q.   All right.  And during the time that you were in Djakovica for

 7     these condolences, did you see Nike Peraj?

 8        A.   Nike Peraj as far as I knew was also on quite good terms with

 9     Milutin Prascevic.  I seldom visited Djakovica since I worked in Pristina

10     where my family was, but I do know that they occasionally socialised.  On

11     the day of the condolences, I came across Nike Peraj seated on a bench

12     together with other locals.  He also came there to express his

13     condolences.

14        Q.   Do you remember who the other locals were who were sitting by

15     Nike Peraj?

16        A.   In Djakovica the population structure was such that there were

17     the least Serbs in all of Kosovo and Metohija, only 3 per cent.  In

18     Djakovica there are three small enclaves where there are Serb houses, one

19     of which was next to the bus station.  There were other citizens there,

20     neighbours, relatives, my wife was there, his brothers were there, so the

21     family, all of the relatives.

22        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  Now, yesterday you were shown Nike

23     Peraj's statement, and you had already read this statement prior to

24     yesterday, though, correct?

25        A.   I had also read it before my testimony in the Milutinovic case.

Page 11894

 1     What I noticed was that he gave several statements.

 2        Q.   Well, I'm not asking you about that, sir.  I'm asking you about

 3     the P313 that you looked at yesterday.  You had read that previously,

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   All right.  And you were told that in paragraph 59 that Nike

 7     Peraj said that on the day, he called it the funeral for Prascevic, on

 8     that day he heard you say in the presence of Camovic, Micunovic, another

 9     individual named Kovacevic, and Perovic that at least a hundred heads

10     must be eliminated and houses burned in retribution for the killing of

11     Prascevic.  And I think you've made your position clear, your position is

12     that you did not say this.  Is that accurate?

13        A.   Please, I repeat, such a meeting of that sort was never held, I

14     never attended it, and I never said something of the sort.  The whole

15     statement of Nike Peraj came about as a result of pressure which he

16     probably experienced after the withdrawal of the army.  He was pressured

17     by the terrorists and for his own safety he was forced to give such a

18     statement.

19        Q.   Sir, in paragraph 60, and I just want to make sure that we are

20     working from accurate information, in paragraph 60 of P313, Peraj

21     explains:

22             "The meeting referred to was informal.  A discussion within a

23     group that had gathered for a completely different purpose and

24     Stojanovic's order could more accurately be described as an emotional

25     outburst."

Page 11895

 1             So we're not talking about a formal meeting here where you stood

 2     up and ordered everyone to eliminate a hundred heads; what's more

 3     accurately being described is a group that was gathered for another

 4     purpose, entered into a conversation about this, and you in an emotional

 5     state after the death of your relative made this statement.  Do you

 6     recall that happening?

 7        A.   I repeat, there was no formal or informal meeting.  Emotionally,

 8     I never react in this way.

 9        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.

10             Now, it's my understanding that one of the reasons you've given

11     for why this could not have happened at all is that you yourself couldn't

12     give orders.  You didn't have the authority to command.  Do I understand

13     that right?

14        A.   I never had any command authority.  I could never issue orders.

15     However, your conclusion is incorrect.  Not that it didn't happen because

16     I held no such authority.  I'm simply telling you that this is a

17     notorious lie contained in the paragraph you referred to and that not a

18     single sentence in it is correct.

19        Q.   Well, sir, beyond -- we understand that you're saying you did not

20     say that.  Beyond that, though, I believe you've given reasoning in your

21     prior testimony that this could have never happened anyway because you

22     had no authority to issue such a command.  Is that accurate?

23        A.   Everything I said previously is correct, and everything I said

24     today is too.

25        Q.   All right, sir.

Page 11896

 1             MS. PETERSEN:  If we could now have P338 on the screen, and if we

 2     could just first go to the first page in both the English and the B/C/S

 3     to identify what the document is.

 4        Q.   Now, sir, as you can see here this is the war diary for the 52nd

 5     Military Police Battalion.  Do you see that?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             MS. PETERSEN:  And if we could go to page 6 in the English and

 8     page 9 in the B/C/S, please.  And if we look -- the B/C/S is good.  If we

 9     can scroll down to in the English the entry for 13 April 1999.

10        Q.   It says -- it briefly describes that a company was formed, made

11     up of one platoon from the 1st company of the -- I believe that's the

12     military police battalion, maybe you can tell us what 1st CVP means.

13        A.   Military police company.

14        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  And it describes how a military police

15     company was formed.  And if we look down at the last full paragraph from

16     the bottom just before point 3 it says:

17             "Upon arrival in the Morina border post we were tasked by the

18     chief of the PrK security department to capture the border post in the

19     village of Kamenica.  The task was carried out ..."

20             Now, that's you, is it not, sir?

21        A.   I'm the security chief.  Do you want me to comment more

22     extensively?

23        Q.   Well, first let's make sure we're clear on that.  It's referring

24     to you as the security chief, correct?

25        A.   That's right.

Page 11897

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, is this not an example of you giving a task to a

 2     company of the military police and them doing it?

 3        A.   No.  This is not an example of me giving a task to the military

 4     police company.  Each unit keeps a war log-book, a diary.  This one

 5     belongs, as can be seen, to the 52nd Battalion of the military police.

