1 Friday, 26 February 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
7 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
8 WITNESS: MOMIR STOJANOVIC [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen: [Continued]
11 Q. Sir, it feels like we've been here for a while. I just have a
12 few more questions for you this morning.
13 You testified that the VJ wanted civilians to stay in Kosovo, not
14 leave Kosovo, because their presence made it more difficult for NATO to
15 hit military targets; right? Do you recall saying that?
16 A. Yes, I do recall saying that.
17 Q. So your understanding at the time was that NATO was trying to
18 avoid civilians; is that correct?
19 A. I assumed that it was trying to avoid that. Nevertheless, quite
20 a number of errors were made. As you know, three refugee columns of
21 Kosovo Albanians were mistakenly targeted by the air-strikes; one in the
22 Meja area; one in Bistrazin village in the general surroundings, that is,
23 along the Djakovica-Prizren road; one in the Korisa village general area
24 in the centre of Prizren.
25 Q. Okay. So although there were some mistakes, your general
1 understanding was that the intent of NATO was to try to avoid civilians;
2 is that fair to say?
3 A. Yes, I assume that's fair.
4 Q. And because of that reason, the more civilians that were around,
5 the more difficult it would be for them to hit military targets; is that
6 the basis of the analysis that you gave us the other day?
7 A. No. We who worked in the VJ, specifically those of us work in
8 the Pristina Corps, were never in favour of the idea that civilians
9 should be expelled. We saw no reason for that.
10 Secondly, by being left alone in Kosovo-Metohija, any movement by
11 civilians would make it very difficult for our forces to move about. We
12 could not longer move our own forces about. As was sometimes the case
13 later on --
14 Q. Just one second. I think we may have a misunderstandings, sir.
15 I'm seeking about what you told us the other day that the army -- it
16 didn't make sense for the army to want the civilians to leave because it
17 actually made it more difficult for NATO to bomb when the civilians were
18 there. So I'm just asking you about the underlying rationale for that.
19 And I'm asking you if the idea behind that is that when an area is
20 densely populated and NATO has to try to avoid that civilian population,
21 that then makes it more difficult for them to hit military targets; is
22 that the basic underlying idea of what you told us the other day?
23 A. No. For as long as there were inhabited villages and towns in
24 Kosovo and Metohija, there was always population moving about. The
25 security conditions were quite complex. Nevertheless, the citizens
1 needed to move about and travel all the roads there between smaller
2 villages and settlements and major towns. Had it not been for the public
3 transport using those roads and civilians moving along, anything at all
4 along that road would have been a target for NATO because NATO would have
5 known that the only people possibly moving down that road were soldiers
6 and the VJ, making any of them legitimate targets in their eyes.
7 Q. All right. So the presence of civilians and the need for NATO to
8 avoid those civilians in some ways made it more difficult for NATO to
9 bomb VJ military targets; is that fair?
10 A. I assume that was the case, yes.
11 Q. Okay. Now, you talked yesterday, I guess it wasn't yesterday at
12 this point, you -- probably it was on Tuesday, you talked about the
13 Supreme Command staff having a proclamation printed that was to try to
14 keep Albanians in the area and that they tried to have this printed in
15 the Albanian news. Do you recall discussing that, sir?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. And that proclamation ultimately was not printed; correct?
18 A. It was. It just wasn't published. The Albanian media refused to
19 publish it.
20 Q. Okay. And I meant -- by printing, I meant publishing. So
21 this -- this proclamation was never published or distributed in any way?
22 A. Ever since 1981 because of the illegal education system, the
23 young did not follow the official curriculum of the government of the
24 Republic of Serbia
25 that proclamation to be accepted by the Albanian people at large, it was
1 necessary for it to be published in Albanian in order to make it
2 intelligible to all. Had it been accomplished in Serbian, it would have
3 been intelligible to no more than a handful of Kosovo Albanians.
4 Q. Well, my basic question is in Albanian or whatever language it
5 needed to be distributed in, this was ultimately not distributed; is that
6 correct, sir?
7 A. Efforts were made at the time, at least that's what I was told.
8 As for later on, I have no idea whether it was eventually distributed or
9 published or not. It's possible that it was published at a later stage,
10 it's just that I don't know of it.
11 Q. You personally weren't involved in those efforts to distribute
12 it, it was something that you heard about from others?
13 A. We had the media centre, the ground floor of the Grand Hotel.
14 Writers, journalists, as well as those from the BBC and some local
15 agencies were there. I was personally approached by some of those
16 journalists telling me the Albanian media were refusing to publish that
17 declaration of the Supreme Command staff. That is the source of my
19 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. So let's look at that proclamation.
20 MS. PETERSEN: I believe it's D180. If we could have that on the
21 screen. And we can just have the first page in e-court in English and in
22 B/C/S, please.
23 Q. Now, if we look at this first paragraph, it says:
24 "The evil monsters of the allied, American, Canadian, British,
25 Dutch, Belgian, Italian, French, German, and Spanish have lashed out
1 fiercely at the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In
2 their ruthless strikes, they do not choose their targets, they do not
3 spare the holy places which are the pride of our civilisation. They bomb
4 monasteries, churches, and mosques; even graveyards are not sacred to
5 them. They wish only one thing, to subjugate us and to do us harm. In
6 their onslaughts they are directing most of their missiles at cities and
7 villages throughout Kosovo and Metohija."
8 So, sir, this language about the not choosing targets, directing
9 missiles at cities and villages, implying that these are indiscriminate
10 strikes, you would agree that that was false; correct?
11 A. Madam Prosecutor, the specific phrasing in paragraph one of this
12 document, well, as far as that is concerned, I will agree with you that
13 it is an example of exceptionally poor phrasing, in terms of inviting
14 people or encouraging people to stay in their homes. That is an
15 unfortunate turn of phrase. As to your question, whether there were any
16 random attacks, or, rather, let me put it this way: Had I been the one
17 writing this or phrasing this, I would have put it quite differently. I
18 would try to phrase it more realistically and in a way that was more
19 acceptable to the potential addressees of this proclamation.
20 As for random attacks in Kosovo, as in Serbia, generally
21 speaking, as you know, random attacks were carried out, bridges were
22 targeted, as well as kindergartens. You probably know about all of that.
23 There were a great number of civilian casualties, both in Kosovo and in
25 That is what they mean when they say poorly selected targets,
1 that means targeting something that can never be a legitimate military
3 Q. Well, I think in this proclamation it says in their onslaughts
4 they are directing most of the missiles at cities and villages throughout
5 Kosovo and Metohija. They do not spare Albanians or Serbs, Montenegrins,
6 Turks, Muslims, Goranci, Roma, Egyptians, or anyone.
7 So this isn't talking about random strikes; this is insinuating
8 in no uncertain terms that the NATO bombs are directed at regular people.
9 And based on what we were just discussing, sir, you yourself had said
10 that that was not the intent of NATO. My question to you is: This is
11 more propaganda than truth; would you agree with that, sir?
12 A. I would agree that this document, and I've had a chance to look
13 at it, as a whole reeks of propaganda. Nevertheless, to some extent, it
14 also realistically reflects the situation as it was. Therefore,
15 Madam Prosecutor, may I ask you this: Have you ever wondered about the
16 victims in Meja, or some of them at least? You are saying, perhaps for
17 good reason, that some of them came to grieve as a result of inhumane
18 treatment and violations of International Humanitarian Law; were these,
19 perhaps, the columns passing through Meja bombed by NATO? I myself have
20 had an opportunity to see horrific images from Bistrazin, Meja, and
21 Korisa when Albanian refugees started leaving Kosovo. Let me ask you a
22 hypothetical question, if I just may. Do you believe that --
23 Q. Sir, sir, we need to stick with me asking you the questions here
24 today. And my question to you is just this: This document is telling
25 people that NATO is directly targeting them. You have said, sir, that
1 NATO was, your understanding, was that NATO was attempting to avoid
2 civilians, which is why it was better to have civilians around. This
3 document is not true; correct? That's my only question for you.
4 A. My answer shifts between your statement and my previous answer.
5 Madam Prosecutor, Kosovo and Metohija was the most miserable place to be
6 on planet earth at that point in time. NATO was perhaps trying to avoid
7 that as any normal and civilised army would have, nevertheless, the
8 question we must ask ourselves is, in practical terms, to what extent
9 were they successful in their efforts to avoid civilian casualties.
10 Q. Sir, I asked you a precise question about this document, and I'm
11 not sure if I'm going to get an answer from you on that. So I'll move on
12 to my next question.
13 Now, you told us in your testimony that the point of this
14 proclamation was to try - let me see if I can get the exact quote
15 here - you said at page 11759 that:
16 "This proclamation would serve to make clear to the Albanian
17 population that they should not leave their homes and that they are safe
18 where they are and that they should stay in their homes."
19 Now, you would agree, sir, that telling people that evil monsters
20 are indiscriminately bombing and directing most of the missiles at cities
21 and villages throughout Kosovo would likely do the opposite of that,
22 would you agree?
23 A. Yes. I also agree with the impression that the latter portion of
24 this document would create, and you are not showing it. You decide to
25 dwell on this first statement. Nevertheless, the character of this
1 document reflects a sincere invitation to the locals to stay, saying they
2 had no reason to leave. If you wish to judge a document based on a
3 single portion of that document, then I can hardly be expected to agree
4 with you.
5 Q. Well, sir, you are correct that at the end of this document there
6 is a request to the Albanians to return to their homes and their
7 every-day work. But you would agree that before they ever get to that
8 point if someone read this and believed it, they would be terrified;
10 A. Terrified, yes, by all means.
11 MS. PETERSEN: All right. I don't have any more questions for
12 this witness. Thank you.
13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Petersen.
14 Mr. Djurdjic.
15 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Djurdjic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Let's start with the last document.
18 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have page two of
19 that document displayed, the very end of that document. Thank you.
20 Could we please have that in the B/C/S as well.
21 Q. General, sir, could you please read out loud the last paragraph
22 saying "Albanians" and then from there.
23 A. Sure.
24 "Only life together without hatred and contempt leads to a
25 happier future, a care-free childhood for our children, regardless of
1 religion or ethnicity. Let us all together make an effort to restore
2 peace to our native area. Return to your homes and your daily work. Do
3 so today."
4 Q. Thank you. We see the date here as being the 7th of April, 1999
5 You say that you were in the general Pristina area throughout the
6 air-strikes. Can you tell us what the targets were between the beginning
7 of the air-strikes and the 7th of April specifically in Pristina because
8 that's where you were at the time?
9 A. Quite a number of targets. If you leave aside the military
10 targets, the Ministry of the Interior in the very centre of Pristina was
11 targeted too. Several of the neighbouring Albanian houses were
12 destroyed. The main post office was targeted too, leading to a breakdown
13 in all communication lines. During that particular attack, again, a
14 number of Albanian homes were destroyed. The waterworks system was
15 targeted. Grmija was targeted. The oil derivatives depot near the
16 Orthodox cemetery was targeted. This was a full-scale disaster. There
17 was a plume of smoke rising, and I don't think it ever dispersed before
18 the war ended. The depots were there and the reservoirs, and there was a
19 thick plume of smoke emanating from the scene.
20 Colonel Milutin Filipovic was the garrison commander, and he kept
21 all the records. He was the one reporting on everything that was going
22 on. All of this made life in Pristina unbearable to anyone including the
23 Albanian population there.
24 Q. Thank you. NATO was hitting civilian targets outside Kosovo and
25 Metohija during the war in 1999; do you know anything about that?
1 Leaving civilian casualties in the wake of these attacks?
2 A. Of course I am aware of that. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea
3 addressed the world media several times and termed this collateral
4 damage. For example, the horrible atrocity at the bridge near Varvarin
5 where some children were killed. The Gurgalica [phoen] bridge, for
6 example, where a passenger train was targeted. All these were atrocious
7 crimes. Bridges were destroyed in the main cities such as Novi Sad
9 the figures, the number of civilian casualties and facilities that were
10 destroyed during NATO air-strikes.
