Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14362

 1                           Tuesday, 13 July 2010

 2                           [Prosecution Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Good morning.  We sit today to hear the final

 7     submissions in this case of the Prosecution.

 8             Mr. Stamp.

 9             MR. STAMP:  Thank you very much, Your Honours, and good morning.

10     For the record, I'm Chester Stamp, along with Ms. Daniela Kravetz and

11     Ms. Priya Gopalan for the Prosecution and Ms. Line Pedersen is our case

12     manager here to assist us today.

13             I suspect, Your Honours, that this is the last time that I will

14     be formally addressing you on my feet in this trial.  It is probably my

15     last appearance if all runs -- goes well, it will be.  And I think I

16     would like at the beginning to acknowledge some persons who participated

17     in the running of this case which for me at least personally has been a

18     very major event in my career as counsel.

19             It has been a year and a half since this case commenced.  It has

20     been a very efficient and fast-moving case, in my view, it's faster than

21     most.  And there are many persons, some here in court, some not here in

22     court, who assisted in making that happen.  I'd like to thank my

23     colleagues from the Prosecution side, the lawyers who appeared in court

24     before Your Honours and many other lawyers who did not appear in court

25     but were outside of court preparing the motion, researching, and doing

Page 14363

 1     what is necessary for us to come before you to present this case.

 2             We are also thankful to the support staffing of the OTP, the

 3     trial support section, the language assistants, investigators, analysts,

 4     and our interns.  We recently completed the job of putting together a

 5     pre-trial brief [sic] in which we tried to discuss most of the important

 6     evidence in this case, thousands of exhibits and a couple hundred

 7     witnesses, and many of them worked way into the night and into the

 8     mornings to get it before the Court on time and in very good order and in

 9     very good shape I hope Your Honours will find.

10             We could not have proceeded, Your Honours, without the work or

11     the assistance of those who work in court, in the language booths.  They

12     had to put up with lawyers who spoke too fast.  It seems most times that

13     I was the most culpable or the one who received the most complaints.

14     They had to put up with overall emotional witnesses and their work is

15     much appreciated.  The court reporters who recorded the proceedings and

16     produced a transcript so we could review them early.  Those in the

17     technical booth also have to be acknowledged because they have assisted

18     us to manage and to use the high level of technology that we have

19     available with us in court.  And the members of the Victims and Witnesses

20     Section, the Registry in total.  We appreciate their work and I make

21     special mention of those who have worked with us in court as well as

22     those at the Victims and Witnesses Section.  Without the witnesses

23     coming, the trial could not proceed and they worked efficiently to bring

24     the witnesses to The Hague so we could move smoothly and to attend to

25     them, attend to their comfort, while they were here in The Hague.

Page 14364

 1             I'd like to acknowledge counsel and the parties on the other

 2     side.  In the course of this case, they have always been very

 3     professional in the way they related to us when we had to work together.

 4     And finally, I'd like to thank the Chamber for the manner in which you

 5     have conducted the trial and the kind courtesies that you have extended

 6     to us.

 7             I don't know if counsel should have too much useful to say to the

 8     Court after a trial that is so long.  If we haven't presented the

 9     evidence over a year and a half clearly enough for the Court to seize our

10     case, then perhaps it's -- it might be a little bit too late to do

11     anything about that.  However, I'll try my best, Your Honours, to make or

12     to deal with one or two issues I think or to -- of importance, go to the

13     core of what Your Honours have to consider as you evaluate the evidence.

14     And I will not deal with the evidence in too much detail.  I think that

15     has been dealt with quite comprehensively in the Prosecution's final

16     trial brief and I hope not to and don't intend to repeat that too much.

17     I will just deal with a couple of core issues and I will spend some time

18     dealing with some matters raised in the Defence brief which I believe

19     ought to be met by the Prosecution and before we rest.

20             Your Honours, having failed to resolve the issue of non-violent

21     and violent separatism on the part of the majority Kosovo Albanians in

22     Kosovo and as conditions for continued Serbian rule deteriorated in

23     Kosovo, the leadership of the FRY and Serbia, including politicians,

24     military figures, and the police leadership embarked on a plan to modify

25     the ethnic balance in Kosovo in order to ensure continued Serbian control

Page 14365

 1     over that province.  This objective was impossible to achieve without

 2     resorting to criminal means, that is the forcible expulsion of a

 3     substantial part of the Kosovo Albanian population.  Those criminal means

 4     took the form of a widespread and systematic campaign of terror and

 5     violence directed at the Kosovo Albanian population.  Various persons,

 6     command structures, and entities played different but complementary roles

 7     in the execution of the plan and the public security sector of the

 8     Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, which the accused commanded, had a

 9     vital role to play.

10             This trial, Your Honours, is not about the crimes of the KLA.

11     There were crimes committed on both sides.  It is neither about the

12     larger political issues of the independence or separatism of Kosovo.

13     These are relevant but ancillary issues.  This case is about the

14     liability of one of the principal persons responsible for this planned

15     campaign involving specific crimes charged in the indictment.

16             During this case we have heard witnesses and seen documents that

17     revealed Mr. Djordjevic's position and authority at the apex of the

18     public security sector of the MUP and his actions and conduct in that

19     capacity which were in support of the plan.  The Defence asserts - and

20     this is one of the main issues in this trial - and they do so at

21     paragraph 311 of the brief and throughout the case that there was no

22     common plan, that the evidence does not amount to an organised campaign

23     but of isolated incidents perpetrated by random individuals.  That's what

24     they've said in the brief.  This, Your Honours, is an attempt to minimise

25     and localise the crimes that the Chamber have to consider.  The plan to

Page 14366

 1     expel the Kosovar Albanian population or a substantial portion thereof

 2     and to prevent their return is borne-out by the scale of the crimes and

 3     the pattern of the crimes, which is discussed at the -- in the final

 4     trial brief of the Prosecution from paragraphs 458.  Approximately

 5     800.000 Kosovar Albanians were expelled, thousands murdered in less than

 6     three months in this relatively small geographical area.

 7             One can readily perceive the organised pattern from the

 8     crime-base evidence, that is, the evidence of the victims who survived

 9     and the observers on the ground.  That is what I refer to as crime-base

10     evidence.  Typically there were joint VJ and MUP assaults on village --

11     villages and population centres, and the Kosovo Albanian population was

12     expelled through violence and threats of violence and other persecutory

13     acts.  Often the personal identification cards were confiscated and

14     destroyed and their homes destroyed to prevent their return.  Sometimes

15     groups of them, mostly men, were separated from the fleeing populace and

16     killed.  The Kosovar Albanian population was thoroughly terrorised and

17     this resulted in further mass exodus.  The evidence reveals, Your Honour,

18     that practically the same pattern of expulsions was occur -- or were

19     occurring at disparate locations throughout Kosovo and Metohija.  It is

20     submitted, respectfully, that the crime-base evidence considered in its

21     entirety is sufficient to prove that there was a widespread and

22     systematic campaign.

23             In addition to this, a finding that there was a widespread and

24     systematic campaign against Kosovar Albanian population is confirmed by

25     the evidence of the clandestine transportation of the bodies of over 800

Page 14367

 1     Kosovar Albanian persons to Serbia proper and their concealment in mass

 2     graves.  The bodies that were transported to Serbia and buried there to

 3     cover up the crimes is, Your Honour -- Your Honours, unchallenged

 4     evidence.  And the Chamber is entitled to draw certain inferences from

 5     this unchallenged evidence.  Some of them are pretty obvious, including

 6     one that the remains of these victims or these persons were the remains

 7     of persons who were victims of murder and that the parties who organised

 8     this transshipment and concealment were aware that they were murder

 9     victims and not combatants or victims of the accidental killings but

10     murder victims.  There must have been awareness of that.  And the parties

11     who organised this transshipment and concealment were conscious of their

12     guilt or their participation in these murders; that is, these weren't

13     killings that arose from the activities of the KLA, for example, or

14     ordinary crime.  The reasons why the bodies were moved so far and so much

15     resource and effort was put in place to move over 800 bodies, hundreds of

16     miles to be concealed in mass graves must have been because the persons

17     involved in the movement were responsible for these killings.  And it is

18     obvious also, I think, that this was the result of high-level planning

19     and organisation.  It is manifest that an operation to ship so many

20     bodies so far involving so many people must have been planned very

21     carefully and from a high level.

22             These points again have been set out and the evidence in support

23     of these points have been also been set out in the final trial brief, but

24     these, it is submitted, are clear inferences that the Court is entitled

25     to draw from the mere fact of the transport of these bodies, which is

Page 14368

 1     evidence that has not been and indeed cannot be challenged.

 2             Another incident -- inference can be drawn from this evidence,

 3     Your Honours, an inference and the Prosecution submits the sure inference

 4     is that the murders were the consequence of a planned campaign.  The

 5     sheer scale and number of the victims is proof enough by itself, but this

 6     is not the only aspect that the transshipment of the bodies establishes.

 7     Careful analysis of the forensic evidence in its entirety of Sterenberg,

 8     the forensic archaeologist, the DNA evidence from the ICMP and Dr. Alonso

 9     from the Madrid forensic institute, the evidence of Dr. Baraybar, the

10     forensic anthropologist and the OMPF list of missing persons establishes

11     that the human remains of Kosovar Albanians found at the mass graves in

12     Serbia were from many different crimes committed at many different places

13     committed at many different times.  The bodies came from a multitude of

14     crime sites all over Serbia -- all over Kosovo, I beg your pardon.  And

15     this is overwhelming evidence, it is submitted, of a planned, widespread

16     and systematic campaign, not merely random killings.  If it were random,

17     the persons involved in the transit and concealment of the bodies would

18     not know where to gather all of these bodies from all of these crimes.

19     Your Honours, what I'm saying is that these bodies that were found in

20     Serbia were not the -- did not arise from one, two, or three incidents

21     and they were gathered up and hidden, but there were many incidents

22     spreading all over Kosovo, right through the indictment period of

23     reported killings and murders, where all these bodies were gathered up

24     and taken and concealed in Serbia.  So it proves more than just scale.

25     It proves more than just planning.  It proves, it is submitted by the

Page 14369

 1     Prosecution, knowledge of these various murders.

 2             P815, that is Exhibit P815, comprises exhumation reports by

 3     Sterenberg on behalf of the International Commission of Missing Persons,

 4     the ICMP.  It details the process of exhumations of the three mass graves

 5     at Batajnica, Petrovo Selo and Bajina Basta in the area of Lake Perucac

 6     in Serbia where remains of these Kosovar Albanians were found.  It tells

 7     us that 705 bodies or body parts from 705 individuals at least were found

 8     at Batajnica, 75 at Petrovo Selo, and 48 at Bajina Basta.

 9             Following DNA analysis conducted by the ICMP and Dr. Alonso in

10     Madrid, the vast majority of these human remains were identified and the

11     ICMP provided us with those -- with the lists of the persons identified

12     which is contained in P818, which I think is before on the screen.  And

13     it lists the hundreds of persons whose bodies were identified from the

14     mass graves in Serbia.  I'll just -- if we could we just look at one

15     page, perhaps.  There are over 600 -- I think it lists 650 persons,

16     Kosovo Albanians, whose bodies were found in this grave.  We heard the

17     evidence about the Suva Reka massacre from Shyhrete, Hysni Berisha and

18     Hebib Berisha.  These are some of them who were found years later,

19     including babies, at Batajnica.

20             After the completion of the identification procedure, the bodies

21     were returned to the families by the United Nations mission in Kosovo and

22     the cases closed were applicable.  P477 is a consolidated list of persons

23     reported missing in Kosovo to the ICRC, that's International Commission

24     of the Red Cross and other international organisations which was

25     consolidated by the UN Office of Missing Persons and Forensic, the OMPF.

Page 14370

 1     And importantly, when the ICRC and other bodies recorded the information

 2     or the reports of the disappearance of these persons in Kosovo, they also

 3     recorded the dates when these persons were recorded as having disappeared

 4     and the location of the event where the persons were reported to have

 5     disappeared from.  I just put it on the screen to remind the Court of

 6     this document which is in evidence.  You will see in the columns fourth

 7     from right or fifth from right, the date of the event and the location of

 8     the event where the persons on this list disappeared from.  The names on

 9     this list, the ICRC list -- the OMPF list of unaccounted persons includes

10     many of those whose remains were identified in mass graves in Serbia, and

11     it demonstrates, Your Honours, that the murders and the violence in

12     Kosovo and Metohija were not random, isolated events but were the result

13     of the execution of a plan.

14             And to give the Chamber a better idea of the widespread and

15     systematic nature of the crimes and the cover-up, I have merged these two

16     exhibits, that is, I have merged the ICMP list of identified victims

17     found in the three mass graves in Serbia with the information from the

18     OMPF and the ICRC, showing the location of the events and the dates of

19     the disappearance.  And before you now, Your Honours, there is a

20     consolidated spreadsheet.  Happily, the ICRC and OMPF lists were

21     submitted in evidence in spreadsheet formats so the Chamber would be able

22     to do much of what I propose to do.

