1 Monday, 26 April 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon. While we are waiting for the
6 witness to come in, the Chamber would mention that on the 25th of March
7 the Defence applied for the amendment of two documents admitted as
8 Defence Exhibits D636 and D703 which had been uploaded incorrectly in
9 e-court. Now leave to amend the exhibits is granted. Exhibit D636 shall
10 be identified as document D011-1858 for the B/C/S version and D010-4417
11 for the English translation. Page 3 of the English translation of
12 Exhibit D703 shall be removed from the e-court as it was erroneously
14 [The witness entered court]
15 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, sir.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please read the affirmation which is
18 shown to you. Read it aloud. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
20 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. Please sit down.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic.
24 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
25 WITNESS: MILAN
1 [Witness answered through interpreter]
2 Examination by Mr. Popovic:
3 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Cankovic.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 Q. Mr. Cankovic, before we begin your testimony today, I'm going to
6 ask you, first of all, to pause a little bit after you hear the question
7 since we are both speaking the same language. So make a pause and then
8 begin your answer because in that way we will make it possible for the
9 interpreters to do their job properly.
10 A. I understand.
11 Q. Sir, can you please tell us your first and last name?
12 A. I am Milan
13 Q. When were you born and where?
14 A. I was born on the 8th of March, 1948, in the Republic of Croatia
15 in Zagreb
16 Q. Were you a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and if
17 yes, from what date?
18 A. I was a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1976
19 until the 31st of December, 2002.
20 Q. And on the 31st of December, 2002, did you retire?
21 A. I retired on the 1st of January, 2003.
22 Q. Thank you. Can you briefly explain to us what your duties were
23 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs during your period of work there?
24 A. Yes. In 1976 and then until 1978, I was working on the
25 exploitation of the communication system in the MUP. From 1978 until
1 1981 I worked as a course leader and lecturer at the high school for
2 Internal Affairs education, and I dealt with communications courses from
3 1981 until 1993 or 1994, I don't know exactly. I worked on monitoring
4 measuring systems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All of this was in
5 the communications administration.
6 From 1994, I think, I was transferred to the police
7 administration where I worked on procurement of communications equipment,
8 and vehicles. Also different parts for vehicles. I worked on these
9 assignments in the police administration until 2001 when the gendarmerie
10 was formed, and this is where I was the chief of the communications
11 department. I stayed there until I retired, until the 31st of December,
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. I'm just going to put one question to
14 you for the purposes of the transcript, since in a few places in the
15 transcript it said you worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Were
16 you working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of
17 Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Serbia
18 A. All of the posts I held were in the Ministry of Internal Affairs
19 of the Republic of Serbia
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. You told us briefly which jobs you
22 worked on, so to summarise, I would put this question to you: All of the
23 duties you performed during your professional career, did they all have
24 to do with communications?
25 A. Yes, all the duties in the Ministry of Internal Affairs that I
1 had had to do exclusively with communications.
2 Q. Can you please tell us something about your education?
3 A. I'm an electrical engineer. Engineer of telecommunications by
5 Q. Thank you. Mr. Cankovic, I'm going to ask you to specify for us
6 exactly which duties you carried out in the Ministry of Internal Affairs
7 in 1998 and 1999 until the time that the NATO bombing ended.
8 A. In 1998 and 1999 I was a member of the staff in Kosovo and
9 Metohija which had its seat in Pristina.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I would now like to see Exhibit
12 P760 on our monitors, please.
13 Q. And while we are waiting for the document to be shown,
14 Mr. Cankovic, can you please tell us when in 1998 did you become a member
15 of the staff, and exactly which staff was this?
16 A. I was appointed a member of the staff on the 11th of June, 1998
17 Q. Thank you. Now, I'm going to ask you to look at the document
18 that we can see on the screen. This is a decision on the composition of
19 the staff leaders and members of the staff of the Ministry of the
20 Interior for the Autonomous Province
21 going to ask to look at page 2 of this document right away. On page 2 at
22 the bottom of the document you can see the following: In Belgrade, 11th
23 of June, 1998, this was signed by assistant minister, head of the
24 department, Vlastimir Djordjevic. I'm also going to ask you to look at
25 the top of the page.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll the document up a
2 little bit, please.
3 Q. Can you please read in paragraph 9, what it says in paragraph 9.
4 A. Number 9 it says:
5 "Captain Milan Cankovic providing communications, equipment,
6 vehicles and other equipment in the police administration of the ministry
7 as the assistant staff leader for radio communications."
8 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether this is you?
9 A. Yes, this is me.
10 Q. And did you become a member of the staff on the basis of this
12 A. I became a member of the staff on the basis of this decision, but
13 for a very brief period of time.
14 Q. Thank you. We are going to speak about this in a minute. First,
15 I would like to ask you to answer some questions in relation to this
16 decision. First of all, let us go back to page 1 of the document. Can
17 you read the title of this decision.
18 A. "Decision on the composition of the staff leaders and members of
19 the staff of the Ministry of the Interior for the autonomous province of
20 Kosovo and Metohija."
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. Can you please tell me to whom was this
22 staff responsible for its work?
23 A. The staff was responsible for its work directly to the chief of
24 the department, to Lieutenant-General Vlastimir Djordjevic.
25 Q. Thank you. Can we again look at page 2 of this document, please.
1 Mr. Cankovic, if you look at the Roman numeral II, that paragraph, can
2 you tell us who were the members of the expanded staff?
3 A. The members of the expanded staff were the heads of secretariats
4 of the interior in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and
6 Q. Thank you. If you look at these 14 persons that are mentioned in
7 the decision, can you please tell me which departments they are from, all
8 of these members of the Ministry of the Interior? If necessary, we can
9 go back to page 1, if you need to look at that.
10 A. No, not needed. I am aware of the first page. All of the
11 members were from the public security department.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. Earlier you said that on the basis of
13 this decision, your term of duty was very brief. Can you please explain
14 what you actually meant by that?
15 A. What I wanted to say was that already on the 16th of June, 1998
16 I received a new decision in which the minister of Internal Affairs of
17 the Republic of Serbia
18 staff that was headquartered in Pristina.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we look at Exhibit P57.
21 Q. Before we look at that Exhibit, Mr. Cankovic, did you receive
22 this decision personally that was issued by Mr. Djordjevic on the 11th of
23 June, 1998?
24 A. I did personally receive both decisions. The decisions assigning
25 me by the chief of the department, and also I personally received the
1 minister's decision. I received this decision by the minister in
2 Pristina though.
3 Q. Thank you. You can see on the screen in front of you something
4 that I'm going to ask you to read, and that is the title of the decision
5 of the 16th of June, 1998.
6 A. Decision on the establishment of the ministerial staff for the
7 suppression of terrorism.
8 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to ask to see the last page of the
9 decision. This is page 3 in both B/C/S and English. Mr. Cankovic, can
10 you please tell us who signed this decision? Who issued the decision?
11 A. The decision was signed personally by Minister Stojiljkovic.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 1 now,
15 Q. And I'm going to ask you to look at the persons referred to as
16 the head, deputy head, and the members of this staff in the document.
17 And when you look at the contents of page 1, please, let us know so we
18 can continue to look at the names that are contained on page 2.
19 A. The head of the staff was Major-General Sreten Lukic.
20 Q. Thank you. You don't need to read it, it's written down here.
21 You can read it to yourself then I will put the question to you after
23 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please look at page 2 of
24 the same document.
25 Q. When you look at these names, the names of the members of the
1 staff, do you know in which MUP department these persons worked?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And can you please tell us?
4 A. If we start from the Chief of Staff, he is from the public
5 security department. His deputy was from the state security department.
6 The commander of the special unit was from public security. The
7 commander of the unit for special operations was from state security.
8 Q. Thank you. We don't need to continue. My question is whether
9 staff members -- the staff members were from both departments of
11 A. Yes, that is correct. They were from both security departments.
12 Q. All right. After the last named member, Dobrasin Krdzic, the
13 paragraph below that refers to members of the extended staff. Can you
14 please tell us who the members of this staff were?
15 A. The members of the expanded staff were the chief of secretariats
16 for Internal Affairs centres and branches of the department of state
17 security in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. Can you please tell us if the chief of
20 the public security department could issue instructions or orders to
21 members of the state security department?
22 A. No, he couldn't do that in any event.
23 Q. Please tell me who could issue instructions and orders to members
24 of both departments.
25 A. This could be done only by the head of both departments, and that
1 was only the minister of the Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. Can you look at the same decision and
3 the same page. Can you look at the paragraph marked with Roman II. When
4 you look at that, just read it to yourself, and you can give us a brief
5 comment on whether what is written there was actually put into practice.
6 A. Yes, it was.
7 Q. In brief, what was the role of the staff for the suppression of
8 terrorism in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?
9 A. To organise and control the work in that domain.
10 Q. Did this entail all units of the Ministry of the Interior in the
11 territory of Kosovo
12 A. We could see from the document itself that it applied to all the
13 units of the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, those participating in
14 anti-terrorist operations as well as the regular force belonging to the
15 respective secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija.
16 Q. When you refer to the units participating in anti-terrorist
17 operations, what units do you have in mind?
18 A. The units which participated in anti-terrorist operations were
19 the PJP Units, the SAJ
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please scroll up in the
22 Serbian, which is page 2 in the English.
23 Q. Mr. Cankovic, I would kindly ask you to look at the Roman numeral
25 staff answerable to, that is to say, the person in charge of the staff
1 had to report to whom?
2 A. We can see from paragraph 3 that the staff was answerable
3 directly to the minister.
4 Q. Thank you. Can we see here who they were obliged to report to?
5 A. The staff had to report to the minister of the interior of the
6 Republic of Serbia
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. One other thing, before we move on to
8 the next page of the document, let's do that first. The next page is
9 actually the last page in both versions. We could see what is stated in
10 the decision. Did it work in practice?
11 A. Yes, it did.
12 Q. Thank you. Let's look at paragraph 6 which is the last paragraph
13 of the document. In the first sentence it is stated:
14 "With the coming into force of this decision, the following shall
15 cease to be valid:"
16 And we have a number of decisions listed. Do we also see the
17 decision of the 11th of June, 1998?
18 A. Yes, it's here. As well as the decision of -- yes, that's what
19 the decision actually ends with, with that particular decision.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Cankovic. Between the 16th of June, 1998
21 date when the staff was established by the minister, all the way until
22 the units withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija, was there any other minister
23 of the interior staff in the territory of Kosovo
24 A. No, there was no other staff.
25 Q. Thank you. Who was your immediate superior in 1998 and 1999, and
1 I mean between June 1998 and June 1999 in particular?
2 A. My immediate superior during that period, because I was a chief
3 in his staff, was the head of the staff General Sreten Lukic.
4 Q. When you say that you were a chief in his staff, what were you
5 the chief of?
6 A. As we can see from the decision, I was the chief of
8 Q. During 1998 and 1999, did you receive all orders solely from the
9 head of the staff for the suppression of terrorism in the territory of
10 Kosovo and Metohija? I have the same period in mind.
11 A. Yes, exclusively from him.
12 Q. I'd like to put a number of general questions about the
13 functioning of the staff whose member you were. First of all, where was
14 the seat of the staff?
15 A. The seat of the staff was in Pristina. To be precise, for awhile
16 we were in the secretariat building in Pristina which was before the air
17 campaign, and after that we changed locations, although the staff was
18 always in Pristina.
19 Q. How frequently were the staff meetings held?
20 A. Meetings of the staff were in a way held daily when circumstances
21 allowed, but when there were anti-terrorist operations underway, such
22 meetings were not held while they lasted.
23 Q. What was the situation like during the bombing?
24 A. During the bombing, the situation was completely different
25 because there were interruptions in communications, lines, and our
1 inability to use any communications means. We had to rely on slow
2 courier connections, and we couldn't exchange information in a fast and
3 efficient way. Hence, meetings were held seldom. However, certain
4 chiefs of secretariats and other staff came to the staff whenever an
5 opportunity arose.