11 Q. Do you remember any civilian casualties on the road passing
12 through Podujevo, specifically near the village of Luzane
13 in 1999?
14 A. Yes, NATO's planes targeted the bridge itself near the village of
15 Luzane along the Podujevo road. They targeted a bus carrying passengers
16 belonging to a [indiscernible] company known as Nis Express. The bodies
17 were charred, so I couldn't identify the bodies by the time I arrived.
18 It was a horrific sight, blood curdling.
19 Q. About the commander of the Pristina Corps security, you told us
20 at one point that he was not keeping you informed of his whereabouts;
21 nevertheless, there is this unit securing the commander. Wouldn't they
22 keep you up to date as to their movements and whereabouts?
23 A. The unit securing the Pristina Corps commander, this being one of
24 the tasks of the military police would report to their own superior. The
25 commander of the 52nd Military Police Battalion who would then, in turn,
1 regularly brief my own assistant for security and staff affairs who was
2 in charge of the military police. He was one of my two assistants. And
3 then there were daily briefings where he would report to me to cover
4 matters such as these.
5 Q. Based on these reports, would you normally know what you needed
6 to know about the whereabouts and movements of the Pristina Corps
7 commanders, sir?
8 A. Not entirely since, as I said, the commander was not duty-bound
9 to always stick to his plans. Normally monthly plans were drawn up for
10 counter-intelligence and physical security of the corps commander. The
11 corps commander then approves this monthly plan, and we are all expected
12 to stick to it. Nevertheless, the commander may sometimes change the
13 plan without necessarily consulting anyone, but then it is his
14 responsibility to bear in terms of his physical safety.
15 Q. During the war, did the commander ever move around without being
16 provided by military police security?
17 A. No, that was never the case. Heavy security was always provided
18 for him.
19 Q. When we discussed the exchange of information in the security
20 organ in the Pristina Corps -- well, my question is as follows: Did you
21 receive information that concerned the security zone of the security
22 organ of the Pristina Corps? Did you receive such information from
23 Superior Commands from the security department of the 3rd Army, from the
24 security administration, and from the security departments of other
1 A. Yes. Information was conveyed vertically up the chain, and all
2 information and territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was
3 contained and in the territory of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army, information
4 from all organs that concerned the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, all
5 that information was conveyed to the security department, that is to say,
6 to us in the Pristina Corps.
7 Q. Can you briefly explain the following for us: What is the
8 professional leadership of units of the military police? What does that
10 A. I'll simplify this. As in the command of each and every unit,
11 the heads of certain branches of the infantry, of the artillery, of
12 armoured units, and then you have heads of certain departments, financial
13 departments and so on and so forth, in a similar way, in the security
14 department, you have an assistant for security issues who, with approval
15 of the head, is involved in these matters, these heads that I have
16 mentioned and the professional head are concerned. You have to monitor
17 how plans and programmes for training are carried out. You have to
18 monitor how units of the military police are staffed, since those units
19 have A category soldiers. They had to carry out security checks because
20 these soldiers have sensitive duties. Security for the commander is a
21 sensitive duty. Then you have to provide MP units with special equipment
22 against intercepting telephone calls, against sabotage; so it involves
23 training units of the military police. That is what professional
24 monitoring means.
25 Q. Yesterday a colleague showed you a letter from the security
1 department of the Pristina Corps. In the example of the letter sent from
2 the communication centre, could there be a signature?
3 A. No.
4 Q. A personal signature?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Thank you. Let's clarify something. Investigation, I think, is
7 the term; we spent quite a bit of time on it yesterday; the security
8 department of the Pristina Corps in. Which part of a pre-criminal
9 procedure is it involved?
10 A. According to the law, the Criminal Code, criminal procedure, it's
11 involved in the activities prior to the crime -- prior to the criminal
12 procedure. That is investigation, securing the crime scene, gathering
13 the necessary material, evidence, and you have to make sure that the
14 criminal does not move away, that he is arrested, that he does not flee.
15 Q. Does this also involve detecting crimes and perpetrators and then
16 taking certain measures in relation to that?
17 A. It concerns gathering all information that might shed light on
18 the crime in question.
19 Q. Very well. The work you were involved in, all the people who did
20 sabotage with regard to the Army of Yugoslavia, were they the subjects of
21 your work regardless of whether these were foreigners or locals?
22 A. Yes, that's what it says in the rules that regulate the work of
23 the security department.
24 Q. For that reason, would you be interested if a mandate is abused
25 in the members of the Kosovo Verification Mission, or rather, in members
1 of non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations,
2 journalists too?
3 A. Yes. If I may clarify this. We weren't just interested in
4 members of the Kosovo Verification Mission. They had a UN mission, so we
5 weren't interested in them. We were interested in the activities of
6 terrorists. When investigating terrorist activities, we were conducting
7 legitimate activities; it was a legitimate threat for the units. When
8 investigating terrorist activities, we obtained information that
9 indicated that concern representatives of the Verification Mission were
10 involved - you have shown a number of such documents to that effect. So
11 we weren't really interested in Kosovo Verification Mission; that wasn't
12 the focus of our interest, but it became involved in the matter, we
13 became interested in them because they were involved with those that we
14 were actually interested in.
15 Q. Yesterday you told us what the duties of the security organ of
16 the Army of Yugoslavia were, but I'm interested in the following: When
17 you find out that there has been a crime, the perpetrator of a crime
18 against the JNA, to whom do you file -- against the Army of Yugoslavia,
19 to whom do you file a crime report?
20 A. We do that to the Prosecutor of the relevant military Court.
21 Q. And then who launches the criminal procedure?
22 A. The court that is competence, that has jurisdiction, does that.
23 Q. At whose request?
24 A. At the request of the prosecution.
25 Q. And then the procedure is further -- the further procedure is
1 dealt with by the court organs? Can you get involved in that once a
2 criminal procedure has been instigated?
3 A. According to the law of criminal procedure that was in force at
4 the time, it was possible to do that until the time that the Prosecution
5 took over the case.
6 Q. Very well. If military policemen discovered anyone involved in a
7 crime, would they prevent the person from committing the crime in the
8 course of that act?
9 A. Yes, that would be his legal duty.
10 Q. Would they then surrender this person to the relevant organs if
11 the military organs weren't responsible for dealing with those
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Very well. Yesterday we spoke about what certain houses of
15 Albanians looked like. I'm interested in the following: The houses of
16 Albanians in the village, Albanians of Muslim faith, could you describe
17 the houses of those Albanians of Muslim faith?
18 A. Of course. In my childhood and later, I often stayed with
19 Albanian families as their guest. The vast majority of the rural areas
20 in Kosovo and Metohija have typical Albanian houses surrounded by high
21 walls. They have very large yards. And in the middle of those yards,
22 there were these constructions in an oriental style, sort of castle-like
23 constructions with openings. This was for the traditional vendetta idea
24 that you had, but these houses were never built independently. It was
25 part of a complex of a number of houses that were surrounded by a wall of
1 a tribe or a family, as they say, because often, after there had been a
2 marriage, brothers wouldn't separate the property. They all remained
3 living in the same place together. They would build houses next to each
4 other, and these houses would be surrounded by high walls.
5 Q. What were these walls made of and what was the height of these
7 A. Usually these walls were made of large concrete blocks, and the
8 height varied between a metre and a half and two metres.
9 Q. Very well. Yesterday my learned friend asked you some questions
10 about the arrest or the attempt to arrest Adem Jashari. Was Adem Jashari
11 asked to surrender to the security organs?
12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, the witness has told us he wasn't
13 there. How can you expect him to know the answer to that question?
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Well, he answered a number of
15 questions from the Prosecution yesterday. He said he wasn't present, he
16 wasn't there, but he had information, some information. So I'm asking
17 him about that in relation to what the Prosecution asked him about. I'm
18 asking him about the information he has about the subject he was examined
19 about by the Prosecution. I wouldn't have put this question to him if he
20 hadn't answered the Prosecution's questions.
21 JUDGE PARKER: The Prosecution was asking about topics other than
22 ones that involved direct personal knowledge. Your question here is
23 wanting his direct personal knowledge. If you are wanting to ask him did
24 he have reports about this and what did they say, we would allow you.
25 But you are asking him was there a warning, or words to that effect. So
1 if your questions are directed to what he knows from his reports, you can
2 go ahead on that basis.
3 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. The
4 witness said that he didn't have any information about that. The army
5 units weren't involved, he said.
6 Q. General, when mobilisation is carried out, is there a difference
7 between the active and reserve forces in the units of the
8 Army of Yugoslavia
9 A. When mobilisation is ongoing, no difference is made between
10 active and mobilised force. At the time in question, they were all
11 members of the active forces, and they have identical rights and duties.
12 Q. Yesterday, in response to some Prosecution questions, you said
13 that you were in Djakovica when Prascevic was killed. How long did you
14 stay in Djakovica on that day?
15 A. I was there for an hour and a half or two at the most. As I
16 said, I already had other obligations so I apologised to the family, but
17 I just went to visit them to express my condolences. I wasn't at
18 Mr. Prascevic's funeral.
19 Q. I'd like to ask you about the following: You said that in the
20 yard on a bench --
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I don't know whether I can mention
22 the name of the person in open session, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE PARKER: I wouldn't think there's any difficulty. He gave
24 evidence. It's what's the subject of the question that can be the
25 problem, not the name.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Nike Peraj was, therefore, present on that day when you went to
3 express your condolences. Did you speak to Nike Peraj?
4 A. Yes. Like all the others who had come to express their
5 condolences, he was sitting on the Bench. I was a bit surprised, given
6 that it was a state of war, he was exposed, and I was afraid because of
7 the relationship he had. I thought that some might notice this and
8 inform the terrorists. However, he was having a small glass of rakija,
9 and he was sincere. He had associated with Mr. Prascevic earlier on.
10 And he told me that, not Mr. Prascevic, so I assumed that it was because
11 of the fact that they were close that he felt it was necessary for him to
12 appear there and to express his condolences.
13 Q. Do you remember whether there were any conversations with
14 Mr. Nike Peraj on that occasion?
15 A. No, no. There were quite a lot of people, relatives, who were
16 there. So apart from greeting him out of courtesy, no, no, there were no
18 Q. Thank you. Yesterday my colleague showed you paragraph 59 and 60
19 of a witness statement, of Peraj's witness statement, and she said, or
20 reference was made to your meeting at the funeral and also to
21 conversations referred to in paragraphs 59 and 60 of the statement.
22 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] If we could see Exhibit P313, and
23 could we have a look at paragraphs 59 and 60 of that exhibit, please.
24 Q. In paragraph 59, second line, where was the meeting held
25 according to the witness's statement?
1 A. Well, the witness says that it was in a private house in
2 Djakovica in the vicinity of the barracks.
3 Q. Thank you. And he then mentions who was present apart from
4 yourself. In paragraph 60, what is said with regard to the meeting?
5 What kind of a meeting was it? It's in the first line.
6 A. In paragraph 60 it says that the meeting I'm referring to was an
7 informal discussion in a group that had met for completely different
9 Q. Very well, thank you.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see P338 now. It's
11 the journal of the 52nd Battalion of the military police. I'm interested
12 in page 6 in the English version, and it's page 9 in the Serbian version.
13 Q. I'd like to ask you the following: Did you arrive with part of
14 the unit of the 52nd MP Battalion that was resubordinated to the
15 125th Motorised Brigade, or rather, that became part of the
16 125th Military Police Company of this brigade?
17 A. Are you referring to the two platoons?
18 Q. Yes, yes.
19 A. No, they had previously been subordinated to the 125th Company of
20 the Military Police.