23             This spreadsheet only includes those cases where the remains were

24     recovered for the mass graves in Serbia and those -- and who were

25     identified and the locations and places where they were killed and

Page 14371

 1     disappeared or disappeared were recorded.  And what I've done first is

 2     assort the sheet by the place of the event of the disappearance of these

 3     victims.  These are persons, I remind the Court, who were found -- or

 4     whose remains were found at Batajnica.  If we look at this, scroll down,

 5     we see a variety of places, Cabrat, Dardania, Pec, Djakovica, many of

 6     these found at Batajnica, Izbica, Skenderaj, Pec, Kacanik, Kosovo Polje,

 7     Landovica, Ljubanic, Pec, Meja.  There will of course be many from Meja

 8     because in one particular incident on the 27th of April, 1999, at least

 9     300 men weaponry murdered and disappeared.  Their bodies, this shows were

10     found, at Batajnica.

11             People from the village of Ramoc, Djakovica, Slovinje.  We heard

12     a lot of evidence about people being expelled and murdered in these

13     places.

14             If we were to represent what we see here on a map, and this is

15     Annex C, we can't represent each individual killing but we can represent

16     the concentrations of the killings, we see that the bodies found in

17     Serbia came from right across -- from incidents that were reported to

18     have occurred right across Kosovo.  There ought to have a bigger circle

19     to the south of the map to represent the Suva Reka massacre, but the

20     Suva Reka massacre on the 25th of March, for some reason, was not

21     reported to the ICRC so it does not come up on their list.  So that

22     massacre is not represented here.  The ICRC list, Your Honours, is not

23     exhaustive.  This just indicates some of the murders and we can have an

24     idea of the spread.

25             Another important matter which the ICRC list can assist the Court

Page 14372

 1     with if we analyse it on a spreadsheet is the spread, if we sort it by

 2     the date of the killings or the date of the disappearances, we see that

 3     the persons whose bodies were found in Serbia were killed over a long

 4     period of time right through the indictment period.  March, we could

 5     probably go quickly; April, different dates in April, different dates in

 6     March; May, different dates; 8th of June; and we see one at the bottom,

 7     7th of July.  So I should advise the Court that that one is in the ICRC

 8     records, a disappearance which -- but I take it Your Honours would

 9     understand that in records of this nature that the ICRC would keep -- the

10     odd error would creep in.  It does not affect the substance of the

11     records in respect to the killings.  One error -- I think an error was

12     made in recording the date, does not affect the record in respect to

13     thousands of people.

14             So, Your Honour, this is not merely, as the Defence suggested in

15     their brief, a massive criminal enterprise, but it is also one of

16     significant complexity.  And the recovery and transshipment of the bodies

17     from so many crimes committed at so many or on so many occasions could

18     only have been achieved, it is submitted respectfully, if there was

19     knowledge of these crimes and high-level planning and management.

20             The parties who organised the collection and transfer and

21     concealment of these bodies in Serbia must have had knowledge of these

22     murders as they were ongoing.  The collection of the remains of the

23     victims of murder committed on so many different days at these disparate

24     places is clear evidence, it is submitted, of planning and organisation

25     and also of knowledge of the ongoing killings because only persons with

Page 14373

 1     the knowledge of the killings from these various places where they

 2     occurred would have been able to carry this out.

 3             And the Prosecution submit respectfully that the forensic

 4     evidence viewed broadly and in its totality entitles the Court to make

 5     this finding as a safe and sure finding, not only that it was widespread

 6     and systematic but that it was planned.

 7             The Defence said at paragraph 308 of its brief that it defies

 8     logic that there was a plan, but it is submitted, Your Honours, that this

 9     forensic evidence in reality shows that there could be no other logical

10     and reasonable explanation but that there was a plan.

11             There is, if I could move on, an additional question the Chamber

12     could grapple with and it is whether or not there was just a campaign of

13     killings or of persecutions or whether these organised killings,

14     obviously systematic, were also related to the deportations which the

15     Prosecution alleges is the motivation for all of these crimes that were

16     committed against the Kosovar Albanians.  The Prosecution submits that

17     the answer to this question could only be yes and that it is a certain

18     and safe conclusion, that if these murders fell within an organised

19     scheme then the related deportations were also organised and planned.

20             Many of the victims, including those referred to in the ICMP

21     report including whose remains were found in mass graves, disappeared

22     from places and at times where according to the evidence tendered in the

23     trials there were mass expulsions of Kosovar Albanians.

24             If we -- and we could look through, and I invite the Court to do

25     so, look through the column for group disappearances and if we sort that

Page 14374

 1     by place, these are when the reports of groups having been killed, we see

 2     that many of them occurred in places where there were massive

 3     deportations of Kosovo Albanians.  And if we -- once you scroll down for

 4     group deportations you see Izbica, the Izbica killings, massive

 5     deportations.  The striking one of course is always Meja because there

 6     were so many persons killed in the Meja incident, but the evidence of the

 7     people who were witnesses to the Meja incident, particularly Pnishi, I

 8     hope I got his name right Martin Pnishi, Dedaj, and Nike Peraj told of

 9     massive deportations that were associated with the murders that occurred

10     there.  And I'll return briefly to the Meja incident when I come to

11     discuss the crime base.

12             But for the time being if I could just remind the Court that the

13     victims of Meja were found at Batajnica.

14             As we are speaking about deaths and evidence of killings,

15     Your Honours, if we could look briefly at Annex C to the -- well, to the

16     proof of death chart, which is annexed to the Prosecution pre-trial brief

17     [sic].  The proof of death chart refers to evidence relevant only to the

18     named victims of murder incidents that are specifically charged in the

19     indictment.  The other lists which I just went through deals with -- one

20     list deals with all of the identified victims from the mass graves in

21     Serbia, and the other list, the ICRC list deals with all of the reports

22     that they receive in respect to disappearances.  The proof of death chart

23     is more narrow and more specific.  It just deals with the names of those

24     who are specifically listed in the indictment for the specific count of

25     murder.  The remains of some of these victims, however, were found in the

Page 14375

 1     mass graves in Serbia, Suva Reka, in Schedule D of the indictment were

 2     found at Batajnica, Izbica; in Schedule F were found at both Batajnica

 3     and at Petrovo Selo; and most of the Meja victims were found at Batajnica

 4     and Meja is Schedule H.

 5             The chart, Your Honour, consolidates in one place for easy

 6     reference by the Chamber the evidence in respect to each of these named

 7     victims.  It is not evidence, but we proffer it as part of the final

 8     submissions, and I think it can assist the Court in locating the forensic

 9     evidence referred to each of the deceased persons insofar as proof of

10     these specific charges of murder in the indictment is required.  And it

11     includes forensic evidence in respect to the examination of those human

12     remains and also the identification evidence, mainly DNA evidence and to

13     some degree the evidence of the murder of these persons.  The proof of

14     death chart is not on the screen.  I think this is the ICRC chart.  When

15     one scrolls through this, one will see that many of the victims or most

16     of the victims were men, which is consistent with the viva voce testimony

17     before the Court, that in the course of these expulsions men were taken

18     away and shot while the rest of the population was expelled.

19             The evidence reveals, as Dr. Baraybar testified, that the vast

20     majority of the scheduled victims of murder whose remains were recovered

21     in a state that was susceptible to forensic examination died from

22     gun-shot wounds inflicted on persons who were not engaged in combat.

23     These were murder victims.  Baraybar and his team used the most advanced

24     methodology of forensic anthropology to reach these conclusions as the

25     state of decomposition in many of these bodies was far advanced.

Page 14376

 1             There has been some challenge in the course of the trial as to

 2     whether or not Dr. Baraybar and his team could make findings on the cause

 3     of death, having regard to the state of these human remains.

 4             Dr. Baraybar testified before the Court and he told the Court

 5     about the modern techniques available in his field to review human

 6     remains, particularly bones, and to come to forensic conclusions.  I

 7     respectfully invite the Chamber to review the proof of death chart, and

 8     where there is evidence from viva voce witnesses as well as forensic

 9     evidence in respect to a killing or the cause of death, it will become

10     readily apparent to the Court that evidence of the crime-base witnesses

11     with particular killings is materially consistent with the forensic

12     evidence of Dr. Baraybar as well as the evidence presented through

13     Dr. Baccard.

14             I turn now to the issue of the individual criminal liability of

15     the accused as a participant in the plan.

16             So the Prosecution submits, Your Honours, there -- that the

17     evidence establishes that there was a widespread and systematic campaign

18     that was planned, there was a joint criminal enterprise.  And it is in

19     the nature of things that this joint criminal enterprise could not have

20     been effected without the participation of the police.  Mr. Djordjevic 's

21     knowledge and conduct at all relevant times, as proven by the evidence,

22     establishes his liability as a participant in this plan and also for

23     aiding and abetting the perpetrators of the crimes charged.

24             The evidence discussed in the Prosecution's final trial brief

25     establishes that he knowingly made significant contributions to the joint

Page 14377

 1     criminal enterprise and assisted in the commission of the crimes by,

 2     among other things, participating in the arming of non-Albanian civilians

 3     and disarming Albanian villages; participating in the co-ordination of

 4     joint VJ/MUP operations through the Joint Command and the command

 5     structure of the police; and in these operations crimes were committed.

 6     He authorised, along with Minister Stojiljkovic, the use of paramilitary

 7     groups and volunteers, particularly, particularly, the Skorpions which

 8     committed many of the crimes charged.  And he, most tellingly, played a

 9     leading role in concealing the crime of murder, concealing the bodies

10     that were located in the mass graves in Serbia.

11             He acted in concert with other persons named in the indictment,

12     but primarily with the minister of interior, Minister Stojiljkovic.

13     Your Honours, although the Defence, particularly the accused in his

14     testimony, would invite the Court to come to a view that there was

15     tension and disagreement between the accused and his minister at the

16     relevant time and the accused was not in agreement and was not a willing

17     participant in the acts and conduct that led to the police participation

18     in these crimes, it is submitted, Your Honour, that a full examination of

19     the evidence discloses that they worked together, they fit together like

20     hand in glove.

21             And without reviewing all the evidence that we have pointed out,

22     I would respectfully just refer the Court to one series of dispatches by

23     both of them which demonstrates the point that these were not men working

24     and pulling in opposite directions, but they were pulling together.

25             If we look at P85.  This is a very important exhibit,

Page 14378

 1     Your Honours.  This is a record of a meeting of the 17th of February

 2     where the plans for the operations during which many of the crimes that

 3     we are -- we have to consider were committed were discussed.  Present at

 4     the meeting was the minister, as one can see; and immediately before him,

 5     the accused, Mr. Djordjevic.  And if we move to page 3, we see at the end

 6     of his presentation the minister issues the following tasks.  It reads:

 7             "Our forthcoming tasks are as follows ..."

 8             And in the middle of those bullet points, he says:

 9             "Approach and engage volunteers carefully, linking their

10     engagement through the reserve police force when assessed as necessary."

11             The next day, on the 18th of February, 1999, Mr. Djordjevic

12     issued the dispatch which is P356.  We have the front page before us.  If

13     we could move on.  We see him at item 7 saying:

14             "Through intensified intelligence and other measures and actions,

15     carry out necessary checks, complete lists, and establish complete

16     control over volunteer and paramilitary units and their members."

17             And if we could go back to the front page of this dispatch, this

18     is dispatch number 312 of the 18th of February, 1999.  The plans having

19     been made at around that period -- we move to the 24th of March, 1999,

20     when the -- they were about to be executed.  And if we could look at

21     P702, which is a dispatch by the minister.  And in the first paragraph of

22     that document we see the minister says:

23             "It is necessary to intensify the enforcement of measures that

24     were ordered as per our dispatch number 312 of the 18th of February,

25     1999."

Page 14379

 1             Clearly, Your Honours, in regard to the engagement of

 2     paramilitaries and volunteers, something that led to enormous crimes,

 3     Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Stojiljkovic were pulling in the same direction.

 4     It was their dispatch, 312.  Having referred to their dispatch, although

 5     it was signed by Djordjevic, but their dispatch, the minister says:

 6             From that dispatch "you are to enforce in particular the

 7     following measures: "

 8             Look at paragraph 5:

 9             "You shall register all volunteer and paramilitary units and

10     their members and keep them under control in case that you might need to

11     engage them."

12             This seems to have presented some problems for the Defence in

13     writing their pre-trial brief [sic] because I notice their final brief.

14     At paragraphs 102 to 104, they tried to explain away the clear meaning of

15     these words, or I think it's a matter that they have given up trying to

16     explain away the clear meaning of these words.  Some Defence witnesses,

17     insiders, subordinates of Mr. Djordjevic, came to tell us that the words

18     he used and the words the minister used did not mean that they were

19     planning to engage paramilitaries and volunteers.  Well, we expect that

20     from those witnesses.

21             But what the Defence has argued in their pre-trial brief [sic]

22     now is that the minister was doing one thing and Mr. Djordjevic was doing

23     something else.  They say at paragraph 102 that Djordjevic's order, the

24     one that he signed, was aimed at preventing paramilitary and volunteer

25     units from gathering and operating; conversely, the minister was

Page 14380

 1     instructing that former volunteer units could possibly be admitted if

 2     they met the requirements.  Djordjevic, they say, was preventing; the

 3     minister was enabling.

 4             Well, Your Honours, respectfully, that just doesn't wash.  The

 5     minister -- the minister's dispatch of whom the first addressee, the man

 6     at the top of the list, was Mr. Djordjevic, speaks of "our" dispatch and

 7     says to enforce in particular "our" instructions.  So they weren't

 8     pulling in different directions; they were part of the same team, members

 9     of the joint criminal enterprise.