6 Q. Who attended the staff meetings?
7 A. The staff meetings were always attended by the head of the staff,
8 his deputy, and assistants along their professional lines, as well as
9 chiefs within their respective domains. That was for the most part the
10 composition of such staff meetings in Pristina.
11 Q. In the decisions we could see that mention was made of an
12 expanded staff. What did that entail?
13 A. The extended staff had weekly meetings. There were members of
14 the staff present headed by the head and his deputy, as well as
15 secretariat chiefs from the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.
16 Next, there were unit commanders and PJP Units, as well as the SAJ
17 commanders and the JSO commanders.
18 Q. Did the situation change once the air campaign began as opposed
19 to what it was in 1998?
20 A. Of course the situation was no longer the same. There were less
21 members in attendance. For example, there were some secretariat chiefs
22 who only managed to reach the staff and its head once or twice.
23 Q. Thank you. Were there any working hours of the staff? And if
24 so, what was it?
25 A. There were regular working hours in normal conditions. The staff
1 worked between 8.00 a.m.
2 then it would work again between 7.00 and 9.00 p.m., and between 9.00
4 officer was either the deputy head of the staff or one of the chiefs. Of
5 course, these working hours did not apply in the course of operations
6 because then the staff worked round the clock for as long as such
7 operations lasted.
8 Q. Who headed those meetings?
9 A. If I understood you properly, all meetings were held by the chief
10 of the staff and his deputy.
11 Q. Can you tell the names?
12 A. Sreten Lukic and his deputy, Mr. Gajic, who was there on behalf
13 of the state security department of sector. In Mr. Gajic's absence, Mr.
14 Vilicic. Was usually there. But I think it was already 1999 that that
16 Q. How long did such meetings usually last?
17 A. For the most part we tried to keep them as short as possible
18 because of other obligations that the staff members had. If the expanded
19 staff sat, that included unit commanders who also had their respective
20 duties. On average it would be between one and two hours. When we had
21 sessions of the expanded staff it would usually take longer because
22 secretariat chiefs usually submitted oral reports on the situation in the
23 field, and in such situations, meetings took longer.
24 Q. Did you attend all of the meetings of the staff for the
25 suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija?
1 A. Due to the amount of work I had, I seldom attended such meetings,
2 but I was always kept informed of all the tasks issued to me. I would
3 receive them from other members of the staff who took notes of what was
4 important for me. These were usually Mr. Adamovic or Mr. Mijatovic.
5 This is how we co-operated.
6 Q. Thank you. What were your specific tasks in the staff?
7 A. My task first and foremost was to secure communication between
8 the staff and field units. When I say communication, I mean radio
9 communication. This also included phone lines, but there wasn't that
10 much work to be done there because the secretariat in Pristina had their
11 own communications department, and following my instructions they
12 assigned telephone lines.
13 As for radio communication, I took direct part in that part of
14 the work, and it was mostly led by me. My task was to enable
15 co-operation between the staff and the communications administration, as
16 well as to set up radio channels for operations, to draft call lists and
17 reprogramme radio sets, and a number of other things. But most of my
18 time was spent doing the things I just mentioned.
19 Q. Thank you. We'll deal with each of the tasks you mentioned, but
20 before that, tell me whether you submitted reports to anyone concerning
21 your work?
22 A. If you have in mind oral reports, I did, daily, after each and
23 every task. If you have in mind any written reports, then I did not.
24 Q. Thank you. Who did you report to orally?
25 A. To the chief of the staff. To the head of the staff.
1 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the reprogramming of radio sets, what
2 do you have in mind? What type of task was that?
3 A. When PJP Units were engaged, which had come into Kosovo and
4 Metohija, they had to bring along their regular radio sets which they
5 otherwise used in their respective secretariats. Those radio sets were
6 not programmed so as to be compatible with the system we used in the
7 territory of Kosovo
8 them to have our standard channels preset as well as operational channels
9 used exclusively by the staff and to preset a command channel in addition
10 to the regular and operational channels as well as to introduce the
11 so-called simplex type of communication.
12 Q. All right. Very well. And you also mentioned setting up an
13 operations radio channel, and now in your answer again you refer to the
14 command channel or the channel for operations. Can you please explain
15 what these channels are and how did you set them up?
16 A. In Kosovo and Metohija there was a radio network, regular radio
17 network. The radio network worked on that principle for actions. So
18 when we are talking about one type of network, we can talk about the
19 other type. One was a regular network and the other one was an action
20 network. The first one was permanent and the other one was on an
21 as-needed basis. Each detachment had its own channel when going off on
22 an anti-terrorist action. It was a unique channel that everybody had,
23 and that also included the head of the staff, the Chief of Staff. There
24 were also channels of the semi-duplex type which could function in micro
1 So this was the basis on which it functioned. These repeaters
2 and channels of the units that were operational would be used as needed,
3 and they were on repeaters or relays where you also had the equipment for
4 regular channels. They went through the same channels. These were just
5 regular facilities. For example, above Prizren we had a station at Sara
6 then near Djakovica. We had the repeater station at Cabrat. If we are
7 talking about Pec, we had such a facility at Mokra Gora. The one for
8 Pristina was at Butovacki Breg. The one that covered Giljane was at
9 Zeleni Vrh. Urosevac was covered by Bukova Glava, and there was a joint
10 channel on Bukova Glava for all the secretariats that converged towards
11 Pristina, towards the staff.
12 Q. I'm just asking you for a clarification. When you are setting up
13 an operations communications network, who can participate in this network
14 and in what manner?
15 A. The radio communications during anti-terrorist operation or
16 actions for specific areas would have specific facilities. For example,
17 if it was Kosovo, the repeater station at Mokra Gora would be active --
18 I'm sorry, did I say the Kosovo area or the Metohija area? Let's say
19 Metohija, that area would use the repeater station at Mokra Gora and the
20 one at Vukovar Glava, the one at Cabrat above Djakovica.
21 Now, since there were many mountainous rugged areas and it wasn't
22 possible for some parts of units to be able to communicate all the time
23 and on the basis of the type of terrain that the action would be carried
24 out on, I had confirmation repeater station. I would decide on lower
25 elevations where I would set up such repeater stations in order to
1 reinforce the communication system. We had these semi-duplex type of
2 communications that proceeded via repeater stations. Of course units
3 could communicate amongst themselves at some micro locations using the
4 simplex type of communications, but this is something that has a shorter
6 Q. We will come back to this in more detail. Just a small
7 digression, how did all of this function after the NATO bombing began?
8 A. After the bombing began and the radio relay facilities in Kosovo
9 and Metohija were destroyed, it actually didn't function. The systems
10 were destroyed. There was no power supply, and it was not possible to
11 maintain these communications, and they were downed. There was only
12 communication via radio that could be supported through mobile repeater
13 stations, and they covered a much smaller area than the earlier repeater
14 stations would be able to cover when they were in working order.
15 Q. Thank you. I would now like to go back to the very beginning
16 when we are talking about actions, and then we will come to this
17 particular thing. So then I would ask you to provide a more specific
18 example illustrating how all of this functioned. First of all, can you
19 please tell us how you received assignments in the staff relating to
20 anti-terrorist actions that would be conducted in the area of Kosovo and
22 A. Once actions were planned, once these plans were completed, and
23 once the section where a certain action would take place would be
24 established, I would then receive maps from Mr. Adamovic or
25 Mr. Mijatovic, excerpts of maps, topographical maps where the axis of
1 movement of specific units would be marked. On the basis of that, I
2 would figure out the area where -- the area that needed to be covered by
3 a radio network.
4 Q. You said at the beginning of your answer once the plans were
5 complete. Are you aware who planned these actions? Do you know?
6 A. The actions were planned by the chief, the deputy chief, the
7 operations chief of the staff, including Mr. Mijatovic and Mr. Adamovic.
8 And as needed, very often some others would be invited to participate.
9 Some commanders, for example, or commanders of the PJP or the SAJ Units
10 or the JSO Units depending on the terrain where they were for possible
11 suggestions that they could make, but they didn't participate in the
12 planning all the time.
13 Q. Thank you. And did you take part in these planning actions?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Can you please tell me if you know if there was any co-ordination
16 between the Army of Yugoslavia and the MUP staff in these planning
18 A. As far as I know, yes, there was, because Adamovic or Mijatovic
19 were mostly communicating with the corps in Pristina where the Army of
21 Q. As far as communications are concerned, I'm, first of all,
22 thinking of the relationship between the army and the police and the
23 communications that the MUP had and that the army had. What was the
24 relationship between these two networks? Were they compatible?
25 A. No, I'm really not familiar with the system of communications
1 that they had, they were carrying them with them. But I really didn't
2 know what sort of equipment they were. We had our radio stations that
3 the commanders in the field carried. The co-operation mostly boiled down
4 to perhaps some superior officer of the army being together with the
5 police unit or vice-versa.
6 Q. And can you please tell me if there was a possibility for the
7 Army of Yugoslavia
8 police to use frequencies used by the army, and for these communications
9 to intersect or to be used together?
10 A. No, this wasn't possible and never was possible. Generally,
11 according to the frequency division plan, this is not permitted.
12 According to the general plan, the army had its own range of frequencies,
13 and the army and the police had their own, the railway system had its
14 own, the PTT services had their own range of frequencies, so you could
15 never combine these two.
16 Q. And now that we are talking about equipment, did the police use
17 similar equipment in its communication system as the army in its
18 communication system?
19 A. The army was always big and inert in comparison to us, and this
20 probably applies to every army, I'm not going to go into that. So their
21 system of communications was based on the radio relay system. It was a
22 completely different communication signal system from ours. They
23 probably had more of that kind of communications in their vehicles, in
24 their transporters, but I really don't know how their system functioned.
25 Q. Thank you. You told us more or less how the actions were
1 planned, but can you tell us how the preparations for these actions were
2 carried out?
3 A. Well, preparation for action is more of a different activity than
4 this one because in preparation for the action, people would assemble in
5 the staff who were in charge of the action. This would be the Chief of
6 Staff, deputy Chief of Staff, then you would get the commander of the
7 Special Police detachments, the commander of the special anti-terrorist
8 unit, the commander of the unit for special operations, the chiefs of the
9 secretariats. Especially those from the secretariat would participate in
10 the area where the action would be carried out. This would be the
11 broader composition, and then the planning and the assignment of tasks
12 would take some more time. The participants in the actions would also
13 address these meetings. This is how I understood it to be done.
14 Q. And did you attend these preparatory meetings often?
15 A. When they were making their plans and agreements, I was already
16 out in the field. I was already making preparations. Before they would
17 get together, I already would have received my working assignments, which
18 I extracted from the map, which they used later, and then together with
19 my group of technicians and communications people, we would go and carry
20 out our assignments. Excuse me, yeah, because this is what we had to do.
21 We had to be prepared at a specific time. For example, if the action
22 would begin at 5.00 a.m.
23 a.m. Everything had to be ready before.
24 Q. Thank you. And what was the situation when the NATO bombing
25 began? Did things work in exactly the same way as you have just
1 described, or can you please specify when preparations were carried out
2 in this way that you just described?
3 A. No, this couldn't be. It couldn't be done any more because
4 members of the narrow inner staff and the expanded staff couldn't
5 actually get together.
6 Q. When you say they couldn't meet and that things were different,
7 which period are you talking about?
8 A. I'm talking about the period of the bombing.
9 Q. And how were tasks assigned, or how were units informed about
10 their tasks at the time, how were preparations carried out?
11 A. Well, at that time we tried to do something by using mobile radio
12 communication systems, but later this became very dangerous, especially
13 with the destruction of the repeater stations. Any sources of radiation
14 became dangerous. So we did it with a lot of fear, and then once -- if
15 we had to do it, then we would do it anyway but then we would try to stay
16 as far away from these facilities as possible. Mostly the communications
17 were done by courier. That was how it was done in that period. For
18 example, the messenger for Prizren would have to go and come back
19 conveying his message two or three times a day because the message would
20 be urgent. So this is how our communications were then proceeding in
21 this way.