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at page 13 in
22 the Serbian version and page 10 in the English version.
23 Q. Can you see the entry for the 21st here? And item 2, line 3,
24 towards the end, what sort of shift took over in the
25 125th Motorised Brigade? What kind of change occurred?
1 A. This company was visited by Gavrilovic, Captain 1st Class from
2 the Battalion. So this is the company that was attached to the 125th.
3 It wasn't a company, two platoons - but you signify that this is the fact
4 by saying a company minus one - in the area of the village of Junik
5 This was done for -- in order to provide logistical support and on so
6 forth as it says here.
7 Q. And who was replaced? What does it say at the end?
8 A. Captain Stankovic, Jovica was replaced. As -- due to the combat
9 around Karelj Kosovo [phoen], he had a nervous breakdown. And
10 Captain Antic, Sasa or Sasa Antic, replaced him as commander of those two
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Let's now have a look at the 13th
14 page 13 in the B/C/S version and page 10 in the English version.
15 Page 15 in the Serbian version and page 11 in the English version. I do
16 apologise, my mistake. Could we see the entry for the 28th, please, of
18 Q. Above the heading of "Logistical Support," the first line above
19 that, preparations to replace men from the Military Police Company that
20 were attached to the 125th Motorised Brigade were carried out. And the
22 A. The 28th of April, 1999.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we now, please -- 330A.
25 Exhibit P330A. I'd like to have a look at paragraph 46.
1 JUDGE PARKER: What is that exhibit, please, Mr. Djurdjic?
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's a statement of
3 Witness K-73 that you have there.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] P00330A. Or perhaps it's dash A.
6 P00330-A. We have already seen this exhibit; we saw it a few days ago.
7 Could we see page 10. Just a minute.
8 Q. Could you please read the last sentence of this paragraph.
9 A. You mean 45?
10 Q. No, 46.
11 A. "In Korenica, we got on a civilian bus and went back to Junik."
12 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us if K-73 was in a unit there,
13 and which one when he was involved in the operation in the Caragoj
15 A. He was a member of Captain Antic's unit.
16 Q. Was that unit getting ready to be replaced in relation to the
17 28th of April, 1999? You remember the replacement that we read about a
18 while ago?
19 A. Yes, yes, indeed.
20 Q. You said yesterday that you were not the responsible person nor
21 indeed were you taking any measures in terms of finding out more about
22 the circumstances surrounding Prascevic's murder. When you went there to
23 express your condolences, did the family perhaps tell you anything about
24 the circumstances of his death?
25 A. No, they just said he had been off to some sort of action and was
1 ambushed on the way there and killed in the general area of such and such
2 a village.
3 Q. When police work is done by a police department anywhere in
6 A. For example, if they are trying to put a stop so some smuggling
7 operation, the smuggling of weapons, for example, any other illegal
8 actions taking place, as far as I know, most of the secretariats for the
9 interior, their crime prevention departments, the officers would normally
10 work in plain clothes. The nature of their job being to be planted in --
11 into certain environments where all these criminal offences were being
12 committed, and still wanting to pass unnoticed.
13 Q. Did you perhaps know that back in the Ministry of the Interior
14 they had introduced ranks?
15 A. Yes, that's right.
16 Q. Did you know that the persons working for these crime police
17 squads had ranks as a matter of fact?
18 A. Yes, they did.
19 Q. Very well, thank you. Can you tell us about planning the
20 Caragoj valley operation. Witness Nike Peraj, given his position in the
21 52nd Brigade, would have been involved in the planning of that operation,
22 would he not?
23 A. Given his post establishment-wise in the 52 Artillery and
24 Rocket Brigade, there was no way he could have been there, not even when
25 the operations for that brigade were being planned, because the working
1 methodology for the work for staffs and command envisages precisely what
2 officers are there when a decision is made at one of these meetings. And
3 this certainly wouldn't have applied to a case involving the forward
4 command post since the distance in actually exercising a command is far
5 greater than would have been the case in a brigade.
6 Q. What about paragraph 96, we spoke about that, from the witness
7 Peraj's statement. I wanted to ask you whether the commander of the
8 Pristina Corps back in 1999, General Lazarevic specifically, had an
9 office Djakovica?
10 A. No, never.
11 Q. What about the forward command post in Djakovica, the
12 Pristina Corps forward command post, was there an operations centre
14 A. No. According to the instructions governing the work of commands
15 and staffs, you normally have an operations centre only in operative
16 units belonging to a brigade or in a corps. The first such unit would be
17 the corps command. As for operative duty rosters in brigades and other
18 lower ranking units, that is something that is organised. There was no
19 operations centre at a forward command post. If you'd like me to, I can
20 explain what exactly that implied. It was this whole system of
21 communications of all the devices being used, the equipment for
22 encrypting, and so on and so forth, all of that in a single room that was
23 then used as an operations centre.
24 Q. The statement goes on to say that there was a map made with
25 see-through talcum on the wall where all of the details were recorded on
1 this map regarding the operation in the Caragoj valley. What I would
2 like to know is whether Nike Peraj was given access to this room
3 allegedly holding -- housing this map showing all of the developments
4 during the progress of the Caragoj valley?
5 A. As I explained yesterday, there is no topographic map being used
6 in any country in the world in any army in the world to cover an entire
7 wall. The format is different, the size it different. There isn't an
8 honest hard-working army command anywhere in the world that would display
9 an operation plan like that for all to see over a whole wall. As I
10 explained yesterday, the only thing that map was actually showing was the
11 deployment of the army units, the border units, and the combat groups, as
12 well as the locations of the Siptar terrorists in that area. This map
13 was there throughout.
14 As for Mr. Nike Peraj, I don't believe that he would have been
15 allowed into that room at any point in time. I don't think he ever
16 asked, let alone was actually granted permission. Certainly not to the
17 forward command post.
18 Q. Very well --
19 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Djurdjic, you mentioned paragraph 96. Is that
20 of this exhibit that is on the screen?
21 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] No, no, this is Nike Peraj's
22 statement, Your Honour. That's P313, paragraph 96, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I do apologise for not stating the
25 exhibit number.
1 Q. You told us yesterday that, after the war, you found out about
2 the bodies in Batajnica. Did you know where those people had been
3 killed, whose bodies were found at Batajnica?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Did you know anything about the circumstances of their deaths?
6 A. No, I didn't know anything about that either.
7 Q. You were asked a question yesterday about the prosecution of
8 brigade commanders for crimes committed during the war. Did you have any
9 knowledge indicating that brigade commanders committed any crimes at all
10 during the war?
11 A. Not a shred of information in 1998 or indeed 1999 indicating that
12 brigade commanders were involved in the planning, organising, or, indeed,
13 ordering and commission of any crime at all.
14 Q. Had you known anything about that at all, had you had information
15 indicating that, would the security service not have initiated
16 proceedings against not just these brigade commanders, but, rather, any
17 VJ officers, soldiers, at all?
18 A. It was the same practice that applied throughout peacetime, even
19 for a far smaller infraction, people were replaced and dismissed, let
20 alone brigade commanders, and let alone in the case of a crime. The
21 corps commander would have had such a person dismissed on the spot.
22 Q. Does that apply to all the other VJ officers too?
23 A. Yes, as I pointed out at, lower levels of command, there were
24 those who were ordering for certain refugees to be singled out from the
25 column in the 37th Brigade. And we submitted this information to all the
1 other brigades as a practical example of what must not be done. There
2 were lower-level officers, company commanders, and platoon commanders
3 who, in certain situations, violated the provisions of
4 International Humanitarian Law.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have P1543. Thank
6 you. Specifically, page 10 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S. The
7 document on the right-hand side, could you please zoom in a little. No,
8 that's the left document; I mean the one on the right. Yes, that one,
9 thank you. The upper portion of that document, please. Just to make
10 sure we got the English where we want it, I want the introduction to this
11 document with the header in both documents in both languages. All the
12 way up, thank you. Though I am looking at the English and it doesn't
13 seem to correspond with the Serbian text.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
15 MS. PETERSEN: I may be able to assist with this. I think that
16 what we see at the top of the page in English is actually the end of a
17 different document that's being displayed in this. So I think that this
18 document starts where it says "2 Pristina Corps Command."
19 Does that look right, Mr. Djurdjic?
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much indeed for
21 your help. You are entirely right, yes.
22 Q. General, sir, if you look at the header, what exactly does it
24 A. Pristina Corps Command, security section, to the Joint Command
25 for KiM.
1 Q. And there's a date underneath, right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. What about any filing numbers?
4 A. No, this is not a document as such, not the kind that was filed.
5 It wasn't dispatched or addressed to any particular institution. As I
6 explained yesterday, I typed up quite swiftly some information that I had
7 in a rush and then forwarded this to Mr. Djakovic in order to keep
8 ourselves mutually informed, as I explained.
9 Q. All right.
10 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] P1329, please. My apologies, it
11 must be P1328. The previous number is the number that I have, but I
12 think it was quoted as 29 yesterday in the transcript and the error was
13 all mine.
14 Q. General, sir, the OTP showed you this document yesterday, and
15 what you told us about the header is that you could identify the filing
16 number that was a reference to the Pristina Corps. What about
17 paragraph 2 which reads "task" or "assignment"?
18 A. This is a textbook order for the Pristina Corps and then
19 paragraph 2 details the tasks for the Pristina Corps.
20 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Can we please move down to
21 paragraph 5 now.
22 Q. 5.1, sir, please focus on that. General, sir, which unit is it
23 here that we see receiving a task?
24 A. The 125th Motorised Brigade and then, in the brackets, the second
25 battalion of the 58th Light Infantry Brigade.
1 Q. Thank you. In addition to the task for this unit, is there any
2 other task being assigned to any other unit under 5.1?
3 A. No, no task for any other unit. There were plenty of documents
4 such as these, but --
5 Q. Thank you, thank you, you've explained that already. Let's try
6 and save some time on this.
7 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Paragraph 11, please, if we can
8 move down to paragraph 11.
9 Q. Paragraph 11, the first portion, please.
10 A. It talks about command and communications, that's what it says.
11 You can see the command post of the Pristina Corps, its peacetime
12 location. This clause is always there in each and every order relating
13 to the Pristina Corps. The clause about the peacetime location,
14 although, in fact, we abandoned our peacetime location before the
15 beginning of the air-strikes. Nevertheless, for security reasons, we
16 were never able to share with our subordinate commanders the exact
17 location of the Pristina Corps Command. There were many units like that.
18 Had any of those documents fallen into the hands of the
19 terrorists, there was always the danger for NATO to bomb to bits the
20 entire Pristina Corps Command. The subordinate commanders would normally
21 receive scrambled communication. They would de-scramble it in order to
22 find out the exact location at any given point in time of the
23 Pristina Corps Command. Each time there was a document like this, the
24 phrasing was always the same, talking about the command's peacetime
25 location for the reasons I've enumerated.
1 Q. Can you please move down to paragraph 13.
2 JUDGE PARKER: The speed at which questions and answers are
3 proceeding is a little too fast, the interpreters are under too great a
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] I'll do my best to slow down, and
6 General, may you do the same, please, in order to make sure the job is
7 done properly.
8 Q. Paragraph 13 is the first thing you can see there.
9 A. Paragraph 13 talks about co-ordination with the MUP forces in
10 terms of preparing and carrying out combat operations, meaning in a
11 particular area. This is then to be organised before the commencement
12 and during the actual progress or combat operations.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have D104 now,
15 thank you.
16 Q. Okay. An order entitled the Joint Command. We have a filing
17 number, the one that relates to the Pristina Corps. What number is that,
19 A. The filing number? 455-56.
20 Q. Thank you very much. Towards the bottom of the page, we see who
21 the task is in relation to?
22 A. This is a textbook order by the Pristina Corps Command, so that's
23 who it's in reference to.