10             That Mr. Djordjevic participated in acts that furthered the joint

11     criminal enterprise, Your Honours, I respectfully submit, is beyond

12     dispute.  He participated in the engagement of the Skorpions; that is

13     admitted.  We see these documents of him facilitating the engagement of

14     paramilitaries.  He was involved and admitted that he hid or participated

15     in concealing several truck-loads, I think at least six truck-loads of

16     bodies of up to 8 -- beyond 800 in Serbia.  And these are the bodies of

17     victims of the crimes that we charge.  So his participation or acts and

18     conduct that participated to the JCE, it is submitted, are beyond issue

19     in this case.

20             The interesting point or one interesting point in the case and

21     his state of mind, knowledge; when he was doing all of these things, what

22     did he know.  The essence of Mr. Djordjevic's defence is that he had no

23     command responsibility for the police in Kosovo.  I think we have

24     dispatched that one in the pre-trial brief [sic], and I won't be

25     repeating those arguments here.  He had the power, he had the command

Page 14381

 1     over them.  He had no command responsibilities for those police he's

 2     saying, at least those engaged in the anti-terrorist actions.  He's

 3     saying that he did nothing to contribute to the JCE.  I think,

 4     Your Honours, that it is clear that the opposite is true.  And mainly

 5     he's saying that insofar as there were crimes committed, he, as the chief

 6     of police, did nothing because apart from the Podujevo incident he knew

 7     nothing about these crimes.  That is the pith and gravamen of his

 8     defence.  When I did what I did, I knew nothing about these crimes

 9     specifically, I knew nothing or I knew not that these crimes were

10     ongoing.

11             One of the questions for the Chamber, Your Honour, is this:  If

12     you accept that there was a campaign, a widespread and systematic

13     campaign of violence, including murders against the Kosovo Albanians with

14     the hundreds of killings and expulsions, did Mr. Djordjevic as chief of

15     the regular police of the country have a duty to act to protect the

16     safety of the endangered population and did he discharge his duty to act

17     in that way or did he, on the other hand, knowingly act to assist and

18     support the campaign?  The Prosecution says that not only did he fail in

19     his duty to protect the endangered population, but he actively

20     participated in facilitating the commission of the crimes.  One of the

21     critical elements in answering this question is, as I indicated, an

22     analysis of his state of mind at the relevant time.  Because if he knew

23     that the crimes were being committed or would be committed when he acted

24     as he did, particularly in concealing the bodies, he's liable for

25     contributing to the joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting

Page 14382

 1     their commission.

 2             The accused elected to testify; that's his right.  He probably

 3     did so having regard to his rank as chief of the regular police and it

 4     was thought that he needed to explain certain things that he did.  The

 5     Prosecution does not say that he has any obligation to prove or disprove

 6     anything, but he has raised a defence and it is for the Trial Chamber to

 7     evaluate his testimony and to make of it what you think fit.  His defence

 8     primarily is that he knew not.

 9             In evaluating his testimony, Your Honours, I ask you to bear in

10     mind that the accused is a trained lawyer who spent 30 years in the

11     police force, the last part of which he was in a very powerful position

12     as an assistant minister and chief of the public security section.  He

13     said when he testified that at the relevant time he was aware in general

14     terms that there may have been crimes committed somewhere, as every war

15     is accompanied by crime.  But apart from Podujevo, he never became aware

16     of specific allegations during the indictment period.  He told you,

17     Your Honours, further that he never became aware of specific allegations

18     during the remainder of 1999.  He told Your Honours that he never became

19     aware of the allegations against the police force in Kosovo in the year

20     2000.  In his testimony, Your Honours, he told you that in the year 2001

21     he did not become aware of the allegations against the police force in

22     Kosovo.  He said specifically he did not even know about the Suva Reka

23     massacre, a crime for which ultimately a SUP chief would be charged,

24     until many years later when the persons were charged in Belgrade.  He

25     never knew about the Mala Krusa massacre of scores of people which was

Page 14383

 1     published in the international press at the time and was subject to the

 2     indictment made public in May 1999 against his boss, Mr. Stojiljkovic.

 3     He never knew about it until 2003 when he got the indictment against him.

 4     That is what he told you.  And Your Honours will have to consider whether

 5     or not you believe that, whether or not, to put it unforensically,

 6     whether you can buy that, whether it evokes in your mind reasonable

 7     doubt.  That perhaps is the best way to put it.

 8             Stojiljkovic was indicted for these crimes in 1999, 1999, May

 9     1999.  He was burying bodies with Stojiljkovic in May 1999 and he tells

10     the Court that those crimes that Stojiljkovic was indicted for, he did

11     not know about them until 2003.

12             I remind the Court that the bodies found in Batajnica from the

13     evidence were of persons killed right up until the end of May 1999.  I'm

14     reminded that the president of the country, Milosevic, was extradited to

15     The Hague to stand trial for some of these charges that he says he never

16     heard about until 2003.  Your Honours, I assume that any interested

17     party, any interested party in the world knew about these crimes and it

18     is beyond belief that the former police chief of the country did not know

19     about these crimes.  It is beyond belief that when he did what he did he

20     did it in complete ignorance of these crimes.

21             Your Honours, if I may respectfully again go unforensic.  I ask

22     the Court not to buy that.  He could not have participated as he did and

23     become so deeply involved without knowledge of what he was doing.  And,

24     Your Honours, as a matter of fact that doesn't fit the type of persona

25     that all the senior police officers who testified described him as, all

Page 14384

 1     internationals who knew him described him as, as a leader of strong

 2     decisive personality.  That doesn't fit that he would be engaged in these

 3     huge crimes of concealing bodies or -- acts, call it that, of concealing

 4     bodies in complete ignorance.

 5             When he testified, Your Honours, it was to explain the evidence,

 6     uncontrovertible evidence, as to what he did.  And he was asked some

 7     questions, he was asked to explain some things, and in the course of his

 8     testimony I submit and I ask you to find, because he could not answer

 9     satisfactorily primarily questions about what he knew, he resorted to a

10     defence or a claim that he acted under duress.  He found himself in a

11     situation where it became difficult to explain how he could have done

12     what he did and not know what he was doing, and eventually said:  Well, I

13     did it because I was -- I feared for my life.  He said I -- that he acted

14     as he did because he was afraid for his life because of what he

15     understood to be a serious threat from the minister.

16             He does not know the minister to be a dangerous man, but he knows

17     Serbia to be a dangerous country.  This is the police chief giving

18     evidence to you.  He says dangerous things were happening in Serbia at

19     the time and he felt afraid because he understood the minister to be

20     threatening him.  Your Honours, he tried to explain his conduct and his

21     state of mind to the Court for over one week in his evidence in chief

22     when he was being asked questions by counsel for the Defence, and he was

23     asked many times about his motivation for doing what he did and not once

24     did he say it was because he was afraid.

25             He wrote a letter in June 2004 to the "Nedeljni Telegraf," this

Page 14385

 1     is P1474.  And it spent pages explaining his motivations.  He did not say

 2     that he did what he did because he felt threatened for his life.  He

 3     addressed this Court in his opening speech in January 2009 and he

 4     discussed his motivations for doing what he did, for burying these murder

 5     victims and concealing the crime of murder.  He did not say then that he

 6     did it because he was afraid for his life.  So Your Honours would have to

 7     consider whether he said that during cross-examination because he was

 8     being asked hard questions and he reached a point where he could not

 9     explain why he did it and he could not explain his state of mind.

10             Besides, Your Honours, we see from the evidence which is

11     discussed in the closing brief that there were some events in October

12     2000, and he claimed that he was threatened not only by the minister but

13     by two assistant ministers and they tried to force him to resign and they

14     tried to get him to do certain acts that he thought would endanger

15     Serbian lives and he refused, refused to comply with what the minister

16     ordered him to do.  That evidence is important for two things, it shows

17     that he could refuse, he could stand up and say no and not commit crimes;

18     but it also shows, Your Honours, that the minister as the political boss

19     of the Ministry of the Interior could not use the police without the

20     participation of Mr. Djordjevic.  That is why he had to resign when he

21     refused to do what the minister told him to do.  They wanted him to

22     resign, to put in somebody in his place who would comply.  That is the

23     most or among the most telling evidence of his power, the power invested

24     in him as chief of the public security sector.  The minister couldn't use

25     the police without him.

Page 14386

 1             And we see also that even in the Defence brief at paragraph 582

 2     to 583, even the Defence argues that when Djordjevic couldn't put up with

 3     the shipment of the bodies anymore, he merely told the minister that it

 4     had to stop and it stopped.  That is a concession from the Defence.  So

 5     the defence, if you call it that, of duress of what he did doesn't wash.

 6     He knew what he was doing, Your Honours, and he was acting to further the

 7     joint criminal enterprise.

 8             The Defence at paragraph 427 of the brief alleges that

 9     Mr. Djordjevic sought to investigate the issues of bodies even after the

10     war, but the minister prevented him - they said "prevented him," as if

11     the minister could force him, could coerce him.  Again, that type of

12     argumentation has no foundation on the evidence, and it is rebutted by

13     the fact that Mr. Djordjevic remained in office for many months after the

14     minister was removed from office.  And in that period of time when the

15     minister was out of the way, he did none of the things that he admitted

16     he ought to have done but did not do.

17             Your Honours, I submit respectfully that that -- the evidence

18     shows that he played a voluntary role in furthering these offences.  He

19     acted wilfully and voluntarily with knowledge, not under duress, not

20     under coercion.

21             The Trial Chamber is entitled to find that his participation in

22     the concealment of the bodies was voluntary.  A Judge of fact can infer

23     knowledge and intent from the voluntary conduct of an accused person.

24             The Trial Chamber is entitled to find from Djordjevic's conduct,

25     particularly his participation in the concealment of the bodies, that

Page 14387

 1     there is no other reasonable inference available on the evidence but that

 2     he possessed the relevant awareness and intent to further the crimes that

 3     were being committed.  The bodies were from a continuing campaign of

 4     murder right throughout the indictment period, and he was concealing them

 5     while the murders were ongoing.  He must have known what he was doing.

 6             To put it another way, Your Honours, you may conclude that he had

 7     sufficient knowledge and intention.  If the circumstances in which he

 8     engaged in this cover-up were so suspicious and his alleged failure to

 9     make inquiries were so clearly deliberate that there is no other

10     reasonable explanation other than he was fully aware of the entire scheme

11     and his role in it.  It bears repeating that a man of his stature, a man

12     of it ilk described as he was by so many people, including his former

13     subordinates and the senior internationals who met him, could not have

14     become deeply involved without knowing what he was doing.  And the

15     Trial Chamber, it is submitted, should not allow what would appear in his

16     evidence to be his wilful blindness to be an avenue for escaping

17     liability of participation in the JCE and aiding and abetting the

18     perpetrators.

19             And it is to be noted, Your Honours, having regard to the charts

20     I showed you, that had he acted appropriately on the first occasion when

21     he became aware of these murders -- of these bodies, it is unlikely,

22     nearly impossible, impossible, that the remaining murders would have been

23     committed.  Had he done just one or two things in his capacity as chief

24     of police for the country to discharge his responsibility, to protect the

25     endangered population, thousands would be alive.

Page 14388

 1             There are other areas, if I may move on, it is respectfully

 2     submitted, other areas of his testimony that the Court may well find

 3     raises grave concerns about his sincerity when he testified.

 4     Mr. Djordjevic gave different accounts about what happened after the

 5     discovery of the corpses, and I'll read them quickly as I see time is

 6     moving quickly -- quicker than I am.

 7             In his letter of June 2004 to the "Nedeljni Telegraf," P1474, he

 8     said when he got the call from Mr. Golubovic:

 9             "I immediately proposed that the complete criminal process be

10     conducted there.  Immediately after that conversation, I informed the

11     minister about everything and a half hour later, he issued an order for

12     me for the bodies to be transported to Belgrade for autopsy and further

13     processing."

14             In his opening statement he told the Court:

15             "I thought that the regular police crime investigation had to be

16     carried out in accordance with the law and this is what I insisted on in

17     my conversation with the chief of the SUP in Bor; however, having

18     received additional information and in light of the fact that the local

19     SUP could not do this in accordance with the procedure, I informed the

20     minister about all that and he took all the decisions that followed."

21             So he's out of it, having informed the minister.  When he

22     testified he gave a third account as to what he did immediately upon

23     hearing about these bodies.  He said that the order of the minister --

24     that he went to the minister immediately and that the order of the

25     minister was that after routine procedures the bodies should be buried in

Page 14389

 1     the vicinity where they were found.

 2             He sought to explain away these contradictory statements by

 3     saying that in his previous renditions he left things out or he wasn't

 4     being accurate, but that his testimony was to be believed because he was

 5     being complete and accurate in his testimony.

 6             Mr. Djordjevic in the course of this trial testified at another

 7     war crimes trial by videolink, and we saw his testimony in that case.

 8     It's P1508.  He told the Judges in that trial in respect to the important

 9     issue as to his whereabouts in Kosovo in 1999, he said he was in Kosovo

10     only once in 1999 along with the minister.  He misled the Chamber because

11     we know from the evidence here, which he accepts, that he was there

12     several times in 1999.  When I put to him that he had recently misled

13     another Trial Chamber when giving evidence, he said that what he told

14     them there was probably a mistake.  This is at transcript 9970 of the

15     10th of December, last year.  What he told them was a mistake but he

16     insisted what he was telling you was the truth.  It's a matter for you.

17     It's a matter for you as to whether that type of error making causes you

18     grave concerns about his sincerity when he testified.