 6     It's not kept by the commander.  It is often kept by whichever officer is

 7     placed in charge of this by the commander.  These war diaries are not

 8     always precise.  Sometimes they're not even written up properly.  This

 9     company numbers 100 members, 100 soldiers or men, and they can confirm

10     this.  I received an assignment from the commander of the Pristina Corps

11     to take this company to the Morina barracks area and to hand it over to

12     Lieutenant-Colonel Goran Jevtovic, who was one of the officers at the

13     forward command post of the Pristina Corps command in Djakovica.  This

14     company, pursuant to orders from the corps commander, was to launch an

15     attack on the left wing of the Albanian terrorists in relation to the

16     Morina barracks because there was a danger that they would be linking up

17     from there with the terrorists at Smonica and Junik and succeed in making

18     that corridor that I spoke about yesterday down which a large group of

19     terrorists could then pass.  It says here, Pursuant to my order, and I'm

20     saying, No, I conveyed the order of the Pristina Corps commander.  That

21     is what I did, and I was not in charge of this operation or indeed the

22     order.  My job was to hand the unit over to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic

23     and a number of other officers who were at the Morina barracks at the

24     time.

25        Q.   So you conveyed the order from the Pristina Corps command?

Page 11898

 1        A.   Yes, yes.

 2        Q.   Now, sir, often when a command is issued by a commander of a

 3     unit, they got that order from above, would you agree?

 4        A.   Every order comes from above.

 5        Q.   All right.  And the person conveying that order from above needs

 6     to have the authority to do so, do they not?

 7        A.   Yes.  I was authorised by him to take the company there, to march

 8     them there, and to convey his order to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic.  I

 9     assume that the Djakovica forward command post knew they had received

10     word through their communications equipment as to how exactly the company

11     would then proceed to be used.

12        Q.   So you would agree that someone off the street could not simply

13     come in and pass along an order to a unit and have them follow it?  There

14     needs to be some authority behind the words?

15        A.   In this case and in my assessment, the corps commander ordered

16     the Chief of Staff, who was the commander at the forward command post, to

17     receive that company and to use it in keeping with their previous

18     agreement.  I'm not sure what it is.  The assignment is stated here.  My

19     assignment was to take the company there and hand them over at this

20     pre-agreed location where they were to report.

21        Q.   Now, sir, I think we can agree this entry in the war diary says:

22             "We were tasked by the chief of the PrK security department to

23     capture the border post.  The task was carried out ..."

24             In their view they had received the task from you.  Of course it

25     may have come from a superior commander, but they responded to a task

Page 11899

 1     that came from your lips, did they not?

 2        A.   We could speculate about a number of theorys here.  Whoever wrote

 3     this up may not even have heard my conversation with the company

 4     commander as to what their assignment was to be.  It is difficult to draw

 5     up a number of theorys here, but what I'm telling you is the truth.  I

 6     was not in command of that company in that operation or in command of any

 7     unit at all ever.

 8        Q.   Well, sir, let's be careful not to get hung up on semantics here.

 9     I think we understand your position that you were not a commander of a

10     unit leading a troop into battle; that position is clear.  However, you

11     told this unit to do something, you tasked them to do something on this

12     occasion, maybe it came from above - that sounds reasonable - and they

13     then did it.  That's all I'm saying.  Can we agree on that?

14        A.   No, we can't, no way.  Regardless of the level of command that

15     the order was issued from, I personally did not issue such an order to

16     this unit.  I repeat, I conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Jevtovic who had

17     previously been informed also by the forward command post because the

18     Chief of Staff and the commander had heard about the fighting at Kosare

19     that this company was to be there and they knew -- and later on I brought

20     them there and I returned.  I went back.  I was not directly ordering

21     them, and I was not there on the spot during the actual implementation of

22     the task.

23        Q.   Sir, I think we're getting caught up in the semantics again.  I

24     am saying merely that you spoke this order to them.  You told them this.

25     You are saying, "I conveyed it to them."  Those sound like the same thing

Page 11900

 1     to me.

 2        A.   I conveyed the order.  I spoke to the company commander, not the

 3     soldiers who were there all lined up.  I spoke to their company commander

 4     that they should go there and that what they had to do was what the corps

 5     commander had told me, that was to hand them over to Lieutenant-Colonel

 6     Jevtovic.

 7        Q.   And they then did that, correct, what you had conveyed?

 8        A.   As far as I know, they did that, yes.  And they took Kamen C4.

 9     That's what I received in my reports.  We were monitoring the fighting at

10     Kosare.  Many people were killed there in order to ease the frontal

11     pressure by the terrorists.  In terms of military strategy they had to

12     attack from the flank.  This was a dominant feature, Kamen C4 straddling

13     the very border between the Republic of Albania and the Federal Republic

14     of Yugoslavia.

15        Q.   All right, sir, now we -- you were asked questions about the

16     Caragoj valley operation, and I'd like to speak with you about that a bit

17     now.  Do you agree that there were two platoons of the 52nd Military

18     Police Battalion who took part in that action?

19        A.   Yes, two platoons of the 52nd Military Police Battalion.  They

20     were subordinated to the 125th Motorised Brigade.

21        Q.   All right.  And the 52nd Military Police Battalion itself was

22     located in Pristina, is that correct, the larger battalion; is that

23     accurate?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   All right.

Page 11901

 1             MS. PETERSEN:  I'm about to go on to an exhibit now.  I see we

 2     only have about five minutes left.  I could go on to that, or we could

 3     end for the day.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  I take it you won't finish with the exhibit in

 5     that time.

 6             MS. PETERSEN:  I may not.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  We will then adjourn.  We continue again tomorrow

 9     at 9.00 in the morning.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day of

12                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.