24 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] All right. I think it's probably
25 the next page in the English document where it says "Tasks." Could we
1 please go to paragraph 5.
2 Q. Sir, if you look at 5.1, which is the unit being assigned a task
4 A. The tactical group of the 211th Armoured Brigade.
5 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we flip on to the next page,
6 please, to check paragraph 2. The previous page. 5.2.
7 Q. Who is the task under 5.2 in reference to, sir?
8 A. 5.2 - the document is being moved all the time; it's difficult to
9 say. The 125th Motorised Brigade.
10 Q. 5.3, what about that one?
11 A. The 15th Armoured Brigade.
12 Q. Fair enough.
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we please move to the very
14 last page of this document.
15 Q. Based on what's written there, who issued this order?
16 A. The Pristina Corps Command.
17 Q. And what does it say at the end of the page?
18 A. Signed by Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija.
19 Q. Any signatures you can see on the face of this document, sir?
20 A. No, none. Nevertheless, this was a signal, a hint to the units
21 that this was something that had been co-ordinated and agreed upon with
22 the staff, the MUP staff.
23 Q. Who would have been in a position to amend this order in any
24 shape or form?
25 A. Only the commander of the Pristina Corps, the person who issued
2 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could we move on to Exhibit 205,
3 please. 105. D105.
4 Q. The right, could you please read the header, sir, what does it
5 say, the filing number?
6 A. The same filing number as in the previous order, 455-59/1.
7 Q. 56/1?
8 A. Yes, I apologise.
9 Q. What about down the middle, what does it say?
10 A. "Amendment to the decision on supporting the MUP forces in
11 breaking up and destroying the Siptar terrorist forces in the area of
12 Malo Kosovo near Podujevo."
13 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Could you please move on to the
14 next page of this document, thank you. Rather, the last page.
15 Q. Who signed this document?
16 A. The Pristina Corps commander, General Vladimir Lazarevic.
17 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you were shown a portion of General
18 Vasiljevic's transcript. You discussed that, particularly about that
19 dinner, was he invited or not. Nevertheless, I would like to read back
20 to you a portion from 5691 of the transcript in our own trial. General
21 Vasiljevic says:
22 "The two of us went to the Pristina Corps Command to that
23 building, having exchanged greetings, General Pavkovic told me, Stick
24 around, we shall be holding a meeting of the Joint Command."
25 Tell me, were you standing next to General Vasiljevic as he was
1 exchanging greetings with General Pavkovic?
2 A. I was there standing right next to him throughout.
3 Q. Did you hear Pavkovic tell General Vasiljevic that there would be
4 a meeting of the Joint Command?
5 A. No. I don't see how he possibly could have. The greetings that
6 were exchanged were a matter of pure protocol. It was a formal thing.
7 Q. You were then asked by my learned friend the following question.
8 Please, I expect you to tell me, sir, I'm not jumping to any conclusions.
9 Where exactly was General Vasiljevic seated, next to whom?
10 A. Next to me.
11 Q. How far from you?
12 A. Chair to chair, like that. You can imagine the distance.
13 Q. For example, had he had an open notebook right in front of him on
14 that table, you would have seen that, wouldn't you?
15 A. Yes, by all means.
16 Q. So did he, in fact, have an open notebook in front of him?
17 A. No, he didn't.
18 Q. Thank you very much. Much obliged. What about this room in
19 which you were, how large was the table at which you were all seated?
20 A. It was arranged in a semicircle, and it was no more than 2 metres
22 Q. Thank you. In which building were you?
23 A. The basement of the Grand Hotel, the information centre of the
24 Pristina Corps.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. DJURDJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further
2 questions for this witness. Thank you.
3 Thank you, General.
4 JUDGE PARKER: Very well timed.
5 Questioned by the Court:
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Sir, you were talking about the NATO spokesman,
7 that he addressed the media several times and termed some actions as
8 collateral damage. How did you learn about this address by the NATO
10 A. It was through conferences that were shown via the media in
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You read it in Serbian media, in newspapers or
14 A. No, I listened to comments on the television. There were images
15 from the press conference for NATO, and there were comments - I don't
16 know English - but there were comments according to which he made
17 statements to this effect.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You saw that on the television?
19 A. Yes, yes.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You mentioned the name of the NATO spokesperson.
21 It was not recorded on the record this morning. Can you repeat the name?
22 A. As far as I can remember, his name was Jamie Shea.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
24 JUDGE PARKER: You will be very pleased, I'm sure, to learn that
25 that's the end of the questions for you. We would thank you for your
1 attendance here in The Hague
2 able to give. And you are free now to return to your normal activities.
3 After we rise, a Court Officer will show you out.
4 And we will adjourn now for the first break and resume at five
5 minutes past 11.00.
6 [The witness withdrew]
7 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
9 JUDGE PARKER: While the witness is being brought in, I should
10 indicate that we need to finish this session earlier than usual at about
11 20 minutes past 12.00. So if you can bear that in mind as you plan the
13 [The witness entered court]
14 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, sir.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Please read aloud the affirmation shown to you
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
19 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: MILOS PANTELIC
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much. Please sit down.
23 Mr. Popovic has some questions for you.
24 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Examination by Mr. Popovic:
1 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Pantelic.
2 A. Good day.
3 Q. Mr. Pantelic, before I commence with my examination-in-chief,
4 since we both speak the same language, I would like to ask you to listen
5 the question I put to you, make a brief pause, and then answer. And this
6 will make it possible for the interpreters to do their work correctly. I
7 would also like to ask you to speak slowly for the sake of the
9 Could you tell me your first and last name, please?
10 A. My name is Milos Pantelic.
11 Q. Thank you. When were you born and where?
12 A. In 1951 in Miljenica [phoen] in the immediate vicinity of
14 Q. Thank you. Tell me, were you a member of the MUP, and, if so, up
15 until when?
16 A. I was a member of the MUP from 1984 up until the
17 30th of December, 2001.
18 Q. Thank you. Did you then retire?
19 A. Yes, on the 30th of December, at my personal request, I retired
20 when -- I more or less took an early retirement.
21 Q. Sir, let's just repeat this for the sake of the transcript. You
22 said when all the legal conditions had been fulfilled for retirement?
23 A. Yes, all the legal conditions had been fulfilled, and at my
24 request I retired.
25 Q. Very well. Thank you. Mr. Pantelic, what was your rank when you
2 A. I received a rank of colonel at the beginning of -- I apologise.
3 At the beginning of 1999, I obtained the rank of colonel.
4 Q. Thank you. Could you briefly tell us what duties you had in the
5 MUP when you were employed there?
6 A. When I arrived in the Ministry of the Interior in 1984, I was the
7 deputy chief of the municipality SUP. The organisation of the MUP was
8 different then. It was one municipality, I was the deputy chief of the
9 municipal MUP, and around 199 -- I was acting chief of public security.
10 Then I was the chief of public security. Then I was the acting chief of
12 Q. Let's just clarify your answer. When you say that you were the
13 chief of public security, within which body were you the chief of public
15 A. When I say I was the chief, well, that was the position of the
16 chief of public security. I was the chief of public security for the
17 territory of six municipalities, Valjevo, Lajkovac, Ljig, Mionica,
18 Osecina, and Ub. According to the organisation of the work at the time,
19 there was that position - it no longer exists - but, at the time, it did
21 Q. Thank you. This was necessary to make sure we knew what you
22 meant when you said the chief of public security.
23 Could you now tell us what duties you had to perform in 1998 and
24 1999 within the MUP?
25 A. In 1998 and 1999 I performed the duties of the chief of
1 secretariat. So all security problems in the territory of the
2 secretariat, I had to deal with. That included these six municipalities,
3 and those were the duties that I performed. I had to deal with the
4 security for citizens, public order, crime prevention, and so on and so
5 forth. So all security duties that were the responsibility of the MUP
6 were my responsibilities.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel is kindly asked to switch off his
8 microphone when the witness is answering questions.
9 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pantelic. We'll go into details a little later.
11 First of all, I'm now interested in the territory covered by your
13 A. It was the territory of six municipalities as I have said.
14 Valjevo, Lajkovac, Ljig, Mionica, Osecina, and Ub. About 240.000 people
15 live in that area now.
16 Q. Thank you. Now, you could perhaps tell us the duties you had to
17 perform as the chief of the secretariat.
18 A. My duties involved, above all, the system of organisation,
19 commanding, control, co-ordinating work, issuing instructions, so all
20 security issues that had to be dealt with in that area.
21 Q. Thank you. Given the duties that you had, what was your
22 responsibility as the chief of the secretariat?
23 A. In the documents of the MUP or according to those document, I was
24 responsible to the chief of the ministry for security in the
25 Ministry of the Interior. Should I clarify this?
1 Q. Yes, please go ahead.
2 A. Well, at the time, there were a number of assistant ministers. I
3 think there were four such assistants who were directly tied to the
4 minister, but according to the regulations, I was responsible to the
5 chief of public security. All of the four individuals had certain
6 duties, and I remember what duties they had as far as professional duties
7 are concerned and tasks. I had regular consultations with him. But with
8 regard to other issues, it was the chief of the ministry for public
10 Q. Thank you. Since you have mentioned this, could you tell us who
11 the four assistants were, the four assistants to the minister? And we'll
12 talk about duties later.
13 A. If I don't count Vlastimir Djordjevic who was an acting chief for
14 public security before and was appointed as assistant to the minister,
15 from 1997 to 1998 the assistants were Radomir Markovic, later he became
16 the chief of state security. So Radomir Markovic; Stojan Misic;
17 Obrad Stevanovic; and Zekovic, I can't remember his first name.
18 Petar Zekovic, sorry.
19 Q. Mr. Pantelic, do you know how they became assistants to the
20 minister? Are you familiar with the procedure that has to be followed in
21 order to become such an assistant?
22 A. Yes, I'm very familiar with the procedure. The government
23 appoints such assistants at the recommendation of a minister. So our
24 minister of the interior made such suggestions. I think that was in
25 1997; they were appointed in 1998. Prior to that period there were fewer
1 assistants to the minister. However, they were appointed, and the
2 minister divided up their duties. Each assistant was responsible for
3 certain duties within the ministry.
4 Q. Thank you, we'll deal with that when we speak about the
5 relationships in the MUP. Let's just be more precise. When we refer to
6 the minister, who are we referring to in this period of time?
7 A. We are referring to the Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic who, as far
8 as I remember, appeared on the scene in 1997 and performed those duties
9 until the year 2000 or 2001, as far as I can remember.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pantelic. I'd like to show you some documents and
11 ask you to comment on them. You have in front of you a binder.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The Defence has prepared a binder
13 for the witness. It has always proceeded in this manner to date. The
14 binder has numbered documents. So, with your leave, we would like to use
15 this binder.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Q. Mr. Pantelic, when I give you the document number, I'll tell you
19 where you can find it, under which tab in the binder. We'll then have a
20 look at the document.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The first one that I would like to
22 have on the screen is P66. Thank you.
23 Q. It's under number 1, tab 1, Mr. Pantelic, in your binder. Have a
24 look at Article 7. Page 1. It says the minister prescribes the way in
25 which ministry duties are to be performed and issues instructions for the
1 way in which they were to be carried out.
2 Can you comment on this article, and did the MUP in 1998 and 1999
3 function in accordance with this article?
4 A. With regard to this Article 7, I think that it has -- it is
5 derived from the Laws on Ministries and Government Administration; laws
6 that were in force at the time. This just prescribes the way in which
7 the MUP is to perform its duties. And instructions were issued for their
8 execution. So the minister is responsible for all these issues in the
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pantelic.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Now, could we please see
12 document P357 on the screen.
13 Q. Mr. Pantelic, it's on under tab 2 in your binder. We can see the
14 document that is called "The Rules on the Internal Organisation of the
16 Mr. Pantelic, are you familiar with this document, and does this
17 document state how the MUP is to be organised in detail?