19             Your Honour, we have testimony about the circumstances in which

20     he ended his career in the police force.  He said that he fled Serbia

21     when he became aware that a criminal report had been filed against him

22     for abuse of office and that it was not because of his involvement in the

23     bodies' concealment.  Your Honours will have to consider what were the

24     real reasons for his flight, for the ending of his career in the police

25     force so precipitously -- I think so precipitately and his sudden

Page 14390

 1     departure from his homeland.  Because flight can be evidence of a guilty

 2     mind and it is for the Tribunal of fact, at the end of the day, to

 3     consider whether there is any other reasonable explanation for flight,

 4     apart from knowledge of guilt.  Is it a coincidence that just when the

 5     news regarding the find of the mass graves at Batajnica was brewing in

 6     the media in Serbia, just about that time he disappeared?  Or is it

 7     because of this investigation for abuse of office?

 8             K84, (redacted)

 9     (redacted) received certain information

10     and spoke to Mr. Djordjevic about it at the initial stages of his

11     investigation.  At that time Mr. Djordjevic was still in Serbia.

12     Mr. Djordjevic told him what happened happened, and that was the end of

13     the conversation.  You recall these were two senior policemen who had

14     known each other right throughout their careers.  This is not something

15     that is a regular event in the police force in Serbia or anywhere in the

16     world, that in the -- just on the outskirts of the capital hundreds of

17     bodies are found in a mass grave.  Djordjevic's response:  What happened

18     happened.  He did not give K84 any assistance apart from that, nothing,

19     not a word, not a word did he tell K84 about what he came to this trial

20     to tell this Trial Chamber.

21             When the Working Group sought to interview him again, they could

22     no longer locate him and Mr. Djordjevic was declared a wanted person by

23     the police so he could be brought in for questioning.

24             I ask Your Honours to recall the evidence that while the -- the

25     new about the find of the mass graves was breaking, and shortly after

Page 14391

 1     what Mr. Djordjevic described at his retirement, he met with Mr. Lukic

 2     and K83.  K83 was one of the drivers of the trucks that was shipping the

 3     bodies from Serb -- from Kosovo to be concealed in Serbia.  He met with

 4     Lukic and K83 during that period -- sorry, K93.  And it was decided that

 5     K93 would be transferred away from Belgrade to work in a town on the

 6     other side of the country away from the spotlight.

 7             Djordjevic could find time to meet with Mr. Lukic for that

 8     purpose, but he couldn't find time to tell the investigator, K84, who was

 9     investigating the bodies, what he came to tell us.  He couldn't find time

10     to write a letter to say:  This might assist you in your investigations.

11     He could find time to continue a cover-up.

12             Djordjevic's suggestion, if I could just add, in explaining this

13     meeting with Lukic and K93, he said that he just happened to be back in

14     the building as a pensioner and dropped in Lukic's office when the

15     meeting took place is really very, very strange because he also tells us

16     that it was Lukic who was the one who called him in and gave him his

17     letter of retirement to sign against his will.  So his explanation as to

18     how he came to be in Lukic's office is unusual, to say the least, but the

19     fact is that the testimony is that in that office at that time it was

20     decided to transfer away from Belgrade, away from the spotlight, one of

21     the truck drivers.  And after that, Djordjevic fled Belgrade and remained

22     a fugitive until 2007.

23             Djordjevic went to great lengths -- perhaps, Your Honours, it is

24     time.

25             JUDGE PARKER:  It is indeed, Mr. Stamp.  We will have the break

Page 14392

 1     now and resume at 11.00, if that's convenient.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 4             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Stamp.

 5             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             In explaining how he came to end his career in the police force,

 7     Mr. Djordjevic during his examination-in-chief said that he was dismissed

 8     from the police force on the 3rd of May, 2001.  Later on, when he was

 9     presented with his request for retirement, he changed his testimony,

10     saying that he was retired on the basis of his request not dismissed.

11     His evidence became that he was retired without his knowledge.  He says

12     that he was summoned to Mr. Lukic's office on the 4th of May, where a

13     request for early retirement already written up was presented to him and

14     he simply signed it.

15             The cross-examination he was asked why he signed.  He said he did

16     not want to cause any problems.  If the state had decided to retire him,

17     he was willing to accept it.  And this is what -- or how, according to

18     him, he would have the accord to believe his 30-plus-year career in the

19     police force ended.  He said that when he signed the request he was aware

20     that he would not be entitled to his full pension.  Prior to signing it,

21     he did not discuss it with the minister, nobody, neither the minister,

22     Lukic, or anyone told him that he was going to be pensioned off at a

23     lower pension than he would have been entitled to.  He did not inquire or

24     protest the decision because as far as he was concerned the decision had

25     already been made.  That is his explanation as to how he left the force

Page 14393

 1     so quickly, and again that is a matter for you to consider whether or not

 2     you believe him.

 3             When it was put to him that he would have been entitled to appeal

 4     the decision had he not signed this request, he obfuscated first by

 5     saying he didn't know.  He said he didn't know whether he could appeal.

 6     And when it was put to him that in many documents where he had

 7     transferred or removed senior police officers, including SUP chiefs,

 8     there was a paragraph at the end of these documents telling them that

 9     they had a right to appeal within a certain time and he had signed many

10     of those documents.  He eventually accepted that he was entitled to

11     appeal.  His attempts to explain how he ended his career and his flight,

12     Your Honours, become an era in his testimony that the Prosecution submits

13     you should review cautiously.  It is a matter for you, but the evidence

14     indicates clearly that he was not being sincere with the Court as to how

15     his career was terminated.

16             His claims that he fled his homeland, Serbia, because of his

17     fears of arrest are not of any merit.  Even he says that the charge or

18     the charge that he heard was being investigated against him of abuse of

19     office was spurious.

20             It does not square up at all, Your Honours, that a man with his

21     career would flee because he has heard of a spurious allegation made

22     against him for a relatively minor charge.

23             So it is a matter for you to consider, Your Honours, whether or

24     not his flight at that time when the bodies were discovered and the

25     investigation started, investigation which interestingly included,

Page 14394

 1     according to the testimony, investigators from this Tribunal.  But

 2     Your Honours should consider whether his flight arose from his own

 3     knowledge of his guilty participation and whether or not there is any

 4     other reasonable alternative to that finding.

 5             Turn now to another aspect of the case, Your Honour, Racak and

 6     the evidence of K86, a police officer or former police officer who

 7     testified that on the onset of that operation on the 15th of January,

 8     1999, Mr. Djordjevic was present with the SUP chief and the Urosevac

 9     police chief at the Stimlje police station.  K86, a very important

10     witness for the Prosecution, his evidence shows that Mr. Djordjevic

11     continued to exercise oversight and command responsibilities over the

12     police in their activities in Kosovo in 1999.  I think it is as a result

13     of this that the Defence has launched an attack on the credibility of

14     K86, comes in various ways.  They say at paragraph 86 that he was not

15     aware of Marinkovic's presence on the 15th and had he been present there

16     on the 15th he would have had to know that the Racak investigation

17     started on that day and that Marinkovic was present.  The Defence

18     assertion seems to be or they seem to be saying now that K86 was not

19     there on the 15th.  They make a point, Your Honours, but there is no

20     citation of the trial record for any of those propositions on which they

21     made the point.  It says in paragraph 86.

22             At paragraph 87 the Defence purports to contradict K86's

23     testimony that deputy commander Mitrovic was at the police station that

24     day by claiming that he was on sick leave, that is, deputy commander

25     Mitrovic was on sick leave and they cite to D138 in support of that

Page 14395

 1     assertion.  I invite the Court to have a look at D138.  It does not

 2     support in any way the Defence assertion that deputy commander Mitrovic

 3     was on sick leave that day.

 4             At paragraph 90 they also sought to attack his credibility

 5     because he had recently been treated for post-trauma stress syndrome.  I

 6     would submit that that doesn't reflect on his credibility on the matters

 7     that he had to testify about here, and the Defence could not identify any

 8     contradiction or inconsistency nor offer to the Court any reason why he

 9     would be untruthful to this Court.

10             Your Honour, he -- the defence is that Mr. Djordjevic arrived

11     there on the 18th just that make sure that there was an investigation.

12     K86 says he saw him there on the 15th and K86 could not be mistaken

13     because it is not a matter of the date, 18th or 15th, it's a matter of

14     the circumstances.  K86 says he saw him there the day of the operation.

15     He related the sequence of events and the circumstances in which he saw

16     him there.  So he could not be mistaken.  On the day the operation

17     started, he saw Mr. Djordjevic there.

18             Your Honour, not only is K86's evidence to this Court internally

19     consistent and seamless, but it is to some degree confirmed by P1555,

20     which is the transcript of the testimony of the SUP chief Janicevic, who

21     testified before the ICTY in the Milosevic case where he was

22     cross-examined.  He said that he, as the SUP chief in charge of the

23     operation, was present there on the 15th and Mr. Djordjevic was there on

24     the 15th as well.  Your Honours, the Prosecution notes and accepts that

25     this is hearsay evidence.  Mr. Janicevic is not before the Court and this

Page 14396

 1     Defence has not had an opportunity to cross-examine him, and therefore

 2     that must diminish the value of P1555.  In addition, this is a statement

 3     about the acts and conduct of the accused, and that as well would

 4     diminish the weight of it.  However, it is submitted that it is entirely

 5     within the Trial Chamber's discretion to attribute to it whatever weight

 6     it thinks fit at this point in the case when the Chamber is evaluating

 7     all the evidence and doing so in light of all of the evidence,

 8     particularly of those persons who testified about this event.  And while

 9     conceding and accepting that there are factors which diminish the value

10     of P155 [sic], the Prosecution submits that the evidence of Janicevic,

11     the SUP chief responsible for the action, albeit hearsay, can have some

12     reliability and lends some support and corroboration to K86's evidence

13     regarding the presence of Djordjevic at the Stimlje police station that

14     morning.

15             Mr. Djordjevic -- to move on.  Mr. Djordjevic was the man in

16     charge of the police in Serbia.  Everybody knew that, everybody treated

17     him that way.  All the senior MUP generals, all the senior police

18     generals, all the senior politicians, and that is why he was the

19     policeman that featured in all the negotiations with internationals in

20     respect to Kosovo and signed all of -- and signed many of these

21     agreements, particularly the October Agreements in 1998.  The fundamental

22     purpose of the October Agreements was to maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo,

23     and you have before the Court K -- I'm sorry, P836, an understanding

24     between KDOM and the Ministry of the Interior signed by Mr. Byrnes,

25     Mr. Djordjevic.  Interestingly, if I could read from Mr. Djordjevic's

Page 14397

 1     testimony at 10118 of the transcript.  He said:

 2             "Shaun only saw me on negotiations.  It wasn't me who decided to

 3     participate in negotiations, no.  It was the president of Serbia and the

 4     minister of interior who decided that.  I had spent years and years in

 5     Kosovo and what Byrnes said was quite natural.  I knew every village,

 6     every hamlet, every path, every road, and I knew the circumstances there.

 7     But far be it that I was the supreme decision-maker there."

 8             Of course the Prosecution does not, does not, suggest that

 9     Djordjevic was at the head of the joint criminal enterprise.  The

10     allegations are that he, like Lukic, like other policemen - not all the

11     policemen but some policemen, senior policemen, senior army

12     commanders - participated.  And the fact that Milosevic or Mr. Sainovic

13     or Mr. Stojiljkovic were senior to him and perhaps were the leading

14     figures and the original orders and plans emanated from them is not

15     inconsistent with Mr. Djordjevic's guilt if he participated with

16     awareness of what he was doing.

17             But this quote from Mr. Djordjevic indicates that, as Mr. Byrnes

18     said, he was very knowledgeable about Kosovo and he was in command.  He's

19     appointed by, no less, the president of the country and the minister.  If

20     we look to 837, P837, this is a record of a meeting in Belgrade of the

21     same date, the 25th of October, 1998.  In this agreement, again signed by

22     Mr. Djordjevic and other very senior personnel, agreement was reached to

23     scale-down the operations of police and VJ units in Kosovo.  Djordjevic

24     having signed both of these agreements would be aware of their

25     requirements.  If we look at page 2 and with -- you see:

Page 14398

 1             "With these goals in mind, the state authorities of the FRY have

 2     announced the following measures," and move on to page 3.  And these are

 3     some of what is agreed.

 4             If you look at paragraph 3:

 5             "Police -- special police will resume their normal peace time

 6     activities.  Heavy weapons and equipment remaining under MUP control in

 7     Kosovo will be returned to cantonments and police stations."

 8             So Mr. Djordjevic was aware of the requirements of these

 9     agreements, and he violated these agreements through his involvement in

10     the Racak action.  In that action the VJ and the MUP thwarted the very

11     purpose of the agreements by attacking the KLA without informing the

12     observers, and thereby they destroyed the fragile cease-fire and caused

13     the cease-fire to collapse.  According to Mr. Philipps, after that the

14     regular meeting between the KVM and the liaison group stopped, and as

15     Byrnes testified, at the end of the day Racak destroyed the October

16     Agreements.

17             One matter before I move on in respect to the agreements, and I

18     don't wish to engage too much in any -- in submissions about the KLA.

19     They, it is conceded, committed crimes themselves.  But the Defence in

20     their brief at paragraph 66 says:

21             "As noted above, the purpose of the October Agreements was to

22     verify the maintenance of cease-fire by all elements; however, the KLA

23     was not a signatory to any of these agreements and the evidence shows

24     that the suggestion that they become signatories was rejected by the KLA

25     Main Staff.  Their refusal to agree to a cease-fire and their action to

Page 14399

 1     the contrary are important factors in this intervening period."