22 Q. Thank you. When you say command channel, what do you mean by
23 that, what does that mean?
24 A. The command channel was used by commanders of detachments or
25 units in the field, I'm talking about police units now. They were
1 connected directly to the Chief of Staff. Only commanders of those units
2 in the field could use that channel, and the staff chief. Each unit, as
3 I said, also had their own repeater stations and then if they were in
4 some broader area of a company or so, then they had their own internal
5 repeater station, just like the secretariats each had their own internal
6 repeater stations.
7 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us which units took part or were
8 participants in this command channel?
9 A. Just like I said in the beginning, these were units that were
10 carrying out actions. These were the PJP, SAJ, and JSO Units.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell me after the anti-terrorist
12 action would be completed, was this command channel -- or did this
13 command channel or these communications set up specially for that
14 particular action cease to operate?
15 A. This action radio network would stop functioning as soon as the
16 units returned to their starting positions.
17 Q. Thank you. And can you please tell me, this action radio
18 network, was it set up for each individual anti-terrorist action that was
19 carried out in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?
20 A. Yes, it was, for each one. If we are talking about
21 anti-terrorist actions which were larger, which encompassed larger
22 swathes of territory and if they included several units. However, the
23 same thing applied in actions with just one company or one detachment.
24 Actually, they would then mostly use the simplex type of communication.
25 They would communicate amongst each other because this would be in a
1 village or a smaller town. And they would have a working channel,
2 regular working channel connecting them to the staff, so in case of any
3 kind of emergency or anything, they could use this regular channel. And
4 ultimately it was their duty to call in in case of any kind of
5 intervention or if they had a call from the Chief of Staff or deputy
6 Chief of Staff.
7 And I can mention that in the situation when regular radio
8 communications were used, where all secretariats could listen in, then
9 scrambled communications, scrambling would be used for precaution sake
10 and only short messages would be relayed.
11 Q. Thank you. Tell me, did you partake directly in the actions for
12 which you were charged to set in place a radio communications system on
13 the action channel?
14 A. Well, I left nothing to chance. When a repeater system which
15 used relay station could be employed, and this was the case where
16 operations took place in a flat area and where radio stations could be
17 normally used, I would be on standby to make sure that units did not use
18 channels they were not designated to use. However, where an operation
19 involved a larger swath of territory and where an operation was of a
20 larger scale, which involved rugged terrain, and made it possible for
21 units to find themselves in areas where radio communications would not
22 operate because of the various obstacles, I would put in place the
23 so-called mobile repeaters. Since it was otherwise impossible for me to
24 set up stations of this sort, I had to follow the unit and set up
25 repeaters for micro locations. I don't know on how many occasions this
1 must have been, but at least six or seven, eight times I was in such a
3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Cankovic, do you know up until what time in 1998
4 were anti-terrorist operations conducted in the territory of Kosovo
5 Metohija, or rather, to make it simple for you, up until what period of
6 time were you in charge of setting up these action radio communication
7 systems you spoke of?
8 A. Well, it was in late September or early October already that the
9 radio stations that were in the outlying area such as Sviljen and Mokra
10 Gora, which were difficult to reach, and it was already cold, I
11 dismantled the radio communication systems since no more operations were
12 expected. At least this is what we were told. I dismantled the stations
13 and took all the equipment along, and I can tell you that my radio
14 communication systems were no longer used.
15 Q. Do you know that in October of 1998 the Milosevic-Holbrooke
16 agreement was reached?
17 A. Yes, I'm aware of it.
18 Q. Are you aware of the fact that under the agreement verifiers were
19 expected to arrive in Kosovo and Metohija?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did you have any contact with the verifiers?
22 A. No, not I myself, save for the chance encounters in the staff in
24 Q. Thank you. From the month of October up until the start of the
25 NATO bombing, did you take part in any of the operations in Kosovo and
1 Metohija, and did you set up any action communication systems in that
3 A. Well, as I've told you, I no longer engaged in any such activity.
4 I had by that time dismantled all of my equipment.
5 Q. Mr. Cankovic, did your duties and assignments change in any way
6 after the start of NATO bombing on the 24th of March, 1999?
7 A. Well, yes. As I said, mobile repeaters were used in order to
8 have radio communication systems up and running. However, it did not
9 help much. I was very much engaged in the relocation of the staff which
10 changed locations at the time. And this had to be done. The radio
11 communications were operational until the SUP building was hit, and this
12 was the first major obstacle we were confronted with.
13 Q. Thank you. We will get back to that later. Tell me, on how many
14 occasions during the bombing was the Pristina staff relocated?
15 A. Well, we have to draw a clear distinction because the staff per
16 se was never housed in one location. When it comes to the staff leader,
17 well, they changed location at least ten times, perhaps even more. Since
18 the staff would normally be housed in two or three locations, segments of
19 it would be relocated, but other segments not that often.
20 Q. Thank you. Were all these locations where elements of the staff
21 were housed equipped with radio communication systems?
22 A. During bombing when we started relocating the staff, up until the
23 29th, it was still possible for the Pristina communications department to
24 provide telephone lines and special telephone lines for the staff leader
25 and all the other members of the staff, including the telegraphy, because
1 the SUP
2 also had the radio sets, but we only had receivers, not transmitters. If
3 we wanted to use transmitters, then it had to be done elsewhere. And
4 this was, of course, for security reasons to protect the staff.
5 Q. Can you tell us what the special telephone line is?
6 A. The special telephone line is one used in the secretariat or in
7 the Ministry of the Interior. There was a certain degree of protection
8 involved because the switchboards for the various telephone lines were in
9 the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior unlike the ordinary
10 telephone lines which had their switchboards in post offices. We had
11 this special telephone line in the Ministry of the Interior, and we had
12 hired a special line from the telecommunications company, and that's how
13 it worked.
14 Q. Thank you. What became of the communications systems as of the
15 start of the bombing on the 24th of March? You mentioned the 29th. Can
16 you specify which month it was, and what happened with the communications
18 A. It was on the 29th of March that the secretariat building in
19 Pristina was destroyed. At that point all the special lines that existed
20 with these secretariats in Kosovo and Metohija and the ministry and other
21 secretariats across Serbia
22 which meant that dispatches could no longer be sent from the staff and
23 the secretariat in Pristina to all the other secretariats.
24 In other words, what remained were only local radio networks, and
25 especially so later on when Butovacki Breg and Goles were destroyed.
1 Butovacki Breg was not that important but Goles was because the telegraph
2 and telephone system which covered Serbia
4 Q. Thank you. What happened after the 29th of March, what were the
5 developments that followed?
6 A. Well, after the 29th of March, we were practically left only with
7 the local switchboards, and we had some sort of radio communications in
8 Pristina and through the PTT. We had communications with the
9 secretariats and the ministry up until the point when the post office
10 building was destroyed, at which point the regular telephone lines across
11 the town were also destroyed. None of the secretariats were in contact
12 with Pristina any longer and vice-versa. The line with Belgrade was
13 established through the existing optic cable, which was relocated to the
14 new switchboard, as it was called at the time. The optical line was
15 established via Nis
16 Q. Mr. Cankovic, from that point on, what was the means of
17 communications used by the staff combatting anti-terrorist activity with
18 units that were deployed in Kosovo and Metohija?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat his answer.
20 The interpreter didn't catch it.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Cankovic, the interpreters didn't hear your answer. Can you
23 please repeat your answer to my question. What was the means of
24 communications used by the staff combatting anti-terrorist activity with
25 units in Kosovo and Metohija?
1 A. If we are referring to the period following bombing and the
2 destruction of the various buildings, that is to say, the building of the
3 secretariat and post office in Pristina, the only reliable means of
4 communications was through couriers.
5 Q. Can you tell us what was the means of communication used by the
6 staff with the ministry in Belgrade
7 A. The staff communicated with the minister through the optic cable
8 which went from Pristina via Nis
9 this, this cable did not belong to the MUP of Serbia. It was only the
10 optic cable used by the telecom of Serbia, and many town lines were
11 connected to it as well.
12 Q. I see that my question was interpreted as being what was your
13 communication with the ministry in Belgrade, whereas, I asked what was
14 your communication with the minister, and that's the answer you gave us.
15 Now, this communication that ran through the optic cable, was it
16 used by the Pristina staff, could it be used by the staff itself to
17 communicate with the minister in Belgrade?
18 A. Since there were quarters of town where communication systems
19 were destroyed, there could be no communications directly from the
20 location where the optic cable was initially connected. We tried to use
21 locations where we could get connected to and have communication.
22 Wherever elements of the staff, including the staff leader were housed,
23 they had this connection, and they had the possibility to use the
24 communication system.
25 Q. What types of communication could be used by way of this cable?
1 A. Well, one could transmit verbal messages over the telephone line
2 and written messages by use of facsimile, a fax machine.
3 Q. Thank you. Do you know who it was that the staff leader informed
4 after the NATO forces started bombing the area, that is to say, after the
5 month of March, 1999?
6 A. Before and after bombing, he always informed or reported to the
7 minister and was always in contact with him. He would report to him
8 about the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, about the conduct of
9 operations. He would always report directly to the minister, and this
10 was the situation both before and after bombing.
11 Q. How come you know this, Mr. Cankovic?
12 A. I know this because on several occasions I would be the duty
13 officer in the staff. I had to be there as a communications officer to
14 make sure that the system was always up and running. It was not his duty
15 to be in that particular location at all times. He could abruptly decide
16 to relocate the staff, in which case I would be duty-bound to put a
17 communication system in place. Normally, he would choose a location
18 where the system was already operational. And wherever a minister would
19 be -- wherever a call would be placed for the minister, I would be there
20 to respond, and I'm talking about situations where he was absent.
21 Q. Mr. Cankovic, your answer has not been interpreted fully. Can
22 you please repeat your answer. How do you know this? You said that the
23 staff leader communicated directly with the minister.
24 A. I can say that I personally heard the staff leader, Mr. Lukic,
25 talk to the minister, not once but several times. Even I myself when I
1 was a duty officer by the telephone line when the staff leader was absent
2 received calls from the minister who told me that Lukic should return the
3 call as soon as he got back.
4 Q. Mr. Cankovic, did you know whether the head of the staff informed
5 anyone else about things save for the minister?
6 A. I never heard him do that, and I don't think there was any need
7 for him to do so.
8 Q. Did you know that some dispatches were sent to the Ministry of
9 the Interior?
10 A. Dispatches could not have been sent any other way save by
11 facsimile. I do know that. But I'm not familiar with the contents of
12 any dispatches though. I must say this, though, we could only transmit
13 poor copies and for the most part we ended up resorting to the use of
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honours, I think
16 this is a good time for our first break.
17 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break now. We must have an
18 adjournment now for half an hour. We resume at 4.15. A Court Officer
19 will assist you in the break.
20 [The witness stands down]
21 --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Popovic.
25 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. Mr. Cankovic, did you keep radio station logs or phone books for
2 such channels that you set up?
3 A. I did.
4 Q. Can you explain to us what these station lists or logs were?
5 A. Such logs for different channels were used basically for the same
6 purpose, as one would for regular radio channels used by the
7 secretariats. All units, all PJP Units, that is, as well as all SAJ
8 Units and the JSO were in that log. They were each assigned a number of
9 frequencies and channels they were to use. These channels and
10 frequencies were permanent and the log was permanent throughout the
11 duration of operations and the existence of operational channels. The
12 only thing that differed was the unit that was in the field at that point
13 in time. They had their respective log-books, and I never had to do this
14 all over again. The only issue was how many units were in the field and
15 then those units would use their respective code-names based on the
17 Q. Thank you. In the process of drafting such logs, have you ever
18 resorted to the use of code-name Morava?
19 A. It was used as part of the regular log, and it was in use in
21 Q. To have it reflected more accurately in the transcript, I wanted
22 to ask you whether you used it in the territory of Kosovo
23 A. No, never.
24 Q. Thank you. In the process of creation of operational logs, did
25 you ever use the call-sign of Skorpioni?