18 A. Yes, I'm familiar with the document. And I do remember the
20 Q. Thank you. I'll show you parts of this document so that you
21 don't have to search your memory. Have a look at page 4 in the B/C/S
22 version, first of all.
23 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] It's page 3 in the English version.
24 Q. I'm interested in Article 3 which states the the following:
25 For performing duties from Article 2 of the rules, the
1 secretariat of the Internal Affairs will be responsible hereinafter
2 secretariats, from areas that the ministry is responsible from, and its
3 headquarters will be in the municipality of Ito
4 And, under item 3 --
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it's Article 3 in the English.
6 We can move on to the following page immediately.
7 Q. Item 3 refers to Valjevo for the municipalities of Valjevo,
8 Lajkovac, Ljig, Mionica, Osecina, Ub?
9 Is that what you said earlier on? Does that concern Article 3,
10 item 3?
11 A. Parts of the Ministry of the Interior had its territorial
12 organisational units, and these were secretariats of the interior. Apart
13 from its basic headquarters in the MUP, there were also territorial
14 organisational units. There were 33 secretariats in the territory of
16 territory of Vojvodina, the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, and in
17 Kosovo and Metohija, there were seven secretariats each. So the MUP was
18 organised in a territorial way as well.
19 Q. Thank you. We can move on to Article 4 now. In secretariat,
20 under Article 3, it says secretariats will be in Valjevo, there will be a
21 detachment for Internal Affairs in Lajkovac, Ljig, Mionica, Osecina, and
23 Could you briefly comment on what I have just read?
24 A. Very briefly. We wanted to see what the secretariat of the
25 interior would look like as territorial organisational units. The first
1 thing that was taken into account was security, security issues, and the
2 number of inhabitants in the territory of the municipalities concerned.
3 Someone in the MUP would have a look at the situation, assess the
4 situation, and decide that in the territory of my secretariat it was not
5 necessary for me to have police stations that were lower organisational
6 entity; but there would be these departments for Internal Affairs, and
7 these departments were formed then in all five municipalities, Lajkovac,
8 Ljig, Mionica, Osecina, and Ub. Departments for Internal Affairs were
9 formed, and they performed all the duties that existed in the SUP and in
10 the MUP.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at page 10 in the
13 B/C/S version now and page 8 in the English version. It's Article 12
14 that I'm interested in.
15 Q. Article 12, Mr. Pantelic. It says that secretariats carry out
16 all the duties from the ministry, all the duties as determined by these
17 rules, and they are responsible for the security situation in the
18 territory that is their responsibility. Secretariats, in accordance with
19 provisions of Article 7 to 11 of these rules, organise work and control
20 of departments of intern affairs, that is to say, of police stations in
21 municipalities. They are responsible for their work.
22 Could you briefly comment on this article?
23 A. A while ago I said that secretariats perform the duties that the
24 responsibility of the ministry and the rules determine these duties. So
25 all those duties and tasks that exist in the MUP and were performed by
1 SUPs as well as by departments of Internal Affairs in municipalities, so
2 there's a hierarchy, a system of organisation, but they practically did
3 the same sort of duties. And this is in accordance with Article 12 of
4 the rule book.
5 What it says in paragraph 2 of Article 12 is that the chiefs of
6 secretariats are responsible for their work, for the work of the entire
7 secretariat of the Internal Affairs, and that includes these internal
8 organisational units of the secretariats that were present in
10 Q. Thank you. Mr. Pantelic, could we have a look at Article 37,
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] It's page 32 in the B/C/S version
13 and page 31 in the English version. Article 37. I think in English
14 we're looking at 27, whereas it should be 37. Page 31. Yes, that's
15 right, that's the article. Thank you.
16 Q. Mr. Pantelic, Article 37 says:
17 "The following organisational units shall be established in the
18 secretariats under Article 3 of these rules:" And then there is a list.
19 Could you please tell us this, what about your secretariat? Did
20 it have these organisational units? If so, could you comment in the
21 briefest possible terms on the substance of this article?
22 A. It's just like the rules say, that's exactly what the situation
23 was in my secretariat. We had a total of eight departments, although in
24 some secretariats they had lower level units such as departments. I had
25 the crime police department. Its task being to look after the citizens'
1 property as well as law and order. That was the priority.
2 The next one was the police department. I'm sorry, I'm going
3 back to the crime police department. There was general crime and
4 temporary crime, shedding light on general crimes as well as explaining
5 the circumstances about white collar crime. The police department had a
6 police station and also inspectors in the department that were
7 particularly in charge of special preparations, Special Police units, the
8 reservists. In addition to all their other work, these were their
9 priorities -- I mean their tasks.
10 The next thing was the traffic police department. What we have
11 there, the priority tasks were to check and regulate traffic as well as
12 any administrative work having do with traffic, such as issuing drivers
13 licences and that sort of thing.
14 The next was the section for foreigners and administrative
15 affairs. They were in charge of administering travel documents, any
16 questions regarding the status of various persons, and so on and so
18 There was the fire prevention police section. They had
19 sub-inspectors carrying out checks in terms of fire prevention across the
20 six municipalities. It also had fire brigades, one in each of the
21 municipalities. And they all answered to the fire prevention section.
22 The next thing was the section for analysis records and
23 information technology. This was a special section. I don't think this
24 warrants any particular explanations. We know what they did.
25 The communications section was maintaining communications at an
1 appropriate level.
2 And then the last thing was the department for joint tasks, and
3 they had to do with personnel, with resources, equipment, finances, and
4 other issues too.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please now go to
7 Article 57 and Article 58. The relevant pages are 44 in the B/C/S and
8 43 in the English.
9 Q. Mr. Pantelic, Article 57 and Article 58. If you could focus on
10 these, please. This is about the rights and obligations of the chief of
11 the secretariat in addition to his tasks within the purview of a
12 secretariat. These are lengthy; please read them and comment briefly. I
13 just want to avoid having to read them myself.
14 A. Okay I'll read it for you, but the legibility is poor.
15 "In addition to the tasks within the purview of the secretariats
16 established by these rules in accordance with the law, the secretariat
17 chief shall ensure and maintain co-operation with municipal town --
18 All right. "Ensure and maintain co-operation with municipal town
19 and district organs, including provincial organs ..."
20 I do apologise, but the legibility is really poor. I can't see
21 what it says.
22 "In performing" - I can't read this - "Internal Affairs, and it
23 shall" --
24 JUDGE PARKER: There's no point in the witness trying to struggle
25 with what is on the screen. We have, as an exhibit, the original. We
1 can read it. That will save you time.
2 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] That's right. Thank you, thank
3 you, Your Honour. It wasn't my intention to have the document read out
4 loud; that was the witness's interpretation of my question.
5 Q. Could you sir, just briefly comment on these two articles, if you
6 could, Mr. Pantelic, we don't need to read them here. We have these in
8 A. We touched on these issues a minute ago. This is about the
9 powers of the chief of the secretariat. The chief of the secretariat, in
10 addition to all the security related tasks, co-ordination, control,
11 organisation, directing, he also had certain responsibilities vis-à-vis
12 the political structures, not just the municipalities where the
13 secretariat was based, but also in all the neighboring municipalities as
15 JUDGE PARKER: [Microphone not activated] Slow down your speech.
16 The interpreters are working into several languages and they --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the president, please.
18 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the microphone was
19 off. Do you want me to explain this to the witness or perhaps you would
20 like to run it past him again.
21 JUDGE PARKER: I ask you to slow down your speech. The
22 interpreters are working into several languages, and you are going too
23 fast for the process. Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I'll try to adopt the
25 slowest pace possible. The chief of the secretariat established such
1 political contacts, as were necessary, for example with the ... regarding
2 Article 37, or rather, 57, the chief of the secretariat had to establish
3 contacts with the appropriate social and political structures in the
4 municipality. His responsibility, I think that was defined a while ago,
5 we talked about it, and we reached the appropriate conclusion.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. Mr. Pantelic, within your own secretariat, did you
8 have any reserve police forces and did you have Special Police units?
9 A. Yes, that was certainly the case. We had some Special Police
10 forces. They were organised in a particular way. We also had some
11 reserve forces. They were organised in a similar way, but pursuant to
12 decisions that came from the Ministry of the Interior.
13 Q. Thank you very much. I'll be asking you a number of questions
14 now about these particular members of your secretariat. First of all, I
15 would like us to focus on the reserve forces.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] For that purpose, could we please
17 have P706.
18 Q. This is tab 3 for you, sir. P706. Thank you. This is a
19 dispatch, the number is 587, sent by the assistant minister chief of the
20 public security sector Colonel-General Vlastimir Djordjevic. Sir, if you
21 look at paragraph 1 of this dispatch, or, rather, let me phrase it this
22 way. My first question: SUP
23 mean, and did this dispatch apply to the Republic of Serbia
25 A. I explained a while ago that there were a total of
1 33 secretariats of the interior throughout Serbia, throughout the
2 Republic of Serbia
3 from 1 to 33. So, yes, that applies to the Republic of Serbia
4 entirety. This dispatch followed an order by the minister of the
6 There is a reference here to that order by the minister of the
7 interior who envisaged the use of the reserve forces. And what we see
8 here is specific measures being ordered in terms of updating our lists
9 and records. This was something that was an ongoing task with the
10 secretariats and something that was being done all the time, because
11 certain individuals were not quite ready for these tasks and then they
12 would be replaced by other persons.
13 Summons such as these were issued every 15 or 20 days in order to
14 make sure how many men were there, how well prepared they were, what sort
15 of equipment they had, their personal weapons. Additions were made to
16 the resources of the unit, and some members were replaced occasionally.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P66, please. Page 3 in both
19 Q. Mr. Pantelic, this is the first exhibit that you saw, the
20 Law on the Ministry of the Interior. That is tab 1 for you in your
21 binder. Could you please look at number 1, please, page 3, Article 28,
22 specifically. I do believe you are looking at the wrong document.
23 Tab 1, which is the very first document in the binder in front of you,
24 sir. That's right. Page 3, please, Article 28.
25 It says:
1 "The minister may call on members of the Ministry of the
2 Interior's reserves forces to perform certain peacetime duties of the
4 And then it goes on to state what these tasks or duties are.
5 What about the previous order by the minister referred to in the person
6 who produced the dispatch, does that somehow link up with the substance
7 of Article 28?
8 A. That is quite obvious. We have an article here telling you us
9 how we should use the reserve forces in the ministry. And if you look at
10 item 2, it was taken over directly from the Law on the
11 Ministry of the Interior, specifically Article 28. It was based on these
12 powers that the minister then --
13 Q. Thank you, thank you very much, sir. We'll be getting to that at
14 a later stage. My question was in relation to Article 28 of the law
15 specifically, the one that I quoted to you. Article 28 talks about the
16 powers of the minister in terms of using the reserve police forces; is
17 that right?
18 A. Yes, that is certainly right.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] And now could we please have D102.
21 Q. In your binder, sir, that is tab number 5. We saw the article of
22 that law, and we also saw what Mr. Djordjevic invoked in his dispatch.
23 What we have in front of us now is an order to call up and engage reserve
24 forces, personnel, to carry out certain peacetime tasks of the ministry.
25 This was signed by minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic.
1 Could you please comment in the briefest possible terms and tell
2 us how it relates to what you said previously?
3 A. In the briefest possible terms, this order to call up and engage
4 reserve forces is almost like an implementation of the previous one that
5 we looked at. The minister was the only one with the power to do that,
6 to call up these men. Based on that, he wrote this. And then the order
7 simply specified what was to be done. The order specifically was about
8 certain steps to be taken vis-à-vis certain issues, men who would be
9 drafted normally for six-month periods; and then once that period
10 expired, the minister would issue a new order in order to regulate the
11 status of these members or men for the following period.