 2             The evidence that the KLA's absence from the October negotiations

 3     was mainly because of the demands by the Serb and FRY officials.  If we

 4     could look at P87.  It's the record of a meeting on the 2nd of November,

 5     1998, minutes of the meeting of the operations inter-departmental staff

 6     of the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija held at Beli Dvor

 7     palace in Belgrade on 29 October, chaired by President Milosevic,

 8     participating President Milutinovic, Mr. Sainovic, Mr. Stojiljkovic,

 9     Mr. Andjelkovic  Mr. Perisic, Mr. Pavkovic, Mr. Djordjevic,

10     Mr. Stevanovic, Mr. Lukic.

11             At page 2, General Pavkovic speaking on behalf of the

12     Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija stated that just days after the

13     signing of the October Agreements to participants -- may I re-read that.

14     General Pavkovic said at page 2:

15             "Efforts by foreign country to have the legitimacy of the

16     so-called KLA as the armed force of the Siptar secessionist movement

17     recognised by including the KLA in the solution of the Kosovo question

18     was also very unfortunate for us."

19             At page 13 of the same meeting or of the same document in respect

20     to the same meeting, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic reminded the

21     participants of the fact that influential international factors,

22     especially German and the US, wanted to bring the so-called KLA into the

23     position of a negotiator with the legal organs of our government, but the

24     attempt was successful thwarted.

25             So the proposition of the Defence at paragraph 66 of their brief

Page 14400

 1     does not square up with the record.  Mr. Vasiljevic, General Vasiljevic,

 2     Your Honours, was another important witness in this case, an important

 3     witness for the Prosecution.  He was a senior member of the VJ and he

 4     testified about Skorpions, paramilitaries in Kosovo, crimes that were

 5     committed, their incorporation into the MUP, the fact that it was

 6     well-known or could be easily discovered that the MUP was incorporating

 7     criminal elements.  I won't go over that.  That is well recited, I think,

 8     in the Prosecution's final brief.

 9             But he also testified about the 1st of June meeting, another very

10     important meeting, the 1st of June meeting in Pristina, a meeting of the

11     Joint Command that was attended by Mr. Djordjevic.  This -- the Defence

12     claims that Mr. Djordjevic -- Mr. Vasiljevic is either mistaken or not

13     being honest when he says that Mr. Djordjevic attended this meeting.  We

14     see no motive presented as to why Mr. Vasiljevic would make something

15     like this up, and he was cross-examined in quite significant detail about

16     his evidence that Mr. Djordjevic was present at this meeting and

17     responded carefully, ably, and convincingly, it is submitted.  He could

18     remember Mr. Djordjevic's presence at that meeting because Djordjevic was

19     well-known within Serbia as the head of the police, and this was the

20     first time they had met.  So it was remembered before him that he was

21     meeting this well-known figure.  He recalled that they met later on at a

22     meeting in July 1997, but this was the first time they met and it was

23     therefore memorable to him.  In fact, he remembered a specific comment

24     Mr. Djordjevic made and if we could move to private session just for one

25     moment, Your Honours, I would be grateful.

Page 14401

 1             JUDGE PARKER:  Private.

 2             MR. STAMP:  He remembered specifically -- oh, sorry.

 3                           [Private session]

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12                           [Open session]

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

14             MR. STAMP:  So, Your Honours, what that general would be doing in

15     the field would be something that would be known to General Djordjevic,

16     and it is reasonable and consistent that General Djordjevic would make

17     that comment in respect to Mr. -- to that general's absence.

18     Mr. Djordjevic was coming from the seat of the MUP in Belgrade and so was

19     that general that he spoke of, they were coming from the same place, and

20     he would know where that general was.

21             The Defence called Mr. Stojanovic, General Stojanovic, who at the

22     relevant time I think was a lieutenant-colonel and the chief of the

23     security section in the command of the Pristina Corps, to say that

24     Mr. Djordjevic was not present at that meeting on the 1st of July.  And I

25     ask Your Honours to reflect carefully on the evidence of Mr. Stojanovic.

Page 14402

 1     He was generally an incredible witness who tailored his evidence

 2     specifically to refute the testimony of his subordinate Nike Peraj who

 3     testified about various crimes that were committed in Meja.  And he

 4     tailored his testimony specifically to refute the testimony of his

 5     superior, General Vasiljevic, but he's incredible primarily because of

 6     his absurd denial of any VJ wrong-doing.  Most noticeably, Your Honours,

 7     he denied knowledge of the expulsions and murders that happened during

 8     the joint police/VJ operation at Meja.  He's an intelligence -- the chief

 9     intelligence gatherer, the chief of security section for the Pristina

10     command, and he would have the Court believe that he was not aware of

11     this type of information.

12             Your Honours, the Prosecution submits that when all the evidence

13     is weighed together, General Vasiljevic's evidence is acceptable and

14     reliable and the Court can act on it safely.

15             If I move on quickly to the alternative mode of liability under

16     Rule 7(3).  The Prosecution's case is based primarily on evidence of the

17     accused's knowing participation or contribution to the joint criminal

18     enterprise and aiding and abetting and planning the crimes under

19     Rule 7(1).  However, the same evidence supports convictions under

20     Rule 7(3) mode of liability.  In fact, Your Honours might well think that

21     this is the least troubling part of the case as evidence in respect to

22     his responsibility or his individual criminal liability under Rule 7(3)

23     is quite clear and straightforward.  Most of it is beyond dispute; the

24     remainder of it has been admitted by the accused.  I won't go through the

25     evidence in detail.  That again has been set out in our pre-trial brief

Page 14403

 1     [sic], but we'll submit very quickly that the evidence establishes that

 2     Mr. Djordjevic's liable as a superior under Rule 7(3) for all the crimes

 3     charged in the indictment that were committed by members of the RJB

 4     because the elements required for his liability under Article 7(3) are

 5     fulfilled, primarily the subject of admissions.  There was a superior --

 6     one, there was a superior -- Your Honours, so far -- may I just say this

 7     before I continue.  So far I have said "pre-trial brief" many times and I

 8     meant final trial brief.  At all times I mean the final trial brief and

 9     not the pre-trial brief.

10             The first element for 7(3) liability is that there was a

11     superior/subordinate relationship between Djordjevic and the persons who

12     committed the underlying crimes in the sense for Rule 7(3) that

13     Djordjevic had a material ability to prevent and punish members of the

14     RJB.

15             Secondly, he knew or he had reason to know that the underlying

16     crimes were about to be, were being, or had been committed and he failed

17     to take -- certainly he failed to take the reasonable and necessary

18     measures to prevent his subordinates from committing the underlying

19     crimes or to punish them subsequent to their commission.  It is submitted

20     that the Podujevo incident is an unambiguous example of Mr. Djordjevic's

21     individual criminal liability for murder under Rule -- or under

22     Article 7(3).  The perpetrators of the murders, members of the Skorpion

23     unit, were incorporated into the public service -- public security sector

24     as reserve policemen and were, therefore, his subordinates in the sense

25     that he had the material ability to punish them at the minimum to cause

Page 14404

 1     and ensure that effective investigations were committed -- were commenced

 2     to inquire into allegations that they had committed crimes.  At his level

 3     that is a minimum that would be expected of him and that is his material

 4     ability to punish under the law.

 5             Now, before I move on there is -- there was in the course of the

 6     case some dispute as to whether or not the Skorpions had been

 7     incorporated into the SAJ.  I think it is beyond dispute that they were

 8     incorporated into the police as MUP reservists, but Mr. Stalevic and

 9     Mr. Simovic and even the accused seem to be suggesting that at the time

10     of the Podujevo massacre they were not under the command of the SAJ, the

11     Special Anti-Terrorist Unit.  However, we see now that the Defence in its

12     final trial brief has stated and seems to concede or accept now on review

13     of the evidence that the reservists were attached to the SAJ, indicating

14     that the Skorpions were under the SAJ command.  This is at Defence final

15     trial brief paragraphs 479, 480, 481, 483, 484, 488, 496, 509, and 511.

16             It probably does not matter that much because if there were

17     reservists in the police force it does not really matter if they had been

18     attached to the SAJ at the time of the massacre.  They were still within

19     the ambit of his material ability to effect investigations, to punish.

20             So these reservists, the Skorpions, committed this crime and the

21     second element is notice.  In this case he received from Mr. Simovic

22     actual notice that some of these men had murdered civilians, including

23     women and children.  He admits that.  There is no issue on the second

24     element of actual notice.

25             Thirdly, he failed to adopt any measures, any measures at all

Page 14405

 1     available to him to ensure that his subordinates, particularly

 2     Mr. Simovic, take any steps at all to investigate the incident and to

 3     identify the perpetrators.  On the contrary, he acceded to Mr. Simovic

 4     sending away the perpetrators from the scene without any investigation;

 5     and worse, later he ordered Mr. Trajkovic to disband and disperse them

 6     without ensuring that investigations had been conducted to identify the

 7     perpetrators of this horrible massacre.  He admitted these things, that

 8     he did all of these things, he took no steps in respect to the

 9     investigations and he accepted their removal from the scene without

10     investigations and their dispersal without any inquiries being made.  He

11     says his failure is because it had been report to him and it was his

12     belief on the evening of the 28th when he spoke to Mr. Simovic that the

13     OUP of Podujevo had been informed and that the OUP would conduct an

14     investigation, and that is why he did nothing.

15             But, Your Honour, his failure to do anything becomes even more

16     egregious when we see the reports that he was receiving the next day.  If

17     we could look at D296.  D296 is a MUP staff daily report for Kosovo on

18     the 29th of March, and you see here it covers a period 0600 hours on the

19     28th of March -- sorry, 28th of March, 1999, 0600 hours, to the 29th of

20     March, the period of the massacre.  Paragraph 5 is for serious crimes

21     committed.  And if you look through it, Your Honours, you will see at

22     paragraph 5 for serious crimes committed nothing.

23             Your Honours, I ask you to assess the accused as a reasonable

24     police officer, as a man endowed with all the attributes that we know

25     about Mr. Djordjevic as chief of the police.  His subordinates or he's

Page 14406

 1     told that his subordinates lined up 20-odd women and children and shot

 2     them, killing I think it was 16.  Some lived to come and testify.  He

 3     doesn't do anything about it because it's supposed to be investigated.

 4     The very next day it comes on his desk, the report, from the people who

 5     are supposed to be investigating it and they say there is no serious

 6     crime.  What would any reasonable police chief do?  What is his duty

 7     under Article 7(3)?  His excuse for doing nothing is that he thought

 8     something was being done on the 28th.  Now he knows, now he receives

 9     indications at least that nothing is being done.

10             Your Honours should review the record of his testimony when he

11     was asked about this.  He could not explain why he did nothing, having

12     received it, having been advised that nothing was being done.  He merely

13     just insisted that he was told previously that the OUP would be brought

14     in.

15             Your Honours, it is noteworthy that no investigations at all were

16     conducted under the -- of this horrendous crime, and although there is

17     evidence that the investigating judge was brought to the scene, the

18     evidence is that they were brought to the scene three days later.

19     According to Mr. Vasiljevic they were brought there three days later and

20     they presented a -- they did an on-site report three days later of I

21     think about two pages in respect to this crime.

22             Disciplinary proceedings or investigations for disciplinary

23     purposes within the police force would not have been sufficient for mass

24     murder, but Djordjevic also had a duty to do internal disciplinary

25     investigations, if only, if only, to identify who were the perpetrators

Page 14407

 1     and end their career in the force or stop them at least from carrying

 2     weapons until they were charged criminally.

 3             The Prosecution submits that Mr. Djordjevic had two

 4     responsibilities, to ensure that his subordinates on the ground took all

 5     the steps necessary of collecting evidence, interviewing people, and

 6     bringing -- and starting or initiating a criminal investigation.  He did

 7     not do that.  And he also had a responsibility to take internal

 8     disciplinary investigative steps to identify the perpetrators and at

 9     least relieve them of duty until they were charged.  As it turned out,

10     because he did nothing, many of these shooters who murdered these women

11     and children returned to Kosovo in April when Mr. Djordjevic authorised

12     that the Skorpions be regrouped and sent back.  They returned to Kosovo

13     under the auspices of the police because of his failure.

14             These failures, Your Honour, or these elements in respect to

15     7(3), Article 7(3) liability for Podujevo are all admitted.

16             Before we look at the requirements of the law enforcement

17     agencies, I should point out that the Defence trial brief at 693,

18     paragraph 693 and elsewhere, claims that Mr. Djordjevic would not know of

19     the crimes that were being committed in Kosovo because the daily reports

20     that were coming up from the MUP staff and the SUPs did not include these

21     crimes.  And we see one, and this is a very interesting document, very

22     interesting document, D296, because it shows clearly that Mr. Djordjevic

23     must have known of the policy of his senior policemen in Kosovo covering

24     up crimes, covering up massacres against civilians.  He knew on the 28th

25     that a score of women and children were lined up and shot by his

Page 14408

 1     subordinates.  The next day his senior subordinate in Kosovo does not

 2     report that this crime occurred.  I asked him:  Well, what did he do

 3     about it?  Nothing.  Did he call up the SUP chief, MUP staff chief, and

 4     say what is a serious crime in your books?  No.  Why?  His answer was:

 5     Well, I heard that the thing was being investigated.

 6             Your Honours, that was not the point.  The point is:  What does

 7     he do when he realises that his subordinates are not reporting serious

 8     crimes?  Nothing.  The Court is entitled to find that he was aware of the

 9     policy of covering up serious crimes and he did nothing because he agreed

10     with it and he facilitated it as the head of the service.  If we could

11     look quickly at D855, this is a long criminal procedure of the former

12     SFRY, but it was operational in Serbia at the relevant time according to

13     Judge Marinkovic.  Go quickly to Article 151, 1-5-1:

14             "If there are grounds to suspect that a crime which is

15     automatically prosecuted has been committed, law enforcement agencies

16     must take the steps necessary to locate the perpetrator of the crime, to

17     prevent the perpetrator or accomplice from hiding or fleeing, to detect

18     and preserve the clues to the crime and articles which might serve as

19     evidence and to gather all information which might be of use to effective

20     conduct of criminal proceedings.