1 A. No, never.
2 Q. Did you use the same call-signs on operational and regular
4 A. In the sense of the staff?
5 Q. Well, generally speaking.
6 A. No. The staff had operational call-signs, and for the staff of
7 the interior ministry, the call-sign in Pristina was Kosava in periods of
8 operations. In regular conditions concerning the secretariats and
9 regular tasks, the call-sign was Ruby or Rubin.
10 Q. Mr. Cankovic, in the course of 1998, did you see General
11 Vlastimir Djordjevic in the territory of Kosovo
12 when, on what occasions?
13 A. In 1998 as of my arrival in Kosovo to the staff, I did see
14 General Djordjevic on a few occasions. I saw him at least twice or three
15 times in the field. I also saw him at least two or three or even four
16 times in the Pristina SUP
17 Q. Thank you. When did you see him in the field, if you can recall
18 that? What were the circumstances?
19 A. On those occasions when I saw him I believe them to be important.
20 The first one was in Malisevo, I had a number of reasons to be with my
21 union. The first reason was given that Malisevo is in the rear and could
22 not effectively be reached by my repeater stations, I was supposed to set
23 up a mobile repeater station. Secondly, if we -- in case of entering
24 Malisevo, we were supposed to set up a duty operations office and set up
25 a radio equipment in the OUP building which had previously been occupied
1 by terrorists. Mr. Djordjevic was there when I saw him. That was on the
2 first occasion I entered Malisevo.
3 Another occasion was in the operation towards Klina and Jablanica
4 and Glodjane. It was difficult terrain for radio communication, and I
5 was there with some equipment. We entered a village and before that
6 there had been a clash with the terrorists and the village was completely
7 deserted. Afterwards there was no resistance whatsoever. On that
8 occasion, we found basically all of the inhabitants in the mosque. It
9 was in summertime. It was quite hot. And we reported that there were
10 people in the mosque. Some commanders came and took them out. There
11 were people fainting and there were children. It was not an easy scene.
12 Mr. Djordjevic was there. We inquired who would be a representative of
13 the village. They said that they were afraid of terrorists, and I
14 supposed this was correct because the villages we went through before
15 that were also deserted. So I believed people had pulled out.
16 I particularly remember this one because of the grave situation
17 with those people. We spent the night in that village, although I don't
18 know whether Mr. Djordjevic did so. In any case, we sat down with the
19 village representative, with the village elder, and had a discussion with
21 I also saw him in the staff, although I had much to do and he was
22 quite busy touring secretariats and units. Well, for the most part that
23 was it.
24 Q. Thank you. When you refer to the village when you saw him, what
25 village was that?
1 A. I think it was Jablanica.
2 Q. Thank you. You said you saw him in the staff. Did
3 Mr. Djordjevic attend the meetings of the staff in 1998 when you saw him
4 in the staff building?
5 A. Mr. Djordjevic was not a staff member. He was under no
6 obligation to attend any meetings of it. He did, however, come there on
7 a number of occasions and he attended some meetings, but his presence had
8 no particular effect, in the sense that he wasn't there to deal with
9 anything in particular. Of course, he held consultations and things like
10 that, but that was the extent of it.
11 In the secretariat building, he had a small office. I know that
12 because I had installed a regular phone line in his office. We did not
13 install a special line because he wasn't there permanently. Special
14 lines were only assigned to officers who were in their office all time.
15 For him, however, this was just a side office.
16 Q. Thank you. In 1999, did you see General Djordjevic in Kosovo and
17 Metohija, and if so, when?
18 A. In 1999 I saw Mr. Djordjevic -- the minister was there then as
19 well because there was a government session in Kosovo. I saw the prime
20 minister, the late Mirko Marjanovic there, as well as a number of other
21 ministers. I remember we lined up in front of the secretariat building,
22 and we reported to Mr. Marjanovic, the prime minister. I'm positive that
23 Mr. Djordjevic was there as well.
24 On that day I went to Belgrade
25 before that because I had to take over some equipment there. However, I
1 was asked to stay and they were even jokingly telling me that I could
2 join the government on their plane back to Belgrade. I do remember that
3 I was supposed to bring some equipment back. That was sometime in the
4 morning, perhaps around 10.00 or 11.00 or perhaps around noon. In any
5 case, they all went to attend the government meeting, and I was told that
6 they were to go to Belgrade
7 As for any tasks of mine in that regard, they were completed by
8 the time of that meeting and I went to Belgrade. In any case, I did see
9 Mr. Djordjevic on that occasion. That was the only time I saw him in
10 1999 in Kosovo and Metohija. If we are talking about the time when I was
11 in the staff, I also saw him on, say, another couple of occasions. One
12 of them was during a trip similar to the one I just referred to. It was
13 in Belgrade
14 was, or rather, in that building in Lole Ribara Street -- well, at that
15 time, they were in the building of Commercial de Banca. The chief of the
16 communications administration also had his office there, and I came to
17 see him three or four times, and on one such occasion I saw
18 Mr. Djordjevic, or perhaps on two such occasions.
19 Q. Thank you. When you are referring to submitting a report to
20 Mr. Marjanovic, the prime minister, can you tell me who reported to him?
21 A. I was on those staffs a number of times and reports were usually
22 given by such officers who had completed military academies. In this
23 particular case, it was Adamovic. However, during a previous period it
24 was Colonel Arsenijevic. In any case, on this occasion it was Adamovic.
25 He submitted his report to the PM Mirko Marjanovic in the presence of the
1 minister of the interior, Vlajko Stojilkovic.
2 Q. You also said that it was in the morning at around 10.00 or 11.00
3 or perhaps at around noon
4 can, of course?
5 A. Not from this point in time, I can't be any more precise. I
6 don't think it was around noon
7 although I don't know when. First of all, we waited for the plane to
8 land, and we were in front of the building throughout that time. In any
9 case, time passed slowly, and I do not have a clear memory of it.
10 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please see
11 P144 next.
12 Q. Mr. Cankovic, on your screen you will see a decision. It says:
13 "As of 31 May 1999
14 Ministry of the Interior police administration shall cease to carry out
15 special security related tasks in the MUP staff in Pristina where he was
16 deployed on 1 May [as interpreted] 1998."
17 Mr. Cankovic, did your duties in the MUP staff or the suppression
18 of terrorism in Pristina cease by virtue of this decision?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that in the transcript,
22 line 8 it states from the 1st of May, 1998, but it should say from the
23 1st of June 1998. Yes, thank you.
24 Q. Mr. Cankovic, during 1998 and 1999, did you ever see or hear of
25 any plan or agreement within the Ministry of Internal Affairs according
1 to which the population -- the Albanian population would be expelled from
2 the territory of Kosovo
3 A. No, I did not.
4 Q. During 1998 or 1999 did you see or hear of any plan or agreement
5 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to expel the Albanian population and
6 thereby change the ethnic structure of the population in Kosovo and
8 A. No.
9 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic, did you mean May 1998, June 1998, or
10 the year 1999 when you corrected the transcript?
11 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, when I corrected the
12 transcript, I was thinking of the 1st of June, 1998, because that is what
13 the date is in the document, the original document.
14 JUDGE PARKER: We may be looking at something different. We are
15 seeing the year 1999.
16 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] I don't see anywhere 1999 in the
17 English translation. The mistake is 1st of May, 1998, and it should
18 correctly read the 1st of June, 1998. This is what it says in the
19 original, and in the English I can see that the date says the 1st of May,
20 1998. It should correctly be the 1st of June, 1998. The date I'm
21 talking about is in paragraph 2 of the decision where it says, is no
22 longer going to be carrying out the duties in the police administration.
23 The document -- as of 1st of June, 1998. The document is dated the 30th
24 of May, 1999.
25 Your Honours, a brief explanation. Mr. Cankovic was sent on the
1 1st of June, 1998, and the decision was dated the 1st of June, 1998.
2 With this decision, he is no longer being assigned to the post from the
3 1st of June, 1998. So the decision whereby he is no longer supposed to
4 be at that assignment is the 1st of May, 1999.
5 The English translation in paragraph 2 should state the 1st of
6 June, 1998
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE PARKER: We think we understand what you are saying,
9 Mr. Popovic.
10 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE PARKER: In the original the date seems to be 01.06.1998.
12 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.
13 Thank you, Mr. Cankovic.
14 Your Honours, I have now completed my examination-in-chief of
15 this witness. Thank you.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Popovic.
17 Ms. Petersen.
18 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, if I could just have one second to set
19 up the podium.
20 JUDGE PARKER: Take two if you need.
21 Cross-examination by Ms. Petersen:
22 Q. Good afternoon, sir. In 1998 on a day-to-day basis, what were
23 some of the usual tasks that you would perform?
24 A. In 1998, well, we can split that into two periods. Until the 1st
25 of October and from the 1st of October. Up until the 1st of October, as
1 we said, actions were being conducted against Albanian terrorists, and in
2 those kinds of assignments -- well, you heard mostly about those kinds of
3 assignments. I don't have anything particular more to say about that.
4 After the 1st of October, after the agreement that the
5 Verification Missions should be sent to the Kosovo and Metohija area, I
6 no longer had any tasks in that area. During that period, I had
7 assignments relating to the withdrawal or the pulling out of equipment
8 which was located in the places which I referred to earlier. And I can
9 say a little bit more about that. So there was quite a lot of equipment
11 Then my other assignments were to get the equipment back, store
12 it. Units were still changing over, and they spent 45 days in the field
13 and then switched, and this was happening continuously. The units were
14 not all being changed at the same time. So I always had new units, I had
15 to issue instructions, direct them in their work so I had work also in
16 the staff itself. These were my duties roughly.
17 Q. You spoke about setting up radio communications out in the field
18 during an action prior to October of 1998. When you would set up these
19 radio communications, who could receive and listen into that channel
20 within the MUP?
21 A. We had communications on channels that were not used for regular
22 radio communication. These were channels dedicated -- actually, these
23 were channels on a different frequency range from the usual one, if that
24 means anything. The regular radio network used by the secretariats
25 within Kosovo, and this also applies to the Serbia as a whole, this was
1 done on VHF. My systems of communications were ultrashort UHF, and it
2 was set up where there were already repeater stations and relay stations
3 which were either military, post office, or TV channels. So in that
4 sense, the radio communications that I was setting up were used only by
5 the units for anti-terrorist actions. The ones that I mentioned, this
6 was the PJP, the SAJ
7 Those communications were used from the moment that an action was
8 launched and were used only until the end of the action and the return of
9 the units to their, let's say, home base.
10 After that the communication system was dismantled and not used
11 anymore. These communications could only be followed, exclusively be
12 followed by people from these units and by those in the staff in
13 Pristina. Of course some undesirable elements could also monitor these
14 communications, but we didn't really record any intrusions or incursions
15 into our communications network. I never had an occasion to do that.
16 Q. So just to make sure that I understand, during the operation, the
17 units involved in the operation could listen to this radio station or
18 channel, I'm not sure the technical term, and also the staff in Pristina
19 was also able to hear it?
20 A. Not listen in, but participate and work on that channel, yes.
21 Q. Thank you very much, sir. Now, moving to the NATO bombing. What
22 were the regular tasks that you would perform on a day-to-day basis
23 during that period?
24 A. During the bombing, my primary assignments were, just like in
25 regular conditions, to secure existing and possibly new communications
1 for the staff with units that were out in the field as much as possible
2 and with the ministry, the minister that the staff was accountable to.
3 That was the primary task.
4 Secondary tasks were to have everything that needed to be done by
5 the units in the field which were constantly moving in terms of
6 maintenance or repair we would do. They would bring this equipment to
7 us, and this we would describe as kind of on-going, daily work.
8 So I was mostly sticking close to the staff and making sure in
9 all possible ways that these communications were functioning properly.