12 Q. Mr. Pantelic, could we please go to paragraph 2 of this order.
13 It reads:
14 "Secretariats of the interior shall engage reserve forces,
15 personnel, in accordance with their own assessment, having obtained prior
16 approval by the police administration of the ministry."
17 Can you please comment on that.
18 A. I'll try to use an example to illustrate this. For example,
19 there is a security problem, for example, in my municipality. The
20 territory covered by my secretariat. The first thing we do is to make an
21 assessment of the security situation. If we are not able to cope with
22 the tasks by using our regular police forces, we ask that these other
23 forces be used, and we put in a request through the police administration
24 of the Ministry of the Interior.
25 So, following the assessment, a specific request was made to the
1 police administration. I think they actually had departments there.
2 There was a department for Special Police units, and there was a
3 department for defence preparations. They would receive these requests,
4 process them, and normally submit them to the minister for inspection or
5 for review. The minister would then make a decision and perhaps approve
6 use of those forces. And then the minister of the interior would go back
7 to the original secretariat, in this case my secretariat, would inform
8 the secretariat of the approval, and specify when the units would be
9 arriving and what exactly the makeup of those units would be.
10 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pantelic.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D103, please.
12 Q. Before we go there, the date here was the 1st of July, 1998, in
13 the previous document. Now, D103. That's tab 6 for you, sir.
14 Mr. Pantelic, this is yet another order to call up and engage reserve
15 force personnel, signed by minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic. You commented
16 on that a while ago. So my question is: Is this order identical to the
17 order that we were looking at a minute ago?
18 A. These two orders are entirely identical except for paragraph 5;
19 the dead-line is here extended from the 1st of January, 1999, to the
20 30th of June, 1999.
21 Q. Thank you very much. Just very briefly, sir, based on Article 28
22 of the Law on Internal Affairs, that is what we see invoked here in this
23 order, right? And that's what we were talking about a minute ago, isn't
25 A. Yes, that's the article. The reference is to that article.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D101, please.
3 Q. Tab 4 for you, sir. Instructions on the performance of
4 Internal Affairs duties by reserve forces personnel of the ministry.
5 First of all, I would like to ask you at the introduction, the first
6 sentence, which reads "Pursuant to Article 7 of the Law on Internal
7 Affairs," my question is: Is that the same article that we discussed at
8 the beginning of your evidence today, sir?
9 A. Yes, this directive is based on Article 7 of the Law on
10 Internal Affairs adopted by the minister himself.
11 Q. Thank you. What I'd like you to be focusing on now is Roman
12 numeral I, basic provisions. Subparagraph 2. Don't read it, and I'm not
13 going to be reading it back to you, just please skim it and comment on
14 the substance, if you can.
15 A. It states in no uncertain terms what reserve forces may be used
16 for. It says, In order to carry out certain peacetime tasks for the
17 ministry, to prevent any activity undermining the security of the
18 republic, or restore serious violations of law and order. This is about
19 mass rallies.
20 In the previous period, I believe, in 1998 and 1999, we had quite
21 a number of rallies, demonstrations, staged and organised by the various
22 opposition parties. So these units were to be used in such cases.
23 Needless to say, they were also there to prevent accidents, deal with any
24 natural disasters, and so on and so forth.
25 Q. Can you please move on to page 3, Roman numeral IV. Final
1 provisions. Article 10. Article 10 reads:
2 "The chief of the secretariat directs and co-ordinates work and
3 is responsible for engaging reserve forces personnel in the area of the
5 Can you please briefly explain what exactly the article means?
6 A. This is an example of very generic phrasing. The chief of the
7 secretariat has precisely that job; he must direct and co-ordinate work.
8 Specifically in relation to the reserve forces, the commanders of police
9 stations would take over, inspectors working in police departments, all
10 of these parts of the secretariat. And that normally happened at a local
11 level, the level of local police stations.
12 Q. We see that this was signed by minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic and
13 the date is the 22nd of June, 1998.
14 Mr. Pantelic, within your own secretariat, specifically 1998 and
15 1999, did you have any members of the reserve forces there?
16 A. Just like any other secretariat in Serbia, I, too, had some
17 members of reserve police forces under me. We tried to use them as
18 seldom as possible due to financial problems; nevertheless, when Special
19 Police units were in Kosovo and Metohija and when the manning levels were
20 low across the police stations in the area, there were cases, not
21 frequently though, where we had no choice but to use the reserve forces.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please go back to P357 for
24 a minute.
25 Q. Tab 2 in your binder, sir. Rules on internal organisation.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Page 8, specifically, in the B/C/S.
2 Page 7 in the English.
3 Q. Article 6, please, if you could focus on that, sir. It says:
4 "In addition to the organisational units envisaged in these
5 rules, in order to perform tasks from paragraph 2 of these rules, the
6 minister of the interior shall establish PJPs and Special Police Units,
7 operative groups, and other special – posebne units as well."
8 Mr. Pantelic, could you please just briefly comment and then
9 we'll tackle this in more detail by using other documents further down
10 the road.
11 A. It was first stated in the law and then in these rules, the
12 minister has the right to set up PJPs and Special Police Units. The
13 minister had sole power to set up such units, and their task was to carry
14 out certain security related assignments.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P58, while we are still on this.
16 Q. Tab 7 for you, Mr. Pantelic. This is a decision to set up
17 Special Police Units. The first sentence reads:
18 "Pursuant to Article 6 of the rules on the internal organisation
19 of the Ministry of the Interior."
20 Is that the article that we read a minute ago, sir? Is that what
21 the reference is to?
22 A. Yes, that's right.
23 Q. Thank you very much. If you go to page 2, this was signed by
24 minister Zoran Sokolovic, and the date is the 1st of August, 1993
25 you tell us about these Special Police units. When were they set up and
1 what was their purpose, what were they to be used for, and did this apply
2 throughout the Republic of Serbia
3 A. We see this decision to establish Special Police units, adopted
4 by the then-minister Zoran Sokolovic back in 1993. In a way, if you look
5 at Article 6 of the rules and the internal organisation of the ministry,
6 Special Police units were formed or set up. There was a name change
7 somewhere along that road, but nothing about the substance of these units
8 changed. A total of 15 detachments were set up, police detachments,
9 stationed in Belgrade
10 Q. Thank you. Sir, one thing I'm particularly interested in is
11 article 2 of this decision, it reads --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please pause until the text is
13 displayed on the screen so the interpreters can follow. Thank you.
14 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, I'll repeat this.
15 Q. Article 2, paragraph 2. Placing at the ready the assembling and
16 engaging Special Police units for the performance of such tasks as
17 described in article 1, paragraph 1, of this article. This is done
18 pursuant an order of the minister and approval by the minister and the
19 chief of the public security sector.
20 Can you please comment on that briefly?
21 A. Well, what I need to say is that this decision was adopted in
22 1993. From that day on, these units continued to operate, under a
23 different name at one point, but nothing about the substance of their
24 work or nature changed. The one thing that needs pointing out, and I
25 believe that it is clearly demonstrated by paragraph 2, item 2, the
1 assembling and engagement of PJPs for the performance of these tasks is
2 something that is done pursuant to orders by the minister and possibly
3 orders by the chief of the department, providing he was previously
4 authorised by the minister to do that. Things are perfectly clear as far
5 as these units are concerned; they could only ever operate having
6 previously obtained approval from the minister.
7 Q. Thank you. Tell me, were these units established for the
8 territory of the -- for the entire territory of Serbia
9 A. Yes. I think this decision is quite clear. All the secretariats
10 in the territory of the Republic of Serbia
11 Special Police units.
12 Q. Thank you. Were these regular police units, or were they police
13 units that were engaged when necessary? Or if you could provide more
14 details, perhaps you could explain the principle according to which they
15 functioned, how they were organised.
16 A. Let me first answer the first part of your question. They were
17 units that were formed to perform certain tasks or to deal with certain
18 security issues. As I said previously, the minister decided about all
19 these issues and they were engaged on the basis of security issues that
20 prevailed in a given territory. These units were engaged when it was
21 necessary. The question is who -- who engaged those units and where they
22 were engaged from. Part of the answer to the question is in this
23 decision on the formation of Special Police units.
24 These members of the police force were in uniform. It was the
25 active police force that included the regular police or the transport
1 police, traffic police. And sometimes reserve forces were included too.
2 They performed their regular duties and tasks within the secretariat and,
3 when needed, when they were engaged - and we are dealing with ad hoc
4 situations in this case - when needed, they would go to the territory of
5 the secretariat where a certain security issues had arisen. They would
6 be placed under the command of the secretariat staff in question or under
7 the command of the chief of the secretariat, if there was no such staff.
8 And when the security problem had been dealt with, they would then return
9 to their usual positions in their secretariats in their respective
11 Q. Thank you. Let's have a look at item 6 since we are dealing with
12 this decision.
13 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] It's the following page in the
14 English version.
15 Q. It says that:
16 "Ministry employees and members of the Special Police units shall
17 be deployed and perform their duties that they have when they are not
18 engaged as part of the Special Police units, and they have the rights
19 that their position gives them in accordance with the rules."
20 So is that what you saying, that they were performing their
21 regular duties, in fact, when they weren't engaged in Special Police
23 A. Yes, that is what I have been discussing when they would return
24 to the ministry. When a specific problem in another territory had been
25 dealt with, they would then return to the positions, the positions that
1 they held according to the rule book on the organisation of the
2 Ministry of the Interior.
3 Q. Thank you. You are talking about Special Police units in
4 general. A little later on I'll ask you about 1998 and 1999. But since
5 we are dealing with certain general facts, I'm above all interested in
6 whether the Special Police units were used in what sort of circumstances
7 before 1998 and 1999, or during 1998 and 1999, if that was ever the case?
8 A. Special Police units were used a lot earlier, that is certain.
9 I've already said we had a lot of political incidents, public incidents,
10 a lot of demonstrations, public gatherings, expression of discontent on
11 the part of the citizens; and in many such situations, members of the
12 Special Police units would be used.
13 Q. Thank you. To clarify certain matters, within your secretariat
14 did you have any members of the Special Police units; and, if so, how
15 many such members were there within your secretariat? How many members
16 of the Special Police forces, and how were they deployed, how were they
18 A. The secretariat for Internal Affairs in Valjevo gave three
19 companies, provided three companies. At the beginning, there were four,
20 but later, three, for the Special Police units. Workers of the
21 secretariat were members of the 35th Detachment or the 65th Detachment
22 and of the 85th Detachment of the Special Police Units. The headquarters
23 of the detachment that they were sent to, that members of the secretariat
24 in Valjevo were sent to, was in Uzice. I said that Valjevo gave one
25 company for the A version, for the B version, and for the reserve forces.
1 The company had about a hundred men, including three platoons and
2 logistics. When they went to the detachment, they would report to the
3 positions they had been called to; they no longer had duties -- or the
4 secretariat no longer had the duty to monitor them. They were under the
5 command of the detachment commander, or, rather, under the command of the
6 staff that they went to.
7 Q. Thank you. For the sake of the transcript, line 11, page 57,
8 when they returned from certain tasks that they had been assigned to, for
9 example, members of your secretariats, where did they return to?
10 A. They returned to their own secretariats.
11 Q. Thank you. The translation was somewhat different in that line,
12 that's why I put that question to you.
13 When we are talking about general matters with regard to
14 Special Police units -- well, tell me, when you referred to
15 demonstrations, violence on the street in which members of the
16 Special Police units were involved, for example in the territory of
18 would they report to someone? If so, who did they report to, and, as of
19 that point in time, who would be responsible for their acts?