21             "...  law enforcement agencies must take the necessary

22     information from individual citizens ..."

23             Your Honours, I ask you -- I will not read it all, but these

24     reflect the usual responsibilities of policemen on the ground, although

25     an investigating judge should turn up to take charge of the

Page 14409

 1     investigations, policemen on the ground have a responsibility to inquire,

 2     apprehend, collect evidence until the investigating judge is arriving.

 3     If we could look at Article 152, paragraph (1), I ask the Court to review

 4     these laws more carefully when time permits:

 5             "Authorised officers of law enforcement agencies have the right

 6     to send persons found at the scene of the crime to the examining

 7     magistrate or to detain them until he arrives if such persons might

 8     provide information important to the criminal proceedings and if it is

 9     probable that they could not be interrogated at a subsequent date ..."

10             If we look at 154, paragraph (2):

11             "If the examining magistrate is unable to come to the scene

12     immediately, law enforcement agencies may themselves conduct an inquest

13     on the spot and order the necessary expert evaluations, except autopsy

14     and exhumation of a corpse.  If the examining magistrate reaches the

15     scene during an inquest he may undertake to perform these actions.  The

16     public prosecutor shall be informed about everything done."

17             Your Honours, Mr. Simovic was told that the Skorpions committed a

18     crime, sent away the men, didn't detain them, he didn't wait for the

19     investigating magistrate to come, he didn't collect any evidence.  The

20     investigating magistrate did not arrive until three days later when some

21     of the bodies were still there, three days.  In that period of time the

22     police had responsibilities.  The police did nothing, and the steps taken

23     by the MUP after this incident were manifestly inadequate and

24     Mr. Djordjevic must have known they were manifestly inadequate.

25             If we look quickly at P1591, page 4, it's a record of

Page 14410

 1     Mr. Simovic's interview at the Prokuplje trial in 2001 or 2002.  Said:

 2             "For the third or fourth time now, the Court insists that I give

 3     my final opinion about who, or whose member, fired at the civilians."

 4             It is clear, Your Honours, that those Judges were shocked and

 5     outraged by Mr. Simovic's inaction, his failure to do what was his

 6     responsibility to do.  Mr. Simovic reported his inaction to

 7     Mr. Djordjevic.  Mr. Djordjevic did not express the same outrage and did

 8     not do his duty to ensure that his commanders on the ground investigated

 9     this crime.

10             Your Honours, I ask you to review even the concern and the

11     questions by this Chamber to Mr. Simovic when he testified from 13623 to

12     1327 -- 13627 of the transcript.  It was manifest, manifest, that

13     Simovic, having been in charge of these men, leaving -- he left the same

14     day and hightailed it to Belgrade without knowing if any OUP had come on

15     the scene, any investigating judge.  He sent away the men, and that is

16     what he told Mr. Djordjevic; Mr. Djordjevic did nothing.

17             I won't bother to go over the question and the answers put to

18     Mr. Simovic by this Court, also clearly outraged by his inaction.  It

19     seemed, Your Honours, that the only person who was not outraged by the

20     inaction of the police to investigate this was the commander,

21     Mr. Djordjevic.

22             On the issue of 7(3), these admissions by the accused, entitles

23     the Judge -- the Chamber to find that all of the elements have been

24     satisfied and to find him guilty under 7(3), Article 7(3) for this

25     murder.  The Prosecution further submits that in light of

Page 14411

 1     Mr. Djordjevic's own evidential guard against participation in the

 2     concealment of the bodies, he is also liable under Article 7(3) for each

 3     and all of the incidents of murder specifically enumerated in paragraph

 4     75 of the indictment.  The evidence proving the required elements for

 5     conviction under 7(3) are again not susceptible to reasonable dispute

 6     being mostly admitted by the accused.

 7             The evidence in respect to several murder sites specifically

 8     referred to in the indictment, Suva Reka, Podujevo, Bela Crkva,

 9     Mala Krusa, Milos Gilic Street, Pusto Selo, and Suceska is that the

10     perpetrators of these massacres included policemen who were Djordjevic's

11     subordinates under Rule 7(3) -- Article 7(3).  This is -- and when I say

12     subordinates under Article 7(3), I make a distinction between whether or

13     not he was in Kosovo because he says that he was not in Kosovo and he was

14     not commanding them in the operations, but for purposes of Article 7(3)

15     they are subordinates if he had a material ability to punish them, and at

16     his level his material ability would be to ensure that disciplinary and

17     criminal proceedings are commenced against them and he had that power.

18     That is not disputed.

19             He admitted in his evidence, Your Honours, the second element,

20     that at the time when he participated in the concealment of the human

21     bodies he was aware that these bodies or these were the bodies of victims

22     of crimes and he accepted in his evidence that he was aware of the

23     possibility that the perpetrators were police officers.  This is at 10011

24     of the record.  That, according to the jurisprudence and Article 7(3), is

25     sufficient notice, inquiry notice.  The difference in Podujevo, with

Page 14412

 1     regard to Podujevo, he was told specifically about that crime, he had

 2     specific notice.  Here he had inquiry notice, this is ought-to-know

 3     section.  He was put on inquiry, he accepts that.  A superior will be

 4     deemed to have reason to know when he's possessed of information

 5     sufficiently alarming to justify inquiry.

 6             I submit to the Court that 800 dead bodies being concealed is

 7     sufficiently alarming to justify inquiry.  The information may be general

 8     in nature and does not need to include specific details about unlawful

 9     acts which have been committed, so he has admitted to that element.

10             He has admitted to the third element in respect to these murders,

11     Your Honours, because he said that he knew that it was his duty to

12     properly investigate these killings, that he should have acted

13     accordingly; and he admitted to this Court that he failed to do so.  In

14     this context he said in cross-examination, and I quote:

15             "I acted the way I did at the moment.  I accepted his," that's

16     the minister's, "orders without opposing him.  I'm aware that this was a

17     big mistake I made but what happened cannot be made undone.  I'm ashamed

18     of my deeds and I believe that the Court's decision will be adequate and

19     I will be held responsible for what I did."

20             Transcript 10006.  He has admitted all the elements, all the

21     formal elements required for conviction under Rule 7(3) -- Article 7(3)

22     for murder in respect to all of the scheduled murder incidents in the

23     indictment.

24             Your Honours, the Prosecution further submits that in respect to

25     all the other incidents of murder involving perpetrators from the public

Page 14413

 1     service department and having regard to the admissions made,

 2     Mr. Djordjevic knew or ought to have known that murders of

 3     Kosovo Albanians were being committed by his subordinates in Kosovo and

 4     that, as he put it, to quote him:

 5             "The situation required a full check and that all the facts

 6     needed to be established."

 7             And that:

 8             "A commission or a group ought to have been set up to investigate

 9     it."

10             This is transcript 9723 to 4 and transcript 10002.

11             Again, the Court is entitled to act on the admissions that he has

12     made before you.

13             Your Honours, I move on to a variety of issues, matters in the

14     Defence brief which at the beginning I indicated I wanted to meet,

15     because it is the position of the Prosecution that many of these

16     propositions are erroneous, not based on the evidence or mis-characterise

17     the evidence.  And I wish to begin by making a correction to the

18     Prosecution's final trial brief.  At page 304, paragraph 1232, footnote

19     3336, the reference to K84 should be removed and the correct citation

20     should be Djordjevic at transcript 9973 to 9975, Exhibit P1508, P815,

21     pages 31 to 35.

22             Another correction is at paragraph 567 of the Prosecution's

23     closing brief, third sentence, 35 -- it is -- I'll read the third

24     sentence.

25             "35 to 37 corpses were later exhumed and identified as having

Page 14414

 1     originated from Kosovo."

 2             This is in relation to the mass grave at Bajina Basta, Lake

 3     Perucac.  And the footnote in respect to the sentence I just read was

 4     cited to Mr. Baraybar.  That is not correct and that footnote should be

 5     removed.  The proper footnote or the proper reference is K84 at

 6     transcript 2043 to 2046 and transcript 2075, both in closed session; and

 7     also P394.  And to just explain that a little bit further, K84 was

 8     investigating these mass graves in Serbia gave an estimate of 37 corpses

 9     found at Bajina Basta at the site of Lake Perucac.  However, Your Honours

10     would be aware that the forensic anthropologist who actually did the

11     excavation and disinterment of the bodies counted at least 48 bodies.

12     And -- right.  I'm corrected also.  The proper citation, therefore, or

13     the evidence in respect to the 48 individuals is Sterenberg P815, that's

14     the excavation report at page 37, paragraph 1.

15             The Defence claims, and I'll just run through some of these

16     matters very quickly.  The Defence claims at paragraph 586:

17             "Not a single piece of evidence was presented during the trial

18     that would in any way associate Mr. Djordjevic with the event at

19     Petrovo Selo."

20             That is the mass graves at Petrovo Selo.  This is manifestly not

21     the case, Your Honour.  There is evidence that entitles the Court to

22     infer that he was a party to the operations of burying bodies at the --

23     at Petrovo Selo.  This is set out in the Prosecution's closing brief at

24     paragraphs 303 to 305.  There are several items there which makes it

25     readily apparent that Petrovo Selo was part of the same operation as

Page 14415

 1     Batajnica.  However, there's an additional point that was not addressed

 2     in the brief.  The original refrigerator truck that was found floating in

 3     the Danube near Tekija was ordered destroyed by Mr. Djordjevic.  The

 4     evidence of Mr. Radojkovic who destroyed it and also Mr. Golubovic is

 5     that the truck, the truck, from Batajnica was transferred to the MUP

 6     facility in Petrovo Selo and destroyed there.  So that an additional

 7     piece of evidence showing that the Petrovo Selo burial operations is part

 8     of the same transaction as the Batajnica burial operations that the

 9     accused admitted to.

10             The Defence argues at paragraphs 559 to 560 of its brief that

11     there is no evidence that shows that the order to destroy the truck in

12     which the bodies had been found -- I'll just read it.  I'll quote it,

13     Your Honours:

14             "There is no evidence that shows that the order to destroy the

15     truck in which the bodies had been found was a consequence of any direct

16     order of Vlastimir Djordjevic."

17             This is in paragraphs 559 to 560 of the brief.

18             Your Honours, this is splitting hairs or even worse it's

19     decimating hairs because the Defence admitted or Mr. Djordjevic admitted

20     at transcript 9726, line 16, that on the minister's instructions he told

21     Djordjevic to destroy the truck.  So I don't know if the Defence is

22     trying to say that it was not a direct order of Djordjevic simply because

23     Mr. Djordjevic said that he convoyed the minister's instructions, but

24     that is splitting hairs.  Djordjevic ordered the destruction of the

25     trucks by his own admission.

Page 14416

 1             And Mr. Golubovic in his testimony at 1715, that's 1715 and 1755

 2     to 56, he said too that Djordjevic told him to have the refrigerator

 3     lorry destroyed, and so it was.  Defence, if I could move on, argues for

 4     several paragraphs, 549 to 554 that the concealment operations in Tekija

 5     were not intentionally kept secret.  They appeared to focus on the

 6     question of whether Mr. Djordjevic officially classified this as a state

 7     secret.  There is no merit in this argument, Your Honours.

 8     Mr. Djordjevic himself testified at transcript 9721 that he instructed

 9     Mr. Golubovic:

10             "All further action in relation to this should be kept

11     confidential so that the public was not informed."

12             If I could move on, the Defence make the repeated assertion in

13     their brief that Mr. Djordjevic intended to have the bodies autopsied at

14     some point.  They go so far as to suggest that the bodies -- that

15     Mr. Djordjevic wanted the bodies to be autopsied in Tekija and that he

16     intended the bodies at Batajnica to be autopsied eventually.  This is

17     obvious or this is opposite to the clear evidence that there was never

18     any intention to autopsy or properly process these bodies.  And I ask the

19     Chamber to review the Chamber's own questioning of Mr. Golubovic in this

20     regard at page 1746 of the reference.  The transcript indicated that

21     Presiding Judge Parker asked:

22             "Well, what I'm not clear about then is why if you had no

23     pathologist and no judge, either municipal or district, and no

24     prosecutor, you would have thought of burying these bodies that night."

25             And the answer:

Page 14417

 1             "Well, the reason was we had to move the refrigerator truck

 2     further off the road because the people who were near the refrigerator

 3     truck said that there was already a stench spreading of decomposing

 4     bodies.  It just couldn't stay like that without being dealt with, so

 5     that was the reason for us trying to deal with this as quickly as

 6     possible."

 7             Effectively, avoidance or evasion of a direct question put to him

 8     by the Court, and it continues on and on in that reference in the

 9     transcript to questions being asked about this supposed intention to have

10     these bodies autopsied.