10 In the beginning there were situations when this equipment that we had,
11 I'm talking about the mobile communications equipment, the same equipment
12 that was being used at the relay stations and which was now being used at
13 some lower elevations for security reasons because of the bombing, and
14 this was quite dangerous because any kind of emission of vibrations,
15 frequency, or energy was a possible target, so we would repair or go to
16 those facilities only when this was essential. But these type of
17 communications were not used on a regular basis. They were not
18 permanent. They were something that posed quite a danger, so people who
19 had to deal with issues with that type of equipment were quite concerned
20 and were exposed to a considerable amount of danger while performing
21 these tasks.
22 Q. Are you aware of whether in Belgrade they had their own
23 communication staff there to perform a similar function to you to make
24 sure that their communications were working in Belgrade?
25 A. You couldn't have a communications staff in Belgrade. You could
1 only have communications that would be attached to the staff, and that's
2 what did exist. And I did say earlier that I saw Mr. Djordjevic at that
3 staff sometimes. I had to make a connection between him and the Belgrade
4 centre. So you had the chief of that communication centre sitting there.
5 In a way, I was the main person in the area, and the person who is in
6 charge of these communications would always be close to the staff. As
7 opposed to us, let's say that that staff had a little bit more room and
8 possibility to set up communications with other staffs because the main
9 post office in Belgrade
10 having normal telephone calls, not special telephone communications, was
11 working. And the system for special telegraph and telephone connections
12 was destroyed. So all they had at their disposal was just regular
13 telephone communications, telephone lines, but they had much more
14 potential or capacity than we did.
15 MS. PETERSEN: I see Mr. Popovic.
16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Popovic.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I have an
18 objection exclusively to the transcript. I'm listening to what
19 Mr. Cankovic was saying, and line 22 absolutely does not correspond to
20 what he said in the Serbian. I actually never heard that sentence at
21 all. Perhaps it could cause some confusion. It's quite general. I
22 agree that in the Serbian the witness absolutely did not say that and
23 that could give rise to some further questions that I would just like to
24 warn the counsel or the Chamber, I don't know whether she believes that
25 this is something that would need to be further clarified or established,
1 but simply this was not stated in the Serbian.
2 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen, page 41 in the area of line 22, I
3 leave it to you whether you see it as of significance or not.
4 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Sir, I would like to clarify your answer a bit in a couple of
6 ways. Initially I thought I understood you to say there was not a
7 communication staff in Belgrade
8 as your answer continued, it seems that there is a communication staff in
10 with communication issues in Belgrade
11 A. I understood you the first time and I understood you now, but you
12 need to understand me. There is no communication staff. Only there is a
13 communication facility in the staff. Just like I am a representative for
14 the communications in the Pristina staff, there is a communications
15 representative at the staff in Belgrade
16 In that staff we had Mr. Vasilije Joksic who was the chief of the
17 communications administration for Serbia. Down in the staff is where I
18 was sitting pursuant to a decision by the minister where I was the chief
19 of communications for Kosovo and Metohija.
20 Q. So you handled Kosovo and Metohija. There was a different
21 individual who dealt with this in Belgrade
22 A. Yes, that's correct.
23 Q. Now, the transcript earlier quoted you as saying that you had
24 seen Mr. Djordjevic, I believe, in the -- let's see what the exact word
25 is. It says:
1 "And I did say earlier that I saw Mr. Djordjevic at that staff.
2 Sometimes I had to make a connection between him and the Belgrade centre.
3 So you had the chief of that communication centre sitting there."
4 Was that an accurate translation of what you said, and if not,
5 you can feel free to correct that at this point?
6 A. No, the translation is not correct. I could not set up a
7 communication in Belgrade
8 communication line to the Chief of Staff in Pristina and the other
9 members of the staff who were not at the same place. For example, you
10 had three or four locations where parts of the staff were. So I was
11 trying and I was successful in securing communications for all of them
12 which after the post office was bombarded in Boles [as interpreted]
13 consisted of telephone communications which was made from the town post
14 office in Pristina using optic cable which went through Nis to Belgrade
15 That was the communication line which was used by the Pristina post
16 office and the parts of town which were connected to that exchange.
17 So let's understand each other. This was not a communication of
18 the SUP
19 PTT Serbia facilities. So we were the users of those telephones and
20 those numbers. The telephones were city telephones, the phone numbers
21 were city telephone numbers, there was no special connection. Thus, I
22 could only secure communications to the chief of the staff and parts of
23 the staff in Pristina, whereas Mr. Joksic with his departments and work
24 lines, in this case, this was, you know, only the section for telephone
25 traffic, he would provide communications to the minister and the members
1 of the staff at the ministry in Belgrade
2 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, in this trial, we've heard from a
3 Mr. Deretic. Do you know Mr. Deretic?
4 A. Yes, I know Deretic. At the time I was in Pristina, Deretic was
5 the chief of the communications department in Pristina.
6 Q. And he testified that it was the responsibility of the
7 communications department in Pristina, it was his responsibility to take
8 on responsibility for SUPs throughout Kosovo. Are you aware of that
10 A. Of course I knew about it and of course that is correct. So I
11 was assigned, as I said at the beginning, to a chief communications
12 amongst units in the field and the Chief of Staff or the staff in
13 Pristina, that was my main activity. I said that at the very beginning.
14 Mr. Deretic was taking care of and taking care so about the system of
15 communications which was used in peacetime. For all secretariats, he was
16 in charge of telephone communications, telegraph communications. He was
17 in charge of special telephone communications. All that was under the
19 So I'm only saying that this when we were working on that to
20 secure telephone radio communications for the Chief of Staff and other
21 members of the staff, of course that was something that had to be done by
22 Milos Deretic, but I was also there to decide when and where a certain
23 communication would be installed. In that sense, if you understood me
24 literally, that I was the one doing that, that I was the bearer of the
25 telephone exchange, that is not so. But I plan.
1 Q. Can you explain your responsibility -- you mentioned the duty
2 centre. During the NATO bombing, what was your job responsibility with
3 regard to the duty centre, if any?
4 A. I had nothing to do with the duty centre. Nothing whatsoever.
5 Because the duty centre is something that is a permanent body and had to
6 be constantly present. So I could never be sure that I would be in one
7 place for the next half an hour or so, so I could never be a member of
8 any kind of duty centre. If you saw from my testimony, I was very rarely
9 at these, how shall I put it, meetings about preparations, the work, and
10 let me put it that way, these actions and all that kind of thing. But I
11 was a participant in that in the sense that I was the one who was
12 securing communications for those units that were operating in the field.
13 And I explained the way in which I did this.
14 Q. Sir, during the NATO bombing at what location did you generally
16 A. I don't understand the question specifically. Which locations do
17 you mean? You mean the locations where the staff was or which locations
18 where I was doing what? If we are talking about locations where I was
19 working for the staff, that was, for example, like I said, you know, the
20 staff itself changed at least ten locations. I'm thinking about the
21 chiefs of staff, members of the staff depending on what they were doing
22 in order not to disturb one another and ultimately it was not desirable
23 to have the entire staff in one place for security reasons. These
24 others, let me put it that way, other parts of the staff, we did not
25 really change over so much. But I was obliged to monitor whether the
1 communications were provided, whether this was working properly, and
2 sometimes, if necessary, and this is something that I said in the
3 beginning and this was being like that for awhile only in that initial
4 period after all of these bombings and all of that, it was necessary to
5 do something with that radio communications network, for example, some of
6 these places with these mobile repeater stations, yes, but this was
7 really brief, and I really cannot take credit for that kind of work
9 Q. Well, let me ask you this way: How often were you actually in an
10 office setting, and how often were you out in the field? I guess I'm
11 wondering, were you more travelling to different areas, fixing radio
12 towers or fixing technical equipment away from an office, or were you
13 more located in an office?
14 A. This may sound rather impossible to you, but it was, as I say, in
15 addition to the jobs I've just referred to, I also visited the
16 secretariats. If you can take my word for it, I went through certain
17 zones which were not controlled by the police in order to arrive at a
18 different secretariat, and if I had to do that, I did. Whether I was
19 crazy enough to do that or not, that's for someone else to judge.
20 Q. Well, were you travelling around to these secretariats most of
21 the time, or were you usually in Pristina in an office?
22 A. For example, I spent a lot of time in various offices. For
23 example, the head of the staff would leave and there were none of those
24 who were supposed to stand in for him along professional lines, then I
25 would assume that duty. I was part of technical personnel. There was
1 always someone next to him in charge of police and operational work. I
2 frequently stayed to replace him while, for example, he attended a
3 meeting in a different part of the staff. In any case, my job was --
4 Q. I'm sorry. I could just stop you there. Are you saying that you
5 stood in for Lukic when he was absent? That you were acting as the chief
6 of the MUP staff in his absence?
7 A. No, no. Wherever Lukic went, he had a telephone line available.
8 If an office had been assigned to him and if there was a regular city
9 line there, if he went to another building and someone called him back to
10 the other office, someone was supposed to be there to tell that person
11 that Mr. Lukic was in the field and absent. I could only act as his
12 secretary of sorts.
13 Q. How often would you do that? It sounds like you were quite busy,
14 so how much did you have time to just sit in an office and answer phone
16 A. Let me tell you this: During the last period I tried to spend as
17 much time as possible in the office, but I couldn't really.
18 Q. I mean how much time did you spend sitting in Lukic's office
19 while he was absent acting as his receptionist?
20 A. Well, it's not that I was only a receptionist. I could have been
21 in Mijatovic's office, for example, while Mijatovic was absent and then
22 someone would call him, and I was there to answer the phone and say that
23 Mr. Mijatovic wasn't there and that a message could be left with me. Or
24 I could tell that person at what number Mr. Mijatovic could be reached
25 at. The head of the staff never told me where he went. He would either
1 attend meetings in some other parts of the staff or something else, I can
2 speculate whatever it was.
3 Q. Okay. I'm just trying to understand. You said earlier that you
4 were in a lot of places. You were busy. You were running around dealing
5 with things, and now you are telling us that you are spending time
6 sitting in the office of other people answering their phones, and I'm
7 just trying to understand how much of your time you spent doing that
8 because it sounded like you were pretty busy.
9 A. I was pretty busy, but since we are talking about offices, I
10 never spent this much time in an office. I said that I would spend half
11 an hour, an hour at a time in an office, but having this discussion with
12 you one would believe that I spent at least half of my time during
13 aggression in any office. I was in the first, second, or third office at
14 any point in time, and it could just so happen that I would stay in the
15 office with another staff member. It could just so happen that Mr. Lukic
16 was not in his office all the time, and the minister wasn't in his office
17 all the time in Belgrade
18 be there to take calls. In other words, there always needed to be
19 someone on the end of the line.
20 Q. Sir, I'm trying to understand from you how much time you did
21 that, and I think we need to break this down because your answer is a
22 little confusing. First of all, did you yourself have an office? Your
23 own office? Or were you sharing with a group of other people in the MUP
25 A. Well, at that time I did not have an office of my own. My office
1 at that time was wherever Mr. Lukic was and where the other parts of the
2 staff were, but I was seldom in such premises. And when I say seldom, I
3 have in mind, say, a 24-hour period. During such a period, I would spend
4 perhaps an hour in an office, and the rest of the time, I was basically
5 in the field.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you. And when you say, "at that time I did not have
7 an office of my own. My office was wherever Mr. Lukic was," do you mean
8 that your office was wherever his office was, not that you were
9 constantly with General Lukic?
10 A. Yes, precisely.
11 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you. Now, you said that the MUP staff
12 itself was often housed in different locations so when you say that, were
13 you always in the location that Lukic was housed in when there was moving
15 A. Mr. Lukic could never take up a different office or a building
16 without previously consulting me. He could envisage any particular
17 location, but if we could not introduce a telephone line there, it meant
18 nothing. I was constantly with Lukic for that reason. And out of, say,
19 three or four proposals he put forth about where he wanted to take
20 shelter or an office, I first needed to check whether there was a
21 possibility to establish phone lines and then I would assign him an
22 office. I was always nearby as well because I never knew when he would
23 want to change next.
24 Q. Now, you just said you were constantly with him, with Lukic for
25 that reason. I would just like to clarify that. I mean, it sounds like
1 you would go, you would set up, if he was moving an office, you would set
2 up the communication. Did you need to be around him any longer that it
3 would take to do that, or is that what you meant?