20 A. Once Special Police units had been sent in, regardless of the
21 formation concern, once this had been done, the secretariat no longer had
22 any duties. The SUP
23 worked in. So once they had left the territory of the secretariat of
24 Internal Affairs, they were directly responsible to the commander, or,
25 rather, to the command, to the staff or to the secretariat they had been
1 sent to. They were directly responsible to them for their activities.
2 That was the case if you would send in Special Police units to the
3 secretariat in Novi Sad
4 command of the chief of the secretariat, or, rather, of the staff, if
5 such a staff had been established to deal with the specific problem. I
6 myself, as the chief of the secretariat, had no responsibility over them
7 at the time.
8 Q. Thank you. Mr. Pantelic, we'll return to that issue and go into
9 details later. But first have a look at Exhibit P57. It's under tab 10
10 in your binder.
11 Mr. Pantelic, this is a decision on forming a staff in the
12 ministry for terrorism prevention. It's dated the 16th of June, 1998
13 signed by Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the minister. Above all, my question is:
14 Were you aware of the fact that in June 1998 in the territory of
15 Kosovo and Metohija there was a staff of the ministry for terrorist
16 prevention, the prevention of terrorism, in fact?
17 A. Yes, by all means. I was aware of the existence of this staff.
18 I had to be aware of the location to which I was sending Special Police
20 Q. Thank you. My following question, in fact, had to do with that,
21 when you referred to staffs that had authority that were responsible for
22 Special Police units after they had been sent into the field from the
23 secretariat -- well, could you tell me whether this staff that was formed
24 pursuant to this decision, could you tell me whether this staff had
25 authority over the Special Police units that you sent from your
1 secretariat to the territory of Kosovo
2 A. If one has a careful look at this decision, I think that
3 everything is quite clear. The only body that was responsible for the
4 organisation, for the acts, for the instructions to carry out certain
5 tasks was the staff of the ministry in Pristina.
6 Q. Thank you. We'll discuss the details later on when going through
7 this decision. But, first of all, I have another question. Under item 1
8 we can see that certain individuals are named. It says the chief of the
9 staff Major-General Sreten Lukic. Which party was he a member of?
10 A. He was a member of the public security sector.
11 Q. Thank you. And then it says the deputy leader of the staff
12 David Gajic. Which department, which sector in the
13 Ministry of the Interior was he employed?
14 A. David Gajic, I'm sure he worked in the state security sector. As
15 to the position he held at the time, I couldn't say for sure.
16 Q. Thank you. Then it says the assistant head of the staff of
17 special operations Milorad Lukovic. Which department did he work in?
18 A. I know Mr. Lukovic personally. He was the deputy head of staff
19 for special operations in the state security sector.
20 Q. Thank you. So we see that the members of this staff were members
21 of the state and public security sectors. Who could have established
22 staffs or any other bodies that were composed of members of both
23 departments, and who was in a position to issue orders to them?
24 A. The Ministry of the Interior in organisational terms is composed
25 of two main elements: You have the department or sector for public
1 security, and you have the department or sector for state security. The
2 heads of those departments were directly related to the minister. So
3 only the minister could take decisions with regard to those issues. The
4 head of the public security sector couldn't issue orders of any kind to
5 the head of the state security sector and vice-versa. So these were the
6 two main organisational units that were related under the minister and
7 his orders.
8 Q. Thank you. Have a look at the following page. Under Roman II it
9 says -- it mentions the following: It says that the staff has the duty
10 of planning, organising, and controlling the work of organisational units
11 within the ministry and also to control the work of the attached units
12 for terrorism suppression in the territory of Kosovo
13 item 2, in fact, relate to what you were saying about sending in
14 Special Police units from your secretariat, sending them into
15 Kosovo and Metohija?
16 A. That's correct. The staff has to control the work and engaging
17 of organisational units from the ministry.
18 Q. Just a minute, please. I apologise, do continue.
19 A. The task of the staff is to organise, direct, and plan the work
20 of the Special Police units present in that territory. In addition, this
21 decision means that SUPs from the territory of Kosovo
22 placed under the command of the staff in Pristina. I think that this
23 situation is clear, the main responsible body in the territory of the
24 region of Kosovo and Metohija, at least in security terms, was the staff
25 of the Ministry of the Interior. They are responsible for performing
1 these tasks in the territory of Kosovo
2 Q. Thank you. My last question before we have the break. If you
3 have a look at Roman III
4 and the security situation, that's parts of the staff's tasks, the head
5 of the staff shall be responsible to the minister to whom he shall submit
6 reports on the security events, measures taken, and the results of the
7 measures taken. Could you briefly comment on what I have just read out.
8 A. What is important here --
9 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
11 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, there are two types of comments. I'm
12 not -- intervene before, but if the witness is going to comment on the
13 meaning of it, separate and apart from what is written here, I think he
14 should tell us what the basis of his knowledge is. If he is just going
15 to read the document and tell us what it says, that's all fine; but if he
16 is going to give an assessment, he should tell us the basis of his
18 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic, I have no idea what you're leading
19 to. You do, but the point is that the witness cannot interpret the
20 meaning of what is here. The witness may explain how it operates in his
21 experience. You understand the distinction?
22 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Absolutely. We can then continue
23 with this issue after the break, because I think you said that we had to
24 finish or adjourn a little earlier.
25 JUDGE PARKER: We must have the first break -- second break now,
1 and we adjourn, resuming at 1.00.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 --- Recess taken at 12.22 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Could we
8 have a look at Exhibit P133.
9 Q. Mr. Pantelic, it's under tab 8. Thank you, that's the document.
10 Mr. Pantelic, we can see letter 1268 dated the 28th of July, 1998
11 question is as follows: Who is this letter addressed to, and is it
12 intended for the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia
13 A. This letter was addressed to all secretariats of the interior in
14 the territory of the Republic of Serbia
15 Q. Thank you. Please read out the first paragraph in this document,
16 and in particular the second paragraph and tell me what it is about. And
17 comment on the sentence, Send to the members of the Special Police units
18 to the secretariat. And then do you see your detachment, or, rather, not
19 your detachment but the detachment that members of your secretariat were
21 A. Here it says to whom members of the Special Police units should
22 be sent and to which places. The detachment that was part of my
23 secretariat is the 65th Secretariat, and it's being sent into
24 Kosovska Mitrovica. It's being sent there to assist and has been placed
25 under the command of the staff in Pristina.
1 Q. Thank you. If you have a look further on, please comment and say
2 what it says about how they are to be sent into the territory, and what
3 does it say about the transport and so on and so forth? What sort of a
4 document is this, in fact?
5 A. In this document, certain problems that concern engaging special
6 police units in the territory of the Autonomous Region of Kosovo are
7 being referred to. As I have said, it's a matter for the
8 administration -- the police administration of the MUP. In accordance
9 with the security assessment in Kosovo and in accordance with the
10 instructions issued by the staff in Pristina, they have to order
11 secretariats of Internal Affairs as territorial organisational units to
12 prepare a certain number of men in companies that they are providing in
13 centres where detachments are formed. Here it says what sort of measures
14 have to be taken, what has to be prepared, usually such letters would
15 mention the measures that have to be taken. It would mention what sort
16 of equipment has to be taken, what sort of uniforms are to be worn. It
17 would refer to lunch packets, logistics, per diems that were to be paid,
18 and so on and so forth. So such letters were quite frequently drafted.
19 There would be 30- or 40-day shifts. So every 40 days we would
20 more or less receive a letter of this kind, a document of this kind.
21 Q. I'll just ask you to be very precise and to make a distinction
22 between engaging and sending in. So is this a letter that is dealing
23 with engaging units or sending them in, and could you tell us what the
24 difference is? Who was responsible for engaging such units, and who was
25 responsible for sending them in?
1 A. As I have said, as far as engaging units is concerned, one knows
2 how they would be engaged. It was through a decision from the minister
3 that went through the Ministry of the Interior, and the secretariats, the
4 local secretariats of Internal Affairs would send them in. I think there
5 were 15 detachments, so it depended on how many members of the
6 Special Police units were already in the territory of the
7 Autonomous Region of Kosovo. And on that basis a decision would be taken
8 to send in other units. So I, as the chief of the secretariat, would, in
9 fact, send in units as instructed by the police administration within the
10 Ministry of the Interior.
11 Q. Thank you. As to where a certain unit would be sent to, well, on
12 what basis were such decisions taken?
13 A. Such decisions were taken on the basis of assessments that the
14 staff made in Pristina on the basis of the entire overall security
15 assessment with regard to which territory was under threat of terrorist
16 activity. It was on the basis of all security issues that were raised.
17 The staff would then assess the situation. It would then contact the
18 police administration. And that administration would then contact the
19 staff in return and the secretariat of the interior.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's now have a look at P1184,
23 Q. It's under tab 11 in your binder. Just a brief comment, please.
24 Have a look at this letter dated the 14th of January, 1999. Item 2
25 refers to the 4th Company of the 83rd Detachment of the SUP in Valjevo --
1 of the 85th PJP Detachment in Valjevo. So is it the same case that is
2 concerned, the same men being sent in?
3 A. It's the same sort of letter, for all intents and purposes,
4 certain forces from certain detachments are being engaged. 85th is in
5 question, the detachment that employees from the Valjevo SUP were in. So
6 we also have the variant with reserve forces. An order is being issued
7 to prepare them, to send them in. It says where they should be sent in,
8 which place, and what conditions. It says what should be prepared. So
9 logistics is being prepared. I think this letter is more or less
10 identical to the previous one.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pantelic. Tell me, from the time that members of
12 the Special Police units were engaged and when they were sent in in
13 accordance with the letters from your secretariat, instructions from your
14 secretariat, from that point in time, what was your responsible as chief
15 of the secretariat with regard to those units? I'm talking about the
16 period 1998, 1999 specifically. I'm talking about the period that we
17 referred to and in relation to the documents I have already shown you.
18 A. As soon as Special Police units were dispatched, I no longer had
19 any responsibility vis-à-vis those units anymore. They would be placed
20 under the command of the secretariat or staff to which they were being
21 sent. They were no longer supposed to send back any reports to me.
22 Sometimes, though, I would pick up the phone to ask questions, such as
23 how they were doing, whether they needed any help from me, or anything
24 like that. There was no reporting, though. And they were certainly
25 under no obligation to send back any reports to me.
1 Q. Thank you. I would, nevertheless, like to talk specifically
2 about Kosovo and the situation there in 1998 and 1999. Primarily 1999.
3 When you sent these Special Police units to Kosovo, under whose command
4 were they? And as for reporting, what sort of information was being
5 forwarded to you?
6 A. Special formations of Special Police units such as companies
7 would be dispatched on a periodical basis. They would spend 30 or
8 40 days there and then they would have a break. Nevertheless, the
9 security situation was gradually becoming more and more complex in
10 Kosovo and Metohija. So there were a number of problems that were
11 occurring. And it was sometimes the case that these units would stay in
12 the area nearly all the time. We've seen a number of dispatches
13 following orders by the ministry. They would report to serve under the
14 command of the Pristina staff. They would go to an area covered by a
15 particular secretariat and report for duty there. The dispatch always
16 defined clearly where they were to go and report.
17 Nevertheless, the staff was the supreme body in terms of orders
18 as far as the police in Kosovo and Metohija were concerned. They would
19 normally issue specific orders, where to go, where to report to, what
20 equipment to carry, and all the other logistical aspects of the
22 Q. When they arrived and when they were placed under the command of
23 the staff, as you said, what sort of information, if any, would you
24 receive from them following their arrival?
25 A. In practical terms, I received virtually nothing from them, no
1 information. They were deployed in the area. Only when they were in
2 a position to get in touch with me, would I communicate with senior
3 officers, that is to say company commander, deputy company commander or
4 perhaps detachment commander. The purpose being just to get some
5 general information on their situation, how they were getting along, and
6 whether there was anything I could do for them. The gist is no one was
7 systematically forwarding any kind of information to me, the simple
8 reason being I had no such authority at this time over them.