11             The claim that Mr. Djordjevic was interested in forensic

12     examinations at a later time has no foundation on the evidence,

13     completing lacking in merit.  Mr. Djordjevic had no intention of doing so

14     and he never did so, nor did he at any time when he had the opportunity

15     up until 2007 and even beyond inform anyone of the location of these

16     bodies.  To the contrary, he took steps to maintain the cover-up until

17     the bodies were discovered by others.  I ask the Court to note that after

18     the conflict in June 1997, Mr. Trajkovic, according to him in his

19     evidence, expressed concern about the bodies being at his, that is,

20     Mr. Trajkovic's, base.  Mr. Trajkovic, if you recall, Your Honours, was

21     head of the SAJ and Djordjevic's immediate subordinate.  And Djordjevic

22     spoke to Mr. Trajkovic and accepted the potential need to move the bodies

23     away from Batajnica, that is, just to continue the cover-up.

24             The Defence made allegations in respect to ethnicity.  At

25     paragraph 604, the Defence says in its brief that Mr. Djordjevic did not

Page 14418

 1     know about the ethnicity of the bodies.  Your Honours, this does not

 2     square up with Mr. Golubovic's testimony or even Mr. Djordjevic's own

 3     testimony.  Mr. Golubovic testified that he told Mr. Djordjevic that the

 4     victims were dressed in the fashion or the manner of Kosovar Albanians

 5     and the truck had markings of having come from Prizren.  Mr. Djordjevic

 6     testified at 9730 of the transcript:

 7             "He(the minister) said that since I was already familiar with the

 8     matter and that I knew from our previous contacts that these were bodies

 9     which came from Kosovo and Metohija, in other words, that these were the

10     bodies of Albanians, that it was necessary to bury them ..."

11             So Mr. Djordjevic's evidence contradicts this proposition.

12             In fact, at different parts of the Defence brief, the Defence

13     seems to make the concession that Mr. Djordjevic knew where the bodies

14     came from because the minister told him.  So in the final trial brief --

15     in their final trial brief at paragraph 557, they state that having

16     realised that General Djordjevic was resolved to have the matter

17     investigated, the minister told him that he, himself, was behind the

18     whole story, that there had been some incidents in KiM, that is, Kosovo

19     and Metohija, and that something had to be done to conceal the bodies.

20     So this is the Defence's own submission elsewhere in the brief,

21     indicating that the -- that Mr. Djordjevic was aware of the ethnicity of

22     the victims, that they came from Kosovo.

23             And the Defence, when they made that submission, they cited to

24     Djordjevic's testimony at 9723 to 4 and what he actually said at 9723,

25     line 24, and thereafter:

Page 14419

 1             "Only after he had realised," that's he, the minister, "had

 2     realised that I was commited to taking steps in order to clarify the

 3     whole matter, me made it known to me that he was fully behind.  That

 4     certain incidents had happened down there and that something should be

 5     done in order to prevent the revelation of the finding of these bodies

 6     because of the whole NATO campaign and bombing."

 7             So the Defence is conceding that when Mr. Djordjevic said that

 8     the minister referred to these bodies having come from "down there,"

 9     Mr. Djordjevic was, in fact, actually referring to down there in Kosovo

10     and Metohija.  Respectfully, Your Honours, it is submitted that there is

11     no real doubt or issue that Mr. Djordjevic was aware that these bodies

12     were of Kosovar Albanians.

13             The Defence in its final trial brief argues in respect to the

14     Skorpions that final -- that -- sorry, that background checks were

15     properly conducted.  That's paragraph 480.  MUP police administration

16     performed background checks of the men based on SUP records.  Firstly,

17     the Defence makes its claim without citing any evidence in support of

18     this claim, and the Prosecution submits that there were no background

19     checks on these men.  The Skorpions contain men who had criminal records,

20     their general reputation was of a criminal type, and I'm quoting

21     General Vasiljevic at 5662 of the record:

22             "Their general reputation was of criminal types in their ranks,

23     problematic people, people with criminal records."

24             The Skorpions were not even trained.  Stoparic testified that he

25     had to give them a crash course in using weapons or some of them a crash

Page 14420

 1     course in using weapons, and according to Witness K92 who was involved in

 2     or gathering together these Skorpions, Mr. Djordjevic did not inquire

 3     about whether or not they had received any training.  He just accepted

 4     them.

 5             So that submission by the Defence that these men -- that there

 6     were in fact proper checks made is not supported, they haven't cited

 7     anything to support it, and the evidence is to the contrary.  Indeed, no

 8     one involved in the recruitment or command of this body of men was able

 9     to say that they had in fact been checked and screened.  They merely said

10     that they were supposed to be, police administration was supposed to do

11     this, but nobody said anything that supports the Defence submissions.

12     Identification and I give -- before I move on, I gave a reference to

13     Mr. Vasiljevic just now in terms of what he said about the fact that

14     these Skorpions contained persons' criminal records.  The proper

15     citation, it's transcript 5667.

16             Defence in its final trial brief, at paragraph 485, argues that

17     the perpetrators of the Podujevo massacre could not be identified at the

18     crime scene.  The references usually given in support of this proposition

19     do not support it and this is mere argumentation.  As a matter of fact,

20     the evidence in respect to Podujevo is quite clear, nothing was gone, so

21     it cannot be argued that the perpetrators of the massacre could not be

22     identified.  However, we should recall the evidence of Mr. Stoparic that

23     some of the Skorpions who objected tried -- these are the foot soldiers,

24     some of the men on the ground who participated in this sort of thing,

25     they, themselves, tried to do an inquiry themselves.  Who were the ones

Page 14421

 1     who participated in it?  And that inquiry was stopped and there was no

 2     follow-up.  So the assertion by the Defence that they could not be

 3     identified has no merit, particularly because no efforts were made to

 4     identify them as was the requirement of the law.

 5             There is a lot of submissions in respect of the Skorpions about

 6     Trajkovic being effectively responsible for the reservists.  Many of

 7     these submissions the Court will, no doubt, look at the references and

 8     assess them for what they are, but the Prosecution does not deny, even

 9     though the Defence in its -- in making many of their references, are

10     quite wrong.  But Trajkovic was the commander of the reservists and was

11     responsible for their actions.  We accept that, but Trajkovic himself

12     said that he reported to Mr. -- he was the direct subordinate of

13     Mr. Djordjevic.

14             Mr. Vasiljevic's evidence in regard to the paramilitaries

15     generally and the Skorpions in particular is of significant importance in

16     this case, especially when the Court considers questions as to why men of

17     this quality should be incorporated into a police force.  And so, of

18     course, the Defence sought to attack his evidence, one means being at

19     paragraph 506 where they say that his evidence in regard to the

20     information that he got on the paramilitaries operating in Kosovo was

21     preliminary and unconfirmed.  They say that Mr. -- or they tried to

22     impugn his credibility when they say that he denied the facts contained

23     in D210, a report of the security administration of the Supreme Command

24     Staff.  Well, he did deny or did not -- or refused to accept the facts in

25     that document, but this does not make him an unreliable witness.  In

Page 14422

 1     fact, it demonstrates that the report itself was unreliable and its

 2     authenticity questionable.  If we review the record at transcript 5913,

 3     we'll see it clear from the intervention of the Presiding Judge that the

 4     doubts about the authenticity of D210 was clearly raised by the witness.

 5     The Prosecution submits that Mr. -- General Vasiljevic's credibility

 6     could not be rationally impugned on the basis of his refusal to accept

 7     that document.

 8             Various other claims are made about Mr. Vasiljevic, one of them,

 9     the last one which I'll address, is the claim made by the Defence that

10     all - and they say all - the evidence provided by Mr. Vasiljevic

11     concerning crimes and paramilitary units was preliminary and unconfirmed.

12     And the reference that the Defence makes in its trial brief is to

13     transcript 5897, and that does not support the Defence assertion that

14     Mr. Vasiljevic's information was unconfirmed.

15             As a matter of fact, Your Honours, Mr. Vasiljevic actually

16     rejected the Defence proposition that these were preliminary reports and

17     said that the reports and information he received was not initial

18     information and what -- and he received reports in great detail about the

19     operations of these paramilitary units, which is a natural thing.  He's a

20     chief or the deputy chief of the security administration in the VJ.  They

21     are in operations.  He would be expected to know in detail about the

22     movements and the operations of other armed paramilitary groups in the

23     area where the VJ was.  So even in terms of logic, in addition to the

24     evidence, General Djordjevic -- General Vasiljevic's evidence is reliable

25     and credible, it is submitted.

Page 14423

 1             The Defence at paragraphs 512 to 514 seem to argue that there

 2     were no paramilitary units in Kosovo during the war.  This is probably a

 3     misunderstanding because that is completely and wholly contrary to the

 4     evidence.  I won't deal with that any further.

 5             The Defence argues in its closing brief at paragraphs 605 to 608

 6     that the arming of civilians was done in an undiscriminatory way in

 7     compliance with the Law on Defence.  The Prosecution submits that this

 8     was not unmeritorious.  The arming was done along ethnic lines.  During

 9     1998 and 1999 the MUP and VJ covertly armed over 600.000 [sic]

10     non-Albanian citizens from local villages and towns, and they referred

11     to, quite specifically, many of the documents referred to them as

12     non-Siptar population.  And without further ado, I would just submit that

13     this is -- -- and the number is 60.000, not 600.000.  60.000 men,

14     civilians, sorry, were armed and these were of Serbian ethnicity.  This

15     would be a very, very high proportion of the Serbian population in

16     Kosovo.

17             And Mr. Cvetic, SUP chief at 6719 and Mr. Djakovic, VJ general at

18     8139, confirmed that the ethnic Albanians were excluded from these RPOs.

19             Defence argument, again at paragraph 609 of the brief, is that

20     there is no evidence whatever that Mr. Djordjevic had any knowledge or

21     that he received any information about the engagement of the armed and

22     non-Albanian population in 1999.  They say that there is no evidence

23     whatever that he knew about these armed persons.  I submit, Your Honours,

24     that he clearly knew about the policy in 1999 and of the plans to use

25     them.  I'd ask the Court to look briefly at P85.  I used the document

Page 14424

 1     earlier.  It's one of the important documents of the case.  This is the

 2     17th of February meeting, 17th of February, 1999, meeting, at the stage

 3     where operations that would lead to all of these murders and all of these

 4     expulsions were planned and being discussed.

 5             Mr. Lukic reported in Mr. Djordjevic's presence that RPOs in

 6     nearly all villages inhabited by Serbs:

 7             "RPOs in all villages inhabited by Serbs are very active.

 8     Meetings have been held with all the RPOs and they were attended by

 9     General Stojanovic and Lieutenant-Colonel Blagoje Pesic.  Their work and

10     engagement have been assessed as good."

11             JUDGE PARKER:  Is that a convenient time, Mr. Stamp?

12             MR. STAMP:  Yes, Your Honour, it is.

13             JUDGE PARKER:  We'll adjourn and resume at five minutes past

14     1.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.04 p.m.

17             JUDGE PARKER:  Yes, Mr. Stamp.

18             MR. STAMP:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             Moving on to the defence's submission in respect to the

20     Joint Command at paragraphs 298 and 299 and elsewhere in the brief, they

21     assert that the Joint Command was just a series of information sharing

22     meetings that no orders could be given at Joint Command meetings and that

23     it did not continue to exist after October 1998.  The Defence's position

24     is fundamentally inconsistent with the extent of evidence detailing the

25     Joint Command's existence and actions in both 1998 and 1999, and this is

Page 14425

 1     addressed at length by the Prosecution in its brief at paragraphs 267 to

 2     311.  And one specific allegation of the Defence that there were

 3     different participation -- because there were different participants at

 4     each meeting indicates that there were people simply exchanging

 5     information from the ground.  This is at paragraph 299 of the brief.

 6     Ignores the fact that it is easily discernible from the Joint Command

 7     minutes that there were core members that attended most meetings or

 8     virtually every meeting to the point that if one of them did not attend

 9     the absence would be specifically recorded in the minutes.  So the fact

10     that other persons participated does not negate the fact that this was a

11     command structure.

12             The Defence argues that - and this is in paragraph 22 of its

13     brief - that the Joint Command is left as the only source of action of

14     the alleged joint criminal enterprise.  This is elaborated upon further

15     in paragraph 297 of the brief where they say that by abandoning the

16     theory of the Supreme Defence Council commanding all forces in executing

17     the alleged plan, this modification leaves the so-called Joint Command as

18     a main source of charged plurality of an alleged joint criminal

19     enterprise.  This is not correct.  And I invite the Court to refer to

20     paragraphs 20 to 25 of the indictment, particularly paragraph 20, which

21     sets out the leading members of the JCE.  The Supreme Defence Council and

22     the Joint Command are two of the organisations, two of the instruments or

23     command structures that were used to effect the JCE, but the plurality,

24     if one can call it that, or the membership of the JCE is set out in

25     paragraph 20 of the indictment.  And the members of the Joint Command use

Page 14426

 1     several command bodies as instruments to effect the JCE.

 2             Now in this trial some of these command bodies are more or less

 3     relevant to the liability of the accused.  The SDC which we haven't led

 4     much evidence on is more relevant to the liability of political accused

 5     and the chief of the VJ who are not before the Court.  But the

 6     Prosecution does not abandon any theory in respect to the SDC.

 7             In respect to the crime base evidence, the Defence at

 8     paragraph 686 seems to challenge the evidence of [indiscernible], the

 9     UNHCR regarding the number of refugees and the fact that he said the vast

10     majority of the refugees were Albanians.  They say that his numbers are

11     confusing because in his final summary, P734, he refers to 896.000

12     refugees and that does not match up with the cumulative estimate of

13     780.000 refugees of 10 June 1999.