4 A. No. When I say that, when I say constantly with him, one would
5 conclude that he changed offices every 20 minutes and that I was with him
6 all time. But he would spend two or three or four days in a single
7 location. In certain locations he spent as many as seven days. In the
8 meantime there were other locations where lines had already been set up.
9 This is what I had in mind.
10 Q. So just to be clear, you were not travelling around with General
11 Lukic constantly, or in his presence on a regular basis?
12 A. I never travelled around with General Lukic.
13 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, you stated, when you were answering
14 questions from Mr. Popovic, that you did not take part in any of the
15 planning of MUP operations or actions. So my question to you is: Your
16 testimony, then, about how these actions were planned is not based on
17 your firsthand knowledge; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, definitely. And I wasn't interested in any such thing. I
19 am not a true policeman so to say and I'm not an operative. I did take
20 part in operations and in planning, but the planning of communication.
21 If we see that as planning, then it is. Participation also is
22 participation, however, but the planning of operations and their
23 implementation in terms of combat, this is something I did not
24 participate in.
25 Q. And you also testified that you did not take part in the
1 preparation of the operations other than your own work where you would go
2 out into the field and you would have it set up by 3.00 a.m. if it
3 started at 5.00 a.m.
4 would prepare, that's also not based on your own firsthand knowledge or
5 experience; correct?
6 A. Of course, that is true. While I was in the field, commanders
7 came to the staff and they would discuss the implementation of a plan.
8 However, for me it was not important. The only thing important to me was
9 the area where the operation was to take place. My clock started running
10 as of the moment when the plan was complete. As soon as I received a
11 definitely plan in the sense of area, the clock started running. If a
12 plan was completed at noon
13 their discussion which goes on until 3.00 or 4.00 p.m. because they all
14 have their own questions and the operation is, say, in the territory of
15 Djakovica, I need to leave Pristina upon preparing all of the equipment
16 to go in the field. I had a team of my own with which I worked on my
17 part of the plan. Then I would draft my own plan. Based on that plan,
18 depending on whether that was before the bombing or after or the time
19 before February, I decided which repeater stations I would turn on, what
20 other assets I needed, whether I needed mobile repeater stations and what
21 personnel. Those were the details.
22 Secondly, since each PJP detachment and the SAJ and JSO ... I
23 had to get into touch. I had to check whether they had enough radio
24 stations, but sometimes they didn't. It could just so happen that they
25 too needed equipment. We also needed to work on the issues pertaining to
1 the tasks those guys were supposed to carry out in the field as
2 signalsmen. This was what the situation was like, and that's how things
4 Q. Now, after an operation or an action was completed, would you
5 receive any report about what happened during the action?
6 A. No. As I said, I participated three, four, or five times when I
7 had to use mobile repeater stations. In other situation, my job was to
8 decide the main feature such as the relay station at Mokra Gora. I would
9 stay there and follow developments in the field from there in terms of
10 radio communication. I was in touch with the signalsmen attached to the
11 field units. That was my work. When there was redeployment or advancing
12 or pulling out, when they left their units, their areas and could no
13 longer be reached by their repeater stations, I would then direct the
14 signalsman in question to use a different channel or a different repeater
15 station belonging to another unit to establish communication. That was
16 my work throughout operations.
17 When an operation was finished, I would stay at the feature
18 awaiting the return of the units to their deployment area. Their
19 commanders would then go to the staff working probably on the -- their
20 reports. In the meantime, I would dismount my equipment and go back. If
21 the operation took until 4.00, 5.00, or 6.00 p.m., I couldn't reach the
22 staff before 8.00 or 9.00 p.m. I could only receive new tasks from
23 Mijatovic or Adamovic if there was to be the continuation of that action
24 the next day. Or if there was other operation, plans would be drafted
25 anew and the whole story began again. If an operation took several days,
1 I would be in a single location, much as I was during operations which
2 took only a day.
3 Q. As chief of communications for the MUP staff, what kind of
4 reporting did you personally receive, if any? I don't mean to suggest
5 that there was any, but if you did, what was it?
6 A. I never received any reports from anyone.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. And I think that you said in your testimony
8 that you also were not familiar with the content of MUP dispatches?
9 A. If I did not send a dispatch, I was not familiar with its
10 contents, and I had no right to be, or unless I was one of the
12 Q. Well, did you generally read MUP dispatches?
13 A. No. Firstly, there was no time. Secondly, I had no interest in
15 Q. All right. Thank you. You also said in your testimony that you
16 didn't write any written reports to anyone, but you would give oral
17 reports to General Lukic. Could you just tell us briefly what the
18 general subject matter of those reports would cover.
19 A. When we say that I gave reports to Mr. Lukic, I meant to say that
20 he was my superior and I was under an obligation to plan or comment on
21 communications issues. However, he wasn't privy to it in the sense that
22 this was not part of his work. In that sense, I could not submit a
23 report to him, because to him it meant nothing. Communications were in
24 order. The staff was content with the work I did, and I was part of that
25 staff during the previous period. I had three or four terms of service
1 with that staff. I was familiar with the area. I was familiar with the
2 profession, and I enjoyed their full support.
3 The same went for Deretic in his domain. He could never submit
4 reports to me. He did his work, and he could receive reports in turn
5 because he was a chief too. However, I as a chief was under no
6 obligation to report to anyone, not even the communications
7 administration in Belgrade
8 was. There was a line of command. Lukic was my superior and the
9 minister was superior to him. That was the end of it. As to how they
10 communicated and who gave what tasks to whom, that's a different matter.
11 Q. Okay. You said in your testimony that you did not ever see the
12 call-sign Morava
13 A. Let us understand each other. The code-name of Morava is in the
14 code-names log used by the secretariat in Pristina for their regular
15 tasks. They were in touch with Morava
16 MUP of Serbia
17 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia
18 However, while on the topic of lists or logs, as well as
19 operational logs, Morava
20 Q. Okay.
21 MS. PETERSEN: I see we are approaching the time for the break.
22 This would be a good time, if that's convenient for the Court.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We will have the second break now. We
24 resume at 6.00.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 --- Recess taken at 5.28 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE PARKER: Ms. Petersen.
5 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Q. Now, sir, you testified that you seldom attended MUP staff
7 meetings. So is it fair to say that your testimony about what when on in
8 these MUP staff meetings was not your own firsthand knowledge?
9 A. Everything I testified about concerning MUP staff meetings has it
10 do with those meetings I attended. It is all firsthand knowledge. I'm
11 not sure what you have in mind.
12 Q. Well, you told us that you seldom attended MUP staff meetings.
13 About how many did you attend?
14 A. If you have in mind the meetings of the expanded staff, then
15 there was one such meeting.
16 Q. Okay. So your testimony is based on the one meeting that you
18 A. I don't know in what part, but let's stay with that.
19 Q. I'm not sure I understood what you just meant.
20 A. I attended one extended MUP staff meeting, and I testified about
21 that based on that one meeting about that one meeting.
22 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, in evidence in this case we
23 have quite a few exhibits that are minutes of MUP staff meetings, and
24 we've also heard some testimony from other witnesses about MUP staff
25 meetings. And in the interests of time, I won't go through all of these
1 with you, but I would just put to you that there are a number of these
2 meetings in 1998 and 1999 where General Djordjevic is in attendance,
3 where the security situation in Kosovo is discussed, and where plans
4 about Kosovo are made. And my question to you is, you weren't
5 necessarily in those meetings; correct?
6 A. Yes, I did not participate in the making of any plans for Kosovo.
7 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. So at page 33 and 34 of the
8 transcript where you stated that General Djordjevic in 1998 came to
9 Kosovo but to no particular effect, you weren't in those meetings with
10 him, so you really don't have firsthand knowledge of how he participated;
12 A. The question was whether I saw Mr. Djordjevic in Kosovo in 1998
13 and 1999. I said I did, and I explained where. I said I saw him -- had
14 I seen him at any meetings, I would have said so.
15 Q. Sir, I believe you stated an opinion at page 33 and 34 that
16 General Djordjevic came to Kosovo for no particular effect. Now, because
17 you weren't attending meetings with him, you don't really have a basis
18 for saying that, do you, sir?
19 A. I didn't say that I thought I saw him. I said I did see him and
20 I told you when and where.
21 Q. All right. I think we are miscommunicating here, but I will move
22 on. There is one exhibit that I'd like to show you from a MUP staff
24 MS. PETERSEN: If we could have P689 up on the screen.
25 Q. Now, sir, this is a meeting of a -- minutes of a meeting of a MUP
1 staff for 2 December 1998
2 the one that I saw your name. Does this -- where I saw your name. Does
3 this refresh your memory that this was the MUP staff meeting that you
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. All right.
7 MS. PETERSEN: If we look at page 3 in both the B/C/S and in the
9 Q. And I can just read it. Midway through the page, right after it
10 says the meeting commenced:
11 "Major General Sreten Lukic stated that on 27 November 1998 in
13 minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, was attended by the chiefs of department
14 for the public security and the state security, assistant ministers, head
15 of the MUP staff in Pristina, and Nikola Sainovic. The current security
16 situation in Kosovo was examined in the meeting in which the duties and
17 further engagement of members of the police in Kosovo were defined. The
18 essence of the meeting was to continue execution of anti-terrorist
19 actions aimed at suppressing terrorism in Kosovo ... "
20 Now, do you recall General Lukic in this meeting talking about
21 how he had just met with minister Stojiljkovic and with the chiefs of
22 department meaning General Djordjevic and then also the chief of the
23 state security department? Do you remember him talking about that in
24 this 2 December 1998
25 A. Certainly I do. It was the only meeting I attended, and it was
1 very important for us. It would have been unreasonable for me not to
2 remember it. What you just read out is what I can see for myself. The
3 suppression of terrorism in Kosovo at the time of these events -- well,
4 that was no longer. As far as I know at that time -- well, not at that
5 time, but for two or three months before that there had been no
6 activities concerning suppression of terrorism in Kosovo. The great
7 problem of the time is what we discussed after the reports were submitted
8 by the officers, were terrorist attacks against units and the casualties
9 we suffered in such attacks. It was agreed that fire should be returned
10 proportionately in such occasions. There was a lot of arms smuggling and
11 other things. That was the way I understood it. It was decided that we
12 should adequately respond to the terrorist attacks carried out against
13 field units. That was the goal of it. I don't know how Sainovic could
14 say that. As far as I recall, he was the main person in charge of the
15 mission that was there monitoring the situation in Kosovo. I don't
16 understand how he could have said this.
17 Secondly, I claim that there were no operations because I would
18 have been in charge of establishing communications. That did not take
19 place. As of September, or rather, October, it never happened again
20 because I dismantled the equipment, and it was no longer at those
21 features. This is my explanation, if you accept it. I have no other
22 explanation. There were no anti-terrorist operations at that time, but
23 there were terrorist attacks and lots of casualties among the policemen.
24 If there are reports to that effect, you could check that against what
25 I'm saying.
1 Q. I would just like to clarify one thing, I think the transcript
2 missed the part of the question, so just to clarify the question: Was do
3 you remember -- do you recall General Lukic saying in this MUP staff
4 meeting that he had been to a meeting with the minister and the chiefs of
5 department for the public security and the state security, public
6 security, of course, being General Djordjevic? Sir, that was -- do you
7 agree that that was the question that you heard?
8 A. Yes, I do agree. But I wasn't there at that meeting which was
9 attended by General Lukic.
10 Q. Correct. That was a meeting in Belgrade. I'm just asking you
11 about this MUP staff meeting.
12 Now, sir, I would like to clarify one thing. You stated with
13 authority that there was no -- there were no anti-terrorist operations
14 after October. However, in light of the fact that you didn't participate
15 in planning, wouldn't it be more accurate to say that there were no
16 anti-terrorist actions for which you set up radio communications?