9 Q. Thank you for that answer. Were you receiving any information
10 about anti-terrorist operations or indeed on the way the unit was being
11 used in some operations throughout Kosovo and Metohija?
12 A. There was no such information. We had the daily bulletin which
13 we would receive on an almost daily basis. Sometime it didn't arrive.
14 The information on terrorist operations was quite terse. There
15 would normally be two or three sentences. This or that happened in such
16 and such an area, leading to the following consequences, and then on like
17 that. And that's where the reporting stopped as far as that was
18 concerned. We had no information at all on any anti-terrorist operations
19 with the exception of some men who were in the area, my own men, whom I
20 would sometimes speak to over the phone just to check how they were
22 Q. You mentioned terrorist operations. You mean terrorist attacks
23 on the security forces; right?
24 A. Yes, that's what I'm talking about. I had the misfortune on
25 the 26th of March, 1999, to see the following happen in a single day:
1 Along the road between Lajkovac and Rezelaj [phoen] or, rather, as I was
2 accessing the village, there was an ambush by the terrorists. Five
3 people were killed and six seriously wounded.
4 Q. Very well.
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please have 65 ter
6 Defence Exhibit 1149. Thank you. This is 4729 for the OTP 65 ter list.
7 Q. You have that at tab 11, sir.
8 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The reference is K003-6325.
9 That's the document, thank you.
10 Q. Mr. Pantelic, it's a dispatch. The number is 2917. The date is
11 the 20th of March, 1999. Could you please go to the portion that relates
12 to the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP
13 yourself, and just briefly comment, please. Is this the sort of
14 information that you would receive at the time in terms of anything that
15 had to do with the Special Police units that were dispatched to
16 Kosovo and Metohija?
17 A. As for members of the Special Police units that were sent to
18 Kosovo to perform security related tasks, I would receive official
19 information via a dispatch, unless we were dealing with a serious injury
20 or with a death among our ranks. This is a typical dispatch, it tells
21 you exactly what happened, it specifies the area and the time.
22 Following the terrorist attack and an attempt to track down and
23 arrest the perpetrators, two police officers, members of the secretariat
24 of the interior in Valjevo injured themselves. It was a case of
25 self-inflicted injury.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.
2 May this be received, please.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As D00782, Your Honour. Thank you.
5 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] D007-0078. Thank you.
6 Q. Mr. Pantelic, you'll find that at tab 12.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please immediately go to
8 page 2 of this document. Chronologically speaking, it predates page 1.
9 It's just the way the document was loaded.
10 Q. We see the dispatch date of the 27th of March, 1999, from
11 Kosovska Mitrovica. It is addressed to you. And if you could please
12 read this for yourself. The next page of that document, please. This is
13 the dispatch that I'm talking about. If you could please briefly comment
14 in relation to the members of your SUP
16 A. The Kosovska Mitrovica SUP or the crime police department in
17 Mitrovica is here addressing the secretariat of the interior in Valjevo.
18 There is an Official Note here drafted by members of the Mitrovica
19 secretariat who were working with an investigating magistrate. They were
20 at the crime scene. They established the situation as they found it and
21 proceeded to describe it in their Official Note and this dispatch.
22 As I said, they would only keep us informed of situations such as
23 these and any related activities that they were undertaking. That also
24 being the reason I received this particular dispatch at the time. That
25 notwithstanding, I had been informed about this. I had received a phone
1 call several hours earlier on. I had to do something about contacting
2 the families of those wounded and kill. First, information would be
3 forwarded by telephone and then later this would be followed by a
4 dispatch from the relevant secretariat in Kosovo and Metohija or the
5 Pristina staff.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please look at page 1 of
8 this document.
9 Q. Mr. Pantelic, it's an Official Note produced by the
10 Kosovska Mitrovica SUP
11 the same as we have discussed; right?
12 A. Yes, as I said a while ago, the crime police department put
13 together this Official Note on the spot. They were going to use this as
14 a stepping stone to further investigate this atrocious crime.
15 Q. Thank you very much.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may this be received,
17 please. One thing I'd like to point out is that the document contains
18 more pages than I have shown the witness, since it also talks about some
19 items that were found on the SUP
20 the men from the Valjevo SUP
21 these documents, since I do not consider them to be documents of
22 particular relevance to this trial. Nevertheless, I would like to have
23 the document exhibited. Thank you.
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: It will be received as D00783. Thank you,
1 Your Honours.
2 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Pantelic, another question about members of the PJP which
4 were dispatched from your secretariat to Kosovo and Metohija. Did you
5 ever tour the units there in 1999? If so, how many times?
6 A. Throughout 1998 and 1999, I regularly visited my units there,
7 except for the period of the aggression and air-strikes by NATO. During
8 that time I didn’t go down there because Valjevo had been targeted on a
9 number of occasions, a total of 21 times. Therefore, because of the
10 precarious security situation, I was unable at that time to visit them in
11 the area. I believe the last time I visited was sometime early in 1999.
12 In 1998, I think I paid them at least three visits in Kosovo and Metohija.
13 Q. Thank you. What was the purpose or objective of those visits?
14 What did you talk to them about?
15 A. Many things were discussed, but the priority was as follows: We
16 knew about their tasks; we knew about their patrol duties; we knew about
17 the check-points and the work they performed there; we knew about what it
18 meant to keep the area under control. Mostly, we discussed billeting
19 conditions, their health, their mental health, just to make sure that
20 there were no men having problems with that. Was the command happy, were
21 the police officers happy. So that was the gist of most of our
22 conversations there.
23 Q. Thank you very much.
24 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P708. Thank you.
25 Q. You have that at tab 13, sir. Mr. Pantelic, the next set of
1 documents that I'm about to show you comprises dispatches from the public
2 security sector. In order to speed ourselves along through this, let's
3 start with the first one. What sort of a dispatch is this? Does that
4 apply to Serbia
5 on the substance.
6 A. This was a dispatch that came to the secretariat, and the area it
7 covered, three or four times a year. You can tell that a dispatch like
8 this was sent to all the secretariats across the Republic of Serbia
9 a way, this was a perfectly ordinary occurrence for us. This dispatch
10 tells us something in relation to state holidays and religious holidays,
11 saying we should step up our security measures in order to reduce any
12 security problems or risks in our areas to a minimum. In practical
13 terms, it tells us that we should step up our patrols and regular routine
14 policing. It also says that other types of operative steps should be
16 It says we should try to ID more people and take other steps to
17 prevent any negative things from happening, such as criminal offences.
18 It also tells us to step up security measures in all areas of our work.
19 Q. Thank you very much. Is this something that is perfectly usual
20 in the work of a sector such as yours?
21 A. Yes. This is perfectly ordinary. And normally this would happen
22 three or four times a year. I didn't even need to read dispatches such
23 as this one since I knew by heart what they said already. The only thing
24 that we would look into was whether there would be an active-duty or a
25 passive-duty. Apart from that, these dispatches were always identical.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have
2 Exhibit D234.
3 Q. That is tab 14, sir. The 18th of June, 1998. Another dispatch.
4 Again did this apply throughout the Republic of Serbia
5 question, Does it have to do with the routine tasks of the public
6 security sector with the exception that here they are talking about
7 diplomatic and consular representatives?
8 A. This is a dispatch by the minister of the interior on a unified
9 course of action to be taken vis-à-vis diplomatic staff and consular
10 staff as well as members of international organisations and international
11 humanitarian organisations. In this dispatch, the minister orders that
12 all be treated in the same way and that vehicles be stopped. He says we
13 should explain to these members of international organisations where
14 exactly they are on their way to and what they could expect along the
16 Q. Thank you very much. Is this not a general overview of the sort
17 of business and the sort of tasks performed by the public security
19 A. Yes, this unified course of action is here being ordered to keep
20 any discrepancies from arising between the various municipality and to
21 make it possible for people to move about Kosovo and to reach their
23 Q. Thank you. You said this dispatch was by the minister of the
24 interior. Was it customary for the minister of the interior to send out
25 dispatches that had to do with the work of the public security sector?
1 A. If you ask me, this one should have been dispatched by the
2 department for foreigners in the border affairs section. This would have
3 been within their purview and not the minister's. Nevertheless, probably
4 because of the sheer importance of the matter, it ended up being the
5 minister who actually signed this.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] P1202, please.
7 Q. Tab 15, sir. Again, a brief comment if you can, sir, please,
8 about this dispatch. Does it apply to the Republic of Serbia
9 entirety? Is there anything about the tasks performed by the public
10 security sector? And briefly, quite generally, what it says.
11 A. Much the same as the previous one, this dispatch was addressed to
12 all secretariat chiefs across the Republic of Serbia
13 stepping up overall activities in every field, and it concerned the
14 danger of the explosives being planted in important facilities - for the
15 country's economy - along major roads, in buildings, housing estates,
16 institutions, and such-like, the message being to step up our overall
17 activities in a bid to keep the overall security situation under control.
18 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. P1203 is our next
20 Q. Tab 16, sir. Dispatch 1827. The date is the
21 7th of October, 1998. The preamble or paragraph 1 states that there is
22 pressure being exerted on sovereignty and territorial integrity. That's
23 what it says. Was this dispatch addressed to all, and is it not about
24 measures to be taken by the operatives of the public security sector,
25 particularly bearing in mind this introduction?
1 A. Much the same as the previous one, this one was addressed to all
2 the secretariats across the country. Again, they are being told to step
3 up certain types of activity, virtually all of their activities, in order
4 to tackle such problems as are mentioned in the body of the dispatch
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Exhibit D433.
8 Q. Tab 17 for you, sir. It's a dispatch of the public security
9 sector 451/98. The date being the 8th of October. It's about special
10 provisions about measures to be taken in case of an armed attack.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see the following
12 page, particularly the last paragraph on the following page.
13 Q. Can you briefly read for yourself and tell us what it's about,
14 what the point is of this entire dispatch. Again, did it apply to the
15 territory of Serbia
16 security sector?
17 A. The same thing applies as to the previous dispatch. It concerns
18 all of the secretariats throughout Serbia. It was produced in
19 October 1998. There were huge problems in the market in terms of food
20 supplies and oil derivatives. This became a hotbed of speculation
21 because the market being what it was lent itself easily to practices such
22 as that. The government was convened to pass and adopt a special package
23 of measures. The decree was forwarded to us by the chief of the public
24 security sector for our information and so that we were duly informed and
25 able to take measures about it.
1 If you look at paragraph 6, this is only an operationalisation of
2 potentially devious behaviour. This is about concealing certain goods,
3 selling certain goods, raising prices, and so on and so forth.
4 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Pantelic. I have one more question
5 before we conclude for the day. Dwelling on this document, this dispatch
6 and the previous ones that I've been showing you. Is this regular
7 business or routine business for the public security sector?
8 A. In what sense? Would you care to clarify a little.
9 Q. Is this routine daily business for the public security sector,
10 steps that are normally taken to improve overall security in the country?
11 A. In this specific dispatch, it specifies that these are special
12 measures. That is to say that the decree says that these are special
13 measures. These measures were being implemented on a permanent basis
14 by the internal affairs organs. Nevertheless, this one instructs that
15 particular attention be paid to these phenomena and events. One had to
16 bear in mind the overall economic and political situation in the country,
17 and this was a potential hotbed for deviant forms of behaviour.
18 Q. Preventing speculative behaviour such as this, was this in itself
19 something that the public security sector normally did?
20 A. Yes, that was my understanding of my previous answer, and I'm
21 telling you that was certainly the case.
22 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Your Honours,
23 I believe it is time for us to draw to a close.
24 JUDGE PARKER: We must adjourn now, and we resume on Monday, I
25 believe in the morning, at 9.00.
1 [The witness stands down]
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Monday, the 1st day
4 of March, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.