14             The Prosecution does not dispute that this -- there is a

15     difference here, but there can be no real dispute that approximately

16     800.000 Albanians left Kosovo from the 24th of March to the 10th of June,

17     1999.  In addition to the UNHCR's number, the MUP's own reporting shows

18     similar numbers and also shows that the refugees were Albanian.  On the

19     1st of May, 1999, over a month before the end of the NATO intervention,

20     it was reported in P694, and is a MUP report, that 715.158 persons

21     "belonging to the Siptar national minority" had left the territory of

22     Kosovo and Metohija.  And this is the figure to the end of April 1999.

23     So the figures are more or less consistent between the UNHCR and the

24     Defence document and the Defence document also accepts that these were

25     Kosovo Albanians.

Page 14427

 1             The Defence generally in respect to the crime base, they argue

 2     many places in their brief but primarily from paragraphs 669 and

 3     thereafter that the crime base witnesses could not identify the

 4     perpetrators of the crime against them.  Specifically we had translation

 5     difficulties in court where the witnesses identified colours.  Some

 6     witnesses said they saw "milicija" on police uniforms, but "milicija" was

 7     no longer on uniforms.  Many witnesses describe the forces as wearing

 8     green; however, this isn't sufficient because some KLA units wore green.

 9     Many people described the MUP as wearing ribbons, but the MUP changed the

10     ribbon colours according to the schedule each day, and some witnesses'

11     description of the ribbons did not correspond with the schedule.

12             It is submitted, Your Honours, that there can be no serious

13     question that the crime-base witnesses knew the Serb forces; namely, the

14     VJ soldier, the MUP policemen, the paramilitaries, and the armed Serb

15     civilians, they knew about the crimes that were being committed against

16     them.  There is a difference, Your Honour.  It might well be said that a

17     witness might not be able to identify an individual because of the

18     circumstances in which an event occurred, but this is not a matter of

19     identifying an individual.  It's identifying a group of persons and it is

20     submitted that it is not a sequence -- a commendable or a meritorious

21     submission to say that Kosovar Albanians could not tell the difference

22     between police and soldiers and could not tell the difference between

23     police and armed Serb civilians.  These crimes, Your Honours, were

24     committed in broad daylight, most of them, and the civilian witnesses

25     were in the presence of these perpetrators for significant periods of

Page 14428

 1     time before they were expelled from their homes.  So it is submitted that

 2     these Kosovar Albanians would have seen policemen in their municipalities

 3     and villages and knew what policemen looked like, knew what they wore.

 4             And we have detailed -- in our closing brief, in respect to each

 5     individual crime site, the documentary evidence, much of these from the

 6     VJ, that corroborates these witnesses showing that VJ and MUP forces were

 7     indeed deployed and present in these areas conducting operations at the

 8     relevant time.  And again, Your Honours, it is submitted that it is a

 9     non-commendable argument to suggest that Kosovar Albanians civilians in

10     being expelled from their homes would not know the difference between the

11     KLA and a Serb soldier or policeman.

12             The Defence at paragraph 708, paragraph 70 -- well, 720 made the

13     general argument that people left because of fear of NATO bombing.

14     People left because of fighting between the force and the KLA, but not

15     because of the acts of the Serb forces.  Without going into the evidence,

16     the submission very quickly is that the witnesses consistently referring

17     to themselves and a whole class of people, their villages, everybody were

18     leaving, they were consistent in saying that they left because they were

19     forced out, they were expelled and they feared for their lives because

20     they were aware of persons being murdered and otherwise abused.  These

21     witnesses were from different parts of Kosovo, they had different

22     backgrounds, and in most cases they didn't know each other.  The only

23     thing in common, Your Honour, was their expulsion, the confiscation of

24     their ID cards, and other indicia which we have discussed in the final

25     trial brief in the section on the patterns of the crime.

Page 14429

 1             In their final trial brief, Your Honour, the Defence addressed

 2     each crime site in turn, and in the section the Prosecution has noted

 3     that in some circumstances they misstate or mis-characterise the evidence

 4     of the witness and they often make claims without any supporting

 5     evidence.

 6             It is not possible at this stage to go through all of them.  I

 7     just ask the Court to exercise caution in -- as I believe the Court will

 8     in reviewing the evidence which is referred to.

 9             I have some examples to highlight which are not exhaustive, and

10     even of these examples I will not go through all of them.  For example,

11     in respect to Pristina, the Defence brief states at paragraph 817 that

12     K14 only left Kolevice having been forced to do so by unidentified

13     persons, that is, after her brother spoke to unidentified men at the door

14     of the place in which they lived.  They decided it was dangerous for them

15     to stay.  That is not a proper characterisation of the evidence.  She

16     said uniformed policemen and soldiers came to their home and told them to

17     leave, and they did as they were told.  This is at 8993 of her transcript

18     and P1325, which is her statement.  The Defence in respect to Pristina

19     and in respect to Bala, the witness Bala, they state in paragraph 813

20     that the identifications of Bala and her family were not taken at any

21     point in time.  And the purpose of this submission is to dilute the

22     evidence in respect to the confiscation of IDs, and it is misleading

23     because Bala directly observed Serb forces taking and destroying

24     Albanians' identification.

25             They were asked, it was Bala's testimony, and this is in P41 of

Page 14430

 1     her statement and at transcript T2344, they were asked for their IDs, but

 2     they did not have them and they told that to the Serb forces.  And

 3     because there were hundreds or thousands of people, the Serb forces did

 4     not continue or force them to give up their IDs.  If I may re-read this.

 5     Because there were so many people there, the Serb forces did not continue

 6     asking for everyone's IDs.

 7             In respect to Suva Reka -- and I indicate to the Court that this

 8     is not even close to the amount of mis-characterisations the Prosecution

 9     submits exist, but I just move on quickly to Suva Reka, which is the

10     place of the Berisha family massacre.

11             At paragraph 770 the Defence says, if I may -- I'll move on from

12     this one because I cannot find the correct cite, but I think the Defence

13     in respect to Podujevo -- in respect to Suva Reka, yes, the second

14     paragraph -- the second sentence of the paragraph of 770 the Defence

15     said:

16             "According to 62, the whole town, the whole town of Suva Reka was

17     in the hands of the KLA ."

18             They don't cite to where and when 62 is supposed to have said

19     this.  No citation of the record is made.  And this is contrary to the

20     evidence of Hysni Berisha, Halit Berisha, K83, Shyhrete Berisha, who were

21     living in the town at the time.  K83 was, in fact, a policeman who

22     witnessed a murder at Suva Reka.  So this is an unsupported statement

23     about what was happening in Suva Reka.  The KLA were not operating there.

24     There was some KLA presence 2 or 3 kilometres away from Suva Reka town;

25     namely, on the right side of the road to Prizren in the village of

Page 14431

 1     Dobrodeljane and Semetiste and on the road to Restane about 2 kilometres

 2     from the town.

 3             So that statement is not correct, and in any case it would not --

 4     well, it boggles the mind to see how that would explain the massacre.

 5             Paragraph 773, the submission is that the Suva Reka incident was

 6     an incident in fact involving individuals acting for personal reasons.

 7     Well, this is an argument that the Prosecution submits that this defies

 8     logic, that this killing could be simply personal reasons.  Having regard

 9     to the number of policemen present and participating in the event in the

10     middle of the town that day, it's clear that the Berisha murders were

11     preplanned.  The evidence of the police K83 directly indicates that when

12     he arrived back at the police station he was sent off to join the others

13     or other policemen who were committing the murders.

14             And shortly after the massacre occurred, the mayor of the town

15     Boban Vuksanevic [phoen], arrived with a truck to remove the bodies and

16     this indicates that they must have known about or known in advance about

17     the massacre.  And we also have the policeman Velickovic whose evidence

18     was that after the killings there was an order that came down from

19     Belgrade to stop it, the killings should stop it, and they should just

20     expel the Kosovar Albanians.

21             The Defence argument in respect to Milos Gilic, this is not a

22     mis-characterisation; it's an argument which we submit lacks logic.  They

23     argue at 841 that Dren Caka, being only 10 year's time, was not able to

24     identify the forces, could not say -- or the Court should not accept his

25     testimony in respect to who committed the massacre.  He, Your Honour, if

Page 14432

 1     you review his testimony and I respectfully ask that you do so, he could

 2     describe the uniforms or the police who came to Vesa's house on the night

 3     of the 1st of April.  He could describe -- he could identify the uniforms

 4     on the Exhibit 1301 which was a photo-board of police uniforms with

 5     police uniforms and other uniforms.  And he identified photos 913, 14,

 6     and other photos, quite properly police uniforms.

 7             And when the Defence showed him different patterns of uniforms,

 8     he could identify, and this is D360, they showed him that and he could

 9     identify the blue uniforms worn by the police.  And he has been

10     consistent.  We -- he was young at the time, but this was a situation

11     where he was with his family and there is no issue that he could not see

12     who the perpetrators were and -- in that town where he lived did not know

13     policemen and could not, as a class as a group of people, tell who

14     policemen were.  Even if he could not see or identify an individual, but

15     he would know who policemen were.

16             And he has been very consistent in his testimony as to who the

17     perpetrators were in both testimonies -- in previous testimonies and also

18     in the video that was filmed when he was in a field hospital in April

19     1999 in Albania just days after the massacre.  That's P1302 which was

20     shown in the course of the evidence.

21             In respect to Djakovica, the Defence claims that at paragraph 813

22     that Lizane Malaj who was also in Korenica testified that those in mixed

23     uniforms told them to go to Albania; however, the next day Aco Mucinovic

24     [phoen], an officer of the MUP, returned the civilians to their village.

25     This shows that there was no plan to deport or forcibly transfer and

Page 14433

 1     certainly none involving the MUP.  This is, it is submitted, misleading.

 2     If one reviews her evidence at transcript 809 to 818 and 830 to 832 and

 3     865, her evidence was that on the 4th of April the police expelled her,

 4     her family, and other families from Korenica and they all left in a

 5     convoy.  She agreed, accepted, that they were later ordered back to

 6     Korenica.  But the Defence ignores her testimony that on the 27th of

 7     April about 35 men, some wearing blue camouflage, others wearing green

 8     camouflage, and others wearing mask, entered her courtyard, robbed the

 9     people, separated out the men, and ordered her and the rest of her family

10     to walk to Albania.  Some of these men were shot and their bodies later

11     found at a police base in Batajnica later on.  And the fact that the

12     bodies, Your Honours, are found at a police base and part of this police

13     cover-up, indicates that it was policemen who did the shooting of these

14     men.

15             So that is to clarify the -- what is said about her evidence.

16     And if I may just make one quick point here in this regard.  The

17     Prosecution does not say that every senior policeman or police or soldier

18     in Kosovo was a participant.  So the fact that somebody might have

19     assisted some of these refugees.  For example, Nike Peraj, one of the

20     Prosecution witnesses, a soldier testified that when he went up the

21     valley there were so many killings going on that he was able, along with

22     some other police officers, to stop some of the murders.  So we don't say

23     that it is impossible that on occasions some police officers and some

24     members of the army were repelled by what was happening and acted to stop

25     it when they could.  So the fact that they were sent home at one point in

Page 14434

 1     time does not negate the evidence in support of a plan.

 2             And the Defence states that at 753 in respect to Prizren, that

 3     Latifi's testimony shows that he voluntarily left for Albania and was not

 4     deported or forcibly transferred.  Further, his documents were not taken

 5     at any point.  Your Honours, Latifi clearly said that the chief of police

 6     of Prizren ordered all the local residents to leave and go to Albania.

 7     He clearly states that the people were expelled and this is in his

 8     statement page 38 and it's P779.  He also said -- statement that at the

 9     border crossing their documents were taken away.  What he said is that he

10     managed to hide his driver's licence, but all the other documents were

11     taken away.  So they -- the evidence is completely contrary to the

12     submission that he left voluntarily.  Defence makes claims in respect to

13     Witness Krasniqi in respect to the same site, Prizren, that his documents

14     were not confiscated, and this is at paragraph 755 of their brief.  He

15     did say, Your Honours, that he did not personally give up his documents,

16     but his evidence was that at the check-points along the way to the

17     Albanian border the police were confiscating the documents of many

18     people.  So his evidence should be looked at in that context.

19             Your Honours, I have come to the end of the submissions I have to

20     make.  As I indicated, there are materials that the Prosecution could

21     address you on further; however, the Prosecution believes that the Court

22     is fully seized of this matter and is satisfied in leaving the matters in

23     the hands of the Court for your consideration.  The Prosecution submits

24     that having regard to the evidence heard, all the evidence heard in this

25     case, the Court has enough evidence before it to make a safe and sure

Page 14435

 1     finding beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty, both under

 2     Articles 7(1) and Article 7(3), on all counts of the indictment as

 3     alleged.

 4             Thank you very much, Your Honours, for your patience.  May it

 5     please you.

 6             JUDGE PARKER:  Thank you, Mr. Stamp.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE PARKER:  We will adjourn now to resume tomorrow at 9.00 to

 9     hear the Defence closing submissions.  I never see you there, you're

10     behind the television screens, Mr. Djordjevic.

11             We will resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.34 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of

14                           July, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.