17 A. No one could approve an action like that because that would mean
18 suicide for units which would be without radio communications in that
19 situation in the field in Kosovo. So I can say that in the territory
20 where each village was a fortress unto itself and to have policemen enter
21 that village and to be without the support of communications, there would
22 be no chance for anything like that. Simply that is impossible.
23 Q. Okay. So you are not aware of any MUP actions in Podujevo or in
24 Racak in 1999 or after October 1998?
25 A. I can say that these were actions for which the activation of
1 action channels was necessary. I did hear of Podujevo. This was during
2 the war, maybe the 25th, 26th, 27th, I'm not sure about the date. It was
3 at the beginning of the bombing campaign. This was a crime committed
4 against innocent people in Podujevo. I did hear of that crime. I know
5 there were victims who were children, women. In such a situation, even
6 one victim of that kind is too much. I mean, this is really something
7 that I do know that happened. I know that it took place, but as far as I
8 know, it was no action. It was simply a crime. To do something like
9 that is a crime, and this is how it was described in the press too.
10 Unfortunately, I say again because of my own duties and the
11 duties of everyone in the staff this passed, and in the course of those
12 events there were many victims. There were people who were killed.
13 Among them policemen, terrorists, those killed by NATO bombs, but let's
14 say this was collateral damage, whatever you want to call it. But this
15 particular thing is a crime.
16 As for Racak, this is something quite different again. This was
17 an anti-terrorist action of a smaller scale and communication systems
18 were not required there. This was a small area. I think I said in the
19 beginning that -- which were the situations in which such connections
20 were activated. If we had some small area where radio, hand-held radios
21 were within range, this would be okay. They could use regular channels
22 and by using the regular channels meant that this was not something for
23 which channel -- action channels were necessary. There were some actions
24 where it was possible to have the whole of Kosovo within range and to
25 have communication with the staff. I didn't really take part in things
1 like that. Well, this was a small action, but it's not a small action
2 per se. There were many casualties there, but it was an anti-terrorist
3 action on a minor scale.
4 Q. And, sir, just to be clear, when you spoke of Podujevo, you are
5 speaking about something that happened during the NATO bombing, not any
6 action that took place starting in December of 1998?
7 A. No, no.
8 Q. All right. Now, sir, you stated in your testimony that you were
9 familiar with the October Agreements with the OSCE; do you recall stating
11 A. Yes. I was just acquainted. I was just familiar with it.
12 Q. Were you aware that the MUP had to reduce their numbers in Kosovo
13 under that agreement?
14 A. I know that it did reduce the numbers, not that it should have
15 reduced the numbers, and I know that because the units that were coming
16 to Kosovo later required much less equipment from me than the ones who
17 came before. This was definitely true.
18 Q. But is it your testimony that you are not aware that was one of
19 the requirements of the agreement?
20 A. No, I do know about that, and I know about it just the same as I
21 knew that the mission would be in the terrain that we would need to keep
22 them in good regard, that we needed to co-operate with them --
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the last two
24 or three sentences of what the witness said.
25 MS. PETERSEN:
1 Q. Let me just stop you there. If we can be a little bit more
2 focused on the answers, we can get through with you tonight possibly,
3 sir. I think you answered the specific question. Were you aware that
4 the MUP also had to return heavy weapons that they had? Yes or no, were
5 you aware of that?
6 A. No, I didn't know that piece of information. This is outside of
7 my duties. Not MUP, I don't know what sort of heavy equipment MUP had.
8 Perhaps they did have something. I know that the army had such weapons.
9 I'm just a technical person so anything else really is something that I
10 know very little about, and I don't know what the distinction would be,
11 the line of distinction between light and heavy weaponry. That is
12 something that I really don't know.
13 Q. I'm really asking you these questions, sir, just to see if you
14 understood the effect, whether these agreements had a significant effect
15 on MUP activities in Kosovo. Were you aware of that, that it affected
16 MUP activities in Kosovo?
17 A. You know, unfortunately with this agreement which was good and
18 should have been realised and was realised to a good part by the MUP,
19 actually had a result that anti-terrorist attacks were stepped up. We
20 had many more problems in terms of terrorism than before the agreement.
21 Q. Sir, my particular question to you was whether these agreements
22 affected the MUP in Kosovo. Did you understand that they affected the
23 MUP's activities in Kosovo?
24 A. This is what I'm trying to say but in a kind of reverse way. So
25 the MUP for the most part respected everything. Well, let's talk about
1 people, let's not talk about weapons --
2 Q. Sir, this is not my question to you. Let me move on to the next
3 question which is, were you aware that it was General Djordjevic who
4 negotiated for the MUP when these agreements were finalised with the
6 A. I am hearing this for the first time.
7 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. Now, there's also evidence in this
8 case that General Djordjevic was actively involved in the summer
9 offensive in Kosovo in 1998. And, in fact, General Djordjevic himself
10 testified here, and he said at page 10031 of the transcript:
11 "In 1998 when the situation was most difficult I was down there,
12 meaning Kosovo, all the time."
13 Now, sir, based on your own observations of General Djordjevic in
14 Kosovo, does that comport with what you observed in 1998?
15 A. I said that I saw Mr. Djordjevic, you know, there. I know that
16 Mr. Djordjevic -- yes, I saw him in the field. I know that
17 Mr. Djordjevic was in the staff too. I saw him at the staff as well. So
18 I know that Mr. Djordjevic was sitting in the office where I installed a
19 telephone that he would use. This was a town line, not a special line.
20 He had access to the staff, he could enter the staff whenever he wanted.
21 He could have, I don't know how to say, I mean, it's nothing disputable.
22 Mr. Djordjevic spent the bulk of his time touring the units.
23 Most of the time he spent also touring the secretariats. More or less
24 his stay there was approximately like that. In the staff itself at the
25 meetings, I don't know if he attending them. Well, I attended them
1 seldom myself, but I did used to see him there. I was still kind of
2 there, yes. I don't know exactly what to say to you about that. He was
3 in Kosovo in the capacity that he was in there.
4 As far as command and control, that was in General Lukic's hands.
5 If General Lukic permitted him to do any command and control, that was up
6 to General Lukic. That was a matter between the two of them, and that is
7 something that I don't know.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MS. PETERSEN: If we could just look at one exhibit. P699. Just
10 the first page of that.
11 Q. Now, if we could just look at the top of this, sir. Do you see
12 this is a dispatch from the MUP staff? It's incidents of the last 24
13 hours on 20th of April, 1999. And do you see at the top that this is
14 addressed to both the minister and to General Djordjevic? I'm just
15 asking at this point if you can see that?
16 A. Yes, I see it.
17 Q. Now, sir, were you aware that the dispatches that went up to the
18 ministry, that those were addressed both to the minister and to General
19 Djordjevic, that he also received these?
20 A. Yes, I see that. Well, this can be unclear to me because I know
21 that in the earlier period it just went to Stojiljkovic, and what this
22 here could possibly be that it possibly went to Djordjevic in the event
23 that Stojiljkovic was absent, perhaps that could be the justification. I
24 don't know what else it could be. Because if it was just for purposes of
25 information and if it was sent to Mr. Djordjevic, then there would be
1 enough reason to be sent to the other chiefs of administrations.
2 Q. Sir --
3 A. But this here could --
4 Q. Sir, you told us that you are not familiar with the content of
5 these dispatches. So why are you saying now that you know General
6 Djordjevic did not receive these at any time? Why would you know that?
7 You've told us that you are not familiar with the content of these.
8 A. No, I was never informed or familiar with the content. Never. I
9 was not interested in any of the dispatch contents.
10 Q. And, sir, I would put to you that there are other exhibits which
11 I will not go through now. I could, for the record, name P694, P698. I
12 won't go through those just to save time, but these also are addressed to
13 General Djordjevic. Is it your testimony you are not aware of that?
14 A. Yeah, I really don't know anything about that. I have never seen
15 them, no.
16 Q. Okay. So I just would like to return to P57, the last page, and
17 I don't even know that we need to go back to it, I think we can remember
18 this is the June 16th, 1998
19 says that the head of the staff shall report to the minister about his
20 own actions and the actions of the staff, et cetera.
21 Now, you testified, sir, that not only were you aware of this
22 point 3, but you testified that you were aware in practice that this is
23 how it happened; correct? That was your testimony?
24 A. Yes, correct.
25 Q. All right, sir. We have just gone through numerous things, all
1 of these after June 16th, 1998
2 Djordjevic after June of 1998 was actively involved on the ground in the
3 summer -- in that summer offensive in Kosovo. That he participated in
4 numerous meetings of the MUP staff in 1998, 1999, meetings where you were
5 not in attendance, that you were in attendance at a MUP staff meeting
6 where General Lukic said he had gone to Belgrade and met with both the
7 minister and General Djordjevic about the security situation in Kosovo
8 and the MUP in Kosovo, and General Djordjevic was also in charge of
9 negotiations for the MUP in October of 1998, another fact of which you
10 were not aware.
11 Sir, my question for you is: How do you have any knowledge or
12 basis with your lack of knowledge about the activities of Mr. Djordjevic
13 and what he was doing to say that this point number 3 in practice did
14 take effect? You can't say that, can you, sir?
15 A. All I can say is that Mr. Djordjevic did not take part in the
16 planning of actions. We are talking about a period when he was there,
17 before October. He did not participate in actions. Mr. Djordjevic for
18 the most part was with the units. Mostly with the units. I know that
19 for a fact, and the people -- on the basis of the people who were there
20 and who were with him, this was something that was talked about. When he
21 would come to a certain sector and visited the people who were there in
22 the trenches, this was a major thing. So this was something that was
23 talked about. I can say one thing, I'm under oath. I was at the staff
24 when the telephone would ring and the minister would reply or actually,
25 Mr. Djordjevic would answer the minister's call and then he would ask for
1 Mr. Lukic next to him. So you could not --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat what he is
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are details and he did not --
5 and for me as a clerk, this was something very strange. We were in the
6 room, Mr. Djordjevic, Mr. Lukic, and myself who was there for some reason
7 or other.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The entire witness's
9 answer was not interpreted because it was not very clear.
10 MS. PETERSEN: I see Mr. Popovic.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, you've got the picture. Yes. You may need
12 to retrace your steps a bit. Good luck.
13 MS. PETERSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Let's break this down a little bit. First you just said that,
15 "all I can say is Mr. Djordjevic did not take part in the planning of
16 actions." Since you yourself didn't take part in the planning of
17 actions, you don't know that, do you, sir?
18 A. Yes, that is true. But so when the action was being worked out
19 at the time I was at the staff. I was at the staff. When the action is
20 worked out, I get the plan first. I said that. So I am there and then I
21 should whether Mr. Djordjevic was inside or not, whether he had gone in
22 or had come out, and I didn't see him, and believe me, so the first
23 person who would receive a document about the completion of a planned
24 action was me. I think that this was -- this was definitely so.
25 Q. You would receive a map, correct, sir?
1 A. Correct. But I would receive the map inside. I would not
2 receive it outside. I would receive it inside, and I would be given it
3 by Mr. Mijatovic or some other colleague of his. He would explain to me
4 what it was about, and I would go. Thus, this was so. We can twist it
5 now this way or that way, but that's how it was.
6 Q. Sir, the main question is, I just went through with you a series
7 of things after June 16th, 1998
8 involved in Kosovo, participating in plans about Kosovo, negotiating on
9 behalf of the MUP with regards to Kosovo, all after June 16th, 1998 when
10 this document by the minister was signed. Many of those things you said
11 you were not aware of. So my question to you is simply: Because of your
12 lack of knowledge of Mr. Djordjevic's activities and doings, you can't
13 really say whether he was or was not out of the loop? You yourself don't
14 have that firsthand information; is that fair to say?
15 A. Yes, that is fair to say. I didn't say anything that I didn't
16 know, but the things that I do know, that I'm sure of, that's what I did
17 tell about, yes.
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, you've already testified that you were
19 not around General Lukic all the time. You didn't go to all of the
20 meetings with General Lukic that he went to, did you?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. Okay. And you didn't listen into his telephone calls, did you?
23 A. No.
24 Q. And you didn't review his telephone logs; correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Okay. So while you can tell us that he had a certain number of
2 conversations with Minister Stojiljkovic, you certainly can't say who
3 else he did or did not have conversations with at other times; correct?
4 A. I can say that he spoke with some other persons who were perhaps
5 not that important, but as far as co-operation of this kind, and we are
6 talking about situations that were delicate situations, these were
7 conversations. I was on a couple of occasions, or three occasions there
8 when the minister called. I picked up the phone because I was there to
9 hold that telephone. When somebody else comes, they continue and I go
10 off on my job, so that is the truth. It's also that's the truth that he
11 spoke with the minister, meaning talked and referred or reported about
12 the situation and the events in the field. It is true that always thus
13 any event that happened as far as terrorist attacks and such-like was
14 something that he had to inform him about first. That is certain. That
15 is for sure like that.
16 And now if somebody was on the other side instead of the
17 minister, just like I was there sometimes instead of Lukic, we can say
18 that perhaps some deputy minister was there, he could have conveyed
19 everything to the minister, but the minister could not tell me what I
20 should convey to Lukic in the same way.
21 Q. Sir, what I'm asking you is although you can say that you heard
22 Lukic talking to the minister on several occasions, you can't tell us
23 that Lukic never spoke to on the phone or communicated with in some other
24 way someone else, such as General Djordjevic? You couldn't represent
25 that, could you?
1 A. Of course not, of course I couldn't do that. Naturally I could
2 not do that.
3 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, you have testified that you weren't part
4 of the planning operations, you weren't part of the preparation for
5 operations, you didn't get reporting on operations afterwards, you
6 weren't familiar with the content of MUP dispatches, and, in fact, that
7 that didn't interest you. So my question to you was, is this: You've
8 testified that there was no plan to expel Albanians from Kosovo. If
9 there would have been such a plan, sir, it is not very likely that you
10 would have known about it; correct?
11 A. As far as such important things that were happening, there had to
12 have been some kind of staff meeting which would have to have been
13 attended by all because what we are talking about now is a very serious
14 matter. It could not have been at a staff meeting or something and to
15 have reached me from somewhere and to have been talked about. If
16 something like that did take place, I would have had to have been there
17 at the staff because this was a very important thing. This could have
18 been some kind of secret meeting, some secret agreement that we had to
19 have known about, and to have been able to implement it, but I really
20 don't know anything about it. Had this really been happening and we in
21 the staff didn't know anything about it, then that would be quite a
22 different matter.
23 Q. Well, sir, anti-terrorist operations were quite important; right?
24 A. The most important at the time.
25 Q. And you didn't participate in planning those; correct?
1 A. I didn't participate in the planning of those, in the
2 implementation of the, let's say, military operations, but I did know
3 what was going on in the field because I was there a number of times and
4 in the process of setting up radio communications I could follow what was
5 going on in the field as could the head of the staff in Pristina.
6 Q. And, sir, your focus was on whether the radio communications were
7 working; correct? Your focus, and, in fact, you've testified that you
8 were not interested in combat operations and the strategy of actions,
9 that was not of interest to you; correct?
10 A. Correct. But, as I said, I had to follow the functioning of the
11 entire radio network. For example, if they couldn't hear each other, it
12 was a problem I had to solve. If one was trying to call another who
13 couldn't hear him, and of course, I could overhear their conversations,
14 and it is only natural that some of it remained in my memory.
15 Q. All right, sir. But it's fair to say that you were not aware of
16 all of the plans of combat actions of the MUP, and in light of that, if
17 there would have been a plan to expel Albanians, it easily could have
18 slipped by you; fair to say?
19 A. I truly don't know of the existence of such a plan, but I do know
20 that an enormous amount of people during the bombings left the territory
21 of Kosovo and Metohija. I truly know that. Great many of them.
22 Especially in the Drim valley towards Kacanik and Macedonia. Also there
23 were many going towards Bujanovci and Presevo. There were other
24 inhabitants, Serbs, Roma, who left the territory of Kosovo
25 it wasn't very popular for officers to take their families out of Kosovo,
1 but civilians were fleeing en masse. It wasn't easy to be there as bombs
2 fell and refugee columns were struck. We can only discuss expulsions in
3 that context. This is how I see it. And amidst all that are for someone
4 to organise an operation to expel anyone, well, it wasn't necessary.
5 People started fleeing.
6 MS. PETERSEN: Just one second, Your Honours. Those are all the
7 questions that I have for the witness.
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Ms. Petersen.
9 Mr. Popovic, any re-examination?
10 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
11 Re-examination by Mr. Popovic:
12 Q. Mr. Cankovic, in your testimony you said you attended one meeting
13 of the MUP staff in its extended composition. However, as for the inner
14 staff meetings, how many such meetings did you have occasion to attend?
15 A. Well, there were many more such meetings. Many more.
16 Q. Thank you. During those meetings of the inner staff, could you
17 have drawn any conclusions about the functioning of the MUP staff in
18 Pristina and the way operations were planned and prepared?
19 A. At those meetings, it was mainly tasks that were issued. For
20 example, communications tasks to me, and the situation and the staff
21 itself was discussed for the most part.
22 Q. Thank you. My learned friend asked you how you knew of the plans
23 and operations that were implemented. I have this question of you: When
24 you received maps based on which you were supposed to set up
25 communication lines, what was shown there?
1 A. On those maps one could see the movements of the units which were
2 to take part in that particular anti-terrorist operation. Where I set up
3 communication lines, there were usually three, four, or up to six units
4 involved. They were indicated in red or blue indicating their axes of
5 movement, and one could conclude what the goal of that particular
6 operation was by looking at it.
7 Q. Thank you. I'd like to go back to General Djordjevic now. In
8 1998 when you saw him in the field and you said it was in Malisevo and
9 Jablanica, if I'm not mistaken, to your knowledge did he have any command
10 role in those operations?
11 A. General Djordjevic had no command role to play. He never used
12 our radio lines. He was never in any of our lists of call-signs. In
13 such a situation, he had to keep in touch with the staff. He was never
14 on any radio lines or communications, however, with the staff. This is
15 what I claim in full responsibility.
16 Q. Thank you. When you said that you saw General Djordjevic in the
17 MUP staff in Pristina in 1998, did you see him issue any orders to anyone
18 at the staff or in the staff?
19 A. I truly don't know. I don't know how he spent his time there. I
20 don't know. I know that there were no staff meetings at which
21 Mr. Djordjevic -- Mr. Djordjevic participated in terms of contributions
22 or as the head of such meetings. There were no such things. Maybe he
23 had some arrangements with Mr. Lukic, but at the meetings, the meetings
24 of the inner staff, he was never in charge of those.
25 Q. Thank you. You started discussing a certain event when the
1 minister called and Mr. Djordjevic picked up the phone. The interpreters
2 were unable to put that in the transcript. Could you please repeat your
3 description of that event.
4 A. It seemed unusual that the minister called and that his answer
5 was -- his phone call was answered by the chief of the sector. And that
6 they did not speak following that, but that the minister simply asked to
7 speak to the chief of the staff. And then they -- the chief of the
8 sector simply gave the receiver to the head of the staff, and following
9 that I left.
10 Q. Mr. Cankovic, you said you were present when Lukic called from
11 the staff to report to the minister. Were you ever present when
12 Mr. Lukic called Mr. Djordjevic from the staff premises?
13 A. I answered that question already, I believe, but I also said that
14 it wasn't completely impossible that he did so. In any case, I did not
15 hear it.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see P699.
18 Q. Mr. Cankovic, you were shown this document by my learned friend.
19 Look at the heading of this document, please. What is its title?
20 A. Survey of incidents, events, and intelligence of security
21 significance recorded in the period between 600 hours on 19 April to --
22 Q. 600 hours on 19 April to 600 hours on 20 April 1999. I'd like to
23 assist you since we are running out of time. Please look at item 1, what
24 does it say?
25 A. Attacks by NATO armed forces.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please go to page 2 now.
3 Q. Thank you. Mr. Cankovic, is there a subheading or a subtitle on
4 this page?
5 A. I don't see it.
6 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to page 3.
7 Q. Mr. Cankovic, what does item 2 say?
8 A. "Terrorist attacks."
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Let's go to the next page, please.
11 Q. Can you tell us what is the title of paragraph 3? Perhaps we can
12 zoom in. Thank you.
13 A. "Serious crimes committed."
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The next page. Please zoom in.
16 Q. What does paragraph 4 say?
17 A. "Persons of Albanian and other ethnic communities fleeing from
18 the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija."
19 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] The last page in the Serbian,
20 please, and I think this is the last page in the English version.
21 Q. What does paragraph 5 say?
22 A. "Other."
23 Q. Mr. Cankovic, in this survey of intelligence related events
24 concerning that date, is there any mention of terrorist activities?
25 A. No.
1 MR. POPOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours, this
2 concludes my redirect.
3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you Mr. Popovic
4 Questioned by the Court:
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I have very few questions, Mr. Cankovic. What
6 was your rank in 1999?
7 A. I was a captain, and I was retired as one.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And did you wear a uniform at the time?
9 A. I never wore a uniform because I always worked on such things
10 which would quickly destroy my uniform or make it extremely dirty.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. You testified about a meeting of the
12 Serbian government in Kosovo in 1999. When did this meeting with the
13 government take place?
14 A. That meeting was held on the 15th of January, 1999.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You told us that you had the opportunity to go
16 back to Belgrade
17 understand that correctly?
18 A. You did not. That was a joke made by my colleagues. I was
19 supposed to go to Belgrade
20 equipment, and I also had a free weekend. I was supposed to go the day
21 before, but I stayed another day because the prime minister was supposed
22 to arrive. As the chief of communications, I was supposed to be there in
23 particular for security reasons. Once they went to attend the meeting, I
24 headed towards Belgrade
25 could join the government on the plane back to Belgrade but, of course, I
1 couldn't. I was supposed to bring all the equipment along. Had it not
2 been for that, I may have been on that plane.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you, I missed obviously the word
4 "jokingly." Do you know where Mr. Djordjevic went after the meeting of
5 the government with the prime minister?
6 A. I actually can't say. Perhaps around 2.00 or 3.00 p.m., I headed
7 towards Belgrade
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you tell me where Mr. Djordjevic went after
9 the meeting of the government?
10 A. It wasn't meeting concerning the prime minister. Yes, they went
11 to attend the government session and then they had lunch together.
12 That's what was planned. As for what truly happened later on, I really
13 don't know. I don't know what the protocol was.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You don't know where Mr. Djordjevic went after
15 this event in Pristina?
16 A. No. I wasn't really interested in where the prime minister was
17 or --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: My last point, you qualified the event, the
19 incident in Podujevo just as a crime and not as an action. Are you aware
20 that there were at least two units of the SAJ were present just --
21 arrived just before the crime was committed and even more units of the
23 A. As for any units that were there, I could only have been aware of
24 that if their commander would come in requesting some additional
25 equipment or something of that sort. But as for my knowledge of any
1 units entering or leaving, that is something I really had nothing to do
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We've heard the evidence of one of the commanders
4 of the SAJ
5 on which axis his unit should move. You are not aware of that?
6 A. No, I am not.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can I conclude from your answer that you are not
8 aware of all orders issued in that way from the MUP staff by handing over
9 marked maps to you to convey them to the units?
10 A. I never handed over maps to the units. I received maps that I
11 was interested in, and these were usually excerpts, photocopies of
12 topographic maps. But I never handed over any maps to anyone, not even
13 as a mail person.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you know if the telephone communication from
15 Podujevo, from the OUP Podujevo to Belgrade was working that day?
16 A. No, I don't know that. I don't know whether the communication
17 line in Podujevo was in operation that day.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
19 JUDGE PARKER: That concludes the questions for you. Thank you
20 for your attendance here and for the assistance you have been able to
21 give, and you are now free to go back to your normal activities. When we
22 rise, a Court Officer will assist you from the courtroom.
23 The Chamber now adjourns until tomorrow at 2.15.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.
1 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th day of
2 April, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.